philosophy as teaching us to 'realize our unique, inherent potential', or Montaigne as teaching us to 'embrace life on its own terms' (183). But otherwise Guignon's volume is a welcome corrective to the self-help genre and a hopeful sign that philosophers can reassert their claim to consideration of the question of the good life — and Guignon has certainly done his part, with this excellent anthology that undergraduate philosophy teachers will no doubt find extremely useful in the classroom.

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Larry Hickman, ed.
Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1998. Pp. xxi + 271.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-33384-9);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21179-4).

Anthologies of expository and critical essays on the philosophy of John Dewey are appearing with ever more frequency, testifying to the resilience of pragmatism and of Dewey's own peculiar contributions to this tradition. Presumably for this reason the editor, Larry Hickman, felt it necessary to distinguish this collection from other recent examples by promising essays geared specifically to the needs and interests of a 'postmodern generation'. Hickman writes: The twelve original interpretive essays in this volume locate Dewey's major works within their historical context and present a timely reevaluation of each of the major areas of his broad philosophical reach' [ix].

Whether Hickman's collection will satisfy the demands of its intended audience is difficult to say, since nothing is said about what this generation's interests are. From the essays included, it appears that locating Dewey's work in his historical context is not actually one of them. Dewey lived and worked in the late nineteenth and twentieth-century philosophy, yet with a few notable exceptions (the essays by Thomas M. Alexander, Peter T. Manicus, Gregory F. Pappas, and Charlene H. Seigfried) these essays rarely mention, let alone relate Dewey's work to, the major figures in Western philosophy in this period; e.g., John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, etc. Later twentieth-century figures fare little better. One gets the impression that the postmodern generation knows little about twentieth-century philosophy and cares less. Those who, unlike the postmodern generation, do read

twentieth-century philosophy, will regret the editor's decision to privilege the interests of this group.

But that aside, readers seeking a collection of generally accessible, well written and informative essays on some of the most important topics in Dewey's thought, all by established scholars in their fields, probably could not do better than to consult Hickman's collection. Hickman wisely opens the volume with two excellent essays exploring fundamental themes running through the whole of Dewey's thought: qualitative experience and nature in Alexander's 'The Art of Life: Dewey's Aesthetics', and community in James Campbell's 'Dewey's Conception of Community'. Dewey's *Art as Experience* offers perhaps the most accessible avenue into Dewey's thinking, but it is not for that reason the less revealing. As Alexander points out: 'Experience is basic for Dewey and he gives one of his best accounts of this central term in ... *Art as Experience*' [8]. Alexander not only illuminates Dewey's aesthetics and the role of experience within it, but also the role of aesthetic appreciation in Dewey's conception of the 'art of life'. James Campbell does a similar service in untangling Dewey's understanding of 'community', an understanding that underlies his theories of education, individual personality, and of moral and social criticism.

These two 'keynote' essays are followed by discussions of more specific areas of Dewey's philosophy: education, religion, metaphysics, inquiry, social science, political philosophy, and feminism. The merits of these essays lie primarily in their careful exposition of Dewey's contributions to the fields mentioned. Three in particular, the essays by Manicas, Siegfried, and Boisvert, accompany exposition with trenchant critical commentaries that point out real shortcomings in Dewey's approaches, but find positive resources within Dewey's philosophy for overcoming them. Some will find these the most exciting essays of the twelve, as being the most suggestive of the directions in which neopragmatists true to the spirit but not necessarily the letter of Dewey's thought might profitably go.

The last two essays were possibly intended to make good the editor's promise to locate Dewey in his historical context, but neither are strictly speaking about Dewey's philosophy at all. Both are provocative and indirectly shed some light on Dewey's thought. However both require considerably more than interest in or a casual acquaintance with Dewey's thought to benefit from them. The first, by Thelma Lavine, offers an account of American pragmatic philosophy that is breathtaking in its audacious dismissal of opposing traditions. 'What is distinctive about the American philosophic tradition,' she writes, 'is that among the various competing philosophies that survive in the contemporary western world, the classic American tradition alone attempts to identify and to reconcile the conflicting philosophical traditions of the modern West' [217]. Lavine does not attempt the impossible task of justifying this claim, but instead uses it to assess the success or failure of particular pragmatists, such as Dewey, in fulfilling this aim. Almost as astonishing as her opening sentence, quoted above, is Lavine's assessment of Dewey's efforts at reconciliation as driving him politically towards statist

socialism, considering that Dewey has usually been dismissed as a milk-toast liberal by the left. The final essay, by Joseph Margolis, is a highly critical response to Richard Rorty's identification of parallels between the philosophies of Dewey and Heidegger. Following a lengthy comparison of the views of Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Margolis argues for a nearer sympathy between Dewey and the phenomenalism of Merleau-Ponty.

Taken all in all, Hickman's collection provides a valuable introduction to central themes in the philosophy of one of the founders of American pragmatic philosophy, and as such deserves attention from readers interested both in American philosophy, generally, as well as Dewey's thought in particular.

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Patricia Kitcher, ed.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
1998. Pp. xvii + 300.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8916-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8917-4).

Suppose you were charged with selecting up to twelve pieces of Kant scholarship with the primary purpose 'to help students read the *Critique of Pure Reason* with a greater understanding of its central themes and arguments, and with some awareness of important lines of criticism of those themes and arguments' (xvii). You might approach this task with a view to select pieces on the *First Critique* (i) that are important and influential in interpreting the concepts, issues, arguments and positions, (ii) that are representative of major objections to, and defences of, the central arguments, (iii) that are representative of the central themes and of the major subdivisions therein, and (iv) that demonstrate a clarity of expression which would be accessible to senior undergraduates. Given the aforementioned criteria, I strongly suspect that most of us who lecture on Kant would produce widely varying lists for inclusion, which suggests that the set of commentators/pieces which properly satisfy criteria (i)-(iv) is not unique. Since I do not wish to engage in an argument concerning particular preference orderings of either specific commentators or specific pieces, I shall address Kitcher's selection with only the satisfaction of such criteria in mind.

If one wishes to 'ease' students into the *First Critique* with a general discussion of some of the difficult concepts with which they will be dealing, the opening selection, Philip Kitcher's 'Kant's *A priori* Framework', provides a splendid introduction, while considering a central issue in the *First Critique*, i.e., the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. Although Kitcher's intentions are not to 'solve' the so-called problem of the 'synthetic *a priori*', his analysis offers a wealth of information regarding Kant's usage of terms such as apriority, analyticity, syntheticity, possibility, necessity, experience and knowledge.

Depending upon one's proclivities, the Strawson and Allison selections may provide the centerpiece around which many Kant courses might revolve. The Strawson selection is excerpted from *Bounds of Sense*; Allison's is excerpted from *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*. Both works have been extraordinarily influential, and the manner in which Strawson lays out the doctrines of transcendental idealism and Allison's arguments concerning anthropocentrism and epistemic conditions provide the background for a pitched battle amongst Kant commentators. The excerpts identify two entrenched positions regarding the correct interpretation of the phenomenon/noumenon distinction, with Strawson representing the two domain interpretation, and Allison representing the dual aspect (or better: two ways of considering) interpretation. The prize is the incoherence or coherence of transcendental idealism itself. I know of no two other articles that could set the stage as well.

With respect to the central arguments, themes and subdivisions, the Aesthetic and the thorny problems regarding the coherence of Kant's notion of a form of intuition are represented by a pair of articles: Falkenstein's 'Was Kant a Nativist?' and Parsons' 'Infinity and Kant's Conception of the "Possibility of Experience" '. On the one hand, Falkenstein offers a reasonable historical analysis of the nativist/empiricist dispute prior to Kant and an analysis of Kant's arguments concerning the conditions and nature of our representations of space and time. These analyses yield a controversial, but hopefully defensible, notion of what comprises a form of intuition, i.e., as 'orders in which sensations (or the data that correspond to sensation) are presented in intuition' (42). On the other hand, Parsons argues that Kant cannot both account for our geometrical knowledge and successfully limit knowledge of objects to possible experience, without either rendering the notion of form of intuition explanatorily useless or denying the type of geometrical knowledge Kant claims we possess. This represents a much deeper objection than is commonly held, and to this end Parsons deals not only with the arguments of the Aesthetic, but also with the manner in which Kant handles infinite divisibility in the second antinomical conflict.

The Analytic of Concepts is represented by a trio of articles: Patricia Kitcher's 'Kant's Cognitive Self', Ameriks' 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Progressive Argument' and Beck's 'Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams?' Any meaningful discussion of the Analytic of Concepts must come to grips with the status of the transcendental unity of apperception and