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TITLE

A SURVEY OF WESTERN CANADIAN CONCERNS AND FEARS
DURING THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

by

Marijan Salopek Esq.

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in
Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements For the Degree of
Master of Arts.

Department of History

Edmonton, Alberta

Spring 1984

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation reveals the impact the Korean War had on Canadians, particularly western Canadians. It is a multifaceted study relevant to several disciplines, history being the foremost-- political science and sociology the other associated fields. As a historical work which captures the Cold War mood in Canada, it covers the problems and issues which were directly attributable to the outbreak of the war and later events; and shows the changing psychological impact on western Canadians as the war progressed.

Most western Canadians after the end of the Second World War counted on the United Nations to prevent future world wars. Unfortunately, the invasion of South Korea shattered any illusions of a war-free world. The invasion's shock value is extremely important in any overall evaluation of the concerns and fears of western Canadians. Since the crisis was seen as a potential world war, the measures advocated to improve national and civil defence must be viewed in terms of the circumstances under which western Canadians lived. Generally, the debate that ensued during the war revolved around two major issues --the type of society in which Canadians would live, and the how threats to national security should be dealt with.

Each of the chapters emphasises the changing nature of opinion and concerns during the Korean War. In the second chapter we can see how the initial concerns about a world war developing out of the Korean War gave way to an assessment of the long and short term implications the war would have on Canadian domestic matters. The theme of this chapter is that western Canadians did not have a static view of the war or future international relations and that their concerns and fears fluctuated with the changing fortunes of the UN forces.

Chapter three reveals a great deal about the manner in which western Canadians dealt with political groups which were outside the accepted norm. Their perception of these groups was also affected by the changing military situation in Korea: When the world seemed to be on the brink World War III, especially after Communist China intervened, the public favoured the imposition of strict limits on the freedom of Canadian Communists and peace supporters; but when the war was seen as less dangerous, they reassessed restrictions on civil liberties. In many respects, the current debate on the testing of the cruise missile and the peace movement is a continuation of the debate begun in the 1950s.

Chapter four expands upon the theme of chapter two as it stresses the danger in which western Canadians believed themselves to be in.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1943 Cairo Conference. Allies Discuss Korea

February 1945 Yalta Conference. Allies Agree To Multi-power Administration of Korea

8 August 1945 USSR Declares War on Japan

27 December 1945 Moscow Conference. Establishment of a Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea.

20 March 1946 Joint Commission Discussions on Korea Begin.

August 1947 Break Down in Negotiations on the Nature of the Korean Government

August 1947 Soviets Propose Withdrawal of Occupying Forces By 1 January 1948. Rejected by Americans.

September 1947 George Marshall, American Secretary of State dispatches Foster Dulles to the United Nations. Re. Request for UN involvement.

November 1947 Establishment of UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK).

November 1947 Pearson Accepts Canadian Seat on the Commission

December 1947 Debate in the Canadian Cabinet on Canada's Participation on the Commission.

12 January 1948 First Meeting of UNTCOK

February 1948 Commission Announces Plans to Hold Elections in American Zone.

March 1948 Canada's Delegate Rejects Commission's Election Proposal

23 March 1948 Ottawa Instructs Canada's Representative to Co-operate with the Other Commission Members.

10 May 1948	Elections Held in American Zone
12 August 1948	Americans Recognize Government of Syngman Rhee
25 August 1948	Soviets Hold Elections in Their Zone
December 1948	UNTCOK Report Accepted by UN General Assembly.
December 1948	New Commission Established. United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK).
December 1948	Soviets Withdraw Forces From Korea.
June 1949	Americans Withdraw Forces with Exception of a Few Advisors.
March-April 1949	Republic of Korea (South Korea) Applies for Admission to the UN.
8 April 1949	Soviets Veto South Korean Application
14 July 1949	Canada Recognizes South Korean Government.
October 1949	UNCOK Authorized to Appoint Observers with Regard to Reporting On State of Relations Between North and South Korea.
December 1949	General MacArthur Comments on American Interests in the Far East. Excludes Korea.
January 1950	Dean Acheson Sketches US Pacific Defence Perimeter. Excludes Korea and Taiwan.
13 January 1950	USSR Boycotts Security Council on the China Question.
25 June 1950	North Koreans Invade South Korea.
25 June 1950	UN Security Council Condemns North Korea.
27 June 1950	President Truman Orders American Forces to Korea.
27 June 1950	Security Council Appeals to Members to Supply Military Assistance.

28 June 1950	North Koreans Capture Seoul, the Capital of South Korea.
29 June 1950	First Debate in the Canadian Parliament on Korea.
5 July 1950	American Troops Arrive in Korea.
7 July 1950	Security Council Asks Members For Troops. Forces Authorized to Use UN Flag.
7 July 1950	Truman Appoints MacArthur Commander-in-Chief of UN Forces.
21 July 1950	Canada Officially Offers RCAF Transport Planes to UN.
24 July 1950	Two Canadian Military Officers dispatched to Korea to Assist UNCOK.
7 August 1950	Canadian Army Special Force Established. St. Laurent Appeals to Canadians to Enlist.
15 September 1950	Inchon Landing. UN Forces in Pusan begin simultaneous offensive.
September-October 1950	UN Forces Cross 38th Parallel. North Koreans in Full Retreat.
27 October 1950	First Chinese Encounter.
November 1950	Canadian Army Special Force Brigade Moved to Fort Lewis, Washington for Training.
November 1950	2nd Battalion of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Dispatched to Korea.
November-December 1950	Second Chinese Offensive.
January 1951	Third Chinese Offensive.
January 1951	Seoul Abandoned to Chinese Forces.
February 1951	Truman Threatens Use of A-Bomb.
19 February 1951	Princess Patricia's Moved to the Front Lines.

Mid February 1951

UN Forces Surrounded in the Vicinity of Pusan.

Mid March 1951

UN Forces Push Out From Pusan.

April 1951

UN Forces Re-Cross 38th Parallel.

May 1951

Balance of Canadian Special Force Brigade Reaches Korea.

23 June 1951

Jacob Malik, USSR Deputy Foreign Commissar, Proposes Cease Fire. Accepted.

10 July 1951

Peace Negotiations Begin at Kaesong.

July 1951

Canadian Special Force Assigned to First Commonwealth Division.

August-October 1951

Break Down in Peace Negotiations.

25 October 1951

Peace Negotiations Resume at Panmunjon.

November 1951

Canadian Special Forces Involved in Full Scale Combat with Communist Forces.

November-January 1952

Full Scale Hostilities.

February 1952

Disturbances at Kojie Island POW Camp.

April 1952

Canadian Special Forces Rotated. First Battalions Replace Second Battalions of Same Regiments.

May 1952

Kojie Island POW Camp Commander

October 1952

Canadian Special Force Suffers Highest Casualties in Single Battle.

Nov. 1952-July 1953

Relative Stalemate. Neither Side Has the Advantage.

13 July 1953

Final Communist Offensive of the War.

27 July 1953

Armistice Signed.

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of June 1950 North Korean Forces invaded South Korea without warning or declaration of war. Under considerable pressure from North Korean troops, the South Korean Army fell back disorganised and demoralised. News of the attack spread quickly and within hours of the invasion the United Nations Security Council convened to consider a response, and on the same day it adopted a resolution condemning North Korea as the aggressor (9 to 0; Yugoslavia was the only member on the Council to abstain--The Soviet Union representative was absent). At the same time the Council appealed to the North Koreans to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces across the 38th parallel. This appeal was ignored and the North Koreans continued to advance southward. Two days later President Harry Truman of the United States ordered American troops to Korea. Later that day the Security Council convened and passed a resolution which asked 'the members of the United Nations [to] furnish such assistance to the republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area'.¹

Purpose of Thesis

The United Nations' decision to respond to the crisis not only changed the character of the war but also shaped Canada's response to the crisis. The war had a particularly tremendous psychological impact on western Canadians, and in

the following pages, the issues of concern to western Canadians will be reviewed and discussed. The theme of this thesis is that the opinions and attitudes western Canadians formed during the period 1950-53 were directly shaped by the Korean War. To many western Canadians, the war appeared as a precursor to another world war; this perception, the author suggests, was primarily responsible for the appeals for greater defence spending, conscription, civil defence, as well as restrictions on the liberties of the peace supporters and Canadian Communists.

It is also my intention to show that the public's perception of the war changed as events in Korea changed; the stalemate at the front, and the on and off peace talks, for instance, had the effect of shifting attention away from the actual hostilities to the matter of the war's impact on social and economic conditions in Canada. The foremost domestic problem directly attributed to the war and its prolongation was inflation. While western Canadians had become relatively bored by the news reports regarding the war in Korea, they were still conscious of the dangers surrounding the war, and in the following pages the reasons underlying their continued support for increased defence spending will be examined. The arguments for and against Canada's commitment to the war will be detailed as will some of the radical proposals to defeat the Communists in Korea and elsewhere.

Generally, Communism for the majority of western Canadians was an anomaly and a threat. The presence of Communists raised, as one scholar believed, 'the question of the extent to which Canadian political institutions lived up to the democratic ideal proclaimed by those in office'. 'On several occasions', he added, 'confrontation with the Communists exposed the dilemma of those who thought that liberal democracy faced the stark choice of either doing nothing, and watching helplessly while the Communists undermined the Canadian political system and society, or of resorting to repressive measures against a small minority which did not share the same values as the great majority of the nation. By their reliance on coercion, these moderates revealed the limitations of their own liberalism, and their lack of faith in the ability of Canadians to cope with a genuinely revolutionary challenge by democratic means.'² Throughout this thesis evidence has been presented to confirm this point of view.

Chapters two and three of this thesis deal with the peace movement and civil defence respectively. Both topics were included in the thesis because they were a subject of debate throughout the war. Although the peace movement had originated before the war, it did not arouse much support for or against it from the general public until the war in Korea escalated. By lobbying for peace on terms demanded by the Communists and Moscow, the movement precipitated a

reaction which was not all to favourable to it. The outcry against the activities of the movement and its sympathizers, it is my intention to argue, was related to the Communist invasion of South Korea and the public's perception of the movement as part of a larger Communist effort to undermine not only the United Nations' war effort, but also Canada's political and military contribution. The activities of the peace promoters were seen as an extension of the Korean War beyond the borders of Korea to the advantage of Moscow. The evolution of the movement in Canada will be briefly examined as will the activities of the peace promoters at crucial periods in the war. In addition the objectives of the peace promoters will be scrutinised and outlined; the reaction of western Canadians to the movement are outlined in the context of the overall reaction to the war and the Cold War.

The concern with civil defence, as with defence policy in general, was directly related to the sense of urgency and paranoia that surrounded the war. The perception of the invasion of South Korea as part of a much larger confrontation between the Communists and the West spurred western Canadians to finally ask what measures their governments had implemented to protect them from enemy attack. It is my contention, that the civil defence measures begun during the Korean War would not have happened if it were not for the North Korean attack; the war was the catalyst which explains both government and public reaction to matters such

as defence and Canada's role in the western alliance. Civil defence, according to some western Canadians, was essential in a world where distance no longer was a defence against attack. In the past Canadians had been spared the horrors of war on their own soil, but the advances in air warfare, and the development of the Atomic Bomb, as well as the increased hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union made it all the more probable that Canada might become a theatre of war in the event of a world war. Faced with this prospect, western Canadians demanded that the federal government implement measures to protect the population from the horrors of conventional or nuclear war.

While the civil defence measures implemented during the war represented a significant improvement over what had been the case at the beginning of the war, the funds that were expended were far short of what was needed to develop an adequate civil defence programme. The money that was spent on civil defence, as one western Canadian editor noted, was barely enough to cover the cost of supplying the residents of a major Canadian city with gas masks.³ In truth, he had not exaggerated the situation, and in this chapter the measures implemented by the federal and provincial governments have been outlined and commented on. Furthermore, the major civil defence concerns and priorities of western Canadians will be examined as will be some of their proposals to make Canada's cities less vulnerable and

dangerous places in which to live.

It is hoped that the information in the following pages will provide some insight into the fears and concerns of western Canadians living during a volatile period in human history. It should be kept in mind, while reading this thesis, that the radical proposals advanced by Canadians to deal with the Communist threat were rooted in fear. They were far from the norm, and were a product of the war.

The increased frustration with the Communist attempts to destabilise international relations caused western Canadians, like Canadians in general, to seek security both at the domestic and international level. Threats to their peace of mind and well being, whatever their source, naturally aroused suspicion and opposition. Canadians reacted in a manner that could be expected from a people who felt threatened. It is my contention that the Korean war gave them, so to speak, their first taste of the Cold War, and opened their eyes to the Communist threat, and forced them to reconsider the country's state of preparedness, militarily and psychologically.

At the same time western Canadians supported Canada's involvement in the United Nations police action because they believed that Canada had a role to play in the international arena. They, for one, had placed their faith, not to mention fate, in the hands of the United Nations; they believed that the UN could police the world provided all

nations were willing to work towards peace. Thus, in their opinion, a response to the North Korean attack was imperative; if the United Nations did not act it would go the way of the League of Nations. Western Canadians realised that they could not afford another war, especially since another world war would in all probability be more devastating and more encompassing than any war of the past.

In addition western Canadians regarded the events which led to the outbreak of the Korean war as a repeat of history. The Korean war seemed to them to be following the same sequence as the events which led to World War II -- the community of nations either responded or reverted to the policies of appeasement; western Canadians firmly believed that the United Nations and the western powers had to respond to the North Korean invasion.

Methodology

For the purpose of this thesis newspapers were a valuable source of information. Relatively inexpensive and readily available, newspapers were the major source of information for Canadians at the time of the Korean War. Radio was also an important source of information and entertainment to Canadians in the 1950's, however because of its very nature few of the broadcasts are preserved and thus many opinions about the war and the Communist vs. West conflict are unavailable for analysis.

As the decision was made to utilize newspapers as

sources of information on the opinions and attitudes of western Canadians and their reaction to the war, the writer had to ask himself two important questions: Did the press lead the public or did it simply reflect existing opinion? Secondly, what papers should be examined? Since it was virtually impossible to survey all newspapers, several key metropolitan papers were reviewed. The decision to concentrate on papers, such as the Edmonton Journal, the Vancouver Province, the Winnipeg Free Press, the Regina Leader Post, etc. was made because these newspapers were widely distributed and appealed to the various groups and publics in society. These newspapers were mass circulation newspapers; they had a varied readership and were read by the rich or the poor, the political or apolitical, the religious and non-religious, the well educated and the not so well educated. The literature on the subject of mass circulation newspapers is varied, however, it is generally agreed that these types of newspapers differentiate their reading publics into different market segments in order to increase their circulations and thus they tend to echo what is happening in society rather than promoting opinions which run counter to what is being said or thought by society at large, and thus risking offending major blocs of readers.⁴

For any of the major western or eastern Canadian newspapers to have come out in support of the North Korean invasion or Communist interpretation of the war would have

been economic suicide. To a large extent, the opinions expressed in the mass circulation papers corresponded to the opinions expressed by Canadians to pollsters, and echoed in the legislative halls of the country; Liberal, Conservative, CCFer, and Social Creditor expressed reservations about the war and its impact on Canada and humanity's future, and the response many of them advocated did not vary significantly from what could be read in any major newspaper anywhere in Canada. In this context, it would be fair to say that the press of the time reflected the opinions held by many Canadians. As Aldous Huxley once wrote: 'The propagandist is a man who canalizes an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water he digs in vain'.⁵ Although the various newspapers differed in their opinions on how the war should be conducted, they were in general agreement that the North Korean invasion was part of a larger Communist thrust against the West. While the Canadian press at times seemed to be more hostile and strident than the average Canadians as regards the Communist threat, on other occasions it was conciliatory and cautious--it called for a greater response to the war when the public seemed favourable to curtailing Communist aggression and advised caution when the public feared the war was about to escalate beyond Korea's borders.

During crucial points in the war, such as the Inchon landing, the crossing of the 38th parallel, the Chinese

intervention, and so forth, eastern Canadian and limited circulation newspapers were consulted to test if geographic, ethnic, economic, social and political factors affected the manner in which Canadians responded to the war, and whether the editors of the mass circulation newspapers were saying and advocating a response different to what could be read elsewhere. The Medicine Hat News and the Lethbridge Herald were examined because they occupied a position somewhere between the urban and rural community. Both papers are of some regional importance and thus the opinions found on their pages were compared to those which appeared in the mass circulation papers. Other papers like the Western Producer, Financial Post, the Canadian Churchman, and La Survivance etc. could easily be identified with a particular economic or social group and were therefore examined. Some differences in opinion were expected to appear on the basis of the factors referred to above, and they did appear, however they were of a minimal nature and usually a matter of degree: the opinions that could be read on the editorial page of western papers could also be read on the pages of the eastern papers; eastern Canadians were as frightened by the Korean War and its ramifications as were western Canadians; French Canadians considered the war as dangerous as non-Francophones; Catholics viewed the war in the same light as Anglicans or United Church goers-- as a threat to international peace and humanity. The major difference that

could be distinguished was not one of whether to respond to the Communist threat, but how to respond.

History of the War

For an understanding of the reaction of western Canadians to the Korean War, it is important that some space be devoted to the events in Korea as they happened. As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis the Security Council appealed to all members of the United Nations for assistance to repel the North Koreans, however, this development failed to deter the North Koreans who continued their advance. On 28 June they captured Seoul, the capital of the Republic of South Korea. On the 5th of July the first contingent of American troops to arrive in Korea encountered North Korean forces. Two days later the Security Council met and passed a resolution recommending to members that they make available their military forces to a unified command under the United States which was authorised to use the United Nations flag. Pursuant to this resolution, President Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces.

This development, like the past measures of the United Nations, failed to move the North Koreans to halt their advance. Their early successes and gains, apparently, had convinced them that they could finally capture South Korea, and they subsequently pushed forward without regard to future losses. By the end of July, the United Nations

forces had been pushed as far south as Pusan where they managed to establish a defensive perimeter. Although the North Korean advance had been halted, the situation was still precarious.

The unstable conditions at Pusan caused considerable concern to the United Nations command. The North Koreans could not be contained for any length of time, and the situation demanded drastic action and quick thinking. Any further deterioration at Pusan would require the evacuation of the United Nations forces to Japan. This development the UN Command was determined to avoid. In consultation with his fellow officers, MacArthur devised a daring plan to halt the North Koreans, and possibly their destruction. The plan entailed landing men and equipment at Inchon, a point just to the north of the main body of the North Korean Army.⁶

If everything went as planned, the landing forces would cut through the North Korean supply lines and begin an enveloping action. At the same time the United Nations' forces at Pusan were expected to attack and complete the manoeuver. The movement relied as much on an element of surprise and luck as it did on meticulous planning and execution; fortunately for the United Nations forces they had a good measure of each.

The North Koreans were stunned by the landing (15 September 1950), and were nearly surrounded; they managed to escape encirclement partly because of good fortune--the

Inchon landing force could not move quickly enough to prevent the North Korean retreat. Despite this set back, the United Nations Command took the initiative and ordered all UN forces to pursue the fleeing North Koreans. Finally the tide had turned for the United Nations' forces and the North Koreans were forced to abandon Seoul and to retreat across the 38th parallel. By October the North Koreans were fighting a rear guard action on their own territory, and they still could not stop the United Nations forces; by the middle of the month they were forced to abandon Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. The crossing of the 38th parallel was a momentous moment and caused serious debate. The Canadian government, like its British counterpart, was concerned over the implications of extending the war into North Korea and it voiced its concerns. The crossing of the parallel gave the war a different character and fueled a debate not only in diplomatic circles but also among the general public.

Sensing a United Nations victory and discounting reports on Chinese military activity along the Chinese-North Korean border, MacArthur ordered all forces under his command to move northward to destroy the North Korean Army. The first United Nations forces reached the Yalu River in the middle of October, where they encountered Chinese Soldiers. Between the 27th and 31st of October the Chinese launched their first major offensive of the war, and forced

the United Nations forces to retreat. Despite the early Chinese successes, the United Nations forces managed to regroup and renewed their drive toward the Yalu River. Under-estimating the Chinese response, MacArthur predicted that the UN forces would destroy the Chinese and North Korean forces before Christmas.

Within three days of the renewed United Nations offensive, UN troops encountered stiff resistance from the Chinese who launched their second major offensive. By the end of November an estimated two hundred thousand Chinese soldiers were involved in the war. The second Chinese offensive was more successful than their first, and the United Nations forces were compelled to retreat--by the 5th of December the Chinese had liberated Pyongyang. The Chinese intervention heightened concern among Canadians. At this point many western Canadians feared the war would escalate into World War and wondered aloud what the United Nations should do next.

Shortly into the new year, the Chinese launched their third major offensive. Once again the United Nations forces were forced to retreat; abandoning Seoul to the advancing Chinese and North Koreans. By the middle of February, the UN forces were surrounded once again in the vicinity of Pusan. It was not until the middle of March that they took to the offensive. The Communist forces could not repulse the UN attack, and they subsequently retreated north of

the parallel. After MacArthur's dismissal in April, the Chinese launched their last major offensive of the war in an attempt to evict the United Nations forces from Korea. This new offensive ground to a halt just north of Seoul; thereupon the UN forces resumed their advance and re-crossed the parallel. MacArthur's handling of the war also became a subject of debate among Canadians, not only because of the dangerous implications of extending the war but also whether military commanders should be responsible to civilian authorities in times of crisis.

Since neither side seemed to be gaining an advantage, a solution to the war was a priority in the minds of many Canadians and UN officials. Finally on 23 June 1951, Jacob Malik, Deputy Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union proposed a cease fire. The proposal was acceptable to the United Nations, and on orders from Washington, General Ridgway, MacArthur's replacement, advised the Chinese of the United Nations' intention to negotiate an armistice. On the 10th of July negotiations began at Kaesong, but the UN command quickly realised that it had made a mistake; Kaesong was in Chinese held territory, and travel to and from the site by UN negotiators was to prove difficult. The Chinese and the North Koreans did not fail to hamper the movement of the negotiators whenever the opportunity presented itself. This situation quickly frustrated the UN negotiators, and they subsequently withdrew from the negotiations and refused to

return to Kaesong until they could be guaranteed freedom of movement.

The Chinese and North Koreans refused the condition; thereupon the United Nations Command ordered its forces to move northward deeper into north Korea. After a number of strategic positions, north of the parallel, had been captured by UN Forces, the Communists requested a resumption in the truce talks. They resumed on 25 October 1951 at Panmunjon, a site acceptable to both parties; negotiations continued until the end of the year, while both sides concentrated on strengthening their respective defensive positions.

Hostilities resumed after the new year; the combatants primarily engaged in a shelling match with little change in the defensive position of either. At this time the war became one of attrition, reminiscent of the stalemate of World War I. Despite the resumption of hostilities the peace negotiations continued uninterrupted. Throughout the negotiations the Communists repeatedly attempted to gain a propaganda advantage from the disturbances in the prisoner of war camp established by the UN Command on Koje Island. Prisoners at the camp had seized Brigadier General Francis Dodd, the camp Commander, and held him hostage until his immediate replacement Brigadier General Charles T. Colson signed a statement admitting that camp officials had mistreated prisoners. Fearing another disturbance at the camp,

the UN Command ordered a reorganisation of the camp into a number of smaller compounds. Communist agitators were segregated from non-communist soldiers; this completed the camp officials began to screen the prisoners for eventual release. The screening process was at the root of the disturbances, and was a major factor prolonging the war. The prisoner exchange issue was important to Canadians not only because it hampered the peace negotiations but also because it raised a serious moral question: should men who are anti-Communist be forced to return to China or North Korea.

Another major obstacle to an armistice was where to place the border between north and south Korea. The Communists were adamant that the border be established along the 38th parallel; this suggestion, however, was not acceptable to the UN negotiators because the UN line north of the parallel was a more defensible position than was the old boundary between the two Koreas. Furthermore, the opinion among the UN Command and officials was that the North Koreans should not remain unpunished for their act of aggression and defiance of the United Nations--locating the border north of the parallel was considered adequate punishment; besides there was not much more the United Nations could do in any event.⁷

Dissatisfied over the state of negotiations pertaining to the position of the border the Communists attempted

another thrust to the south, their objective, to force the United Nations forces beyond the 38th parallel. Beyond pushing several thousand yards to the south and capturing a few advance UN outposts, the Communists gains were negligible. The final communist offensive of the war began on 13 July 1953; within six days of its launch negotiators at Panmunjon reached a truce agreement.⁴ The formal truce document was signed 27 July 1953, and thus ended a war which had lasted three years, one month and two days, with heavy casualties on both sides.

Canada's Participation

Within days of the Security Council's appeal for military assistance, Canada had despatched three destroyers to Korea.⁸ A month later, the Canadian government announced that it would recruit and despatch a full brigade as part of Canada's commitment to the United Nations. Recruiting for the force began on 8 August, and by September the group was at full strength. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier J. M. Rockingham and consisted of a brigade headquarters staff, the Second Battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the Royal 22nd Regiment, the Second Field Regiment of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, and appropriate support troops.⁹

Due to weather conditions in Canada, and the time required to activate training camps, the Department of National Defence decided to order the brigade to Fort Lewis

Washington, The American staging point, for training alongside American soldiers. In November 1950, the brigade moved to Fort Lewis where it remained until 31 March 1951. In order to establish Canada's presence in Korea, the Second Battalion of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was despatched to Korea at the same time the balance of the brigade left for training. Sending the force to the United States to train was a blow to the pride of many Canadians; besides it raised serious questions as to state of Canada's defences.

For approximately two months the Princess Patricia's engaged in training exercises in the area of Miryang, Korea, and on several occasions it was deployed against communist guerrillas operating behind UN lines. Declared 'fit and ready' for combat by its Commander, Lt. Col. J. R. Stone, the Princess Patricia's moved to the front lines on 19 February 1951; shortly after it engaged in combat. In April 1951 the Second Battalion of the Princess Patricia's crossed into North Korea. Fighting alongside Commonwealth troops the Canadian contingent participated in a rear guard action while the major body of the UN forces retreated. The discipline and bravery of the Canadians who participated in this maneuver won the battalion recognition from other UN allies and a citation from the President of the United States, the first such citation awarded to a non-American force.

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The balance of the Canadian Light Infantry Brigade finally reached Korea in May 1951; the Princess Patricia's rejoined the brigade later in the month. Under the operational command of the United States I Corp, the brigade was mainly used for patrol duties. This lasted for two months, after which it was reassigned to the 1st Commonwealth Division which included British, Australian, New Zealand, and Indian troops (Field Ambulance Unit)-- the brigade remained so assigned until the end of the war.

Its first major confrontation with Communist forces came in November 1951, when it was involved in capturing a number of strategically important hills. During the course of this fighting the brigade suffered its first significant casualties.¹⁰ It remained in action until the end of the year; primarily defending advance outposts along the front.

In April 1952, the brigade underwent a complete rotation of men. The Second Battalions of the various regiments deployed to Korea were replaced by the First Battalions of the same Regiments, and General Rockingham was relieved by Brigadier M. P. Bogert. Shortly after the outbreak of the disturbance at Koje Island, a company of the Royal Canadian Regiment was ordered to the island to assist other UN troops guard the Chinese and North Korean prisoners. The balance of Brigade remained in action during the better part of 1952, suffering its heaviest casualties in October. The following year the brigade was re-assigned

to the reserves where it remained until the end of the war, concentrating primarily on combat training.¹¹

The role of the Royal Canadian Navy in Korea was of a relatively limited nature. Throughout the war it patrolled the waters off the west coast of Korea, and on occasion, it provided escort service and participated in the bombardment of Communist shore installations. Like the Canadian Infantry Brigade, the naval contingent was rotated--ships of the Pacific Command, which had been deployed to Korea when the war began, were replaced by sister ships of the Atlantic Command. Because of its limited role, the Canadian Navy emerged from the war virtually unscathed--its only casualties occurred when the destroyer Iroquois was fired upon by Communist shore batteries.¹²

The Royal Canadian Air Force also had a limited role in the war, namely transporting men and supplies from Tacoma Washington to Tokyo. Altogether a squadron from the RCAF Air Transport Command, and several planes chartered from Canadian Pacific Airlines adequately fulfilled Canada's air commitment to the United Nations.¹³

FOOTNOTES

1

Quoted in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the Korean Crisis, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), p. 9.

2

Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada: A History, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), p. 279.

3

Daily Colonist (Victoria, British Columbia), 21 March 1952, p. 4.

4

One scholar discovered (at a time when newspapers were a major source of information) that modern newspapers tend to 'discover and reflect' public opinion 'rather than to make it'. He also discovered that a newspaper's public position on certain issues was 'a negligible factor in the readers estimation in selecting his newspaper', and that only when the paper can be identified with some 'homogeneous group' that 'a slight correspondence between the attitudes of the newspaper and reader appear'. He concluded that 'newspaper opinions are perhaps themselves the products of the various forces which make opinion in a community'. For additional information see George A. Lundberg, 'The Newspaper and Public Opinion', Social Forces IV (1926), p. 709ff. See also: D. Boyce, 'Public Opinion and Historians', History 63 (June 1978), pp. 218-221; Harwood L. Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation, and Role, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The Pulse of Democracy: Opinion Polls and How It Works, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940); Bernard C. Hennessey, Public Opinion, 3rd ed. (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1975); Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New York: The Free Press, 1922); Frank Luther Mott, 'Evidences of Reliability in Historical Studies', Journalism Quarterly 21 (1943), pp. 304-8; Joseph R. Strayer, 'The Historian's Concept of Public Opinion', in Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences, ed. Mira Komarovsky, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 263-68.

FOOTNOTES

5

Quoted in D. Boyce, 'Public Opinion and Historians', History 63 (June 1978), p. 218.

6

For a more detailed discussion of the Inchon landing, see Matthew, B. Ridgway, The Korean War, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 33-46.

7

Ibid., p. 203. See also William E. H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjon: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations, (New York: Praeger, 1958).

8

The three destroyers that were placed under the United Nations Command had been part of the Canadian Pacific Command. The destroyers Cayuga, Athabaskan, and Sioux sailed from Esquimalt, Vancouver Island on 5 July 1950.

9

Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report for the Year Ending 31 March 1951, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), p. 9.

10

Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report for the Year Ending 31 March 1952, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), p. 85. For an account of the fighting see Herbert Fairlee Wood, Strange Battlegrounds: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada, Maps by E. H. Ellwand, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp. 149-152. During the course of the fighting the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry suffered 3 killed and 15 wounded.

11

Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report for the Year Ending 31 March 1953, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953), p. 10. For a history of the Commonwealth Division see C. N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of the British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-53, Forward by Field Marshall Earl Alexander of Tunis, (Aldershot: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954). See also John M. Rockingham, Major, 'Recollections of Korea', Add. MSS. 466,

FOOTNOTES

Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia.

12

Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report for the Year Ending 31 March 1953, p. 9.

13

Ibid., p. 10.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND TO CANADA'S INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA AND THE REACTION OF WESTERN CANADIANS TO THE WAR

Canada's involvement in Korea must be viewed in the context of the international situation after 1945, and the role that Canadians saw for Canada in the post-war world. After World War II Canadians became cognizant not only of their economic strength, but also of the world in which they lived. They realised that they could not find security sheltered behind their own borders, and that the prosperity that they enjoyed after the war was as much a product of the efforts of other nations as it was of Canada's geographic position.¹ Partly out of recognition of the sacrifices of others, and partly out of their own self interest Canadians accepted international commitments in the expectation that world peace and economic prosperity could be achieved simultaneously.²

They willingly accepted international obligations on the understanding they might have to pay a high price for these commitments, and in itself, this was a significant departure from the past. One way to pay for the cost of

these commitments was to expand Canada's trade links with other countries, and this the Canadian government set out to do.

A revival in international trade, however, was dependent on a healthy international climate free from war, or the threat of war. This threat could be partially eliminated if nations refrained from engaging in restrictive trade and currency practises as well as economic warfare. The Canadian government was fully cognizant of the conditions necessary for economic prosperity in the post-war era-- it was especially sensitive to preventing a return to the economic and trade conditions of the mid 30's.

In a White Paper presented to Parliament in 1945, it outlined the policies it expected to follow once the world returned to peace.³ Foremost among these policies was support for the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Bank of Reconstruction and Development. The Monetary Fund was established to regulate foreign currency exchange and eliminate 'discriminatory currency practices which turned world trade into economic warfare'.⁴ The Bank of Reconstruction, on the other hand, was to provide the necessary capital for reconstruction of war-torn economies, which subsequently would restore confidence in international investment and produce an healthy climate for trade in general.⁵

In addition the Canadian government indicated that Canada's economic health depended upon the economic and political situation in Europe, and for this reason it announced its intention to assist its European allies in the reconstruction of their economies either through international organisation or directly. The government acknowledged that an economically stronger Europe would make for a stable international climate and eliminate the conditions which led to the outbreak of World War II. Furthermore, the Canadian government was not ignorant of the advantages Canada could gain from providing economic aid. Apart from the immediate advantage of increased international prestige, aid could consolidate existing trade links and open new avenues for trade with Europe.

Accordingly, Canada assisted in Europe's recovery through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). It extended loans and easy credits to allied governments on the condition that portions of the money be used to purchase Canadian exports.⁶ The increase in trade was expected to increase employment and the standard of living in Canada, as well as, generate a higher level of national income which was essential if Canada was to meet her international commitments.

Overall it would not be far from the truth to say that Canada looked upon her international commitments from the perspective of self interest, but it cannot be denied that

an altruistic sentiment was also present. Canadians hoped to live in a secure world free from war, but they realised that for this to happen nations had to co-operate and trust one another. Cooperation and trust could be achieved partially by increased economic and trade links between countries, and once nations became more interdependent, more conscious of their common interests and the benefits to be derived from pursuing these interests the less chance there was of war being used as an instrument of national policy. What the government and the Canadian public had not expected however, was that the world would be divided into two opposing ideological blocs within several months of the end of WW II.

In fact, much of the initial support for the United Nations had been predicated on the successful wartime cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. Canadians believed that this cooperation would extend beyond the war, but the brave new world that many expected failed to materialise.⁷ The first notice of this came in 1945--the Gouzenko Affair, as the case became known, alerted Canadians to Soviet Espionage in Canada and to the overall Soviet threat to international peace.⁸ The recalcitrant behaviour of the Soviets during United Nations Security Council and General Assembly sessions and the Atomic Energy negotiations substantially increased apprehension as to Soviet motives and objectives. The

disillusionment shared by many Canadians with post-war international relations first received official expression in 1947 when External Affairs Minister Louis St. Laurent, before the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, said:

If theory-crazed totalitarian groups persist much longer in their policies of frustration and futility, we will not very much longer allow them to prevent us from using our obvious advantages to improve the conditions of those who wish to co-operate with us and thereby overcome the difficulties we ourselves are experiencing from the present disruption in the normal flow of trade and the normal exchange of specialized services between nations and their respective peoples.

Several months later MacKenzie King echoed St. Laurent when he remarked that communism is 'no less tyranny than Nazism'.¹⁰ King's words were to ring true as within several months of his speech the Soviets blockaded Berlin and instigated a coup in Czechoslovakia. Throughout the height of the war western leaders had suspended whatever opinions they might have had about the Soviet system and communism in general in interest of allied solidarity. They were less willing to do so after Nazi Germany had been defeated and after the Soviets had clearly displayed their intentions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

The slow emasculation of the Security Council by the Soviet Union, and the instability it caused, led Canadians like their European and American allies to question the

extent to which they could find security under the wing of the United Nations. A viable alternative to the United Nations was to participate in a regional defence alliance--the United Nations Charter recognised the right of individual states to participate in regional defence alliances. Subsequently in 1949, Canada, the United States, and the western nations of Europe agreed to come to the assistance of each other in the event one of them was attacked.¹¹

The alliance they established was named the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, more commonly called just NATO, and in the words of one international specialist: 'Nato emerged as complex and extensive military alliance committed to containing Russian expansion in Europe'.¹² Undoubtedly western leaders hoped the alliance would dissuade the Soviet Union from pursuing its aims, and in some respects, it created a false sense of security which the Korean war was to dissipate.

Although the alliance developed predominately into a military alliance, the Canadian government had hoped to make it into something more--in a speech to the House of Commons, St. Laurent stressed that the the alliance must not be only 'military'; it must be 'economic'; it must be 'moral'.¹³ During the drafting of the treaty, Canadian negotiators pressed this issue, and despite the disinterest of both the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada succeeded in

alliance beyond its immediate military objectives. Ultimately known as the Canadian article, Article II of the treaty obliged the signatories to:

. . . contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. ¹⁴

Of all the articles in the NATO treaty Article II alone has yet to be implemented, and will probably remain unimplemented until such time as the major alliance members see some advantage in pursuing it.

Initially the Canadian government did not foresee stationing Canadian troops in Europe as part of its commitment to the alliance--Lester Pearson, one of the treaty's architects, believed that 'the Treaty would actually reduce the overall need for troops in Europe'. ¹⁵ The United States had apparently been investigating troop commitments almost from the moment the treaty had been signed, and its intention to do so was confirmed in May of 1949 during the first Ministers meeting of the North Atlantic Council. A Communiqué announcing this development read:

The Council unanimously agreed that if adequate military defence of the member countries is to be achieved it must be along the lines of the most economical and effective utilization of the forces and materials at the disposal of the North Atlantic countries. They accordingly urged their governments to concentrate on the creation of balanced forces in the progressive build-up of the defence of the North Atlantic Area, taking at the same time fully into consideration the requirements for national forces which arise out of commitments external to the North Atlantic Area. ¹⁶

Subsequently to this Council meeting, Canada was pressured to make a military contribution; the following year the first contingent of Canadian troops arrived in Europe. Although the Canadian government had put its faith and security in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, it had not lost total faith in the United Nations which continued to figure prominently in Canadian external policy; Canadian confidence in the United Nations was somewhat rehabilitated after the UN responded to the North Korean invasion.

The problem of what to do about Korea emerged as early as 1943--in that year, leaders of the three major countries involved in the Pacific War, the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, met at Cairo where they agreed that Japan be stripped of all territories it had seized since the beginning of World War II. ¹⁷ They also affirmed that Korea should be liberated and eventually established as a

free and independent state. This principle was reiterated during the Teheran and Yalta meetings of the Big Three, and it was finally confirmed during the Potsdam conference. The other important development during the Potsdam conference was that the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan--it declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945.

During both the Teheran and Yalta meetings, the leaders of the Big Three had agreed that Korea would be administered under a trusteeship until such time as a freely elected government could take power. Later at Potsdam, the Soviet Union was included in the trustee agreement, and under the terms of the agreement, the Soviets were to accept the surrender of all Japanese forces in Korea north of the 38th parallel; south of the parallel the surrender was to be effected by the Americans. At Moscow, on 27 December 1945, the signatories agreed to establish a provisional government.¹⁸ At the same time they agreed to establish a joint commission which would consult with the various Korean political parties to determine the form of the new Korean government. Unfortunately neither the Americans nor the Soviets could agree on what political parties should be represented--herein lay the future division of the country.

As a compromise to the problem could not be reached, the Americans decided to refer the matter to the United Nations. On 17 September 1947, John Foster Dulles presented to the United Nations Assembly a proposal on the matter of

of establishing a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. 19 Although the Soviet Union opposed the proposal, it could not prevent it from being included on the General Assembly agenda. When put to a vote on 4 November 1947, it passed 46 votes to 0 and 4 abstentions (the Scandinavian bloc); the Soviet Union refused to participate in the vote. Upon the vote, Dulles nominated Canada for a seat on the commission which St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson politely accepted on Canada's behalf without first consulting with MacKenzie King who at the time was in London England. 20

King, upon hearing of what had happened in his absence, was dismayed by St. Laurent's independent action. The Prime Minister considered Dulles' nomination of Canada for a seat on the commission as a deliberate manoeuver by the Americans to include Canada in a solely American problem. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that the Korean problem was not properly the concern of the United Nations, and that the Americans should solve the matter by negotiating with the Russians. The debate that ensued in Cabinet on the subject threatened to destroy cabinet unity--St. Laurent stood by his original decision and threatened to resign, while King and several other Ministers argued that Korea was totally outside of Canada's sphere of interest. 21

After a private discussion with St. Laurent, the Prime Minister finally agreed to Canada's participation on the UN

Commission on the understanding that the Canadian government could recall its delegate if the Soviets failed to cooperate. King expected the Russians to refuse to support the Commission's activities or to allow it to operate within its zone. 22 The Commission's term of reference included the whole of Korea, but since it was barred from operating north of the 38th parallel, George Patterson, the Canadian delegate, recommended to the other delegates that a report on the matter be submitted to the United Nations for consideration. Patterson's proposal was rejected outright on the grounds that it would definitely close the door to any future cooperation with the Soviets, and the Commission's members voted to restrict their duties, at least until some settlement could be reached with the Russians, to the south of the parallel. 23

During the Canadian delegate's visit to Japan, the seven remaining members of the Commission met on 28 February 1948 to consider their course of action. Pressured by the American military Commander, Lt. General John R. Hodge, the Commission decided that it should conduct elections in South Korea no later than the 10th of May 1948. Patterson returned to Korea on 6 March and confronted the other delegates on the issue and argued that the vote on the resolution could not be regarded as official or binding. Consequently, in order to settle the issue, the Com-

mission met officially on 12 March and confirmed the resolution of the 28th of February 4 votes (India, El Salvador, China, Phillipines) to 2 (Canada and Australia) and 2 abstentions (France and Syria); thereupon the Canadian delegate promptly withdrew from the Commission to await instructions from Ottawa. 24 Despite the conditions surrounding Canada's participation, the Canadian government notified Patterson on 28 March that it agreed with the vote and that he was to return to the Commission. Elections were eventually held on 10 May and Syngman Rhee was elected President of the Republic of Korea; the new government was officially recognized by the Americans on 12 August 1948, the Canadian government followed suit on 14 July 1949. 25

The establishment of a Korean government south of the 38th parallel prompted the Soviets to conduct elections within their zone. On 25 August 1948 elections were held in North Korea and the outcome was not unexpected. The Communists formed a new government, and the elections only confirmed what had been the situation in Korea since the Japanese surrender. Having completed its responsibilities, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea submitted a report on the situation in Korea to the General Assembly. Foremost among its recommendations was that the occupying powers be asked to withdraw from the peninsula, and on 12 December 1948 the General Assembly voted to accept the report. Forty eight of the UN members, including Canada,

voted in support of the report; subsequent to the report the Commission was dissolved only to be replaced by the United Nations Commission on Korea.²⁶ This new Commission observed the withdrawal of the occupation forces and assisted 'in the problems of political transition and unification'.²⁷ By December of 1948 the Soviets had withdrawn their forces from North Korea and the Americans followed six months later.

News of the North Korean invasion in June 1950 was communicated to the Security Council by the UN Commission which was in an excellent position to observe the events during that tense summer. As noted, the Security Council immediately responded to the invasion with two resolutions: one condemning the North Koreans; the other appealing to UN members to provide military assistance. Both resolutions passed because the Soviet representative to the Security Council was absent from the proceedings. Six months earlier, the Soviets had withdrawn their delegate in protest because the permanent Security Council seat reserved for China was occupied by a representative from Taiwan. The Soviets argued that the Republic of China did not have a legitimate claim to the seat and that the rightful claimant to the seat was Communist China. In addition they argued that any vote cast by the Taiwanese representative was void.

Whatever the legitimacy of the Soviet argument, their absence during the Security Council emergency session in-

advertently allowed the Americans to capitalise on the situation and to take the initiative in committing United Nations forces to Korea.²⁸

The urgency with which the American administration responded to the invasion was surprising; several months prior to the North Korean attack American officials announced that Korea did not figure in US strategic planning. In December 1949 General Douglas MacArthur issued a statement in which he defined American defence interests in the Far East; Korea was not mentioned. MacArthur's statement was confirmed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson the following month: In a speech he made to the National Press Club Acheson sketched out the form of the Pacific defence perimeter for the benefit of the assembled journalists--Korea and Taiwan were excluded. Some analysts contend that this oversight was a signal to the North Koreans and their allies that the United States would not risk men and materiel to defend South Korea.²⁹

The first reaction of the Canadian press to the invasion of the Republic of Korea was a mixture of caution and concern. Nevertheless, editors unequivocally demanded that the west meet the Communist challenge. In many of the editorials that appeared within hours of the invasion, the North Korean attack was depicted as a repetition of the events which led to the second world war. Failing to respond to this act of aggression in an effective manner, it

was argued, would be to accept the appeasement policy which was the hallmark of the inter-war years. Appeasement had failed to satisfy Hitler's appetite, and it would hardly satisfy the Soviets who were sworn to spread Communism throughout the world. Had not the Soviets made their intentions known elsewhere? Berlin, Czechoslovakia, China, Indonesia, and Indo China were repeatedly cited as examples of the forward march of Communism. Despite the appeals to reject appeasement, the consequences of responding to the Communist challenge did not go unconsidered. The Regina Leader Post, in a report on the hostilities, told its readers 'trying to stop the Russian aggression will mean running the risk of precipitating a third World War with all of its terrifying consequences'.³⁰

The invasion was widely viewed as Russian inspired -- underlying this opinion was the belief that the North Koreans would not have risked such a dangerous course of action if they did not have some guarantee from the Russians. 'Firm action early in the 1950's may stop the Third World War' was affirmed by many western Canadians.³¹ That a third world war would be more devastating than any war of the past went without saying; many believed that a confrontation with the Russians would mean the end of the world. One reader of the Western Producer was so convinced of this that he thought it important to write to the editor to warn that Gog of Magog was in Moscow and that it

was simply a matter of time before the Bible prophecy would be fulfilled and all of humanity would be standing before the throne of God.³²

The swiftness with which the Americans responded to the crisis was warmly praised by the western Canadian press. The Americans were portrayed as accepting the inherent risks in committing forces to Korea; their response was seen as a acceptance of the UN as an international police force and a rejection of appeasement. As the fortunes of the South Koreans and US forces deteriorated in face of North Korean pressure, Canada's immediate reluctance to commit military forces was seen as a sign of weakness. The government was criticized, not only abroad, but also domestically; the criticism was all the more pronounced because the North Korean invasion was viewed in global terms rather than as strictly a regional problem.

When the government announced the despatch of three destroyers to Korea, the press rose to the occasion and praised the decision, nevertheless, it argued that the contribution was inadequate and unworthy of a nation which purported to be a middle power of some economic and political standing in the world. When the United Nations Secretary General appealed to the Canadian government for a larger commitment, more in the form of combat troops, the Calgary Herald wrote that the government should say: 'look here; we can let you have x destroyers, y squadrons of jet

fighters, and 2 brigades of infantry. How many do you need, and where and when?'³³ It went on to warn that if Canada did not respond quickly and concretely to the Secretary General's appeal, other nations might be led to believe that Canada lacked the ability to defend herself: 'Imagine', said the Herald, 'Stalin sitting in the Kremlin and remarking as he did in another context a few years back; "Canada? Oho, and how many divisions has she got?"'³⁴

In order that its might readers have some conception of what the American press had to say about Canada's performance, the Calgary Herald reprinted an editorial from the Arizona Star, which described Canada's military defences as utterly 'shocking'. 'Think of it', it said, 'Canada a great wealthy country of 12,000,000 rugged enterprising people has only three thousand men available for her defence'.³⁶ The response of Canadians to this editorial, which appeared in its entirety in several western and eastern Canadian newspapers, was a bitter and angry one. The general reaction was that Canada had done her fair share, if not more, during the last two wars, and that the United States might as well fight the Koreans unaided just as Canada had fought in World War I and II while the United States stood aside and waited for an opportune time to intervene.³⁷

While the English language dailies, in the east and west, clamoured for an immediate response to the United

Nations' appeal, the French press argued that Canada had already contributed too much. La Survivance, published in Edmonton and representing French Canadians in Alberta, informed its readers that Canada's response was larger than its size warranted. ³⁸ To support its argument it noted that France, a country with three times Canada's population, had not rushed to respond to the UN's appeal for aid. It went on to castigate the English press for its pre-occupation with the war and alarmist and militaristic attitude. ³⁹ According to La Survivance, the English press had shown itself to be totally irresponsible by urging an immediate and full fledged Canadian commitment to Korea when other countries, like Britain for instance, had adopted a business as usual attitude and continued to pursue commercial relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union. If Britain was not taking the crisis seriously why should Canadians?. Despite this opinion the editor of La Survivance was worried by the events in Korea, and wanted Canada to make a commitment commensurate with her size and influence in the world.

The opinion expressed by La Survivance was shared by a number of English speaking western Canadians who cautioned that if Canada sent a larger contingent to Korea, the country would lack the means to defend itself should the Korean war escalate. They warned that the conflict was a diversionary tactic designed to draw western forces away

from where they were needed the most, Europe.⁴⁰ Past Communist activities in Europe and Asia led them to this conclusion; ultimately many western Canadians believed the Communists were out to dominate the world and would use any strategy and tactic to achieve this result.

Anxiety over Canada's defences increased after Prime Minister St. Laurent announced that Canada 'could not send the trained brigade group (airborne brigade), or any other worthwhile part of it to Korea without dangerously weakening [its] immediate defences'.⁴¹ Underlying this was the fear that if Canada could not defend herself the Russians might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive attack on North America. Canada, in some quarters, was seen as prize greatly coveted by the Russians. In a speech to the Senate, Senator Haig warned fellow Senators that the Russians would seize Canada if only given the opportunity. He added, 'we fought World War I in Europe but we know from what the Germans have told since that if they had been successful in that war Canada would have been the first country taken over by them. World War II was also fought in Europe and again we know that had the Germans been successful in that war the first country they would have taken was Canada. And Canada is the country that Russia would take first if she won World War III.'⁴²

According to those who shared Senator Haig's opinion, Canada's lack of defences and small population opened the way for a Russian attack. Few western Canadians doubted

Canada could escape the consequences of a US-Soviet confrontation; Canada's very geographic position virtually guaranteed its involvement. As early as 1945 General Pearkes warned that Canada might become the Belgium or Poland of the future,⁴³ and a sizable number of Canadians shared a similar opinion as evidenced by a public opinion poll conducted May 1951.⁴⁴ Eight percent of those polled indicated that northern Canada might become a theatre of war, in a future world war, while 16% doubted that Canada could escape hostile actions on her territory in such a cataclysm.

In an apparent effort to soothe the public, Defence Minister Brooke Claxton expressed the government's opinion that Canada would be an unlikely candidate for any Russian invasion should the Korean war escalate.⁴⁵ As might have been expected the announcement drew an immediate response. The Daily Colonist, surely one of the most alarmist newspapers in western Canada at the time, considered Claxton's remarks irresponsible, and it told its readers, 'No defence program worth its salt can be shaped on the half hearted basis that the need for it is unlikely'.⁴⁶ One Alberta editor, in an attempt to dispel any fears the public might have about a Soviet attack on Canada, wrote, with a touch of humour, that any Russian invasion, especially within the vicinity of Hanna, would be unsuccessful, not because of the performance of Canada's military forces, but

because the road conditions in the district would bog down Russian forces.⁴⁷

Despite the government's statements to the contrary, western Canadians continued to question the state of Canada's military preparedness. Foremost among the concerns was that the government was not spending enough on defence in light of the crisis. Canadians, it was argued, would willingly accept larger defence budgets.⁴⁸ Although the cost would be high, it was irrelevant if security and peace of mind were the end result. The government's proposed defence budget for the 1950-1 fiscal year was deemed inadequate especially when compared with American or British defence expenditures. On the basis of such a comparison, Canada should spend \$1.5 billion on defence in 1950-1 rather than \$475 million as the government proposed to spend.⁴⁹ As a percentage of Gross National Product, Canada was devoting approximately two percent to defence; the Americans and the British, on the other hand, spent 7.6% and 6.4% of their GNP on defence respectively.⁵⁰ Since the United States, and the United Kingdom to a lesser extent, were great powers and had worldwide responsibilities, it was not surprising that their defence budgets reflected these commitments; but this was conveniently ignored by Canada's defence critics who only looked at percentages and nothing more. The Canadian government eventually did increase the size of its defence budget; by the end of the

war it had appropriated \$2 billion for defence. The Canadian economy in the meantime had expanded--GNP in 1953 was \$25,833 million, \$7,342 million more than it was in 1950.⁵¹

While the war was responsible for a larger defence budget, it also resurrected the conscription issue. Conscription's most outspoken advocates emerged from western Canada, particularly British Columbia. The BC dailies claimed that the number of men in the armed forces had to be increased if Canada was to meet her international obligations, and defend herself at the same time. According to proponents of conscription, a voluntary system failed to meet the needs of the military, and at most led to 'recreation' when the supply of willing volunteers dwindled.⁵² Shortly after the war began, the Financial Post published the results of a poll it conducted among leading English speaking Canadians in different parts of the country.⁵³ The overall opinion was that conscription might become necessary if the situation in Korea deteriorated into world war. Many of the respondents believed that conscription should affect all Canadians equally. Quebec was singled out as a possible source of opposition; however, several of the respondents believed that the French would be more willing to support conscription at that time because of the well publicized antipathy of the Catholic Church to Communism. A similar opinion was echoed in the western

press, and only demonstrated that Canadians had yet to come to terms with the conscription issue.

Conscription's supporters emphasized that Canada had to convince her allies that she was pulling her weight during the crisis; the best way to do so, they argued, was to implement conscription. ⁵⁴ Of all the NATO partners, only Canada and Iceland had not instituted compulsory military service. The issue of whether the NATO members should institute compulsory military service emerged in October 1950 during a meeting of the North Atlantic Defence Committee in Washington, D.C..⁵⁵ The committee pondered the issued and agreed in principle that all members should impliment two years compulsory service--quite understandably this announcement caused some concern to the Canadian government. In response the government argued conscription would be too costly to introduce in Canada, and that in any event, it would be of little value during the present crisis.⁵⁶

Furthermore, the government resurrected the often heard argument that Canadians were more valuable to the alliance if they remained employed in industrial production than they would be enlisted in the armed forces. This argument was commonly used by many Canadians past and present; generally the majority of Canadians were opposed to compulsory military service. In 1951 Canadians were polled by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion on the issue.

Approximately fifty eight percent of the people polled favoured a volunteer system-- this figure was 83% for French Canadians.⁵⁷ As noted earlier, by this point in time general concern with the war had diminished significantly, and the poll reflects this change.

To some western Canadians, the government's reluctance to commit forces to Korea was taken as a sign that it had lost faith in the United Nations.⁵⁸ As a retort to this charge St. Laurent said: 'Since our wartime forces were demobilized we have not attempted to maintain, in the Canadian army, a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside of Canada;' he concluded by saying, 'we wanted to get the best value we could for the Canadian taxpayers' defence dollars; and for the army. The first requirements were for our own immediate territorial defence and for a basic training establishment. We have developed an airborne brigade group highly trained for operation in the north and designed to share in the immediate protection of this continent. We have also maintained an establishment for the rapid expansion of the Canadian army in the event of general war.'⁵⁹

Under pressure from domestic and foreign critics, the Canadian government finally announced on 7 August 1950 that it was prepared to commit Canadian ground troops to Korea. Shortly after the announcement Parliament was reconvened and legislation was introduced authorising the formation of a

Special Force for Korea. When the government announced that it would reconvene Parliament for the purpose of passing special legislation, critics responded with the charge that St. Laurent was stalling, and that the move 'savours of evasion tactics employed by MacKenzie King in connection with compulsory military service during the war'.⁶⁰ However, the government moved quickly and within days of the final vote in the House of Commons recruiting for the Special Force began. When the government introduced the legislation it had expected recruiting to proceed much as in the past, and it was surprised when the number of people wanting to enlist overwhelmed recruiting depot personnel.⁶¹

The government was proud of the force it established. In the House of Commons Lester Pearson vocalized this sentiment. 'This force is unique in one way among the offers of military forces which have been made to the United Nations as the result of the war in Korea;' he said and added, 'and provides, I think, a valuable example and precedent. If other countries were, in the same way, to earmark a portion of their forces which might be available to the United Nations for collective defence, there would be ready throughout the free world national contingents for a United Nations force which would be quickly brought together in the face of a future emergency. In this way the United Nations would be equipped with that military strength

which it was intended in the Charter that it should have at its disposal but which, in fact, it never has had, largely because of the attitude of the U.S.S.R.'⁶²

Although the Special Force had been specifically formed for service in Korea, the federal government entertained the hope that the force might not have to be dispatched to Korea, but would be dispatched to Europe instead, if it served outside of Canada at all. The success of the United Nations forces between the time the decision to recruit the force was made and the time it was up to full complement seemed to obviate the need for a large Canadian contingent.⁶³ There was some speculation that if the war ended quickly the force might be used primarily for occupation duties if it was mobilized at all. In response to this development the government turned its attention to Europe and the commitment that could be made to Nato. The Special Force seemed to be ideal for service in Europe, and on the first of October 1950 the Prime Minister announced the government would be sending ground forces to Europe; the following year a fully armed brigade complemented with support services left for Europe, but the men who went were not from the Special Force as originally envisaged. The Chinese intervention late in October 1950 changed the face of the war and made a commitment all the more necessary.

Western Canadians who enlisted in the Special Force

joined for any number of reasons, and undoubtedly, there were as many reasons as there were recruits. However, three broad categories of recruits can be distinguished: there were those who were of an adventurous spirit; those who were convinced of the righteousness of the United Nations action; and those who because of unemployment or any other reason could not adjust to civilian society.⁶⁴ Pursuit of adventure certainly motivated many young men to enlist, especially since the government had promised that the Special Force would only serve overseas for a limited period of time. One young Sergeant from western Canada in a letter to his fiancée, shortly before his death, possibly epitomized what many like him might have felt when the war began: 'I am not a flag waver nor am I overly patriotic', he wrote, 'When this wave of insanity which now engulfed us all in its seething turbulence began I was, to say the least disinterested. As time went on I felt the urge to go over there and reap my share of excitement and adventure. My subsequent enlistment with the Royal Canadian Air Force followed. Gradually the full meaning of this greatest of wars has filtered through my mind. I am no superman. I have been endowed with average intelligence and physique. You may see on the farms, and small towns, in running factories, in large cities, in the dimness of the poolrooms and the brightness of the dance halls. In short I am the youth of Canada. Ours is not a great nation. Rather let be

said that we are a growing country. Our fathers toiled and suffered; when necessary even gave their lives, so that we might live in security, happiness, and peace. Yes, ours is a great heritage. No one must take that heritage from us. We must keep it even if some of us must block the breach with our own bodies.'⁶⁵

How many other western and eastern Canadians went through a similar transformation is unknown; yet fighting for democracy in opposition to communism indeed figured in the minds of some. One reader of the Calgary Herald stressed, 'I am greatly enthused over helping in the Korean campaign (if they will open aircrew enlistment to veterans some day) but . . . I am not ready to fight in Korea because the western world is opposed to any further communist expansion. . . . [If] there are no moral issues involved. I am not ready to sacrifice my life for "power politics". . . but I am ready if the issue is that a Godless unindividualistic philosophy is striving to fool and force millions of people into a single big harness for the purpose of building a great superstate.'⁶⁶

Many of the men who appeared at the recruiting depots to enlist in the Special Force were veterans of the second world war. ⁶⁷ This wasn't surprising since St. Laurent had specifically appealed to veterans to enlist during his CBC broadcast of 7 August. In the government's opinion veterans were ideally suited for the Special Force because they

already had military experience, and less time would be required to convert them into a fighting force.⁶⁸ Certainly some of the veterans enlisted because they could not adjust to civilian life, others were motivated by the prospect of adventure--apparently this later group was representative of the force; they had enlisted for only the duration of the war, and when the war ended they returned to civilian society. Of the 10,308 men who had enlisted in the Special Force, only 2823 joined the Active Forces when their eighteen month term of service was completed; this in itself, suggests that the majority had little interest in pursuing a career in the military, and that they had only enlisted because the Korean War offered an opportunity to escape from everyday life.⁶⁹

As happened in the past whenever Canada was involved in a war, the youth of the country below military age were seen as a pool of manpower that could be tapped once the available supply of men ran out. At an annual meeting of the Air Cadet League of Canada in October 1950, the Lieutenant Governor for Manitoba, R. F. McWilliam, told the assembled cadets that their training made them ideally suited as future recruits for the RCAF should the Korean war considerably drain the regular forces of men.⁷⁰ How appealing the prospect was to the cadets is a matter of speculation as no account of their reaction is available. One might suspect that the Lieutenant Governor's statement

had a certain appeal to adventurous spirits, yet one can imagine that he had also impressed upon them a sense of the sacrifices Canadians had already made, and might have to make, fighting in defence of democracy.

The issue of training Canada's youth emerged during a sitting of the House of Commons. James Sinclair, Member of Parliament from Coast Capilano British Columbia, advised the government to prepare for all eventualities. He emphasized that the greatest contribution Canada could make to the defence of the free world was to utilize her resources and manpower efficiently. Canada could not afford 'to drain off [her] eighteen and nineteen-year-olds for two years of compulsory military service',⁷¹ he stressed; concluding with the suggestion that compulsory military service in the cadet corps become part of the high school curriculum. 'I had that training, and I am sure it did me no great harm!'⁷² he told his colleagues, and added that they would be prevented from wasting their time 'at hockey games, or basketball matches, at the movies, at dances and in pool halls'.⁷³

Shortly after Sinclair's speech in the House of Commons, the Daily Colonist proposed that all high school students receive eight weeks of basic military training.⁷⁴ Such a proposal coming from the Colonist was not unusual its repeated appeals for some form of compulsory conscription were characteristic of its response to the

crisis. Sinclair's proposal, like conscription, failed to win much parliamentary support; the few letters from readers printed by western Canadian editors on the issue reveal a dichotomy in public opinion.⁷⁵ On the one hand there were those who opposed the proposal because it was too militaristic, while on the other there were those who believed that some form of military instruction would be good training in citizenship as it would instill in the young pride in their country and a desire to defend it.

Recent immigrants to Canada were regarded, at least in some quarters, as a potential source of men for military service in Korea or in any part of the world where Canada might be involved. In May 1951, John Decore, Member of Parliament from Vegreville, proposed that Canada's recent immigrants be conscripted into the reserves as this 'would be the best school for [the immigrants] in Canadian citizenship'.⁷⁶ He estimated that approximately forty thousand non-British subjects, of various races, had recently arrived in Canada. Many of these people he stressed had had some form of prior military training, and thus were ideally suitable for military training in Canada. He referred to the United States Compulsory Service Act (1948) which required all non-citizens to register for military service, and suggested that Canada enact similar legislation--the official policy of the Canadian government at the time was not to admit non-British subjects into either the active or

reserve forces.⁷⁷

Not unexpectedly the Daily Colonist quickly seized upon the proposal as a partial solution to Canada's defence problems, the foremost of which was a shortage of manpower.⁷⁸ Its support for Decore's proposal elicited a response from one concerned reader who exclaimed: 'After all a citizen's first duty should be to defend his country; how much more so should one defend his adopted country'⁷⁹--the apparent contradiction of this statement was not noticed by either the writer or the Colonist.

Since a larger defence budget was believed to be necessary by many Canadians, the question, asked even by those who supported spending more on the military, was: how to pay for it? That taxes might have to be increased went without saying, but an increase in taxes had political implications and dangers. The other alternative as proposed by the Winnipeg Free Press was to reduce all non-military and non-essential services.⁸⁰ The proposal was echoed by other western Canadian editors, who in the same breath, stressed that to do otherwise would put a considerable strain on the country's resources (natural and human) and contribute to inflation. In order to counteract the inflationary tendencies of increased defence spending, they proposed that the federal government carefully manage the economy--in essence, full support of Keynesian economics was advocated.

What concerned many western editors about inflation was that the misery and discontent it caused provided Communism with the opportunity to take root. The psychological attraction of Communism for those who suffered financial misfortune or poverty was not underestimated. The Financial Post went so far as to say that 'every price increase, every inflationary move runs away from action and is in fact a defeat'.⁸¹ Some Canadians regarded inflation and the prospect of greater inflation as the work of the Soviet Union.⁸² According to this view, the aggressive manifestations of the Soviet Union militarily and through propaganda had increased apprehension in the west which naturally led to a greater defence commitment. As the west diverted more of its resources to defence, other sectors of the economy suffered from a shortage of labour and natural resources and inflation became a reality. By the middle of 1951 inflation rather than the Korean war had become the major concern of many western Canadians and Canadians in general. In a public opinion poll conducted at the time twelve percent of the respondents rated the threat of war as a major concern, while 39% believed rising prices and the cost of living were the major problems confronting Canadians.⁸³

Inflationary pressures began shortly after the end of the Second World War; Canadians found themselves in the unusual position of having excess savings which they quickly converted into a variety of durable and non-durable

commodities. This increase in spending occurred in conjunction with an increase in population due to both an surge in immigration and births, a shift in settlement from rural areas to the cities, and expansionary government policies. Together these factors forced prices up, and by the last quarter of 1948, inflation was hovering at 12%; it dropped below 10% in the short interval between the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1950, only to rebound under the impact of the Korean War. Between the fall of 1950 and the summer of 1951 it had risen to 13% and peaked at 14% in the autumn of 1951. The reason for this significant jump was simple--demand for scarce materials related to the war effort. Shortly before the war ended inflation began to drop; between the spring of 1953 and the winter of 1956 it hovered near the 6% mark.⁸⁴

A crusade against inflation was launched by a variety of women's groups.⁸⁵ They assaulted the problem with a thrift campaign. Wielding such phrases as: 'Don't buy it unless you need It!' and 'Don't buy it unless you can pay cash for It!' they hoped to convince average Canadians to purchase wisely and only what was essential. In this way they hoped to control inflation; although the primary goal of the campaign was to improve the consumers economic position, the organizers also hoped that the campaign, in a small way at least, would contribute to the re-arming of the country. In an article entitled "Saving Helps Rearmament",

the National Women's Council outlined the measures the public and the government had to follow if inflation was to be effectively challenged and the task of rearmament met.⁸⁶ In short 'purse controls' rather than 'price controls' were advocated; it was believed that if spending on non-essential goods and services could be effectively limited much needed natural and human resources could be diverted to rearmament.

When the war began, western Canadians expected it to end quickly, provided the Soviet Union did not intervene. The ultimate goal of the United Nations in Korea, many believed, was to force the North Koreans to abandon their aggressive plans rather than to reunite the country. Once the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel, western Canadians sensed that reunification might just be possible, but they were conscious of the dangers. Reunification became less important after the Chinese intervened; return to the status quo of 1950 was far more acceptable than World War. China's intervention understandably heightened concern about the Russians becoming also involved, and as a consequence western Canadian editors warned that the United Nations had to proceed cautiously.⁸⁷

In order to ease public concern they tried to explain why China became involved in Korea. The Chinese, it was claimed, intervened because they did not understand what the United Nations' goals and objectives were with respect to Korea. In addition it was noted that the Chinese had

legitimate defence concerns, especially in light of China's past relationship with Korea; Korea had often been used as a staging area for attacks on China. Some believed the Chinese intervention could have been avoided if China had been a member of the United Nations before the war began.⁸⁸

Support for China's admission came from various quarters. China's admission to the United Nations, it was hoped, would convince the Chinese of the good intentions of the west. Isolated and ostracized from the international community, the Chinese naturally viewed the west with suspicion. They were especially distrustful of the United States which supported Taiwan and repeatedly declared China a threat to peace in the Far East. China's fear and distrust of the west was reinforced by the Soviet Union which had become its major ally.⁸⁹

Whatever the real or suspected origins of China's distrust and fears, most western Canadians glossed over them and argued the west was obliged to halt any Communist expansion whatever its origins. Mr. L. Trippe, epitomized this state of opinion when he told fellow members of the Saskatchewan legislature that neither the Chinese Communists nor any other communist government was needed at the United Nations.⁹⁰ The past intransigence of the Soviet Union and its allies at the United Nations prompted and facilitated such an attitude, and added to the feeling that China's admission would further emasculate the United Nations.

Whatever support there was for China's admission

quickly dissipated when the Chinese refused to withdraw their forces. Editors, who in the past had stressed China's preoccupation with defence and security, changed their tone and became vitriolic and strident in their attacks on China.⁹¹

When the Chinese refused to attend the the United Nations to discuss the Korean problem unless Formosa's membership was debated, western Canadians became convinced of China's aggressive intentions. Editors demanded that the United Nations label China for what it was--an aggressor.⁹² Failing to do so, it was argued, would be an act of 'coward-ice' and appeasement;⁹³ they feared that the Chinese intervention might cause the UN to abandon Korea to the communists. The United Nations' hesitancy to condemn the Chinese was viewed as an act of appeasement. As China's involvement seemed permanent, western editors reconstructed an image of the events which led to the second world war in an attempt to arouse public opinion and to discourage complacency.

Commenting on Canada's, Great Britain's, and France's reluctance to label China an aggressor, the Albertan asked: 'Don't they realise that Stalin will start the war just as soon as he is ready and no sooner, and that he doesnot need any excuse?'; 'Don't they know', it continued, 'that to give passive approval to what China is doing is destroying their own integrity?'. . . 'In the months and years ahead, the

integrity of the case of freedom will be of much more value in building necessary friendships and maintaining the very necessary morale than an amount of appeasement just now.' . . . 'Worst of all it would delay the war one day longer than when Stalin's timetable calls for it.'⁹⁵

Despite the willingness of some western Canadians to condemn China, they recognized the implications of extending the war to Chinese territory. When General Douglas MacArthur proposed the bombing of strategic sites in China, news of his statement was greeted with alarm not only by politicians in Ottawa, but also by the general public. The Daily Colonist wondered by MacArthur was allowed to make statements which threatened to draw the world closer to conflagration.⁹⁶ Matie Rotenberg, a prominent CBC public affairs commentator, in one of her daily radio broadcasts heard across Canada, told her listeners that MacArthur's outspokenness must not be tolerated by a civilian government.⁹⁷ She believed that MacArthur had become so embroiled in his own image and reputation that he was unsuited for military command. Accordingly she concluded that MacArthur was a threat to the democratic nature of the United Nations. In another radio broadcast, a week later, she announced that MacArthur's dismissal would ease tensions between the United States and the UN members which had also committed men and materiel to Korea.⁹⁸ Shortly after the broadcasts, the Winnipeg Free Press and the Western Producer echoed her words, and emphasized that the military must

always remain subservient to the civilian authorities.⁹⁹

General MacArthur was eventually dismissed by President Truman on 17 April 1951, and news of his dismissal was greeted with a sigh of relief. His dismissal, it was claimed, not only assured the supremacy of a civilian government over its military servants, but also offered a reprieve from the Korean war evolving into a world war.¹⁰⁰

Two months after MacArthur's dismissal, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion asked Canadians: 'Do you approve or disapprove of President Truman's action in relieving General MacArthur of his command?'¹⁰¹ The response was surprising: Despite the publicity the dismissal had received in the Canadian press, forty percent of the Canadians polled had no opinion on the matter; thirty five percent approved of the action, while 25% disapproved. Of those who approved Truman's action, only seven percent believed MacArthur's policies might have led to world war, and 8% thought MacArthur acted as a dictator. While the press condemned MacArthur, because he had crossed the grounds thought proper for a military officer, only one percent of the 35% who approved the dismissal believed the civilian authority should exercise supreme control over military decisions.

As the war dragged on, people began to wonder if MacArthur had not been right all along in proposing what he had. Solon Low, Leader of the Social Credit Party and

Member of Parliament from Peace River Alberta, raised the question in the House of Commons.¹⁰² Low told his colleagues that he did not believe that the war should have been limited to the Korean peninsula. The United Nations, he argued, had an obligation to halt aggression, and no distinction should have been made as to the origins of the aggressor. Aggression was aggression, should be viewed as such, and should be dealt with accordingly, was Low's maxim. He concluded by saying that MacArthur was 'absolutely right' for proposing to extend the war to the Chinese mainland as such a measure might have brought an early end to the fighting.

Within months of the Chinese intervention and UN retreat from North Korea, the prospect of a long drawn out war seemed to be all the more certain. Consequently politicians and members of the public began to examine the options available to the United Nations to end the war. One such option was to capitalize on the west's superiority in Atomic weapons to force an early end to hostilities. Early in 1951, President Truman hinted that the Atomic Bomb had not been ruled out. The announcement caused a flurry of debate throughout the world; western Canadian editors advised their readers that the Korean situation had to be viewed coolly, and that any precipitate action had to be avoided if the world war was to be avoided. It was widely known that the Soviet Union possessed atomic weapons, and

this knowledge only increased apprehension about the use of the Bomb in Korea. The Western Producer commented that the Bomb had made a significant impression on humanity and that any decision to use it should not be made lightly.¹⁰³ Moral implications were involved in the use of the Bomb, and these issues did not escape the attention of the press or the public. The Bomb's deterrent value went without saying, yet the question that needed an answer was: Under what circumstances should the Bomb be used? An insight as to what these circumstances might be was provided by the Edmonton Bulletin shortly before it ceased to publish; It conducted a survey among prominent Edmontonians and discovered that the general opinion was that the Bomb should not be used except in response to a nuclear attack on North America.¹⁰⁴ Andrew Stewart, President of the University of Alberta, like so many others polled, indicated that the bomb was different from other weapons only in 'scale' and that outlawing it would not reduce mankind's 'tendency to self destruction'.¹⁰⁵ This tendency to view the Bomb as simply another weapon available for the pursuit of military ends clearly shows how little western Canadians understood the implications revolving around the use of the Bomb. This perception was shared by the Bulletin which expressed the opinion that if the Bomb did destroy an enemy's capacity to resist, it might in the long run save lives. Therefore, it concluded that it should not be ruled out as an offensive

weapon.¹⁰⁶ In the opinion of another western Canadian editor death by the Bomb was preferable to dying from a bayonet wound, as it would cause an immediate death rather a death of a 'thousand cuts'.¹⁰⁷

A few of the Bulletin's respondents took a more aggressive position and advocated the use of the Bomb against the spread of Communism. 'If the use of the atomic bomb means the survival of our way of life over some way of life that is definitely inferior', one respondent commented, 'I say use it and use it first. If the survival of the teaching of Christ is at stake there can be no doubt about our moral right to use it.'¹⁰⁸ Underlying this opinion was the issue of good vs. evil; in such circumstances the ends justified the means even though Christian and non-Christian would perish in a nuclear cataclysm. The eagerness of some Canadians to use the Bomb against the Communists was striking, and in the opinion of Matie Rotenberg, was due to ignorance.¹⁰⁹ She told her listeners such people lacked a true understanding of the Bomb's destructive capabilities or its implications for humanity. She believed that if the public were as aware of what the Bomb could do they would be less willing to advocate its use. To make her point she quoted a passage from George Bernard Shaw's play, St. Joan in which one of Joan of Arc's persecutors said: 'I am not a bad man, my Lord, I meant no harm. I did not know what it would be like. If I had known I would have torn her from

their hands. . . . You don't know-- you have not seen -- it is so easy to talk when you don't know. . . . ^A But when you see the thing you have done -- When it is blinding your eyes -- stifling your nostrils, tearing your heart -- oh then. . . .

A proposal to make the public more aware of the destructive capabilities of the Bomb was actually considered in the United States during this time.¹¹⁰ It was suggested that the United States government detonate several Atomic bombs in an area where the public could view the results. It was dismissed by the American Atomic Energy Agency as impractical, not only because it would be impossible to attract a significant number of people to view the results of the explosion, but because the demonstration would reduce the country's Atomic Bomb stockpile.

As the war dragged on, many western Canadian's realised that the west's weapons and technological superiority would not halt the Communists. Communism, not only in Korea, but in other parts of the world had to be challenged differently, yet the question was: How? One proposal which was widely publicized was to use food in the fight against Communism. According to the Regina Leader Post, the west could have easily averted a Communist victory in China in 1949 if it had shipped food to the Chinese.¹¹¹ The Western Producer concurred that food might be effective in dissuading people in the Third World¹¹² from accepting

Communism, but it also reminded its readers not to expect too much since food might not be enough. Borrowing from the Scriptures the maxim that men do not live on bread alone, it went on to say that the Communists offered the world's down-trodden hope and a prospect of a brighter and more prosperous future, while the west had only brought exploitation.¹¹³ One of the Western Producer's readers replied that shipping food to the Third World would in addition to halting the Communist advance also improve the economic position of western Canadian farmers. He outlined his position in a form of a petition which read:

Whereas Canada is heavily rearming so as to ensure her survival through military preparedness, and
 Whereas we believe that Christian charity as laid down in the Sermon on the Mount is the only workable approach to world peace, and
 Whereas we believe that food given freely without strings is vastly desirable to bomb shell fire and destruction of life and property through fire, and
 Whereas we in Canada have a huge crop of coarse grains which may be hard to sell, and this difficulty will be increased unless we dispose by gift or otherwise of a lot of our frozen wheat which makes highly nutritious but not too palatable bread, and
 Whereas the payroll for the fabrication of military equipment is mostly distributed in Eastern Canada thereby increasing still further the spread in living standards between Western Canada and Eastern Canada, and
 Therefore, we respectfully request our Canadian government to wage peace, and especially to build goodwill in those countries not yet controlled by communism by giving this low grade wheat to the world's hungry millions. The financing of this wheat to come out of the national appropriation for war.¹¹⁴

The Canadian government, like so many other western governments, felt morally obligated to improve the economic conditions in the Third World. The Colombo Plan was just one of the many vehicles the government used to fulfil its obligations to the world's poor. The plan was the result of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Commonwealth in Colombo in 1950. 'In a world racked by schism and confusion', the Ministers' communique read, 'it is doubtful whether free men can long afford to leave underdeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human resources of the countries of South and South-east Asia which could help so greatly, not only to restore the world's prosperity, but also redress its confusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere'.¹¹⁵

Although originally designed to alleviate poverty in the under-developed world, it acquired a new significance during the Korean war. In 1952 Prime Minister St. Laurent remarked that the plan might become 'one of the greatest factors in keeping the people of South and South East Asia in the free world'.¹¹⁶ This opinion, apparently, was shared by many Canadians and undoubtedly accounted for much of the support for the plan.¹¹⁷

While Canada's commitment to foreign aid was acceptable to the public at large, a small minority were opposed to giving aid to the Third World. One critic, in a letter to the Vancouver Province, expressed the concern that

aid given to the under-developed countries might, one day, be used against Canada and the west in general.¹¹⁸ The writer strongly emphasized that no amount of aid could avert Communist infiltration in the Third World and that the aid given by the west would only strengthen the Communist position once they gained power. He had no desire to be struck by a bullet with 'made in Canada' printed on it.

Senator Thomas Reid from New Westminster British Columbia, commenting on the efficacy of foreign aid to combat poverty and Communism, criticized the naivete of those who believed that aid would affect the manner in which the people of the Third World viewed the west. 'It is a well known characteristic of human nature', he said, 'that many people do not like to be given what might be called charity. I, for one, do not believe that people of Colombo, [sic] India and other countries will envy Canada, which has given them the wheat and other goods, and think that Canada must be a wonderful land, or that they will adopt our way of life.'¹¹⁹ Aid, Reid implied, might in fact turn the Third World against the west; however, his argument did not win many supporters since most people believed foreign aid was advantageous not only to the world's poor but also to Canada because it promoted stable international relations. Foreign aid, as John Diefenbaker said, was 'cheap insurance' against the spread of Communism.¹²⁰

News of the beginning of truce negotiations in June 1951 led western Canadians to speculate that the war was nearly at its end. Their hopes were quickly shattered; the intransigence of both the North Koreans and the UN negotiators made peace as distant as when the war began. Each new report that negotiations had recommenced raised a glimmer of hope, but their subsequent collapse only confirmed what most western Canadians already knew, a solution to the war would not be easy. Repeatedly disillusioned by the breakdown in negotiations, western Canadians, and Canadians in general, began to ask whether the Chinese and North Koreans were bargaining in good faith or if they simply were using the break in hostilities to gain time to rebuild their forces.¹²¹ As an offensive often began after a negotiation session failed, this seemed to confirm the view that the Communists were not committed to peace.

When the Communists launched an offensive after a break in negotiations, the United Nations forces appeared unprepared to many western Canadian observers. The UN Command's failure to predict the outcome of a negotiating session was severely criticized. More broadly the criticism was aimed at the general public; editors felt people had become complacent, not only about the war, but also about rearmament and defence. The Edmonton Journal, warned that the world had not become any less dangerous on account of the stalemate in Korea.¹²² The Calgary Herald also

cautioned against complacency; it indicated that the peace talks were wearing down the West's will to continue fighting, and this was what the Russians wanted: They wanted people to turn their attention to matters other than Korea or defence. It therefore appealed to its readers to support rearmament and increased defence spending.¹²³

As victory eluded the UN, on the battle field and at the peace table, it was not uncommon to hear it said that the Communists would never be expelled from Korea, and that the country might never be reunited.¹²⁴ The Macleod Gazette, although discouraged by the UN's performance, still praised the organisation and what it stood for.¹²⁵ According to the Gazette, 'it was better to have tried to combine against aggression and to prevent war than to have allowed world affairs to develop into chaotic conditions'. The Calgary Herald, in the same tone, advised its readers not to lose sight of the goals and ideals underlying the United Nations, nor of why Canadians and other nationalities were fighting in Korea. In addition, it reminded them to have nothing but praise for the UN and not to forget that the United Nation's response was a warning to the Communists that aggression would not be tolerated in other parts of the world.¹²⁶ A similar opinion was echoed by Mrs. Raymond Sayre, President of the Saskatchewan chapter of the Associated Country Women of the World, during a meeting of the association in Saskatoon in the fall of 1952. She told

the members they must not forget the sacrifices of the United Nations, and concluded by saying: 'Think about Korea -- 57 nations decided to stand together against aggression. . . . Fifty seven nations decided to stand together. If we had only wisdom enough to do it in the days when Japan moved into Manchuria or Hitler into the Ruhr, we might have saved ourselves World War II'.¹²⁷

Some western Canadians feared that if the war did not end quickly the United Nations might abandon Korea to the Communists; this development, they warned, would repudiate everything the UN stood for, as well as allow the Communists a free hand at spreading revolution.¹²⁸ Abandoning Korea, they concluded, would make a mockery of the human sacrifices and suffering, and sign the UN's 'death warrant'; consequently, it was argued that the UN had to remain in Korea until a solution was achieved, militarily or otherwise.

A major obstacle to a successful peace settlement was the matter of prisoner of war exchange. Many of the captured North Koreans and Chinese prisoners, once under the protection of the United Nations, took an oath that they were anti-Communist and consequently refused to be repatriated to their homeland. The North Korean and Chinese governments argued that under the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1949 'prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of actual hostilities'.¹²⁹ 'If we were now to break the promise and

forcibly hand over anticommunists to the enemy as we forcibly handed over after World War two men of Vlasov army and so many others according to the Yalta agreement exacted by Stalin', one writer noted, 'we will take precious few prisoners in any future conflict with Soviet imperialism. . . and by compounding folly with same we can win neither peace nor security'.¹³⁰

A similar opinion was well publicized by the western Canadian press. The Vancouver Province called any proposal to return prisoners, regardless of whether they wanted to be repatriated, a 'great betrayal'.¹³¹ The conflict in Korea, the editor added, was over 'men's minds', and 'a way of life and democracy' as opposed to totalitarianism. To return these prisoners when they refused repatriation would be to deny everything the war was fought for. The Winnipeg Tribune also expressed shock at returning prisoners who did not want to return; the original purpose of the Geneva Convention, it argued, was to prevent prisoners of war being exploited as slave labour as had happened in the aftermath of the second world war. 'To compel these prisoners to return to Red dominated territory would be tantamount to becoming an accessory to murder'.¹³² A solution to the problem was proposed by the Calgary Herald, which suggested that the UN transfer the prisoners to neutral territory, where they would be released and free to decide whether they wished to return to their native country. In the opinion of

the Herald, if the Chinese refused, then they had no intention of ending the war, and that the issue of prisoner release was a ploy to drag out the conflict.¹³³

Since the war in Korea came to be depicted as a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism, there was some doubt as to the democratic nature of the regime the United Nations was defending from totalitarianism. Shortly after Syngman Rhee imprisoned several of his political opponents, the Vancouver Sun, asked its readers whether it would not have been better for the UN to have stayed out of the conflict.¹³⁴ The Sun's editorial drew a response from one reader who correctly explained that the United Nations was involved, not because the North Koreans were Communists, but because a flagrant act of aggression had been committed. That the aggression had been committed by Communists was totally irrelevant the writer noted, and he concluded by saying that if the United Nations was to 'select aggression on sympathy or lack of sympathy for the aggressor it would never succeed in abolishing war as an instrument of policy'.¹³⁵ Whether the United Nations would have become involved in Korea if the aggressor had not been Communist is a matter of speculation. Undoubtedly, the spread of Communism was a major factor underlying the United Nations' decision to commit troops to Korea, particularly since United States aggressively lobbied for UN involvement.

News that an armistice had been signed on 27 July 1953

was greeted with relief by many western Canadians, yet they realized the United Nations had not won a clear-cut victory. The Edmonton Journal bemoaned the fact that Russia remained undefeated, and that the war begun in Korea would be carried on in other parts of the world, possibly Vietnam or Malaya.¹³⁶ The Vancouver Province in its review of the war emphasized that a much larger and more devastating war had been prevented, and that the United Nations deserved to be warmly praised for responding to the crisis.¹³⁷ Accordingly, it stressed that the principal lesson the world's democratic countries learned from the conflict was that they had to remain united in the face of aggression, and if they acted in cohesion any challenge to the security of the free world could be met. 'The price has been heavy in blood and treasure', the Winnipeg Free Press wrote, 'but if an armistice succeeds in liberating South Korea and thus proclaiming both the failure of aggression and the first decisive success of collective security the money and sacrifices have never been so profitably invested in the cause of peace.'¹³⁸

It has been estimated that 2.3 million casualties were suffered during the course of the war: the majority of whom were Chinese and Koreans.¹³⁹ While the Canadian casualty count of 1329 seems relatively small in comparison to that of the Americans, Chinese and Koreans, they are significant

because they do represent Canada's commitment to freedom and the very principles on which the United Nations was founded.¹⁴⁰

FOOTNOTES

1

R. A. MacKay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-54: Selected Speeches and Documents, Introduction by R. A. MacKay, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), p.xxvii.

2

Public Opinion polls conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion substantiate this claim. In 1945, 90% of the respondents to one poll indicated that they supported Canada's membership in the United Nations. Sixty-five percent of those polled also indicated that they were in favour of the principle of punitive sanctions. The polls referred to in this note were cited in F. H. Soward, and Edgar McInnis, Canada and the United Nations, (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1956; reprinted Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 15.

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The White Paper was entitled: Employment and Income, with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction. It was presented to Parliament in April 1945. Cited in R. A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents, Introduction by R. A. Mackay, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1971), pp. 51-55.

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Ibid., p. 53.

5

Ibid., p. 53.

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Ibid., pp. 63-65.

7

In 1945, polls conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion revealed that most Canadians believed that the west could co-operate with the Soviets. F. H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, Canada and the United Nations, p. 16.; For an analysis of early Soviet-Canadian relations see: Aloysius Balawyder, Canadian-Soviet Relations Between the World Wars, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

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A succinct account of the Gouzenko Affair is found in: Tom Axworthy, "Soldiers Without Enemies: A Political Analysis of Canadian Defence Policy", (Ph.D. Dissertation, Queens University, 1979), pp. 44-47. See also: J. L. Granatstein, A Man of Influence; Norman A. Robertson and

Canadian Statecraft 1929-68, (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers and Co. Ltd., 1981), pp. 168-182. See also Igor Gouzenko, This was my Choice: Gouzenko Story, (Toronto: J. M. Dent and Sons Canada Limited, 1948), pp. 208-324.

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Quoted in F. H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, Canada and the United Nations, p. 55.

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Article 52 of the United Nations Charter allowed members to enter into regional alliances. The article read as follows:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

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Lewis Hertzman, and John W. Warnock, and Thomas A. Hockin, Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question, Introduction by Dalton K. Camp, (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Ltd., 1969), p. 17. See also Robert, Endicott, Osgood, Nato: The Entangling Alliance, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

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Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 April 1948, p.3447.

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Quoted in R. A. Mackay ed., Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 193.

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Jerome Davis, "To the Nato Review: Consistency and Change in Canadian Nato Policy, 1949-1969", (Ph. D. Dissertation, The John Hopkins University, 1973), p.35.

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Ibid., p.37, note # 39.

17 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents on the Korean Crisis, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), p. 1.

18 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, The Korean War and the United States, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). p. 4. ; See also: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents On the Korean Crisis, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951), p.4.

19 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, pp. 6-8.

20 Ibid.,

21 Ibid., pp. 8-16.; See also: Lester B. Pearson, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, 1948-1957, vol. II, edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inqles, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 150-160. For a short and concise account of King's spiritual encounter with President Roosevelt and revelations regarding the outbreak of the Korean War see Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, note 18, p. 10.

22 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, p.18.

23 Ibid., p. 19.; See also: Lester B. Pearson, The Memoirs..., p. 160.

24 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint, p. 24.

25 Ibid., p. 27.

26 Ibid., p. 26.

27 Ibid.,

28 For a commentary on the United Nations Resolution concerning assistance to the Republic of Korea see: Wolfgang G. Freidmann, Oliver J. Lissitzyn, and Richard Crawford Pugh, Cases and Materials on International Law, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1969). pp. 923-926.

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Glen D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 67-68.

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Regina Leader Post, 28 June 1950, p. 13. See also James, Eayers, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); and James, Eayers, In Defence of Canada: Peace Making and Deterrence, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

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Ibid., p. 13.; See also Ibid., 4 July 1950, p. 11.; Western Producer, 6 July 1950, p. 6.; Calgary Herald, 11 July 1950, p. 4.; Western Producer, 13 July 1950, p. 12.

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In response to a public opinion poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion conducted on 20 August 1951 a majority of the Canadians polled indicated that another world war was a strong possibility. Fifty-three percent of those polled thought that another world war might erupt within 5 years of the poll. Only twenty-five percent of those polled doubted that another world war would erupt within 5 years. See: Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, "Public Opinion Poll", 20 August 1951, Department of Sociology, Carleton University, Ottawa.

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Calgary Herald, 13 July 1950, p. 4.; see also Stratford Beacon (Ontario), 10 August 1950.

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Calgary Herald, 13 July 1950, p. 4.; see also: Hamilton Spectator, 9 August 1950, p. 6.; Vancouver Province, 7 February 1952, p. 4.

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Calgary Herald, 27 July 1950, p. 4.

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p.2. For a survey of French Canadian Press Opinion on international issues see J. I. Gow, 'Les Qu b cois: Le Guerre et la Paix, 1945-60' Canadian Journal of Political Science III (March 1970), pp. 88-122. See also Louis St. Laurent, Papers, Unofficial Correspondences, MG National Archives of Canada, Ottawa

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Ibid., 19 July 1950, p. 2.

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R. A. Mackay, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 303.

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Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 21 December 1950, p. 4.; Ibid., 26 December 1950, p.4.; Calgary Herald, 13 July 1950, p.4.; Ibid., 20 July 1950, p.4.; Ibid., 2 August 1950, p.4.; Vancouver Province, 5 September 1950, p. 4.; Medicine Hat News, 24 January 1951, p. 2.

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The phrase Third World originated shortly after the Second World War; originally it had a political meaning and referred to those countries which were neither part of the First World (United States, Canada, Western Europe, and later Japan) nor of the Second World (the Communist bloc countries). The Third World, at that period in time, included the neutral non-aligned countries of Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, Ghana, and Indonesia. By 1950, the term had an economic connotation, referring primarily to the under-developed parts of the world. For additional information on the Third World see L. S. Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age, (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1981).

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CHAPTER III

THE REACTION TO THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN WESTERN CANADA DURING THE KOREAN WAR

As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, support for the United Nations' involvement in North Korean was not unanimous. Among the most vocal critics of the UN's response and Canada's military involvement in Korea were the peace movement supporters. The movement appealed to western Canadians of differing socio-economic-educational backgrounds; among its ranks could be found Communists, socialists, isolationists, religious leaders, union leaders, politicians, housewives, university professors, workers, etc.. Its leaders were undoubtedly pro-Communist, pro-Soviet Union, and for this reason the movement won the wrath of the western Canadian press. For the most part, the movement was depicted as a threat to democracy and Canada's war effort, and consequently radical measures were suggested to deal with it. These proposals found their origins in fear and general paranoia about another world war. The concern over the activities of the peace supporters and Canadian Communists peaked in the middle of 1951. After the prospect of world war no longer seemed so threatening, the activities of the peace promoters and Communists were regarded as less dangerous. In essence, this shift in

opinion confirms the findings of one scholar who, although in a different context, concluded that people were more willing to accept criticism of a nation's war effort if the state was not in danger, but were less ready to do so if it was believed that the war threatened the very foundations of the state and its form of government. In the latter situation, criticism is considered treasonous, and very quickly suppressed.¹ In the following pages, an effort has been made to detail the activities of the peace promoters, and the manner in which western Canadians wanted to deal with them.

Pacifist activity in western Canada has had a long history. Some of the earliest and better-known Canadian pacifist groups included the Society of Friends (Quakers), the Mennonites, and the Doukhobors. Their adherents rejected military service and defence spending out of religious conviction. Because of their customs, religious practices, and different way of life, they remained outside the mainstream of Canadian society, often subjected to ridicule and abuse. As a consequence, these religious societies kept to themselves and did not take an active role lobbying for peace among the general population.²

The League of Nations societies that emerged across western Canada in the aftermath of the Great War were a testament to the peaceful aspirations of many Canadians.³ Undoubtedly, the horrors of World War I had convinced people that war had to be avoided, and that if peace was to be had

it had to be worked for. These peace lobbyist believed an open show of support for peace would have some effect on national and international policy;⁴ a major attempt to change Canadian national policy was made in 1930 when the western branch of the Women's League of Peace and Freedom, in conjunction with sister branches in other parts of Canada, circulated a peace petition which read:

The nations have renounced war. Let us also renounce the instruments of war. The undersigned men and women, irrespective of party STAND FOR WORLD DISARMAMENT. They are convinced: that competition in armaments is leading all countries to ruin without bringing them security; that this policy renders further wars inevitable; that wars in future will be wars of indiscriminate destruction of human life; that the Governments' assurances of peaceful policy will be valueless so long as those measures of disarmament are delayed that should be the first result of the Pact for the Renunciation of War.⁵

The appeal was warmly received by all Canadians; a total of 497,000 people signed the petition-- of this number 17,917 were from western Canada.⁷ The Canadian government also warmly received the petition as a meaningful expression of public will. In a speech before the assembled delegates to the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, George Perley, Canada's representative, said: 'The Canadian petitions that have been laid before you are a witness to the intense interest of our people in your deliberations. . . . These petitions are no meaningless list of names but the living expression of the public opinion of our dominion on this question of disarmament.'⁷ The change in the international

climate between 1930 and 1950 had significantly affected the Canadian government's opinion of the peace movement. The St. Laurent government like the majority of Canadians doubted the loyalty and motives of the peace promoters.

During the height of the depression, western Canadians naturally turned their thoughts to other matters; simply surviving and meeting daily needs was a greater priority than lobbying for peace. In addition many had been disillusioned by the failure of the League of Nations to fulfil its mandate. International cooperation seemed nothing more than a dream, and further away than at any time in the interwar years. By the time of the second world war, the peace lobby in western Canada had virtually disappeared. The only major group campaigning for peace after 1939 was the Communist Party of Canada led by Tim Buck;⁸ the party abandoned the campaign after the Soviet Union became a participant in the second world war, and throughout the war it repeatedly encouraged the Canadian government to increase defence spending.⁹

At the end of World War II, people believed there would be a period of respite from the worries of war, and in this atmosphere of calm before the storm few expected that world affairs would become more dangerous and volatile than they had ever been in the past. The United Nations, unlike the League of Nations, appeared to the general public more favourably endowed and capable of maintaining world peace;

hence Canadians gave little thought to peace campaigns on the scale of the interwar years.

Within months of the signing of the United Nations Charter, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, both UN Security Council permanent members, deteriorated. This development crippled the operation of the Security Council and threatened to destroy the very foundations of the organization. Sides were drawn along ideological lines, and allied solidarity became a thing of the past. As relations between the world's two superpowers deteriorated, interest in a peace movement was renewed.

Its major promoters, prior to the outbreak of the Korean war, were two United Church Ministers: Rev. I. G. Perkins, Minister of Toronto's Dowsland United Church; and Dr. James Endicott, a United Church missionary who had served in China. Both men sympathized with the Soviet Union and believed that the Soviets were more concerned with reconstructing their war-torn economy than with attacking the West and spreading Communism.¹⁰ They believed that Canadians were ignorant of the 'real' international situation; the Canadian Peace Congress they founded in 1949 was expected to redress this state of affairs--the founding meeting was held at Toronto's Bathurst United Church and attended by 300 people; by 1950 the Congress claimed 1706 fully paid members, the majority of whom were from the Toronto area.¹¹

The peace groups of the interwar years were relatively unorganized, in contrast to the Canadian Peace Congress. The interwar years movement had no identifiable leadership or membership. It emerged out of the desire of a number of western Canadians for peace and security. A few well known western Canadians, like Violet McNaughton and University of Alberta President Henry Marshall Tory, took up the cause; but theirs was an individual initiative; they could not lay claim to any large following, or make any claims to the leadership of the Canadian peace movement.¹²

Within a space of a few months of its organization, the Canadian Peace Congress became actively involved in promoting the Stockholm Appeal. As its name suggests, it originated in Stockholm Sweden; the occasion was the the Second World Peace Congress (March 1950). Delegates from every corner of the world were in attendance, and the common denominator linking them together was their opposition to the Atomic Bomb; the majority were pro-Soviet and ideologically to the left of the political spectrum. During one of the sessions, they drafted an appeal for disarmament which read:

We demand the absolute banning of the atomic bomb, weapon of terror and mass extermination of populations.

We demand the establishment of strict international control to ensure the implementation of this ban.

We consider that the first Government to use the atomic weapon against any country whatsoever would be committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war criminal.

We call on all men of goodwill throughout the world to sign this appeal.¹³

Dr. Endicott had a hand in drafting the appeal and was foremost in gathering support for it in Canada. In addition to the Stockholm Appeal, the Canadian Peace Congress circulated another petition in 1951 which called for a Five Power Conference to end the war in Korea and settle international disputes. Since this petition, like the Stockholm Appeal, had originated outside of Canada and was associated with the Soviet Union, it was also critically received and denounced. Western Canadian editors reminded their readers that the Stockholm Appeal had been proclaimed by the Mayor of Stockholm as 'Communist inspired'. The Winnipeg Free Press, one of the peace movements' loudest critics, condemned the petitions as propaganda fabricated in Moscow.¹⁴ It charged the peace promoters with misleading the public; the wording of the petitions, it claimed, led people to believe they were supporting peace, rather than Russian propaganda efforts.

A common technique used by the peace promoters was to publicize the names of its more famous supporters. Well known men like Duke Ellington, Picasso, George Bernard Shaw, and Sartre supported the peace petitions, and their support added credibility. The Canadian Churchman, an Anglican Church publication, condemned this practice, and charged the peace promoters with insincerity.¹⁵ Reportedly, the petitions were signed by 448,000 Canadians; 'Peace supporters in Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Canada', the Russian news-

paper Trud wrote, 'are vying with one another in the collection of signatures to the appeal. The Canadian Peace Congress has challenged peace partisans in Great Britain to a competition for the canvassing of signatures'.¹⁷ The Canadian Press saw things differently; one western Canadian editor noted with more than a tinge of sarcasm that it was 'nice to know that Canadians were doing their part in keeping Moscow happy'.¹⁸

A major 'driving force' behind the peace campaign was the Labour Progressive Party (LPP), otherwise known as the Communist Party of Canada. It was the only political party to officially recognize the Canadian Peace Congress, and in many cases the peace councils that sprung up across western Canada were in reality party cells.¹⁹ This close relationship confirmed what many western Canadians already suspected; the peace movement was a Communist front. Although the movement was lacking in credibility, western editors feared that its very existence would be enough to convert Canadians to the Soviet cause. Consequently, they did their utmost to discredit the movement whenever the opportunity presented itself, by publishing any report that implicated either the LPP or the movement in any form of underground activity.²⁰ In the opinion of many editors the LPP was a fifth column element committed to paralyzing the country and furthering Russian objectives.²¹

From the moment of its inception in 1921, Canada's

Communist Party followed the directives of Comintern, that international organisation established to promote the dissemination of Communist ideology throughout the world. The Royal Commission (to investigate the facts relating to and circumstances surrounding the communication of secret and confidential information to agents of a foreign power) reported that Canada's Communists were committed to furthering the goals and objectives of Moscow 'through the election of secret members to the directing committee of as many types of functional organizations as possible, including trade unions, professional associations and broad non-party organizations such as youth movements and civil liberties unions'.²²

The peace movement as pointed out in the introduction to this chapter attracted people of different walks of life. Many of its supporters sincerely believed peace could be achieved if enough people took an interest in lobbying for it; many were simply idealists, others were fearful of the consequences of another world war, while others felt a sense of belonging, importance and power by being involved with the movement. Although the majority of its members were not Communists nor sympathetic to Russia, its leadership was a different matter; the movement's most prominent spokesmen were either Communist Party members or associated with the party in some manner or other. They were openly sympathetic to everything said or done in Moscow, and it was

their activities and statements which tarnished the movement's image and subsequently performance. The important thing to keep in mind about the movement is not the extent to which it was infiltrated by Communists, but that the majority of Canadians perceived it as being Communist dominated and loyal to Moscow.

The railway workers' strike of August 1950 appeared to them an example of Communist efforts to sabotage Canada's war effort. The strike was obviously Communist inspired they claimed because it was abetting the enemy.²³ This opinion, surely a product of fear and war paranoia, was very effective in inciting hostility against the railway workers' union. Many Canadian unions had been infiltrated by Communists, and this fact was publicly known; since the Communists occupied leadership positions, they were suspected of working under the orders of their mentors in Moscow who had a direct interest in disrupting Canada's war effort.²⁴ Although western Canadian editors deplored the actions of the railway workers, they, nevertheless, had praise for the Canadian democratic system which allowed the workers to go out on strike. Indirectly they were saying that communism would not offer this same freedom, and that the Canadian worker should respect the system which allowed him to make his dissatisfaction known.²⁵

The railway strike provided the business community with the opportunity it needed to implicate the labour movement

in a communist conspiracy. The Financial Post informed its readers that a communist-dominated union, the United Electrical Workers' Union, was involved in some of Canada's most strategic industries.²⁶ In question were the radio, radar, and electronic industries. The Post went on to report that the mining industry, another strategic industry of primary importance to Canada's defence program, was dominated by a communist union, the United Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers' Union. Both unions were eventually expelled from the CIO and CCL in the fall of 1950; however the decision to expel them was a combination of war paranoia, as well as, a desire on the part of the CCL leadership to remove two troublesome elements. The leadership of the United Electrical Workers' Union (UE) had been a thorn in the side of the CCL leadership for a long time. For example, between 1943 and 1949, the UE had been suspended on six occasions, so the decision to expel it had been long in coming. During the 1948 CIO convention Aaron Mosher, President of the CCL warned the UE leadership that if they failed to cease expounding communist doctrine and their attacks on the CIO leadership they faced expulsion.²⁷ The following year the CIO adopted the resolution which 'barred communists from its executive board'.²⁸ The CIO leadership was at a loss as how to expel the UE, until it was discovered that the union had not paid its per-capita tax for 1950. The CIO constitution clearly delineated the conditions, under which a member could be

expelled-- failure to make the per-capita payment was one.²⁹ Despite an appeal from the UE executive, the delegates to the 1950 CCL convention supported the decision of their leaders, who had labelled the union as a fifth column movement and a threat to democracy.³⁰

The United Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Union followed much the same course as the United Electrical Workers' Union, and eventually it too was expelled from the CIO. Its leadership was just as unrelenting in its attacks on the CIO executive and without doubt was communist. The justification the CIO executive gave for the expulsion of the union was that 'its policies and activities. . . [were] consistently directed toward the achievement of the programme and purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the CIO constitution'.³¹

Western Canadians became somewhat less concerned with Communist underground activity after the railway workers had gone back to work, but within several months their fears were rekindled. The spark was an article which appeared in Maclean's, entitled: "The Reds Are Ready to Wage War Inside Canada".³² T. G. McMannis, the author and former executive member of the Communist Party, wrote that it was his duty to transform several thousand party supporters, in the event of a war between the west and Soviet Union, into an underground army. The party's overall objective in such a situation was

to paralyze the Canadian government and economy. According to the author, this goal would be achieved by way of strikes in key industries. The article became the focus of a number of newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, the majority of which suggested that the Communists should be dealt with, and quickly. 'If communists are known to be plotting against the state', one editor asked, 'are they traitors now, and as such should they not be dealt with without waiting for a war to happen?'³³

Within several weeks of the publication of McMannis's article a number of fires were reported at a Toronto armoury. The Army's Public Relations' Officer reported that the Communists were the suspected culprits. The Daily Colonist, which carried the story, told its readers: 'Nevertheless the Toronto incident is a reminder that communists are ready and willing to sabotage vital defence stores at the slightest opportunity. Perhaps a return to wartime security measures of identification is due if the rearmament program is not to be too vulnerable to such attempts at hamstringing this nation's preparedness.'³⁴

The Colonist, without doubt, was attempting to arouse anti-Communist sentiment; in many respects it achieved just that. It warned western Canadians that they must not become complacent in the present crisis, and that they must be prepared to meet any Communist challenge.

After these incidents became public, there was some

speculation as to how many Communist saboteurs were operating in Canada. During the 1951 session of the Alberta legislature, C. F. Gerhart, Minister of Municipalities, alleged that between five hundred and six hundred~~en~~ spies/saboteurs were in Alberta waiting for the opportunity to cripple Alberta's industries.³⁵ Although he had no concrete evidence to support such an allegation, he indicated that it was not unreasonable to assume that this many Communists were active in the province. It seems the figure he quoted was based on a U.S. report which estimated that sixty-five thousand Communist saboteurs, either native or foreign-born, lived in the United States. Since Canada's population was ten percent that of the U.S., Mr. Gerhart calculated the potential number of saboteurs operating in Canada and subsequently in Alberta.

Elmer Roper, the CCF leader in the Alberta legislature, took exception to Gerhart's implication of the working class as potential saboteurs and traitors. In Roper's opinion traitors were more likely to be found higher up the 'economic ladder'.³⁶ This was in keeping with his political beliefs. Whatever the socio-economic background of these saboteurs, the Albertan, which reported the debate in the legislature, was sure of one thing: that the Communists were to be found in Alberta. It noted that in Calgary alone, during the previous election, five hundred votes had been cast for the Communists. In its view, this was evi-

dence enough to warrant increased surveillance of suspected Communists. In fact, it told its readers that they had an obligation to spy on their neighbours, and to report any evidence of Communist underground activity to the proper authorities.³⁷ The implications such a proposal had for the future of Canadian democracy, apparently, went unnoticed by the writer. Without doubt the proposal was a product of the paranoia which marked the early 1950s.

Another radical proposal, suggested in this climate of paranoia and fear, emanated from a sitting of the House of Commons. The proposal as made by a Member of Parliament from Alberta, John Decore, already well known for his position on the war and support for increased defence spending. He told his colleagues that the west should sponsor fifth column activities in the Soviet Union. In short, Decore proposed that the west incite the various minorities in the Soviet Union to rebellion. Decore remarked, Stalin would receive 'some of his own medicine'.³⁸ The reasoning behind this proposal was that if the Soviets were faced with rebellion, they would be too pre-occupied to spread Communism throughout the world, the west would be given a reprieve, and would be free to strengthen its defences. Decore's proposal received little support in the Commons primarily because it would have exacerbated relations between the west and the Soviet Union.

As happened in the past, foreign nationals, partic-

ularly from Eastern Europe, were singled out as the group most prone to commit acts of sabotage. Since many East European countries were Communist controlled, it was naturally assumed that the people living under Communist regimes shared the same political outlook. Canadians of East European origin were thought to be equally susceptible to Communist propaganda and ideology, and therefore were considered a threat to Canada. This distrust of East Europeans dated back to the period of WW I. At that time Canadians willingly accepted legislation which stripped naturalized citizens of enemy origin of the franchise because of real or suspected links and sympathies with the Central Powers. That legislation established a strong precedent for the internment of Japanese Canadians during WW II, as well as future measures against suspected enemies of the state during the Korean War.³⁹ The St. Laurent government, true to the past, introduced legislation which would allow the government to deprive a naturalized citizen of his citizenship.⁴⁰ The following year another bill came into law which allowed the government to deport 'any person with Canadian domicile, other than a Canadian citizen' if such person has:

Within or without Canada performed for or rendered to a country other than Canada any military service or any other aid or assistance that is prejudicial to any action taken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or other similar instruments for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.⁴¹

The legislation to deprive a naturalized Canadian of his citizenship naturally had its supporters. The Daily Colonist warmly praised the government for finally having done something to deter communist sympathizers.⁴² R. A. McCarthy, a Liberal MLA in the Saskatchewan legislature, in a speech worthy of US Senator Joseph McCarthy, proposed that Soviet sympathizers 'go to Russia [and] live there'.⁴³ Mr. McCarthy saw two advantages to this: 1) that it would rid Canada of a dangerous group; and 2) that it would ensure that continued survival of British traditions in Canada. Apparently, he believed that only people of non-British descent would question the traditions upon which Canada had been founded.

While Communism had an attraction for landed immigrants and naturalized Canadians of East European descent, it should be kept in mind that the most sympathetic were frequently older immigrants who had come to Canada after 1920.⁴⁴ Part of their lives had been spent in the revolutionary atmosphere which pervaded Europe in the early part of the twentieth century, and the ideals underlying Communism continued to exert a strong influence on their political outlook.

The immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe who settled in Canada after the second world war had undergone a different experience; many had fled Communist rule and were staunch anti-Communists. In Winnipeg, the Canadian chapter

of the Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations participated in anti-Communist demonstrations. Its members apart from supporting Soviet dissident groups disrupted Communist and peace movement rallies in the Greater Winnipeg Area. Another anti-Communist group calling itself the Russian Freedom League threatened to 'castrate' Endicott if he continued to spew Communist propaganda.⁴⁵ The atmosphere of the time encouraged such behaviour, and in certain instances it was warmly praised and commended by the local press. Fortunately, this activity did not go far beyond disrupting a few lectures and public meetings; the potential for violence and bloodshed was real and present. During a radio programme on an Edmonton station the announcer appealed to his listeners to set aside time each day to hate Russians. 'If this is a Christian remark', one angry listener wrote to the Edmonton Journal, 'then what are we saving Korea from? There is far too much hate in this world now, and it will take a great and understanding love to help things out, not more hate. I would suggest that this person and others who like to spread hate and suspicion, be sent to Korea, and lets call our boys home for Christmas instead of roaming frozen mountain sides looking for enemies who don't want to fight but are just guarding vital spots of their country.'⁴⁶ Had the war in Korea deteriorated and escalated into world war, anti-Communist demonstrations might have degenerated into violence.

2

The Winnipeg Free Press, well known for its anti-Communist position, attempted to capitalize on the anti-Communist sentiments of recent Canadian immigrants when it wrote: 'The best contribution the DP's and others who cherish freedom can make is to go out at election time and beat the communist candidates. . . . This would be a good year to clean them out.'⁴⁷ If landed immigrants had the right to vote, they no longer were a displaced peoples, yet this minor point escaped the attention of the author who had his suspicions about the political inclinations and sympathies of recent Canadians.

The repeated references to Russians, in a pejorative sense, alarmed the Russian Community in Canada. They protested the press' efforts to lump all Russians together with Communists. 'We should have the Russian people on our side', wrote, the Russian Orthodox Society and Russian Veterans of the First World War Society to the Edmonton Bulletin, 'in any future conflict against communism and we should reassure the Russian people that we will help them overthrow the communist regime. We should also educate the Canadian people in the fact that there is a great difference between a Russian and a communist since communism is not national but international.'⁴⁸

Although non-British Canadians were deemed the most susceptible to Communism, a close examination of the peace movement's and the LPP's leadership testifies to the con-

trary. Dr. Endicott, the Canadian Peace Congress Chairman, was Canadian; Libby Park and Francis Park, also prominent peace movement supporters and LPP members, were Canadian. Tim Buck, the LPP Chairman, was British, as were many of the party's other leading members.⁴⁹ Canadians of British ancestry were particularly suited to leadership positions in the LPP and peace movement; their knowledge and mastery of the English language, education and above all ethnicity made them natural leaders over immigrants of non-British origins, who because of language difficulties, education, prejudice and distrust could not aspire to executive positions.

That Communists occupied positions of influence was very disconcerting to many western Canadians. The Communists were believed to be exploiting their positions to disseminate Moscow's propaganda. Communist infiltration of the schools was considered especially dangerous because of the influence school teachers had on young impressionable children. On several occasions the issue was raised in the Alberta legislature by concerned Social Creditors. Mr. William Tomyne charged one teacher, whose name was not recorded, with 'exalting to the skies conditions in Russia' and 'flaunting Canadian institutions'; a fellow party member, William Masson, in a similar vein, said: 'Teachers who go about spewing socialism make me sick, but their numbers are growing smaller every year'.⁵⁰ Subsequent to this discussion, it was suggested that all teachers be

forced to take an oath of allegiance; fortunately, the proposal was not taken seriously and legislation requiring an oath of allegiance as a condition of employment in Alberta schools was not enacted.

Like many Americans, western Canadians believed that loyalty oaths would distinguish loyal citizens from the disloyal. Underlying the support for loyalty oaths was the naive belief that Communists would be reluctant to take the oath. This naivete, undoubtedly, was responsible for the following resolution passed by Moose Jaw City Council:

Whereas it has been made abundantly clear that the Canadian concept of Democracy is being seriously challenged, not only by all those countries now under communist rule, but through individuals, organizations and fellow travellers, posing as Canadians who are being allowed to spread the virus of communism throughout our land; and

Whereas it seems desirable and in the public interest that every person holding public office in Canada, whether elective or appointive, or any position of control over young people, should be required to subscribe to an Oath of Allegiance to the Crown and to affirm that he or she is not a member or follower of any communistic or other subversive group.

Now therefore be it resolved:

1. That the Provincial Government be requested to amend the various Municipal Acts so as to require such an oath and affirmation from all Municipal officials, whether elective or appointive;

2. That the provincial government be requested to consider similar action in respect to the public service, school teachers and others employed under or in connection with our Educational system.51

The resolution was presented to the Saskatchewan government for consideration, but was simply ignored. The important thing to keep in mind about the resolution is that it indicates the extent to which some western Canadians had been swept up by the anti-Communist reaction which pervaded Canada and the United States during the Korean War.

The Western Producer acknowledged that the witch hunt and loyalty oath advocates were sincere but 'shortsighted' since their means threatened the very institutions they hoped to protect. Appealing to its readers, it asked them to recognize the mistakes made by the Americans and not engage in activities which '[smothered Canada's] valued institutions in protective but blundering arms':⁵²

This anti-Communist reaction also led to demands that courses in Marxist theory be removed from university curriculums. University Professors, like school teachers, were suspected of indoctrinating students in Communism. It was feared that professors with definite Marxist sympathies were using their position to advance students of the same political inclinations.⁵³ These Marxist students, it was claimed, would, once in positions of authority, also promote neophytes, and thus the process would continue indefinitely.

In response to this scenario, it was proposed that the board of governors of Canadian universities should have the right to review university curriculums. The public had a right to demand a review, it was declared, since post-

secondary education was financed out of taxes. 'It would seem the plain duty of university authorities', wrote the Edmonton Journal, 'to resist infiltration and to oust communist agents who are detected on the faculty but these efforts are often hampered by cries that they are interfering with freedom of thought'.⁵⁴ The Journal's editorial drew an angry response from one concerned reader who labelled it as worthy of US Senator Joseph McCarthy.⁵⁵ The writer strongly emphasized that university students are fully capable of recognizing Communist propaganda, more than the Journal gave them credit for. In addition, he stressed students would be immune to Communist propaganda because their long contact with democracy made them cognizant of its real advantages. Apparently this was not an opinion shared by many western Canadians who believed Communist propaganda, in any form or shape, might infect the general population.

One western Senator simply could not understand what motivated intelligent people to praise Communism. 'I am unable to give the house the exact figure of the number of Canadians who are favourable to the Soviet Union', Senator Reid said, 'for it is difficult indeed to get those figures, but I know that when a meeting is addressed by any member of the group sympathetic with Russia, the hall is usually packed, and that is true all the way from Montreal to British Columbia. I know certain professors who, with all that life in Canada or the good Lord could give them and who

hold good positions in our colleges and universities, do not mind admitting, if you get talking to them quietly, that they admire the Soviets and think they have a splendid system.'⁵⁶

The peace movement's critics feared that statements made by these so-called 'disloyal' elements would also damage Canada's reputation abroad, and particularly, relations with the United States. When Dr. Endicott pronounced that the United States was using chemical and germ weapons in North Korea, western Canadians, like Canadians in general, wondered what impact it would have on Canadian-American relations.⁵⁷ Endicott claimed he saw the evidence during his fact-finding mission to China, and further charged the Canadian government with complicity since Canada was experimenting with chemical and biological weapons. The response to Endicott's charges was immediate and vitriolic. John Diefenbaker, a member of the House Committee for External Affairs and a rising star in the Conservative party, demanded to know what the government had done to silence Endicott.⁵⁸ In Diefenbaker's opinion Endicott's charges had crossed 'far beyond those that constitute expression of free speech'. He went on to declare that these charges were 'most dangerous to the peace of the east'. Another member on the House Committee for External Affairs demanded that the government strip Endicott of his citizenship;⁵⁹ this was impossible, Lester Pearson

replied, since Endicott was a Canadian citizen by virtue of the citizenship of his parents. Although Pearson shared the opinions of his colleagues that Endicott's statements were part of a 'subversive campaign', he counselled that it would be unwise to imprison Endicott since, to do so, would make him a martyr, and thus more valuable to the Communists.⁶⁰

Endicott's biographer argued the real reason the government did not imprison his father was that a legal inquiry into Endicott's activities would have meant an examination of American foreign policy; this he stresses, was a situation the Canadian government wanted to avoid.⁶¹

The government's inaction irked some western editors who demanded that at least Endicott be interrogated to determine what he had done during his visit to Communist China.⁶² The trip was exploited to good advantage by the western press; Endicott certainly was in the employ of the Communists, it was claimed, why otherwise would he have visited China, if not to receive instructions?

The issue of whether the Korean war's opponents should be allowed to make statements which impinged upon the UN's integrity had emerged several months prior to Endicott's China visit. It was first raised after Mrs. Rodd, Chairman of the Women's International Democratic Foundation, returned to Canada from North Korea. Upon her return she had charged the United Nations' forces with committing atrocities against the North Korean people.⁶³ As was to happen with

Endicott's case, her charges caused an uproar; something had to be done to prevent Canadians from travelling to Communist countries, it was argued. Solon Low, only half jesting, proposed Mrs. Rodd 'be sent as [Canada's] ambassador to Ruffinland for a period of 25 years'.⁶⁴ Although the government was embarrassed by Mrs. Rodd's allegations, it lacked the means to stop Canadians visiting Communist countries. According to Pearson, the government was powerless to act since Canada, technically, was not at war with Korea.⁶⁵

Despite warnings that the government not adopt techniques which would be acceptable behind the Iron Curtain, the St. Laurent government eventually remedied its inability to prosecute Canadians who made statements detrimental to Canada's or its allies' interests by amending the Criminal Code in June 1951.⁶⁶ The amendments took into account the new state of international relations and the commitment of Canadian troops to an international organization without a formal declaration of war on Canada's part. The changes, in short, made it an offence for anyone to 'interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty or discipline of' the RCMP or foreign troops stationed on Canadian territory; the penalty was five years imprisonment. It also became treasonable, punishable by death, for anyone to make any statement or statements which could be used by a foreign power, against which Canada might be engaged in hostilities, to the disadvantage of Canada's

military or its allies, regardless whether or not a state of war existed. In addition, it became an offence for any person to impair 'the efficiency of machinery for any purpose prejudicial to the interests of Canada';⁶⁷ this had serious implications for labour. 'What are the interests of Canada?' asked Senator Arthur Roebuck, 'Are they the interests of sections of Canada, all the people of Canada, or the Government of Canada? . . . That is a dandy piece of legislation to use in a case of a strike. . . . Any plant would qualify under this. It would cover any act or omission that impairs efficiency or impedes the working of any plant in any town, city, or elsewhere.'⁶⁸ In a similar vein, Stanley Knowles said: 'It seems to me that along with our responsibilities to devise laws that protect the security of the state we also have the responsibility to see to it that we do not completely whittle away our civil liberties. We must protect the right to discuss the policies of this nation even in relation to any war in which we might be engaged.'⁶⁹

These changes to the Criminal Code were warmly received by the Financial Post which had nothing but praise for the government. Thanking the government for its courage, the Post argued the legislation was essential if traitors were to be prosecuted.⁷⁰ Labour leaders, on the other hand, understandably, had serious reservations; they feared the amendment might be used to restrict workers' right to strike

especially during a time of international instability. The legislation was a clear warning to the Communists and non-Communist unions that work stoppages and strikes would not be tolerated during a time of war.

The government passed the amendments to the Criminal Code in reaction to both the railway workers strike, and the embarrassing allegations of the peace supporters. Since the labour movement appeared dominated to a certain extent by Communists, the government had made it publicly known that any attempt to sabotage Canadian industry would be immediately dealt with. In addition, the government had to appease its critics who were continually demanding that something be done about Communist sympathizers. The legislation drafted, undoubtedly, went a long way in meeting both of these concerns. To this day, these amendments, passed in the Cold War atmosphere, form an integral part of the Canadian Criminal Code; however, two significant changes have been made since: first of all, the government took into account the concerns of labour--in 1953 it amended the Code so that workers could not be charged with sabotage if they stopped work because of a contract dispute with their employer; secondly, when the government abolished capital punishment, the relevant sections of the Code were changed to read life imprisonment.⁷¹

The anti-Communist reaction affected Canada's major Socialist party--the CCF. The western press exploited anti-

Communist sentiment to the disadvantage of the CCF by suggesting the party was a Communist front since its policies seemed to be taking Canada in the direction of Communism.⁷² These attempts to damage the CCF's reputation were not a phenomenon of the Korean war, but had been common almost from the moment the party became a political force; the war only provided editors, and Liberal and Conservative politicians with extra ammunition with which to continue their crusade.

The CCF and the Communist Party of Canada have had a long and troubled history together: 'The CCF leaders were clearly anti-Marxist and anti-Communist', one writer observed, 'but the rank and file were far from unanimity in their opposition to Communist organizations. The Communist party recognized this divergence and sought to capitalize on it in order to divide the national CCF executive from the rank and file.'⁷³ This was especially true during the Korean war as the Communists through the peace movement attempted to gather support from sympathetic CCF members; they were undeterred by the CCF executive's condemnation of their activities. As early as 1949, the peace promoters had been charged with making statements which were 'typically communist fabricated' in the CCF journal Across Canada.⁷⁴ Members were advised not to sign the peace petitions, since the Canadian Peace Congress was a front for the 'LPP and international communism'. The advice was ignored by a number of party members, particularly from British Columbia;

the party's national executive attempted to discipline these recalcitrants, but failed.⁷⁵

The presence of peace movement members in the CCF ranks was used as evidence by the movement's and party's opponents to prove that the CCF was a Communist affiliate. These clumsy attempts evoked angry responses, and one CCF MLA from Saskatchewan denounced the 'press, the liberal party, and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce' for having constructed an 'iron curtain' around CCF Saskatchewan.⁷⁶ This 'iron curtain', he believed, was as restrictive and undemocratic as its counterpart in Eastern Europe. 'Governments like that of Britain, or the Scandinavian countries or Saskatchewan or India are not be feared.', one frustrated party member wrote; 'They are trying to bring prosperity and happiness to the masses rather than just to classes. Their aim is to bring peace on earth through good-will and cooperation among men.'⁷⁷ Other troubled party members sought refuge and comfort in the words of J. S. Woodsworth, founding father of the party, who had emphasized that the CCF would achieve its objectives by 'peaceful and orderly methods',-- in direct contrast to the violent and revolutionary methods advocated by the Communists.⁷⁸

The attacks on the CCF and Communists certainly had an effect. In Manitoba, where the CCF had a considerable amount of support, membership declined dramatically; between the years 1944 and 1950, the number of members had fallen

off from a high of five thousand to 1200.⁷⁹ In Saskatchewan, the party continued to enjoy sizable support, particularly because the CCF government responded to the needs of the average farmer, but party membership even in this CCF haven fell during the Korean war.

At the national level the CCF continued to be successful. Although the party captured 10 additional seats in the House of Commons in the 1953 federal election, these new seats had been won predominately in western Canada where it was considered an alternative to the eastern dominated Conservative and Liberal parties. Despite its success in 1953, the party's popular vote had dropped to eleven percent; in 1945 the party had 15% of the popular vote.⁸⁰ The decline in party support was partly in response to the anti-Communist reaction, and partly a response to the change in economic conditions. At the end of the second world war, the CCF had prophesied a return to the times of the depression; the CCF drew much of its early support from the victims of depression, and when the poor times predicted by the party's leaders did not appear many shifted their allegiance to other parties. The accusations that the CCF was a Communist front most certainly affected party members who were wavering in their allegiance; the 'hard-core' party members, who would have voted for the CCF regardless of what was said against the party, were in all probability marginally affected.⁸¹

The accusations levied against the CCF were also made

against farmers. Their efforts to organize were portrayed, in certain instances, as Communist inspired. Dismayed at the press' efforts to label every attempt to organize farmers as Communist inspired, one Saskatchewan farmer wrote to the Western Producer to suggest that farmers prove their loyalty and intentions by banning all those who professed to be Communist from farmer organizations.⁸² During the 1951 Alberta Farm Union Annual Convention, delegates voted to do just that. Four of the Union's directors were expelled because of real or suspected Communist leanings. The Brooks Bulletin, which reported the events at the convention, approved the decision because of the state of international relations and the possibility of world war.⁸³

In this atmosphere it was proposed that Canada should outlaw the Communist party; New Zealand and Australia had done so, and their action established a strong precedent to do likewise in Canada. The Calgary Herald, despite its anti-Communist stance, warned that an outlawed Communist party would simply go underground and continue much as it was at the time.⁸⁴ Such a development had to be avoided, it emphasized, because it would then become difficult to monitor Communist activities. Of greater concern to other opponents of the proposal was that it might set a precedent which, in the future, could be used to curtail or remove the democratic rights of Canadians in general. The Winnipeg Free Press expressed a similar opinion in response to demands that Mr. W. Kardash, a Manitoba MLA, be removed from

his seat in the legislature because of his Communist inclinations.⁸⁵ It went on to say that the Canadian political system facilitated freedom of speech and thought, and that if Canadians prevented men like Mr. Kardash from speaking their mind and participating in the political system the very foundations of democracy were threatened. When George Drew, Conservative party leader, announced that existing laws were inadequate to deal with Communist subversion, the Winnipeg Free Press responded by accusing Drew of calling for witch hunts and the power to arrest anyone because of their real or suspected beliefs; such a policy, it noted, would quickly convert Canada into a totalitarian state with all of its horrifying consequences.⁸⁶

When comparing themselves with Americans, Canadians have tended to take pride in being more tolerant, more willing to let those who hold radical political beliefs to express their opinions without fear of imprisonment or physical injury. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. For the most part, Canadians, at the time of the Korean war, were more than willing to impose restrictions on those with radically different and dangerous political beliefs. What they can legitimately take pride in is that men like United States Senator Joseph McCarthy did not emerge in Canada to incite and inflame the population against Communists and peace supporters. Western Canadians

feared being engulfed by Communists and by the flames of world war, and they responded in a manner which could be called natural. In the following chapter the issue of home and civil defence will be examined. Civil defence became a priority especially at the start of the Korean war, and the steps taken in the 1950's form the basis of Canada's civil defence programme.

FOOTNOTES

1

Lawrence A. Lowell, Public Opinion in War and Peace, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1923), pp. 224-9.

2

For an account of the early history of the different religious and pacifist societies in Canada see: William E. Mann, Sect, Cult and Church in Alberta, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955); Donald M. Page, 'The Development of a Western Peace Movement', The Twenties in Western Canada, edited by S. M. Tofimenkoff, (Ottawa: Museum of Man, 1972), pp. 75-106.; Victor Peters, All Things in Common: The Hutterian Way of Life, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965), pp. 43-45, 47-48, 76-77.; George Woodcock and Ivan Avakumovic, The Doukhobors, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 84-106.; C. A. Dawson, Group Settlement: Ethnic Communities in Western Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1936); Garry Moffat, History of the Canadian Peace Movement Until 1969, (St. Catharines, Ontario: Grape Vine Press, 1969); Fellowship of Reconciliation Canada Files, Vol 1-3, MG 28, I 128, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

3

In 1921 the League of Nations Society was founded by Professors Henry Marshall Tory and Arthur Burt of the University of Alberta. By 1923 branches of the society were found across Canada. In 1924 membership in Western Canada stood at 987, and by 1929 membership in the western Canadian branches of the society peaked at 2094. For additional information on the League of Nations Society see: Donald M. Page, "The Development of a Western Canadian Peace Movement", p. 85. See also L. H. Thomas, The Renaissance of Canadian History: A Biography of A. L. Burt, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

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Arthur Burt, A Short History of the League: Its Origins, Organization and Problems, (Edmonton: 1924), see also Donald M. Page, 'The Development of a Western Canadian Peace Movement', p. 83.

5

Quoted in Donald M. Page, "The Development of a ...", p. 86.

6

Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 100.

8
For a history of the activities of the communist party of Canada see Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada: A History, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975), pp. 183-186.

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Norman Penner, The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1977), p. 99. See also Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada, pp. 139-166.

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S. Endicott, James G. Endicott: Rebel Out of China, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 262.

11
Ibid., p. 264.

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Donald M. Page, "The Development of the . . .". pp. 83 & 89-99.

13
Quoted in Garry Moffatt, History of the Canadian Peace Movement Until 1969, (St. Catherines, Ontario: Grape Vine Press, 1969), p. 71.

14
Winnipeg Free Press, 15 August 1951, p.15; see also Ibid., 22 January 1951, p. 3; Ibid., 14 April 1951, p. 25; Western Producer, 29 March 1951, p. 6; Ibid., 19 April 1951, p. 6; Ibid., Letter to the Editor, 26 July 1951, p. 6; Ibid., Letter to the Editor, 6 March 1952, p. 6; Ibid., 20 March 1952, p. 6; Ibid., 1 May 1952, p. 6.

15
Canadian Churchman, 19 October 1950, pp. 311-12.

16
Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada, p. 185; see also Garry Moffatt, History of the Canadian Peace Movement Until 1969, p. 71.

- 17
Quoted in Regina Leader Post, 6 August 1951, p. 11.
- 18 }
Ibid., p. 11.
- 19
Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada, p. 185.
- 20
Calgary Herald, 26 July 1950, p. 4; Ibid., 4 August 1950, p. 4; Financial Post, 12 August 1950, p. 1.; Regina Leader Post, 28 August 1950, p. 11; Edmonton Journal, 14 November 1950, p. 4; Daily Colonist, 18 November 1950, p. 4; Vancouver Province, 27 November 1950, p. 4.; Western Producer, 29 March 1951, p. 6.
- 21
Quoted in Vancouver Province, 27 November 1950, p. 4.
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Quoted in Aloysius, Balawyder, Canadian Soviet Relations Between the World Wars, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 179.
- 23
Regina Leader Post, 12 August 1950, p. 11.
- 24
Financial Post, 12 August 1950, p. 1; Ibid., 9 September 1950, p. 6.
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Regina Leader Post, 25 August 1950, p. 11.
- 26
Financial Post, 12 August 1950, p. 6.
- 27
Irving, Martin, Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour: The CIO, The Communist Party, and The Canadian Congress of Labour 1935-1956, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 149.
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Quoted in Ibid., p. 154.
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Ibid., p. 156.
- 30
Quoted in Ibid., p. 160.

- 31
Quoted in Ibid., p. 110.
- 32
Maclean's, 15 November 1950, p. 7.
- 33
Daily Colonist, 18 November 1950, p. 4.
- 34
Ibid., 4 January 1951, p. 4.
- 35
Quoted in the Edmonton Journal, 27 February 1951. Also quoted in the Calgary Herald, 13 March 1951, Clippings in the Alberta Hansard Scrapbook, 1951.
- 36
Quoted in the Edmonton Journal, 27 February 1951. Clipping in the Alberta Hansard Scrapbook, 1951.
- 37
Albertan, 24 February 1951, p. 4.
- 38
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 13 February 1951, p. 316-7.
- 39
Ann Gomer Sunahara, "Deportation: The Final Solution to Canada's 'Japanese Problem'", in Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada, ed., Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando Vol 3 (Toronto: Methuen Publishers, 1981), pp. 254-278; see also John Herd Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1978), pp. 73-94; see also W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), pp. 142-166.
- 40
An Act to Amend the Canadian Citizenship Act, 1951, 15 George VI, ch. 12. The Amendment read:
- 19(1) The Governor-General in Council may, in his discretion, order that any person other than a natural-born Canadian citizen shall cease to be a Canadian citizen if,

upon a report from the Minister, he is satisfied that the said person either

19(1e) if out of Canada, has shown himself by act or speech to be disaffected or disloyal to His Majesty; or

19(1f) if in Canada, has, by a court of competent jurisdiction been convicted of any offence involving disaffection or disloyalty to His Majesty.

See also Canadian Citizenship Act, 1946, George VI, ch. 15.

41

An Act Respecting Immigration, 4 July 1952, I Elizabeth II, ch. 42.

42

Daily Colonist, 5 April 1951, p. 6.

43

Canada, Saskatchewan Legislature, Debates, 13 February 1951, p. 3.

44

Nelson Wiseman and Wayne Taylor, 'Class and Ethnic Voting in Winnipeg During the Cold War', The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 16 (February 1979), p. 62.

45

Stephen Endicott, p.268. See also Winnipeg Tribune, 9 May 1952, p. 3.

46

Edmonton Journal, Letter to the Editor, 25 November 1950, p. 4.

47

Winnipeg Free Press, 8 April 1953, p. 21.

48

Edmonton Bulletin, 20 October 1950, p. 4.

49

Stephen Endicott, p. 270; see also Frank and Libbie Park Papers, "Peace Movement and the Labour Progressive Party", MG 31 K 9, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa. See Tim Buck Papers, "Labour Progressive and Communist Party", MG 32 G 3, National Archives of Canada, Ottawa.

50

Quoted in the Edmonton Journal, 10 March 1951,
Clipping in the Alberta Hansard Scrapbook, 1951.

51

Premier T. C. Douglas Papers, Communists and Saskatchewan Peace Council, "Resolution of Moose Jaw City Council", File XCVI, 925 (105)a, Archives of Saskatchewan, University of Regina, Regina.

52

Western Producer, 14 May 1953, p.14.

53

Edmonton Journal, 10 January 1953, p. 4.

54

Ibid.

55

Ibid., 14 January 1953, p. 4.

56

Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates, 29 November 1951, p. 8.

57

Stephen Endicott, James G. Endicott, p. 291.

58

Canada, Parliament, External Affairs Committee, Minutes, 24 April 1952, p. 89.

59


This measure was proposed by Gordon Graydon (Peel).
Ibid., p. 90.

60

On 15 May 1952 the Canadian Cabinet had discussed what measures should be taken against Endicott. Stuart Garson, the Minister of Justice, reportedly told Cabinet that Endicott could be successfully prosecuted on the charge of treason. The Cabinet decided to play down the incident and therefore chose not to prosecute Endicott. See James Rusk, "Cabinet eyed traitor charge for Endicott", Globe and Mail, 5 January 1983, pp. 1-2.

61

Stephen Endicott, James G. Endicott, p. 298.



62
Vancouver Sun, 1 May 1952, p. 4; Ibid., 15 May 1952,
 p. 4.

63
 Canada, Parliament, External Affairs Committee,
Minutes, 25 May 1951, p. 48.

64
Ibid., p. 50. Mr. Green, a committee member,
 suggested that the government attempt to prevent Canadians
 from travelling to communist countries.

65
Ibid., p. 48.

66
 The amendments to the Criminal Code were incorporated
 into Bill 391, s. 132(A), 134, and 509(A). Criminal Code of
 Canada, 'An Act to Amend the Criminal Code' 1951, 15 Geo VI
 ch. 47.

67
 Section 509(A) of the Canadian Criminal Code reads:

(1) Everyone who does a prohibited act for a purpose
 prejudicial to

- a). the safety or interests of Canada; or
- b) the safety or security of the naval, or army or air
 forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully
 present in Canada

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to
 imprisonment for ten years.

(2) In this section 'prohibited act' means any act or
 omission that

- a) impairs the efficiency or impedes the working of
 any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, machinery, apparatus or other
 thing; or
- b) causes property, by whomsoever it may be owned, to
 be lost, damaged or destroyed
- c) conspires with any person to commit high treason or
 to do anything mentioned in paragraph (a);
- d) forms an intention to do anything that is high
 treason or that is mentioned in paragraph (a) and manifests
 that intention by an overt act; or
- e) conspires with any person to do anything mentioned
 in paragraph (b) or forms an intention to do anything
 mentioned in paragraph (b) and manifests that intention by
 an overt act.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) or (2), a Canadian citizen or a person who owes allegiance to Her Majesty in right of Canada,

a) commits high treason if, while in or out of Canada, he does anything mentioned in subsection (1); or

b) commits treason if, while in or out of Canada, he does anything mentioned in subsection (2).

68

Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates, 29 June 1951, pp. 746, 747.

69

Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 25 June 1951, pp. 4432-3. John Diefenbaker, commenting on the amendments to the Criminal Code, said:

The objective of this clause is laudable but its implications are very dangerous! . . . I know of no case in four or five hundred years interpretation of the law of treason that goes as far as this amendment.

70

Financial Post, 7 July 1951, p. 6.

71

The amendments to the Criminal Code repealing section 509A read:

46(1) Every one commits high treason who, in Canada,

c) assists an enemy at war with Canada, or any armed forces against whom Canadian Forces are engaged in hostilities whether or not a state of war exists between Canada and the country whose forces they are.

46(2) Every one commits treason who, in Canada,

a) uses force or violence for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Canada or a province;

b) without lawful authority, communicates or makes available to an agent of a state other than Canada, military or scientific information or any sketch, plan, model, article, note or document of a military or scientific character that he knows or ought to know may be used by that state for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or defence of Canada;

Penalties for High Treason:

47(1) Life imprisonment

Penalties for Treason:

47(2a) life imprisonment if guilty of 46(2) (a), (c) or (d);

47(2b) life imprisonment if guilty under 42(2) (b) or (e) while state of war exists between Canada and other state

47(2c) imprisonment for 14 years if guilty of 42 (2) (b) or (e) if committed while no state of war exists between Canada and other state.

For additional information see Martin's Annual Criminal Code 1980, annotated by Edward L. Greenspan, (Aurora, Ontario: Canadian Law Book Ltd, 1980), pp. 45-47.

72

The Winnipeg Free Press led the attack on the socialist and communist parties in Manitoba. see Nelson Wiseman, et. al., 'Class and Ethnic', p. 64.

73

Walter, Young, Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-67, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 255.

74

Across Canada III (March 1949), p. 4. Mr. Coldwell, the leader of the federal branch of the CCF party, in reply to a request for aid from the Canadian Peace Congress, said:

When organizations like the Canadian Peace Congress direct the major portion of their attacks on the real forces of aggression around the world as they are found in communist dominated governments, then they will deserve some measure of respect from the Canadian people.

Quoted in Regina Leader Post, 27 July 1950, p. 13.

75

Walter, Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 283.

76

Canada, Saskatchewan Legislature, Debates, 14 February 1951, p. 10.

77

Western Producer, Letter to the Editor, 2 August 1951, p. 7.

78

Ibid., Letter to the Editor, 26 July 1951, p. 10.

79

Nelson Wiseman, et. al., "Class and Ethnic . . .", p. 63; see also Nelson Wiseman, "A Political History of the Manitoba CCF-NDP", (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1975), pp. 206-7.

80

Nelson, Wiseman, 'A Political History of the Manitoba CCF-NDP', note # 22.

CCF MEMBERSHIP IN PRAIRIE PROVINCES

<u>Year</u>	<u>Manitoba</u>	<u>Saskatchewan</u>	<u>Alberta</u>
1947	1932	10,821	3739
1948	1953	17,260	4920
1949	1589	14,858	3329
1950	1199	8120	2336
1951	1064	12,800	1826
1952	1047	12,800	1826
1953	1034	12,271	1452
1954	795	6,500	1671

81

For a discussion on how people behave when confronted with opposing opinions see: Bernard, C., Hennessey, Public Opinion, 3rd ed., (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1975), p. 240.; Harwood, L., Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation and Role, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Herbert, C., Kelman, 'Processes of Opinion Change', Public Opinion Quarterly 25 (Spring 1961), pp. 57-78.; Brewster, M., Smith, et. al., Opinion and Personality, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), pp. 241-48.; Samuel, Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 103-6.

82

Western Producer, 4 January 1951, p. 13.

83

The Brooks Bulletin report was reprinted in the Lethbridge Herald, 26 February 1951, p. 4. The directors involved were: Mrs. Gunn, Mrs. Lowe, Carl Kapler, and Earl Wright.

84


Calgary Herald, 25 August 1952, p. 4. see also
Letters to the Editor on the matter of outlawing and
imprisoning known communists and peace supporters: Daily
Colonist, 2 November 1950, p. 4; Ibid., 18 November 1950,
p. 4.

85

Winnipeg Free Press, 8 April 1953, p. 21.

86

Ibid., 17 August 1953, p. 17.



CHAPTER IV

CIVIL DEFENCE DURING THE KOREAN WAR

The fear that the Korean war would escalate into a third world war stimulated Canadians in the west and the east to ask what measures had been taken in the area of civil defence. Most Canadians knew they had military forces, but if asked what home defences were in place the general public and even most politicians would be hard pressed to give an answer. Apart from the thousands who had served overseas during the first or second world war, the majority of Canadians had no conception of what the realities of war entailed; the destruction of cities and the thousands of dead or dying civilians. Canadians as a nation felt smugly secure behind their borders during both world wars and even in the interlude between world war two and the Korean war. The Korean war and the world wide confrontation with Communism alerted Canadians to just how precarious their position had become within five years. Increasing hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States, coupled with the development of the long range bomber

meant that no part of the North American continent, or the world for that matter, was immune from attack; Canada would be no exception.

By 1950 both the Soviet Union and the United States had begun to stockpile nuclear weapons. Because of its early lead in the development of the atomic bomb, the United States, understandably, had stockpiled a few hundred nuclear weapons of a total yield of 10 megatons of TNT.¹ The Soviets first detonated a nuclear device on 29 August 1949, five years ahead of American estimates. This development spurred the Americans to pursue research on a thermonuclear weapon, and in May 1951, they succeeded in reproducing a thermonuclear reaction. The following year, in November, they detonated a thermonuclear bomb which yielded an explosion equivalent to 10 megatons of TNT; this new generation of nuclear weapons was as significant an advance over the A-Bomb as the A-Bomb had been over TNT. Theoretically, the complete fusion of 1lb of uranium 235 could produce an explosion equivalent to 9000 tons of TNT, while 1lb of hydrogen isotope deuterium under similar circumstances could produce as much energy as the detonation of 26,000 tons of TNT.² The damage such a bomb could cause, at one instance was unthinkable: The bomb dropped on Hiroshima (pop. 300,000) in August 1945 was of the 20 kiloton variety; the Japanese estimate that it instantly killed 100,000 people, injured 100,000, and was responsible

for the future hospitalization of another 98,000.³ The Russians finally succeeded in exploding a hydrogen bomb on 12 August 1953, and hence was the arms race begun.

These developments forced Canadians to re-examine their defences and to devise new plans to deal with the change in the international climate and the possibility of Canada becoming a future battleground. The Canadian government took its first steps towards the institution of a civil defence plan in 1947 with the appointment of General Worthington as Civil Defence Co-ordinator for Canada. He was directed to consult with provincial and municipal representatives in the drafting of a national plan. A significant amount of time was delegated to consultation with fire equipment manufacturers and insurers on standardization of fire fighting equipment. One of the major lessons of world war two learned by the British, who had considerable experience in the area of civil defence, was the need for standardized equipment: Fire fighting equipment was useless if it could not be used in conjunction with another manufacturer's products.⁴ At the the outbreak of the Korean War, after two years as Civil Defence Co-ordinator, Worthington was still attempting to define an equipment standard, and a well devised civil defence plan was still a long way off.

The most outspoken advocates of civil defence tended to be found in British Columbia, and, to a lesser extent,

Alberta. Of the four western provinces, only these two established elaborate civil defence programmes, while Saskatchewan and Manitoba did virtually nothing at all.

Within a month of the war, Premier Manning had written to Brooke Claxton, Minister of Defence, to ask what civil defence measures the federal government had implemented.⁵ Claxton was advised by Manning that Edmonton should be included in any federal plan because of its airports and oil refining facilities, extremely important to Canada both offensively and defensively in the event of a world war. Coincidentally Manning had been advised by Fred Colborne, a Socred backbencher, that the province's oil refineries and the section of the Mackenzie Highway which led to Alaska were in danger of being attacked.⁶ Claxton had written to the premier early in August to inform him that the federal government was taking the necessary steps in its area of jurisdiction, but that the provinces would have to develop their own programmes and plans.⁷ Although not encouraging, Claxton had spelled out what had been done, and made it absolutely clear that the provinces would have to take some responsibility for their own civil defence. After the Federal-Provincial Civil Defence Conference in February 1951 provincial and federal responsibilities in the area of civil defence were clearly spelled out.⁸ The federal government became responsible for:

1. Civil defence organizations within federal government

- departments, armed forces and other federal organizations,
2. Coordination with provincial and local authorities,
 3. Information regarding general civil defence policy,
 4. Cooperation with the United States and other countries,
 5. Allocation of Officers of the armed forces to } work with
provincial civil defence authorities to ensure } cooper-
ation.operation,
 6. Provision of adequate warning systems in cooperation
provincial authorities,
 7. Protection against sabotage of federal works,
 8. Support for provincial research and development in the
area of civil defence,
 9. Civil defence staff courses and special ABC [Atomic,
Biological, and Chemical warfare] courses including
payment of travelling costs to and from and living
expenses of all civil defence students,
 10. Support by federal agencies and armed forces in the
event of attack,
 11. Provide training manuals, badges,
 12. Provide radiological and technical instruments,
respirators and special protective clothing in
connection with ABC warfare,
 13. Supply and install sirens and other warning devices
in cities of over fifty thousand,
 14. Payment of one-third of the cost of standardization of
hose couplings,
 15. Provide stirrup pumps and trailer pumps for training
purposes,
 16. Stockpiling medical supplies.

The provincial governments, in conjunction with
municipal authorities, were expected to develop their own

civil defence plans, establish provincial civil defence schools and allocate the equipment received from the federal government. By 1952, the Alberta government took the lead in developing a provincial civil defence programme; British Columbia was a close second.⁹

From the moment Worthington was appointed civil defence co-ordinator, the federal government maintained that it did not have full responsibility for civil defence, since the provinces had jurisdiction over local policing, fire control, and the administration of justice.¹⁰ In keeping with its position, the federal government delegated civil defence to the the Minister of Health and Welfare.¹¹ In 1951, Paul Martin, Minister of Health and Welfare, assumed responsibility for civil defence. During a visit to Calgary, Martin, emphasized the government's position: 'Civil defence' he said, 'is the maintenance of normal community service, and for this reason, the main operational responsibility apart from over-all planning and co-ordination must fall on those local municipal agencies who carry even now the day-to-day responsibilities of meeting the normal amenities of life in our complex urban communities'.¹² Some of western Canada's most vocal civil defence supporters were found in British Columbia; they constantly complained that the government was ignoring the province's defences. Long past were the days when one

prominent Canadian historian said Canada's west coast could be easily defended by strategically mining the major shipping straits and channels.¹³ Many west coast residents feared that the province would be attacked in a future world war because of its geographic position, and because two naval bases were located on Vancouver Island.¹⁴ Many envisaged a Pearl Harbour type of attack on British Columbia. The disaster at Hawaii was still fresh in their minds, as was the shelling of the Estevan Point lighthouse by a Japanese submarine in the summer of 1942.

In an apparent effort to dispel their fears, W. T. Strait, Minister of Education and Civil Defence co-ordinator in the Bennett government, announced the province was not in any danger, and that, in any event, it would only be a secondary target in a future war.¹⁵ His comment hardly encouraged residents; in fact, it had the opposite effect. The Daily Colonist considered the remark irresponsible and reminiscent of the thinking which led the Americans to ignore Pearl Harbour's defence.¹⁶ In much the same tone, the Saskatoon Star Phoenix, commenting on Saskatchewan's civil defences, advised readers 'to expect the worst and prepare for it'.¹⁷ In any event a surprise attack could not be ruled out. 'There will be no warning if another war breaks out', one concerned Albertan said, 'it will be a second Pearl Harbour'.¹⁸

The sense of separation many British Columbians felt

was accentuated when the federal government announced it would be relocating the province's few anti-aircraft batteries to Ontario.¹⁹ How could the government have been so insensitive and stupid was a common query. Installing the batteries at Sault Ste. Marie, deep within the country's heartland was pure folly according to west coast editors. The Daily Colonist reported the move as having left British Columbia with barely one fighter squadron and a few anti-aircraft guns which could be 'counted on both hands'.²⁰ Clearly, the federal government considered the mining and industrial facilities of Ontario to be of more importance and therefore in greater need of defence than other areas of the country.

The situation was exacerbated when the last remaining destroyer stationed on the west coast was transferred to the Atlantic Command. The destroyers Sioux, Cayuga, and Athabaskan of the Pacific Command had already been transferred to Korea in the fall of 1950, and the Pacific Command was left with only one destroyer and a cruiser to defend the entire west coast of Canada. The transfer of this last remaining destroyer, Crescent, meant that only one major warship was available to patrol the Pacific coastline, and to rub salt into the wound, this ship could not leave port unless it had destroyer escort.²¹ 'Certainly no other United Nations participant will have stripped its home defences to almost nothing', the Daily Colonist remarked,

and, and concluded by saying: 'No wonder officialdom does not spur itself about civil defence, what is the use when there is no adequate military defence?'²²

This remark was more than just a reproach; it was by implication a criticism of the federal government's overall defence programme. The west coast press believed that the despatch of the destroyers to Korea clearly displayed how poorly equipped the country was to defend its own interests, not to mention fulfil its international commitments. The Defence Minister attempted to propitiate critics when he announced that the federal government's decision to relocate the destroyer was predicated on the assumption that the west coast was not in any immediate danger of being attacked.²³ This remark only served to further infuriate the critics. If the west coast was not in any imminent danger, why had the United States defence forces been placed on 24 hour emergency alert, and why was the US airforce and coast guard conducting around-the-clock air and sea surveillance?²⁴ 'In Victoria by contrast', the Daily Colonist wrote, 'not a single combat plane is housed; in all of the Canadian north west there is not a squadron equipped to duplicate even a tiny fraction of the vigil kept at McCord air force base [major military base in Washington state].'²⁵ The federal government appeared to the residents of BC to be relatively unconcerned about their fate. Ottawa seemed as indifferent to their situation in 1950 as it had seemed in 1903 when Premier E. G. Prior said:

'Victoria is 3000 miles from Ottawa, whereas Ottawa is 30,000 miles from Victoria'.²⁶ When St. Laurent stated 'that so long as he is alive there will be no war [world war]', the Daily Colonist remarked: 'This would account for the half hearted measures taken about the Korean conflict, and the seeming lack of reality attached to recruitment for the armed forces. If Mr. St. Laurent believes no early threat of war exists, it is not surprising his regime lacks the sense of urgency displayed by nearly every other government committed to the western alliance'.²⁷

Expecting the worst, some west coast residents even speculated on what might happen if the United States was too pre-occupied with its own defences to defend Canada.²⁸

The Canadian navy seemed inadequate to the task of defending the country's shoreline, and for this reason the government was importuned to establish a separate Canadian Coast Guard. The coast guard campaign was organized by a variety of private organisations, the foremost of which were the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, the Vancouver Branch of the Canadian Council of Women, and the west coast press. The Vancouver Branch of the Canadian Council of Women presented the federal government with a resolution which appealed for a 'separate coast guard . . . to patrol coastal waters'.²⁹

The most paranoid advocates of home and civil defence, in British Columbia at least, expected a massive Oriental invasion.³⁰ The Korean war seemed as the first step in the

eastward march of Communism; British Columbia was the next. A horde of Chinese, it was claimed, were ready to invade Canada once the opportunity presented itself. This fear must be examined in perspective. In the words of one social historian 'anti-Orientalism was endemic in British Columbia' between 1850 and 1940; apparently this sentiment had not fully dissipated by the 1950's.³¹

Whether an invasion was actually in the offing is irrelevant here, but what is important is that some British Columbians considered it real enough to warrant serious consideration and preparation. If an attack, in any event, had been launched, it would in all probability have been a diversionary attack, as the federal government believed. An enemy contemplating an invasion of Canada's west coast had to realistically assess how long an invasionary force could survive; the logistics alone would have presented an insurmountable problem. Father Bernard Hubbard, a well known northwest explorer, argued this very point: 'If an army invaded the territory [Alaska]', he noted, 'it would have to rely on a massive air lift to supply it which would make the Berlin air lift look puny in comparison'. His views originally appeared in the Tacoma News Tribune; the Daily Colonist reprinted the editorial, apparently, to assure its readers that the Russians would have serious problems if they invaded North America.³²

During an address to the Alberta Chamber of Mines,

Premier Manning warned that Edmonton, Calgary, and Lethbridge might become targets of convenience rather than primary targets.³³ What Manning meant was that Atomic Bombs would be dropped on sites within Alberta in the event the Russian bombers couldn't reach their targets further to the east. Since Alberta was within the broad flight plan a Russian bomber squadron would have to traverse, 'panic bombing' - the indiscriminate bombing of cities and industrial complexes-- was a conceivably realistic problem. Manning, western editors claimed, had concisely and succinctly described the situation: His analysis was worthy of praise, they concluded.³⁴ Early in December 1950, the Regina Leader Post had said much the same as Manning when it warned that panic bombing might be an important element in any Russian attack on North America. 'There is always the possibility', it wrote, 'that while the enemy may save its bombs [Atomic] for more important targets than Canada offers, these other weapons (incendiary and missiles) may be used for panic and nuisance raids to disorganize Canada's war effort and destroy its efficiency'. . . . 'Amid all the uncertainties as to the future, there is one certainty; in the event of a third world war civilians where they live and work will be in the front line as never before.'³⁵

The consequences of an Atomic Bomb attack on Canadian cities had not gone unconsidered. One concerned citizen bombarded Premier Manning with a series of letters in which

he advised that the only viable defence against Atomic weapons was dispersion.³⁶ He believed that the urban population should be dispersed into several smaller communities, such that in the event of a nuclear war, bombs dropped on Edmonton would not cause as much damage or death as if everything had been concentrated in one restricted area. The government, he claimed, had the authority to regulate urban growth, and that it should establish satellite communities within fifteen and twenty miles of the province's major cities. The Premier denied the government had such authority; however, during his address to the Chamber of Mines, he informed his audience that the Provincial Director of Town Planning was examining plans to develop small urban centres 'separated by main thoroughfares, greenfarming belts and other open spaces'.³⁷ Undeterred by Manning's denials, the writer continued to write on the subject; his letters are found not only in Manning's private papers, but Edmonton's Commissioner papers and major newspapers.³⁸ Apparently, his efforts had some effect: Edmonton's chief town planner advised Mr. Gerhart, Minister of Municipalities, that the District Planning Commission was investigating decentralization as an alternative to the existing urban plan, and that satellite communities might be a reality in 2 or 3 years.³⁹

The damage a nuclear explosion could cause was well publicized both by the government, the press, and community

organizations. In Alberta Mr. Gerhart, during a public affairs broadcast, advised his listeners that an Atomic Bomb blast over Edmonton would be devastating; at least, it would cause 15,000 deaths, 11,000 wounded --Property damage would be extensive--approximately 15,000 houses would be totally destroyed, while another 6000 would be partially damaged. Altogether 88,000 people would be displaced; 52,000 would be homeless, the remaining 36,000 would first have to repair their homes before they could return to them.⁴⁰

Although the general opinion was that Atomic Bombs would not be used as a first resort against Canadian targets, public and private agencies prepared for the worst and proceeded to inform the public of the possible defences against nuclear attack.⁴¹ The federal government for its part published a short booklet which defined three possible defences against attack, dispersion, evacuation, and shelters.⁴² Dispersion was a commonly suggested defence, and entailed moving not only people but industry as well. However, this defence had not been well thought out. The two most obvious problems were, how to move a significant number of people within a short period of time and what to do if people and business refused to relocate. Whole cities could not simply be uprooted and dispersed without prior planning and preparation for housing and other amenities. Western Canadians living in the shadow of

another world war simply did not have the time or capital to develop satellite cities on short notice. Dispersion, as a defence against nuclear or conventional attack, was a long range measure that required years of planning and a substantial outlay of capital. In addition a period of international calm was needed to plan and make preparations; in the atmosphere then little time seemed at hand.

Evacuation, as a defence, was also based on the questionable premise that there would be enough time to alert the population to the danger and evacuate people without much difficulty. An adequate warning system had to be in place for evacuation to work, but at the time of the Korean war, few Canadian cities were equipped with air raid sirens, or any other type of early warning network. Whether a city was provided with sirens or not depended upon its size and how vulnerable it was considered to be. Once a city was designated a target area, it was eligible to receive sirens under the conditions specified by the Federal Provincial Civil Defence agreement of February 1951. Only after the war was well underway did the Canadian government begin to distribute sirens.⁴³ Edmonton, listed as a possible target, was allocated 20 sirens, but it was not until the war in Korea had ended that all the sirens were delivered and installed.⁴⁴

An additional problem with the evacuation proposal was

that it required an excellent transportation system if it was to be workable. In the case of most western Canadian cities, such a system was nonexistent. Vancouver, for example, was connected to the outside by one rail link. Harry Ainlay, a former Edmonton Mayor and resident of Vancouver, wrote to the Vancouver Province to criticize BC's civil defence programme and the lack of available routes out of the city.⁴⁵ Ainlay's concern was echoed by a retired defence officer who warned that the scarcity of bridges and railines would cripple any mass evacuation of Vancouver.⁴⁶ Even if an adequate system was intact, the resulting panic caused by an evacuation announcement would render it useless.

Despite these problems, evacuation and dispersement were at the root of the civil defence programmes of both the federal and provincial governments. In consultation with the federal government, the provinces designated specific target and cushion areas.⁴⁷ To test the responsiveness of the civil defence organizations mock air raids and black outs were practised on a regular basis.⁴⁸ On occasion, these exercises were held in conjunction with similar tests conducted along the American west coast. During these tests, sirens were tested and the data collected was collated to determine the efficacy of the early warning system; people were evacuated; and the results were tabulated. 'The importance of [these] tests is that

[they]' will show', General Worthington said, 'just how far the sirens can be effectively heard. The only way I know to get this information is for people to listen to the sirens and report to civil defence headquarters.'⁴⁹ A day after this statement, the results of Winnipeg's siren test had come in: 'Many people did not hear the sirens at all', said Major General M. H. S. Perhale, civil defence co-ordinator for the greater Winnipeg area. 'Others', he said 'heard them only faintly. But in a general way most of the people in the city did hear them and know what they sound like.'⁵⁰ Although the test was relatively successful, it was not reassuring, and the Winnipeg Tribune, therefore, suggested that in the future the sirens be centrally controlled rather than regionally operated.⁵¹

Rather than organize a volunteer airplane spotter force as had been done in the United States by several state governments, the western provinces of British Columbia and Alberta relied on their existing network of forest fire spotting towers and forest radio networks.⁵² The financial advantage of using existing services is clearly evident.

When Edmonton Mayor S. Parson declared evacuation as a viable defence against nuclear attack, the Edmonton Bulletin reacted with an editorial lambasting him for commenting on a matter which it thought he knew little about.⁵³ Civil defence, it reminded its readers, was best left to the experts -- that the Mayor sat on the city's civil defence committee

and was in a better position to analyse the situation than was the Bulletin's editor seemed irrelevant.

When Edmonton's civil defence co-ordinator, Brigadier J. C. Jefferson advised Edmontonians to stock emergency supplies of food, water, and other necessities, the Bulletin again responded and labelled the proposal both 'uneconomic and senseless'.⁵⁴ 'If the water supply is threatened', it wrote, 'Brigadier Jefferson's job is to see that it is adequately protected and not to set timorous souls to filling tubs and wash boilers every clear and moonlit night'. What really, apparently, concerned the paper's editor was that these statements were unduly alarming the public, and that they might lead to uncertain and possibly disastrous results. Although the Bulletin stopped short of recommending censoring civil defence information, it came very close to doing so. Other western Canadians, on the one hand, importuned the government to publicize whatever civil defence information was available. 'Civil defence is not a matter to keep the wraps on', a BC MLA said. 'By its proper direction', he added, 'the duties, burdens, and safety of the civilian population are determined. If in Canada the importance of civil defence has been underrated by those responsible, it may be as well now rather than later-- to take steps to remedy what could prove a very inconvenient miscalculation.'⁵⁵

Another civil defence advocate claimed that the public had a 'right' to know everything there was to know about civil defence, because publicizing this information, he argued, would have the advantage of not only informing the population, but also indicate to the enemy that Canadians were prepared to deal with an attack on their country.⁵⁶

Yet others suggested that civil defence could be used to protect the population against acts of sabotage which disrupted essential services. Canadians as discussed earlier were deeply concerned by the prospect of fifth column elements at work within Canada. The reports of Communist activity were used to good measure to increase the public's awareness. During the American Water Works Contractors Association Convention, delegates were warned by the Association's president that Winnipeg's water works could be easily destroyed by a few carefully placed sticks of dynamite.⁵⁷ The warning was followed with an appeal to municipalities that they prepare for such eventualities by developing emergency water supply systems. Although the proposal might certainly have been motivated out of a sense of concern with underground Communist activity and sabotage, it is evident that the construction of emergency water supply facilities would accrue to the benefit of the Association's members.

Defending against deliberate acts of destruction and disruption of essential services was just another facet of

civil defence, it was argued.⁵⁸ Overall, civil defence was seen as another form of emergency service available to deal with such disasters as the Winnipeg and Fraser Valley floods of the spring of 1950, and the Rimouski and Cabano fires (Quebec) of the same year which necessitated mass exodus of people. In the instance of the Winnipeg flood and the Rimouski fire the Canadian military had been called in to assist local authorities;⁵⁹ proponents of civil defence argued that in the event of a confrontation between the west and the Soviet Union, the military would not be available to provide assistance to the local population to the extent that might be needed, and therefore, a civilian civil defence organization was a necessity.

To inform Canadians of the civil defence measures that might be needed in the future, the government employed a variety of information services. Radio and newspapers, French and English, were widely used; over 75 English and 29 French radio stations broadcasted on a regular a programme entitled 'Here's Health'.⁶⁰ In addition short informative plays entitled: 'Preparing for Atomic Attack'; 'Bombed Out'; 'Emergency Feeding in Disaster'; 'Panic'; 'Civil Defence in Schools'; and 'When Disaster Strikes' were heard across Canada. In the newspapers articles such as 'Canada Prepares to Deal with Disaster' were commonly found. The government's efforts to communicate civil defence information to the public were supplemented by a

variety of women's and church groups who regularly informed their members to prepare for the worst.⁶¹

Information on how to build shelters was occasionally published by the federal government and supplemented with information from private organizations. General Worthington when questioned on when the government would be issuing information booklets on how to find shelters replied: 'There is no point in publishing a book telling Canadians to go to shelters in the case of a raid where actually no shelters are being built'.⁶² Shelter construction required a substantial capital investment which the government at the time was unprepared to make.

Essentially, a large portion of the money spent by the government on civil defence went to pay for such items as first aid kits, training aids, blankets, boots, coveralls, steel helmets, stretchers, anti-gas suits, respirators, radiation detectors and wireless equipment.⁶³ Although this equipment was needed, it was barely enough to supply the needs of one city.⁶⁴

For the most part, civil defence supporters concentrated their efforts on urban areas. This was natural enough considering that the majority of Canada's population was concentrated in cities. Although the cities were important, the rural areas also demanded attention; the rural areas were designated cushion areas, they were expected to absorb the urban population in the event of an

attack.⁶⁵ But for the rural areas to accommodate and feed a large mass of people from the cities, measures had to be taken to defend them against attack.

Apart from providing shelter and hospital facilities, the rural areas were naturally important because they constituted the country's major source of food. One farmer, in a conversation with John Diefenbaker, stressed the government should take appropriate measures to protect fuel supplies.⁶⁶ He outlined how dependent farmers had become on machinery, and warned that any disruption in fuel supplies would affect future food production. Diefenbaker brought this concern to the attention of his fellow MPs but failed to suggest how the country's fuel supplies could be assured.

In addition protecting livestock was considered as important as defending the human population.⁶⁷ Animals were an essential source of protein, and consequently they had to be protected from contamination. Government officials feared that the Russians might resort to Chemical and Biological weapons in a future world war, and that they would not hesitate to affect the west's food stocks.⁶⁸ In response to this fear provincial veterinarians were advised to be on the lookout for any disease not common to the region, and to take the appropriate measures to quarantine any area suspected of being a target of chemical or biological sabotage. A list of possible diseases was cat-

taloqued together with appropriate antidotes where available.⁶⁹

Similar measures were implemented to deal with chemical or biological attacks on grain supplies.⁷⁰ District agriculturalists were requested to make periodic checks of the region under their supervision. Anything unusual was to be investigated and reported as quickly as possible to the federal department of agriculture. The provincial veterinarians and district agriculturalist, not to mention other government officials, could not succeed in their efforts if they did not have the support of vigilant and committed volunteers.

The governments of Alberta and British Columbia expected to supplement their civil defence personnel with trained volunteers. In Alberta's case, the government expected to recruit 25,000 volunteers (2-3% of the general population), who would be led by a highly trained cadre of civil defence workers.⁷¹ Although this number was considered ideal, V. A. Newhall, Calgary Chief Commissioner in a letter to Gerhart, expressed the opinion that this many could be recruited in Calgary alone;⁷² by 1955 more than 25,000 Albertans had been trained in the basics of civil defence.⁷³

In the opinion of some western Canadians civil defence training should be compulsory for every citizen.⁷⁴ This appeal was often made in conjunction with calls for cons-

cription. Compulsory civil defence training, it was mentioned, was a fact of life in neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland; if these countries deemed civil defence so important why then shouldn't Canadians, it was asked. During the course of his tour through Canada, Swedish Civil Defence organizer Mr. Sandelin told Canadians that in Sweden everyone between the ages of 16 and 65 had to take some form of civil defence training. Mr. Sandelin in addition, mentioned that 900,000 people had received civil defence training; this number represented approximately 13% of the general population.⁷⁵

The western press which recorded Mr. Sandelin's visit reminded Canadians that Sweden had a population of only seven million. On the basis of this information, it was suggested Canada institute a similar programme. 'Our military strength remains inadequate', wrote a columnist in the Daily Colonist, 'Therefore, we might well emulate peace loving Switzerland with its smaller population. Compulsory military training for all males. Result, an army of 800,000 loyal dependable reservists, age 18 to 60, each provided with a rifle at his home and ready for any defensive emergency, to rally within a few hours of a national alarm.'⁷⁶ The column, apparently, pleased one reader who concurred that conscription was 'an answer to the present weakness of this country', and suggested that civil defence preparations be accelerated.⁷⁷

Volunteer organizations were also used to a great extent by the civil defence authorities. The Red Cross, St. John's Ambulance, the Canadian Legion, and Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts supplemented the trained volunteers.⁷⁸ Paul Martin, commenting on the value of St. John's Ambulance Corp, speculated that the Corp could train as many as 135,000 people in first aid;⁷⁹ obviously, such valuable private organizations had a major role to play in Canada's civil defence programme.

Between 1951-52, the federal government had taken major steps in establishing an advance warning system. Key points were identified and scheduled to receive sirens. In addition radiological equipment, and over 70,000 respirators, helmets, anti-gas suits, and other protective clothing were provided to the provinces in fulfillment of the federal government's obligations. As for standardizing hose couplings, the federal government agreed to pay a third of the total cost of the programme. By 1952, Alberta and Ontario had taken advantage of this guarantee: approximately \$300,000.00 was allocated to them. For training purposes, Ottawa distributed 4000 stirrup pumps to the provinces and nearly one million copies of a variety of pamphlets, information booklets, etc to the general public.⁸⁰ At the end of the 1952 fiscal year 1363 people had been trained at the federal training school in the basics of civil defence; the majority were provincial or municipal representatives

who took advantage of the Ottawa's offer to pay the cost of training.⁸¹

However, by 1952, some of the concern over civil defence dissipated, partly because the Korean war had not escalated into world war. For the most part, many western Canadians had become immune to the events in Asia. When the war started they had been bombarded with reports attesting to its seriousness. After a period of time, people seemed to be bored by it all. Even newspaper editors who had warned of the war's implications had somewhat reduced the volume and pitch of their Korean editorials. In this subdued atmosphere, people tended to concentrate on just living day to day. Civil defence became another burden, which was cumbersome to carry, financially and psychologically. Despite this shift in attitude, the federal government, and the western provinces slowly plodded along with their civil defence preparations. The foundations they laid during the Korean war remain intact to this day. The federal and provincial governments have continued to emphasize evacuation, dispersion, and shelters as the best means of civil defence. For the most part the civil defence agencies established across this country are used for the occasional disaster such as floods, fires, etc., but they are relatively unsuited to deal with a major disaster caused by a nuclear war. The sirens that were distributed during the 50's are still in place today.

Municipal planning has continued much as in the past; urban sprawl has eaten away at the greenbelt and open spaces that separated major cities from satellite cities, and the transportation system of Canada's cities leaves much to be desired as anyone who has been caught in rush-hour traffic can attest. The shelters that were not built during the 50's, 60's, and 70's have yet to be built; in all probability they will never be built considering the financial position of the federal, provincial and municipal governments-- besides it would be impossible to protect even a small portion of Canada's population in the event of a nuclear holocaust.

V

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81

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The idea for this dissertation, came as most ideas do, when one least expects them. I had been reading an article on the Korean War, and I began to wonder what the average Canadian thought of the war. The question as always was-- Where to begin, what sources to look at, and where to find them. My major reason for concentrating on the reaction of western Canadians was simply ease of access to sources; in short I sampled a segment of Canadian society via the press, public opinion polls, legislative records, and other public records to determine how Canadians reacted and why they reacted to the war in the manner they did. Once involved in the research I discovered that a variety of issues had come to the fore during the war, and that some of these issues were of great importance to many Canadians regardless of where they lived in Canada.

A major issue, as discussed in this thesis, was: Should Canada support the United Nations in carrying out the prescribed sanctions against North Korea?. From the material examined, I think it is fair to say that the average Canadian supported Canada's involvement in Korea, if for no other reason than to show the Russians that the United Nations would not go the way of the League of Nations.

At the end of World War II, the Canadian government and the Canadian public had made a commitment to the United Nations partially because they believed that the UN would make the world a more secure and peaceful place in which to live. Canadians, most of all, wanted to avoid, if not eliminate, the state of international tensions which precipitated WW II; they believed that it heralded a 'brave new world', free of war. Although, they began to have some misgivings about the organisation when it appeared the Russians were determined to disrupt its operation, they found new hope when the Security Council voted to condemn North Korea and to take punitive action. The major theme pursued throughout the thesis is that the war opened the eyes of western Canadians, and Canadians in general, to the Cold War and the Communist threat. Prior to the crisis, the activities of the Russians seemed too distant to be of any consequence; the Korean War altered Canadian perceptions of world events, and subsequently forced them to take account of Canada's military and home defences. Conscription, military and civil defence, the Atomic Bomb, and the Peace Movement all became important in the context of the state of international relations, and Canada's position in a world dominated by two superpowers.

The common denominator tying together all the issues that emerged from the crisis was fear--fear of Communism and fear of another world war. The Peace Movement which grew from the beginning of the war was unacceptable to the

majority of Canadians, not merely because it echoed Communist propaganda, but that some of its members were openly supporting the efforts of a country which was hostile to the basic fundamental principles which most Canadians believed in--the right to live in freedom, the right to practise one's religion, the right to own property, etc..

Denis Stairs' book, The Diplomacy of Constraint, deals with the reaction of Canadian policy makers to the war and the operation of Canadian diplomacy throughout the duration of the conflict. This thesis complements Stairs' book in that it completes the picture of the political and social milieu in which the government operated. The Canadian government committed the country only after it had surveyed the opinion of the public at large; it discovered that most Canadians wanted the United Nations to act, and wanted Canada to make some commitment comparable to its size and resources. The government throughout the war tended to be more hesitant and cautious than many western Canadians would have liked. It would be fair to say, based on the evidence presented in this paper, that western Canadians viewed the Korean situation as more dangerous and volatile than did the policy makers, and for this reason, they seemed prepared to accept drastic measures to deal with the Communist threat.

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