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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ACQUIESCENCE AND CONVENTIONALITY IN A COMMUNAL SOCIETY

by

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Acquiescence and Conventionality in a Communal Society" submitted by Edward D. Boldt in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

It is a common but untested assumption that acquiescence (i.e., yielding to group pressure) becomes a personality feature of individuals reared in gemeinschaftlich societies, and that this process then accounts for the marked conventionality (i.e., behavior in accordance with group norms) characteristic of such societies. Utilizing a revised acquiescence-inducing technique, the study tests experimentally this assumption. One hundred "communitarian" subjects, aged ten to fifteen years, from twelve Hutterite colonies in Alberta, are compared to a control group of one hundred and fifty "worldly" children (both rural and urban) from the host society in a standardized group-pressure setting. A second control group of Old Colony Mennonite subjects is also tested in an attempt to ascertain more specifically the effect of communal living, as practised by the Hutterites, on the dependent variable.

The findings indicate that Mennonite, but not Hutterite, subjects are characterized by a significantly greater tendency to acquiesce than subjects from the "worldly" control group, and the hypothesis that Gemein-

schaft necessarily reduces deviance through the production of acquiescent personality is challenged. Alternate hypotheses and implications are suggested.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The problem of how societal stability is achieved and maintained has a long intellectual history. Ever since Thomas Hobbes first formulated his well-known conception of nature as "the war of all against all" in the seventeenth century,[1] the "problem of order" has alternately inspired and frustrated a large number of scholars. "How is social order possible?" "How is it that man becomes tractable to social discipline?" [2]

Hobbes introduced his own analysis of the problem with the notion that man was originally self-centered, egotistic, and pleasure-loving. His interest in his fellow human beings was based primarily on their potential benefit to him. Since both he and they aspired toward the same goals, man was in constant competition with every other man, resulting in a perpetual state of conflict that was detrimental to the welfare of everyone concerned. Consequently each person entered into a contract with a central authority whereby he relinquished certain of his rights in return for the maintenance of law and

order. In this way the war of each against all was supplanted by a mutual contract.[3]

The influence of Hobbes and his supporters (e.g., Rousseau and Locke) was enduring, and the idea of social contract dominated theoretical approaches to the relation of individual and society for two centuries. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, Emile Durkheim effected a major shift in emphasis by offering a viable alternative to social contract theory,[4] an alternative that is sometimes referred to as "social mold theory."

> "He [Durkheim] came close to turning Hobbes and Rousseau inside out. Where they had assumed that the individual was primary and society a mere resultant of the characteristics of individuals, Durkheim came near to saying that society was primary and individuals mere resultants of the characteristics of society. He thought of society putting its stamp on individuals, like a mold forced over hot metal, and so we may call his theory the "social mold theory."[5]

Durkheim's pronounced realism had a profound impact on the subsequent development of sociological thought, and his influence continues to pervade contemporary theories. So much so, in fact, that a recent president of the American Sociological Association felt obliged to direct his presidential address against the "anti-psychological" bias of present-day sociology, and exhort sociologists to "bring men back in."[6]

But even as Durkheim himself found it necessary to

reassess, and qualify, his sociological determinism in his later work, so too the contemporary version of his "social mold theory" has been modified to accommodate persons and personality theory.[7] Talcott Parsons, for example, whose entire work has been described as "an attempt to solve the Hobbesian problem of order,"[8] has made an ambitious attempt to link personality with the social and cultural systems.[9] Also, students in the subject area known as "culture and personality" have, as the label suggests, focussed almost exclusively on the relationship of the individual to his socio-cultural environment, and have drawn heavily on personality theory in the process.[10] This work represents an attempt to synthesize the individualism of social contract theory and the determinism of Durkheim. But in the course of this rapprochement, what has become of the original Hobbesian problem of order?

A rather large and vocal group of critics is decidedly unhappy with current efforts to escape a narrow Durkheimian determinism,[11] and would claim that much contemporary sociological theory amounts to nothing more than an attempt to "explain away" the problem of the order by denying the very reality of the Hobbesian question.[12] On what basis are these charges made?

The heart of the problem appears to lie in the postulate of "isomorphism". Thus Baldwin suggests that in addition to being a sociologist, Parsons is also a "unitary isomorphist." He sees all the phenomena of the social world as formally isomorphic to each other, "and is never satisfied to leave a personality concept without its parallel in the social system."[13]

> "But in so doing. . . he is in danger of picturing a social system that does not need external controls at all because they are all part of the individual's motivation. This suggests a Utopian condition contradicted by the facts of life."[14]

Such a state of isomorphism between personality and society is not regarded as being accidental or achieved haphazardly. Rather, it is the result of a systematic socialization of individuals such that cultural values are internalized and thereby transformed into individual motivations.[15]

At this point critics point to a confusion and misuse of the concepts of "socialization" and "internalization". The two are not equivalent as "isomorphists" would apparently have us believe, and treating them as such implies that "either someone has internalized the norms, or he is 'unsocialized,' a feral or socially isolated child, or a

psychopath."[16] Rather, "the influence of socialization is chiefly in the cognitive area even when emotional factors are involved; that is, the individual learns the nature of the reality in which he lives."[17]

> "The learning of cognitive and evaluative orientations may involve the development of representations or maps of the cultural state of affairs. These are not tendencies to action but simply guides to the nature of the world in which one lives that one may or may not act in terms of."[18]

In other words, the process by which isomorphism is supposedly achieved (i.e., internalization of norms and values) is open to serious question, and it is on this basis that Wrong and others would claim that the problem of order has been largely evaded. While internalization may account for a certain amount of the conformity of individuals,[19] a good deal of behavior that is congruent with the sociocultural system remains unexplained.

Perhaps as a result of these strictures that have been advanced against current conceptions of the relation of individual and society, there now appears to be a reappraisal underway most clearly evidenced in Bert Kaplan's work. He has outlined the beginnings of what he considers a "new look" in social structure-personality theory,[20] based on the premise "that the motivational basis for orderly, ap-

propriate behavior need not be isomorphic to the role itself."[21]

> "....social and personality systems need not be symmetrical or isomorphically structured. A small number of motivations may support a wide variety of different behaviors, or quite diverse motivations in different persons may be the bases for the same role behavior. Since either can be the case, motivations are emancipated from the role requirements and we are forced to seek a new conception of the relationship between the two."[22]

> "Perhaps the most important preliminary step to this alternative theory is the definition of the problem . . . as having to do with the motivation not of this or that specific role behavior but of conformative behavior generally."[23]

> "If our general problem is to understand the way in which personality processes are involved in the maintenance of social order, we must no longer think of the motivation of a great variety of diverse behaviors but of a single diffuse disposition or orientation. Instead of positing for each specific behavior of the person . . . its own motivation, we must be concerned with discovering the motivations that underly the generalized mechanism, conformity. The concrete task of the research worker is to clarify the psychology of conformity in the person in the cultural group, and in human beings generally."[24]

The fact is, of course, that there has been a great deal of research into the psychology of conformity in recent years, and the literature in this area has now reached "Brobdingnagian proportions."[25] While it is still fair to say that there is as yet no single "theory of

conformity", some progress in this direction has been made,[26] supported by a large body of data. To date, however, efforts to relate these findings to the broader issue of the relation of the individual to the sociocultural environment have been conspicuously lacking. Most of the research to date has been conducted within the confines of the laboratory with American college students serving as subjects.[27] Moreover, the limited number of general theoretical discussions of conformity that are extant in the literature (e.g., Riesman and Fromm[28]), have been in the nature of social criticism, and hence directed primarily at the alleged erosion of individual freedom and creativity rather than the larger and more basic problem of order.

The study reported here is an attempt to apply certain of the concepts and techniques emerging out of the experimental study of conformity in a cross-cultural context, in an effort to identify certain of the processes by which social order is achieved and maintained. While a detailed statement of the specific purpose of the study must await the definition of key concepts in the following chapter, our general problem is to try to specify more precisely the role of conformity processes in the maintenance of social order in the communal society of the Hutterites. A review of the

literature reveals that current explanations of the remarkable orderliness of Hutterite society can be characterized as constituting essentially "social mold theories", with pronounced emphasis on such concepts as "socialization" and "internalization". The validity and generalizability of this approach will be examined by comparing Hutterite subjects with appropriate control subjects with regard to one dimension of conformity, acquiescence.

The study represents a continuation and elaboration of research that was begun in 1965 as the writer's M.A. thesis project.[29] Much of the effort in the original study was devoted to the technical and methodological aspects of the problem, such as the development of a measurement technique appropriate to the type of cross-cultural group comparisons being attempted. Due to limitations of time and money (abetted by a generous dose of human fallibility), the subsequent application of this technique was not sufficiently rigorous to yield reliable data, and the findings are therefore inconclusive. However, the basic intent of the original study was considered to be potentially significant enough to warrant a second effort utilizing larger and more representative samples and hopefully avoiding previous errors.

Details of specific changes and refinements will be included under the appropriate headings in subsequent chapters.

FOOTNOTES

1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1924. (First published in 1651.)

2. Dennis Wrong refers to the former as the "Marxist question," and the latter as the "Hobbesian question." See his, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," American Sociological Review, 26(1961), pp. 183-193 (p. 184).

3. E.S. Bogardus, The Development of Social Thought, New York: David McKay, 1960, pp. 299-300.

4. "Durkheim's treatment [of social contract] is a profound attack on a vein of thought that began in the seventeenth century with Hobbes and his contemporaries and continued through the Enlightenment to become in the nineteenth century the essence of the utilitarian movement." R.A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, New York: Basic Books, 1966, p. 91.

5. G.C. Homans, The Human Group, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1950, p. 317.

6. G.C. Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," American Sociological Review, 29(1964), pp. 809-818. For a similar view, see A. Inkeles, "Personality and Social Structure," in R.K. Merton, L. Broom, and L.S. Cottrell, Jr. (Eds.), Sociology Today, Vol. II, New York: Harper and Row, 1965, pp. 249-276. (Paperback edition. First published in 1959 by Basic Books.)

7. "Emile Durkheim, after having first attempted to explain social control solely in terms of exterior constraints, was led in his later work to emphasize that social norms, far from being imposed on the individual from the outside, became in fact internalized, that they are 'society living in us.' Durkheim now maintained that the essence of control lay in the individual's sense of moral obligation to obey a rule -- the voluntary acceptance of duty rather than a simple exterior conformity to outside pressure. The moral demands of society, as Durkheim sees them in his mature work, are constitutive elements of the individual personality

itself." L. A. Coser and B. Rosenberg (Eds.), Sociological Theory, New York: MacMillan, 1964 (second edition), p. 88.

8. Wrong, 1961, op. cit., p. 185, Cf., "It may be said that all of Parson's work, beginning with The Structure of Social Action, is an extended commentary on the Hobbesian question: How is social order possible?" Lewis Coser, The Function of Social Conflict, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 24. (Paperback edition. First published by the Free Press in 1956.)

9. Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

10. See for example, Bert Kaplan (Ed.), Studying Personality Cross-Culturally, New York: Harper and Row, 1961; C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (Eds.), Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953 (second edition); D. G. Haring (Ed.), Personal Character and Cultural Milieu, Syracuse University Press, 1956; F. L. K. Hsu (Ed.), Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality, Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1961.

11. A good portion of this criticism is compiled in a recent book of readings by N. J. Demerath III and R. A. Peterson (Eds.), System, Change, and Conflict, New York: The Free Press, 1967. See also Max Black (Ed.), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961.

12. Wrong, 1961, op. cit. See also, J. S. Coleman, "Collective Decisions," Sociological Inquiry, 34(1964), pp. 166-181; and H. Rich, "Homo Sociologicus and Personality Theory," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 3(1966), pp. 145-153.

13. A. L. Baldwin, "The Parsonian Theory of Personality," in Black, 1961, op. cit., pp. 153-190 (p. 155). The culture-personality literature has been similarly criticized: "Following logically from this emphasis on cultural configurations is the idea that given cultural configurations have their counterparts in the individuals of each society. Given cultures produce

one or more types of personality designated by such terms as 'modal personality,' 'basic personality structure,' 'character structure,' and so on." A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, 15(1950), pp. 587-600 (p. 588).

14. Ibid., p. 161. According to Bendix and Berger, this "has often had the cumulative effect of suggesting that the individual merely does what is expected of him -- in the literal sense in which the actor on the medieval stage reads his text from the rolled script in his hands." R. Bendix and B. Berger, "Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology," in L. Gross (Ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory, New York: Harper and Row, 1959, pp. 92-118 (p. 97).

15. Bert Kaplan, in Kaplan, 1961, op. cit., p. 661. Elsewhere Kaplan states: "The crux of Parson's theory, insofar as it concerns the relation between personality and social structure, appears to reside in the concept of the penetration of the cultural system into both the personality and social systems . . . . Parsons considers internalization as a process by which cultural elements can be transmitted with minimal change from one system to another . . . . It is the broadness of the way the concept of internalization is used about which we have strong reservations." B. Kaplan, "Personality and Social Structure," in J. B. Gittler (Ed.), Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957, pp. 87-126 (p. 104).

In this regard the following comment by Gardner Murphy is relevant: "There is [during socialization] no simple osmosis of the prevalent social usages from old to young; there is a mixture of love-feast and battle royal." See his, "The Internalization of Social Controls," in M. Berger, T. Abel, and C. H. Page (Eds.), Freedom and Control in Modern Society, New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1954, pp. 3-17 (p. 6).

16. Wrong, 1961, op. cit., p. 188.

17. Bert Kaplan, "Hutterite Socialization and the Resolution of the Conformity-Deviance Conflict," unpublished paper, 1958, p. 2. Spiro makes the related point that, "although it may be cognized, culture need not be internalized; and even when internalized, it comprises only one dimension of the personality: the superego." M. E. Spiro, "An Overview and a Suggested Reorientation," in F. L. K. Hsu, 1961, op. cit., pp. 459-492 (footnote on p. 474). Wrong also addresses himself to this point: "Sociologists have appropriated the superego concept, but have separated it from any equivalent of the Freudian id." Dennis Wrong, 1961, op. cit., p. 187.

18. Kaplan, 1957, op. cit., p. 105. Cf., "But whereas this training [acquired during socialization] provides the knowledge of appropriate behavior on the part of status holders, it does not automatically ensure that the requisite acts will be forthcoming." A. Inkeles and D. J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems," in G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II, London: Addison-Wesley, 1954, pp. 977-1020 (p. 1004). Bendix counters certain of Erich Fromm's proposals by stating that, "People do not always or even eventually desire to act as they have to act. It is quite possible that external necessities are not internalized but are endured, even in the long run." R. Bendix, "Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality," American Journal of Sociology, 58(1952), pp. 292-303 (p. 300). (Emphasis in original.)

19. "We do not wish to imply that internalization does not take place nor that it is unimportant. It does seem, however, that its scope may be limited and that some values remain 'external' at least in the sense that when the individual changes his group identification he abandons them. In addition the fact that actual internalization occurs and is important does not signify that the whole of the cultural pattern is internalized. The actual extent to which it is is a matter of empirical investigation." Kaplan, 1957, op. cit., p. 105.

20. Kaplan, 1961, op. cit., p. 660.

21. Ibid., p. 663.

22. Ibid., p. 663.

23. Ibid., p. 665.

24. Ibid., p. 667.

25. E.P. Hollander and R.H. Willis, "Some Current Issues in the Psychology of Conformity and Nonconformity," Psychological Bulletin, 68(1967), pp. 62-76 (p. 62). For recent reviews of this literature, see for example, I.A. Berg and B.M. Bass (Eds.), Conformity and Deviation, New York: Harper, 1961; D. Graham, "Experimental Studies of Social Influence in Simple Judgment Situations," Journal of Social Psychology, 56(1962), pp. 245-269; V.L. Allen, "Situational Factors in Conformity," in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. II, New York: Academic Press, 1965, pp. 133-175; R.H. Willis, "Social Influence and Conformity -- Some Research Perspectives," Acta Sociologica, 5(1961), pp. 100-114; C.A. Kiesler, "Group Pressure and Conformity," in J. Mills (Ed.), Advanced Experimental Social Psychology, in press.

26. See especially, R.H. Willis, "Conformity, Independence, and Anticonformity," Human Relations, 18(1965), pp. 373-383.

27. Two notable exceptions are, S. Milgram, "Nationality and Conformity," Scientific American, 205 (6) (1961), pp. 45-51; and G.C. Chu, "Culture, Personality and Persuasibility," Sociometry, 29(1966), pp. 169-174.

28. D. Riesman, N. Glazer, and R. Denney, "The Lonely Crowd, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950; Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, New York: Farrar and Rinehard, 1942.

29. E.D. Boldt, "Conformity and Deviance: The Hutterites of Alberta," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, 1966.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THEORY AND RESEARCH

As was indicated in the introductory chapter, it is unfortunately the case that there is as yet no single "theory of conformity". Graham points out that "attempts at theoretical analysis have taken the form of showing that experimental results can be fitted into this or that general theoretical framework."[1] Examples of such theoretical frameworks include field theory,[2] psychoanalytic theory,[3] reinforcement learning theory,[4] conditioning theory,[5] adaptation level theory,[6] and even mathematical models based on probability theory.[7] Graham concludes that "no convincing case has been made out that any one of these theories better fits the findings than any other."[8] In view of this state of affairs, a systematic review of the large body of data on conformity, and the application of each of the various theories to these findings, would constitute a major undertaking and will not be attempted here. Rather, we will limit our discussion of theory and research to such broad considerations as are not contingent upon any one theoretical framework, but which are basic to the study

of conformity processes generally. In the main, these considerations will consist of those crucial conceptual and operational clarifications and refinements that the literature presently recognizes as fundamental to the understanding and measurement of conformity phenomena. In other words, our discussion of the psychodynamics of conformity will be restricted to those aspects and issues that are directly relevant to the explication of our central theoretical problem -- the relationship between acquiescence and societal orderliness. While such an eclectic approach has certain obvious disadvantages, in the present instance such a strategy seems justified.

A. Some problems of definition.

Certain societies are recognized as being more "orderly" than others, and some individuals are said to be more "conforming" than others. What precisely, does this mean?

The term "conformity" is used in a number of different ways, and since theoretical implications and generalizations differ depending on which definition is being used, analyses of the workings of conformity often leave the reader confused. To avoid similar misunderstandings in the present discussion, certain of the major distinctions

drawn in the literature will be discussed in some detail.

1. Conventionality and acquiescence. The first distinction to be noted -- one that is reflected in the title of the present study -- is between "conventionality" and "acquiescence". Halla Beloff was the first investigator, to our knowledge, to make this differentiation explicit using this particular terminology,[9] although other writers have since made very similar distinctions. "Conformity" now becomes the more generic term, with conventionality and acquiescence subsumed under it as two specific expressions of the general process. Beloff defines conventionality as "the concurrence with tenets, attitudes, and mores of a subject's culture or subculture."[10] Acquiescence, on the other hand, "refers to the agreement with expressed group opinion in a particular experimental situation involving pressure from others."[11]

Willis acknowledges the importance of Beloff's distinction, but prefers a different terminology to make essentially the same point.[12] "Congruence conformity" is his equivalent of conventionality, while "movement conformity" corresponds to acquiescence. He suggests the following operational criteria:

> "At the purely descriptive level, the congruence criterion requires that conformity ....

> be measured in terms of the extent of agreement between a given response and the normative ideal. The movement criterion dictates the measurement of conformity in terms of a change in response resulting in a greater or lesser degree of congruence."[13]

To return to our original question for a moment, when an individual is referred to as being "conforming", what is usually meant is simply that his behavior is conventional (i.e., in accordance with group norms, not deviant), and "orderly" societies are those marked by a high degree of conventional behavior. Recently, however, "conformity" has been increasingly used to denote acquiescence rather than conventionality, to deprecatorily describe the behavior of individuals or groups who unhesitatingly go along with the "conformist herd" rather than "sticking to their guns". This usage of the term reflects a growing concern by "many diagnosticians of our times that this is an age of conformity."[14]

Whether or not this is a correct assessment of contemporary North American society (or whether it is "good" or "bad") need not concern us here. The point is that "conformity" has increasingly acquired certain connotations which serve only to blur the distinction between conventionality and acquiescence. This has frequently resulted in considerable confusion in discussions of conformity, even

by sociologists.[15] Conventionality and acquiescence are conceptually (and operationally) distinct phenomena and should be treated as such, as note the following:

> "The essence of conformity [i.e., acquiescence] in distinction to uniformity and conventionality, is the yielding to group pressures. For there to be conformity there must be conflict -- conflict between those forces in the individual which tend to lead him to act, value, and believe in one way and those pressures emanating from the society or group which tend to lead him in another way."[16]

> "The simple correspondence of an individual's belief or opinion with the views of others does not by itself denote his conformity [i.e., acquiescence]. If he is, in fact, in agreement with the majority this is obviously not conformity, nor is conformity necessarily betokened by similarity in dress, manners, or other habits [i.e., conventionality] . . . . A meaningful definition of conformity requires that the individual demonstrably give up something of value or importance to him as the price of alignment with the group."[17]

> "Conformism [i.e., acquiescence] is not being like other people [i.e., conventionality], but believing that one ought to be as much like other people as possible. Only this belief, when elevated into a principle of conduct, constitutes conformism."[18]

Though acquiescence and conventionality are distinct phenomena, they are not unrelated, and it is the nature of this relationship that constitutes a major part of the subject matter of the present study. We will return to this point later, but first a second major distinction must be noted.

2. "Expedient" and "true" acquiescence. Accepting the Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey definition of acquiescence as "the yielding to group pressure,"[19] it has been shown that this "yielding" can take two forms. Beginning with an initial disagreement between the individual and the group, "expedient" acquiescence (discussed by Kelman as "compliance"[20]) refers to the situation where "the individual outwardly agrees with the group but remains in inward disagreement," while in the case of "true" acquiescence "the individual both inwardly and outwardly is brought to agree with the group."[21] Festinger refers to these two modes of acquiescence respectively as "public compliance without private acceptance" and "public compliance with private acceptance,"[22] while Spiro prefers the terms "social" and "cultural" conformity to describe a very similar set of phenomena.[23]

Regardless of which terminology a particular investigator prefers, however, there is general agreement in emphasizing the fact that although two separate acts of acquiescence may appear indistinguishable in overt behavioral terms, they may nevertheless be distinguishable in motivational terms, and hence different in their psychological meaning to the actor. The failure to recognize

this represents a confusion of "descriptive (phenotypic) and explanatory (genotypic) levels of analysis."[24]

To date "true" acquiescence has been largely the concern of attitude change experiments and studies focussing on "persuasibility",[25] whereas the work of investigators such as Allport,[26] Asch,[27] and Crutchfield[28] has been directed mainly toward the exploration of "expedient" acquiescence although explicit reference to the different levels of analysis noted here is seldom made by either group. Moreover, while the findings of the two areas of study would appear to be mutually relevant, thus far only minimal cross-fertilization has occurred,[29] even though a synthesis could conceivably provide some insight into the present "attitudes vs. action" or "words and deeds" dilemma.[30]

The focus of the present study is on the relationship between conventionality and "expedient" acquiescence, but as will be shown later, the "true-expedient" dimension is not as central to our problem as is the "acquiescence-conventionality" dimension. For purposes of clarity, both distinctions have been summarized diagrammatically in Figure 1 below. The reference in the diagram to "independence" and "anticonformity" is discussed under the heading immediately following.

FIGURE 1

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF VARIOUS MODES OF CONFORMITY



* Except in the case of the "anticonformist," who is non-acquiescent, but not independent in that his negativistic responses are just as predictably being determined by the group as are the yielding responses of the acquiescent.

3. Acquiescence: A multidimensional phenomenon. Until recently, most of the research in the subject area here designated as "acquiescence", employed (implicitly or explicitly) a unidimensional approach "in which conformity [i.e., acquiescence] and non-conformity are represented as opposite poles of a single dimension, with perfectly congruent behavior resting at one extreme and growing magnitudes of discrepancy located at increasing distances beyond."[31]

Such an approach is evident, for example, in the J-curve formulation of Allport,[33] as well as in the more recent work of Walker and Heyns.[34] Other investigators, such as Asch[35] and Jahoda,[36] have utilized a variant of this approach in which "independence" rather than nonconformity is contrasted with acquiescence. According to Willis and Hollander this latter conceptualization constitutes an improvement "insofar as independence has a more precise meaning than does undifferentiated nonconformity."[37] Nevertheless, the acquiescence-independence model is still inadequate because it implies that "to the extent that one lacks independence, one conforms [i.e., acquiesces]."[38] This assumption, according to Willis, is not valid in that it fails to distinguish between several possible modes of non-conformity.

Accordingly Willis has developed, with experimental support, a two-dimensional response model which he considers a "more adequate description of behavior than either of the two unidemensional conceptualizations."[39] The earlier version of this model closely resembles the Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey formulation. These latter investigators also point to the necessity of distinguishing among types of nonconformity and posit "counterformity" as a crucial example.[40] "This is the case where the person is actively opposing the group, being negativistic, hostile, compulsively dissenting from the . . . . For the counterformist, the group serves as a negative reference group."[41] They conclude that:

> "Conformity [i.e., acquiescence], independence, and counterformity are thus not to be thought of as three points along a single continuum. Rather they represent three vertices of a triangle. A proper understanding of the whole problem of conformity must take full account of the important differences among these three forms of reaction to group pressure."[42]

Willis' earlier model differs from the foregoing in that it first of all posits "anticonformity" in place of "counterformity", but "more importantly, two dimensions of response are introduced in order to specify precisely the interrelations among the three vertices of the triangle."[43]

In other words, although Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey conceptualize conformity, independence and counterformity as being interrelated, they fail to identify the actual dimensions of response.[44] "The first of these dimensions," according to Willis, "is that of dependence-independence, while the second is that of conformity-anticonformity."[45] (See Figure 2 below.)

FIGURE 2

EARLIER VERSION OF WILLIS' TWO-DIMENSIONSAL RESPONSE MODEL[46]



Willis defines the three modes of responding represented in Figure 2 as follows:

"1. Conformity.... In its pure form, it consists of a completely consistent attempt to behave in accordance with normative expectations as perceived.

2. Independence. Pure independence behavior occurs whenever the individual perceives

> relevant normative expectations, but gives zero weight to these perceived expectations in formulating his decisions.... The independent person is one capable of resisting social pressures, rather than one who is unaware of them or who merely ignores them. He 'sticks to his guns', so to speak.
>
> 3. Anticonformity. In pure anticonformity behavior, the response is directly antithetical to the norm prescription. Pure anticonformity, like pure conformity, is pure dependence behavior.... Anticonformity rarely, if ever, occurs in undiluted form, but as a limiting case it is of considerable theoretical importance."[47]

In terms of Figure 2 above, pure dependence behavior can fall anywhere along the horizontal axis, while the line connecting the "conformity" and "independence" vertices represents "various combinations of conformity and independence, with no trace of anticonformity. Points within the triangle correspond to possible combinations of all three modes of response. That the figure is triangular, converging as it does at [the "independence" vertex], reflects the fact that the more independent an individual is, the less conformity or anticonformity he can exhibit."

In a later version of this two-dimensional model, Willis has added a fourth response mode which he terms "variability". In pure variability behavior "the individual invariably changes his response if given an opportunity .... Variability reflects complete indecision. As soon as the individual has

responded in one way, he changes his mind."[49]

> "Because the completely variable person changes his mind incessantly without giving any consideration to the norms, variability represents a second kind of independence from the social environment. It is the direct opposite of the 'sticking to one's guns' variety of independence, ... but it does represent, nevertheless, the assignment of zero weight to the normative expectations of the group."[50]

The relation between the four modes of response are now diagrammed as follows. (See Figure 3 below.)

For obvious reasons, Willis refers to his revised version as the "diamond model", and points out that "if the name were not so clumsy, the [vertical] axis could well be named the <u>independence-dependence-independence</u> axis, for each end corresponds to one kind of independence and the midpoint corresponds to complete dependence upon the norm.... Points located along the perimeter of the diamond represent combinations of two modes of response, while points within the diamond represent various combinations of all four basic modes of response."[52] Willis compares the two versions of his model as follows:

> "In many cases the diamond model and the author's earlier triangular model lead to identical conclusions. In those cases in which a difference arises, the picture given by the diamond model is to be preferred. One can say that the triangular model is like a map of North America that omits northern

> Canada. Most of the time such a map suffices, but not always. Likewise, one can usually make do without the variability vertex or even the entire [lower] half of the diamond, but occasionally some individuals must be located [below] center."[53]

FIGURE 3

REVISED VERSION OF WILLIS' TWO-DIMENSIONAL RESPONSE MODEL (THE "DIAMOND MODEL")[51]



Willis has been credited with "some of the more precise theoretical work in the area of conformity,"[54] and his two-dimensional model has been hailed as a "step in the proper direction of greater precision in conformity research."[55] It should be noted, however, that Willis' model is not intended as a typology of persons, but a differentiation of response modes. In other words, "it is not suggested that a person engages exclusively in one of three types of responses ..... A person may exhibit all three types of responses within an experimental session."[56] This possibility will be taken into account in the present study.

B. Acquiescence and the problem of order.

In the introductory chapter it was noted that Dennis Wrong takes the position that sociologists have largely evaded the Hobbesian problem of order. This criticism is based on Wrong's assessment of contemporary sociology's answer to the Hobbesian question, which, he points out, is two-fold.[57]

1. Through a systematic socialization of individuals, the dominant value orientations of society are internalized and thereby transformed into individual motivations. The individual now "wants to do as he has to do,"[58]

and this presumably accounts for his conventional behavior. However, as was pointed out earlier, this answer to the Hobbesian question has been taken to task, in that it implies an isomorphic relationship between the individual and society. Critics have pointed out that not all that is "learned" is necessarily "internalized", and in deference to this stricture a second explanation is proffered to account for conventional behavior that is not motivated by internalized norms and values.

2. A certain proportion of conventional behavior, it is argued, can be accounted for in terms of a desire on the part of individuals to win the approval of others. According to this approach, an individual may act in accordance with group norms even though he does not (at least initially) personally accept these norms as "legitimate," that is, he does not "believe in" the content of the norms. His conventionality no longer represents an expression or affirmation of internalized values, but a yielding to the expectations of the group in an effort to gain its approval. Individual behavior is now motivated by a generalized need to elicit favorable responses from others, and the satisfaction of this need is accomplished by acquiescing to the expectations of others.

To recapitulate, this second solution to the problem of order would hold, first of all, that conventionality is achieved (at least partly) through acquiescence; and secondly, would posit a personality factor (a need for approval) as the motivational base for acquiescent behavior. Both of these statements require further examination, and will be dealt with in order.

As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, acquiescence and conventionality, though distinct, are not unrelated phenomena. The precise nature of this relationship, however, has been insufficiently investigated and is far from clear. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey state that, "Conventionality and uniformity do, of course, result partly from conformity [i.e., acquiescence] . . . . the conformist tends to hold more conventional values. But the converse does not necessarily hold. Highly conventional individuals may often be quite able to resist conformity pressures."[59] This suggests an asymmetrical relationship wherein acquiescence is sufficient but not necessary for the existence of conventionality. Elsewhere these same authors cite evidence to support their conclusion,[60] and a review of the literature indicates that other investigators, such as Beloff,[61] and Back and Davis,[62] also report a significant relationship

between acquiescence and conventionality. On the other hand, some studies have found no such relationship.[63]

These contradictory findings appear to be at least partly due to inconsistencies in definition of key variables, as well as a failure on the part of some investigators to differentiate between "expedient" and "true" acquiescence. Nor has the multi-dimensional nature of acquiescence always been taken fully into account. However, without speculating further as to the reasons for the apparent inconsistency in the available data, the point remains, as Wrong points out, that sociologists commonly invoke acquiescence as a second major mechanism (in addition to the internalization of norms) whereby societal orderliness is achieved. The present study tests this assumption in the context of an ongoing and highly conventional society.

The second statement in the "need-for-approval" approach to conventionality which bears scrutiny, holds that the overt expression of acquiescence is determined primarily by personality factors. Individuals presumably acquire a need for approval through a process of socialization which then accounts for their subsequent acquiescent behavior. Such a conceptualization, of course, is susceptible to the very same criticisms that have been directed

against the "internalization-of-norms" approach, in that it implies an isomorphic relationship between the individual and society. The individual, in effect, still "wants to do as he has to do" as a result of being "molded" by his socializers. The only real difference is that the motivational base of his conventionality has now shifted from internalized norms and values to a need for approval, and he now has an acquiescent personality rather than a strong super-ego.

For this reason Wrong regards both, the "internalization-of-norms" approach and the "need-for-approval" (or acquiescent personality) approach, as constituting an "oversocialized conception of man". Such a conception, he contends, ignores "both the highest and the lowest, both beast and angel,"[64] in man's nature, and overlooks the fact that although man is social, he is not entirely socialized.

But what about the concept of "acquiescent personality"? What is its status in contemporary social psychological theory? There is in the current conformity literature a decided lack of consensus as to the usefulness and validity of this construct. While it is generally recognized that personality and situational factors are both involved as determinants of acquiescent behavior, there is much less

agreement as to which of these factors is predominant. The following statement by Back and Davis succinctly summarizes this lack of unanimity.

> "In the social psychological analysis of conformity [i.e., acquiescence], three distinct emphases appear. One of these is a search for a generalized personal trait of conformity -- one exhibiting transituational consistency. Another emphasis has been on the search for generalized social-situational conditions, conditions whose relationship to conformity are relatively uninfluenced by the personality characteristics of the respondents. And, finally, there is a third school of thought that regards the search for generality in either the person or the situation as a hopeless task. From the latter point of view, the specificity of person-situation determinants is empasized."[65]

These differences are clearly reflected in the literature, as witness the following contrasting statements:

> "One can conform [i.e., acquiesce] or not in the service of such a wide variety of personal needs and perceived instrumentalities as to permit only a very limited validity to the construct of the conforming personality."[66]

> "Taken together these many different findings argue for the existence of stable and enduring conformity [i.e., acquiescence] tendencies in people -- in short for an interpersonal response trait of <u>conformity-proneness</u>."[67]

> "For the sake of emphasis, let me say that I at once reject the view that conformity is a persisting personal attribute, like being lame, or even a passing state, like having a rash."[68]

> "High-need-for-approval subjects have been shown to be significantly more conforming [i.e., acquiescing] than lows in three quite different contexts: a paper-and-pencil test situation intended to measure

> a 'latent' disposition to conform; a simulated group-pressure situation; and a more natural group setting where the other persons were actually present. In addition, the last two situations employed different perceptual stimuli as the material to be judged. The results, overall, are highly confirmatory of the hypothesized relationship [i.e., positive] between individual differences in the strength of approval motivation and conformity to group pressure."[69]

Proponents of the acquiescent personality approach base their conclusions on the fact that subjects in a wide variety of situations, each of which is essentially the same for everyone,[70] have been observed to show consistent individual differences in tendency to acquiesce, and such differences are then attributed to differences in personality. Also, positive correlations of personal characteristics with acquiescence have been reported by a number of investigators. Moreover, it is significant to note that of all the studies reporting findings which would appear to negate the existence of acquiescent personality, not one, to our knowledge, is cross-cultural in nature. It seems possible, therefore, that such negative findings are due to excessive restriction of the range in personality of subjects tested. As Mead[71] and other anthropologists have shown, it is possible to rank primitive societies according to the degree to which individuals acquiesce to the demands of the group, and the limited cross-cultural data on modern

national cultures also indicates that there are consistent inter-cultural differences in tendency to acquiesce. A study by Milgram,[72] for example, comparing Norwegian and French university students, showed significantly greater independence among the French than among the Norwegians. Similarly Chu has recently reported data that "provide strong evidence that cultural difference exists in the persuasibility of the Americans and Chinese, the latter being significantly more persuasible.... This difference is consistent with the Chinese core values of authoritarian submission and the corresponding stress on self-reliance in the American culture, and represents an effect of predominant cultural norms on personality functioning."[73]

At any rate, the point is that sociologists and anthropologists frequently assume, explicitly or implicitly, the viability of the acquiescent personality approach, and tend to attribute (at least in part) the orderliness of societies to the existence of such personality traits. This is an assumption, however, that remains largely untested particularly on a cross-cultural basis, and the present study provides such a test. Techniques to measure certain behavioral manifestations of acquiescence have been developed, and a modified version of one such technique

is used to test experimentally the relative vulnerability to acquiescence of children reared in the highly conventional Hutterite communities.

FOOTNOTES

1. D. Graham, "Experimental Studies of Social Influence in Simple Judgment Situations," Journal of Social Psychology, 56(1962), pp. 245-269 (p. 266).

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4. H.C. Kelman, "Effects of Success and Failure on 'Suggestibility' in the Autokinetic Situation," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 45(1950), pp. 267-285; B. Mausner, "Studies in Social Interaction: I. A Conceptual Scheme," Journal of Social Psychology, 41(1955), pp. 259-270.

5. J.S. Kidd and D.T. Campbell, "Conformity to Groups as a Function of Group Success," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51(1955), pp. 390-393.

6. H. Helson, R.R. Blake, J.S. Mouton, and J.A. Olmstead, "Attitudes as Adjustments to Stimulus Background and Residual Factors," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(1956), pp. 314-322.

7. B.P. Cohen, Conflict and Conformity: A Probability Model and its Application, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963; S.C. Goldberg and A Lubin, "Influence as a Function of Perceived Judgment Error," Human Relations, 11(1958), pp. 275-280.

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9. Halla Beloff, "Two Forms of Social Conformity: Acquiescence and Conventionality," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 56(1958), pp. 99-104.

10. Ibid., p. 99.

11. Ibid., p. 99.

12. R. H. Willis, "Descriptive Models of Social Response," Technical Report, Nov., 1964, Washington University, Nonr 816(12), Office of Naval Research.

13. E. P. Hollander and R. H. Willis, "Some Current Issues in the Psychology of Conformity and Nonconformity," Psychological Bulletin, 68(1967), pp. 62-76 (p.64).

14. Marie Jahoda, "Conformity and Independence," Human Relations, 12(1959), pp. 99-120 (p. 99). Elsewhere Jahoda states: "Many observers of the current crisis of civil liberties in this country agree with regard to one of its aspects: this is a time of growing conformism, they maintain, of severely restricted tolerance for deviation from the medium and mediocre." See her, "Psychological Issues in Civil Liberties," American Psychologist, 11(1956), pp. 234-240 (p. 234).

15. See, for example, E. K. Wilson, "Conformity Revisited," Transaction, 2(1964), pp. 28-32. Also, Dennis Wrong and Ernest Van Den Haag, "Replies to Conformity," Ibid., pp. 33-36.

16. D. Krech, R. S. Crutchfield, and E. L. Ballachey, Individual in Society, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, pp. 506.

17. D. P. Crowne and D. Marlowe, The Approval Motive, New York: John Wiley, 1964, p. 74.

18. Wrong, 1964, op. cit., p. 35. In the same article Wrong also makes the remark: "Conformism is the extension of the dictum 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do' to all social conduct and to thinking and feeling as well as to overt 'doing'." Ibid., p. 34.

19. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 506.

20. H. C. Kelman. "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(1958), pp. 51-60.

21. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1961, op. cit., p. 506.

22. L. Festinger, "An Analysis of Compliant Behavior," in M. Sherif and W. O. Wilson (Eds.), Group Relations at the Crossroads, New York: Harper, 1953, pp. 232-256 (p. 235).

23. M. E. Spiro, "Social Systems, Personality, and Functional Analysis," in B. Kaplan (Ed.), Studying Personality Cross-Culturally, New York: Harper and Row, 1961, pp. 93-127 (footnote on p. 94). Jahoda has also stressed the importance of making such a distinction. See, M. Jahoda, 1959, op. cit.

24. Hollander and Willis, 1967, op. cit., p. 63.

25. Cf., C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953; C. I. Hovland, The Order of Presentation in Persuasion, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957; C. I. Hovland and I. L. Janis (Eds.), Personality and Persuasibility, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959.

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28. R. S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," American Psychologist, 10(1955), pp. 191-198.

29. C. A. Kiesler, "Group Pressure and Conformity," in J. Mills (Ed.), Advanced Experimental Social Psychology, MacMillan, in press, p. 94 of mimeo. copy.

30. See for example, R. T. LaPiere, "Attitudes vs. Actions," Social Forces, 13(1934), pp. 230-237; I. Deutscher, "Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy," Social Problems, 13(1966), pp. 235-254.

31. R. H. Willis and E. P. Hollander, "An Experimental Study of Three Response Modes in Social Influence Situations," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69(1964), pp. 150-156 (p. 150).

32. Ibid., p. 150.

33. Allport, 1934, op. cit.

34. E. L. Walker and R. W. Heyns, An Anatomy for Conformity, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962.

35. Asch, 1951 and 1956, op. cit.

36. Jahoda, 1959, op. cit.

37. Willis and Hollander, 1964, op. cit., p. 151.

38. R. H. Willis, "Conformity, Independence, and Anticonformity," Human Relations, 18(1965), pp. 373-388 (p. 375).

39. Willis and Hollander, 1964, op. cit., p. 151.

40. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., pp. 506-507. Pauline Pepinsky has suggested the term "negative conformity". See her, "Social Exceptions that Prove the Rule," in I. A. Berg and B. M. Bass (Eds.), Conformity and Deviation, New York: Harper, 1961, pp. 380-411.

41. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 507.

42. Ibid., p. 507.

43. R. H. Willis, "Two Dimensions of Conformity-Nonconformity," Sociometry, 26(1963), pp. 499-513 (p. 500).

44. Willis, 1965, op. cit., p. 381.

45. Willis, 1963, op. cit., p. 500.

46. Adapted, with modifications, from Willis, Ibid., p. 501.

47. Willis, 1965, op. cit., p. 379.

48. Willis, 1963, op. cit., p. 500.

49. Willis, 1965, op. cit., p. 379.

50. Ibid., p. 379.

51. Adapted, with modifications, from Willis, Ibid., p. 380.

52. Ibid., p. 380.

53. Ibid., p. 381.

54. Kiesler, in press, op. cit., p. 16 of mimeo. copy.

55. Ibid., p. 24.

56. V. L. Allen, "Situational Factors in Conformity," in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2, New York: Academic Press, 1965, pp. 133-175 (p. 135).

57. Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology," American Sociological Review, 26(1961), pp. 183-193 (p. 185).

58. This is a slightly modified version of Fromm's well-known statement: "In order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character which makes them want to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or of a special class within it. They have to desire what is objectively necessary for them to do. Outer force is to be replaced by inner compulsion and by the particular kind of human energy which is channeled into character traits." Erich Fromm, "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," in C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray (Eds.), Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953, pp. 515-521 (p. 517). (Emphasis in original.) A very similar statement appears in his Escape From Freedom, New York: Farrar and Rinehard, 1942, pp. 283-284.

59. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 506.

60. Ibid., pp. 526-527.

61. Beloff, 1958, op. cit.

62. K. W. Back and K. E. Davis, "Some Personal and Situational Factors Relevant to the Consistency and Prediction of Conforming Behavior," Sociometry, 28(1965), pp. 227-240.

63. See for example, L. Nahemow and R. Bennett, "Conformity, Persuasibility and Counternormative Persuasion," Sociometry, 30(1967), pp. 14-25; H. Linton, "Dependence on External Influences, Correlates in Perception, Attitudes and Judgment," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51(1955), pp. 502-507.

64. Wrong, 1961, op. cit., p. 191.

65. Back and Davis, 1965, op. cit., p. 227.

66. Hollander and Willis, 1967, op. cit., p. 70.

67. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., pp. 522-523.

68. E. P. Hollander, "Reconsidering the Issue of Conformity in Personality," in H. P. David and J. C. Brengelmann (Eds.), Perspectives in Personality Research, New York: Springer, 1960, pp. 210-225 (p. 216).

69. Crowne and Marlowe, 1964, op. cit., p. 82.

70. Situations are, of course, "never identical for different people.... The best we can do is to find situations that are as objectively similar as possible. And even then when we do, the meanings of these objectively similar situations may differ for different people." Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 522. Similarly, Clyde Kluckhohn states: "No technique can assure 'identical stimulus conditions' unless (as one condition) all of the subjects come from precisely the same subculture." See his, "Culture and Behavior," in G. Lindzey (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II, London: Addison-Wesley, 1954, pp. 921-976 (p. 957).

71. M. Mead, Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939.

72. S. Milgram, "Nationality and Conformity," Scientific American, 205(6) (1961), pp. 45-51.

73. G. C. Chu, "Culture, Personality, and Persuasibility," Sociometry, 29(1966), pp. 169-174 (p. 174).

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM

A. The Hutterites: A brief history and description[1]

The Hutterian Brethren, or Hutterites, are a German-speaking religious sect whose origin dates back to the Protestant Reformation and the founding of the Anabaptist movement in 1525. In 1533, under the leadership of Jakob Huter, a small band of dissidents separated from the main body of Anabaptists to practice a form of Christian communism. Using the biblical Apostolic Church as a model, this group committed itself to the practice of "community of goods". The year 1525 also marked the start of the Peasant War, and since the Hutterites were devout pacifists, they refused to support the hostilities. This immediately made them the target of severe persecution. The entire sect faced total extermination on a number of occasions, and in 1536 Jakob Huter, their first leader, was burned at the stake.

Pursued by their enemies, the Hutterites were forced to flee, and during the next 250 years they wandered throughout central Europe, finally settling in the Ukraine upon the invitation of the Russian Government. Here they managed

to live unmolested until 1870, at which time their pacificism again made them the object of hostility. Between 1874 and 1879 approximately 400 Hutterites migrated to the United States, settling initially in South Dakota where they established the original three colonies (or Bruderhofs) in North America.

For the next forty years they enjoyed a period of tranquil prosperity, until World War I once again aroused anti-Hutterite sentiments. The war against Germany had intensified feelings of patriotism in the United States, and by 1917 public hostility toward these non-resistant, German-speaking strangers had reached dangerous levels. Negotiations with the Canadian Government followed, and between 1918 and 1922 almost all of a total of seventeen colonies moved to Canada, settling initially in Alberta and Manitoba.

As of 1965 there were 15,249 Hutterites living in approximately 162 colonies in agricultural areas of the northwestern United States and the Prairie Provinces of Canada. Sixty-three of these colonies were located in Alberta with a total estimated population of 7,000.[2]

The Hutterites in North America are divided into three distinct kinship groups (or Leut) who trace their

origin to the three colonies originally established in South Dakota, as follows:

1. Dariusleut - descendents of the Wolf Creek Colony, established in 1874 under the leadership of Darius Walter.

2. Lehrerleut - descendants of the Elm Spring Colony, established in 1877 under the leadership of Jacob Wipf, a teacher (Lehrer).

3. Schmiedenleut - descendants of the Bon Homme Colony, established in 1874 under the leadership of Michael Waldner, a blacksmith (Schmied).

In Alberta today, roughly two-thirds of the colonies are of the Dariusleut variety, and the remainder are Lehrerleut. The Schmiedenleut group is limited largely to Manitoba and is not represented in Alberta. Superficially, differences among the three groups appear to be relatively minor, reflected only in slight variations in dress, customs, and colony organization. However, the fact that members of the three groups rarely intermarry would seem to indicate that the differences may be more thoroughgoing. Most investigators have attributed little significance to the threefold division, although no one, to our knowledge, has yet attempted a systematic study to determine its precise significance.

As has already been noted, the Hutterites live in colonies or Bruderhofs. These are small rural communities with a population of 50 to 150 members. Each colony is an autonomous economic unit, but close contact is maintained with other colonies in the same kinship group through visits and correspondence. The economy of these colonies is based almost entirely on agriculture, though they generally engage in a highly diversified type of mixed farming. Each colony is headed by a "preacher" who is in charge of the spiritual welfare of the members, and a "boss" who manages the secular affairs of the colony. Every colony practices "community of goods" to the extent that there is very little private property. Meals are prepared and served communally, and the socialization of children beyond the age of three is essentially a community rather than a family responsibility. Community organization in many respects resembles an extended family setting. Hutterite population is expanding rapidly at the rate of 4.1% per year, or doubling approximately every sixteen years.

Other relevant aspects of colony life will be discussed in greater detail under subsequent headings.

B. An oversocialized conception of the Hutterites?

Since 1874 when the Hutterites first arrived in North

America, they have been the object of considerable controversy and some research. A recurrent theme in the available literature concerns the apparent paucity of deviance in their colonies.

> "So far as Hutterite society is concerned, the societal requirements for a maximum of conformity and a minimum of deviance seem to be met to an astonishing degree."[3]

> "There seemed to be no serious, and only a few petty, violations of moral norms by Hutterites, although every effort was made by our staff to find all severe personality disorders and instances of socially deviant behavior."[4]

> "On the whole, deviant behavior, including colony desertion, is rare."[5]

While these descriptions may be somewhat utopian,[6] there is little doubt that the Hutterites, when compared with their host society, have succeeded in maximizing the overt signs of social order. Serious students of the Hutterites are without exception impressed by their highly conventional behavior, and we turn now to a review of the explanations that have been put forth to account for this state of affairs. This review will be limited to the two major Hutterite studies that have thus far been conducted. The first of these was completed in the eraly 1950's under the guidance of J.W. Eaton,[7] while the second was directed by J.A. Hostetler[8] and completed in 1965. Both studies

were interdisciplinary and have been widely cited as authoritative sources.

The following are some of the more general conclusions of the Eaton study:

> "The order of their society is maintained through an internalized discipline of conscience, reinforced through a fear of external punishment and disapproval."[9]

> "The survival of the 16th century Hutterite peasant culture in the heart of the most 20th century-minded continent is a vivid demonstration of the power of values and beliefs."[10]

> ". . .there is no question about their effective socialization process. Religion, tradition and the active manipulation of parents and leaders work hand-in-glove to bring up Hutterite young people to want what their way of life can give them."[11]

> "The people as a whole are religious to an unusual degree and there is hardly a doubter among all the Hutterites."[12]

> "The growing Hutterite child is molded consciously and consistently by parents, teachers, and the impact of all community institutions ... into an adult who will live in conformity with the expectations of the Hutterite way of life."[13]

With regard to one specific form of deviance, desertion, Eaton explains as follows:

> "Adolescents get an opportunity to peek a little behind the curtain of faith drawn by their culture. Most of them are indoctrinated sufficiently well so that they lose interest in what they see."[14]

> "The rareness of permanent desertions from the parental hearth no doubt reflects also the effectiveness of Hutterite child-rearing practices. Youngsters are so well indoctrinated that they grow up to need the kind of communal support which their culture offers them."[15]

In terms of our previous discussion regarding sociologists' answer to the Hobbesian question, these statements, taken together, certainly point to an "internalization-of-norms" approach to the problem. Contrast this with Hostetler's conclusions.

> "Our field observations indicate that Hutterite children are primarily controlled through surveillance rather than through internalization of standards."[16]

> "They are not taught to discipline themselves, deciding what is right and following their own concept of truth, rather they are taught to do as they are told and that those in authority will watch over them, punish, and protect them."[17]

> "Social controls are based primarily on the individual's fear of rejection. The adult Hutterite has identified with the group, and for his own self-esteem, he needs full acceptance by the group. Even an indication of possible rejection is threatening to him."[18]

> "Hutterite child rearing and socialization practices are phenomenally successful in preparing the individual for community life. The individual is taught to be obedient, submissive, and dependent upon human support and conduct."[19]

> "There is greater emphasis on correct acting than correct thinking."[20]

The emphasis here is clearly on a "need-for-approval" approach rather than the internalization of norms and values, as the principal method for assuring conventional behavior. Group awareness and sensitivity to the expectations of others is now the immediate goal of Hutterite socialization practices and the development of a strongly internalized super-ego is secondary. Moreover, Hostetler's emphasis on behavioral submission would seem to indicate that he considers Hutterite acquiescence to be of the "expedient" rather than "true" variety. With regard to desertion, Hostetler would attribute such cases to a breakdown in socialization resulting from colony disorganization.[21] In short, both Eaton and Hostetler place great stress on the effectiveness of Hutterite socialization practices, but the end product of this process of socialization differs according to the two investigators. For Eaton the socialized Hutterite represents a "bundle of internalized values", while Hostetler would describe him as an acquiescent "acceptance-seeker" and together they constitute the twin pillars of Dennis Wrong's "oversocialized man".[22]

Hutterite societies are relatively isolated homo-

geneous societies resembling in many ways what Redfield[23] has termed "folk societies", or Tönnies'[24] "Gemeinschaft". It seems appropriate, therefore, to compare briefly (within the context of the problem of order) statements pertaining to the Hutterites with the literature on folk societies generally. As has already been noted, Hutterite society is highly conventional when compared to the gesellschaftlich host society. This description is consistent with a socio-anthropological tradition that views gemeinschaftlich societies as relatively immune to deviant behavior, particularly in the form of such disapproved behaviors as crime and delinquency, divorce and desertion, suicide and despair.[25] Moreover, like Hostetler (and unlike Eaton), this conception of Gemeinschaft often assumes that orderliness is achieved via the production of "yea-saying personality"[26] rather than through the internalization of norms and values.

Riesman, for example, holds that a Gemeinschaft is characterized by individuals who are predominantly "tradition-directed".[27] Such individuals, along with the "other-directed", ". . . live in a group milieu, and lack the inner-directed person's capacity to go it alone."[28] "The tradition-directed person takes his signals from others."[29] Similarly, Walter Reckless states:

> "In an undisturbed village . . . the paradigm of containment does not include inner containment . . . . The self rarely has occasion to show its strength -- if it has any. As a matter of fact, the self as a management system for life adjustments is not well developed in undisturbed tribes, villages, and religious sects."[30]

Finally, Kelsen states that:

> "This complete submission of the individual to the group manifests itself also in ... the fact that breaches of the social order occur less often in primitive than in civilized society .... A weak ego-consciousness leads to an increased sensitiveness as far as the judgment of society is concerned, particularly to an increased fear of public disapproval."[31]

Thus Hostetler's conclusions (and in part Eaton's as well) regarding, first, the state of orderliness in Hutterite communities, and secondly, the manner in which this state is achieved, would appear to be supported by similar findings in other "folk-like" societies.

C. Statement of problem.

It has been suggested that a "new approach" to the Hobbesian problem of order is needed which would abandon the search for myriad isomorphic links between the individual and society, and concentrate instead on the investigation of the generalized processes which lead individuals to act in a conventional manner. The Hutterites provide a most appropriate milieu for the pursuit of such an investigation.

Each Hutterite colony constitutes a miniature society which has largely succeeded in maximizing the overt signs of social order. It seems logical to assume, therefore, that the processes contributing to this condition would also be maximized, and hence more easily discerned and analyzed.

Previous research would attribute Hutterite orderliness to the same two processes that Wrong has criticized as constituting an oversocialized conception of man. The most recent study of the Hutterites, however, discounts Eaton's earlier "internalization-of-norms" approach and posits instead a "need-for-approval" approach, an emphasis which appears to be more consistent with the literature on gemeinschaftlich societies generally. This proposed "solution" to the Hobbesian problem, however, has never (to our knowledge) been experimentally tested in the context of an on-going social system. Hostetler's conclusions, for example, are derived largely from a case study of three colonies in which "the data was obtained by direct observation and from conversation while participating in the culture."[32] Moreover, the "need-for-approval" approach accepts rather uncritically the viability of the concept of "acquiescent personality", even though the social psychological literature is far from unanimous on this point.

Our general problem then, is to investigate the manner in which Hutterite orderliness is achieved and maintained. More specifically, the present study provides a test of the statement that Hutterite conventionality is achieved via the production of acquiescent personality. Such a test would first of all provide further data as to the credibility of the concept of "acquiescent personality", and secondly, contribute toward the clarification of the relationship between acquiescence and conventionality. On the basis of our own previous research,[33] we would predict that Hutterite subjects do not differ significantly from control subjects in the degree to which they exhibit acquiescence as a characteristic mode of response in a group-pressure situation. If the data fail to reject this hypothesis, current statements regarding Hutterite conventionality will have been opened to question, and the onus will be on the writer to suggest a plausible alternative to the Hostetler thesis.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is not our intention to present a detailed account of contemporary Hutterites and their history. Interested readers are referred to the following sources: V. Peters, All Things Common: The Hutterite Way of Life, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965; P.K. Conkin, Two Paths to Utopia: The Hutterites and the Llano Colony, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964; J.W. Bennett, Hutterian Brethren, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967; P.S. Gross, The Hutterite Way, Saskatoon, Sask.: Freeman Publishing, 1965; J. Horsch, The Hutterian Brethren, 1528-1931, Goshen, Ind.: Mennonite Historical Society 1931; R. Friedman, Hutterite Studies, Goshen, Ind.: Mennonite Historical Society, 1961. For an account of Hutterite religious beliefs see, P. Ridemann, Confession of Faith, Rifton, N.Y.: Plough Publishing House, 1938, translated from the original German edition (1565) by K.E. Hasenberg.

2. These figures are provided by J.A. Hostetler, Education and Marginality in the Communal Society of the Hutterites, Cooperative Research Project No. 1683, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 228.

3. B. Kaplan, "Hutterite Socialization and the Resolution of the Conformity-Deviance Conflict," unpublished paper, 1958, p. 2.

4. J.W. Eaton and R.J. Weil, Culture and Mental Disorders: A Comparative Study of the Hutterites and Other Populations, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955, p. 138.

5. Peters, 1965, op. cit., p. 164.

6. Evidence to this effect is cited, for example, by Bennett, 1967, op. cit., pp. 248-249. Eaton, of course, also admits that,"The sect has its deviants, but most violations of the common core values are not a threat to the group's survival." J.S. Eaton, "Adolescence in a Communal Society," Mental Hygiene, 48(1964), pp. 66-73. (p. 73).

   The Eaton study was conducted almost twenty years ago. Since then changes have no doubt taken place in

Hutterite society, and what we regard as a possible over-emphasis on conventionality may be partially due to this time factor. It is also possible that some students of the Hutterites have been influenced by what has been referred to as "the loyalty-to-people-studied code." See G. M. Foster, "Introduction: Peasant Character and Personality," in J. M. Potter, M. N. Diaz, and G. M. Foster (Eds.), Peasant Society, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967, pp. 296-300 (p. 296).

7. The results of this study are reported in the following publications. Eaton and Weil, 1955, op. cit.; Kaplan and T.F.A. Plaut, Personality in a Communal Society, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1956; J. W. Eaton and A. J. Mayer, Man's Capacity to Reproduce: The Demography of a Unique Population, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1954; J. W. Eaton, "Controlled Acculturation," American Sociological Review, 17(1952), pp. 331-340; J. W. Eaton, 1964, op. cit.; J. W. Eaton, R. J. Weil, and B. Kaplan, "The Hutterite Mental Health Study," Mennonite Quarterly Review, 25(1951), pp. 47-65; J. W. Eaton and R. J. Weil, "Psychotherapeutic Principles in Social Research: An Interdisciplinary Study of the Hutterites," Psychiatry, 14(1951), pp. 439-454; J. W. Eaton and R. J. Weil, "The Mental Health of the Hutterites," Scientific American, Dec., 1953, pp. 31-37.

8. Published reports of this study include, Hostetler, 1965, op. cit.; J. A. Hostetler and G. E. Huntington, The Hutterites in North America, Toronto, Ont.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967; J. A. Hostetler, "The Hutterite Socialization Study," Mennonite Quarterly Review, 37(1963), pp. 239-242.

9. Eaton, Weil, and Kaplan, 1951, op. cit., p. 57.

10. Eaton and Weil, 1955, op. cit., p. 182.

11. Eaton, 1964, op. cit., p. 73.

12. Kaplan and Plaut, 1956, op. cit., p. 12.

13. Eaton and Weil, 1955, op. cit., p. 126.

14. Eaton, 1964, op. cit., p. 71.

15. Ibid., p. 71.

16. Hostetler, 1965, op. cit., p. 76.

17. Hostetler and Huntington, 1967, op. cit., p. 67.

18. Ibid., p. 86.

19. Ibid., p. 111.

20. Ibid., p. 81.

21. Hostetler, 1965, op. cit., pp. 89-91.

22. H. Rich, "Homo Sociologicus and Personality Theory," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 3(1966), pp. 145-153 (p. 145).

23. Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," American Journal of Sociology, 52(1947), pp. 293-308.

24. Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), New York: Harper and Row, 1963. (Originally published in German in 1887, translated and edited by C. P. Loomis.)

25. "Anthropologists and sociologists are still writing voluminous monographs on underdeveloped peoples, villages, and sects. They still find evidence of the effective incorporation of the individual into the value system and structure of society .... Although containment of behavior is recognizably not complete, it is certainly maximized under conditions of isolation and homogeneity of culture, class, and population." W. Reckless, The Crime Problem, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967 edition, pp. 471-472. Banton states: "The arcadian qualities of village life should not be exaggerated .... Nevertheless, the broad contrast between village and town in level of social control, as reflected in crime and other forms of deviance, cannot be denied." Michael Banton, Roles, London: Tavistock, 1965, p. 204.

This view has not gone unchallenged. See for example, Oscar Lewis, Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951. (A critique of R. Redfield's Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village, University of Chicago Press, 1930). See

also, A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," American Sociological Review, 15(1960), pp. 587-600.

26. This phrase was suggested by, A. Couch and K. Keniston, "Yea-sayers and Nay-sayers: Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60(1960), pp. 151-174.

27. D. Riesman, in collaboration with N. Glazer and R. Denney, The Lonely Crowd, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961 edition, pp. 11-12.

28. Ibid., p. 25.

29. Ibid., p. 25. Who these "others" are, of course, differs for the other- and tradition-directed. Ibid., p. 22. Riesman also points out that there "can be no such thing as a society or a person wholly dependent on tradition-direction, inner-direction, or other-direction; each of these modes of conformity is universal, and the question is always one of degree to which an individual or social group places relevance on one or another of the three available mechanisms." Ibid., p. 30.

Culture-personality writers typically fail to specify whether the acquiescence that characterizes gemeinschaftlich societies is "true" or "expedient," although Riesman (like Hostetler) appears to imply the latter in describing the acquiescence of the tradition-directed person as "behavioral compliance alone." Ibid., p. 15.

30. Reckless, 1967, op. cit., p. 479. Elsewhere Reckless states: ". . . of the two containing buffers [i.e., "inner" and "outer"] the inner containment is the more important in the mobile, industrialized settings of modern society. This is because individuals in such societies spend much of their time away from the family and other supportive groups which can contain them. As a result they must rely more on their own inner strength to function competently. It is also probable that the outer is operationally more important than the inner containing buffer in less industrialized societies where the clan, the tribe, the village retain their effectiveness or in the modern, intensively managed, communistic societies. In such societies the strength of self, away from a circumscribed social structure, is not

put to a test and we really do not know how strong it is or how well it can manage alone." See his, "A Non-Causal Explanation: Containment Theory," Excerpta Criminologica, 2(1962), pp. 131-134 (p. 132).

31. H. Kelsen, Society and Nature, London: Kegan Paul, 1946, pp. 20-21. Kelsen concludes: "Thus it is characteristic of primitive man that he satisfies his 'desire for prestige' by the consciousness to behave entirely in conformity with the social order, to have the approbation of his fellows and in no way to oppose the social order." Ibid., p. 292 (footnote no. 107).

See also G. H. Mead: "One difference between primitive human society and civilized human society is that in primitive human society the individual self is much more completely determined, with regard to his thinking and behavior, by the general pattern of the organized social activity carried on by the particular social group to which he belongs, than he is in civilized human society. In other words, primitive human society offers much less scope for individuality -- for original, unique, or creative thinking and behavior on the part of the individual self within it or belonging to it -- than does civilized human society." G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 221.

32. Hostetler and Huntington, 1967, op. cit., p. 4.

33. E.D. Boldt, "Conformity and Deviance: The Hutterites of Alberta," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, 1966.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

A. The testing procedure.

The two best-known techniques utilized in the experimental study of acquiescence to group pressure have been developed by Asch[1] and Crutchfield,[2] although a number of investigators have employed variants of these two basic types.[3]

In his widely-known experiments, Asch employed a number of "stooges" (i.e., confederates of the experimenter) and a single naive subject. The experimental setting was such that the naive subject sat near the end of a row of stooges. Each individual in the group was asked to judge the length of lines displayed before him on cards. By prior arrangement all the stooges gave an incorrect answer on certain of the line stimuli. The naive subject thus found himself in a situation where the correct answer was in opposition to the consensus of the majority, and his response to this situation (i.e., either yielding or remaining independent) provided Asch with a measure of the subject's vulnerability to group pressure.

The major advantage of the Asch technique would appear to be that it "engages the subject in an interpersonal behavior event, with face-to-face oral communication among members,"[4] thereby approximating more closely a "real life" setting. On the other hand, the need for confederates makes the Asch technique uneconomical in that only one subject can be tested per session. In order to avoid this handicap, Crutchfield devised a different technique, utilizing electrical equipment, which permits the testing of five or more subjects simultaneously. A brief description of this technique follows:

> "Five subjects at a time are seated side by side in individual booths, screened from one another. Each booth has a panel with a row of numbered switches which the person uses to signal his judgments on items presented on slides projected on the wall in front of the group. Also displayed on his panel are signal lights which indicate what judgments the other four members are giving to the item. The booths are designated by the letters A, B, C, D, and E, and the subjects are instructed to respond in that order. They are not permitted to talk during the session.
>
> Although this is the way the subjects are led to understand the situation, they are in fact being grossly deceived by the experimenter. There are really no electrical connections among the five panels; the signals are actually delivered by the experimenter from a master control panel in such a way that pre-established sequences of lights appear in the same way on all five individual panels. . . . Moreover, all five booths are labelled E, so that <u>each</u> subject sees the sequence of judgments allegedly emanating from persons A, B, C,

> and D before he makes his own judgment. On those critical items where the experimenter wishes to impose group pressure, he makes it appear that all four members - A through D - agree on an answer which is clearly at variance with the correct answer. In this way all five subjects are confronted with the same conflict between their own judgment and the bogus consensus. They may resolve the conflict either by giving the same judgment as the group's thus conforming, or by giving their own answer, thus remaining independent."[5]

The Crutchfield technique (sometimes referred to also as the "panel-of-lights technique"), however, gives no indication how the subjects might have responded to critical items under "normal" (i.e., when not under pressure from the group) conditions. Thus what might be interpreted as a yielding response might in fact be the way in which the subject would have responded in the first place. In other words, the experimental procedure employed by Crutchfield constitutes what has been referred to as a "one-shot case study",[6] in that scores are based on a single observation with no attempt to ascertain how subjects might have responded when not under pressure from the group. Consequently what might be interpreted as a sign of acquiescence may in fact be nothing more than an expression of conventionality.

This possibility becomes especially critical when test items tend to be ambiguous, and in cross-cultural comparisons where differential acquiescence rates may then be due to differences in the perception and interpretation of

test items, rather than a result of the independent variable, group pressure.

For the present cross-cultural study, therefore, the Crutchfield technique has been modified to make it adaptable to a more rigorous experimental design.[7] A private pretest measure has been introduced necessitating certain procedural modifications of the Crutchfield technique, while retaining a very similar electrical apparatus. The modified technique involves the reversal of a previous judgment or decision, thereby allowing each subject to serve as his own control.[8]

Description of procedure.[9] Subjects, in groups of five,[10] are asked to respond to a series of twenty questions under what might be termed "zero pressure" conditions. Each of the questions is accompanied by three possible answers (labelled A, B, and C), only one of which is correct. Subjects are required to choose the answer which they consider to be correct by pulling the appropriate switch (of which there are three, also labelled A, B, and C) on the panels at which they are seated (in enclosed cubicles). Questions are answered privately and in orderly sequence on instruction from the experimenter. Subjects during this trial are under the impression that their responses are being fed anonymously

into a portable computer where they will be stored and retrieved for analysis (again anonymously) at a later date.[11] To simulate the sound of such a computer, an electric calculator is activated each time a switch is pulled.

Upon completion of this part of the test, subjects are told that since the test is rather unusual, their performance may not have been truly indicative of their abilities in that they may inadvertently have made some errors.[12] It is only fair, therefore, that they should be given another opportunity to respond to the questions now that they have familiarized themselves with the equipment and procedure. And in order to make the second trial more interesting, each subject will be shown how the other members of the group previously answered each question. Since the initial responses were recorded by the computer, it will now be possible to make these known to the group via the rows of lights on the panels. Thus each subject is made aware of the responses of his fellow subjects before responding to the questions a second time.

On this basis subjects are confronted with the same items a second time, but now five of the questions have been "fixed" by the experimenter to create the illusion of a disagreement between the individual's own previous response and that of his fellow subjects. Subjects are thus faced with the

decision of whether to ignore the opinion of the other members of the group by responding as they did initially, or to yield to the pressure of the group by changing their response to coincide with the false group consensus.

If differences in scores obtained through the use of this technique are to be construed as reflecting personality differences, it is essential that situational factors remain constant for all subjects tested. As has already been noted, it is not possible to create situations that are entirely identical for different people, but efforts can be made to assure that situations are as objectively similar as possible. This task, of course, is especially important and difficult in cross-cultural research. However, every effort was made to achieve situational uniformity in the present study. This effort included a careful arranging of the equipment and other physical aspects of the testing situation, as well as striving for consistency in the administration of the test and the delivery of instructions to the subjects. In an earlier study[13] the instructions to subjects were taperecorded to achieve maximum uniformity. This experience indicated, however, that whatever was gained in increased uniformity may have been offset by certain disadvantages, and hence this procedure was not followed in the present study. Specifically,

the use of a taperecorder appeared to leave some subjects, especially the Hutterites, rather bewildered, as though they could not quite understand why the experimenters were not delivering the instructions personally, and a certain lack of concentration on the part of these subjects was perceived. Consequently instructions were delivered orally with the proper precautions taken to insure uniformity -- in content as well as intonation, mood, and emphasis -- for all sessions.

Of the total situation, however, perhaps the single most important aspect is the actual tasks required of the subjects, and it is to this important topic that we now turn.

B. Test items.

As is the case with other aspects of the total situation, test items which are superficially similar may nevertheless differ in their meaning to the subjects, and it is therefore crucial to select items that are unambiguous and not open to contradictory interpretation. In a cross-cultural context this requires choosing tasks that are as "culture-free" as possible.[14]

With these considerations in mind, tasks in the present study were limited to "visual perception items". Twenty such items were prepared on slides, with "fixed" items consisting of a single line on the left and three

comparison lines on the right (each of a different length), or vice versa, and projected on a screen twelve feet in front of the subjects.[15] The subjects' task was to choose from among the three comparison lines the one equal in length to the line on the left. One of the three comparison lines was actually equal to the single line, while one of the two remaining lines was shorter, and the other longer (by equal amounts).

In the original study three types of questions were used: line stimuli similar to those described above, opinion items, and "logical items" such as are commonly found in I.Q. tests. A re-examination of the data obtained using the three types of items revealed less variability in response, in terms of errors, between Hutterite and control subjects on visual perception items than on the other two types. For example, one of the "fixed" opinion items in the original study read as follows:

> Which is most important?
>
> A. To treat others the way you would like them to treat you.
>
> B. To wash before going to bed.
>
> C. Always try to be on time.

Since the "Golden Rule" is a basic tenet of Hutterite religion, and since their commitment to pacifism is at least partly based

on this very precept, it was expected that Hutterite subjects would not hesitate choosing A as the correct or most appropriate answer. The results indicate, however, that 26% of Hutterite subjects responded with B or C compared to only 5% for control subjects. This pronounced differential in error rates was duplicated on other opinion items as well, and was the primary reason for the inconclusive nature of the data. It was decided, therefore, to restrict tasks in the present study to visual perception items.

The twenty items used were selected from a total of forty on the basis of pretest results. Sixty subjects were pretested in three stages, with certain deletions at each stage. The decision to retain or delete an item was made on the basis of ambiguity (i.e., the number of errors made) and discriminatory power (as measured by the degree of acquiescence elicited). Five of the twenty items were selected as "critical items", that is, items to be "fixed" by the experimenter. These were selected on the basis of the same two criteria already mentioned.

In deciding upon the total number of items to include in the test, as well as the number of items to be fixed, the following considerations were taken into account. Our experience in the original study as well as the pretest for the

present study showed that a test consisting of twenty items required approximately one hour to complete. This was considered to be the maximum time allowable, both from the standpoint of subject fatigue and boredom as well as experimenter efficiency. In deciding how many of the items were to be "fixed", a prime consideration was to set a small enough ratio of "fixed" to "non-fixed" items to safeguard the credibility of the experimental procedure. Obviously if all or most of the items were fixed, subjects might well become suspicious as to the real purpose of the test. On the other hand, a sufficient number of "fixed" items are necessary to allow for a reasonable range of possible scores. Asch[16] and Goldberg[17] both report that increasing the number of exposures to group pressure does not significantly affect the degree of acquiescence elicited, and hence it was decided to "fix" only five of the twenty items, interspersed at irregular intervals with the "non-fixed" items.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the scoring procedure used, some additional remarks regarding the ambiguity of items is in order. Deutsch and Gerard have distinguished two types of social influence as follows:

> "We shall define a <u>normative social influence</u> as an influence to conform with the positive expectations of another. An <u>informational social</u>

> influence may be defined as an influence to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality."[18]

The authors do not discuss the relation of these different types of influence to the distinction between "true" and "expedient" acquiescence, but other investigators consider it reasonable to assume that informational influence would likely lead to "true" acquiescence, while normative influence would be more likely to result in "expedient" acquiescence.[19] Moreover, it has been suggested that informational influence (and hence "true" acquiescence) is more likely to occur when the stimulus is ambiguous, while normative influence (and hence "expedient" acquiescence) is more likely to occur when the stimulus is unambiguous.[20] Since the stimuli used in the present investigation were relatively unambiguous, as determined by the low percentage of errors, it follows that the type of influence at work in this particular testing situation was probably "normative" and that the type of acquiescence elicited was accordingly "expedient".

Additional evidence to this effect comes also from another source. According to Allen:

> "Behavior which is only public compliance [i.e., "expedient" acquiescence] and not a true change would not be expected to be the same in the absence of the group. In contrast, if conformity to the group represented an actual change in one's private

> position [i.e., "true" acquiescence], then the behavior should not change when the group is no longer present."[21]

Apropos of this statement is the following remark by Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, made with reference to the Crutchfield panel-of-lights technique:

> "When individuals are retested privately and individually on the items sometime after the group session, a major part of the original yeilding effect disappears, that is, the person tends to revert to his own unchanged, private judgment. However, not all the yielding effect disappears."[22]

The "yielding", then, that occurs in the Crutchfield experimental setting is largely, though not entirely, "expedient" acquiescence. Since subjects do not revert completely to their initial behavioral judgment, one must assume that some opinion change has indeed occurred, and to this extent their yielding is an expression of "true" acquiescence.

One possible way to ascertain more precisely the extent to which private acceptance does occur is to obtain retrospective verbal reports from subjects upon completion of the experiment.[23] We know, of course, that such reports cannot always be relied upon and therefore this method has certain obvious weaknesses. But imperfect as it may be, this method was utilized in the present experiment in an attempt to ascertain whether or not, and to what extent, "true" acquiescence had occurred. The results indicated that by and large

true opinion change did not occur.

We would conclude, then, that while our experimental procedure certainly provides a measure of acquiescence, the data cannot definitely be interpreted as reflecting either "true" or "expedient" acquiescence exclusively. Insofar as this is the case, our conclusions will be limited to statements about Hutterite acquiescence in the more generic sense of the term.

C. Scoring.

At first glance the calculation of scores would appear to be a straight-forward matter of summing the number of "fixed" items on which subjects yielded. Since there were five such items on the test, individual scores should theoretically vary between zero and five. For a number of reasons, however, this procedure had to be modified. First, it was found that a certain proportion of the subjects answered "fixed" questions incorrectly during the first trial, and in such a way that it was not possible to subject them to group pressure during the second trial. Secondly, some subjects who did change their response (on "fixed" items) during the second trial, did not do so in the anticipated or predicted direction. Both of these contingencies may be illustrated as follows.

For a particular "fixed" question A is the correct response, but the panels indicate that everyone in the group has answered C. In such a case, if a subject answers A during the first trial, and does not change his response in the second trial, his score on that item is obviously zero. By the same token, if the subject changes from A to C, this is interpreted as a yielding response and he obtains a score of one. Such a change in response is here termed a "predicted change". So much is clear. The subject, however, may also change to B during the second trial, and such a response can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, it may indicate that the subject has not been influenced by the group and represents simply the subject's tendency to be inconsistent -- an expression, in other words, of what Willis has termed "variability".[24] Secondly, such a response may also indicate that the subject is being negatively influenced by the group, in which case his response is an expression of "anticonformity".[25] Unfortunately, in the present circumstances it is only indirectly possible to determine which of these two modes of nonconformity a particular response represents.

A tendency toward "variability" on the part of a subject would result in responses that at times coincided

with the group response (whether false or authentic), while at other times remained at variance with the group response. A tendency toward "anticonformity", on the other hand, would by definition result in a response pattern more consistently at variance with that of the group. A careful examination of each subject's response pattern should, therefore, reveal whether there were any subjects who might be suspected of being "anticonformists". Such an examination of the data was made and failed to reveal any positive signs of "anticonformity". On this basis it was concluded that this particular mode of nonconformity could be ruled out in the present experiment.

Now this means that all changes on "fixed" items that were not "predicted changes" could be interpreted only as expressions of "variability". Hence, to return to our illustration, a subject who changes from A to B during the second trial when the group response is C, is simply being inconsistent, and such a change is here termed a "random change". Such a "random change" could, of course, be in the direction of (and hence coincide with) the group response, raising the possibility that a certain proportion of the "predicted changes" were, in fact, not indicators of the yielding to group pressure, but simply expressions of a

tendency toward inconsistency or changeability on the part of some subjects. To take this possibility into account, "random changes" were subtracted from "predicted changes" in the numerator of the scoring formula shown below.

$$\text{score} = \frac{\text{no. of predicted changes - no. of random changes}}{\text{total possible no. of predicted changes}}$$

As mentioned above, some subjects answered "fixed" questions incorrectly during the first trial, and did so in such a way as to make it impossible to subject them to group pressure during the second trial. In terms of our illustration, an answer of C during the initial trial would constitute such a case. During the second trial, the subject's panel indicates that the false group consensus favors C as the correct answer, but the subject has already answered C during the first trial making a yielding response impossible. This, of course, effectively reduces the total number of "predicted changes" possible for the subject, and the denominator of our scoring formula needs to be (and was) adjusted accordingly in calculating each subject's score. Note that the use of this formula makes it possible for a subject to obtain a minus score.

We would submit that this method of scoring provides a conservative but accurate estimate of a subject's vulnerabil-

ity to group pressure. As will be shown in the next chapter, the incidence of both errors and "random changes" was sufficiently low as to pose no serious threat to the overall validity of the data.

D. Samples.[26]

1. Hutterite sample. An experimental group of one hundred subjects in grades five to eight was selected from twelve Hutterite colonies (six Dariusleut and six Lehrerleut) in Alberta, in the following categories.

25 Dariusleut males
25 Dariusleut females
25 Lehrerleut males
25 Lehrerleut females

Colonies and subjects were selected as follows. School authorities in the six municipal districts or counties in southern Alberta with the highest concentration of colonies (a total of twenty-nine) were contacted and their cooperation requested. Since testing was done in groups of five subjects per session, the enrollment figures of colony schools in these districts were examined and an initial selection of all colonies with at least five eligible subjects (of the same sex) was made. This resulted in a restricted list of twenty colonies. During the early stages of the testing program, colonies to be visited were selected randomly from this list; but as the research progressed it became necessary to seek out

particular colonies with the required numbers and types of subjects in order to obtain a full complement of subjects in each of the above-listed categories. At each of the colonies visited the entire eligible population was tested during the earlier stages of the research, while later on (for reasons already mentioned) a random selection was made. No refusals from either district authorities or colony leaders were encountered. The test was in all cases administered by the writer either in the colony school or else in appropriate quarters elsewhere on the colony.

The decision to test children in grades five to eight was based on the consideration that it would not be feasible to test adult Hutterites. Colony leaders would be averse to such a plan for a number of reasons, not the least of which being the disruption of colony routine. Hutterite school children, on the other hand, constitute a more or less "captive audience", and hence are much more readily accessible. With respect to the particular grades chosen, it was felt that children below grade five might well experience some difficulty in comprehension, and that it would therefore be prudent to restrict our sample to grade five and up. And since Hutterite children do not attend school beyond what is legally required, this effectively restricted

our sample to grades five to eight.

It should be pointed out that Hutterite pupils, apparently as a result of a higher failure rate, are on the average older than their counterparts in the same grade in non-colony schools. Consequently, while the age range is the same for Hutterite and control groups (ten to fifteen years), the average age of Hutterite subjects is somewhat higher than for the control groups. Also, due to the low enrollment in colony schools, it was not possible to restrict each group of five subjects to the same grade level. To do so required a minimum of five students of one sex in a particular grade, and students in excess of five needed to be in multiples of five. Naturally, these conditions were not always met, and to avoid losing subjects the grade distinction was therefore not rigidly maintained. This problem was not encountered, of course, in the larger schools from which control subjects were selected.

2. Control samples. Initially our plan was to utilize only urban subjects as a control group. Further consideration, however, convinced us to include rural non-Hutterite subjects as well, for this reason. If we should find a significant difference in acquiescence scores between Hutterite and urban subjects, this could plausibly be the result of the rural-urban

distinction rather than the result of factors intrinsic to Hutterite society *per se*. But by including a rural control group it would be possible to separate "Hutterite-larger society" differences from rural-urban differences, in the event that such differences were discovered. Moreover, while the Hutterites share many features with other *gemeinschaftlich* societies they also differ from the latter in at least one important respect. The Hutterites, as has been noted, practice a form of Christian communism that is unique even among communal societies in that it extends considerably beyond the common ownership of property. Victor Peters observes: "The Hutterians speak of their group as the *Gemeinschaft*, or *die Gemein*! The expression defies a simple translation, for its comprehensive explanation implies a community of place, mind, and spirit."[27] He concludes: "One may summarize and describe the fabric of the Hutterian colony life . . . as totalistic. Beginning with the family, every part, every office, every activity carries with it the religion-sanctioned approval of the *Gemeinschaft*, the community."[28]

It may be that this "totalistic" feature of Hutterite society has an overriding influence on the methods by which conventionality is achieved; an influence that is unique to *Gemeinschaft* Hutterite-style. If this is the case,

then findings based on Hutterite subjects cannot validly be generalized to other gemenischaftlich societies. For this reason it was decided to include a sample of one other gemeinschaftlich society, the Old Colony Mennonites.[29] This is a sect whose origin and history closely parallels that of the Hutterites.

> "The Old Colony is an ethnic minority which dates back from the years between 1880 and 1890. It separated gradually from the larger stream of Russian Mennonites who had sojourned in Russia for one hundred years. The Russian Mennonites in turn originated in Holland during the Reformation, following the leadership of Menno Simons, a Catholic priest, who became 'converted' in 1536 and joined the Anabaptist movement which had spread down the Rhine from Switzerland.
>
> Through persecution the early Mennonites became rural and agrarian, and their history from about 1500 to the present has been that of a rural ethnic minority, avoiding as much as possible any contact with the 'world'. The Old Colony (Alt Kolonier Reinlander Mennoniten Gemeinde) represents the separation of the most conservative elements of Russian Mennonitism from the main body and the formation of a 'sub-society' which portrays in extreme form all the tendencies in the ethnic-minority comprising the larger Mennonite stream."[30]

Characteristic features of contemporary Old Colony Mennonite society include isolation, homogeneity, emphasis on primary relationships, rapid population growth, agricultural economy, and asceticism. "The village, religious and social structure is a merging of sacred and secular systems which resembles the designs some utopian thinkers have proposed."[31]

From this brief description it is clear that the Old Colony Mennonites exhibit a number of the gemeinschaftlich qualities of Hutterite society, and while deviance may be comparatively more common in Mennonite than in Hutterite communities, Old Colony Mennonite society is nevertheless considered to be highly conventional. Unlike the Hutterites, however, the Old Colony Mennonites do not practise "community of goods", and consequently lack the "totalistic" feature of Hutterite society. This would appear to be the most notable difference between the two groups, and since one of our purposes is to assess the possible effect of the "totalistic" aspect of Hutterite society on tendency to acquiesce, the Old Colony Mennonites constitute an appropriate comparison group.

Urban sample. One hundred subjects in grades five to eight were selected from ten schools in the City of Edmonton. Since the grade range overlaps the elementary-junior high division, a list of Edmonton schools combining these grades was compiled, and from this list ten schools were selected using a random procedure. Ten subjects were tested in each of the schools, with males and females, as well as each of the four grades, equally represented.

Selection of subjects in the ten schools was not random. During the pre-test phase of the research,

which was also conducted in Edmonton schools, efforts were made to obtain random samples of all eligible subjects in each school. This turned out to involve more effort than most school principals were willing to expend, however, and an alternative selection procedure had to be adopted. At each of the ten schools, the principal was supplied with a description of the subjects required in terms of sex and grade level. He was then asked to select these from classrooms that would be least disrupted by this intrusion, in an essentially "accidental" fashion, that is, without any preconceived criteria. The limitations of such a selection procedure as opposed to a random procedure are, of course, obvious.

Rural sample. Using this same selection procedure, fifty subjects were obtained from three rural schools in the Province. Two of these schools were located in the immediate vicinity of Hutterite colonies in southern Alberta, while the third was located near the Old Colony Mennonite community in northern Alberta. Once again, males and females, as well as the same four grade categories, were equally represented.

Old Colony Mennonite sample. Fifty Old Colony Mennonite subjects, representing the total eligible population of two schools in the Fort Vermilion School District,

were also tested as per the categories already indicated.

3. Group composition. As the foregoing discussion indicates, no effort to control the composition of each group of five subjects was made, beyond the criteria of size, sex, and grade level. This procedure leaves something to be desired in that it has been demonstrated that group composition may have an important bearing on a subject's performance while "under the influence".[32] As in the case of other aspects of the total situation, the crucial question is: To what extent was group composition "identical" for all subjects?

Without reviewing in detail the literature on this issue,[33] it seems fair to say that the major variables of group composition left uncontrolled in the present study are competence, status, and attraction, all three of which are interrelated in a rather complex fashion. Numerous studies have shown that competence and tendency to acquiesce are inversely related.[34] Similarly, there is considerable evidence that attraction to the group and acquiescence are positively related.[35] However, increased competence may also result in higher status, and since persons with high status are usually more highly rewarded by the group, such persons tend to view the group as being more attractive. But there is also evidence, paradoxical as it seems, that

high status individuals do not necessarily acquiesce more readily to the group.[36] This oversimplified version of how the three variables are interrelated only serves to illustrate the complexity, and perplexity, of the problem.

With regard to the present study, data bearing on this issue are not available, and about the only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that all members of each group of five knew each other, and were probably friends. It is likely that the Hutterites, Mennonites, and rural subjects knew each other more intimately than did the urban subjects, but since each group of five subjects shared the same classroom they all must have been reasonably well acquainted. To the extent that this was the case, our group resembled naturally existing groups more closely than is the case in most laboratory studies of acquiescence.

E. The use of deception.

The increasing use of deception in social research has aroused considerable concern and debate among social scientists in recent years.[37] In the writer's opinion, there are two distinct issues involved in this debate which must be kept separate if we are to have informed discussion on the matter. One of these issues is essentially empirical

and methodological, while the other is a moral and ethical one.

The empirical consequences of deception involve, first of all, the question of whether subjects "catch on" to what the investigator is really up to, and if so, what effect does this have on the subject's performance? At least two recent studies have investigated this problem, specifically as it relates to conformity research.[38] The evidence indicates not only that suspicion on the part of subjects is probably more common than most researchers realize, but also that suspicion of deception can seriously influence a subject's performance. In short, if deception is to be effectively utilized (and it can be effective), every precaution must be taken to avoid arousing suspicion, and efforts should be made to assess the extent to which these precautions were successful.

In the present study subjects were questioned extensively on this point during a post-experimental debriefing period. The two aspects of our experimental procedure perhaps most vulnerable to suspicion, included establishing the existence of a computer and the rationale justifying a second trial. We found no evidence, however, of suspicion as to the credibility of either one of these ruses. Most subjects

requested to see the "computer" upon completion of the experiment and expressed surprise, amusement, and some embarrassment when told how they had been deceived. Our modification of the Crutchfield technique was, of course, designed for use with children, and its utility with adults has not been established. It is doubtful that the computer ruse, for example, could be maintained with adult subjects.

A second empirical problem involved in the use of deception concerns the extent to which it contributes to the artificiality of the laboratory setting. In this regard we tend to agree with Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey that "real life" does, after all, also involve deception; "the group <u>is</u> trying to mislead the individual, or opinion leaders who control the mass media <u>are</u> deliberately misrepresenting what the group believes."[39]

With regard to the moral and ethical dimension of deception, Crutchfield makes the following comment:

> "Undeniably there are serious ethical issues involved in the experimental use of such deception techniques, especially inasmuch as they appear to penetrate rather deeply into the person. My view is that such deception methods require that great care be taken immediately afterwards to explain the situation fully to the subject."[40]

As indicated earlier, this advice was followed during post-experimental discussions with subjects. Beyond this, the defense rests.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," in H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men, Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951, pp. 177-190. See also, S. E. Asch, Social Psychology, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952.

2. R. S. Crutchfield, "A New Technique for Measuring Individual Differences in Conformity to Group Judgment," Proc. Invitational Conf. on Testing Problems, Princeton, N. J.: Educational Testing Service, 1954, pp. 69-74. See also Crutchfield's "Conformity and Character," American Psychologist, 10(1955), pp. 191-198.

3. See, for example, R. R. Blake and J. W. Brehm, "The Use of Tape-recording to Simulate a Group Atmosphere," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49(1954), pp. 311-313.

4. D. Krech, R. S. Crutchfield, and E. L. Ballachey, Individual in Society, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, p. 511. This conclusion has been questioned by J. A. Olmstead and R. R. Blake who have compared "face-to-face" and "simulated group" techniques and found no significant differences in their results. See their, "The Use of Simulated Groups to Produce Modification in Judgment," Journal of Personality, 23(1955), pp. 335-345.

5. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 509.

6. D. T. Campbell, "Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings," Psychological Bulletin, 54(1957), pp. 297-312.

7. The testing procedure was developed in collaboration with J. W. Bulcock, now a member of the faculty of the Grande Prairie Junior College. The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Bulcock, who provided much valuable advice and assistance toward the completion of the writer's M. A. thesis, upon which the present study builds.

8. It should be pointed out that the introduction of a pretest measure forces the subject to commit himself to a

particular response prior to the application of group pressure. Such a prior commitment, whether public or private (in the present instance it is private), has been shown to have the effect of increasing resistance to subsequent influence. This effect, however, would presumably accrue to all subjects equally, and hence not constitute a confounding factor. For further discussion of this point see, M. Deutsch and H.B. Gerard, "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51(1955), pp. 629-636.

9. See also Appendix A, "Instructions to Subjects."

10. Asch and Goldberg both report that enlarging the number of group members beyond three or four has no significant effect on the degree of acquiescence exhibited by subjects. Hence the decision to test subjects in groups of five was an arbitrary one, based primarily on considerations of efficiency, ease of administration, etc. Asch, 1951, op. cit.,; S.C. Goldberg, "Three Situational Determinants of Conformity to Social Norms," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49(1954), pp. 325-329.

11. The private and anonymous nature of the subjects' responses was emphasized to reduce the possibility that subjects might be acquiescing to the perceived demands of the experimenter, rather than the group. Care was taken to convince subjects that the experimenter was not observing their responses, and also that during the subsequent analysis of the data it would be impossible to match responses with names. To this end, subjects' names were recorded only after the experiment had been completed. See, G.I. Schulman, "Asch Conformity Studies: Conformity to the Experimenter and/or the Group," Sociometry, 30(1967), pp. 26-40; M.T. Orne, "On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications," American Psychologist, 17(1962), pp. 776-782; S.R. Sherman, "Demand Characteristics in an Experiment on Attitude Change," Sociometry, 30(1967), pp. 246-261.

12. This suggestion was made in such a way as to avoid the implication of criticism, since criticism by the experimenter has been shown to increase certain subjects' susceptibility to influence. (See, Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 518.) It was made

clear to the subjects that the experimenter really had no way of knowing whether or not any errors had in fact been made, since the responses were fed directly into the computer. It was merely suggested that in case any errors had been made as a result of subjects' unfamiliarity with the testing procedure, they should in fairness be given an opportunity to rectify these.

13. E.D. Boldt, "Conformity and Deviance: The Hutterites of Alberta," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, 1966. For the sake of brevity, this study will henceforth be referred to as "the previous study", or "the original study".

14. For a recent discussion of the difficulties involved in such a task see, R.B.W. Anderson, "On the Comparability of Meaningful Stimuli in Cross-Cultural Research," Sociometry, 30(1967), pp. 124-126.

15. In addition to the Asch-type line stimuli, a number of "fill-in" items were employed as "non-fixed" questions. These consisted of three triangles (or squares), each of a different size, and the subjects' task was to choose the largest (A, B, or C) of the three. For copies of questions see Appendix B.

16. Asch, 1953, op. cit.

17. Goldberg, 1954, op. cit.

18. Deutsch and Gerard, 1955, op. cit., p. 629,

19. See, C.A. Kiesler, "Group Pressure and Conformity," in J. Mills (Ed.), Advanced Experimental Social Psychology, MacMillan, in press, p. 12 of mimeo. copy; V.L. Allen, "Situational Factors in Conformity," in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2, New York: Academic Press, 1965, pp. 133-175 (pp. 137-138).

20. Kiesler, in press, op. cit., p. 35 of mimeo. copy.

21. Allen, 1965, op. cit., p. 137. Luchins disagrees with this position, and argues that private acceptance may occur in the influence situation without the effects being carried over to the private situation. A.S. Luchins, "A Variational Approach to Social Influences on Perception," Journal of Social Psychology, 42(1955), pp. 113-119.

22. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 510.

23. Allen, 1965, op. cit., p. 140.

24. R. H. Willis, "Conformity, Independence, and Anticonformity," Human Relations, 18(1965), pp. 373-388.

25. Ibid.

26. For purposes of comparison, the original study was based on a sample of sixty Hutterite subjects (and an equal number of rural control subjects) from Dariusleut colonies only. Moreover, males and females were not tested independently as in the present study.

27. V. Peters, All Things Common: The Hutterite Way of Life, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965, p. 91.

28. Ibid., p. 105.

29. The literature on the Old Colony Mennonites is limited. See Calvin Redekop, The Old Colony Mennonites: An Intentional Minority in Conflict With Society, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, in press; C. Redekop, "The Sect From a New Perspective," Mennonite Quarterly Review, 39(1965), pp. 204-217; C. Redekop, "The Old Colony: An Analysis of Group Survival," Mennonite Quarterly Review, 40(1966), pp. 190-211; C. Redekop, "Toward an Understanding of Religion and Social Solidarity," unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Chicago, 1966; Leo Driedger, "A Sect in Modern Society: The Old Colony Mennonites of Saskatchewan," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Western Association of Sociology and Anthropology, Banff, Alberta, 1967.

30. Redekop, 1966, op. cit., p. 190.

31. Ibid., p. 200.

32. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 514.

33. See, for example, reviews by D. Graham, "Experimental Studies of Social Influence in Simple Judgment Situations," Journal of Social Psychology, 56(1962), pp. 245-269;

Kiesler, in press, op. cit.; Allen, 1965, op. cit.

34. See, for example, Crutchfield, 1955, op. cit.

35. See, for example, J. E. Dittes and H. H. Kelley, "Effects of Different Conditions of Acceptance on Conformity to Group Norms," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53(1956), pp. 100-107. Earlier studies assert that conformity is monotonically related to attraction to the group, but more recent research has uncovered some important intervening variables, one of which is "commitment". See, H. B. Gerard, "Time, Perspective, Consistency of Attitude, and Social Influence," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62(1961), pp. 565-572; C. A. Kiesler and L. H. Corbin, "Commitment, Attraction, and Conformity," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2(1965), pp. 890-895; C. A. Kiesler, M. Zanna, and J. DeSalvo, "Deviation and Conformity: Opinion Change as a Function of Commitment, Attraction, and the Presence of a Deviate," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3(1966), pp. 349-353; C. A. Kiesler, "Commitment," in R. Abelson, et. al., Studies in Cognitive Consistency, in press; C. A. Kiesler, "Attraction to the Group and Conformity to Group Norms," Journal of Personality, 31 (1963), pp. 559-569.

36. See, for example, E. P. Hollander, "Conformity, Status, and Idiosyncrasy Credit," Psychological Review, 65(1958), pp. 117-127.

37. See, for example, L. Rainwater and D. J. Pittman, "Ethical Problems in Studying a Politically Sensitive and Deviant Community," Social Problems, 14(1967), pp. 357-366; Kai T. Erikson, "A Comment on Disguised Observation in Sociology," Social Problems, 14(1967), pp. 366-373; T. M. Mills, "The Observer, the Experimenter and the Group," Social Problems, 14(1967), pp. 373-381; J. R. Seeley, "The Making and Taking of Problems: Toward an Ethical Stance," Social Problems, 14(1967), pp. 382-389; H. C. Kelman, "Deception in Social Research," Transaction, 3(1966), pp. 20-24.

38. V. L. Allen, "Effect of Knowledge of Deception on Conformity," Journal of Social Psychology, 69(1966), pp. 101-106; L. J. Stricker, S. Messick, and D. N. Jackson, "Suspicion

of Deception: Implications for Conformity Research," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5(1967), pp. 379-389.

39. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, op. cit., p. 512. It is an open question, of course, as to the extent and frequency of such "real life deception" in Hutterite society as compared to the host society.

40. Crutchfield, 1955, op. cit., p. 197.

CHAPTER V

THE FINDINGS

Subjects' responses were recorded by the experimenter on appropriate recording sheets during the course of the testing. Subjects, of course, were unaware that their responses were being recorded in this way, having been led to believe that a computer was anonymously receiving and storing all responses, while the experimenter was merely operating the projector by means of which the questions were being presented to the subjects.

Initial analysis of the data consisted of a tabulation of all changes in responses, whether "predicted" or "random", as well as all errors made on "fixed" and "non-fixed" questions. The results of this tabulation are summarized in Table I. The following points are noteworthy.

1. As the legend indicates, column VI reports the overall error rate for all questions. Subjects, with only minor variations, answered questions correctly during the first trial approximately 93% of the time. This would indicate that on the whole questions were perceived as relatively unambiguous.

2. In columns VII and VIII the error rate has been broken

TABLE I

GENERAL COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF THE MOST RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE DATA

		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
Mennonites (N=50)	No.	162/1000	48/750	120/250	18/250	102/250	68/1000	36/750	32/250	23/250
	%	16.2	5.6	48.0	7.2	40.8	6.8	4.8	12.8	9.2
Hutterites (N=100)	No.	284/2000	84/1500	200/500	37/500	163/500	125/2000	67/1500	58/500	35/500
	%	14.2	5.6	40.0	7.4	32.6	6.3	4.5	11.6	7.0
Rural (N=50)	No.	123/1000	43/750	80/250	15/250	65/250	64/1000	34/750	30/250	24/250
	%	12.3	5.7	32.0	6.0	26.0	6.4	4.5	12.0	9.6
Urban (N=100)	No.	267/2000	81/1500	186/500	40/500	146/500	137/2000	71/1500	66/500	49/500
	%	13.4	5.4	37.2	8.0	29.2	6.9	4.7	13.2	9.8

I = Total changes on all questions.
II = Total changes on "non-fixed" questions.
III = Total changes on "fixed" questions.
IV = "Random changes" on "fixed" questions.
V = "Predicted changes" on "fixed" questions.
VI = Total errors on all questions.
VII = Errors on "non-fixed" questions.
VIII = Errors on "fixed" questions.
IX = Errors on "fixed" questions coinciding with "predicted response".

down and reported separately for "fixed" and "non-fixed" questions. Subjects in all four samples made a considerably higher percentage of errors on "fixed" than on "non-fixed" questions, indicating that the former were more ambiguous than the latter. This is understandable and reflects a conscious effort on the part of the experimenter to design "fixed" questions that were not too "obvious" while at the same time not too ambiguous. If the contrived group consensus on "fixed" items were too obviously at variance with perceived reality, subjects might well become suspicious of the real purpose of the experimental procedure. On the other hand, questions needed to be sufficiently unambiguous to insure that most subjects gave the correct response during the first trial, otherwise changes during the second trial might reflect a subject's effort "to be right" rather than a tendency to yield to group pressure. The results suggest that our "fixed" questions succeeded in avoiding both extremes. Subjects responded correctly at least 87% of the time on "fixed" questions. Moreover, the error rate is again remarkably consistent across the four groups. This uniform error rate on "fixed" questions is in marked contrast to the findings of the original study in which Hutterite subjects exceeded control subjects by 8%. The present differential of less than 2% constitutes an important improve-

ment over the original study.

3. A comparison of the figures in columns II and VII shows that the percentage changes and the percentage errors on "non-fixed" questions are very similar, indicating perhaps that changes were prompted by uncertainty as to the correct answer, that is, "trying to be right". A similar comparison is therefore in order for "fixed" questions as per columns III and VIII. If the percentages in this case were also very similar, we would be forced to conclude that changes on fixed questions also may have been prompted by uncertainty rather than by group pressure. However, the error rate and change rate on "fixed" questions show a relatively much larger differential providing further evidence that we were in fact measuring vulnerability to group pressure. This is again in contrast to the findings of the original study in which the Hutterite error rate and change rate were almost identical leaving it an open question as to whether or not Hutterite subjects had in fact responded to group pressure.

4. The figures in columns IV, V, and IX enter directly into the calculation of scores. Column V represents the raw acquiescence rate which is "corrected" in the scoring formula by subtracting "random changes". As the figures in column IV show, the percentage of "random changes" on fixed ques-

tions was quite low, indicating that a tendency toward inconsistency was not a prominent feature of our subjects. Column IX reports the percentage of errors on "fixed" questions during the first trial that coincided with the false group consensus of the second trial. As noted earlier, such a response makes it impossible to submit a subject to group pressure during the second trial, thereby reducing the total number of "predicted changes" possible. These figures, then, are necessary to adjust the denominator of the scoring formula. Note that this type of error comprises a major portion of the overall error rate on fixed questions (column VIII). Since there were three possible answers to each question, this indicates that the answer favored by the false group consensus was perceived as approximating the correct answer more closely than the remaining alternative. In other words, of the two incorrect answers one apparently was perceived to be less discrepant from the correct answer than the other, and the contrived group consensus appears to have favored this less discrepant alternative. This again reflects a conscious attempt by the experimenter to preserve the credibility of the experimental procedure. The more important point to note, however, is the low absolute rate of this type of error, indicating that its overall effect was

minimal.

In our discussion of the scoring procedure in the preceding chapter, it was noted that the use of the proposed scoring formula makes it possible for a subject to obtain a minus score, such scores indicating a tendency toward inconsistency as well as independence. Theoretically the range of possible scores is from minus one to plus one, although relatively few subjects did in fact obtain minus scores. For greater ease and convenience in data analysis, a constant of one was added to all scores in order to eliminate minus quantities. The range of possible scores now varies between zero and plus two, with a score above one indicating acquiescence and a score of one or less indicating independence.

An initial analysis of scores was made to determine the proportion of acquiescers to independents in the four samples tested. Table II below indicates what these proportions were in absolute numbers as well as percentages. The data reveal only minor variations in the ratio of acquiescers to independents for three of the four samples tested, with the Old Colony Mennonites the only notable exception. The small difference between Hutterite and rural-urban figures is a first indication that our hypothesis of

TABLE II

THE PROPORTION OF ACQUIESCERS TO INDEPENDENTS IN THE FOUR SAMPLES TESTED

		Acquiescers	Independents
Mennonites (N=50)	No.	36	14
	%	72	28
Hutterites (N=100)	No.	55	45
	%	55	45
Rural (N=50)	No.	26	24
	%	52	48
Urban (N=100)	No.	60	40
	%	60	40
Totals (N=300)	No.	177	123
	%	59	41

no significant difference will not be rejected. Overall, acquiescers are in the majority over independents, but in each group individual subjects ranged all the way from complete independence to complete acquiescence.

When acquiescers are examined separately and divided

into three categories covering an equal range of scores, as in Table III below, all four samples are consistent in showing a preponderance of medium acquiescers. For reasons unknown, however, the Hutterites show considerably less variation across the three categories than do the other three groups.

TABLE III

DISTRIBUTION OF ACQUIESCERS IN LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH CATEGORIES

Score		Menn.	Hutt.	Rural	Urban	Totals
1.67 - 2.00 High	No.	11	17	7	16	51
	%	31	31	27	27	29
1.34 - 1.66 Medium	No.	16	20	11	28	75
	%	44	36	42	46	42
1.01 - 1.33 Low	No.	9	18	8	16	51
	%	25	33	31	27	29

Table IV reports mean acquiscence scores for all samples tested broken down by sex and, in the case of the Hutterites, by kinship group. The most noteworthy features of the figures in this table are as follows.

TABLE IV

ACQUIESCENCE SCORES:
EXPERIMENTAL VS. CONTROL GROUPS

		Sex	N	$\bar{X}$	S.D.
Mennonites		Male	25	1.34	
		Female	25	1.40	
		Total	50	1.37	.399
Hutterites	Dariusleut	Male	25	1.28	
		Female	25	1.29	
		Total	50	1.29	
	Lehrerleut	Male	25	1.28	
		Female	25	1.23	
		Total	50	1.26	
	Combined Total		100	1.27	.435
Rural		Male	25	1.21	
		Female	25	1.25	
		Total	50	1.23	.355
Urban		Male	50	1.21	
		Female	50	1.23	
		Total	100	1.22	.430
Grand Total			300		

1. Rural and urban samples report almost identical mean scores, indicating that the rural-urban distinction is of no significance with regard to the criterion in question.

2. The mean score of the combined Hutterite sample, though slightly higher, does not appear to differ significantly from the rural-urban control groups. The subsample scores

of the Dariusleut and Lehrerleut kinship groups are very nearly identical. Previously we noted that the literature on the Hutterites typically de-emphasizes differences between kinship groups, and the present findings provide no basis for challenging this approach.

3. The mean score for Old Colony Mennonite subjects is notably higher than that of the remaining three groups. This is in accord with the figures in Table II which reported the Mennonites as having a markedly higher proportion of acquiescers.

4. Females show a slightly higher mean score than males in all groups except the Lehrerleut subsample. This compares favorably with the findings of most other studies of acquiescence.[1] We can offer no explanation which might account for the Lehrerleut anomaly.

Test of statistical significance. It was hypothesized that the scores of Hutterite subjects would not differ significantly from those of rural and urban control subjects. Simple observation of the small magnitude of actual differences as reported in Table IV suggests that the findings fail to reject this hypothesis. The markedly higher scores of Mennonite subjects, however, calls for further analysis to determine whether differences between these scores and

the scores of the remaining three groups are statistically significant. Since certain of the assumptions underlying statistical tests of significance are not met in the present study, the following results of a series of two-tailed difference-of-means tests must be interpreted cautiously.[2]

TABLE V

ACQUIESCENCE DIFFERENCES:
SIX INTERGROUP COMPARISONS

Comparison	t	p
Hutterites vs. Urban	.833	
Hutterites vs. Rural	.571	
Hutterites vs. Mennonites	1.362	< .20
Mennonites vs. Rural	1.840	< .10
Mennonites vs. Urban	2.080	< .05
Rural vs. Urban	.143	

The results confirm that the observed differences between Hutterite scores and rural-urban scores are not statistically significant. The Mennonite vs. Urban comparison, on the other hand, is significant at the .05 level. Moreover, the finding of no significant difference in the Rural

vs. Urban comparison indicates that the significant Mennonite-urban difference cannot be accounted for simply in terms of rural-urban differences. Rather, the data suggest that factors intrinsic to Old Colony Mennonite society, other than its "rurality", are required to account for Mennonite subjects' significantly higher acquiescence scores.

To the extent that differences in scores reflect personality differences, and insofar as Mennonite scores differ signficantly from those of the other groups, it seems reasonable to conclude that the concept of "acquiescent personality" is indeed a viable one and may be an important factor accounting for the greater conventionality of Old Colony Mennonite society. By the same token, since Hutterite subjects do not differ significantly from control subjects, one may conclude that the "acquiescent personality" approach to the problem of Hutterite orderliness is not a particularly useful one.

One final analysis was undertaken to investigate the possible effect of age on acquiescence. Since the ages of our subjects ranged from ten to fifteen years, it might be suggested, for example, that Hutterite children become more acquiescent as they grow older, and hence if our sample had

consisted of less youthful subjects the results might have been quite different. To check for such a possibility, the mean scores of each of the four samples, broken down into six one-year age categories, are presented in Table VI below.

TABLE VI

MEAN ACQUIESCENCE SCORES ACCORDING TO AGE

Age	Mennonites	Hutterites	Rural	Urban
10			1.21 N= 7	1.15 N=15
11	1.26 N= 8 (1 age 10)	1.33 N=21 (4 age 10)	1.26 N= 8	1.26 N=28
12	1.34 N= 8	1.24 N=24	1.42 N=11	1.17 N=25
13	1.35 N=12	1.22 N=25	1.16 N=15	1.31 N=23
14	1.40 N=22 (3 age 15)	1.35 N=23	1.08 N= 9 (3 age 15)	1.27 N= 9
15		1.06 N= 7		
	N=50	N=100	N=50	N=100

The Hutterites, as well as the rural and urban control groups, exhibit no consistent trend across the various age categories, indicating that length of exposure to Hutterite socialization practices has no discernible influence on the

relative vulnerability to group pressure. The Mennonites, however, do show a consistent increase in score with increasing age, suggesting that Mennonite socialization practices do have such an influence. This lends support to the position espoused earlier that the concept of "acquiescent personality" is applicable to the Old Colony Mennonites, but not to the Hutterites.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, S.E. Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority," 70(9, whole no. 416), 1956; R.S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," American Psychologist, 10 (1955), pp. 191-198; M.H. Applezweig and G. Moeller, "Conforming Behavior and Personaltiy Variables," Technical Report No. 8, contract nonr 996(02), New London, Conn.: Connecticut College, 1958; R.D. Tuddenham, "Some Correlates of Yielding to a Distorted Group Norm," Technical Report No. 8, contract nonr 120-159, Berkeley: University of California, 1958.

2. Distributions of acquiescence scores are skewed raising questions about assumptions of normality. Moreover, since "fixed" test items were not scaled, assumptions of equal intervals are also open to question. Finally, the sampling procedure utilized was in large part purposive rather than random, signifying the inappropriateness of inductive statistics.

   Analysis of variance was considered as a possible alternative to a series of t-tests. However, the latter approach was considered more appropriate in the present instance. Blalock notes: "It should not be concluded that analysis of variance is always preferable to a series of difference-of-means tests, however. The latter tests, when used cautiously, may yield considerably more information. For example, analysis of variance may lead to significant results primarily because one category is far out of line with the rest. Had this category been excluded the conclusion might have been different. A series of difference-of-means tests might indicate this fact more clearly. Especially if one suspects before making the test that one or more of the categories will differ considerably from the others, a number of one-tailed difference-of-means tests might be appropriate. . . . Generally, it would seem that the more knowledge we have for predicting the relative magnitudes and/or directions of differences, the more likely it is that separate difference-of-means tests will be appropriate." H.M. Blalock, Social Statistics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 252-253.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Hobbesian question focusses on the central problem of sociology, the relation of the individual to society. While Hobbes is credited with first formulating this problem in precise terms, his proposed "solution" has been largely discounted as being too individualistically oriented. Durkheim's alternative to Hobbes' social contract theory, on the other hand, has been criticized for ignoring the individual altogether. More recent attempts to formulate a balanced approach, one that recognizes both the constraining influence of the sociocultural environment as well as the individual's capacity for autonomous action, have also been criticized for presenting a picture of man as an over-determined, role-enslaved Homo. Critics would argue that such key distinctions as between "learning" and "internalization", "social" and "socialized", have been blurred by a preoccupation with efforts to demonstrate the alleged isomorphic nature of the relationship between the individual and society.

In other words, although the contemporary answer to the Hobbesian question takes cognizance of the individual and what personality theory has to tell us about him, it is a

hollow recognition that fails to come to terms with the basic issues. Both the "internalization-of-norms" and "need-for-approval" approaches are partial formulations stressing "the malleability of the individual organism, the potency of the socialization process, and the inability of the organism to become a full 'human being' apart from society."[1] It has been suggested, therefore, that a "new approach" to the problem is needed which would abandon the search for myriad isomorphic links between the individual and society, and concentrate instead on the investigation of the generalized processes that lead individuals to act in a conventional manner.

A logical first step in this direction would be to investigate the adequacy of present approaches in the light of the most recent findings in the social psychological study of conformity processes. The "need-for-approval" approach, for example, seems to take for granted the viability of the concept of "acquiescent personality", whereas the conformity literature is far from unanimous on this point. In other words, the social psychological study of conformity processes has progressed sufficiently to raise serious questions regarding certain of the assumptions on which current formulations are based. A reassessment seems

in order, therefore, which would provide fresh evidence as to whether present conceptualizations are as inadequate as critics would suggest, and whether or not a "new approach" is in fact required.

The present study has attempted such a reassessment. Certain of the theoretical concepts and methodological techniques emerging out of the laboratory study of conformity have been applied in the context of an ongoing social system that in certain respects constitutes a "natural laboratory" for the study of conformity processes. Specifically, our problem has been to investigate the viability of the "need-for-approval" approach through a study of the relationship between acquiescence and conventionality. The earlier literature would reduce Hutterite orderliness to the internalization of norms and values. More recently, however, this approach has been discounted in favor of what has here been referred to as a "need-for-approval" approach. In other words, Hutterite socialization is said to produce acquiescent personality, and this then allegedly accounts for the marked conventionality of individual members. We have attempted to test experimentally this assumption. If the greater conventionality of Hutterite society is in fact the result of the greater acquiescence-proneness

of its members, it follows that Hutterite subjects should score significantly higher than control subjects from the less conventional host society in a standardized group-pressure situation.

The data indicate that this is not the case. Hutterite subjects do not differ significantly from rural-urban control subjects in tendency to acquiesce, as per the test employed. It appears then, that the "acquiescent personality" approach has been inappropriately applied in current explanations of Hutterite orderliness. The significantly higher scores of Mennonite subjects, on the other hand, suggests that the concept of "acquiescent personality" cannot be discounted entirely as a mechanism whereby orderliness is achieved. In other words, our findings suggest that the orderliness of gemeinschaftlich societies may be variously achieved, and to equate order with "acquiescent personality" or "internalized norms" is to close the door to other possibilities. The present study provides no direct evidence as to the viability of the "internalization-of-norms" approach, of course, but the marked acquiescence of Mennonite subjects suggests that conventionality, while resting on some base of shared values, may also find support in other processes.

As was pointed out earlier, Hostetler discounts Eaton's emphasis on the internalization of norms as the principal mechanism whereby Hutterite orderliness is achieved, and posits instead a "need-for-approval" or "acquiescent personality" approach. The present findings suggest, however, that the Hostetler thesis is also an insufficient explanation. How, then, is Hutterite conventionality achieved?

It must be noted at the outset that the alternative "solution" to this problem which we will now briefly propose is not based on actual research, and therefore can be regarded only as an "educated guess". Our justification for concluding this thesis on a speculative note is merely to suggest a plausible alternative to the "internalization-of-norms" and "need-for approval" approaches that currently dominate the literature on the Hutterites, and thereby set forth some possible avenues for further research. This alternative, moreover, contains no new or original ideas, though the application of these ideas in the Hutterite context has, to our knowledge, not been previously attempted.

The key to our proposed "solution" lies in Gouldner's concept of "functional autonomy of system parts". He states: "Operationally speaking, we might say that the functional autonomy of a system part is the probability that it can

survive separation from the system."[2] Moreover, "those parts in a social system with most functional autonomy become loci of organized deviance and of effective resistance to system controls."[3] Consequently, "if we think of the 'socialized individual' as in some sense a 'part', and not merely as the raw material of social systems,"[4] it follows that individuals with high functional autonomy are more likely to engage in deviant or non-conventional behavior than are individuals with low functional autonomy because "they can more safely defy the group's directives."[5] And a social system characterized by low functional autonomy of its individual parts would therefore be expected to be more orderly than a social system characterized by high functional autonomy of its parts.

Gouldner implies that "total institutions" are examples of a social system with low autonomy of the parts.[6] Previously we noted that Hutterite society has also been referred to as being "totalistic", and recently Pelto has described Hutterite communities as constituting exceptionally "tight" (as opposed to "loose") societies.[7] In fact, almost by definition a communal society such as that of the Hutterites would have, as one of its characteristics, a "closely geared social structure" that effectively reduces

individual autonomy. We would suggest, therefore, that rather than posit Hutterite orderliness upon the production of "yea-saying" personality or commitment to common values, a more economical explanation reduces lack of deviance to lack of functional autonomy; that is, lack of opportunity to defy the system and survive.

Gouldner states that there are at least four strategies which a system can adopt to reduce the functional autonomy of its parts,[8] all of which appear to be highly applicable to the Hutterite situation. The first of these is "selective recruitment" which involves refusing to admit to the system "those elements that promise to be recalcitrant."[9] Victor Peters observes of the Hutterites:

> "If a convert asks to be accepted into the Brotherhood, the Hutterian elders advise him to weigh his step carefully. He is asked to wait a year or longer, to live in the community, and to study Hutterite doctrine. During this period any property or assets the convert may have remain his own. If at the end of the trial period the convert insists that his decision to stay is final, and the congregation agrees that he qualifies for membership, he is accepted into the Church. He then transfers all his private property to the community. Whether he was a pauper or a rich man when he joined, if he decides to leave the community he forfeits all claim to the community's assets."[10]

> "The fact that only a few converts join the communities is one of the sources of

> strength of the Brotherhood. The new converts at no time form a group strong enough to challenge the traditional pattern of the community. Instead the individuals are assimilated, enter the kinship group by marriage, sometimes occupy positions of responsibility, and identify themselves fully with the group."[11]

This careful selection of converts corresponds closely to Gouldner's notion of "selective recruitment", and the insistence on the permanent forfeiture of all private possessions is certainly an effective method for limiting an individual's autonomy.

A second strategy that a system can adopt "is to insulate itself and withdraw its parts from the environing system".[12] This is the strategy of "isolation",[13] and there can be no question about its applicability to the geographically and socially isolated Hutterite communities.

A third strategy "is that of expansion, in which the system attempts to engulf others which share its parts and thereby tighten control over them."[14] An appropriate example of this in the Hutterite communities is the functionally eroded position of the nuclear family. "The Hutterite nuclear family of the parents and their young children does not really form a social unit. Rather they form one essential aspect of an indivisible unit -- the colony."[15]

A final strategy is that of "selective risk". "That is, the system will maximize its security by delegating its basic metabolic needs to structures within it which have minimal functional autonomy."[16] According to Gouldner, "not all parts of a system have an equal 'vested interest' in its maintenance,"[17] and "those parts with least functional autonomy, those which cannot survive separation from a social system, are more likely to be implicated in its conservation than those which can."[18] The elevated status of old people appropriately illustrates the use of this strategy in Hutterite colonies. "Within the male status hierarchy older men have more prestige and greater authority than younger men, married men have higher status than unmarried men, and baptized men more than unbaptized men. . . . Among the women, older, married, and baptized women are superordinate to their younger or unmarried or unbaptized counterparts."[19] Older people, of course, would have greater difficulty surviving separation from the system, and married Hutterites would have greater difficulty, especially with children, than would single persons.

Earlier it was noted that very few Hutterites do in fact separate themselves from the system through desertion. Nevertheless some do, and the question is to what

extent can the prevailing pattern of desertion be explained in terms of functional autonomy? According to Gouldner's formulation we would expect individuals with the highest functional autonomy, and hence greatest "escape velocity",[20] to be overrepresented among actual deserters. The available information indicates that defectors are usually male, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, and single.[21] In the context of the Hutterite social system, these characteristics of defectors would appear to coincide closely with Gouldner's description of increased functional autonomy. If for no other reason than physical incapacity, the functional autonomy of children and elderly persons is limited. Similarly it could be argued that females have less functional autonomy than males, especially in view of the over-protected and subordinate position of Hutterite women. Finally, one can readily foresee the compounded problems of a married man with a family, and no share of the colony assets, as he attempts to separate himself from the system.[22]

But if the "escape velocity" of Hutterite individuals who meet these characteristics of age, sex, and marital status is higher, the question still remains why so few do in fact defect. One possible answer, of course, is

that although the "escape velocity" is relatively greater for single, youthful, male Hutterites, it is still low in absolute terms. Evidence to this effect (obtained through interviews with defectors) is reported in the original study.[23] This evidence suggests that a high proportion of Hutterite young people contemplate defecting, but that an awareness of a rigorous initiation into the highly competitive and individualistic host society effectively inhibits such action. Defectors indicated that the alternative to colony life, though attractive in many respects, is accessible only at considerable cost. Prominently mentioned deterrents included financial naivetė, insufficient command of the English language, lack of formal educational qualifications, difficulties in adjusting to "worldly" rules of etiquette and dress, and finally defectors were almost unanimous in emphasizing the difficulty in adjusting to the more stringent work requirements of the larger society. As one defector put it: "They don't know what work is back there [on the colony]."[24]

In the case of Hutterite society then, we would suggest that it is not the individual, but situational factors that are "molded" in a fashion that results in low functional autonomy of its members, and that this then

accounts for their greater conventionality. In other words, Hutterite orderliness does not depend so much on the production of acquiescent personality, or even the internalization of norms, as it does on the lack of opportunity for individuals to be "different".

But what about Old Colony Mennonite Society? Can the difference in acquiescence scores between Mennonite and Hutterite subjects be accounted for within the framework of functional autonomy? As has already been indicated, the literature on the Old Colony Mennonites is very limited, and indeed in the case of the particular Old Colony community in question, almost non-existent. Consequently our comments can again only be speculative, based largely on the writer's observations during two brief visits to the Fort Vermilion-LaCrete area of Northern Alberta.[25]

While the functional autonomy of individual Old Colony Mennonites is undoubtedly quite limited in absolute terms, we would nevertheless suggest that it is greater for Mennonites than for their Hutterite counterparts. This statement bears closer scrutiny, and this can perhaps be best achieved by examining, in the light of the limited evidence available, the applicability of Gouldner's "four strategies" to Old Colony Mennonite

society, as compared to Hutterite society.

1) Selective recruitment. Old Colony Mennonites, like the Hutterites, do not engage in active proselytizing, and prospective members are carefully scrutinized as to their sincerity. Admission to Old Colony society is contingent upon church membership, and hence is granted only upon confession of faith. However, the active discouragement and formalized waiting period characteristic of Hutterite recruitment procedures, are not practised by the Mennonites, and neither does admission to the group require the forfeiture of personal possessions.

2) Isolation. The Old Colony Mennonite community in question is situated in a rural area of a remote part of Alberta, thereby insuring its effective geographical isolation. Socially, however, it might be argued that the isolation of Mennonites from "worldly" influences is somewhat less complete than in the case of the Hutterites. Many of the Old Colony children in the Fort Vermilion-LaCrete area, for example, attend large centralized schools, in contrast to the one-room colony schools attended by Hutterite children. In both cases the schools are required, of course, to meet Provincial curriculum standards. Nevertheless, the centralized

schools do offer a larger number of teachers,[26] better library and audio-visual facilities, and the presence of at least some (albeit a small minority) non-Mennonite pupils. To this extent, then, we would suggest that Mennonite children are exposed to a broader spectrum of "outside" influences.

3) Selective risk. This is a strategy the system utilizes to maximize its security "by delegating its basic metabolic needs to structures within it which have minimal functional autonomy."[27] Both the Hutterites and Old Colony Mennonites tend to reserve positions of authority for older members of the community who, as has already been noted, generally possess less functional autonomy than younger individuals. The question, however, is whether older Mennonites have greater functional autonomy than older Hutterites. In other words, to what extent are the barriers that presumably inhibit Hutterite defection applicable also to the Mennonites? With regard to matters of language and education as barriers to defection, there would appear to be little difference between the two groups. We would suspect, however, that certain of the other deterrents cited by Hutterite defectors, such as "hard work", financial naiveté, dress and

etiquette, would operate less effectively as barriers to defection in the case of Mennonites. Moreover, the fact that Old Colony Mennonites can leave the system without relinquishing their personal assets would also make defection a less formidable prospect. Unfortunately we do not posses data bearing on the actual extent of Old Colony defection, and consequently the effect of these suggested differences in "escape velocity" between Hutterites and Old Colony Mennonites cannot be assessed.

4) Expansion. According to Gouldner this is the strategy whereby "the system attempts to engulf others which share its parts and thereby tighten control over them."[28] It is in respect to this particular strategy that the difference between Hutterite and Mennonite social systems is perhaps most pronounced. The Old Colony system makes no attempt to reduce the functional significance of the nuclear family, whereas such efforts are a prominent feature of Hutterite society. This difference, of course, is directly related to the fact that the Hutterites practice an intensive form of "community of goods", while Old Colony Mennonites live on separate, individually owned farms.

This comparison of Hutterite and Old Colony Mennonite

social systems, though obviously incomplete, suggests then that Old Colony society is relatively less "tight" than Hutterite society, and that therefore the system cannot rely on situational restrictions of functional autonomy to keep its members "on the straight and narrow". Individual Mennonites may be better able to survive separation from the system and are consequently in a better position to defy the directives of the group. In these circumstances it becomes necessary for the system to develop and utilize alternate techniques for maintaining orderliness, and on the basis of our findings with Mennonite subjects we would suggest that this alternative may well involve the production of acquiescent personality. If this is the case, we might speculate further that the production of acquiescent personality is a characteristic of "looser" gemeinschaftlich societies generally, in contrast to "tighter" communal societies such as that of the Hutterites.[29]

Since conventionality and deviance are, in a sense, "opposite sides of the same coin", it is instructive to inquire whether the present application of Gouldner's concept of "functional autonomy" is consistent with current formulations in the area of deviance and crimin-

ology. Our analysis of Hutterite conventionality calls attention to the structure of society as an important explanatory variable, and there is indeed a prominent tradition in the sociology of deviance with a very similar emphasis. This tradition originates with Merton's thesis that "some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming conduct."[30] Merton's central hypothesis is that deviant behavior "may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations."[31]

More recently, Cloward has extended "the notion of social-structural differences in ease or difficulty of role-performance to hold for both socially legitimate and illegitimate roles," and deviant behavior is now "construed as a function of access to both legitimate and illegitimate opportunity-structures."[32] In focussing on the question of whether or not the prospective deviant possesses the appropriate skills, and has opportunities for their use, Cloward brings to attention the possibility that conventional behavior may occur "among individuals who have not necessarily internalized

strong restraints on the use of illegitimate means."[33]

"Opportunity-structure" theory, however, has been used largely to explain comparative rates of social deviation among individuals and groups within a particular social structure. The present study, on the other hand, demonstrates the possible utility of this approach in explaining the comparative orderliness of different types of societies.

Conclusion. The study on which the present findings are based has its inevitable weaknesses of course, and a number of these have already been noted. Perhaps the single most important deficiency, however, lies in the fact that only one measure of acquiescence was employed, in one particular setting, utilizing only one type of task. Ideally we would have preferred to use a variety of data-gathering techniques, but in a cross-cultural context this is a most difficult undertaking and beyond the scope of the present study.[34]

Nevertheless, the study does point to an "oversocialized conception of man" in current explanations of Hutterite orderliness. In so doing, the study calls attention to the possibility that the production of acquiescent personality and/or the socialization of individuals into

a consistent normative structure are not the only processes that enter into the genesis of conventionality. Some portion of the orderliness of gemeinschaftlich societies may be better explained as a function of the ability or opportunity of individuals to become -- and survive as -- "deviants".

FOOTNOTES

1. A.W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in L. Gross (Ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory, New York: Harper and Row, 1959, pp. 241-270.

2. Ibid., p. 254. See also, A.W. Gouldner and H.P. Gouldner, Modern Sociology, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, pp. 396-413; A.W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," American Sociological Review, 25(1960), pp. 161-178.

3. Ibid., p. 258.

4. Ibid., p. 256.

5. Gouldner & Gouldner, 1963, op. cit., p. 411.

6. Ibid., p. 401; Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

7. P.J. Pelto, "The Differences Between 'Tight' and 'Loose' Societies," Transaction, 5(April, 1968), pp. 37-40.

8. Gouldner & Gouldner, 1963, op. cit., pp. 411-412.

9. Ibid., p. 411.

10. Victor Peters, All Things Common: The Hutterian Way of Life, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965, pp. 179-180.

11. Ibid., p. 180.

12. Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., p. 260.

13. Gouldner & Gouldner, 1963, op. cit., p. 412.

14. Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., p. 260.

15. J.A. Hostetler, Education and Marginality in the Communal Society of the Hutterites, Cooperative Research Project No. 1683, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 69.

16. Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., p. 260.

17. Ibid., p. 258.

18. Ibid., p. 258.

19. Hostetler, 1965, op. cit., p. 29.

20. Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., p. 255.

21. Hostetler, 1965, op. cit., p. 87; J.W. Eaton and R.J. Weil, Culture and Mental Disorders, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955, p. 41.

22. Another reason why the functional autonomy of individual Hutterites is greater during the eighteen to twenty-five year period is that it coincides with what the system regards as the transitional stage in the life cycle of its members, and is commonly referred to as the "in-between years" or "foolish years". This is the period between the completion of formal school and baptism, during which "some disregard of colony mores is institutionalized." (Hostetler, 1965, op. cit., p. 65.) "The 'foolish years' are a time for trying the boundaries. The young person will eventually grow to the point where he will reject the world and choose the colony way of life, but during this time there is some flirtation with the world, some learning about that which will be rejected." J.A. Hostetler and G.E. Huntington, The Hutterites in North America, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, p. 79.

    This allowance by the Hutterite system for exceptions to its otherwise rigid restrictions on functional autonomy coincides with Gouldner's position. He states that "a need of systems which possess parts having degrees of functional autonomy, is to inhibit its own tendencies to subordinate and fully specialize these parts. In short, it must inhibit its own tendencies toward 'wholeness' or complete integration if it is to be stable." And again, "the parts of social systems must be allowed a measure of functional autonomy by the system". Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., pp. 257 & 262, emphasis in original.

23. E.D. Boldt, "Conformity and Deviance: The Hutterites of Alberta," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, 1966, pp. 52-65.

24. Ibid., p. 76.

25. Driedger has attempted a classification of Old Colony Mennonite communities based on different types of community structures and boundary maintenance techniques. He outlines "four distinct patterns of coping with social change" as follows: "1) retreat to the European village, 2) conservation in an isolated community, 3) accommodation to an ethnic urbanism, and 4) innovation of a suburban satellite." With regard to the Fort Vermilion-LaCrete community he states: "Whereas the central feature of the European village community was a well organized community structure, the significant feature of the Fort Vermilion and Fort St. John settlements is the isolated community, far away from industrial, urban influences. Ecological isolation is still very effective in the Fort St. John area with no telephones, no electricity, limited use of vehicles, radios, T.V., and newspapers, and a two-room public school up to grade eight. The Fort Vermilion settlement, now thirty-five years old, is no longer as isolated as it was. There are now roads, more schools, and general prosperity with greater access to towns. High Level, only forty miles away, is a mushrooming oil town with a liquor outlet, modern businesses, etc. Isolation can be attained for only some years, it would seem, and with a looser social structure, the community may be even more vulnerable to change than the village pattern." Leo Driedger, "Changes in Types of Boundary Maintenance in a Canadian Ethnic Minority," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Association of Sociology and Anthropology, Banff, Alberta, 1967, pp. 4 and 7-8.

26. A certain proportion of the teachers in the Fort Vermilion-LaCrete schools are themselves Mennonites, though not of the Old Colony variety, so that the larger number of teachers cannot unequivocally be equated with greater "outside" influence.

27. Gouldner, 1959, op. cit., p. 260.

28. Ibid., p. 260.

29. Such a proposal has interesting implications for further research. It may be, for example, that these various methods of achieving conventionality are reflected in the socialization practices of "tight" and "loose" societies. If this is the case, how do Hutterite and Old Colony Mennonite methods of child-rearing differ? Present knowledge of the child-rearing antecedents of acquiescence and independence is far from adequate, with only limited empirical evidence available. See, for example, M.L. Hoffman, "Some Psychodynamic Factors in Compulsive Conformity," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48(1953), pp. 383-393; L. Boehm, "The Development of Independence: A Comparative Study," Child Development, 28(1957), pp. 85-92; P.H. Mussen and J. Kagan, "Group Conformity and Perception of Parents," Child Development, 29(1958), pp. 57-60. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in this type of research see, D.P. Crowne and D. Marlowe, The Approval Motive, New York: John Wiley, 1964, pp. 195-197.

30. R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957, p. 132.

31. Ibid., p. 134.

32. R.K. Merton, "Social Conformity, Deviation, and Opportunity Structures: A Comment on the Contributions of Dubin and Cloward," American Sociological Review, 24 (1959), pp. 177-189 (p. 188). See also, R.A. Cloward, "Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behavior," American Sociological Review, 24(1959), pp. 164-176; R. Dubin, "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure: Continuities in Social Theory," American Sociological Review, 24(1959), pp. 147-164.

33. Cloward, 1959, op. cit., p. 175. See also, R.A. Cloward and L.E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity, New York: The Free Press, 1960.

34. The Crutchfield technique (of which our own technique is a modified version) has, of course, been used to compare individuals with respect to a considerable variety of tasks with fairly consistent results.

(R.S. Crutchfield, "Conformity and Character," American Psychologist, 10(1955), pp. 191-198). Moreover, positive correlations have been reported in studies comparing the Crutchfield technique with other measures of acquiescence. See, for example, G.M. Vaughan, "The Trans-situational Aspect of Conforming Behavior," Journal of Personality, 32(1964), pp. 335-354; K.W. Back and K.E. Davis, "Some Personal and Situational Factors Relevant to the Consistency and Prediction of Conforming Behavior," Sociometry, 28(1965), pp. 227-240; M. Wiener, J.T. Carpenter, and B. Carpenter, "External Validation of a Measure of Conformity Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(1956), pp. 421-422; J.A. Olmstead and R.R. Blake, "The Use of Simulated Groups to Produce Modification in Judgment," Journal of Personality, 23(1955), pp. 335-145.

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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS

INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS

I am a researcher from the University of Alberta, and I'm here today to give you a little test. It's not a very difficult test, and it doesn't hurt, so just sit back and relax. The test is called a "visual perception test". In other words it's a test to find out how good you are at judging the things you see. This same test has been given to pupils your age in various parts of the Province, and today I'd like to find out how well you do on the test compared to some of the other pupils that we've already tested.

Now the way the test works is really quite simple. In front of each one of you there is a small box or panel. Each panel has three switches, three red lights, and twelve green lights on it. Now if you'll look at the three switches you will see that beside each one there is a letter. The top switch has the letter A beside it; the middle switch has the letter B beside it; and the bottom switch has C beside it. You will also notice that each of your panels has a number on it in the lower right hand corner. The numbers range from one to five, depending on which of the panels you are seated at. Find out what your number is and try

to remember it, because once we start the test I will be calling out each of your numbers when it's your turn to answer the questions I will be showing you. Pay no attention to the green lights on your panels. We won't be using them just yet.

I'm going to show you a number of questions on the screen in front of you. Each of the questions will have three possible answers, but only one of the three is the correct one. These answers are also labelled A, B, and C. So if you think, for example, that A is the correct answer to the question, then you should pull the switch that has the letter A beside it, and the same for B and C. Each time you pull a switch the little red light next to it will go on. This is to show you that your panel is working properly. If you should ever pull a switch and the light does not go on, be sure to tell me and I'll see if I can fix it for you.

Well, let's try an example and you'll be able to see for yourselves how everything works.

DEMONSTRATION

Now as each of you pulled the switch, you heard a machine behind you making a noise, right? This machine,

which is on the table behind you, is a small computer. Do you all know what a computer is? Well, it's a very expensive and complicated machine, and the important thing about it is that it can remember things. Now all of us can remember things, of course, but we also forget a lot of things -- like doing our homework! But the computer never forgets anything. This is why it's such a remarkable machine. Each time you answer one of the questions by pulling a switch, the computer picks up your answer and remembers it. And after you have answered all the questions the computer will be able to tell us exactly what your answers were without ever making a mistake. In this way the computer can remember the answers of thousands of pupils all at the same time, and it's much easier for me than writing everybody's answer down on paper.

Now remember, the computer does not know who each of you are, or what your names are. All it knows is the number on your panel and the answers that come from each of these numbers. This is to make sure that nobody will ever know what your score on the test was. I won't be watching to see how you answer, and the computer doesn't know your names, so there is no way to tell how each of you did on the test. So you don't have to worry about

your teachers or anybody else ever finding out what your mark or score was.

Is that clear? Do you have any questions?

Now there are some rules to this test that must be followed and I'd like you to listen carefully to what they are.

1. Do not pull a switch until I ask you to. Everyone has to wait his turn, otherwise the computer jams up.
2. After you've pulled a switch, leave it on. Do not switch it off until I tell you to.
3. Once we've started the test there must be no talking or whispering.

Any questions? Do you all understand how the test works?

Well, now we are ready to start. Look at the questions on the screen carefully, and do the best you can.

Second Trial.

Well, how did you like the test? It's different than the kind your teacher gives you, isn't it?

It is kind of an unusual test, and it's possible that some of you might have made some mistakes just because you've never had one like it before, with switches, lights, computers and things. Of course I don't know if any of you

actually made any mistakes; only the computer knows that. But some of you may have, and in order to be fair about it I'll tell you what we'll do. Now that you know what the test is all about and how the panels work, I'll give you another chance to answer the same twenty questions again. Your first answers won't count, and the score that you get will depend on how you answer the questions this time around. O.K.? And to make it a little more interesting for you this time, so you don't get too bored answering the same questions all over again, we'll do it a little differently this time. We'll make the computer do a little work for us. The computer has been busy picking up your answers and remembering them, and it can now tell us how each one of you answered the questions by using the green lights on your panels. Let's just try it, and you'll see how it works.

DEMONSTRATION

So before you answer the questions this time, the computer will show you how your friends in the group answered the questions the first time. This should make it a little more interesting for you. I don't mind you seeing how the others answered because the first answers don't count any-

how. But remember, the answers that you give this time will count. So look at the questions carefully before you answer. You won't get another chance. You may change your answers on any of the questions if you wish.

O.K.? Do you all understand? Any questions?

Alright then, let's begin.

APPENDIX B

TEST QUESTIONS

QUESTION NO.1



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

C

QUESTION NO.8

QUESTION NO. 9 (FIXED)

A

B

C

A B C

QUESTION NO.10



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

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

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

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

A B C

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

C

QUESTION NO.16

A B C

QUESTION NO.17 (FIXED)



QUESTION NO.18

A B C

QUESTION NO.19

QUESTION NO. 20 (FIXED)

A [redacted]

B [redacted]

C [redacted]

[redacted]