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Title of Thesis — Titre de la thèse

Saints or Sinners: A Selective and
Political Study of Certain Non-State
Terrorists.

University — Université

University of Alberta

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

Ph.d.

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1979

Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de thèse

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SAINTS OR SINNERS: A SELECTIVE AND POLITICAL
STUDY OF CERTAIN NON-STATE TERRORISTS

by



FRANCES CRUCHLEY ADAM

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1979

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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DEDICATION

To Mohamed, Sikander and Jameel.

ABSTRACT

In this synoptic comparative study six non-state political terrorist groups active since the late 1960's are examined. They are evaluated within a perspective which first discusses the evolution of the terrorist option in politics both historically and typologically. Next the difficulties inherent in defining 'political terrorism' are considered, whilst recognizing the problems of the 'legality' or 'morality' often underlying definitions of state and non-state terror.

For the purpose of facilitating discussion and comparison the non-state terrorist groups are dealt with under two categories. The three more domestically focused groups the Tupamaros, the Front de libération du Québec and the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army are considered first. Then the more internationally oriented Red Army of Japan, Red Army Faction of Germany and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine are introduced. The growth and development of each movement is detailed, then each is assessed according to similar criteria of achievement. These criteria include the attainment of political goals, group survivability in the face of militant opposition, publicity, the acquisition of funds, freeing of comrades, weakening the state and redressing grievances real or imagined.

Although this research is focused on the non-state terrorist, his actions must be considered within a framework which includes how the states being besieged respond to him. Throughout the discussion of the histories and motivations of these groups the role of states in controlling or influencing such actions is considered. As well there is a

separate chapter which compares the responses of the various states.

The discussion concludes by arguing that there is far too much general fear of non-state terrorism. Terrorism is very much a part of politics and has a rich history. Although there is perhaps more non-state terrorism today than at any previous time, most of it is not threatening to a state. Both domestically-based terrorists with weak international ties like the Tupamaros and the FLQ, and internationally aligned groups with abstract goals like the German and Japanese Red Armies, are categories of non-state terrorists who can be quite successfully curbed by states using a minimum of force. Only the minority of terrorist groups who seek an uncompromising domestic goal through international as well as domestic acts of unbridled terror pose a formidable challenge to governments world-wide. Yet even such groups as the PFLP and Provisionals have not caused as much death and destruction as has occurred through other types of violence and disasters. Non-state terrorism, while it poses a problem for many governments, should not be viewed as an uncontrollable threat to world stability nor should the responses to it inspire a terror spiral.

PREFACE

In undertaking this study of non-state terrorism it was apparent that terrorism is a practise accessible both to those in power and those out of power and even though this research is confined to non-state terrorism it does not deny the power and efficacy of state terror. Because it would have been too unwieldy to deal with both state and non-state terrorism, and all the ramifications inherent in trying to establish who fired the first volley, this discussion arbitrarily opted to focus on the phenomenon of non-state terrorism. Nothing said or implied in this study is meant to condemn or condone the actions undertaken by the various governments which were involved with the six non-state terrorist groups. Their decisions and policies have been reported only in order to explain as fully as possible the atmosphere in which such terrorist activities took place. It would be unfair to all those states involved to pass judgment on their actions within the framework of this necessarily restricted focus.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Leslie C. Green, of the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta for his accessibility at all times and his critical comments. Many other members of the Department were also very helpful, in particular Dr. Donald Carmichael, Professor J. Paul Johnston and Ms. Myrna Garanis, former departmental librarian, who provided invaluable assistance in locating books and articles. Special thanks are due to my parents who encouraged me and provided help in areas as varied as babysitting and sorting through stacks of newspapers, to my sons for being patient when mummy was 'working on her thesis', and to my husband who supported me both emotionally and financially, and was always prepared to offer informed comments.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a matter of flesh and blood.¹

On numerous occasions over the past decade both the domestic affairs of individual nations and the political relationships among states have been shaped, in rather striking fashion, by the activities of organized groups of radical political activists, many of whom are popularly termed 'terrorists'.² On most of these occasions such groups have attempted to draw attention to their particular political cause or grievance through the use of violent tactics that are designed and executed to shock an indifferent public into an awareness of their plight, a type of 'propaganda by the deed';³ to force unrelenting political leaders to make decisions or to implement policies desired by the terrorist group;⁴ or to achieve autonomy or independence for a specific minority or colonial group.⁵ As violence and terrorism have become stock-in-trade elements in this form of pressure group politics, the type of tactics employed has become ever more dramatic and spectacular in the hope of achieving particular short and long term goals. The news media give front-page coverage to a continuing sequence of hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, guerrilla attacks on communities, bombings, and other acts of terror and sabotage.

In so doing they create an impression that terrorism is a novelty of the post-World War II world, a virulent plague about to destroy society as it is known by those who live in Western democracies.⁶ Yet terrorism is as ancient a practise as any in politics where the

spoils for the victorious are immeasurable. Despite the rather naive assumptions that democratic governments are pure and good, recent revelations in Canada, the United States and Israel attest to the willingness of governments to break their own rules in order the better to terrorize their enemies.⁷

This discussion does not deal with state terrorism, focusing rather on the terrorism of non-state outgroups desirous, in all cases under study, of overthrowing the governments of those in power. Because post-1960's terrorism is almost exclusively viewed as a threat to the viability of democratic societies public interest has focused on whether or not such groups have been able to gain political power for themselves. In so doing a mistake has been made, for there are also other relevant criteria for assessing such groups. Among such measures this study has included the publicity generated for the terrorists 'cause', whether or not comrades have been freed and money and weapons secured; if support for the authorities has been eroded; and if the terrorists have been able to force some changes or compromises on the part of the government. By applying such criteria to several terrorist groups the following analysis hopefully will underline the contention that non-state terrorism, whilst it presents a serious challenge to any administration, is only rarely the destructive menace the public is so often led to believe.

In fact, the achievements of such groups over the last decade have been minimal. But because of the widespread media coverage focusing on such incidents,⁸ persons distant from the locations in which such activities occur and removed from the conditions which underlie these conflicts have become, for some time, involuntary witnesses to, and even on occasion victims of, these struggles.⁹ Bearing this situation in mind

it seems reasonable to enquire how the concept of terrorism has evolved over the centuries, what functions it served historically, how its meaning is interpreted today, and its utility as a weapon of protest in the modern world.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary¹⁰ the term 'terror', long associated with certain murderous behaviors during the "Reign of Terror" in revolutionary France, now commonly means the state of being greatly frightened; the quality or action of causing dread or fear; or a state of things in which the general community lives in dread of death or outrage. 'Terrorism' is government by intimidation; or policies or methods designed to intimidate those against whom they are adopted. A 'terrorist' is any person who attempts to further his views by means of coercive intimidation; or anyone who professes, or tries to awaken or spread a feeling of dread or alarm. Such terror can be practised by any individual, group or nation capable of convincing its opponents of its competence to deliver such violence. The objective to be achieved through the employment of such terror may be purely criminal, religious, socioeconomic, psychological or political; or any combination of these.

Criminal terrorism is a means to personal enrichment for individuals and groups as varied as Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic for thirty-one years, and the Mafia.¹¹ Religious terror covers the gamut from the legendary savagery of the Spanish Inquisition,¹² recreated on a much smaller scale by the witchhunts against Jehovah's Witnesses in various parts of the world today;¹³ through the internecine feuding of the Sons of Freedom Doukhabors;¹⁴ to the 'mind control' purported to be practised by certain cults on their members.¹⁵ Charges of economic terror have been laid by company

managements and governments against what they see as the excessive wage demands and/or strike tactics of labour unions on the one hand, and the price-fixing and 'blackmail' of some producers' cartels on the other. At the same time employees often accuse management of using terror tactics to prevent union-organizing or to break strikes; and nations dependent for their income on their production of raw materials accuse the industrialized importers of using economic terrorism against them in the forms of tariff barriers, low commodity prices, and demands for certain postures on international issues in return for economic benefits.¹⁶

Psychological terrorism features in criminal, religious and socio-economic terrorism and is also prominent as a component of political terrorism. The type of terrorist act selected; the taking or not taking of hostages, and the determination of their fates; the setting and extending of deadlines on negotiations; the variety of demands made; whether or not the terrorists make an appeal for public sympathy; and the media's response to the terrorist act are all influenced by psychological as well as political considerations.

In this discussion with its primary focus on selected contemporary acts of non-state terrorism the vagueness of the Oxford Dictionary definition is readily apparent. Only acts with manifestly political motivations and consequences are included although it is recognized that elements of the other types of terrorism are intertwined in such incidents. Moreover, in all cases under study the ultimate political objective has been the seizure of political power. Although political goals may be less all-encompassing than such an objective it was felt that analyzing groups with similar objectives, no matter how unrealistic these might

prove in practise, would provide opportunities for comparison.

The decision to restrict the study's parameters to post-1960's incidents of non-state terrorism is a strictly arbitrary one, in no way denying the importance of the large and varied history of political terrorism prior to that date. But because the concept of political terrorism touches on the whole recorded history of mankind it is impossible to consider it in any great detail without severely restricting one's primary area of focus. However, Chapter 2 is included to provide a general, albeit brief, discussion on the historical development of the three most prominent forms of political terrorism - assassination, the mass terror of states, and the terrorism of outgroups. Although assassination was historically the most universally practised terrorist form it now most often is a tactic of state or non-state terrorism.

States and outgroups comprise the two very broad categories of political terrorist 'actors'. States, that is the individual members of government administrations - agents of the states - acting either independently or through an agreed upon policy, can carry out terrorist acts against individual persons or groups both within their own boundaries and abroad.¹⁷ These target individuals or groups may or may not be opponents, violent or otherwise, of the regime; and may or may not be citizens of the state in question.¹⁸ Further, states can also practise terrorism against other states, either during wartime or peacetime.¹⁹ When such practises are confined to one's own nationals, within one's own country they are acts of internal terrorism. Directed against other nations, their nationals, or one's own nationals abroad, thus involving the 'peace' of a third state, they become acts of international terrorism.

Non-states, that is individuals and groups not acting at the behest

of the government comprise the second category of political terrorist actors. This grouping has several sub-divisions ranging from the completely lone assassin,²⁰ through the small, fragmented and shortlived cell,²¹ to the highly organized, disciplined and long-functioning terrorist organization.²² As with states, such terrorist actors can challenge individuals, groups or governments, either at home or abroad. Whereas states usually use terrorism to maintain the status quo, the goals of non-state terrorists can be as dissimilar as the mere overthrow of a dictator,²³ national liberation,²⁴ or world revolution.²⁵ Incidents committed by nationals in their own country, and against their own fellow citizens are internal terrorist acts. Those involving foreign hostages, victims or targets, or incidents against the representatives of one's own government abroad are all international terrorist acts.

This discussion is focused on certain non-state political terrorists who have, or had, established some staying power, either in the national or international arenas. This decision reflects both the previously mentioned limitations of time and space and a recognition that it is easier to identify and catalogue incidents of non-state terrorism. Although not condoning the use of terrorism by states it must be appreciated that it is difficult adequately to define state terrorism, particularly if such acts are confined to internal incidents.

L. C. Green has underscored the centrality of a concept such as 'national sovereignty' to discussions of state terrorism and state terrorist actors.

.... Despite all the pressures for consolidation of power and towards internationalization and supra-national federalism, national sovereignty is still of major significance and international law still recognizes that every country has the

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right to select its own governmental form, to control its own domestic affairs and, within sharply defined and narrow limitations, deal with its own nationals at will.²⁶

Because a challenge to the authority, and sometimes even the legitimacy, of a state is often apparent in acts of non-state terrorism, the outgroup terrorists must struggle to overcome an almost automatic, unquestioning bias against those who would usurp the powers that be. Yet in spite of this serious handicap, and the belief that nearly all the important struggles for national or popular liberation were resolved by the mid-1960's, non-state terrorism appears to be on the rise. Such divergent factors as the popular media; the instant telecommunications available nearly everywhere in the world; the new, mobile, and easily operational weapons of destruction; and the large number of highly vulnerable targets for hijackers, blackmailers and saboteurs contribute to making terrorism accessible to, and profitable for, even the smallest fringe groups.²⁷

In such cases it may be viewed more as a weapon of protest than as a weapon of conquest. This partially explains why the terrorist option has become so contagious. But each group which selects terrorism as a means towards its goal does so in relation to its view of specific circumstances and conditions; and these are presented individually when the particular groups under study are discussed.

Returning to the three sub-categories of non-state terrorists it would appear that the individual terrorist has nearly always been an assassin; and even the most 'successful' assassin has rarely changed much more than the person of the individual office-holder.²⁸ The assassin has limited control over events and people. Therefore, although discussed with reference to the evolution of terrorism, he is not considered within the framework of modern terrorism. Nor has there been

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included the myriad of fragmented, short-lived groups, such as the Angry Brigades in the United Kingdom and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States, which burst violently into the public conscience for a short time.

Instead, the focus is on a cross-section of fairly well-organized and long-functioning terrorist groups, reflecting differing emphases on tactics and goals. Although the activities of these groups might be defined as either 'defensive' or 'offensive' terrorism,²⁹ they all share an antipathy to the governments in power in their theatres of operation; and all are motivated to replace such governments. Six non-state terrorist groups have been selected for study. All have become well-known throughout the world because of their highly publicized terrorist actions.

Uruguay's Movimiento de liberacion nacional, the MLN or Tupamaros; Canada's Front de liberation du Québec, the FLQ; and Northern Ireland's Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, the Provos or PIRA are introduced and discussed in chapters 4 and 5. These three groups reflect socioeconomic, nationalist and religious aspirations confined, for the most part, to the national arena. Each has been involved in at least one international terrorist incident but they all tend generally to be associated with actions in their native territories.

Japan's Sekigunha, Red Army or JRA; the Federal Republic of Germany's Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF; and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP, are all examined within an international framework in chapters 6 and 7.³⁰ These latter three groups are also representative of the close contacts which some international terrorist movements now enjoy; and some of the incidents to be discussed with reference to them were cooperative ventures.

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The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the historical development and growth of the three most prevalent terrorist styles; individual assassination, mass terror by states and partisan terror; as well as their acceptance by the public. Chapter 3 considers the important definitional problems of what is and is not political terrorism. Although what is 'legal' and what is 'just' are not necessarily congruent, one cannot fail to appreciate how important it is for the public image of both nations and opposition movements that their violence not be classified as 'terrorism' but rather as legitimate self-defense.

A similar format is adopted for the discussion of the two types of non-state terrorist groups discussed in chapters 4 through 7. First, the nationally oriented movements are introduced and their individual histories sketched. Then they are compared on several criteria of political achievements and motivations set out in articles by Hakon Wiberg and Andrew Pierre.³¹ The same is then done for the three internationally oriented groups. Chapter 8 contrasts the responses to such acts of terrorism by those being besieged, and their allies, and those on the offensive, and their supporters, by considering selected national and international policies on the control of terrorism.

The conclusion, chapter 9, evaluates the costs and benefits of the terrorist option for the non-state political actor within both national and international settings. It is maintained that there is perhaps too much fear of most non-state terrorism. Various democracies have proved themselves quite capable of not only responding to, but overcoming their terrorist problem through a combination of the introduction of special police powers to meet the emergency combined with a willingness,

by at least some vocal elements of the population, to consider the complaints, if not the violence, of the terrorists. There is, however, a certain type of terrorist, the rejectionist, who presents a difficult challenge to a besieged state. This type of terrorist should be feared not merely for his own actions but also for the responses he inspires in others. For as King Hussein of Jordan said in response to the assassination of his Prime Minister by Black September terrorists, "The tragedy is not death, but the degree to which cowards and subhumans will stoop."³² King Hussein must be very aware of the level to which all sides can sink in a terrorist conflict between the fanatically committed and righteous.

Hopefully, people will learn to distinguish among non-state terrorists and respond variously to them. One of the more interesting points to emerge from the synoptic comparison of the six groups was that not only were their parameters of terrorism differently delineated, but also the cultures within which they operated tolerated greater variant degrees of violent repression of such opposition.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism, (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 15.
2. Such outgroups can be in opposition to a government such as ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatazuna, Basque Country and Freedom) separatists in Spain; or the SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) in the United States. They can be surrogates of governments like the Saiqua guerrillas, a Palestinian group under Syrian control; or they can be operatives of government agencies, such as Israel's Mitvah Elohim. On this little known, but highly successful, 'death squad' see David Tinnin, Hit Team, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976).
3. Such propaganda for the cause may not be directed at winning support or sympathy for the movement, although this is never discouraged; but rather to make the group's capability for bloody violence known, or to create popular anxiety and a desire to have the 'whole mess' resolved quickly and permanently.
4. Such as land or other economic reforms, or voting or other civil rights reforms. An example is the Tupamaros of Uruguay who tried to force the government into granting wage increases to workers. The Tupamaros are discussed in detail in chapter 4.
5. Some authors chide the United States for being against the use of terrorist tactics by groups struggling for autonomy or independence in light of its own violent independence struggle. Edward Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism, (London: Dent, 1975), pp. 183-184. Others hotly contest such views. Martin Clancy, "Rules of Land Warfare during the War of the American Revolution", World Polity, 2 (1960), pp. 203-317.
6. "Under Skull and Crossbone", The Economist, 18 November, 1972.
7. All three nations have been agonizing over certain actions of their security forces in dealing both with subversives and 'would-be' subversives.
8. Hijackings, kidnappings and the like qualify as having vital components of newsworthiness. Johan Galtung's research suggests that only top nations and top people or extremely negative events and people attract large audience interest. "Introduction", Race As News, (Paris: UNESCO, 1974), p. 19.
9. After failing in their attack on an El Al flight at Orly Airport (20 May, 1978), Palestinian terrorists attacked travellers in an España Always departure lounge, killing one person and wounding several others.

10. Oxford English Dictionary, (1933, reprinted 1961). As general as the dictionary's definition of terrorism is, things have not improved greatly, at least in the United Kingdom. In the Terrorists Order: Temporary Provisions Act. Northern Ireland, 1972, terrorism is defined as "the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear". See Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1978, European Court of Human Rights, official text, para. 85).
11. Frederick Hacker is a practising psychiatrist who feels that it is very important to distinguish between the manifestly political terrorist, the 'crusader', and all others, whom he classifies as either 'criminals' or 'crazies'. Hacker contends that criminal terrorists are not rebels, "but conformists, products of the existing order, in which they have a function and within which they make a comfortable living." Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 27. A detailed study of Mafia terror is Gaia Servadio, Mafioso. (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976).
12. Paul Hauben, ed., The Spanish Inquisition, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969). This book examines both the intended and actual consequences of the Inquisition on the Spanish nation and the various groups comprising it.
13. Tony Hodges, Jehovah's Witnesses in Central Africa. Report No. 29. (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1976).
14. Simma Holt, Terror in the Name of God, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964). George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968).
15. Ronald Enroth, Youth, Brainwashing and the Extremist Cults, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1977), especially chapters 8 and 9.
16. Peter Donaldson, Worlds Apart: The Economic Gulf Between Nations, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), especially Part IV. Barbara Ward, The Lopsided World, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968). Don McGillivray, "Arabs Quite Entitled to Make Threats", Edmonton Journal, 8 June, 1979.
17. Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico in 1940 by Soviet operatives. Within the Soviet Union there have been numerous reports of the harassment of dissidents. The treatment meted out to dissidents in psychiatric hospitals may not be physically harsh in all instances but is certainly a highly developed form of psychological terror. "Russia: In the Dark Ages of Psychiatry", The Economist, 8 July, 1972.
18. The massacres of the Armenians were one of history's bloodier examples of genocide until the persecution of Jews, gypsies and other non-Aryans by the Nazis. Robert Hewsen, "'Who Speaks Today of the Armenians'", in Marius Livingston, ed., International

Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 447-453.

19. It is hard to imagine states practising terrorism against each other during peacetime. The activities of the American CIA in Chile during the Allende administration provide but one example. Taylor Branch, "The Letelier Investigation", New York Times Magazine, 16 July, 1978. During wartime, atrocities against civilian targets can be classified as terrorism; two similar examples might be the German bombing of Coventry, and the Allied bombing of Dresden.
20. Such as Sarah Jane Moore, who tried to kill U.S. President Ford, in September, 1975. The lone assassin often driven by personal needs, rarely reflected in rational political goals, is the most difficult terrorist to predict and prepare for.
21. The title 'Symbionese Liberation Army' is a misnomer, the group never comprised more than a handful of members.
22. The Basque terrorists are one of the oldest militant groups in Europe, their roots buried in hundreds of years of Castilian dominance of Spanish political life.
23. Coups and assassinations, particularly in Latin America, rarely change more than the individual incumbents of particular offices. In such cases the new leadership, rather than the general population, becomes the direct beneficiary.
24. Terrorists would appear to be most respectable when fighting for national independence such as the EOKA guerrillas in Cyprus and the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia.
25. World revolution is a fairly recent goal of terrorist groups; associated with 'leftist' terrorists such as Japan's Sekigunha, discussed in chapter 6.
26. L. C. Green, "The Nature and Control of International Terrorism", Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, IV, (1974), p. 135.
27. Most authors are aware of the extent of modern vulnerabilities to terrorism; but few have come up with acceptable remedies. Without the use of airplanes there would be no skyjackings! However, subjecting passengers, personnel and aircraft to hours of intensive searching prior to each departure is not feasible; most people would be opposed to the inconvenience and 'wasted' time. Individual travellers, however, can be more selective as to the air carrier and stopovers. The first skyjacking occurred in Peru in 1931; until the mid-1960's the overwhelming majority of such hijackers were people fleeing either communist Eastern Europe or Castro's Cuba. David Phillips, Skyjack, (London: Harrap, 1973), pp. 19-26, 29.
28. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June, 1914 had numerous, unplanned consequences.

29. Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare. Adelphi Paper No. 79, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971). Groups like the PIRA, FLQ and PFLP all view themselves as 'defensive terrorists' challenging colonialism or occupation. Groups like the Tupamaros, Baader-Meinhof Gang or Sekigunha perceive their struggles as 'offensive terrorism' against corruption in governments, both at home and world-wide. These groups are analyzed in chapters 4 through 7.
30. Each group has also practised internal terrorism although the PFLP, like other Palestinian groups, does not initiate or carry out most of its operations within its own national state. What is held by such groups to be the national boundaries of the state of Palestine is found within the boundaries of other Middle Eastern nations, notably Israel and Jordan. In this sense the PFLP is different from all the other groups considered here, but representative of the nationalist aspirations of peoples like the South Moluccans, who are not discussed here.
31. Hakon Wiberg, "Are Urban Guerrillas Possible?", International Working Conference on Violence and Non-Violent Action in Industrialized Societies, Urban Guerrilla, (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), pp. 18-19. Andrew Pierre, "The Politics of International Terrorism", Orbis, XIX, (1976), pp. 1254-1256.
32. Christopher Dobson, Black September. Its Short, Violent History, London: Robert Hale and Company, 1974).

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORISM

A man who goes forth to kill another whom he does not know must believe only one thing - that by his act he will change the course of history.¹

Whether or not history is changed by terrorism, the salience of such events and actors can be measured in terms of the amount of space allocated to such happenings in contemporary media coverage, popular literature and historical accounts. By such standards it would seem that terrorists have long caught the imagination and interest of people far removed from their struggles both in space and time. Literature has immortalized them,² often the passing of time has made legends of them,³ and victory has, on occasion, vindicated them.⁴ Yet, in spite of the contributions of terrorists, either as 'tyrants' or 'liberators', to a bloody-coloured world history, little scholarly interest was shown in the potential of terrorism as a powerful political instrument until the 1930's. Earlier accounts of ruthless caesars, barbaric conquerors, or fanatical assassins had dealt only indirectly with the application of terrorism for political ends.

One of the first academic articles on terrorism was J.B.S. Hardman's four-page discussion in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.⁵ Hardman limited the term 'terrorism' to purely political acts, and suggested that terror-type tactics used to achieve anything less than full-scale social and political change were not terrorism at all, but 'intimidation'.

Terrorism is a method of combat in the struggle between social groups and forces rather than individuals, and it may take place in any social order. Those who appear on the terroristic scene, whether as protagonists or victims, stand as representatives of social groups or of systems of government. Violence and death are not intended to produce revenue or to terrorize the persons attacked but to cause society or government to take notice of the imminence of large-scale struggles.⁶

Hardman viewed the terrorist act as the harbinger of the mass societal action. Through terrorist acts not only the government, or occupying power, but also the general population was being forewarned that the established authority was no longer secure and unchallenged.⁷ He pointed out, correctly, that for such terrorism to succeed it would not be enough merely to expose the harshness of governmental responses to critics.⁸ Rather, the terrorists would have to win widespread popular support. Acts of terror, by themselves, would never topple regimes; neither could the heroic sacrifices of individuals and groups create a revolution. For not only must many people strongly desire alterations and be willing to struggle, even unto death, to secure such changes; but they must also have the disciplined troops and technological capabilities to achieve these ends. 'Propaganda of the deed' type incidents could be a catalyst for revolutionary guerrilla warfare only if such reservoirs of support were available.⁹

Hardman's focus was on the employment of terrorism as a means of changing governments in power. But he also discussed the phenomenon of 'governmental terror' which he differentiated from outgroup terrorism.

Terror practised by a government in office appears as law enforcement and is directed against the opposition, while terrorism in

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its proper sense, implies open defiance of law and is the means whereby an opposition aims to demoralize a governmental authority, to undermine its power and to initiate a revolution or counter-revolution. While the terrorist party makes no pretense at legality, legitimate government must at least formally adhere to law. In the absence of directly supporting legislation governmental terror is made to appear as justified by a declaration that a state of emergency exists, usually followed by the issuance of special decrees.¹⁰

This semantic differentiation underlines the very enormous powers which state administrations enjoy over their own citizens; powers which they cannot employ against others. As indicated in the Introduction, L.C. Green has stressed that because of this sovereign right, efforts to combat state terrorism are restricted to clearly recognized international incidents. The result is that much of what is state terrorism is rarely publicized or condemned.¹¹

Hardman's discussion highlighted three general types of terrorist activities: individual actions, armed resistance to a government over time, and state terror. Each category is now briefly examined in its historical context. Although only the non-state terrorism of certain outgroups is central to this discussion even a cursory examination of the functionality of assassinations and mass terror cannot but impress one with the realization that terrorist practises are universal in origin and scope. Further, they can sometimes be perceived as noble or essential to one's own or national survival, and therefore 'justifiable'. Assassinations can be a component of the terrorist practises of both states and non-states. The mass terror of some states ought to be remembered when too much paranoia is created over non-state terrorism for mass terror ought to be a major concern for the 1970's.

Assassination and Individual Terror

Men, and women, have been killing each other since before recorded history; and, no doubt, political motivations have been almost as prominent as economic or personal ones.¹² Feliks Gross made just this point in his book on the history and development of assassination as a political tool.

The humanizing effects of democracy and our civilization had an impact on our thinking and perceptions of the past history. It seems that it is almost forgotten that use of violence and assassination, in order to achieve political power, remove an adversary or change a dynasty was a general historical phenomenon for centuries in societies organized into this complex political form of the state. Next to assassination as a means to gain wealth and property, assassination to gain political power seems to be tragically frequent in past history.¹³

Before discussing some of the literature on assassinations, the word 'assassin', because it is such an emotionally-charged term, deserves some extended comment. Its etymology is also fascinating. The term 'assassin' first appeared in European writings of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in reference to a strange Muslim sect, resident in the Levant (Syria) and Persia, which was abhorrent to Christians and the majority of Muslims.¹⁴ The people described were adherents of an offshoot of the minority Shi'a sect within Islam and were called 'Assassini'.¹⁵ Although feared by nearly everyone their sworn enemy was the Sunni Muslim majority, whom they viewed as a corrupt establishment. Their religious mission was to overthrow that establishment. Although the Assassini posed a threat to the Sunnis for several centuries, they were never able to sustain an overt intellectual or political opposition to the powerful Sunni faith. Over time the

religious beliefs of the less affluent Assassini acquired ever more mystical qualities and millenarian traits; characteristics associated throughout history with cults of the dispossessed, underprivileged and unstable.¹⁶

Small in numbers, and weak militarily, the Assassini adopted the policy of murdering supposedly well-protected social, political and religious leaders as their weapon of protest and terror. Although they ultimately failed in their quest to change the Sunni dominated society, the undercurrent of messianic hope and revolutionary violence which sustained them has found many imitators throughout history. The Assassini predated many other sects in reshaping and redirecting the rage, desires and beliefs of the discontented into an ideology and organization which, Bernard Lewis believed, "in cohesion, discipline and purposive violence has had no parallel before or after."¹⁷ Without precedent in their "planned, systematic and long term use of terror as a political weapon" Lewis maintained that they may have well been the first 'terrorists'.¹⁸

Although the predominant meaning of 'assassins' today is that of "secret murderers of a peculiarly skilful and dangerous kind",¹⁹ what originally impressed both Muslim and European observers about the Assassini was their fanatical devotion to their cause, rather than their bloody deeds.²⁰ This absolute commitment was reflected in the willingness of the individual assassin to die himself in order to effect his goal. To survive a mission was even considered shameful.²¹ Some scholars have suggested that this fanaticism was induced by the taking of drugs prior to a mission, and even refer to the Assassini as 'hashish-eaters'.²² Bernard Lewis has argued that this opinion resulted from Western confusion over the closeness of the Arabic terms for the

Assassini and drug-takers.²³ But because no Arabic text of the time, and there is abundant and rich documentation, mostly by Sunni scholars, has ever referred to drug-taking by the Assassini; and since the Sunnis had no reason to overlook any aids that may have been available to their ferocious enemy; Lewis maintained that the Assassini were not drug-users. The discussion of the use of drugs also has relevance when beliefs about modern terrorists are considered later since some authors have sought to link drug-taking and terrorist proclivities.²⁴

Although they were not called such, assassinations were common centuries before the Crusades. David Rapoport, in a series of broadcasts on assassinations and terrorism, has pointed out that the ancient Greeks and Romans had no word to correspond to our term assassination because, rather than defining the deed in terms of the act of murder, they defined it in terms of the guilt or innocence of the victim.

A killing was simply a means to an end; its moral significance depended entirely on the NATURE of the person killed. A man who struck a public personality down was either a murderer or a tyrannicide. And the word for tyrannicide was the same as that for "liberator", one who freed his country.

Cicero's discussion of tyrannicide represents the conventional attitude. A tyrant, or one who aims at tyranny, was a public enemy; every citizen was OBLIGED to kill him as quickly and efficiently as possible. Cicero provides no ethical or political arguments to justify treachery or the abandonment of legal procedure; his audience understands that the tyrant is one who means to subvert all conventions himself, and that it would be foolish to bind oneself by rules which the tyrant means to destroy. The idea that the method of killing tyrants involved moral questions would have been as preposterous as the notion that it might be morally wrong to put out fire with water, or to shoot a wild beast from behind.²⁵

As a logical extension of these strongly held beliefs, it was not considered wrong to kill anyone who 'might' become a tyrant.²⁶ In the beginning assassins did not even have to appear before a tribunal; and as Rapoport noted, when the practise of justifying such acts by means of an inquiry became accepted, the deceased 'tyrant' was hardly able to challenge his accusers.²⁷

For the early Christians, on the other hand, assassination was always wrong; later theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas offered extremely particularistic justifications for tyrannicide under very limited circumstances. These conditions included the facts that the tyrant had used violence to usurp power; that he had violated moral law; and that he posed a persistent threat to the lives and morality of his subjects. Only if there was no other way of removing such a despot from office; and further, if the executioners were fairly certain that the tyrant's death would result in a better situation for the population could such a murder be sanctioned. Finally, all the killers had to submit themselves to judicial inquiry after completing such an act.²⁸ A similar moral strength was prominent among the Eastern European assassins of the nineteenth century. Victims were carefully selected, often they were charged with horrific acts of ruthlessness in quelling dissent. The individual assassins also preferred to be captured and punished after committing their deed. They believed that in taking a life, no matter how wicked the victim's practises had been, they should forfeit their own.²⁹

In spite of the long history of assassination, research on what it involves is a recent phenomenon. Feliks Gross, however, has contributed to overcoming this inadequacy. In Violence in Politics Gross

limited the term 'assassination' to those political murders, whether sporadic and isolated, or systemic, where the goal was to eliminate one or more individual office-holders. This type of homicide is as old as politics itself and has occurred whenever competitors have been killed, tyrants overthrown or even whole dynasties exterminated.³⁰ The distinguishing characteristic of such assassinations has been that the elites change but there is little, if any, substantive ideological change. The roles remain and only the office-holders are different.³¹

A sub-category of assassinations dealt with those performed more for personal than political motives, but on highly political victims. These are undertaken, often, by deranged and/or aggrieved individuals. They are, therefore, extremely difficult to categorize and not 'political' in the usual sense; although their political consequences can be enormous. The United States National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence has described such murders as "assassination unconnected with rational political goals which satisfies only the psychological needs of the disturbed attacker."³²

Gross applied the term 'individual terror' to a third type of assassinations, committed because the perpetrators somehow envisage that such actions will cause changes to occur not only in government personnel but also in government policies. The deaths of the individual office-holders are not ends in themselves but become, rather, a symbol and a challenge to the whole political system. Opposition groups can use such assassinations to spread panic throughout the government and bureaucracy in the hopes of contributing to a weakening of commitment and solidarity, and forcing substantive policy changes. Or the goals of the terror may be less direct. Small groups of dissidents,

recognizing their own powerlessness to force a government to effect changes, may hope that the government, in an effort to quell the terror, will brutally suppress all opposition, and even take away some freedoms from the entire population; which may contribute, over time, to increased support for the terrorists, and even a popular uprising.³³

Such acts of 'individual terror', guided by some ideology or principles, however poorly formulated and articulated by the terrorist group, are a more recent phenomenon than the other types of assassination. Group organized 'individual terror' is also distinguished by its duration.³⁴ Among its early practitioners, several of the Eastern European groups utilized individual terror from the 1880's until the outbreak of World War I. Here was systematic terror with definite, if unrealistic, political objectives. Carefully selected representatives of the autocratic regimes were assassinated both to intimidate replacements from perpetuating the specific victim's excesses, and to weaken the entire government's operative capabilities and prestige.³⁵

This discrimination in the choice of victims was a less obvious characteristic of assassinations during the partisan resistance movements of the Second World War and now virtually unpractised by present-day terrorists. Although today's terrorists may rationalize their murders on strategic-ideological grounds, they appear to choose their victims much less selectively than their predecessors did,³⁶ and are rarely willing to sacrifice their own lives in return. Rapoport therefore felt that a distinction must be made between those he terms 'assassins',³⁷ and 'terrorists', those who practise a very indiscriminate, and sometimes even random, type of individual terror. Rapoport's refinement is illustrative of the evolution of assassination from the era

of the Narodniki³⁸ to the present.

In his mind the assassin destroys men who are corrupting a system while the terrorist destroys a system which has already corrupted everyone it touches. The vastness of this difference and the variety of the ensuing consequences simply cannot be overestimated. In principle the guilt or innocence of the terrorist's victim is irrelevant. The terrorist often deliberately kills persons innocent of any wrong-doing, knowing that terror spreads more rapidly and is more paralyzing when men are murdered indiscriminately.³⁹

Not only is Rapoport describing much of today's random style of outgroup terrorism, he is also describing the mass terror practised by some governments and regimes. Although governments can employ individual terror tactics like selective assassination to suppress challenges to the system,⁴⁰ because of the vast arsenal of weapons and trained troops more readily available to them, those governments which opt for terror as a political tool are able to administer it on a very large scale - in which case one begins to talk about mass terror.

Mass Terror

The use of terror, by those in power, as a means of maintaining firm control of a population and as a method of dealing with rivals to power and dissidents within one's own group is, like assassination, a practise as old as politics itself.⁴¹ The Bolsheviks who so strongly condemned individual terror as adventurism very early advocated mass terror as an acceptable means of bending a population to the party's will.⁴² Gross cited four monstrous examples of mass terror; the Spanish Inquisition, the French Revolution, the Stalinist era and the Nazi Reich. Central to all these periods, as it is to lesser mass

terrors, is the "belief that a minority has the right to kill and destroy entire sections of population pursuing what they believed was a paramount ideological or religious principle."⁴³

Juan Linz argued that although terror is neither a necessary nor a sufficient characteristic of totalitarian systems it has a greater probability of occurrence, especially as mass terror, under such systems.⁴⁴

He cited the commitment to ideology, the desire for monopolistic control and the fear of losing power as explanations for the adoption, and then the continuation, of terror by some regimes. Linz recognized that states which cannot be called truly totalitarian can practise mass terror, using as his example the dictatorship of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.⁴⁵

Linz listed ten characteristics of terror in totalitarian systems which are worth recounting since some of them are also characteristic of modern, outgroup terrorism. These traits include the terror's unprecedented scale in lost and broken lives; its use against whole categories of people because of ethnic, religious or class affiliation; the disregard for even the appearance of legality in passing sentences, laws, etc., the unrestrained moral self-righteousness of those in power; the extension of the terror to those in the elite;⁴⁶ the guilt, by association, of members of the families of those accused of crimes; the emphasis on the actor, his social background and its ideological characterization - entire groups can be ideologically defined in such thinking - rather than the act itself; the use of 'popular' or 'people's' organizations to administer justice; the tendency to maintain the reign of terror once power is consolidated; and the subordinate role of the armed forces.⁴⁷

Once entrenched such power is nearly impossible to destroy. The Nazi Reich was defeated by its external foes and the Stalinist terror

appears to have been curbed by fellow members of the elite who feared the consequences of the terror spiral within their own ranks.⁴⁸ The perpetuation of such extreme terror has been explained by Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer. They recognized the functionality of unrelenting terror in certain systems and labelled it 'purposive' because it

serves the two functions of eliminating rival authority figures - actual, potential or imagined - as well as their sub-elites, disciples, subordinates and bureaucracies; and eliminating incongruent value structures, either by neutralizing or removing groups identified a priori as carriers of such values, or else by isolating the population from access to them.⁴⁹

This striving for a monopoly over values and authority suggests that the functions of terror, if somewhat bloody, can also be rational and goal-oriented. But terror cannot always be controlled; and once put into operation it can be difficult to halt. Linz mentioned some non-instrumental, but equally valid, reasons for the perpetuation of terror in some regimes; the 'habit' of terror - it becomes an accepted and efficient means of dealing with problems, it is professionalized; the personal preference for terror of certain bureaucrats and administrators - there are personalities who derive pleasure from terrorizing others; and the fear of those in power as to what their opponents would do to them if the tables were turned - a fear which can rationalize the maintenance of ruthless policies.⁵⁰

In the academic literature mass terror is rarely discussed today except with reference to Nazi Germany and the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union. However, the media have been more alert to the trends towards the use of mass terror in regimes as disparate as Pinochet's Chile, Amin's

Uganda and Khomeini's Iran. Yet, the revelations of the mass genocide practised by the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea (Cambodia) do not appear to have caused as much outcry throughout the world as the Vietnamese led overthrow of that same government has inspired.⁵¹

Small wonder then that there appears to be little, if any, widespread opposition to the modified practises of mass terror in evidence, to varying degrees, in many countries of the world today. Such repression may not encompass all of Linz's ten characteristics of totalitarian terror, but it can be just as atomizing and intimidating for its target population. In fact, various terrorist outgroups in opposition to such governments often claim that they must adopt indiscriminate, and sometimes international, terrorist tactics in order both to fight a ruthless and uncompromising foe that is practising terror itself, and to educate the world community to the corruption of the regime it opposes.⁵² Yet, no matter how ruthless the regime is made to appear, none of today's terrorist movements has managed to gain for itself the respect and admiration felt towards many of the resistance movements associated with the Second World War.

Partisan Terror

Although Arjan Malik observed that "in most countries of the world some sort of guerrilla activity has taken place at some time or another,"⁵³ Colonel C.M. Woodhouse, in a Foreword to a book on partisan warfare, argued that the present popularization of this type of irregular warfare could be traced to the successes of the resistance movements of World War II.

The Resistance during the second world war was the prelude to this new kind of warfare.

It was not, of course, a new invention between 1940 and 1945: one remembers, on the contrary, the Spanish resistance during the Napoleonic Wars, which gave us the word guerrilla to add to our language, and the exploits of Lawrence and others during the Arab Revolt of 1917. But these were side-shows (Lawrence's own word) in support of a major conventional war, without which they would have achieved practically nothing. Since the outbreak of the second world war the corresponding outbreaks of irregular warfare have stood on their own as the major, if not the only, armed conflicts in support of a major war elsewhere.⁵⁴

Kenneth Macksey's The Partisans of Europe in World War II recounted case histories of various of these resistance movements.⁵⁵ As with their counterparts in Asia throughout the war years, and later, these irregulars engaged in both the 'little wars' commonly associated with guerrilla bands from Mao and his followers through Tito, Castro and Nkoma, and the 'individual terror' of assassination, bombings, and sabotage.

Many factors can influence the options available to partisans. Whereas the French partisans were formed after the occupation of their country by the Nazis, the Polish resistance movement, although newly operationalized in 1939, had an historical tradition and acceptance stretching back some one hundred years at least.⁵⁶ Consequently the Polish movement was a finely structured organization which was able to function as an underground state, complete with courts of justice, schools and an underground parliament.⁵⁷ And yet, although one speaks of the Polish resistance, it was not a completely united operation - there was also a "small but aggressive fascist and antisemitic" subgroup which killed several distinguished Polish democrats and Jews.⁵⁸ As well as this 'rightist' orientation the leftists were divided into the social

democratic and communist camps, and they too were suspicious of each other's intentions..

Communist sentiments were so powerful in some nations, such as Yugoslavia, that the resistance movements were unable to subordinate these conflicts and to join together in opposition to their common enemy. And not all these partisans believed the Axis powers to be the enemy. The Ustashi in Yugoslavia received support from the Nazis and Italian fascists. And the pro-Allied partisans of Tito and Mihailovich bled themselves in senseless infighting which helped the Ustashi and the Nazis.⁵⁹

At the same time a similar situation developed in Asia where Indian and Burmese⁶⁰ and Indonesian⁶¹ nationalists received support from the Japanese in their struggles against the colonial governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands. It is indeed ironic that the South Moluccans who remained loyal to the Netherlands Crown during the Japanese war against, and occupation of, the Indonesian colonies have now spawned their own terrorist organization demanding Dutch support for the independence promised by the Netherlands at Linggadjati and de Renville.⁶²

Although there have been urban as well as rural resistance movements, the image of Mao and Tito-style rural guerrillas is the more prevalent one both for World War II partisans and guerrillas generally. This identification of guerrilla activity with a rural base of operations has caused considerable problems for disparate opposition movements. Because early heroes like T.E. Lawrence in Arabia, Mao tse-tung in China and Ho Chi Minh in Viet Nam had waged successful rural guerrilla campaigns people tended to overlook the important role of the

conventional armed forces in each of these wars. This in spite of the fact that in his writings Mao warned that ultimate victory was possible only with a combined guerrilla and regular (people's) army operation. Mao argued that there were three stages in any war - the defensive, the stalemate and the counter-offensive stages. Only during the period of stalemate could guerrilla warfare become primary, in the other two stages Mao viewed it as supplementary to regular warfare.

In the intermediate stage guerrilla warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary, because the enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing for the counter-offensive but will not yet be ready to launch it. Though this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one of the three stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary.⁶³

Mao's warning, perhaps never properly understood, seemed to be forgotten in the early 1960's excitement over two extraordinary 'revolutions'. In Cuba a government was toppled by a few hundred guerrillas, led by Fidel Castro, who were able to take over the island's government with little resistance, just two years after twelve of them had established their first base in the Sierra Maestre mountains.⁶⁴ The world was amazed. The dictator, Batista, supported by thirty thousand troops and the most sophisticated weaponry, had been defeated by small bands of guerrillas lacking both the armaments and manpower to wage regular offensive warfare. Castro's winning strategy, popularized as the 'foco' theory,⁶⁵ involved small units of guerrillas operating as mobile strategic forces in selected rural areas. Not only did these small units successfully harass the much stronger enemy but they also

succeeded in winning over the population through aiding those in need.⁶⁶ Castro, it seemed, had successfully condensed Mao's guerrilla strategy.

Then, in July, 1962, President De Gaulle of France granted independence to the Republic's North African 'province' of Algeria. Despite the presence of thousands of battle-hardened French troops in the colony and the power of the dreaded Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) to commit terrorist acts, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) had succeeded in winning the psychological battle for the hearts and minds of the majority of the native population, as well as influential persons abroad.⁶⁷ Like Castro's forces the FLN had realized the importance of waging something other than a regular war against the vastly superior French forces. At the same time as the majority of the FLN troops were engaged in ineffectual rural guerrilla campaigns the Front was able, at great expense in human lives, to win the public opinion war through their actions and sufferings in the capital, Algiers. Their weapon was the secretly planted bomb - which brought random, indiscriminate and widespread death and destruction. Roland Gaucher quoted an FLN terrorist on why this particular urban terror option was selected. His reasoning is chilling.

... notre infériorité numérique et en matériel en face de l'armée colonialiste ne peut nous permettre d'obtenir de grandes et décisives victoires militaires. Est-il préférable pour notre cause de tuer dix ennemis dans un oed de Tergma, ce dont nul ne parlera, ou bien un seul à Alger, ce que notera le lendemain la presse américaine? Si nous prenons des risques, il faut que notre combat soit connu Réfléchissons aux conséquences de nos actes et veillons à ce qu'ils soient payants, et attirent incontestablement l'attention sur le généreux combat de notre peuple et de son armée.⁶⁸

Although the FLN's Reign of Terror lasted for approximately one year it has come to be synonymous with the Algerian Revolution. Perhaps one of the most important reasons for this association is Gillo Pontecorvo's very sympathetic film, "The Battle of Algiers". The central character, a terrorist named Ali la Pointe, became a revolutionary folk-hero.⁶⁹ With the miserable failure of Che Guevarra to establish a rural 'foco' in Bolivia in 1967 would-be-guerrillas sought alternatives. "The Battle of Algiers" offered a direction. Not long afterwards the Brazilian communist, Carlos Marighella, provided the ideology and theory for this new concept of popular struggle in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla.⁷⁰

Urban terrorism became 'the' form of revolutionary warfare; and 1968 ushered in a wave of youth militancy against established governments throughout the world. What this urban strategy actually encompassed has been difficult to define, but even as early as the FLN's bombings in Algiers there has been the tendency not to discriminate between military and political targets on the one hand, and civilian targets on the other. Neutrals, rather than the avowed governmental enemies become the targets, although many guerrilla terrorists would argue that those who are not with us are against us. The groups under discussion have all chosen the 'soft' targets for the most part - and that is a major reason for tending to refer to them as terrorists rather than as urban guerrillas.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Abraham Stern, cited in Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism, p. 143.
2. Albert Camus, "The Just Assassins", Caligula and Three Other Plays, Translated by John Gilbert, (New York: Vintage Books, n.d.).
3. The French Maquis is remembered very favourably. Yet, between 1942-1944 more members were lost to the Nazis through betrayals within their own ranks than through engagements with the enemy. Walter Laquer, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986), p. 230. For some documentation on the seamier side of the Maquis see Sisley Huddleston, France: The Tragic Years, 1939-47, (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955), especially chapter 23.
4. Bernard Avishai has commented that, "Terrorism is the more perplexing since many good causes ... have been furthered by sickening acts of violence." He is fearful that, even though the effectiveness of such actions might be exaggerated, and they fail to further the good cause they are meant to serve; nonetheless, "the moral status of the action still gains." "In Cold Blood", New York Review of Books, v. 26:3, 8 March, 1979, p. 41.
5. J. B. S. Hardman, "Terrorism", Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XIV, (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 575-579. The more recently published International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), contains no headings for terrorism. And Bart de Schutter, Bibliography on Criminal Law, (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972), has only a few dozens entries on terrorism, the majority of which relate to pre 1950's incidents.
6. Hardman, "Terrorism", p. 576.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 578. Often today's urban terrorists argue that popular support is unnecessary prior to commencing the struggle. Groups like the Baader-Meinhof Gang argue that by forcing the government into adopting repressive postures 'across the board' they will win spontaneous and widespread popular support. This has not occurred.
9. Hardman, "Terrorism", p. 577. Ze'ev Iviasky, "Individual Terror: Concept and Ideology", Journal of Contemporary History, v.12:1 January, 1977), p. 45, "As interpreted by the anarchists who espoused it 'propaganda by the deed' refers to acts of violence which will demonstrate revolution in a tangible way, i.e. arouse and excite, elucidate and explain. The terrorist act itself becomes a manifesto; neither the removal of tyrants, opponents or enemies, nor the seizure of power is the aim of this violence, but protest and confrontation."

10. Hardman, "Terrorism", p. 576. Hardman's pre-World War II distinction between state and non-state terrorism has not always been upheld in practise; not all laws are published, and some may be retroactive.
11. Green, "Nature and Control of International Terrorism", p. 135. Green points out, however, that when the Canadian Ambassador to Santiago forwarded to Ottawa reports that were critical, or analytical, of the policies of the Allende regime "he was denounced", p. 135.
12. In 4 Genesis Cain slew Abel, the first murder, and one which could perhaps be interpreted as having a political component - i.e. Cain wished to be paramount.
13. Feliks Gross, Violence in Politics. (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 6.
14. Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam. (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 2.
15. The Assassini were members of the dissident Ismaili sect, an offshoot of the Shi'a minority within Islam. In the Arnould Judgement (Bombay, 12 November, 1866), the High Court, supported by a wealth of historical evidence, legally established, among other things, that the Ismailis were the heirs of the Assassins, and that the Aga Khan, the spiritual head of the Ismailis, was the heir of the Imams of Alamut. The great castle of Alamut was the Persian headquarters of the Assassins. Lewis, The Assassins, pp. 6, 10, 15, 17. The once impoverished Ismailis have become an extremely prosperous and distinguished community with settlements throughout the world.
16. Lewis, The Assassins, p. 136. On millenarian cults generally see Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium, (Fairlawn, New Jersey: Essential Books, 1957).
17. Lewis, The Assassins, p. 139.
18. Ibid., p. 130. The Ismailis early recognized the efficacy of carefully orchestrated acts of murder. Lewis quoted from an Ismaili poet of that period. "Brothers, when the the time of triumph comes, with good fortune from both worlds as our companion, then by one single warrior on foot a king may be stricken with terror, though he own more than a hundred thousand horsemen."
19. Lewis, The Assassins, p. 2. The definition is that of a German priest who recorded his eyewitness account of the Assassini in the Levant.
20. Lewis, The Assassins, p. 5.
21. Ibid., p. 127.
22. Albert Parry, Terrorism From Robespierre to Arafat, (New York: Vanguard, 1976), p. 29. Baljit Singh, "An Overview", in Yonah

- Alexander and Seymour Finger, eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (New York: John Jay Press, 1976), p. 6. Dobson, Black September, pp. 14-15. The authoritative Oxford English Dictionary refers to the Assassini as hashish-eaters, despite scholarly research to the contrary. It also defines 'Jews' negatively, however.
23. Lewis has pointed out that the Assassins' name in Syria, 'hashishi', could easily be confused with the Arabic term for a drug-taker, 'hashshash'. Yet in Persia the Assassini were known as 'malahida' (deviators). Lewis believes that both the Arabic and Persian terms were expressions of popular "contempt for the wild beliefs and extravagant behavior of the sectaries - a derisive comment on their conduct rather than a description of their practices. For Western observers in particular, such stories (drug-taking) may also have served to provide a rational explanation for behavior that was otherwise totally inexplicable" Lewis, The Assassins, p. 12, pp. 8, 10, 11.
 24. Parry, Terrorism From Robespierre, p. 29, misrepresents the Assassins on several counts. He insists that they were drug-takers and also states that their chosen mission was to kill Christians. Although some Christians, in the Levant, were killed by the Assassins, they never waged a war against Christians. Parry then jumps to modern terrorism and erroneously links his version of the Assassins history with a proclivity for today's Arab terrorists to take drugs in order to inspire greater bloodthirstiness and fanaticism. Although other authors have reported the use of stimulants by various terrorists (not just Arabs) to help them to remain awake during hostage-taking incidents, Parry's interpretation of drug-taking as a 'ritual sacrament' is, it would appear, a minority opinion.
 25. David C. Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism, (Toronto: CBC Learning Systems, 1971), p. 7. L.C. Green, "International Law and the Control of Barbarism", in Ronald Macdonald, Douglas Johnston and Gerald Morris, eds., The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978) discusses several classic legal opinions on tyranny and the legitimacy of both internal and external opposition to such rule.
 26. Ibid., pp. 7-8. Rapoport notes that the first three Roman victims of tyrannicide were accused only of 'aiming' at tyranny. Sometimes states, and non-states, use this pre-emptive justification against would-be terrorists.
 27. Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism, p. 8.
 28. Ibid., pp. 9-10. The Hebrews accepted tyrannicides in the tradition of Ehud and Jehu, but not Judith. Lewis contends that the story of Judith, despite being apocryphal to Jews, may explain the acceptance of the 'Sicar' (daggersmen), Jewish zealots who appeared at about the time of the fall of Jerusalem and destroyed all who opposed or hindered them. Islamic tradition recognizes the

justifiable revolt; subjects are not obliged to follow sinful commands. Lewis maintains that since small groups like the Assassins could not succeed, in a revolt, against the all-powerful Sunni majority, assassination became an expeditious and accepted practise. Three of the four Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet were murdered. Like the Sicarii the Assassins always used a dagger. But the individual Assassin usually killed only one victim and then was captured. Lewis, The Assassins, pp. 125-127.

29. Feliks Gross, The Seizure of Political Power, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 109. Camus' play, "The Just Assassins", is based on a true incident which occurred in Moscow in 1905. The assassin, Ivan Kaliayev, would not throw his bomb on the first attempt because the intended victim, the Grand Duke Sergei, was travelling with his wife and children who were not considered guilty of any crimes against the people. Eventually Kaliayev succeeded in killing the Grand Duke when he was alone. He allowed himself to be captured and refused to appeal for clemency.
30. Mass dynastic murders are called 'sultanism'. Practised first in Imperial Rome, and later in the Ottoman Empire, they involved "a continuous murder of all possible pretenders to power, or competitors, until no one but the ruler survived." Gross, Violence in Politics, p. 6.
31. This type of change is sometimes called 'praetorian', and involves "violence to achieve specific gains - power, office, money, recognition - from the political system without changing significantly the overall distribution of these values within the system." It is intrasystem violence without lasting upheavals. Samuel Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," Civil Violence and the International Order, Adelphi Paper No. 83, Part II. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), pp. 3-10.
32. James Kirkham, Sheldon Levy and William Crotty, Assassination and Political Violence. (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 6. An example might be the assassination of South African Prime Minister Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, by a white South African, in 1966. The United States experienced an 'assassination epidemic' in the early 1960's. Both President John Kennedy and his brother Robert were killed; as were Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, two black leaders.
33. Such a plan of action has been a trademark of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Their determination to force the Bonn Government to enact repressive legislation had had results. Extremely stringent hiring regulations are in effect, but surprisingly, the majority of citizens have not voiced opposition to them. Hans-Jochen Brauns and David Kramer, "Political Repression in West Germany: 'Berufsverbote' in Modern German History," New German Critique, no. 7, (Winter, 1976), pp. 105-121.
34. Gross, Violence in Politics, p. 1.

35. Ibid., pp. 10-12.
36. Some observers might contend that the German and Italian terrorists have been more selective in their choice of victims than the Japanese and Palestinians who hijack aircraft. While it is true that the European groups have murdered or kidnapped and murdered some prominent political and financial figures, they also kill anyone in their path, and the Red Brigades have attacked prison guards and foremen in shops, etc. Patricia Clough, "The malaise of terrorism hits two widely differing countries", The Times, 26 September, 1977.
37. Rapoport's 'assassins' are individual terrorists to Gross.
38. The members of the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) Party in Czarist Russia believed that the peasants and intelligentsia, rather than the working classes, were the revolutionary vanguard. They practised assassination because this form of violence, they believed, made them equal in political strength to the Czarist oppressors. Iviensky, "Individual Terror: Concept and Typology", p. 54.
39. Rapoport, Assassination and Terrorism, p. 37.
40. For example, critics of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua can be murdered in broad daylight on a main street and no one is ever charged. Human Rights Bulletin, (New York: International League for Human Rights), April, 1978, p. 2.
41. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. Translated by George Bull, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), especially Section VIII, "Those who come to power by crime".
42. Isaac Steingerg, In the Workshop of the Revolution, (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1953) pp. 144-146, Gross, Violence in Politics, pp. 16-17, The Bolsheviks looked upon such acts as justifiable revolutionary terror, Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, new edition, (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1971).
43. Gross, Violence in Politics, p. 18. The most dangerous, because it is the most powerful, of all minorities, is a government with all the military, technological and economic might of a nation at its disposal, like Amin in Uganda or Pinochet in Chile.
44. Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, V.3, Macropolitical Theory, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 195. This position is in contrast to that of Hannah Arendt who stresses the centrality of terror in such systems, "a form of government whose essence is terror." The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. 474.
45. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," p. 217. See Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, pp. 23-24, for a psychiatrist's

- impressions of Trujillo. Hacker believed Trujillo to be a criminal, rather than a political, terrorist; one who used terror for personal financial enrichment above all else.
46. This phenomenon, 'the purge', is well discussed by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd edition, revised by Carl Friedrich, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 183-190.
 47. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 218-224.
 48. Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, p. 188.
 49. Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 24-25.
 50. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 227-228.
 51. Newsmagazines, like Time, October-December, 1978 reported on the gross atrocities of the Khmer Rouge Government as well as the protest over its overthrow.
 52. These general comments are presented here merely to serve as an example of a popular terrorist argument to justify violence. Specific examples are evaluated later.
 53. Arjan Malik, An Indian Guerrilla War, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 1.
 54. Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), p. 9.
 55. Kenneth Macksey, The Partisans of Europe in World War II, (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1975).
 56. Gross, Violence in Politics, pp. 72-76.
 57. Ibid., p. 72.
 58. Ibid., p. 74.
 59. For a detailed account of the Yugoslav partisan movements during World War II see Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches, (London: J. Cape, 1949). The heirs of the pro-Nazi Ustashi movement are still active in the struggle for Croat separation. They have violently harassed Yugoslav personnel and missions abroad for years. It is noteworthy that Yugoslavia was condemned in November, 1978 for releasing four suspected West German terrorists before they could be extradited by Bonn. The Economist, 25 November, 1978, p. 55, pointed out, however, that the Yugoslav authorities granted the releases in protest against the West German government's refusal to allow the extradition of eight suspected Croat terrorists to Belgrade.

60. For a first-hand account of these nationalists on trial see L. C. Green, "The Indian National Army Trials", Modern Law Review, v. XI, 1948, pp. 47-69.
61. Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, translated by Mary Heidhues, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).
62. J. C. Bouman, et al., The South Moluccas Rebellion: Province or Occupied State, (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1960).
63. "The Strategic Role of Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan", Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp. 279-280.
64. Needless to say one sentence cannot describe the Cuban Revolution. For a brief account of those two years see Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960), especially chapters 6 and 7 which include a brief discussion of the role of the urban resistance to the Batista regime.
65. Perhaps the most popularized account of the 'foco' theory of revolution is Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, (New York: Grove Press, 1967).
66. Like Mao, Castro expended time and supplies in assisting the peasants and offering them medical services, etc., Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba:, p. 57.
67. Anthony Burton, Urban Terrorism, (London: Leo Cooper, 1975), pp. 134-140.
68. Roland Gaucher, Les Terroristes, (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1965), p. 262.
69. Gillo Pontecorvo's "Battle of Algiers" was released in 1967. Controversial and sympathetic to the FLN, it was banned in France until the 1970's, For a review by Rosley Crowther see New York Times, 21 September, 1968, p. 56.
70. Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1974).

CHAPTER 3

DEFINING TERRORISM TODAY

Terrorism is what the bad guys do.¹

The word 'terrorist' has undergone a radical change in meaning over the last one hundred years. Whereas the bomb-throwers of Czarist Russia and Eastern Europe had been proud to bear the name terrorist,² Roland Gaucher has argued that since the Second World War the term has been used extensively as a pejorative.³ Acts of terror by outgroups increased in popularity after the war as various movements sought to drive out colonial masters or overthrow the existing social order. The terror was less specific than that of the nineteenth century assassins and the number of victims rose dramatically. No longer was the target necessarily a high-ranking military officer or colonial bureaucrat. Ordinary men, women and children were all threatened by this popularization of violence. Terrorists were perceived less as heroic martyrs, attempting to curb ruthless government rule, and more as cold-blooded, indiscriminate murderers. The terrorist label became synonymous with extreme violence and disregard for human life.

One of the first groups vigorously to oppose the terrorist epithet was the Irgun, a squad of Jewish extremists opposed to the British presence in Mandate Palestine. Its leader, now Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, wrote in his memoirs,

Our enemies called us terrorists. People who were neither friends nor enemies, like the correspondents of the New York Herald Tribune, also used this Latin name, either under the influence of British propaganda

or out of habit. Our friends, like the Irishman, O'Reilly, preferred, as he wrote in his letter, to 'get ahead of history', and called us by a simpler, though also a Latin name: patriots. In truth, we were anti-terrorists.⁴

Because of its present notoriety the term 'terrorist' now, often seems to be attached, both by governments and opposition groups, to any and all adversaries, whether violent or peaceful, legal or extra-legal. The resulting definitional problems can be enormous. Daniel Heradstveit, a specialist in the area of conflict resolution, has argued that, whether intentionally or accidentally, most definitions of terrorism tend "to be used to propagate certain opinions about a conflict, often implying a moral judgement designed to put more blame on one party to the conflict compared with another."⁵ The result is that many individuals, including 'experts', who discuss terrorism have already defined who is 'good' and who is 'bad' through their terminology, and structure their discussions and research accordingly. Brian Jenkins also recognized the subtle, yet powerful, ethical inferences of many definitions.

Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while anti-government extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgement, and if one party can successfully attach the label "terrorist" to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.⁶

Despite the abundant scholarly documentation that ruthless violence in politics is not only a part of history, but also still a part of modern life, people and governments tend to view the violence of their enemies as abnormal and wrong, particularly when such deeds are

performed by non-state actors. Edward Hyams is most probably in the minority when he argues that individuals and groups, as much as states, should be able to justify violence, even terror, in certain circumstances.

Hyams contends that

... terrorism is neither more nor less justified than war; the pacifist's position is that neither is justifiable; the position of the non-pacifist who admits the justice of war in certain circumstances is untenable unless he also admits the justice of political terrorism in certain circumstances. As for the innocent victims of terrorism they are in precisely the same case as the innocent victims of war.⁷

Arguing the liberal proposition that "men have a right and a duty to be as free and happy as their nature allows them to be"⁸ Hyams is opposed to the power of states to shape and control their populations, free from accusations of employing terror, maltreatment of specific groups, and similar charges. Hyams wants to give back to the citizen the rights, not only to question and challenge government, but also the right to use violence against it if it is perceived as wrong.⁹

The controversial issue of the legitimacy of state as opposed to non-state terror is never far from most definitions of terrorism. Yet this debate tends to overlook several other prominent themes that have emerged in academic discussions of terrorism. An early, and helpful, discrimination involved 'subjective' and 'objective' terrorism. In an article on internal war, Thomas Thornton drew a distinction between subjective terror, which he sometimes referred to as 'terror' and by which he meant the individual's or group's psychic state of being very fearful; and objective terror, also termed 'terrorism', which he understood as the physical threats or acts which cause the state of fear or panic in

one's audience or victims.¹⁰ Thornton's recognition that terrorism could occur without death and destruction is important, yet generally overlooked, for too often definitions of terrorism are predicated on actual incidents of extreme violence.

Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer also make use of the theme of the subjectiveness of terror when they described the 'hermetic terror' of Stalin, among others.¹¹ This phenomenon involves secret detentions and deaths; the victims and the direct audience are identical. Individuals just disappear. Dallin and Breslauer argued that this very specific, yet secretive, type of terror was extremely successful in atomizing, isolating and completely terrorizing Soviet society.

Zbigniew Brzezinski underscored the power of such secretive, psychic terror, arguing that its most significant effect was the indiscriminate fear and panic it could spread. Under such terror "... failure to adjust can mean extinction of life. But success in adjusting ... does not guarantee either liberty or safety."¹² Although Brzezinski had the terror of totalitarian regimes in mind, today's non-state terrorists wield something of the same psychic terror over millions of people throughout the world. Ordinary travellers might hesitate to travel on certain aircarriers or to holiday in certain countries. Diplomatic, business or other advisory personnel stationed abroad can become virtual prisoners in efforts to avoid being kidnapped or assassinated. Even citizens, living in their own communities and carrying out their daily obligations, can be terrorized in the name of some abstract goal.¹³

Geoffrey Fairbairn, a specialist on counter-insurgency warfare concluded in a study on guerrillas and terrorism in South-East Asia that even a few well-coordinated acts of terror could render impassive the

majority of a population. He referred to the belated recognition by American strategists in South Viet Nam that the power of the Viet Cong over the population was more psychological than military.¹⁴ Although the United States could provide its ally with military superiority neither the American nor the South Vietnamese authorities were able to instill in the people either the fear, or alternately, the support and confidence which the 'black pyjamas' bands could.¹⁵

What is termed "terrorism" then should be defined as much by the perceptions, feelings and beliefs of the victims of, and audience to, a terrorist act as by the kind of action itself. Academics and legalists might conclude that terrorism has not occurred in a specific instance where there has been gross coercion, applying some other term instead.¹⁶ Studies of terrorism rarely acknowledge this problem. Although the incidents selected for this study are well-recognized terrorist acts, it is important that 'lesser' acts can be pure terrorism to victims and audience alike, as can the mere threats of terrorism. Saleem Qureshi was well-advised to include such possibilities in his definition of terrorism.

It is not necessary for violence to actually be used in order for it to be called "terrorism". The threat of the use of such violence, whether explicit or implicit, if it is perceived by the intended victim as likely to be actually carried out, also constitutes terrorism.¹⁷

As well as this failure to recognize the powerfulness of terrorist threats, some analysts have severely restricted the scope of political terrorism. Pioneering theoreticians tended to define political terrorism as a weapon employed variously to preserve or overthrow a government in office. This division provided a first, and fairly obvious

classification in light of the numerous nationalist and communist inspired rebellions of the post-war era. But it was also an oversimplified, and even at times, biased perspective. Brian Crozier's terror/counter-terror dichotomy found in his book, The Rebels, is a case in point.¹⁸ In arguing that those in opposition to governments practise terror and that 'besieged' states 'respond' with counter-terror Crozier none too subtly implied that the state's ruthlessness is somehow a 'legitimate' response to acts initiated by outgroup terrorists. The weakness in this definition is that the state's position is unquestioningly presented as a defensive one, as an unprovoking victim, and not as an instigator of violence. This, however, need not be the case.

Later Crozier adopted Hardman's terror/terrorism dichotomy, arguing that terror refers to "a state's use of measures of extreme repression, including torture ... to oppress the population or repress political dissenters who may or may not be terrorists or guerrillas"; whereas terrorism refers to "motivated violence for political ends" by those out of power.¹⁹ Thornton, as well as Eugene Walter, also discriminated between state and non-state terrorism by applying terms like 'enforcement terror' or 'the regime of terror' to state acts, and 'agitational terror' and 'the siege of terror' to areas of non-state terrorism.²⁰

The underlying difficulty with these four dyads is that they all divide on a ruler-ruled dichotomy which focuses on, and restricts discussion exclusively to outgroup revolution and state repression. Ignoring the chicken-and-egg argument as to whether states 'respond' to outgroup terrorism or vice-versa, in reality both states and non-states utilizing terror can have goals much less all-encompassing than either

making a social and political revolution or enforcing obedience from unwilling citizens. Paul Wilkinson points out that terror by those out of government can reflect numerous non-revolutionary goals.

These include revenge against a particular official or group for a particularly hated decision, judgement or policy; as a weapon in an inter-movement or intra-movement feud; as an act of partisan retaliation against an invasion of one's land or property, or against interference with one's customs, beliefs, or way of life; as a gesture in repudiation of the legitimacy of a regime.²¹

And the objectives of terrorism can be as numerous for states. Besides the totalitarian terror of certain regimes against all their citizens there is the selective terror applied to specific groups of people, and the use of terror to combat one's opponents, as well as conquered peoples and enemies.

Recognizing the weakness of defining political terrorism in terms of whether the instigator is a state or an outgroup Wilkinson focused on the amorality of such violence and classified such acts in terms both of their randomness or specificity and duration.

What fundamentally distinguishes terrorism from other forms of organized violence is not simply its severity but its features of amorality and antinomianism. Terrorists either profess indifference to existing moral codes or else claim exemption from all such obligations. Political terror, if it is waged consciously and deliberately, is implicitly prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian considerations for the sake of some political end. Ideologies of terrorism assume that the death and suffering of those who are innocent of any crime are means entirely justified by their political ends....

... Political terror may occur in isolated acts and also in the form of extreme, indiscriminate and arbitrary mass violence,

the kind of insurrectionary outburst that characterized the lynchings and sackings at the height of the popular terror in revolutionary France. Such terror is not systematic, it is unorganized and is often impossible to control.... Political terrorism, properly speaking, is a sustained policy involving the waging of organized terror either on the part of a state, a movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals. Systematic terrorism invariably entails some organizational structure, however rudimentary, and some kind of theory or ideology of terror.²²

Wilkinson's definition excludes isolated acts and series of random acts of terror from what he defines as 'political terrorism', for rarely have such acts, "ignited by a chance concatenation of events" resulted in the attainment of political goals.²³ Difficult to categorize, such occurrences are sometimes understood as a political version of "don't just stand there, do something"; a form of bloody protest, unintegrated with social or political policy.²⁴

A classification of terrorist actors which complements this distinction between sporadic terror and organized, longer-functioning terrorism, and at the same time maintains the useful state/non-state division is found in the work of the psychiatrist Frederick Hacker. Hacker places all terrorists into one of three categories, all of which are at least partially applicable to politics. Not all terrorists, of course are 'pure' types but one drive usually predominates. Each category is subdivided into 'ins', that is people in power, in government; and 'outs', those who wish to challenge that government in some way, or to wage a struggle against other, non-governmental groups.

Terrorists can be roughly divided into three groups according to their main motivation; the crazy, the criminal and the crusading (the most typical variety). The emotionally

disturbed are driven by reasons of their own that often do not make sense to anybody else. That is why they are called crazy, a colloquial designation I use with reluctance because of its judgmental connotations. The motives of those terrorists who use illegitimate means to obtain personal gain are understood by everybody. Criminal terrorists want nothing different from what most people want, but they are willing to resort to socially disapproved methods in order to achieve their goals. Crusading terrorists are idealistically inspired. They seek not personal gain but prestige and power for a collective goal; they believe that they act in the service of a higher cause.²⁵

Hacker believes that crusaders are the "real terrorists, the genuine article."²⁶ Whether operating from 'above' or 'below' the crusading terrorist is a committed individual. Often well-trained and highly skilled, crusaders are unselfish, and even sacrificial, in their determination to achieve their objectives. They are fanatics, but without overt behavioral disturbances. They do not necessarily wish to harm anyone but can be capable of great ruthlessness. And they are difficult to negotiate with because they cannot easily be bribed; being interested only in deals on their own terms.²⁷ In later chapters Hacker's profile of the crusader will be used as a reference to compare various terrorist actors.

Both state and non-state crusading terrorists proffer several justifications for their employment of terror.²⁸ The Biblical, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' has universal appeal. States often argue that they use terrorism as a deterrent; this is, they argue, a 'lesser evil' than allowing the terrorists to grow strong and pose a threat to the general population. Outgroup terrorists frequently argue that no other means of changing the government are available to them.

Both types will sometimes explain that terrorism has proved successful 'in the past' and is, therefore, worth trying.

Some of the fiercest battles with regard to non-state political terrorism are being waged verbally in the media and in academic definitions. Individuals and governments endeavour to include all others whom they regard as dangerous enemies under the 'terrorist' label, whilst at the same time attempting to justify their own violence and that of their friends/allies as legitimate self-defense. In this discussion the use of the term 'terrorist' is not meant to imply that those so labelled are the only practitioners of extreme violence, or that they are necessarily evil. The meanings of the term are numerous and sometimes vague. The non-state terrorists under discussion share a desire for radical political change either at the international or national levels. In the pursuit of their goals they have opted for sustained policies of violent opposition to those in power and have employed indiscriminate tactics of terror including bombings, barricade and hostage situations and hijackings. At the same time some of these groups have pursued certain discriminating policies of sabotage, assassination and kidnapping. Despite the beliefs of the non-involved and victims that their actions are self-defeating the committed terrorists under study seem prepared to sacrifice personal happiness and comfort to work toward goals they personally may not live to enjoy.

There is no definitive measurement for the proficiency of terrorism. But some general standards have been suggested. Hakon Wiberg has proposed two norms.²⁹ His minimum criterion is social survival - "We fight, therefore we are."³⁰ This criterion means that despite the loss of some members the organization has been able to survive as a continuous actor;

but excludes those cases where the majority of the members have been killed off, or been so fragmented that they are incapable of waging another campaign. The major measure is the group's ability effectively to take over social power. Clearly, state-terrorists have a much easier time at both tasks. In his own research Wiberg has been unable to document even one case of a strictly non-rural 'guerrilla' movement that has succeeded, alone, in winning control from a government.³¹ Yet, despite this lack of achievement, Wiberg does not rule out that such movements, even if they fail to survive, may have some limited success in forcing governments to compromise or make personnel changes.

Robert Moss further develops this position, arguing that it is a mistake to attach the 'revolutionary change' label too rigidly to such groups because their objectives, despite radical rhetoric, may be pragmatic and much less all-encompassing than what they demand.

... the terrorists and guerrillas are waging a campaign of harassment and attrition against superior, conventional forces. Their basic target is not control of territory, but control of men's minds. They are essentially political partisans, for whom success or failure will hinge less on what happens on the battleground than on their capacity to get their message across, to erode the morale of the forces of order, and to induce a general 'climate of collapse'.³²

Leaving aside the thorny issue of legitimacy, there are several important points to consider in discussions of political terrorism. The first is that threats, just as much as acts, can be terrorizing to victims and audience alike. Moreover, individuals may believe an act or policy to be terroristic even when it has not been so defined in law. Analysts should take these reactions into consideration when evaluating a particular terrorist act. In so doing they may begin to appreciate why

people and governments have responded in particular ways to such stresses.

Second, there are two comprehensive categories of terrorist actors - states and non-states. But it is inadvisable to limit the discussion of terrorism to the interaction of states and oppositions. Acts of political terrorism can have goals which are neither revolutionary nor nationalist. It is not inconceivable that lengthy campaigns can be waged between two, or more, opposing groups within a state on religious, economic, ethnic or class lines.

Third, political terrorism may be either carefully planned and orchestrated or spontaneous. It may continue for a considerable time, even years; or it may fade quickly. Because of the great differences in organization, objectives and commitment by various groups it is worthwhile to distinguish between the more random and the more controlled types of terrorism. It would be extremely difficult to attempt to evaluate all types of political terror. We have chosen to restrict our focus to events of long duration and substance.

A similar qualification is applied to the terrorist actor. Since our concern is manifestly political, the criminal terrorist is of peripheral interest. But so too is the crazy, for he/she is more closely associated with the spontaneous, random act of terror.

As mentioned previously the non-state, crusading terrorist has been chosen for study as represented by the membership of six terrorist groups. This study would become extremely all-encompassing if an attempt were made to compare states and non-state terrorists. Yet the actions of certain states, when relevant to the discussion of non-state terrorism, are also included.

Finally, for the non-state terrorists selected, survival and success as assessment criteria have been tempered by the suspicion that the immediate goals of these groups may not be the full-scale revolutions they espouse. What these crusaders have sought, and whether or not their tactics have been good ones are included in the discussion in the following chapters.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict", in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and World Security, (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 14.
2. In the memoirs of a Russian Menshevik there are excerpts from Maria Spiridonova's defense of individual terror to the Bolsheviks. Spiridonova had assassinated a cruel Czarist General in 1906. Having survived Czarist imprisonment she was again jailed, by the Bolsheviks, for opposing their policy of mass terror.

.... You call this terror (Bolshevik rule). But in the history of the Russian Revolution this word was never meant to signify revenge or intimidation (that was its least important purpose). It did not even mean only the liquidation of one of the people's hangmen. No. The most important element in the terror was PROTEST against the repression of despotism, an attempt to arouse indignation in the souls of humiliated men and women, to fire the conscience of those who stood silent in the face of this humiliation. That is how the terrorist advanced on the enemy. And almost always did the terrorist combine his deed with the voluntary sacrifice of his own life and freedom. I believe that only thus was it possible to justify the terrorist act of the revolutionary

Steinberg, Workshop of the Revolution, p. 132.

3. Gaucher, Les Terroristes, p. 235.
4. Menachem Begin, The Revolt, 9th printing, (Jerusalem: Steimatsky's Agency Limited, 1977), p. 59.
5. Daniel Heradstveit, "The Role of International Terrorism in the Middle East Conflict and its Implications for Conflict Resolution," in Carlton and Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism and World Security, p. 93.
6. Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict", in Carlton and Schaerf, eds., International Terrorism, p. 14.
7. Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism, p. 14.
8. Ibid., p. 10.

9. Hyams' major concerns with how men are governed in the broad political sense, including such areas as leadership, self-determination of groups, etc. There is also another area of concern for the citizen, and although outside the scope of this paper is worth mentioning. The area is 'deviant behavior' and the immense power of state employees to enforce certain behavioral modifications on citizens deemed 'different'. See Nicholas N. Kittrie, The Right To Be Different, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
10. Thomas Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation", in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War, (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 71-79.
11. Dallin and Breslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems, pp. 1-3.
12. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 1.
13. In 1971 the Tupamaros sent threatening letters to Argentinian newspapers and tourists who regularly vacationed in Uruguay, warning them to stay away or face a terrorist incident. Subsequently tourism for 1971 dropped by 50%. Robert Moss, "Uruguay: Terrorism Versus Democracy", Conflict Studies, No. 14, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1971), p. 6. Dutch citizens, including many young children, have been taken hostage by South Moluccan terrorists, and some adults have been killed. There is often very little concern for the mental stress suffered by such victims and its long term effects on them. Frank Ochberg, "The Victim of Terrorism: Psychiatric Considerations", Terrorism, v. 1, 1977, pp. 147-168.
14. Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 351-353.
15. There is no attempt to deny, however, that the Viet Cong were ruthless in their use of terror, often assassination, to discourage villagers from co-operating with the South Vietnamese authorities. Stephen Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future, (Lexington: Heath Lexington, 1970). An excellent account of Vietnamese comment on the problems of being caught between the two warring sides is Ly Qui Chung, Between Two Fires, (New York: Praeger, 1970).
16. Although the European Commission on Human Rights found that the British methods of deep interrogation used in Ulster constituted torture, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, early in 1978, that torture had not been committed, finding Britain guilty only of "inhuman and degrading treatment". As L. C. Green has argued, in reference to the Court's decision, "While the victim and outsiders might not see much difference, from the point of view of law there is a great difference between torture and this finding". Edmonton Journal, 9 February, 1979, p. A5.

17. S. M. M. Qureshi, "Political Violence in the South-Asian Sub-continent", in Yonah Alexander, ed., International Terrorism, (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1976).
18. Brian Crozier, The Rebels, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), p. 159. Crozier was discussing only how to 'respond' to insurgents, often against colonial rulers; he was not concerned with the whole spectrum of political terrorism. His interpretation of 'counter-terrorism' is not the only possible one; a less good/bad opinion is possible.
19. Brian Crozier, ed., Annual of Power and Conflict, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1974), p. 4.
20. Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon", p. 72. Eugene Walter, Terror and Resistance, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 17. Part of the problem with most of these definitions is that they were first used in an era when internal rebellion was widespread.
21. Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 34.
22. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
23. Carl Leiden and Karl Schmitt, The Politics of Violence, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 19.
24. Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 365, 351. Fairbairn suggests that some of these otherwise puzzling bombings, assassination attempts and the like may be the rites of initiation into a terrorist group.
25. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, p. 8.
26. Ibid., p. 33.
27. Ibid., pp. 12-17.
28. Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, pp. 23-35, discusses these four arguments for the use of terror.
29. Hakon Wiberg, "Are Urban Guerrillas Possible?", pp. 18-19.
30. Begin, The Revolt, p. 26.
31. Wiberg, "Are Urban Guerrillas Possible?", p. 19.
32. Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 1.

CHAPTER 4

DOMESTICALLY FOCUSED TERRORISM

No crime a man commits in behalf of his freedom can be as great as the crimes committed by those who deny his freedom.¹

In order to facilitate the comparative discussion of the six terrorist outgroups selected the movements have been divided into two categories - those whose main area of conflict has been domestic on the one hand, and those who have acted internationally on the other. This chapter and the one following focus on the three domestically oriented groups.

Very few post-war terrorist movements have achieved the prominence of Uruguay's Movimiento de liberación nacional (MLN), commonly referred to as the Tupamaros.² Not only did the MLN almost succeed in toppling a national, as opposed to a colonial government; but it was also one of the more romanticized and accepted movements. In 1972 Costa-Gavras released a sympathetic film about the Tupas entitled "State of Siege", and earlier the Tupamaros Comic Book had been published.³ Brilliantly, innovative in terms of military strategies, the Tupamaros were pioneers in urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America, successfully, or so it seemed, contradicting Ché's doctrine of the mobile, rural 'foco' with the establishment of fixed, urban bases. The Tupamaros were also very patient revolutionaries. Although organized in the early 1960's they avoided coming into open conflict with the Uruguayan authorities until around late 1968. Through selective acts, designed both to show their concern for the poor and to reveal government corruption, the Tupamaros

were able to project a 'Robin Hood' image to much of the population. It was only when they began to assassinate police officers and then an American official in 1970 that their image became tarnished. And within three years of these assassinations they ceased to pose any threat to the Uruguayan government.

At about the same time as the Tupamaros were losing credibility and support both through their assassinations and their ineffectiveness against the Uruguayan Army, another terrorist movement was preparing for a brief reign of international notoriety from its urban bases in Montreal, Canada. The Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), kidnapped first a British Trade Commissioner and then a Quebec Government Minister in October, 1970. These kidnappings became the topic of a novel, The Revolution Script.⁴ Unlike the MLN which had established a strong infrastructure and underground network before engaging in protracted conflict with the Uruguayan authorities, the FLQ, whose direct roots also can be traced back to the early 1960's, had appeared briefly, but violently, on the Canadian scene in several disparate waves over a seven year period. But good police work and poor planning on the part of the various terrorist waves had contributed to the early discovery of all cells prior to 1970. The public horror after the murder of Laporte in 1970 prevented the emergence of sympathy for any future FLQ actions.

The third urban terrorist group to be outlined is the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army (PIRA), commonly referred to as the Provos. Although there is a tendency in the literature on the PIRA to label them as conservative, patriotic, nationalist and rightist,⁵ they cannot be so rigidly categorized. They are, nonetheless, rather different in their views from the Tupamaros and the Félquistes. Whereas

religion was irrelevant to the socio-economic considerations of the Tupas, and, at most, peripheral to the nationalist and socio-economic goals of the FLQ, religion plays a central role in the Ulster conflict. Moreover, the PIRA terrorists are waging a three-sided war in that, unlike the MLN and the FLQ, their enemy is not only the state; they must also contend with Protestant terrorists and hostility from the 'Official' Irish Republican Army (IRA). Responsible for much more bloodshed than the Tupas and Félquistes combined, the Provos have used indiscriminate bombings and assassinations, since the late 1960's, as their means of forcing the withdrawal of British troops from the province of Ulster, which they insist must be reunited with the Irish Republic. In spite of their failure to achieve this goal the Provos have not been defeated by the British. Whereas terrorism in Uruguay and Canada appears to be a thing of the past, in Ulster terrorism is still very much a problem for today.

In order to facilitate one's understanding of the development of these three groups the history of each is now discussed separately and synoptically. Then in Chapter 5 the three groups are discussed together as to their achievements and failings.

The Tupamaros

At first glance Uruguay seems a most unlikely candidate for a terrorist movement in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In striking contrast to its neighbours, Uruguay had long enjoyed fairly democratic and stable government, as well as many of the benefits of a modern welfare state. Literacy was high, population growth was low, and there were various health and pension schemes.⁶ Indeed, Uruguay appeared a

model of what other Latin American nations sought to achieve.

Yet Uruguay, from the end of the Korean War, was a nation in deep economic difficulties. Uruguay's economy was heavily dependent on stockbreeding. Meat and wool, which account for over three-quarters of its exports,⁷ had been in great demand during both world wars and the Korean War. Prices had risen steadily and the economy was buoyant. But during these prosperous years little was done to modernize outmoded technologies, or to diversify and expand markets. When prices for meat and wool began to drop the Uruguayan economy faltered. Deficit financing became a yearly practise. At the same time large amounts of local capital and cattle were smuggled out of the country,⁸ and inflation increased dramatically.⁹ The government's wage and price controls policies were so violently opposed that under President Pacheco some strikers had to be 'mobilized' into the army in order to force their return to the work place. Emergency powers were used extensively by the Executive.¹⁰ But the government could not control the economic situation and, as the foreign debt and inflation spiralled ever upward, salaries were not paid and social services collapsed. Uruguay became a developed country which was "undeveloping at speed."¹¹

Into this chaotic social and economic situation came a group of individuals determined to overthrow the government by force of arms. One of the apparent founders of the M.L.N. Raúl Sendic, had begun his anti-government agitation in the early 1960's in Northern Uruguay, the poorest and least developed part of the nation. In that vast, underpopulated region there are a few large landlords, many of whom are absentees, and a largely landless peasant population. These day-labourers; often in virtual bondage to plantation owners, and hungry

and homeless for half of each year, seemed a logical focus for unionization to a young, middle-class, socialist law student.¹² By 1962, after living among them for two years Sendic had organized these workers and they marched, on foot, men, women and children, the three hundred and fifty miles to the capital, Montevideo, to publicize their plight. It was an extraordinary protest march. Yet, although a congressional commission publicly acknowledged the abhorrent living and working conditions of these people, nothing was done to aid them. And in two subsequent marches to Montevideo no benefits were granted.

It seems reasonable to surmise that Sendic came to two conclusions after the failure of these annual marches: first, peaceful demonstrations made no impact on a violent government; and second, the Northern peasants were too far removed from the seat of economic and political power to pose any persistent threat to that same government. Therefore another strategy had to be devised. Sendic and others,¹³ in spite of the success of Castro in the Sierra Maestre, and the advice of Ché to establish the rural 'foco', opted instead for an urban strategy.¹⁴ There were several excellent reasons for choosing Montevideo. Uruguay's capital city stretches over some three hundred square kilometres and houses nearly half the nation's three million citizens. There are very active labour and student unions headquartered there and general political participation levels were high. Personal and institutional targets for assassination, kidnapping or sabotage were all within easy access. The crowded, bustling city would provide shelter from government detection as well as acting as a deterrent to ruthless policies of repression. Finally, the Tupas wanted to make sure that, if they were killed in their struggle, as many people as possible would know

about their heroic sacrifices. The MLN was so confident of its ability to challenge the government that it believed that Argentina and Brazil might intervene on Uruguay's behalf. They looked forward to this possibility, arguing that the presence of foreign troops in the capital would inspire the general population to join in a war of resistance.¹⁵

Although the name 'Tupamáros' appeared for the first time only in August, 1965,¹⁶ various incidents occurring prior to that date have since been attributed to the MLN, including numerous bank robberies and arms raids. But it was not until late 1966 that the Montevideo police stumbled onto the scope of the Tupamaros organization, after giving chase to a stolen car. Among their discoveries; a youth club was a front for a paramilitary training centre and an accountancy school housed a firing range and explosives laboratory.¹⁷ The government's immediate response to these revelations was to increase anti-guerrilla training by sending police officers to Washington, D.C. for special courses.¹⁸

Confrontation was heightened in December, 1967, when Pacheco Areco succeeded to the Presidency. Pacheco suppressed most opposition by silencing left-wing newspapers and parties, and by continuing the policy of suspending constitutional guarantees. Violent strikes by refrigeration workers and students throughout 1968-1969 foreshadowed a more militant stand against the authorities by the Tupamaros, who engineered two daring kidnappings during that same period. On 7 August, 1968, Dr. Ulises Pereyra Reverbel, a close associate of President Pacheco and a known union antagonist, was kidnapped; then soon released without any demands being made. At this time the Tupamaros only wanted to humiliate the government. As their popularity soared, especially

among students, they pulled off the nation's largest robbery at a casino; and released stolen account books from the Monty Society, which they had burglarized in February, 1969. These documents incriminated prominent government personnel, including Pereyra Reverbel and Frick Davie,¹⁹ in illegal speculation in foreign currencies, smuggling, customs frauds and loans at usurious rates.²⁰ Such expositions were very popular with the press and the public, but they were not necessarily harmful to the accused who were rarely charged.

In September, 1969, the Tupamaros again kidnapped a prominent Uruguayan, Gaetano Pelligrini Giampetro, a well-known publisher and banker. Pelligrini was seized the same day that, an agreement having been worked out in the lengthy bank clerks' strike, the Pacheco regime had militarized the strikers. The Tupamaros hoped to secure a more favourable settlement for the workers in return for Pelligrini's safe release. However, their demands for the reinstatement of strikers were not met. After more than two months in captivity Pelligrini was released in return for a ransom of some \$60,000 U.S. 'donated' to a Montevideo hospital for city workers.²¹

The MLN's first, and only, purely military action was the occupation of the suburban town of Pando on 8 October, 1969, the second anniversary of 'Ché Guevara's death.²² The physical occupation of the town was a success, but the Tupamaros were caught in a surprise ambush on their attempted return to Montevideo. Some were lucky enough to escape; others were killed in the exchange of gunfire; the rest surrendered. Of these, a few were publicly murdered after they had turned over their weapons, or, seriously wounded, were lying defenseless.²³ In spite of this defeat the Tupamaros argued that they had attained a victory in

that there had been a 'qualitative leap forward'. They were following Ché's dictum in his tricontinental message to create "Publicity Vietcong style - what matters is the number of battles waged, never mind who wins."²⁴

After Pando the level of violence, by both sides, rose dramatically. In April, 1970 two police officers were 'executed' for allegedly torturing and/or murdering MLN prisoners.²⁵ In July of that year the Tupas kidnapped Judge Pereyra Manelli, charging him with complicity in the Monty scandal and dereliction of duty in failing to condemn the torture of prisoners. Then three days later the Tupamaros followed the continental trend of international kidnappings and took both the Brazilian Consul, Aloysio Dias Gomide, and a United States AID official, Dan Mitrione, as hostages. These kidnappings can be viewed as another 'qualitative leap forward' by the Tupamaros. However, for reasons to be discussed later they actually were the death-knell of the MLN.

Although kidnappings in other parts of Latin America had sometimes resulted in bloodshed,²⁶ since the two previous MLN incidents had concluded with the safe release of the hostages, despite the government's refusal to give in to any of the terrorists' demands, the general belief was that these hostages too would not be harmed.²⁷ Dias Gomide and Judge Manelli were released eventually, but Dan Mitrione was 'executed', purportedly when the Pacheco government failed to release imprisoned Tupamaros. Alain Labrousse recounts, however, that the decision to kill Mitrione had been agreed upon earlier, perhaps at the same time as the alleged police torturers had been killed in April.²⁸ Mitrione was believed to be an adviser to the police on interrogation and torture. Richard Gott, writing in the Manchester Guardian, and Father Luis

Colonnese, an official with the U.S. Catholic Conference, interviewed in Commonwealth, both charged that Mitrione personally, and U.S. AID generally, had been committed to the use of security techniques, including torture, in Latin America.²⁹

The price the Tupamaros paid for the American's death was an immediate loss in popular support, much of which was never regained.³⁰ The government's response was to call in the army and grant it unlimited powers of search and detention in a determined effort to crush the insurgents.³¹ Although Costa-Gavras' "State of Siege" sympathetically recreated the Mitrione murder from the Tupamaros viewpoint, and although the MLN was able to kidnap other prominent national and international figures, their most famous victim being the United Kingdom's Ambassador in Uruguay, Geoffrey Jackson,³² the MLN lost the offensive with Mitrione's death. By mid-1973 the organization was routed; many suspected Tupamaros were in detention, often with no charges being laid. Little was heard from those who had managed to go underground.³³

The Tupamaros are often considered 'third-world' terrorists. Although Uruguay is a modern nation, in certain respects it is also an underdeveloped country. Despite the introduction of pension and hospitalization benefits there are many hungry, poorly housed, uneducated Uruguayans, especially in the slums of Montevideo. The Tupamaros hoped to capitalize on the gross inequities within the national social fabric. Their appeal for change was a class-oriented one, they were determined to overthrow the economic and political elite which was governing Uruguay for its personal benefit. For as long as the Tupas concentrated their energies on exposing government corruption and avoided bloodshed they were supported, not only by the poor, but

also by the middle classes. But when the tarnished government fought back ruthlessly, and abandoned all civil liberties and protections, most of the population was unprepared to support the escalation of violence by the Tupamaros. When the discriminating terror of the MLN was not accepted and support was lost the Tupamaros were defeated. Without popular support their early offensive advantage was lost. Compounding this weakness the government and the military used every available means to ferret them from their hiding places. There were no restrictions on the governmental terror and it proved sufficient to the task.

The FLQ

Although they advocated radical economic changes similar to those of the Tupamaros, the members of the Front de libération du Québec have been identified most closely with their goal of an independent French nation in North America. Over two hundred years ago the French colonists in Canada were defeated by the British at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. Cut off from their linguistic family, the French-speaking inhabitants of the newly British colony refused to be assimilated despite numerous British schemes to achieve that goal.

With the creation of Canada in 1867 the predominantly French-speaking province of Quebec found itself alone in its struggle to maintain, through education and linguistic guarantees, the French culture and language as they had evolved in Canada. Only in the 1960's did the people of Quebec, long content to exist in solitude from the rest of Canada, demand more from Confederation in both socio-cultural and economic terms. Quebec was a mineral-rich province with a high concentration of foreign investment and ownership; where the English-

speaking minority occupied nearly all the managerial positions, and where unilingual French-speakers very often occupied the lowest rungs of the work ladder, or were unemployed. But in 1960 a new Liberal provincial government started to develop policies for economic and social change which came to be known as the 'Quiet Revolution'. The desire to become 'Maîtres chez nous' was widespread. Self-pride and militancy, manifested in the work force in numerous, violent strikes, became a part of Quebec life.³⁴

One of the apparent triggers for the creation of the FLQ was a statement by an apparently totally insensitive President of the federally-owned national railway that there were just not enough qualified French-speaking Canadians to serve in executive positions with the CNR.³⁵ The immediate response to this provocative statement was widespread rioting in the province, followed by the founding of the first separatist party.³⁶ A few months later, in the spring of 1963, there was a wave of fire-bombings directed at federal armouries and monuments by a group which advertised itself, on public buildings, as the FLQ. Publicity ensued, especially after the destruction of the Wolfe Monument in Quebec City.³⁷ In the midst of further bombings the first FLQ 'Manifesto' was released to the 'French Nation of Quebec' in April, 1963.

The style of this message was peculiar. It stated that the FLQ was a volunteer revolutionary movement of 'suicide commandos' determined to destroy the 'colonial', i.e. Federal Government, presence, and to eliminate all 'collaborators' with the 'occupying power'. The authors also demanded treatment as prisoners of war as accorded by the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention.³⁸ The tone of the communiqué was very much that of World War II European resistance movements; which was not surprising

considering that the leader of this first FLQ group was a Belgian immigrant, and one-time youthful courier for the resistance, Georges Schoeters.³⁹

Initially the FLQ had thrown fairly harmless Molotov cocktails, but within a few weeks they were able to manufacture and place more powerful bombs. It was not long before the first victim, a bilingual veteran and soon-to-be retired nightwatchman, was killed. The FLQ tried very hard to deny guilt in his death, shifting the blame to those who 'collaborated' with the occupiers, reasoning that it was just such support and co-operation with the federal authorities that forced the 'patriots' to adopt violence. Heady on rhetoric, the Félquistes claimed to have established a parallel court system to try foreigners and traitors, and hinted that they were also acquiring funds, an allusion to robbing banks and credit unions.⁴⁰

The public reaction to this first, of several, victims was immediate, and strongly against not only the terrorists but all separatists per se.⁴¹ When a second bomb mentally and physically incapacitated the police officer attempting to defuse it the authorities stepped up their investigations. Within a few months the cell was broken.

Tried, and found guilty under the Criminal Code, these terrorists inspired a second wave of violence which coincided with their sentencing in September, 1963. A group calling itself l'Armée de Libération du Québec (ALQ) carried out numerous bank and weapons robberies. There was little to distinguish the ALQ; some members were related to the original Félquistes, a relationship which was to occur again in several cases; and the extravagant lifestyle of some gang members eventually

alerted the authorities. This group specialized in robberies and seemed to be less committed ideologically.

Subsequent waves of terrorists⁴² continued to rob armouries and construction sites for weapons and explosives until 1970. Armed robberies were also committed against credit unions, cinemas and social centres in efforts to raise capital for food, lodgings, transportation, etc. There was a brief liaison with the militant wing of the black power movement in the United States; a concerted attempt to identify with, and gain the support, of labour; and an apparently close and productive relationship with elements from the government-sponsored and funded Company of Young Canadians.⁴³

If one individual could be charged with inspiring the FLQ to greater things he was, perhaps, a very angry young Quebecker named Pierre Vallières.⁴⁴ A propagandist and intellectual, Vallières attempted, through his writings, to politicize and knit together the disparate histories of several FLQ waves. In April, 1966 he and several others established the first Central Committee of the FLQ. Their immediate goal was to support strikers against employers and thereby build up popular support. Vallières hoped that the bombings since 1963 would radicalize protest and create mass sympathy for violent alternatives to change. Over time mass organizations would be created, these would occupy schools and factories and create the conditions for a civil war. However, in one of the first bombings undertaken by this group an innocent lady was killed. Within a few months a teen-age bomb-carrier also died. The trade union movement rejected this escalation of violence and Vallières and a co-defendant, Charles Gagnon, were tried and sentenced, after an unusual trial, where the comments of the

prosecutor and judge helped create an image of political repression in Canada.⁴⁵

Like the mythical phoenix, however, the FLQ rejuvenated itself with a series of spectacular bombings, including a few in Ottawa during 1968-1969.⁴⁶ More arrests followed, and each time the police claimed to have broken the FLQ.⁴⁷

Nonetheless, sporadic, minor bombings occurred through until July, 1970 as well as numerous robberies, not all of which were related to the FLQ. Then in October of that year the FLQ kidnapped, first the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal; and subsequently a senior Quebec Cabinet Minister, in an effort to escalate the struggle and to secure the release of jailed comrades.⁴⁸ There is a great deal of controversy surrounding these two kidnappings which will be discussed in the next chapter. For the present it is worth mentioning that with the 'qualitative leap' to kidnapping the FLQ appeared to gain popular support; especially among the province's francophone youth. But with the murder of Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Cabinet Minister, they forfeited an incredible amount of support and sympathy.

The Federal Government, however, modified its position of no negotiations with the terrorists after Laporte's death. In exchange for the safe return of Mr. Cross they offered his kidnappers exile in Cuba, which they accepted.

Eventually the members of the cell responsible for the Laporte kidnapping and murder were arrested, charged, tried, found guilty and sentenced. In 1978 over 40,000 Quebecers signed a petition demanding the immediate release of the man convicted of Laporte's murder.⁴⁹

Over the years a climate of sympathy has been nurtured towards those who took part in the kidnapping. When two of the Cross kidnapers voluntarily returned to Canada to face charges there was much interest in them. Thousands were on hand at the airport, and both were given jobs with the provincial government since they have been free on bail since they entered guilty pleas.⁵⁰ They have come a long way from being described as "sewer rats".⁵¹

Throughout its erratic history the FLQ did not appear to enjoy the continuity of leadership and the well-established infrastructure that proved so helpful to the Tupamaros. For the most part the FLQ concentrated on protest bombings which occasionally claimed unintended victims, and caused great harm to the group's image. When the FLQ adopted the then popular Latin American policy of kidnapping foreign diplomats and government officials they failed to anticipate the revolution which the murder of one of their victims would precipitate.

Unlike Uruguay where the Tupamaros' struggle had been class-oriented, the nationalist aspirations of the FLQ were not defeated with their terrorism. Continued support for the goal of sovereignty was reflected in the election of the separatist Parti Québécois in 1977.

The Provos

Warfare, both regular and irregular, has been central to Irish history during the last eight hundred years for it was in the twelfth century that English kings were granted sovereignty over Ireland by Pope Adrian IV. Because the vast majority of the Irish did not convert after Henry VIII created the Church of England, suspicious English sovereigns instituted and maintained a policy whereby 'loyal' Protestant

Scots and English were settled in rebellious, Catholic Ireland, and granted numerous, land, economic and social benefits.⁵² Small in numbers, but powerful both militarily and economically, these colonizers were able to hold onto the Irish domain until 1921, although over time their grip had weakened. After two centuries of intermittent, but bloody, guerrilla activity the British negotiated a 'treaty' whereby twenty-six of the thirty-two counties of Ireland became first a Free State and eventually a Republic in 1938.

The Black and Tan War of 1919-1921, which followed the 1916 Easter Rebellion, defeated the British in Ireland. Exhausted after World War I the British Army was unable to defeat the Irish Republican Army insurgents. Nor were the IRA able to defeat the British. There were only two courses of action open to London; to 'govern through coercion of a type which was "so violent as to be unpalatable to British public opinion";⁵³ or to negotiate a settlement. The original Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was very favourable to Britain. The twenty-six predominantly Catholic counties formed a Free State, but legislators took an oath to the Crown, and Britain retained economic advantages and facilities. Militant Republicans refused to accept partition and Crown allegiance, and a Civil War ensued in the Free State. Defeated by former comrades-in-arms, the IRA went underground in 1923.

Between 1932-1938 Eamon De Valera, a former IRA militant who had come to power, managed to change parts of the 1921 Treaty and the Free State became completely independent in 1949. This event appeared to seal permanently the fate of the six Northern counties of Ulster. The IRA again split with many members resigned to this partition, but militants determined to force British withdrawal through a bombing campaign in

Ulster and in England. Defeated in the 1940's the IRA regrouped in the 1950's and carried on a low intensity guerrilla campaign along the Republic of Eire/Ulster border. Both the Irish and Ulster governments used repression, including internment to defeat the Republicans.⁵⁴ By the late 1960's it appeared as if the IRA was indeed a terror of the past.

However, in Ulster the Protestants with a two to one majority had created a "Protestant state for a Protestant people". J. Bowyer Bell has succinctly summarized the tragedy of Ulster rule.

London turned Ulster over to the Protestants.... The Protestants subjected the Catholic minority in Ulster to ritual humiliation. As much as possible, the unionist government at Stormbunt restricted the advantages of the partition to the Protestants. They added to the traditional prejudices - housing, employment and welfare. All this occurred without any intervention by the British Parliament, which was delighted to be rid of the Irish issue for the first time in centuries.⁵⁵

Nearly fifty years of non-interference by Westminster in Ulster ~~affairs must~~ have confirmed a widespread Protestant belief that there was no need to accommodate the large Catholic minority. When initially peaceful, but all too soon violent, opposition emerged with the founding of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in 1968 it was too late for incremental change. The brutal Unionist government response to the peaceful NICRA marches did not go unnoticed in Dublin, London or America. Nor did the Protestant gang attacks on Belfast's Catholic slums. When the Ulster Catholics beseeched the IRA for military support in the wake of unprecedented violence after the August, 1969 Apprentice Boys' Parade⁵⁶ in Derry and Belfast, it was slow to materialize. The majority in the IRA opted for a policy of continuing political support for NICRA

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. The words of 'Long Dan Sweeney' in Leon Uris, Trinity, (New York: Bantam, 1976), p. 466.
2. The Tupamaros take their name from Tupac Amaru, an Incan prince, who rebelled against the Spanish authorities in 1780-1781 and was defeated by them; then quartered. Subsequently the Spanish adopted the name 'tupamaros' to refer to any rebels; and during the struggle for Uruguayan independence in the early 1800's, the followers of the rebel General José Artigas were so called. But rather than protesting the intended slur, Artigas' followers embraced the name. In this same spirit the young urban terrorists of the 1960's adopted the name Tupamaros. In public relations terms their choice was a shrewd one, since it can be linked both to the continent's Indian heritage and the continuing struggle for economic independence.
3. Rosley Crowther reviewed "State of Siege" twice in the New York Times, 14 April, 1973, p. 39, and 22 April, 1973, p. 11. He found it both 'riveting' and 'harrowing', not because it was necessarily true; he could not know if that were so; but because it could be true. The Tupamaros Comic Book, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971).*
4. Brian Moore, The Revolution Script, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971).
5. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, p. 69.
6. Although Uruguay was long believed to be a workers' paradise the actual pension, hospitalization and other benefits have not met expectations. Interviews with working class Uruguayans on this subject can be found in Maria Gilio, The Tupamaros, translated by Anne Edmondson, (London, Secker and Warburg, 1972), parts I and II.
7. Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas, (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p. 212.
8. Ibid., p. 213. James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), p. 175. Half a million cattle were smuggled into Brazil in 1971 alone.
9. The 1967 rate of inflation was a staggering 136%. Alain Labrousse, The Tupamaros; translated by Dinah Livingstone, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 27. With 100 as the cost-of-living index for 1963, by 1973 it was almost 6,000. Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 176.
10. Excepting 1966, constitutional guarantees were suspended every year - a 'state of siege' - from 1965 until 1972. For the first three times the suspensions were directed against labour; after 1971 against the Tupamaros, Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 178.

11. Richard Gott, "Why the Joker's Turned Wild", Manchester Guardian, 103(6):4, 15 August, 1970.
12. Sendić organized the sugar workers and other plantation staff because they were easier to unionize than the staff of the stock-breeding farms who were widely scattered and fewer in numbers. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, pp. 32-35.
13. Even now, after apparent defeat, very little is known about the leadership of the Tupamaros - background, training, or how they spent their underground years. Unlike some other terrorist groups they have never aspired to personal prominence.
14. Urban guerrillas have become so popular that one tends to forget the role they played in the Second World War in cities like Warsaw and Leningrad. Immortalized in Pontecorvo's "The Battle of Algiers", the Algerian FLN's long struggle is best remembered for its urban element which lasted for approximately one year during 1956-1957. Yet the FLN was badly defeated in Algiers. There does not appear to be any urban guerrilla movement which has played a decisive role in an overall victory to date. Wiberg, "Are Urban Guerrillas Possible?", p. 19.
15. On the choice of an urban guerrilla model see Arturo Prozecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 15-16.
16. On the evening of 25 August, 1965 the Tupamaros bombed the Bayer pharmaceutical depot in Montevideo. They were protesting 'U.S. aggression' in Vietnam. Their first message, left at this site was anti-American, pro-Viet Cong, and overflowing with Cuban revolutionary rhetoric.

Death to the Yankee assassins in Vietnam!
 In view of the criminal intervention in
 Vietnam, oppressed people must unite to
 crush the common enemy. Bayer, a Nazi firm,
 supplies fuel to the American aggressors.
 Gringo dictators get out. Long live the
 Viet Cong! Long live the Revolution!
 Tupamaros.

Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 37.
17. Ibid., p. 41.
18. Ibid., p. 41.
19. Pereyra Reverbel was re-kidnapped on 30 March, 1971, and Frick Davie on 14 May of that same year. Both were held until discovered by police in May, 1972.
20. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 47. In July, 1970 a commission of inquiry into the Monty Affair confirmed nearly all the allegations laid by the MLN.

21. Carol E. Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings, pp. 102-103. The ransom was paid by Pellegrini's family. The Uruguayan authorities never granted concessions in kidnappings.
22. For a descriptive narration of this operation see Gilio, The Tupamaros, Part III.
23. Murder was perhaps the more humane alternative as many of the Tupamaros prisoners were brutally tortured. Gilio interviewed some of these torture victims, The Tupamaros, pp. 142, 149. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, pp. 76-77.
24. Gilio, The Tupamaros, pp. 119-127, for an interview with one of the participants in the Pando operation.
25. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, pp. 77-78.
26. Urban terrorists in neighbouring Brazil had been highly successful in kidnapping foreigners. In September, 1969 the U.S. Ambassador had been exchanged for 15 prisoners; in March, 1970 the Japanese Consul brought 5 more releases; and in June, 1970 the West German Ambassador was traded for 40 prisoners. Subsequently, in December, 1970 the Swiss Ambassador was returned for 70 prisoners. Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings, pp. 94-101.
27. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 100.
28. Ibid., p. 104.
29. Gott, "Why the Joker's Turned Wild", and "Unanswered Questions About a Tragedy: Death of a Policeman", Commonweal, 92(19): 456-457, 17 September, 1970.
30. It was not only the international press which played up the fact that Mitriane was the father of nine small children rather than his work in AID. "Senseless Killing in Uruguay", New York Times, 10 August, 1970, lead editorial. The Uruguayan papers also had numerous pictures and stories of this family man which touched the family-loving Uruguayans deeply. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 113.
31. The Uruguayan army succeeded in crushing the MLN; but they also destroyed the last vestiges of democratic rule in the nation with a 'soft coup' in February, 1973. The new President, Bordaberry, remained in office but all powers were held by a 'security council' of military and civilian administrators. Prozecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, pp. 73-76.
32. Geoffrey Jackson, People's Prison, (London: Faber, 1973).
33. In an attempt to remove some of the military power from Montevideo the MLN established rural guerrilla bases in outlying areas in 1971-1972, known as 'Plan Tata'. These, however, were not very successful. Prozecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 16.

34. George Radwanski and Kendal Windeyer, No Mandate But Terror, (Richmond Hill: Simon and Shuster, 1971), chapter 4.
35. Gustave Morf, Terror in Quebec, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1970), p. 1.
36. Ibid., p. 2. Dr. Marcel Chaput's Parti Républicain de Québec was founded in December, 1962.
37. Quebec City is the capital of the province of Quebec. Wolfe was the English General who defeated the French, under de Montcalm, on a field outside the city in 1763. In destroying this monument the FLQ could not have toppled a more obnoxious symbol of the conquest of the 'habitants' (a term used to describe the French-speaking citizens of the province). In 1966 the IRA bombed Nelson's Column, in Dublin to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising.
38. Morf, Terror in Quebec, pp. 4-5.
39. The actual founding date of the FLQ is unknown. It is known that a clandestine Revolutionary Committee, later to be known as the Réseau de Résistance, RR, was formed in the city of Montreal in 1962, after the CNR incident. Early in 1963 about half of the estimated RR membership split to form the Front de libération québécois, FLQ. Like the RR, their goal was to achieve independence by force; unlike the RR, they quickly attempted to do so through fire-bombings, etc. Their leader, Georges Schoeters, modelled them on the Belgian resistance movements of World War II, hence the use of terms like 'collaborators', 'patriots', etc. Morf, Terror in Quebec, p. 2.
40. Like other groups the FLQ resented the terrorist epithet and went to great lengths to blame others for deaths and injuries. Later FLQ groups, however, made no pretense at being a parallel power, until, perhaps, the kidnapping cells. The Tupamaros, through their well-publicized people's prisons and 'executions' of alleged police informers sought to be such a parallel power. This strategy has been condemned by their philosophical mentor, Abraham Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, translated and edited by Donald Hodges, (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1973), p. 267.
41. The Parti républicain leader, M. Chaput, stated that the murder was the work either of English provocateurs or communists out to discredit all separatists. Morf, Terror in Quebec, p. 6.
42. Depending on the author read there were from five to eleven separate, but sequential, networks, the most detailed analysis is Marc Laurendeau, Les Québécois Violents, (Montreal: Les Editions du Boreal Express, 1974), pp. 222-224.
43. Most writings on the FLQ focus, almost exclusively, on events after the date of the first kidnapping. Parry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat, chapter 28; and Morf, Terror in Quebec, provide a good

commentary on pre-October 1970 developments. On the close ties with the CYC, especially by Paul-Pierre Geoffrey, the 'super-bomber' see Morf, pp. 139-140.

44. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 167.
45. Ibid., pp. 129-134 for a discussion of the trial. Vallieres autobiography; White Niggers of America, translated by Joan Pinkham, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), became a sort of Bible for Quebecois radicals in the late 1960's.
46. In 1968-1969 one man, Pierre Paul Geoffrey was responsible for a series of spectacular and destructive explosions. No one died but damages were more serious than ever before. Laurendeau refers to this series as 'les super-bombs'. Laurendeau, Les Québécois Violents, p. 224.
47. Prior to the 1970 October crisis the 'success rate' of the police had been very high. Nearly every FLQ crime had been solved, and with no special police powers required. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 129.
48. Numerous books have been published detailing the events of the 'October Crisis', as the period of the kidnappings has come to be called. A good journalistic account is Radwanski and Windeyer, No Mandate But Terror.
49. Macleans, 25 December, 1978.
50. On 7 August, 1979 the Cosette-Trudels were sentenced to two years less a day.
51. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 4.
52. Perhaps the most popular account of the Irish struggle is the novel by Leon Uris, Trinity. It is unabashedly pro-Republican.
53. J. Bowyer Bell, Transnational Terror, AEI - Hoover Policy Study, No. 17, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 30-31.
54. For a discussion of internment and other arbitrary methods of justice in both the South and North see Ovid Demaris, Brothers In Blood, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), pp. 324-327. J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror, (New York: Basic Books, 1978), pp. 223-225.
55. Bell, Transnational Terrorism, p. 31.
56. The Apprentice Boys' Parade marks the victory, in 1690 of King William of Orange over the Irish Catholic forces of King James II at the Battle of the Boyne.

57. Sean MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), pp. 133-143 gives a first-hand account of these events by the first PIRA leader. Demaris, Brothers In Blood, pp. 306-312 also discusses the split.
58. P. G. Macdonald, Stopping the Clock, (London: Robert Hale, 1977), p. 133. This account of bomb disposal relating to terrorism details the types of bombs used and the methods developed to counter them. The book is encouraging. On Ulster, Macdonald reports that the 'success rate' of bomb disposal experts is very high - averaging 48%. Although the bombers did £200 million damage and killed hundreds of people, including over one hundred bombers, the costs would have been considerably higher in both human and economic losses without the disposal teams.
59. The kidnapers, Eddie Gallagher and Marion Coyle, wanted the release of their lovers and one, unknown to them personally, Provisional also serving time. The PIRA have adamantly denied knowledge or sanction of this kidnapping. Demaris, Brothers In Blood, pp. 366-367. For six days in December, 1975, PIRA bombers held an English couple hostage in their central London apartment but finally surrendered on 12 December.
60. The level of violence and number of deaths in Argentina over the last decade, as well as the numerous right and left-wing terrorist groups, comes close to approximating the Ulster violence. Unlike the Ulster groups, however, some Argentinian groups have used kidnapping incidents to acquire enormous sums of money. Justo Escobar y Sebastian Velasquez, Examen de la violencia Argentina, (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1975) is a detailed account of the violence of that era.
61. Mr. Christopher Ewart-Biggs, the UK's Ambassador to the Republic of (Eire was killed in a bomb blast on 21 July, 1976, while travelling to Dublin from his residence.
62. Sir Richard Sykes, the U.K.'s Ambassador to the Netherlands was shot by assassins in the Hague on 22 March, 1979. A Belgian banker was also shot soon after.
63. Mr. Airey Neave, Conservative Party spokesman on Northern Ireland died in a car-bomb blast as he left the Houses of Parliament in London on 30 March, 1979.
64. Frank Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). This is a detailed study of life in a Catholic ghetto in Ulster, with much emphasis on how the antagonists perceive each other. The discussion of 'telling', a method of quickly identifying friend or foe through speech, clothing and behavioral clues not obvious to the outsider (chapter 2) is most informative.

CHAPTER 5

EVALUATING THE 'SAVING REMNANT'

It is not those who can inflict the most suffering who will win, but those who can endure the most.¹

The first point that comes to mind when considering the MLN, FLQ and PIRA is that these three groups are, in a sense, representative of a spectrum of domestic, non-state terrorism ranging from the rather ineffective, low intensity operations of the FLQ; through the selective, disciplined actions of the MLN; to the ceaseless onslaught by the PIRA against the British presence in Ulster. Yet, none has proved itself a winning formula, and it is doubtful that any of these movements ever will. All have failed to take over effectively the social power within their nations, Wiberg's earlier discussed maximum criterion of achievement.² At the present only the Provisionals appear to be surviving 'socially as a continuous actor.' Both the Felquistes and Tupamaros are incapable of concerted action; in fact they do not even engage in any public communications. These two groups no longer fulfill Wiberg's minimum criterion of social survivability.

Yet recognizing this reality one cannot dismiss the FLQ, MLN and PIRA as total failures for they have all achieved some small victories against their enemies, and have had a social impact far greater than their numbers and nonsuccess would suggest, both at home and abroad. In Canada; the separatist aspirations shared by the FLQ and others, seemingly disgraced with Pierre Laporte's death, have been revived and dignified through the democratic election of a provincial government committed to

Quebec separatism. The Tupamaros, in defeat, did succeed in bringing down the Uruguayan Government; but it was not replaced by a socialist 'people's democracy'; rather, a militarily controlled 'Security Council' rules through the President.³ In Ulster the PIRA terrorists succeeded in bombing their way to Cheyne Row for unofficial talks with the British authorities, at the same time, they have so alienated and terrified the Protestant majority that the British have been unable to impose a settlement on the warring parties.⁴ In fact, the bitterness engendered by the indiscriminate terror practised by all sides to the conflict has contributed to this hardening of attitudes: "we ask no mercy and we accept no compromises".⁵ One of the saddest features of this great tragedy is the blind, sectarian hatred manifested by very young children; hatred so intense that it augurs little hope for the future.⁶

These three examples of internal terrorism by non-state actors do not present a coherence as regards the utility of terrorism. Only one group is still functioning in violent opposition to the authorities. None has yet achieved its political objectives. The example of the MLN offers little 'hope' for future revolutionaries - it helped to put into office a more repressive administration than it had sought to overthrow. The FLQ, on the other hand, although personally defeated, can be viewed as another manifestation of the continuing desire for a French nation in North America; a desire fully shared by the provincial government now in power. In a sense, then, the Félquistes may still win their political objective. There is also this possibility in Ulster, but the rigidity and mistrust on both sides makes this less likely. Nonetheless all three movements have enjoyed prominence, publicity and sympathy throughout their campaigns. What they did accomplish, and its importance to

terrorist movements in general is now discussed.

Andrew Pierre has suggested six general motivations for acts of international non-state terrorism which are equally applicable to internal non-state terrorism. In addition to a political goal - people's democracy, a French nation, a thirty-two county Eire - these include attention and publicity for the cause; the acquisition of money and resources to finance the organization; the liberation of comrades; the erosion of support for the authorities and their laws; and as a response to government repression, popular apathy or personal drives.⁷ Having already discussed the political goals of each group, the latter five categories are employed as a framework within which to compare and evaluate these three terrorist movements.

Publicity

Publicity, preferably sympathetic, is of vital importance to any opposition movement, violent or otherwise. This is particularly so in the case of terrorists because they must rely on others to spread their message. Since they themselves are unable to maintain offices and information headquarters in cities like Montevideo, Montreal and Belfast, they come to depend on either externally generated sympathy or on support from segments of the local media as their vehicle for making themselves known, and defending their activities. Television is of the greatest help here for it provides almost instantaneous, visual commentary.

One of the more serious problems for violent outgroups is the now generally negative image of terrorists. In a discussion relating to the media and communications James Halloran noted that, optimally, media

research should be of such a quality that it can contribute to informed decision-making and enlightened policies; yet in reality it has willingly, or unwillingly, served the sponsoring institutions and maintained the status quo.⁸ The reason is not so much that researchers and media personnel are biased and calculating; rather the individuals who make editorial and policy decisions work within a certain environment, and have absorbed, often unknowingly, a clearly defined hierarchy of social and economic values. 'Social norms' are at work; those innocuous beliefs which seem almost as natural as breathing to those within the system; so much so that there is often a tendency for media personnel to produce an extensive and unrealistic consonance when reporting events.⁹

Christopher Warr and Peter Knapper, in their detailed research on the role of the press in the perception of people and events concluded that readers, like media personnel, filter information very selectively; "it was not the content of a newspaper item so much as the reader's impression based upon that item that was of greatest importance" in opinion formation and impression.¹⁰ James Davies noted that the tendency towards simplicity and completeness in human perceptual organization is so strong that man willingly seeks and accepts simple, categorical solutions to complicated problems.¹¹ Through classification of information into consistent wholes a person is better able to make some sense of an otherwise bewildering amount of data. But because of the strong relationship between culturally determined values and social norms, and the cognitions which the reader forms - "We are so accustomed to believing what we see that we find it hard to credit - save in a general way - that we also see what we believe"¹² - the non-state terrorist has a most difficult time in getting his point across. Even if he

does receive sympathetic publicity he cannot be sure that the individual reader will accept the 'justness' of his violent methods.

Precisely to overcome this problem the Tupamaros, early in their struggle, experimented with an innovative, 'Robin Hood' strategy. On Christmas Eve, 1963, a group of young people commandeered a truck loaded with festive foods for a banquet and distributed them among the poor of a Montevideo slum.¹³ In retrospect this type of action aroused considerable sympathy, both in Uruguay and abroad. All too soon, however, the MLN realized the danger of being considered 'good guys'; in the event of a killing the public's shock would be that much greater.¹⁴ This is exactly what happened with the 'executions' of alleged police torturers, including Dan Mitrione; the Uruguayan public would not accept cold-blooded murder. The philosophical mentor of the Tupamaros, Abraham Guillen, commented upon the strategic and political problems which resulted from the tactically flawless Mitrione kidnapping.

The kidnappings of the Brazilian Consul Dias Gomide and the CIA agent Dan Mitrione are instances of tactical successes by the Tupamaros. But in demanding in exchange a hundred detained guerrillas, the Tupamaros found the Uruguayan government obstinate, in order not to lose face altogether. Here a successful tactic contributed to an impossible strategic objective. In having to execute Mitrione because the government failed to comply to their demands the Tupamaros not only failed to accomplish a political objective, but also suffered a political reversal in their newly acquired role of assassins - the image they acquired through hostile mass media.¹⁵

Despite what one may think of Guillen's bias in favour of the MLN and his apparent lack of humanity towards Mitrione, his argument is an important concern for terrorists. Both the Tupamaros and the FLQ

suffered serious losses of popular support with their murders of hostages. The original response to the daring and unexpected kidnappings of Messrs. Cross and Laporte had included many voices, some prominent, urging moderation and concessions by the government.¹⁶ But with Laporte's death such opinions were silenced. Like the Uruguayans many Quebeckers believed that the Félquistes would not kill their hostages. The Premier, Robert Bourassa said, "Those kids, after all, those kids are from our own neck of the woods and basically they aren't bad, they won't kill."¹⁷ A more reflective opinion was voiced by Rene Levesque, the present Premier.

Our assessment was different, because of the quality of the communiques, they looked like dedicated fanatics. And this Quebec frustration - once they start copying this sort of thing from the outside, they want to be taken seriously. If they aren't taken seriously, they will go the limit.¹⁸

For their part the Provisionals have never been involved in a kidnapping for ransom; the Herrema Affair was, however, associated with them since Dr. Herrema's release was to be bargained for at least one Republican.¹⁹ Despite persistent PIRA denials, they were associated with this horrible ordeal.

Needless to say bombings which kill innocent bystanders like night watchmen, secretaries, old age pensioners and infants in their prams cannot enhance the terrorists' image. It is noteworthy that the Provos started to give bomb warnings because of the widespread, adverse publicity to their 1971 bombing campaign.²⁰ And as the Army disposal teams became more adept at successfully dismantling bombs the Provos used shorter and shorter time delays with serious consequences for their bombers.²¹

All terrorists, however, profit to some degree from just having their names in print; they become household words and an accepted part of the community. A few individuals throwing molotov cocktails at Canadian armouries can strike fear in the public if they are reported regularly enough. Governments too can play into the hands of the terrorists and an eager press by repeated pledges that the terrorists have been wiped out, etc. when in fact they are unsure as to the extent of the movement.

Uruguay's government has not had to contend with an internal press eager to aid the terrorists simply because of its stringent censorship policies.²² In Quebec and Ulster, on the other hand, the problem is the exact opposite and can even extend to serious ethical questions such as whether journalists break the law when they make contact with and broadcast interviews with wanted terrorists.

There appears to have been more written, in English and French, about the aftermath of the passage of the War Measures Act,²³ including alleged police harassment of leftists and civil libertarians, than about either the 1970 kidnappings or FLQ terror in general. Canadian journalists and academics, whilst they should be credited with their concern for 'civil rights', seem to have overlooked the negation of these same rights to Messrs. Cross and Laporte as well as to the victims of the FLQ bombings. The same problem is in evidence in Ulster. Interestingly enough; allegations of police brutality and 'torture' against the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and British security forces receive fairly extensive coverage by the media worldwide. Yet at the same time the use of questionable methods of detention and interrogation by Eire's police have not been as extensively reported.²⁴ The United

Kingdom won a pyrrhic victory when the European Court of Human Rights ruled on 18 January, 1978 that it was not guilty of torture in its treatment of suspected IRA terrorists, but rather, only of 'inhuman and degrading methods of interrogation'. However, immeasurable harm has been done to the perceptions of 'British justice' held by millions of people throughout the world who view the harsh efforts of British intelligence to extract information from suspected Republican terrorists as monstrous, whilst often failing to recognize that the detainees may themselves be guilty of heinous crimes.²⁵

In each country certain events have been able to colour strongly the public's, often international as well as domestic, perceptions of the possible 'justness' of violent struggle against seemingly ruthless governments. Canadian justice suffered greatly from the rather clumsy proceedings against Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon in relation to the Lagrenade murder bombing in 1966. Haggart and Golden have discussed the creation of 'folk heroes' and political martyrs by the government in this case. On their release from jail they became "suitable material for interviews in both French and English."²⁶ Articulate and pseudo-intellectual, they used every available opportunity to spread the FLQ's message.

For the Tupamaros a very costly publicity coup was achieved with the tactically brilliant occupation of the suburban town of Pando in October, 1969.²⁷ The 'bloodthirsty behavior' of the police that day - they murdered unarmed and wounded terrorists - generated widespread revulsion towards the security forces and sympathy for the guerrillas; and apparently hardened the terrorists' attitude towards the authorities.²⁸

'Bloody Sunday' of 30 January, 1972 occurred when an illegal Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march in Derry against internment was fired upon by British troops and several unarmed people were killed.²⁹ As with the violent aftermath to the 1969 Apprentice Boys' Parade people in the Catholic districts demanded that the Republicans respond to such events. On that Sunday too there were numerous foreign journalists present in Ulster who filmed the event. These films were telecast world-wide and were in conflict with statements by the British authorities as to what occurred on that day.³⁰

Invaluable publicity can be garnered for either side of a struggle through popular entertainment forms such as films and novels. Undoubtedly one aid to the faltering image of the post-Mitrione MLN was Costa-Gavras' film, 'State of Siege',³¹ a not necessarily factual recreation of Mitrione's kidnapping and death. In the film the Tupamaros were presented as intense, warm, caring, committed individuals, unselfishly dedicated to the goal of a more humane, democratic Uruguay. The Uruguayan and American representatives were grotesque alter-ego caricatures, without humanity or morality. The film was distributed widely, but not in Uruguay, and received enthusiastically throughout the world by youths, leftists and anti-American types generally. It was a most effective piece of propaganda.

Both the FLQ and the IRA have been central to recently published novels. Brian Moore's The Revolution Script recounts the Cross kidnapping. Amazingly enough the character of Mr. Cross is the least developed in the whole book; the kidnappers are warmly portrayed in terms of their personal affections, commitment and, perhaps, purity and naivety. Even peripheral characters are warmly sketched. Moore is

careful to introduce the Chenier cell terrorists, those responsible for the kidnap and murder of Pierre Laporte, in a somewhat less favourable light; and he is thereby able, very subtly, to suggest that perhaps Mr. Cross's kidnapping was permissible. Somewhat along the reasoning of terrorists elsewhere Moore puts forward the position that if there was never any prior intention to kill the hostages, even if they became casualties during the operation, then that is not terrorism; rather a struggle for national liberation.³² The novel expresses the author's interpretation of the 'noble' struggle of the young terrorists to challenge a heartless government. And he is successful in creating some sympathy for his characters.³³

The Republican movement has long been a part of Irish folklore and literature. A popular modern British novelist in the best 'spy-thriller' tradition, Gerald Seymour, recently published The Glory Boys,³⁴ with a Palestinian central character and a PIRA assistant, McCoy. Interestingly enough, McCoy is not a likeable figure; he is neither warm, dedicated nor incorruptible but quite the opposite. He is hard-nosed, ruthless and without redemption. Yet Seymour has him make the ultimate sacrifice in the end. Even McCoy becomes a noble, if somewhat besmirched, individual. Seymour must be credited with giving some character and dimension to the victim, a middle-aged Israeli nuclear physicist. But the reader does not easily identify with this victim; he too contributes to destruction in that he builds better bombs to kill more people. An extremely unsavory British special agent, Jimmy, is also introduced. Seymour leaves the reader with numerous questions as to who the terrorists really are. His novel is much more thought-provoking and less black and white than either Costa-Gavras' film or Moore's book.

But all three should be appraised cautiously for they convey abstruse images which can influence the reader's conceptions of terrorists and terrorism very subtly, yet very fundamentally.

Totally negative stereotypes of terrorists are also best avoided in literature and films since if one strips a terrorist, or anyone else, of all vestiges of humanity, then any action against him/her becomes permissible. Soon such excesses can be applied to 'suspected' terrorists, 'sympathizers' and ultimately 'co-religionists', 'co-ethnics', etc.

Brian Phelan, speaking at the 1978 Edinburgh International Television Festival cautioned delegates that jokes and reports about the Irish as lazy and stupid were a subtle way of influencing soldiers and others in the United Kingdom that the IRA were 'savages' and that there need be no reservations about killing them, denying them due process of law, and the like.³⁵

The Acquisition of Funds

"The Tupamaros are perilously close to resembling a political Mafia".³⁶ One of the more sensitive problems for guerrillas and terrorists is the acquisition of funds. When comparing the MLN, FLQ and PIRA it is soon evident that the Provisionals have a much easier time of it than the Tupas or Félquistes have had. Whereas FLQ funds were raised through robberies, and Tupas' funds came both from incredibly large robberies and kidnappings, both gangster tactics, the Republicans have always been able to raise their funds from Irish emigrés in America, Australia and South Africa. The same situation has held true for weapons.

The FLQ's second wave, l'Armée de Libération du Québec, was associated with both arms and bank robberies - there were no bombs,

manifestos or political actions. In a four-month period in 1963 the ALQ managed to steal close to \$100,000 in cash, weapons and electronic equipment. Unlike subsequent cells, ALQ members lived ostentatiously and this lifestyle eventually led to questions being asked about their sources of income. Morf felt that the members of this cell, however, were atypical of future FLQ members in that "the liberation of Quebec had been only a pretext to give free rein to those romantic criminal tendencies which may lurk in many people, and to satisfy their thirst for adventure and personal independence."³⁷ Although no other Pelquiste group enjoyed as extravagant a lifestyle as some members of the ALQ, they nonetheless acquired generous funds from the common people. One of the last holdups, in June, 1970 netted \$58,000 from the Student Social Centre of the University of Montreal, hardly a capitalist bastion.³⁸

Weapons and materials for bomb construction, usually dynamite, were also easily available to the FLQ. The province had sixty-seven well stocked armouries, full of expensive military equipment.³⁹ Because of all the unguarded construction sites around Montreal, even as late as 1970, dynamite was readily available.⁴⁰

Yet despite their numerous arms and funds 'expropriations', one of the demands of the FLQ kidnappers in 1970 was for a 'voluntary tax' of \$500,000 in gold bars.⁴¹ The cell responsible for the Cross kidnapping soon agreed to drop this demand. However, the Laporte kidnappers demanded that it be honoured. It is known from accounts of the 'October Crisis' that this Chenier cell barely had the money to pay for their hideout and were unable to afford provisions. When arrested in December, 1970 they were pathetically armed.⁴² There does not appear to have been any great co-ordination or planning among the various cells active in

1970 despite reports that this was so.⁴³

Whereas the FLQ was plagued by a weak and ineffective organizational structure, the various Tupamaros commandos suffered from an absence of autonomy. "Their supreme command is centralized: it knows all, says all, does all."⁴⁴ This rigidity paid handsome benefits in the early years of the MLN but proved fatal when the Tupas forced the Army's hand in 1971-1972. Structured more like a conventional army than independent guerrilla 'focos', the various groups lacked self-direction and adaptability and were more easily discovered by the authorities once initial breakthroughs were made. However, this hierarchical structure had proved advantageous when the Tupas challenged the authorities in the late 1960's. Spectacular robberies, including a casino,⁴⁵ all the banks in the town of Pando,⁴⁶ and kidnappings⁴⁷ netted the MLN large amounts of money. The attack on the Naval Training Centre resulted in a rich supply of weapons for the guerrillas.⁴⁸

Unlike some other terrorist groups, however, the Tupas did not squander their wealth. Their numerous suburban hideouts undoubtedly ate up much of their financial resources; and it is believed that large sums were used to bribe jailers who then assisted in the numerous, and highly successful MLN jailbreaks.⁴⁹ Apparently the personally frugal lifestyle of individual Tupamaros included a total abstinence from alcoholic beverages.⁵⁰

A similar intolerance towards alcohol was subscribed to by Sean MacStiofain, the former head of the Provisionals. He alone of all the terrorists discussed has been described by more than one source as mentally unbalanced. Maria McGuire, in her autobiographical account of her year with the PIRA, has singled out MacStiofain as the cause of the

bloody and murderous bombing campaigns of the 1970's.⁵¹ Parry too has spotlighted MacStiofain as one who so hated his father that he had to oppose all authority figures.⁵²

Yet despite these comments MacStiofain seemed never to have difficulties in either presenting himself as a political militant or in obtaining generous support for his terror campaigns. Besides the traditional fundraising efforts in former colonies,⁵³ the PIRA has sought arms supplies from abroad through Eastern European and Arab contacts.⁵⁴ However, most of its funds, and many of its weapons still come from the Irish communities of the United States.⁵⁵ Because of these generous donations the PIRA have been able to avoid involvements in bank and arms robberies as well as kidnappings for ransom.⁵⁶ Referring to Guillen's quote at the beginning of this section on the 'political Mafia' the PIRA's image has benefitted from the absence of robberies. Revolutionary organizations in particular, when they do not appear just, equitable and concerned for the small depositor or investor, soon lose sympathy. On the topic of extortion kidnappings Guillen has voiced very strong reservations. Kidnappings focus on the repressive apparatus of the guerrillas; and the large ransoms sought appear self-aggrandizing.⁵⁷ It can never help a terrorist movement if it is seen as a parallel instrument of corruption. This is perhaps why some of the more romanticized international terrorist groups, to be discussed in the next chapter, depend on financial backing, and the obligations sometimes attached to such beneficence, rather than on raising their own funds.

Freeing Comrades

There are many reasons why terrorists choose to free comrades: to replenish their memberships; to save face; to embarrass governments by forcing them to negotiate as equals with the movement; and to reassure would-be guerrillas that they will not be abandoned to their fate if captured. Although both the Provisionals and the Tupamaros have engineered the escapes of some comrades from jails, including a dramatic helicopter escape from Mountjoy Prison (Eire) by the PIRA Chief of Staff, Seamus Twomey, and two top aides, in 1973;⁵⁸ none of these three groups has been able to force a government to negotiate with it over the release of 'political' prisoners.

When this tactic of blackmailing a government fails the terrorists are forced either to carry out their threat and kill the hostage(s) or to give in and lose face. Labrousse and Guillen have both pointed out that, even if popular at first, such kidnappings, the longer they last, work to the detriment of the terrorist group. When hostages are executed, like Messrs. Mitrione and Laporte, irreparable harm is done to the movement's image.⁵⁹ Hopefully, terrorists will soon realize the futility of such a tactic. The spectacular jailbreak, on the other hand, will always have popular appeal even among non-supporters.

Weakening the State

One of the easiest ways to garner sympathy is to make the enemy, in this case the state authorities, appear repressive. It was only with the publicity surrounding the rather strange legal proceedings against Vallières and Gagnon that most English-speaking Canadians not resident in Quebec became aware of the aspirations of the FLQ.⁶⁰ French and English

Canadians, brought together over revulsion at Pierre Laporte's death, also worked together to oppose the draconian powers of the War Measures Act. 61

In Ulster the undeniable excesses of both the RUC and the British Army in the treatment of Catholic suspected terrorists has resulted in worldwide reporting detrimental to the British image. Yet the IRA was outlawed in Eire years before it was in the United Kingdom. And, as mentioned above, the Republic's treatment of suspects may be more repressive than that of the British. 62

Both the Ulster-Westminster and Quebec-Ottawa authorities have been hindered in their struggles against terrorism by open and free societies which tolerated media communications with terrorists and uncensored reporting of terrorist incidents. Such was not the case in Uruguay, where autocratic Presidents, through the use of extensive Executive powers, were able to quash many individual and press freedoms. To read the newspapers in that country in the early 1970's one would be unaware of terrorism. Despite these internal restrictions, however, the struggle of the MNL became well-known throughout the world; aided undoubtedly by Costa-Gavras' film and the international trend among youth to be violently anti-establishment so prevalent after 1968. The Tupamaros did succeed in exposing gross corruption and decadence within the Uruguayan political system. Unfortunately it was the military and not the masses which responded to these accusations. Uruguay today is now ruled by the generals; and no other nation has concerned itself with the tragic fate of the former 'Switzerland of Latin America'.

Of the three movements the PIRA seems to have fared best in efforts to discredit the 'colonial' regime. Ulster is still unfortunately a

'Protestant state for a Protestant people' where even the most incremental changes are violently opposed by fanatical unionists. As a result of this Protestant violence the Provisionals, despite their blood-thirstiness, have managed to retain support from abroad, as well as among elements of the Northern Catholics.

Not the FLQ itself but the concept of Quebec separatism benefited from the Canadian government's extensive use of the terms of the War Measures Act to detain hundreds of people and search their property. Nine years later there is still heated controversy about that time.⁶³

In Uruguay it does not appear that the new military rulers will be responsive to the socioeconomic aspirations of the Tupamaros. However, it is also doubtful whether they would tolerate corruption on the scale of the previous administrations.

Redress of Grievances

All terrorists believe themselves to be 'patriots'. They are so convinced of the justness of their particular position that they often view themselves as the Biblical 'saving remnant', convinced that "change comes about through minorities and the dedicated minority is unbeatable."⁶⁴ It apparently has never mattered to any of them that they have lacked widespread popular support. They appear to deny the importance of verbal proselytization prior to the commencement of violent campaigns for none of these groups has either produced an ideology or tried to work within the political structures. The Provisionals were organized because the Official IRA was leaning too heavily on peaceful and incremental within-system changes. Perhaps in Uruguay a stronger case could be made for the permissibility of violent opposition to the regime. Yet

even in Uruguay, the majority of the people, despite the socio-economic problems and political restrictions, were inclined to continue with the democratic model and supported the 1971 elections. There is a great deal of speculation as to just how fair those elections were.⁶⁵ But even then there was not popular support for a violent opposition movement.

In trying to summarize, briefly, these three terrorist movements it seems tragic that so much dedication to abstract political goals, with only limited possibilities of attainment, could have inspired such intense, violent opposition. No group came close to achieving its goals. The FLQ and Tupamaros appear to have been defeated and the PIRA although functioning and destructive acts in a somewhat random fashion.

Despite the failures to achieve primary goals, numerous secondary goals were achieved. The Félquistes helped to make the question of separatism Canada's number one political issue. It will never be dormant again. The Tupamaros succeeded in their efforts to overthrow a government; but they failed to control the choice of successor. The real influence of the MLN is more international in scope. They are considered to be the prototype of the modern urban guerrilla and are accorded a status in revolutionary literature far out of proportion to their achievements. Their fatal weakness has been recognized and commented upon by various authors. Guillen has charged that the Tupamaros were too "professionalized, militarized and isolated from the urban masses" and that they came to represent a parallel power to the legally established state.⁶⁶ In so doing they forgot the fundamental point that a revolutionary struggle is essentially a political one. Ideas and ideologies, not military panache, are the keys to success.⁶⁷

The only statement which can be made with any surety about Ulster is that the violence will continue. Despite staggering losses in members killed or detained the PIRA carries on its struggle, oblivious to the wishes of Ulster's majority in favour of continued union with the United Kingdom.⁶⁸ It is truly a case of a movement being prepared to tolerate horrific terror in order that its goal of a thirty-two county Republic of Eire be achieved. The totally blind faith in the rightness of all-Ireland Republicanism is as strong today as it was for Long Dan Sweeney in Trinity; "We engage in a fight vulnerable to scathing propaganda, unloved by most of our own people, but God and God alone will eventually decide which side was just in its aspirations and which side was evil."⁶⁹

Whether or not they are prepared to admit the final judgment of God, most of today's international terrorists seem as fanatically committed to their struggle as the stereotype of the Republican fighter. Three such movements are presented in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Terence MacSwiney cited in Denis Clark, "Terrorism in Ireland: Renewal of a Tradition", in Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, p. 79.
2. Wiberg, "Are Urban Guerrillas Possible?", p. 19.
3. After the election of 28 November, 1971 Bordaberry, Pacheco's nominee, became President. In April, 1972 he declared a 'state of internal war' and the Army was given free rein to hunt the Tupamaros. In less than a year the MLN was 'wiped out' and the armed forces were dictating to the government. In June, 1973 they backed Bordaberry in a Presidential coup d'etat. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, pp. 129-131. Burton, Urban Terrorism, pp. 99-101.
4. During a truce in 1972 PIRA leaders met with the British at Cheyne Row. MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, pp. 279-285. After the tripartite Sunningdale Conference met to discuss the establishment of a Council of Ireland militant Ulster Protestants demonstrated their opposition to such power-sharing with the May, 1974 General Strike.
5. Words of an IRA hero, Terence MacSwiney, who died on a hunger strike in an English prison in 1920. If anything the sentiments expressed are more firmly held today, cited in Clark, "Terrorism in Ireland", p. 79.
6. Gloria Emerson, "In Belfast Children Fight a War Too", New York Times, 26 April, 1972.
7. Andrew J. Pierre, "The Politics of International Terrorism", Orbis, XIX, 1976, 1254-1256.
8. "Introduction", Race As News, pp. 9-34. For a critical evaluation of the treatment of the PIRA by the Manchester Guardian, (British) Irish News (Ulster/Catholic), and Newsletter (Ulster/Protestant), see Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy, pp. 131-154.
9. "Introduction", Race as News, pp. 14-15. T. Pettigrew, "Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes", Journal of Conflict Resolution, v.2, 1958, 29-42. Pettigrew compared the responses of whites in South Africa and the Northern and Southern United States and concluded that differences in their attitudes towards blacks could not be accounted for by personality factors but were reflective of elite sociocultural norms.
10. Christopher Warr and Peter Knapper, The Perception of People and Events, (London: Wiley, 1968), p. 5.

11. At the height of the 'October Crisis' in Canada, Real Caouette, leader of the Creditiste Party in the National Parliament, demanded that ten FLQ hostages be taken before a firing squad for every one of their victims. Like many others, he believed that greater violence was the only way to crush the enemy. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 25.
12. James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics, (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 104.
13. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 36. When the SLA kidnapped Patty Hearst eleven years later they demanded a food give-away as ransom. Parry, Terrorism From Robespierre to Arafat, p. 354.
14. For an interview with a Tupamaro on this problem see, Lisandro Salazar, "We Don't Want People To Think We're Santa Claus", Liberation News Service, (New York), No. 291, 1970.
15. Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, p. 270.
16. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, pp. 8-9 and 28-29, for discussion of newspapers and prominent Quebecers in favour of concessions.
17. Ibid., p. 28.
18. Ibid., pp. 27-29.
19. Demaris, Brothers In Blood, pp.
20. Macdonald, Stopping the Clock, p. 134.
21. Ibid., p. 139. From 1970 through 1976 well over one hundred bombers blew themselves up.
22. So determined was the Pacheco government to outlaw terrorism that it forbade the use of terms like 'subversive', 'cell', 'commando', 'terrorist', 'extremist' and 'Tupamaro' in November, 1969. Prozacanski, Uruguay's Tapamaros, p. 59.
23. The War Measures Act went into effect at 4 a.m. on 16 October, 1970. It permitted arrests without warrant, up to three weeks in jail with no charges necessary; and jail terms of up to five years for merely supporting the FLQ. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 34.
24. The Irish Times, 15 February, 1977 and Amnesty International, 28 September, 1977, both charged the Republic's law enforcement agencies with brutality against political detainees. Bell, A Time of Terror, pp. 223-225, has noted that the majority of the Republic's citizens accept the necessity/wisdom of such measures to combat terrorism.

25. One of the problems of the British in Ulster has been that Provos appear to suffer more than Protestant terrorists whilst in detention. Robert Fisk, "The Effect of Social and Political Crime on the Police and British Army in Northern Ireland", in Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, pp. 84-93.
26. Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, pp. 127-134.
27. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, pp. 73-77, summarizes both the operation and the police reaction.
28. Ibid., p. 73.
29. MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, pp. 225-234.
30. The British Army has a credibility problem in Ulster as does the RUC which it replaced. On the British Army in Ulster and its relations with the RUC and the law itself see Robert Fisk, "The Effect of Social and Political Crime on the Police and Army in Northern Ireland", pp. 84-93.
31. As mentioned previously, the film was so controversial that New York Times film critic, Rosley Crowther wrote two reviews; the latter was more a political critique than a film review.
32. Menachem Begin recently voiced these sentiments on a trip to London. Edmonton Journal, 23 May, 1979.
33. The various news reports of the return of the Cossette-Trudels to Canada from exile have been full of sympathy for their suffering and the tragedy of their children, born in a foreign land. Macleans, 25 December, 1978 is a typical example.
34. Gerald Seymour, The Glory Boys, (New York: Random House, 1976).
35. The Times, 30 August, 1978, p. 2. Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy, pp. 131-142, analyzes the subtlety of certain ways of reporting the news about the Republicans.
36. Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, p. 271.
37. Morf, Terror in Quebec, p. 37.
38. Ibid., pp. 159-160.
39. Ibid., p. 38.
40. Just how much dynamite the FLQ had may never be known. See Aubrey and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 9. But in 6 years there had been over 200 bombings, an insignificant figure when compared to Ulster, but a frightening one nonetheless.

41. Aubrey and Golden, Rumours of War, p. 6.
42. Ibid., p. 248. The Chenier Cell members were arrested in possession of one rusty shotgun, a starter's pistol and one .22 millimeter clip of ammunition.
43. Morf, Terror in Quebec, pp. 153-154 reports on a three-pronged structure devoted to action (robberies), research and training.
44. Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, p. 275.
45. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 70. The San-Rafael Casino at Punta del Este was robbed of \$15,000 U.S., the biggest robbery in Uruguay's history.
46. The Pando operation netted the MLN \$240,000 U.S. Burton, Urban Terrorism, p. 98.
47. Giampietro Pelligrini was released after his family 'donated' \$200,000 U.S. to a worker's hospital. Burton, Urban Terrorism, p. 98.
48. The Naval Training Centre was occupied and looted on 29 May, 1970. An enormous arsenal of guns, bombs, grenades and machine-guns was acquired. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 83.
49. The most spectacular jailbreak, of 106 prisoners from the Punta Carreta prison on 6 September, 1971 may have been assisted by British Intelligence agents in return for the release, three days later of Ambassador Jackson. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 128.
50. On the demands on the personal habits and lifestyle of individual Tupamaros see Labrousse, The Tupamaros, pp. 42-43.
51. Maria McGuire, To Take Arms, (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 16.
52. Parry, Terrorism From Robespierre to Arafat, p. 382. Morf, Terror in Quebec, p. 180, has expressed similar feelings about the murderers of Pierre Laporte. In The Revolution Script, Moore presents Paul Rose as the troubled, unbalanced personality. Unfortunately very few psychiatrists have bothered to study these particular groups of terrorists.
53. Dennis Clark, "Terrorism in Ireland", p. 79.
54. A good part of McGuire's To Take Arms deals with the botched efforts to purchase a planeload of Czech-made weapons through Amsterdam.
55. Dennis Clark, Irish Blood, (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1977), especially chapter 3.
56. Although the unwanted PIRA sympathizer, Dr. Rose Dugdale held ransom a priceless art collection in April, 1974. In every scheme she

concocted Rose harmed the image of an unwilling PIRA. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 364-365.

57. Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, p. 267.
58. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 332.
59. Guillen, Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 267. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 108.
60. Aubrey and Golden, Rumours of War, pp. 127-134.
61. Bilingual criticisms from a consortium of authors were very popular. "... Strong and Free ...", (Toronto: New Press, 1970).
62. See footnote 23 above.
63. The Commission of Inquiry Investigating Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, often deals with events relating to the FLQ.
64. Clark, "Terrorism in Ireland", p. 79.
65. Burton, Urban Terrorism, p. 99; and Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 59, take very opposite stands as to the fairness of these elections.
66. Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla, p. 269.
67. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, p. 76.
68. The interdenominational 'Peace Movement', whose founders were awarded the Peace Movement Nobel Prize in 1971, has been in the forefront of the movement for remaining within the United Kingdom. Recently it has been wracked by internal dissension.
69. Uris, Trinity, p. 466.

CHAPTER 6

NON-STATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-Tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the operation at Munich.... It was like painting the name of Palestine on the top of a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth.¹

If as Brian Jenkins has argued much of modern terrorism is theatre, aimed at the observers and not the victims,² then the deaths at the Munich Olympics were indeed a theatrical performance without parallel. Many millions of people worldwide watched the unfolding of that tragedy as it was beamed live via satellite to distant parts of the globe.³

The three terrorist groups to be discussed in this chapter all share a penchant for spectacular, widely publicized acts of terror. Both the Japanese and German Red Army terrorists and those of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have regularly opted for novel, attention-arousing terrorist incidents the better to promote their beliefs and ideologies. All are or were committed to 'world revolution' against capitalism, imperialism and Zionism. Although each group has operated domestically all of them are best known and feared for their international actions.

These movements advocate a philosophy of 'total war' where there is little actual discrimination between civilian and military targets. As well, they argue that nearly any place in the world could be a site for one of their attacks and pose a potential threat to citizens of any nation who might be passing through an operational area.

Despite such chilling comments, however, I hope to show in the synoptic histories of each movement which follow that despite the seemingly all-pervasive danger of such groups they are not in fact greatly to be feared. Their violence cannot be dismissed; but neither ought it to be made the only issue of international concern.

Sekigunha

With the Rote Armee Fraktion the Red Army of Japan shares the distinction of being one of the few terrorist movements headed by a woman, Fusako Shigenobu, who apparently still directs the powerful Political Committee of the JRA in Beirut.⁴ Shigenobu and approximately thirty hard-core activists continue to carry out terrorist spectacles far in excess of their numbers and resources. This violent organization emerged in 1969 when leftist university students, disillusioned with the materialism of modern Japanese society, and its close alliance with 'world imperialism', represented by the United States, joined forces to challenge the government and to make 'world revolution'.⁵ Initially the Red Army engaged in bloody confrontations with the police over American-Japanese security arrangements. On 31 March, 1970 a successful hijacking of a JAL plane took some members to exile in North Korea.⁶ Certain authors have recognized this hijacking as 'a qualitative leap forward' for the movement.

It gave the Red Army the cachet of success and the reputation for militant action among the young radicals who now clamoured to join an organization which had actually taken a new direction instead of indulging in mutual headbeating with the riot police.⁷

The Red Army hijackers who took up residence in Pyongyang apparently soon came in contact with either Dr. George Habash, leader of the PFLP, or a

personal representative; very little has been written about the development of these contacts. Nor can a firm date be given for the departure from Japan of JRA personnel to the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, ostensibly as medical teams, but it is believed to have been sometime in the summer of 1971.⁸

It is important to try to establish the Sekigunha's departure date because their image has been shaped, rightly or wrongly, by a sadistic series of murders in the Japanese Alps in the winter of 1971-1972.⁹ For roughly two years after the North Korean hijacking the Red Army had carried out bank robberies and hostage seizures in Japan. In July, 1971 some Sekigunha members joined with an even more militant group from Kyoto, the Keihin Ampo Kyoto, as the Rengo Sekigun, United Red Army (URA).¹⁰ Despite an initial escalation in their violent robberies, there was little public outcry against the new group. In March, 1972 several members of this group were eventually flushed out of a mountain retreat. Much to the horror of the police authorities and general public, the bodies of fourteen brutally murdered comrades, including that of a pregnant woman, were found buried in the snow. This macabre revelation so horrified virtually the entire Japanese nation that little sympathy or support for any other radicals has been forthcoming. The discoveries were all the more shocking in that those responsible were all from the upper-middle, educated classes, and had prospered from the post-war economic boom in Japan.

Although the 'snow murders' were an extreme manifestation of 'the purge' use of terrorism within one's own group,¹¹ they have become symbolic of 'Japanese terrorists', who are presented as zealots lacking even a hint of humanity. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne refer to

their "latent tendencies for suicidal action" and modern "kamikaze spirit" like that of "the fanatical airmen of the Second World War".¹² What such sensational generalizations fail to appreciate, however, is that neither the kamikazes of the war nor the present-day Japanese terrorists are imbued with a cultural legacy of bloodlust.¹³ Japanese society has always emphasized self-control and social harmony; and the militarist concept has not been all-pervasive.¹⁴ Therefore it has been extremely difficult for the Japanese to comprehend how they have produced a very few, but extremely committed and ruthless, terrorists.¹⁵

Notwithstanding that their personal frustration at failing to create the revolution and extreme isolation in their mountain hideout provide two popular explanations for the behaviour of the United Red Army terrorists in the 'snow murders', the personal deficiencies of the two ringleaders are also worthy of consideration.¹⁶ These individual aberrations, however, cannot be used to 'understand' the subsequent international activities of Shigenobu's group, despite the fact that the JRA's most publicized act was at least equal to the 'snow murders' in its horror, viz. the Lod Airport massacre.

Once a base had been established in Beirut, memberships were solicited both from the young, hippie Japanese communities in Europe and from the committed at home.¹⁷ But after the revelations of the 'snow murders' the terrorists were rarely operational in Japan itself.¹⁸

Because Shigenobu's group had been brought to Beirut by the Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and were dependent on it for financial support, the JRA adopted the Palestinian cause as the priority one in their world revolutionary struggle, even though they were opposed to concentrating their revolutionary endeavours

on this cause. Their single most notorious action was the massacre at Lod Airport, Israel on 30 May, 1972 of tourists and Israelis. Earlier that month the Israelis had successfully stormed a Sabena jetliner hijacked to Lod by Black September (BSO) terrorists. In order to obtain revenge for that 'embarrassing' failure, the PFLP's Wadieh Haddad quickly implemented an innovative scheme; he subrogated Japanese for Arab commandos and attacked inside the airport's terminal building, instead of hijacking the airplane. Patricia Steinhoff's interview with the lone surviving member of the Japanese squad responsible for some twenty-eight deaths and eighty woundings, is one of the rare insights into how a modern individual terrorist viewed his act.¹⁹ Sociologist Steinhoff has no doubts that these commandos were politically, rather than personally, motivated.²⁰ In his trial speech, Okamoto pledged himself a partner in the worldwide revolution of all oppressed peoples like the Vietnamese, Arabs and American blacks, arguing that in such a war there could be no innocent bystanders; all were supporters of one side or the other.²¹

Steinhoff believes it is a mistake to view this mission as a 'suicide' one in the usual Western meaning, with its strong connotation that the individual judges his life as worthless. Rather, she argues that Okamoto, in the Buddhist tradition, accepted that his life had meaning, as did his death, but within a broader social context.

Suicide frequently takes place when the individual feels that he can make a more important contribution to the group with his death than he could with his life ... the individual uses his death to symbolize how much he values a cause, when he knows that he has no way of realizing his goal.²²

To Okamoto the most important element of the attack was its destructiveness. He believed that it was necessary to shock the world community by underscoring both the ferocity of the forces of revolution and the 'vulnerability of the bourgeoisie'. Okamoto had no personal hatred for his victims, even believing that they would all be stars in a constellation together (becoming a star after death is a Japanese legend). Brotherhood would come, but only after death.

Over a year later the close association between the Sekigunha and the PFLP, evidenced in Okamoto's trial testimony was confirmed in the combined hijacking of a JAL jumbo jet on 20 July, 1973. No one has ever learned what was supposed to have happened with this hijacking. The commando leader killed herself and her one Japanese and three Arab assistants were only able to direct the plane to Benghazi, where it was eventually blown-up on the tarmac.²³ Then in January, 1974 two Japanese and two Palestinians bombed an oil refinery complex in Singapore. Upon being discovered they took hostages and were eventually allowed safe-conducts, after unidentified Arabs had stormed the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait and taken hostages.²⁴

Entirely dependent on the PFLP for funds, but critical of their parochial revolutionary interests, Shigenobu planned a 'new' tactic long popular in Latin America; she hoped to kidnap prominent Japanese businessmen resident in Europe and ransom them for large cash payments which would allow the JRA to become financially independent of Habash's group. But not only was the plan discovered in advance, many active and passive JRA members throughout Europe were detained. Most were quickly released, but Yutaka Furaya was held by the French authorities. In order to secure his release the French Embassy in the Hague was seized in

September, 1974; early French resistance to the terrorists' demands was overcome when the terrorist, *extraordinaire*, 'Carlos' dropped grenades at Le Drugstore in Paris, bringing the violence to the French capital itself.²⁵ But fast on the heels of this success two other Sekigunha operatives were arrested in Sweden whilst on a mission to reconnoitre all Lebanese missions in Scandinavia. Less than half a year later these terrorists were among five released by the authorities in exchange for more than fifty hostages in the Swedish Embassy and American Consulate in Kuala Lumpur.²⁶

A further benefit of this Malaysian barricade and hostage incident was the embarrassment it caused the Japanese Government on the eve of the Prime Minister's departure for the United States. The hijacking of a JAL jet to Dacca and Algiers some two years later proved even more embarrassing, for the Japanese were again seen to give in quickly to their terrorists, whilst at the same time their allies were saying a firm 'no' to hijack blackmail after the highly successful Israeli raid at Entebbe.²⁷ In response to these protests the Japanese Justice Minister and his Deputy resigned and the new Minister announced on 8 October, 1977 that henceforth it would be government policy to combat the Sekigunha head on. To facilitate such operations a special department was established within the national Police.

Consequently when two 'suicide commandos' attacked and hijacked a passenger bus in Nagasaki in mid-October, 1977²⁸ and demanded a cash ransom and direct negotiations with the Justice Minister, no compromises were made. Within twenty-four hours the Japanese police had stormed the bus, killed one terrorist, wounded the other, and rescued all the passengers.

In the wake of the rescue at Mogadishu a tragedy occurred when 'Japanese leftists', as they were described by the pilot, commandeered a Malaysia Airways jet ten minutes after take-off.²⁹ But before the terrorists could identify themselves to the Singapore control tower and make their demands known there was an explosion on board and the plane crashed, killing all the passengers and crew. Both the bus and aircraft hijackings have been attributed to the Sekigunha. Although one might conclude from these two incidents that the JRA has been defeated as a movement it would be wise to remember that six comrades and a \$6,000,000 U.S. ransom were obtained in the Dacca/Algiers hijacking.³⁰ The Red Army can afford to wait. Moreover, if Shigenobu has freed her group from its dependence on the PFLP she may be rebuilding her infrastructure elsewhere. More time must pass before the JRA can be presumed to be defunct. But its inactivity since December, 1977 is itself a pleasant event.

Rote Arme Fraktion

The founding of the RAF occurred when the journalist Ulrike Meinhof and fugitive Gudrun Ensslin freed Andreas Baader from custody on 14 May, 1970. Two years earlier Baader and Ensslin had set fire to a Frankfurt department store in protest against the Vietnam War and 'consumption terror'.³¹ Freed on bail pending final sentencing, both had gone underground, and Baader had been re-arrested only a few weeks prior to his 'liberation'.

The German RAF were unabashed admirers of the Japanese Red Army and chose their name to confirm that admiration.³² Like the Sekigunha, many of the members of the RAF had come from the most militant, leftist

student organizations which had mushroomed in Germany in the late 1960's in response to a world wide wave of anti-Americanism associated with the Vietnam War. There were also domestic reasons for the general student militancy. These included doubts that democracy was the only possible form of good government, an assumption on which the Federal Republic's educational and administrative policies were based; a search for new leaders to replace the 'old men' tainted with Nazi pasts; and a conflict between students and production oriented society which demanded student acceptance of rigid, impersonal university structures.³³ In responding to these challenges a small part of the student left moved from "passivism through 'passive provocation' to violence in the late 1960's."³⁴

As early as 1969 there had been numerous bomb explosions directed against non-human targets by persons unknown, but leftists were suspected. Like Dr. Chaput in Quebec, some leftists believed that such bombs were planted by the police to create a fear of terrorism and to justify the adoption, in June, 1968 of the State of Emergency Laws which granted extensive and extraordinary powers to the police.³⁵ However, from information in the memoirs of an anarchist revolutionary, at least some of these bombs were planted by members of a drug-taking commune in protest against 'Amerikan fascism' and German imperialism.³⁶ According to the author Michael Baumann some of the members of 'the Blues', as this group was known, founded the Second of June Movement in July, 1971. Unfortunately Baumann claims to have left the movement early in 1972 and his memoirs do not cover the subsequent years of co-operation, or at the very least liaison, with the RAF. Baumann personally did not like the RAF 'intellectuals' and their bourgeois pursuits. This fact, coupled with his proletarian background may

explain why he withdrew from the movement when it became more ideological, and took on a third world focus.³⁷

Besides Baader, Meinhof and Ensslin, a lawyer named Horst Mahler,³⁸ who had defended Baader and Ensslin at their Frankfurt trial, was a founder of the RAF. Meinhof was the group's apologist through her articles in Konkret, a chic leftist-skin magazine. Soon after Baader's escape the four are believed to have travelled to an Al Fatah camp in Jordan where they received instructions in weapons and explosives use; and, no doubt, where they also came into contact with 'guerrillas' from other nations.³⁹ On their return to Germany they used the funds acquired from some spectacular bank robberies to build their infrastructure. This included a network of luxurious safe-houses and rather expensive get-away cars. There never seemed to be sufficient financial resources to keep the group comfortable enough to escalate the struggle to the operational level against the authorities.⁴⁰ Most of their weapons were received from abroad, usually from Palestinians; in return El Al offices and U.S. firms were sometimes fire-bombed.⁴¹

It was only in May, 1972 that the RAF actually began to use destructive bombs against targets like the American Army's European Headquarters in Heidelberg and the Axel Springer Publishing House in Hamburg. The robbery of seventy-five M26 grenades from an American weapons depot at Mieux occurred around the same time. These grenades were used by several different groups in operations throughout Europe in the next few years.⁴² They are one of the few influences which the original RAF members have had on European terrorism for shortly afterwards, by the summer of 1972, all of them were behind bars. In the Heidelberg and Hamburg attacks both Americans and Germans had been

seriously injured or killed. The revulsion against this extreme violence was so widespread that both Baader and Meinhof were turned in by leftist sympathizers.⁴³

It becomes extremely difficult to try to establish who actually bears the direct responsibility for the terrorist acts which followed. Various commando titles were used, suggesting numerous groups.⁴⁴ However, in each incident one of the objectives was either to secure the release of the imprisoned RAF leaders or to protest the death of an RAF leader. There is also evidence that in some cases Baader or Meinhof encouraged certain actions. Perhaps of more importance, the incidents to be discussed reveal the close ties between these later German terrorists and groups like the PFLP, the Sekigunha and agents like Carlos; bonds first established by the Baader-Meinhof group.⁴⁵

On 9 November, 1974 one of the Baader-Meinhof terrorists, Holger Meins, died whilst on a hunger strike in prison.⁴⁶ The next day the Second of June Movement assassinated a Judge of the Berlin Appeal Court. In February, 1975 five major, but not the leading, RAF terrorists were released and flown to Aden along with a substantial cash ransom in exchange for the life of Dr. Peter Lorenz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, of West Berlin. This kidnapping also bore the signature of the Second of June Movement.⁴⁷ Then in April, spurred on by the successful Lorenz kidnapping, the 'Holger Meins Commando' stormed the West German Embassy in Stockholm and took hostages. This time Baader, Meinhof and Ensslin headed the list of twenty-six prisoners to be released. But perhaps regretting the precedent that they had set in the Lorenz kidnapping and appreciative of the greatly escalated demands of the terrorists, the Bonn Government stood fast - despite the killings

of two of its diplomats.⁴⁸

Aside from the tragic deaths of two of the diplomatic staff hostages, there were other new developments at Stockholm. The barricade and hostage tactic was a new one for West German terrorists. Some of the M26 grenades stolen by the RAF in 1972 were found at the site.⁴⁹

And perhaps most frightening was the revelation that at least some of the participants were mental patients of a radical Heidelberg psychiatrist.⁵⁰ Dr. Wolfgang Huber believed that mental illness was caused by capitalist societies, and he had formed a Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK) to rehabilitate the mentally ill. This rehabilitation was to be through violent opposition to the established order.⁵¹

Thwarted in their direct challenge to the authorities at Stockholm, and pursued more vigorously within the Federal Republic, the German terrorists sought easy targets throughout Europe like the Mercedes Branch offices in France, German tour buses and the like. The contacts developed with 'Carlos' and other terrorist groups were also strengthened at this time. (Not until the Buback and Ponto assassinations and the Schleyer kidnapping were the terrorists involved in high-profile operations within Germany.⁵² Individual terrorists, however, did participate in certain spectaculars. Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann was involved in both the OPEC and Entebbe raids. Hans-Joachim Klein was also at OPEC;⁵³ and Wilfried Boese died with Tiedemann at Entebbe. It was not until the 5 September, 1977 kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer, a leading industrialist, that the RAF supporters again attempted an extortion within the Republic. Unable to gain concessions from Bonn with their one hostage, they received support from Palestinian comrades who hijacked a Lufthansa aircraft to Mogadishu. The demands included the

release of eleven of West Germany's most wanted terrorists, two Palestinian terrorists held in Turkey and a cash ransom of some \$15,000,000 U.S.⁵⁴ Despite the skyjackers' belief that an Entebbe-style raid was impossible the West German commandos, British weapons specialists and Somali ground personnel pulled one off successfully. After this debacle Baader, Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe committed suicide in Stammheim prison, where Meinhof had done so a year earlier.

Since Mogadishu there have been no RAF spectaculars. Lacking the financial security of the Sekigunha and mistrustful of leftist sympathizers who once provided hideouts, the RAF terrorists are running from the authorities. They appear to have abandoned their bases in Germany. It has been rumoured, however, that they provided the brainpower in the Moro kidnapping in Italy and that some of them may be part of an international guns for hire.⁵⁵

The RAF is somewhat like the FLQ in that the various waves of terrorists appear to have been quite self-reliant. There was a minimum of infrastructure and continuity. In retrospect the RAF accomplished very little other than creating an image of a super-terrorist organization - an image which encouraged the introduction of repressive legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Front was chosen as the Palestinian example because of its large number of actions;⁵⁶ its international links with other terrorist movements, including the Sekigunha and the Rote Armee Fraktion; and its ideological commitments to 'total war' and 'world revolution'. Apparently it was the PFLP which organized an international symposium

to discuss a 'multinational corporation of terrorism' in May, 1972 in the Baddawi refugee camp to which the RAF, PIRA, BSO, JRA and others sent delegates; and where the PFLP allegedly put together the Lod Airport massacre team to avenge the humiliation suffered by the BSO earlier that month when their Sabena skyjacking to Lod ended in failure.⁵⁷

Ovid Demaris has charged that it was the PFLP which appointed 'Carlos', the Venezuelan master terrorist, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, to head its European network in the summer of 1973 believing, correctly it would seem, that a non-Arab would be less conspicuous to Israeli and other government agents.⁵⁸ Gillian Becker noted that that same summer a Hamburg lawyer's office was raided revealing that it had been the information centre for the Baader-Meinhof's links with international terrorists, especially the PFLP.⁵⁹ And it was the PFLP, along with 'Carlos' which was responsible for the Entebbe hijacking which ended disastrously for the terrorists with the successful Israeli surprise assault.⁶⁰

The name of George Habash is synonymous with the PFLP. A Christian Arab from Lydda, now Lod, Israel, Habash became involved in Arab nationalist politics whilst a medical student at the American University in Beirut in the early 1950's. Even then Habash, unlike most other Palestinian exiles, believed that the liberation of Palestine was not something which could be isolated from the rest of the Arab nation. With friends he founded the Arab Nationalists' Movement (ANM) in 1953.⁶¹ The ANM's first task was to work for Arab unity through co-operation with the Nasserites, who had recently come to power in Egypt. When, however, the Egyptians were unable to prevent Israel from diverting the headwaters of the Jordan River in 1964-1965, Habash knew that it was time for

a 'new concept'. And so the ANM formed fedayeen cells within Israel.⁶² The ignominious defeat suffered by the regular Arab armies in the June, 1967 War confirmed in Habash's mind that it was time to 'Vietnamize' the Palestinian issue. In October of that year the ANM's guerrilla cells merged with those of two small, Syrian-backed groups to become the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Unlike other Palestinian groups the PFLP's aggressive tactics taught that "the route to Tel Aviv lies through Amman and Beirut".⁶³ The Popular Front was determined to maintain the ANM commitment to a total, socialist revolution.

Because of this strong ideological component it was not long before the less politicized members began to waver. In August, 1968 two non-ideological groups splintered; the PFLP - General Command, and the Palestine Arab Organization.⁶⁴ Later extreme leftists accused Habash's group of being too 'petit bourgeois' and formed a proletarian group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) in February, 1969.⁶⁵ In 1972 another split occurred when a leftist faction withdrew because the PFLP continued to tolerate hijacking despite condemning it as a general policy in November, 1970. This group called itself the Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine.⁶⁶ The debate over skyjackings finally split Habash and Haddad in 1976, with the latter forming the PFLP - Foreign Operations Branch.⁶⁷

Aircraft hijacking has become as identified with the PFLP as kidnapping was with the Tupamaros and bank robberies with the RAF. Their first hijacking of an El Al jetliner on 23 July, 1968 proved successful. Habash believed El Al to be a 'just' target "since it transports military personnel and hardware"; and had, in fact, been used for just such purposes in the June 1967 War.⁶⁸ This hijack resulted in the eventual

release of sixteen Arab prisoners from Israeli jails. Changing tactics slightly the PFLP attacked two El Al planes on the ground in Europe, killing two people and continued to set off explosives inside Israel. Then in August 1969 Leila Khaled hijacked a TWA jetliner to Damascus, after forcing it to fly into Israeli airspace.⁶⁹ El Al buses and offices in Europe were attacked throughout 1970. When a Swissair plane exploded in flight, and an Austrian Airlines one was damaged, however, the PFLP denied responsibility. They also disassociated themselves from a July, 1970 hijacking of an Olympic Airways plane which resulted in the release of seven terrorists from Greek jails - at least two of whom were known to be PFLP members. But in September 1970 the PFLP credit for the greatest skyjacking scenario to date, successfully hijacking four aircraft to Cairo and Dawson's Field, Jordan; and securing the release of fellow terrorists in Germany and Switzerland as well as Leila Khaled who had been thwarted in her efforts to hijack an El Al flight.⁷⁰ Christopher Dobson believes that the ultimate goal of the PFLP at that time was to sabotage the American initiatives for a Middle East Peace Plan.⁷¹ Not only did it do that but it also brought the wrath of King Hussein on all the Palestinians resident in Jordan, whether PFLP, Fateh or non-politicized. Incredible numbers were killed by the Jordanians, including many women and children. With the subsequent mass exodus of many Palestinians from Jordan to Lebanon the most anonymous of all the terrorist organizations was formed - Black September.

The earlier mentioned third split in the PFLP erupted at this time because the leftists who became the PRFLP believed that the most important, immediate enemy was King Hussein of Jordan. The split was finalized when the Popular Front was identified as being behind the

February 1972 hijacking of a Lufthansa jet to Aden where it was held for \$5,000,000 U.S. ransom.⁷² Only three months later the PFLP introduced a new tactic in their terroristic war against Israel by training and arming the three Sekigunha commandos for their mission inside Lod Airport's terminal building.

Although the PFLP continued to be responsible for acts of sabotage and terror inside Israel,⁷³ it has long felt that spectacular, well-publicized foreign operations are the only way to advertise itself and inflict damage on the enemy.

A guerrilla war in Palestine could only be limited in nature. By making the whole world the resistance's theatre of operations the Front wanted ... 'to force international opinion to realize that there is such a thing as a Palestinian cause and that there is an uprooted people fighting on other people's lands because it has been denied its own land.'⁷⁴

Only foreign operations could keep the Palestinian issue alive, for what went on in the occupied territories rarely reached the Western press.⁷⁵

Believing this sincerely, the PFLP continued to do what it knew best, aircraft hijacking, as well as trying out some new tactics. In April, 1971 the Israelis arrested five French and two Moroccan tourists who were transporting explosives for the PFLP.⁷⁶ In May of that year a

Liberian tanker, the 'Coral Sea', carrying Iranian oil through the Red Sea to Israel came under bazooka attack. The PFLP claimed responsibility and charged that the Saudis were also secretly supplying oil to Israel.⁷⁷

Then in July, 1973 the bungled hijacking of a JAL jumbo by an Iraqi Christian woman and three Arab, and one Japanese males ended when the plane was blown up in Benghazi.⁷⁸ And later the Sekigunha and PFLP continued their co-operative efforts in Singapore and the Japanese Embassy

in Kuwait.⁷⁹

The more spectacular events were yet to come with the barricade of the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, and seizure of the Oil Ministers as hostages in December, 1975; the Air France hijacking to Entebbe in June-July 1976; and the assassination of the United States Ambassador to Lebanon, also in 1976. Although there is some confusion as to whether or not any of the 'Arabs' who took part in the OPEC raid were PFLP members, there is little doubt that the PFLP was behind the operation.⁸⁰

Early in 1976, shortly after the OPEC success, three PFLP members went to Nairobi intent on destroying El Al aircraft with a portable SAM7 missile. Apparently tipped off by the Israelis, the Kenyan authorities arrested the trio and secretly handed them over to the Israelis. A similar fate befell a German couple sent to investigate.⁸¹ When the Air France plane was hijacked to Entebbe the five terrorists, still thought to be in Kenyan jails, were among those to be ransomed, along with the Sekingunha's Kozo Okamoto, and some of the RAF terrorists, in exchange for the passengers' lives. Fortunately in a now well-known blitzkrieg the Israelis rescued the Entebbe hostages, and reportedly killed all the terrorists found at Entebbe. Two very prominent PFLP members were among the dead. As well two RAF members were also killed; and a close confidante of 'Carlos', although not killed or captured, was also identified as having been involved.⁸²

Because of the purported break between Habash and Haddad over hijacking later in 1976 the role of the PFLP in the 1977 Mogadishu hijacking has not been clearly established. The four hijackers were young and very nervous. But because this hijacking must have been directed primarily against the breaking the impasse in the Schleyer

kidnapping by the RAF it would appear that the PFLP, either directly or indirectly, had some hand in the operation.⁸³

The PFLP elected to use the PIRA's tactic of assassinating the enemy's Ambassador when they ambushed Francis Meloy Jr., United States Ambassador to Lebanon, an economic aide and their chauffeur on 16 June, 1976. The PFLP was linked to these deaths by a PLO investigation.⁸⁴

And there seems to be no end to the PFLP's terror. In May, 1978 it was linked to an attempted sabotage/hijacking of an El Al aircraft at Orly.⁸⁵

The PFLP has proved itself one of the more able terrorist organizations, with an ability to vary its operations both in terms of location and style. Like the PIRA the PFLP is also able continually to recruit new fedayeen willing to undertake virtually suicidal missions. For in spite of the large number of incidents the terrorism of the PFLP has gained them almost nothing in terms of political concessions from Israel. Yet the PFLP continues to plan and carry out operations despite their staggering losses in personnel and very limited results.

Notwithstanding the negative publicity such exploits engender both individually and jointly the international terrorists discussed here have a legacy of terror which is shocking more for what was threatened than for what was actually done. In spite of certain horrific actions very few people have died as a result of such incidents, in fact only a small percentage of those who have lost their lives in Ulster. In the next chapter what these three groups have accomplished comes under discussion. Moreover, two themes of some prominence when discussing the JRA, RAF and PFLP - the role of the female terrorist, and the association with 'Carlos' are also included.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Translated from Al Sayyad, 13 September, 1972, in David Hust, The Gun and the Olive Branch, (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 311.
2. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," p. 16.
3. H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism and the Media", in Alexander and Finger, eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, p. 145.
4. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, (London: Hodder and Sloughton, 1977). The authors suggest her code name was 'Samira', p. 165.
5. Yoshihiro Kuriyama, "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a 'New Left' Group in Japan," Asian Survey, v. 12, (1973), pp. 336-340. Robert W. Taylor and Byong-Suh Kim, "Violence and Change in Post-Industrial Societies: Student Protest in America and Japan in the 1960's", in Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (1978), pp. 214-217.
6. At the time of the hijacking the founder, Takoya Shiomi, was leader of the group and the man in charge of the hijacking. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex; pp. 166-167. One of the hijackers was the older brother of Kozo Okamoto who participated in the Lod Airport Massacre in 1972.
7. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 167.
8. Ibid., p. 168. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 28.
9. The terrorists of the Sekigunha deny the relationship. Patricia Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo Okamoto", Asian Survey, v. 16 (1976), p. 845.
10. Kuriyama, "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport", p. 343.
11. Japanese psychologists argued that the primeval mountain conditions, rampant hedonism and frustrated idealism of the group's members had caused the internal 'purge'. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 29. No one wanted to look at Japanese society and the immense pressures it puts on young people to conform. Taylor and Kim, "Violence and Change in Post-Industrial Societies", pp. 214-217.
12. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 164.
13. James R. Soukup, "Assassination in Japan", in Kirkham, Levy and Crotty, Assassination and Political Violence, pp. 672-679. Kuriyama, "Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport", p. 342.
14. Soukup, "Assassination in Japan", p. 675.

15. Yet the Japanese have long held a reverence for acts of assassination and suicide performed on behalf of the nation as presently constituted with the Emperor as Head. Okamoto expressed an identification with the right-wing traditionalist and popular novelist Yukio Mishima who committed public suicide when he failed to recreate the old Japan. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist:", p. 843.
16. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 28-29.
17. The support troops appear to have come from Japanese residents abroad; the action commandos from Japan itself. This suggests a fairly strong tie to the mother country. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 172-185.
18. The 'Wolf' group of bombers concentrated on various commercial enterprises in Japan and were quite successful. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 183.
19. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist:", pp. 830-845.
20. The three took the extraordinary step of agreeing to mutilate their faces in death; not to hide their Japaneseness, but to prevent personal identification and any subsequent dishonour to their families. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist:", p. 839.
21. Ibid., p. 842.
22. Ibid., p. 843.
23. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 175-176.
24. Ibid., p. 178.
25. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 36-38.
26. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 179-183.
27. Two diametrically opposite viewpoints on the Japanese reaction to the 1977 hijacking have been reprinted in English. Seizaburo Sato, "Handling Hijack Terrorism", and Tetsuro Morimoto, "A Deadly Dilemma", Japan Echo, v. 5:1, (1978), pp. 44-59. For a sample of the international outcry against the Japanese authorities see, "The Japanese Pay Their Danegeld", The Times, 5 October, 1977.
28. The Times, 17 October, 1977.
29. The Times, 5 December, 1977.
30. H.H.A. Cooper, "Hostage Rescue Operations: Denouement at Algeria and Mogadishu Compared", Chitty's Law Journal, v. 26:3, (1978), p. 97.

31. Gillian Becker, Hitler's Children, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1977), p. 65.
32. Ibid., p. 14.
33. Gunther Wagenlehner, "Motivation for Political Terrorism in Germany", in Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, pp. 201-202.
34. Becker, Hitler's Children, p. 21.
35. Ibid., p. 53.
36. Bommi Baumann, How It All Began, translated by Helene Ellenbogen and Wayne Parker, (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1977). German leftists regularly spell 'American' with a 'k' instead of a 'c' to imply fascist ties. So did the Tupamaros.
37. Ibid., pp. 82-83, 96.
38. Mahler is the only founder still alive. The German authorities had agreed to release him, among others, for Peter Lorenz in 1975. Mahler, who had converted to Maoism in jail, refused. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 158. Meinhof committed suicide in Stammheim Prison in May, 1976. Baader and Ensslin did the same after the failure of the combined Schleyer/Mogadishu extortions in October, 1977.
39. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 146. Baumann, How It All Began, p. 49 reports that the return of some West Germans from Jordan in 1969 forced the 'Blues' to go underground. The struggle became political.
40. Baader in particular loved to indulge himself, whereas Meinhof tended to be austere. Baader seemed to be in the group as much, if not more, for the criminal benefits as for any ideological convictions. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 232.
41. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 146.
42. These grenades figure prominently in the links that various groups had with 'Carlos'.
43. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 154, 152.
44. Baumann's 'Blues' group had used various titles to confuse the authorities earlier. Many of these people joined the RAF and the Second of June Movement and may have introduced this tactic. Baumann, How It All Began, pp. 43-44.
45. Some two years after their first visit to the Middle East it is believed that at least Baader was present at a PFLP symposium on

- internationalizing terrorism in May 1972 in Lebanon. Contacts were made so that some help could be provided BSO later that year during the Munich Olympics. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 22-23.
46. Demaris, Brothers In Blood, p. 248. Demaris could not be accused of being pro-terrorist. Yet when it comes to discussing the prison conditions for the Baader-Meinhof terrorists he becomes very partial to the prisoners. Pp. 245-251 discusses the hunger strike conditions; pp. 240, 260-261 are on 'isolation torture'. On 17 July, 1974 the British abandoned all efforts to artificially feed starving prisoners. Hansard, 17 July, 1974, cols. 451-455.
 47. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 157-158.
 48. Ibid., pp. 159-161.
 49. Ibid., p. 161.
 50. Becker, Hitler's Children, p. 275.
 51. Ibid., pp. 227-231.
 52. Siegfried Buback the Chief Federal Prosecutor in charge of coordinating the Federal and State investigations of terrorism was shot to death en route to work in April, 1977. Jurgen Ponto, the first member of the financial community to be slain by the terrorists was shot at his Frankfurt home in July, 1977 after he had welcomed his god-daughter (she was one of the killers).
 53. Klein, interviewed by Der Spiegel in September, 1978 has apparently renounced terrorism and lives underground, in fear both of police and terrorist reprisals.
 54. Cooper, "Hostage Rescué Operations", p. 100.
 55. Claire Sterling, "The Terrorist Network", Atlantic Monthly, November, 1978.
 56. Edward Mickolus, "Trends in Transnational Terrorism", in Livingston, ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, pp. 63-64. In his statistically oriented study Mickolus lists twenty-five Palestinian terrorist organizations, plus another general heading of 'Palestinian guerrillas' for actions not claimed by a specific group. Of these twenty-five named commando organizations, nineteen have claimed responsibility for only one incident, usually a barricade and hostage situation; and another three groups have been involved in two to four incidents. Of the three remaining identifiable groups Al Fatah has ten incidents; Black September claims twenty-six and the PFLP is linked to forty-three.
 57. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 22-23.

58. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 32-33.
59. Becker, Hitler's Children, p. 15.
60. The re-creation of such incidents in paperbacks and movies is now very popular. William Stevenson wrote 90 Minutes at Entebbe in about a fortnight, and there were at least two movie versions of the story. There was a similar reaction after the deaths at Jonestown, Guyana in November, 1978. A film has even been done about the Munich massacre, 21 Hours at Munich. Worse yet, novelists and screenwriters seem to be in a race to invent the greatest terrorist spectacles. Black Sunday is a recent such endeavour, directed by John Frankenheimer and released in 1977.
61. John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September, (London: Frank Cass, 1973), pp. 134-136.
62. Ibid., p. 137.
63. Ibid., p. 139.
64. Riad El Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, Guerrillas For Palestine, (London: Croom, Helm, 1976), p. 39.
65. Ibid., p. 39.
66. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 152.
67. Haddad and Habash fell out after the disastrous Entebbe raid in 1976. Haddad may have provided the commandos at Mogadishu.
68. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 146.
69. Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live, (Toronto: NC Press Ltd., 1975),
70. Ibid., pp. 190-197.
71. Christopher Dobson, Black September, pp. 41-42.
72. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 152.
73. John Laffin, Fedayeen, (London: Cassell, 1973), pp. 42-52.
74. El-Rayyes and Nahas, Guerrillas For Palestine, p. 42.
75. The Palestinians have never maintained a continuous presence in the occupied territories. Israeli military occupation, especially in Gaza, has been severe - yet little is heard about the mass punishments, torture, etc. in the West. Colin Smith and John Andrews, The Palestinians, Report No. 24, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1977), provides an introduction to this question and a bibliography of books and films.

76. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 189.
77. Ibid., pp. 232-233.
78. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 175-176.
79. See footnote 23, above.
80. Ibid., p. 121. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 18, states that Habash himself was at Algiers for the final negotiations which saved Amouzegar's and Yamani's lives. At p. 61 he suggests that Haddad helped 'Carlos' plan the raid.
81. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, pp. 189-190. Only in March, 1977 did the Israelis admit to holding the five for fourteen months.
82. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
83. Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism in the Middle East: A New Phase?", Washington Quarterly, v. 1:4, (Autumn, 1978), p. 116. "Beirut's Dr. Death", Newsweek, 1 January, 1979, p. 32.
84. "Beirut's Dr. Death", Newsweek, 1 January, 1979, p. 32.
85. Ibid. Alexander, "Terrorism in the Middle East", p. 115.

CHAPTER 7

EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-STATE TERRORISTS

Terrorists, like great powers, fight dirty.¹

Like their more domestically focused comrades, the international, non-state terrorist actors discussed in the previous chapter have all failed to achieve their maximum political goal. In all three cases this goal was to have been a 'world revolution'. The Popular Front chose to work towards that goal by trying to create socialist and nationalist revolutions throughout the Arab world. For the RAF terrorists that 'world revolution' was to be aided by revealing the corruption and fascism of the Federal Republic of Germany and leading a people's rebellion against it. But for the Sekigunha, 'world revolution' literally meant world revolution everywhere. Of all the groups included in this study the Sekigunha has had the least impact in its own nation as well as elsewhere. Although no group, either domestic or international, has yet overthrown those in office, the Sekigunha seems the least likely movement to succeed.

Although none of the international terrorist groups discussed has even come close to attaining political power the Popular Front appears to meet the minimum political criterion of group social survivability. Despite the defeat at Entebbe the PFLP is still very much a rejectionist force in Middle East politics against the Israelis and their Western allies, against the more moderate Arab states, and even against the majority of the Palestinian resistance. It remains fanatically opposed to any compromises or half-measures on the road to a partial solution of

the insoluble issue of a just disbursement of lands and nations in the Middle East.

The present position of the JRA is most difficult to assess since it appears to have evaporated with few traces to be found. The RAF, on the other hand, is not as mysterious. A combination of loss of support from liberal sympathizers and good international police cooperation has contributed to the break-up of the German urban terrorist network and the dispersal of its members.

Before discussing those less political motivations which often seem to inspire terrorists - publicity, acquiring funds, freeing of comrades, weakening the state and redressing grievances - it seems necessary to mention two phenomena which figure prominently in the histories of these three groups; the rôle of the female terrorist, and 'Carlos'. The links between the Japanese, German and Palestinian are ever so much clearer than any between the more domestically focused groups.² And although women participated in the FLQ, the PIRA and the Tupamaros, it has only been in the more 'anarchist' or 'Trotskyist' movements that females have been in leadership positions.

The Female Terrorist

The Judeo-Greco-Christian heritage provides many examples of courageous women who stood up to tyranny. Queen Esther and Judith, Antigone, Charlotte Corday and Maria Spiridonova are readily remembered. From our perspective of space and time they all appear courageous and noble. One cannot help but wonder if such may not also be the case one day for women like the PFLP's Leila Khaled. In her rather embarrassing, somewhat maudlin autobiography, My People Shall Live, she comes to a

different conclusion than Ivan Kaliayev, the central character in Camus' play, "The Just Assassins", on how to deal with the innocent victims of terrorism, this time within the context of a hijacking situation.

.... All was going smoothly when suddenly the human element threatened our careful planning. A few seats away there was a little girl with a button on her dress cheerfully proclaiming, "Make Friends". That message brought me up short, forced me to remind myself, as I watched her playing with her little sister, that this child had committed no crime against me or my people. It would be cruel to imperil her life by hijacking a plane, the symbolic meaning of which she had no conception - a plane that could explode during our attempted seizure or be blown up by Israeli anti-aircraft fire when we entered the 'Israeli airspace'.

While these qualms pricked my conscience, the whole history of Palestine and her children came before my eyes. I saw everything from the first day of my exile. I saw my people homeless, hungry, barefoot. The twice 'refugee' children of Bagan camp near Amman seemed to stand, a humiliated multitude, in front of me saying, "we too are children and we are part of the human race." The scene strengthened me enormously. I said to myself, "What crime did I and my people perpetrate against anyone to deserve the fate we have suffered?" The answer was "none". The operation must be carried out. There can be no doubt or retreat. My children have spoken.³

Whilst one might sympathize with Khaled's plight, despite the fact that she too was going to inflict injury on the innocent TWA passengers en route to Athens, much more shocking is the case of Susanne Albrecht, a West German terrorist who assisted in the murder of her godfather, the banker Jurgen Ponto.⁴ Mr. Ponto had made extensive arrangements to protect himself from a terrorist attack, but could hardly be faulted for failing to suspect a godchild bringing him flowers.

Approximately half of the West German terrorists have been women. Despite the fact that the RAF was usually referred to as the Baader-

Meinhof Gang it was Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin who provided the ideological framework for the group.⁵ Baader, on the other hand, has been described as "an anomaly, an anachronism, a square peg in a round hole", and was believed to be without intellectual or revolutionary principles. Nonetheless he was vital to what limited success the original RAF enjoyed for he had the practical knowledge necessary to rob banks, steal cars and the like; and he shared this expertise with the other members of the RAF.^{6/}

Women's liberation appears to have been prominent in each group's concepts and activities. It even seemed as if true emancipation required a denial of one's womanhood and motherhood. Meinhof had wanted to have her twin daughters raised in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, 'dedicating their lives to Palestinian liberation'.⁷ Gudrun Ensslin had given up the care of her child years earlier. Leila Khaled, although she eventually married, has opted to spend most of her time away from her husband. She seems particularly aware of the sexual bias against women in the Arab world, charging that for too long they have been viewed merely as "appendages to our men or maids to our parents."⁸ Determined to overcome this restriction, Khaled decided that if a woman wanted to commit herself to politico-military work "it meant the final break with her past and relegating her life and desires to a secondary position."⁹ Fusako Shigenobu has been described as a "generally rather sexless woman" whose one great love is the Sekigunha.¹⁰

Despite their similarly total dedication to their movements these four women have fared differently. Not only did Meinhof and Ensslin provide the RAF's ideology, but they were also involved at the operational level. Shigenobu does not appear to have been involved in commando

actions except as a courier. She did, however, write a great deal for the JRA, much of it published in Beirut. Khaled appears to have risen rapidly within the PFLP only after her first successful hijacking.¹¹

Although some writers claim the female membership of the JRA to be one-third that of the total membership neither the Sekigunha nor the PFLP have used women as extensively as the West German groups.¹²

If anything the West German female terrorists have acquired a well-deserved reputation for being more dangerous than their male counterparts. Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann is a case in point. She had killed two men in cold blood at the OPEC headquarters in 1975. From the diary kept by one of the Entebbe hostages, a deeply perceptive woman named Sarah Davidson, a profile begins to emerge of Gabriele, "the sadistic German female terrorist, who was marching around with a pistol the whole time, [and] reminded us of the Nazis."¹³ All the rescued hostages were agreed in their condemnation of Kroecher-Tiedemann, the authoritarian madwoman.

This liberated ruthlessness and female macho played into the hands of a hostile press. Very few people could sympathize with as vicious a terrorist as Kroecher-Tiedemann. The one advantage in her character, if it could be called such, for the hostages and for the public more generally, is that her dangerousness was open and visible, and one could put up defenses against her. Sarah Davidson recognized this point when she commented on the character differences between Gabriele and her German, male counterpart, Wilfried Böese.

.... The German woman was like a wild animal. Frustrated as a person and as a woman. But she was less dangerous because she was frank about what she was, and wore no mask.... She was an open enemy.

The German man adopted a pleasant manner. He was a concealed enemy, pretending, tempting

his victims to believe in his good intentions. He was so quiet, so pleasant, so affable that, after my conversations with him, I found myself accusing myself: You believed him. He succeeded in deceiving you. If he had said to march in a certain direction where his colleagues were awaiting us with machine guns, ready to mow us down, we would have gone.¹⁴

Perhaps the fierce female Amazons of the RAF, Italian Red Brigades, South Moluccans, PFLP¹⁵ and other movements would do well to ponder whether such zealotry may not be self-defeating. They seem to have forgotten Che Guevara's dictum: "We must grow tough, but without ever losing our tenderness."¹⁶ Regrettably, this seems doubtful since such women are battling on both the political and personal levels. In their determination to prove themselves the equals of their male comrades they may feel it necessary to over-emphasize their ferocity and commitment.

'Carlos' and 'Terror International'

'Carlos', believed to be a Venezuelan named Ilich Ramirez Sanchez,¹⁷ appears to have headed an international terrorist team, headquartered in Europe and dedicated to creating or maintaining violent opposition to governments not deemed 'correct'. Although both the Soviet KGB and the PFLP appear to have aided 'Carlos' in his rise to prominence it would seem that his ultimate paymaster was/is Colonel Muammer Qaddafi of Libya.¹⁸ Simply because a South American organizer is able to recruit Japanese and German terrorists to act with or on behalf of, Palestinian groups does not mean that there is necessarily a 'Terror International' with its own goals and strategies.

Some authors suggest that there is such a concrete, definitive organization, perhaps in part because this explanation makes some sense of the rash of transnational terrorist spectacles since Lod Airport in

1972.¹⁹ But co-operation in a relatively few operations does not confirm the presence of an international terrorist organization with its own timetable. At a minimum the terrorists, like state intelligence services, are sharing knowledge and expertise. An October 1977 article in The Times²⁰ reported that a Paris-based, Latin American financed organization, the Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria (JCR), seeks not only to publicize the goals of world-wide revolutionary movements and the activities of specific terrorist organizations but also to facilitate "joint planning, funding, coordination and support" among such groups. Lest the reader become overly frightened it would appear from other information in the article that the JCR's main operations are two thriving drug-peddling rings. Moreover, one specified, major aim of the group is "to secure the release of affiliated members who are under detention in West Europe" rather than world revolution. Two other articles published approximately a year later could not shed any more light on the subject.²¹

With the main preoccupation of many terrorists being "escaping capture and rescuing each other from prison"²² it is perhaps a mistake to overemphasize a 'terror international'. There can be no denying, however, that certain mechanisms do permit the occasional transnational terrorist spectacular with planners like Haddad and Sanchez being able to hire operatives from Europe, Asia and the Americas. However, individual 'guns for hire' should be seen as just that. And although fraternal ties have been established between nationalist groups like the IRA, the PFLP and the Breton, Welsh and Basque separatists, these are of a loose nature.²³ Obviously there are areas of common concern and interest: adequate financial support, secure sources of arms and materials and qualified training of commandos. Some of these concerns

can be satisfied by individuals like Qaddafi. But there is not yet available any information which would suggest that these fraternal bonds extend into such areas as mutual deployment of commandos on a regular basis, united fronts in regions where that is possible, and a co-ordination headquarters.

Although the actions of some non-state terrorist actors appear to be highly coordinated the majority of such groups act alone. Without denying the role of suppliers of money and weapons like Qaddafi in creating an appearance of unity - Qaddafi reportedly has backed both Catholic and Protestant groups in Ulster²⁴ - an entity like 'Terror International' if it exists is most probably made up of the remnants of groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion and the various Latin American groups now on the run, and it should not be feared any more than an international criminal syndicate.

Publicity

Without publicity derived from specific international terrorist acts the Palestinian issue would not have become as prominent as it has in Middle East politics today. Bloody terrorism, and not 'justice', 'fair play' or 'humanity' has forced leaders in the Middle East and elsewhere to recognize that there is a people without a land of their own; and they are determined to regain it. The Palestinian situation is not unique, however; the Israelis whom they charge with usurping their homeland were themselves homeless for thousands of years. The South Moluccans have a similar problem in that their homeland has been absorbed by Indonesia. And strong arguments can be made for Kashmiris, Croats, Kurds and others who long for autonomy for their regions. All of the

peoples mentioned have employed terrorist and guerrilla warfare tactics in their efforts to achieve nationhood. Of the movements still struggling to attain their goals only the Kurds have avoided terrorist spectaculars like skyjacking or train hijacking.²⁵ Despite the belief that it was Jewish terrorist movements which contributed to driving the British from Palestine and creating the state of Israel²⁶ none of these groups has come close to a similar achievement. Nonetheless they have all made their movements known to people the world over for they have all been the focus of much media coverage.

But as was mentioned in the discussion of the female terrorist, the widespread coverage of gruesome terrorist attacks can leave the general public with strong feelings of revulsion against not only those particular terrorists, but with all their fellow South Moluccans, Palestinians, etc. Some authors like John Laffin even state categorically that terrorist extremism, especially by the PFLP, has "destroyed world sympathy" for the Palestinian cause.²⁷ Even the PFLP may have realized the harm that certain types of actions, specifically hijackings, can do to the cause. Skyjackings are extremely counter-productive because they threaten everyone who ever intends travelling. Yet skyjackings have meant large ransoms and generous media coverage for the Popular Front. It is indeed ironic that the final break between Habash and Haddad came over the question of the continued utility of aircraft hijacking in the wake of the successful Israeli raid at Entebbe.

Whether or not there ever was 'world sympathy' for the displaced Palestinians, or any other people is another question. The philosopher Ted Honderich argues that because terrorist violence is bloody and shocking it is roundly condemned.²⁸ On the other hand, the inequality

in political or economic opportunities which most terrorists claim to be opposing is not as immediately obvious; it is benign and virtually ignored by the media. Because of this oversight people are not as aware of why some groups may be opting for violence as they ought to be.²⁹ We can readily identify the specific agents of terrorist violence; but we find it more difficult to recognize agents of inequality, especially if we are classed as such by the terrorists.

Although the three international terrorist groups discussed all seek a 'world revolution' the PFLP's struggle tends to be viewed as a parochial one. In this sense it is perceived as somewhat different from the JRA and RAF. Because these two groups appear to be almost anarchist in their emphasis on destroying governments everywhere, and their failure to explain how they propose to replace such governments, one would think that they would both suffer short shrift from the media. Yet for a long time the Baader-Meinhof groups enjoyed popularity and good press throughout the world. The Sekigunha, on the other hand, has suffered from a totally negative image.

The Japanese Red Army, both at home and abroad, lost nearly all its credibility and support after the 'snow murders' and the Lod Airport killings. The Lod tragedy in particular, and perhaps indelibly, re-created the image of the fanatical Japanese 'kamikaze' who showed no respect for human life. The internationally popular Swedish crime novelists Maj Sjowall and Per Wahloo introduced the stereotyped Japanese terrorists, Kaiten and Kamikaze to millions of readers in their novel The Terrorists.³⁰ A more unpleasant pair could not be found anywhere for their very existence seemed to be devoted to killing.

The German terrorists, on the other hand, have been the recipients of a good deal of sympathetic reporting, and this despite the fact that some of them deliberately murdered both chosen victims and bystanders with impunity. The original Baader-Meinhof group actually led little more than a gang-sized 'Bonnie and Clyde' type of existence, where bank robberies, fast get-away cars, an expensive lifestyle, and the occasional shooting of a police officer formed the cycle. Their few 'political' bombings occurred in the month before they were all captured. Nonetheless they provided good copy for the media, and Meinhof was a prominent, easily recognized, journalist and television commentator. They were 'radical chic'. It is interesting that fellow journalists, like Ovid Demaris seem more empathetic to the Baader-Meinhof terrorists than others they have written about.³¹ Despite their warts these intellectuals are seen as qualitatively more noble than the 'ignorant' Irish, the 'anti-semitic' Palestinians, or the 'kamikaze' Japanese.

As if to underscore this bias, articles and books on West German terrorism tend to include criticisms both of the bureaucracy and democracy in general. It is not taken as an accepted fact that German society is healthy; the Nazi past haunts the sociopolitical environment in the Federal Republic. There is an all-consuming fear that either the state or the terrorists could become neo-fascist. The editors of The Times argued that even though "today's West Germany is by far the best incarnation of Germany that history has ever seen" nonetheless both historic stresses and insecurities and aspects of the "German character" contribute to the strength of German terrorism.³² The editorial goes on to say that a national history of general intolerance of diverse opinions, the tendency by both terrorists and state authorities to dehumanize the

opposition, and a strong desire by the majority of citizens that the state put down all challenges to itself (so as to prevent chaos) has contributed to a governmental over-reaction to what has been a small, yet troublesome, terrorist problem. In the autumn of 1977 a right-wing newspaper, Bild Zeitung, went so far as to publish a 'psychological test' to assist parents in identifying terrorist tendencies in their children.³³ No cures for the infected were recommended.

At the leftist extreme, a film entitled Deutschland im Herbst (Germany in Autumn) which looks at the Schleyer kidnapping, the Mogadishu rescue and the suicides at Stammheim Prison, is a rebuttal to the government's interpretation of these events by several directors and cinematographers. The suicides by Baader, Ensslin and Raspe are eulogized. The Schmidt government's state funeral for Schleyer is seen as being as politically motivated as that held by Hitler for Field Marshal Rommel after his suicide. A piece by Nobel Laureate Heinrich Boell characterizes the controversy over where and how to bury the suicide victims as a modern 'Antigone'. Rainer Fassbinder, one of Germany's best known directors, concluded with his own, violent reaction to the successful commando raid by being physically ill on screen.³⁴

Because of the perceived interactions between the Bonn government and the terrorists in many peoples' minds there is an openness, even among media which tend to support the authorities, to entertain criticisms of the Federal Republic's policies.³⁵ Even though the RAF groups appear to be ineffective in a physical sense against their government they have stimulated discussions of and concern about, West German democracy both generally and in its responses to the urban terrorists.

For rejectionists like the PFLP and the PIRA there is an advantage in any publicity, whether good or bad. Newsmedia personnel rarely distinguish between organizations, referring instead to 'Arab', 'Palestinian' or 'Irish' terrorism. Such coverage harms the more moderate organizations like the Official IRA and the PLO which have to work very hard to disassociate themselves from incidents which create hostile reactions. But to the 'all-or-nothing' extremists making the group's presence felt is enough; being liked is unimportant - "... good grades in conduct are the concern of obedient schoolchildren, not of revolutionaries."³⁶

The stereotype of the Palestinian fanatic is found in many popular novels, films and television dramas. Seymour's The Glory Boys and the film Black Sunday are two recent examples. Unlike most other terrorist groups, however, the PFLP had within its ranks a prominent Palestinian writer and painter, their newspaper editor, Ghassan Kanafani.³⁷ Surprisingly enough, Kanafani never wrote an action thriller with a Palestinian terrorist as the hero/heroine to cash in on the seemingly insatiable European and North American reading public's hunger for novels of political intrigue. Kanafani's works published in English are difficult to read for he has personalized 'Palestine' in writings which tend to be allegories.³⁸ There is no satisfaction or hope at the conclusions. One theme that is prominent in the short story 'The Middle of May' is that Palestinians must fight, that there is no other way to re-enter Palestine: Yet the Palestinians are presented as too gentle/weak to fight and so they are killed instead. The message in this story endorses the PFLP ideology.

In The Glory Boys, the central character Famy is a member of the PFLP - General Command. But this is more to give him a recognizable

identity rather than as a purposeful choice of a specific terrorist membership on the author's part. Famy fares reasonably well - he is the pure, youthful, dedicated crusader type; Palestine is his bride. His intended victim, the Israeli nuclear physicist David Sokarev is portrayed with both personal strengths and weaknesses. He becomes the pawn in a war of assassins; for both the Israeli and British secret services are seen as less than exemplary. Jimmy, the agent resurrected by the British for especially 'messy' or 'disreputable' assignments is a refreshing addition to the spy thriller genre. After all, not all government agents are of the gentlemanly James Bond variety. Like the IRA man, McCoy, also in The Glory Boys, Jimmy likes to kill, and if he had not been put on a retainer by the government he surely would have found a job with the underworld.

The film "Black Sunday", based on a novel by Thomas Harris, also portrays Rejection Front Palestinians determined to sabotage the Superbowl, an American football spectacular. What makes "Black Sunday" gross is not the portrayal of the Palestinian terrorists but the story itself. The public must need terrorist spectacles to fill a vicarious bloodlust, for Hollywood makes money on producing sick films which instruct viewers on how to put together a truly spectacular terrorist operation. In this particular case upwards of eighty thousand people, including the United States President, were the intended victims of the terrorists. At the last minute, however, they are foiled by one semi-retired, seriously injured Mossad agent.

Such "mush" is perhaps tolerable in a cinema where disgruntled patrons can ask for their money back. Recently in Canada the public has been privy to a somewhat hysterical response by segments of the news media

to the condemnation by Arab governments, Palestinian groups, and American officials of a new Canadian policy committed to moving the country's Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On the CBX (Edmonton) Morning Show of 7 June, 1979 the interviewer, John Hanlon, persisted in badgering a spokesman from the Canadian Arab Federation as to whether 'Arab terrorists' would plant bombs in Ottawa or carry out attacks elsewhere inside Canada to protest this new policy. Hanlon sounded disappointed when the spokesman could not promise that there would be bloodshed.

Recalling Brian Jenkins' argument that "terrorism is theatre", that publicity is what creates and sustains many terrorist groups, and that for some groups publicity is the only realistic goal;³⁹ one cannot but wonder, after the CBX interview, if the media are not guilty themselves of encouraging terrorists through encouraging the horrific incidents and downplaying less violent acts of protest.

Acquisition of Funds

The PFLP, RAF and JRA all obtained substantial sums of money through terrorism. Since its arrival in Beirut in 1971 the Sekigunha had been dependent on the PFLP for the bulk of its funds, of which there was no shortage provided that the JRA concentrated its energies on the 'Arab revolution'. Apparently, however, Shigenobu felt that revolutions should be created throughout the world. By 1974 she was desperately short of funds.⁴⁰ All her schemes to become financially independent through a series of kidnappings for ransom in Europe were discovered in advance. And when her leading European operatives were arrested Shigenobu had to call in the PFLP to assist in their release. It was not

until the October 1977 hijacking to Dacca and Algeria that she netted some funds, a sum of \$6,000,000 U.S.

In their early years in Japan the Sekigunha had lived off the avails of bank robberies, a practice at which the RAF has excelled. Unlike many other terrorist groups the various RAF commandos have all lived rather ostentatiously. Although the desire for luxurious apartments and expensive cars was not as pronounced in the Second of June Movement, nonetheless these 'working class anarchists' also became consumption oriented.⁴¹ Although the original Baader-Meinhof cell never progressed beyond robberies, its successor groups obtained substantial sums through the Lorenz kidnapping. One of their demands in the Schleyer-Mogadishu incident was for a cash ransom of \$15,000,000 U.S. Individuals who became contract terrorists, like Hans-Joachim Klein at the OPEC raid, received substantial salaries. Klein was given 'compensation money' of about \$225,000 U.S. for the wound he suffered at OPEC - a sum which must have proved helpful when he fled underground.⁴²

Like the PIRA, the Palestinian groups have not been motivated by a need for funds because of the generous support from various Arab states and Palestinians.⁴³ Although groups in the Rejection Front, like the PFLP, have not had as secure sources of income, they do not receive funds from the Saudis, but have been supported by Libya's Colonel Qaddafi. If reports on the OPEC raid are correct, the Saudis and Iranians contributed \$50,000,000 U.S. to the PFLP and 'Carlos' to ensure the safe returns of Sheikh Yamani and Mr. Amouzegar.⁴⁴ They have also received lesser sums through various hijackings.

Freeing Comrades

According to The Times, the main preoccupation of ideological terrorist groups like the RAF and JRA recently has been "escaping capture and rescuing each other from prison."⁴⁵ After their success in winning the release of five comrades in the Lorenz kidnapping regular attempts were made, all unsuccessful, to secure the release of the leadership of the RAF by various of its commandos - at the Stockholm Embassy barricade and hostage, the Schleyer kidnapping, and the Mogadishu hijacking. Hopefully their repeated failures and the subsequent suicides of the leaders may suggest an end to terrorist incidents with that particular objective by the RAF.

The Sekigunha has also used both barricade and hostage situations and skyjackings to win the release of comrades. To date these have been very successful, and since few of the JRA members have been recaptured they need not again employ such tactics to free comrades for some time.

The PFLP has long asked for the release of prisoners, both its own members and other Palestinians, as well as non-Arabs. Through hijackings and barricade and hostage incidents they have managed to win the release of prisoners from Israel and Europe. The Israelis gave in once, in 1968 when an El Al flight was hijacked to Algiers. Since then the Israeli government's policy has been to stand fast, even when children's lives have been threatened. Although Israel holds more Palestinian prisoners than anyone else it would seem that hostage incidents directed towards the release of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel are counter-productive. Further, the United States stood firm against Black September at Khartoum and the Germans did the same at Mogadishu. It is doubtful that such extortion can succeed from now on, at least against North American and

European targets.

All in all the freeing of comrades has not been that successful an enterprise, and the risks are high. When the six groups under study are considered the Tupamaros are seen to have the best record; their achievements however were not a result of hostage-taking incidents but well planned prison escapes.

Weakening the State

Either terrorists might want to weaken the leader of a nation personally or they might direct their terror at creating an image of instability and the inability of the administration to govern generally. Only the Tupamaros concentrated on exposing the corruption of individual government leaders; and only they were concerned primarily with a parochial social revolution. Because the Sekigunha's target is the opposite - an attack on all capitalist government administrations world-wide, their objective is to be as random and indiscriminate in their terror as possible - to show the strength of the revolutionary forces and the vulnerability of the bourgeoisie.

Although police powers of search and arrest had been strengthened and scrutiny of all applicants for government positions had been introduced, the Bonn Government did not come under serious criticism by the public until the Buback and Ponto murders. When Schleyer was kidnapped, people demanded a swift, strong response to the terrorists. Whatever the terrorists had hoped the popular responses to their actions would be - the terrorists wanted people to question the 'authoritarian administration' - people generally thought the authorities had been far too soft and they demanded that the terrorists be crushed. This public attitude

was relaxed somewhat after the brilliant commando rescue at Mogadishu.

Perhaps more than most other countries the West German authorities have come under a great deal of foreign criticism, including governmental, for their responses to the demands of international terrorist groups. The Federal Republic is a very young democracy, greatly burdened with the ghost, still fresh in the minds of many people, of the Nazi Reich. So when the authorities implemented legislation like the 'Berufsverbot',⁴⁶ laws, the image is of a repressive regime which is over-reacting to violent but fringe group opposition. And when the contrast is made, as it usually is, with chaotic Italy, which has not introduced such draconian legislation in its struggle against the much bloodier Red Brigades, the apprehension against the Bonn government grows.

Moreover, the West German authorities appeared negligent in their handling of criticisms of Holger Meins' death whilst on a hunger strike; the 'isolation' policies at Stammheim; Ulrike Meinhof's suicide; and those of Baader, Ensslin and Raspe. They were slow to respond to questions and appeared quite evasive; in doing so they helped create sympathy for the terrorists.⁴⁷

The PFLP, like the FLQ and the PIRA, is in a quite different position. The Front's struggle is seen as more of a nationalist or separatist one by leftists and third world populations, while tending to be viewed as a racially or religiously motivated struggle by many in the West. Whereas the FLQ operated within its own 'territory', the Provisionals and the Popular Front are perceived as coming in from the outside and creating trouble where there would not otherwise be such violent opposition to those in power. Because both the PIRA and the PFLP tend to such extremes in their violence they receive little sympathy in the world's

media. It is a situation where Palestinian terrorism makes the news; but the violence of occupation, expulsion from one's homeland and refugee life does not. One can identify with the hostages on an aircraft, ~~four~~ bus or in a school. But unless one has been a refugee himself, it is quite difficult to identify with the residents of a refugee camp who are bombed and strafed because 'suspected terrorist bases' are reported to be in their camp.

The PFLP seems to have given up on trying to make known the repression of some Israeli policies. They are not trying to get sympathetic coverage in Israel or abroad. Their contempt for public opinion, coupled with their 'total war' ideology whereby anything and anyone becomes a legitimate target, caused the split with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the division within the Palestinian resistance.

History too plays a role in the difficulties which the PFLP and other Palestinians face in charging the Israelis with terrorism. Because of the Nazi holocaust in particular, and the centuries of suffering by the Jewish people in general, there is a reluctance to criticize Israeli policies against the Arabs in Israel proper, those in the occupied territories, and those in other countries. This bias is quite noticeable in David Tinnin's Hit Team,⁴⁸ which reports on the exploits of an elite Israeli assassination squad let loose in Europe in the wake of the Olympics tragedy. It never occurred to Tinnin that Israeli actions, especially when they resulted in the murders of innocent third parties, might be questionable. And there was a boyishly simplistic "Hurrah for our side" whenever an 'Arab', known terrorist or otherwise was killed.

Although all of the Palestinian groups have failed in their efforts to show the brutality of certain Israeli policies, books and journalistic accounts are now appearing which detail the terror practised by both sides to the conflict.⁴⁹

Redressing Grievances

If the RAF and JRA have concrete grievances against their homelands they must be that these two countries, despite being on the losing side in the Second World War, are now extremely prosperous, highly technological states where the seemingly limitless consumption has created an uncritical population, prepared at all levels, including the universities, to surrender itself to the capitalist system.⁵⁰

The Palestinian groups generally, and the PFLP in particular, have made little progress towards redressing the great wrong that they believe was done by the United Nations and the Israelis. In their somewhat distorted view of Palestinian history, however, they have come to believe that it was the utter ruthlessness of the terrorist Irgun and Stern Gang which created Israel; and they, therefore, believe that they can accomplish the same end for Palestine through similar methods. Hacker interviewed some of these Rejectionists after the Munich Olympics tragedy.

Not surprisingly, the Palestinians called the Jews Neo-Nazis. More surprisingly, they half-ironically and half seriously referred to themselves as Neo-Zionists....

The Palestinian admiration for ... what they believe to have been Zionist methods, and their determination to imitate them is not clandestine, but quite conscious and outspoken. According to the Palestinians the success of the Zionists was due to a combination of three factors; the insistence

on the realization of a dream of national independence on a certain "holy" territory; the determination to pay no attention to diverse opinions, including those of one's own people; and the unrestricted employment of all means to realize the dream of territorial independence.⁵¹

Not only have the Palestinian terrorist groups salvaged the feelings of despair felt by many after the 1967 War;⁵² more importantly they have dragged the Arab nations into supporting their minimum demands. And rejectionists like the PFLP have been able to prevent an Israeli Peace Treaty with any nation except Egypt.

They have given a meaning to the word 'Palestinian' to many thousands of refugees. We in the West may not approve of their actions, but like Menachem Begin a generation ago, they fight and therefore they are - a people, a nation.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism, p. 175.
2. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 362, mentions links between the PIRA, FLO and MLN and 'Carlos' however.
3. Khaled, My People Shall Live, (Toronto: NC Press, 1975), p. 136. Khaled's memoirs are difficult to read, often appearing irrational and overly emotional. But before drawing conclusions about Arab polemicists and wild-eyed bedouin fanaticism from her style one is advised to read Rabbi Meir Kahane, The Story of the Jewish Defense League, (Radnor: Chilton, 1975). The 'crusader' writing style is unmistakable in both cases.
4. Four of Ponto's five slayers were female.
5. Becker, Hitler's Children, p. 241. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 232.
6. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 221.
7. Becker, Hitler's Children, p. 221.
8. Khaled, My People Shall Live, p. 122.
9. Ibid., pp. 110-112. Khaled scoffed at the idea of having her marriage approved by her family, yet had it approved by the PFLP (p. 174).
10. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 29.
11. Khaled, My People Shall Live, p. 186. Other than Khaled and Katie George Thomas the PFLP has not used Arab women.
12. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 29.
13. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 203.
14. Ibid., pp. 204-205. Robert Liston, Terrorism (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1977), pp. 129-130, mentions that Boese could not kill any of the hostages when he had the chance during the Israeli rescue. Instead he ran into the Israeli gunfire.
15. Khaled has been described as courteous during the TWA flight. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 149. One of the female hijackers at Mogadishu was not so soothing. Time, 31 October, 1977. Newsweek, 31 October, 1977.

16. Khaled, My People Shall Live, p. 150. This statement has become Khaled's 'guiding principle'.
17. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 62 states that the West Germans do not believe there is an individual who is 'Carlos'; the name is a code for a terror organization. The Israelis believe that there have been four different 'Carlos' operatives. If David Phillips Attlee, ex-CIA man turned novelist, The Carlos Contract, (New York: Macmillan, 1978), can be believed there has been more than one 'Carlos'. The biography of Ilich Ramirez Sanchez is Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist.
18. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Contract, pp. 124-142 present an excellent case relating to Colonel Qaddafi's involvement in many terrorist spectacles. Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp. 288-291, believes that Qaddafi is a 'Father Christmas' figure to terrorists like Haddad and 'Carlos'; he approves of the actions and pays the bills, but he is not always advised of the plans. Smith contends that a \$50,000,000 U.S. ransom was paid for Yamani and Amouzegar by their governments and that most of the ransom went to Habash, Haddad and 'Carlos' personally, making them the world's richest terrorists (p. 283).
19. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex; Demaris, Brothers in Blood; Parry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat; and Alexander, "Terrorism in the Middle East", all lean towards the concept of a terrorist organization.
20. Michael Frenchman, Louis Heren and Ian Murray, "Worldwide Terrorist Activities are Planned and Financed by International HQ in Paris", The Times, 8 October, 1977.
21. Eric Moonman, "Terrorists Rule, OK?", The Times, 14 August, 1978. Alexander, "Terrorism in the Middle East".
22. "Well Brought-Up Middle Class Terrorists", The Times, 7 September, 1977.
23. 'Carlos' is believed to have organized an international meeting of separatist movements in Trieste. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 79.
24. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, p. 356.
25. An India Airlines plane was hijacked to Lahore, Pakistan by Kashmiris in January, 1971; Croatians hijacked a TWA flight to Paris in October 1976; and South Moluccans have commandeered trains in Holland, for example the thirteen day siege in December, 1975.
26. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, pp. 71-75.

27. Laffin, Fedayeen, p. 42.
28. Ted Honderich, "On Inequality and Violence and Differences We Make Between Them", Political Violence: A Philosophical Analysis of Terrorism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
29. Bernard Johnpoll, "Terrorism and the Mass Media in the U.S.", in Alexander and Finger, eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.
30. Maj Sjowall and Per Wahloo, The Terrorists, translated from the Swedish by Joan Tate (New York: Pantheon, 1976).
31. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 217-263.
32. "Well Brought-Up Middle Class Terrorists", The Times, 7 September, 1977.
33. Reported in the Alberta Democrat, November/December, 1977, p. 13. Danger signs within the family were said to be a weak father; a dominating mother; sensitive, inquisitive children, and a liking for the writings of Franz Kafka.
34. A review of the movie appeared as "tortured Look at Terrorism", Edmonton Journal, 4 July, 1978.
35. Brauns and Kramer, "Political Repression in West Germany;". Milton Mankoff and Monica Jacobs, "McCarthyism and West Germany", Dissent (Winter), 1978, pp. 84-87.
36. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, p. 73.
37. Kanafani was assassinated, along with his teenaged niece, apparently by Israeli commandos, in July, 1972. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 154.
38. Ghassan Kanafani's works are discussed by Cooley, Green March, Black September, pp. 62-64.
39. Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," p. 16.
40. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 181.
41. Baumann, How It All Began, pp. 94-95.
42. Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist, p. 288.
43. Dobson, Black September, p. 120.
44. Smith, Carlos: Portrait of a Terrorist, p. 283. Smith noted that Chancellor Kreisky of Austria confirmed the ransom.
45. "Well Brought-Up Middle Class Terrorists", The Times, 7 September, 1977.

46. See note 35 above. Perhaps one explanation for the severity with which the Federal Republic's administrators clamped down on 'leftists; within the civil service is their belief, based on the advice of student radical Rudi Dutschke, that the leftists could win the revolution through a 'long march through the institutions'. Hans Josef Horchem, "West Germany: The 'Long March Through the Institutions'," Conflict Studies No. 46, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1974).
47. Demaris, Brothers in Blood, pp. 261-263 questions the fairness of the trials and prison treatment, see European Court of Human Rights on Derogations in Emergency, Ireland v. U.K.
48. David Tinnin, Hit Team, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976).
49. Non-Arab journalists, sympathetic to the Palestinian cause had a difficult time selling their books. A.C. Forrest, The Unholy Land, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971). Christopher Mayhew and Michael Adams, Publish It Not..., (London: Longman, 1975).
50. Taylor and Kim, "Violence and Change in Post-Industrial Societies". Wagenlehner, "Motivation for Political Terrorism in Germany".
51. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies, pp. 72-73.
52. The turning point for the fedayeen was the 'victory' at Karamah. Laffin, Fedayeen, pp. 30-32.

CHAPTER 8

RESPONDING TO NON-STATE TERRORISM

Barbarous acts are committed by the thousands every day in some corner of the globe which no state dreams of stopping because no state has an interest in stopping them.¹

General violence and the slaughter of innocent people are not novelties in human society, nor is non-state terrorism. There are some differences for today's non-state terrorists, in comparison with their brethren of centuries past, not only do they find it easier to receive publicity, world-wide in many cases; they sometimes kill persons unrelated to their struggles; and, at times it seems, they have become almost as powerful as governments. On occasion they have succeeded in temporarily commanding the attention of whole communities, most often through the taking of hostages.² And the potential for destruction is much greater than at any time in the past for like states they may be able to detonate nuclear weapons, use bacteriological warfare and the like.³ Yet despite the fears as to what certain non-state terrorists might do, their violence pales in comparison to the capability for terror of nearly any nation with even a small but well-armed security force; and the actual terror of certain regimes.⁴ It should be remembered that, by itself, no terrorist movement has yet both brought down a government and replaced it with its own personnel and forms.⁵

Why then the widespread interest in non-state terrorism over the past decade - for numerous academic books and articles have been published on various facets of the topic; conferences have been held and there is

even a journal devoted to the subject, entitled simply enough, Terrorism.⁶ Moreover, the subject has provided the material for a plethora of novels. Yet, although at the same time there has been "a world-wide revival of the use of torture, especially against political prisoners - as can be ascertained from the most casual acquaintance with the work and reports of Amnesty International ... there has not been ... a comparable outpouring of books on this even more disagreeable subject. No international conferences of academics, no subsidized research projects"⁷ and, one might add, no special journal. Anthony Arblaster has concluded that the differences in focus and interest of these two serious political problems result from a conscious or unconscious bias against those who would question the status quo or challenge the legitimacy of presently constituted states. For this reason 'official', or state terror, whether in the form of torture, denial of all civil rights, or the bombing of civilian targets, is rarely studied. This is so because, Arblaster argues, "writers primarily are not concerned with terrorism as such, and still less with the several varieties of political violence. They are concerned with terrorism as and when it is used for political ends which they do not endorse, and against states whose legitimacy they accept."⁸ Arblaster does not deny that such a bias in research is acceptable, provided that such criteria are made explicit by the authors.

This discussion also focused on the non-state terrorist actor, but not because they were necessarily seen as being evil. The interest was in why six very divergent groups of political militants would all opt for what, at least to this writer, appears to be a rather impossible political policy. But as has become apparent in chapters four through seven terrorism can produce many results, often beneficial, even if

unsuspected. The issue of a sovereign Quebec is stronger today than it has been at any other time in Canada's history, and there will be a referendum in the province of Quebec to gauge the extent of the support for withdrawal from the Canadian Confederation in the spring of 1980.

Palestinian extremism and nothing but such violence has made the resolution of the problem of the homeless Palestinians one that is central to international politics today.

The governments challenged by the various terrorist groups discussed have responded to them both individually, and at times jointly. Although the Tupamaros, FLQ and PIRA have all engaged in acts of international terrorism they have been primarily internal terrorists, and the Uruguayan, Canadian and British authorities have reacted accordingly. Uruguay used every means available, including the apparently widespread use of torture and the usurpation of the civil rights of all its citizens to defeat the Tupamaros.⁹ And defeat them they did, once the military took control of the country. The price has been very high in Uruguay. Of all the groups discussed the Tupas tended to be, although they were not always, the most selective and discriminating of terrorists. This caution and restraint gained them respect in many quarters; but it did not restrain their governmental opposition.

In Canada the various waves of the FLQ were quite successfully brought to trial through the efforts of the various police agencies until the Cross-Laporte kidnappings and Laporte's subsequent murder. In bringing in the military to assist the police, and the War Measures Act to grant them sweeping powers of arrest and search, the Canadian Government argued that there was serious danger of an insurrection of some sort at the time in Quebec. Although only a few hundred brave citizens questioned

the government's draconian legislation at the time there is now, almost a decade later, a concern to learn as much as possible about that period and any possible wrongdoing by the police forces and governments involved.

Although there do not appear to be widespread charges of brutality against the authorities, some wrongdoings have been reported.¹⁰

The British have been brutal in the suppression of suspected terrorist detainees,¹¹ and about all that can be said to their credit is that both Protestant and Catholic detainees have been so treated.¹² The British have been charged with using military personnel in civilian clothes to 'create' incidents to discredit the terrorists, usually the Provos.¹³ The German authorities too have also been so charged;¹⁴ as well it has been alleged that informers are used by both nations.

Although the British were quick to release Leila Khaled in exchange for the passengers and crew of a BOAC aircraft hijacked to Jordan by the PFLP in 1970,¹⁵ they have not openly interfered with nations dealing with 'internal' terrorists who held British hostages, like Cross in Canada, and Jackson in Uruguay.¹⁶

Until the public outcry both within Japan and among its allies abroad after the surrender to the JRA hijackers at Dacca/Algiers the Japanese could be counted on to give in to any demands by its terrorists for cash ransoms and the release of prisoners. It was hostile public opinion which forced the Japanese to adopt a 'get-tough' policy after the October, 1977 hijacking; a policy which paid-off at Nagasaki a few weeks later when a bus was hijacked.

Initially the West German Government also agreed to pay large cash ransoms and exchange prisoners, including the survivors of the Munich Olympics hostage-taking, in exchange for the passengers and crews

of several Lufthansa jets. Some pressure had also been brought to bear on various Latin American nations where German diplomats were taken hostage and sometimes killed, by terrorist groups.¹⁷ It was only after realizing what a costly precedent they had set in releasing several West German terrorists in connection with the Lorenz kidnapping that the authorities adopted a policy of no surrender to terrorists, a policy which has perhaps contributed to the gradual demise of urban terrorism in Germany. Two diplomatic staff were killed in Stockholm, and Mr. Schleyer and the pilot of the Lufthansa jet at Mogadishu, Juergen Schumann, died but since then terrorists have not been as serious a threat either in Germany or against German businesses and personnel abroad.

In the wake of the Dacca hijacking the Japanese Justice Ministry announced the formation of a special department within the police force to deal with Sekigunha terrorists, much as the Germans and Israelis had done after the Munich tragedy. The GSG-9, as the German unit is called, is similar to the British Special Air Services (SAS), established during the Second World War.¹⁸ It is noteworthy that there were British SAS Weapons specialists to assist the Germans at Mogadishu; and they brought some special 'stun' grenades which contributed to the raid's success.¹⁹

Israel's intelligence service established an elite squad of assassins in the wake of the Munich debacle to punish the guilty.²⁰ Moreover, the Israelis, like the Jordanians and Lebanese, have not been averse to bombing heavily populated refugee camps into rubble in efforts to kill terrorists even though this results in the death of anyone who is unfortunate enough to be in the vicinity. Israel gives open military support to Christian militiamen in southern Lebanon.²¹ Within Israel

proper they have used detention without trial and have denied full equality to their Arab citizens;²² in the occupied territories mass punishments and torture and involuntary expulsion have all been practised in efforts to deter those sympathetic to the cause of a Palestinian nation - not all of whom may have been active terrorists.²³ The escalation of the violence by both sides was reflected in the shooting down of a civilian aircraft, and the deaths of all on board, by Israel in 1973. The Israelis feared that the plane, off course in a severe sandstorm, was going to crash into one of their cities. Their response was to bring it down.²⁴

The Israelis were the first nation to win the release of skyjacked hostages through a commando raid in a 'country of refuge' other than their own.²⁵ L.C. Green, in making a strong case for the forceful intervention of Israel into Uganda, points out that

even though this may result in condemnation at the United Nations and elsewhere ... it may reduce the incidence of hijackings and similar acts of international terrorism. Secondly, it may lead those States which really do believe in the rule of law and the suppression of such manifest breaches of the law to take joint action to ensure that, when such acts do occur, they are dealt with on a multi-lateral basis, and that no single State is left to act alone, even though the others might afterwards say that it has contributed greatly to vindicating the rule of law.²⁶

The problem which arises when states attempt to proscribe international terrorism by non-state actors is that some nations argue that all acts of terrorism by outgroups must be condemned and punished, regardless of the motivations of the terrorists; whereas other nations, often third world and recently independent, insist that just about any terrorist act is permissible for groups seeking national liberation. A

quote from the Report of the United Nations General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism is a case in point.

Two main trends emerged with respect to the orientation to be given to the measures the Ad Hoc Committee was required to elaborate. According to the first trend, the measures should essentially be directed against acts of international terrorism which were occurring with increasing frequency.... According to the second trend, the measures to be elaborated should be directed against the situations as the very root of acts of individual terrorism.... 27

Because of the very different concerns between those who feel threatened by international non-state terrorists,²⁸ and those who support such incidents within the framework of a political ideology of national liberation it has become impossible for agreement to be reached, by international bodies, on how to combat such terrorist incidents. Despite the recognition that such acts are a threat to world public order, and academic proposals for the establishment of an international criminal court to hear such cases impartially;²⁹ Green contends that "in the present state of the world, with the different approach to the problem of terrorist control adopted by the older Western democracies as compared with that of the developing countries" there is no possibility of being sanguine about the prospect of establishing any legal controls against such non-state activities.³⁰ Instead, Green proposes "multi-lateral action on a more restricted scale, when the participants have somewhat similar views as to moral conduct, the rule of law, standards of civilization, and the like, for these show, if the examples of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights is anything to go by, a more helpful prospect."³¹ At the international level Green argues for such like-minded states having two international laws: "that which we

have to subscribe to for the sake of universal public opinion, though we know it will never operate as law; and that more restricted collection of rules of law that we believe in and will carry out, ensuring a reduction and suppression of barbarism at least among ourselves."³²

Such an approach would enable nations under attack to respond efficiently either singly as in the case of the Israeli raid at Entebbe or jointly, as through the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.³³ Regretably such policies do not necessarily discourage further such incidents, although there have been only a few hijackings since Entebbe and Mogadishu. But perhaps of equal significance as the change in tactics of internationally oriented groups like the PFLP has been the realization that certain acts like hijacking, assassinating diplomatic personnel and the like can be self-defeating.³⁴ It may not be surprising, therefore, that the most recent hijacking was by a Croatian nationalist of an American aircraft.³⁵ Groups like the Croats and the South Moluccans have even less of a concern as to how they achieve publicity for their cause than the most extreme of the Palestinian rejectionist groups. Now, more than at any time in the past, there is at least an impression that there may be in the not too distant future some sort of a Palestinian state, autonomous region or the like. There is definitely a need for Palestinian terrorists to reconsider their public image.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Oppenheim, International Law (1955), 312-3.
2. Millions of people watched the unfolding of the Munich Olympics tragedy through the live satellite coverage provided in conjunction with the Games. Life in parts of the Netherlands has been brought to a standstill on several occasions through South Moluccan hostage-takings, particularly that of schoolchildren.
3. H. Herbert Brown, "Nuclear Facilities and Materials", pp. 149-185, and Brian Jenkins and Alfred Rubin, "New Vulnerabilities and the Acquisition of New Weapons by Non-government Groups", pp. 221-279, in Alona Evans and John F. Murphy, eds., International Terrorism, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1978).
4. Amin's Uganda and the Khmer Rouge's Cambodia are but two examples of modern state terror. Iran's administration, both under the Shah and now under the Ayatollah, continues to terrorize segments of its citizenry.
5. Although the Tupamaros were seen as responsible for the overthrow of Bordaberry's government in Uruguay it was the military which seized power.
6. Terrorism: An International Journal, (New York: Crane Russak) commenced publishing in 1977. Volume 1 contains no articles on state terrorism of an international nature.
7. Anthony Arblaster, "Terrorism: Myths, Meanings and Morale", Political Studies, V. 25:3 (September, 1977), p. 414. However, a U.N. Committee is now working on a draft Convention.
8. Ibid., p. 416.
9. After the April, 1970 'executions' of several alleged police torturers by the Tupamaros systematic police torture was reportedly suspended. The authorities may have been responding as much to opposition from their own police officers as much as from fears of more assassinations since in June, 1970 many Republican Guards struck in protest against wearing their uniforms to and from work. They also refused to fight the Tupamaros. Forty leaders were arrested. Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 78.
10. Aubrey and Golden, Rumours of War, p.
11. John McGuffin, The Guineapigs, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).
12. This was the conclusion reached by the European Court of Human Rights in January, 197 , after the Republic of Ireland had brought

- a charge against the United Kingdom, charging it with torture and discriminatory practises of internment.
13. Fisk, "The Effect of Social and Political Crime on the Police and Army in Northern Ireland", p. 86. Fisk, far from being an Irish partisan is a distinguished columnist for The Times.
 14. Both Baumann, How It All Began, pp. 20, 33, 37, 46, and Becker, Hitler's Children, pp. 99-101 and 268, not only admit that Peter Urbach was a police undercover agent but that he supplied weapons to both the Second of June Movement and the Rote Armee Fraktion.
 15. Khaled, My People Shall Live, pp. 195-212.
 16. Gott, "Events since 1971", in Labrousse, The Tupamaros, p. 128, alleges that British Intelligence might have aided the escape of 106 Tupamaros from a Montevideo jail after Ambassador Jackson had been held hostage almost eight months.
 17. Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings, pp. 96-101, 78-79. When the kidnapped West German Ambassador to Guatemala was killed in April, 1970 because that Government refused to meet their demands the Bonn Government protest in the strongest terms, asking the Guatemalan Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany to leave and virtually closing its mission in Guatemala City. Two months later the German Ambassador to Brazil was kidnapped and the Bonn authorities not only put pressure on Brazil to accede to the demands, which they did, but also made their own efforts to contact the kidnapers.
 18. Roy Farran, Winged Dagger, (London: Collins, 1948), pp. 155-258 gives a first-hand account of the setting up and early operatives of the SAS during World War II. Major Farran joined the Palestine Police after the war and organized a counter-terrorism branch, pp. 348-381, which attempted to curb Irgun and Stern Gang terror. He himself was the target of a Jewish terrorist letter bomb which killed his brother. Dobson, Black September, pp. 98-99.
 19. Newsweek, 31 October, 1977.
 20. Henry Stanhope, "A Counter-Terrorist Department Called 'God's Wrath'," The Times, 12 April, 1973. Dobson, Black September, chapter 6. Dobson reports that the then Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, knew a great deal about the squad (pp. 101-102).
 21. Since March, 1979 the Israelis have been aiding a rebel Christian soldier, General Saad Haddad, who has proclaimed his own state in the border region near Israel.
 22. Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, (Beirut: 1969), was originally written in Hebrew and uses Israeli government information and Hebrew press reports.

23. Smith and Andrews, *The Palestinians*, pp. 15-16, cites the 'involuntary expulsion' of the principal of the Bir Zeit College in November, 1974.
24. Dobson, *Black September*, pp. 118-120. The downed aircraft was Libyan owned and the Israeli intelligence services believed that an aircraft, possibly with an atomic weapon on board, might be crashed into one of their cities. Dobson discusses these concerns as well as the actual sequence of events as verified by the black box recording recovered from the crash site.
25. The Israelis have successfully stormed aircraft before, at Lod in May, 1972 with the hijacked Sabena aircraft. What was unique about Entebbe is that they were able to do so in a third country which did not offer co-operation to them, as the Somalis did at Mogadishu two years later.
26. L.C. Green, "Rescue at Entebbe - Legal Aspects", Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, V. 6 (1976), pp. 312-329.
27. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, General Assembly, Official Records, 28th Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/9028), (New York, 1973), p. 17, par. 54.
28. There is a tendency to think that only Western diplomats and businessmen are threatened. Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings, reports on an aborted kidnap attempt on Soviet diplomats in Argentina, p. 73. Croatian nationalists have attacked Yugoslav missions and personnel abroad.
29. L. Kos-Rabcewicz Zubkowski, "The Creation of an International Criminal Court", in Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Terrorism and Political Crimes, (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), pp. 519-536; or at the least an international criminal code, L.C. Green, "An International Criminal Code - Now?", Dalhousie Law Journal, V. 3:2, (October, 1976), pp. 560-579.
30. L.C. Green, "International Law and the Control of Barbarism", in Ronald St. John Macdonald, Douglas Johnston, and Gerald Morris, The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978), p. 267.
31. Ibid., p. 267.
32. Ibid., pp. 267-268.
33. "The End for the Political Refugee?", The Times, 7 February, 1978.
34. Dobson, Black September, p. 120, quotes unidentified Arab sources who believed that counter-productive terrorism, like the Khartoum killings, must be ordered by Israeli agents who had infiltrated the guerrilla organizations.
35. An American aircraft was commandeered whilst on a domestic flight and eventually exchanged for another which flew the lone skyjacker to Shannon, Ireland where he surrendered. These events took place on June 20-21, 1979.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

To think clearly, yet never coldly, about killing is difficult at the best of times.¹

Terrorism, as a political weapon, has been used throughout history, world-wide, and by both states and non-states. Terrorist acts have been perpetrated in the name of 'noble causes' as well as for the achievement of personal political goals. Despite the fact that it does not fit the prevailing notions of Western democracy, violence, in its many forms, including terror, has very much been, now is, and is likely to long remain, an option chosen both by the besieged and the besiegers in various political circumstances.

This study focused on six non-state terrorist actors, three waging basically internal struggles against perceived oppression by legally constituted governments; and another three movements committed to militant international opposition to capitalism, imperialism and Zionism, (i.e. the state of Israel as presently structured, its supporters and allies). Within terms of the psychiatrist Frederick Hacker's three categories of terrorists - crazies, criminals and crusaders² - it was observed that nearly all of the terrorists discussed were predominantly crusaders, although there was a proclivity for criminality evidenced in the behaviour of some of them, most notably Andreas Baader of the Rote Armee Fraktion.³

Hakon Wiberg's two criteria of success for urban guerrilla warfare⁴ were applied to each of the terrorist groups discussed. No group has yet achieved the maximum criterion of achieving political power, nor

does this seem likely, Wiberg's own optimism notwithstanding. A state likely to collapse in the face of a terrorist campaign would have probably fallen to a more traditional guerrilla campaign much earlier - Cuba may be a case in point. Even the weakest of state administrations are prepared to hold on to power at almost any cost; and terrorists, although they may be difficult to apprehend, do not require expensive military hardware to contain. However, rejectionists like the PFLP and PIRA may, in the future, force serious changes within the geographical and/or political makeup of certain states even if they themselves fail to win political control.

Wiberg's minimum political criterion - the social survivability of the terrorist group in the face of government responses to their challenge - has been achieved only by the PFLP and the PIRA in a very concrete and visible way. The secretive Sekigunha has not had its membership depleted by numerous arrests, as has happened to the RAF. One can take comfort in the realization that both Japan and Germany in 1978-1979, have not suffered the burden of non-state terrorist incidents, which haunted them from 1971 through 1977.

The once virtually impenetrable columns of the Tupamaros were badly fragmented when the Uruguayan military were granted a carte blanche to pursue them. Several thousand suspected MLN members or sympathizers were killed or detained, and those who went underground or abroad have not been heard from in several years. The Canadian FLQ, although it virtually disappeared in the aftermath of the 'October Crisis', has had more success than most other groups in popularizing its political objective of a sovereign French nation in North America to many French-speaking Canadians, and not a few non-Francophone Canadians. This is indeed an unusual case - the movement fell into disgrace, but the political objective became more widely accepted.⁵

Robert Moss recognized that a terrorist movement, even if it failed in its maximum and minimum political criteria, could still enjoy some forms of 'success' in the attainment of limited objectives; so the various non-political functions of terrorism proposed by Andrew Pierre were examined.⁶ It all too soon became apparent that certain political movements which had opted for the terrorist tactic to achieve some political goal were drifting away from that objective in an extended period of foundation-laying and organizational structuring; terrorism became a weapon to achieve partially criminal and personal objectives - the acquisition of funds and weapons; the release of imprisoned comrades; and revenge, both against deviant comrades and enemy 'cheap tricks' and 'treachery'.⁷ More politically oriented goals such as weakening the personal prestige of the political leadership,⁸ or the undermining of the authority of the state⁹ were also pursued however, often with some success.

With the exception of the nationally-oriented Tupamaros who were denied any internal media publicity by first the civilian and then the military regimes, all the other groups studied received considerable publicity, at home and abroad. The publicity was neither always favourable nor helpful; but it was publicity. The Japanese terrorists have had the greatest 'black image' handicap as a result of their association with the 'snow murders' and their responsibility for the 1972 Lod Airport massacre.

The PFLP and PIRA, although both of the rejectionist, 'all-or-nothing' mould, have slowly come to realize that certain types of terrorism - hijackings, killing third-state diplomats and babies, and exploding bombs without warning - are counterproductive in the long run. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the Popular Front's shift away from

hijacking was the series of splits which occurred over that issue, and which culminated in the expulsion of Dr. Wadie Haddad from the PFLP in 1976. The PIRA has not only reduced the number and strength of its bombs, it has returned to giving warnings. The Provos have not given up murder, however; they reminded the world of this by the assassinations of a British diplomat and a British politician, both of whom had spoken out against terrorism, early in 1979.

The most difficult question to consider, for all terrorists, is whether such acts can even be justified. The Tupamaros, Provisionals and various Palestinian groups all argue that it is the only means of combatting regimes which will not listen. Although a case can be made, at times considerable, against certain policies of these states, given the complexities of each situation it is most difficult to come to hard and fast conclusions. Such an approach is reflected in the muted protest which greeted the Félquistes who returned to Canada in 1978 from exile. Almost a decade after the 'October Crisis' there was more understanding of the goals of the terrorists. Yet the FLQ with the JRA and RAF certainly never had as strong a case for government repression as the other three groups. All six groups are rather contemptuous of the mass of their fellow citizens, whom they often perceive as lethargic or stupid. And so each group has put itself in the role of 'the saving remnant', prepared to drag the unwilling and protesting along its path to a better world. Such vision is a necessary component of the ultracommitted ideologies of the PFLP and PIRA. Both groups have lost many of their members to prison or death, and yet the recruits continue to come forth.

Three levels of the crusading terrorists have emerged from this study. First, and very dangerous, although not all that effective in

terms of the achievement of political goals, are the student-militant, world revolutionary types like the RAF and the JRA. In the middle are the particularist groups with one concrete and quite possibly attainable political goal who prefer, when they use terrorism, to opt for non-human targets; and who attempt to win over public opinion at home. In this category are the socioeconomically motivated Tupamaros and the nationalistic Félquistes. Such groups, because they are basically internal and may not have established strong ties with outside groups, are not too difficult to defeat. They tend to run short on funds and weapons. Moreover, they find it difficult to escalate the violence to human targets, since their victims are often also members of the parochial milieu. In taking this 'qualitative leap forward' they can lose widespread sympathy and support.

In the last category are the rejectionist terrorists, the doctrinaire, inflexible pursuers of an often impossible goal, who are unprepared to entertain the possibilities of negotiations, alternative proposals and compromises. They are extremely dangerous, because of their strong commitments; for example, they can rarely be talked out of a hostage drama. They are not as interested in gaining public sympathy as making their position and strength known through often bloody acts of 'propaganda by the deed'. They feel that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain from their actions. Because of their 'all-or-nothing' philosophy they tend to bring out a mirror-image in their enemies (the terrorists might argue, with some justification, that that characterization was present in the enemy to begin with). Since the 'enemy' often has everything to lose and nothing to gain from the struggle, he too will use any means available, legal or extra-legal, to remain in

control of the situation.

Non-state terrorism, despite what certain media and academic accounts of specific incidents and series of events might lead one to believe, is not of 'epidemic' or 'plague' proportions. Much of non-state terrorism as evidenced in the first two categories of crusaders, could be fairly easily contained provided that the challenged state is prepared to forego some civil liberties, as in the two quantitatively different cases of Canada and Uruguay. Anarchist-type terrorism seems to defeat itself in attempting to win popular sympathy for abstract world-revolutionary goals. There is no denying that terrorism of this latter sort can be immediately brutal and intimidating as, for example, the Red Brigade terror was in Italy. But it can be ridden out, as the Italians are demonstrating, if states and their citizens are prepared to tolerate increased security measures and some victims.¹⁰

There is finally the third category of non-state crusading terrorist, the rejectionist for want of a better term. He is the most dangerous of all the non-state terrorists. He is not cost-effective; he will carry on his struggle despite external opposition, internal dissension and losses in personnel. Any target becomes permissible; any act is tolerated. Such campaigns are more than protest, greater than violent opposition; they are perhaps a form of warfare. As Arblaster argues,

It seems more honest to recognize on the one hand that terrorism is a regular feature of most modern wars, and on the other hand that the type of terrorist campaign waged by the Provisional I.R.A., or by certain Palestinian organizations, is a form of war.¹¹

Terrorism, by non-state actors, pursuing political objectives has become too diverse a practise to be discussed under the single heading of

non-state political terrorism. It might prove beneficial both to theorists and those who deal with the concrete manifestations of such concepts to begin to look at the type of non-state political terrorist movement which is active in each case and what its objectives are.

Certain policies and postures might prove beneficial in relation to the different motivations and commitments to violence of the various groups.

There is no one correct way of dealing with such divergent movements.

In many cases the best tactic might be to 'rough it out', making attempts to protect one's citizens as best as one can through increased security, improved government administration, and even a recognition that some of the terrorists' demands may be worthy of consideration.

In dealing with rejectionist groups the options are more restricted, particularly during a terrorist incident. But attempts might be made to isolate the most extreme groups from all other opposition, both violent and peaceful. Difficult as it is to do in practice, governments in such situations must respond in a restrained, discriminating manner. To do any less would only play into the hands of the terrorists.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1. Arblaster, "Terrorism: Myths, Morals and Meanings", p. 413.
2. Hackler, Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies,
3. H.H.A. Cooper, "The Terrorist as Psychopath", Legal-Medical Quarterly, v. 2: , (December, 1978).
4. Wiberg, "Are Urban Guerrillas Possible?", p. 19.
5. The recently announced spring 1980 referendum on 'sovereignty association' to be held in Quebec has reopened the interest in the issue across Canada. Not all Anglophone Canadians are hostile to the idea; although during the June, 1979 general election only the small Communist Party, which did not elect any Members of Parliament, was in favour of negotiating independence with Quebec.
6. Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 1256. "The Politics of International Terrorism", pp. 1254-1256.
7. It was because of the 'treachery' and 'dirty tricks', the terms used by the Palestinians to describe the successful assault of the Israelis at Lod Airport during the May, 1972 Sabena attack, that the Sekigunha terrorists carried out the revenge at the end of the month in the airport terminal. Dobson and Payne, The Carlos Complex, p. 22. Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, p. 318.
8. The Tupamaros excelled at exposing the corruption of high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats, a few of whom were obliged to resign.
9. The West German authorities introduced some repressive hiring legislation in the public service. But rather than protesting such legislation the German public wanted the government to go farther in its efforts to crush the terrorists.
10. Mario Fasanotti, "Terrorism Brings Screening Before Hiring", The Times, 3 October, 1978.
11. Arblaster, "Terrorism: Myths, Meanings and Morals", pp. 417-418. Essentially the same point was made in "Under Skull and Crossbones", The Economist, 18 November, 1972.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANM Arab Nationalist Movement

BSO Black September Organization

FLQ Front du Libération de Québec

JRA Sekigunha - Red Army of Japan

MLN Uruguayan National Liberation Movement - Tupamaros

PDFLP Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-FOB Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Foreign Operations Branch

PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command

PIRA Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army - Provos

PRFLP Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine

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