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ACTION SYSTEMS IN CRISIS: A THEORETICAL EXPLORATION

WITH REFERENCE TO SELECTED CASES OF FORCED MIGRATION

by

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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled ACTION SYSTEMS IN CRISIS: A THEORETICAL EXPLORATION WITH REFERENCE TO SELECTED CASES OF FORCED MIGRATION submitted by Sarah Loza-Soliman in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology.

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ABSTRACT

This study undertakes the exploration of forced relocation as a crisis situation at the collectivity level. Crisis is defined as a sudden demand for change in the established action-system as defined by the actor(s) involved. Responses to crisis is conceptualized as a developmental process in which the actual undergoing of the process sets its own conditions for further action.

In addition to the review of the literature on the concept of crisis, four cases of forced relocation are selected for detailed review: the Egyptian Nubians, the Japanese-Americans, the Valley Tonga, and the Bikini Marshallese. The review of each case includes the pre-existing action-system, the emergency and intervening action-system, and the duration of the crisis.

The crises at the micro-level of the collectivities included in this study are all precipitated by crises and contradictions experienced at their respective macro-levels. The small, powerless communities are sacrificed in the process of the macro-systems responding to their own crises. Since time is a relative concept, it takes on new dimensions as our analysis moves from a micro- to a macro-level.

Action-systems in crisis are confronted with contradictions between forces of preservation and forces of change. The outcome of this conflict affects the degree and direction of change. However, the majority of cases resort to adaptive changes as solutions to existing contradictions. When the forces of preservation fail to incorporate

adaptive changes to neutralize or transcend the conflict, there are greater tendencies toward the destruction of the system, either by revolutions, complete transformation, or cultural death.

Micro-collectivities faced with the crisis of forced relocation pass through three stages. At the onset of the crisis the collectivity passes through a stage of shock and passivity; activity is directed toward the solving of immediate and personal problems. Later, through the process of redefinition of relationships and assertion of power, internal conflict resurges. The external threat to the collectivity enhances the strengthening of group feeling leading to symbolic reactions of nativism and/or active, directed reactions toward a perceived external threat. A higher level of education among the members of the micro-collectivity tends to enhance directed action toward the social environment.

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Unfortunately, to myself alone, I have to attribute all the shortcomings of this work.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE STUDY

Sociology as a field of inquiry has been directed toward the study of social behavior in human societies. Three other goals of Sociology have been apparent. Sociology endeavors to understand social processes; this will hopefully enhance the prediction of social behavior. In turn, prediction may lead to control — which is the most controversial goal of social sciences. Regardless of the moral, ethical, and value issues involved in striving toward understanding, predicting, and finally controlling human and social behavior, sociologists are confronted more and more with the quest for controlled social change, or planned social change.

In modern social thought, serious attention has been given to two most important areas of social life: stability and dynamism — or — order and change. It is hoped that understanding the web of society, or the persistence of order, will increase our understanding of processes of change; and vice versa. However, through the history of the discipline, many questions remain to be answered.

Regardless of our limited understanding of persistence and change, social life goes on. Today, social studies mushroom on all aspects of life in a millinium-old effort to understand social behavior.

This study is another effort to perceive patterns of order out of disorder. It is an investigation of forced collective migration. This is becoming a trade mark of our civilization. With modern economic and technological development, and the increase of the power of

centralized governments, more and more individuals, small groups, and collectivities are affected positively or negatively by decisions made outside their own immediate spheres of relationships.

Hence, the study of forced collective relocations can not be conceptualized or treated in isolation as a separate social phenomenon. It should be related to other social processes, in an effort to understand forces of persistence and forces of change.

A general conceptual scheme has been formulated to tackle the problem of responses to forced relocation. Forced relocation is conceptualized in this study as a crisis situation -- crisis in the sense that sudden demand for change is mandatory and irresistible. It is a part of a general study of wyas in which social units adapt or respond to altered circumstances while still retaining enough integrity for survival.

The concept of crisis has been loosely used with reference to numerous particular cases. It has been used to denote existing contradictions that necessitate change in one direction or the other -- The Crisis of Development (Pearson, 1970), The Crisis of Our Age (Sorokin, 1940), Crisis in American Institutions (Skolnick and Currie, 1970). Numerous other examples can be mentioned in modern social science literature where the concept "crisis" was used loosely to indicate conditions where there were discrepancies between the traditional, established, old ways of solving problems and new altered realities.

Similarly, in the literature, the concept "crisis" is often used in a negative sense. Crisis is associated with stress, disorganization, catastrophies. Rarely is crisis conceptualized as functional for the social unit facing crisis.

Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldun, as early as the fourteenth century, was aware of the positive aspects of crisis. Though the concept was not used in the English translation, we find that in his analysis of patterns of change in man's political and social organizations, Ibn Khaldun emphasized the role of hardships and tranquility in affecting the strengths and weaknesses of human organizations or social units. In times of hardships and privations, the social unit is more aware, and stronger, in group feeling and solidarity. In times of tranquility, luxury and life of ease, the social unit loses its vigor of group feeling and becomes senile (Dawood, 1967: 135-138). Hence, the consequences of crises are not necessarily evil.

Nevertheless, despite the burgeoning of the literature on crises, little effort has been made to relate the various crisis situations to a theoretical discussion of crisis as a field of systematic inquiry. This research is an exploratory study of crisis situations.

Forced migration as a type of crisis situation, then, is explored in terms of the reactions and responses of human groups faced with the crisis of forced movement and resettlement in new and different social and physical environments.

The study utilizes a historical, comparative approach using four cases of forced collective relocation: The Egyptian Nubians in 1963, the Japanese-Americans in 1942, the Valley Tonga in 1958, and the Bikini Marshallese in 1946.

The selection of the four cases for investigation was made on the basis of two considerations. First, the availability of sufficient

data was considered, that is, data relevant to three areas that were selected: the pre-crisis action-system, the emergency action-system, and the responses to post-relocation developments.

Second, the cases had to be different enough to elucidate different collective responses for comparative purposes. For example, the Nubian relocation did not entail a radically different relationship to the group's means of production; the move merely accelerated pre-existing trends such as that toward urban wage labor on the part of adult males. By contrast, the Japanese-American relocation during the prison-camps did require a drastic change in their network of inter-relationships and relationships to their means of production. The Bikinians and the Valley Tonga are two comparatively simple anthropological cases to contrast with the relative sophisticated societies of the Egyptian Nubians and the Japanese-Americans.

The main method of data collection was library research. One relocation case was intensively investigated. In the case of the Egyptian Nubians, a field trip was taken for six months in the summer of 1971. Intensive interviewing took place with several government officials in order to acquire an understanding of conditions and relationships between government officials and the relocated Nubians.

Two visits were made to New Nubia and to Aswan, the capital of the province. The first visit was an exploratory one. During the second visit which lasted four weeks in two new Nubian villages: Ballana and Kalapsha, data was collected relating to the established, formal institutions, the emerging leadership in the area, the agricultural conditions, the relationship between the Nubians and the local government

officials, and the views and frustrations of the local government officials concerning the relocation project.

In addition to this intensive interviewing, data were also collected through observation. Several formal meetings were attended to get some insight into various problems faced by relocation, as well as into the different forces of conflict that existed in the area.

The archives of the Research Center at the American University at Cairo were also reviewed. The Research Center was very active in sponsoring ethnographic studies of the Nubian area prior to relocation. The Center is currently carrying out an evaluative research on the relocation project in general.

The review of the four cases of forced relocation is followed by a theoretical and comparative discussion of forced relocation as a crisis situation. An effort is directed toward a systematic analysis of the cases, differences and similarities, in an endeavor to develop tentative generalizations for further research. A tentative typology of collective action-systems responses through time is developed.

Hopefully, these conclusions will lead toward more research relating collective reactions to crisis and responses to crisis at various levels of analysis: individual, small groups, and larger collectivities.

Originally, this study aimed to produce a general typology of crises and responses to crises. As the work progressed, that ambitious goal seemed increasingly premature. Hence, a more limited aim gradually materialized: a focus upon forced relocations (four cases), duly compared with respect to similarities and differences. In process of

evolving this revised focus, a new insight emerged: the source of the crisis of relocation of the micro-collectivity was, in all four cases, a crisis in the respective macro-collectivity. That is, to understand why the Japanese-Americans relocation occurred, one must analyze the tensions and crisis in American society. In this perspective, forced collective relocations appear (in part) as a scape-goating response: the macro-system solves -- or eases -- some of the tensions at the expense of the micro-collectivity, at least in the short run.

Our concept of crisis, then, has broadened from a focus on the original micro-system (the four relocated communities) to a focus on the macro-systems (the larger national societies) that encompass the relocated sub-systems. Further, it has led to a focus on the conflicts, both internal and external, that confront the larger (macro) society.

One net insight is, that pre-existing ties and opposing interests and values may lead to new resolutions, at least in the short run, however temporary. For example, the Nubians were assisted to relocate by the Egyptian national government. By contrast, the Bikinians received minimal and inadequate assistance; and when assistance was increased, that was due to the internal American protests against Bikini deprivations -- protests originating within the macro-American society.

The importance of interaction with the macro-system by the micro-system to resolve the crisis in the micro-system is highlighted by an earlier study by H.C. Taylor, Social Change and Cultural Death (1951). This analysis suggests that the Greenland Norse pastoral villages, 11th to 15th Century, confronted with a critical climatic change, failed to survive because there were no stimulating interactions with a relevant

macro-society. The result was cultural death -- or extinction. Isolation, it seems, was fatal.

Among our four studies, the nearest to being socially and physically isolated was the Bikini case. However, minimal interaction with the American macro-society resulted in a new and -- for the time, at least -- a viable resolution for the micro-system.

In conclusion: some applied insights following from these four cases, plus the Taylor study, are outlined.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF CRISIS

Although this study will focus upon certain specific examples of crises — collectivities experiencing forced relocation — we may profit from a preliminary discussion of crisis as a general concept.

Crisis is a turning point in an unfolding sequence of events and actions. It may be seen as a point in time in which an actor or a collectivity must decide whether a going course of action shall proceed, be modified or terminated, due to a major, relatively sudden, and sometimes unanticipated disruption of everyday activities, meanings, and/or expectations of the individual or the social unit.

From a social action perspective, an actor in a situation selects means to attain certain valued goals or ends. The course of action is influenced by the situation: whether objective and external, or subjective and internal. The external conditions of a situation involve the physical, relevant objects and other social actors. The internal conditions include the actor's ideas, feelings, and state of knowledge (Cohen, 1968: 74). The actor acts in a situation according to how he defines it, and his "definition of the situation" might be quite different from the situation as assessed by an observer. Thus a "routine" life-cycle crisis such as marriage, pregnancy, divorce, illness, etc., may have little or no meaning for society, whereas to the actor himself, heavily involved as he is, the experience may be quite traumatic and devastating.[1] Therefore, crisis needs to be defined, in the first instance, from the viewpoint of the actor's or the group's

system of action.

An actor or actors in a situation selects between available means to the achievement of valued goals. The action is guided by the meanings the actor(s) attach to the situation as well as the relationship to goals and interests. This orientation to a situation in action systems is more or less stabilized or patterned by institutionalization. Situations are grouped according to regularity of action into institutions. Patterns of action become internalized in the form of norms which set limits to the selection process between alternatives. The limits of action which are a function of values and norms define mutual expectations between actors in different roles.

The goals or ends of an action are absolute goals, or means to other goals. The hierarchy of the value system underlies the goal selection as well as the means to achieve those goals. The selectivity of means is limited by the availability of alternatives in relation to the goals. The means are also selected according to knowledge of the availability of means, as well as the efficacy of the means in terms of costs which are socially defined, and the degree of success of action in achieving the goal.

Action, however, is regulated and patterned according to ordered relationships underlined by shared cultural ideas. The actor in a specific role acts according to his perception of expectations of the significant others. The mutual expectations are the product of the established relationships and the status of the actor within the structure.

Thus, the three crucial elements of the action-system are:

1. the goals which are defined according to the hierarchy of values.

2. the inter-personal relationships that are institutionalized, and

3. the role definitions and expectations of actor or actors.

I.   SELECTED REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ON CRISIS

The concept "crisis" has been used in an indeterminate way for a variety of meanings. Little has been done to clarify the concept in a systematic or analytical way. As Rapoport mentioned:

> "In lay language, a crisis is usually equated with disaster, an environmental event which poses an external threat... Moreover the term 'crisis' and 'stress' are often used interchangeably" (1963: 211).

Herman, too, professed the same complaint, he wrote:

> "Inspite of the potential value of studying crisis, little distinction has been made between the concept of crisis and a number of seemingly related terms (e.g., tension, stress, anxiety, disaster, and panic). Crisis has been separated from some of these other concepts by the concept of stimulus and response. In this conceptualization a crisis is conceived as a stimulus to which certain kinds of behavior-like anxiety or panic are possible responses" (1963: 63).

The existing literature, in other words, does not contribute much to our analytical interests. Herman goes on to demonstrate how the various disciplines are inclined to use one term in place of the other. In psychology, the terms anxiety, threat, or stress are used; in sociology and political science, the focus seems to be on panic and crisis; an interdisciplinary group studied disasters.[2] Though all these terms are

interrelated, their relationship has to be specified.

The distinction, however, that has been made by Herman of stimulus-response criteria does not clarify the matter. Though crisis by our definition requires a change in the action-system, its impact and the reaction to the impact are far from being a mechanical response to stimuli. The process involves a cognitive aspect in defining crisis and in reacting to the situation (Lazarus, 1970: 143-164).

Most of the literature defines crisis in either a very limited perspective that restricts the concept, or in too general terms that does not provide the distinction between crisis from non-crisis. Sorokin in his Man and Society in Calamity (1969), limited calamities to war, revolution, famine and pestilence. Though these are certainly viewed as crises, to equate limited types of calamities with crises will rob the latter of all analytical value. Form and Noscow defined crisis in more general terms. For them crisis is "a breakdown of social relations and social systems in a community that are of greatest significance to the individual or particular organization involved" (1958: 12). This definition, though general, is limited in application, as crises not only affect relationships, but may also affect self, or collective images and goals. Harry Williams defines crisis very generally as "a situation in which an actor faces the necessity of making an appropriate choice of action in order to avoid or minimize severe punishment" (1957: 15). This definition is too general to allow any analytical discretion as in almost all situations including crises situations, an actor tries to minimize punishment.

In specifying elements of crisis, Kutak mentions "suddenness"

as a crucial aspect of crisis, i.e., without much advanced warning and little preparation. This creates a breakdown in the organization of a community as members faced with new problems and new needs which the every day system of organization fails to meet. Crisis also entails a psychological change with the increase in confusion and fear in the sudden new situation. Immediate needs replace ultimate purposes as criteria by which behavior is determined (Kutak, 1938: 66-72).

This conceptualization by Kutak, while it contributes certain insights, clearly is tailored to one specific event: the 1937 Louisville flood. This ad hoc formulation needs to be compared to other ad hoc formulations of other types of crisis, if we are to attain a general typology of crisis on a sophisticated analytical level: an abstract and systematic typology applicable to a wide variety of individual and collective "crisis." Contributing to such a general typology is a prime concern of this thesis. Our problem is on what analytical level can we evolve a systematic schema that will delineate the structural elements (and their psychological counterparts) and processes that can distill the common aspects of many different empirical events classed as "crisis." For example, Kutak mentions the "increase in confusion and fear." But accounts of revolutions show that exhilaration may be a primary psychological reaction, as well as fear. This point illustrates the limitations of one-case, status-quo oriented formulations, and the need for a comparative approach of numerous cases, in order to move the conceptualization of "crisis" to higher, i.e., more general, levels of analysis.

Wiener and Kahn (Robinson, 1968: 511) enumerate twelve generic

dimensions of crisis:

1. Turning point in an unfolding sequence of events and actions.

2. Situation where requirements of (new) action are high among participants.

3. Threatens goals and objectives of those involved.

4. Important (new) outcomes follow crisis that shape the future of participation.

5. Crisis consists of a convergence of events that result in a new set of circumstances.

6. Produces uncertainties in assessing situation and formulating alternative for dealing with it.

7. Reduces control over events and their effects.

8. Heightens urgency which produces stress and anxiety.

9. (Traditional) information usually inadequate.

10. Increase in time pressure.

11. Changing relations among participants.

12. Raises tension among participants.

Within this conceptualization, the first dimension is not very helpful. The second, fourth, and ninth dimensions have to be amended to differentiate "crisis" analytically. The sixth overlaps with "2 and 4," as amended, in addition to being much too loose propositions that include variables which can vary independently. Furthermore, crisis may increase as well as reduce "control over events" or "tension among participants." These shortcomings are a result of unduly low level of analytical abstraction, hence they are not useful in a systematic,

analytical, and general conceptualization.

II.   TOWARD AN ANALYTICAL DEFINITION OF CRISIS

        From the previous review of the literature, crisis can be
conceptualized as a process that has a time dimension and involves
changes in the action-system of an actor or a group, to cope with a
sudden, new set of circumstances that increase uncertainties and reduce
control over events. Crisis can be defined as any sudden demand for
structural change in the actor's or group's system of action. This
entails changes in role definitions and expectations, modifications of
goals as a result of changes of values or the hierarchy of values
(Yutzy, 1970: 344-353), and changes in the inter-personal network of
relationships, as three crucial elements in the system of social action.
The three dimensions of crisis: a) suddenness, b) demand, and
c) change, have to be specified.

A.   Suddenness

        The "suddenness" of crisis ranges from sudden calamitous events
and disasters, with little or no warning, producing great material
damage such as floods and tornadoes, to crisis in which previous warning
was possible, such as planned, forced population movement in urban
renewal schemes. Miller and Iscoe conceptualized this "suddenness" as
"acute" rather than "chronic" (1963: 195-200). The acuteness dimension

is due to the unexpectedness and unanticipation of the new situation
(Herman, 1963: 64). The traditional, or customary means-end relation-
ships of the former order of system of action can no longer be retained,
which increases the unpredictability of the new disordered reality.
Thus the time of crisis should not be equated with clock-time, as time
has varying meanings relevant to the system at stake.[3]

B.   Demand

The "demand" for change in general would range from a mild
verbal proposal for change to irresistible pressures for structural
change. In crisis, the "demand" is not optional, and therefore is at
the latter end of the continuum. A different course of action has to
be adopted, though the degree and the direction are in part a product of
the "definition of the situation" by the actor or group, and in part a
function of the objective, external factors. Davis in describing the
onset of polio in a member of a family, states:

> "In other words, a commonplace explanatory
> framework is applied at the onset of the child's
> illness. With the introduction of incongruous
> symptoms, this becomes ambiguous and less tenable,
> giving rise to a course of action that eventuates,
> sooner or later, in a definition of the child's
> condition as one more serious and dangerous than
> that originally contemplated" (1963: 16).

Robinson, who deals with crisis as a decision-making situation
rather than problem-solving situation, sees types of crises varying in
three dimensions: the source of crisis, whether external or internal;
the decision time available for response; and the relative importance

of the values at stake (1968: 512). Whether the focus of the crisis

situation is on the decision aspect or on the action-system, the

irresistible demand for a different course of action is still a crucial

dimension in the definition of crisis.

C.   Change

Change as a concept and a dimension in crisis also needs to be

specified. Individuals experience changes by the biological fact of

growth and development by which they experience role-changes, i.e.,

from a child, to student, to employee, to aging. Usually, those

experienced changes are not a result of crisis, nor in most cases do

they converge into crisis. The social system allows means for gradual

adaptations to changes that are foreseen and predicted. Yet the death

of a key individual leader, e.g., J. Kennedy, G. Abdel-Nasser, may pose

a severe crisis for the national collectivity. Changing of personnel in

a formal organization does not ordinarily constitute crisis, as there

are usually built-in mechanisms of rules and regulations, impartiality,

and recruitment procedures that guarantee the smooth orderly working of

the system. Nevertheless, a sudden decline in membership of the American

Red Cross was a crisis situation that necessitated the "adoption of

new program and the introduction of new standards for the survival of

the organization" (Sills, 1961: 154). This particular change, for this

particular organization, was "new," unplanned, yet irresistible.

Nisbet, in conceptualizing the difference between persistence

and change stated that, "mere social interaction, or mobility, or

physical movement from place to place, job to job and so on" should not be confused with structural change as this will not affect the structure of social order (Nisbet, 1970: 306). He goes on to indicate that the only substantial change is related to some form of crisis. He uses W.I. Thomas' definition of crisis:

> "As W.I. Thomas stressed in his own distinguished studies of social change, crisis is a relationship between human being and environment precipitated by the inability of the human being (or social group or organization) to continue any longer in some accustomed way of behavior. Crisis is a form of attention, of conscious, heightened attention, that is wrung from us in moments of emergency when breakdown is manifest in our ordinary ways of behavior" (Nisbet, 1970: 316).

Thus the change as a dimension of crisis, by definition, postulates a change in which the "habitual problem-solving activities are not adequate and do not lead rapidly to the previously achieved balanced state" (Rapoport, 1963: 213), and a new action-system has to be adopted to cope with the crisis. Alternatively, the system of action confronted by crisis may suffer destruction, e.g., a community overwhelmed by flood or military conquest may be destroyed, or the system may be so drastically transformed that it can no longer be identified as a continuity from its own past. For example, a conquered population becomes an appendage of the conquering collectivity, or a prison population or a population in a concentration camp becomes an entirely different social system. This differs from "adopting a new action-system" voluntarily, in that no choice is afforded to the actor or collectivity that has to change.

The sudden demand for change in the actor's or group's action-system can result from voluntary or involuntary decisions. Marriage,

pregnancy, emigration, are sometimes examples of voluntary decisions. By contrast, all three of these events may be compulsory to the actor. The voluntaristic aspect, however, does not exclude the social forces that might make the decision imperative. The crisis in these situations may usually be seen as lesser in degree and intensity than involuntary demands for change such as forced migration for an individual or a group, illness, bereavement, loss of job, natural disasters, wars, economic recessions, etc.

Crisis can also be classified according to its source, external to the system or internal. External sources include sudden changes in the physical environment such as floods, earthquakes, or impacts from other social systems or individuals. The external-internal dichotomy pends on the delineation of the social system in question. Robinson (1959) hypothesizes that external sources of crisis are more intensive and demanding of the social system than internal sources of crisis.

In summary, crisis implies _suddenness_ which is a relative term depending on the system of action in question; _demanding_, which is more or less irresistible; _change_, that is structural change rather than simple role-change or role-succession. Crisis could also be a result of voluntary or involuntary acts or events. It can also be caused by internal or external sources of the social system in question. This introductory discussion suggests that "crisis" involves a well-nigh irresistible pressure for change in the pre-existing or traditional structure of the action of the individual actor or of the collectivity; that the pressures and changes involve key, valued elements of the action-system of the individual or group; and that crisis is relatively

sudden, as the time-scale of that individual or collectivity goes.

As crises involve a time dimension, several social scientists
conceptualized the process in terms of sequential-stages. Davis in
expressing the advantages and disadvantages of such conceptualization,
wrote:

> "The advantages of a sequential-stage analysis of the
> type are obvious. It allows the investigator to break
> down his subject matter into more manageable parts, to
> relate these parts to one another in a relatively
> systematic way, and, in general, to bestow a semblance
> of analytical order on the chaos of contradictory
> reports and observations that usually emerges from the
> disaster experience. In these very advantages, however,
> lies the chief disadvantage of this approach; for the
> segmented description of the crisis experience tends to
> suggest that more order and coherence exist than is
> usually the case in such situations. To the extent that
> confusion, vascillation, ambiguity, fortuitousness, and
> the like, distinguish these occurrences from every day
> social life - and they clearly do - the employment of
> this kind of analytical tool falls short of reality"
> (1963: 19).

The stages through time overlap, and there are no clear cut
demarcation lines between the various phases. Also different events
involve different phases. No model has been developed to account for
the differences observed in the action-system in various stages or
phases.

Barton in conceptualizing the time dimension of disasters which
are a form of crisis, distinguishes five stages (1969: 41):

1. The predisaster period.

2. The period of detection and communication of warning of a
specific threat.

3. The period of immediate, relatively unorganized response.

4. The period of organized social response.

5. The long run post disaster equilibrium.

Davis in his study of family experience of polio-strickened child, broke the process down to five stages which he called, the prelude stage, the warning stage, the impact stage, the inventory stage, and the recovery stage (1963: 19).

Wolfenstein (1957) identified three main stages that affect the psychological set-up of individuals in disaster situations: the threat, the impact and the aftermath.

The three agree on the sequence of "before-during-and after" conceptualization. Barton breaks down the response time to three phases according to organizational criteria: the immediate spontaneous, unorganized activities, later controlled and organized activities, and post disaster stabilization processes. Within the scope of action-systems in crisis, stages have to be specified.

III. RESPONSE TO CRISIS

Reaction to crisis situation is a fragmented field in social science investigations. Sometimes it is conceptualized as a passive or automatic response to a stimulus (Herman, 1963: 63). This facilitates relating different stimuli to different reactions. Lydia Rapoport, for example, states that crisis may be conceived by an actor as a threat, loss or challenge. A threat to need or integrity is met by anxiety; loss or deprivation is met by depression; and, if the problem is viewed as a challenge, energy and resources are mobilized toward problem-

solving activities (Rapoport, 1963: 213).

Reaction to crisis, however, is a developmental process through time that is affected by the on-going events. As Davis rightly states:

> "...the reactions of families can best be described in terms of an on-going developmental process -- an improvisatory 'building up,' as it were, in which each new event posed new problems that in turn generated trial-and-error search of new interpretations and definitions of the situation... Thus, the actual undergoing of the process sets its own conditions for the further action, the conditions themselves being an existential amalgam of previously emergent responses and events" (Davis, 1963: 10).

Also, crisis reaction is usually associated with unorganized, shattered, pathological, irrational behavior. There are social scientists, who studied specific cases of crises and who negate, to a certain extent, this orientation. Spiegel (1957: 3) observed in a flood situation in England, that the individual behavior is not irrational or unorganized, but each individual acts as he defines the situation. The lack of coordination, though, is caused by the number of actors acting on private definitions rather than on common or collective definitions (Spiegel, 1957: 3; Fritz, 1957: 7).

Form and Noscow (1958: 10) negate the unorganized reaction from another perspective. They claim that people's beliefs, values and expectations of everyday community life are not destroyed by crisis. They survive physical destruction and enable people and their communities to function under the most distressful conditions. So behavior in crisis is an attempt to meet emergencies in the context of the group's traditional ways of life.

Thus, individuals respond to crisis, drawing on their past experiences. Accordingly, at the onset of crisis, the response is more

or less individualistic because of the lack of group consent due to the
suddenness of the emerging crisis. Groups tend to rely on past ex-
periences in defining the situation and in coping with it. Communities
in which crisis events are common such as mining communities, when
disaster breaks out, there is a normative structure that defines the
roles which facilitate rescue activities (Lucas, 1969). The range of
experiences, however, might not be conducive to a realistic coping with
crisis (Barnett, 1953: 83).

In addition to the pre-crisis action-system of the actor or a
group, the improvision of means to cope with the crisis situation is
another crucial dimension in response as a process. Within the
emergency stage there are activities and relationships that develop to
meet the sudden demand for change. The actor or group either depend on
personal resources, community resources, or call for external help from
external agencies or organizations.

In the case of external help, effective functioning requires
reciprocal fulfillment of expected behavior on part of actors and
organizations (Form and Noscow, 1958: 17). When external help is
mobilized, until its functions are somehow incorporated into local
expectancy, the crisis will continue and conflict will heighten and
prolong the crisis (Form and Noscow, 1958: 19). What happens within
the emergency period leaves a lasting impression on the actor or the
group and their action-system. The external system might become the
target of hostility.

Crisis may be prolonged by an inability of the individual, the
group, the community or the nation to act appropriately with other

groups or organizations involved in the intervention and with which they are expected to act. Where several organizations are involved, the capacity for necessary reciprocal action becomes problematic. The situation may be extended by other actors involved as individuals, groups, organizations, or segments of community defining the conditions in different ways, thus frustrating the possibility of integrated action (Form and Noscow, 1958: 12).

The duration of emergence or threat is also an important dimension affecting process of reaction to crisis. Fritz in comparing six disasters in American communities hypothesizes that the reaction and disorganization are less intense if the threat is over quickly (1957: 6-9). This is related to means of coping, yet it is important in its own right.

This exploratory study proposes to investigate three of the dimensions of response to crisis:

1. the pre-existing action-system.

2. the emergency action-system, and

3. the duration of crisis as they affect the overall process of response in time.

A. Stress

Stress is another ambiguous concept which is often used as a synonym for crisis. It is often used as a generic concept for disasters (Barton, 1969: 38), where members of the social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system.

Stress is an emotional experience accompanying a changing personal or social situation (Levine and Scotsh, 1970: 9). It is a product of excessive demand made on individuals, demands that might produce disturbances of physiological, social and psychological systems. Hence stress might accompany crisis situations as a reaction to crisis. Crisis might be a stimuli for stress. Crisis creates stress when there is a threat to the self or collective image, to goals, or to network of relationships of the system under analysis.

In conceptualizing differential reaction to stress, Lazarus emphasized two aspects. The first is the cognitive processes that lead to specific emotions that organize behavior. The second important dimension is the situational constraints that limit the viability of alternative action (Lazarus, 1970: 143-164). This conceptualization is important for our purpose, as it emphasizes the aspect of "definition of the situation" of the actor(s) involved. In addition, reaction to stress is a developmental process. Like crisis, a stimulus-response conceptualization of reactions to stress does not explain reality.

IV.   LEVELS OF ANALYSIS OF ACTION-SYSTEMS IN CRISIS

Analytically, crisis situations may involve four levels of analysis, according to the social unit that is being considered. There is the individual level; the small-group or primary-group level such as family, a neighborhood, peer group, or a work group; the formal-organization level such as complex bureaucratic organizations; and the

collective level of a community, a society, or a nation. All these
levels are ordinarily cumulative. A family crisis will affect the
action-system of its individual members; a formal-organization crisis
will influence the individual members and may reflect on their families;
a community crisis will involve its members, the small-groups and the
formal-organizations included in the social unit. On each level,
however, there are exceptions, as mentioned earlier. For example, a
serious illness or death of a key national leader, although, in the
first instance, a family-crisis, obviously may precipitate a nation-
wide crisis affecting all components of that society.

On the individual level a crisis affects decisively, i.e.,
structurally, the action of the actor. The challenge of crisis to the
actor's self-image, or the threat to his goals provokes new coping
mechanisms which either serve or hamper his adaptive capacity (Davis,
1963: 138). He is no more "normal." Certain activities are prohibited
or outside the actor's reach. Losing a job may affect the actor's self-
image as well as his goals. Bereavement is a hazardous event dis-
rupting the actor's network of relationships.

At the small-group level, the crisis might also affect the
group's self-image, or its goals, or network of relationships within
the group, as in divorce, or with external group relationships.

Crisis can also occur in large, formal, bureaucratic organi-
zations and requires change, in their action-system. The study by
Gouldner (1954a) typifies an organizational crisis, due to the change
of the head manager, which necessitated a different system of action to
increase his control. The Wildcat Strike study (1954b) is, also, an

organizational crisis, through innovation, that created a situation that
required restructuring of the "normal" system of action of the workers.

A fourth level of crisis analysis is the collective level of a
community or a nation, where the event affects the collective self-
image, their goals, or the intra- and inter-group network of relation-
ships.

V.   SELECTED EMPIRICAL CASES OF FORCED MIGRATION

As crises are a common phenomena that can occur at all levels,
it is imperative that the study be limited in its scope. This study
explores in particular the collective reaction of collectivities as
they are exposed to the crisis of forced movements.

Through history, movements of masses of people from one place
to the other are common phenomena. Movements of individuals, small
groups or massive migration is usually conceptualized by the "push-and
-pull" factors. There are conditions, however, where the "push" factors
become dominant and in a sense irresistible due to political events,
decline in economic resources, or physical disasters. Within the latter
events, the degree of imperativeness of the move is variable, though
demanding. The famine in Ireland, due to the successive failure of
crops was a crisis situation which eventuated in the massive exodus of
hungry Irish people to North America and Canada (Duncan, 1968: 2). The
"pushing" factors were selective. That is, not all the Irish had to
leave, but only those who viewed and defined the situation as
detrimental to their survival. The decision to migrate was a volun-

taristic response to a crisis situation, though the events converged
into a situation in which a sudden demand for change was imperative,
yet the situation allowed for alternative systems of action from which
the actors made the decision to migrate or to cope with the threat by
other means rather than migrating. War refugees are another example of
mass-movements that, to a certain degree, involved voluntary decisions
after assessing the threat.

There are, however, population movements that are the result of
explicit, forced, involuntary, and external forces, usually as a
result of political decisions, like the relocation of the Japanese
in camps during the World War II, the movement of urban populations
because of urban-renewal plans, or the relocation of whole communities
whose areas are affected by constructions such as dams. The crises for
the actors are not in decision-making, but rather in solving and coping
with the consequences of the relocation.

Thus forced movements of complete communities are involuntary,
external crises for the people that are moved. They are traumatic
experiences which entail a sudden change in the group's social action-
system, as the traditional, customary means-end relationships are
disrupted. New elements in the new situation necessitates new
structuring of the network of collective relationships as well as with
other social units that impinge on their life in the new settlements.

One of the cases to be investigated is the Egyptian Nubians
resettlement scheme. After the construction of the High Dam in Egypt,
the creation of the great Nasser Lake, and the flooding of the Nubian
area with water, the relocation of the Egyptian Nubians became imperative.

The second case of forced movement to be examined will be the relocation of the Japanese-Americans during World War II. The Japanese-Americans, unlike the Nubians, were less associated with one concentrated location; rather they were scattered in urban and suburban areas along the American West Coast. They were, to a certain extent, more diffused within the American social structure. During the war and specifically after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, all Japanese-American citizens were relocated into camps inland. The move was relatively sudden, without previous planning. They were relocated under conditions of considerable stress, to inland concentration camps in the American West.

Two cases from the anthropological literature will also be investigated. The Bikini settlers of the Marshall Islands were relocated after the war for military purposes, i.e., atomic test. The resettlement process was done through various stages (Mason, 1950). The second case is the relocation of the Valley Tonga after the construction of Kariba Dam in Northern Rhodesia.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Fred Davis documents a parent's reaction to his child's illness with polio as saying, "You can't believe it's happened to you. You think, well, it's maybe so many cases in the U.S. every year, but it's never here. It's always next door, or next country, or next state. Never here. It's to hit somewhere sometime, but you never think of yourself. And this time it was us" (1963: 40). Being an actor in that situation was quite different from being an outside observer.

[2]A committee on Disaster Studies was formed by the National Academy of Sciences and was succeeded by Disaster Research Group. They supported many studies on disaster. Also the Disaster Research Center of Ohio State University carried out instant research on disasters. See acknowledgement by Allen H. Barton (1969).

[3]"Sudden" and time are relative. Geological time (thousands or hundreds of human chronological years) involves a very long time between structural changes in the earth's crust or between earthquakes. C. Brihton's study, Anatomy of Revolutions (1956), and P. Sorokin's volume, Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937), show a long time between waves of revolution and war in history of Greco-Roman and Western countries. Further, there are daily, weekly, monthly, and other time cycles in human events (Goody, 1968). Geitges Gurvitch also writes: "The sociologist cannot ignore indeed that each society, each social class, each particular group, each microsocial element or further, each level in the depth of social reality, every social activity has a tendency to operate in a time proper to itself" (1963: 174).

PART TWO

EMPIRICAL CASES

MAP 1: OLD AND NEW NUBIA IN EGYPT

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

CAIRO

EGYPT

RIVER NILE

RED SEA

KOMOMBO

ASWAN HIGH DAM — ASWAN

NASSER LAKE

WADI HALFA

SUDAN

DAHMIT
AMBARKAB
KOSHTEMNA
KOMOMBO

KENUZ

ARAB
DIWAN

MAHAS
BALLANA

NEW NUBIA

ASWAN

OLD NUBIA

DAHMIT

AMBARKAB

KOSHTEMNA

KENUZ

ARAB

DIWAN

MAHAS

BALLANA

EGYPT

SUDAN

RIVER NILE

LEGEND:

⬭ RESETTLEMENT AREA

0   50   100   150 miles

CHAPTER III

THE RELOCATION OF THE EGYPTIAN NUBIANS

This chapter deals with the involuntary relocation of the Egyptian Nubians in 1963. First, it will review the geographic, historical and cultural background of the Nubians. Attention will then turn to the resettlement project of 1963 — its initial governmental organization and the early roles and responses of the Nubians to the prospect of relocation. Finally, we shall trace the various facets of the crisis attending the actual 1963 relocation, from the viewpoints of both government officials and the Nubians. On-going changes in age and sex roles, economy, power structures and other aspects of the redevelopment process will be delineated.

The first Aswan dam on the Nile River (see map) was built in 1902; and raised in 1922 and 1933. These three events did not completely flood the Nubian area, although some removals of villages further back from the Nile were required. But in 1963, the final raising of the dam level entailed the complete relocating of 50,000 people, mainly Nubians. It is this latter event and its massive ramifications which constitute our focus.

I.   THE GEOGRAPHIC, HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

The Egyptian Nubians lived in old Nubia, which was part of the Nile River valley that began at Aswan Cataract on the southern borders

of Egypt, and which ended upstream, a little north of Khartoum in Sudan.

Old Nubia was not a political division, so the name is unofficial. The

northern part, which was known as lower Nubia, was under Egyptian

jurisdiction. It was bounded by the Aswan Cataract (Shellal) in the

north, and the second shellal in the south. The northern cataract had

been an effective physical barrier that for centuries culturally

separated the Nubians from other Egyptian populations. As Leslie

Greener notes:

> "It is interesting to see how a natural barrier so
> comparatively slight as the first cataract at Aswan
> has kept the peoples of Egypt and Nubia separate
> through some fifty centuries, although the natural
> river immediately above the barrier differed but
> little from that below" (Greener, 1962: 22).

Lower Nubia was one of the most arid regions in the world

(Trigger, 1965: 14). Though it was located midway between the

Mediterranean and Sudanian rain belts, it received less rain-fall than

either region. The winds were from the north, and were continental and

dry. The relative humidity was very low: 29% in July, and 50% in

December. The temperature could rise to 51° Centigrade (124° Fahrenheit)

and the monthly mean ranged from 14.4° to 32.3° Centigrade.

In addition to the general aridity of the area, the fertile

patches in Nubia were not continuous. The Nubian hamlets tended to

cluster around the fertile areas and usually took the name of the oasis.

Throughout Nubian history, the principal factor determining the

distribution of settlements in the area had been the existence of arable

land for cultivation. Subsistence technology insofar as it allowed the

utilization of poorer areas, ranked second. For example, the intro-

duction of the <u>Saqia</u> (water wheel) in Roman times caused some increase of population in those areas. At different times other factors such as trade and war have made different parts of the valley particularly attractive or unattractive places in which to live.

Agricultural settlements were based on individual or family farming. The narrowness of the Nile river valley and the frequent projection of rocks to the edge of the river prevented the development of complex irrigation systems, or even of basin agriculture. As a consequence, the land tended to support a small and relatively stable population. Migration drained off any increase that was above what the region could support. It is evident that the Nubian population increase was not proportional to that of the rest of Egypt over the past century. In 1813 the population in lower Nubia was 48,000, while the Egyptian population was estimated to have been 2.5 million. In the 1960 census the Nubian population was still 48,000, while the over-all Egyptian population had increased to 25.2 millions.

The origin of the Nubians is debatable, but recent archeological excavations may bring some light to this problem. The currently dominant theory is that the Nubian language was introduced to the area from the south-west by a flow of migrants from the south which destroyed the existing meriotic civilization and culture (Trigger, 1965: 135-140). The present population is a product of a long and fairly continuous inter-breeding of the existing population with increments from a surprising variety of places. There was intermarriage between the Nubians and the Beja tribesmen in the east — a population usually characterized as Caucasoid. Among other Caucasoid elements that have

blended with the indigenous population are the garrisons sent by Sultan
Selim of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century. The slave trade
accentuated the Negroid elements. As in Islam, children of slave women
were born free if sired by a Moslem master (Trigger, 1965: 6).

Nubia has been an important gateway between the north and the
south. Thus, its history has been largely determined by the foreign
policies of northern and southern neighbors. The area has history and
traditions that go back to predynastic times (Trigger, 1965; 1966).

In the sixth century, lower Nubia was converted to Christianity
under the auspices of Constantinople during the reign of the Byzantine
Emperor, Justinian. The conversion had a unifying effect: the Nubian
valley was consolidated from Aswan to Dongola farther south, under one
church and one King (Fernea, 1966: 2).

The Arabs conquered Egypt in 640, but were defeated by the
Nubians when they attempted to push south of Aswan. About twelve years
later, the Arab army got as far as Dongola and then withdrew, having
demonstrated their power. Unlike the Egyptian Copts, the Nubians were
determined to resist them. The Arabs, realizing the defensive attitude
of the Nubians, and the poverty of the region, made no attempts to
conquer further. They established their frontier at Aswan Shellal
(cataract). A treaty was signed, and the Nubians agreed to trade
several hundred slaves each year in return for wheat, barley, lentils
and horses. Most of the slaves came from further south, the Nubians
acting as middlemen.

Regardless of the Nubian resistance, the Arab invasion of Egypt

gradually affected the Christian church. Nubian contact with the mother church declined; gradually the Nubian language replaced Greek as the liturgical language. It was written in Greek letters (Fernea, 1966: 2).

Around the 12th Century, after a Nubian raid on Aswan, an Egyptian military action was taken against them. Nevertheless, the final blow to Christianity and Nubian independence came later, around the 14th Century, as a result of constant raiding, harassment and infiltration by the Hillalian Arabs from the north-western desert. Recent excavation gives evidence that Christianity was still existing in the middle ages till the downfall of Dongola at the beginning of the 16th Century (Skinnie, 1965: 263). Now all Nubians are Moslems.

Until the 18th and 19th Century, Nubian villages were either independent or under the rule of Kashifs: Turkish aristocrats who paid taxes to the Turkish government and had a standing Bosnian police force. This Turkish government was a predatory one. It had no protectional function from any common danger, nor did the communities require a strong hand to preserve order among them. It existed basically to extract taxes from farmers. Regional social control was the function of tribal social organization rather than of the established colonial administration. Following Durkheim's analysis, social sanctions in Nubia were restitutive rather than punitive.

One of the major events that had a lasting effect on the Nubian life at the turn of the twentieth century was the building and heightening of the Aswan Dam in 1902, 1922 and 1933. The reservoir greatly altered all but the extreme south of lower Nubia. It changed the landscape as well as the annual cycle of the river and the

subsistence economy. Traditionally, the fertile land that was cultivated had been the land that lay between the high level and low level of the Nile, i.e. the alluvial land. After the dam, the water level was no longer controlled by the Nile flow, but by the Aswan Dam authorities, according to the water needs of agriculture in Egypt. The water level became high almost the whole year with the exception of three to four months in the summer during the flooding season.

The Egyptian government compensated the Nubians in cash for their houses and loss of land. It also developed pumping schemes in the southern area, by way of compensation, to irrigate fertile areas at a considerable distance from the Nile.

After again raising the Dam in 1933, the Nubians north of Abu-Simbel had three alternatives. Some emigrated with their families to cities in Egypt or Sudan. Others rebuilt houses on sandstone deposits fringing the reservoir water line and sought jobs as laborers in urban areas. There were a few who opted to continue agriculture north of the Dam or south of the reservoir, either in the new agricultural project area or rebuilding their old saquias (water wheels) (Scudder, 1966: 100-138).

A.   The Scene Prior to Resettlement

The Nubians, a black minority in Egypt, are linguistically and culturally distinct from the rest of the Egyptians, despite the partial acculturation that has taken place in the last century. They are quite

conscious of their country, Nubia, and despite the loss of their best fields because of the building and the successive enlargement of the Aswan Dam, in 1902, 1922 and 1933, most Nubians have preferred to move their villages farther back from the river than to go north. Even those who migrate to Egyptian towns looking for employment, return to their land in sickness and old age. There has been very little intermarriage between them and other Egyptians. Among Egyptians, the Nubians are recognized for their cleanliness and honesty. The Nubians themselves are proud of these traits and see themselves as superior to the Upper Egyptian peasants or Sayidis.

Nubian culture is a mixture of Islamic and pre-Islamic traits. They retain their traditional languages for oral communication, while Arabic is the formal, written language. Certain arts and architectural styles and designs, and certain supernatural world concepts, as well as certain methods of cultivation have been retained from the pre-Arab past (Fernea, 1966: 2). Islam and Arab tribal traditions have governed most ceremonial organizations, formal religious practices and beliefs, kinship organization and marriage patterns, and legal systems (Fernea, 1966: 21).

Linguistically, Lower Nubia was divided into three parts: the Kenuz area, the Arab-speaking area and the Mahasi area. Kenuzi and Mahasi are two different but related dialects that correspond to ethnic divisions within Nubia (Millet, 1966: 59-71). The Kenuzi dialect was spoken in Lower Nubia in the northern-most territory adjoining Aswan to a distance of 50 kilometers south. Beni Kenuz, a part of the Rabia tribe from Nejd, totally occupied and dominated the northern area by the

11th Century. They infiltrated and intermarried with local inhabitants
in accordance with Moslem religious laws, producing Moslem offspring.
They adopted the Nubian language along with other aspects of Nubian
culture, but retained their tribal social order (Fernea, 1966: 3).

The Arab-speaking enclave occupied the next 40 kilometers
southward from the Kenuz. The people in this area were merchants who
plied the trade routes between Korosko and Abu Hamed, selling slaves,
ivory, gum, feathers and camels from Sudan to Upper Egypt, and
transporting manufactured goods from there to southern markets (Trigger,
1965: 16).

The Mahasi (Fadija) area extended beyond the Sudanese territory
to the 3rd cataract, 300 kilometers south. This was the richest
resource area in terms of arable land and cattle breeding.

The Nubians, especially in the Kenuz area, had an elaborate
Sheikh cult and complex rituals associated with the river and supernatural
spirits (El Mesiri Nadim, 1966: 219-237; El Guindy, 1966: 239-256). The
Sheikh cult had its own organized personnel, as it included individual
as well as group rituals. Mulids, which are the celebrations of the
birthday of Sheikhs, were rituals characterized by singing, dancing and
a joyful atmosphere. They had important social and economic functions
for the community and were a source of unity between groups and
solidarity within groups.

The women, however, were excluded from religious participation,
yet they had their own saint cults and rituals, especially those
associated with the river Nile. This reflected the religious signifi-

cance and general importance of the Nile.

The _Zar_ was another elaborate women's institution associated with supernatural spirits. It was used as a therapeutic device for psychological disturbances. Kennedy has suggested that the psychological disturbance was caused, in the case of Nubian adult females, by the social conditions of adult separation, low female status, exclusion from religious participation, an unbalanced sex ratio, marital insecurity and relative isolation (Kennedy, 1967: 189). The anxieties of many Nubian women were intensified by migrant labor conditions, which drew many adult males away from home for long periods of time.

Weddings and funerals were also occasions for group participation and joint activities. There were, however, no male initiation rites at puberty (Faris, 1969: 482). From demographic data one can infer that boys, after the age of eleven, joined their fathers or lineage male members seeking employment in urban centers.

Although generally the Nubians shared many common cultural patterns, there was considerable variation in their organizational structure and in the social significance of agnatic descent groups with regard to their function as corporate groups. This variation could be the result of adaptation to different subsistence problems.

In the Kenuz area in the north, patrilineage appeared to be of considerable importance in organizing many of the economic, political and religious affairs of the community, thus providing a focus for corporate interest (Fernea, 1966: 270). The social organization included three distinct units: the tribe or descent groups, the village (residence) and the _Nahia_ (the administrative district) (Callender,

1966: 183-217). Residents of villages were normally drawn from several tribes, but major rights and obligations were defined by tribal structure regardless of residence. This was so even with migrants. The village had an informal social structure and the villages shared wedding and death obligations. The Madiafa or Khema (guest house or meeting place) was the only corporate feature of the village. Each major tribe owned its own major institutional facilities in the village in which they composed the majority of residents. These institutions included the cemetery, mosque, cooperative association and shrines of tribal ancestors. In practice however, the tribe was seldom the actual unit for ownership of production resources.

Administratively, the Nahia was headed by an Omda assisted by sheikhs who were tribal heads of the district. The district was made up of several villages and various tribes. The tribal heads represented dispersed descent groups rather than particular areas or villages. Relations with the National Government and strangers were handled by the Nahia administration. Otherwise, internal affairs were tribal responsibilities. As a result of this setting, the cohesion of the Nahia was a function of the lack of disputes between the various tribes. Gahafirs (guards) were associated with the Nahia administration and were outside the tribal system. Crimes were rare, however, and most of the disputes were handled within the lineage system.

The head of the tribe was the highest position within a tribe, followed by heads of major lineages. The tribal head interfered in conflict and disputes according to Hag-El-Arab (a system by which the offender pays a nominal amount to the offended, and later the victim

returns it). Lineage heads were the communication links between migrants and residents. Selection of people for these positions was instrumental rather than dogmatic. It was determined by the function of the position, so it was not inherited. Literacy, a dependable income from a salaried position, and personal qualifications were all crucial qualities for the occupants of such positions. Usually the occupants were returning migrants. Due to the limited number of males that qualified for the important positions within a tribe, usually the Head of the tribe assumed responsibility for other ritual offices, such as mazun (officiating at weddings and funerals) and Nakib (caring for tribal shrines).

The tribal rituals were concentrated on four kinds of activities: the Friday prayer in the Mosque, ceremonies commemorating the dead, the cult of ancestral sheikhs, and Islamic Feasts. There were five positions associated with those activities: the Iman of the Mosque, male and female ritual leaders, and Nakib and Nakiba (female) for the ancestral Sheikh cult. In practice, they might not be separated and one person might hold several positions.

The women acted through male representatives in tribal or kinship affairs. They were basically organized in informal, close-knit groups based on residence.

Marriages were arranged within minor lineages. Minor lineages were branches of the main lineage, traced patrilineally. The Mahr (bridal price) was fixed for inter-tribal marriages, but higher for outsiders. Nevertheless, wedding ceremonies were a village activity in which the residential neighbors as well as lineage members took part.

The tribal system did not disintegrate with migration. Small lineages merged with viable tribes; this was an adaptive measure. The Mehanab tribe in Dahmit, for example, about 1960, was composed of 1,703 members organized in major and minor lineages. But those who lived in the area numbered only 226, of which only 56 were males between the age brackets of eleven and under, and 40-90 years, with none in the age-range of 12-40. One-third of the female population was over 50 years of age, and around one-third below the age of fourteen. Despite these conditions, the tribe survived as a viable organization that attracted the loyalties and concern of its members.

For the middle, Arab-speaking area of Old Lower Nubia, documentation in relation to the organizational structure is lacking. Fernea, however, attributes ideological aspects to their agnatic descent system, as they identified with the tribal structure especially outside the area. This, though, had little additional corporate significance within the social system (1966: 262-263).

On the other hand, the Mahasi-speaking area in the south was not homogenous, because of varied technology used for agriculture and farming. In Ismailia, a village in Ballana district in the southern-most of seventeen Omadias in the Mahasi-speaking region, and an area in which the pumping projects were installed, the patrilineal descent group had no corporate function associated with it, and was also of no ideological significance (Fernea, 1966: 263). However, descent groups remained socially significant as units of economic dependence. Even adult women, who shared one household were expected each to fulfill their obligations independently (Haikal, 1966: 289-297). The nuclear families

were the basic social and economic units, and each unit solved its own problem of subsistence. Within this setting, all group activities were based on reciprocities.

The overall pattern of social organization was midway between societies organized by corporate descent groups and societies where the nuclear family is the only socially significant unit. This had been a recent change affected by the flooding of the arable land in the north; it increased the number of immigrants especially after the introduction of government diesel-pump projects for irrigation (Fernea, 1966: 264).

In areas in the Mahasi region where the saquia (water wheel) was still the main system of irrigation, corporate activities were still in existence. The working of water wheels required the cooperation of owners and relatives. Strong ties and good relationships based on cooperation were crucial in solving cow problems, irrigation, and land ownership problems (El Zein, 1966: 298-322).

These variations in the societal relationships among the various Nubian communities indicate the relative flexibility of Nubian social structure in coping with subsistence problems.

B.   The Economy Before the 1963 Resettlement

Lower Nubia did not produce enough food for its inhabitants. This had been true also in the past; all reports written on the area, regardless of the time, support this fact. To supplement their living conditions, adult male migration has been the solution. Those left behind in the villages lived on the remittances sent to them by their

migrant relatives.

In addition, there were indigenous sources of income such as palm trees and the farming of small plots of arable land. Farm land was used for producing food for household consumption and fodder for animal husbandry, which consisted basically of raising cattle, sheep and goats. There were few salaried positions within the villages. A few people engaged in barter trade. Cash crops were non-existent; the only source of cash income were the remittance from emigrants.

Traditionally, Nubian emigrants worked as waiters, doorkeepers and cooks in urban areas. Lately, they have become more inclined to government jobs and industrial employment for more security as well as for prestige. This latter development, combined with the rising costs of travel, has reduced the frequency of home visits, which average once every ten years (Geiser, 1967: 165-177). The migrants, however, continued to meet certain tribal obligations, as well as to organize on a lineage basis in urban areas, and to function as a welfare system for members of the group.

Urban migration was fundamentally caused by meager economic conditions in the home area. Lower Nubia had a total of 11,500 feddans under cultivation with the average of 0.23 feddan per capita, while in Upper Egypt it is .48 feddan per capita and .64 in Lower Egypt (a feddan is 1.038 acres). Callender, however, holds the view that causes other than agriculture should be sought for explaining the depopulation of the area, such as the pull of city life plus the prestige enjoyed in Nubia by an urban migrant (1966: 184). Another point would be the cultural disposition of the Nubians and their preferences for non-manual

jobs and their lack of interest in farming as an occupation. This is
clear in the circular movement of Nubian males outside their communities
looking for jobs, and the inflow of Sayidis into the Nubian region for
farming, cultivation and other local occupations (Abdel Rassoul, 1966:
340-351).

As a result of this pattern of migration, Nubian villages were
made up primarily of women, children and old men. The sex ratio (males
per hundred females) fluctuated between 37 and 84. The areas with the
higher male ratios reflect usually the presence of Sayidis (Upper
Egyptian peasants) moving into pump-irrigated areas to farm the Nubian
land.

The Sayidis played a major role in the cultivation of the arable
land in Old Nubia. They were divided into settlers and seasonal
migratory labor (Abdel Rassoul, 1966: 340-351). The settlers farmed
the land in the area with irrigation schemes, and due to their efforts,
land productivity was increased. They cultivated the land of the
Nubians, as they owned no land of their own. They provided all expenses
in return for two-thirds of the crop.

Seasonal migratory labor moved into the area between the months
of July and October, when the reservoir was lower in the south and the
land inundated north of the Dam. Almost one thousand Sayidis went to
Old Nubia for summer cultivation. Sayidis also engaged in fishing and
coal mining activities, as the Nubians did not value hard physical
labor and lacked an entrepreneurial attitude. Even small shops as well
as mills and bakeries in the pump-project areas were often owned by
Sayidis.

The extent of the migratory movement of adult male Nubians is demonstrated by the fact that prior to resettlement only 28.5 percent of Nubian families had all their members living in Nubia; 33.5 percent were living outside Nubia; and 38 percent of families had a few members living in Nubia (total: 100 percent).

The average size of the Nubian family living in Nubia is 2.8, while the average size of Egyptian family is 5 persons per family (Ministry of Social Affairs: 43).

Migration varied in different areas. Villages in the north that were affected by the Aswan Dam had an average of 10 percent of their families living in the village. The rest had migrated. Southern villages who retained their land and palm trees in addition to irrigation projects such as Dakka and Ballana, had only 10 percent of their families absent. It has been calculated that only 48 percent of the Egyptian Nubian population was living in Lower Nubia in 1962.

Table 1 shows the age-sex structure of the Nubian population in Nubia in relation to the overall age-sex composition of the Egyptian population. It is clear from the table that, percentagewise, the age bracket of 15-50 in the Nubian sector is much less than the corresponding proportion of the Egyptian population. By contrast, Nubia contained a relatively greater percentage of people over 60 years of age. These facts indicate the migration of Nubians in the productive ages of 15-50, especially males — some of them accompanied by their wives. The relatively large proportion of the aged is a result of elderly migrants returning to Nubia after retirement.

TABLE 1

AGE-SEX DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATIONS OF LOWER
NUBIA AND EGYPT IN PERCENTS, 1960

	Sex	0-1	1-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-+	Total
Nubia	Male	3.9	13.2	18.8	14.7	7.7	8.8	8.7	7.	6.9	8.8	98.5
	Female	2.2	17.8	10.7	9.2	7.2	14.1	13.9	11.7	9.1	12.8	108.7
Egypt	Male	2.9	13.2	15.1	12.6	8.5	13.6	12.6	9.4	6.2	5.9	100.
	Female	2.9	12.8	14.1	11.8	8.1	14.9	13.3	9.2	6.3	6.6	100.

A G E   G R O U P S

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, Resettlement of the
Egyptian Nubians (Arabic), p. 49. (Nubian errors
in original source.)

The literacy rate among the Nubians was higher than the literacy rate of Egypt as a whole, as shown in Table 2. However, the percentage of Nubians acquiring intermediary or higher education is lower than the corresponding Egyptian percentage. This was a consequence of the limited availability of intermediate or secondary schools in Old Nubia, plus the difficulty of transportation. Those limitations, nevertheless, did not discourage Nubians from seeking elementary education whenever it was feasible. The table also shows that more females than males did not speak the Arabic language, due to their relative isolation and lack of opportunity to mix with other Egyptians.

TABLE 2

EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF ARABIC LANGUAGE
IN NUBIA AND EGYPT, 1960

	Sex	Illiterate	Read and Write	Intermediate Certificate	Higher Education	Do Not Speak Arab	Total
Nubia	Male	37.5	41.	4.3	0.1	4.3	87.2
	Female	46.7	8.5	0.2	–	31.0	86.4
Egypt	Male	56.2	32.6	9.	1.6	–	99.4
	Female	83.	12.4	3.3	2.3	–	101.

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, Resettlement of the
Egyptian Nubians (Arabic), p. 52. ("Total" errors
in original source.)

Women in Old Nubia farmed the land, especially home gardens. About 55 percent of those engaged in agricultural activities in Old Nubia were females (Ministry of Social Affairs: 51).

II.   THE RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

> "The sons of Nubia shall experience great abundance
> in their new home. They will unite again on the
> right basis of a viable community" (Nasser, 1960).

> "It is futile to ask whether the new home is better
> than the old. This would be equivalent to asking
> if an aunt is better than a mother. At best an
> aunt could replace a mother, at worst she becomes
> a step-mother" (A Nubian spokesman, 1971).

The difference between these two statements can not be over-
looked. One cannot but contrast the optimism and promises of the first

statement with the pessimistic, resigned mood of the second. The first

statement, in the form of glorious promises for their future, stems from

the leader of the Nation, the macro-structure, speaking to the people to

be relocated. The second statement is almost ten years later, seven

years after resettlement. It comes from an outspoken member of the

group that was relocated, putting in a nutshell his evaluation of the

whole process. The promises were not all fulfilled, neither were

Nubian expectations met, regardless of the efforts and expenses that

were involved in the long continuous process of planning and

implementing the resettlement and development scheme of the Nubian

community.

A.   The Resettlement Project: An Overview

This section of the study will investigate the process of

planning and implementing the project, with special reference to factors

that prolonged the crisis situation and their implications for the

adjustment processes of the Nubians. These factors are the definition of the family and the lack of coordination between the various agencies involved in the project.

Egypt's population increase in the last century was not proportional to the increase in the cultivated area. This has caused tremendous pressure on land resources and a premature movement of people to urban centers looking for scarce or non-existent jobs. The logical solutions for those pressing problems were to develop the industrial sector through the introduction of various industries, to substitute domestic for imported goods, and to develop the agricultural sector vertically and horizontally. Horizontal development would have meant an increase of the arable area through reclamation of land. Since Egypt's sole source of water is the Nile, attention was drawn to the study of the most efficient way of utilizing the maximum amount of water that usually was poured into the Mediterranean during the flooding season.

The Magnopus High Dam Project was thought to be the solution to agricultural as well as industrial requirements of Egypt's quest for economic and social development. The construction of the High Dam, besides providing full control over the Nile water by restoring it and utilizing it as required, also generates electrical power for industry.

The High Dam had political as well as economic and social implications. As a prestige symbol, it demonstrated the power and organizational capabilities of the new revolutionary regime.[1]

A major side effect of this gigantic engineering project was the inundation of Nubian land by the great Nasser lake, the reservoir.

This necessitated the preparation of plans to relocate the Nubian population and resettle them in new areas. The Egyptian government agreed with the Sudanese government that the latter, on compensation from the former, should be responsible for the resettlement of those Nubians who moved into Sudanese territory.

From the turn of the century, the Egyptian Nubians have had to sacrifice their homes, farm land and palm trees to the growing agricultural demands of Egypt, the mother country. Three times -- 1902, 1922, 1933 -- they had to cope almost independently, as individuals or families, with the crisis arising from partial inundation of their home land. In 1963, with the construction of the High Dam, the 50,000 residents of the whole area had to be relocated. The ideology of the revolutionary regime dedicated to socialism, justice and abundance for all citizens, dictated that the government be fully responsible for the social and economic welfare of the relocated Nubians. So, in accordance with the existing national mood for development policies, and in an effort to ameliorate the crisis of relocation, the government saw the relocation of the Nubian population as an opportunity to transform Nubian social and economic organizations. The basic explicit goals of the relocation plan were to introduce opportunities to enhance the economic and social conditions of the Nubians and to integrate them more closely into the Egyptian national socio-economic and political system.

B.   Governmental Organizational Structure

Though discussion on the plans for relocation started as early as 1955 (El Ahram, 1955: November 28), no definite steps were taken until 1958, when a Committee of High Dam Services was organized to investigate and study the project of relocation. This committee was formed from representatives of various ministries involved in the project. Due to the humanistic nature of the move and its social implications, the Ministry of Social Affairs was assinged the full responsibility for the project and for coordinating the activities of other ministries.

In 1961, a committee was formed, the Joint Committee of Nubian Migration, under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs, with representatives from the Ministry of Land, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Education, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Supply. The Committee was responsible for surveying property, compensation, evacuation of the Nubian population before inundation of the land, constructing the new villages with their various services, and distribution of the newly reclaimed land among the Nubians. This set-up was a joint administration between the temporary project machinery and the regular government machinery.

C.   Initial Steps Toward Implementation

In 1960, the Ministry of Social Affairs sponsored a census survey that included the list of Nubian people living in Nubia, their composition, their financial resources, ownership of land, houses,

animal husbandry and other properties. The survey also included a
plebiscite on the preference for style of compensation, whether in cash
or property, and questions on the location of their new homes.

The questionnaire revealed the preference of 96 percent of the
Nubian families to be relocated north of the Aswan High Dam in a
separate community. Also, 97 percent declared their interest in having
compensation in kind rather than in cash.

On the basis of the survey, plans were drawn up and decisions
made for the resettlement project. The area selected was in the Kom
Ombo region about 35 miles north of Aswan and east of the Nile, where
21,000 feddans (about 23,100 acres) of land were to be reclaimed and
distributed to Nubian farmers and farm-owners. Plans were made to
construct 43 villages and one administrative center called Nasr City
in New Nubia. Each village was given the name of the old village from
which the occupants would come. The new villages were geographically
ordered according to their situation in Old Nubia. Thus, the Kenuz
villages were in the north, the Arab villages in the middle, and Fadija
villages further south. This permitted the preservation of traditional
relationships between groupings of villages.

Each village was provided with a primary school, a public health
unit, guest house (Madyafa), market, bakery, sports field, and a mosque.
Roads were constructed to connect villages and facilitate transportation.
Four large villages included rural combined centers. Nasr City, the
administrative center, was the location of a central hospital, secondary
and teacher-training schools, and police stations.

The resettlement plan included three stages. The first stage

was the resettling of the inhabitants of Nubia. The second stage was providing houses and social services for Nubians living outside the area and wishing to join their families. The latter were named by the government, Moghtarebeen (not at home). About 33 percent of the houses in Old Nubia were vacant and their owners were outside the area. The third stage was compensation for loss of properties (El Abd, 1971: 26). Half the estimated amount of compensation was given in cash, and the rest was kept as a down payment for the new houses and farm land.

The villages were constructed by engineers whose main goal was to provide a suitable house for each family at minimum cost. So each village was divided into blocks made up of one-room houses, two-room houses, three-room houses and four-room houses. Each family was given a house according to family size. Houses were built of stone, approximating as much as possible the old Nubian houses.

The resettlement plan also scheduled the reclamation of 27,000 feddans (about 28,026 acres) at Kom Ombo. The irrigated land would be distributed to the head of each household, including those who owned no land in Old Nubia but were registered as agricultural workers. Following the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952, the land distributed would range between 2 and 5 feddans (2¼ to 5½ acres) for each household. Table 3 shows the distribution of heads of families by their ownership of land and engagement in agricultural activities, according to the 1960 survey done in Old Nubia prior to relocation.

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES ACCORDING TO OWNERSHIP
AND CULTIVATION OF LAND, OLD NUBIA, 1960

Families Owning Land		Families Not Owning Land		
Families Working in Agriculture	Families Not Working in Agriculture	Families Working in Agriculture	Families Not Working in Agriculture	Total
3865	3364	3994	5638	16861
23%	20%	23.5%	33.5%	100%

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, p. 58.

This distribution varied according to area of residence. In the northern area, between 66 percent and 92 percent of families in certain villages did not own or cultivate land. In the south where land was more abundant, more families owned land or worked on the land as agricultural laborers, especially among the Sayidis.

D.   The Degree of Nubian Participation

The plans for resettlement were unilateral to a great degree (Fahim, 1967). The Nubians voiced their opinion on the manner of compensation and on the general outline of resettlement. They opted for a separte resettlement north of Aswan. Their choice was made on the basis of facility of transportation to the urban centers where their relatives lived and worked, and they wanted to be near the mainstream of action to end their isolation. Yet they did not want to mix with other Egyptians, especially the Sayidis. The Nubians through the years

have developed stereotyped images of Sayidis as aggressive and dishonest, and felt that they themselves were ethnically a superior group. In their old home, Sayidis were not allowed to live among the Nubians. Sayidis built their homes at the outskirts of the Nagas or villages. Nubians were proud of their identity and wanted to retain it; they objected to the idea of being dispersed among the Egyptian villages and towns. However, the choice of the area of Kom Ombo was a government choice. Representatives of the villages were called to discuss the design of houses and few modifications were made with the general framework of the plan (Ministry of Social Affairs: 72; Little, 1965: 140). Nubians were not represented in any of the committees responsible for the settlement plan.

The lack of direct Nubian participation in the resettlement plan, in addition to the memories of past experiences especially among the elders, increased the anxiety of the group and eroded their confidence in administrators' promises regarding the concern of the government for the future well-being of the Nubian population. To calm the fears and to guarantee the full cooperation of the Nubians in this gigantic effort, a Committee for Investigation of Nubian Demands was formed in 1961 (Fahim, 1967). This held monthly meetings with Nubian delegates to answer questions, explain plans, and thus calm the fears. "A Nubian voice was heard but seldom taken account of, except when it was possible to accommodate it within the general plan" (Fahim, 1967).

Brochures were also distributed among the Nubians to inform them of the plans for evacuation, with pictures of the new villages and the services available, and the abundance that awaited them in their

new homes. The mass media -- radio, television, and films -- were also utilized to answer questions and to enlighten the anxious people about their future (Ministry of Social Affairs: 113-115).

In addition, training camps were held for Nubian teachers to introduce them to the plan and its implementation, and to indoctrinate them on the National ideological and socialistic premises, so that they in turn could play the role of instructors back home among their own students and people.

E.   Rising Nubian Expectations

The enlightenment programs and propaganda campaigns carried out by the government administration were like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they helped to decrease the fear and anxiety of the people toward this traumatic experience of leaving their loved country and home and being moved into the unknown. Knowledge of the future seemed to reduce the anxiety effects of uncertainties. The government this way secured the full support and cooperation of the Nubians. Very few incidents happened during the evacuation and resettlement that hampered in any way the plans drawn by the Joint Committee on Nubian Migration.

This policy was successful to the extent that many Egyptian Nubians were willing to move to better conditions lower down the Nile and be nearer than before to their migrant relatives in Egyptian urban centers. Fernea and Kennedy report:

> "Faced with the necessity of totally abandoning their
> home-land, the Nubians' attitudes were somewhat

ambivalent. They had always stated that their native
land was 'blessed.' They considered the climate, land
and water superior to that found anywhere else in the
Nile valley and they believed their villages, which
were relatively free from outside interference, to have
the highest standards of peacefulness, cleanliness,
honesty, and personal security in Egypt. On the other
hand, they were well aware of the material and social
disadvantages which resulted from their isolation, and
they resented their inability to participate fully in
the revolutionary changes taking place elsewhere in
Egypt" (1966: 349-350).

Though Nubian feelings toward the move were ambivalent, they
also varied by age, sex, and social class. The older people naturally
were against the move, as they could still remember the previous
experiences and were quite attached to their old country. Young men
were "excited" over the move; to them it meant greater social and
economic opportunities. Women also looked forward to the move, as they
would have better and quicker chances for marriage, as well as for
reunion with absent husbands or more frequent visits due to easier
transportation. However, the economically secure people were the
"least enthusiastic," as they were to lose their source of income,
comfort and power. These people were the well-to-do landowners, the
shopkeepers, boatowners and government employees (Fernea and Kennedy,
1966: 350).

On the other hand, the elaborate propaganda campaigns also had
a negative effect. Great stories were heard about the New Nubia. It
was to be the land of their dreams. Each family would own its own house
with animal husbandry. The streets and homes would have electricity and
running water. Streets would be paved between villages with public buses
for transportation. Each household would own 2 to 5 feddans of good

irrigated land that would yield 100 Egyptian Pounds a year rather than the 50 pounds/feddan as in Old Nubia. Jobs would be in abundance for all Nubians living within the area and abroad, and finally the time would come when no further emigration would be needed for employment. All the Nubians would be reunited in their New Homes.

The rise in Nubian expectations regarding their new home facilitated the move and ameliorated the anxiety of the first stages of the crisis. But the expectations were far greater than the government could meet, considering the magnitude of the project, the complexity of the undertaking, the lack of experience in carrying out such operations -- in addition to deficiencies already existing within the government machinery, and the sensitive relationship between Nubians as a minority ethnic group and administrators who were culturally, socially and ethnically different.

The actual move was accomplished in seven months from the middle of October, 1963, till the end of June, 1964, without serious mishaps (Fernea and Kennedy, 1966: 350). However, problems soon arose between the Nubians and officials. In some villages, boats were late for days after the fixed date of evacuation. People found themselves "temporarily homeless with no food for a couple of days till the boat arrived." Often people would reach their new village tired and exhausted after four days travel by boat and bus, to find their homes incomplete and without water, food, or cover (Little, 1965: 143).

Another problem faced the Nubians on their arrival in their new homes. In defiance of government orders to slaughter animals on receiving compensation, many Nubians insisted on taking their animals

to the new settlement. Several animals died in the quarantines. Those
which survived died in the new land, as most Nubians could not afford
to buy fodder for these animals.

The situation was further complicated by the great number of
Nubians who came from the urban centers to help their relatives during
the move. They overcrowded the transports and shared with the evacuees
whatever food and shelter was available. Some of them brought their
families and demanded houses from the officials, thus aggravating the
existing complications.

The action of the administration not only led to a rise of
expectations among the Nubians which were met with subsequent frus-
trations. It also aggravated the dependency of the Nubians on the
government to satisfy all their needs and demands. The Nubians' view
was that they sacrificed their homeland and rejected their beloved dead
ones for the economic and social good of the Nation. Hence it was the
duty of the government to meet its promises and provide the Nubians with
their dreams of the New Home and the promises of home with great
abundances where they would "unite again on right basis of a viable
community."

III.   SOURCES OF CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS

In the Egyptian Nubian case of forced migration, as a crisis
situation, the government provided external help. It took the full
responsibility for planning and implementing the evacuation and

resettlement. The emergency action system provided by the government to a certain extent reduced and ameliorated the stress and anxiety of the traumatic experience. But it was not completely successful in providing the Nubian Community with the means of facilitating their adjustment to the new social and physical environment. Certain actions of the government agencies created problems for the Nubians, as they were not incorporated within the expectations of the community. These actions aggravated the crisis situation and created new problems for the Nubians as well as for the officials. They also had far-reaching implications for the response process of Nubians as individuals and as a collectivity.

The first of these crises was the government's definition of "family" in its 1960 survey. A "family" meant the members of a household. Thus, the head of the household living in the house at the time of the move was the head of the family, whether a male or female. He/she was given a card with a list of other members living in the same household and all the property owned by the members of the household. Compensation in kind was given to the head of the household, and homes were allocated with the number of rooms determined by the number of members living in the same household. The government did not consider the nuclear family because it wished to minimize cost. It was calculated that if homes were provided for nuclear families, an additional one-third of the houses would have been needed.

This decision created tremendous familial conflicts. Homes were registered in the name of women when their husbands were either dead or away employed in Egyptian or Sudanese towns. This was not only against

traditional customs whereby females should rely on men for legal and external errands. It was also incompatible with the Moslem family laws on divorce and polygamy. Co-wives had to share the same house which was usually much smaller in area than the old house. In cases of divorce, conflict developed as neither spouses had another place to live. Also, familial conflict was generated on the issue of ownership of land. In cases of the death of the "head of the family," conflict arose between members of the family who had a right of inheritance but who were listed on the identity cards of different households.

At the beginning, attempts were made to resolve such conflicts within the extended family under the auspices of family or tribal elders. When this did not work, females reported to the national police body, to the dismay of male members. Resort to external formal institutions in conflict situations was a new behavior pattern that had to be accommodated within the action-system of the Nubian group. The bargaining power of females was enhanced, as they no longer were fully under the jurisdiction or control of traditional family leaders. Police officials, however, were in a sensitive position striving to maintain their ties and good relationships with members of the community, and trying hard not to provoke the antagonism of the village community. Hence the police usually played the role of peacemakers through informal channels rather than utilizing the formal channels of the court. Several reconciliations were made such as, in the case of divorce, a wall would be built dividing the house into two separate parts for each spouse. It was reported by informants, however, that divorce and polygamy were to a certain extent controlled by these

existing circumstances.

Death and inheritance created other problems that also stemmed
in part from the way the government defined the family. A large
proportion of the "heads of households" were males or females over 50
years of age. In addition, almost 33 percent of enumerated households
were composed of one member (Ministry of Social Affairs: 54).
Subsequently land was allocated to the "family Head." Relocation caused
a rapid rise of mortality, especially among the children and the very
old people (Fernea and Kennedy, 1966: 350). In subsequent years,
mortality also affected the old people. This left the government,
especially the organization in charge of land reclamation and distri-
bution, with several decisions to make regarding the problem of
inheritance of land given to families who did not own land according to
the Land Reform Law of 1952. Distributed land was divided into
two groups: land that was compensation for land ownership in Old Nubia,
and land that was distributed among heads of families that were agri-
cultural workers and owned no land in Old Nubia.

It was decided that in the latter case, i.e., land distributed
according to Land Reclamation law, a substitute for the title of listed
members of the household was called for. This required a statement of
all members to the effect that they agreed on one person among them to
carry the title. The statement had to be substantiated by a statement
from members of the local committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's
only political party, that the selected member lives in the village and
he or she is a farmer, in addition to notarizing the signature of the
other members. The Authority for Utilization and Development of

Reclaimed Land under the Ministry of Land Reform then changes the title of the land to the name of the new substitute.

Conflict also existed among members of households with respect to the substitute. This delayed the already complex procedures for substitution and affected the services attainable from the Agricultural Cooperative Association at the village level for cultivating the land. The lesson was soon learnt that conflicts should be resolved as quickly as possible, and that members of households have to yield in certain situations for their own personal good as well as the good of the group's.

The inheritance problem of compensation land, however, was not resolved at the time the present research was carried out in summer of 1971. Legally, inheritance should follow the Islamic Hereditary Laws of the Country. Nevertheless, this will mean the subdividing of already small pieces of land, and this in turn will affect its economic productivity. This problem is still being discussed at the ministerial level for possible solutions.

Stemming from the definition of the family as those household members living in the area at the time of survey, was the definition of house owners who were not in the village at that time. These absentees were classified as Moghtaribeen (not at home). Fifty percent of the value of this property was paid in cash and the rest was kept as a down payment for the new houses and land to be given to them as compensation in kind during the second stage of the plan. Urban Nubians who had relatives or friends having access to information were warned of these plans and of the time of the survey. So they returned and claimed their

homes and land as living members of the community. The majority,
however, lacked such information, and were registered under the category
of Moghtaribeen, a concept that upsets the Nubians. To the Nubians,
being in another town or city within the same Nation should not be
defined in these terms.

The government promises of providing these homes were
interrupted by the 1967 War and its subsequent implications. With
pressure from Urban Nubians Associations, the government recently
started to build ten homes in each village annually. Priority of
allocation was given to widows, males on pension, families already
living in New Nubia with other relatives, and families with members
enlisted in the army. This did not solve the problem. The demand for
homes far exceeded the annual supply of newly built houses, especially
as the Urban Nubians increased their pressure. They became increasingly
impatient after waiting for eight or nine years for their homes. The
annual supply is even short of satisfying the families that are
considered on the high priority list, especially in Kenuz villages in
the north where migration was more acute because of the lack of arable
land and other sources of income.

The allocation of the new houses was done by a special committee
made up of the Arab Socialist Union committee members, and representatives
of the Ministry of Social Affairs. As a consequence, there were many
complaints that members of the Arab Socialist Union utilized personal,
subjective criteria in allocating houses. This caused conflict among
members of the village and affected the confidence of the villages in
their Arab Socialist Union representatives. The Nubians, valuing justice

and honesty, started to send delegates requesting the government to be
fully responsible for the distribution of houses, thereby lessening the
role of Arab Socialist Union in the distribution process. This was a
significant turning point in the attitudes of Nubians toward government
officials: they started to recognize the government as the least of
evils.

The Moghtaribeen problem was further complicated by the
evacuation of Suez Canal cities -- Port Said, Ismalia and Suez -- after
the 1967 War. Evacuees were sent to their villages of origin. Many
Kenuz families had migrated to Suez through the years and had to come
back to their villages in New Nubia and live with relatives, as no homes
were available for them. This added to the already pressing density of
population and is still a source of conflict among village communities,
as well as a source of deviant behavior that taxes the tolerance of the
traditional elders of the village community. Their traditional control
and influence does not impress or affect the behavior of the Urbanites,
especially the young ones.

The second cause of troubles and problems in the New Home of the
Egyptian Nubians was the lack of coordination between the various
government agencies and Ministeries involved in the resettlement project.
Though ideally the organizational set-up of the Joint Committee for
the Nubian Migration was mainly to supervise the coordination of
various activities, in reality this was not fully met, especially in the
case of land reclamation and development which lagged far behind the
program of relocation. Since evacuation of the villages in Old Nubia
was imperative according to the schedule of High Dam construction, the

government rushed through the building of villages and other amentities (El Ahram, 1963: August 8). Nothing could be done to speed the process of land reclamation, as canals had to be dug, land leveled and flooded with water, then mapped before it was handed over the the Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Land (EAUDRL). This authority then cultivated the land for several years till it reached a certain level of productivity. Finally, the land is handed to the farmers.

This lack of agency coordination, in addition to the delay in reclaiming the land, affected the physical set-up of the villages and cultivated land, caused land erosion, and was responsible for delay in distributing land among Nubians for cultivation. This had social as well as economic implications.

The physical layout of the settlement with respect to such community facilities as the community center and schools was convenient. On the other hand, the location of village houses with respect to the area of cultivation was not adequately considered. Villages were not surrounded by their respective plots, though the general shape of reclaimed land followed the general crescent shape of the settlement. The result was that some plots of land were alloted to villages at considerable distance away. This problem was more acute in the Kenuz northern villages. Due to the small number of inhabitants in each village, villages were clustered according to such factors as communication facilities and facilities for receiving services from community centers. The fact that in Old Nubia, many females carried out the agricultural activities, as the men were often away engaged in other jobs in towns, and the cultivated land was adjacent to the house,

was not fully taken into consideration. The men refused to let their
women go far away to cultivate the land. In addition, there was the
physical impossibility of walking to some of these plots daily.
Security problems and Nubian distrust of their _Sayidi_ neighbors further
reinforced the problem.

The Nubians coped with this problem in one of two ways. A few
village communities refused altogether to accept the land that was
allotted to them. A few accepted the plots near their village and
refused the far plots. The communities that received their plots relied
on their traditional pattern of share-cropping, thus violating the Land
Reform Law of 1952 which explicitly states that land should be given
only to those who farm it. The traditional pattern that had developed
was to give the private plot to a male relative or a _Sayidi_ to cultivate
in return for one-third of crop product. If the owner shared the
expenses, then he or she was entitled to one-half of the crop. All
formal transactions within the local Agricultural Cooperation would be
carried out in the name of the members who own the title to land. In
case of his or her absence, the metal seal would be left behind to be
used in signing out loans, fertilizers and for receiving their final
share of crop marketing.

Officials, understanding the difficulties involved and sympa-
thizing with the Nubians and their problems, overlook these violations.
In a formalistic way, they act as if they are not aware of the informal
arrangements that are developing to cope with agricultural problems.

Nevertheless, though these arrangements are compatible with the
existing structure of Nubian communities, the end result is an income

from the already small plot of land that lags far behind actual needs.
The economic viability of such small plots of land is based on the
assumption that owners will personally work on the land with the help of
members of his or her household. Share-cropping or the employment of
agricultural workers increases expenses and reduces the full economic
benefit of the land. Thus the migration pattern has not been decisively
effective; but neither has it been reversed. Nubians still have to look
for jobs outside agriculture to complement their small income from
farming.

Another problem that was created due to the lack of coordination
between building the villages and reclaiming the land was erosion of the
land. Villages were built before the leveling or flooding of the
reclaimed land. When this occurred in addition to deficiencies in the
drainage system, land erosion was the result, and this affected many of
the already built houses and public buildings. One percent of the houses
were damaged and several public buildings (e.g. schools) were also
affected to a considerable degree.

The damaged buildings, the water seepage, and the consequent
prevalence of mosquitoes (which taxed Nubian cleanliness values) all
affected the psychological adjustments of Nubians in their new homes.
Lacking technical knowledge of the causes, they attributed the misfortune
to the negligence of government officials and to the dishonesty of those
responsible for construction. To them, this was sign and proof of the
lack of concern of the government executive machinery about the welfare
of the Nubians who sacrificed their homeland for the well-being of the
Nation.

The third consequence of lack of coordination in governmental action was the delay in land distribution. Evacuation started on the 18th of October, 1963, and ended on the 30th of June, 1964. From 1964-1969 only 6,000 feddans (about 6,200 acres) were distributed, one feddan per household involved in agricultural activities. This was considered as a "training" plot till the rest of the land was ready. Most of this land was not fully developed to average productive capacity. It required a lot of labor and financial investment to become productive, and most of the Nubians lacked both.

In the meantime, the Nubians were exposed to a full-blown cash economy without the means of production for a supply of money. In their old home, they lived on a partial subsistence economy. They had their farms or housegardens for cereals, fruit and fodder; their livestock for meat and milk; and their palm trees for food and barter. In the new homes they had to buy fuel, fodder, food and milk. Prices were exorbitant, as Sayidis were more shrewd than Nubians in commercial activities. Compensation money, settling-in allowances, and the increase in urban remittance relatively cushioned the impact of the transition. The government, too, gives monthly support payments as high as 26,000 pounds per month, and will continue to do so till the land is distributed and as it reaches productivity level. This adds to the overall expenses of the resettlement project -- almost 50 million Egyptian Pounds up till 1971.

The economic stress is further aggravated by idleness and the feeling of unproductivity and disillusionment. The Nubians responded to these psychological feelings of stress, disillusionment and frustration

by sending telegrams and letters of complaints to all responsible government authorities and even to the President, protesting and projecting their frustrations.

As Fahim puts it (1967) "They (the Nubians) felt no responsibility for what was happening and did not show initiative in solving their own problems." Most of their compensation money was spent in either reconstructing their homes or in consumption, but not in investment in any local business. They did not try to work as agricultural laborers for the development of reclaimed land; mostly, Sayidis did this work. The Nubians lacked all entreprenurial disposition; they did not value strenuous physical jobs. These propensities hampered any efforts to solve their problems.

In time, the Nubians became quite impatient. They pressed for allotment of their plots of land. The Authority for Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Land (EAUDRL) tried to convince the Nubians that the land was not yet fully developed for distribution. Distrusting the motives of the agency, as well as losing confidence in its efficiency, the Nubians insisted on their demands. Under pressure, the Authority distributed 5,100 feddans in the Northern Kenuz area towards the end of 1969. The basis of distribution was to allot to each village two plots of land, one near and one far. Each household received two plots of land, one plot in good land and the other (which was about one-third of the area) in poor soil. As mentioned before, regardless of the pressure, 1,507 feddans were refused by certain village residents.

In the southern area of the Fadija or (Mahasi), the Authority tried to explain the problems involved in allocating land under such

conditions; they tried to relate to the experience of the Kenuz.
Failing in their efforts, they distributed the 6,500 feddans toward the
end of 1970. The southern Nubians are better farmers and many Sayidis
families that were relocated with the Nubians were allotted land,
according to the Land Reform Act of 1952. The latter, are good farmers.
Yet problems still exist in relation to poor soil areas. The conflict
between the Nubians and EAUDRL will be discussed later.

In the Arab middle area nothing has been done due to the delay
in the construction of the irrigation system.

The delay in land distribution affected the adjustments of the
Nubians in their New Home. It affected them economically. It prolonged
the stress of relocation. It also increased the gap of conflict and
distrust between the community and government machinery. Paradoxically,
it shook the confidence of Nubians in their leaders, yet it enforced
the idea that they have to unite and be organized to exert pressure on
the government as a collectivity rather than as individuals.

IV.   THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

The Egyptian Nubians are still passing through the processes of
adjustment and adaptation to the sudden change of relocation. As has
been shown, the process had been prolonged by the incongruity of Nubian
expectations as a collectivity in crisis and the action-system of the
government executing machinery as an outside relief system.

Though the Nubians still have their sources of complaints, in

certain areas they are more settled and adjusted as individuals, small groups and collectivities.

Social services in the New Home far exceed the services that were available in Old Nubia. The New Nubia settlement has been provided with: 24 post offices, 20 telegraph offices, two main roads connecting the settlement area to surrounding towns, railway and bus services, electricity for village roads and government offices, 30 marketing centers, four government supply offices, 12 cooperative consumer stores, 17 mechanized bakeries, 200 tap units for pure water for public use, one central police department with four stations, 25 elementary schools, six preparatory schools, three technical boarding schools, one secondary boarding school, one teacher-training boarding school, six social units concerned with social welfare problems, 35 centers for youth recreational and educational activities, 10 small clinics, four major health units which provide out-patient treatment, and one central hospital (El Abd, 1971: 30-31).

The Nubians fully utilize the health and education services. As a community they had a high literacy rate even prior to relocation when schools were scarce. Now all children, males and females, at the age of six are in school. They are proud of their educational awareness and to them education is the best lever for their status as a minority group. The new generation look with contempt at the traditional occupation of Nubians in urban centers as porters, cooks and domestic servants. The only channel to improve their job opportunities is through education. The research study carried out by the Human Resources Development Center in Aswan in 1968 shows occupational differences before and after

resettlement and occupational differences between sons and fathers of a
sample of 500 Nubians, Tables 4 and 5.

TABLE 4

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BEFORE
AND AFTER RESETTLEMENT

Occupations	Before		After	
	#	%	#	%
School Teachers and Principals	–	–	19	3.8
Domestic Services	77	15.4	53	10.6
Policemen and Ghafir	8	1.6	16	3.2
Farmers	212	42.4	187	37.4
Skilled Workers	19	3.8	22	4.4
Unskilled Workers	12	2.4	19	3.8
Fishermen and Boatmen	11	2.2	3	.6
Trade	15	3.0	21	4.2
Porter	16	3.2	11	2.2
No Occupation	118	23.6	149	29.8
Not Specified	12	2.6	–	–
Totals	500	100.0	500	100.0

Source: Human Resources Development Center (Arabic), 1968, p. 39

TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF HEADS OF FAMILIES
AND THE OCCUPATION OF THEIR FATHERS

Occupations	Heads of Families		Fathers of Heads of Families	
	#	%	#	%
School Teachers and Principals	19	3.8	7	1.4
Domestic Services	53	10.6	32	6.4
Policemen and Ghafir	16	3.2	8	1.6
Farmer	187	37.4	369	73.8
Trade	21	4.2	16	3.2
Skilled Labor	22	4.4	9	1.8
Unskilled Labor	19	3.8	8	1.6
Fishermen and Boatmen	3	.6	22	4.4
Porter	11	2.2	8	1.6
No Occupation	149	29.8	21	4.2
Totals	500	100.0	500	100.0

Source: Human Resources Development Center (Arabic), 1968, p. 38.

From these two tables it is clear that certain occupational adjustments have occurred on the individual level. The decline in farming might be temporary -- a result of delay in land distribution. Fishermen and boatmen had to change their occupations out of necessity as, unlike Old Nubia, New Nubia has no access to the Nile. Now donkeys, carts and taxis are used to supplement public transportation services and several former boat owners joined together to purchase cars for local use

(Fernea and Kennedy, 1966: 351). There is a considerable increase in teaching occupations, in service in government offices, in trade and in skilled and unskilled labor. The increase in the number of heads of families without an occupation is probably due to the return of aged people from their urban centers to settle in New Nubia with their relatives, and perhaps also to unemployment. What is especially relevant is the decrease in porter jobs and domestic service. This is an indication of the developing scorn against such traditional jobs.

Several males returned to their jobs in urban centers. Others managed to find jobs in the Province of Aswan. However, the migration trend has not been reversed. Northern villages still depend on urban remittances. Whether this is a result of the lack of job opportunities in the area, and whether migration has developed to be a permanent pattern, still are questions that remain unanswered.

With the density of population in the new area and the increase in the network of relationships, several changes took place in traditional customs and ceremonial patterns. As Fernea and Kennedy note an increase of participation:

> "...due to the ease of transportation and increased leisure time, participation even by persons living miles from the event is no longer unusual. The attempt to fulfill the traditional hospitality requirements associated with these activities placed an almost impossible financial burden on the hosts and in addition created logistic problems" (1966: 352).

As Nubians place high value on reunions and social gatherings, restricting participation was not considered as a solution. Simplification of ceremonies and reducing meals offered were the logical

solutions.

It was not long till neighborhood relationships were established
as in Old Nubia (Fernea and Kennedy, 1966: 353). In weddings and in
funerals, neighborhood obligations are kept.

Mulids too have been restricted in number (Fernea and Kennedy,
1966: 353). People from all adjacent villages attend the festivities.
Formerly, the density of the people in addition to the latent conflicts
between villages and tribes made such gatherings a scene of overt
conflict and fights. The spread of alcoholism, especially among the
young males, aggravated the problem. Now Mulids are no more held at
night, but during the day time, and by evening the ceremonies are over.

Nubians now complain about the lack of social control over the
younger generation of males and females. They attribute all non-
traditional behavior to vice caused by the break of their long isolation.
Nevertheless, they still retain the in-group and out-group feeling. If
any violence or theft are caused by outsiders, they are publicized.
When they occur within their own community, they try to overlook them,
or at least not talk about them in presence of strangers.

The relocation awakened the Nubians as a single people with
common cultural heritage. They realized that their demands carry more
weight when their sub-group diversity is overlooked. Clashes between
the various ethnic groups have subsided, but rivalries still exist
(Fahim, 1969: 7). Various communities still compete with respect to
social development, in arts and crafts, in sports and in other social
activities. Some villages go to the extent of organizing youth camps to
pave streets and plant trees.

Other self-help activities are sponsored by several village communities. Neighborhoods collected funds to build their own Madyafas (guest house or community hall). For the last two years a literacy campaign has been organized in evening schools for adult males and females. Communities raised funds to build schools, youth centers, sport stadiums and religious institutions. An organization was formed for the care of male and female students in connection with an intermediary religious institution and to provide hostels for Nubian students in the city of Aswan. The government donated to this organization one thousand pounds as an encouragement for its efforts.

Certain natavistic trends are occurring. Folk groups are organizing to restore and glorify the present and past Nubian folklore. Efforts are being made to write their unwritten language for preservation for fear of complete assimilation in the Arabic heritage. A large proportion of school teachers are Nubians who emphasize the history and values of the Nubian Community. They keep stressing their values of cooperation, honesty, hospitality, cleanliness, justice and straightforwardness, nonviolence, and peaceful coexistence.

They are opposing the government family planning programs. They feel it is a plot against their ethnic identity. Family planning is seen as a way to make the community weak. They feel their minority status, and see bigger families as the only solution to counteract the majority of Non-Nubians they confront in their New Home. Larger numbers and higher education in addition to organization are their only hope for becoming a powerful pressure group.

A.   Political Movements and Pressure Activities

The Nubians now are more determined than ever to keep their identity and to exert pressure to get their demands known and fulfilled. They tap every source and use every channel, whether nationally or locally.

The educated Nubians are quite articulate. Their political awareness far exceeds the awareness of an average non-Nubian Egyptian. They are becoming much more involved in the project as a whole than they were at the onset. To avoid all responsibility for their failure to act while the plans were still being thought of and decisions being taken, they tend to blame the government for manipulating the traditional local leaders and not involving the educated Nubians in the urban centers in the project.

Nubians in the urban centers have their own organizations and associations (Geiser, 1966: 143-169; Shukairy, 1966: 170-177). Now these associations are used to fully back the demands of the Nubians in their New Home. As an example, The General Nubian Association in Alexandria formed a standing committee called "The Nubian Committee for the Affairs of the High Dam and Resettlement." They send continuous official memos to responsible government officials reiterating all the demands of the Nubians.

Their basic demands center around the problem of Moghtaribeen (not at home) as this is the problem that directly affects them and the possibility of their return to their own community.

The Association also worked on organizing a student work camp in

the summer of 1971. Its basic goals were to render services to the New Nubian community such as the planting of trees and the pavement of roads. It was to be a first step toward organizing international work camps in the following years on the national level, and to provide opportunities for the integration of Nubian urban students with Nubian students living in the community. Unfortunately the camp did not take place, as the government agency responsible for youth failed to provide the promised funds in time. Nevertheless, such actions indicate the awareness of Nubians concerning the power of unity and organization, and their determination to utilize all their available resources for the betterment of their community as a Nubian island midst a majority of non-Nubians.

In addition, the Association held a conference in 1969 with responsible government administrators to discuss problems emanating from resettlement, and to suggest workable solutions. Thus, there has been a radical change in traditional function of urban Nubian associations as centers of charity and entertainment. Now they act as liaison between the migrants and the local group, as well as acting as spokesmen to the government on various demands of the Nubians (Fahim, 1970: 17).

The Nubians also exerted pressure and sounded their complaints and protests through their representatives in the Egyptian National Assembly. A committee was formed in 1968 to investigate facts and recommend solutions. In 1970 the General National Assembly met to discuss the report of the committee and hear the points of view of the ministers. This approach was quite fruitful in voicing the Nubian demands to the national level. It resulted in the involvement of

Ministers, personally, in trying to solve some of the problems. This
was also a forum where administrators and Nubians exchanged information
and ideas as a step toward bridging the gap that existed between them.
A follow-up investigation was made a year later by the committee to see
how much of the recommendation and promises were fulfilled. This report
is still in the process of being written.

The Nubians also used other channels to exert influence and
pressure at the national level besides the formal channels of the
National Council. Thousands of letters of complaints and telegrams are
sent to responsible administrators daily from individuals and
collectivities. Letters of complaint have become a characteristic
phenomenon of the Nubian community. As Fahim puts it, "(it) may be
viewed as characteristic of an adaptive mechanism to an imposed setting."
Though letters of complaint have decreased with the years, they were a
clear indication of the lack of confidence of the Nubians in their local
officials and the lack of authority of local officials to make decisions.
So the latter were overlooked, and contacts were made directly with
national administrators. In several villages a special fund was raised
per head to meet the expenses of telegrams and letters.

Contact with higher officials was not only limited to letters.
Nubians have often had the opportunity to work in wealthy homes, in
private clubs and in government offices. They had the chance to
establish a wide network of influential relations. These urban Nubians
acted as "intermediaries between their fellow Nubians and employers"
(Fahim, 1969: 13). Though most of these personal contacts were on an
individual rather than a collective basis, still it was another informal

channel utilized by the Nubians to make their demands at the national level.

New Nubia is located in the province of Aswan which has experienced recently a boom in its population due to construction of the High Dam, the various administrative agencies, and industry. In 1966 the population of the Province was 500 thousand and the New Nubian Community was 50 thousand, of which the majority were females, children and old males. To increase their voting power in the province and subsequently be influential in the local political arena, the Nubians enfranchised their women. They also requested that Dar-El-Salam-El-Nubia, a Nubian village made of Nubian emigrants from 1933 after the second raising of Aswan Dam (Kennedy, 1966: 355-371), be considered a village under the administration of Nasr, the New Nubian town, rather than under the administration of Kom Ombo. This increased the possibility of electing Nubian representatives to the Provincial Committee of Arab Socialist Union.

In the last elections that were conducted in the province in the summer of 1971, the struggle for power was so great between the Nubians and the original Aswan people that it almost led to physical confrontation. The result of the elections was that the head of the Provincial Committee of Ten of the A.S.U. was a Nubian, in addition to two other members.

Now the head of the Police forces in Aswan and the head of the Arab Socialist Union are Nubians. The Nubians, however, still resent the idea that the Head of the Province is not Nubian. With the national trend toward decentralization and local rules, the Nubians have a good

chance of exerting power and influence in the Province at the regional level.

B.   Internal Conflict

Nubian success as a minority group in national and regional politics, however, is not an indicator of internal consensus and unity. As has been mentioned before, regional conflict within the various ethnic groups and tribes within the Nubian community still exists, due to their relative physical proximity and the increase in interaction.

The physically isolated small communities (Nagas) of each Omadia (administrative village) in Old Nubia were combined in one village in New Nubia. Some villages were too small to have separate services, especially in the northern villages of the Kenuz. So several villages were sometimes combined in terms of social services and formal institutions. Thus every formal organization and institution necessitated the representation of every village included. Collective decisions were no longer made at the village level, and the only way to exert influence or power within the community was to join one or more of these representative institutions.

Each community was organized into four formal institutions: the committee of Arab Socialist Union, the Agricultural Cooperative Association, the Community Development Organization, and the Village Council. As mentioned before, these institutions were village-level. Depending on the number of inhabitants, villages were combined in

representative membership.

The Arab Socialist Union Committee is a political organization
and hierarchical in structure. There are committees at the village
level, at the town level, at the province level and at the national
level. Members for these committees are elected. Powerful traditional
leaders usually are elected. School principals and teachers infiltrate
this organization. In New Nubia, this is considered the most important
formal structure, due to its political nature and hierarchical structure,
and its influence at the regional and national levels. In certain
villages there is consensus on who should be elected for the Committee;
in other villages, lack of consensus creates conflict between certain
segments of the community. In Ballana, the largest village in New
Nubia, in the south, during the last election in summer 1971, the village
was divided into two groups: those who opposed the traditional leaders
and former members of the A.S.U. on the basis of their shortcomings, and
those who backed the traditional leaders. The former group were
basically the young and better educated, mostly school teachers who were
displeased with the performance of the previous members, especially the
head man of the Committee. The traditional leaders who managed to retain
their influence and power are now being evaluated by their constituency
on the basis of their performance and achievements.

Another significant change that occurred in this institution as
a formal platform for the power structure in the Nubian communities is
the election of young females to the A.S.U. village, town and provincial
committees. This is a real innovation in Aswan province and, though it

was opposed by a few traditional leaders at first, it is now a source of pride for the Nubians and a concrete example of their advanced social awareness relative to their _Sayidis_ neighbors. Female influence in the A.S.U. is still ceremonial: they are still inhibited and lack the training and the awareness to fully participate in discussions and to be influential or instrumental in representing the views and demands of members of their sex. Yet their colleagues encourage them and respect them; this may lead to further participation of women in the power arena. However, women still do not constitute a threat to the dominant male power at the local level, so the direction of further development in this matter can not be forseen at the present time.

The Community Development Organization (C.D.O.) is another formal structure that has been introduced in the New Nubian villages by the government. Its main purpose is to enhance the participation of village members and local leaders in the social development projects, and to promote self-reliance and social involvement in community affairs. The organization under the supervision of the Head of the Social Unit as a representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for vocational training centers for youth, nurseries for children, and handicraft for females. The actual participation of members in C.D.O. is nominal. Almost everything is under the control and supervision of the Ministry. However, community development programs allow activities that were not available in Old Nubia. Boys that miss the chance to complete their education are trained in carpentry and rug weaving to introduce them to skilled vocations. Girls

and women are taught handicraft and are encouraged to produce commercially for local consumption, and this supplements their family income. Marketing is the hampering factor for the success of these projects and not the willingness of Nubians to participate. The only vocation that Nubians have a cultural aversion against is the profession of blacksmith. Hence the workshop equipment is not being utilized.

The C.D.O. is also responsible for providing Raiidat (female guides) for each village. These are selected from active young females in the village and are trained for a year. They provide a linkage between village households and government projects. They themselves are members of the village community, so they have free access to the homes and their guidance and advice are more acceptable to housewives. To accentuate their loyalties to their communities rather than to the Ministry of Social Affairs, they are not given a salary but rather a small monthly payment as compensation for their time and their wardrobe. This institution has been relatively successful, especially in literacy campaigns among females and in enhancing the social and economic awareness of females in the community.

The Village Council is another formal structure responsible for civic projects. There are three Village Councils in New Nubia under the City Council of Nasr. Each Village Council is composed of four A.S.U. members and six members from the executive machinery. They are considering the introduction of two members of Agricultural Cooperative Association onto the Council. This institution is still in an embryonic stage, as the combination of several villages in one council necessitates

the full cooperation of various village representatives. The Council, however, has been successful in placing complaints about the drinking-water supply, provision of electricity, eradication of seepage caused by difficulty in drainage, and so on.

The fourth formal structure introduced in New Nubia and the second in importance is the Agricultural Cooperative Association (A.C.A.). Every head of household owning land is by fiat a member of A.C.A., and has to pay one pound per feddan as subscription fee. A board of directors, usually men, is elected, with the chairmanship rotating among the members.

The A.C.A. in New Nubia is under the supervision of the Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Land (EAUDRL), and an agricultural engineer is responsible for each Association. The settlement is divided into three major areas with a senior agricultural engineer responsible for the farms and association under his jurisdiction: the Northern farms in Kenuz Area, the Middle farms in Arab Area, and the Southern farms in Fadija Area.

The basic function of the association is:

1. to provide credit, seeds and fertilizers to farmers.

2. marketing of products.

3. planning the program of cultivation of crops in each area and providing machinery for the farmers and control of irrigation, and

4. providing training, information and consultation to individual farmers.

Within the National plans, the newly reclaimed area in Kom Ombo

is geared to cash-crop farming of sugar-cane for the local sugar-cane factory on at least 40 percent of the land. Sugar-cane cultivation requires skills, experience and knowledge which the Nubians lack. Few southern farmers were trained in irrigation farming; the rest were subsistence farmers of alluvial land which required no technical skills. The predominant age-sex composition of villages -- females, old men and children -- and the consequent shortage of able productive men further complicate the plans for sugar-cane cultivation.

Added to these limiting factors is the lack among Nubian farmers of such managerial skills as bookkeeping and organizational capacities for coordinating individual efforts for the good of the members of the Association.

The local agricultural officials are burdened with the requirements of their position. Each official has to supervise the land reclamation projects, the plots of land cultivated by EAUDRL, the responsibilities of A.C.A., and the distribution among farmers of monthly amenities such as flour, sugar, lentils, and butter provided by the World Health Organization. The requirements of their jobs, the limits on their authority to make decisions, the social and physical handicaps of the area, the lack of transportation and living facilities, and the lack of cooperation from Nubian farmers all increase the frustration of the agricultural officials, and decrease their efficiency in providing training and consultation to the individual Nubian farmers.

The local agricultural officials view the situation from a different perspective than that of the Nubians, and they tend to feel the problems are unsolvable. The Nubians, they believe, have been spoilt by

the government's acceding to all their demands. The Nubian farmers are incapable and unwilling to exert any effort in cultivating their land. "The Nubians will never be good farmers. The women did the farming in Old Nubia and the requirements for cultivating sugar-cane in remote plots of land are beyond the physical capacities of women. The Nubian farmer is lazy; he hires labor for all jobs including irrigation and he will never change." Statements like this are heard from government officials responsible for agricultural activities in the area and frustrated by the results of their efforts.

The Nubians, on the other hand, refuse to accept this argument. Instead, they put the blame on the inefficiency of the administration and of the local agricultural engineers and on the poor soil of the farming plots allotted to them.

The communication gap between the E.A.U.D.R.L. and the Nubian farmers had been further aggravated by the results of the sugar-cane crops of 1971. In 1969 the farmers were allotted their plots already cultivated with sugar-cane. At the end of the year they earned some money from marketing the crop. The second year was catastrophic. After submitting their crop to E.A.U.D.R.L. through the nominal A.C.A. and subtracting the credit and farming expenses of preparing the land and cutting of the crop where the Nubians were unable to provide the labor for themselves -- most of the farmers had either very little money left over or they were in debt to the Association. Not understanding the actual calculations, they felt cheated by E.A.U.D.R.L., and lost all motivation to cultivate sugar-cane again. Some A.C.A. members thought of contacting directly the sugar-cane factory for marketing the crops. The

over-all experience was frustrating and bewildering for farmers who were
trying to respond to the complex requirements of sugar-cane cultivation.
Conflict broke out between farmers and their representatives on the
Board of Directors, and between members of the A.S.U. and members of
the A.C.A. directory board. Several members tried to resign from their
offices on the grounds that they waste time and arouse the antagonism of
their village community because of their inability to produce positive
results, without any direct personal advantage to compensate for the
damage.

The communication gap has increased between local E.A.U.D.R.L.
officials and farmers. As one informant from the Kenuz in the north puts
it, "We lack experience in agriculture in the New Settlement. Because
we lack the knowledge we are not aware of things. Because we are not
aware of issues they (meaning the Ministry of Land Reform) took advantage
of us. The government should advise and direct us, not exploit us. This
is the result of officials who know everything and still do not advise
us."

Though the Nubians are always proud of their socialist and
cooperative past history, they have failed -- relatively speaking -- in
the present agricultural crisis to organize cooperatively to improve
their lot. Individualistic trends and non-confidence in their local
leaders are developing; this hampers cooperative organization of their
efforts. This is in addition to their lack of knowledge and skill, and
the ambiguous role of E.A.U.D.R.L. with no clear cut plans nor fixed
rules and regulations. The more pressure from Nubians as collectivities,
the more concessions from the government. The end result is a tremendous

concentration on political activities and organization, and little effort
toward solving their agricultural problems realistically on a self-help
basis.

FOOTNOTE

[1]For a discussion of the political importance of the High Dam and the politics involved in its construction, see D.C. Watt, "The High Dam at Aswan and the Politics of Control," in Dams in Africa, Neville Rubin and W.M. Warren (eds.). (London: Cass and Company, Ltd., 1968).

CHAPTER IV

THE FORCED RELOCATION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS, U.S.A., 1942

I.   INTRODUCTION

The Japanese-Americans in the United States were descendants of Japanese male workers who began immigrating to the West Coast of the United States of America from Hawaii and Japan in 1890. They continued to arrive on the United States West Coast till the passing of the National Immigration Bill in 1924. They were a homogeneous group: males, young, four to six years of education and with a general rural background. Later, wives joined them through arranged marriages: "picture-brides." Males sent for brides from Japan on the basis of pictures they saw through intermediaries.

The flow of Japanese immigrant workers was initially accepted and encouraged by the United States, as male laborers were desperately needed to fill the demand for cheap labor that had been created by the reduction in number of Chinese workers due to the prejudiced and discriminatory activities against the Chinese. In 1882, Congress had passed the Chinese Exclusion Act that barred Chinese immigration, as the Chinese competed with white workers by accepting sub-standard wages.

It was not long, however, before the Japanese immigrants inherited the aggression previously directed toward the Chinese. After the experience with the Chinese, which was characterized by physical attacks, the fight against the Japanese was more calculated, politically

and legally. More sophisticated techniques were used to curtail
Japanese economic success and the flow of Japanese immigrants to the
United States.

Both the similarities and differences between the Japanese and
Chinese immigrant groups facilitated the transfer and intensification of
aggression toward the Japanese. As Americans saw these groups, they
were from the same race; from the mysterious orient. They shared
similar work habits and spoke alien languages. Though the Japanese did
not wear their own dress as did the Chinese, their physical appearance
seemed almost the same.

The differences that existed between the two groups also
accentuated the American fear and hate of the Japanese. While the
Chinese were servile, the Japanese, being better educated, were proud
of their own country, more inclined to resist exploitation and to fight
back against personal affronts (Hosokawa, 1969: 44). The Japanese did
not honor unfair agreements; hence, they soon gained the reputation of
being unreliable, cunning and shrewd.

Japanese immigrants were subjected to several types of
discriminatory legislation that affected their life chances in the
United States. In addition to being denied the acquisition of natural-
ized citizenship, in 1913 the California Alien Land Law was passed.
This law prohibited further purchases of land and permitted lease of
farmland for not more than three year periods, discouraging long-term
investment. The upshot was to force Japanese to work as agricultural
laborers or as share-croppers on white-owned land. However, to get
round this block, the Japanese bought land in the name of their

children who, if born in the United States, were American citizens.

In 1924, the Exclusion Law was passed, which curtailed immigration from nations other than those of northern Europe. The procedure of picture-brides was halted: many male immigrants were not able to send for wives from Japan and they had to remain bachelors. This law, besides affecting the self-esteem and pride of the Japanese, severely restricted their future prospects. Economically, those in businesses depending on immigrants were the most hard-hit, like inn-keepers and those who sold home furnishings and utensils (Hosokawa, 1969: 113). These discriminatory laws prevented the Japanese from taking roots in American society and from being fully assimilated. Reverend Kitagawa states:

> "Physically he (the Japanese immigrant) was in America, working for the Americans and resting his hopes for his future in America; and yet socially and psychologically he was apart from the American people. He was in America but not part of America. The Japanese-American community came to be an insulated cultural island in American society, not by choice but as a result of rejection and social ostracism by American Society" (Kitagawa, 1967: 11).

Thus, though the Japanese immigrants were welcomed as cheap labor, especially in California, anti-Japanese propaganda started when the immigrants indicated an effort to assert their economic inde-pendence. Numerically, they were less than one percent of the American population and two percent of the Californian population. "Sociologi-cally as well as numerically, they held minority status, being biologically and culturally distinguishable from the white majority and, at the same time, competing with them sharply in economic activities" (Thomas, 1946: 1).

The minority status of the Japanese-Americans, the racial prejudice that confronted them in addition to their cultural disposition, influenced their adjustment processes and their community development -- socially, economically, and politically. Living as a small and culturally isolated group with a white majority, they have constantly adapted to their weaker position through hard work, conservatism and willingness to please (Kitano, 1969: 78). Their chief hope for the future was their American-born children.

Dorothy S. Thomas summarized the factors that hampered the assimilation of Japanese immigrants, as follows:

1. Ineligibility for American Citizenship and consequent necessity of maintaining at least nominal political allegiance to a foreign power.

2. Paternalistic attitude of the Japanese government.

3. Economic discrimination and social segregation imposed by the whites on the West Coast.

4. Self-sufficiency of their ethno-centered communities, and the strength of their organizations.

5. Failure to master the English language.

6. Adherence to an alien religion.

These factors were intertwined and complex, with no possible analysis of causes and effect. The history of Japanese on the West Coast of the United States was one of racial discrimination, and of cultural segregation counteracted by strong internal community ties, vigilance and hard work.

II.   JAPANESE-AMERICANS PRIOR TO RELOCATION

A.   Ethnical Identity

By the late thirties, the Japanese community was far from being Americanized, yet far from the culture of contemporary Japan (Kitagawa, 1967: 11). Their condition was neither accepted by America nor accepted by the Japanese back home. This pattern of segregation and strong intra-community ties kept the individual Japanese in America from being completely disintegrated.

Inter-marriage with white (Caucasians) was forbidden by the white population. Free access to certain places of public recreation was prohibited to the Japanese. There were also informal restrictions on entrances to certain skilled occupations and professions for which their education had fitted them (Thomas, 1946: 2). For example, Nisei with college or university degrees found jobs only in institutions related to the Japanese-American community.

Some occupations exposed Japanese to other lower-class populations. The Japanese, however, did not assimilate nor identify with working-class attitudes or life styles with the same ease as they did with middle and upper-class life styles (Kitano, 1969: 22). As their only hope for the future lay with their children, who were American citizens, they implanted in their children the importance of education as the only channel for self-improvement. Their aspirations as a group were high; they tried to achieve through their children what they themselves failed to achieve -- mainly, acceptance within Caucasian society.

The tightly knit, isolated Japanese community, nevertheless, contained its own divisions and cleavages. The principle division in the Japanese-American community was between the first generation immigrants and the second-generation of American-born, American-educated children, i.e., the Issei and Nisei, respectively. The division was both in terms of their relationships to each other, and in terms of their respective relationships to Japan and to America. Between the two generations there was a gap in age distribution, a gap in cultural orientation, and a gap in their religious affiliation. The Issei were Japanese citizens, culturally oriented toward Japan, their homeland. Their religious practices were Buddhist. The Nisei were American citizens, born and educated in the United States and mainly of the Christian faith.

The Nisei were born between 1910 and 1940. In 1930 the average age of Issei males was 42 and the average age of Issei women was 35. Fewer than 4,000 of 68,000 Nisei were of voting age (Hosokawa, 1969: 151). By 1940, the Nisei outnumbered the Issei: totalling 80,000, they were approximately twice as numerous as the 47,000 Issei. Half of the Issei were aged fifty years or over. Only 8 percent were under 35 years of age. By contrast, the Nisei were extremely young. Two-thirds were under 20 years and less than 3 percent had reached 35 years of age. The gap in the age distribution between Issei and Nisei accentuated the normal generation gap, partly because there was no intermediary age bracket to ameliorate the gap between the two generations.

There was another group called "Kibei," who were Japanese-

educated Nisei. Though they were legally American citizens, their orientation was directed toward Japan and Japanese culture. They found it difficult to associate with those Nisei who were much more American-ized.

The Nisei experienced a social and psychological dilemma. They were caught between two worlds: the world of their parents, and the real America they lived in. This caused them terrific internal tension. To prove they were Americans, anything that identified them with Japanese became taboo. The lack of full acceptance in the host society drove them to form a tight-knit community of their own. Though they tried to identify with the larger society, they were extremely sensitive to the ostracism of their community on the part of most white Americans. This greatly hampered the process of becoming totally Americanized. However, they tried hard to convince both themselves and the American public that despite their looks and their parentage, they were really Americans. "The result for the Nisei was a world that was both secure and confining, comfortable and frustrating, challenging and stultifying, warm and hostile. In a word, although they rarely had either time or inclination to brood about it, theirs was a confusing life" (Hosokawa, 1969: 152).

Their identity and self-image were questionable. They were "proud native-born Americans with Japanese faces" (Hosokawa, 1969: XVI). The typical identity questions that rotated in Nisei minds before the war were reported as being: "Who am I? Where am I going? What is my destiny? What can I do to claim my rightful place in this, my beloved land?" (Hosokawa, 1969: XVII).

Regardless of the generation gap and its implications, the Japanese family in the United States was characterized by strong solidarity, mutual helpfulness, and a patriarchal structure. Family themes included filial piety, respect for age and seniority, and a preference for male children (Kitano, 1969: 61).

The family had strong control over the children. Desired behavior was accomplished by being constantly rewarded, punished, reinforced and reshaped by such parental techniques as emphasis on dependence, economic and emotional; appeals to obligation, duty, responsibility; the use of shame, guilt and gossip; and finally by emphasis on ethnic identity, e.g., "Japanese boys do not cry" (Kitano, 1969: 67-68). The children were always reminded of hunger in Japan and the possibility of shipment back to Japan in cases of lack of conformity. What others think of them and their behavior was another means used to consolidate conformity, lest they be laughed at. Disgrace from others was another conducive technique implanted by the parents in their children to protect them from deviance, and to motivate them toward their duty and obligations.

Hard work, honesty, humility, obedience, loyalty, respect for parents and love of learning were virtues learnt by the children under the direction of their parents. The community reinforced the efforts of the parents. The dual control of family backed by the community is clear in Professor Mujamoto's statement:

> "Since status in the community depends upon the observation of these basic ideals, another means of parental control exists in an appeal to the children's sense of respect for the family name. Every caution and every reprimand, therefore is accompanied by a

reminder of the necessity for preserving the status of
the name, and of attempting to raise it if possible.
What others will think of one's behavior looms large
in the minds of the Japanese and controls their
behavior extensively. This pressure undoubtedly, is
of basic importance in explaining the strong Japanese
interest in keeping up a front and preserving 'face.'
Family control, therefore, is not simply parental
control, but community control as well. It is the
family in relation to the community that becomes the
decisive force in regulating the behavior of individuals
within the group" (Hosokawa, 1969: 163).

That is how parents indoctrinated their children into the

Japanese normative structure. While they should respect and conform to

seniors in authority in a passive unquestioning way, they should also

be competitive in work and learning. Thus, though the Japanese culture

differed basically in certain respects from the individualism of the

American culture, the inherent competitive aspect was compatible with

American societal norms. This fact facilitated adaptation to American

society, but was not successful in easing the tension, the frustration

nor the crisis of identity of the "Americans in Disguise" (Okimoto,

1971). In fact, the competitive aspect was a large source of tension

for the Japanese-American, because it aroused the fears and repressions

of the white Americans.

B.   Culture, Religion, and Associations of Japanese-Americans

The most outstanding characteristic of the Japanese culture is

what Kitano (1969) calls the enryo norm syndrome. It is the manner in

which inferiors behave towards superiors. This explains much of their

behavior as individuals and groups. The hesitancy to speak out at

meetings, the refusal of any invitation, especially the first time, the
acceptance of less desired objects when given free choice, lack of
verbal participation, refusal to ask questions or ask for raises, all
are traced to this norm syndrome Enryo (Kitano, 1969: 103-104). They
are aware of realities and conform to what is expected of them lest they
fall into ridicule and disgrace, or lose face.

Kitano attributes to their cultural background the relative
success they achieved as a minority in the United States. He writes:

> "Probably the one outstanding characteristic of
> Japanese norms is their adaptiveness to fixed
> positions and external realities. Rather than a
> stream making its own course, the stream follows
> the lines of least resistance - their norms emphasize
> duty and obligation; their values include conformity
> and obedience. Part of the success of Japanese
> adaptation to the United States was their ability to
> respond to the problems of lower status with those
> normative patterns learned in Japan" (Kitano, 1969:
> 103).

In other words, the Japanese in the United States did not accept
the low status that was assigned to them by the majority group. On the
other hand, they did not overtly fight discrimination. They utilized
their normative patterns of competition, conformity and hard work to
achieve their success in the hostile environment of the West Coast.
Hence, they followed the lines of "least resistance."

In addition, the Issei had flexible approach to religion. They
did not have strong traditional nor ritualistic beliefs that directed
their behavior regardless of the requirements of the situation. The
focus of religious training was training in ethical behavior: how to
act towards parents, friends and strangers. Though most of the Issei
were Buddhists, they were not fanatic about their religion and they

allowed the Nisei to attend Christian churches. Christianity was not viewed as a threat to their world view, so long as it accentuated the morals and norms they valued.

While Buddhism enforced group conservatism and isolation from the larger society, Christianity facilitated assimilation. The former was strictly a closed and homogeneous local group, "little different from what it would be in the old country" (Kitagawa, 1969: 16). The latter had an element of heterogeneity and openness. Nevertheless, the Japanese Christian Church tended to accentuate such Japanese cultural activities as flower arrangement and sukiyaki (Japanese food) (Kitano, 1969: 85).

The Japanese community was divided not only in religious affiliations, but also in associations. The kenjinkai was an association according to descent or local prefecture in Japan. Membership qualification was ascribed or predetermined for each individual. The basic function of these associations was mutual support for members; they were of a "general and benevolent social nature." The Japanese West Coast community was divided among several kenjinkai associations which fostered conservatism and conformity to Japanese norms. This "ethnic communalism protected individuals from becoming completely disintegrated in competitive society and, at the same time, prevented them from attaining the individualism necessary for a democratic society" (Kitagawa, 1969: 15).

The Nikonjinkai (Japanese association) was an organization at a larger community level. The internally split community was unified

by this association when it was conscious of the existence of other groups. The aims of this association were "general and vague." Dorothy Thomas cites the various functions of this association in different localities.

> "In many localities they (the Japanese Association) were similarly of great value in promoting morality and orderly living as well as in preserving harmony between conflicting interests. They were on the alert to meet the changing needs of immigrant communities. They developed programs for adult education, emphasizing Americanization, and they translated and interpreted American news items and documents for the Issei. At the same time, they promoted Japanese language schools for Nisei. They directed the settlers in matters where concessions to the American public seemed advisable, for example, they recommended abandonment of the 'picture bride' practice, and advised immigrants not to work too hard as to cause their neighbors to criticize them and to create some leisure for self-development. They assisted the indigent who wished to return to Japan. Their members visited sick Japanese in hospitals and cared for graves in cemeteries where Japanese were buried. They gave banquets honoring the aged, the mothers, the distinguished. They acted as arbiters among businessmen, cleared up misunderstanding about contracts, and promoted Japanese and immigrant business interests in the American community. They contributed to American welfare and patriotic societies, and during the 1930's they also collected funds for the Japanese war effort in the orient. They sponsored tours for Nisei in Japan and promoted the return to America of those among the second generation who had been sent to Japan for education, arranging special steamship rates for Kibei and in some cases financing their passage as assisting them in findings jobs. They encouraged higher education for Nisei, publicized honors conferred upon them, and acted as the watch-dog for any cases of juvenile delinquency, that they might be publicized as a moral lesson to other children" (Thomas, 1952: 49).

The local Japanese Association normally featured a wide variety of activities catering to the needs of the ethnic community, and ameliorating the external conditions of racial prejudice and discrimination. It also decreased the possibility of full assimilation and

integration with the larger society, since it functioned as a cushioning
and insulating welfare system for the Japanese members, overriding
differences in descent and occupation.

To limit "competition among themselves or to protect themselves
from injury by others and to further their own interests" (Thomas, 1952:
49), Japanese farmers and businessmen organized trade associations.
These were occupational associations that exercised protective functions
against a hostile world. Those trade associations were purely ethnic
in nature, and they catered to the Japanese-American community.

The majority of members as well as the leadership in all those
associations were the Issei. They represented the interests of aliens
as an ethnic community and a minority group. The attacks from members
of the larger society as well as the homogeneous background of the
Issei were important sources of solidarity among the Japanese community.
This led to the development of organizational associations for intra-
community affairs (U.S. Department of Interior: 188). They had
protective functions, and part of the protective functions lay in
their relationship with Japanese consulates (Kitano, 1969: 81).

Thus, concomitant with segregation and exclusion from American
community life, the immigrants developed strong organizations within
their own communities. The immigrant organizations expanded and
proliferated and as of 1920, they were described as, "the most efficient
and completely organized among immigrant groups" (Thomas, 1952: 50).

Between 1920 and 1940, many of the Nisei businessmen and farmers
joined "junior associations" that were usually sponsored by the more

powerful Issei economic associations (Thomas, 1952: 51). The Nisei
were not satisfied with Issei-run and Issei-dominated associations.
With their orientation toward America and their training in United
States educational institutions, Nisei needs were different. The Nisei
managed to organize their own organization, the Japanese-American
Citizens League (JACL) which by 1940 had 5,600 paying members. It was
the second-generation counterpart of the Japanese Association. It had
a protective function, as well as one of accelerating acculturation.
This was different from the Issei associations, which accentuated
conservatism. The main functions of JACL were exerting political
pressure against discriminatory legislation; promoting public relations
by interpreting the Japanese to the larger community; and educating the
second generation in Americanism (Thomas, 1952: 52).

Thus the Japanese-American community, organized as it was
against external hostilities, still contained intra-communal factions
caused by different original prefectures, different religions, and
different age structures. The most overriding cleavage, however, was
the conflict and tension between the first generation immigrants, the
Issei, and the second generation Japanese-American citizens, the Nisei.

C.   Occupational Structure

Newly arrived Japanese immigrants usually worked as agricultural
workers, or as workers in small businesses owned by other Japanese.
From the beginning, the tendency was toward self-employment and inter-

dependency with their own ethnic group.

The passing of the 1913 Californian Land Law denied Issei the chances of owning or leasing land. However, aliens sometimes got around such laws by buying and leasing land in the name of their children, who were American citizens by birth.

Japanese success in agriculture caused a lot of indignation among the Caucasians. While the Japanese operated by ownership and lease only 4 percent of improved crop land in California, the fuss was more a result of the kind of land they occupied, and their success in operating it, rather than in the total acreage they controlled[1] (Hosokawa, 1969: 105). Eighty or ninety percent of truck crops were produced by Japanese -- strawberries, asparagus, celery and tomatoes. They were successful in these crops, the harvesting of which requires a stooping posture, great manual dexterity, and painstaking methods of work. Caucasians were incapable and unwilling to do such work (Hosokawa, 1969: 106).

In California, the agricultural production of Japanese farmers rose from six million dollars to sixty-seven million a decade later. This was one-tenth of California's agricultural output (Hosokawa, 1969: 61).

By 1940, however, the West Coast Japanese group was split 45-55 between agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits. The bulk of the farmers were tenants or sharecroppers. Sixteen thousand Japanese owned farms with titles vested in the Nisei (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 4).

The success of Japanese farmers in agriculture is clear from the observation of the historian, Bradford Smith. He wrote:

"The Issei contribution to America was not in great
men, but in the anonymous little men who made the
desert spaces green with the labor of their hands,
who kept the track even so that Americans could ride
comfortably across the land, who tended the comfort
of the well-to-do, and grew the vegetables the poor
could afford to buy, who sacrificed for the welfare
of their children" (Hosokawa, 1969: 193).

Most farms were family enterprises. Children who worked or studied in

urban centers returned in the summers to work on their parents' land

(Kitagawa, 1967: 3).

The Japanese penetrated the urban economy with very specialized

occupations. Their most marked concentrations were in domestic service,

in unskilled labor generally, and in the small proprietor-managerial

class. They were notably deficient in higher professional and white-

collar ranks and in skilled labor. This situation was not attributed

to Japanese lack of knowledge and education; it was a result of racial

discrimination and the reserving of these preferred occupations for

Caucasians.

Entrance to urban labor forces on the West Coast was often

achieved by domestic service, mainly of "schoolboys" who attended grade

schools and worked as domestic servants for room and board. During the

housing boom of the 1920's the demand for gardening services expanded

rapidly. "Through the advantages of group organization and family

enterprise, the Japanese almost monopolized this type of work in the

Los Angeles metropolitan district and in the suburban areas around San

Francisco" (Thomas, 1952: 26).

Trade and non-domestic service enterprises developed to meet

the needs of this ethnic group, or to cater for the general public in

a few very specialized activities such as restaurants, laundry and dyeing. The stabilization of agricultural activities and the shift in taste of the second generation to American goods and services caused a decline in the demand for these specialized services by Japanese in urban areas (Thomas, 1952: 27). Thus the Japanese started to cater to the general public in form of restaurants, cleaning and dyeing establishments and oreintal art goods.

The unique organization of Japanese enterprises gave a tangible advantage over their competitors. Wages were slightly lower and partnership arrangements allowed for long working hours by partners and family members. Hence they could provide relatively cheap services and could increase the output. This, added to the quality of hard work, made their services cleaner and more attractive to the public. It was normal to experience great opposition and even boycotting by organized labor, as the Japanese often successfully competed with unionized labor (Thomas, 1952: 30).

The most notable expansion, however, was in the marketing of agricultural produce. This expansion paralleled the rapid growth of Japanese farming which was a link between the urban and rural economies. During 1941, Japanese wholesalers in the Los Angeles markets for fruits and vegetables were estimated to have handled more than 60 percent of the total amount of business (Thomas, 1952: 35).

The penetration and expansion of the urban economy did not cause a decline in agricultural population. Between 1908 and 1940 the labor force in agriculture slightly increased, from 40 percent to 42 percent (Thomas, 1952: 36). The structure however went through a

radical change. As the number of Japanese-American citizens who could

own land increased, land owners and managers among farmers also

increased from one-sixth of the total to two-fifths. Consequently, more

women and children worked as unpaid labor in Japanese family enter-

prises.

D.   Wholesale Evacuation in 1942

The decision to move all Japanese aliens and "non-aliens" from

the West Coast of the United States was a reaction to the crisis of the

sudden attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941, by the

Japanese during World War II.

Though Italians and Germans lived in the area, too, the history

of racial discrimination and the apparent solidarity of the Japanese

community facilitated the process of singling them out for evacuation

with their children, even though the latter were American citizens.

The first few weeks after the attack, the shock and the

confusion of the incident did not allow any direct action by the larger

community against the Japanese. However, with time, the fear of the

"yellow-peril" overtook the people, the old aggression toward, and

distrust of, the Japanese were resumed.

Most of those who got organized and pressed for Japanese

evacuation had economic interests which made them eager to eliminate

the Japanese from the area of business competition. They seized the

crisis resulting from the attack on Pearl Harbor to make a well-

organized and concerted effort to eliminate once and for all people of
Japanese descent from West Coast states.

The psychological reaction of the Japanese community was shock,
bewilderment, anger, shame, deep anguish and despair. Within four
days of the attack, the FBI detained over 1,370 Issei who were leaders
or active members in any of the Japanese associations. Some Issei,
for fear of being detained, destroyed all possible evidence of
sentimental ties with Japan such as letters, photographs, books or
magazines.

The Nisei's spontaneous reaction was to show their loyalty to
their country, the United States. The JACL sent a telegram to
President Rooevelt to demonstrate their loyalty and concern: "...in
this solemn hour we pledge our fullest cooperation to you, Mr.
President, and to our Country...now that Japan has instituted this
attack upon our land, we are ready and prepared to expend every effort
to repell this invasion together with our fellow Americans" (Hosokawa,
1969: 225).

They made every effort to publicize their loyalty by condemning
Japanese military activity. They donated blood and purchased war
bonds to prove this loyalty, and volunteered for service, but were
refused. "Spontaneous, uncoordinated series of action that were more
noticeable for their sincerity than their effectiveness" were taken.

Nevertheless, funds were blocked in banks. Flower growers lost
their customers. Trained workmen left Japanese employers for fear of
not being paid. Suppliers demanded cash from Japanese customers. Some
shops were closed by federal agents. Japanese workers were fired.

Some hospitals even refused to accept Japanese patients.

The authorities, too, frequently changed and inadequately communicated their instructions about alien travel, funds and related matters. This resulted in the Japanese community falling prey to anxieties, insecurity, rumors and nervous speculation about the future.

The major ethnic institutions collapsed and community resources were dissipated. Everything was in confusion and chaos. The solidarity of the community had been its source of strength, but with the Issei leadership gone, picked up in a series of swift roundups by the FBI agents, the Japanese community was without leadership except for the young Nisei and their association, the JACL. "Those plucked out of the communities represented the first and second echelons of community leadership. Most of those who had been spared had never been in a position to lead; if they had, they hardly dared raise their heads now for fear of being noticed by the FBI" (Hosokawa, 1969: 240).

The JACL was weak and could not sustain the internal stresses. By advocating full cooperation with American authority as a demonstration of loyalties, the members later lost favor with the Issei. Some people rejected their leadership and directed aggression against them in the centers (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 13).

On February 19, 1942, Roosevelt signed the executive order 9066 that gave the Secretary of War the authority to designate certain "military areas" and to exclude "any or all" persons from this. The order allowed action to be taken against the Japanese community.

At first, voluntary evacuation of Japanese from the east area of the West Coast was allowed and encouraged. Voluntary evacuation was

not successful as the Japanese did not know where to go, and communities elsewhere were hostile to them. On March 29, it was recommended that voluntary evacuation be halted; free movement was banned effective March 29. The Japanese were to wait for the army to move them.

The Japanese community on the West Coast, aliens and citizens, were moved into assembly centers which had been hastily constructed by the army on nearby race tracks and fair grounds for a transitory phase of detention, preliminary to another controlled mass migration and further enforced detention.

The evacuation was rapid, smooth and efficient, primarily because of the cooperativeness of the Japanese, who responded to posted notices to register, to assemble voluntarily on time at designated points, and to follow all orders. The manner in which Japanese obediently marched to the trains and buses, hauling them to camp, presaged a conflict-free camp life.

The strains, stresses, confusion and anxiety of the few months after the incident of Pearl Harbor came to a temporary end. Most Japanese sold their property at very low prices, other found Caucasian friends to take over or to keep their property. Many quick decisions had to be made and long days of waiting ended with the actual move. A Japanese Reverend describing his experiences in the train journey to the assembly center wrote:

> "Everybody was settled in their seat, relaxed and
> looking as if he hadn't a thing in the world to
> worry about. No one seemed to care where we were
> being taken. No matter what might be ahead of us,
> we were all together; and that was the most
> reassuring thing" (Kitagawa, 1967: 64).

The official reasons given for the mass evacuation of Japanese aliens were military necessity and the safety of the Japanese community. The action was rationalized on the basis of the doubt of the ability of anyone to distinguish between the loyal and disloyal among persons of Japanese ancestry. Furthermore, some officials doubted the ability of non-Japanese residents of the West Coast to safeguard Japanese residents from vigilantism and mob lawlessness (Spicer et al., 1969: 44).

Nevertheless, to many Japanese-Americans who experienced public hostility and were aware of the widely reported activities of anti-Japanese pressure groups, this was convincing evidence that the evacuation order was not prompted by the army's stated regard for military necessity, but rather was motivated by racial prejudice.

The action, in fact, was the result of a combination of several ostensible motives: military necessity, protection of those evacuated, political and economic pressures, and racial prejudice (Lehman, 1970: 14).

> "The necessity for protecting coastal areas, the widespread hostility toward resident Japanese, racial animus, economic aridity, fears of attack and apprehension over the growing victories of the enemy - these factors became so intertwined that their separation was impossible. Yet they had the common feature of pushing in the direction of evacuation. And the political representatives of the Western States reflected one-way pressure" (Hosokawa, 1969: 282).

A very few cases of protests by Nisei, American citizens, were legally documented.[2] But the Supreme Court ruled against them. Otherwise, the Japanese community was quite passive in the face of the evacuation, and even cooperated with authorities as has been mentioned

before.

This initial reaction of non-resistance by the Japanese-American community to the crisis of relocation has political, social and psychological explanations. The pre-war Japanese were politically powerless. The Issei were denied citizens' rights, and Nisei were just reaching voting age (Kitano, 1969: 44; Spicer et al., 1969: 38). There was no conspicuous Japanese figure in American political life, nor did they have mature leaders of their ancestry in high social or financial circles to apply pressure on behalf of their interests. The Nisei were to immature and disorganized to be effective as community leaders, and to regenerate solid collective activity after the breakdown of existing Japanese organizations when the FBI interned the leaders. In addition, Japanese norms of conformity and obedience to authority diminished possibilities of group dissent. They rationalized the action as shikata-ga-nai (it can't be helped); they felt too weak to stand against the power of the United States government. Psychologically, widespread and acute insecurity deterred people from group activities which might have ameliorated the accumulating tensions, or enabled them to explore a new basis of community solidarity (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 15).

III.   THE CRISIS OF RELOCATION: ADJUSTMENTS AND DECISIONS

Over 110,000 people of Japanese descent, aliens and American citizens alike, old-aged and babies, were all moved from the West Coast of the United States by the army to centers surrounded by barbed wire. The Japanese viewed the relocation centers as concentration camps

and collective jails regardless of the efforts of American authorities
to indicate otherwise. Uncertainties over the future were dominant.
The evacuees had no clear notion of any plan. The evacuation was a
relatively sudden decision to cope with new circumstances: the sudden
attack on Pearl Harbor, to American leaders, required a change in the
action-system of the West Coast population, the army and the government.

> "The three years following the attack on Pearl Harbor
> had been a period of recurring crisis for the 30,000
> families of Japanese-Americans. At the intervals of
> four to six months had come successive decisions by
> government, each of which demanded sweeping new
> adjustments for every family. The evacuation decision
> in March 1942, and the swift transfer from homes to
> assembly centers; the move in the summer of 1942 from
> assembly to relocation centers; registration in
> February 1943; segregation in fall of 1943; the
> reopening of Selective Service in January 1944;
> relentlessly one official decision led to another and
> each meant crisis, reorientation of plans for the
> future, and new decisions for every family" (Spicer
> et al., 1969: 251).

The Japanese-Americans passively cooperated with the army when
they were evacuated to assembly centers. The second controlled
migration from assembly centers to more extensive camps which were
administered by War Relocation Authority (WRA) was completed in
November, 1942.

In the assembly center the evacuees learned much about living
together. They had made many basic adjustments by the time they
arrived at the relocation centers. Some of the friction between young
and older people, and among long standing factions in the former
communities, had been fought out. Therefore, the adjustments in the
new camps went a little more smoothly (Spicer et al., 1969: 64).

The relocation camps were administered by the WRA, which was

created on March 18, 1942, by order number 9102 in the Office of
Emergency Management to assist persons evacuated by the military. The
head was responsible to the President (Hosokawa, 1969: 338).

A.   Initial Reactions at the Relocation Centers

The evacuation did not break up the family system, as the whole
family was moved to the same center. The new organization of activities,
however, affect family unity. At the centers and camps, the families
were to sleep in barracks in small separate rooms, yet they ate, washed
clothes, went to toilets, and played in communal buildings in the center
of their own block which contained several dormitory barracks.

Every block had a background of differing class, religious, and
family behavior. Antipathies sprang up and adjustments had to be made
as they adapted the semi-communal framework of the block to their own
needs.

People were faced in the camps with new, unfamiliar persons in
a life imposed upon on block basis. They all confronted new roles, as
chefs and workers in the mess hall, as table companions, as block
managers. These new roles were entirely outside the Japanese-Americans'
experience, as they had to adapt to them with a host of other roles
required in the organization of center life.

The unfinished conditions of the barracks and blocks was an
immediate stimulus to individuals to provide the basic comforts that
were lacking. The first few weeks were spent in activities to

straighten out the details of life. Personal differences soon were ironed out, and people adjusted to getting along with one another as new roles were defined in the course of getting the necessary things done.

Thus, the first of the new social units to take form was the block. The social unit of the block was an organization concerned with the physical well-being of the group, as well as a source of integration for the feelings and values of its members (Spicer et al., 1969: 14).

On arrival, the evacuees set out to make their barracks more livable. They made their own furniture, set up partitions in apartments and constructed porches outside their barracks. Women made curtains and rugs.

The WRA staff were a small number of less than a hundred to handle everything for 5,000 to 10,000 evacuees in one center. 50 evacuees were swiftly recruited to assist in carrying on necessary services. At the beginning there was unity of purpose in getting the mess halls into shape for serving food, in establishing hospitals on a working basis, in cleaning up blocks, in making newcomers as comfortable as possible in their barracks. The spirit of cooperation grew up and continued for several weeks (Spicer et al., 1969: 75). By the end of the first month, in every camp, the framework of administration had been formed. Essential services were proceeding, and life in the blocks was linked to the administrative head office, the source of all supply, through the network of block managers.

In spite of physical hardships, the evacuees were, in the beginning, almost uniformly cooperative and helpful. The first director

of WRA, Eisenhower, testified in May 15, 1942: "I just cannot say things too favorable about the way they cooperated under the most diverse circumstances." His successor Myer, wrote in June 8 of the "high degree of cooperation and helpfulness on the part of the evacuees" (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 38). The evacuees tended to share the belief prevalent among WRA officials and employees that a "good life" could be built up in these isolated communities for the duration of the war (Thomas, 1952: 59).

B.   The Emergence of Conflict

In each center, after the first burst of activity in making blocks livable, and as the evacuees reached the limits of improving their barracks rooms, lack of interest and dissatisfaction set in. Though the initial adjustment to "pioneer life" was favorable, it did not endure. Inter-group antagonism flared up, and faith in the good intentions of the administration declined.

Regional and generational pressures, temporarily closed during the stress of evacuation, were reopened. Cooperation with the administration was labeled as "collaboration," and mostly Nisei leaders fell into that group.

The aggression that was directed toward the Nisei leaders had its seeds in the time of evacuation. Resentment was built up against them because they had collaborated with the prejudiced and hostile majority. Members of the JACL fell under especial suspicion. The aim

of JACL was as one leader said, "We can turn the tragedy of evacuation into a display of loyalty" (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 20). This position soon earned for the Nisei leaders the reputation of being inu (informers: literally "dogs"), and betraying the parent generation. They were blamed for attempting to save themselves from evacuation at the expense of the Issei. At the camps they became targets of hostility. Suspected informers were ostracized, threatened, and even beaten by their fellow evacuees.

The organization of camp life and the relation between the American administration and the evacuees aggravated the situation. While aggression and conflict within the group was dealt with through beatings and ostracism, revolt against the administration took the form of strikes or minor work stoppages.

The Nisei who were American citizens were angry and resentful, but did not see a way out. Some out of bitterness tended to view the situation as did the older people. Others, and they were mainly the leaders, viewed the whole affair as misguided, but complied with them as they were war-measure acts for the benefit of the country. They, as a minority, sought to cooperate in all plans of WRA and looked to it for support. For them, opportunities were opened to demonstrate their skill. Wages were irrelevant; they enjoyed the new feeling of responsibility, prestige and/or authority.

The center was divided into evacuees and Caucasian adminis- trators. The evacuees suddenly found themselves organized on the basis of two distinct classes of persons: "evacuees" and "appointed personnel" (Spicer et al., 1969: 83). The evacuees were willing to

cope with administration officials, ignorant of Japanese experience, put in positions of authority, as they were a sort of external or given fact about which the evacuees could do nothing. They did not, however, accept the next level of the hierarchy which consisted of young, and sometimes downright distrusted persons from among their own community.

Many Japanese families at the centers were economically ruined. Their property had been lost, stolen, sold, or confiscated. They had a bleak outlook on the future; this caused unmeasurable damage to the self-respect of a proud, independent group of people. Thus, financial ruin, together with the camp policies of using American citizens (Nisei) in positions of camp responsibility, worked to shift power away from the Issei and onto the shoulders of the Nisei (Kitano, 1969: 36).

The bitterness was to increase and to find channels for expression later on. Initially, there were too many new and confusing experiences to assimilate, and consequently too little comprehension of the wide crystallization of such attitudes. The staff began to hear complaints about rudeness of employed evacuees. There were complaints about block managers who were said to be ordering people around. There were complaints of incompetence of evacuees in important positions. These complaints multiplied after the first month or two and reached such volume that they could not be ignored. Evacuees placed in responsible jobs were charged with dishonesty, and the label "adminis-trative stooge" was often heard (Spicer et al., 1969:81). Thus, every faction found its convenient scapegoat, and intra-community conflict

emerged.

In addition to providing opportunities for responsible jobs for
Nisei, the American authorities installed a political structure that
further increased the gap between the two Japanese generations. Blocks
were organized with a block manager in each. Most of the block managers
were Issei. Later in June 1942, a system of self-government was
established. This provided for the election of a temporary community
council whose functions would be advisory. The block was the unit of
representation. All persons above sixteen years of age were eligible
to vote, but aliens were declared ineligible for office holders.
Therefore, council members were Nisei (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 37).

The administration viewed council cooperation as a way of getting
the people behind the administration. So when members of council
started exploring the hospital and food affairs, the administration
viewed such council investigations as not really cooperation. The
administration, failing to realize the suspicion and distrust of the
people, were convinced of their efforts to make services for the
evacuees satisfactory. Failure of members of council to achieve any
tangible results from administration, meant failure to find favor with
the people. This increased the power of block managers as leaders and
representatives.

C.   Differential Views of WRA and Evacuees

The WRA staff were of the belief that they could see what was

best for the evacuees. It was considered unnecessary to consult the
evacuees as to what was good for them. "The weighing of their future
was taken as a matter of administrative decision" (Spicer et al., 1969:
8). Though they tried to run the camps as a "normal" community, the
WRA viewed the centers in negative terms. Hence they wanted to
eliminate them as soon as possible. Over and above, the WRA policy-
makers had not experienced the prejudice of forty years on the West
Coast -- a deep reality for the evacuees. They knew little or nothing
of the West Coast Japanese community, and they failed to understand the
hidden currents that burst to the surface with every opportunity.

The evacuees' conception of the relocation camps was opposite
to that of the administrators, as it was founded on their past-
experiences. To them, especially the older people, the camps were a
"neutral haven" (Spicer et al., 1969: 9-11). They were a secure place
where they could wait till the war ended. Thus they were ready to do
the work that would affect the living conditions of the community.
They refused to exert any effort for war purposes, as this would affect
their neutral position and their gains if Japan should win the war
(Spicer et al., 1969: 11).

Furthermore, to the evacuees, the centers became a concrete
example of the "stupidity of the government."

> "The cost of the centers to the government, the idling
> of important-productive manpower, the failure of the
> original work corps idea of the WRA were stigmatized
> and bitterly joked about. The 'play-toy' community
> councils, the unenforceable work standards, the
> duplication of hospital service and school systems
> which the evacuation had brought on and which were
> observable all around them became for the evacuees
> symbols of the ignorance and prejudice which had beset

their life in the United States from the beginning.
At least a little of the aggression which they felt
was relieved in the pervasive reference to the centers
in these terms" (Spicer et al., 1969: 12-13).

The evacuees' adjustment to the administrative framework was accommodation rather than acceptance. It was described as "the accommodation of the evacuees concept of inner harmony in human relations to the administrative concept of efficient management" (Spicer et al., 1969: 13).

The underlying insecurity of the evacuees and their view of life at the centers as a secure "neutral haven" for the period of war, aroused their sensitivity to any action that would upset the harmony of relations or threaten their meagre living conditions. As Leighton pointed out, "for evacuees trivial things had unexpected powers of arousing emotions which would not have bothered them had they been genuine pioneers, roughing it as a result of their own choosing with confidence in the leadership and in the outcome. As it was, specks of dust in the water, or strange tastes in the food brought strong complaints regarding health protection" (Leighton, 1946: 118). The evacuees tried as much as possible to work together to make the camps as comfortable and as harmonious as possible.

D.   Collective Reactions

The crisis of relocation created a change in the action-system and behavioral patterns of the Japanese-American community. The basic sources of the change were the breakdown of their economic system, their

political and leadership structure, and the established family unity.

At the centers, evacuees were responsible for most of the work needed. They were paid token wages between 12 and 16 dollars a month in addition to extra allowances for clothes. This affected their motivation for work. The Japanese who were known to work long and hard became in the relocation camps reluctant and indolent. They ceased to be hard-working people. Reverend Kitagawa who shared the relocation experience wrote:

> "Having no incentive to work they had no initiative to do anything for their own benefit, let alone for that of others. All creative imagination seemed to disappear. The whole situation was demoralizing and increasingly so as time went by" (Kitagawa, 1967: 85).

The majority of the people viewed their stay at the camps as a vacation from hard work to secure a living (Spicer et al., 1969: 216-217). A small number of men and women in every center found that vacation was impossible because their services were needed at the camp. A few others found themselves incapable of enjoying a prolonged vacation and leisure, so they took their assigned work seriously. But the majority stuck to their plan and enjoyed for the first time in years the luxury of not having to work hard. For all of them it was basically a vacation from having to cope with an aggressive and prejudiced white majority (Spicer et al., 1969: 224).

Established family patterns of behavior were also disrupted by life in the camps. Family-shared activities were minimal, which affected the solidarity of the family as a unit. The family ceased to experience the meal-time gathering of the group which had been a re-enforcement of customary family rituals associated with that activity.

In contrast to pre-war times, the economic activity of the family was not integrated; each member experienced individual work at the camp and shared almost the same amount of personal earning.

The contraction of family activities emancipated its members. They channeled their new-found leisure with other members of the peer-group in a community recreation department (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 38). The children ate alone, and often spent all their waking hours without either seeing or being seen by their parents. The mothers, relieved from their home responsibilities and economic responsibilities of helping in the family enterprise, filled their leisure time by taking English lessons, flower arrangement, sewing and Japanese music (Kitagawa, 1967: 90).

The center environment encouraged the Nisei emancipation from the family in two ways: by granting them economic independence and by strengthening peer-group influence against the family influence (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 40).

The most hard-hit were the Issei parents. Their control over their children diminished as both the economic and social bases of their family authority were removed. They lost all their savings and felt helpless. They could not improve life conditions for their family, and their increasing awareness of their dependency affected their definitions of issues.

The Kibei were also affected. Lacking the acculturation ties with the United States and having little in common with Nisei, they became "either timid introverts or belligerent troublemakers" (Kitagawa, 1967: 98).

Besides the breakdown in family unity and solidarity, destruction of family patterns of behavior, and the decline in motivation toward hard work, other behavioral patterns were also changed. Riots, assaults, and other forms of violence "not typically Japanese" were encountered for the first time in Japanese-American groups. These were effects of the special situation, as can clearly be seen in the fact that such behavior ceased as soon as the camps were closed (Kitano, 1969: 37).

Regardless of the minority of Nisei who had views opposing the majority sentiments, the Issei conception became crystallized in all the camps. Apparently, the evacuation and attack on the basic security of the group was "stimulating a solidarity which had not been before" (Spicer et al., 1969: 121).

> "Before and during the period when evacuees were desperately trying to safeguard their economic interests, attitudes were being built up which transformed many members of a traditionally law abiding, cooperative minority group in factions collectively protesting and rebelling against both Caucasian majority which was pressing to dispossess, evacuate and incarcerate them, and persons of their own racial group who collaborated with government agencies" (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 17).

Many studies on the Japanese-Americans report outspoken uneasiness and collective activities occurring in many camps. In Manazar camp, a Kibei meeting was "a manifestation of sentiments that had been steadily crystallizing ever since evacuation" (Spicer et al., 1969: 115). The Issei discussion at Poston was followed by beatings and strikes (Leighton, 1946: 165). "...the movement, like almost all other social movements...was not truly spontaneous, but was whipped up

by a small group playing on a responsive instrument." At Tule Lake the
growing discontent was manifested by strikes in two of the largest work
units: the farm workers and the construction crews (Thomas and
Nishimoto, 1946: 41).

These patterns of responses were followed with minor variations
in all the relocation projects (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 45). The
pattern shows an initial cooperative and surprisingly unprotesting
acceptance of a new situation followed by unrest and distrust toward
both the administration and other evacuees, with protests and revolts
against the administration and cleavages among residents.

After the period of anger, strikes, and upheavals the air was
relatively clear of the heavy distrust between the evacuees and the
administrators. The occurrences brought the administration into touch
with evacuees views on the camps, and the antagonism against government
was weakened. The upheavals also affected the influence of community
organization and its working relation with administration, as Nisei
leaders either gained the confidence of influential Issei, or were
removed so that the Issei consolidated their influence (Spicer et al.,
1969: 138). Thus, things again became relatively quiet at the surface.
Answers for questions on the future were postponed rather than
answered, until they were confronted with the crisis of registration
and its threatening effect on the seemingly settled community life of
evacuees at the camps.

Another collective trend apparent in most camps was the revival
of Japanese customs. This nativistic reaction succeeded in providing
unity and harmony among the groups to offset somewhat the implications

of inter-group conflicts and the fears of relocation and informers. These activities also provided an escape from boredom, defeatism and frustration caused by insecurity and nonproductivity of relocation. The evacuees spent their time in playing Japanese games such as go (checker-like game) and card games. They read more Japanese books. Japanese poetry and drama were revived, and the renewed interest in tradition included instruction in tea ceremonies, flower arrangements and music.

Those nativistic reactions were also encouraged and reinforced by the conservatism of the Issei. The lack of contact with Caucasian students and teachers affected the acculturation process of the Nisei. They became more "Japanese" as their only contact was the Japanese atmosphere of the camp.

E.   Registration and Segregation

WRA officials, viewing the relocation camp life as a type of community that is damaging to the self-images of individuals and the group; and striving to liquidate them as soon as possible by resettling the evacuees in the "outside world" in the middle and eastern states, implemented a hurried program for identifying "loyal" and "disloyal" Japanese. The plan involved the segregation of "disloyal" evacuees into a center from which access to the outside world would be strictly prohibited, while the "loyal" evacuees would be assisted to resettle in other communities.

This plan was a consequence of an effort to allow Nisei American citizens to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States by volunteering in a Japanese combat team. The questionnaire that was set up for the Nisei was used by the WRA for classifying all evacuees over the age of sixteen as "loyal" and "disloyal."

The implementation of this program resulted in an unanticipated, almost fortuitous reaction from evacuees. The conflict that emerged between evacuees and administration, and among evacuees, was a culmination of all the underlying fears, distrust and antagonism resulting from the pre-war and post-war experience of the evacuees. The happenings were also an ideal showcase for the inconsistent policy of WRA administrators and their ignorance and unawareness of emotional undercurrents within the evacuated community.

In formulating and conducting the program, the WRA authorities ignored the existence of community leaders and overlooked the possibility of utilizing the councils in disseminating information among the evacuees. After the development of considerable resistance by residents, the administrators contacted members of the councils and appealed to them for cooperation. By that time confusion was widespread (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 26).

Question 27: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?

For females: If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?

Question 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor or

any other foreign government, power, or organization? (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 57-58).

The "Yes" answers to the two questions would qualify the individual as "loyal." A "No" answer to either or both was considered as evidence of "disloyalty."

Ironically enough, people who were not trusted with their own freedom, were trusted to give answers on which their freedom later depended (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 26). The mood of the people was basically a mood of suspicion, distrust and lack of confidence in the WRA administration. "It was the mood of people who had experienced a progressive loss of self-determination, who felt themselves increasingly to be in the hands of a power over whose actions they had no control and whose purposes had consistently worked injury to the group" (Spicer et al., 1969: 148). Thus, doubts and fears accompanied registration in all relocation camps.

As a result, the official interpretation of "loyal" and "disloyal" bore more heavily on sentiments than upon behavioral attitudes. The Nisei who were declared "disloyal" were angry and disillusioned because of the abrogation of their citizenship rights. Among the Kibei, chances for success in America looked bleak, seen from behind barbed-wire fences. The Issei, denied the right of naturalization, could not accept status as "loyal" to America if it carried the implication of abdicating their Japanese citizenship (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 95).

Other factors affected some decisions for answering the questionnaire -- factors that were often irrelevant to the matter of

political allegiance. There was the belief that a declaration of "loyalty" might imply eventually another forced resettlement. "The fear of the insecurity of the 'outside world' for these displaced people was enough to tip the balance in favor of a declaration of 'disloyalty'" (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 88). Therefore, the number of minors and old dependents, occupational experience and employability, health and draft status -- all these were additional factors that affected the family's position on resettlement or segregation (Spicer et al., 1969: 46).

Thomas and Nishimoto investigated the socio-cultural background of those who were segregated as "disloyal." Buddhists were proportionately more "disloyal" than Christians or agnostics. The rank-order of "disloyalty" descended from the Kibei to the Issei to the Nisei. Californians were more "disloyal" than other northwesterners. Farming groups tended to be more "disloyal" than non-agriculturalists. These results indicate that the degree of acculturation and assimilation with the larger society, the degree of pre-war experience of prejudice and job opportunities in the "outside world" -- all were factors that influenced answers to the questionnaire (Thomas and Nishimoto, 1946: 106).

Registration, nevertheless, had upsetting effects on the evacuees comparable to the original evacuation (Spicer et al., 1969: 158-159). Though the residents were not actually physically uprooted, registration affected the two basic securities that the evacuees were relatively successful in achieving at their new life-style in the camps; namely, the increased solidarity of the family, and the new home

base in the relocation centers. The issue of registration struck at family unity and control, especially in those families which included Nisei members eligible for registration. Lacking reliable community reinforcement for controlling the behavior of its members, families had to utilize internal resources of strong leadership for maintaining family cohesion through the crisis of registration.

In September, 1943, 15,000 individuals were shuttled between Tule Lake and other camps for the purpose of segregating the "loyal" Japanese from the "disloyal." It was not a clear cut segregation, obviously, as other factors (suggested above) affected the choice of answers. The segregation or "disloyal" camps became so violent that the army took over. The forces that underlay the antagonisms of residents of segregated camps had been present in other centers. However, in other camps, by the time of segregation, they had been channelized and brought under control by stabilization of the people under their natural leaders (Spicer et al., 1969: 183).

IV.   RESETTLEMENT PROCESSES

WRA officials encouraged loyal evacuees to leave the camps. First, college students were encouraged to leave camps and pursue their studies. "Seasonal leave" procedures were drawn up, whereby evacuees could leave the centers for temporary agricultural work, return to the camps when the job was finished. By the end of June, 1942, 1,500 evacuees were working in Idaho, Utah and Montana. By the end of the

fall harvest, 10,000 evacuees were on seasonal leave (Hosokawa, 1969: 380).

From July, 1942, the WRA started a wide campaign to assist and facilitate permanent resettlement of evacuees outside the camps. Upon security clearance by the FBI, both Issei and Nisei were allowed to leave camps for jobs outside. The majority, however, especially Issei, were reluctant to leave camps because of their uncertainty of public sentiment, or lack of funds and information, or fear of inability to support dependents.

Therefore, the movement out of camps for resettlement was not a massive migration, but voluntary unforced migration of individuals. It was highly selective, both demographically and culturally. Until 1944, 31 percent of relocatees were between 20-24 years of age, and 61 percent fell in the age group of 15-29 (Spicer et al., 1969: 280). Most of them were single. Married persons left their families in the camps. They were mostly Nisei, educated within American institutions and identifying more with America as their home and future, rather than with Japan. They were eager to escape the demoralizing life in the camps, and to have a fresh start toward the future. They had more confidence in the WRA administration and relied on it for help and support.

As the relocation process proceeded, the residue in centers became more "Japanesy," and a regressive trend in acculturation was fostered (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 25). The attitude of those who stayed in the camps and refused to leave was marked by apathy and dependency. This troubled the WRA officials. They realized the

disintegration of the "fiber of a people who had previous to evacuation been unusually self-reliant, sturdy and independent" (Broom and Kitsuse, 1956: 32).

The WRA started a wide program of resettlement which involved findings jobs, houses, and public acceptance for evacuees in cities all over the United States outside the prohibited zone of the West Coast. The objective of the program was to get evacuees out of the detention centers, and to disperse them, as it was felt that the concentration of Japanese on the West Coast was a factor behind the decision to evacuate them (Spicer et al., 1969: 277). The WRA also worked toward integrating the relocatees into the communities where they settled.

To reach its program objectives, the WRA took three courses of action. The first was to assess relocatees and ameliorate the problems and hardships involved in resettlement. The second course of action was to combat the anti-Japanese propaganda and increase public acceptance of Japanese as loyal American citizens without prejudice and discrimination. This action involved the mobilization of public acceptance and support of the WRA project (Myer, 1971: 127-143 and 157-197; U.S. Department of Interior: 5-46). The third course of action involved the encouragement of hesitant evacuees to leave the camps by informing them through leaflets and movies of the success of resettling evacuees (Spicer et al., 1969: 189).

Initially, these activities were not very successful in convincing Issei and their families to leave their secure homes in the camps and to venture into the antagonistic outside world before the end

of the war. For the people of the camps worked against such plans; a gap was widening between the programs of WRA and programs of evacuees.

During the early weeks of resettlement from the concentration camps, it was quite uncomfortable for the relocatees. Missing the backing of the familiar Japanese-American community, the support and direction of the Issei, their lack of adjustment was expressed in numerous ways. Often, they did not like their jobs. They did not like the housing conditions, and to them the cities were dirty and noisy (Spicer et al., 1969: 282). They moved from job to job, city to city, uncertain of their needs and undecided on their goals. Some earned and saved a maximum. Others indulged in expensive and exciting entertainment, enjoying the freedom they were experiencing from the control of camp, family and community. Nevertheless, for the first time in their experience, some Nisei found employment in fields for which they had been trained, and which had been denied them on the West Coast before the war.

With the re-opening of the West Coast for Japanese-Americans and the liquidation and closing of relocation camps, many families returned to the West Coast. The evacuation had destroyed their economic position as a group; they lost their homes and businesses; families with older Nisei were scattered in many States. The returning Japanese started from scratch to re-build their economic structure, lacking now the organized Japanese economic institutions and the help of children in constructing family enterprises.

Farmers worked as farm laborers in rural areas. In urban centers they lived as domestics and gardeners, as a temporary expedient. Their

main investments were not in stores and restaurants, but in small hotels

and apartment houses that catered mainly to Negroes.

> "Five years after relocation, the most obvious
> economic effect of that order is a change from
> dependence for livelihood on an economy funda-
> mentally within the control of the Japanese
> community to general dependence by the Japanese-
> American people everywhere upon employment found
> in the general community" (U.S. Department of
> Interior: 47).

The destruction of the economic and community structure of the

group was counteracted by the change in the employment opportunities for

the Nisei. This was facilitated by the nature of the adaptive process

the Japanese used in the United States. They were educated, trained,

patient and hard-working with low expectations. So, when opportunities

were available, "a legion of already trained and qualified people

poured in to meet the opportunities" (Kitano, 1969: 57).

The barriers vanished one by one for the Japanese-Americans:

legal barriers and social barriers, barriers that blocked their way to

job opportunities. Now the Japanese were ready to meet the challenge

of employment. Their expectations after the war became more congruent

with those of American society. While in 1940 more than one-fourth of

the Japanese labor force were laborers and only 3.8 percent were

professionals, in 1960 the percentage of laborers was reduced to 5

percent and professionals had increased to 15 percent, in a period of

two decades (Kitano, 1969: 47).

Currently, the major sources of Japanese-American employment

include the Civil Service, gardening and agriculture. Their salaries

in the Civil Service are higher than those of any other minority group,

because of their education and training (Kitano, 1969: 48). In the
agricultural sector, the initial concentration upon labor jobs in the
early days of resettlement has changed into land ownership, as more and
more Japanese now own their land. An interview by Erickson in 1958
demonstrates the economic success of the Japanese in Los Angeles. Of
45,000 Americans of Japanese descent in Los Angeles, one out of seven
owned his own business -- an expansion of the pre-war trend toward
self-employment in urban centers (Kitano, 1969: 52).

In addition to the modification of the economic structure of
the Japanese-Americans after the war and the changes in job opportunities,
the family as a social unit experienced challenges from changing con-
ditions and institutional manipulations during the relocation years.
Though families were evacuated as units, the organization of life in
the retention centers and camps threatened the solidarity and unity of
the family. The loss of parental economic and social control over the
children was underscored by the economic independence of the Nisei and
the strengthening of peer-group relations in the camps. The early
resettlement of the Nisei and the wide range of geographic and job
mobility further affected the integration, solidarity and unity of the
family, as decisions were made more often an an individual basis rather
than as a group.

Broom and Kitsuse made a study of the aspects of cultural
adaptation and family structure that affected the process of decision-
making and adjustment to the crisis of evacuation. Of the ten family
cases they studied, four cases experienced individual emancipation and
independence of the family members, which adversely affected the pre-

war solidarity and unity of the family. The cases that did not
experience any deterioration of family solidarity succeeded in retaining
the family as a unit, either through the authoritarian control of the
father or by relying on exceptionally strong affiliations existing prior
to relocation. Otherwise, pre-existing strains in family relations were
provided a channel for expression of issues created by relocation and
administrative acts.

Apathy, dependency, violence and assault as dominant attitudes
and activities in relocation camps disappeared with resettlement. The
resettled people immediately started actively to solve their economic
and housing problems. With the destruction of the older Japanese
associations, they had to work even harder, having no community
solidarity to lean on. Those who did not opt to leave for Japan, were
finally determined that the United States was their home and the home
of their children.

The dream of going back someday to Japan was fully eliminated.
The Nisei confirmed their leadership status. More and more Issei
recognized and settled with this fact, as pressing living needs did not
give time for the Issei to reorganize their former associations. More
Issei came to depend on external United States institutions for pension
and welfare. This was a new development in the Japanese-American
community.

Still, the proportion of Japanese dependents is much less than
that for any other minority group (Kitano, 1969: 1 and 82).

FOOTNOTES

[1]Efficiency of a minority group is the prime economic source of tension in the larger society. Efficiency is equated with diversification and modern methods of production and marketing. The economic success and efficiency of the Hutterites in the Province of Alberta, Canada, is also a source of contemporary tension vis a vis the white farming communities.

[2]The Hirabayashi case against imposed curfew and the Kosmatsu case against evacuation are two cases reported in the literature (Grodzin, 1949: 35; Myer, 1971: 259-266; Girdner and Loftis, 1969: 373).

MAP 2: RESETTLEMENT OF THE VALLEY TONGA AND KARIBA LAKE

CHAPTER V

THE RELOCATION OF THE GWEMBI VALLEY TONGA[1]

The Valley Tonga lived in the middle section of the Valley of the Zambesi River which forms the boundary between what had been Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Almost equal numbers of Gwembi Tongas lived on both sides of the river. The alluvial land at the banks of the river were separated from the Rhodesian Plateaux by open plain followed by rugged hills. At Kariba point the hills reached the river, thus it was chosen to be the site for the hydro-electric dam which in 1958 converted 2,000 square miles of the Gwembi area into a large lake, and forced the relocation of over 57,000 inhabitants of both Northern and Southern Rhodesians either into the hills adjacent to the Zambesi plain or to areas north of the Kariba Dam.

The Zambesi River, being a political boundary rather than a geographical or ecological barrier, did not isolate the population on both sides of its banks. Conditions on both sides of the river were much the same and the people shared almost the same culture and were closely related. This study, however, will concentrate on parts of the Northern Rhodesian Valley Tongas, and only passing reference will be made to the Southern Rhodesians whenever relevant.

Like inhabitants of any area with a very low level of material technology, the Valley Tonga patterns of activities were highly shaped and determined by the ecological conditions of the area. The weather was an important factor in organizing agricultural activities, as well

as the availability of arable land.

The rainy season started in October and November and tapered off in March and April. The cold season came after the rainy season, and lasted till late August, when the hot season began. Their agriculture was governed by this cycle. They planted the seeds at the beginning of the rainy season and harvested at the beginning of the cold season. With the flooding of the Zambesi, planting of a second crop was feasible during the cold season in the alluvial land at the banks of the river. These arrangements facilitated the settlement of the population in almost permanent villages. Unlike most central African agriculturalists, the Valley Tonga did not use a shifting agriculture. However, the unequal distribution of rainfall through the rainy months and over successive years made the area vulnerable to years of drought or flood which brought frequent hunger periods to the area.

Until very recently, the Gwembi Valley people were isolated, for travel was difficult, and the hills isolated the Gwembi from the rest of the Rhodesians. Hence they developed a locally distinctive culture. In addition, the area was not looked at favorably for settlement by outsiders, because it was known for its heat and uncomfortable conditions and for its frequent famine spells (Colson, 1960: 4).

I.   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The origin of the Valley Tonga is not known. Each locality had its own myth and chronology. Toward the end of the nineteenth century

when the Europeans arrived, it was reported that: "There is no centralized form of government among these natives; they are divided into numerous little tribes or sectors, each tribe having its own settlement and being governed by its own head" (Colson, 1960: 28).

During the nineteenth century, the area was subjected to raids for the slave trade. Yet it was never incorporated into a central state. From 1860 European hunters found their way to the area, but they had little interest in it till the British South African Company took hold of the area and established Northern Rhodesia with the valley incorporated as an administrative locality in 1893. The hut tax was first imposed on the Valley people in 1904. The early administrators "contented themselves with the collection of taxes and the prevention of battles between neighborhoods" (Colson, 1960: 30). As time went on, the connection between the Valley people and the administration became minimal.

At the turn of the century, the Valley was visited by a few missionaries, but they shortly withdrew. Thus for many years the valley remained in isolation, "unsought by outsiders."

After World War II, the isolation of the area was relatively terminated. Roads were built and missionaries increased, introducing elementary schools. By 1948 there were 22 elementary schools in the whole Gwembi area.

Activities increased and trading stores were introduced. With access to clothing, salt and other goods, there developed a demand for money as a medium of exchange. However, despite these changes, the people as Colson describes them were "until the end among the most

independent of people of central Africa and the ones who were the most firmly in touch with the older world" (Colson, 1960: 34).

In 1953 Northern Rhodesia was pushed into Federation with Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia. This was opposed by the Northern Rhodesians. Yet Northern Rhodesia was controlled by the British Colonial Office till it gained independence from British rule in 1964 and became Zambia. Until then, the relationship between Europeans and Africans was a patron-client relationship. However efficient, an African who failed in deference to Europeans could expect nothing but punishment and dismissal (Colson, 1967: 95).

Zambian unrest toward British rule started in the late fifties. In 1962 the first African party was elected to rule. The Valley Tonga, though they admired the skills of the Europeans and looked up to them as their source of security, backed their own national leaders when they pushed for more say in decisions that directly affected the lives of the people. They were not, however, ready to back the National leaders all the way to independence. They were still under the myth of the protective power of the Europeans as superiors. They depended on Europeans for jobs and goods, and lacked technical knowledge, so they felt more secure if governed by Europeans rather than by Africans (Colson, 1970: 144, 145).

II.   THE VALLEY TONGA PRIOR TO RESETTLEMENT

Though the origin of the Valley Tongas is unknown, there is

reasonable certainty that there were few population movements into or out of the area. There might have occurred a little migration outside of the area because of famines, raids or pressure on agricultural land. Recently, there has been more movement -- in the form of labor migration to the Northern Rhodesia Plateau for unskilled jobs. Pressure on the land has increased due to the removal of some checks on population growth, such as the relative elimination of raids, famine relief grains, and elementary health services (Colson, 1960: 10).

The population of the area lived close to subsistence level. Each household supplied its own needs mainly through farming. This was supplemented by gathering, fishing and the raising of domestic stock. The increase in demand for cash was supplied through labor migration of male youths, the selling of tobacco cultivated in the alluvial lands of the well-to-do households, and the sporadic sale of chicken and sheep (Scudder, 1962: 34-128, 161-214).

The arable land was divided into three major categories: the alluvial land at the banks of the river that could be cultivated in the cold season; the plains land that was cultivated in the rainy season and was less fertile because of extensive cultivation through the years; and the bush-cleared land further west.

The matrilineage was the basic corporate body. Inheritance and successions followed matrilineal lines of descent. As residence was virilocal, matrilineal clans were not necessarily in the same neighborhood. Nevertheless the system of land rights and inheritance checked the dispersion of small lineages. Certain lineages might take precedence over others in a neighborhood. Thus, a member of the primary

lineage would become the ritual leader and the custodian of the local community shrines (Sikatango). This ritual headman had no power of his own. His power was derived from the inheritance of the shade of the founders. Hence it was believed that he and his lineage should not desert the area or they might be punished by the shades who would bring illness on them and their children.

Shades were the spirits of the dead that had to be integrated into the matrilineal lineage of the deceased to protect the lineage from the evil spirits and ghosts. A chosen surviving member of the lineage inherits the shade of the deceased at the funeral and he inherits with it all the privileges and rights of the dead who the shade represents. Those rights, however, remained attached to the lineage and were passed on to the next inheritor.

Personal estates consisted of two positions:

1. the material possessions of both land and moveable goods.

2. rights over descendants (Colson, 1960: 151).

The first was inherited by various kinsmen; the latter was inherited by the heir of the shade. Thus, land that belonged to father returned to the lineage of the father. Lineage land was inherited by the heir of the shade. Cleared bush land was inherited either by the heir of the shade or the father's lineage.

During the life of a man with a large land holding, he could give the right to use small plots of land to his wives, sons, or kinsmen. On his death, the land was reclaimed, especially if it had belonged to the lineage.

Women cultivated their own land inherited through their lineage.

Some women farmed plots of land given to them by their husbands in exchange for working in their husband's fields. In case of divorce or widowhood, the land could be claimed back by the husband's lineages. Hence such plots of land, though they provided grain for the household, did not procure either status or security to the women.

Due to the organization of agricultural activites, polygyny was a valued form of marriage. A head of a household with several wives and many children had access to more labor to work on his fields, which added to his wealth. Grain that was harvested beyond the food requirements of the household was turned into beer. Beer was an essential item for exchange for labor.

In addition to the well-defined and obligatory relationships among kinsmen, a system of institutionalized exchange transactions was formed between members of a neighborhood and between neighborhoods (Colson, 1960: 36-37). Bonds of friendship were also another attempt to create claims upon people who were not obligated through kinship. If a friend failed to return a present formally given to him, the relationship would be terminated.

Thus through kinship relationships, exchange relationships and friendship bonds, a complex network of interrelationships existed among members of a neighborhood or with other neighborhoods, including residents of the Plateau and of the Southern Rhodesian Tonga.

The importance of agricultural activities for the survival of the people was demonstrated in the ritualistic activities associated with planting, harvesting and rain. The ritual leader in each locality was responsible for coordinating all these activities.

In times of trouble the people would go to the spiritual leader or prophet (basangu). In contrast to the ritual leader (Sikatango), the basangu was not tied down to a specific locality, especially if he had a good reputation as rainmaker. He would be consulted by members of other neighborhoods. Thus the basangu served "as a guardian over the proper form of ceremonial, though he (might) also function as an innovator of new practices" (Scudder, 1962: 116).

III. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The basic local unit in the Valley was the neighborhood, which was a collection of homesteads. Each homestead was made up of several households, each consisting of a married woman and her children. The Head of the homestead was the father or the inheritor of his shade.

Every neighborhood had its own ritual leader and prophet. The ritual leader was not a ruler. His duties, privileges and authority were well-defined and limited to the coordinating of agricultural activities. Though there were considerable variation in size of individual holdings within each neighborhood, there was no class of wealthy land owners. There were, however, heads of households that had access to more labor through polygyny, or through possessing an ox and a plough that would be exchanged for labor on their fields.

The concepts of village and chieftaincies were introduced by the administration. A headman was appointed for each village. Several villages were grouped as chieftaincies, and chiefs were also appointed.

But the appointed leaders were not usually the actual, prominent leaders, as the people mistrusted the administration. Later on, with the plan for indirect rule, small chieftaincies were amalgamated into seven larger chieftaincies. The seven chiefs with councillors formed the Valley Tonga Native Authority in 1939 (Colson, 1960: 31-32).

This local administrative set-up did not impress the Valley Tonga. The neighborhood remained as the basic local unit. The chiefs and the Authority had very limited control or influence on the everyday life of the people. On the contrary, the Tonga were discontented with the imposed structure because it decreased chances of contact with European patrons. "The Tonga, especially the progressive men, wanted direct access to the (European) District Officer" (Colson, 1967: 95).

The appointed headman of a village had no ritual duties to perform. He served as an intermediary between the administration and the people.

IV. RELOCATION IN 1958

As in any case of forced movement of collectivities, once the policy decision has been made, and the move is compulsory, the government, as an initiating agency, assumes a degree of responsibility toward the relocated population. The difference, however, in the degree of involvement and the complexity and goals of the relocation plans are to a large extent a reflection of the political ideology and development policy of the government involved.

The movement of the Valley Tonga was necessary and compulsory due to the construction of the Kariba Dam and the flooding of the Valley by the great lake. In Northern Rhodesia, the government paid one million pounds to almost 30,000 evacuees. Half of the compensation money was given to the Native Authority and the rest to the people: to every head of household on a per capita basis (Brokensha and Scudder, 1969: 29). The people were expected to build their own villages. Government assistance was restricted to the transportation and provision of customary building materials.

As early as the middle of 1955, the District Commissioner and the Chief Councillor of the Native Authority toured the Valley. They held meetings, attended by the local chiefs and headmen and members of the general public to discuss plans and problems of relocation. At that time the Tonga were reported to have been cooperative (Colson, 1960: 219). Still, the timing was not well planned, and relocation was a crash program to get the people physically moved before the area was flooded.

As a consequence, the people were relocated before the new environments were prepared to receive them. It took the Tongas two years to clear sufficient land to meet their basic subsistence needs. These conditions were aggravated by the timing of the move. The resentment of the people against relocation delayed the actual move until the beginning of the rainy season. The Tonga had already prepared their original land for cultivation, and it was too late to plant in the new area. Hence, they lost the sowing season (Clements, 1959: 141). Most of the compensation money was spent buying grains during the

hunger period.

Colson summarized the traumatic experience of the Tonga by writing:

> "Against their protests they were moved to the desolate
> hills which lay above the future shorelines of the lake,
> and then they had known some years of helpless indig-
> nation, hunger, hardship, and much labor in pioneering
> the bush. Only with the harvest of 1960 did they begin
> to grow enough food to feed themselves; only in 1962
> did they have an abundance of food. In 1962 the country-
> side still showed signs of its recent occupancy, though
> it was no longer regarded as frighteningly strange"
> (Colson, 1970: 144).

V.   RESENTMENT AND CONFRONTATION

Though the Tonga showed relative cooperation in discussions with authorities on the possibilities of relocating, when the actual time arrived, they were quite resentful over the move. They could not believe or conceptualize the fact of their lands being flooded by the lake. They mistrusted the European administration, and felt that they were being removed so that the Europeans would use the alluvial land that had been supporting them for so many years (Scudder, 1966: 102; Clements, 1959: 148).

In addition, the Tonga were so tied to their shrines, they were afraid of mishaps if they left their shrines and ancestral shades. Over and above, their ties of kinships and friendship would be disrupted; this increased the anxiety of the people and added fuel to their resentment against the move.

Nevertheless, those who actually rioted and used violence to

oppose the move were a segment of a tribe who were to be moved further to unknown areas. Most of the evacuees were moved few miles westward toward the Plateau. On the other hand, over 6,000 people had no suitable land adjoining their old settlements, so they were moved near the Lusito River over one hundred miles from their old homes. This meant a split of the tribe into two sections, separated by considerable distance.

The opposition was further enhanced by nationalistic political agitators at this time, who challenged the political power of Europeans in the fifties. The African Nationalist Congress was the first African party to appear. They encouraged the Valley Tongas to oppose the move itself.

As a result, the White Northern Rhodesian Government used armed forces and opened fire. The protestors were joined by other men of adjacent neighborhoods. It was reported that as a consequence of the armed resistance and violence, eight people were killed and over thirty of them were wounded (Clement, 1959: 82).

Regardless of the disbelief of the Tongas that this land would really be flooded, and regardless of their conviction that they would not be forced to move, relocation took place and by the end of 1958, all the Northern Rhodesian Valley Tonga were moved to their new homes.

VI.   RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT

A.   Psychological Reactions

The move was accompanied by tremendous stress.

"To be wrenched from home, as a result of what seems to be an arbitrary and unjustifiable government action, is especially difficult for relatively isolated human populations whose members (and their ancestors) have derived most of their support from local resources for as long as they remember" (Brokensha and Scudder, 1968: 25).

Morbidity and mortality rates increased after resettlement. This was attributed to the sudden changes in food consumption, higher population density and lowered resistance to illness because of stress (Scudder, 1966: 105). The rise in mortality aggravated the stress and anxiety of the people. They were uncertain of their relationship both to the land and to the receiving population.

Scudder reported a "crisis of identity" among the Tonga of the Lusito area (Scudder, 1968: 173).

This group, however, adjusted to the situation by utilizing their prelocation pattern of bonds of friendship. Instrumental friendships between wealthy villagers and their indigenous counterparts were developed. Those who had large underutilized alluvial holdings became the "important strangers" with whom the Tonga cultivated bonds of friendship (Scudder, 1968: 173).

B.   Economic Reactions

Three major economic changes occurred after resettlement: change in the land holding system, change in the occupational structure, and an increase in cash cropping.

The land that the Tonga cultivated in the new area was less

fertile because it had not long been cultivated like the fields in the old area (Colson, 1966: 6). Few people invested their compensation money in buying ploughs and oxen. Hence livestock became more essential in cultivation.

Most land available for cultivation, however, was land cleared from the bush by the effort of the owner. Thus lineages lost their land base though they became important for the livestock. Table shows the change in land holding sources for males and females in one village between 1956 prior to relocation and 1962.

TABLE 6

CHANGE IN SOURCES OF LAND IN CHEZIA
VILLAGE, 1956 to 1962, IN PERCENTS

		From Maternal Lineages	From Paternal Lineages	Cleared by Own Effort	From Husbands	Total
Male	1956	57.4%	17.1%	22.8%	-	97.3%
	1962	4.3	5.3	88.1	-	97.7
Female	1956	31.8	11.4	-	53.0	96.2
	1962	14.4	5.5	-	70.2	90.1

Source: Colson, 1966: 2; calculated from the text.
(Discrepancies in totals are in the original source.)

The table shows a vast decrease in land holdings from maternal lineages and paternal inheritance. Most women depended on their husbands to clear land for them to cultivate. With these changes in land holdings, men have greater control over the fields. On the other hand, women have less security: in case of divorce or separation, they lose the land.

Consequently, relationships between husband and wife and children were also changed. With no lineage land, the wives and children became more dependent on the father who exchanged this support and services for labor in his fields. The compensation money which was given to the father was used to enhance his resources to clear more land and control more labor (Colson, 1964: 10).

This situation might be a transitory stage. With time, the importance of lineage holdings might increase though it could lead to fragmentation of land holdings. Nevertheless, the enhancement of the elders and the resentment of youth might have longlasting implications.

The second major change in the economic structure has been the increase in occupational opportunities. Other ways of life are beginning to be envisaged besides farming. More specialized occupations are available such as fishermen, craftsmen, traders, civil servants, teachers, etc. There was a marked drop in labor migration immediately after resettlement, as labor was needed to build the homesteads and to clear the fields. More and more men are going to towns for jobs leaving the fields for their wives to cultivate. Some even take their families to towns (Colson, 1966: 6). This might ease the pressure on the land and decrease quarrels over land.

The development of the lake fishing industry will also have an impact on concept of ownership, organization of labor, skills (Colson, 1960: 202). Fishing will require pooling of resources and joint ownership which is alien to the existing concept of individual owner- ship. There are no further reports on the degree of development of the fishing industry among the relocated Tonga. As a long term adjustment process, its consequences still remain to be seen.

The third crucial change that occurred in the economic institutions is the increase in the money nexus through cash-cropping and wage labor. Tonga farmers have now started to cultivate cotton and sorghum for cash.

There is a noticeable increase in stores and in primary schools. By 1962, Colson reports that the people were more or less settled though they still resented the resettlement. With two good years of rainy seasons the harvest was exceptionally good. The fishing industry, too, opened opportunities for occupations other than farming and allowed the development of local market for selling of produce such as beer. "The material standard of living indicated that people were handling more money than at the Zambesi" (Colson, 1964: 7).

C.   Changes in the Power Structure

After resettlement, the Tonga experienced a radical shift in holders of power, status and influence within the community. The prelocation bases of influence and authority were drastically changed

in the new environment, with a concomitant decline of power of previous heads or leaders.

Among those who lost the most in power and prestige were the local ritual leaders. They experienced a decline in their official status, for their position was anchored to the old locality and the shrines no longer operated in the new area. Disputes over land were few and their power was reduced, especially with the enhancement of the positions of administrators. They lost their alluvial land on which they grew tobacco as a cash crop. Most of them looked for laboring jobs outside the village; this added to their loss of status and power in the neighborhood (Colson, 1964: 9).

With the move, the administration gained more power and control. As in Zambia, strong local authorities were encouraged, and the position of the appointed chief was enhanced. The support of the chiefs for the administration, particularly during resettlement, gained them the dislike and antagonism of the people, who were indifferent to them prior to resettlement. The chiefs had their authority and power consolidated by the government administration in line with the policy of building up local government. The Gwembi Native Authority became rich from resettlement compensation and taxes levied on fishing licenses and the beer trade. This led to an increase in the salaries of the chiefs (Colson, 1964: 8). "Chiefs now tended to live a life apart from their people and regarded themselves as people set above the rest of the population" (Colson, 1964: 8).

The only way the people could curtail the power and authority of the local administrators was with the support of political parties.

The increase in the popularity of the African political parties limited the arbitrary power of administrative chiefs, as the parties had access to public press (Colson, 1964: 8).

The power of the elders in the communities was also enhanced by their increased control over land. The youth of the few years after resettlement were the children of the fifties who were exposed to the teachings of missionary schools. The mission stations were not successful in converting students to Christianity, though they were successful in making them doubt the truth of their own religion and the power of the dead on the lives of the living (Colson, 1970: 147). They challenged the belief of the elders as early as 1953 by not taking part in offerings to the shrines.

By the sixties when they were through primary schools, clerical jobs became quite limited. Refusing to forego their achieved skills by taking unskilled jobs, the young people returned to their villages. In addition to being under control of the elders, they were ridiculed and were not respected by the elders because of their idle life (Colson, 1970: 147; and 1964: 11).

D.   Revitalization Movements as Response to Crisis

Colson reports an interesting revitalization movement that occurred among the youth of a relocated village, Chezia, in 1962, four years after resettlement. The movement appeared to be a response to the general crisis of relocation and to the specific increase of

domination by the elders over the youth (Colson, 1970: 146).

The movement was a reflection of the disillusionment of youth created by the disruption in the continuity of the established goals and relationships. Colson reports several factors that led to this disillusionment (Colson, 1970: 144).

The relationship of the Tonga vis-a-vis the Europeans has changed. They lost faith in the Europeans, especially after the whites fired at villagers in order to relocate them. On the other hand, they admired their power in moving the villagers and their technical power in building the dam. Their sense of security with the rule of Europeans was also endangered because the administration was being shifted from Europeans to Africans, after the United National Independence Party came into power in 1962 with a speedy program to complete independence. The villagers held this, too, against the Europeans. First they threw them into the hills by force and then without considering local wishes they were turning over the rule to the National African Party (Colson, 1970: 145).

The villagers' belief in the powers of local spirits was also shaken. The spirits did not protect the people from the move and they did not even punish the Europeans. The spirits' effectiveness in the new area was also doubtful. The harvest of 1962, after the local rituals were abandoned for four years, shook the belief in local prophets. Scepticism was apparent (Colson, 1970: 144).

The secular leaders were not strong enough entirely to replace the spiritual leaders. The fluidity of the situation increased the disillusionment of the people especially the youth. They were exploited

by the elders to work for their support. The channels for labor
migration were closed. Thus they formed a discontented group that
opposed the domination of the elders (Colson, 1970: 148).

As a reaction to the discontent and a response to the general
crisis of relocation, strong enthusiasm for Christianity was shown in
1962-1963. The movement included school children, discontented youths,
a few senior men who were in "peripheral" positions, and only two
elders (Colson, 1970: 149).

Thus the movement was basically composed of young people. It
was tailored to their desires and view of life. The new religion was
specifically appealing to youth. It was a means to obtain European
knowledge: the source of European power and wealth. Only those who
can read can have access to the only source of truth: the Bible. This
undercut the authority of the elders who could not read. As Colson
writes:

> "It provided the one secure defence that youth had
> against those who because of their seniority could
> claim to know the rules of life better than did the
> young. In the name of the Bible, the young men and
> children could claim authority equal or higher than
> that of the elders" (Colson, 1970: 150).

Christ was not important for this Christian movement except when
He healed the sick. His death was used to demonstrate the cruelty of
the Europeans who killed Him. They lacked all interest in the rising
of Christ from the dead and His second coming. This was a blow to the
power of diviners and those who controlled the cult of the shades: the
dead are dead, they have no power (Colson, 1970: 153).

The movement died out in a little over a year. The first to

turn away were the elders and the senior young men. The young men lost their zeal, though they maintained their opposition to the shades. As the harvest season was over, they tried to find work in fisheries. The children kept their zeal the longest. On the whole, the movement died out when the power and knowledge of Europeans was needed no more.

FOOTNOTE

[1]This study is based almost exclusively on the research done in the area by Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder in 1956-1957 and 1962-1963.

MAP 3: NORTHERN MARSHALL ISLANDS

BIKINI ATOLL

RONGELAB
ATOLL

AILINGINAE
ATOLL

RONGERIK
ATOLL

WOTHO ATOLL

KWAJALEIN
ATOLL

UJAE
ATOLL

LAE ATOLL

ELIB ISLAND

NAMU ATOLL

| 0 | 50 | 100 | 150 | 200 miles |

CHAPTER VI

THE RELOCATION OF THE BIKINI MARSHALLESE[1]

The Bikini Marshallese lived in Bikini, one of the 30 atolls of
the Marshall Islands in the Pacific. The island was selected by the
United States Navy Department as the site for a nuclear experiment, an
atomic bomb explosion, in 1946. Consequently, the inhabitants, 167 in
number, were moved to another atoll. The move, carried out under
pressure of limited time, was not successful. Bikinians faced a crisis
of starvation at the new atoll. Having to experience the traumatic
experience of three successive moves, the Bikinians were finally
resettled in a southern atoll, Kili, in 1948. This part of the study
will review the pre-crisis conditions of the Bikinians, the emergency
action-system of the Bikinians, and their responses to the crisis of
forced relocation.

I.   GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Bikini atoll is composed of twenty-six islands. Only four of
these islands could support permanent human occupation. The rest of the
land was called rārōk, as it was less desirable land, covered with
shrub and a few coconut trees. Eonene was the land where people built
their dwellings: it could support a more dense population because of
the abundance of fruits and vegetation. Before relocation, the
population lived on Bikini island and occasionally went to other islands

on collecting trips.

The Bikini atoll possessed a lagoon 229 square miles in area. This area was more than twice the size of the land area. The size of the lagoon was an important physical asset, facilitating fishing and sailing to and from the island. Sailing was considered a crucial economic and recreational activity by the Bikinians.

Unlike the Southern Marshall atolls, the northern atolls did not enjoy the same amount of rain. Bikini had strong north-east winds, with no rain from December to April. These winds were dangerous for sailing, and fishing activities could be carried on only in the lagoon. In the summer months, winds were from the east, with rain and frequent storms.

The uneven distribution of rain throughout the year increased the probability of thirst and starvation of the population during the dry winter months. Arrangements were made to store water in rocky ground depressions and coconut shells. In recent decades, the Bikinians had started building large concrete cisterns to store water for dry seasons.

The yearly temperatures on the other hand did not fluctuate. The annual mean temperature was 80 Fahrenheit. Humidity, though, was high, about 85 . Still, it was less than the humidity in southern atolls, where there was more rainfall through the year.

The atoll's poor weather conditions restricted the vegetation on the island as well as the diet of the Bikinians. They basically survived on fish caught from the lagoon or the ocean; on coconut, pandarus, and arrowroots. Though the island resources were relatively

meager, the Bikinians had managed to organize and subsist in this environment for generations.

The Bikinians lived in relative isolation, even in contrast to other Marshallese atolls. The southern atolls first came in contact with outside civilization as they exported copra-dried meat of coconut fruit. They were the first to come under the influence of Christianity. The northern islands, especially Bikini, were not influenced by these cultural contacts. Thus, the Bikinians were considered conservative by other Marshallese (Mason, 1954: 32).

The first contact of the Bikinians with Christianity was around 1908. A mission station was established with a native pastor from the south Marshallese. Before that, the Bikinians had almost no contact with the German protectorate established over all the Marshalls around 1885. The Germans did not collect copra from Bikini because of the dryness and the unprofitable conditions of the atoll.

In 1914, the Germans were replaced by the Japanese in the "international chess game associated with the first World War" (Mason, 1954: 27). The Japanese introduced a system of commercial transport which facilitated the travelling of Bikinians beyond their reef. They travelled to other atolls for various reasons. Some went to the medical dispensary in Kwajalein, the Japanese military base. Others went to elementary school, or to labor on military projects.

Bikinians' contact with the outside world was further enhanced when the Americans took control of the Marshallese in 1944 after the second World War. A military government official visited the island monthly, bringing medical aid, trading supplies for handicrafts, and

stressing law and order. The Bikinians used these regular field-trip vessels for transportation to other atolls, especially Kwajalein, which remained the center of American military and administrative activities in the Marshalls.

Mason reports, based on a sample, that about 75 percent to 80 percent of all Bikinians had made at least one trip away from Bikini to other atolls. Most of this travel was limited to single trip for each person. The duration of the visits, however, rarely exceeded one year.

Thus, though the Bikinians were exposed to three different colonial administrations, and experienced changes in each phase; and though they had the opportunity to travel and acquaint themselves with other groups, "the Bikinians may truly be said to have known little but their own lives at Bikini" (Mason, 1954: 32). Bikinians remained quite attached to their group and to their atoll, in spite of the experiences to which they were exposed.

II.   PRE-LOCATION CONDITIONS

The population of Bikini at the onset of the move was 186. Around twenty were out of the atoll at the time of the move. They all belonged to one of three major clans. "Clan...is defined as a group of persons who trace lineal descent from a common legendary ancestor, and is matrilineal and non-localized in character" (Mason, 1954: 93). They practiced clan exogamy.[2]

The group lived in one village located on the island of Bikini. Dwelling units were scattered according to land ownership, with one

street passing between the huts. Each dwelling was composed of a
nuclear family of five or six. Labor was divided according to sex.
Men were responsible for fishing, planting of coconuts and pandanus,
collection of fruits from such trees, and production of fire by the
plow method (friction). They were also responsible for making coconut
sennit, for scraping pandarus cones after they were cooked by women for
preservation, and for producing flour of arrowroot tubers.

The women were responsible for work "associated with the ground
oven and the open fire, and for all preparation and plaiting of pandarus
leaf fiber." They collected shellfish from shallow waters. Supposedly,
the division of labor by sexes was on the basis of danger and risk
involved in the activity, or the amount of masculine effort required.

The Bikinians managed to live by a marginal subsistence economy.
Small amounts of cash were earned from outsiders by trading handicrafts
done by women as souvenirs for Japanese and Americans, or by selling
copra. Both of these activities did not procure much cash. For
Bikinians, coconuts were essential for food consumption. There was
very little surplus for trade with Japanese. The annual per-capita
cash income for Bikinians was around four dollars. The cash earned from
trade was used for such consumer goods as tobacco and rice, to supplement
their food diet. This, too, was interrupted through the war years,
because of the deterioration of transportation from Japan.

III.   SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

The Bikinians were organized in two basic social units, though they were not equal in importance. The first and most important was what Mason called the "cooking group." This was more or less an extended matrilineal family. Each of the eleven extended families in Bikini was represented by an _alab_ or a leader who was usually the hereditary headman of the matrilineage. Land on the atoll was assigned to one or another of these lineage groups which comprised the community.

The second social unit was the "sleeping group," or members of a dwelling, mostly the nuclear family. The nuclear family was subordinated to the lineage or extended family. Members of the lineage shared rights to real property, and formed the core of economic work unit.

The land, however, was not owned by the Bikinians. They had only the right of usage. The land was owned by a paramount chief (_iroij-Lablab_) who inherited the land from his lineage. Originally, the land was obtained by conquest. Those islanders who lived in the area paid tribute to the paramount chief, almost like the feudal system in Europe in the Middle Ages. The chief of Bikini lived in another atoll -- Ailinglablab. All Bikinians were subject to the authority of the paramount chief. Tribute was paid periodically in form of food, mats, coconut oil, money, or anything produced by the labor of Bikinians who lived on the land. On his side, the chief was supposed to give protection and assistance in times of emergency as well as to represent the group in dealings with Europeans.

Though the Bikinians became Christians as a result of mission work, they retained elements of their traditional beliefs. They believed

in good spirits and evil spirits. They also kept the taboos against

certain places, foods, and activities. Among these beliefs was that in

the aura of spiritual force that surrounded the paramount chief. As

Mason explained it:

> "Although Bikinians did not support an iroij-lablab
> (paramount chief) on their atoll, they retained a
> sense of awe bordering on fear of the royal personage
> whenever he visited Bikini. This fear was not due
> entirely to the chieftain's secular power of life and
> death over his subjects, although doubtless it was
> strongly reinforced by such, but involved a conviction
> on the part of the people that improper attitudes
> toward their paramount chief might well invite super-
> natural punishment" (Mason, 1954: 255).

The relationship between the paramount chief and their subjects

was perpetuated and accentuated by the foreign administration of the

Germans and the Japanese successively. The Americans, however, intro-

duced a new democratic form of self-rule. In each community they

organized the lineage heads (alab) into a council which elected local

officials: the magistrate or atoll leader, the scribe, and two police-

men. "They were required to record all births, deaths, to maintain an

orderly community, and to see that American directives as issued from

time to time were carried out" (Mason, 1954: 249). This government

system included all the traditional lineages and sub-clan leaders.

Thus, it was significant in integrating the "traditional local leader-

ship within the American pattern of Council Government" (Mason, 1954:

250). The American administration, however, did not interfere in the

relationship between the local government and their paramount chiefs.

Yet, consequently the chiefs' over-all authority was undermined as the

American Military administration replaced the chiefs' role of offering

services to their subjects as well as representing them to the outside

world.

The Americans introduced three new services to the Bikinians on their own atoll. They trained an elementary school teacher from the Bikinians and supplied most of the school equipment as well as paying the salary of the teacher. Another young Bikinian was trained as a medical practitioner for first aid. The Americans also established a store with a Bikinian store keeper.

Thus when the Bikinians were approached to evacuate their atoll for American nuclear experiments, the American administration had almost replaced the need for the paramount chief. The traditional patron-client relationship between the chief and the Bikinians had been transformed by the Americans. With the recognition of the local leaders and the various services introduced, the Bikinians felt a moral obligation to temporarily sacrifice their home for the good of the United States.

IV.   THE FIRST MOVE IN 1946

The move of all Bikinians from Bikini atoll was necessitated by the need of the United States government to conduct a test "in order to determine the effect of atomic bombs on American war ships." The decision to select Bikini as the site for the test, or "Operation Cross-road," was officially made on January 24, 1946, before any consultation with the Bikinians. Mason mentioned the factors that led to the choice of Bikini as:

> "...it was located in an American-controlled area; it
> was subject to steady trade winds from November to
> July; a great expanse of ocean to the southwest was
> uninterrupted by islands; the atoll was outside the
> usual typhoon area; it was outside the commercial
> lanes of transpacific travel and only 215 miles
> north of the naval air base at Kwajalein. Finally,
> there was a population of only 167 natives to be
> moved elsewhere" (Mason, 1954: 260).

With all the advantages of Bikini atoll, the relocation of the

population was considered as a minor sacrifice for the national security

of the United States.

On the tenth of February, the military governor of the Marshalls

arrived with his staff to secure the nominal consent of the Bikinians

for their evacuation. He explained the operation and its importance to

the United States government. He later asked them, through an interpret-

er, if they were willing to leave Bikini and settle in another atoll.

This situation was succinctly described by Mason as follows:

> "As Wyatt (governor of the Marshall Islands) later told
> newsmen at Kwajalein, 'that was a tough job..., if one
> man in the crowd said, 'I will not leave,' it meant
> trouble and bad feelings. I told the story as simply
> as I could, and made no commitments.' The Bikinians
> discussed the matter among themselves, a subject which
> they could scarcely have comprehended in all of its
> ramification. That which conceivably they did under-
> stand was a request by the United States, whose Navy
> and Army had delivered them from hunger and hardship
> during the war, to yield up their home land for tests
> which were exceedingly important" (Mason, 1954: 263,
> emphasis added).

No dissent was recorded or reported. The conditions offered

the Bikinians no alternative choice. If the government of the United

States wanted them to leave, then they could only obey (Mason, 1950: 6).

The decision on the site of relocation was postponed until the

exploration of available possibilities. Finally the atoll of Rongerik

was selected with the consent of the majority of the Council members.
The new site was uninhabited which was in agreement with the Bikinian
preference for isolation and community autonomy. It also lacked
navigational hazards. On the other hand, the quality of coconut trees
was not impressive. The island was associated with a well-known myth
among the Marshallese of an evil spirit that died there and poisoned the
fish of the sea as well as land vegetation. Nevertheless, the Bikinian
leaders agreed, nine to two, to be moved to Rongerik for two basic
reasons. First, they were officially Christian in religion and were
hesitant to bring up their pagan beliefs. Second, perceiving the move
as temporary, they were not in a position to fuss over the place as part
of their ascribed duty toward their new patron, the United States
government.

In less than five weeks the move was accomplished. A few male
Bikinians went first to the new site to build huts and cisterns for the
group. On March 7, the Bikinians were moved to Rongerik. The move
itself was relatively smooth and according to schedule, as the Bikinians
were quite understanding and cooperative. The administration, too, had
its own interest in making the move without any troubles. As was
quoted by Mason:

> "(the Move) has elicited a certain public interest
> because of the unusual circumstances which has induced
> it. The operation may be said to have political
> implications of a supranational character and it is
> desired that it be accomplished without unfortunate
> incidents of any kind" (Mason, 1954: 273).

The first response of the Bikinians that was reported was a
reaction of fluidity of responses. The reaction was "one of satisfaction
without enthusiasm. In some quarters...a feeling of dispiritedness, and

this was not easily dissipated."

Nevertheless, the official news reports that were released to the American public were different. They glorified the success of the military administration and fabricated the enthusiasm of the natives.

"The Seabees built a model village on Rongerik that anyone would be proud to live in, complete down to Chick Salers of the latest model, which it is hoped the natives will admire and perhaps use. The natives are delighted, enthusiastic about the atomic bomb, which already has brought the prosperity and a new and promising future" (Mason, 1954: 284).

During the two years of living on Rongerik, the Bikinians vacillated between their yearning to go back to Bikini, and their efforts to survive on the new site, which was a second-rate substitute for their own atoll. They suffered a critical food shortage and were on the verge of starvation.

The accustomed ways of solving their living problems in Bikini were not appropriate in the new conditions. On the other hand, their knowledge and skills were limited to the conditions in Bikini, and did not help toward an efficient utilization of the meager resources of the new site.

As conditions worsened, survival of the group became the most important goal for the collectivity. Consequently, they reorganized relationships and redefined roles. They reorganized the work and distribution of food at the community level. The social unit of the extended lineage family was subordinated to the collectivity. The Council met each day to make up work plans and divide the work among the males. Later in the day, whatever food was collected was distributed in equal shares among the collectivity, with special attention to the

old and to the young children.

This reorganization of community relationships helped the
collectivity to cope temporarily with the critical food and water
shortage. It did not, however, solve the problem of resources. The
health conditions of the group deteriorated from malnutrition. At first,
the military administration defined the situation as "the natives were
tending to rely too much on American help, and were losing self-
reliance" (Mason, 1954: 290). Later, with the anticipation of inter-
national supervision of the Marshalls as part of the Trust Territories,[3]
the administration was forced to redefine the situation and to take
action to ameliorate the famine disaster that Bikinians were experiencing
at Rongerik.

National internal politics also necessitated action from the
military administration. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin on October 4, 1947,
published a column by a former Secretary of Interior, "a long-time critic
of Navy Department," in which he "implied that experimental animals who
survived the atomic blasts at Bikini had received more consideration
than Bikinians, who had been persuaded by the Navy to move to Rongerik
atoll as their contribution to the advancement of science" (Mason, 1954:
321).

The New York Times wrote on October 3, 1947:

"Bikini people deserve a lot more than they have been
given by the richest country in the world. Their debt
can never be fully paid. Perhaps the current publicity
will make Navy officials more conscious of their
responsibility" (Mason, 1954: 322-323).

Another editorial in the Star-Bulletin on October 4, 1947,
charged the administration:

"We could spend tens of millions for Bikini experiment.
But we couldn't spend the tiny time and trivial money
to see that 160 natives...were properly cared for where
we ordered them to go. We were more interested in
promoting death than in sustaining life..." (Mason, 1954:
323).

The pressures that were exerted on the administration were
external pressures either from the international scene, from internal
political rivalries, or a positive image of the United States and its
role as the savior of the world from misery. No pressure, however, was
reported that stemmed from the collectivity itself. They quietly met
their fate, trying to the best of their knowledge to cope with conditions
without perceiving the American military administration as the source of
the threat.

V.   THE SECOND MOVE

Finally, with the realization of the critical conditions at
Rongerik, the administration before deciding with the Bikinians on the
new site for resettlement, moved the group on March 15, 1948 to
Kwajalein Island, the military base. Separate quarters were assinged to
the Bikinians, but they shared meals in mess halls provided by the
administration.

During the collectivity's stay at Kwajalein, they were exposed
to other less conservative Marshallese working at the base. They also
came into direct contact with American culture. For the first time,
their isolation was broken. Some of them worked at the base and with
the money they earned bought consumer goods available such as clothes,

ornaments, watches, cigarettes and cokes.

After five months, the attraction and novelty of the base subsided. The Bikinians became more restless and wanted to resettle on a Marshallese Island and resume their "normal" activities. A plebiscite was carried out by the administration to assure that the opinion of all members of the group would be considered on the important decision of selecting the new and final site for resettlement.

Kili Island was one of the proposed alternatives. It would be a source of wealth for the Bikinians, as it produced and traded copra. It was also outside the domain of ownership of their paramount chief, which might raise the possibility of terminating the traditional relationship. However, the American administration recommended that the title to the land at Kili be vested in the paramount chief of Bikini with the rights and privileges that he enjoyed at Bikini. On the other hand, Kili had no lagoon which meant that navigational hazards would affect fishing activities as well as sailing to and from the island.

The result of the plebiscite revealed a 54 to 22 choice of Kili as a site for resettlement. The Bikinians opted for their autonomy on a resources-stocked island despite the difficulties associated with the reef, rather than consenting to share an island with other Marshallese and be subordinated to the existing government council.

VI.   THE THIRD MOVE

On November 2, 1948, the Bikinians were moved for the third time to settle on Kili Island. Immediately work started on building the

housing units and cisterns needed and collecting food to supplement the government rations.

Work on copra production was later started. Bikinians sold their copra and paid the sales money to the credit fund that was accumulating from trade goods. Older people were upset by the condition of the reef and lack of a lagoon. Their fishing skill was basically centered on lagoon fishing. The younger population, on the other hand, were less concerned by this draw-back and were looking forward to applying the knowledge and skill they acquired in developing the island resources and reorganizing relationships within the community in accordance with the new ideas to which they had been exposed.

A.   Responses to Relocation

At Kili, the Bikinians confronted two physical problems that ran counter to their values. The lack of a lagoon deprived the Bikinians from well established activities of sailing and fishing that were important for survival and relaxation. The land conditions were also different from Bikini. Though the land was strange, it presented unlimited possibilities for material improvement of the whole community.

Coconut trees were abundant, but the land needed clearing from shrubs, which required long hours of tedious work without direct, immediate results. The land lacked the familiar vegetation that the Bikinians were used to in Bikini, such as pandanus and arrowroot. To compensate for food stuff, they had to plant other, new crops for which they first had to develop a taste, before they could be motivated to go

through the required sustained work for weeks with material returns deferred to the future.

Even the production of copra was a problem, regardless of the thousands of coconut trees available. In the humid weather of the south, it was difficult to dry to coconut meat. Other southern Marshallese communities had developed more complex techniques of using artificial heat to dry the fruit. Bikinians found it difficult to adopt the new complex methods.

To the older generation, all these adjustments were difficult to cope with. The sudden change from a subsistence economy to a commercially directed money economy was a great leap. They were not sufficiently motivated to adopt the tedious work schedule, as they had been used to immediate and direct gratification in Bikini. The younger group which had become oriented to work schedules and a money economy during the stay in Kwajalein, and which tasted the pleasure of consumer goods, was more motivated to work for future wealth, and these regarded the change in the action-system with little concern.

B.   Changes in Land Relationships

A matrilineal, extended family system had been the basis for land distribution in Bikini. In facing the food-shortage crisis in Rongerik, community needs undermined the importance of the extended family. This reorganization of relationships survived during the stay in Kwajalein, with the enhancement of the nuclear family as the "sleeping unit." The extended family lost control over its members.

The Council became the most important political institution for authority and control after the first move. These relationships continued in Kili. Thus, Mason reports two trends of change in the social organization of the community. First, the extended family as a social unit was undermined and the nuclear family was gaining more control over its members. Second, the ascribed status of the Council members based on their position as extended family heads was changing into an achieved status founded on their skills and competence.

These two trends were reinforced by the fact that the Bikinians postponed the distribution of land according to the traditional Marshallese customs. The young group wanted to defer the distribution until the land was cleared and productivity assessed in order to provide for more equitable distribution among the lineages. The decision was also postponed till the problem of their future relationship with the traditional paramount chief was settled.

The Bikinians viewed Kili as owned by the American government. They envisaged no right to title on the part of their paramount chief. They requested the help of the administration to cut the ties with their chief. The administration, having promised the chief the title to the land did not want to interfere in what they believed to be traditional internal ties.

C.   In-Group Feeling

The Bikinians, by the nature of their small number, their isolation prior to resettlement, and their conservative nature, were

a highly integrated community. Roles, statuses, and behavior were well defined according to matrilineal lineage system. Their in-group feeling was further enhanced by the shared experiences of the crisis of relocation. They refused two alternative sites other than Kili, because they did not want either to split the group, or to mix with other communities.

No direct nativistic reactions were reported. This could be explained by the fact that Bikinians did not experience any direct, external threat that might have created the need for elimination of alien persons, customs, or values.

Nevertheless, two contradictory forces were apparent in the community. A conservative, revivalistic force of the elders in the community and the traditional holders of authority preferred to organize the community in Kili on the traditional basis that existed in Bikini prior to the move. The other force, "exploratory and forward-looking," consisted of the younger group. They came in contact with other cultures, and were more aware of alternative ways of organizing the community other than the restricted social limits that characterized Bikinians prior to relocation. Thus, the gap between generations widened. The young group was more enthusiastic and willing to adopt changes for the sake of future well-being; the older generation remained nostalgic for the simple and restricted life in Bikini.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This review is based on the study done by L.E. Mason (1950, 1954) on the relocation of Bikinians. He collected his data through the participant-observation method, and by interviews. He also made use of official documentory materials, periodical literature, and newspapers reporting on the forced movement.

[2]Mason includes quite an interesting demographic analysis of the disequilibrium in numbers between males and females of marriageable ages and the difficulties and solutions involved in this distribution (1954: 84-121).

[3]On July 8, 1947, the United States Congress authorized the President to sign the trusteeship agreement approved by the United Nations Security Council, by which the United States acted as a trustee for the islands formerly under mandate to Japan. The Trusteeship Council provided for by the United Nations charter had the authority "to require periodic reports from the administering authority, ... to receive petitions from native inhabitants, and to provide for periodic visits to the Trust Territory by a mission composed of representatives from member nations," (Mason, 1954: 302).

PART THREE

COMPARISON AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER VII

CRISIS AND CHANGE

By definition, crisis entails -- or threatens -- change, as the normal habitual way of solving problems suddenly do not fit the new conditions. Thus, change becomes imperative, as the traditional means-ends relationships are disrupted. It is the sudden need for change that creates the crisis condition at all levels -- individual as well as collective levels.

The importance of crisis for change was demonstrated by W.I. Thomas as early as the beginning of the century. His dichotomy between attention and habit in the process of controlling the environment, attributes to crisis the arousing of attention which leads to the re-adjustment of habits.

> "When the habits are running smoothly the attention is relaxed; it is not at work. But when something happens to disturb the run of habit the attention is called into play and devises a new mode of behavior which will meet the crisis. That is the attention establishes new and adequate habits, or it is its function to do so" (Thomas, 1909: 17).

However, Thomas recognized that on this personal or individual level, change is problematic. Similar objective crises do not produce the same effect on everybody. He explained the difference by variables such as the quality of leadership and the cultural base. He also acknowledged the conservative, resisting forces against change. "The effort of attention is to preserve the present status rather than to reaccommodate" (1909: 21). Thus, change is incorporated with a maximum

of resistance.

In contemporary sociology, Nisbet followed Thomas' scheme. He was skeptical about notions of inherent sources of change within the social structure. He argued that crises, and events that produce crises, are necessary conditions for change, as change is discontinuous. Nevertheless, he was also aware of the aspect of resistance to change. He wrote:

> "...no substantial change in a social group or organization, or in the structure of any form of social behavior, takes place except under the impact of events that cause crises. It does not follow, of course, that events necessarily lead to substantial social changes. This, plainly, could never be substantiated in any proposition. Events occur or happen all the time in the life of the individual or in the history of a social organization. Usually events can be assimilated without much difficulty in the life organizations of individuals and by codes and customs in societies. Many invasion has taken place, or war broken out, or migration, famine, drought, or flood occurred, without the major elements of the social organization being more than transitory affected" (Nisbet, 1970: 328).

On the other hand, H.G. Barnett doubts the importance of crisis in generating any innovative change. He bases his argument on the assumption that psychological stress associated with anxiety and insecurity is not conducive to production of new ideas.

> "A crisis as such is neither wholly nor certainly productive of the new. Neither is it unequivocally inimical to it... The overall effect of a crisis situation is restrictive... The personal freedom to experience and to explore widely can be constrained by anxieties as well as by the design of social pressures, cultivated ignorance and legal coercives" (Barnett, 1953: 82).

It is relevant to point out that Barnett's definition of crisis is different from our working definition. Barnett implicitly defines

crisis as a situation where an individual experiences deprivation of essentials, due to wars, conquests, famines, epidemics, land alienation, economic losses, captivities, exploitations, extermination or discrimination (Barnett, 1953: 80-81). Yet, he singles out displaced and relocated groups as being more receptive to new ideas for survival in new physical and social conditions. "Migrants and dispossessed populations are characteristically receptive to new ideas, whether those are developed by their own members or suggested by outsiders" (Barnett, 1953: 87).

Change, then, as a variable is problematic. The question arises, as Moore puts it -- what changes? There are short-term and long-term changes. There are even significant as well as insignificant changes that have to be distinguished by criteria of significance (Moore, 1967).

Human, organized groups, by the mere fact of their existence or survival, imply processes of adaptation and adjustments to internal and external requirements and needs. Thus change is a complex phenomena in all social organizations on the cultural, societal, and personal levels. As Service notes, "Primitive cultures cannot be explained by mental capacities, but by the survival into the present of ancient forms which because of relative isolation have maintained a relatively stable adaptation" (Service, 1968: 8).

Stability itself as a concept should include in its definition, processes of adaptation and change; unless it is used to connote a static state which is not usually an attribute of human groups. Adversaries of the structuralist-functionalist approach rightly criticize the static orientation and the incapacity of the approach to

incorporate adaptation processes and change.

Buckley, in his approach to human groups as "open systems," conceptualized clearly the adaptive nature of social systems (Buckley, 1967). Adaptation, however, as a process, has various levels and dimensions which differentiate various processes. Buckley did not develop in his model criteria by which various adaptation processes could be assessed or compared.

Mere survival, at whatever level or capacity, connotes adaptation. Adaptation is defined in the Dictionary of Social Sciences as, "The process and resultant conditions in which change in the organism, system of organization, group or culture, aids the survival, functioning, maintenance and achievement of purpose on the part of an organism, personality, group, culture or any part thereof." The incapacity to survive as an entity means either complete disintegration and in a sense annihilation, or complete assimilation.

The former in Toynbee's concept is "perilous immobility at high tension" (Pieris, 1969: 12-13). The rigid socio-cultural complex does not allow for adaptive processes, and the result is extinction of the group.

Herbert C. Taylor did a study on two communities: the Norse Greenland community between 986-1500 A.D., and the Pecos River Focus. Both communities were faced with changed physical conditions. The Norse Greenlanders experienced "cultural death," as the social order was incapable of adapting to sudden changes in physical conditions. The potentialities of the cultural conditions, lacking external cultural stimuli failed to produce new societal solutions to cope with the sudden

environmental change. Though Taylor failed to explain the difference
between the complete physical and cultural death of the Norse Greenlanders
and the adoption of gathering as an economic activity by the Pecos River
community, his generalization still holds true:

> "In times of stress a social order not in receipt of
> extra-societal cultural diffusion will tend to
> emphasize certain of its old patterns or institutions
> rather than forming new patterns to adjust to the new
> environment. If stress is sufficiently severe and
> society sufficiently isolated, by geography or
> artifice, from other cultures, cultural death will
> eventually result" (Taylor, 1951: 90).

In other words, social orders -- in isolation -- are incapable
of breaking through crisis by changing their traditional patterns to
confront sudden changing environmental conditions. Hence, "cultural
death" is experienced. "Cultural death" in the case of the Greenland
Norse meant actual physical extinction.

In our four cases, the Bikinians came closest to Taylor's case of
"cultural death." Left alone to struggle for survival in an alien new
environment on the island of Rongerik, the Bikinians were unable to
adjust their old established ways of survival to the demands of the new
situation. Their health deteriorated and they experienced famines which
would have led to the extinction of the collectivity in due time. The
Bikinians were unable to innovate new means on their own to improve
their subsistence pattern of survival. The only change that they intro-
duced was the reorganization of community relations to give priority to
the collectivity, rather than to the extended lineage family, in work
organization and food distribution.

This innovative change ameliorated -- to a limited degree --
famine conditions, and lengthened the survival capacity of the

collectivity in the new, hostile environment. They were not, however, successful in innovating new means to increase food or water supplies.

Their only rescue from extinction came from the military government of the United States. Pressured by international forces and local political rivalries, the American government extended help by relocating them in another atoll, thus providing new means to help the collectivity to adapt to their new environment.

Hence, the Bikinians even though they did not actually experience "cultural death," still reinforce Taylor's thesis. Established social orders, because of their conservative nature, are incapable of generating change within the traditional system to cope with sudden new changing environments, without interaction with other systems for the diffusion of new patterns to increase the number of alternative solutions of the new problems.

A second major proposition that Taylor introduced in his thesis is that acculturation "is not an inevitable result of continuous contact between two cultural entities" (1951: 90). For isolated communities to achieve an "abrupt break with the past," they need the aid of "inter-cultural stimulus diffusion" (Taylor, 1951: 81). Nevertheless, the availability of contact opportunities with other systems does not lead necessarily to the adoption of patterns of survival from another existing system. The Norse Greenlanders had contact with Eskimoes who had "superior subsistence patterns" for the survival in the arctic cold, yet the former did not adopt these patterns which might have improved their adaptive means to the new physical environment.

Taylor suggested one of three conditions that are necessary for

acculturation between two societies to take place.

1. Domination through force or threat of force of one social order by another.

2. Sufficient cultural similarities to allow societies to exchange goods and ideas.

3. A state of fluidity in cultural patterns of one or both social orders which allow rapid adjustment to new ways of doing things (Taylor, 1951: 84).

Since none of these conditions existed among the Greenland Norse, they failed to adopt Eskimo ways that might have helped them to survive. Hence, they experienced cultural death.

In all of the four reviewed cases in this study, with the exception of the Bikinians in the first stage of relocation, the micro-collectivities increased their interaction with the respective macro-system. Their relative isolation was broken. Certain changes in relationships were introduced by dominant governments. Other changes were enhanced by the relative fluidity the relocated communities experienced during the first stages of the crisis. This point will be further investigated in a later chapter.

Taylor's case of the Greenland Norse and the experience of the Bikinians in the island of Rongerik validates Nisbet's point that social structures are incapable by themselves of generating change. That is, change is not an inherent characteristic of social structures. It is also in accordance with the conservative aspect of the social order. Social systems tend to adapt, when they have to, with the least possible modification. It requires a clash of opposing, or partly opposing,

systems to realize structural change.

This conservative aspect of the established order is clear,
even in revolutions that are considered as drastic, sudden transformation
of the action-system. Brinton in his Anatomy of Revolution clearly
stated that, "...For societies that undergo the full cycle of revolution
are perhaps in some respects the stronger for it; but by no means emerge
entirely remade" (Brinton, 1952: 17). He reached the conclusion that
change was differential in various sectors of the social order.

> "Now it should be clear that our present study of the
> English, American, French, and Russian revolutions can
> hardly permit any absolute answers to the question:
> What did really change? Some institutions, some laws,
> even some human habits, they clearly changed in very
> important ways; other institutions, laws, and habits
> - they changed in the long run but slightly" (Brinton,
> 1952: 264).

Revolutions are end-products of a situation of dialectic
discrepancy and conflict between two realities: the old established
reality and the reality of the new conditions. Political revolutions,
as Brinton tried to explain, tend to increase the efficiency of a more
centralized government. They result in transfer of economic power from
one group to another. Socially, however, revolutions slightly touch the
social arrangements of the average man.

> "Our revolutions seem in many ways to have changed
> men's minds more completely than they changed men's
> habits" (Brinton, 1952: 276).

Thus, in political revolutions the network of relationships are
modified, "some are cut out, and others inserted." The crisis, never-
theless, does not produce a totally new or different network. "The
whole network itself seems so far never to have been altered suddenly

and radically, and even the noble beliefs tend to fit into the network in the same places" (Brinton, 1952: 284).

In Thomas Kuhn's conceptualization of scientific revolutions, he, too, clearly demonstrated the incongruency between old paradigms or old ways of solutions, and the new facts. Though these crisis conditions are necessary preconditions for the emergence of new theories and paradigms, the conservative aspect of the old tends to persist. "Though they (scientists) begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis...A scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place" (Kuhn, 1970: 77). However, unlike Brinton's analysis of political revolutions, Kuhn demonstrates the replacement of old theories by new ones that are "incompatible" with the old (Kuhn, 1970: 92).

The conditions that precipitate the crisis are not necessarily internal to the original action-system. As an example, in the history of the field of astronomy, Copernicus in the sixteenth century was confronted with a "monster."[1] The awareness of the monstrous conditions was a product of the intellectual, political, economic and social conditions of the time. As Kuhn succinctly states:

> "Though he seems unaware of them (novelties that are
> main currents in his time), Copernicus was carried
> by these philosophical currents, as his contemporaries
> were unwittingly carried by the motion of the earth.
> Copernicus' work remains incomprehensible unless viewed
> in its relationship to both the internal state of
> astronomy and the larger intellectual climate of the
> age. Both together produced the monster" (Kuhn, 1957:
> 140).

The conception of new alternatives or solutions is a function

of confrontation with anomalies or crises due to changing conditions.

Yet, almost always as Kuhn indicated, "men who achieve these fundamental

inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to

the field whose paradigm changes" (Kuhn, 1970: 90).

The reason is the fact that these newcomers are usually not well

committed to the traditional rules, so they are in a better position to

re-evaluate them and "conceive another set that can replace them" (Kuhn,

1970: 90).

Thus, we find crisis at the collectivity level varying in the

direction and aspects of change. Isolated, small communities, limited

in alternative choices, fail to adapt to new conditions, and experience

"cultural death."

However, the concept of "cultural death" does not only connote

actual physical extinction such as happened in the case of the Greenland

Norse. "Cultural death" can also occur through complete assimilation

with another collectivity that is more powerful. Conquests and

subjugation by force can also lead to the assimilation and/or "cultural

death" of a weaker collectivity.

Hence, "cultural death" can occur at two ends of a continuum

of change. At one end we encounter situations where the action-system

completely fails to adjust to new demanding conditions, and the end

result is extinction. At the other end of the continuum are cases

where the action-system experiences complete transformation through

assimilation and absorption within another, more powerful system.

Other collectivites, through confrontation and crisis,

experience political revolutions producing uneven and differential

changes in various sectors of the macro-system.

At the other end of the continuum are crises that induce a transformation of the action or macro-system and the means-end relationships, as has been conceptualized by Kuhn (1970) in regard to scientific endeavors. Cases of complete assimilation through conquests can also be included within this extreme category of the continuum of crisis and change (see diagram).

Between "cultural death," that is, extinction, and revolutionary changes, we find the great majority of adaptations. Most cases are between those two points. Systems tend to react by the least possible adjustment to conflicting new conditions.

DIAGRAM 1

CONTINUUM OF CHANGE

Majority of Adaptations
to Crisis

Cultural Death
through extinction

Political
Revolutions

Cultural death
through assimi-
lation
Complete
Transformation
of the system

Collective, forced movements are one specific type of action-systems in crises. With relocation, the micro-collectivity confronts sudden conditions that make certain structural changes imperative. The four case studies that have been reviewed -- the Egyptian

Nubians, the Japanese-Americans, the Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) Valley
Tonga and the Bikini Marshallese -- are all cases of groups of people
exposed to a collective, external, involuntary crisis of forced movement.
In all four cases, the decision had been made by a body of outside
policy-makers, and the people involved had no real choice in the matter,
making the move compulsory. For that reason alone, the governing bodies,
as the initiating agents in all cases, assumed a degree of responsibility
quite different from any case of voluntary movement. The governing
bodies in all cases took specific actions during the emergency stage of
relocation to ameliorate the impact of sudden change.

The degree of involvement of the external intervention or macro-
system was different in the four cases. These differences are to a
certain extent a reflection of the developmental ideology of the
particular governing elite. Thus, the aims and objectives of relocation
plans differed and this fact affected the action of the respective
macro-system responsible for the intervention.

In addition to similarities in the general collective experience
of forced relocation and exposure to an external action-system by an
intervening macro-agent, the four cases are similar in minority
relationships between the powerful governing macro-body and the power-
less dislocated minority. The Nubians increased their interaction
with the "Egyptian" government; the Japanese-Americans were confronted
by the American "Caucasian" government; the Tonga had to comply with
the orders of the British Colonial government; and the Bikinians were
moved according to the demands of the United States government which
colonized the area after World War II.

The fact that the intervening bodies were of a different ethnic background influenced the interaction processes between the relocated communities and the external emergency macro-action-system. In turn, these processes shaped and limited the micro-response processes to the crisis of relocation. In the four cases, the officials -- the policy makers, and the administration -- had very little information about the communities of which they suddenly were in charge. Their technical skill, their position of power, their cultural background, their institutional limitations as well as their relative ignorance of the values, norms, and institutional arrangements of the relocated population -- all combined to color their actions. Their "definition of the situation," their expectations as well as their goals differed drastically from the expectations and problems of the relocated. Hence, communication between the two communities -- the powerful and the powerless -- was blocked, and this was detrimental to the effective functioning of external help. The increase in the credibility gap, the mistrust and the antagonism within the relocated group toward macro-officials averted the possibility of concerted action (between the two systems) based on reciprocal fulfillment of expected behavior. Thus, the crisis was prolonged by increasing conflict and aggression.

The time dimension of the onset of crisis is relative. In cases of forced relocation, the "suddenness" of the move involved a relatively long period of "detection and communication of warning of a specific threat" (Barton, 1969: 41). Though, in the four reviewed cases, the actual temporal time of warning varied from more than one year to a couple of months (as in the case of Japanese-Americans and

the Bikini Marshallese) the suddenness was still a crucial element for all the collectivities.

Fritz, in comparing the social-psychological effects of disasters in six American communities, mentioned the speed of the impact or the length of warning as crucial aspects to be taken into consideration in making comparisons (Fritz, 1957: 6). He suggested that no forewarning leads to maximum disruption. This notion is logical. Previous warning allows for more time to ponder on solutions to face the crisis. Theoretically, the longer the warning stage the more effective the emergency reaction system in confronting problems, other things being equal. However, in the cases reviewed in this current study, the differences in temporal time-length of the warning stage seems to have had no substantial impact on the response processes of the four examples.

Explanations of these results can be sought within the larger macro-system, in which each relocation case here reviewed was a sub-system. The crises experienced at the micro-levels were net consequences of responses to crises at the macro-level of the larger social systems. The small communities were sacrified by the larger systems reacting to confrontations of threats, or sudden urgent internal or external crises.

Hence, a condition defined as crisis by a micro-system may be re-defined as a by-product or function of another and greater crisis in the larger system. In our four cases, this differential "definition of the situation" blocked communication between the macro- and micro-levels. It was also a hindrance in establishing grounds for shared expectations when the two systems were experiencing directly conflicting

interests.

Consequently, the time lapse between the decision of the larger or macro-systems to utilize the scapegoat solution of relocating communities, and the actual move, was not used effectively by the macro-system to organize conditions that might have facilitated adjustments by the relocated micro-collectivities to the sudden change brought about by the physical move. Nor was the time-lapse used to ameliorate the psychological stress caused by anxieties and uncertainties regarding the future relocations.

In the four reviewed cases, the larger or macro-systems were capable of facing the technical and organizational challenges of building large dams, winning international wars, or blasting nuclear bombs. Simultaneously, they were unable to handle effectively the challenges and counter-challenges of the relocated collectivities, concerned about the human aspects of the relocation.

Thus, at the micro-collective level, the duration of the warning stage in situations of externally imposed crisis is an important variable to the micro-action-system in crisis, depending on the action of the macro-system of which the micro-system is an understudy.

Hence, the predicament and the changes occurring at the micro-collectivity level can not be isolated from the conditions at the macro-level that precipitated the crises. The macro-level in looking after itself incorporates changes that are disruptive to other collectivities that are a subordinate part of the larger system. The lack of power of these micro-collectivities to defend their own interests facilitates the processes of scapegoating the small and the powerless,

for the security and well-being of the strong and the powerful.

To focus the analysis of crisis in the micro-sector without extending the analysis to the macro-level will limit our understanding of the action-system in crises. First, it is important to demonstrate that crises at the micro-level are caused by crises at the macro-level. Second, and following from the previous point, is the fact that processes occurring at the micro-level are to a significant degree a reflection and product of adjustment processes at the macro-level.

The following chapter will deal with factors that created crises at the respective macro-levels, and which led to decisions from those in power to relocate collectivities and create the crises conditions that are here under study. The analysis will center on Egypt, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and the U.S.A. The latter is responsible for two of our relocations: the Japanese-Americans and the Bikini Marshallese.

FOOTNOTE

[1]In the prefix to the De Revolutionibus, Copernicus wrote: "With them (the mathematicians) it is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other members for his images from diverse models, and since they in no way match each other, the result would be monster rather than man" (Quoted in Kuhn, 1957: 138).

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRISES AT THE MACRO-LEVELS

All our four cases of forced relocation shared their predicament as a result of decisions made by their respective governments. The decisions that led to relocation of collectivities, in turn, were products of crises faced at the macro-levels of which each relocated collectivity was a part. The decisions were the least-costly solutions (as seen by macro-level policy-makers) for the macro-level to cope with certain tension-increasing or tension-threatening conditions in their arenas; hence the crisis, that is, the sudden demand for change experienced by the micro-level. Considering the conservative bent of any system, most of the decisions for change affected a peripheral sector of the macro-system, rather than the core relationships or the core values of the system.

This chapter will deal with the historical development of these crises at the macro-levels in the cases of Egypt, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and the United States of America. It must be understood, that, in moving to the macro-level, our three criteria of crisis at the micro-level (see Chapter II) at once take on new dimensions of time and space. For example, "sudden," "demanding" and "structural change," all assume much longer-run dimensions. On this level, we are dealing with the underlying thrusts and drifts of the respective macro-systems. Long-run tensions at the macro-level, however, are not always reflected at the micro-level, on a one-to-one basis.

I.   EGYPT

The building of the Egyptian High Dam at Aswan which created the relocation crisis for the Egyptian Nubians was the apparent solution, at least in the short run, to the crisis experienced or anticipated at the micro-level, that is, the national level. The social, economic, and political contradictions that faced the new regime which took power in 1952, culminated in an ideology of development. The regime was faced with inequalities in the social structure, stagnation of the economic system, a rapidly growing population, and a disunited apathetic political front.

From the turn of the nineteenth century, Egypt had been a monarchy. The royal family professed to be of Turkish origin and its founder, Mohammed Ali, from Albania, successfully gained Egypt's autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. The royal family, through time, managed to trace their descent to Mohammed, the Moslim prophet, to consolidate their legitimacy to rule Egypt. The new elite that took power in 1952 and declared Egypt a Republic, were army officers with average family backgrounds, that is, middle class.

Thus, the new regime was also confronted with a legitimacy crisis. The new plans and programs were measures to consolidate power and to legitimize the rule of the new governing elite through concentration on social, economic, and political development.

To comprehend the crisis at the macro-level that crystallized the crisis at the micro-level, a historical review is imperative.

It is often said that "Egypt is the gift of the Nile." Egypt lies in the desert belt of North-East Africa. With the exception of the narrow Mediterranean coastal fringe, there is practically no rain during the year.

The Nile flows through Egypt from the South to the North, forming its own valley as a strip of green land between two parallel ranges of hills. North of Cairo, the Nile is divided into two streams forming the Delta. On the west side of the Nile the hills subside into the Western Desert, in which lie a series of scattered oasis. The eastern hills border the Red Sea.

The desert area is arid and unlivable. Although the country encompasses an area of almost 386,196 square miles, the population occupies only a very small proportion of the land area -- 3.5 percent. The rest of the land is uninhabited. The inhabited area is 13,500 square miles, consisting of the Nile Valley, the Delta, and a few scattered oasis. The cultivated area, around six million acres, is made fertile and irrigated by the Nile river, which used to overflow once a year in the summer.

The importance of the Nile is demonstrated by the very early development of civilization, including classes, writing, and centralized government to ensure the planning and the distribution of scarce water over the country as a whole. From the earliest times, the main effort of the Egyptians has been directed toward the fullest possible utilization of the life-giving water of the Nile -- given the existing level of technology and social development.

In addition to the unbroken unity of Egypt under centralized government from 3100 B.C. until the present time, Egypt experienced a long period of foreign occupation. This began in 525 B.C. with the Persian occupation. The Persians were followed subsequently by the Macedonians, the Romans in 30 B.C., Moslim Arabs in 642 A.D., the Tulumids in 868 A.D., the Fatemids, the Kurds in 1174 A.D., the Mameluks, and

finally the Turkish conquest in 1516 which was the beginning of the dark
ages for Egypt. Later, the Egyptians were also conquered by the French
and colonized by the British. So for twenty-five centuries, Egypt has
been ruled by foreigners whose primary goal was to squeeze the maximum
out of the Egyptian Fellaheen (peasants).

Another key feature of Egypt's history is its strategic geograph-
ical location. It is the meeting place for trade routes between three
large continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe. For thousands of years,
Egypt, besides its main agricultural activities, had a considerable source
of revenue from Indo-European trades. However, the discovery of the Cape
of Good Hope during the reign of the Ottoman Empire, led Egypt into an
economic and cultural stagnation, from the fourteenth to the nineteenth
centuries. While the West was enjoying the age of great discoveries, the
Renaissance and the Reformation, Egypt was settling into a period of
isolation and stagnation. This dark age of isolation and stagnation came
to an end with the French expedition of 1798.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Egypt entered a period of
rapid transformation which revolutionized its entire economic, social,
and political structure within a relatively short period of time. The
change, however, did not proceed gradually and indigenously like the
evolution of Medieval Western Civilization. The change was rather a
result of the initiative of individual autocrats imposing reforms on a
reluctant population in an effort to emulate certain aspects of Western
civilization (Safran, 1961: 26).

When Mohammed Ali took power in Egypt, he destroyed the existing
feudal system of the Mameluks and redistributed the land in hereditary
tenure to individual fellaheen (Egyptian peasants) who had to pay rents

and taxes. He gave large areas of land to members of his family and to high officials. He also introduced cotton cultivation, an export which changed Egypt's economy from a subsistence to a heavily export-oriented economy. Irrigation works were constructed with emphasis on the development of an interior physical infrastructure to facilitate foreign trade -- including roads, railways, mail facilities, and so on.

Ismail, Mohammed Ali's successor, in his quest for power and recognition by international spheres as an equal European prince, took further measures to make Egypt into the Equal of any European state. He improved the communication system and roads, expanded education, introduced the first school for girls, and encouraged mission schools. Foreigners were attracted to set-up business and trades. As expenditures increased, to meet the financial difficulties, private ownership of land replaced Mohammed Ali's system of rent and taxation. The loans were increased to finance vast projects, and the result was bankruptcy, foreign control, and foreign occupation.

So by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Egypt experienced a great change in its economy as a result of the production and export of cotton. It was a revolution of the agrarian system as Egypt became a colony intensively exploited by Britain's textile industry. Projects were constructed to enhance the cultivation of cotton through control of irrigation. Roads, bridges, and railway lines were built to improve transportation. Various institutions were introduced for the marketing and exporting of cotton.

The influx of capital into the country, however, financed by foreigners, attracted only foreign agents, but did not substantially

raise the cultural level of ordinary Egyptians — except for few

compradors (native agents of foreign businesses). Nor did it result in

the development of other sectors of the economy. Most Egyptians left

business almost entirely to foreigners and to local agents or compradors,

or minority groups, such as native Christians or Jews. These groups

controlled finance and large-scale commerce. They even dominated petty

trade. Wealthy Egyptians bought land, while some educated Egyptians

joined the rapidly expanding civil service. Because of lack of

opportunities, practically none showed any interest in industry, trade,

nor finance. Social status among Egyptians became a function of land

tenure rights. As a result, land had value and significance which

extended far beyond its economic use, and this fact influenced all

aspects of life.

Moreover, the Egyptian social structure was influenced by the

sudden exposure to and contact with Western culture. Westerners

— foreigners — gained local superiority and became the upper-upper

class. The acquisition of Western cultural trappings became a symbol

of identification with the foreign ruling group by the native upper-

class, and of social advancement for all other classes. Patai argues

that:

> "Before the import of Western culture, the upper-class
> was identical in kind with the culture of the masses.
> There existed what can be termed as lower-class-upper
> -class cultural continuum. The continuum was disrupted
> when the upper-class became more oriented toward the
> Western culture and ceased to be creators, inspirers,
> and consumers of national cultural products and became
> avid consumers in all fields of importations from
> countries in the West" (Patai, 1955: 1).

As a result of this development, the cultural gulf between the

rich and the poor, between urban and rural life — widened. The native upper-class became alienated from the rest of the population, as the indigenous culture became vulgar and improper. The poor, traditional groups were looked upon as backward and primitive.

Consequently, Egyptian society became divided quite unevenly into a few "haves" and a mass of "have nots." The "haves" had ascriptive status, as they were born into the right land-owning family, which facilitated access to economic, social, and political resources and power. As for the majority of the masses, they lacked all access to any wealth or improvement in their poor, illiterate and oppressed conditions. A third, in-between class started to emerge at the beginning of the twentieth century through the spread of education. This middle class was mostly engaged in the civil service.

Another major change occurred in the social structure: the increase in the rate of urbanization. In 1917, the urban ratio was 21 percent, while by 1947 it had become 30 percent. By 1966, the urban ratio was 42 percent. Whereas urbanization in the Western world was associated with industrialization, in Egypt urbanization preceeded industrialization. Urbanization in Egypt was mainly the product of population growth (a "push" from out of the countryside) plus the attraction and remote glamour of the largely upper-class Western way of life in the cities.

Moreover, industrialization in Western Europe and in Eastern North America was also associated with massive emigration to so called "new" or "empty" continents and vast rural regions in Western North America, Australia, South America, and so on — where pre-industrial

resident natives could be readily stamped out or pushed aside. But in Egypt, no such mass emigration was possible. There were no arable and "empty" western plains to absorb the growing Egyptian population.

Between 1917 and 1947, the total population of Egypt increased by nearly 67 percent. The available crop area increased by only 20 percent during approximately the same period. Thus, the pressure on the land caused great acceleration of the movement from the countryside to cities. So, unlike the classical pattern of a "pull" into the city because extra labor was required in industry, the surplus Egyptian agricultural population was "pushed" into the city because of comparatively poorer conditions in the countryside.

The constant flow of migrants from the countryside to towns did not ease population pressure on the Egyptian land. With unequal distribution of land ownership, population pressure was a decisive factor in reducing the peasants' standard of living. Sixty percent of the population in 1951 were rural people, cultivating an area of almost six million acres. Less than six percent of the population owned 65.5 percent of cultivable land (see Table 7).

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY SIZE
AND HOLDINGS IN EGYPT IN 1951

Size of Holdings Feddans*	Owners		Arable Area	
	Number (000)	Percent	Holdings (000)	Percent
1 and under	2,018.1	72.0	778	13.0
over 1-5	623.8	22.2	1,344	22.5
over 5-50	148.4	5.4	1,817	30.2
over 50-200	9.6	0.3	866	14.5
over 200	2.1	0.1	1,177	19.8
Totals	2,802.0	100.0	5,982	100.0

*Feddan = 1.038 acres

Source: Gadalla, 1962: 13.

A.   Problems Confronting the New Regime in 1952

As the new government came into power, it was alarmed by the

social and economic inequalities that existed. There were tremendous

differences in living conditions, styles of life and "weltanschaung,"

between the urban and rural population; between the small proportion of

the educated and the 70 percent illiterate population (U.A.R., 1962:

242); between the rich people whose income went beyond 2,000 Egyptian

Pounds a year, and the poor people whose income was below the average

per capita income of the country. The latter was around 50 Egyptian

Pounds in the year 1952-1953 (Statistical Handbook, U.A.R., 1952-1966:

215).

In addition to the great prevalence of social, economic, and

political inequalities in the country, the new Government was faced with a stagnant economy. The economy was not stationary, but stagnation was in terms of growth not sufficient to increase the real per-capita income. With a population growing annually at the rate of 25 per 1000. the country needed a more efficient use of its resources to achieve a rate of economic growth higher than the rate of increase of population (O'Brian, 1966: 30-31).

Other than the limited, highly fertile land area, Egypt is very poor in other natural resources. It is not endowed with mineral wealth, nor with oil as are most of the Arab Middle East countries. It lacks any means of generating power. This fact makes it extremely difficult to plan any realistic policy for economic growth.

So, in order to meet the growing pressure of the population upon a relatively fixed area of land, the new Government had two solutions. The first solution was to increase productive capacity and to create opportunities for employment outside the primary sector, that is, industrialization. The second solution was to increase the area of cultivable land.

For about two decades before the new regime took power in 1952, the Egyptian government provided private manufacturers with various incentives to expand. Yet the industrial sector failed to grow. The low per-capita income in villages where lay the mass market for consumption, did not stimulate further industrial growth. Industrial expansion was based on replacement of imported goods for consumption, hence, it was conditioned by local growth of incomes. Costs and prices of manufactured products were very high because of lack of efficiency.

The difficulty in assembling a reliable force of skilled labor, the lack of sufficient power resources -- all these factors resulted in finished products of poor quality which required excessive tariff protection. This, the government was not in a position to provide.

During the first few years of the new regime, the government tried to attain the required economic growth through the existing economic institutions of private entrepreneurs. After the land reform laws, domestic investment was expected to be diverted away from the primary sector. The government gave the private sector every conceivable incentive to expand by tax exemption, cheap credit, higher tariffs, and improvement in the infrastructure. But businessmen and investors failed to invest enough to provide a noticeable rate of growth. They were not willing to take the risk of investment in heavy industry. They preferred to invest in real estate and light industry because of their high short-run returns on investment caused by the population explosion and by ever-increasing urbanization.

If the period between 1950-1958 is evaluated in terms of growth of National Income and per-capita income, we find that the annual growth in National Income was 5.1 percent (at 1954 prices). With an annual rate of increase of population of 2.5 percent, the increase in per-capita income was about 2 percent. Thus, the government set a target rate of economic growth of 7.4 percent per annum. With a marginal capital output ratio of 3, a net capital formation of 22 percent of the National Income was needed. Consequently, the government had to resort to a more planned and nationally directed economy, through nationalization of the major institutions related to industrial production.

Following the massive trend of nationalization measures, the government laid the foundation of "Socialism, Democratic and Cooperative" society. Legitimization of those activities was largely drawn from a socialist ideology. Thus, as O'Brian rightly holds, the economic measures did not stem from an ideology to which the political leaders were committed, but rather the reverse. The economic and social crisis of the nation directed the leaders toward the ideology of socialism (O'Brian, 1966: 200-204).

In the agricultural sector, the Land Reform Laws were measures to redistribute land ownership in a more equitable way. They were also designed to protect the security of tenants who were usually landless farmers; and to increase and control agricultural-labor wages. With the continuous race between population growth and economic expansion, demographic factors affected the welfare of the people and hampered any social or economic development. Very little could be done to increase agricultural productivity; for Egypt had experienced and practiced intensive agriculture for decades. The government was faced with the only existing and realistic alternative: increasing the area of cultivable land.

B.   Significance of the High Dam

The building of the High Dam was the logical short-term solution of Egypt's pressing social, economic, and political problems. The High Dam would allow the restoration and utilization of eight million cubic meters of the Nile water to irrigate an extra 1.3 million acres of land:

almost 20 percent of the pre-existing arable land. It would provide
electricity double the electric power previously available, and this
would enhance the development of industry. Added to all this was the
creation of jobs and employment for the ever-increasing labor force
that might otherwise have been a danger to the political stability of
the country.

All these social and economic advantages should not overshadow
the political importance of the project. The High Dam is a great
monument to demonstrate the power and will of the "revolutionary"
government. Most of all, it is concrete evidence of the legitimacy
of the New Government, both nationally and internationally.

Hence, because of the desperate need for solutions of the
contradictory conditions obtaining in Egypt, the High Dam was built as
a response to the social, economic, and political conditions that
underlay the crisis in Egypt. This solution created crisis conditions
of relocation for 50,000 Egyptian Nubians and an equivalent number of
Sudanese Nubians, in the process.

II.   NORTHERN RHODESIA (ZAMBIA)

The decision to build Kariba Dam which was responsible for the
relocation of the Valley Tonga was also a response to crisis faced by
the white settlers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Faced with the
danger of native black nationalist movements as new elements in the
environment, the white settlers reacted by consolidating their power

and economic positions through uniting forces in form of Federation.
The Kariba Dam, in addition to its economic advantages to the
industrial sector dominated by the white settlers, had political appeal
in the form of demonstrating the strength, grandeur and determination of
the new Federal Government. Thus the Valley Tonga were faced by the
crisis of forced relocation as a result of particular problems that
the macro-system was encountering.

Northern Rhodesia was a British protectorate on the plateau of
Central Africa. It covers an area of 290,000 square miles. Except in
the lower reaches of three great river valleys -- Zambezi, the Luangwa,
and the Kafue -- the elevation of the territory relieve it from the
high temperatures and humidity of the tropics.

Around the end of the nineteenth century, a Royal Charter
authorized the British South African Company, newly founded by Cecil
Rhodes, to acquire power for the governing of territories north of
Bechuanaland (Franklin, 1963: 17). In 1897, Rhodes acquired Southern
Rhodesia by conquest for the Queen. European settlements in farming,
mining and trading developed comparatively fast. Yet in 1923, the
company rule ceased and Southern Rhodesia became almost a self-governing
colony, ruled by the white settler population.

Unlike Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia was never conquered
or defeated. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British
South African Company extracted certain concessions from the chiefs of
Northern Rhodesia in return for the Queen's protection. At that time
the tribes suffered from intertribal wars and raids for the slave trade.

Eventually, Northern Rhodesia came under company rule. However,

no quick European settlements followed. The colonial office took over the territory from the Company as a Protectorate in 1924, when the European population was still negligible. The European immigrants increased only with the exploitation of the copper mines after 1930.

The Protectorate in Northern Rhodesia followed a completely different political trend from that in the South. The white Southern Rhodesians inherited "the Rhodes tradition" of expanding northward, of imperialism, and of white native minority rule over an overwhelming majority of natives. In the North, "the Rhodes tradition" was submerged under Colonial Office administration which tended to slowly direct the country toward self-government by the majority rather than by the minority.

Thus, from the early years of European settlement there was tension between the two ideologies: that of trusteeship advocated by the colonial administration, and the ideology of segregation furthered by the European settlers. Though the two concepts shared the same assumptions as to the immediate inability of the indigenous population to cope with the requirements of the European tradition, they differed in the direction of their policies. The exponents of Colonial Office "trusteeship" felt the essential role of the Imperial Government should be as an "impartial arbiter" to preserve a balance of interest between the native majority and the white minority.

On the other hand, advocates of European settlement maintained that their leadership was the only sure means of bringing lasting benefits. However, the concept of segregation presupposed at least a temporary, and generally a permanent, incompatability between the races

(Gray, 1963: 4). Although those two positions would add up eventually to the white supremacy, the tension between them played a major role in forming the historical developments in the area, the development of the "Two Nations," as Richard Gray called it.

A.   European Settlers

As late as 1920, Northern Rhodesia was regarded by the administering British South African Company as merely a reservoir of native labor for the farms and mines of Southern Rhodesia. The chief occupations of the few European settlers that moved into Northern Rhodesia by 1920 were agriculture, public service, transport and communication, commerce, and finance. Later on, between 1921-1931, mineral discoveries were made which completely reversed the relative positions of agriculture and mining. With the expansion of the mining industry, especially the copper belt, the influx of immigrants increased, and the gainfully occupied European population in the mining industry almost quadrupled (Deane, 1953: 19).

Nevertheless, the majority of Europeans were temporary residents employed in the mines or the government. A large proportion, almost half, were from South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. They were temporary migrants. Comparatively few Europeans retired in Northern Rhodesia. In general, the European adult population consisted of employed individuals who spent their working life or part of their working life in the territory and retired with their savings or their

pensions to other countries. Most of them maintained close contact with their mother country, with Southern Rhodesia, or the union of South Africa, throughout their life (Deane, 1953: 20).

After World War II, there was a growing tendency toward permanent settlement. The war broke the practical ties with Europe and the United Kingdom for them. A positive feeling of local patriotism started to evolve among the settlers, and this became a marked feature of European society. It was the white South African element in the community that lent weight to the political movement towards responsible self-government by the white majority. By 1946, the European population was 21,809.

The majority of the population were the indigenous natives of Bantu origin, about 1.7 million. They lived mostly in villages on subsistence agriculture. Almost one-third of the able-bodied men worked away from home at temporary jobs in the rail area where the European settlements developed. As all able-bodied male Africans had to pay a poll tax, and as the only extensive sources of employment were on the rail line, the great majority of Africans had no alternative but to journey long distances to work in order to pay their tax (Gray, 1960: 182). The village population on which the standard of living of the majority of African people depended, consisted largely of women, old or infirm men, and children.

B.   Economic Structure

The most striking feature of the economic structure of Northern
Rhodesia was the localized nature of private investment (Deane, 1953:
67). Development was restricted to development in the Copperbelt, or
on a narrow belt of the country along the railway line following the
mining industry's channel of communication with the outside world.
Beyond the railway belt, nothing changed in other parts of the country.

The consequences of the expansion in exporting copper were such
that Northern Rhodesia became a markedly dualistic economy whose
prosperity was largely dependent upon the fluctuations in the world
market of copper. The economy was dualistic in the sense that there
existed a small sector based on a money economy with a large sector
living on subsistence agriculture. Added to this, the export-oriented
nature of the industry did not help in the development of secondary
industry. The content of inputs for the export industry were not
favorable to domestic production; so most of the inputs -- other than
unskilled native labor -- were imported (Baldwin, 1966: 65-70). The
Union of South Africa or Southern Rhodesia provided the major imports of
skilled labor, capital, and material inputs.

The economic returns to the country from the copper mines were
minimum. The giant mining companies were registered in the United
Kingdom. The greater part of their balances were held abroad, and their
dividends flowed abroad. Sales were also negotiated abroad. What was
spent in the country was the money for operating expenses; the balance
of the proceeds remained in the United Kingdom. The net profits were

added to reserves in the United Kingdom or distributed to other share-holders outside Rhodesia. As an example, in 1949, the gross value of the output of the copper mines was 36,742,000 Sterling Pounds; the total expenditures that remained in Northern Rhodesia were 12,500,000 Sterling Pounds. Thus the country actually benefited by only about one-third of the gross transaction. Foreign parties, outside the country, got the rest.

Even this small share was almost cancelled by imports for the white settlers' consumer demands. The minority sector of highly-paid Europeans followed an expenditure pattern and consumer tastes similar to that found in rich developed countries. These demands were met by imports, and not by developing local manufacturing industry. The total consumer demand of Europeans was too small to support local industry, and African purchasing power was insignificant. Hence the import of consumer goods was high. Phyllis Deane summarized the general economic picture of Northern Rhodesia as follows:

> "In spite of the considerable quantities of wealth and skill which have been injected into the Northern Rhodesian economy by the immigrant communities, the standard of living of more than 85% of its population is demonstrably low, even by colonial standards" (Deane, 1953: 32-33).

Northern Rhodesian agriculture was mainly a subsistence sector, except for some commercial European plantations around the rail belt. The productivity of Africans was low in comparison with the productivity of Europeans. The Europeans were planters rather than farmers: thus more intensive farming required capital and experience which the natives lacked. With the expansion of the local retail market from the boom in the copperbelt, cultivation of maize, potatoes, fruits, and vegetables,

and the production of meat and butter increased. In addition, the rise in the international prices of tobacco increased export possibilities.

In 1949, with the rise of prices, the gross return for European farmers from tobacco was almost a half-million pounds per year. African farmers had no share in this economy. They were excluded from most of the land that could be used to meet local food demands stimulated by the expansion of the mining industry, and from the areas for growing and marketing tobacco near, and by means of existing transportation facilities (Baldwin, 1966: 216).

Naturally, these conditions of economic growth have been significantly affected by the use of monopolistic power by European groups. The Europeans held most of the seats in the Legislative Council. This power was used to influence the distribution of benefits from development.

After World War II, the Colonial government set up a ten-year development plan. The program was originally planned to achieve goals heavily oriented toward improving the living standards of the African population. These basic goals were:

1. Providing the bare essentials of social and economic services which all sections of the community require.

2. Encouraging the development of natural and potential assets; and assisting the African population to develop itself under its Native Authority (indirect rule) with all possible speed (Baldwin, 1966: 193-194).

However, the rapid expansion of the Northern Rhodesian economy after World War II created pressing needs for capital -- a sector

dominated by Europeans. To take full advantage of these new capital
opportunities, greatly enlarged outlays on roads, housing, medical
facilities, power, water, and the like were urgently needed. These
alternatives gave every indication of yielding a higher, short-run
return, than did spending in uncertain rural projects to elevate the
living conditions of natives.

Consequently, the original development program had hardly
started in 1947, when a shift in emphasis occurred. Under the influence
of the Legislative Council, which was dominated by Europeans, three
short-term goals were superimposed upon the longer-run objectives.
These were: increased food production, more European housing, and
improved roads (Baldwin, 1966: 195). Thus the general goal of
stimulating the rural and non-monetary native sector soon was relegated
to a relatively minor position in the development program. The share
devoted to African housing, African education, and rural development
fell from 31 percent in the original plan to 17 percent in the 1953
version (Baldwin, 1966: 196).

The efforts and capital directed toward the rural areas, in
addition to being limited in funds, were also limited in scope. More
attention was given to introducing Western technology than to improving
local marketing and transport facilities (Baldwin, 1966: 203). Thus,
the over-all effects of the meager expenditures were minimum.

After thoroughly analyzing the economic conditions of Northern
Rhodesia, Robert Baldwin wrote:

> "From the point of view of maximizing national
> product, heavy spending in the expanding monetary
> sector undoubtedly was a good policy. But it is not
> evident that the near neglect of economic expenditures

in the rural, subsistence sector was justifiable on
these same economic grounds. Moreover, on the grounds
of equity — a consideration that most governments are
prepared to use to modify the goal of maximizing
national product — the pattern of expenditures is
one-sided. For years, government officials deplored
the extent of imbalance between economic development
in the monetary versus the subsistence sector. But,
under political pressures of the moment, the
Legislative Council invariably responded to the wishes
of the European electorate, and channeled most of the
funds available into the money economy. Without
significant political representation, the rural
African population understandably was seriously
neglected" (Baldwin, 1966: 201).

The Colonial government thus gradually let slip its "trusteeship"

responsibility toward the Africans. "Native paramountcy" was another

facade for the continuation of the economic advantages for whites that

were procured from Colonial rule.

C.   The Insecurity of Europeans and the Cry for Union

Although the doctrines of trusteeship and native paramountcy

conferred few immediate benefits upon the African population and had

little impact on their situation, there was considerable discontent

with the colonial regime on the part of Europeans. There was a basic

lack of security, and a fear of what might happen in the future (Gray,

1960: 184). The Northern Rhodesian Europeans with their insecurity and

fears looked for support from the South to win recognition of their

claim to establish a regime of prosperity and security for themselves

and their children.

This was the "paradox" for the Europeans, as Philip Mason puts

it:

"...that just when his economy is booming, when he sees
Salisbury transformed from a collection of frontier
shacks to a modern town with sky-scrapers and parking
problems, at the very moment the rule of Europeans in
Africa was beginning to disappear" (Gray, 1960: xv).

As early as 1930, the European settlers and their representatives
in the Legislative Council evoked a storm of protest against British
Trusteeship and the Paramountcy of Native interest. As a result, a
Parliament Select Committee defined these terms in 1931 as meaning, "no
more than the interests of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous
population should not be subordinated to those of a minority belonging
to another race, however important in itself" (Gray, 1966: 161).

Not satisfied with this explanation, the Governor of Northern
Rhodesia had to further assure the Europeans in 1934 that the Select.
Committee's "no more" also meant "no less than the interests of non-
native minority must not be subordinated to those of the native majority"
(Gray, 1966: 182).

Nevertheless, all these assurances did not remove the Europeans'
fear of the future. In 1936, at a conference in Victoria Falls, the
Europeans of the two Rhodesias reached a consensus in favor of "early
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesias under a Constitution
confirming the right of complete self-government" (Gray, 1966: 188).
The United Kingdom government, however, did not support such notions of
amalgamation on the basis that the United Kingdom's responsibility for
the welfare and development of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia·
could not be discharged by "handing them over to the European settlers
of Southern Rhodesia."

With the expansion of the copper industry and tobacco culti-

vation in Northern Rhodesia after the war, the value of exports by 1953 had become almost double that of South Rhodesia. The idea of union with Northern Rhodesia became more attractive to Southern Rhodesian settlers than it had been in the thirties. It also became increasingly difficult for the Colonial Office to overrule the ambition of Europeans in Northern Rhodesia. Hence, a new formula had to be found to satisfy all the parties involved — except the indigenous people.

The new formula was a Federation between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The doctrine of the Federation should be "partnership" with the native population rather than separate development for the "two nations": the white, European population and the black, native population.

Economic conditions in Central Africa and the inherent need of the European population to unite against the emerging African power were not the only factors that led events toward Federation. The course of political developments in South Africa also affected the views of the United Kingdom on the question. The United Party in South Africa lost power in the 1948 elections. The new government in power was a nationalist government backed by the Africaaners. Apartheid policies were put into practice (Genn, 1964: 399).

Thus, when the British Government gave its consent to a Federation of the two Protectorates with a nearly self-governing colony of Souther Rhodesia, the decision was basically made to prevent the colony from joining up with the Union of South Africa (Franklin, 1963: 13). The British Government only insisted on the "partnership" aspect to ameliorate African protest and fears of Federation, and African anger

against the British Government's violation of the trust.

"Partnership," however, was a slogan to mobilize consent and avoid opposition. Those who pushed for Federation were responsible almost entirely to the white voters. With talk of handing the government to the indigenous people, it was in the interest of the whites to keep their supremacy. Within the Federation, the fears and desires of the white population were naturally well heeded by the Federal Government, as the whites had the votes, and Africans did not have enough influence to matter in crucial issues and decisions.

Accordingly, the Federation was created by an act of Parliament on August 1, 1953, after years of negotiations. And as should have been expected, as soon as Federation was achieved, by November 1953, the leaders began to agitate for independence from the British in favour of Dominion status with white-controlled self-government (Franklin, 1963: 82).

The importance of Federation to the white population was mainly to preserve their political power and supremacy from the dangers of native nationalism. The economic arguments they used to convince opponents of the advantages of the move were not of crucial importance. As the economists Thompson and Woodruff took great pain to explain, the most relevant economic argument for Federation was attracting more foreign capital. The diversification of the economic base meant fewer economic risks for investors (Thompson and Woodruff, 1954: 182-193). Yet even they qualify this conclusion by stating that "...every thing depends on the accomplishment of Federal Government."

D.   Importance of the Kariba Dam for National Conditions

The copper-mining industry which was Northern Rhodesia's main source of income and economic growth suffered from a basic problem -- shortage of power, mainly coal. The rapid development of the area since the war had produced two problems: one of mining sufficient coal, and the other of transportation. The transportation problem was met by the extension of railways. As for coal, the copper mines had to go without sufficient coal for years. Under these circumstances, wood-cutting was organized on a large scale to supplement the coal supplies.

Despite the elaborate power system owned by the mines in the early fifties, the difficulty of obtaining coal supplies persisted. The deficiency of power forced the mining companies to seek an alternative source of electric power. Therefore they were anxious for a hydro-electric power project in order to obtain electricity at a lower rate than was possible from their own steam plants (Baldwin, 1966: 178). The prospects of obtaining cheap and abundant supplies of power were sufficiently attractive to warrant serious investigation.

Most North Rhodesians favored a hydro-electric project on the Kafue River. The Kafue project required less capital expenditure and would be completed in less time. The Kafue scheme also had the advantage of having attached to it a vast irrigation scheme for the benefit of African peasants. It also required the dislocation of only three to four hundred tribesmen, and not thirty-five thousand as was the case with Kariba (Franklin, 1963: 108).

In March, 1954, the previous decision of the Northern Rhodesian

Government to construct the Kafue project was reversed by the Federal Government's decision to build the Kariba Dam on the Zambesi River, instead of on the Kafue.

The Kariba was a larger project. It offered better propaganda for bolstering the Federation. The "biggest man-made lake" was also an attraction. In addition, the Kafue electric project was both directly and indirectly of greater economic advantage to Northern Rhodesia than to Southern Rhodesia. The Kariba was sited on the Southern Rhodesian side of the Zambesi River. The Federal Government, dominated by Southern Rhodesian representatives, selected the site which brought more advantages to Southern Rhodesia (Franklin, 1963: 107).

"Magni esse mereamur: let us deserve to be great." Such was the motto of the Federation. The Kariba Dam was to be the Federation's most enduring monument (Hanna, 1965: 268). It would be a concrete example to the outside world of the greatness and power of the new Federal Government.

The importance of the Kariba Dam in terms of the world publicity that it would give to the Federation is exemplified in the Federal Prime Minister's speech. He stated:

> "There is no doubt about it, the idea that we should build
> this enormous scheme -- enormous only in some ways.
> The dam is not a monster. It is not anything like as
> big as great many dams, but the lake it will create
> is. It is practically as big as anything there is in
> the way of artificial lakes, and the output from it
> will be about the same as the Great Boulder scheme,
> and it has a tremendous appeal, particularly to North
> America. I think it is a most fortunate circumstance
> that economics and other reasons have forced us to
> choose this scheme, because it is in many ways more
> attractive to the outside world. Its size and all
> that sort of things make such a popular appeal and it
> will be an excellent advertisement for the whole

Federal Area" (Franklin, 1963: 111).

Hence, confronted by a rising threat to white supremacy; and by various economic difficulties; and by a need for publicizing the tenuous viability of the new Federation -- a decision was made for the Kariba Dam. That it meant displacing 35,000 Africans instead of 500 -- this was not a major factor in the decision.

Thus, the Kariba Dam was built, bringing a crisis of relocation for a community of around thirty-five thousand African villagers. It was the White man's solution to the paradox of his existence in a predominantly Black society, enjoying to the maximum -- perhaps temporarily -- the regional economic resources, and fearing that a Black resurgence one day would sound the White man's doom.

III. THE UNITED STATES CRISIS: THE RELOCATION OF
TWO SMALL COMMUNITIES

The crises of relocation that both the Japanese-American community on the West Coast of the United States and the Bikiri community in the Marshall Islands experienced were crises at the micro-level generated by decisions at the macro-level. These decisions may ultimately be related to the long-run drifts, thrusts and contradictions slowly developing in American society over a half-dozen decades.

The United States government in both cases resolved on these measures as reactions to long-run crisis conditions faced by the American government. Those crises as well as their solutions can only be understood and analyzed by focusing on the internal historical development of United States society at large, and on the reflections of this develop-

ment on the relations of the United States with the rest of the world.

The two cases were the products, apparently, of two immediate, yet different conditions. In the first instance, the Japanese-Americans were relocated in response to the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941, by the Japanese, and in response also to the existing racial prejudice against the Japanese on the West Coast. The Bikinians were relocated to make way for nuclear experiments on their home island, as a reaction to the chronic Cold War -- now overt, now dormant -- that developed between the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union, and the Capitalist bloc led by the United States. Indeed, the Cold War goes back to 1917, though at times other factors obscured or countervailed -- e.g., the wartime alliance against the Axis Powers.

This apparent difference as to immediate causes, however, conceals the fact that both conditions were the outcome of a general cast of thought and scheme of political practice in the United States. This cast of thought corresponded to the requirements of capitalist development. Free enterprise, Manifest Destiny and the Open Door Policy are all ideas and ideals that have long shaped the foreign policy of the United States. Basically these are ideas that serve the purpose of American capitalism.

Expansion was an economic -- and political -- necessity of capitalism. In the nineteenth century, national expansion was primarily within the national frontier: the acquisition of Florida, the Texas war against Mexico, and the gaining of the Pacific Coast. After 1898, the year of the war against Spain, a more aggressive policy was oriented toward the spread and increase of American control and influence in the

Far East, the Caribbean and South America. The domestic or internal "frontier" may be said to have been closed out in the early 1890's.

Ever since the war with England in 1812, the quest for foreign markets had been increasingly dominant. The term "Manifest Destiny" was coined by President Andrew Jackson after the 1812 war. It expressed America's self-assumed responsibility to extend authority over "semi-barbarous" people. America should perform the noble role of teaching inferiors to enjoy their blessings. This would prepare them for the better days to follow under America's benevolent leadership (Williams, 1962: 54).

This moral calling converged with the economic demands of farmers, manufacturers, merchants and financers. It tended to reinforce their expansionist view till they firmly believed that their own internal prosperity and democracy depended upon the continued expansion of their going economic system, re-inforced by a growing control of overseas resources and markets.

It has often been argued that the 1812 war with Britain was a result of commercial activities against American commerce in the Old World. However, the real cause was the cry for more land and virgin soil from farmers calling aggressively for the subjugation of Indians and the annexation of Canada (Beard and Beard, 1930: 40).

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Southern agriculturists, who largely dominated the Federal government, were in a power struggle with the New England and other capitalists of the American North-east. The planters pushed for more land on the western frontier, the new Englanders feared the growth of the West if it was not under

their control (Beard and Beard, 1930: 400). With the creation of new Western States, the western agriculturists gained more power in the American Congress. This marked the division of power that existed prior to the American Civil War, in 1860, between three dominant economic blocs in the country: a highly developed group of northern industrial capital- ists, a large body of western, independent farmers, and a powerful landed, southern plantation aristocracy. Each power bloc, to a marked degree, was segregated within a fairly definite geographical area, each having its distinct mores and interests. Each group evolved a reasonable (in its own eyes) scheme of political action.

The industrial North-east demanded a liberal immigration policy to assure an abundance of cheap labor, ship subsidies for promotion of commerce, and internal improvements in the form of roads, canals, and harbor facilities; and also a "sound" monetary system. High tariffs were also desired in order to protect domestic markets from foreign merchandise (Beard and Beard, 1930: 665).

Planters and farmers, on the other hand, as producers of raw material and food stuff, and as consumers of manufactured goods, wanted to sell in the dearest markets and to buy in the cheapest — Europe and England. Hence, they favored low tariffs. They both were borrowers of capital and in need of the eastern financial markets so they did not mind the lack of soundness in money or currency (Beard and Beard, 1930: 665-666).

Nevertheless, the dominance of the South and West in Congress in the 1830's and the consequent reduction of tariffs brought about a lessening demand for American commodities at home. This drove Northern manufacturers to seek new markets and new outlets. In the Far East, the prospects seemed brighter than in the overcrowded markets of

Europe. Thus, as early as 1844, America secured commercial privileges in the open ports of China. (Beard and Beard, 1930: 720).

Even planters saw great prospects for marketing their tobacco in China.

The increasing power and expansion of the industrial commercial sector in the East culminated in the Civil War of 1860 between the Southern planters and Eastern capitalists. It was a "social war ending in the unquestioned establishment of new power in the government, in accumulation and distribution of wealth" (Beard and Beard, 1930: 53). The net result of the Civil War was the destruction of the Southern aristocracy, and the shift of power to the northern capitalists and the free farmers, who gained prestige and wealth from the conflict, as well as power.

With growing economic surplus came increasing pressures for foreign markets and investment opportunities. After 1861, the manufacturers found markets at home with the aid of high tariffs. Until this market was saturated, no overpowering need was felt for foreign trade outlets. In the mean time, potential or undeveloped markets, like China and other similar areas, were already dominated by rival foreign powers. The result was the "Open Door Policy."

The aim of the American Open Door Policy was to check the greed of other powers in China and in other overseas markets, and above all, to get a part of the trade for the United States. Its central idea was to establish the equality of all competing nations with respect to access to markets and equal trading privileges for all foreigners. When this policy developed, it was neither a military strategy nor a balance-

of-power policy. It was mainly designed to bring economic victory to the United States without resorting to wars.

The policy originated from a debate which took place between 1898-1901 over the proper strategy and tactics of expansion. The Open Door Policy was a third or compromise alternative between imperialists and anti-imperialists. It was produced through a coalition of business-men, intellectuals and politicians who opposed traditional colonialism. They advocated, instead, a policy of the Open Door. This meant, hopefully, that American's economic strength would enter and dominate the world in all underdeveloped areas. This view has dominated American foreign diplomacy ever since (Williams, 1962: 37-38).

This approach was more or less acceptable to all parties, since it would aid the expansion of America's economic system and authority throughout the world, without the burden of formal governing, as in old-style political colonialism. Ironically, though America seemed to oppose political colonialism, it practiced indirect imperialism through economic expansion and dominance of the political economy of developing nations.

The Open Door Policy dominated the foreign policy of the United States. However, two modifications were added. These were the source of crises, or the "Tragedy of American Diplomacy" (Williams, 1962). The first was the convergence with Manifest Destiny. Americans should perform the noble role of teaching inferiors to enjoy the blessings of American democracy and would prepare them for better days to follow under America's benevolent leadership. Even missionaries changed their strategy from mere religious conversion to reform and regeneration by

molding peoples into the American way of life.

These "barbarous" inferior people, so the premise ran, cannot really solve their own problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States. This principle clashed with the generous humanitarian impulse of helping other people solve their problems. Any movement or trend that diverged from those of the United States were considered by the Americans as wrong and dangerous for the welfare of the United States.

The second modification of the Open Door Policy was the backing of the State Department and the Navy in the advancement of commerce and of Manifest Destiny. Even in the so-called isolationist years after World War I, isolationism may have characterized relationships with Europe, but not the limitation of American expansion in the Caribbean (Beard and Beard, 1930: 498; Lewis, 1963: 71). Both parties, Democrats and Republicans, pursued the same basic policy in this regard, with various minor differences.

Several justifications were used to rationalize Manifest Destiny through armed imperialism. Such justification has at times taken the "law of nature" for expansion: if expansion ceased, death supervenes (Williams, 1962 and 1969). The argument would at other times be the natural right of national security as related to geographical propinquity. Action was sometimes necessary to prevent the possible accession of dangerous neighbors. Indeed, the moral duty of America to civilize "backward" nations was used to justify wars and army intervention (Lewis, 1963: 77). In this fashion, the United States entered and fought two World Wars, for they were convinced they were defending

democracy, and that they were charged with a duty to regenerate the world.

This notion continued after World War II in the struggle for the "balance of power" in the Cold War with the Communist bloc. This was believed to affect world democracy and the economic prosperity of the domestic economic system, under the strategy of the Open Door.

A.   Relations With the Far East and World War II

All through the history of America, expansion was considered the way to stifle and control domestic unrest, preserve democracy, expand trade, and restore prosperity. With the end of the hey-days of frontier expansion around 1890, and the persistence of requirements for democracy and social peace, overseas economic expansion provided the primary needs for ending that danger (Williams, 1962: 23-24). Thus, domestic well-being increasingly came to depend upon overseas economic expansion.

Most American leaders looked to China and Asia as the great markets which would absorb the domestic surplus. Hence, any threat from other nations to gain power over China would intensify the existing fear of exclusion of American interests in China. Williams demonstrates this interest in China and overseas markets for the internal well-being of the United States by quoting political leaders:

> "China was of course given first attention: it 'has, for many years, been one of the most promising fields for American enterprise, industry, and capital.' Access to that market, 'under conditions which would secure equality of opportunity to the U.S., would doubtless result in immense gains to our manufacturers.'

Thus it was mandatory to prevent Japan and the European
powers from excluding the United States: that was an
'immediate and most important objective.' But any
similar partition of Africa raised 'considerations of
an economic character of almost equal magnitude,' as
did any drive by the nations of Europe to enlarge their
economic position in Latin America" (Williams, 1962: 41).

Japan was a power competing with America in China and elsewhere

in Asia. One alternative was to work with Russia against Japan. In

the Russo-Japanese War, America chose to back Japan which looked to be

the weaker and more reliable power, in hope of cancelling out both

countries as opponents of American predominance (Williams, 1962: 69).

This would give America a free hand in economic and political influence.

When America failed to eradicate Japan as a rival power, the

other alternative was to work with Japan in "partnership" in the hope

of expanding markets in Japan and China, and of eventually establishing

Japan's economic dependence on the United States. What emphasized the

attractiveness of this alternative was the interest of the United States

in maintaining the status quo in the Far East. With growing possibili-

ties of revolutions, radical movements and national wars, America found

it more profitable to work with Japan to eliminate those evils. Thus,

Japan was given more room in North-east Asia for the sake of consolidating

American influence in the Far East (Williams, 1962: 140).

On the other hand, Japan, as the most Westernized Asiatic

nation, sought typical Western solutions to her problems -- imperialism,

for example. Japan was faced with serious internal economic problems,

with rapid population expansion confined to a few crowded islands. She

was affected by the wide world depression, and she faced serious

unemployment. In addition, Japan depended heavily on imports of raw

material and exports of finished goods, and the increase of trade barriers meant great hardships. Over and above, she was surrounded with potential rivals and historic enemies (Schroeder, 1958: 2-3).

Accordingly, prospects of economic and territorial expansion looked attractive, in the eyes of Japanese leaders. With Manchuria as a frontier area, Japan could expand her industrial base, have a safe source of food and raw materials, and provide an outlet for her surplus population. Manchuria as a frontier would also protect Japan and Korea from Russia. The expansion into Manchuria would also constitute a major step in establishing a solid economic bloc consisting of Japan, Manchuria and China. Consequently, Japan because of its unity and industrial progress could be the natural leader of Asia and thereby replace Western exploitation (Schroeder, 1958: 3).

Japanese-American relationships started to deteriorate in 1931, with Japan's successful invasion and conquest of Manchuria. However, America did not take any direct action, as it was still preoccupied with the depression. Yet as early as 1935, Germany, Japan and Italy were defined as dangers to the well-being of the United States, even before their launching of military attacks on the areas America considered important to its economic system.

With the successful aggression of Germany in Europe, the fall of France and Holland, and the possibility of the defeat of Great Britain -- Japan had a great opportunity to turn from China to southeast Asia. Indo-China, Malaysia, and the East Indies would provide resources sorely needed for Japanese security and economic development. So Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy as an attempt on the

part of Japan to pave the way for southward expansion (Schroeder, 1958: 21).

Before 1940, the chief American complaint against Japan was against the invasion of American rights and interests. After 1940, America was more worried over the expansionist goals of Japan in East Asia and started to use economic pressure against Japan. Added to this, was the general American opposition to Hitler. The close Japanese-German relations created grave concern in America.

The action taken was to exert enough economic pressure on Japan to deter her from new adventures. As all negotiations failed, the United States government froze all assets of Japan in America, and prohibited all transactions with Japan. Thus, by the beginning of August 1941, Japan found itself caught in a virtually airtight embargo of all strategic materials. In despair, the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941, was carried out.

Though the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor marked the official entry of America into World War II, the debate on the role and reaction of the United States in relation to the Axis power had been carried on since 1935. At first the debate was concerned with possibilities of working a compromise with Axis power, and whether neutrality would lead the United States into another depression after losing its overseas markets. Later, the division of the debate was whether to exert economic sanctions to coerce the Axis into an acceptable settlement. Finally, at the beginning of 1939, after the Nazi victory over Poland, the debate was over whether the United States should become a formal belligerent in the war. As Williams rightly states, "Though the angry

debate was set by the Japanese, it seems apparent that the policy-makers
and public were reaching, however reluctantly, the conclusion that war
was necessary" for peace (Williams, 1962: 185).

B.   The One-Way Relationship With the Far East

Ronald Segel in The Race War perceives certain connections
between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the racial treatment of Japanese
on the West Coast of the United States:

> "The War into which the Americans had suddenly been
> thrust by Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbor was
> not altogether unconnected with the long ill-treatment
> of Japanese immigrants in the United States" (Segel,
> 1966: 217).

Though the United States was not "suddenly thrust" into the war,
as has been shown previously, certainly it portrayed a long history of
racial discrimination, especially on the West Coast, against immigrants
of the Far East -- Chinese and Japanese. As the more politically
powerful economic groups in the nation cried for more overseas economic
expansion as a solution for internal unrest and economic depression, the
less privileged economic groups called for the elimination of non-white
races. The plight of the Japanese-American community on the West Coast
was a product of these two forces. While Chinese and later Japanese
immigrants were prohibited any free or full participation in American
life, the Americans insisted on a free field for their trade and
enterprise in China and Japan -- a one-way relationship defined and
pursued by the power of white Americans.

The West Coast, particularly California, experienced a sudden growth that was different from what took place in any other State. The influx of immigrants into California was not only from older States and from Europe. The growth of California attracted a sudden rush of adventurers from all over the world seeking quick riches. "This mixed multitude, bringing with it a variety of manners, customs, and ideas, formed a society more mobile and unstable, less governed by fixed beliefs and principles, than one finds in North-Western communities" (Bryce, 1927: 428). Because of the sudden growth of California and the large fortunes that were swiftly made and the heterogeneous population, all coming after the fame of quick riches -- California had a very peculiar spirit, different from all other States in the Union. As Bryce succinctly describes it in those days around the end of the nineteenth century:

> "Change of public sentiments are sudden and violent.
> The most active minds are too much absorbed in great
> business enterprises to attend to politics; the
> inferior men are frequently reckless and irresponsible;
> the masses are impatient, accustomed to blame everything
> and everybody but themselves for the slow approach of
> the millennium, ready to try instant, even perilous,
> remedies for a present evil" (Bryce, 1927: 426).

In addition to the natural influx of immigrants, the railways and mining corporations imported large numbers of Chinese as "cheap and patient laborers who did not organize and did not strike" (Beard and Beard, 1930: 159). This was the solution of the capitalists to counteract the labor movement that was starting to polarize at the time, and to frustrate their efforts.

Unlike the European immigrants that were absorbed by America with a surprising speed, the Chinese met with increasing prejudice.

"If the Atlantic was a bridge, the Pacific became a chasm" (Segel, 1966: 205).

What aggravated the situation was the depression that hit California in 1877. With the falling prices of stocks, everybody was hard-hit. Trade was bad and work was scarce. For the little work that was available, the white workers were in a disadvantageous position to face the competition of Chinese who were willing to take half the ordinary wages.

During this trying period, Kearney, a militant worker, organized the Working Man's Party of California, and became its president. The movement was to stabilize working conditions for white workers and to curtail the power of the rich and the corruption of the government. Kearney ended up all his militant speeches with, "And whatever happens, the Chinese must go" (Bryce, 1927: 435). The end result was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.

The same antagonism was later directed toward the Japanese when they replaced the Chinese as cheap labor for the capitalists. Their threat was even greater, as they were a more competitive group, eager to acquire property, more zealous in educating their children, and quicker to resent demands for servility.

To all whites who felt the threat of the competition of the Japanese-American community, and to those who coveted their success in spite of the hostility of the social environment, the exclusion of Japanese from the West Coast was a solution for their problem.

C.   The Cold War and United States Nuclear Supremacy

There are many writers and historians like Frederick L. Allen (1952)
who argue that America was in isolation behind a "wall of neutrality"
and reluctantly had to accept a position of world power. They missed
the importance of American economic expansion and the spread of foreign
domain for the survival of the American capitalist system at home. Any
emerging international power that would interfere with the overseas
interests of the United States or would challenge its world supremacy
would be a direct threat to the United States. For the sake of world
peace (on its own terms) and Manifest Destiny, the United States took
an active, though belated, part in two World Wars and in several
limited wars.

Naturally, then, the emergence of Russia as a powerful Communist
nation after the second World War and the success of several revolutions
that did not emulate the American example, were taken by Americans as a
threat to America; its economic system, its Manifest Destiny and its
Open Door Empire. The reaction to this crisis was to sustain the
military power of the United States and to back its economic and
political power overseas.

Consequently, a small, isolated community was forced through
the crisis of relocation to allow more chances for the United States
government, capitalists and military men to bolster their world power
and economic influence.

Hence, the relocation of the Japanese-Americans into concentration
camps and the relocation of the Bikini Marshallese to other atolls were

by-products of the largely American dilemmas of confronting rival powers
such as Japan, and coping with socialist revolutions as in Russia and
China. Both such events, wars and revolutions, excluded United States
trade from large populous world areas -- Eastern Europe after World
War I, and China after World War II.

IV.   CONCLUSION

The crises of relocation that the reviewed cases experienced
were products of broader crises experienced at the macro-levels. The
small communities -- the micro-levels -- were sacrificed in the process
of the macro-levels adjusting to the contradictory conditions they were
facing. As action-systems respond to crises with the least possible
changes, caused by the resistance of conservative forces making for
the retention of existing order, the macro-levels responded to their
continued and chronic crises by changes at their systems' peripheries.
In effect, this may be seen as scape-goating the small collectivities.

To the Egyptian government, the social, economic, and political
contradictions that existed created pressure for mandatory change,
i.e., crisis. The short-run solutions were viewed in terms of
increasing economic production through industrialization and expansion
of arable land. Thus the Egyptian Nubians were sacrificed for the
probable advantages of the High Dam in eliminating or ameliorating those
contradictions.

The Northern Rhodesian, European-dominated government was also

faced with changing realities in the form of a resurgence of native,
black nationalists. To consolidate their power against this threat,
the European settlers envisaged, as a possible solution, political
unity with other white-dominated governments. Added to this was the
expansion of economic projects to enhance the economic supremacy of the
white population, and the exclusion of the black, indigenous population
from gaining any access to profits. The Kariba Dam was a project
designed to demonstrate the power and signifiance of the Federation.
Thus, the Valley Tonga were victimized in the process of responding to
the larger crisis at the national level.

Similarly, the United States government, in facing the
contradictions created by their striving for overseas economic expansion
in the face of foreign threats, resorted to wars for military supremacy
as solutions to those contradictions. Consequently, the two reviewed
communities: the Japanese-Americans and the Bikinians, suffered from
forced relocation.

Hence, the real crisis of relocation at micro-levels stemmed
from macro-level crises -- often continuing and chronic, despite the
short-run relief afforded by the various dams and relocations.

CHAPTER IX

RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS OF RELOCATION

I.   COMPARISON OF CASES

To analyze responses over time, comparisons will be made in
terms of three aspects:

1. the pre-existing action-system.

2. the emergency action-system, and

3. the duration of crisis, as these affect the overall process

of response to crisis.

A.   Pre-Crisis Conditions

The pre-crisis conditions in the four cases show similarities
as well as differences. The variables that will be considered are the
economic conditions, the power relationships, relationships with the
government, factions within the relocated communities, and attachments
to the physical area.

Economically, the four cases range from a subsistence economy
based on gathering and fishing to a relatively advanced market economy.
The Bikinians, a small, highly integrated community, subsisted on
fishing and the gathering of food from the island flora. Cash was
introduced through the sale of souvenir handicraft done by women and
the sale of copra -- sun-dried meat of the coconut fruit. This cash

income, however, was too meager to consider. By contrast, the Valley Tonga subsisted on primitive agriculture, plus a very little cash from the selling of tobacco by a few land owners. The Nubians, too, had a subsistence agricultural economy, which they supplemented with cash remittances from labor migrants in cities. Though the Nubians had contact with other towns and cities, the difficulty of transportation restricted the migrants' return trips to their homes and limited the process of acculturation of the Nubians. Thus the Bikinians, the Valley Tonga and the Nubians prior to relocation experienced almost complete isolation, physically and economically.

The Japanese-Americans on the other hand were more integrated spatially and economically within the larger American structure. Nevertheless, structurally and physically, they were isolated ostensibly because of their racial characteristics. They specialized in a specific type of agriculture, and they developed their own commercial and social institutions to cater to the needs of their own ethnic community. They shared, however, in a sophisticated money economy with a complex division of labor and complex social and organizational relationships.

The four cases experienced before relocation a certain degree of autonomy in internal affairs with reference to the dominant political structure. There was minimum interaction with government officials in the form of annual taxes. Again, the Japanese-American case differed slightly in that they were relatively more integrated within the macro-system, but they retained their community identity and solved most of their problems within their own community institutions.

Power and prestige were attributes of age seniority in all the

cases. Heads of tribes were the power-holders among the Nubians. Issei, the Japanese emigrants, controlled all the social, economic and political institutions within the Japanese-American community. Elders and inheritors of ancestral shrines had authority over other members of the Valley Tonga. Heads of household and council of heads controlled the activities of the Bikinian group. Wealth was a function of power and authority, though in the four cases stratification was minimal and not over-emphasized. Thus, power of the elders was neither absolute nor arbitrary.

The educational level of the four cases varied. The Valley Tonga and Bikinians were non-literate communities. The Nubians, especially the males, had a relatively high level of primary education. The Japanese-Americans, on the other hand, had a high level of college education -- considering their ethnic and minority characteristics and the antagonistic atmosphere they encountered in the Western United States.

According to Lerner, literacy and education are important variables that positively influence empathy. He defined empathy as the capacity for identification with new aspects of the environment, as the individual becomes more equipped with mechanisms needed to incorporate new identifications and demands arising outside of his habitual experience (Lerner, 1958: 212). Hence this difference in educational level of the four cases should be an important factor in differential reactions to forced relocation.

Furthermore, not all the relocated groups were highly integrated communities. The Nubian community was divided into three sections with

different languages and different social structures: the Kenuz, the
Arabs, and the Mahasi. The Japanese-Americans also had major internal
divisions: the Issei (Japanese emigrants), and Nisei (Japanese-
American citizens born in the United States). Each faction during
relocation experienced different problems and had different attitudes
and expectations. However, the control of the elders over the youth
and the limited chances of youth to ascertain their position within the
macro-structure, emphasized the gap between generations and reinforced
the authority of the elders. Within the Valley Tonga community, the
basic unit was the homestead and no observable factions were discerned.
The Bikinians, by the nature of their small number (164) were a highly
integrated group.

Relations to the spatial area before relocation is also a
crucial variable to be considered in understanding reaction to the
crisis. Fried argued that the intensity of grief for a lost home
varies positively with the degree of identity with the spatial, local
area of residence. He wrote:

> "It would be impossible to understand the reactions
> both to dislocation and to relocation and, particularly,
> the depth and frequency of grief responses without taking
> account of...orientations to residential areas. One of
> our primary theses is that the strength of the grief
> reaction to the loss of (home) is largely a function of
> prior orientations to the area. Thus, we certainly
> expect to find that the greater a person's pre-location
> commitment to the area, the more likely he is to react
> with marked grief" (Fried, 1963: 154).

Fried goes on to explain the differential importance of
locality to the individual's or group's sense of continuity. The two
major components of the importance of spatial locality are the local-

ization of "interlocking set of social networks," and a view of the physical area as an "extension of home."

> "This view of an area as home and the significance of local people and local places are so profoundly at variance with typical middle-class orientations that it is difficult to appreciate the intensity of meaning, the basic sense of identity involved in living in the particular area" (Fried, 1963: 154).

Though Fried was discussing the orientations of a working-group in a slum area, this still holds true for other groups or collectivities. The Nubians, the Valley Tonga and the Bikinians certainly had strong attachments to their physical environment, poor as they were in terms of resources. For the Nubians, the Nile river was the center of all their ceremonial and ritualistic activities, and the place was associated with the cult of the Sheikhs as well as the burial place of their ancestors. The Valley Tonga had an elaborate shade cult and ancestral shrines associated with the locality. The Bikinians' subsistence technology and knowledge were developed according to the basic requirements of their small atoll. The Japanese-Americans on the other hand were relatively less identified with a local area. The older generation was more attached to the old, traditional Japan they left. Hence their loss was more economical and psychological in terms of humiliation rather than a loss of "home."

B.   The Emergency Action-System and the Duration of the Crisis

As has been mentioned before, the governing bodies responsible for the four relocations took action to ameliorate the effects of

dislocation upon the relocated collectivities. The degree of in-
volvement was a function of the principles and ideologies of the various
governments at the time of relocation. The Egyptian government saw
the move as an opportunity to improve the economic and social conditions
of the Nubians and to integrate them more fully within the national
structure. The United States government acted the role of protector to
guard the Western Coast from alleged enemy saboteurs and — allegedly —
to insure the safety of the Japanese-American community. Hence the
American involvement was geared toward providing subsistence for the
relocated in isolated areas. The British Colonial government aimed
by its intervention to keep living conditions for the Valley Tonga no
worse than conditions prior to relocation. The United States military
government helped only in the movement of the Bikinians from one atoll
to the other without further support or guidance.

Finally, expectations regarding the duration of the move varied.
The Nubians and the Valley Tonga were aware that their moves were
permanent because of the complete inundation of their homeland, though
there was some wishful thinking that the water edge might not reach
their homes, hence offering a slight possibility of return. The
Japanese-Americans and Bikinians on the other hand believed that their
dislocation was temporary, and that sooner or later they would return
to their homes.

Regardless of the differences in the external emergency action-
systems and the variance in the expectations of the relocated groups as
to the duration of the move, the four reviewed cases experienced a
prolonged crisis situation of uncertainty and instability that hampered

any stabilization of their network of social relationships. In all cases, with the exception of the Bikinians,[1] the administrative machinery overseeing the relocation became the target of hostility on the part of the relocated.

In the immediate instance, the apparent lack of overt hostility against the United States military government in the Bikinian case might be explained by the intangible and remote nature of the official threat. The interaction between the relocated group and government officials did not increase as a result of dislocation. Hence the people had no contact with a government official towards whom their unrest, frustrations and hostilities could be directed.

The increased contact between government officials and the Nubians and the Japanese-Americans, and the increased control of government administrators in the activities of the relocated populations, underlined the attitude of dependency in the two groups. The people relied more on their respective administrations to solve their problems rather than on the internal resources of their own group. Their demands and expectations far exceeded the actual ability to meet them. Thus, the gulf of mistrust and antagonism and lack of communication widened.

C.   Change in External Conditions

Relocation of a collectivity by higher-echelon fiat entails change (for the collectivity) in external, physical and social conditions, hence the crisis or the sudden demand for change in the

collectivity action-system. The response, however, is a developmental process through time that is influenced by the disposition of the collectivity prior to relocation and by the development of events during the emergency stage, as well as by external objective stimuli.

As a starting point for the analysis of change in external conditions, changes in means of production and relations to means of production will be reviewed. Then the changes in power relations of the communities will be analyzed.

The four relocated cases experienced a breakdown in the continuity of means of production. The degree varied, but a change was there. The Nubians were relocated in an area where the land was not ready for cultivation. Several years passed before they were allotted their plots of land to cultivate. The land was less fertile, at a considerable distance from their homes, it required advanced technical knowledge of irrigation, cultivation and cash cropping, and entailed a complexity of relationships among the various structures that evolved in relation to the activities of cultivation and marketing.

Likewise, the Valley Tonga experienced a considerable change in relation to their means of production. The new land allotted to them was less fertile. Extra land for cultivation was secured by individual effort in terms of bush clearing, which in turn changed the ownership patterns of the collectivity. Though cash cropping was introduced, it was not imperative as in the Nubian case, but was an individual decision.

The Bikinians were moved three times and in each situation they had to cope with existing resources. They were left on their own to solve their survival problems. With the very limited skills they had

developed in their original atoll, they were unable to mobilize the
different resources available on the islands on which they successively
settled.

On the other hand, the Japanese-Americans' life conditions were
quite drastically changed in their concentration camps. No means of
production were available. The American administration met the inmates'
survival needs; the internees staffed most of the jobs necessary for
the functioning of the camps. No wages were given for the jobs
performed; instead a nominal sum of money was allocated for extra or
non-essential consumer goods.

Changes in the means of production engendered disturbances in
the prevailing set of interrelationships. In new Nubia, large land
owners lost their land, though they were compensated for it in cash.
Ownership of land was no longer decisive in status differences. By the
new arrangements of land ownership, agricultural laborers can own almost
the same acreage of land as previous land owners. The location of
agricultural land prevented the majority of women from farming it;
thus, the women lost their control over the cultivated land.

With the scarcity and infertility of land, the complex technical
skill required in cultivation, and the distant location of land — the
Nubians relied on traditional means for coping with these problems.
Males who found jobs in the region lived in the area; others continued
their pattern of migrating to distant urban centers for jobs. Co-
cultivation was continued as a means of solving agricultural problems.
Introduced to money economy with no tangible means of production for
cash, most families relied on remittances from migrating members, as

had been the case in Old Nubia.

The Japanese-Americans during the internment years lost their property and jobs. Family enterprises were abolished. Individuals occupied jobs in the camp according to their skill and training. This allowed some individuals to practise occupations they were trained for but were denied the opportunity to practise, because of the discriminatory structure of the West Coast. The second generation — the Nisei — held the camp administrative jobs, thus enhancing their power and authority in the camps. The first generation, the elders, lost the economic and social base of their control and power, not only over their families, but also over the Japanese-American community.

The Valley Tonga also experienced a change in relations to means of production. The government compensation money given to the heads of households augmented the control of the heads over the labor of members of their households to clear more land for them. The heads of households who controlled more labor were able to clear more land. Consequently the ownership of land for cultivation increased the control of heads over the labor of the members who had no access to clear their own land. The autonomy of women was weakened, as they had to rely on their husband's land for cultivation. Those youth not finding jobs outside the area, also were obliged to work on their elders' farms for a living. The importance of the ancestral lineage system of ownership of land declined. Thus the traditional leaders, by the weakening of the shade cult, lost their power over the activities of the collectivity.

The Bikinians questioned the right of ownership of their paramount chief. They wanted to offset the patron-client relationship that existed in Bikini which entailed the paying of annual tribute to the chief. As for the division of land in Kili island, this too was a question that had to be settled among the group. Contact with American ideas of "democracy" and "justice" introduced other criteria for assigning land. The old Marshallese customs of assigning ownership and rights were questioned and challenged basically by the younger people, who in the successive relocations had widened their experiences so they could envisage other ways of organizing relationships.

D.   Internal Changes

The sudden change of external conditions and the alterations in the relationships to means of production induced equally sudden changes in power relations. In every case, segments of the collectivity lost power and status, while other gained authority and power. The sudden changes also created a certain awareness, especially among the younger groups, that led to unrest and tension, as the old established ways of solving collectivity problems were disrupted.

The abrupt shift in power relations created grounds for struggle between factions of the population in feeling out their new patterns of power and authority. The legitimacy of traditional authority was questioned. The change in relations to the means of production was one of the decisive factors. In addition to that, the failure of traditional

leaders to meet the expectations of their followers in time of crisis diminished popular confidence in the leaders. The third important factor in disturbing the authority of traditional leaders was the awareness and consciousness on the part of segments of the group that alternate ways of organization were available or opening up.

Consequently, some latent cleavages within the collectivity became overt. Intra-group conflict occurred in different degrees in each of the four cases. In the Nubian case, conflict between the territorial sections became manifest, as well as conflict between the traditional elders and the educated young, e.g., school teachers, in the political arena. The Japanese-Americans during the years of internment experienced intra-group conflict that developed to the point of overt physical aggression against the Nisei who were believed to cooperate with the American administration. The young educated group of the Valley Tonga tried to assert the primacy of their skill and attitudes against the control of the elders by undermining the basis of their legitimate authority: the cult of shades. The Bikinians experienced a reorganization of their decision-making mechanism to meet the problem of food shortage in Rongerik. When they were finally settled on Kili, they were reluctant to accept the traditional relation-ships with their paramount chief. The young also pressed for the re-arrangement of land distribution rights in a more equitable fashion than had prevailed on Bikini. Hence, the sudden change in power relations was accompanied by a period of manifest conflict between factions within the collectivity in all four cases reviewed.

Nevertheless, the manifest inter-group conflict did not lead to

the disintegration of any of the collectivities because the conflict was countered by a strong awareness of overall group identity. The termination of their isolation, whether real of psychological; and the external threat of an increase in government control enhanced overall group solidarity in the face of the external threat. The sharing in the traumatic experience of relocation accentuated the "we" feeling of the relocated group, controlling internal differences and increasing differences from other collectivities they came in contact with, as a result of the move.

II.   RESPONSES THROUGH TIME

At the onset of crisis, the action-system of the subordinate, micro, or scapegoat collectivity experiences a stage of fluidity. Long established means of solving collectivity problems do not fit the sudden new conditions. The change in internal relationships, as well as in system goals, requires time for the various inter-group and intra-group roles to be redefined. Observers usually conceptualize this stage as a stage of "disorganization" during which many abortive attempts at solutions are made. This transitional period is also accompanied by psychological stress and physiological stress on the part of the actors. Decisions concerning the most pertinent problems of survival are made under pressure.

Associated with this fluidity is an attitude of passivity. In all reviewed cases the relocated collectivities conformed to the orders of the larger or macro-system with minimum objections or conflict. In

the case of the Valley Tonga's armed confrontation, the group that was active in demonstrating non-conformity to regulations was the one that was being moved the greatest distance to an almost foreign area. In this specific situation it was "relative deprivation" that aroused the antagonism of the group, not the move itself.

This preliminary passive reaction is re-inforced by two other conditions, besides the time factor. First, lack of conceptual awareness of the implications of the move and uncertainty as to conditions in the future hamper any organized means of active confrontation. Disillusionment and anxiety may be increased. Or, on the other hand, a rise in expectations may cushion the fears and the threats, so that no concerted overt action on the part of the collectivity emerges at that stage.

Second, the action of the collectivity is usually concentrated, according to the "emergence priority system of values"[2] (Yutzy, 1970: 344-353), on solving the immediate problems of preservation of life and restoration and maintenance of essential services for the survival of the collectivity.

This conclusion is congruent with findings in disaster research (Yutzy, 1970; Barton, 1969). Williams, studying communities in crisis, wrote: "One way a feedback control system can react more rapidly is to cut down the signal range. Both individuals and community systems revert, in sudden disaster, to a restricted set of referents" (Williams, 1957: 19). Barnett, in examining the role of crisis in innovations, stated that in a crisis situation, attention is directed toward specific activities to ameliorate the stress. Hence, the atmosphere is not

conducive to innovations in other matters (Barnett, 1953: 83).

Kuhn also used the crisis approach to conceptualize the structure of scientific revolutions. As the normal scientific paradigm fails to solve problems of nature, and facts and theory do not agree, the result is an anomaly which evokes crisis.

> "When, for these reasons or others like them, an anomaly comes to seem more than just another puzzle of normal science, the transition to crisis and to extraordinary science has begun. The anomaly itself now comes to be more generally recognized as such by the profession. More and more attention is devoted to it by more and more of the field's most eminent men. If it still continues to resist, as it usually does not, many of them may come to view its resolution as the subject matter of their discipline. For them the field will no longer look quite the same as it had earlier. Part of its different appearance results simply from the new fixation point of scientific scrutiny" (Kuhn, 1970: 83).

Following the preliminary stage of fluidity, passivity and concentration of efforts on solving the most immediate needs -- is the stage of redefining relationships and values. Action that was directed toward individuals and small-group levels tends to move toward the collectivity level. Alternative means of solving community problems become envisaged. Thus this stage is usually accompanied by an upsurge of intra-group conflict.

Crisis will tend to intensify any conflict, dormant or overt, existing prior to the crisis. In addition, any modification of pre-crisis interrelationships tends to increase intra-group conflict. This is more clear in power relations. Traditional power-holders tend to try to consolidate their power basis while other groups strive to ascertain their power, utilizing new elements available in the new

situation.

The four reviewed cases experienced intra-group conflict. The Bikinians, however, demonstrated the least conflict, though there were indications of pressure by young people to redefine certain existing relations. This could be attributed to the highly integrated nature of the group prior to relocation -- due to their small number.[3]

This point supports Hermann's proposition concerning the viability of organizations in crisis: as pre-crisis organizational integration decreases, there will be more intensification of conflicts antecedent to the emerging crisis (Hermann, 1963: 67-68). It also supports Demerath's findings of the survey on disasters: "pre-disaster dissatisfactions are heightened or triggered in the disaster situation" (Demerath, 1957: 29).

Kuhn's conceptualization of crisis in the scientific process pointed out the stage of redefining relations and its concomitant condition of divergent opinions or conflicts.

> "Through this proliferation of divergent articulations
> -- more and more frequently they will come to be
> described as ad hoc adjustments the rules of normal
> science become increasingly blurred; though there
> still is a paradigm, few practitioners prove to be
> entirely agreed about what it is. Even formerly
> standard solutions of solved problems are called in
> question" (Kuhn, 1970: 83).

Gradually the collectivity passes through the stage of reorganization of relations. New roles become relatively institution-alized. As this stage of crisis of identity fades away, the collectivity tends to direct its attention to external relationships. With increased awareness of group identity, action extends toward external threats and objectives.

This stage is also identified in studies of communities in disasters. Spiegel, describing a flood on an English island in 1953, mentioned the tension that developed against officials during the period of long-run adjustments (Spiegel, 1957: 5). Fritz documented feelings of resentment occurring in the "rehabilitation stage" in six American communities faced with disasters (Fritz, 1957: 9).

All these findings support the proposition that collectivities faced with external, involuntary crises pass through a stage of antagonism, conflict or resentment directed toward external sources of threat after the impact and emergency stage — plus a re-sorting of internal conflict.

III.   TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSES
         TO FORCED MOVEMENTS

Group consciousness can manifest itself in two types of collective action (Etzioni, 1968: 224-244) that are not mutually exclusive. Group consciousness might lead to symbolic activities if it lacks commitment or power. This will entail an attempt to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of group culture in the form of nativistic movements (Linton, 1943: 230). Also group consciousness might lead to more direct action to modify the environment (Etzioni, 1968: 25). The symbolic reaction type can be further classified into revitalistic nativism and perpetuative nativism (Linton, 1943: 231). Revitalistic nativism is a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture (Wallace, 1956: 265).

Perpetuative nativism is a conscious and organized effort to perpetuate cultural elements with a strong emphasis on the elimination of alien persons, customs or values (Linton, 1943: 231; Wallace, 1956: 267).

Action consciously directed to modify the environment and specifically the social environment can also take one of two forms: action as an organized effort to obtain desirable results by acting within the interacting system, or action as an organized effort to manipulate the interacting system by refusal to act within the larger system. An example of the former is organized political pressure activities to procure demands. Slow downs, strikes and riots are activities directed toward procuring demands through withdrawal or refusal to act within the existing apparatus.

DIAGRAM 2

TYPOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSES

Collective Action

Symbolic Activity   Directed Activity

Natavistic   Revitalistic

In the four reviewed cases, certain collective actions were activated by the increased group awareness and consciousness of group identity as a result of collective relocation. The Nubians realized the importance of group solidarity and unity in gaining political power in the region and in exerting pressure on the government to comply with

their demands. Simultaneously, they were more conscious of their different identity and sought to preserve their Nubian culture from complete assimilation within the larger group. Nubian folklore is being preserved by organizing troups specialized in Nubian dancing and singing. They are even considering the effort to write their unwritten language for fear of extinction. Thus there are signs of combined direct action and of nativistic movements.

The Japanese-Americans during their internment years likewise tried to promote Japanese cultural elements — nativistic reaction. Over and above there were records of strikes, slow downs and riots in several camps. The Japanese-Americans lacked the channels as well as the political organizations that could exert pressure on the American administration. With their situational limitations, they opted for direct action of withdrawal in the form of creating crisis for the macro-system.

In the Valley Tonga case, though a few villages violently opposed the actual move, the direct reaction of the collectivity was minimal. A revitalistic movement, however, was recorded in one of the relocated villages. It was a symbolic movement by the educated young to undermine the power of the British colonial rule and the control of the elders.

The Bikinians, however, did not experience any external threat that might have induced the need for collective concerted action. With the threat of hunger they reorganized their activities giving priority to the group rather than to the individual households or districts. Later on, after the contact with Americans on Kwajalein island, they

united to terminate the rights of their paramount chief. No other collective actions are reported in the literature.

Hence, the responses of the collectivities to external threat varied from nativistic movements to political counter-pressures. According to our typology, there are two major categories: symbolic activities and direct activities to modify the environment. The former category is further broken down into revitalistic and nativistic movements. The Egyptian Nubians became more conscious of their group identity and started to use all available channels -- formal and informal -- for exerting political pressure to influence political decisions in a direction more favorable for the collectivity. The Japanese-Americans, during their internment years, showed nativistic reactions as they accentuated Japanese folklore and cultural artifacts. They also reacted toward the administration with riots and strikes. The Valley Tonga experienced in one village a revitalistic movement by accepting Christianity as a new religion. The Bikinian aggression was not directed toward the United States military government. They failed to perceive the actual source of threat. Thus their attention was directed toward the paramount chief of the atolls who had been a traditional patron. They tried to use the authority and power of the American military government to acquire autonomy and break all ties with the traditional leader.

The Egyptian Nubians and the Japanese-Americans differed from the Valley Tonga and the Bikini Marshallese in two aspects. First, the level of education in the former cases was higher than in the latter. Thus they were in better position to perceive realistically and

envisage the actual source of their crisis. The Valley Tonga and the Bikinians were non-literate collectivities, which added to their disadvantageous position with regard to the external threat, as well as limiting their conceptual capacity for identifying the source of the threat.

Second, the Egyptian Nubians and the Japanese-Americans experienced more involvement with intervening systems as agents for ameliorating crisis conditions. On the other hand, the Northern Rhodesia Colonial Government (Zambia) was less involved in action to assist the Valley Tonga in adjusting to their new environment. The Bikinians experienced the least intervention from external help. Administrative agencies, as well as encouraging dependency attitudes, also created a tangible system toward which representations and other activities could be directed.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the degree of involvement of the larger system was a partial function of the educational level of the micro-system in crisis. Literacy tends to increase awareness and to raise levels of expectations, thereby leading to efforts to press extra demands on the intervening macro-system to meet at least the minimal expectations of the micro-system. Higher or "modern" levels of education increase the bargaining power of the micro-collectivity, and improve organizational capacity toward more purposeful activities.

Hence, the two collectivities with higher levels of literacy and education -- the Egyptian Nubians and the Japanese-Americans -- exhibited activities directed toward the external macro-system in an

effort to change their social environment by solutions more favorable
to the micro-collectivity experiencing the crisis of forced movement.

However, there were substantial differences between the Japanese-
Americans' activity and that of the Egyptian Nubians'. While the
Egyptian Nubians did not manifest any riots or strikes, they still
produced changes in their new social environment by acting as a pressure
group, as well as by utilizing personal, informal relations and channels
to obtain their demands. The Japanese-Americans procured changes in
their social environment during the internment years through riots,
strikes, and slow-downs.

Between these two cases -- the Egyptian Nubians and the
Japanese-Americans -- there was one substantial difference, and that
was the group-image. The Japanese-Americans were relocated in prison-
like communities, as they were allegedly seen as a possible threat to
American citizens, especially on the West Coast. They were treated
more or less as enemies and traitors. The racial discrimination that
existed prior to relocation perpetuated the psychological isolation of
the group. Thus, the reaction of the macro-system accentuated a
negative group-image that hampered any chances of exerting pressure
within the system.

The Egyptian Nubians viewed themselves almost as national
heroes who sacrificed their homes for the welfare of the Nation. This
group-image was reinforced by statements and promises of government
officials and responsible national leaders. The positive group-image
legitimized the micro-system's collective demands as rights, and it was
the obligation of the macro-system to meet these demands.

The group-image, whether positive or negative, not only affects the collectivity's "definition of the situation" by envisaging alternative means of channeling demands. It also affects the degree of tolerance of the larger system to these demands. Hence, group-image could be proposed as an important factor in determining the type of activity directed toward the external social environment.

On the basis of the preceeding discussion, the following propositions could be formulated:

1. External crisis at the micro-collectivity level increases group consciousness and identity by enhancing the we-feeling of the collectivity, which preserves the solidarity of the collectivity against the internal conflict that is associated with redefinition of relation-ships.

2. External crisis at the micro-collectivity level intensifies symbolic activities to meet the danger of new relationships.

3. The pre-crisis level of education affects reactions to change the new environment.

4. Group-image affects the choice of means toward goals. A positive group-image increases opportunities for active pressure. A negative group-image limits chances of active pressure.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This exception might not be true in reality. However, the scarcity of sources of information might lead to false expectations.

[2]Daniel Yutzy argues that community structures are adaptive devices to achieve desired ends. Though preservation of life and property is one of the functions of communities, it is only in crisis conditions that disrupt the fulfillment of some or all essential functions, that preservation of life and restoration and maintenance of essential services emerge as priority values in organizing the immediate organizational goals (1970: 344-353).

[3]This apparent integration may also be attributed to lack of documentation.

CHAPTER X

SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

I.   THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Forced relocation of collectivites is conceptualized in this
study as a specific type of crisis at the micro-collectivity level.
With relocation, the collectivity is faced with a sudden new physical
and social environment, hence the crisis: sudden and irresistible
demand for structural change.

Crisis can be analyzed at different levels which are cumulative.
A crisis at the collectivity level affects institutions, small groups
and individuals within the collectivity. Similarly, a crisis at a
family level affects individual members of the family. Nevertheless,
in certain instances, crisis at the individual level might create crisis
at the collectivity level too.

In the present study, we encountered the situation where crisis
at a micro-collectivity level was precipitated by decisions taken at
the macro-level. Those decisions were in turn responses to contradictions
faced by the macro-collectivities. The incident of forced relocation in
all reviewed cases was viewed as a product of crisis conditions faced by
the larger governmental system. Hence, crises faced by macro-systems
can create crisis conditions in the subsystems.

Similarly, the reverse is also possible though not highly
probable. Subsystems in response to crisis may react in ways that
create crises at the macro-levels -- but not proportionately as serious.
Riots, wild cat strikes, slow-downs, demonstrations are all actions that

are resorted to by collectivities to produce changes in their social
environment in response to their own contradictory conditions. These
reactions create, or threaten to create crises at the macro-level.

Thus, crisis can occur as a result of voluntary or involuntary
decisions. It can also be precipitated by decisions taken outside the
system under analysis, that is, external; or by decisions taken inter-
nally. Involuntary, external crises are usually more intensive and
demanding of the social system than crises stemming from internal and
"voluntary" causes.

In any situation of crisis, because of changes occurring in the
physical, or social environment of the action-system, anomalies arise.
The old established ways of solving problems, the means-end relation-
ships do not fit the requirements created by new conditions. These
contradictions create crises. Suddenly change becomes imperative
-- changes in the goals of the system, the inter- or intra-relationships,
and/or of self- or collective-image.

Though change is imperative in any crisis situation, the degree
and direction of change is problematic. In any crisis situation there
is the conflict or dialectic of two opposing forces -- the forces of
tradition -- conservative forces tending to retain the status quo, and
the forces of change emerging or re-inforced by the new and sudden
conditions. The outcome, or the long-term changes that occur in the
action-system, are products of this dialectic.

When traditional forces are disrupted by means of the process,
the outcome is radical changes in the core structure of the system
-- both macro and micro. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases, changes

or adaptations are incorporated. Modifications are introduced to absorb the conflict without radically transforming the structure.

Size and isolation are limiting factors for the process of adaptation to sudden changes. Without external help, in the form of an intervening emergency system, or acculturation, the action-system seems to be incapable of innovations and change to confront the crisis. The Norse Greenlanders are a case in point, and likewise the case of the Bikinians before the intervention and help from the United States Military Government. Action-systems without such external resources may not be capable of inducing sufficient change to cope with the crisis; the result is deterioration or complete extinction.

Moreover, confrontations and conflicts between forces of change and conservative forces do not by definition produce radical changes as has sometimes been conceptualized. "Social movements" are not necessarily indications of transformation or drastic changes.

As social systems adapt to confrontations with the minimum necessary changes, there is often a general tendency to absorb conflicts and oppositions by introducing minor changes in the on-going action-system. Revolutions are usually the product of conservative traditional forces incapable of adapting to the opposing forces of change within the system created by crises conditions, and in themselves creating crises through the conflict.

The farmer's movement in Saskatchewan, Western Canada, as explained by McCrorie (1964) clarifies this point. The movement through time was capable of introducing certain changes in existing relationships by creating cooperatives. However, the cooperatives were not a drastic

change in the pre-existing capitalist relationships. They were only

changes that enhanced the adaptation of the farmers to the on-going

macro-system.

> "Unlike other industrialists, Saskatchewan farmers
> coped with the intra- and inter-industrial competition
> and conflict in a somewhat different manner. Instead
> of removing competitors, farmers attempted to preserve
> them through co-operation and co-operative institutions.
> Institutions such as co-operatives and marketing boards,
> in turn, were used by farmers to integrate themselves
> with different, but related industries. Credit unions,
> wheat pools, consumer co-operatives, marketing boards
> are cases in point... The irony of history is that
> their efforts and dreams resulted in a remarkable
> adaptation to capitalist system, not a changing or
> overthrowing of the system" (McCrorie, 1964: 121).

Similarly, the unrest of the United States farmers through

history was met by the solution of expanding the overseas markets to

sustain the political economy of the capitalist macro-system (Williams,

1969). The quest of the farmers for solutions to their successive

economic crises did not culminate into a radically different "social

consciousness" (Williams, 1969: 445) even when the seeds of such a

change were present. The forces of preservation succeeded in incorpo-

rating certain changes to counteract the opposing forces that might have

led to radical change.

In the absence of internal or external confrontations, the forces

of preservation of traditional means-ends relationships seem incapable

of adapting to sudden external, physical changes. The result may be

"cultural death." In situations where forces for change develop within

the collectivity, and the traditional forces do not adapt so as to

accommodate the tension, the result may be the complete destruction of

the old system in the form of either social and political revolutions,

or complete subjugation by force and assimilation: these may all be seen as forms of "cultural death." When the system incorporates certain changes as modifications of the on-going system of action, then the system adapts to forces of change without necessarily changing radically the prevailing patterns of existing relationships and values.

The four cases reviewed in this study were cases of forced relocation -- involuntary, external crises that descended upon the micro-collectivity. Due to the cumulative nature of crises, all individuals and institutions within the collectivity were affected by the onset of crisis.

The four cases, with the partial exception of the Bikinians, experienced adaptive changes: changes that were the product of the confrontation between forces of change, and forces of preservation of the status quo.

There are two methodological limitations in this study that restrict the development of generalizations concerning relationships of variables according to orthodox expectations. First, the comparative historical approach that was chosen to tackle concrete, complex, empirical cases limits the possibility of finding clear-cut generalizations. With the focus on how historically social wholes really react to the crisis of relocation, we are confronted with similarities as well as differences stemming from the unique historical circumstances of each case.

The second methodological limitation to any clear-cut generalizations is the basic assumption of this study that reactions and responses to crises are developmental processes through time. The

actual, evolving response-process sets its own conditions for further action. These conditions are in themselves an existing amalgamation of previous emergent responses and events. Hence, no stimulus-response conceptualization would be conducive to explain the complex on-going reality.

With these methodological limitations, few generalizations can be put forth for further research.

The collectivity at the onset of crisis passes through a stage of fluidity and passivity. The uncertainties as well as the immediate requirements of mere survival take priority. Hence, action of the collectivity is directed more toward individual and small groups. Through the process of defining and institutionalizing new roles within the collectivity, conflicts and struggles emerge for consolidation of power of various factions. Crisis alerts segments of the collectivity to alternative means for solution of problems. Confronted with the power of traditional leaders, certain accommodations and modifications of the traditional action-system are introduced.

As new structures are introduced to increase the process of structural differentiation by the macro-system, new roles are established. This is certainly facilitated by the crisis condition and the state of fluidity that is experienced. Nevertheless, the basic problem becomes one of institutionalizing these roles within the existing action-system. Old sentiments and attitudes tend to retain their control on human behavior. Thus the changes become the least or minimal changes to cope with the new situation as defined.

Four propositions were specifically formulated regarding the

reactions of micro-collectivities to external, involuntary crises. These are:

1. External crisis at the micro-collectivity level increases group consciousness and identity by enhancing the we-feeling of the collectivity, which helps to preserve the solidarity of the collectivity against the internal conflict that is associated with redefinition of relationships.

2. External crisis at the micro-collectivity level intensifies symbolic activities to meet the danger of new relationships.

3. The pre-crisis level of education affects reactions to change the new environment.

4. Group image affects the choice of means toward goals. A positive group image increases opportunities for active pressure. A negative group image limits the chances of active pressure.

This study concentrated on a specific type of crisis at the collectivity level. Reference was made to other types of crisis conditions for comparative reasons whenever it was relevant. As an exploratory work, however, it does not exhaust all possibilities. It is a step toward the recognition of the importance of the concept of crisis and its relevance for studies of social change and social persistence. The achievement of a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of crises and their effects on the various levels of analysis seems to be contingent on the sponsorship of further research in the area.

II.   SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The "sociological imagination" advocated by C. Wright Mills is the capacity "to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society" (1959: 6).   In his perspective,

"What they (men) need, and what they feel they need, is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world and what may be happening within themselves" (1959: 5).

To relate the findings of this study to everyday experiences of collectivities is the purpose of this section, that is, the practical implications of the study.

With technological advancements, man endeavors to increase his control over natural resources.   Concomitant with that endeavor is the increase of the control of man over man.   As societies develop and become more complex, the grip of centralized governments become more dominant.   More and more micro-collectivities will be sacrificed for the well-being of the macro-system.

This scape-goating process will be rationalized within the frame of the well-being of the macro-system: economic development, employment opportunities, political prestige and so on.   Some moves will also be justified by the importance of relocation for the displaced collectivity itself in terms of better housing and better social services.

It is usually the case that the most vulnerable collectivities to such decisions are collectivities that lack political power and influence to affect decisions before they are made at the macro-level. Such, for example, are the poor urban enclaves in slum areas, isolated

subsistence communities, or racially discriminated-against collectivities. In other words, we are referring to collectivities that are too weak to fight back.

Africa alone, in almost a decade, has experienced the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of people because of new dams and man-made lakes. The Egyptian High Dam was responsible for the relocation of 100,000 Nubians between Egypt and Sudan; the Volta Dam in Nigeria created crisis for over 75,000 people; the Kariba Dam necessitated the moving of 35,000 villagers; and in Nigeria, the Kainji Lake Basin displaced 50,000 people (Scudder, 1968: 168). These are the first of many projects that will change the African landscape.

Urban renewal programs for deteriorating central city areas also reflect macro-decisions that culminate in the crisis of relocation for the poor and the powerless. Almost every major metropolitan city in North America is resorting to this solution for their urban problems, often without much understanding of the implications of the move for the relocated.

In Canada, the current issue is the James Bay Project of Quebec. Fortunately, with political pressure, this over-optimistic scheme has so far been limited to the damming of La Grande River, instead of the original idea of harnessing the power of five large rivers. That means 20,000 square miles will be flooded instead of 144,000 square miles as initially planned. The traditional argument is used to convince the public of the advantages of the project: economic growth in terms of industrial development, tourism, electricity and employment. The Indians of the area are not overlooked in the justification. As was

released in a report on the Initial Phase of the project:

> "The development of James Bay opens a fascinating vista
> for the James Bay Indians. It provides them with the
> choice: to continue to live off the land hunting and
> fishing and/or to become part of a new lifestyle which
> some of them already have experienced in Montreal or in
> other southern communities" (Richardson, 1972: 181).

These are general, sugar-coated promises that at best will increase the

level of expectations of the communities, ameliorate anxieties, and

facilitate the implementation of the project. At worst, they will

increase the duration and intensity of the crisis, as frustrations

develop from the unmet promises and unmet expectations.

In fact, sudden changes of the physical and social environment

might be very detrimental for the Cree Indians living in the area. Even

when the macro-government takes over the responsibility of ameliorating

the traumatic experience of relocation and improvises means for coping

with the crisis, there is the threat of the clashing of different world

views, different definitions and expectations among the officials and

the relocated.

The effective functioning of the relief system requires

reciprocal fulfillment of expected behavior on the part of the relocated

and of the administering officials. This means that the officials who

are responsible for the relief should be aware of the implications of

the crisis as the relocated define it, as well as have knowledge and

understanding of the organizational life of the collectivity prior to

relocation. In other words, an effort should be made to work with the

people rather than for the people. Any changes in the means of

production or in relations to the means of production have to be

institutionalized within the action-system of the micro-collectivity.

An understanding of the conservative nature of social systems might help in constructing plans that are realistic and that could be easily incorporated within the action-system of the group without creating or increasing the duration and intensity of crisis conditions.

Timing can also be an important factor in relief or development programs for relocation. When the collectivity is experiencing the fluidity stage is the optimal time for the introduction of changes. The collectivity then may be more receptive to new ideas and new alternatives for solving their everyday proglems while they are still struggling to redefine inter- and intra-relationships. Lack of coordination of activities of various organizations joining in the relief might lead to loss of the opportunity to introduce required changes at the right time.

To conclude, crises are situations defined as crises by actor(s). Though they may create stress and anxiety, they need not be necessarily evil in their consequences from an objective perspective. Nevertheless, the understanding of the actor(s) "definition of the situation," and the implications of crises to the individual and the group, should be a basic factor in any program or plan to ameliorate the discomforts of crisis, or to improve the process of coping with sudden demand for change.

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