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JOHN WILSON'S CONCEPTION OF MORAL EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

BY

PATRICIA HELEN WEBBER

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF EDUCATION

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled JOHN WILSON'S CONCEPTION OF MORAL EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT submitted by PATRICIA HELEN WEBBER in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF EDUCATION in PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a critical assessment of John Wilson's conception of moral education. Wilson's theory is placed in the context of the current disarray in theory and practice in moral education. Two competing and influential strategies for moral education, the Inculcation approach and Values Clarification, are discussed as a contrast to Wilson's theory, and the drawbacks of both are explored. Wilson's conception of moral education is presented as an example of the Rational Deliberation approach. This approach is based on respect for the learner as a potentially rational and independent moral chooser. What is distinctive of Wilson's version of the approach is his formalist analysis of moral reasoning and his attempt to deduce a catalogue of components of moral competence from this analysis of moral reasoning.

A selective survey is offered of published criticism of Wilson's theory. Two lines of criticism converge on the idea that Wilson fails to understand the role of reason in the moral life. Some critics suggest that he misrepresents the nature of moral reasoning by emphasizing form at the expense of content, while others claim that he exaggerates the importance of reason in the moral life. It is also argued that he stresses explicit instruction unduly while neglecting the value of example. These and other criticisms of Wilson are examined and assessed in light of his response to his critics.

Finally, Wilson's contribution to the theory of moral education is assessed on the basis of answers to three questions. Does he emphasize the role of reason in morality at the expense of emotion and intuition? Is his formalist analysis of moral reasoning, based on an analogy between learning to "do" science and learning to "do" morality, an adequate basis for moral education? Does Wilson provide a complete theory of moral education?

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This project would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my trusted friend, Margherita Quaglia, and lastly, this project is dedicated in the memory of my Father, who provided me with moral guidance and the belief that through determination and diligence one could attain their goals.

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Were all other things, gods and men and starry heavens, blotted out from this universe, and were there left but one rock with two loving souls upon it, that rock would have as thoroughly moral a constitution as any possible world which the eternities and immensities could harbour. It would be a tragic constitution, because the rock's inhabitants would die. But while they lived, there would be real good things and real bad things in the universe; there would be obligations, claims, and expectations; obedience, refusals, and disappointments; compunctions and longings for harmony to come again, and inward peace of conscience when it was restored; there would, in short, be a moral life, whose active energy would have no limit but the intensity of interest in each other with which the hero and heroine might be endowed.

We, on this terrestrial globe, so far as the visible facts go, are just like the inhabitants of such a rock. Whether a God exist, or whether no God exist, in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an ethical republic here below. And the first reflection which this leads to is that ethics have as genuine and real a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human, as in a universe where there is a God as well.[1]

(William James)

If teachers today are to initiate young people into an ethical existence, they themselves must attend more fully than they normally have to their own lives and its requirements; they have to break with the mechanical life, to overcome their own submergence in the habitual, even in what they conceive to be virtuous, and to ask the "why" with which all moral reasoning begins.[2]

(Maxine Green)

CHAPTER I

The Background to John Wilson's Theory of Moral Education

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine John Wilson's theory of moral education, a theory which focuses upon the notion or rationality in moral judgement and action. The objective will be to assess his theory from the standpoint of its supporting philosophical argument and its practical implications. To assess adequately such a theory, it becomes necessary to decipher somewhat the disarray evident in current academic as well as popular discourse about moral education. Wilson's theory is explicitly offered as a way of overcoming the disarray of current theory and practice in moral education, and hence his contribution to research has to be understood in that context. A survey designed to reveal current problems and obscurity in the theory and practice of moral education will be advanced in this opening chapter. It will also be argued that moral education is far too important to be left to chance and that it cannot be divorced from

formal education. It is suggested, therefore, that schools need to embrace a substantial role in moral education.

Some competing and influential approaches as reflected in the contemporary literature on moral education — namely, Values Clarification, Inculcation and Rational Deliberation perspectives — are discussed to reveal the chief problems associated with each. A variant of the Rational Deliberation approach, namely, the 'Formalist' view as advanced by moral philosopher-educator, John Wilson, is introduced towards the end of the chapter, a theory that claims to alleviate the confusion and obscurity and provide legitimate aims for moral education.

The Crisis in Morality and Moral Education

Modern Western societies cannot take for granted the extensive moral consensus which earlier societies could use as the foundation for moral education. As John Kleinig submits,

> [Our] traditional vehicles have shown themselves unable to satisfy the demands of an increasingly industrialised society. Religious instruction, traditionally conceived, is now something of an anachronism, and the nuclear family has wilted under the pressures placed on it.[3]

Many factors can be identified as contributing to the escalation of moral chaos — rapid social and technological change, the decline in religious authority in some quarters, the rise of religious fundamentalism in others, and the increasing multicultural and pluralistic character of modern

societies. Not surprisingly, such social phenomena often seems to suggest even to reflective philosophers that we lack the intellectual resources to address our shared moral problems. One striking example of this pessimism in the face of perceived moral chaos is Alasdair MacIntyre's view that we live in a moral dark age because we have lost any active moral consensus rooted in the shared cultivation of virtues. By "the virtues" he means those dispositions which permit a person to function successfully in social settings. He claims that in the real world in which we reside,

> [Our] . . . language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder . . . [W]hat we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived.[4]

He maintains we hold "simulacra of morality" and that for the most part we have forfeited both the theoretical and practical domains of morality. However, he points out that "what matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the traditions of the virtues was [sic] able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope."[5] The same combination of pessimism about our current moral predicament and hope about the possibility of moral renewal is expressed by writers who, unlike MacIntyre, write primarily for a popular audience. Kathleen Gow not only provides us with an

explicit view of our chaotic moral climate but indicates the urgency of what is required to combat the disorder in the realm of morality.

> Children and youth face a bewildering kaleidoscope of conflicting facts, opinions, values, decisions . . . . The dilemmas and conflicts widespread in today's society make it plain that unless the rising generation is equipped with some tools for making its way through the confusion, we shall have left its members a very questionable legacy . . . our children and youth need more than ever to learn how to analyze moral issues and how to arrive at moral judgements . . . need to learn to deal constructively with value conflicts they encounter. Ironically, in our complex society, many religious institutions and families appear to have stopped discussing relevant questions and have forfeited their influence. The tragic result is that children and young people are often in a directionless backwash or a compulsive undertow in a sea of conflicting values and opinions.[6]

If, as Gow suggests, moral education is our best hope for moral renewal, it is not obvious that the school could contribute much to its success. Perhaps moral education should be privatized within families given the absence of a substantial morality which we would all confidently affirm. However, to adopt such a stance, given the disintegration of many private institutions and the strain on the nuclear family could once again lead to perpetual moral confusion. Moreover, even if families and churches adopted a vigorous role in moral education, this might not ensure enough common ground in our values to prevent social conflict.

The Necessity for Moral Education in Schools

The view that schools should stay out of moral education is described and criticized by A. C. Kazepides:

> (Many) persons who send their children to the public schools in order "to get an education" . . . maintain that matters of value should be left to the family and/or the church. The schools, according to this view, should be held responsible for teaching only those things that are matters of fact or matters on which there is a wide consensus; all contested issues should be left to the family and its preferred church.

He suggests such a posture "excludes rational non-sectarian thinking about matters of value." The privatization of moral education means that the family and church would have the scope and potential to indoctrinate the young without interference from any other institution. He goes on to argue that this omits "disputable issues" from being debated in public, thereby taking away from the young the occasion to have their beliefs questioned in public and to acquire an "appreciation for other points of view." He maintains that the danger for education, if influenced by this viewpoint, is that some teachers and parents will be allowed to transmit "a form of uncritical dogmatism." There is also the danger that others will become "victims of extreme forms of relativism," which abjure all objective criteria of morality. "How often does one hear the question 'How do you feel about it?' as if that was the most relevant, specific or important question that the teacher could ask."

He submits that there are two issues that need to be clarified. First, "the emphasis on cultural differences, which are, in turn, construed as conflicting, rests on a serious confusion and a logical fallacy." What he is suggesting is that discussion about rapid changes and conflicting values tends to confuse topics of subjective preference with questions of objective moral value; and given that confusion, people are apt to infer fallaciously that moral issues can only be resolved subjectively. The second point he makes is that even though we have cultural differences in our society, they can give us "a unique opportunity to re-examine and clarify our values and render them more rational,"[7] as opposed to just viewing them as a source of brute conflict. But Kazepides emphasizes that widespread confusion about moral values is inevitable so long as we lack a strong policy of moral education in our schools.

One of the most forceful arguments for moral education in schools is offered by David Purpel and Kevin Ryan. They contend that whether or not moral education is intended or explicitly chosen "it does in fact go on in schools." They submit that even though the question — Why not stay out? — could be asked, teachers have no real option but to stay in. In their view, if you consider alone the length of time students spend in schools, it is preposterous to believe that we could avoid affecting their moral thought and behavior.

Moral education suffuses the very fibre of the relationships between teachers and students.

> There is in effect really no point in debating whether there should be moral education in the schools. What needs to be debated is what form this education should take . . . we believe that moral education, in fact, "comes with the territory" . . . to what degree and in what dimensions and areas should we deal with moral education in schools?[8]

In a similar vein, John Kleinig maintains that moral education cannot be exempted from schools; the "structure, organizations, example, and course materials inevitably convey an overt or covert moral message." The relevant question, then, for Kleinig as for Purpel and Ryan, is this: "Given that some form of moral teaching/learning will go on, how can we ensure that it is the best possible?"[9] I believe we can conclude that schools should embrace a substantial role in moral education, despite the current moral disarray. The critical question becomes: What should that role be? To answer that question it is useful to consider three broad approaches to moral education in schools which have been influential in recent years. These competing approaches involve the Values Clarification, Moral Inculcation and the Rational Deliberation perspectives.

Values Clarification View:

The most notable work on the Values Clarification Model is derived from Louis Rath, Merrill Harmin and Sidney B.

Simon. In this model, "right" and "wrong" are entirely relative, depending on the situation and especially on the child's point of view at any given time. Their concern is related to the process which an individual adopts to acquire his values, rather than "with particular values outcomes." They justify this view by contending that during one's lifetime, one cannot predict what experiences an individual will encounter and hence cannot conclude as to "what style of life, would be most suitable for any person."

They believe that the unpredictability and uncertainty of the moral life make it appropriate for educators to shift attention away form specific values to "what processes might be most effective for obtaining values." This is derived from the supposition that those values one acquires "should work as effectively as possible to relate one to his world in a satisfying and intelligent way." From this supposition evolves what they claim to be the "process of valuing." Examining this process is an attempt to make clear how a value is defined. According to these authors, a value must comply with seven requirements. Together these denote the process of valuing. These criteria, the authors claim, are able to help children achieve maturity in the ethical realm by choosing and creating their values. The criteria are as follows:

1. Choosing freely.
2. Choosing among alternatives.
3. Choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative.

4. Prizing and cherishing.

5. Affirming.

6. Acting upon choice.

7. Repeating.

They also recognize that there are dimensions that are not values, such as "purposes," "aspirations," "beliefs."[10] However, they say that values can be acquired from these factors. The central theme of Values Clarification approach is that the individual has to be unrestrained in adopting his own moral values. Any adult restrictions upon value formation undermine the integrity of the process.

Despite the popularity of the approach, it has been the target of some harsh academic criticism. For example, John S. Stewart in "Problems and Contradictions of Value Clarification" remarks that

> Values Clarification is unquestionably one of the most popular and commercially successful educational fads of our generation, . . . perhaps of all time. Its acceptance has been truly phenomenal not only in extent, however, but also in manner. For that acceptance has been, for the most part, somewhat unreflective, uncritical, and unclarified — a strange set of affairs for a movement purporting to seek clarification and reflection.
>
> Paradoxically and ironically vc has become some kind of sacred cow that is adopted largely on face value on the basis of its own claims with little or no examination of its educational soundness, philosophical justification, or alleged efficacy. As with similar educational fads, however, time, experience, and deeper judgement are beginning to reveal hyperbole in its claims, profound deficiencies in its theoretical base, enormous problems in its moral orientation, and serious questions about its proclaimed

> achievements. Even some of the most ardent and experienced disciplines of vc are beginning to see the problems and recognize the superficiality of this approach.[11]

Allen L. Lockwood submits Values Clarification does not guide students in giving rational consideration to moral dilemmas. Nor do students confront the possibility that the values which they form through the process could be egocentric, ethnocentric or otherwise inadequate from an objective standpoint. In Lockwood's view, Values Clarification reduces moral issues to a simplistic level by negating "the controversies associated with value conflict, conflict resolution and moral justification."[12] Moreover, the approach lends itself to a complacent and uncritical relativism about all values.

A prominent Canadian philosopher of education who has been critical of Values Clarification is Jerrold R. Coombes, who raises the question "What is it that leads persons to this rather pallid view of moral education?" He would argue that, fundamentally, it is the belief "that moral judgements are merely expressions of tastes, emotions, or preferences that cannot be justified or supported by argument." This posture, in his view, proposes that the sole option to clarification would be indoctrination. But the latter alternative is immoral, and hence clarification is thought to be the only moral defensible approach to moral education. Coombes suggests

> [adopting a] preference view of moral judgement is clearly mistaken. Such a view can be maintained only at the expense of ignoring or denying some very obvious facts about our moral life and language . . . we do accept some reasons as relevant and reject others as irrelevant, we do challenge moral claims by offering counter examples, and we do ask for and give moral advice.[13]

So long as we recognize these essential aspects of our moral language and conduct, we cannot be satisfied with an approach to moral education that restricts itself to the clarification of pre-existing values.

Inculcation View:

This particular approach is generally depicted as a form of initiating youth into society's established moral standards and accepted ways of conducting themselves. What is required in this approach is to initiate the young into a specific moral code. This is perhaps the most influential approach to moral education, and it differs markedly from Values Clarification in the emphasis it places upon social consensus as opposed to the perspective of the individual.

Andrew Oldenquist is a philosopher who has championed the Inculcation Approach. In "Moral Education Without Moral Education," he raises the following question: "Is it that our educators are so concerned with the rights of the individual that they think individuals can grow up and flourish without any training in social morality or commitment to a common

good?" Oldenquist argues that the concerns of such educators are absurd, and that they ignore the fact that we do have a unified "core of social morality."

> It is important to distinguish the moral core that sustains a moral community from the controversial issues that bewilder adults. The moral core is nearly the same in every tribe and society on the face of the earth . . . it is the minimum required for human co-operative living. This core morality is honesty, fairness, incest aversion, and keeping unwanted hands off other people's bodies and property. We can add personal virtues such as courage, diligence, and self-respect, and for our society a value that is not universal: respect for the democratic process.

He contends that to reason about moral dilemmas one needs to "have already accepted and internalized a basic core of principles." An example, he cites, is the principle of honesty, whereby the acceptance and seriousness of adopting this principle is necessary "before one will agonize over exceptions to it." Oldenquist would argue there is no sense in students scrutinizing exceptions to moral rules when they have yet to understand and internalize those rules.

> Moral education without justified moral content will be perceived as a pointless game. What we owe children is a strong direction in the actual acquisition of morality, not just chatter about "values."[14]

Oldenquist's version of the Inculcation approach endorses what is commonly known as the "bag of virtues" strategy of moral education. There may be an understandable reaction here to some of the excesses of Value Clarification, but Oldenquist ignores the risks of indoctrination implicit in the Inculcation approach. The moral problem of indoctrination in

the Inculcation approach has been taken up by Jerrold Coombes. According to Coombes, indoctrination means that beliefs are "fixed and not amenable to change on the basis of relevant evidence or grounds." Such an approach, in his view, is morally indefensible in that it does not respect children "as rational beings having the right to construct their beliefs on the basis of their own experience." Hence, he raises the question: "Why would anyone adopt this seemingly immoral approach?"

> Proponents of this view tend to believe that it is essential to the welfare of the child and the society for the child to adopt the society's moral views. Consequently, they regard indoctrination as a necessary evil. Notice that there is little to recommend this approach to moral education unless one believes that moral views cannot be taught rationally.[15]

The hazards of indoctrination, which are assumed to prevail specifically within the inculcation approach, are an issue that sparks considerable debate and controversy. Indeed, the appeal of values clarification is precisely that it avoids the problems of indoctrination which the inculcation approach creates. It may be argued in favor of inculcation, however, that it is an appropriate strategy at a stage of moral development when young children are still incapable of understanding the rational grounds for moral principles. Until children are able to develop the capacity for independent thinking, they should be indoctrinated or conditioned to acquire a moral character. This has been viewed in some quarters as the pre-rational training which

lays the foundation for moral education. An element of caution, however, is needed to ensure that indoctrination is kept to a minimum.

> [I]ndoctrination occurs where teaching a false belief is done intentionally in such a way as to render present or future rational evaluation of this belief impossible or strongly improbable. The process can be assisted by fostering an inappropriate or partial approach to the question.[16]

In other words, inculcation is only acceptable if the child is helped eventually to evaluate the grounds on which the moral rule is based.

R. S. Peters would echo these sentiments. He raises the question in his discussion in "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education." He argues that moral principles are beyond the understanding of young children so that inculcation precedes rational autonomy. Therefore, Peters claims that children necessarily "enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition."[17] In other words, habitual conformity to a code that is not rationally held by the child becomes part of moral learning, until such time as the child develops the capacity to form moral judgements in a reasonable manner.

In summary, it can be argued that conditions can be made conducive toward a child achieving a rational moral code via the course of accepting moral rules from an authority. However, it will be important to discriminate between those moral rules which are unreasonable and those classified as

pre-rational in the sense that they are rationally justified even though the child cannot yet appreciate that justification. Moreover, it is equally important that this pre-rational inculcation occur in ways that do not inhibit rational reflection when the child becomes capable of it.

Rational Deliberation View:

This approach to moral education attempts to secure a basis for moral objectivity and judgement that cannot be located in authority or tradition. In that respect it differs from the social conservatism of the Inculcation approach in its pure form, even if exponents of the Rational Deliberation strategy may leave some room for inculcation at the level of pre-rational training.

According to Coombes, this stance toward moral education presupposes "that moral judgements can and do differ in the degree to which they are rational or well-grounded."[18] The complexity involved in moral decision-making is recognized, but it is also stressed that the approach taken toward making decisions can result in objectively good or poor decision-making.

One species of this approach is what might be dubbed "formalism," and one of the most influential representatives of formalism is the moral philosopher-educator, John Wilson. He sets out a theory of what it means to be rational in the

moral sphere — i.e., a theory of what dispositions and abilities are required to be a rational moral agent and what constitutes the criteria for rational decision-making. He argues that what is required to "do" morality and become an effective moral agent is to apply well-defined "procedural" principles. One needs to work with a methodology to learn how to become rational about morality. Thus the primary emphasis in moral education should fall on the *form* which correct moral thinking should take. He attempts to elucidate a concept of moral education which is consistent with respect, in the sense of active concern, for the individual learner as a being with the potential for independent evaluation, choice and rational belief. For Wilson, educating a pupil morally is a matter of teaching how to "do" morals in much the same way that to be educated in science is a matter of learning how to "do" science.[19]

The analogy between an education in science and moral education depends on the assumptions that procedures exist in each domain for the objective assessment of propositions and that these procedures can be clearly distinguished from the content of particular scientific or moral beliefs. Wilson's aim is not to make pupils adopt any particular moral belief but to give them the necessary means to develop and assess a moral code of their own. An adequate program of moral education need not, in his view, assign primary importance to

"substantive principles"; the stress must rather be placed upon procedural principles.[20]

Wilson's position gives rise to philosophical questions concerning form and content in morality. Can we really really teach form without content? There are counter-arguments to suggest that it is not possible to have a program of moral education that is void of content. As DeFaveri points out, "a program of moral education can remain content-free only if it is . . . made trivial, and . . . any program of moral education that has the least importance must make reference to content."[21] But in fact, Wilson does not contend that form can be taught without content. He explicitly says that

> arguments about whether stress should be laid on content or on method in moral education are shown to be misguided: both are inextricably interlocked since morality is a complete form of life, partly concerned with action and partly with feeling.[22]

His point is not that moral education should instill form without content, but that the rational procedures which constitute the form of moral thinking are the *essential* focus of moral education. In the following chapter, Wilson's approach will be explored in greater detail.

It should be noted that there are other examples of the formalist version of the Rational Deliberation strategy, and perhaps the most famous example is Lawrence Kohlberg's.[23] I have chosen to focus on Wilson's theory, even though it is less influential than Kohlberg's, because I believe it is more philosophically coherent and fruitful. The summit of moral

development, according to Kohlberg, is his so-called Stage Six; which in many ways parallels Wilson's formalist account of moral reasoning. Stage Six specifies a procedure of moral reasoning which purports to be justifiable independently of moral content, and it involves a principle of universality akin to Wilson's universalizability. But Kohlberg has been rightly criticised for offering a confused and ambiguous account of ethical universality.[24] Furthermore, Stage Six exalts justice over all other virtues within the moral life, and critics have noted that this preference for justice is not sufficiently justified by Kohlberg.[25] Lastly, feminist moral educators have stressed the implicit disparagement of emotion and attitudes of caring in Kohlberg's theory.[26]

It can be argued that Wilson's theory escapes the criticisms that have been directed against Kohlberg's example of the Rational Deliberation strategy, or at least that Wilson's theory is less vulnerable to the criticisms. First, Wilson offers a lucid and coherent account of universalizability. Second, the formalist analysis of moral reasoning he offers is not presented as exclusively relevant to the virtue of justice — it may guide us where other virtues, like compassion or courage, have application. Finally, Wilson's theory provides an integrative analysis of moral competence that does not disparage the emotions. As we shall see, empathy and active concern for the well-being of others is central to his theory. In this regard, Wilson's

views fit much better with feminist approaches to moral education than Kohlberg's. However, by emphasizing the ways in which emotion needs to be regulated by reason, and giving rational guidance for how moral reasoning might proceed where caring attachments clash, Wilson may in some respects offer a more complete account of moral agency than the feminist critics of Kohlberg.

Summary

It has been argued that the current social context of moral education is one of confusion and disarray. Secondly, it has been contended that schools ultimately play a major role in moral education. This is not to suggest that the schools will now become the panacea for our contemporary moral crises, but that our current difficulties do warrant formal involvement in moral education. However, what is lacking is a strong theoretical base which will identify legitimate aims and procedures for a program in moral education. It has been suggested that two of the most influential competing approaches that have emerged in attempts to implement a moral educational program in schools — Values Clarification and the Inculcation approach — are philosophically and practically flawed. A philosophical argument and theory that purports to resolve some of the major issues and provide a rationally defensible conception of the morally educated person is put

forth by moral philosopher-educator John Wilson, whose theory exemplifies a third approach, the Rational Deliberation strategy, which is more appealing than the other two. It is to the discussion of his theory that the study now turns.

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19. John Wilson, Norman Williams, and Barry Sugarman, Introduction to Moral Education (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1967), 26-27.

20. John Wilson, "Motivation and Methodology in Moral Education," Journal of Moral Education 10 no. 2 (January, 1981): 85.

21. Ivan DeFaveri, "Moral Education: The Risk of Oversimplification," Essay Review, Alberta Journal of Educational Research XXV no. 4 (December, 1979): 295.

22. John Wilson and Barbara Cowell, "Method, Content, and Motivation in Moral Education," Journal of Moral Education 16 no. 1 (January, 1967): 31.

23. See Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981).

24. Richard Brook, "Justice and the Golden Rule: A Commentary on Some Recent Work by Lawrence Kohlberg," Ethics, 97, no. 2 (January 1987), 363-373.

25. Owen Flanagan and Jonathan Adler, "Impartiality and Particularity," Social Research, 50 (1983), 576-596.

26. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Nel Noddings, Caring (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).

CHAPTER II

A Rational Approach to Morality and Moral Education — John Wilson's Philosophical and Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This chapter attempts to explain Wilson's theory of moral education. The central principle of his theory is that by acquainting pupils with a body of rational principles, a "methodology" for moral problem-solving, they will ipso facto come to be competent moral agents.

Wilson contends that progress in our understanding of moral education is greatly hampered by various "fantasies" which induce us to pervert moral education into an ideologically partisan endeavor. Combating these 'emotional fantasies' and 'resistances' is thus a crucial task for the theory and practice of moral education. Wilson identifies two major fantasies:

> There is: (a) the fantasy that moral education can only proceed by taking as its basis a set of substantive and particular moral values (derived from 'society,' or from Christianity, or what Marx says or some other ideological platform); (b) the fantasy that there are no such things as right answers to morality, that one judgement is as good as another, that 'everything is relative.'[1]

Therefore, Wilson asserts the only route toward advancement in the domain of morality will be through an impartial analysis of a moral methodology. The latter is the resource required in order to perform effectively within the realm of morality, and hence be deemed a competent moral agent. The concept of a rational "moral methodology" represents a major thrust of his philosophical position. It is only on the basis of such a methodology that we can acquire objectively right answers within the moral domain:

> In fact, education in morality is like education in other areas of human thought and action, in that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, and a set of abilities, rules, procedures and qualities which enable us to obtain right answers and act on them — in brief, a methodology. In this way, morality has a 'basis' just as other subjects or forms of thought or departments of life have a basis.[2]

This approach in his view is "non-partisan"[3] because it is derived from pure reason, rather than from the tenets of any one specific creed or culture, ideology, group or set of specific values. According to Wilson, this emphasis on reason is required by the very concept of education.

> Moral education demands more than just a set of overt (perhaps conditioned) movements. It demands more than intentional behavior, since we are interested in a person having the right sort of intentions, reasons and motives. It demands more even than this, since we are interested in a person's dispositions or state of mind, from which his reasons and motives — and hence ultimately his behavior — will flow.[4]

As in any other subject or department of life, what is required is the ability to grasp what constitutes a "good

performer" within the domain of morality and to discriminate among the various attributes germane to being a "good performer." Wilson believes that such attributes will have no necessary connection with current social mores. Rather, they have to be determined through an explication of what it means by "being reasonable" or "being educated" within the moral realm.

The primary task for a program in moral education according to Wilson's understanding will be to compile a detailed list of the component abilities and attributes of a morally educated person. This essential philosophical task is one that has preoccupied Wilson right from his earliest writings on moral education. He leaves the onus for the appraisal of those ingredients of a morally educated person to the jurisdiction of psychologists and other empirical workers.

Without an approach to moral education grounded in rational moral methodology, we would merely be swapping prejudices and/or conveying facts whose moral relevance would not be understood. This failure in moral education would parallel a truncated education in science which never moved beyond transmitting scientific information, preaching about the importance of the topic and its history, while eliminating the most important ingredient —i.e., the understanding of the methodology of scientific reasoning.

Wilson states that if we are to be earnest about confronting the question, "What ought I to do?" then the

nature of our earnestness entails a commitment to a set of rational procedures that are required to respond appropriately to the question. More precisely, to answer rationally this question, one must have some grasp as to the prescriptive force of the word "ought,"[5] awareness of what constitutes a person, the ability to discriminate what a person's interests and needs are, and to identify pertinent empirical facts. Further, one must manifest qualities, such as determination, alertness and commitment in order to have the means in which to act upon the answer put forth. Such attributes would be required by any devoted moral agent, and as such, Wilson suggests these attributes would represent the incontestable aims of moral education.

Before proceeding to elaborate upon Wilson's methodological approach in greater detail, there is a necessity to (1) make a distinction between two meanings of "moral," and (2) explain Wilson's preference for a particular concept of morality.

The Meanings of "Moral"

According to Wilson, one fundamental distinction within the language of morality is between "moral" as an evaluative term and "moral" used in a sociological sense usually referring to a specific code or set of values. For example, we often describe an action as immoral meaning that it is

contrary to the established moral code of our society. This is not an evaluative claim in that it could be intelligibly made by someone who rejects that code.

Wilson would suggest that behavior which is correctly described as "moral" in the sociological sense need not be deserving of the approval which "moral" implies in its evaluative sense. Moreover, if any particular use of "moral" in its evaluative sense is to be warranted, its grounds must be found in some conceptual domain which transcends social mores:

> [Morals] can be used to mark out a particular kind of human thought and action, not on the basis of what the mores of a particular society are, but on some other basis . . . . We seem rather to be making some kind of logical or conceptual classification of the area of morality, quite apart from what anyone regards (rightly or wrongly) as that area.[6]

It is the latter connotation of "morals" that Wilson focuses on. His purpose is to institute a procedure for finding rational grounds for judgements about what is moral in the evaluative sense. He believes that such a procedure can only be identified by elucidating "the formal character of a moral judgement or a moral point of view." From Wilson's standpoint, this represents a departure from just transmitting specific values to one that constitutes individual reasoning and critical scrutiny.

The procedure of rational moral thinking is analyzed by Wilson in terms of what he calls the "moral components."[7] The

latter constitute those attributes or abilities which will enable one to confront moral dilemmas in a rational and independent way without undue reliance upon external sources. The emphasis within this approach is upon individual autonomy, with a concomitant curtailment of those dominant social forces which shape morality in the sociological sense. Wilson is realistic enough to acknowledge the immense power of the influences imparted by society and therefore a need to make adjustment, but at the same time he wants to strive toward retaining the integrity and uniqueness of the individual as an independent moral agent. Wilson submits we are propelled toward the notion of the individual as a "moral being." In essence, the moral agent whose morality is determined by reason would be one who participates in a specific activity, involving a particular kind of thinking and a process of doing; in essence he or she would be one who engages "in a particular form of thought or department of life."

Reason and Language

Wilson claims that approaches to moral education which take the sociological concept of morality as its focus do not allow us to judge reasonably between one moral judgement and another. We cannot overcome the inadequacies of such approaches by introducing different codes or authorities. Rather, what is imperative is a standpoint which would enable

us to adjudicate between codes and authorities in an objective manner. That standpoint must comprise principles which "will not themselves be moral principles or codes; they will be principles by which one judges between various moral codes or authorities." If these "second-order" principles are to do the job of resolving "first-order" moral disputes, they will need to be severed from any partisan moral point of view or content base. From the outset, what we need to accomplish, Wilson suggests, is an "agreement about the second-order principles governing morality, rather than about what should be the (first-order) content of particular moral beliefs."[8]

What Wilson is basically trying to emphasize is a separation between the substantive content of moral beliefs which should not be prescribed as definitive, and second-order norms or rules of procedure which are rationally inescapable. For example, such norms as self-awareness, confronting the facts, developing our imagination, being consistent and attentive to logic would be among the ultimate objectives of moral education because they are derivable from second-order considerations. Identifying what counts as a morally educated person in terms of formal criteria may not, as Wilson candidly admits, provide us with all that is required. However, it will enable us to discern the essential aspects of moral competence in any person's life.

Wilson's account of the second-order principles of morality is taken from the influential theory of R. M. Hare.

According to Hare, the moral domain is differentiated by the second-order principles of prescriptivity, universalizability, and over-ridingness.[9] Wilson identifies what counts as a moral reason in terms of Hare's formal criteria, irrespective of any condition of content. That is to say, any judgement which instantiates the three principles is a moral judgement, regardless of what the judgement is about.

The three principles can be best understood through an example. Suppose I say, "I ought to give one-tenth of my income to famine relief." The judgement is prescriptive in that it commits me to a particular course of action — viz., giving a specific portion of my income to famine relief. Prescriptivity is what differentiates moral judgements from descriptive factual claims. For example, if I say, "Famine is a serious global problem," I have made a factual statement which would not in itself commit me to any specific course of action. However, a judgement could be prescriptive without having any moral status. "I want to give one-tenth of my income to famine relief" is prescriptive, but it is no more a moral judgement than "I want to save one-tenth of my income for a new car." Expressions of desire are not bona fide moral judgements because they lack universalizability. In making a truly moral judgement, on the other hand, the prescription made is affirmed as universalizable in the sense that it is taken to be appropriate for <u>all</u> moral agents in relevantly similar circumstances. If I say that I ought to give one-

tenth of my income to famine relief, but that others in different circumstances should give more or less, then it is incumbent on me to identify relevant differences between their circumstances and mine which justify the distinction. This might be done by noting that those who ought to give more are wealthier than me or by saying that those who should give less are poorer. However, if I cannot find any relevant differences between the circumstances of another moral agent and mine, then when I say, "I ought to give one-tenth of my income to famine relief," the universalizability of that judgement entails that he or she also ought to give the same amount to famine relief. Because the principle of universalizability prohibits us from assigning any privileged status to our own interests or anyone else's *a priori*, it is essentially a principle of equality. Finally, serious moral judgements are overriding. That is to say, we will actually act upon them if we are capable of doing so, even though we may be inclined to make prescriptive judgements which would go against moral judgement. For example, if I say, "I want to give nothing to charity because I need to buy a new car" and also "I ought to give one-tenth of my income to famine relief," then a nonmoral prescription conflicts with what appears to be a moral prescription in my deliberations. If I act on the non-moral prescription, then it is clear that I did not make a serious moral judgement to begin with because it was not overriding.

The components of the morally educated person are deduced by Wilson from the three second-order principles. First, there is what he calls PHIL — an active concern for the good of others, a sense of fair play, and respect for other people. This is necessary to ensure that people are motivated to make universalizable judgements which give equal weight to others' interests and their own.

Secondly, KRAT refers to the ability to carry through one's principles into action, an attribute which is required by the overridingness of moral judgements. EMP designates the awareness of one's own and other people's feelings which is essential if a defensible universalizable judgement is to be made. GIG refers to the mastery of relevant factual knowledge. DIK refers to the co-ordination of these various attributes in the formulation of rationally defensible principles.

The second-order principles outlined above, and the components of the morally educated person Wilson deduced from them, entail a distinctive view of rationality in the moral domain. For Wilson, being rational in the moral sphere specifically means:

1. Acting for a reason
2. Acting for a reason related to other people's needs in a way that acknowledges human equality
3. Being logically consistent
4. Knowing the facts and facing them

5. Applying all these skills and translating them into action.[10]

Wilson wants to make very clear that he is not suggesting that his methodological orientation does not mean that morally educated agents are expected to consciously employ the methodology before every moral action. He is quite aware that as human beings, we do not always act or think reflectively. Even if one were to be shown how to think reasonably in the moral domain, one might lack the will to do so. Rather, he wants to emphasize that there is such a thing as 'being reasonable' or 'behaving justifiably' in morality and to be educated in the moral realm, minimally, is to be aware of what reasons are to be used in this domain and how to exercise reasoning in particular cases. This would be only minimal success in moral education, however, since an adequate level of success would lead students to act on the basis of their moral reasons.

Aims of Moral Education

If morality can be understood as a domain of thought and action characterized by certain second-order principles — universalizability, prescriptivity, and overridingness — then it becomes possible to specify a range of educational aims which would ensure students' initiation into the relevant domain.

First, morality needs to become an independent and

serious focus for study, with the methodology provided by the second-order principles becoming the main emphasis. Second, education must encourage and strengthen the motivation to apply the methodology even in situations where the individual might be tempted to act contrary to the requirements of morality. Third, through persistent practice of rational moral thinking, the use of the methodology will become second nature for students. Fourth, as the methodology becomes psychologically entrenched, students will learn to be less vulnerable to sources of moral influence repugnant to reason. Fifth, mastery of the methodology of morals entails proficiency in detecting one's own failures to live in conformity with its requirements, as well as the failures of others in this regard, in specific situations. Lastly, as this proficiency develops, students must also acquire the motivation to overcome their moral limitations and the knowledge that would be necessary to that task.

A comprehensive list of his moral components that constitute moral competence is available in Appendix A, and an analysis of the meanings of the categories and sub-categories, and how ascriptions of the components can be warranted is available in Appendix B.

A distinctive conception of the morally educated person thus emerges from Wilson's analysis of moral methodology. The morally educated person demonstrates respect for other people's interests; exhibits logical consistency and is

knowledgeable about the facts related to moral issues under scrutiny, and finally, is able to demonstrate the ability and desire to translate them into appropriate action. The next question we must address is this: What are the main implications for schools of a commitment to Wilson's conception of moral education?

Major Implications for Schooling

Wilson strongly recommends that there be a direct process of moral education. One cannot do justice to the importance and complexity of moral education by treating it merely as an adjunct to other fields of study. The point of his position is that unless moral education can be effectively "institutionalized," it will not be taken earnestly, nor given sufficient opportunity to flourish. He is suggesting that morality has its own distinctive concepts, criteria, procedures and methodology and therefore, deserves at least the same curricular status in education as mathematics or science.

Wilson's thinking on this point converges the views of the philosopher-educator, Paul Hirst, who argues that "morality has a 'basis' just as other subjects or forms of thought or departments of life have a basis." As such, morality must be assigned the status of a distinct "form of thought."[11]

Morality would therefore possess a set of concepts and criteria that would not hinge upon any ideologies. Instead, morality would need to be treated and approached in the same manner as other subjects of study. The knowledge under discussion is how to make rational and defensible decisions. Hirst and Wilson maintain the case is overwhelming to organize moral knowledge for educational purposes and teach it during periods that would be explicitly concerned with moral education. They would concede that in exploring other subjects of study, moral questions naturally arise and are properly addressed in that context. Nevertheless, an informal treatment of moral issues could not do justice to the range and complexity of the moral issues our students must confront. As both Wilson and Hirst maintain, there needs to be the independent task of giving explicit attention to moral questions because otherwise moral education is likely to be a sporadic and fragmented process.[12]

Although Wilson recognizes his proposed methodology has raised controversy, he nevertheless points out what he deems to be the advantages of the methodology. First, it is honest, in that if we claim that pupils are being educated in morality, we need to have clear ideas about the aims and guidelines to resolve moral problems in a responsible manner and what qualities are called for. If we cannot make this claim, then we have no right to be in the activity of morally educating. Secondly, it is professional, in that the

methodology is a reasonable and coherent basis for doing morality just as there is for undertaking the subject of science, and so moral educators can teach in the same professional spirit that science educators can. Without this approach, Wilson contends, teachers are liable to become anxious about moral inculcation, and thereby tend not to give pupils the clear idea that there are right and wrong answers to moral issues, and that there is a coherent methodology for resolving them. This, in his view, inevitably leads to or reinforces the feelings prevalent today of such expressions as 'It's all relative, really, isn't it?', 'It's just a matter of how you feel,' [or] 'Different people have their own views,' and 'It's a matter of taste.'[13]

Wilson's argument about moral education in schools reflects a traditional approach to curriculum development and structure. A principle pedagogic task he maintains, is to ensure teachers are to understand morality, particularly at the philosophical level. This is essential if they are to formulate the materials required at the practical level. With teaching about the domain of morality or about thinking morally as part of the school curriculum, focus would need to be upon examination and interpretation of the moral components. Such a course would contain exercises in moral philosophy as opposed to preaching. Moral philosophy in his view can be instrumental in helping to solve the practical problems of moral education by helping to clarify the meanings

of moral words. Wilson suggests there could be separate subjects in the school curriculum, and there could be partial integration into other subject areas, in a manner where focus is upon the moral components. He suggests that history and literature could be taught in a way that enhances one's awareness of other people in society, mime and drama that could help to impart reality to moral and psychological problems, music and art that could be relevant in demonstrating ways in which emotions are conveyed. He also emphasizes the dialectic method in the various contexts of moral education, making the claim that such a method could be important for the involvement, passion and active commitment that it generates.[14]

Wilson makes a distinction between two types of school-based activities. "Moral education" would be germane to the cultivation of a rational, autonomous moral agent, while the "Pre-conditions"[15] of that process would constitute the realm of moral training and would relate to activities that are necessary before an individual can develop the level of rationality or intellectual understanding required. Some of Wilson's more practical works on moral education argue for a moral training that transmits traditional norms as the foundation for subsequent rational reflection. But he also suggests qualities pertaining to pre-conditions would be self-esteem, meaningful relationships and the ability to deal with the feelings of others. Wilson suggests pre-conditions would

not in themselves constitute moral components, but would be deemed as antecedent to rational growth:

> The crucial point . . . in considering what pre-conditions to establish or what arrangements to make in moral education, our criteria of justification must be taken from a neutral and non-partisan definition of a morally educated person and from no-where else . . . . What we must do is to inspect the arrangements, and ask whether these arrangements generate those pre-conditions . . . necessary for producing people who are morally educated in the second-order sense of being rational, sane, 'reality-oriented,' autonomous, . . . or whatever general descriptive expression we care to use. Whether a precondition is necessary . . . is not a matter of whether we ourselves happen to approve . . . . It is a matter of whether or not the facts show that a particular arrangement does actually result in giving the child a piece of essential equipment. This is why it is important to regard these arrangements as preconditions rather than as . . . morally educational processes. For if we give them the latter description, we shall be tempted to think that we can judge our arrangements on some first-order partisan basis.[16]

The role of the teacher represents a crucial element in his approach to moral education. The onus upon teachers is to help facilitate the development of the components of moral thinking. It would be essential for teachers to possess a philosophical understanding of the significance of the moral components. Secondly, Wilson maintains, teachers must be able to demonstrate the practical ability to teach and foster the units for instruction that teach the components. He also joins Mary Warnock in tending to be sceptical toward the notion that teachers remain "neutral" in matters of morality.[17] Rather, the role of the teacher is to point out good and bad reasons in the moral domain and to demonstrate to

pupils how to formulate conclusions from evidence. Therefore, he would maintain that in order to teach the process of moral deliberation and resolve moral issues, teachers must present their views and reasons. Therefore, if a teacher undertakes the teaching of the process of moral education, he/she will then, at the same time, be presenting a moral position.

Summary

For Wilson, then, morality should constitute a well-defined subject, requiring teachers to be adept not only in the pedagogical domain, but also in understanding the procedures of rational moral thought. The essential thrust of this approach to moral education is forcefully expressed in the following passage.

> Much has been said about the 'moral vacuum' left by the anti-authoritarian trend of the last few decades (and earlier), and of course it is right to point to the anxiety, the neurosis, the alienation, the drifting, the sense of being lost, that our pupils will have unless they are given something to hang on to. But it is also important, for the general future of education, that morality as a coherent subject is not allowed to perish by default. This is something which could well happen . . . because people are not clear, or agreed about a methodology appropriate for settling questions . . . . ., we may easily relapse into a form of education where the truth, if any, . . . is simply not tackled at all, or is tackled only by those pupils who choose to tackle it. If this did happen . . . to morality, it would be a major disaster. We should have given up the whole idea of education in [morality] because we should have given up the whole idea of what is true or false, right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, and this could have far worse long-term consequences than anything which happens to the pupils immediately under our care. We have to give them something to hang on

to, and we have to hang on to it ourselves.[18]

What Wilson has attempted to argue is that the central barriers impeding moral education pertain to those ingrained fantasies and prejudices that we, at this point, have not moved beyond. What he claims to have proposed for our consideration is a framework that strongly reflects the rational approach to moral education. At the same time he has attempted to demonstrate the essence of the subject, including the psychological, intellectual and pragmatic dimensions that are demanded from us if we are to seriously embrace the topic of moral education.

Wilson's rational approach to moral education has called forth a number of critics who have explicated both complementary and alternative viewpoints. The views of these critics will now be explored.

Footnotes

1. John Wilson, Discipline and Moral Education (Windsor, Barks, Great Britain: The NFER-Nelson Publishing Co., 1981), 86.

2. John Wilson, A New Introduction To Moral Education (London: Cassell Educational Ltd., 1990), 17.

3. Wilson, Discipline and Moral Education, 85.

4. John Wilson, Norman Williams, Barry Sugarman, Introduction To Moral Education (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1967), 67.

5. Wilson, Discipline and Moral Education, 86.

6. Wilson, Introduction To Moral Education, 44-45.

7. John Wilson, The Assessment of Morality (Windsor, Berks, Great Britain: The NFER-Nelson Publishing Co. Ltd., 1973), 8, 38.

8. Wilson, Introduction To Moral Education, 3, 26-27.

9. R. M. Hare, "Language and Moral Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. Donald B. Cochrane et al. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education, 1979), 89-106.

10. Wilson, Introduction To Moral Education, 89.

11. John Wilson, "Moral Education: Retrospect and Prospect," Journal of Moral Education 9 no. 1 (October, 1979): 5.

12. Meriel Downey and A. V. Kelly, Moral Education: Theory and Practice (London: Harper & Row, 1978), 153.

13. Wilson, Introduction To Moral Education, 17, 8, 189-190.

14. Barry Chazan, Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: Analyzing Alternative Theories (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985), 43.

15. Wilson, Introduction To Moral Education, 129.

16. Wilson, Introduction To Moral Education, 129-130.

17. Barry Chazan, Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: Analyzing Alternative Theories (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985), 42.

18. Wilson, A New Introduction To Moral Education, 191-192.

CHAPTER III

The Critics' Responses to John Wilson's Elucidation of a Rational Approach to Moral Education and Wilson's Rejoiners

Introduction

There is an extensive critical literature on Wilson's theory of moral education, and he has also written extensively in response to his critics. This chapter explores some of the major themes which emerge in that literature. Those critical themes will be presented from the viewpoints of Jerrold Coombes, Francis Dunlop, Alan Watt, and Mary Warnock. There appears to be two main lines of criticism that have been developed against Wilson, both converging on the claim that he misrepresents the "role of reason" in morality and moral education.

First, there is criticism which claims that he does not have an adequate theory of moral reason. Is a theory of moral education that places primary emphasis upon formal, second-order principles sufficient to explain the role of reason in the moral life? Does Wilson's distinction between form and content collapse? Or if not, does the kind of moral reasoning

that moral educators should be cultivating have a much more extensive content than Wilson's allegedly empty formalism will allow? Even though Wilson's interpretation of moral rationality may be satisfactory so far as it goes, does he not underestimate the role of non-rational aspects of moral competence?

Secondly, the major practical objection to Wilson's ideas on moral education focuses upon his faith in the role of "formal instruction" in the domain of morality. This faith is reflected in his analogies between moral education and education in other academic domains. Wilson frequently alludes to helping students "do" morality in the way they are taught to do science or arithmetic. If an education in science or arithmetic is significantly parallel to an education in morality, then the formal instruction which is apt in the former will presumably have an important place in the latter as well. Obviously, Wilson's faith in the efficacy of formal instruction reflects his assumption that moral competence is essentially reducible to rational competencies, and critics who have attacked Wilson for his emphasis upon formal instruction have focused on this underlying assumption.

Jerrold Coombes — "Concerning the Nature of Moral Competence"

In his article, "Concerning the Nature of Moral Competence," Jerrold Coombes identifies some alleged

limitations of Wilson's approach to moral education. Coombes is one of Wilson's most sympathetic critics and their theories of moral education are closely aligned. Coombes criticizes Wilson for alleged inadequacies in his theory of moral reasoning.

Coombes rejects Wilson's view that moral reasoning necessarily entails overriding judgements. Coombes gives an example of someone who crosses a picket line to save his career while disregarding the interests of his fellow workers. The judgement to cross the picket line was overriding, but it does not seem to be moral. The problem with the overridingness condition, according to Coombes, is that since the judgements we act on are necessarily overriding, the condition makes it "logically impossible" not to act on our moral judgements. But this seems to deny the obvious fact that we sometimes go against our moral judgements.

A further criticism Coombes levels against Wilson's conception of moral reason concerns his supposed neglect of general moral rules and principles. It is commonly argued that a judicious reliance upon such rules and principles is necessary in the moral life because otherwise moral agents will be incapable of spontaneous, unreflective moral situations where this is required of them — e.g., in situations where a stranger requires immediate help or a promise must be promptly fulfilled without undue deliberation. Reviewing Wilson's moral components, Coombes can find no sign

of "the role of rules and principles in being morally competent." Wilson does not recognize the fact that we have some "moral rules . . . . that it would be irrational not to hold." Such moral rules could be those identified by Gert, who suggests that some general rules, such as "Don't kill" or "Don't deprive others of freedom,"[1] are rationally compelling for all moral agents.

Coombes believes that acknowledging the importance of general rules and principles in the moral life would require a revision of what Wilson defines as KRAT(1):

> noticing moral situations, and seeing them as such. Basically this is a matter of bringing to bear PHIL, the concept of person and the conviction that one ought to act in accordance with others' interests.[2]

Coombes gives an example which purports to show that this interpretation of KRAT is insufficient to identify situations calling for moral judgement. "I may recognize that Joe is a person and that by telling him a joke this morning I could act in his interest." Yet the triviality of this situation surely makes it something other than a genuinely moral predicament, even though it is an instance of the application of what Wilson calls KRAT. Coombes would argue that the situation is not genuinely moral precisely because it does not fall under those rules or principles — e.g., do not kill, keep your promises, etc. — which identify situations as morally serious or hazardous.

Coombes also criticizes Wilson for what he regards as an

excessively individualistic view of moral deliberation. For Wilson, a moral agent makes moral choices under his own steam, so to speak, and moral traditions and the judgements of others have no substantial role in the deliberative process. Against this view, Coombes points out that key abilities and dispositions related to moral competence must also pertain to exploring and evaluating moral counsel and participating in collective moral reflection.[3]

Coombes registers some doubt as to whether philosophical understanding of moral reasoning must be a required component of moral competence. However, he does agree with Wilson that philosophical understanding of morality is a fundamental and distinctive attribute of a morally educated person, and as such, a salient objective of "moral education." He suggests that even though we have enough understanding for instructional purposes of the central properties of rational morality, we nevertheless must concede that our notion of rational morality does contain some inaccuracies or distortions. Coombes argues that we must not convey "uncritical acceptance" of what we deem to be "rational morality."[4] It is important that Wilson would certainly agree on that point. The morally educated person must remain critical and open-minded regarding the philosophical foundations of his or her morality. If Coombes' criticisms are telling, at most they require a fine-tuning of Wilson's theory rather than extensive revisions or outright rejection.

First, Wilson could easily concede our need for a range of substantive principles or rules we rely upon in routine moral situations. However, he would insist that we must learn to select and, where necessary, revise those rules on the basis of the second-order principles of moral reason. Second, Wilson could also concede the value of moral counsel and shared moral deliberation, though again he would stress the need for children to learn to assess these according to the procedures of rational moral thinking. Finally, there is reason to argue that Coombes perhaps misjudges the role of overridingness in Wilson's theory. Wilson does not take the view that all overriding practical judgements are moral. Many overriding judgements — e.g., the judgements of self-interest which Coombes focuses on — are not universalizable, and hence they fail to qualify as moral by Wilson's criteria.

Francis Dunlop — "Moral Procedures and Moral Education"

Francis Dunlop challenges Wilson's "procedural interpretation of moral education." Dunlop suggests that it is mistaken to suppose that moral competence can be reduced to the application of a range of intellectual procedures. The supposition is a mistake, according to Dunlop, because the content of our moral beliefs and practices are logically prior to whatever formal procedures we might design for assessing them.[5]

Dunlop notes that Wilson's whole approach to moral education depends on a crisp distinction between the substance or content of morality, on the one hand — i.e., the judgements, behavior, assessments of behavior, etc., which comprise the ethical life we actually lead — and the abstract procedures in terms of which we should determine this content of morality, on the other hand. For Wilson, the procedures are the paramount aspect in moral education since only these can ensure that the content of our morality is rationally defensible. But recognizing that morality is not the invention of moral philosophers, Dunlop charges that our notion of morality is one we are already endowed with prior to any philosophical analysis of the procedures of rational moral thought. For when did we ever intentionally formulate the "rules," "principles," and "procedures" that partially comprise "rationality"? As Dunlop suggests, as we have evolved into "self-consciousness, we found ourselves with it." That is to say, the procedures of moral thinking we claim to discern in philosophical reflection are derived from the content of our moral experience and traditions.[6]

Dunlop does not deny that reflection on the procedures of moral thinking can be a significant part of moral education. But we must not only examine what procedures we have adopted, we need to be confident that the procedures we endorse are in line with what would be an acceptable content to the moral life. This means that our understanding of procedures is

purposely subordinated to our understanding of acceptable content, despite Wilson's claim to the contrary. He points out, for example, that no theory of the procedures of moral reasoning would be credible if it claimed that lying was always commendable, irrespective of the philosophical arguments that could be made in favor of the theory.

Dunlop claims it is not only fatuous but grossly misleading to espouse a theory of moral education which presupposes a sharp distinction between form and content and exalts the former over the latter. Whatever procedures or method we create, we would only have the "right to teach them to children" if they are judged to be entirely descended from "reflection on such moral paradigms" of acceptable content as the moral prohibition against lying.[7]

Dunlop is aware that Wilson would suggest an alternative grounding for the procedures of moral reason. Instead of deriving these from our pre-reflective moral experience, Wilson would claim that these are entailed by the very notion of reasonableness itself. However, Dunlop submits, there is a difference between the requirements of logical consistency and the fundamental requirements of fairness and altruism which morality involves. Logical consistency certainly is necessary to morality in some sense but it is far from sufficient. "Certainly obedience to the laws of thought and obedience to the demands of the moral law are connected." But even if radical and incessant inconsistency is incompatible

with morality, some substantial departures from the laws of logic are compatible with moral excellence. As Dunlop notes "uneducated people with more or less 'butterfly' minds who frequently contradict themselves and rely on suggestion and context rather than logical precision, may . . . . be scrupulously moral people."[8] Furthermore, people who are impeccably rational may be grossly immoral. Dunlop maintains that the essential error behind Wilson's approach is the fallacy of supposing that a philosophical theory could fully capture the nature of morality and hence the basis of moral education. He charges that

> the attempt to make morality wholly reasonable and luminously intelligible — as Wilson tried to do by interpreting it in the light of the collective interests of society — tends to destroy it, not only "in thought" but also in practice. It seems as though there is an element of irrationality, in the sense of impenetrability, in morality which has in the end to be simply accepted as part of the conditions in which our lives must be led.[9]

This "simple acceptance" of morality, an acceptance that cannot be fully justified in rational terms, is the paramount goal of moral education. If a heart-felt acceptance of moral requirements is the basis of moral character, then Wilson's notion of morality "as a form of enquiry or a subject"[10] comparable to science, misleadingly accentuates the extent to which morality could become an elective. Dunlop is suggesting that those who finish school and perhaps think they can now discard mathematics, likewise could bestow the same attitude toward the moral methodology espoused by Wilson.[11]

The kernel of Dunlop's critique of Wilson is the claim that Wilson rationalizes morality in a way that distorts its true nature. This in turn leads to a proceduralist account of moral education which simplifies moral thinking and overlooks the significance of personal character and commitment.

"Moral Components and Moral Education: A Reply to Francis Dunlop" — John Wilson's Rejoiner

Wilson regards Dunlop's critique of the rationalistic view as deeply confused. First, he denies that his Rational approach means that morality can be completely reduced to an abstract knowledge of moral methodology, devoid of all content or emotional engagements. Instead, he sees the methods of moral reasoning as a way of differentiating good content from bad and appropriate from inappropriate emotional responses.[12]

Secondly, Wilson objects to Dunlop's contention that the procedures of rational moral thinking should be subordinated to the content of our pre-reflective judgements about right and wrong. He accuses Dunlop of adopting an *a priori* stance in opposition to the notion of rational methodology in the moral domain. How would we know if a segment of moral thinking is right or wrong, or an argument or moral behavior desirable or undesirable, except for some reason? Since such reasons are only discernible through rational moral thinking, it is incoherent to suggest that the methods of such thinking

be subordinated to our pre-reflective feelings or intuitions. Wilson concedes that in rational morality some of the elements of commonsense morality must be rescued as Dunlop suggests, but these will be the elements we find rationally defensible, not those which merely feel right.[13]

Thirdly, Wilson says Dunlop fails to make the distinction between

> (a) the philosophic task of setting out just what components are logically required for effective moral thoughts and action and how these components fit together, and
>
> (b) the practical task of actually educating pupils.[14]

For example, Wilson is <u>not</u> suggesting that just because certain intellectual procedures are shown to be the rational core of morality through philosophical inquiry, these procedures must always be the focus of moral education at the practical level.

It is not appropriate, in Wilson's view, for the philosopher to stipulate what should be the first step in moral education at the practical level. Specific practical questions about moral education always rest on "empirical considerations such as information about pertinent pupils." It is unthinkable to be giving lectures on philosophy, he maintains, to pupils who demonstrate a high level of insecurity, do not feel wanted, nor have the ability to maintain attention for periods of time to anything intellectually thoughtful. Conversely, others will be

emotionally and intellectually ready for direct instruction in the methodology of morals. However, the philosopher can still provide important practical guidance in mapping out the components of moral competence that are needed.[15]

Fourthly, Wilson confronts the charge that his emphasis on the educational significance of the form of morality leads to a complete disregard of the importance of content. Wilson agrees that moral education must dwell on the content of the moral life as well as the methods by which moral judgements are formed and revised. Serious moral education must balance content and form, and he concedes that the philosopher should not dictate the proper balance for each and every situation. Where he parts company with Dunlop is in his insistence that no items of content should be presented as immune to confirmation or disconfirmation through the application of rational criteria.[16]

Fifthly, Wilson takes issue with Dunlop's contention that having pupils instructed in procedures of morality means they "are thereby spared the ignominy of having to 'kowtow' to authority." Wilson points out that what constitutes an educated person is that he or she submits to the authority of reason in whatever sphere of activity he or she is engaged, whether it be morality, science, or something else. Wilson maintains that the authority of the procedures of moral reason is ultimately the only legitimate authority in the moral domain.[17]

Sixth, Wilson strongly rejects Dunlop's claim that "the attempt to make morality wholly reasonable . . . tends to destroy it" if that claim is intended to mean that we are entitled sometimes to hold moral views and act upon them without reason. This is unintelligible, or so Wilson claims, because being "entitled"[18] to a certain view or a particular action means having a good reason for the view or the action. Indeed, Wilson suggests that at this point, Dunlop's argument seems perilously close to "blatant irrationalism."[19]

In summary, Wilson challenges Dunlop's criticism, by claiming he is not suggesting morality can be reduced simply to abstract knowledge of moral methodology or that we should discard both content and emotional engagements. Wilson further suggests that moral reasoning is a way of distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable content and emotional responses. He rightly objects to Dunlop's notion that the procedures of rational morality are subservient to the content of pre-reflective judgements and/or pre-reflective feelings or intuitions of what is right or wrong. We need to have a reason for judging an argument or moral behavior to be inappropriate or an aspect of moral thinking to be incorrect. Even though he concurs with Dunlop that some elements of commonsense morality must be rescued, these will be elements that are rationally defensible, not those which may just feel right.[20]

Wilson submits Dunlop does not make the distinction

between what components are logically required for effective moral thought and activity, how these components are integrated, nor the practical function of morally educating. Although Wilson suggests that just because certain intellectual procedures are shown as the rational core of morality through philosophical enquiry, he is not implying these procedures must above all become the focal point at the practical level.[21]

Wilson suggests the philosopher should not be dictating what initial steps should transpire at the practical level, as many pertinent questions should rest upon empirical factors. On this point too, Wilson seems to be on solid ground. Importantly, students' emotional and intellectual abilities will dictate the level of direct instruction that should be implemented. The philosopher may provide guidance at the practical level by mapping out the components of moral competence, but to expect more of philosophy would be unrealistic.[22]

Alan Watt — "Rational Moral Education"

Alan J. Watt, in his work "Rational Moral Education," expresses similar views to those of Francis Dunlop. That is to say, he too contends that the formal principles of moral reasoning which Wilson says can be derived from the concept of reason are an inadequate basis for moral education.[23]

Where Watt seems to move onto new ground is in his critique of Wilson's treatment of the problem of self-interest and the interests of others. Watt calls into question the idea that morality must be grounded upon a "universal and impartial concern for the welfare of others."[24] Watt claims that egalitarian perspective may constitute one basic moral orientation, but to claim this is the only focus for a rational view of morality requires a much more compelling defence than Wilson supplies. Watt points out that Wilson would acknowledge that some individuals base their moralities upon religious or other ideals rather than an impartial consideration of interests, and Wilson also appears to be somewhat uncertain as to whether this could constitute genuine morality. However, Wilson's considered view seems to be that this is morality, but only irrational morality because it flouts the standards of impersonal moral reason. Yet Watt alleges that Wilson fails to provide an adequate explanation of the irrationality of the moral outlook which gives priority to self-interest or some personal ideal. Borrowing some ideas from J. P. White, Watt offers an argument to fill this supposed gap in Wilson's theory:

> An educational system would be less than rational if it saw to it only that the individual built up a way of life for himself based only on his own interests. For if he did so, he would be open to that most devastating of objections to self-centredness: "Given that the way of life you choose to adopt will affect others' interests as well as your own, why do you take only yours into consideration? What is so special about you as distinct from anyone else?" If his position is a

> rational one, he must show that there are relevant differences between himself and others which justify this. Until such good reasons are produced, the individual cannot rationally deny to others that careful consideration of interests which he grants himself . . . . Moral integration is more rational the more universalistic it is.[25]

Watt suggests the notion of rationality this argument hinges upon is "the minimal one of logical consistency."[26] One makes the assumption that individuals cater to their own concerns, but upon reflection they must recognize that the equally valid concerns of others means that they too have an equal claim upon our consideration.

Watt suggests that even though non-egalitarian moral views are open to rational criticism, these views are not "logically incoherent."[27] He makes this point through the example of ethical egoism.

> According to [egoism] each person's final duty is only to himself . . . don't recommend trampling on other people . . . the egoist cannot be accused of making assumptions in his own favor without having any reasons to justify them, since he makes exactly the same judgements about other people's interests and obligations as about his own: I ought to pursue only my interests and you only yours; Smith and Jones have ultimate reasons to consider only Smith and Jones respectively, and so on. Your interests and mine may be similar in all other ways, but they differ in this, that yours are irremediably yours and mine are mine; this difference leaves room to maintain coherently that mine concern me but yours ultimately don't.[28]

In short, Watt would say that even if egalitarian morality is rationally justified, the argument in its favor cannot be strong enough to show that any alternative morality is logically incoherent. Wilson has not offered a formal

response to Watt's argument. However, it is clear that the objection does not undermine any essential feature of Wilson's approach. If Watt's objection is sound, then Wilson would have to concede that there are bona fide moral views that reject the full egalitarian significance of universalizability while remaining logically coherent. But like the concessions that may be due to Coombes' critique, this requires at most minor adjustments to Wilson's theory. For he can still insist that an egalitarian morality is *more* rational than the alternatives, even if the alternatives are not incoherent, and therefore we have good grounds to promote the full implications of universalizability, prescriptiveness and overridingness.

Mary Warnock — "Schools of Thought" and "Broadcasting Ethics: Some Neglected Issues"

Perhaps the most famous of Wilson's philosophical critics is Mary Warnock. In "Schools of Thought" and again in "Broadcasting Ethics," Warnock advances a view of moral education and the school's role therein which differs substantially from Wilson's.[29]

Warnock recognizes that given the length of time students are involved in school, it becomes obvious that the institution must be responsible to some degree for the moral education of students. Children at school and elsewhere need

to be taught how to behave appropriately, and this involves both modifying their desires and affections in morally desirable directions and teaching them what their duties and responsibilities are toward other human beings. Warnock insists, however, that this does not imply that morality should be implemented as part of formal instruction within the curriculum. This point represents one striking difference between Warnock and Wilson. She suggests that there is not much advantage to "direct or classroom exhortation." She submits what we know of as the hidden curriculum may be morally fruitful in comparison to any overt teaching of morality. In contrast to all other subjects, morality should be imprinted largely by "example, not precept."[30]

If the true aim of moral education is to have people conduct themselves in an appropriate manner, it is redundant to have them absorb abstract knowledge of right and wrong, or so Warnock claims. Instead, she believes that the central emphasis in moral education should be on moral character — that amalgam of moral motivation and concrete moral understanding which distinguishes people who are trustworthy, courageous, compassionate, and the like. Warnock contends that the emphasis on character which befits moral education is at odds with the rationalistic approach favored by Wilson. In particular, she objects to the way the rationalistic approach tends to reduce morality to an intellectual exercise, abstracted from the emotional content of real life. This

objection is the basis for Warnock's challenge of Wilson's use of the analogy between the teaching of morality and the teaching of science or mathematics. Given the nature of the reasoning required to practice arithmetic, e.g. calculating the speed of a specific train, there is no difference between "doing arithmetic" in a classroom environment and doing it in other contexts. Math, as she notes, is an abstract subject. It may be performed in the classroom or any other social context as a distinctive intellectual exercise. Morality, in contrast, does not possess a "life of its own." Moral thinking simply has no genuine existence apart from the real life problems of moral agents: "There is no such thing as 'doing morality,' only behaving well or badly, and behavior needs real contexts, not merely exemplary ones."[31]

Warnock's emphasis on character and conduct rather than abstract reasoning makes her conception of moral education close to Aristotle's in important aspects. She reminds us of Aristotle's saying that decisions need to evolve "out of a 'steady and unalterable state of character.' " Indeed, she suggests that "the more a man has a fixed and steady disposition, the less he has to take decisions at all." In other words, if the virtues are ingrained deeply enough, they will often function spontaneously, and the issue of choosing between different options will not arise for the agent. The value of instruction in a particular kind of argument is questionable, given the Aristotelian ideal of the virtuous

person espoused by Warnock. Proficiency in a particular kind of reasoning will not in her view assure us that the reasoning will be used and acted upon when the real time for decision-making arises. She recognizes the validity of having children develop the ability to think rationally about others' interests. To care enough one needs a virtuous character, but Warnock insists that ascriptions of virtue have little to do with estimates of the other's competence in reasoning. For example, when we judge in a given situation that a person has demonstrated honesty, we do not come to the conclusion by determining that the person adhered to the correct methodology of moral reasoning. What counts instead is the behavior the person exhibited and the character underlying that behavior.[32]

Given Warnock's emphasis on character and conduct, it is not surprising that she regards example and experience as the heart of moral education. The chief role of the teacher is as an example of the virtues. A competent teacher will need to demonstrate virtues that

> may sound trivial, because they are confined within the boundaries of a particular, unexciting, context, and are an everyday part of a childish experience. But they are the very same virtues which are not trivial when exercised within a wider sphere; and they can be seen to be non-trivial by pupils as they get older.[33]

Warnock argues that if the teacher's primary role in moral education is as moral exemplar, a strong case emerges against treating it as a separate subject devoted to methodology.

Such an approach encourages students to think of morality as an isolated academic exercise and distracts their attention from the pervasive relevance of virtue in personal interaction. Warnock is not denying that some classroom discussion of contentious moral issues could be useful in developing students' moral understanding. Even the teaching of moral philosophy, if it is made interesting, may be undertaken in schools. But as Warnock notes, Wilson goes further than these practices in recommending classes devoted to instruction in the methodology of moral thinking.[34]

When moral questions explicitly arise in the classroom, a teacher should not be neutral, according to Warnock. Neither should he put a proviso to his presentation, such as the claim " 'according to the morality of our culture.' " In her view, a moral agent should possess "views, principles, attitudes, even passions." However, it is only if he is perceived as a moral agent that he is in a position to instruct his students into becoming moral agents. This approach is obviously entailed by her conception of the process of moral education as one in which learning through example is paramount. For only if teachers are candid about their own values can they set a vivid and persuasive example to their students. The urgent question for Warnock is not the ancient Socratic question, " 'Can virtue be taught?' "; it is rather we first need to ask, "Do we want it to be taught?" Her response is in the affirmative, but not from the view of

"special lessons, nor, it now seems, by a teacher claiming neutrality as between different claimants to be virtue."[35]

Even though Warnock is willing to endorse some informal moral discussion in the classroom, she does not expect much good to come of that activity because in morality it is action not discussion that ultimately counts. Furthermore, if teachers explicitly convey their moral values in classroom discussion, then so long as those values are not immediately translated into action, students will be apt to doubt the sincerity of their values and hence moral education will "come to nothing."[36]

In short, Warnock in her exploration of moral education rejects the basic tenets of Wilson's Rational Deliberation approach. She maintains that approach overestimates the importance of reason in morality. Instead, she emphasizes the virtuous character which is moulded through example and habituation. This leads her to reject Wilson's notion of special classes devoted to moral methodology.

"Example of Timetable? A Note on the Warnock Fallacy" — John Wilson's Rejoiner

Wilson's response is focused upon Warnock's assumption that "example is everything and instruction comparatively worthless." He argues that this rests upon a simplistic view of morality and the process of moral education: "different

pieces of equipment in the armoury of the morally-educated person require different methods." Instead, he emphasizes the diversity of necessary attributes of the morally educated person and the diversity of the methods needed to instill those attributes.[37]

Wilson draws our attention to what he sees as a mistake that prevails in discussions on morality and moral education. The mistake revolves around use of words like "all" and "every." Wilson claims people are liable to be fixated by one or other aspect of morality or moral education and so they elevate this into the whole of morality and moral education. If this is so, Wilson submits, morality and moral education are perceived as "all a matter of love, . . . discipline, . . . example, . . . Christian virtue, . . . party loyalty, or whatever (candidates are innumerable)."[38] But for Wilson a defensible stance toward morality and education requires in particular a complex range of abilities and dispositions or "pieces of equipment" as he sometimes describes them. These pieces of equipment are not all the same and it is primitive thinking in Wilson's view to contend that all can be encapsulated within a single educational process.[39]

In Wilson's opinion, a more reasonable strategy would be to allow some aspects of moral competence to be the focus of set periods within the classrooms while others would be central in settings external to the classroom. Examples of areas which would be fruitfully addressed within the classroom

would be the understanding of particular concepts, decision-procedures, reasons and relevant facts, whereas away from the classroom, attitudes, feelings and commitments might be a more appropriate focus. Wilson suggests that selecting example as the only method of moral education meets "predictable difficulties." He suggests if learning morality through example requires a process of imitation that goes beyond the slavish replication of behavior. That is to say, one must understand the point of the behavior one is imitating. To judge someone as an exemplar of morality one would have to comprehend "of what he is a shining example:"[40] The learner requires an awareness of a "way around the form of life in order to see that he is a star performer in that form (just as I can recognize star footballers only because I understand football)."[41] If learning morality by example presupposes rational understanding, then it is false and misleading, according to Wilson, to suggest that learning by example can proceed without the assistance of methods of explicit instruction and rational persuasion. To suppose otherwise is to embrace the simplistic view that "we know perfectly well what we ought and ought not to do: the only trouble is that 'the good that I ought to do, I do not: the evil that I would not, that I do.' "[42] This view is simplistic, or so Wilson contends, because it ignores the frequency with which people of goodwill go morally astray through ignorance or faulty moral reasoning.

To rectify these deficiencies, rational moral education is needed. People who go morally astray through lack of understanding "cannot be cured by a shining example or a swift kick in the pants: they need instruction and explanation."[43] Wilson suggests that Warnock assumes a crude dichotomy of moral learning into processes of informing (precept), and inspiring (example). Such processes in Wilson's view do not capture the essential features of education. He contends that one who is to be educated in history or science, for example, is not just "informed and motivated, given some precepts and set an example by someone else." Instead, such a person has been initiated into an integrated way of understanding and responding to the world which the disciplines of history and science make possible. Similarly, the morally educated person has been initiated into a form of life in which affective and cognitive elements are tightly woven together. Wilson quotes a passage from Warnock which allegedly betrays her naive reduction of morality to a single attribute and moral education to an unitary process: "Insofar as the aim of moral education is practical, to make people better, it is of no use to fill them up with abstract knowledge of right and wrong."[44] Wilson's response is that the business of moral education is certainly to make people better, but "better" in this context refers to success on a complex array of criteria rather than a single measure of success. Moreover, to suggest that Wilson's approach simply recommends that we ply children with

"abstract knowledge of right and wrong"[45] is a caricature of his view.

Footnotes

1. Jerrold R. Coombes, "Concerning the Nature of Moral Competence," Chap. 1 in Canadian Society for the Study of Education Yearbook: The Teaching of Values in Canadian Education, 2, ed. A. C. Kazepides, (1975), 10, 18, 13..

2. Ibid., 18.

3. Ibid., 18-19.

4. Ibid., 18-19.

5. Francis Dunlop, "Moral Procedures and Moral Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. Donald B. Cochrane et al. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education, 1979), 171.

6. Ibid., 170-171.

7. Ibid., 171.

8. Francis Dunlop, "Moral Procedures and Moral Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. Donald B. Cochrane et al. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education, 1979), 170-173.

9. Ibid., 173-174.

10. Ibid., 174.

11. Francis Dunlop, "Moral Procedures and Moral Education," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. Donald B. Cochrane et al. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education, 1979), 174.

12. John Wilson, "Moral Components and Moral Education: A Reply to Francis Dunlop," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. Donald B. Cochrane et al. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education, 1979), 178, 179, 184.

13. Ibid., 179.

14. John Wilson, "Moral Components and Moral Education: A Reply to Francis Dunlop," in The Domain of Moral Education, ed. Donald B. Cochrane et al. (Toronto: The Ontario Institute For Studies in Education, 1979), 178-179.

15. Ibid., 180.

16. Ibid., 180, 181.

17. Ibid., 181, 182.

18. Ibid., 182.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 179.

21. Ibid., 179, 180.

22. Ibid., 180.

23. Alan J. Watt, Rational Moral Education (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977), 17.

24. Ibid., 15.

25. Ibid., 17.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 18.

28. Ibid.

29. Mary Warnock, "Broadcasting Ethics: Some Neglected Issues," Journal of Moral Education 13 no. 3 (October 1984): 168-172.

Mary Warnock, "The Good Life," Chap. IV in Schools of Thought (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1977), 129-165.

30. Mary Warnock, "Broadcasting Ethics: Some Neglected Issues," Journal of Moral Education 13 no. 3 (October 1984): 169-170.

31. Mary Warnock, "The Good Life," Chap. IV in Schools of Thought (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1977), 132.

32. Ibid., 134, 135.

33. Mary Warnock, "The Good Life," Chap. 4 in Schools of Thought, (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1977), 132.

34. Ibid., 136.

35. Ibid., 142.

36. Ibid, 135.

37. John Wilson, "Example or Timetable? A Note on the Warnock Fallacy," Journal of Moral Education, 14, no. 3 (October 1985), 173.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., 141.

41. John Wilson, "Example or Timetable? A Note on the Warnock Fallacy," Journal of Moral Education, 14, no. 3 (October 1985), 173-174.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 175.

45. Ibid., 175.

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

Introduction

Contemporary moral discourse is plagued by disagreement and uncertainty, and these characteristics are reflected in moral philosophy and educational theory and practice. The school is often regarded as an institution that must help to overcome our disagreement and uncertainty, and influential approaches have been developed with that end in view, such as the Inculcation approach and Values Clarification.

The Inculcation approach supports certain values and discourages others, and it is an approach whereby teachers exert a powerful and direct influence upon students' beliefs and attitudes. Such an approach requires minimal critical reflection by the individual student. The major shortcoming of this approach is that it negates the distinction between education and indoctrination. For that reason, the Inculcation approach can be condemned as failing to respect the learner as a potentially autonomous and rational agent. The Values Clarification conception of moral education directs

students to identify their pre-reflective values, compare alternatives, consider consequences stemming from their values, and then choose their own particular values after this reflective process. It implies a relativistic view of morality, since what is right or good is assumed to be relative to the individual's subjective viewpoint. The major flaw is that the clarifying process reduces moral judgements to personal preferences, many of which may be ego-centric or destructive.

A further prominent conception of moral education is the Rational Deliberation strategy. This particular view asserts that the fundamental objective of moral education is to teach students to make and act on rational, well-grounded decisions about moral issues. It is argued that this particular conception could constitute an approach to moral education that avoids the pitfalls of the major alternatives. In contrast to other approaches, the individual is respected as a learner with potential for rational belief and evaluation, not merely as an organism to be molded or conditioned, or left in a vacuum to decide about what subjective preferences should be morally authoritative.

One influential example of the Rational Deliberation strategy is John Wilson's formalist conception of moral education. In contrast to other conceptions of moral education, his theory reflects a rational strategy and one which focuses upon the notion of rationality in moral

judgement and action. Wilson attempts to elucidate a concept of morality that is grounded in respect for the individual learner, as a being with potential for independent choice and rational belief. Wilson's aim for moral education is comparable to educational aims in other fields of study or forms of thought: to initiate students into a methodology which enables them to determine rationally defensible answers to moral questions. His chief aim is to have students rationally competent moral agents as opposed to having them blindly accept certain beliefs and or make moral judgements in arbitrarily subjective ways.

Before asking whether Wilson's conception of moral education is a viable one, it is important to be clear as to what his fundamental intentions are. First, he is not proposing a definitive set of moral conclusions. Rather, he perceives the task of clearly defining a conception of moral education as paramount, while at the same time he recognizes the multi-dimensional character and complexity of the moral domain. Thus we need to be cautious in not over-simplifying the task of moral educators.[1] Secondly, he hopes to increase our level of awareness in the moral domain by stressing the kind of demands we must face in overcoming fantasies and distracting emotions when moral questions arise.[2] Thirdly, he attempts to raise our consciousness of the scope of questions and theoretical perspectives to be addressed if moral education is to be conducted wisely. For that reason,

he persistently emphasizes the need for close collaborative work between philosophers and other researchers.[3] The aim of seeking such collaboration would be to provide the opportunity to work upon how best to cultivate moral understanding.

To assess adequately whether Wilson's conception of moral education is indeed a viable one, it becomes necessary to address some specific questions.

Reason, Emotion, and Intuition in Morality

First, does Wilson exaggerate the importance of reason in the moral life at the expense of emotion and intuition? A useful way of approaching this question is to compare Wilson's theory with the Inculcation and Values Clarification approaches.

The Inculcation approach circumvents a student's rationality, because it is a matter of instilling beliefs in students without reference to the rational grounds for those beliefs. It is an authority-based conception of moral thinking, which conditions students to exhibit prescribed behaviors. Moral beliefs are brought about in such a way that the belief is fixed and not amenable to change on the basis of evidence and argument. Students are not regarded as even potentially rational beings, having the autonomy to construct their beliefs on the basis of their own experience. Related to this disparagement of reason in the Inculcation approach is

its emphasis on emotion. The Inculcation approach characteristically instills powerful emotional inhibitions against breaking prescribed rules, with the emphasis placed upon conformity, praise and guilt.[4] Further, without the student having the autonomy for independent judgement and evaluation, the Inculcation approach will inevitably leave the student with a strong sense that the rules s/he learns are intuitively correct. These aspects of the Inculcation Approach should make us wary of any theory of moral education that elevates intuition and emotion over reason. For without rational grounds for regarding particular emotions and intuitions as desirable — and the Inculcation approach supplies no such grounds — we have no reason to suppose our emotions and intuitions are worth acting on.

Values Clarification is like the Inculcation approach in its emphasis upon feeling and intuition at the expense of reason. The two approaches differ, however, in that the former prizes whatever feelings and intuitions emerge from unconstrained inner reflection while the latter values whatever feelings and intuitions are instilled through social conditioning. Nevertheless, the common ground between the two approaches leaves them open to the same criticism. It can be argued that the inconsequential scope that reason has in both the Inculcation and Value Clarification conceptions of moral education could result in morally undesirable, even abhorrent intuitions and feelings being given free rein. For example,

what if individuals are inculcated with powerful feelings of disgust towards atheists or people of color? What if the result of values clarification is that a child says "Greed is good for me"?

Wilson's emphasis on reason is a corrective to the hazards of morally irrational feelings and intuitions. Moreover, it is clear that although Wilson places stress upon the cognitive methodology of morals and action, he does not suggest that morality can only be acquired through narrowly intellectual or rational means. Wilson's understanding of morality is one of encouraging rationality in moral discourse, but it is one that calls for more than formal techniques or a program of pure logic or continual ratiocination. He does not imply a moral agent will consciously employ the methodology before every moral action is taken. Wilson does not negate emotional engagement and the role of feelings, the will, obligation and commitment in his rational strategy for moral education. He sees reason as a means to achieve the adjustment and assessment of our intuitions and emotions according to principles that can be critically defended and refined.

Wilson's second-order principles of moral thinking and the components of the morally educated person he has deduced from these entail a distinctive view of rationality in the moral domain. However, the moral competence he argues for does involve a prominent affective dimension. This is obvious

from the first of his central constituents of moral competence, PHIL. This is a disposition to <u>care</u> about other people's well-being, and the importance Wilson assigns to PHIL makes it clear that he does not deny the relevance of emotions to morality. Further, Wilson does not reject intuition altogether; he would simply reject those intuitions which cannot be rationally warranted.

The Formalist Account of Moral Reasoning

To what extent can moral education in schools be understood as a matter of learning to "do" morals in a sense that parallels the way students might learn how to "do" science?

A cardinal assumption of Wilson's theory is that there are formal procedures of moral reason, analogous to scientific methodology, which can be explicitly taught in the way that scientific methodology can be taught. Morals and science for Wilson are assumed to be domains where established procedures exist to allow for objective assessment of propositions. These procedures are to be clearly distinguished from the content of particular scientific or moral beliefs. His intent is not to have students adopt any particular moral belief; rather, the aim would be for them to acquire the ability to reason morally by adhering to a body of procedures that constitute moral objectivity. This method allows the student

to retain the autonomy to be critical, regardless of the particular moral beliefs they hold. Furthermore, Wilson assumes that the formal procedures of moral reasoning are more educationally fundamental than commitment to any particular moral belief or principle just as scientific method is more educationally fundamental than commitment to any particular scientific theory.

A thorough assessment of this aspect of Wilson's theory is beyond the scope of this study, because an adequate investigation would entail a detailed comparative study of the epistemology of science and morality, a task that I would not claim to be competent to do and neither probably would Wilson. However, the following point is important to note. It may be doubtful that the formal procedures of moral reasoning Wilson champions are precise enough to yield agreed answers to moral controversies in the way that application of scientific methodology yields agreed answers to scientific questions over time. Both science and morality are domains that are continually subject to controversy. Within science, however, it does appear that a steady and consistent application of scientific method creates an evolving body of consensus on many matters as old ideas are disconfirmed and new theories gain credibility. By complying with accepted scientific procedures, there is a tendency to create a broad agreement on matters of science among scientists, even if agreement always falls short of unanimity and new disputes continually erupt.[5]

It is not clear that a method of moral reasoning based on the second-order principles of universalizability, prescriptivity and overridingness can provide as powerful a basis for rational agreement as scientific methodology can. For example, universalizability requires us imaginatively to enter the shoes of others, but this is a process in which we are highly vulnerable to error, and it is often impossible to verify whether we have successfully empathized with another or not. For is it ever really possible to always have full knowledge of the experience of others? For example, if a person has broken his or her back, can I really know how much that person is suffering and how much it means to the person, without having experienced it myself?

But the difficulties of genuine empathy should not be exaggerated. It is usually possible for people to draw on experiences similar to those of the individual with whom one tries to empathize, and with systematic practice through moral education, difficulties may be overcome. Regardless of the epistemological difficulties associated with empathy, it nevertheless remains an essential ingredient of moral education, because trying to understand others both intellectually and emotionally is an inescapable part of moral interaction.

Universalizability also requires us to weigh the good of others equally with our own. For even when determined to weigh interests equally, we may end up with moral disagreement

because we interpret the interests of others differently. The conscientious principal who opposes the integration of disabled students may sincerely claim that he has weighed the interests of all affected parties equally, but the conscientious principal who favors integration may sincerely say the same thing. It is not clear how Wilson's formal procedures can resolve such disputes.

If Wilson's formal procedures are not the powerful basis of rational consensus which the analogy with scientific methodology might suggest, then his approach to moral education may not provide as complete an escape from our current disarray in moral education as he would like to think. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to maintain that much failure in moral education derives from unthinking prejudice and the failure to universalize or follow through on the prescriptive force of our own moral judgements. To the extent that teaching students how to "do" morality in Wilson's sense might help us to combat these pitfalls, it certainly represents progress beyond both the Inculcation and Values Clarification conceptions of moral education.

However, there is a final respect in which Wilson's analogy between science and morality may mislead more than illuminate. The motivation to take scientific truth seriously in human life can almost always be taken for granted, given that science discloses truth of immense importnace to egoists and altruists alike. Challenging the point of scientific

objectivity seems an idel exercise because it is hard to imagine what could be the grounds for a serious challenge. But challenging the point of morality would seem to be a meaningful gesture for any calculating egoist or tribalist. Calculating egoists and tribalists can be found in classrooms as well as anywhere else, and it is not clear that Wilson's theory provides an adequate response to the person — who may happen to be a child or adolescent at school — who asks about the ultimate point of being moral.

The Need for Further Research and Educational Innovation

Does Wilson offer a complete theory of the goals and methods of moral education? Wilson's critics have sometimes argued as if he claims to offer such a theory and have condemned his work on the grounds that it does not.[6] As Wilson has insisted, he makes no such claim. Wilson has argued vigorously for the necessity of establishing effective interdisciplinary research on moral education. He believes that only interdisciplinary research, including but going beyond philosophy, could generate a fully adequate theory of moral education. In doing so, however, he would add the proviso that such research must be undertaken in a context that is

> entirely independent, politically, not only from governments but also from prevailing educational fashion and academic climates of opinion . . . only a high-level, long-term, independent and scholarly

> team can hope to do much better in a field which is, as I have tried to show, highly vulnerable to political pressure and prejudice, at the expense of clarity and truth.[7]

Nevertheless, Wilson's theory, incomplete though it may be, might be very useful as a focus for further research and pedagogical innovation. His analysis of the components of moral competence provides an appealing framework for researchers and educators to use in attempting to arrive at a deeper understanding of specific sub-tasks of moral education. For example, Wilson's catalogue of moral components might provide a basis for more objective methods of assessment in the moral domain; and they could be used in interdisciplinary research to evaluate the efficacy of different teaching methods, styles and administrative patterns for schools. However, the philosophical basis of the moral components would need to be clearly understood by researchers and teachers before proceeding in these respective tasks.

It is argued that John Wilson's rational strategy represents progress beyond the Inculcation and Values Clarification approaches. Like any good educational theory however, Wilson's is highly open-ended, leaving much room for the creativity of researchers in other disciplines and teachers in the classroom.

The moral domain will continue to be one of ongoing enquiry and debate, and so long as that is true, the nature of moral education will remain contestable. Yet Wilson's formalist approach does seem to offer the prospect of some

progress in both theory and practice. Will that progress really be made? Wilson's response to that question is ambivalent. It is now twenty-five years since the publication of Wilson's seminal Introduction to Moral Education, and though Wilson has had some influence on theory and practice, the influence has been modest. Wilson has counselled patience; but he has suggested that more than patience may be needed: "we are in moral education where science was in the era of Galileo. We need more time to clarify and gain acceptance of our subject matter and its methodology. But do we have the time?"[8]

Footnotes

1. John Wilson, "Example or Timetable? A Note on the Warnock Fallacy," Journal of Moral Education 14, no. 3 (October, 1985): 173-176.

2. John Wilson, "Moral Education: Retrospect and Prospect," Journal of Moral Education 9, no. 1 (October, 1979): 6-9.

3. John Wilson, Approach to Moral Education, (Abingdon, Berks: The Abbey Press for The Farmington Trust), March, 1967), 10-11.

4. Joel J. Kupperman, "Inhibition," Oxford Review of Education 4, no. 3 (October, 1978): 277-287.

5. Kenneth A. Strike, "Liberty and the Authority of Received Ideas," chap. in Liberty and Learning (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co. Ltd., 1982), 17-40.

6. Meriel Downey and A. V. Kelly, Moral Education Theory and Practice (London: Harper & Row, 1978), 181.

7. John Wilson, "Moral Education: A Hope for the Future," International Review of Education 27 (1981): 61:64.

8. Donald B. Cochrane, and Michael Manley-Casimir, eds., Development of Moral Reasoning: Practical Approaches (New York: Praeger, 1980), 68.

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APPENDIX A

The Moral Components from John Wilson, A New Introduction To Moral Education 130-131

PHIL (HC)	Having the concept of a 'person'
PHIL (CC)	Claiming to use this concept in an overriding, prescriptive and universalized (O,P and U) principle.
PHIL (RSF) (DO and PO)	Having feelings which support this principle, either of a 'duty-oriented' (DO) or a 'person-oriented' (PO) kind.
EMP(1)(Cs)	Being able, in practice, to identify emotions, etc., in oneself when these are at a conscious level.
EMP(1)(Ucs)	Ditto, when the emotions are at an unconscious level.
EMP(2)(Cs)	Ditto, in other people, when at a conscious level.
EMP(2)(Ucs)	Ditto, when at an unconscious level.
GIG(1)(KF)	Knowing other ('hard') facts relevant to moral decisions.
GIG(1)(KS)	Knowing sources of facts (where to find out) as above.
GIG(2)(VC)	'Knowing how' a 'skill' element in dealing with moral situations, as evinced in verbal communication with others.
GIG(2)(NVC)	Ditto, in non-verbal communication.
KRAT(1)(RA)	Being, in practice, 'relevantly alter' to (noticing) moral situations, and seeing them as such (describing them in terms of Phil, etc., above).
KRAT(1)(TT)	Thinking thoroughly about such situations, and bring to bear whatever Phil, EMP and GIG one has.

KRAT(1)(OPU)	As a result of the foregoing, making an overriding, prescriptive and universalized decision to act in others' interests.
KRAT(2)	Being sufficiently wholehearted, free from unconscious counter-motivation, etc. to carry out (when able) the above decision in practice.

APPENDIX B

Analysis of the Meanings of the Categories and Sub-categories From John Wilson, A New Introduction To Moral Education 130-162

PHIL

Under the heading PHIL we have to make sense of the area often described in such terms as 'concern for others', 'sympathy', 'sense of fair play' and 'respect for other people'. As this is one of the most important components, so also it is most liable to confusion and vagueness. I shall try to break it down into a number of logically distinct parts.

1. Having the concept of a 'person'

The first thing that seems to be required is that S should have a clear concept of a 'person' or the 'other', in the sense demanded by morality. Briefly, this concept involves a criterion of similarity in virtue of which all 'rational animate creatures' are put into the same category. By 'rational animate creatures', I mean all entities who are (in the full sense) language-users, and to whom we can correctly ascribe such terms as 'will', 'emotion', 'intention', 'purpose' and consciousness'. Such creatures will also have wants, needs and desires in a fuller, or at least a different, sense than that in which we may say that plants or machines or animals have wants, needs and desires.

Of course there are both logical and empirical difficulties here. We may be logically uncertain about whether, say, dolphins and chimpanzees are to count as 'rational animate creatures', even if we know all the empirical facts about them; and/or we may be empirically uncertain about the facts - do dolphins really have a language? But the vast majority of cases are clear, and the concept can be established clearly enough to enable us to know, for instance, what sorts of entity discovered on Mars would in principle count as 'people' in the required sense. Similarly, we may be doubtful about the age at which infants can be said to count as 'people', but at least the concept allows us to dismiss as irrelevant such considerations as sex, skin-colour, race, height and creed.

It is important that we should remember what is meant by 'having the concept of'. As I use the phrase, it will refer solely to S's ability to conceive of all 'people' as forming one class and, given the facts, to identify any 'person' as a

member of that class. This ability is verified by S's being able to **say**, to himself and in principle to others, something like 'This entity has intentions and needs, uses language, etc., therefore it counts as a person.' S must not merely react or behave differently towards people and non-people, but must do so for a reason - namely, because he sees them as different in terms of this criterion. Nor is there any requirement that S must have an 'image', 'mental picture', 'idea', 'set' or anything else that suggests the existence of some 'psychological mechanism'. That way lies confusion.

Equally, 'having the concept of' does not imply either of two things which even philosophers have sometimes seemed to imply. First, it does not imply that S has what I shall call the 'practical' ability to identify cases of the concept. One may have the concept of an alkali without, in laboratory practice, having the ability to identify an alkali; or checkmate, without being very good, over the chess-board, at recognizing cases of checkmate. Suppose that some of the entities on Mars are people, but that in practice it is difficult to distinguish these entities from robots or other non-rational artifacts. Then S may have the concept of a person so long as he can say, '*If* this entity can really talk, feel, intend, etc., then it counts as a person', and he may add 'though without more experience and practice (or sharper eyesight or other "practical" abilities) I find it hard to recognize which entities are of this kind.' Secondly, and more simply (although not less importantly for research), *having* the concept does not entail *using* or wanting to use the concept. I have the concept 'made of wood', but I do not normally see my room as divided between wooden and non-wooden objects. I shall only *use* the concept in certain circumstances, e.g. if I am frightened of woodworm or fire.

In assessing Ss for 'having the concept of a person', shall we allow ourselves to say that an S has 'some of the concept', or 'part of the concept', or 'is on the way towards having the concept'? The answer is 'no' to the first two, but 'yes' to the third. Suppose S begins by counting all bipeds, but not one-legged men or rational Martians, as people. Then we try to push him a stage further, and he counts all men but still not Martians. Then, finally, he includes all rational, animate creatures. What we should say here is that, at the first stages, he has *a* concept but it is not *the* concept (the concept we want him to have). 'Person' for him means, first, 'all bipeds', then perhaps 'all men on earth'. It is not till the last stage that he has *the* concept. Before then, he does not in any serious sense have 'part of' it; he just has a different concept. If our interests are in the empirical learning process, and if we have some kind of picture of stages of learning through which S has to go if he is to end up with the concept, we can certainly say such things as 'He

is on the way towards getting the concept' or 'He has nearly got it.' But this is a very different matter. In assessing whether someone has the concept of not, we must say, 'Either he has it or he hasn't.'

2. Claiming the concept as a moral principle

This aspect of PHIL is much more difficult. I have written 'claiming', not 'using' or applying', the concept because I want to exclude from this aspect certain things better assessed elsewhere. I want to exclude the question of whether S uses the concept of 'other people's interests' when S is actually faced with the necessity or opportunity for moral decision and action 'in the field': that is, not in any artificial test situation but in the outside world. S may, or may not, use this as his overriding criterion for *deciding* what to do, and, again, S may or may not feel the criterion as strong, or overriding enough for S actually to *behave* in accordance with it. Both these are important, but I am not concerned with them here. I am concerned rather with whether S in general - one might say, in principle or as part of his moral theory - thinks that this is the criterion which he ought to use, whether S claims it as the sort of reason that ought to influence him.

This does not, however, excuse us from so constructing our assessments that we can be sure that S claims - or, in this very restricted context, 'applies' - this criterion as a genuinely prescriptive, overriding and universal one. It will be best to illustrate this and the preceding points by an example. Suppose we present S with a story describing a situation in which other people's interest are involved, and in which he may use them as a criterion for decision and action. We then ask S what he thinks ought to be done, and we suppose that S says that other people's interests should be satisfied. Then (1) this does not (and is not intended to) tell us whether S *would* in fact use this criterion if he were, in real life, the agent *either* (a) in his decision-making *or* (b) in his actual behaviour. All it tells us is that S thinks he ought to use it, the S claims it as his principle. But (2) we need to know more than this. (a) S must mean his 'ought' prescriptively: that is as *committing* him, S, to action. S must mean something like 'It isn't just that this would be a good thing to do; I think that, in such a situation, I ought to commit myself to (order myself to, prescribe to myself) such decision and action.' (b) S must mean his 'ought' overridingly: S must think that this is what he ought to do *more than anything else*. (c) S must mean his 'ought' universally: S must think that he, *and anyone else* similarly placed, ought to do it.

It is easy to see from this, without going into too much detail, that we have both certain limitations and certain detailed obligations, for testing in this area. First, we must *avoid* trying to find out what S would in fact ('in the field') decide to do - or, of course, what S thinks anyone else would in fact decide to do. Secondly, we must *ensure* that we do not rest content with knowing what S thinks some other agent ought to do, or what S thinks that he (S) but not some other agent ought to do, or that S's judgement on actual decisions (given in the story) is, or what S thinks would be 'nice to happen' but not (prescriptively) ought to be done. All these considerations will affect the form of our tests and assessments.

As we have said, we are here concerned with S's beliefs, basic principles or 'moral theory', and to get at this, we have to *exclude* 'in-the-field' factors. In our terminology, to get at PHIL we have to exclude KRAT(1) and KRAT(2) factors. Hence the form of our assessment must be such as to allow S to reflect, at leisure, on what he thinks ought to be done - on what criterion he thinks appropriate, whether that of other people's interests or some other. It is indeed, necessary to ensure, particularly if S is a young child with low verbal ability, that S *understands* the story or other test form; in that sense, the situation must be 'made real' to him. But it is equally necessary to ensure that it is not too life-like. If, for instance, we used some game or simulation situation instead of a pencil-and-paper story, S would be more likely to be carried away by 'in-the-field' (KRAT(1) and (2)) factors, although we could of course use a simulation situation, or a film, or puppets, or some other non-verbal presentation, provided we allowed S time to reflect on it. But we have throughout to remember that our aim is to get S's *general* moral views.

In order to do this we shall of course have to present S with other options, with other criteria besides the 'other people's interests' criterion. This means that we shall present him with conflict situations, in which he may be tempted to opt for other criteria. We need for this an adequate typology of what other criteria are likely to operate. This will be of particular importance in determining whether S's views are overriding, and we can only determine this by making available not only the practical syllogism in which we are interested ('One ought to act in others' interests; this is in others' interests; therefore do this'), but also other practical syllogisms (e.g. 'One ought to seek one's own advantage', 'One ought not to lose face', 'One ought not to disobey authority', 'One ought to act the way one's friends [illegible], etc. as major premises).

We have also to remember that the test form will be primarily concerned not with what specific action S thinks right, but with S's *reasons*: that is, with whether S chooses the action in virtue of the criterion of others' interests. It is very easy to forget this point in an endeavour to keep test stories simple and easily scorable. We may ask numerous questions of the form 'What should Johnny do?' or 'What ought you to do?', forgetting that the answers to these are relevant *only* if we can be certain that they show the operation of a certain reason or criteria, and this need not be so. Even in conflict situations, S may have all kinds of reasons for choosing what is (accidentally) the 'right answer' in terms of others' interests, reasons quite disconnected logically from the criterion. We have to make sure that the criterion is actually being used.

Now it is fairly obvious that few if any Ss will always get the 'right answer' for the right reasons. An S will to some extent, or in some spheres, or in some situations, claim the criterion of others' interests, but in other situations deploy some other criterion. How are we to cater for this, either in devising or scoring the assessment? To this there is no simple answer. What we have to do is to make sensible guesses about the possible categories in which Ss may vary in their application of the criterion. For example, it is a fairly safe bet that some Ss will apply it in situations concerned with members of their own family or gang, but not outside: to whites but not to blacks, and so on. We have here a category or dimension which we shall call *range*, and I shall now go on, not without some hesitation, to sketch out this and other such factors. I must stress, however, that although all these categories (and no doubt others) need to be tried out in assessment, it is at present quite unclear which of them will turn out to be of the most practical significance.

(a) Range

This concerns the numbers and classes of people for whom S applies the criterion. Important categories here may be *similarity* to S (in age, sex, social class, tastes, etc.); *social distance* (whether the other is a family-or gang-or class-member); *social behaviour* of the other (whether 'nice' or 'nasty'); *appearance* or *manner* of the other (physical attraction, accent, etc.); *social status* of the other; *age* or *sex* of the other.

(b) Situation similarity

This turns on whether S has himself been in situations like that given in the story, where S has needed others to attend to his interests (e.g. S has often needed financial help

himself, and is perhaps more likely to say that a story person should have it).

(c) Situation experience

This concerns whether S has experienced situations similar to the story situation (irrespective of whether S has himself been in a position of need, as in (b) above).

(d) Harming and helping

An S may perform well at not-harming, but badly at helping, or vice versa.

(e) Subject matter

The empirical *type* of harm or help may be important. Among these types we may list:

(i) 'bodily' (violence, food, sex)

(ii) 'property' (stealing, lending money)

(iii) 'nuisance/kindness' (excessive noise, baby-sitting without payment)

(iv) 'words' (slander, cheering someone up)

(v) 'contract' (lying, keeping promises, punctuality, debts).

(f) Scope/distribution

S may use the criterion well in distributing 'goods' to others, but badly when allowing others power or scope (in voting, decision making), or vice versa.

(g) Visible immediacy

S may use the criterion well when the results are visibly immediate, badly when the results - though immediate in point of time - cannot be seen: e.g. not stealing from friends, but stealing from the railways or the taxpayer.

(h) Temporal immediacy

As above, but in respect of time: e.g. S may be concerned about the good of others now or for the immediate future, but not about the eventual results of pollution, overpopulation, etc.

It should be clear that these categories are by no means exhaustive. But they are important, not only for PHIL but for other components also, and we shall find ourselves referring to them as we proceed. I have not extended them, chiefly because the most sensible procedure is to begin by trying out tests and assessments that take these at least into account, and then (with the help of interviews and information derived from conversation and behavioural observation) to become clearer about which categories are most significant. Only by spreading the net wide enough shall we ever be in a position to give S a *general* rating for this aspect of PHIL, and even this may prove unwise, for S's claim to the criterion may be so specific to particular situations (or other types of category) that we may be able to do no more than rate S within the various categories.

I have not added the point made earlier about conflict situations and the possibility of other 'overriding syllogisms' to the list above because this point is of a different order of importance. The list contains a selection of *other* factors that may affect S's use of the criterion, and some of these other factors will themselves be such as to generate other 'overriding syllogisms' for S. But it should now go without saying that we must, above all, take care to include in our stories, or whatever presentations we use, the various 'pulls' of guilt, honour, self-advantage and so forth.

It should also be unnecessary to say that, since we are concerned here with one aspect of PHIL only, we must control for other components (as well as, of course, for other variables such as IQ and reading ability). Thus we are here interest in what S *thinks* to be in the other's interests; whether S is correct or not may turn on his factual knowledge (GIG) or knowledge of others' emotions (EMP). We may best control for these by so simplifying the story that all Ss may be presumed to have adequate EMP and GIG. We cannot wholly exclude S's 'bring-to-bear' component (KRAT(1)), since we are after all getting S to bring his knowledge and principles to bear in one, albeit very restricted, situation: namely, the test situation. But by giving S plenty of time, and keeping the presentation simple enough, nearly all Ss should have sufficient KRAT(1) for us to feel secure. We are, in effect, doing the 'bringing to bear' for S, precisely by presenting him with the test (plus whatever incentives are required to ensure that S does it properly).

3. Rule-supporting feelings

We turn now to a very different aspect of PHIL. Let us assume that S has the required concept of a person, and claims this concept as a moral principle of rule of behaviour. It may still be the case that S has little or no *feeling* attached to

this rule, and little or no tendency to *act* in accordance with it. We are here concerned with the former (feeling), but the general point requires a brief discussion.

It is perfectly true that, if an S said that he believed he ought to decide and act by the criterion of other' interests, but rarely or never did so, and rarely or never showed remorse, guilt or sorrow at not having done so, or pleasure or self-approval when he did so - then, in this (rare) case, we should be tempted to say that S could not have really meant what he first said. 'Could not', not because there is a tight logical entailment between believing that one ought to do something on the one hand, and doing it and having certain feelings on the other - there need be no such entailment unless we force on - but because characteristically (rather than necessarily) humans tend to do, and to have certain feelings about, what they think they ought to do. Hence we should be justly suspicious, to say the least, of the S quoted above. But it is still possible, indeed common, *in certain cases* for an S to assent sincerely to our criterion, and yet neither to act on it nor to have certain feelings about it.

For these reasons it is necessary to deal with the feelings and actions under separate headings. This is all the more required of us because in section (2) above we were concerned solely with what we called S's 'moral theory', his intellectual opinion, so to speak, about what criterion he thought he ought to use - as an overriding and prescriptive criterion, certainly, but not necessarily as the one he actually *did* use. We need, then, to find out how far the criterion actually *is* supported by some kind of commitment on S's part. We shall here deal with the extent of what I call S's 'rule-supporting feelings'; S's 'rule-derived' decisions and actions will come under KRAT(1) and (2).

Note further that we are concerned with S's feelings only in so far as they are subordinated to the rule about others' interests. The feelings must be for the other *as for* a being with rights, interests, needs, etc. It is *about the other's interests* that he must feel (and act), not about the other under some other description or in some other light. For instance, I may hold as a principle that other's interests should be satisfied: I may satisfy the interests of an attractive blonde, and I may also have strong feeling about her. But my feeling are not about her *as* a source of needs or interests, and I am not here acting *on* my principle, but am only moved to act in what happens to be in accordance with it. My sexual feelings for the blonde are not 'rule-supporting' feelings. Again, there may be something about the sight of a cripple which moves me in some way (I feel embarrassed or

guilty) such that I give him money, but I am not necessarily giving him money because his interests require that I should.

Nevertheless we must distinguish here between two types of feeling, which I shall call 'duty-orientated' (DO) and 'person-orientated' (PO). This distinction is not between the S who uses the rule about others' interests as a criterion for action and the S who does not: both must govern their actions by the rule. the latter S could not be said to have PHIL or to show genuine benevolence or love, however sentimental or affectionate or strongly moved he might be towards another person, precisely because he does not control his behaviour by the rule. Nor, again is the distinction between the S who will do his (contractual) duty but no more, and the S who will go further, for our concept of others' interests extends indefinitely beyond any contractual duty (though not excluding it). The 'duty-oriented' S may look after the interests of the starving Chinese as well as of his family; the 'person-oriented' S may only look after his family. The distinction is rather in the *kind* of feelings that accompany S's obedience to the rule.

This difference of kind does not lie in the *strength* of the feelings. An S who is DO may feel very strongly (in a Kantian sort of way) about the importance of doing his duty, of attending to the rule about others' interests, but what he will lack is the PO feelings which should, in *some* cases at least, accompany his attention to others. For those latter feeling we use words like 'sympathy', 'love', 'affection', 'identification with others'. Perhaps a good way of putting it is to say that S should *take pleasure* in the other, that S should be happy not that he has done his duty, but that the other is happy.

The importance of this aspect of PHIL is clear. Briefly, there are many contexts in human life - particularly in such close relationships as marriage and child rearing - where others' interests are served not so much by action as by feeling of a PO type. Wives and children, for instance, may care less about getting presents than about their husbands' or fathers' affection. This is not to say that there may not be other contexts (e.g. having to conduct a surgical operation or organize relief supplies to disaster areas) where affection either does not count or positively inhibits the effective performance of the required task.

We have, then, to assess these DO and PO feelings. It is worth noting that we cannot assess them simply by observing what S does. S may have the relevant feelings, yet those feelings may not be overriding: they may not issue in action. For instance S1 may be very sorry for the Jews in Nazi Germany, yet be even more frightened of what might happen to

him if he actually helped them; S2 may be less sorry for the Jews, but because he has no fear at all may actually help the Jews. Here S1's PHIL feelings are stronger than S2's but do not issue in action. We have, then, to assess the DO and PO feelings independently of behaviour - though this is not, of course, to say that we cannot use behavioural observations to induce such feelings, provided we are sure that our inductions are correct.

One important difference between assessment in this area and that in section (2) above is that we cannot do other than try to assess the feelings of S 'in the field': that is, we are trying to get at what S feels in real-life situations. Our presentations, therefore will not be designed so much to give S leisure to reflect, since reflection is not relevant: what we want to know is how much rule-supporting feeling actually attaches itself to the criterion of others' interests. Apart from field observation, therefore, we shall be inclined to use simulation or participation situations, practical experiments, visual media and other media and other methods that try to reproduce real-life situations as far as possible.

What then are these 'rule-supporting' feelings? Chief among them will be *remorse* or *guilt* when S does follow it, *disapproval* when S sees someone else not following the rule, *sorrow* or *regret* or *pity* in respect of the person whose needs are unsatisfied, and *approval* and *pleasure* at rule keeping and the other's satisfaction. These and other relevant feelings have their characteristic beliefs, symptoms and actions (weeping, making restitution, smiles, frowns, etc.) and can be assessed, although with difficulty. Such difficulty should make us incline towards may different kinds of assessment (self-reporting, interviews, behavioural observation, reporting from peers and others who know S well, and so on), and towards those contexts of assessment which seem best able to give us the information we need.

Summary

Above we have distinguished three sub-components of PHIL, the third of which is divided into two. These were:

1. Having the concept of a 'person': PHIL(HC)

2. Claiming the concept as a moral principle: PHIL(CC).

3. Having rule-supporting feelings, 'duty-orientated' or 'person-orientated': PHIL(RSF)(DO) and PHIL(RSF)(PO).

EMP

Under the heading EMP we are concerned with the area often described in such terms as 'emotional awareness', 'sensitivity', 'insight' and 'empathy'.

1. Having the concepts of emotion

To have the concept of an emotion is a necessary precondition for being able, in practice, to identify the emotion. S must know what jealousy *is* if S is to be able to know that so-and-so is jealous. This at once raises questions about what emotions are, and what the particular emotions are. I and other writers have dealt with these elsewhere; here I shall give merely what is likely to be of use to empirical researchers and others.

First, there are important distinctions between emotions and other similar mental phenomena which we may prefer to call 'moods', 'states of mind', 'motives', 'wants', or, more generally, 'feelings'. Emotions, necessarily or characteristically, have *targets* (not just causes) and have a 'cognitive core' consisting of a *belief*: 'moods' (happiness, depression, etc.) do not. Under EMP in general we shall include not only emotions in the strict sense, but 'wants', 'moods', etc. as well. However, the distinction will obviously be important for testing purposes.

Secondly the concept of an emotion is usually made up of the following elements:

(a) a belief (that X is dangerous)

(b) involuntary or semi-voluntary symptoms (trembling, going pale), including certain postures, gestures, facial expressions, etc.

(c) intentional action (running away, trying to avoid attention).

Emotions may be recognized, in ourselves and others, by these three ways. They may also, under normal conditions, be recognized by the *surrounding circumstances*. Thus, to fit the example of fear above, we can induce that X feels fear if we know that a bull is chasing X, or an avalanche is coming towards X, and that X is aware of this.

Thirdly, to have the concept of a particular emotion (as was pointed out under PHIL earlier) involves being able to classify the phenomena in (a), (b) and (c) above under a single criterion. Usually the grasp of an emotion concept will be represented by an ordinary word - 'anger', 'fear',

'remorse', etc. But this is not a necessary condition. If we ask S what X is feeling, and S says, "Well, it's what people feel when someone else has something nice which they feel is somehow rightfully theirs: such people tend to say such-and-such and act in such-and-such ways', etc., then it does not matter that S does not know the *word* 'jealousy': he has the concept. Also it is not required, just for having the concept, that S is any good at identifying emotions in practice. In order to test for this (as for PHIL(HC)) we should have to 'hold the information steady', so to speak: that is, ensure that Ss all had the same information, in order to find out whether they could classify it under appropriate concepts.

Fourthly, there are, of course, a number of very different emotions and hence different concepts. S may have the concepts of fear, anger and hate, but not of remorse or pride. We shall have to assess for all emotion concepts, or at least for a representative sample (if we know what a representative sample would look like). This is not as bad as it sounds, for the number of basic emotions and moods is finite and in fact fairly small. What we required for this is a reliable taxonomy of the emotions, a task that badly needs undertaking. But the empirical researcher will not go far wrong if he starts, at least, by devising assessments for the most common and obvious emotions.

Finally, it may seem odd to suggest that there can be Ss who do not have the concepts of such emotions as fear and anger: only mythical heroes, or those very ignorant of English, as 'What is fear?' No doubt this is generally true. But it is not at all clear, at least in some cases, whether a 'psychopathic' S (whatever this means) merely does not *feel*, say, remorse, or whether he also lacks the *concept*. Further, there may be many Ss who lack the concepts for the more complex emotions (jealousy and envy, remorse and regret, pride and vanity), emotions about which, indeed, we may require to get a good deal clearer than we are. Both for research and, ultimately, for teaching purposes, this aspect of EMP is far from unimportant.

2. Being able to identify one's own emotions (conscious and unconscious) and other people's (conscious and unconscious)

We are dealing here with what we shall later demarcate as four separate sub-components of EMP, but the relevant logical points are too closely connected to separate. The reader will find them discussed fully elsewhere (Wilson, 1971).

First, we are talking about *abilities*. Can S, in practice, correctly say, for instance, 'I am feeling insecure', 'He is jealous', 'She is frightened'? S may have

this ability, but may not bring it to bear (for lack of KRAT(1)). To test this ability we should have to hold the 'motivation' - that is, simply, how much incentive S has to use the ability - constant. This is a problem usually either not faced or not solved in much psychological research (for instance, in intelligence tests).

Secondly, we are not concerned with *how* S knows what he or others feel. There is a temptation to think that S has a different *kind* of knowledge in his own case - a 'direct', 'self-authenticating', 'intuitive' or 'certain' knowledge. This is not so. S is differently placed for acquiring knowledge of his own feelings as against other people's, but this placing has both advantages and disadvantages. Sometimes S will know better than other people what he feels, or what they feel; sometimes not.

We are concerned only with *whether* he knows.

Thirdly, S's knowledge is bound to consist in noting, and probably in correlating, the various aspects of emotions that we noticed above: that is, the belief, symptoms, actions and surrounding circumstances that go to make up the emotion. Our assessment will be based largely on this. S will be able or unable to induce from, say, facial expressions or postures to beliefs, or from beliefs to actions, or from actions to symptoms. Not much is known about the ways in which this ability operates, but obviously assessors must make use of any relevant research.

Fourthly, it is likely that Ss will perform variably, depending on the particular emotion, the context in which they are called on to identify it, the people of whom they predicate the emotion, and so forth, as well as being more or less good at making inductions from the various signs of emotion mentioned above. We shall need, then, a list not unlike that given for PHIL(CC), which takes account of the various areas, contexts, classes of people and so forth. This S1 may be no good at identifying emotions in women; S2 baffled by the over-40s; S3 inept when dealing with societies of people whose facial expressions are in some respects unlike those common in our own culture; and so on.

Fifthly, it needs to be made plain that we are not only concerned with this ability in face-to-face situations. The morally educated S must know what a person would be likely to feel, or to have felt, in the (real or imaginary) future or past. He must be able to *imagine*, as well as in some sense *see*, the emotions of himself and others. This plainly involves different, and in some ways easier, methods of assessment.

Sixthly, and this is connected with our second point above, it is not of course required that S actually *feel* the emotions which he knows to exist in the other person. It may be, indeed, that those Ss who can 'put themselves in other people's shoes' are in fact better at EMP (and perhaps at PHIL also) if they can do this in a strong sense: that is, *have* something like the other's feeling ('empathy'?) rather than just being able to state correctly what the other feels. This may be highly relevant to *methods* of developing EMP and PHIL, but it is not what we are testing for here.

Finally, the distinction between conscious and unconscious emotions requires a brief note. Sidestepping many problems, I shall here mean by 'conscious' emotions those which the person who has the emotion would *not* require any lengthy process of psychotherapy to recognize, and those which he is not prevented from knowing by any deep-laid defences or resistances. For instance, suppose I am angry. I may not be conscious of my anger in the sense of being able to say at once 'Yes, I'm angry', but I could without too much difficulty see that I was trembling, shouting and attacking, and perhaps that I believed someone was thwarting me. If I have difficulty, I lack EMP in respect of my conscious emotions: I am not good, in practice, at noting and correlating the symptoms, actions, etc. of anger in myself (or perhaps in others). The 'raw material' is available to me, but I do not make use of it. On the other hand, the 'raw material' of unconscious emotions (in myself and others) is more subtle and hidden: neither I nor they could reasonably be expected to have it available and to hand immediately. Yet I may induce unconscious emotions, if I have a lot of EMP in this particular area. Naturally Ss may vary a great deal depending on whether it is their own or others' conscious or unconscious emotions: hence we divide this into four sub-components.

The distinction between conscious and unconscious is not an absolute one: we might rather talk in terms of degrees of availability. Nevertheless, a rough distinction between the two may be made, similar to that which we shall make when dealing with KRAT(1) and KRAT(2). It is sense, though untidy, to talk of what is 'normally' available to consciousness, just as it is sense to talk of 'bringing to bear' (KRAT(1)) one's conscious principles and faculties, though there may be unconscious 'parts of oneself' which one has not 'brought to bear'. It would be unobjectionable, perhaps, if we collapsed these four sub-components into two, abolishing the conscious - unconscious distinction and giving a range of assessments that ran for the 'immediately available' to the 'deeply hidden'. But I should be inclined to keep the fourfold division firmly in mind.

A more serious difficulty may be that assessors may not know, in the case of unconscious emotions, what the 'right answers' are. The very existence of unconscious emotions and the sense of that phrase are both disputed, and what unconscious emotions are felt by whom, and on what occasions, is disputed much more. Nevertheless, there seem to be some clear cases. There is, for instance, the adolescent who (unconsciously) feels insecure, impotent and frightened, and who behaves like a 'tough guy', keeps measuring his strength against authority, and so forth, perhaps consciously feeling nothing but contempt and hatred for the adult world of which he is secretly envious and scared. There is the Casanova who consciously despises women, but unconsciously is in desperate need of them. There is the 'nice chap' who consciously likes other people, but unconsciously fears them and tries to placate them. Of course, assessors would have to agree, and to agree for good reasons, on the 'right answers'. But this whole area is of such importance to moral education that the attempt seems well worth making.

Summary

We have distinguished four sub-components of EMP. These were:

1. Being able to identify conscious emotions in oneself: EMP(1)(Cs).

2. Being able to identify unconscious emotions in oneself: EMP(1)(Ucs).

3. Being able to identify conscious emotions in others: EMP(2)(Cs).

4. Being able to identify unconscious emotions in others: EMP(2)(Ucs).

GIG

This is perhaps the easiest component to deal with, and we can be fairly brief.

1. Knowing relevant 'hard' facts and sources of facts

Under this heading we exclude EMP, which deserved a separate treatment. By 'hard' facts I intend to exclude awareness of emotions and moods (EMP) but to include sensations (an S who does not know that a hard slap on the back may hurt a girl lacks this quality). Most of the 'relevant facts', however, will not be directly concerned with sensations of people, but with following basic categories.

(a) Facts relating to health, safety, etc.

This is a large category, and includes what drugs are addictive, elementary biology, first aid, contraceptive devices, the danger of certain machines (cars, electrical devices, etc.), what to do in case of fire, and so on.

(b) Laws, social norms, conventions, etc.

This includes what may be called 'social facts': not only the law of the land, but also the conventions and etiquette of particular social groups with which S may be in contact, the particular powers and scope of various authorities, the workings of particular institutions, social rules and so on.

(c) Facts about individuals or groups in need

S needs to know not just what is (as a matter of 'hard' fact) required in general to satisfy others' interests, but also about the existence of various others who are in need. It is relevant that there are old people, starving people, etc. either in other countries or in some other way removed from S's immediate environment.

It is not altogether easy to draw a sharp distinction between this quality and EMP. Under EMP we include awareness or wants as well as emotions, and it might be argued that this overlaps in certain cases - perhaps particularly in (b) above. Nevertheless, knowledge of laws, conventions and expectations can be roughly distinguished from awareness of wants. In practice we can reasonably confine ourselves here to the 'hard' facts relating to *need* or *requirements*. Whether a person *wants* a certain medicine if he is ill, or wants the kind of politeness that is conventional in his group, is here irrelevant: S will still find it useful to know what medicine the person *needs* or what is socially appropriate.

In reference to (c), we need also to remember that EMP is relevant only when S knows that a person exists, and knows something about him (so that he has, as it were, some chance of knowing what the person feels). It is the 'hard' knowledge that the person's (or group's) existence and circumstances with which we are concerned under (c).

Turning to 'sources' of facts, I intend here to make some allowance, so to speak, for those who happen to be ill informed in particular areas. S may not know much about medicine, but it will make a big difference whether he approaches the doctor or the witch-doctor when he or another is ill. He may not know much about science, but it is important whether he asks the physicist or the priest. Ss who are children or teenagers may rely on their friends as sources

of knowledge, rather than their parents or teachers. In general, what we are after here is some awareness on S's part that X or Y is the *kind* of thing that comes under some general heading ('economics', 'medicine', 'science'): that there is some expertise here. Straightforward sources of knowledge, such as the encyclopaedia, are also not to be despised. The three general groups given above will operate for this kind of knowledge also: it is the same facts that we want him either himself to know, or to know how to find out.

To some extent, it will be true that 'relevant' knowledge is different for different Ss. It does not count much against my moral eduction if I do not know the conventions current among pygmy tribes, or much against a pygmy's if he does not know the social expectations of an Oxford sherry party. If S's own group is at semi-starvation level, S may be pardoned for not taking a great interest in the needs of what count as poor people in the UK. In this respect (and perhaps in this only) our tests are trying to measure something which is not demanded *in the same form* of all cultures. But it is still *equally* demanded. In other words, 'relevant facts' are equally important for me and for pygmies, but the content of this title will be different; whereas, for other components, not only the general quality but the specific content will be the same (emotions, having interests, 'relevant alertness', etc. are common to all societies). In any case, since there are many fundamental similarities between human beings in respect of these 'hard' facts, particularly in the area of health and safety, much of the test content will be common. (When we meet Martians it may be another matter).

2. 'Knowing how': non-propositional skills in dealing with people

In relationships with people there is an important 'skill' element, which may be present or absent independently of the propositional knowledge of EMP, or of the 'hard-fact' knowledge mentioned just above. We are talking here of a skill which cannot be wholly learned by learning the truth or reasons of various propositions, but which might be picked up in practise or by imitation, like learning to swim. I am thinking here of such contexts as apologizing, cheering someone up, displaying sympathy, and giving or receiving orders. Of course propositional knowledge may improve S's abilities in such contexts, but we are here concerned to assess only the 'skill' element, so that such knowledge must be constant. We have also, of course, to hold constant the motivational factors (KRAT(1)), for we are interested only in S's ability - whether he can, not whether he wants to.

These skills may be divided into (a) verbal communication skills and (b) non-verbal communication skills. (a) is about

whether S says the right thing (when apologizing, ordering, etc.); (b) about whether he says it in the right tone of voice, with the right stance, gestures, etc. Both (a) and (b) are concerned with what S *does*, but not with what S does deliberately. For example, S1 may (unconsciously) always stand the right distance away from the person he talks to, smile at the right time, etc., and this will count as well as S2's deliberate taking up of position and smiling. If S3, however, is liked or disliked for what he *is* (badly dressed, ugly, dwarfish), this does not count. The distinction is a fine one, but may be drawn well enough in practice. We have to draw it in order to demarcate this quality at all, for it is something in respect of which people can be trained or educated, and we must exclude cases where Ss may be more or less acceptable to others for quite different reasons. (Being an attractive blonde is not a social skill.)

Summary

We have distinguished:

1. Knowledge of relevant 'hard' facts: GIG(1)(KF).

2. Knowledge of sources of facts: GIG(1)(KS).

3. 'Knowing how', or 'social skills' of verbal communication: GIG(2)(VC).

4. Ditto for non-verbal communication: GIG(2)(NVC).

KRAT(1)

We have here perhaps the most complicated of the components. In dealing with PHIL, we first wanted to know whether S had the concept of a person in the required sense (PHIL(HC)), and then whether S thought he ought to apply this concept in the sense of acting in accordance with others' interests (PHIL(CC)). Both these components could be described as 'cognitive', in that we are not concerned with any feelings or tendencies to act or behaviour on the part of S, except in the possible but unusual case of an S who said he thought he ought to act in other' interests, but never (or hardly ever) did so - in this case we should have doubts about S's sincerity. There is, then, no very tight conceptual connection between PHIL(HC) and (CC) and S's actual feelings or behaviour in 'real life'.

With PHIL(RSF), however, there is a stronger connection. An S who has some feelings, whether of a 'duty-orientated' or 'person-orientated' kind (DO or PO), that support the rule of acting in others' interests *eo ipso* has some motive or incentive for doing so. And the stronger the feelings - the

more PHIL(RSF) - the more we should normally expect that he did so. But there is still not a necessary conceptual connection here. First, S may have the feelings, but not have them as rule-supporting feelings *in practice*. That is, it may be that when S considers, in the abstract, what he thinks he ought in general to do, he has feelings which support the PHIL(CC) rule, but that when he is called upon to decide and act in real life, he either does not have these feelings or does not have the *as* rule-supporting feelings. Secondly, S may have the feelings as RSF, but the feelings are not powerful enough for them to be overriding, in the sense of issuing in *action*. Yet they may still be powerful. S1 has a strong incentive to help a person, but he has a stronger feeling of embarrassment and so fails to do so. S2 has a weaker incentive but no embarrassment, and so helps the person.

For these (and other) reasons we need a separate component, which we call KRAT(1). This is generally concerned with 'bringing to bear' the previous components when S is actually faced with the need for decision and action, with whether S's attitudes and abilities and attainments, listed under PHIL, EMP and GIG, are 'alive' in real-life situations. It is clearly possible that they should be inert. This is easy to see in the case of EMP and GIG: S may have emotional awareness, the ability to identify others' feelings, but not actually use it (through laziness, nervousness or many other reasons); and S may know all the relevant facts, and have all the 'social skills', but not make use of the knowledge and skills when it come to the point. As we have seen, this applies to PHIL also. We all know many Ss who quite genuinely hold, as a sincere moral theory, that they ought to act in others' interests, and who (to a greater or lesser degree) have genuine feelings which relate to and to some degree activate this rule, but who, nonetheless, sometimes or even often fail to follow the rule in practice.

Failure to follow the rule in practice may be of two kinds. Either S fails even to reach the stage of making a proper *decision,* and this is what we are concerned with under KRAT(1); or else he makes a decision, but fails to carry it out even though it was within his power, and this we shall leave to KRAT(2). The 'decision' we are talking about here, however, needs to be specified more fully. It is not just a questions of S thinking that X ought to be done 'in principle', as it were; it is a question of S's committing himself to action in making the decision. We shall expand on this later; here I want to show the width and nature of the gap that KRAT(1) has to fill, between S's just 'having' PHIL, EMP and GIG, and S's making what I have so far called only a 'proper' decision.

The first way in which S can fail to bridge the gap is simply by not being *alert* or not *noticing* that a decision is required. S may be in a day-dream or so intent on his own ends that he does not even realize that a moral situation confronts him. By a 'moral situation' here I mean a situation in which others' interests are at stake and S can act in their favour. This shows that what we require here is not just that S should be, as it were, generally 'alert', but that he should be *relevantly* alert: that is, alert to certain classes of situation. Moreover, he would not count as being 'relevantly alert' is he did not see the situation *under the right description*. If some poor chap is being pelted with stones, S may notice this and say 'How amusing!', and whilst there might perhaps be a correct description under which it *was* amusing, nevertheless we want S to see it as a case of another person in need of help, suffering, etc. We shall describe this part of KRAT(1) as 'relevant alertness', and call it KRAT(1)(RA).

The second type of failure, closely connected but distinguishable, is if S fails to *think thoroughly* about the situation to which he has alerted himself. A bell rings in S's mind, so to speak, whenever it might seem as if other' interest were at stake, but then S might not bother to think much further about the situation. He might fail to make full and proper use of his PHIL, EMP and GIG - particularly, in this sub-component, of his EMP and GIG. S should ask himself questions like 'What does this person really feel? Is it really a desire to help him that I myself feel, or some other desire? What facts do I know, or could I find out, that would make my help effective?', and so on. (I do not imply, of course that S has to do all this *consciously*.) Here it is important to note that S will summon up *any* ability skill, attainment, etc. that he possesses - e.g. not just what he does know, but what he could find out. This part of KRAT(1) we shall call 'thinking thoroughly' - KRAT(1)(TT).

Thirdly, when S reaches the stage of making a decision, he may fail in three ways. (a) His decision may not be the result of his PHIL being *overriding*. Despite his KRAT(1)(RA) and (TT), there may still be some other overriding syllogism derived from his own self-interest, or his inner feelings of guilt, or whatever, which prevents him from deciding in accordance with, and because of, the PHIL principle about others' interests. (b) His decision may not be thoroughly *prescriptive*; that is, S may think in a general sort of way that X ought to be done, but not that *he himself* ought to do it. S is required, as it were, to command or prescribe the required action to himself: to commit himself to acting. (c) His decision may be such that he thinks that *he* ought to do X, but not that X is the thing that *anyone* in a similar position ought to do. S's rule must not be a rule for himself alone,

but must be universalizable. (These last two requirements might perhaps be put by saying that S must mean 'ought' in a full sense.) From the requirement that S's decision should be overriding, prescriptive and universalizable we shall describe this aspect of KRAT(1) as KRAT(1)(OPU).

The assessment of KRAT(1), in its RA, TT and OPU aspects, is beset by similar complications to those of PHIL(CC): that is, there is likely to be a great variety of performance depending on various categories (the type of situation, the people involved, etc). But we have also an added difficulty. S's decision to act can, obviously, be to some extent verified by seeing how S actually does act. However, we need to know that S acts *as a result of* this kind of decision; we need to know what 'goes on in S's head'. So mere observation of behaviour, even coupled with assessments of PHIL(CC) and (RSF) will not be enough: we shall need interviews, cross-questioning of S, and so forth. Such methods will be even more necessary if we are to distinguish whether S lacks the RA, TT or OPU elements of KRAT(1), and, in the latter case, we should need to know whether it was the O, P or U element that was lacking.

A few lines above I mentioned the problems caused by variety of context or situation. For KRAT(1) there will be some important additions to be made to the list given for PHIL(CC). This is obviously because, in the latter case, there are no serious problems about the *context in which* S 'claims the concept', though of course there are problems about the *internal* situation (e.g. the elements in the story) about which S is asked to judge. Thus a test for PHIL(CC) might be in the form of a story in which S's 'peer group' or friends pull one way and others' interest another way. But the peer group is not present in person when S chooses one or the other criterion. With KRAT(1), however, this is not so. S's peers are present, perhaps, looking at him, jeering, shouting 'Come on!', leaving him isolated and so on, and this is a very different matter.

What we are looking for here are categories and contexts which, we guess, so alter the surrounding circumstances of S's decision that we should expect very different 'scores' from KRAT(1) in different categories. Perhaps, in particular, we are looking for *special* or *atypical* circumstances. We may reasonably entertain the concept of S 'normally' bringing to bear, or not bringing to bear, his PHIL, EMP and GIG so as to reach a decision, and go on to determine the 'special circumstances' which encourage S to behave abnormally. S's 'normal score', of course, will depend on general features of S's personality, his 'rule-supporting feelings', general attitude to other people and so on: these are not 'special circumstances' in any sense. If S is characteristically

nervous of other people, over-anxious, apathetic, hostile, etc., then this will affect (rightly) his 'normal' score.

The following categories, which may be taken just as general categories analogous to those suggested for PHIL(CC) or a 'special circumstance' categories, seem to be possibly relevant for assessment.

(a) Influence of 'potent' others

I use this jargon term to refer to 'others' who might, for normal Ss, exercise particular influence on decision-making 'in the field': e.g. S's peer group, his parents or other authority figures, his girlfriend, his dependants. These will affect S's KRAT(1) in ways more familiar to the social psychologist than to myself.

(b) Influence of locale

It is likely to make a big difference whether S's decision is taken in his own country or abroad; at home or at school; at work or at play; conceivably, in a crowded city or in the open country; and so on.

(c) Influence of immediately prior experience

If S has, for instance, just scored a notable success at school or, conversely, been severely rebuked in front of his classmates, won a sweepstake or had a row with his wife, seen an amusing film or been bored to tears by X's conversation - these and suchlike will affect the issue.

(d) Influence of temporary 'moods'

It will matter whether S feels depressed at that particular time, elated, 'unreal' or so on. There are temporary moods of this kind which are *not* caused by immediately prior experiences (as in (c)).

I am only too aware that the above four categories are very unsophisticated. There will be borderline cases and cross-categorizations. For example, if S is *with* his peer group *in* a football stadium *when* his favoured team has just lost, *and* S is 'in a bad mood' that day anyway, this seems to bring in all four categories.

KRAT(2)

If S has KRAT(1), as well as the other components, he reaches the stage of making a 'proper' decision to act in others' interests. but he may still not do so. It is both logically and empirically possible for S to make a sincere and genuine

decision and not to carry it out even though he could do so. If we put enough weight (against normal usage) on such concepts as sincerity, genuineness, wholeheartedness, 'bringing to bear', 'prescriptive', etc., then we can deny that this is true, and say that S will necessarily act unless he is prevented. But I have argued that to do this is to direct our attention away from a very important class of cases which is of particular interest to the researcher.

This is the class of cases in which S has made a 'proper' (sincere, etc.) decision, but does not carry it out, *not* because he is in any simple sense prevented, as if his hands were tied behind his back, but because there is some unconscious counter-motivation or counter-syllogism. On what seems to me to be the correct view of the unconscious, we shall say that there is a part of S - so unknown to himself that we cannot properly speak of S's decision s 'insincere' - that is *following different rules*; or we can say, if we like, that S himself (unconsciously) follows different rules, as a result of unconscious belief and emotions. This is, obviously, a very different view of the unconscious than that held by some, particularly by those who regard it as a clumsy way of talking about conditioned reflexes, 'imprinting', etc. In my view, it is often the case not that S cannot, but that in an important sense S does not *want* to, perform the required action.

Since the unconscious is, on this view, in principle educable, and since there is a sense (which I shall not expand here) in which S is responsible and perhaps 'to blame' for the rules he unconsciously follows, and since, further, this class of cases seems to me very large, it would be a mistake to exclude it from consideration. We are, then, dealing with cases in which S has got as far as KRAT(1) but then simply does not (does not want to, rather than cannot) do what he ought, or what he has sincerely decided. But it will be immediately apparent that there is very little the philosopher can say about this class of cases. We could, no doubt, attempt some kind of taxonomy of the various unconscious counter-syllogisms that may be operating, but this seems rather a task for the clinical psychologist or psychoanalyst.

For our purposes of assessment, all we can do (and it is enough) is to identify that this is in *this* area that S fails. We shall describe the area as KRAT(2) because of its similarity with KRAT(1). We can assess it, at least by any direct form of assessment, only by determining that S has made a 'proper' decision, by assuring ourselves that there is no straightforward prevention of S's acting, and then by seeing whether S does or does not act. If S does not, he lacks KRAT(2). We shall, of course, take care to confine ourselves to standard cases, where a 'normal' or reasonably well-

integrated person (I shall not enlarge on these phrases here) would be expected to carry out his decision.

STATUS OF THE COMPONENTS

I have pointed out earlier that the component titles are not intended to stand for any kind of psychological entity: for 'factors', 'forces', mechanisms', 'innate abilities' or anything else of that kind. When we score S for 'having' or 'lacking' PHIL, EMP, etc., we are simply answering questions of the general form 'Is it true of S that...?' We are not answering any question about *why* this is true or untrue, about what mechanisms or forces make it true or untrue. This is quite a different enterprise, no less important, but one which in my view it would be hard to undertake successfully concluded. In other words, until we know the answers to the general question 'Is it true of S that...?', I do not see that we have much chance of propounding clear and plausible hypotheses about the underlying causes, for we shall not even have clearly identified the phenomena we want to explain.

This needs stressing because empirical research lives in a world densely populated by various entities or 'constructs'. I am thinking here not only of such terms as 'social class', 'ego-strength' and 'super-ego', but of words seemingly more relevant to our present interests - 'ability', 'capacity', 'competence', 'motivation', 'attainment' and so on. I confess to extreme confusion about the meaning of such words as used by empirical researchers, confusion perhaps not unshared by the researchers themselves. Nevertheless, there will be a standing temptation, to which I as well as others may succumb, to describe our components by the use of such terms. The temptation is hard to resist because at least some of them (for instance, 'ability') are normal English words and would be the most natural terms to use in certain descriptions.

In what immediately follows I want to clarify the status of each component in terms of the question 'Is it true of S that...?' If I can do this, we need not become entangled in the undergrowth of quasi-technical terms, nor ambiguously specify this component as an 'attainment', or that as an 'ability', or the other as a 'motivational factor'. To put this another way, on the one hand, we need to be absolutely clear about what we are testing for under the heading of each component. We must be able to say of any evidence that turns up in our assessment, 'This is (is not) part of *what we mean by* "having PHIL" (EMP, GIG, etc.).' On the other hand, we must steer clear of thinking that there is some underlying *thing* for which we are testing, as if our assessment were only valid if it got at his underlying thing. We are concerned with what PHIL, EMP, etc. are by definition.

PHIL(HC) If S has the concept of a person, then S *can do* certain things (most obviously identify, once he knows the facts, certain instances as falling under the concept. There is no question of S's *wanting* ('being motivated') to do this, or of S's being the sort of person who, with time and teaching, may get to be able to do it ('innate ability'? 'potential"?). S has simply got to be able to do it, at the time of assessment, *if* he wants to or is induced to.

PHIL(CC) If S claims the concept as his overriding moral principle, and thinks that he ought to use others' interests as the criterion of decision and action, then this is simply something that S *does*. We are not concerned with cases where S *cannot* do this owing to some preventing factor outside S's control (for instance, S is under hypnosis or threatened at gun-point or drugged). So we are concerned with what S *does when he can*. (We shall be careful, however, to interpret 'he can' in a wide sense to include S;s unconscious desires, beliefs and emotions.) The context of assessment must be one in which S *can do what he wants*; we then assess what S actually does.

PHIL(RSF) (DO and PO) If S has DO and/or PO feelings, then again he simply *has* them. There is no question of his being able to have them, or wanting to have them, though again we must be sure that they are *his* feelings: that is, feelings which arise out of his perception and thinking, not feelings induced against his will.

Feelings, in the present sense of emotions, not sensations, are logically made up of characteristic beliefs, symptoms and tendencies to action. (This was discussed more fully under EMP.) Thus an S who evinces the DO feeling of remorse will believe he has done wrong, show symptoms of guilt and perhaps tend to apologize or make restitution; and so with other DO and PO feelings. Verification of these three elements is required if it is to be true of S that he feels X or Y, and the verification will vary with the particular feeling.

EMP(HC) This is analogous to PHIL(HC), in that we are here concerned only with whether S has the concepts of various emotions (moods, feelings, 'states of mind', etc.). It has to be true of S that he can, if he wants, bring certain phenomena - beliefs, symptoms, actions, circumstances - under the same

criterion. The criterion would normally be represented by a word - 'jealousy', 'pride', etc. - and full knowledge of the meaning of such words would be a sufficient condition for S's having the concept (but not a necessary condition: he may have the concept under some other heading). Whether S can in practice, or in practice wants to, identify particular emotions is not in question.

EMP(1)(Cs)
EMP(1)(Ucs)
EMP(2)(Cs)
EMP(2)(Ucs)

All these are concerned with whether S *can, in practice*, identify emotions: that is, whether he can recognize and correlate the various evidences of emotion in himself and others, in respect of conscious and unconscious emotions. The are not concerned with whether S actually *does* do this, for S may not want or be induced to do this, for S may not want or be induced to do it, yet still be able to do it. Lack of incentive is lack of KRAT(1); we are here interested in the presence or absence of ability.

GIG(1)(KF)
GIG(1)(KS)

Both of these are concerned with whether S does actually know relevant facts and sources from relevant facts. No sense is to be attributed to saying 'Does S *want* to know?' Some sense may be attributed to saying 'Does S want to *remember* the facts?', but we are not concerned with *why* S knows or does not know, only with whether S actually has the knowledge (can consistently produce the right answers for his own or other' benefit).

GIG(2)(VC)
GIG(2)(NVC)

These are components of 'knowing how', and may fairly be called 'skills'. S must be good at (skilled in, competent at) behaving in certain ways, verbally and non-verbally. Neither propositional knowledge ('knowing that') nor motivation is here in question.

KRAT(1)(RA)
KRAT(1)(TT)
KRAT(1)(OPU)

These again are all things which S does or does not do. Is it true that S attends relevantly (RA) to real-life situations; that he attends to and thinks thoroughly about them (TT); that he ends up by making an overriding, prescriptive and universalized decision to take action (OPU)? Here too S must be able to do these things: we are not concerned with cases in which some external compulsion prevents him.

KRAT(2)

Here we need to know only whether S in fact carried out his decisions - again, provided he could carry it out, and not permitting situations of compulsion.

We may now be able, perhaps without too much risk of confusion, to categorize these components under various headings that may be useful to empirical researchers. I shall eschew, and would advise the reader to eschew, such terms as 'cognitive', 'affective' and 'motivational'. But it may help to give a quick sketch under three headings, as follows:

1. Knowing

The following components seem to be concerned with different kinds of knowing:

PHIL(HC)	Knowing what counts as a person.
EMP(HC)	Knowing what counts as anger, jealousy, etc.
EMP(1)(Cs) EMP(1)(Ucs) EMP(2)(Cs) EMP(2)(Ucs)	Knowing when X feels anger, jealousy, etc.
GIG(1)(KF) GIG(1)(KS)	Knowing that some drugs are addictive, etc.
GIG(2)(VC) GIG(2)(NVC)	Knowing how to apologize, welcome, etc.

2. Doing

PHIL(CC)	interWhat Sudoesshis moral principle.other's
KRAT(1)(RA)alert	What S does is to notice, to be relevantly
KRAT(1)(TT)	What S does is to think thoroughly.
KRAT(1)(OPU)	What S does is to make a 'proper' decision to act.
KRAT(2)	What S does is to take action.

3. Feeling

PHIL(RSF) (DO and PO): Having a feeling (emotion) is, as we saw when discussing EMP, partly to have a *belief* and partly to have a tendency to *act*, so that to this extend we are dealing with something that S *does*. Nevertheless certain *symptoms* are also conceptually required and are from some viewpoints the central aspect of emotions, so this merits a separate heading. Emotions, we might say, are neither things we know nor things we do, but things we suffer (or that happen to us).