



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your list - Votre référence

Our list - Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF WAR:
A CASE STUDY OF THE YEARS 1760-61

BY

ROBERT PETER CARSTENSEN



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Edmonton, Alberta
Fall, 1993



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-88387-1

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: ROBERT PETER CARSTENSEN


TITLE OF THESIS: ANGLO--FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE AGE
OF WAR: A CASE STUDY OF THE YEARS
1760-61

DEGREE: MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1993

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.



#201, 9936-87 Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta
T6E 2N7

May 11, 1993


UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled **ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF WAR: A CASE STUDY OF THE YEARS 1760-61** submitted by Robert Peter Carstensen in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History.



David C. Johnson, Chairman



Philip Lawson, Supervisor



David R. Marples, Committee Member



R. Szostak, Committee Member

Date: 5. v. 93

ABSTRACT

From March to September, 1761, France and Britain engaged in peace negotiations to end their parts in the Seven Years War. These negotiations failed. Historians have mainly focused on these negotiations as the background to the resignation of the British war minister, William Pitt. Their analysis has mainly focused on the personality of either Pitt or the French minister, the Duc de Choiseul. According to earlier accounts, the dominating personalities of these two men caused the failure of the negotiations.

This study will focus on a more detailed analysis of these negotiations. It will show how internal political events in both Britain and France effected the course of the negotiations. This study will also focus on the main issue of the Newfoundland fisheries. The fisheries issue was contentious because it involved the issues of finance, naval power, and the balance of power. The attitudes towards these issues by the major players in the negotiations reveals that the main cause for the failure of the negotiations was the clash between traditional European diplomacy and the new force of rising English nationalism which sought the overthrow of traditional diplomacy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Philip Lawson for his interest, assistance, and encouragement in the researching and writing of my thesis. I would also to thank Dr. David R. Marples, Dr. R. Szostak, and Dr. David C. Johnson for their contributions as members of my committee.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents for all their support, encouragement, and understanding throughout my academic career. Thanks, Mom and Dad!

Finally, I would like to thank Jen for her understanding, support, and, in general, for just putting up with me while I wrote this thesis. Thanks, Jen! Your help is greatly appreciated!

Table of Contents

Page

Chapter One- Introduction	1
Chapter Two- The British Cabinet Struggle	8
Chapter Three- Choiseul Gains Control in France	31
Chapter Four- The Newfoundland Fisheries: Finance, Naval Power, and the Balance of Power	
-Part I	48
-Part II	60
Chapter Five- Conclusion	81
Bibliography	85

Chapter One Introduction

What was really new about the patriotic politics of the fifties was not its condemnations of 'corruption' and 'faction' nor even its vitriolic denunciation of ministerial dithering in foreign affairs. What was new was its remarkably strident insistence that the road to national greatness was the global expansion of British trade and the total destruction of that French economic and military power which, like French culture, was now flourishing everywhere.¹

The main goal of British patriots infused with the rising force of English nationalism in the 1750's and 1760's was to destroy French power. The opportunity to achieve the goal occurred during the Seven Years War from 1756-1763. Particularly when, in the year 1761, William Pitt, who held views corresponding to those of the English nationalists, conducted peace negotiations with France.

Spectacular British successes in the war put Pitt in the position to attempt to gain a reduction of French power in Europe. By 1761, Britain had conquered Canada, Guadeloupe, Senegal, and Goree. French naval power had been severely damaged by the defeats at Quiberon Bay and Lagos, in 1759. Finally, on the Indian sub-continent, between 1756 and 1761, French defeats at Plassey, Wandewash, Arcot, and Caracal had broken French influence over the Mughal princes. Faced with these defeats and a severe financial crisis at home, the French first minister, the Duc de Choiseul,

¹Gerald Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987, p. 169.

decided to begin negotiations with Britain to end the war.

The peace negotiations between Britain and France began in April, 1761. The initial overtures went well, and both countries sent representatives to the other's capitals to begin negotiations. The British cabinet decided on Hans Stanley as its envoy. Choiseul's choice of envoy was Francois de Bussy. With the exchange of envoys the negotiations very quickly took on a serious tone. Choiseul needed peace to rebuild the French military and economy, and in Britain, George III, crowned in 1760, wanted a peace settlement to begin his reign. Both Stanley and Bussy conducted their negotiations directly with the first ministers of Britain and France, Pitt and Choiseul respectively. Pitt then reported to the British cabinet for instructions. In contrast Choiseul did not have to report for instructions. He was in complete control of the positions taken by France during the negotiations.

The first area over which the negotiators experienced difficulties concerned the uti possidetis clauses proposed by Choiseul. The uti possidetis was the negotiation principle where the belligerents retained possession of their conquests as standing on a specified date. Choiseul proposed the dates of September 1, 1761 for the East Indies, July 1, 1761 for the West Indies and Africa, and May 1, 1761 for Europe. Pitt wanted the dates to be a month later than those proposed by Choiseul. He wanted to make sure that the

expected conquest of Belleisle fell within the time period of the uti possidetis. This disagreement, combined with the operation against Belleisle, in June of 1761, made Choiseul begin to doubt the sincerity of the British in desiring an end to the war.

A much more serious disagreement quickly developed in the spring of 1761 over the issue of the Newfoundland fisheries. Choiseul wished to retain French rights in these lucrative fisheries, along with a small base so that the French could dry their fish. Pitt wanted to exclude France completely from the fisheries. There was opposition within the British cabinet to Pitt's position. Led by two senior ministers, the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Bedford, traditional elements within the cabinet fought for more conciliatory terms for France on this issue. However, the Newcastle-Bedford group were only successful in bringing about a change in the British position in late August, 1761. Unfortunately for the peace process, Choiseul had, by this time, come to the conclusion that Britain was not serious about peace. Believing that the British were insincere, Choiseul concluded an alliance with Spain. Following the conclusion of the Pacte de Famille between France and Spain on August 15, 1761, the negotiations between Britain and France did not continue very much longer. By the end of September, 1761, the envoys had been recalled, and both sides prepared to renew hostilities.

Many historians have written about the negotiations in 1761. Most of them are part of the English speaking portion of the historiography of the time period. These historians include Basil Williams, Julian Corbett, Kate Hotblack, and Zenab Esmat Rashed.² British historians have been drawn to these negotiations because they are viewed as the background to the resignation of William Pitt, in October, 1761. In the French historiography, the peace negotiations are practically ignored by historians. The notable exception is Alfred Bourguet, who looks at the negotiations within the context of the negotiations with Spain for the Pacte de Famille.

Despite the amount of research by historians on this subject, none of the views give a satisfactory analysis of the situation. Most of the analysis has been superficial. The thrust of the analysis by these historians is discovering the reasons for the failure in the negotiations. Unfortunately, they seek to lay blame whether it be on Pitt, Choiseul, the Spanish ambassadors (de Fuentes and Grimaldi), or the dispute over the fisheries. The traditional accounts of the negotiations fail to penetrate beyond the surface

²Basil Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. II, London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914; Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Vol. II, London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907; Kate Hotblack, "The Peace of Paris, 1763", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. II: (235-266); and Zenab Esmat Rashed, The Peace of Paris 1763, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1951.

reasons for the failure. For example, the main issue over which the negotiations failed was the Newfoundland fisheries. This issue is very complicated, but none of the traditional accounts realize and discuss the underlying conflict and issues which the Newfoundland fisheries brought to the forefront. The dispute over the fisheries brought up the issues of finance, naval power, and balance of power in Europe, and how all these issues interrelated. More importantly, the dispute over the fisheries illustrated the beginning of the conflict between nationalism and the old cosmopolitan European order. Pitt, by attempting to gain the goals of English nationalists, brought himself into conflict with traditionalists like Choiseul, Newcastle, and Bedford. This conflict and the deeper underlying reasons for the importance of the fisheries are aspects of the peace negotiations of 1761 missing from the traditional accounts of this event and is one of the reasons for reexamining the negotiations.

Another reason for the negotiations being reexamined is that traditional accounts are not balanced and fail to take internal political events into account over the period in question. The traditional accounts do not look at both Britain and France. British historians discuss the issue of the peace negotiations without discussing events within France. Likewise, French historians ignore events in Britain. Both fail to examine the effect that internal

politics have on the formation of foreign policy. For example, British historians do not analyze the effect that the power struggle within the British cabinet had on the positions taken by Britain during the negotiations of 1761. Likewise, French historians do not analyze the effect of Choiseul's gaining more control over French affairs had on his foreign policy goals. To gain a balanced view of the peace negotiations an examination of internal events in Britain and France is required. It is through this examination that the underlying issues at stake in the fisheries issue become apparent, and the larger conflict between nationalism and traditional European cosmopolitanism emerges. Failure to examine the internal events of both countries has led the analyses of the traditional accounts to be superficial.

Finally, The Devonshire Diary has recently become available to historians. The Duke of Devonshire was a member of the British cabinet, in 1761, and he recorded the events concerning the negotiations in his diary. This primary source has never been used as evidence in an examination of this topic. The primary source reveals the details of the British cabinet struggle and the conflicts over the peace negotiations with France. The addition of this evidence adds to the understanding of the events of 1761.

By looking at the internal political events in both

France and Britain, combined with the new evidence offered by The Devonshire Diary, a balanced and more detailed analysis of the peace negotiations between Britain and France will be given. The examination shows that the dispute over the fisheries involved the issues of finances, naval power, and the balance of power in Europe. It also reveals that the main conflict was between nationalism and European Cosmopolitanism. It also demonstrates that the negotiations in 1761 were different from the normal eighteenth century methods of diplomacy between Britain and France. Finally, the examination of internal political events illustrates the effect of internal events on this conflict and these foreign policy issues.

Chapter Two

The British Cabinet Struggle

By the beginning of 1761, the unity of the Pitt-Newcastle ministry, which had successfully managed the British war effort, was threatened by two events. The first event was the death of George II and the beginning of George III's reign. The beginning of a new reign meant that the political climate in Britain changed. George III had views which differed from those of George II. First, George III was not German, he was British. This difference led him to view the Electorate of Hanover as less important in the determination of British policies. Second, George III distrusted the whig Lords like Newcastle who had controlled British politics during the reign of George II. George III was determined to end this whig domination. These views made for an unsettled political climate for the ruling politicians. To further George III's aims, the new King's favourite, the Earl of Bute, entered the cabinet. Bute's introduction into the cabinet further upset the political balance between Pitt and Newcastle, as both rivals vied for Bute's support. The second event was the beginning of peace negotiations with France. Pitt and Newcastle differed in their views on the peace, and a power struggle within the cabinet began over the issue. The struggle for control was further confused by Bute, who used the issue and his support for one side or the other to gain power in the cabinet.

In the historiography of the peace negotiations, the British cabinet has been viewed differently by historians. The struggle for power is not viewed as important in the formation of British policy towards France. Instead, to historians like Basil Williams, Zenab Esmat Rashed, and Julian Corbett, William Pitt is in control of the cabinet and policy formation. For example, Julian Corbett describes Pitt's rule as a "dictatorship."³ The use of the term dictatorship implies complete control over British policy on the part of William Pitt.

An examination of the primary sources of some of the leading players in the events does not support the notion of the control attributed to Pitt by historians. A review of the Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, the Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, The Devonshire Diary, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, the Letters of Horace Walpole, and Letters from George III to Lord Bute⁴ and numerous other

³Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Vol. II, p. 185.

⁴Lord John Russell, ed., Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, London, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1846; William Stanhope Taylor, Esq., and Captain John Henry Pringle, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. II, London, John Murray, 1838; Peter D. Brown and Karl W. Schweizer, ed., The Devonshire Diary: William Cavendish, Fourth Duke of Devonshire, Memoranda on State Affairs 1759-1762, London, Royal Historical Society, 1982; Philip C. Yorke, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, New York, Octagon Books, 1977; Paget Toynbee, ed., Letters of Horace Walpole, Vol. V, Oxford, Clarendon Press,

primary sources, reveals a fundamental split in the cabinet over the peace issue with France and the struggle for power within the cabinet. The documents show that William Pitt was not in complete control of Britain or British policy. Rather, the primary sources indicate Pitt's view was only dominant when supported by Bute. When Pitt lost Bute's support, his views no longer prevailed in cabinet. In effect, the Earl of Bute was primarily responsible for the positions taken by England during the negotiations with France through his support of either Pitt's or Newcastle's position.

The cabinet split into two distinctive groups over the issue of the peace terms offered to France in 1761. The first group was led by William Pitt, and it included the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Temple. This group favoured harsh terms towards the French. The second group was led by the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Bedford, and it included the Lord Chamberlain, the Duke of Devonshire, and the Earl of Hardwicke, who had no specific position but who was still a member of the cabinet. This group favoured more conciliatory terms towards the French. The split in the cabinet occurred because of two differing views of Empire. Pitt's group favoured a territorial empire, while Newcastle and Bedford worried that the Empire had expanded too much

1904; and Romney Sedgwick, ed., Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1939.

already and that Britain would overextend itself.⁵

Pitt's position on the peace terms offered to France show that he favoured the establishment of a territorial empire. Pitt's goals in the peace negotiations with France are shown in the following excerpt:

Mr. Pitt said he had laid his thoughts fully before the King; that he had told his Majesty that he did by no means think of the state of the war as other people did; that he was far from doing it, even with regard to the war in Germany; that he thought the total destruction of the French in the West Indies, the probability of taking Martinico, and the effect that this expedition on Belleisle might have, as well as the probable events of this campaign, would enable us to get a peace, which should secure to us all Canada, Cape Breton, the islands, the harbours, the fisheries, and particularly the exclusive fishery of Newfoundland.⁶

By taking this stand, Pitt was seeking to keep the conquests that he had engineered during the war. This view is especially important regarding Canada and the fisheries off Newfoundland. Pitt supported keeping Canada and returning Guadeloupe to France. The cabinet knew from its own figures that Guadeloupe produced a revenue of 400,000 to 500,000 pounds a year for France, as opposed to Canada's 40,000 pounds a year.⁷ If Pitt supported a commercial idea of empire, then he would not have insisted on keeping Canada.

⁵A full discussion of these different views and the views of the balance of power appears on p. 69-74.

⁶The Duke of Newcastle to the Earl of Hardwicke, April 17, 1761, Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Vol. III, pp. 315-316.

⁷Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 109.

Pitt insisted on keeping a monopoly on the Newfoundland fisheries for two important reasons. First, the elimination of French fishing rights in the area would damage French naval power by depriving them of a pool of trained seamen. Second, the fisheries were Canada's most valuable resource and as such they were viewed as a necessary part of the peace by those who supported Pitt's view. This support for a time included the Earl of Bute and he summarized the position as follows: " . . . that therefore if we had not the Fishery we really got nothing."⁸

In wanting to keep Canada, Pitt demonstrated he supported the idea of Britain ruling a territorial empire. Contemporaries also viewed Pitt as a supporter of expansion and a territorial empire. After the peace negotiations with France failed, the contemporary diarist and political observer Horace Walpole wrote the following comment: "Bussy goes to-morrow; and Mr. Pitt is so impatient to conquer Mexico, that I don't believe he will stay till my Lord Bristol can be ordered to leave Madrid."⁹

Walpole was also aware that there was a split in the cabinet on the issue of the peace terms to France. He commented that: "The rest of the council, who are content with the world they have to govern, without conquering

⁸Ibid., p. 109.

⁹Horace Walpole to the Countess of Ailesbury, September 27, 1761, Toynbee, Letters of Horace Walpole, Vol. V, p. 120.

others, . . ."¹⁰ The group opposing the views of Pitt was led by the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Bedford.

Bedford was a strong proponent of peace with France, and he worried that the British empire was expanding too much by territorial conquest. He made his position clear in the following excerpt when he commented on the Belleisle expedition:

I am aware it may be observed that it is not meant finally to retain Belleisle, but that it will be a good thing to carry to market, to obtain better conditions, than we should otherwise have; to this I reply, we have too much already - more than we know what to do with; and I very much fear, that, if we retain the greatest part of our conquests out of Europe, we shall be in danger of over-colonising and undoing ourselves as the Spanish have done.¹¹

As Bedford's comments illustrate, the Newcastle-Bedford group was concerned about overextending British interests overseas, and thought that too much had been conquered. This attitude is in contrast to that of Pitt who wanted more conquests and more territory. On the issue of the fisheries, Newcastle stated that the right to fish in Canadian waters "cannot in justice or prudence be denied."¹² The Newcastle-Bedford group not only saw the

¹⁰Horace Walpole to the Hon. Henry Seymour Conway, September 25, 1761, Toynbee, Letters of Horace Walpole, Vol. V, p. 115.

¹¹The Duke of Bedford to the Earl of Bute, June 13, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, pp. 16-17.

¹²The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford, July 6, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 21.

granting of the fishing rights as prudent, they saw them as vital to the future wellbeing of Britain. As the following passage from the Earl of Hardwicke illustrates, the Newcastle-Bedford group feared a European coalition against Britain, if France was denied the fisheries and destroyed as a maritime power:

. . . but Spain and all the rest of Europe would be against our engrossing such a monopoly [of the fisheries], and I could not think it right to run the hazard of losing, or greatly delaying, this peace for it.¹³

The fear of European reaction indicates another difference in the views of the Pitt and the Newcastle-Bedford groups. Pitt was not concerned about the hostile reactions of other European powers as shown by his eagerness to attack Spain in October, 1761. Newcastle and Bedford, on the other hand, wanted to build a long lasting peace in Europe. They felt that conciliation rather than dictation of extreme terms would lead to an equitable and long lasting peace.

The Newcastle-Bedford group's concern over Pitt's peace terms grew when they realized that Pitt had the support of the public. This realization was evident in Bedford's musings on this issue during August 1761. He wrote:

Mr. Pitt, it is plain, does govern; and the worst of it is, that he governs not only in the cabinet council, but in the opinions of the people too. I have conversed with some of my neighbours here about peace, which they all wish for, and will tell you they shall be undone if

¹³Lord Hardwicke to the Duke of Newcastle, April 6, 1761, Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Vol. III, p. 269.

the war continues; but the disorder of the council is epidemical, for they will tell you in the same breath, that you must keep every thing which you have taken from the French, and have every thing returned to you which you have lost by the war.¹⁴

Rigby and Bedford were so concerned about public opinion that Rigby saw the only solution to eliminate Pitt's popularity and hold over the public as follows:

Depend upon it, my Lord, this is the madness of the times, and there is but one cure for it, and that is a defeat of some one of our projects.¹⁵

There is no doubt that Pitt's popularity was a phenomenon in eighteenth century British history. The standard accounts explain this phenomenon as a popular tribute to a great war minister, and Pitt "The Great Commoner". However, there is more to it than this. It seems fair to say that Pitt's popularity arose from deeper feelings of national pride. There was a new but potent rise of nationalism in this period and Pitt's wartime successes acted as a catalyst. According to Gerald Newman, one of the goals of the rising force was the destruction of French power and William Pitt was the first "charismatic hero-leader" of the movement.¹⁶ The fear of these forces among the Whig Lords like Newcastle and Bedford continued even after Pitt's resignation in October. The fear is demonstrated in the following passage:

¹⁴Mr. Rigby to the Duke of Bedford, August 27, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, p. 42.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁶Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism, p. 169.

Will you carry on the war? perhaps you cannot with success; I am sure not with the expected success. Will you make a peace? I will venture to say that you cannot make one that will satisfy the sanguine demands of the public, nay, what is worse, I question if you can make a good peace in itself independently of the absurd expectations of mankind. And yet whatever you cannot do in either war or peace, Mr. Pitt both would and could have done it, that will be the cry.¹⁷

Because of the position Pitt enjoyed in the prevailing nationalistic mood, his struggles within the cabinet can be seen as a struggle between English nationalism and the old Whig cosmopolitan order.

Into the struggle between Pitt and Newcastle entered the Earl of Bute, who had his own political motives in the formation of cabinet policy. Bute entered the cabinet on March 13, 1761, when he took over for the Earl of Holderness as Secretary of State for the Northern Department. Bute entered the cabinet because of the intrigues of the Duke of Newcastle who felt that "Mr. Pitt must be managed."¹⁸ Newcastle thought that Bute's presence in the cabinet would allow him to control Pitt and the cabinet. Bute's appointment to the cabinet also demonstrated that Pitt did not have total control of the political system in Britain for he "complained that the great change in government of making Lord Bute Secretary of State and the other

¹⁷The Earl of Chesterfield to the Duke of Newcastle, October 26, 1761, Bonamy Dobrée, ed., The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, Vol. VI, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1932, p. 2384.

¹⁸Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 89.

arrangements had been settled without concert with him."¹⁹ Walpole commented that: "Pitt had as short notice of this resolution as the sufferer [Holderness], and was little pleased."²⁰ Bute's appointment to the cabinet illustrated that Pitt had lost control of the political direction of policy taken by the British cabinet. Bute's appointment also added a new and important factor in what had been a straight forward power struggle between Pitt and Newcastle.

If Newcastle had hoped that by getting Bute in the cabinet he had gained an ally against Pitt on the issue of the peace terms, he was to be disappointed. Bute supported Pitt's position for most of the negotiations. Most contemporaries recognized that the peace negotiations were going to divide the cabinet. Newcastle stated that on certain issues (the fisheries) "we shall have disputes."²¹ The Duke of Devonshire realized that problems would arise and in April, 1761, he tried to talk to Pitt to see if an agreement could be reached. Devonshire wanted to reach a consensus because he thought it was very important that " . . . the King's servants should all appear of one mind, for nothing would so much retard the making or prejudice the

¹⁹Ibid., p. 93.

²⁰Horace Walpole to George Montagu, March 13, 1761, Toynbee, Letters of Horace Walpole, Vol. V, p. 33.

²¹The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford, July 6, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 21.

peace itself as our enemies perceiving that we were not agreed among ourselves."²² While most contemporaries realized the problems in the cabinet, few realized that Bute was now involved in the power struggle with Pitt and Newcastle, and that his actions would determine the direction of the cabinet and the peace negotiations. One of the people who saw the implications of Bute's appointment was the Spanish ambassador in London, the Count de Fuentes. He wrote shortly after Bute's entry into the cabinet that "The Duke of Newcastle and his party are persuaded that Mr. Pitt and my Lord Bute have united, in order to demolish him, and form their own."²³

Count de Fuentes was correct. Bute initially decided to support the position of Pitt concerning the peace negotiations. His position is outlined in the following letter portion:

The Duke of Bedford cannot wish for peace more sincerely than I do; but let that peace prove in some measure answerable to the conquest we have made. Can a minister answer for it to the public, if they advise the King to sit down satisfied with a barren country [Canada], not equal in value to the duchies of Lorraine and Barr, and yet an acquisition invidious from its vast extent, while the French have restored to them the

²²Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 94.

²³The Count De Fuentes to M. Wall, March 27, 1761, William Stanhope Taylor, Esq., and Captain John Henry Pringle, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. II, London, John Murray, 1838, p. 106.

very essence of the whole [the fisheries]?²⁴

Bute continued in the letter to support Pitt's position on the peace. He concluded by stating that " . . .his Majesty cannot in honour or with safety sheath the sword on less advantageous terms I have mentioned."²⁵ These excerpts from Bute's correspondence demonstrate that he initially supported Pitt on the peace terms to France in the summer of 1761. He supported this position because he believed it was in the best interests of the King. This support was only the first stage in a larger process, as Bute's support of Pitt had a significant impact on the decisions reached by the cabinet regarding the peace negotiations.

Bute's impact on the decisions in cabinet and his support for Pitt is shown early in the negotiations with France. For example, in the spring of 1761 in the cabinet meeting on May 13, Bute positioned himself between Pitt and Newcastle, and used his support to control the decision of the cabinet. The cabinet met on May 13 to decide the content of the instructions to the British envoy to France, Mr. Stanley. Pitt and Newcastle clashed over the first point of instruction. Pitt wanted to conclude a separate peace with France before a general European peace congress. Pitt's desire led him to push for the inclusion in Stanley's

²⁴The Earl of Bute to the Duke of Bedford, July 12, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. II, pp. 31-32.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 33-34.

instructions of a declaration " . . .that if France would not agree to that we could go no farther."²⁶ Newcastle immediately objected to this declaration. In Newcastle's opinion " . . .insisting upon such a declaration from France would make them break off."²⁷ Before Pitt and Newcastle could become embroiled in an altercation on this point, Bute entered the discussion and settled the dispute. Bute's solution in the early stage of negotiations was aimed at appeasing both parties, but it also shows that, fundamentally, Bute agreed with Pitt's position. The Duke of Devonshire recounts Bute's proposal:

Lord Bute thought Mr. Pitt was in the right, that we should declare our intention and the manner in which we understood this separate negotiation, but he was not for insisting upon the same declaration from France.²⁸

Bute's proposal was supported by the Duke of Devonshire and William Pitt.²⁹ With this support Bute's proposal was easily passed by the cabinet. The compromising nature of Bute's proposal shows that he was not yet committed to either Pitt or Newcastle at this time, but was securing his only mentor - George III.

Bute's non-committal attitude was especially evident when the second point of Stanley's instructions was

²⁶Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 98.

²⁷Ibid., p. 98.

²⁸Ibid., p. 98.

²⁹Ibid., p. 98.

discussed in the same cabinet meeting on May 13, 1761. Pitt wanted the cabinet to specify how the British cabinet understood the uti possidetis as proposed by France. Bute quickly stated that " . . .it was too soon for him to give an opinion on so nice a point and that we must first hear what Monsieur Bussy said."³⁰ Pitt did not like the hesitancy of this position, but Bute was supported by both Newcastle and Devonshire.³¹ With their support, Bute's position was adopted by the cabinet. Devonshire recorded in his diary that: "All the Lords were against him [Pitt] except Lord Temple."³² This incident demonstrated the amount of support that Bute could muster in the cabinet. In his only conflict with Pitt over the peace negotiations before August, 1761, Bute had won. This victory illustrates two important facts. Firstly, Pitt's dominant position in making policy had been undermined. Secondly, Bute's support in cabinet was essential for either Pitt's or Newcastle's position to be adopted. Without Bute's support their positions would not be accepted in cabinet, and would not be reflected in the British peace proposals. This in turn reveals the power of the new monarch and his views on the direction of the peace negotiations.

Bute was able to maintain the appearance of neutrality

³⁰Ibid., p. 99.

³¹Ibid., p. 99

³²Ibid., p. 99.

between Pitt and Newcastle until the beginning of July, 1761. Pitt's position on the peace proposals had, until July, been supported by both Bute and the cabinet, but Bute's actions had left Newcastle unsure of which party Bute was supporting. His uncertainty about Bute's position is shown in the letters that he wrote to his ally on the peace, the Duke of Bedford. On July 2, 1761, Newcastle wrote that "His Lordship [Bute] seemed full of very great resentment of the behaviour of Mr. Pitt towards him."³³ However, he was unsure of Bute's attitude. Newcastle stated " . . . Lord Bute did not seem quite satisfied with us [Newcastle and Bedford]."³⁴ Bute's success in keeping Newcastle unsure of his position was further shown on July 6, 1761, when Newcastle wrote that before the council meeting he wishes to meet with Bute and Bedford to " . . . know what Lord Bute thinks upon the whole [the peace negotiations], that we may judge what part he will take."³⁵ These excerpts indicate that Newcastle was unsure of Bute's position on the peace and Bute's position towards Pitt and himself. Newcastle's desire for information regarding Bute's position highlighted his concern about Bute's role and its effect on his position.

³³The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford, July 2, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. II, pp. 19-20.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 19-20.

³⁵The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford, July 6, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. II, p. 22.

Newcastle's uncertainty about Bute ended in mid-July, 1761. Bute's continued support of Pitt's position and conversations between Bedford and Bute demonstrated unequivocally to Newcastle and Bedford that Bute had sided with Pitt. On July 11, 1761, Bedford in a conversation with Bute threatened not to come back to cabinet and that " . . . he was rather displeased with his Lordship [Bute] for yielding so much to him [Pitt]."³⁶ Bute responded to Bedford on the next day in a letter in which he made his position on the peace clear. Bute stated that he would accept the position advocated by Pitt in denying France the fisheries and for pressing France for an advantageous peace settlement for Britain.³⁷ Bute desired peace, but only " . . . a peace such as the bulk of the nation have a right to expect from such a triumphant war."³⁸ After this letter, Newcastle and Bedford knew that Bute supported Pitt in the peace negotiations.

This knowledge was extremely disconcerting for Newcastle, because if Pitt and Bute acted in concert against him, then Newcastle's political position was precarious. The Duke of Devonshire clearly saw Newcastle's problem. He summarized it as follows:

³⁶Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 99.

³⁷Earl of Bute to the Duke of Bedford, July 12, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol.II, pp. 31-34.

³⁸Ibid., p. 33.

That the Duke of Newcastle was much hurt and much agitated; that he saw his own situation so ticklish and so dangerous, that he did not know which way to turn himself. For that whether it was peace or war, his part was equally distressful. For if the majority of the Council were with him for peace, and Mr. Pitt did not approve the terms, and he, Lord Bute, would not decide against Mr. Pitt, in that case he should be attacked the next Session, and what would become of him, with Mr. Pitt against him, and perhaps his Lordship and of course the King? He should undoubtedly be undone.³⁹

With both Bute and Pitt acting together Newcastle lacked political room for manoeuvre, and he was losing the power struggle in the cabinet. While Newcastle might be able to gain majority support in the cabinet for his position, the alliance between Pitt and Bute would be too powerful to overcome. Pitt, the Great Commoner, could effectively sway the opinion of the House of Commons, and Bute with his ties to George III could control the King. This combination of control of Parliament and the King made Newcastle's political position tenuous. Newcastle's position was so precarious that Bute remarked to Devonshire that " . . . he should not be surprised to see him [Newcastle] quit the Treasury."⁴⁰ Newcastle, however, did not resign from the Treasury at that particular point in time.

With Bute's support, Pitt's position towards France prevailed in the cabinet and in the negotiations during the summer of 1761. Bedford and Newcastle were not pleased by

³⁹Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 99.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 100.

Bute's support of Pitt or the terms demanded of France. Their frustration, particularly Bedford's, exploded at the cabinet meeting on August 15, 1761. The cabinet met to discuss a letter Pitt was sending to France. Lord Hardwicke and the Lord President, Lord Granville, objected to the offensive nature of the letter.⁴¹ Pitt took offense at this suggestion and stated that " . . . he would not suffer an iota in it to be altered."⁴² This outburst by Pitt provoked the following response from Bedford:

The Duke of Bedford replied he did not know what made him so angry, but after what had fallen from him [Pitt] it was vain for him [Bedford] to think of attending Council any more, and went away.⁴³

Bedford's frustrations had finally come to the surface and he left the cabinet. This incident brought the power struggle between Pitt, Newcastle, and Bute to its climax, and forced a change in Bute's position on the peace terms.

Bedford's departure from the cabinet brought George III into the power struggle. George III wanted peace and, since Bedford was a leading proponent of peace, his departure from the cabinet concerned the King greatly. George III " . . . expressed his astonishment and concern . . ." about

⁴¹Ibid., p. 111.

⁴²Ibid., p. 111.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 111-112.

Bedford's actions to the Duke of Devonshire.⁴⁴ Devonshire went on to state that George III " . . . hoped you would be prevailed on to attend again."⁴⁵ Devonshire, who was Lord Chamberlain, then detailed to the King the position of the Newcastle-Bedford group on the peace proposals. According to Devonshire, George III agreed with this position " . . . and intimated as if many more of the council would be in that way of thinking."⁴⁶ This intimation by George suggests that the King would use his relationship with Bute to change the Earl's position on the peace terms. While there is no direct evidence showing that George III told Bute to change positions there are indications that he did. First, George disliked Pitt, whom he considered "mad"⁴⁷ because of his overbearing manner, and he therefore did not trust him. In view of these feelings, it would not be surprising if the King wanted Bute to side with Newcastle against Pitt. Second, George III ordered Devonshire to write another letter to Bedford the day before the next cabinet meeting on August 19, 1761. In this letter, Devonshire stated that Bute had changed his position.

⁴⁴The Duke of Devonshire to the Duke of Bedford, August 16, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. II, pp. 36-37.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁷George III to the Earl of Bute, September 19 ?, 1761, Romney Sedgwick, ed., Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, London, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1939, p. 63.

I have had much discourse with Lord Bute, and we shall not differ to-morrow; for whatever may have been his former opinion, you will find he will give it up and be with us, so that I do hope we shall be able to state in a clear and decisive manner the terms on which we will make peace.⁴⁸

This excerpt shows that in a period of three days Bute completely changed his position on the peace negotiations. It seems logical that the influence of George III on Bute caused by the King's concern for peace caused Bute's volte-face.

The effects of Bute's change of positions became apparent on August 19, 1761. On this day, the cabinet met to decide on new British proposals to France. Pitt wanted to break off negotiations with France if the boundaries of Louisiana were not settled to his satisfaction.⁴⁹ Both Newcastle and Devonshire opposed this action, and urged concessions including the granting of fishing rights and granting the island of St. Pierre as an abri.⁵⁰ Without Bute's support, Pitt's position was not adopted by the cabinet and the peace terms towards France became more conciliatory.

Without Bute's support Pitt was unable to persuade the cabinet to support his positions, and he was no longer able

⁴⁸The Duke of Devonshire to the Duke of Bedford, August 18, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. II, p. 42.

⁴⁹Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, p. 116.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 116.

to control the direction of policy. Pitt made one last attempt to regain control in the power struggle between himself, Newcastle, and Bute. Pitt had intercepted letters from the Spanish ambassadors, Grimaldi and De Fuentes, showing that Spain was planning to declare war on Great Britain. On October 2, 1761, Pitt brought these letters to the cabinet and urged immediate action against Spain and the Spanish treasure fleet. These proposals gained Pitt immediate opposition from the entire cabinet with the exception of Lord Temple. None of the ministers wanted to expand the war, especially Newcastle who did not know whether he could raise the money necessary for another campaign. Likewise Lord Anson and Ligonier, who were in charge of the navy and army respectively, questioned the wisdom of adding the strength of Spain to the French side.⁵¹ Pitt's proposal failed to gain support in the cabinet, and provoked the following action:

In the Council to-day Mr. P[itt] declared his resolution to resign; he did it in as calm a manner as he was able, and said that he would not continue a Minister of the King's without the direction of his affairs.⁵²

Without control over the direction of policy Pitt felt he

⁵¹Ibid., p. 138.

⁵²Mr. Jenkinson to Mr. Grenville, October 2, 1761, William James Smith, ed., The Grenville Papers: being The Correspondence of Richard Grenville Earl Temple, K. G., and the Right Hon: George Grenville, Their Friends and Contemporaries, Vol. I, New York, AMS Press, Inc., 1852 (reprinted 1970), p. 391.

had no choice but to resign, and three days later, on October 5, 1761, Pitt resigned as Secretary of State. Pitt's resignation left Bute and Newcastle as the victors in the power struggle between the three men.

In contrast to previous historical views of Pitt's influence in the cabinet during this period, Pitt was not in complete control of policy making in the British cabinet. He could not control the cabinet without support. Instead, Pitt was involved in a power struggle with Bute and Newcastle, especially the latter. This struggle occurred over the peace terms with France, because Pitt and Newcastle viewed the future of the British empire differently. Pitt wanted a large territorial empire and the destruction of French power, while Newcastle and Bedford worried that the empire was already too large and that Britain might be overextending itself. They were also concerned that Pitt's goals could upset the balance of power in Europe. These differences are indicative of the broader struggle of what Pitt's nationalistic goals represented and the narrower more traditional views of Newcastle and Bedford. In effect, the popular will as expressed by Pitt was stymied by government and his vision overwhelmed in these negotiations. However, in the longer term Pitt's territorial empire was adopted.

Bute's role in the power struggle was decisive, as it was necessary for both Pitt and Newcastle to gain his support. Whichever party had the support of Bute had

control of the policies adopted by the cabinet. When he supported Pitt, Newcastle and Bedford could not persuade the cabinet to adopt more conciliatory terms. When Bute switched his support to Newcastle, Pitt could no longer press for the Carthaginian terms he desired. Ultimately, it was the support of Bute that decided the position of the British cabinet, and by using his influence the Earl of Bute controlled British policy during the peace negotiations with France from May to September, 1761. As such, an understanding of the peace negotiations in 1761, must take into account the internal political situation in Britain. The internal politics of Britain had an important effect on the peace negotiations with France.

Chapter Three

Choiseul gains Control in France

The years 1759-61 saw important changes in Britain, and in the administrations of the Bourbon powers of France and Spain. In Spain, Charles III ascended the throne succeeding Ferdinand VI. Ferdinand had refused to enter into the Seven Years War, but Charles disliked the English for forcing him to stay out of the War of Austrian Succession, and was willing to listen to French overtures proposing an alliance against Britain. In France, a new first minister, the Duc de Choiseul, was gaining control over French policy. Choiseul's rise to power is important because for the first time since Cardinal Fleury in the years 1726 to 1743, France had a strong first minister. When Choiseul became first minister, he took control of the direction of French policy. He was able to follow the policies that he viewed as best for France. His program in foreign policy was twofold. Firstly, after 5 years of war France was exhausted, and needed peace. Realizing this Choiseul pursued peace negotiations with Britain from May to September, 1761. Secondly, Choiseul followed a traditional French foreign policy goal in attempting to ally with the other Bourbon power, Spain. He actively worked for this alliance beginning in 1760. These foreign policy goals of Choiseul had serious impact on the negotiations with Britain in 1761.

In the English language historiography of the

negotiations in 1761 between Britain and France very little attention is given to the events occurring in France. British historians like Basil Williams, H. W. V. Temperley, and Julian Corbett concentrate on the actions of William Pitt. The preoccupation with Pitt developed because the failure of the negotiations coincided with his defeat in the British cabinet and his subsequent resignation as minister in October, 1761. French historians have not given very much attention to this topic at all, with one exception. Alfred Bourguet in his 1906 monograph Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnole did examine in detail the policies and actions of Choiseul during the time of the peace negotiations in 1761. Bourguet, however, did not analyze Choiseul's actions within the context of the negotiations between Britain and France. Both British and French historians have failed to give an accurate portrait of the negotiations because they do not show the negotiations from both sides. Their analyses have always been one dimensional with one exception. Zenab Esmat Rashed in The Peace of Paris 1763 attempted to correct this imbalance by giving equal treatment to both Britain and France. Her analysis of the situation in France, however, needs to be revised because she failed to look at events and forces at work within France.

Thus, only Rashed and Bourguet have offered a detailed analysis of the actions and desires of Choiseul during the

period of the negotiations in 1761. However, both historians came to completely different conclusions about the motives and outcome. In Bourguet's opinion, Choiseul wanted the alliance with Spain and all his actions were directed to this end.⁵³ In contrast, Rashed views Choiseul as desiring peace and the Spanish alliance helped to make that peace impossible.⁵⁴ Both historians' views need to be reexamined as they fail to analyze the situation within Versailles. G. P. Gooch stated that "France was governed by a triumvirate - the King, Choiseul and Mme de Pompadour."⁵⁵ The point that both Bourguet and Rashed missed was that Choiseul did not and could not operate in a political vacuum. The actions, inactions, and wishes of Louis XV and Mme de Pompadour during the negotiations must be understood. Choiseul owed his position to the King and de Pompadour. He could not ignore pressure and directives from these two powerful figures. Bourguet and Rashed also fail to see that some of Choiseul's policy changes were the result of his continuing to consolidate control over French policy as more ministerial responsibilities came under his jurisdiction. In sum, Bourguet and Rashed's analyses are incomplete because they fail to take into account the effect internal

⁵³Alfred Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnole, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1906.

⁵⁴Rashed, The Peace of Paris 1763.

⁵⁵G. P. Gooch, Louis XV: The Monarchy in Decline, London, Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1956, p. 180.

developments at the French Court exerted on Choiseul and his policy.

Louis XV was viewed as being a weak and submissive king by contemporaries. In his memoirs, the Duc de Choiseul described the King as follows:

Though jealous of his authority he is weakly submissive to his Ministers. He displays the most repulsive indifference to every sort of business and all kinds of people. His vanity makes him think it is enough to maintain his authority that from time to time he dismisses Ministers in whom he has shown the fullest confidence by always following their advice.⁵⁶

The Duc de Croy showed a gentler image of the King, but it too revealed Louis XV as weak:

Possessing a thousand good qualities he lacked the resolution to turn them to account. Though he devoted much time to his pleasures, he did a good deal of work. Yet his Ministers easily influenced him and he left almost everything to their judgment. Since there was no First Minister, each was supreme in his own department.⁵⁷

These two examples illustrate the common, unflattering characterization of Louis by contemporaries. Such views make it easy for an historian to dismiss the role of Louis in the outcome of the negotiations with Britain. Despite Choiseul's assertion that the King was indifferent to all sorts of business, there was one area in which Louis XV was keenly interested. That area was diplomacy and foreign policy.

⁵⁶Duc de Choiseul, Memoirs, as cited in Gooch, Louis XV, p. 111.

⁵⁷The Duc de Croy on Louis XV, as cited in Gooch, Louis XV, p.113.

Louis XV was interested in two particular areas of diplomacy and foreign policy. The first area concerned Poland. Louis wanted to see the installation of a pro-French king on the Polish throne. His second area of interest was Britain, and gaining peace for France. Louis conducted secret diplomacy behind the backs of his ministers in both areas. His diplomacy was conducted by agents whom he recruited himself. In February 1760, Louis wanted peace with Britain and he sent the Comte de St. Germain to The Hague to establish contact with the British to start negotiations. Choiseul at the time did not wish negotiations with Britain, and he was informed of St. Germain's contact attempts by the Austrian ambassador at The Hague.⁵⁸ Choiseul decided to deal with the incident in the meeting of the Council. At this council meeting, Choiseul informed the members that he had ordered the French representative in The Hague to stop St. Germain's activities, and then he stated: "I have not sought the King's orders because I feel sure that no one here would have dared to negotiate for peace without my knowledge."⁵⁹ The discovery of his actions by Choiseul made Louis nervous about the potential discovery of his diplomacy regarding Poland. As a result, Louis stopped his secret diplomacy regarding Britain until after the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

⁵⁸Gooch, Louis XV, p. 212.

⁵⁹As cited in Gooch, Louis XV, p.213.

He, therefore, did not play an important role in the formation of Choiseul's peace proposals in the negotiations with Britain in 1761.

Louis XV did, however, make an important decision which effected the course of negotiations with Britain. On July 24, 1761, the French envoy to London, M. Bussy, presented Pitt with the next series of French proposals concerning the peace. In addition to these proposals, Bussy also presented the British minister with a list of Spanish grievances with Britain. Pitt was highly insulted by this development and he became insulting in his attitude towards Bussy. The net result of this incident was to further strain Anglo-Spanish relations, and to threaten the peace negotiations between Britain and France.

Bussy had presented the Spanish demands on the direct order of Louis XV and with the advice of the Spanish ambassador in London, M. de Fuentes. Choiseul objected to the decision, but Louis XV wanted to please Charles III, and Choiseul's opposition was overruled.⁶⁰ In a letter to the French ambassador in Madrid, Choiseul made no secret of his belief that this move would bring about the end of the peace negotiations and the continuation of the war.

Il est certain que si les deux mémoires (relatifs aux affaires de la France et de l'Espagne) sont remis en même temps à la cour de Londres, c'est avec encore plus de fondement que M. Wall pourra dire que le Rubicon est

⁶⁰Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 223.

enfin passé.⁶¹

The negotiations with Britain lasted another month. While the positions during the negotiations were those developed by Choiseul and not the King, Louis XV's decision concerning the list of Spanish grievances had an important impact on the tone and outcome of the negotiations. The inclusion of Spanish grievances insulted Britain, and led Pitt to believe that France was not serious about peace and that Spain was preparing for war. Pitt's beliefs hampered further progress in the negotiations.

Mme de Pompadour also had a keen interest in diplomacy and foreign policy. In 1756, she had played a role in the completion of a reversal of European alliances which saw France allied to Austria, and Britain allied to Prussia. It was through Mme de Pompadour that the Austrians approached France for the possibility of an alliance. This alliance was quickly realized after Frederick the Great's alliance with Britain was discovered. In 1758, the minister in charge of foreign affairs in France was the Abbe de Bernis. Even though he was a favourite of Mme de Pompadour and the King, he was dismissed when he became defeatist and wanted to end the alliance with Austria. To replace Bernis, the King appointed another favourite of Mme de Pompadour, the Comte de Stainville. Stainville was the French ambassador

⁶¹Choiseul to Ossun, July 1761, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 222.

to Vienna, and he was committed to the alliance with Austria. He was recalled from Vienna, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and promoted to the title of the Duc de Choiseul, in the fall of 1758.

Mme de Pompadour was supportive of Choiseul and did not seek to undermine his authority. This support was evident during the negotiations with Britain in 1761, even though she personally believed that the British were not serious about the negotiations:

Nous avons d'abord jugé par les propositions extravagantes de mr. Stanley que la cour de Londres n'étoit pas sérieusement disposée à la paix; et vos dépêches le confirmant. Mr. Pitt est un chicaneur qui ne traite pas de bonne foi: il joue la comédie.⁶²

Even with these misgivings, de Pompadour supported Choiseul's negotiations for peace. In the same letter, she expressed the opinion that peace was needed by both nations and that such a peace would do nothing but enrich the nation.⁶³

Mme de Pompadour showed continued support for Choiseul in his other ventures, including the Pacte de Famille with Spain. Her enthusiastic support for the Pacte de Famille was clearly expressed in a letter to one of her favourites, Marshal Soubise:

Quoi qu'il en soit, on a enfin mis la dernière main à

⁶²Mme de Pompadour to M. Bussy, 1761, Lettres de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, Vol. I, London, G. Owen and T, Cadwell, 1771, p. 175.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 176-179.

ce qu'on appelle un chef- d'œuvre de politique, au pacte de famille; et ce que la France n'auroit osé demander ni espérer dans les tems[sic] les plus heureux elle l'a obtenu au milieu de ses disgraces. Les françois sont à présent espagnols et les espagnols sont françois: C'est surtout à présent qu'il n'y a plus de piranées, comme disoit Louis XIV.⁶⁴

By the time the alliance with Spain had been signed (August 15, 1761) the negotiations with Britain were in serious trouble and the war threatened to continue. The Spanish alliance gave France renewed hope for a reversal in the fortunes of the war if the conflict were to continue. Mme de Pompadour viewed this part of the alliance as follows:

On espère beaucoup de ce coup d'état, et les anglois n'en seront pas contens[sic]: ils seront obligés de séparer leur forces pour faire tête aux espagnols, qui ont une très-belle flotte, une bonne armée et de bons officiers.⁶⁵

These views mirror those of Choiseul at the time on the question of the value of the Spanish alliance.

The examples of Mme de Pompadour's views on both the peace negotiations and the Spanish alliance illustrate the support she gave to the policies of Choiseul. While the support did not directly affect policy decisions, it helped Choiseul push forward his aggressive policies. By having the support of de Pompadour and the King, Choiseul was able to conduct peace negotiations with Britain, and ignore the pressures of both the pro-Austrian faction led by the

⁶⁴Mme de Pompadour to Marshal de Soubise, n.d., 1761, Lettres de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, Vol. II, pp. 5-6.

⁶⁵Ibid, p. 6.

Austrian ambassador and the pro-war faction led by the Spanish ambassador, Grimaldi. The support of both Louis XV and Mme de Pompadour insulated Choiseul from these pressures and allowed him to pursue the policy of his own choosing.

One of the main components of Choiseul's foreign policy was to entice Spain into an alliance. He believed that such an alliance would either force Britain to come to peace terms or increase the ability of France to fight the war.⁶⁶ Charles III had many grievances against the British, and he sent M. de Fuentes to London to negotiate with Pitt. In September, 1760, two events occurred which made Choiseul begin to press Spain about the possibility of an alliance. The first event was the death of the Spanish queen. Choiseul saw in her death an opportunity to create closer ties between Madrid and Versailles. On September 30, 1760, Choiseul issued the following instructions to the French ambassador in Madrid, Ossun:

Si S. M. se remarie, comme il est vraisemblable, elle ne peut épouser qu'une princesse de France, une archiduchesse, une portugaise, une bavarroise ou une savoyarde.

Il n'est pas douteux que l'intérêt du royaume demande que nous fassions tout ce qui est en nous pour que la choix du Roi d'Espagne tombe sur une princess de France. Le roi vous autorise à faire à cet égard les demarches que vous jugerez les plus convenables mais, en meme temps, S. M. vous prescit bien positivement

⁶⁶Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 142.

d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait compromettre sa dignité.⁶⁷

A royal marriage would have aided Choiseul's goal of gaining an alliance with Spain. Unfortunately for both parties concerned, Charles III declared that he was not going to remarry, so the efforts of Choiseul and Ossun failed in this area.

The second event aiding in the possibility of a Franco-Spanish alliance occurred when Choiseul learned that the negotiations between Fuentes and Pitt were not proceeding very well. Choiseul and Ossun used this information to begin to press the Spanish about an alliance. The overtures were met unenthusiastically by the Spanish foreign minister Wall. The response provoked Choiseul to write to Ossun about the possibility of getting Wall replaced.

Vous pouvez à présent, Mr, selon les circonstances marquer plus utilement au roi ou a la reine-mere l'utilité de l'éloignement du duc d'Albe et surtout de M. Wall, ainsi que l'interet de l'Espagne de rétablir M. de la Ensenada mais je n'ai pas besoin de vous marquer de ne faire sur se point que les démarches que vous croirez moralement devoir réussir et de tâter ces démarches par des insinuations.⁶⁸

The attempts to remove Wall failed, but the death of the queen, who was Wall's chief supporter, and the continued failure of Fuentes' negotiations with Pitt, persuaded

⁶⁷Choiseul to Ossun, September 30, 1760, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, pp. 139-140.

⁶⁸Choiseul to Ossun, n.d., 1760, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et l'Alliance Espagnol, p. 145.

Charles III to listen to the French overtures.

To gain the confidence of the Spanish court, Choiseul and Louis XV resolved to keep Charles III informed of French policy positions. To this effect Choiseul wrote Ossun the following:

Le roi désire que vous communiquiez le tout au roi d'Espagne en lui faisant sentir le mérite de cette confiance. Vous prierez S. M. C. de garder le plus grande secret. Les cours de Vienne et de Petersbourg doivent savoir que les intérêts du roi d'Espagne sont les mêmes que ceux du roi. . .⁶⁹

The French decision increased the communication between Madrid and Versailles, and allowed Choiseul to express to Charles III what he could hope to gain by an alliance with France.

Choiseul showed Charles III that Spain was threatened by the victories of Britain over France. He stated: "L'Espagne restera seule en butte aux projects ambitieux de l'Angleterre."⁷⁰ Choiseul concluded his letter by stating that a Franco-Spanish alliance would "maintenir la gloire de la maison de Bourbon et l'équilibre du pouvoir sur mer et en Amérique."⁷¹ Without Spanish help, Choiseul believed that Britain would control maritime trade and therefore could dictate the terms of trade to the rest of Europe. In

⁶⁹Choiseul to Ossun, n.d., 1761, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 158.

⁷⁰Choiseul to Charles III, November 14, 1761, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 159.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 160.

Choiseul's eyes only Spanish intervention could restore the balance of power on the oceans.

Choiseul was so anxious for Spain to enter the war that he proposed a military expedition to be undertaken by Spain:

Les maux étant extrêmes, il n'y a que les remèdes violents qui puissent les guerir. Celui que je vais proposer porterait à l'Angleterre un coup sûr. C'est l'attaque du Portugal. Ce royaume peut être considéré comme une colonie anglaise. . . . En partant de ces principes et de la nécessité de faire une diversion considérable aux projets de l'Angleterre nous proposons, dans le plus grand secret, à S. M. C. de nous confier si elle veut contribuer à la conquête du Portugal et du Brésil et au dessein d'anéantir entièrement cette puissance et de la réunir au domaine d'Espagne.⁷²

These letters indicate that Choiseul wanted an immediate offensive alliance with Spain. Attaining this goal dominated Choiseul's foreign policy in 1760. Choiseul did not want to make peace with Britain. Instead, with Spain's help, he hoped to defeat Britain. Unfortunately for Choiseul, at the end of November and the beginning of December, 1760, he was informed that his goal could not yet be realised. Charles III informed Ossun that he was willing to go to war against Britain, but that he was not yet ready.⁷³ Charles stated that his navy and army were not well enough equipped or trained, but he hoped to be ready in

⁷²Choiseul to Charles III, n.d., 1760, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 161.

⁷³Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 165.

six to twelve months.⁷⁴ In the meantime, close contacts between France and Spain continued.

On January 25, 1761, an internal event in France forced Choiseul to alter his position on foreign policy. The minister of war, the Marshal of Belle-Isle, died. To replace him, Louis XV chose Choiseul. As E. F. J. Barbier, a lawyer for the Parisienne Parliament, noted:

. . . le roi a ordonné à M. le duc de Choiseul de se charger de département de la guerre conjointement avec celui des affaires étrangères, jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.⁷⁵

This appointment gave Choiseul control over the French army and navy. Choiseul's examination of the armed forces convinced him that France needed peace. The French army had seen limited success in the war in Germany. The crushing defeat at Rossbach, in 1757, had severely demoralised the army. In addition, the army was commanded by incompetent generals who were consistently beaten by the numerically inferior British-Hanoverian forces under Ferdinand. Likewise, the French navy was in a shambles, especially after the defeats at Quiberon Bay and Lagos in 1759. These conditions combined with the losses in America and India convinced Choiseul that France needed peace. He wanted to complete reforms in the military so France could challenge

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 165-166.

⁷⁵E. J. F. Barbier, Journal Historique et Anecdote du regne de Louis XV, Tome IV, Paris, Jules Renouard et C, 1856, p. 375.

Britain at a later date. As subsequent events would show, these reforms would be completed by 1770 and would help France defeat Britain in the War of American Independence.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Choiseul's assumption of the ministry of war changed his determination to prosecute the war. The change of policy is clearly shown in a letter that Choiseul wrote to Ossun shortly after assuming his new responsibilities:

Comme cette guerre vraisemblablement serait purement maritime, si le roi d'Espagne veut consolider son union avec la France par un nouveau traité de commerce et défensif entre les deux couronnes, le roi portera tous ses efforts à la paix dans la partie maritime, afin d'être utile à un allié qui lui est aussi cher que l'est Sa Majesté Catholique.⁷⁷

This letter demonstrates that Choiseul was now only interested in a commercial and defensive alliance with Spain.

While Choiseul realized France needed peace, Spain sent a new ambassador to Versailles, the Marquis de Grimaldi. Grimaldi immediately surprised Choiseul with a new proposal. On February 15, 1761, Grimaldi offered Choiseul the alliance he desired two months earlier- an offensive alliance against Britain. Choiseul thought that Grimaldi overstepped his authority and he sent a counteroffer to Madrid on March 3, 1761. Grimaldi had, in fact, been presumptuous for Charles

⁷⁶Gooch, Louis XV, pp. 191-192.

⁷⁷Choiseul to Ossun, January 27, 1761, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 180.

III was not yet ready for that kind of alliance. Nevertheless, serious negotiations for an alliance began. The treaty was signed on August 15, 1761. In the agreement, France and Spain agreed that if France had not concluded a peace by May, 1762, Spain would enter the war.

While the negotiations with Spain were taking place, Choiseul began peace negotiations with Britain to try to gain a reasonable peace for France. Several issues on the French side contributed to the failure of the negotiations in 1761. Firstly, the ongoing discussions with Spain produced a distrust of French intentions in the mind of Pitt. Secondly, the decision by Louis XV to include Spanish grievances with the French proposals, reinforced British distrust of Bourbon intentions. Finally, neither Pitt nor Choiseul were willing to change their positions on the Newfoundland fisheries. These factors led the British to doubt the sincerity of Choiseul in the negotiations.

Choiseul has been labelled as being duplicitous for being involved in separate negotiations with Spain and Britain. An examination of his policies, however, reveals a consistency in his approach. In following an established French foreign policy position, Choiseul always sought an alliance with Spain. His emphasis and desire for an offensive treaty changed when he assumed the responsibility of the war ministry in January, 1761. The assumption of this office allowed Choiseul to examine the status of the

French armed forces and finances. Choiseul was convinced by the examination that France needed peace, and he quickly started negotiations with Britain. Even after the Pacte de Famille with Spain had been signed Choiseul continued to negotiate for peace. The Spanish alliance did not make peace impossible. Under the terms of the treaty, Choiseul had until May, 1762 to conclude peace before Spain would enter the war. Therefore, an examination of Choiseul's policies, and the influence of internal events of the French Court on his policies, reveals that Choiseul held a traditional view of French foreign policy. It also reveals that he adjusted his policies when faced with changing internal events requiring a change in priorities. These factors are ignored in the earlier accounts of the negotiations of 1761.

Chapter Four
The Newfoundland Fisheries:
Finance, Naval Power, and the Balance of Power

Part I

With the benefit of hindsight historians have viewed the Peace of Paris, signed in April, 1763, as the end of an era in the relations between Great Britain and France. With the end of the Seven Years War, it appears that the struggles for empire between Britain and France, which had been ongoing since 1689, had concluded with a British victory. With France losing Canada and her influence in India reduced, historians have assumed the complete victory for Britain and the impotence of France. For example, in the Cambridge History of the British Empire the years leading up to 1763 concentrate on the British rivalry with France and to a lesser extent with the British rivalry with Spain. However, after 1763, the main emphasis is on the internal workings of the British empire leading up to the American Revolutionary War.⁷⁸ France is no longer important in imperial historiography because of the overwhelming nature of the British victory.

This interpretation of the events relies on two main assumptions. The first assumption is that the peace settlement was so different in manner, form, and substance from the treaties earlier in the century that the rivalry

⁷⁸J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton, and E. A. Benians, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1929.

between Britain and France could not be renewed. This assumption is incorrect because the negotiators at the Peace of Paris, Bedford and Choiseul, were proponents of the traditional European diplomatic practices and concerns. By taking traditional European diplomatic concerns into account, both France and Britain in earlier negotiations, at Utrecht (1713) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), and in the negotiations in 1763 maintained positions designed to upkeep the balance of power in the European and colonial spheres.

This kind of negotiating was unacceptable to Pitt. For Pitt, who was regarded as the leader of a rising mood of English nationalism and territorial expansionism, nothing less than the complete destruction of French military, economic, and colonial power would be satisfactory.⁷⁹ Aware of the significance of the British victories, Pitt strove to end the conflicts with France by negotiating a peace so that France could never challenge British power again. The negotiations in 1761 were Pitt's attempt at gaining these objectives.

Pitt's goals were opposed by the Duc de Choiseul and the Newcastle-Bedford group within the British cabinet. Choiseul opposed Pitt because he believed that submitting to the British demands would make France a second rate power with the destruction of French naval power. This degradation of French power was something that Choiseul

⁷⁹Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism, pp. 169-172.

could not accept. Choiseul stated that if he did submit to Pitt's terms "that he should be pulled to pieces in the streets of Paris."⁸⁰ The complete destruction of French naval and colonial power was also not an acceptable objective for the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Bedford. Both of these cabinet ministers represented the traditional European diplomatic concerns and, as has already been shown, they opposed Pitt on this issue within cabinet. They feared that the complete defeat and humiliation of France would bring disaster to Britain. Newcastle and Bedford thought that Pitt's objectives would upset the balance of power in Europe, and that this event would lead to the isolation of Britain and the overreaching of British resources. For the Newcastle-Bedford group maintaining the balance of power meant keeping the balance established in Europe after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Pitt refers to the view held by this group when he stated in the House of Commons:

It has been exultingly said, that the present German war had overturned that balance of power which we had fought for in the reigns of king William and queen Mary [the treaty of Utrecht].⁸¹

To Pitt, attempting to maintain the system established by Utrecht was not possible. In his opinion that system and

⁸⁰The Earl of Hardwicke to Lord Royston, August 15, 1761, Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, p. 321.

⁸¹Pitt's speech to the House of Commons, December 9, 1762, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vol. XV, London, T. C. Hansard, 1813, col. 1268.

balance of power had been destroyed prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years War.

. . . that that balance was overturned long before this war had existence. It was overturned by the Dutch before the end of the late war. . . Since the time of the grand confederacy against France took place, the military power of the Dutch by sea and land has been in a manner extinguished, while another power, then scarcely thought of in Europe, has started up - that of Russia, and moves in its own orbit extrinsically of all other system; but gravitating to each according to the mass of attracting interest it contains. Another power, against all human expectation, was raised in Europe in the House of Brandenburg; and the rapid successes of his Prussian majesty prove him to be born to be the natural asserter of Germanic liberties against the House of Austria.⁸²

With the rise of Russia and Prussia, and the decline of Holland, Pitt viewed the balance of power established by Utrecht as already having been upset. Therefore, his desire to crush France and his belief that the balance of power that Newcastle and Bedford tried to maintain was no longer valid, caused Pitt to pursue his nationalistic goals during the peace negotiations with France. His loss of control over policy and his inability to achieve his goals due to the opposition of Choiseul and the Newcastle-Bedford group prompted Pitt to resign in October, 1761.

The defeat and resignation of Pitt allowed Bedford to negotiate the peace in 1762-63 in the traditional manner which kept European diplomatic concerns in mind.

Pitt and his negotiations in 1761 represented the new nationalistic way of thinking with regards to the conflicts

⁸²Ibid., cols. 1268-1269.

with France. The failure of the negotiations and Pitt's fall from power ensured that the Peace of Paris would be negotiated by men who followed the traditional diplomatic policies relating to the balance of power. The course of the negotiations in 1761 reveal the differences in views between English nationalists like Pitt and the European traditionalists represented by Newcastle, Bedford, and Choiseul. These differences are especially evident in the areas of finance, naval power, and the balance of power in Europe and the colonies. Furthermore, the negotiations and differences are important in showing the beginning of the conflict between nationalism and traditional European cosmopolitan views.

Even though Choiseul followed an established French foreign policy, he demonstrated why the Peace of Paris was not the end of the Anglo-French rivalry. Lending support to Pitt's view that a lasting peace could only be achieved with the total victory of one side, Choiseul regarded the Peace of Paris as a truce in the ongoing struggle with Britain. This view destroyed the second assumption which sought to put an end to Anglo-French rivalry in 1763, namely that after 1763 France could or would not challenge Britain. This assumption proved erroneous when Choiseul immediately embarked on policies that would enable France to gain revenge in the next war. Choiseul explained the situation to Louis XV as follows:

England is the avowed enemy of your power, of your state, and so she will ever remain. Her grasping commercial instincts, her arrogance, her jealousy of your power, ought to warn you that many years must elapse before we can make a lasting peace with such a country.⁸³

To prepare France for the next war, Choiseul began reforms in finances and the army, and especially in the rebuilding, and supplying of the navy. He also encouraged similar reforms in Spain. French agents sent by both Choiseul and Louis XV scouted for potential invasion sites and reported on the state of British industry.⁸⁴ Choiseul's goal was the reversal of the Peace of Paris. While this goal was not accomplished, the reforms of Choiseul helped the French to defeat the British in the American Revolutionary War.

The issue forcing Britain and France to begin peace negotiations in 1761 was money. Proper financial and economic planning were essential to the waging of a long war. By 1761 both Britain and France were having financial difficulties. Both sides realized that these difficulties could have a serious impact on their ability to wage the war. Without money, armies and navies could not be raised or maintained. Also, financial difficulties forced the government to raise more and more money from its subjects, and increased taxes led to increased war weariness among the

⁸³As cited in Arthur Hassall, The Balance of Power 1715-1789, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1907, p. 321.

⁸⁴David B. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 61.

population. This war weariness decreased the popular support for the war effort and further hampered the government's ability to continue to fight effectively. Eventually the financial situation in a long war had the potential to deteriorate to the point where the nation could no longer afford to fight. In the words of historian John Brewer: "Most eighteenth-century wars ended when the protagonists neared financial exhaustion."⁸⁵ In 1761, Britain and, especially, France were nearing financial exhaustion.

The British financial system was generally able to support the war effort better than the French system. Britain had a general taxation system. This system included indirect taxes such as excise duties on a few basic items and custom duties on incoming products. The system also included a land tax with no privileged exemptions.⁸⁶ The system helped Britain in times of war because most of it was either hidden or indirect thereby keeping most of the public unaware of the amount of taxes. Furthermore, the comparatively light burden of direct taxation increased the desirability to save among the wealthy and this saving gave a greater reserve of taxable wealth in wartime (for

⁸⁵John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783, London, Unwin Hyman Ltd, 1989, p. 122.

⁸⁶Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, Inc., p. 79.

increases in land taxes).⁸⁷ With a greater reserve of taxable wealth this taxation system allowed the British population to better support the war effort. Finally, Britain had a higher per capita income than France, and an easier financial market. These factors allowed Britain to raise more money than France. The indirect nature of taxation (direct income tax was not introduced until 1799) combined with Parliamentary responsibility for the management of debts also allowed the British public to support the war effort with greater enthusiasm.

Britain's system of managing debts also gave Britain an advantage in wartime. The management of debts is important for the fighting of eighteenth century wars. As Paul Kennedy states: ". . . almost three-quarters of the extra finance raised to support the additional wartime expenditures came from loans."⁸⁸ In 1694, the Bank of England was created, in part, to attempt to regularize the national debt. The regularization combined with the British government's implementing regular repayments on both the interest and the principal of loans gave the British government a good credit rating throughout Europe. The rating allowed Britain to raise large sums of money in loans at low interest rates. For example, during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the British government was

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 80.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 80.

negotiating large loans at 3 or 4 percent interest.⁸⁹

Despite the advantages of the British system, a lengthy war would eventually defeat its capacity to continue the conflict. By 1761 after 5 years of war, the British economy was beginning to feel the detrimental effects of the war.

The Seven Years War produced a great strain on the finances of Britain. From 1756 to 1763, the national debt rose from 74 million pounds to 133 million pounds.⁹⁰ This debt included the over 60 million pounds raised in loans by the British government.⁹¹ Even though these figures show the financial situation in 1763 and not 1761, the figures are useful in demonstrating the financial pressure that the British government was under in 1761. In addition, the impact of the debt of 60 million pound is further shown when the total national income of Britain in 1760 is shown to have only been 69.4 million pounds.⁹² By 1761, Britain was beginning to experience financial difficulties as the high debt of the government made it difficult for the Treasury to raise new loans to continue the war. To make matters worse for the British, both Spain and France were aware of the British financial problems. For example, the Count de Fuentes analyzed the situation as follows:

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 81.

⁹⁰Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 114.

⁹¹Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 81.

⁹²Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 41.

Your excellency understands the reason; and I am fully persuaded, when there is at Paris no appearance or talk of a congress, stocks will fall much more than they have rose, the difficulty of getting money will increase, and interest will be higher; England will be the first to desire a congress . . .⁹³

The importance of this view shows that it was not only the British government that was beginning to have difficulty raising loans. The debt problem had reached proportions that individual investors were also having difficulty raising money. This difficulty further increased the pressure on the British government to end the war.

That the French also fully understood the British financial picture in 1761 is shown in the following passage from a letter by Mme de Pompadour to M. Bussy.

On ne doute cependant pas ici que dans le fonds ils n'en aient presque autant besoin que nous. Leur dette est immense et augmente tous les jours; les soldats et les matelots commencent à leur manquer; et je ne sais pas si leur crédit, qui est leur seul soutien, pourra se soutenir encore longtemps[sic]. A proprement parler nos guerres avec cette nation ne sont que des guerres des marchands, et n'en sont que plus difficiles à terminer, parce que l'esprit de commerce ne veut point de rival.⁹⁴

That the French knew of the British financial problems gave Choiseul an advantage during the peace negotiations. He could hold out for better terms in the hope that financial pressures would force Britain to conclude a conciliatory

⁹³The Count De Fuentes to the Marquis Grimaldi, March 17, 1761, Taylor and Pringle, Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol.II, p. 98.

⁹⁴Mme de Pompadour to M. Bussy, 1761, Lettres de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, Vol.I, p. 176.

peace treaty.

The financial burden which the war had placed on Britain was also readily apparent to the British ministers, particularly Newcastle. The understanding of these financial problems were part of the reasons that the cabinet decided to pursue peace negotiations with France in 1761. Newcastle was responsible for raising the money so that prosecution of the war could continue, and he was acutely aware of the serious nature of the financial problems faced by Britain. This awareness made Newcastle eager for peace, and his financial concerns also led him to oppose Pitt's terms for peace with France. Newcastle was convinced that Pitt's terms would lead to a resumption of hostilities with France. As recorded by the Duke of Devonshire, Newcastle was unsure that he would be able to raise the funds necessary to continue the war:

On the other hand, if he [Newcastle] was overruled and warlike measures were to be pursued, the great burthen would fall upon him, as he was to raise the money. It was the opinion of moneyed men in the City that few people would risk much in a new subscription credit, being hurt by the many bankruptcies. Sir Joshua Vanneck was of the opinion that very little was to be expected from abroad, they having already laid out all their spare money. That considering how much the stocks would fall and other circumstances, it would be impossible for him to execute his office with credit to himself . . .⁹⁵

In sharp contrast to Newcastle, Pitt was not as worried about the finances. Pitt believed the successes in the

⁹⁵Brown and Schweizer, The Devonshire Diary, pp. 99-100.

colonial war would increase the potential for British commerce. For this reason Pitt was determined to prosecute the war, if he could not gain the terms he wanted. He stated that if he was forced to sign a treaty without the exclusive right of the Newfoundland fishery: ". . . he should be sorry that he had ever got again the use of his right hand."⁹⁶ In addition, Pitt knew French finances were in worse condition than Britain's, and he was determined to bring about a total victory for Britain. To this end, Pitt continued military operations during the negotiations (the expedition against Belleisle in the summer of 1761). These operations, while convincing the French that Britain was not serious about negotiating for peace, also increased the financial pressure on Newcastle. Despite the pressure on Newcastle, Pitt continued to discuss further military operations and began to plan for the expansion of the war to destroy not only the Bourbon power of France but of Spain as well.

In September - October, 1761, Pitt pushed the British cabinet to declare war on Spain. This action would have further increased the financial demands to fight the war. However, Pitt sought in one move to damage the economy of Spain and to help the economic situation in Britain. Pitt urged that Britain attack and capture the Spanish treasure

⁹⁶The Duke of Newcastle to the Earl of Hardwicke, April 17, 1761, Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, p. 316.

fleet. The capture of the Spanish treasure fleet would have added much needed cash to the British Treasury. Overall, however, Pitt was determined to prosecute a total war and bring about a Carthaginian peace. Even the financial problems failed to persuade Pitt to abandon his determination to gain the terms he wanted. Instead, he sought the economic destruction of Britain's enemies, and he knew that France could not effectively continue the war. With this knowledge, he sought to gain the terms which he felt that Britain deserved and destroy the power of the Bourbon powers, France and Spain. Pitt believed that only with this goal accomplished would a lasting peace be possible.

Part II

If the Seven Years War put severe financial strain on Britain, the chief victor in the conflict, the war had a devastating effect on French finances, and overall France was in a worse financial position than Britain. French finances were not as well systematized as they were in Britain. Unfortunately, for the modern scholar, finding accurate financial figures for France during this time period is difficult for two reasons. First, many of the documents were destroyed during the revolutionary periods

from 1791 and 1871.⁹⁷ Second, the accounting procedures used were inaccurate and complicated.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, by the end of the war France was facing a post war debt of 2,000,000,000 livres.⁹⁹ Part of the French problem was in the collection of taxes under the Ancien Regime. Under this system collection of taxes was managed by different levels within the country. Municipal governments, the church, provincial estates and tax farmers all collected money and advanced funds to the government. Before the government collected the taxes all of the individual collectors took his portions of the funds.¹⁰⁰ This system was inherently corrupt and it denied the government the full value of the funds collected. Furthermore, the higher echelons of French society gained tax exemptions. The exemptions combined with the corrupt nature of the system produced resentments among the populace towards the government. Under the increased pressures of wartime, the populace became increasingly hostile to the war.

Another problem for the French government was in gaining of loans. Unlike the British, the French because of internal opposition did not develop a national bank to

⁹⁷Lee Kennett, The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration, Durham, Duke University Press, 1967, p. 88.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 88.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 93.

¹⁰⁰Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 82.

regularize the national debt. Instead, throughout the eighteenth century, the French government resorted to more drastic measures to help with their debt problem. These measures included currency revaluations, and partial repudiations of debts.¹⁰¹ These actions gave France a bad credit rating in Europe. The poor credit rating further hampered the French war effort by forcing the French government to accept loans at high rates, some rates as high as 10 to 11.5 percent.¹⁰² Prior to 1760, the French credit rating was so bad that when Louis XV asked Spain for a loan of 30,000,000 livres, he was refused. The financial situation deteriorated to the point, in 1760, where Louis sent his silver to the mint, and urged the same action on his courtiers. It was this state of financial affairs that Choiseul inherited when he took control of the direction of the French war effort.

The strain of the war brought France to the brink of bankruptcy. The state of the French finances continued to deteriorate to such desperate levels that an attempt was made to secretly gain a loan in Britain in 1761. By 1761, Choiseul realized that France was left with two choices. The first choice was to find a quick end to the war. Such an outcome would allow France time to recover financially,

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁰²Kennett, The French Armies in The Seven Years' War, pp. 93-94. The financial information given in the rest of this section is indebted to this work.

and militarily. To achieve this goal Choiseul began the peace negotiations with Britain, and began reforms in French finances and in the French military. If Choiseul could not bring about peace then the second choice available to France was to find a new ally to help in the fight against Britain. A new ally would give France new avenues for potential credit, and would force Britain to divert forces to new areas. Choiseul hoped to persuade the Spanish to join the war as the ally of France. As has been previously shown, he actively sought the alliance with Spain. With the signing of the Pacte de Famille and the failure of the peace negotiations, Choiseul hoped that the combined forces of Spain and France would defeat Britain.

In view of the financial difficulties experienced by both countries, it is not surprising that one of the main issues disputed in the peace negotiations was financial. One of Pitt's principal demands was the complete exclusion of France from the Newfoundland fisheries. Choiseul refused to give up French claims to these fishing rights. The financial value of these fisheries was estimated at 500,000 pounds a year.¹⁰³ In addition, Choiseul wanted the return of the extremely profitable West Indies sugar islands taken in the war. While Pitt was willing to return the sugar islands, he was not prepared to back down on the issue of

¹⁰³Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol.II, p. 84.

the fisheries. Pitt believed that by granting France the return of the sugar islands and concessions on the Newfoundland fisheries that France would have "the means of recovering her prodigious losses, and of becoming once more formidable to us at sea."¹⁰⁴ In addition, Pitt believed that allowing France access to the fisheries would be "a most dangerous article, to the maritime strength and future power of Great Britain."¹⁰⁵ Pitt wanted to avoid a resurgence of French power and he fought to deny the French this possibility.

Not only did Pitt have to negotiate this point with the French, but he also had to persuade the members of the British cabinet that his demands were justified. Newcastle and Bedford did not agree with Pitt and they fought him in the cabinet, during the summer of 1761, over this issue. Through this dispute Newcastle showed the traditional European diplomatic view of maintaining the balance of power and his desire to abide by terms established earlier in the century at the treaty of Utrecht. As he stated in July, 1761:

Stanley thinks they will give up the point of Cape Breton, provided they can have any place whatever assigned by us , and under our influence and command to dry their fish. This may be very reasonable, if confined to the act of the treaty of Utrecht; but upon this we shall have disputes, as it admits a right to a

¹⁰⁴Pitt's speech to the House of Commons, December 9, 1762, Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XV, col. 1265.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., col. 1263.

fishery, or to come to fish in those seas, which, I suppose, cannot in justice or prudence be denied, as far as is permitted by the treaty of Utrecht.¹⁰⁶

By relying on previous diplomatic precedents, Newcastle demonstrated his belief in the traditional balance of power and system established by the treaty of Utrecht. As such, he could not accept Pitt's goal of the destruction of French power as a viable course of action. Instead, he viewed Pitt's goals as upsetting the European balance of power. In Newcastle and Bedford's opinion, exclusion of France from the Newfoundland fisheries would not only deny France the revenue from the fisheries, but would also destroy the naval power of France by denying France the means to train its seamen. The destruction of French naval power would alter the balance of power in Europe. Both Bedford and Newcastle viewed this development as dangerous to the diplomatic well being of Britain, as Britain would become overextended.

The fisheries issue quickly developed into a disagreement over naval power. Pitt wished to see the destruction of French naval power to ensure British supremacy in the colonies and at sea.¹⁰⁷ Choiseul could not allow France to lose her naval ability as naval power gave a nation the flexibility to conduct and participate in a variety of different foreign policy strategies and

¹⁰⁶The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Bedford, July 6, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 21.

¹⁰⁷Rashed, The Peace of Paris, p. 104.

initiatives. Naval power allowed a nation to launch or (in the case of Britain) prevent invasions, to keep trade moving freely so that the economy could prosper, to supply and join with land forces in continental and colonial campaigns, and to blockade naval bases and commercial ports to damage enemy economies.¹⁰⁸ It was these activities that Pitt wished to deny the French and that Choiseul wished to retain.

The Newfoundland fisheries were important to French naval power for a number of reasons. First, in the eighteenth century, the quality of a nation's navy was based to a large degree on the quality of the seamen who manned the ships. Most nations, including Britain and France, recruited seamen from their merchant marine and their fishing fleets. These sailors were well trained and experienced. Without these sailors the quality of the navy would be very poor, and an inexperienced and untrained crew was no match for an experienced and well trained adversary. France used the Newfoundland fisheries as a training ground for her navy. One estimate shows that France engaged nearly 3,000 ships and boats and 15,000 men in the fisheries.¹⁰⁹ These numbers gave France 15,000 well trained and experienced sailors to man their navy. In comparison, the

¹⁰⁸J. R. Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815, Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1980, p. 18.

¹⁰⁹Hardwicke Papers, "Papers relating to Canada and Newfoundland" as cited in Kate Hotblack, "The Peace of Paris, 1763", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. II: (235-266), p. 266.

much larger Royal Navy's shipboard population during wartime exceeded 40,000 men.¹¹⁰ In 1756, Britain had 105 ships of the line compared with France's 70.¹¹¹ Therefore, the 15,000 men involved in the fisheries for France represented a sizeable portion of their naval crews. The importance of the Newfoundland fisheries for naval power in the eighteenth century was emphasized by Pitt himself in a speech to the Commons in 1762:

That the fishery trained up an innumerable multitude of young seamen; and that the West India trade employed them when they were trained . . . the number of ships employed by it are a great resource to our maritime power: and what is of equal weight, all that we gain on this system, is made fourfold to us by the loss which ensues to France.¹¹²

With the importance of the fisheries to the development of naval power understood by Pitt, he was determined to deny France rights to the fisheries. His determination was due to his nationalistic goal of eliminating France as a serious naval power capable of challenging British interests at home and abroad.

Unfortunately for Pitt, Choiseul was a French minister who was also fully aware of the importance of naval power. Whereas previous French ministers placed the importance of the army over the navy, Choiseul viewed the navy as more

¹¹⁰Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 36.

¹¹¹Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 99.

¹¹²Pitt's Speech to the House of Commons, December 9, 1762, The Parliamentary History of England, col. 1265.

important to well being of France as he noted in 1759:

La supériorité des forces de terre est sans doute d'un grand poids, mais, depuis que le commerce est devenu l'objet de toutes les puissances, il est démontré, par le fait, que la preponderance est du côté de celle qui a l'empire de la mer.¹¹³

Choiseul also thought that a strong naval capability was the determining factor in making a nation a great power.

According to Choiseul, nations without naval power were not great powers. His views at this point were summarized in a letter to the Spanish king in late 1760:

Je ne sais pas si l'on est bien persuadé en Espagne que, vu l'état actuel de l'Europe, ce sont les colonies, le commerce et, par conséquent, la puissance maritime qui doivent emporter la balance du pouvoir sur le continent. La maison d'Autriche, la Russie, le roi de Prusse ne sont que des puissances de second ordre ainsi que celles qui ne peuvent faire la guerre que lorsqu'elles sont subsidiées par les puissances commerçantes, qui sont: la France, l'Angleterre, l'Espagne et la Hollande.¹¹⁴

As Choiseul saw the situation, it was impossible for France to give up rights to the fisheries. Choiseul would not allow French naval power to be destroyed, because France then would no longer be a great power in Europe. Such an event, he believed, would inevitably shift the balance of power in Europe, leading to potential instability on the continent as struggles ensued to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of France as a great power.

¹¹³Memoir by the Duke de Choiseul to Madrid, December 24, 1759, as cited in Rashed, The Peace of Paris, p. 105.

¹¹⁴Choiseul to Charles III, November 14, 1760, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 159.

While Choiseul viewed naval strength as a measure by which great powers were judged, naval power in Britain was viewed as the major part of ensuring national security. The strength of the Royal Navy was paramount to the defense of Britain. British control of the English Channel helped to prevent the possibility of foreign invasion (particularly a French invasion). The importance of the Royal Navy became dominant in British military affairs after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. From 1588 to 1815, the vast majority of British military heroes are from the navy. These men included Drake, Vernon, Anson, Hawke, Howe, Boscawen, and Nelson. During the same time period only two figures emerged as prominent heroes from the British army, Marlborough and Wellington. Britain's preoccupation with naval power also extended into financial commitment from the government. The British government spent large sums of money ensuring the quality and upkeep of the Royal Navy. For example, after the Seven Years War, 680,000 pounds was spent to improve the dockyards at Portsmouth and Plymouth, and 63,174 pounds were spent to build the 100-gun ship of the line, HMS Victory.¹¹⁵ It should be noted that these expenditures were made despite the large debts which Britain accumulated during the course of the war, and amounted to about 5% of the total military budget at the time.¹¹⁶ The

¹¹⁵Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 34-35.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 41.

navy not only received governmental support but also had the support of the public. On ascending the throne George III described the navy as follows:

As my navy is the principle article of our natural strength, it gives me much satisfaction to receive it in such good condition.¹¹⁷

Likewise, George Grenville illustrated the importance of naval power to Britain in the House of Commons debate on his Navy Bill in 1758:

Sir; in a nation, which in a great measure owes its very being and support to the flourishing state of trade and navigation, the increase and encouragement of seamen is a consideration peculiarly worthy the attention of the legislature.¹¹⁸

With the importance of naval power so deeply ingrained in Britain, from the government to the public, it is not surprising that a naval issue, the Newfoundland fisheries and the future of French naval power, would become the most contentious issue in the negotiations with France.

Pitt, however, did not gain support for his goal of eliminating France from the fisheries. Both Newcastle and Bedford resisted Pitt's aims in this area. First, Bedford did not fear a French invasion. He did not believe that France could mount a successful invasion of Britain.

I have never myself been much in apprehension of

¹¹⁷George III's speech on the opening of Parliament, October 25, 1760, The Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XV, col. 983.

¹¹⁸George Grenville's speech to the House of Commons, January 24, 1758, The Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XV, col 839.

invasions of England; for as they [the French] cannot bring cavalry over with them in any number, I think our always having a body of cavalry in this kingdom would soon enable us to put an end to any attempt of this nature.¹¹⁹

Since he believed that a successful French invasion was impossible, Bedford did not have reason to fear the French navy, and after the victories by Boscawen at Lagos and Hawke at Quiberon Bay, in 1759, the French invasion threat was eliminated. Because Bedford did not fear invasion he had little reason to want a reduction of French naval power. In fact, Bedford considered such an action to be unnatural.

. . . will this conquest [of Martinico], which must necessarily cost so many lives of our brave countrymen and immense sums of money, be the means of obtaining us a better peace than we can command at present, or induce the French to relinquish a right of fishery; which if they do must put a final blow to their being any longer a naval power, though possessing a coast in the Channel and the ocean, extending from Dunkirk to the frontiers of Spain, and in the Mediterranean, from the frontiers of Spain to those of Italy.¹²⁰

Not only did he see Pitt's proposal as unnatural, but Bedford viewed it as preventing a permanent peace between Britain and France. In fact, Bedford viewed the original terms offered by Choiseul (to maintain only Cape Breton to dry their fish) as too harsh and leading to the resumption of hostilities in the future:

¹¹⁹The Duke of Bedford to the Earl of Bute, July 9, 1763, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 27.

¹²⁰The Duke of Bedford to the Earl of Bute, July 9, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 25.

The only difficulty that occurs to me is this, that the terms are so advantageous to England, and so contrary to France, that I can hardly persuade myself that she is in earnest to conclude, or, should she be willing to do it, that it is only to take breath in order to break it, when she shall have again recruited strength.¹²¹

It was on this point that the differences between the nationalist Pitt and the European traditionalists like Bedford and Newcastle became most apparent. For Pitt the entire goal of the war was the destruction of French Bourbon power, and he wished to ensure this victory in his Carthaginian peace terms. For men like Bedford and Newcastle, the securing of a permanent peace, and maintaining the balance of power established by the treaty of Utrecht, was the priority in the peace negotiations. This priority led them to adopt more conciliatory positions regarding the peace terms. Their attitudes quickly brought them into conflict with Pitt, in the summer of 1761, as he did not want to see the results of his labour wasted at the negotiation table. Both views on the peace reveals that both sides in the conflict over policy felt that their position was the best one to ensure the future wellbeing of Britain. Pitt felt that the supremacy of Britain could be maintained by the destruction of French power. Bedford and Newcastle thought that the continued prosperity of Britain could be achieved by gaining a permanent peace with France

¹²¹The Duke of Bedford to the Earl of Bute, June 13, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 14.

and ending the decades of war between the two nations.

Aside from destroying French naval power and the chance for a permanent peace, Bedford and Newcastle believed that Pitt's terms would upset the balance of power which had been established and maintained in Europe since the treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and lead to the eventual defeat of Britain.

In the seventeenth century, the balance of power had been relatively simple with a balance being sought between France and the Hapsburg powers of Spain and Austria. This simple system was changed in the eighteenth century with the emergence of Britain, Prussia, and Russia as great powers alongside France and Austria. The emergence of these powers meant that a balance had to be maintained in more areas of Europe. Austria and Russia struggled in the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire. Austria, Prussia and Russia also fought to maintain a balance in Poland. France, also, desired that Poland should not come under the domination of any one power. Austria and Prussia fought for domination in Germany, while France desired that neither nation should achieve domination. Britain, also, desired a balance in Germany so that the Electorate of Hanover was protected. France, Austria, and Spain maintained a precarious balance in Italy. Britain strove to prevent any one power from establishing a hegemony on the continent.

An especially sensitive area for Britain was the Low Countries. Britain regarded this area as vital to her

interests, partly for trading reasons. Another reason that this area was of importance for Britain involved preventing France from controlling this area for purely defensive reasons for Britain. The French ports on the English Channel (Calais, Boulogne, Le Havre, etc.) were too small to contain a transport fleet large enough to transport an invasion force, and all had narrow entrances allowing only a portion of the fleet to leave on a single tide.¹²² Control of the Scheldt river with Antwerp as a base, would allow the French to assembled a large fleet, which could quickly sail to Britain with the right wind before the Royal Navy could react.¹²³ This area was therefore of primary importance to Britain. With all of these areas of contention among the great powers, the diplomats strove to secure a balance in Europe by preventing one power from establishing a hegemony on the continent to the detriment of the other powers. The ultimate expression of this diplomatic activity to maintain the balance of power was in the partitions of Poland between Austria, Prussia and Russia in 1772, 1793, and 1795. In addition to the balance of power in Europe, France, Spain, and Britain also fought to maintain a balance in the colonial sphere.

It was the destruction of the traditional

¹²²Jones, Britain and the World 1649-1815, p. 20.

¹²³Ibid., p. 20. This tactic is exactly what William of Orange accomplished in 1688.

conceptualization of the balance of power that made Bedford and Newcastle fear Pitt's peace terms. Newcastle had long been a supporter of the balance of power system established and maintained by European diplomats. In the 1750's, Newcastle, as the British foreign minister, had attempted various German alliances to counteract his perception of French strength. Newcastle was concerned over the fate of Hanover and felt that France needed to be contained or the balance in Europe would be upset. For Newcastle, Germany was always the primary theatre of military operations.¹²⁴ A maintenance of the balance of power on the continent from the British perspective involved the creation and maintenance of alliances to counter French land power. In Newcastle's opinion failure to keep a balance would result in defeat for Britain. He stated his reasoning in 1742 as follows:

France will outdo us at sea when they have nothing to fear on land. I have always maintained that our marine should protect our alliances on the Continent, and so, by diverting the expense of France, enable us to maintain our superiority at sea.¹²⁵

¹²⁴Reed Browning, The Duke of Newcastle, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1975, p. 276.

¹²⁵As cited in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 98. It is interesting to note that in only one war in the eighteenth century Britain failed to maintain and support alliances on the continent. In the War of American Independence, France was not hampered by having to fight in Europe. Instead, France was able to devote its resources and attention against Britain. This war saw Britain lose naval superiority against a coalition of France, Spain, and Holland. The loss of naval control contributed to the British defeat in this war.

While Pitt viewed the colonial campaigns as the primary theatre of operations, he still devoted considerable resources to the war in Germany. He supported the Army of Observation on the Rhine, which prevented the French from capturing Hanover and protected Frederick the Great's right flank from attack. He also supported Frederick with a 670,000 pounds a year subsidy, which helped the Prussian king to continue his fight against the French, Austrians, Russians, and Swedes. These actions by the British government forced France to split her military resources on many different fronts. With France occupied in Europe and the colonies, Pitt was able to concentrate on the colonial conflict and conquer most of the French colonial empire. With the virtual conquest of the French colonial empire, Pitt felt that Britain had made sufficient gains to demand the exclusion of France from the Newfoundland fisheries. These nationalistic demands, Pitt felt, would reduce French power to the point where Britain could no longer be threatened by France.

Newcastle and Bedford viewed this goal as dangerous for Britain. The reasons for the danger, in their view, were as follows:

Indeed my Lord [Bute], the endeavouring to drive France entirely out of any naval power is fighting against nature and can tend to no one good to this country; but on the contrary, must excite all the naval powers of Europe to enter into a confederacy against us, as adopting a system, viz. that of a monopoly of all naval power, which would be at least as dangerous to the liberties of Europe as that of Louis XIV. was, which

drew almost all Europe upon his back.¹²⁶

Both Newcastle and Bedford believed that the Carthaginian nature of Pitt's peace terms, if forced on France, would oblige the European powers to join in a coalition to combat British dominance. Because the balance of power principle was readily accepted by the European powers, Newcastle and Bedford were firmly convinced that the European powers would take steps to rectify the imbalance in the system that such a crushing peace would create. They feared that Britain would become diplomatically isolated.

Even during the negotiations, the terms demanded by Pitt brought anger to the French, and Mme de Pompadour believed that the British position would eventually harm Britain in Europe:

Cependant il faut continuer jusqu'au bout, et mettre les anglois dans leur tort à la face de toute l'Europe, en exposant leur ambition et leur éloignement pour la paix.¹²⁷

Likewise, Choiseul was already using the British successes in the colonial war to show that Britain intended to upset the balance of power and take complete control of naval power in Europe. In his negotiations with Spain, Choiseul used the spectre of British naval hegemony to help persuade Spain to enter into the Pacte de Famille.

¹²⁶The Duke of Bedford to the Earl of Bute, July 9, 1761, Russell, Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, p. 26.

¹²⁷Mme de Pompadour to M. Bussy, 1761, Lettres de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, Vol. I, p. 175.

La France contenait la rivalité et protégeait le commerce de l'Europe contre l'ambition anglaise. Elle devait être secondée dans ce dessein utile par l'Espagne, mais cette dernière puissance ayant abandonné son allié naturel pendant cette guerre, la France peut difficilement réparer les pertes qu'elle a faites. L'Espagne restera seule en butte aux projets ambitieux de l'Angleterre et l'on verra de nos jours les Anglais maîtres despotiques des mers et, par conséquent, la seule puissance en état de fournir de l'argent au continent et dicter des lois.¹²⁸

By using phrases like "maîtres despotiques" Choiseul revealed his fear that if French naval power was destroyed Britain would control maritime trade. The control of trade would give Britain large amounts of money to finance armies, and Choiseul thought that Britain would use this potential force combined with the economic control of trade to establish hegemony in European affairs. This fear, combined with Choiseul's belief that naval power gave a nation great power status, made Choiseul refuse to give in to Pitt's terms and helped to push France into the Pacte de Famille alliance with Spain.

The resistance of both Choiseul and the European traditionalists in the British cabinet made Pitt's terms unacceptable for the final peace. In the Peace of Paris in 1763 (negotiated by Bedford and Choiseul), France was granted fishing rights and the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon as abri. The negotiations in 1761 broke down on what appears the perfunctory matter of fishing rights in

¹²⁸Choiseul to Charles III, November 14, 1760, as cited in Bourguet, Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Alliance Espagnol, p. 159.

Newfoundland. But, debate on this simple issue was merely the overture to the more complex matters of finance, naval power, and balance of power. Overshadowing all of these issues was the larger emerging conflict between nationalism and traditional European cosmopolitanism. By representing and giving voice to English nationalist desires, William Pitt wanted to establish a new course in diplomacy. He wanted to impose a humiliating and crushing peace on France that would see the end of French naval power and the establishment and securing of British supremacy. These goals involved substantial shifts in the balance of power and the manner of diplomacy in Europe, for Pitt desired the elimination of France as a great power.¹²⁹

Naturally, the Duc de Choiseul, as the French first minister, wanted to maintain French naval power and its status as a great power. The European traditionalists in the British cabinet, led by the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Bedford, opposed Pitt because they viewed his terms as exceedingly harsh. They were convinced that Pitt's terms would not give Britain a permanent peace. The destruction of French naval power was viewed as unnatural and ill advised. In their opinion this event could only lead to resentments and coalitions against Britain to reestablish a

¹²⁹It should be noted that Pitt was unrealistic in his diplomatic goals because even after the crushing French defeat at the end of the Napoleonic wars, France was still considered a great power as the events of the Congress of Vienna were to prove.

balance of power in Europe. Ultimately, Pitt, who wanted to change the diplomatic system for the supremacy of Britain, could not change it because of internal politics within Britain and the emergence of a strong willed minister in France. Change in the system would only come when the Ancien Regime in France was overthrown in 1789, and the sweeping power of the nationalism unleashed by the French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies destroyed the old cosmopolitan system which had dominated European affairs in the eighteenth Century.

Chapter Five Conclusion

From April to September, 1761, Britain and France engaged in peace negotiations in an attempt to end their part in the Seven Years War. Both countries were beginning to experience the financial problems caused by a prolonged war. The financial problems combined with military defeats forced the French first minister, the Duc de Choiseul, to approach Britain about beginning peace negotiations. In Britain, the accession of George III upset the delicate political balance between the Duke of Newcastle and William Pitt. George III and his favourite the Earl of Bute desired peace to begin the reign of the new King. As a result both sides were willing to discuss the terms for a peace. After months of negotiations, the discussions collapsed and hostilities continued. The main issue over which the talks collapsed was whether to give France fishing rights off Newfoundland.

The traditional historiographical accounts of these events have been superficial. Firstly, they failed to take into account both sides in the discussions. They have concentrated on the French or the British sides, but not both. Secondly, they have neglected to consider the impact of internal political events on the formation of foreign policy. Thirdly, they have omitted to examine the issues which caused the Newfoundland fisheries to be the object of

contention in the negotiations. Fourthly, they have not appreciated or understood that the conflict in the negotiations involved the larger forces of nationalism and European cosmopolitanism. Finally, new evidence in the form of The Devonshire Diary has brought an increased understanding into the internal political forces which affected policy formation within the British cabinet in 1761.

By using the new evidence combined with the previous evidence a thorough investigation into the negotiations has revealed new insights. Firstly, by looking at both France and Britain, a more balanced view of the forces effecting the negotiations was made. These forces included: the effect of the internal power struggle within the cabinet on the British positions in the negotiations; the effect of Choiseul becoming the Minister of War on his foreign policy; and the effect that both the Belleisle expedition and the Spanish alliance had in making the other side doubt the other's commitment to the negotiations.

Secondly, this examination has revealed that the issue of the Newfoundland fisheries was not a simple diplomatic affair. This issue, in fact, was highly complicated with many interconnected parts. First, the fisheries were a lucrative enterprise whose loss would be felt by the French economy, and whose exclusive possession would undoubtedly benefit the British economy. Second, the fisheries were

used by France as a training ground for her navy. In the opinion of contemporaries, the loss of the fisheries would eliminate France as a naval power. Choiseul would not allow this to happen because he viewed naval power as an intrinsic part of being a great power. He believed that if French naval power was reduced, France would cease to be a great power, and Britain would control maritime trade in Europe and the wider colonial world. The potential reduction of France from the ranks of the great powers would result in the upsetting of the balance of power in Europe. In the eighteenth Century, French culture dominated the European scene. The removal of France as a great power would leave a power vacuum in Europe. Filling the void was viewed as a destabilizing influence to the balance of power system in Europe at the time. This destabilizing influence is especially true when it is remembered that the balance that was supposed to be maintained stemmed from the Treaty of Utrecht which was designed to contain French expansion. The fisheries issue became a microcosm of these competing diplomatic interests. It is with an understanding of these interests that the reasons for the fisheries as a stumbling block to peace can be understood.

Finally, the close examination of the disagreement over the fisheries reveals the larger conflict between nationalism and traditional European cosmopolitanism. Pitt, who at this time was the 'charismatic' hero-leader of

English nationalism, wanted the complete destruction of French Bourbon power. To accomplish this goal, Pitt wanted to exclude France from the Newfoundland fisheries. In his opinion, this exclusion would bring about a reduction in the strength of the French navy to the point where France could no longer be a threat to British interests. In contrast, Choiseul, and the Newcastle-Bedford group fought to maintain the status quo in terms of conducting diplomacy. They strove to maintain the balance supported by the diplomatic system since Utrecht. Pitt wanted a revolution as he saw this system as no longer viable. In his mind the conditions had changed since 1713, and he wanted to change the system by destroying French power. Pitt lost the power struggle and with it the chance to change the manner in which diplomacy was conducted. Instead, the system would be swept away by the powerful nationalism of the French revolution.

Bibliography

Printed Primary Sources

- Barbier, E. J. F., Journal Historique et Anecdotes du Règne de Louis XV, Vol. IV, Paris, Jules Renouard et C, 1856.
- Barrell, Rex A., ed., French Correspondence of Philip Dormer Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield, Vol. I and II, Ottawa, Borealis Press, 1980.
- Baugh, Daniel A., ed., Navy Administration 1715-1750, London, The Navy Records Society, 1977.
- Boutaric, M. E., compiler, Correspondance Secrète Inédite de Louis XV sur La Politique Étrangere, Vol. I and II, Paris, Henri Plon, 1866.
- Brown, Peter D., and Schweizer, Karl W., ed., The Devonshire Diary: William Cavendish, Fourth Duke of Devonshire, Memoranda on State of Affairs, 1759-1762, London, Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1982.
- Choiseul, Duc de, Memoires du Duc de Choiseul, Paris, Mercure de France, 1982.
- Choiseul, Duc de, Memoire Historique sur la Négotiation de la France et de l'Angleterre, depuis le 26 Mars 1761 jusqu'au 20 Septembre de la même année, avec les Pieces Justificatives, Paris, L'Imprimerie Royale, 1761.
- Cobbett, W., The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vol. XV, London, T. C. Hansard, 1813.
- Copeland, Thomas W., ed., The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, Vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
- Dickins, Lilian, and Stanton, Mary, ed., An Eighteenth-Century Correspondence to Sanderson Miller, Esq., of Radway, London, John Murray, 1910.
- Dobrée, Bonamy, The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, Vol. V and VI, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1932.
- Du Barry, Comtesse Jeanne Vaubernier, Memoirs of the Comtesse Du Barry, London, M. Walter Dunne, 1903.

- Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, ed., Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, Vol. I, London, Macmillan and Co., 1875.
- Morel-Fatio, A., and Leonardon, H., Recueil des Instructions Données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie jusqu'a la Revolution Française, XII bis, Espagne, Vol. III, Paris, Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière et Cie., 1899.
- Ozanam, Didier, and Antoine, Michel, ed., Correspondence Secrète du Comte de Broglie avec Louis XV (1756-1774), Vol. I, Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1956.
- Pompadour, Madame la Marquise de, Lettres de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, Vol. I and II, London, G. Owen and T. Cadell, London, 1771.
- Pompadour, Madame la Marquise de, Memoires de Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, Vol. I and II, Liege, 1766.
- Russell, Lord John, ed., Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, Vol. III, London, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1846.
- Sedgwick, Romney, ed., Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, London, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1939.
- Smith, William James, ed., The Grenville Papers: Being The Correspondence of Richard Grenville Earl Temple, K. G., and The Right Hon: George Grenville, Their Friends and Contemporaries, Vol. I, New York, AMS Press, Inc., 1852 (reprinted 1970).
- Taylor, William Stanhope, esq., and Pringle, Captain John Henry, ed., Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. II, London, John Murray, 1838.
- Toynbee, Paget, ed., The Letters of Horace Walpole, Vol. V, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1904.
- Vallee, Leon, ed., Courtiers and Favourites of Royalty: Memoirs of Madame du Barry, Vol. I and II, Paris, Societe des Bibliophiles, 1903.
- Vallee, Leon, ed., Courtiers and Favourites of Royalty: Memoirs of Duke de Richelieu, Vol. III, Paris, Societe des Bibliophiles, 1903.
- Vaucher, Paul, ed., Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie Jusqu'a la Revolution Française, XXV.2 Angleterre, Vol. III, Paris, Centre National de la

Recherche Scientifique, 1965.

Wiener, Joel H., ed., Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire 1689-1971, A Documentary History, Vol. I, London, Chelsea House Publishers, 1972.

Wyndham, Henry Penruddocke, ed., The Diary of the late George Bubb Dodington, Baron of Melcombe Regis, London, G. Wilkie and J. Robinson, 1809.

Yorke, Philip C., The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, Vol. III, New York, Octagon Books, 1977.

Secondary Works

Ayling, Stanley, The Elder Pitt: Earl of Chatham, London, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1976.

Black, Jeremy, The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793, London, Edward Arnold, 1990.

Black, Jeremy, A System of Ambition?: British Foreign Policy 1660-1793, London, Longman Group UK Limited, 1991.

Bourguet, Alfred, Le Duc de Choiseul et l'Alliance Espagnole, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1906.

Brewer, John, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English state, 1688-1783, London, Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1989.

Browning, Reed, The Duke of Newcastle, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1975.

Cole, Hubert, First Gentleman of the Bedchamber: The Life of Louis-Francois-Armand, Marechal Duc de Richelieu, New York, The Viking Press, 1965.

Corbett, Julian S., England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Vol. II, London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907.

De Nolhac, Pierre, Madame de Pompadour et la Politique, Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1928.

Dorn, Walter L., Competition for Empire, 1740-1763, New York, Harpre & Brothers Publishers, 1940.

Egerton, H. E., British Foreign Policy in Europe to the End of the 19th Century, London, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1917.

- Gooch, G. P., Louis XV: The Monarchy in Decline, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1956.
- Green, Walford Davis, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham and The Growth and Division of the British Empire 1708-1778, London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906.
- Hassall, Arthur, The Balance of Power 1715-1789, London, MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1907.
- Hearnshaw, F. J. C., Sea-Power & Empire, London, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1940.
- Horn, D. B., Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Jones, J. R., Britain and the World 1649-1815, Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1980.
- Kelch, Ray A., Newcastle, A Duke Without Money: Thomas Pelham-Holles 1693-1768, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974.
- Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, London, Penguin Books Ltd., 1976.
- Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, Inc., 1987.
- Kennett, Lee, The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration, Durham, Duke University Press, 1967.
- Lacour-Gayet, G., La Marine Militaire de la France sous le Règne de Louis XV, Paris, Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1910.
- Lawson, Philip, The Imperial Challenge: Quebec and Britain in the Age of the American Revolution, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.
- Mattingly, Garrett, Renaissance Diplomacy, London, Jonathan Cape, 1955.
- Maugras, Gaston, Le Duc et la Duchesse de Choiseul, Paris, Librairie Plon, 1904.
- McKay, Derek, and Scott, H. M., The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815, London, Longman Group Ltd., 1983.
- Mitford, Nancy, Madame de Pompadour, London, Hamish Hamilton

- Ltd., 1954.
- Muret, Pierre, La Prépondérance Anglaise (1715-1763), Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1937.
- Newman, Gerald, The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830, New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1987.
- Nicolson, Harold, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, London, Cassell Publishers Ltd., 1954.
- Pajol, Le Comte, Les Guerres sous Louis XV, Vol. V, Paris, Librairie de Firmin-Didot et Co., 1886.
- Perkins, James Breck, France under Louis XV, Vol. I and II, London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1904.
- Peters, Marie, Pitt and Popularity: The Patriot Minister and London Opinion during the Seven Years' War, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980.
- Rashed, Zenab Esmat, The Peace of Paris, 1763, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1951.
- Robertson, Sir Charles Grant, Chatham and the British Empire, London, Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1946.
- Roosen, William James, The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, Cambridge, Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976.
- Rose, J. Holland, Newton, A. P., and Benians, E. A., ed., The Cambridge History of the British Empire: Vol. I The Old Empire from the Beginnings to 1783, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1929.
- Ruville, Albert Von, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. II, London, William Heinemann, 1907.
- Schumacher, Karl Von, The Du Barry, London, George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1932.
- Sherrard, O. A., Lord Chatham and America, London, The Bodley Head Ltd., 1958.
- Taillemite, Etienne, L'Histoire Ignorée de la Marine Française, Paris, Librairie Academique Perrin, 1988.
- Thompson, James Westfall, and Padover, Saul K., Secret Diplomacy: Espionage and Cryptology, 1500-1815, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963.

Tunstall, Brian, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1938.

Verdier, Henri, Le Duc de Choiseul, Paris, Nouvelles Editions Debresse, 1969.

Williams, Basil, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Vol. II, London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.

Williams, H. Noel, Madame de Pompadour, London, Harper & Brothers, 1908.

Articles

Bourquet, Alfred, "Le Duc de Choiseul et L'Angleterre, la mission de Monsieur de Bussy à Londres", Revue Historique 71 (1899): p. 1-32.

Cahen, Leon, "The Prime Minister in France and England during the Eighteenth Century", Studies in Anglo-French History During the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1935): p. 31-42.

Hotblack, Kate, "The Peace of Paris, 1763", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Third Series Vol. II (1908): p. 235-267.

Hyam, Ronald, "Imperial interests and the Peace of Paris", Reappraisals in British Imperial History (1975): p. 21-43.

Schweizer, Karl W., "William Pitt, Lord Bute, and the Peace Negotiations with France, May-September 1761" Albion no. 13 (1981): p. 262-275.

Williams, Basil, "A Short Comparison between the Secretaries of State in France and in England during the Eighteenth Century", Studies in Anglo-French History During the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1935): p. 19-30.