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DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN HEALTH AND SAFETY: A CASE ANALYSIS

BY

(C) TERESA NADENE ROSE-HEARN

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
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
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
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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the dynamics of change in the design and provision of health and safety (H&S) in a large corporation. Hinings and Greenwood (1988) provided the following five concepts (dynamics) which were considered important for understanding organizational change: situational constraints, values, interests, power, and organizational capacity. The objective of this study was to understand the interplay of these concepts, and their combined affect on H&S design. A longitudinal retrospective case study approach was used. Interview data was transcribed and the Ethnograph computer programme facilitated qualitative analysis. Three time periods, based on three major transitions in the company's H&S programmes, were used as a basis for the analysis of change.

Analysis indicated that from 1965-1975 compatibility existed between the design of H&S and circumstances in its external/internal environment. There was widespread commitment (status quo commitment) to the design of H&S. Dissatisfactions among H&S groups regarding the allocation of resources for H&S were contained by a concentrated power structure. The presence of transactional leadership and expertise in H&S created pressures against change, thus the design of H&S was sustained over this time.

In the late 1970's, changes in the external/internal environment of H&S created pressures for change. The senior executive no longer believed that H&S was a priority. These new values were incongruent with the design of H&S, thus the design of H&S was destabilized. Substantive budget cuts were made to H&S. There was reformative commitment toward a design of H&S that contained few initiatives. Any dissatisfactions pertaining to allocations of resources for H&S were contained by a concentrated power structure. Leadership and expertise in H&S were minimal. By 1985 there was status quo commitment towards a design of H&S which only met the enforced requirements of

provincial legislation.

By approximately 1986, changes in the external/internal environment of H&S once again caused inconsistency between the design of H&S and its environment. The prevailing idea that H&S was not important became discredited. Many H&S activities began to be implemented. Competing views about the design of H&S, and dissatisfactions among H&S groups regarding the allocation of resources intensified and became more evident because the power structure had become more dispersed and decentralized. Transformational leadership and expertise within H&S enabled much of the change that had occurred.

It was concluded that changes in the context of H&S, and in organizational members' values provided the primary impetus for change in H&S. Power, perhaps to a greater extent than that emphasized by Hinings and Greenwood (1988) in their findings, was also important for H&S change. Organizational capacity was increasingly becoming a key enabler of change. Interests were not found to be a key dynamic of H&S change. Three issues for future research pertaining to the design and provision of H&S were identified.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Corporations have undergone significant change over the past fifteen to twenty years. Due to rapidly changing technology and increased amounts of global competition, senior executives' concerns about remaining innovative and competitive have intensified (Kanter, 1983). Dramatic changes in organizational structures, processes, and/or strategies within many corporations have become increasingly common (Kimberly & Quinn, 1984). As part of these changes, there has been a renewed recognition that employee welfare is an important contributor to a corporation's success, and "quality of work life" has become important. Whether due to productivity or humanistic concerns, human resource management issues have become increasingly prominent (Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991; Ellig, 1986). As part of the emphasis on human resources, numerous pressures for change in the design and provision of occupational Health and Safety (H&S) have been evident.

Although there is some understanding of the factors that have produced change in H&S there is not a clear understanding of the dynamics of the change process (Matthias, May & Guidotti, 1989). However, it is predicted that the pressures for change in H&S will continue throughout the 1990's (Gibson, 1988a; Kasperson, Kasperson, Hohenemser & Kates, 1988). Consequently, by understanding more about the factors which have contributed to change in H&S, and even more importantly, the dynamics underlying the change process, the potential challenges to change can be identified; uncertainty over certain change processes can be reduced; and clearer strategies can be developed for implementing, maintaining, and expanding the H&S initiatives that best support overall organizational objectives.

The phenomenon of occupational health and safety is complex. There is neither a

broadly accepted definition, nor agreement on the elements which comprise occupational

health and safety. McCunney and Welter (1988) state that, "any definition of occupational

health services is likely to be an arbitrary one" (p. 4). Similarly, Weisenberger and Gray

(1988) state, "occupational health programmes are as varied as the organizations they serve"

(r. 47).

For the purpose of this study, building on the work of Weisenberger and Gray

(1988), McCunney and Welter (1988), and Wolfe, Ulrich and Parker (1987), the following

definition of H&S is adopted: H&S comprises all organizational activities designed to

promote the adoption of personal behaviour and organizational practices conducive to

protecting employees from health and safety hazards at work and to maintaining and/or

improving employee physiological, mental, and social well-being.

Thus, included in H&S are programmes that are often considered to be traditional

occupational health and safety programmes such as: clinical medical services; pre-placement

evaluations; diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of occupational injuries; return to work

evaluations; periodic examinations for legislative purposes; ergonomic assessments; hearing

conservation programmes; and a variety of hazard control programmes. Also, included in

H&S are health promotion kinds of initiatives such as: fitness programmes, smoking

policies and programmes, nutritional counselling, stress management programmes,

hypertension and cancer screening programmes, and back care programmes. In addition,

employee assistance programmes (EAPs) are also a component of H&S. To further

establish the boundaries of H&S Gibson (1988a) states:

> Health and safety do not happen in isolation from each other
> ... Hazards take on many forms. Some are physical, some
> chemical, some biological, some ergonomic. Increasingly
> psychosocial factors are recognized as being part of the
> problem or a part of the solution (p. 155).

There is substantial agreement that the scope of H&S requires the involvement and coordination of individuals from multi-disciplines (Matthias et al., 1989; Gibson, 1988a; May, 1988).

IMPETUS FOR CHANGE IN H&S:

The wide array of factors which have contributed to changes in H&S range from broad societal influences, to more specific influences related to changes in the nature of industry, and organizations' responses to these changes. There have been three major external environment forces: 1) changes in society's values and the health promotion movement; 2) changes in union involvement in health and safety issues; and 3) changes in government involvement and legislation. Each of these are discussed sequentially.

"Quality of life," generally speaking, has become increasingly important over the past two decades. The dramatic change in society's values concerning health, safety, and the environment is reflected in the increasing network of regulatory agencies, and environmental groups (Kasperson et al., 1988). More recently, these values are reflected in the health promotion movement in which explicit societal efforts have been made to increase health consciousness, and numerous systematic approaches to planning and implementing various strategies that support positive health behaviour have been developed (Saunders, 1988).

The health promotion movement has changed expectations for the scope and, in some cases, the focus of H&S. The traditional focus of H&S was on eliminating physical, biological, and chemical hazards in the environment to reduce injury and disease. As a result of the health promotion movement, initiatives which focus on the individual and employees' general health rather than on the work environment and work related health, have increased (Cottington & House, 1986). Pressures for corporations to provide fitness,

stress management, weight management, smoking cessation programmes, employee assistance programmes, and health and safety education programmes and incentive systems, have thus increased (Hartman & Cozzetto, 1984; Feuer, 1985).

Changes in the level of involvement of unions has also created pressures for change in H&S. During the period of industrialization, workers and unions provided impetus for the development of the traditional occupational health and safety programmes. Their involvement was strong up until the late 1960's. The political strength of unions generally declined throughout the 1970's and as a result union involvement in worksite health and safety issues declined (Cottington & House, 1986). However, over the last ten years pressure for change in the design and provision of H&S within many corporations has resulted because unions have again become interested and involved in corporate H&S activities (Kasperson et al., 1988). The 1985 conference of the International Labour Organization, and the report published from that meeting provides evidence for the increased union interest in certain H&S activities. The report indicates that labour is primarily interested in preventative measures and multi-disciplinary approaches to H&S. It is labour's perspective that only by using a team of specialists (e.g., physicians, occupational health nurses, industrial hygienists, safety engineers, psychologists), along with workers and employers, can health and safety concerns in the workplace be addressed (Ledger, 1988).

Government involvement in H&S has also changed in recent years. This too has provided impetus for change in many organizations' H&S. In the past, government set standards, monitored, and enforced regulations. The government defined health and safety priorities for many companies. In recent years, privatization and down-sizing have become government priorities resulting in insufficient resources to allow the same level of

involvement in H&S as before. With the increasing scope of H&S, government has increasingly been involved in a smaller percentage of companies' H&S activities. Government has increasingly encouraged corporations to set their own priorities, and their own ways of meeting standards for H&S. However, governments continue to establish minimum standards for corporate H&S, and monitor and enforce compliance to those standards (Gibson, 1988a).

Changes in legislated standards and enforcement provided by government agencies have impacted the design and provision of H&S. There have been continuous debates among stakeholders and decision makers about: the extent to which there is a need for H&S legislation; the quality of legislation; the model used for regulatory purposes, and the adequacy of enforcement. The way in which these debates have been resolved has had implications for the design and the provision of H&S. It is predicted that government involvement and regulation will continue, and the debates will continue such that there will be significant pressures impacting on the design and provision of H&S in most companies (Matthias et al., 1989; Godefroi & McCunney, 1988).

In recent years, there has been increased pursuit of more participative approaches to decision making concerning H&S and a number of additional "players" have become involved in the debates. The development of worksite health and safety committees has provided additional impetus for change in H&S. In organizations which have incorporated a participative type of health and safety system, workers are involved in the recognition and control of behaviours, attitudes, and worksite equipment that can affect them (Jenkins, 1990). In many organizations these committees have been federally legislated and have ensured that employees have access to the information upon which H&S decisions are being made, and thus have increased ability to influence those decisions.

In addition to broad societal influences, changes in the nature of industry have put pressures on management to implement new H&S initiatives (LaBar, 1989). Rapid advancements in technology have been a driving force behind increases in global competitiveness, and have put significant pressure upon corporations to provide innovative products and services based in those new technologies in order to remain competitive in the global market (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Porter, 1985). Changes in the nature of industry have provided impetus for change in H&S in a number of ways. For example, as a result of the changes in industry, senior managers have become increasingly concerned about the scarcity of corporate resources; more interested in human resource development; and more interested in understanding and changing the corporate culture. Changes in industry have also created changes in work trends and job demands. Each of these factors has provided impetus for change in H&S and are thus discussed sequentially.

First, management concern over the scarcity of corporate resources and the need to preserve resources in order to remain competitive, has provided some impetus for change in H&S. Traditionally, safety departments have been viewed as "necessary evils" with no revenue producing function. However, recently there has been increased awareness of the costs to corporations as a result of work-related disease and injury. Consequently, H&S polices and programmes have become more important (Garrigan, 1990). Management's increased awareness that many H&S initiatives may help control corporate costs by reducing health care costs, absenteeism, and turnover (Hartman et al., 1984; Soule, 1986; Abramson, 1988), and by improving productivity and other "bottom line" concerns has provided some impetus for change in H&S (Shadovitz, 1988; Leepson, 1988; Latham, 1987).

Second, the development of human resources has become very important as a means by which businesses become innovative and thus remain competitive. Kanter (1983) suggests

that organizations that are most successful in dealing with change are those that are progressive in their human resource practices and in dealing with workplace issues. Similarly, Porter states that, "in some industries [human resource management] holds the key to competitive advantage" (1985, p. 43). Although concrete examples of highly developed human resource practices that are integrally linked into the strategy-making process of the organization are few, there have been indications that retaining and enhancing employees are two human resource strategies that have been taken more seriously by senior management than in the past (Butler et al., 1991), and there are indications that H&S initiatives can facilitate those strategies (Klarreich, 1987; Levine, 1988; Pelletier, Doellefeld-Howard & Stadley, 1988).

Third, also as a result of changes in industry, some managers have made explicit attempts to create corporate cultures which they believe will facilitate the type of changes thought to facilitate competitiveness (Kimberly & Quinn, 1984; Kanter, 1983). A culture which fosters autonomy, team building, innovation, participative management, and accommodates continuous change is believed to be requisite. Related to the creation of this type of culture are pressures for H&S personnel to contribute by providing programmes for the physical, psychological, and social well-being of employees (Fraser, 1988). More recent initiatives such as stress management programmes, EAPs, and health and safety committee development (employee involvement), tend to become important during organizational transitions. The development of H&S can indicate in tangible and symbolic ways, management's commitment to changing some of the cultural dimensions of the organization believed to underpin success in an increasingly competitive environment.

Fourth, changes in work trends and changes in the job demands placed on employees are two additional factors arising out of the changes in industry that have

impacted on H&S. Increases in job redistribution, job sharing, part-time jobs, and contract services in many organizations (Matthias et al., 1989; Walsh & Egedahl, 1986) may be significant for understanding the design and provision of H&S from two different perspectives. On the one hand, these trends impact upon the human resources available for the delivery of H&S programmes. On the other hand, these work trends have important implications for the types of services that need to be provided, and the ways in which they need to be implemented in order to be effective.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE IN H&S:

Despite numerous pressures change in H&S has not been achieved easily or rapidly. Change in H&S has become complicated by the changing backgrounds in which it exists. Not only have major objectives of organizations been changing rapidly resulting in implications for particular H&S initiatives, but health and safety practices themselves have been changing fast and agreement has not been reached regarding what constitutes the best array of alternatives, or the best processes for implementation. In other words, it appears that the development of H&S has not achieved what Tushman and Romanelli (1985) term a template, a situation in which those involved in the process essentially agree and accept what the array of initiatives should be. Given numerous alternatives, individuals charged with the tasks of making the decisions pertaining to H&S do not know which issues are critical (Matthias, 1988).

There are a diversity of H&S alternatives that are increasingly being considered. Practices that prevent or minimize the possibility of exposure or risk (focus on controlling the environment) are the most traditional aspects of H&S. However, new technology which has the potential to supply new programmes and procedures designed to better identify

hazards; assess, reduce, and eliminate risk; and essentially control losses, requires that serious consideration be given to implementing new health and safety technology for these purposes. For example, industrial robots are being developed which can replace workers in harmful environments. It has even been suggested that: "safety managers must learn to apply robotics to their operations to remain competitive into the 21st century" (Pearson, 1990, p. 42). As improvements are made to such devices, decisions will need to be made as to the priority such alternatives will be given as approaches to improve H&S.

Employee Assistance Programmes (EAPs) have become an increasingly more frequent phenomenon within organizations, and pressures exist for those organizations which have not implemented these programmes to do so (Major, 1990; Minter, 1990). These programmes entail confidential services for employees seeking to resolve issues that are affecting their lives and work; issues that if left unattended, could result in health and safety accidents. Traditional EAPs focused almost entirely on alcoholism rehabilitation; however, more recent EAPs have included special programmes which address issues such as assertiveness, self-esteem, motivation, and conflict resolution. Increasingly, EAPs have become an important component of H&S (Kirrane, 1990; McCauley, McCunney & Scofield, 1988).

Given impetus by changing employee demographics and work demands, ergonomics has also become an important consideration for H&S within many corporations. Ergonomics focuses on the fit between the job and the person doing it by designing machines, tools, and all types of office equipment and settings, to be compatible with the physiological and biomechanical limitations of the person doing the work (Weisenberger & Gray, 1988; Ledger, 1988).

In response to the emphasis being placed not only on preventative measures but also

on individual responsibility for health, fitness programmes have also been implemented into many Canadian workplaces. In Ontario there are over 800 occupational fitness, sport and recreational programmes, and 80 professional consultants employed in occupational settings. In Calgary, Alberta in 1986 there were 30 equipped occupational fitness facilities (Lee, 1988). Over the past fifteen years, governments have become increasingly involved in supporting fitness in the workplace. For example, approximately $700,000 per year have been spent by federal and provincial/territorial governments. The government has also released literature to serve as a resource for corporate fitness initiatives; sponsored fitness testing in numerous companies; provided temporary placements for fitness coordinators in selected companies; and sponsored research to make people more aware of employee fitness programme outcomes. In addition, provincial governments have supported employee fitness by offering financial assistance to companies for certain start up costs (Fitness Canada Report, 1988).

The increasing number of alternatives has required a larger number of individuals to become involved in H&S. Interest in corporate H&S among professionals previously working in other areas of health, has provided the resources and multi-disciplinary health and safety perspective that has been called for by unions, health professionals, and management alike. There has been a migration of experts who have different ideas and plans for change in the design of H&S. Therefore, inherent in this migration, has been the potential for problems of vested interest and conflicting priorities for change in the development of H&S. Because of the infusion of many people and disciplines (e.g., fitness consultants, psychologists, industrial hygienists, nurses, physicians, safety specialists), understanding the extent of, and means by which, the coordination of these processes occurs (Loeb, 1989) is important. Also, the extent to which the processes of coordination are

supportive of the overall goals and changes occurring in the organization is important.

Finally, the design and provision of H&S has been affected by employees' reactions to senior managers' attempts to change H&S. The changes in H&S have been affected by the amount of commitment that has been established for various alternatives. Blue-collar workers have sometimes opposed certain initiatives if, in their perception, the health and safety concerns that are most relevant to their jobs have not been addressed. Some employees have viewed new initiatives (e.g., fitness programmes) as alternatives which inadvertently blame the employee for health problems, and relieve the corporation from its traditional responsibilities for H&S. There have been concerns by many groups (i.e., employers, employees, government) that employees themselves are not active enough in the decisions made pertaining to the selection of various H&S alternatives (Feldman, 1989; Pechter, 1986; Gibson, 1988a).

There has often been a lack of commitment to some changes in H&S because of concerns about the extent to which particular initiatives meet the needs of the whole organization. Also, there have been concerns stated by both management and employees that certain health initiatives are an intrusion into employees' lives. The argument is made that employers should not have the right to suggest lifestyle standards to employees. As well, many questions regarding the confidentiality employed in new initiatives have been raised (Feldman, 1989; Pechter, 1986).

In some corporations, there has been lack of commitment for new initiatives from line managers because of their concerns that production may fall if time is spent doing things in new ways for the purposes of health and safety (Reber, Wallin & Duhon, 1989). Therefore, to understand changes in H&S, the endorsement by senior executives and senior H&S managers, and the enthusiasm of all levels of employees for the various initiatives

needs to be clearly understood (McCauley et al., 1988). This array of pressures for and against change, suggests that an understanding of the processes underpinning the design and provision of H&S is critical.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

The purpose of this study, then, was to develop an understanding of the *dynamics* of change in the design of corporate Health and Safety (H&S) within a large corporation. To understand change processes a holistic perspective is required. Change is a complex interaction of organizational context and internal organizational processes, that can be understood only by looking, over time, at the series of circumstances and actions that have surrounded the change process (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Pettigrew, 1988; Kimberly, 1987; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1984).

Hinings and Greenwood (1988) established a model for understanding organizational change. Within that model five key concepts are used to help understand why organizations move in the directions they do; why some organizations retain their structural design; and why some organizations are successful at completing change, while others are not. The key concepts are: the situational constraints and organizational capacity of the organization; organizational members' values and interests; and the power relationships among the organizations' members.

These same concepts can be used to aid in understanding how changes in the design of H&S have occurred, how other changes have been resisted, and how these factors may have implications for the design of H&S in the future. Consequently six sub problems of this research were identified:

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1. To understand the extent to which situational constraints (i.e., changes in contextual factors within the internal and external context of the Health and Safety Unit) have facilitated or constrained changes in the H&S.

2. To understand the extent to which there has been value consensus (i.e., status quo, competitive, reformative, or indifference) among organizational members with key responsibilities for H&S (H&S groups) toward general values affecting H&S, and specific preferences for certain H&S initiatives within the corporation.

3. To understand the extent to which organizational members with responsibilities for H&S have been satisfied with the availability of resources for the H&S in the company (relative to other corporate concerns), as well as the degree of satisfaction with the availability of resources necessary for particular H&S areas.

4. To understand the extent to which various individuals or groups with responsibilities for H&S have influenced decisions regarding particular H&S initiatives within the organization, and to understand how power relations have affected the design and provision of H&S within the corporation.

5. To understand the extent to which the nature of leadership, and the technical/social expertise of the leaders within key positions for H&S have facilitated or obstructed particular H&S changes. Also, to understand the leadership role of senior executives in the design of H&S.

6.   To understand the interplay among the above concepts and to understand their combined affect on the design and provision of H&S within this corporation.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY:

A need for a study of this nature lies in the fact that although there have been many studies that have focused on various health promotion initiatives in the workplace, overall, research efforts have been limited by: their short-term focus; the narrowness and ambiguity of the definition employed; and by the fact that the organizational dynamics inherent in implementing various alternatives have been largely ignored (Wolfe et al., 1987). The longitudinal approach for this study; the focus on all aspects of H&S; and the focus on the dynamics of change in the design and provision of H&S begins to fill a gap that presently exists in the literature. This study allows every H&S initiative to be analyzed, and compared relative to all other H&S initiatives. This is important because there are limited resources available for improving health and safety in the workplace and choices must be made between alternative courses of action.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the theoretical framework used in this study for understanding the dynamics of the change process in H&S. First, however it is necessary to define what constitutes change in H&S for the purpose of this study. The Hinings and Greenwood (1988) framework is then explained as it relates to understanding change in H&S. Specifically, each concept within the model; the literature supporting each concept as an integral part of change processes; and the potential for each dynamic to provide an understanding of change specific to H&S is discussed. Subsequently, a discussion of the interdependence of these concepts, their combined affect on change processes, and their potential for understanding changes in H&S is provided.

In any study of change it is important that the criteria for change be clearly depicted (Pettigrew, 1990). For the purposes of this study, changes in the quantity or quality of the H&S programmes, policies or services; changes in the way the company's H&S programmes, policies, or services were distributed or implemented; and changes in the processes or structuring of the Health and Safety Unit as a sub-unit of the company's Human Resources (HR) Division, as perceived by interviewees, or as found to be explicitly stated in company documents, were deemed to constitute change.

Since there is no consensus about the specific dimensions that comprise H&S, clarification is necessary. For this study, interviewees described, in their own terms, the dimensions of H&S, the changes they perceived to have occurred in H&S initiatives, and their reactions to those changes. In essence, a subjective conceptualization of the dimensions of H&S provided by the interviewees was adopted. This type of

conceptualization is appropriate for phenomena in which discrete dimensions cannot be identified or agreed upon (Howe, 1988). This approach ensured that all the competing elements relevant to the design of H&S were considered. The rationale for using this type of definition is that the complexities and consequences of H&S change could not be understood unless all competing areas, as seen by the employees, were identified. For example, organizational members may feel very different about fitness when it is discussed relative to competing H&S areas, than when it is discussed in isolation. The number of competing areas that organizational members identify influences the choices that are made in terms of designing H&S and the responses towards certain initiatives.

Hinings and Greenwood (1988) emphasize that the process of change in organization design is one of constrained choice. The environmental context within which the organization exists constrains which designs are most appropriate, while organizational members' interpretations of the environmental context influences the choice in organizational design. Decision makers interpret, and give meaning to the environmental pressures, and alter structures and systems with various purposes in mind. The authors also suggest that it is primarily organizational members' **values** and **interests** that impact their interpretation of, and therefore, their reaction to **environmental context**. However, the authors also emphasize that the **power** of relevant role holders and the **capacity** of the organization in terms of leadership and technical/social skills pertaining to change are also important for understanding transitions.

Important to using the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model is recognizing that the concepts of situational constraints, values, interests, power, and organizational capacity work interdependently to affect organizational design. The five concepts are given meaning according to three specific categories: *Constraints* which are found in the situational context

of the organization; *strategic choice* elements which include organizational members' value commitments and their degree of satisfaction regarding resources; and *enabling factors* which include the power dependencies and the organizational capacity to manage change. It is the elements of constraint, and the elements of strategic choice that push an organization toward change or inertia, while enabling factors can facilitate or block change.

SITUATIONAL CONSTRAINTS "constraining elements of change"

The idea of situational constraints arises naturally out of the literature which emphasizes that efficient and effective organizational structures "fit" the context in which they exist (cf. Child, 1972; Pfeffer, 1982). Building on this idea, Hinings and Greenwood (1988) suggest that the particular context within which an organization exists may constrain change and hold it to a particular structural design, but when changes occur in the organization's context, pressures are felt by the organization to adapt its structure to maintain a fit with the context. The greater the contextual change, the greater the pressures for organizational change. More specifically, situational constraints refer to all those "features within an organizational context acting as constraints and as pressures upon processes of design choice" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988, p. 45). They are therefore, contextual circumstances in which a particular organizational reaction becomes necessary.

An idea underlying this study is that many of the same contextual factors found to influence organizational design arrangements and changes in the orientation of the whole organization, for example, organizational size, environment, technology, (cf. Pfeffer, 1982), ownership (Donaldson, 1985), and the institutionalization of ideas (Hinings & Foster, 1972; Zucker, 1987), may be similar to the contextual factors that influence the organizational design arrangements of an individual unit such as the Corporate Health and Safety Unit.

Pettigrew (1985b) has demonstrated that the processes of continuity and change can be more clearly understood when there is an analysis of the context at more than one level. Pettigrew refers to an inner-context which includes an analysis of features in the intra-organization; and to an outer-context which includes an analysis of features external to the organization such as socio-economic and political factors. The idea is that change is a result of the interconnected levels of analysis. Pettigrew also emphasizes that the interconnectedness of the two levels of context need to be further connected with temporal dimensions. The emphasis on the interconnectedness of the contextualist levels over time allows one to identify multiple aspects of change, and the impact of the changes on a new context for future transition (Pettigrew, 1990).

Building on this, it can be implied that more than one level of contextual analysis of H&S may be important for understanding the processes of continuity and change in H&S initiatives. The contextual factors that create pressures for change and constrain change in H&S will include factors which lie outside the organization "external contextual factors," (e.g., economic recession; government health and safety regulations and enforcement); as well as factors which lie within the organization but external to H&S "internal contextual factors" (e.g., corporate reorganization, change in the company's technology, change in attitudes toward employees). The interconnectedness of these factors, over time, will be important to understanding how a variety of factors produce changes in H&S that eventually create new contexts that influence new directions for H&S.

Impact of the External and Internal Environments on H&S:

There have been many external environment factors which have had the potential to impact on the structural design and provision of H&S programmes. Society's increased interest in, and pursuit of improved lifestyle, as reflected in a very prominent health promotion movement over the last ten to fifteen years, has placed pressures on organizations to think about the ways in which H&S is designed and the types of services provided. In light of a societal emphasis toward health and advancing "quality of life" there has been an increase in the availability and movement of professionals from multi-disciplinary backgrounds into corporate Health and Safety (May, 1988). This multi-disciplinary perspective to H&S has resulted in a wide array of expertise, but also differing ideas and plans for innovations for H&S design.

Changes in federal and provincial governments' roles in H&S have had the potential to apply significant pressure on some corporations to make changes in the design and provision of H&S. Government continues to set health and safety standards and enforce regulations. However, companies identify their health and safety priorities, and the ways they will meet standards more than in the past. Because of the increased scope of H&S over recent years, government regulation affects a smaller percentage of companies' H&S activities than it did in the past.

Although unions historically provided impetus for occupational health and safety their involvement in H&S was minimal throughout the 1970's (Cottington & House, 1986). Only over the past decade have unions again taken an active role in health and safety issues (Kasperson et al., 1988). This increased involvement has provided additional impetus for change in H&S.

Many of the pressures for change have been toward the adoption of more policies

and programmes to ensure employees' health and safety. However, conflicting pressure has been intensified by the recurrent recession periods over the past number of years. Periods of recession have put pressures on organizations to make difficult decisions about financial allocations. As well, they have put pressures on particular units within organizations to allocate effectively. The extent to which changes in the external environment of the organization have been interpreted as pressures for change, and have been responded to by senior executives within an organization have had implications for the design of H&S. As well, understanding H&S managers' interpretations of the external pressures for change, their recommendations for responding to those pressures, as well as their interactions with senior executives in this regard, are crucial for understanding changes in H&S design.

Interacting with the external pressures for change is the internal context of H&S (characteristics of the particular organization) in which H&S programmes exist that produces pressures for and against H&S change. Many corporations have undergone significant restructuring of departments/units in response to industrial pressures for change. In many corporations this has resulted in changes in employees' responsibilities and in the work trends within the organization. As well, changes have occurred in the design of particular work sites, and the types of work that people are required to do. Consequently, restructuring in many organizations has had implications for the way H&S policy and programme information can be communicated and services provided; for the number of H&S personnel required; and for the organization of the personnel who provide the services.

Technological changes that have occurred in many corporations have affected the diversity of occupations required, thus companies' health and safety needs (The Worklife Report, 1990). For example, automation in some cases has eliminated or reduced some of

the risks in formerly very hazardous jobs, while new hazards have been created. Monotony and stress have been two consequences of such change that have had significant implications for workers' health and safety. Advanced technology has brought with it a number of other very subtle work hazards. For example, a significant number of psychological and physical health problems have arisen for the increasing number of people who have been required to use visual display terminals (The Worklife Report, 1990).

Finally, there has been substantial internal organizational change in a number of organizations as a result of a movement from public or crown ownership to private ownership (Hardin, 1989). A change in ownership may impact the design and provision of H&S. Private and public organizations have certain characteristics that distinguish them from each other, primarily in terms of patterns of authority and accountability (Kernaghan & Siegal, 1989). Lines of authority and responsibility tend to be clearer and hiring practices more flexible within private organizations. Senior executives in private companies have more influence in H&S decisions. They have more discretion regarding the extent to which H&S will be part of their overall strategy, and have the flexibility to hire expertise to develop and sustain a comprehensive array of H&S programmes. In private organizations there tends to be a greater emphasis on competition and attaining "bottom line" objectives for shareholders rather than maintaining accountability to the general public. As a result, there tends to be a greater awareness of what other companies are doing in all aspects of business, and a strong desire to compete in each area. Depending on the extent to which senior executives and senior H&S managers believe that H&S can facilitate "bottom line" objectives, progressive changes in H&S design may or may not be as great as a result of privatization.

Finally, it needs to be recognized that H&S design may be affected by a change in

the company's ownership as a result of the different legislation applied to the company. Provincial government organizations and provincial crown corporations are regulated by provincial health and safety legislation. Many private corporations are federally regulated. The different standards and enforcement policies between provincial and federal legislation create different pressures for the design and provision of H&S programmes.

Impact of "Ideas" on the Design and Provision of H&S:

It has been noted in the literature that "ideas" may constrain organizational change. Institutional theory, as applied to the study of organizational change, suggests that organizational members adapt their ideas about organizational form based on ideas external to the organization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). For the purposes of understanding change in the design and provision of H&S, changes in ideas about organizational form that exist outside the organization; the extent to which those ideas have become legitimized as the best way to organize; or the extent to which other forms of organizing have come to be legitimized need to be understood.

Institutionalization of ideas underlying human resource strategies generally, and other ideas pertaining to health and safety specifically (ideas about the components that should comprise H&S, and ideas about programme implementation) are likely to be particularly relevant for changes in the design and provision of H&S. For example, the extent to which certain management styles, ways of treating employees, ways of making decisions have come to be legitimized and seen as the acceptable ways of doing things, may be linked to the choices made for the design of H&S. One obvious example lies in the Total Quality movement that began about ten years ago. "Quality," the value underpinning this movement, deals with product and service quality, and focuses on the relationship

between customers and front-line workers. Within this movement employees are seen as crucial to quality products and services, and have been granted a greater role in the decisions that affect their job (Borins, 1991). The Total Quality movement has its origins in Japan, and has engrained within it, the importance of team work and employee empowerment. A vast majority of large corporations in Canada have now implemented at least some aspect of the team concept, and are giving employees more decision making responsibility. This "empowerment of the employee" is reflected in the increasing number of health and safety committees that are evolving throughout the country and impacting H&S (Boehm, 1991).

Ideas about safety processes, equipment standards, or appropriate methods of health education and service, and the extent to which those ideas have been seen as the best ways of operating within the organization may be linked to the degree of pressure the organization identifies for change, therefore the degree to which "ideas" affect the design and provision of H&S. For example, with the increased awareness of the consequences of stress, EAPs have increasingly gained prominence. Senior managers have recognized the benefits of such programmes for the employees and for the company (Major, 1990: Minter, 1990).

The combination of many factors may produce considerable pressures for change. In attempting to understand changes in the design and provision of H&S it is necessary to identify the combination of contextual changes that have occurred and perhaps influenced the types of design options available for the organization of H&S initiatives at particular points in time. It is then important to gain an understanding of the decisions made in light of those choices.

VALUES "strategic choice dynamic of change"

Values are defined as individual members' or groups' preferences for certain outcomes (Ranson, Hinings, Greenwood & Walsh, 1980). These preferences for certain outcomes underlie the decisions people make, and the behaviours they exhibit (Rokeach, 1968). Essentially, values influence the type of changes that are proposed, formulated, and implemented, and as such, impact on the process of structuring within the organization. Values also affect how various members respond to initiated changes.

The level of commitment that exists among organizational members towards certain values, as well as the degree of value consensus that is held by organizational members impacts on the process of change. These two factors are likely to influence whether or not change actually occurs, and the types of changes that occur (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

It is important that differences in values be understood because these differences will be significant in facilitating or constraining certain efforts to change. Members that hold similar values often form coalitions. Dependent on the extent to which certain initiatives challenge particular coalitions, change will be an easy or difficult process. Value differences have been shown to be based on vertical differentiation (value differences according to individuals' positions held within the hierarchy) (Sproull, 1981; Hage & Dewar, 1973; Enz, 1988), or on horizontal differentiation (value differences across sub-units of the organization) (Sproull, 1981; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

According to the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model, a key to understanding the role of values in organizational change, is understanding the pattern of commitment (status quo commitment, reformative commitment, competitive commitment, or indifferent commitment) to certain values. For example, commitment which is status quo (no alternative ideas exist to those that are present within the organization) is likely to result

in no change. Reformative commitments (acceptance of new ideas about the domain and the operations of the organization by the groups) is likely to result in major change. However, there may also exist a pattern of commitments where groups are not committed to the status quo or to reformative ideas. For example, a pattern of competitive commitments may exist, where groups have very different ideas about what the domain and operations of the organization should be. The alternative ways of viewing things will likely destabilize the organizational arrangements, but the degree of change will depend on the extent to which any of those alternative ways of organizing become strongly supported by group members. There may also be a pattern of indifferent commitment in which status quo commitment has slipped to indifference because the domain and ways of operating have become taken for granted.

Recent literature on organizational culture supports the importance of values for change processes (Pettigrew 1979; Sathe, 1983; Schein, 1986; Enz, 1988; Hassard & Sharifi, 1989; Siehl, 1984). Organizational culture is essentially the composition of implicit assumptions and values, held by organizational members, which defines the decisions and actions that are appropriate for the organization (Schein, 1984).

First, Hassard and Sharifi (1989) suggest that particular cultural elements are required for certain strategic decisions and organizational changes to be successfully implemented. Given the changes in the nature of the industry, it appears that cultural change (changes in values) may need to occur to facilitate the other organizational changes necessary for organizational success. The belief among some managers that culture change may benefit organizational productivity, innovation and adaptation, has caused some managers to become interested in identifying the existing values, and changing the values within the organization (Kimberly & Quinn, 1984; Kanter, 1983).

Siehl (1984) on the other hand, describes the linkage between organizational culture and organizational change as one in which major organizational changes provide the opportunity for changing the existing culture. Siehl argues that periods of organizational transition, due to the ambiguity and uncertainty often entailed, provide opportunities for culture to be changed. Opportunities to change culture arise during transitional periods because employees are wanting to identify with a new direction, and may thus be very open to efforts to move culture in a particular direction.

What can be drawn from this discussion is that the interplay of changes in organizational culture and other organizational changes is important. Changes in the dominant organizational values/culture may provide opportunities for the subsequent organizational changes that are believed to be necessary for success. Alternatively, organizational transition may provide opportunities for changing organizational members' values and the overall culture of the organization.

Culture is not a monolithic concept. Some organizations show evidence of multiple cultures either with, or without an over-riding company culture (Meyerson & Martin, 1988). The inter-play of multi-cultures existing within a company may be significant for organizational design processes. Organizational culture literature also contains the idea that organizations may have strong or weak cultures which will be significant for organizational design processes. Strong cultures are ones in which there is widespread agreement upon and commitment to a particular set of values (Schein, 1984). Strong cultures often exist in organizations in which there has been little turnover of key executive members, considerable stability of employees over a long period of time, and in which numerous difficulties have been overcome. In strong cultures it is difficult for change to occur. In weaker cultures, ones in which there is neither consensus nor commitment to a particular set of values,

change may be more easily achieved. Change must account for the probable reactions of all groups who can help or hinder the process of change.

Leadership is a very important part of the interplay between organizational culture and organizational change. Leaders' values are primary to understanding culture and change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984). Leaders have personal values which underlie the vision they have for the design of the organization. It is the leaders' values that are the most likely to become the shared values within the company, thus change begins with leaders re-thinking their values. Change is most often successful when the whole "chain of command" has become supportive of the leaders' new values which underpin decisions being made (Kanarick & Dotlich, 1984; Miller, 1989).

Impact of Organizational Values on the Design and Provision of H&S:

The degree of value commitment and value consensus that exists among organizational members towards global values that indirectly affect H&S initiatives are important to identify in order to understand changes in the design of H&S. For example, the literature has shown that top management preference for a "people orientated organization" (Peters & Waterman, 1982) facilitates the development of comprehensive health promotion type options as part of H&S (Klarreich, 1987). In addition to such broad types of values affecting H&S, it can be expected that individual and group preferences for particular H&S alternatives, implemented in particular ways, may impact change in the design and provision of H&S. Also important for understanding H&S change are the values/preferences of senior executives and their personal commitment to health and safety (McLeod, 1986; Hartmen & Cozzetto, 1984). Senior executives' values have implications for resource allocations as well as symbolic consequences or role-modelling effects that can

impact on the design and provision of H&S.

The values of organizational members who are primarily responsible for H&S, are particularly important to H&S change. Differences in vertical and horizontal values among those groups with responsibilities for H&S may be particularly important in understanding change in H&S because of the multi-disciplinary approach that currently characterizes H&S (May, 1988). Within any large size organization there is often more than one hierarchy which deals with health and safety issues. For example, separate hierarchies of: medical personnel, corporate H&S administrators, functional H&S specialists, fitness consultants, and human resource specialists, and the interplay of these groups may all impact change in the design and provision of H&S. Value differences vertically (e.g., between doctors and OHNs), and value differences horizontally (e.g., between health and safety specialists and fitness consultants) could impact H&S change and thus need to be understood. This is particularly evident in one presentation given at the 1986 Canadian Occupational Health Association Conference in which the following was suggested:

> ... if we are to meet the challenges and cope with the industrial changes carrying us over into the twenty-first century, our success in doing so dictates a whole new look at health and safety. The long extant, traditional inter- (and intra) disciplinary rivalries and territorial claims must disappear ... (May, 1988, p. 31).

Not only are the values among groups which are directly responsible for H&S important for the design and provision of H&S, but the values of all different groups throughout the whole organization are also important. Large organizations are comprised of different functional groups, and various sub-units within these functional groups. These groups may possess different general value systems, as well as different preferences specific to H&S, depending on the extent to which health and safety issues are key to their ability

to perform their role within the organization. The values underlying each groups' responses to the design and provision of H&S has implications for future change. It is important to be aware that preferences pertaining to H&S initiatives are only a part of larger sets of values that exist in the organization. Identifying existing cultures within an organization and the strengths of those cultures, and understanding the extent to which health and safety is valued may provide greater understanding of change in the design and provision of H&S.

The previous discussion about the relationship between organizational culture and organizational change may have relevance for understanding change in the design and provision of H&S. First, as alluded to previously, it has been suggested that only within certain organizational cultures are some H&S activities likely to be adopted and remain successful. Fitness is more successful in a culture where management/employee trust regarding the motivation for fitness has been established (Klarreich, 1987). Second, if major organizational transitions provide the opportunity for culture to be changed (Siehl, 1984) there is a potential for changes in the design and provision of H&S (as an organizational practice) to be used to facilitate particular changes in the culture of the organization that management may wish to adopt in order to meet its broader change objectives. Kanter (1983) states that:

> Culture is an aggregate concept, summarizing numerous events and patterns, combining the behaviour and values of numerous actors ... Culture cannot be said to have occurred until the point at which a high proportion of organizational events have occurred independently and which together reflect a new pattern of values, norms and expectations (p. 133).

Kanter suggests that culture is manifest through organizational structure and events, and can be managed by changing various aspects of the organization's functioning. Values, political signals, and expectations are articulated in rewards, activities, and the programmes

permitting activities. It can thus be argued that progressive H&S policies and programmes may send clear and important messages to employees that top management cares about its employees. H&S initiatives may facilitate a participative, employee-orientated culture that is seen to make organizations more successful.

Expanded EAPs may be interpreted by employees as indications that management is concerned about their general well-being. The development of health and safety committees in which employees at all levels are encouraged to participate in decisions pertaining to their health and safety, may facilitate broader goals of achieving participative environment. The implementation of unique and innovative H&S programmes is one way of sending a message about the type of organization that is important to top management and about the type of culture it wishes to create.

Cultural change is very difficult to achieve. To suggest that change in H&S is key to that process would be overstating its potential. However, to ignore that organizational practices such as H&S initiatives may contribute to cultural change could limit our understanding of the timing and types of changes that have occurred in the design and provision of H&S. Also, to ignore that such practices may be used by management for the purpose of affecting broader objectives (especially during times of major transition) is limiting (Fraser, 1988).

As previously mentioned, Hinings and Greenwood (1988) show that a key to understanding the role of values in organizational change, is understanding the pattern of commitments by groups to certain values. Using this idea to understand the impact of values on H&S, one can expect that where status quo commitment prevails, organizational members will be committed to the existing general values that indirectly affect H&S, and will be committed to the activities presently in place. Therefore, there will be no need to

search for new options for designing or providing H&S initiatives. Where reformative commitment exists, changes in the design and provision of H&S will be likely. It may be new personnel moving into important H&S roles that creates this type of situation. New people may shed a different light upon those general values that affect H&S. They may bring different ideas about activities in place at the time, or new ideas about the way in which H&S can affect broader organizational objectives.

When reformative ideas emerge and become widespread, change in H&S will likely occur. However, there are likely to be periods of time where competitive commitment exists. This is a situation in which there may be varying degrees of support for the general values underlying the design of H&S, differing ideas about the nature of H&S activities in place, and/or differing conceptualizations of the role that H&S should play in the broader organizational objectives. Alternative ways of viewing the design and provision of H&S will work to destabilize existing H&S arrangements. Whether change actually occurs will depend on whether or not new ideas about H&S eventually become widespread. The pattern of commitment, particularly among those responsible for H&S, but also among other organizational members, is important.

INTERESTS "strategic choice dynamic of change"

"Interests refer to the relationship between an individual or group, and the distribution of organizational resources" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988, p. 54). Interests are expressed through a motivation to enhance or defend a particular distribution of organizational resources. What is meant by this, is that dissatisfaction with the present allocation of resources within an organization for carrying out current activities will lead to pressures for change. Conversely, satisfaction with the distribution of resources among

individuals or groups will constrain change. It should be recognized that values are intricately linked to interests. The values inherent within any group will depend on the extent to which the group interprets that its interests will be served by holding such values.

Applied to H&S, it can be suggested that the degree of satisfaction with the financial resources available for H&S, and the degree of satisfaction regarding the allocation of the H&S resources to the specific areas within H&S will have consequences for changes in the overall design and provision of H&S. As well, the degree of satisfaction regarding the human resources available to carry out H&S activities adequately within the company will affect the design and provision of H&S.

For the most part, financial allocations for H&S are controlled within the organization. Only in rare circumstances, when government has offered financial resources for specific initiatives, does the control of any aspect of H&S financial resources lie outside the organization. For example, governments have provided temporary placements for fitness coordinators in some companies and have provided financial assistance to companies for certain start up costs (Fitness Canada Report, 1988). Essentially there is strong competition among various departments for scarce resources. The degree of satisfaction with the amount of financial resources allotted to the Health and Safety Unit relative to other units in the organization will affect the design and provision of H&S. Allocations for H&S may compete against allocations to other human resource units/groups such as the benefits and compensation group, or the employment group.

There will also be pressures for H&S change based on the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with financial resource allocations to specific programmes (e.g., fitness, EAP, Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS)) by those with either personal or group vested interests in the allocations. Also there may be pressures for

change based on the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the availability of human resources for various H&S initiatives. There may dissatisfaction with human resources to carry out certain H&S activities necessary for the company (e.g., WHMIS or other legislated programmes) which will lead to change.

According to the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model, identifying the extent to which there is dissatisfaction among organizational members regarding resources is key to understanding the role of "interests" in organizational change. Using this idea to understand the impact of "interests" on H&S change it can be expected that the greater the dissatisfaction (primarily among those responsible for the various aspects of H&S) over the financial allocations to H&S generally, and to particular components of it, the greater the pressure for change in H&S. Also, the greater the dissatisfaction regarding the availability of human resources to carry out H&S activities, the greater the pressure for change in the design of H&S. Conversely, satisfaction among these members regarding the distribution of resources will support the status quo.

POWER "enabling dynamic of change"

Relations of power are important for understanding change. Power is the ability of particular organizational members or groups to bring about the outcomes they desire. Those groups most powerful in the organization are able to design the organization according to their own values and interests (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). Power relationships also have the potential to provide for effective resolutions of conflicting interests within organizations (Walsh et. al, 1981).

Change may threaten the existing power structure, therefore the impetus behind successful change efforts lies in the degree of support for the change that exists within the

power structure (Pettigrew, 1985a). Any change will be constrained by lack of support from those whose power base is threatened by the particular change. Even if change occurs, individuals with substantial power may remain committed to pre-change interpretations and structures when it is in their best interest to do so (Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978).

Structures are used by organizational members and groups to obtain and use power. The extent to which power is dispersed or concentrated influences change. When power is concentrated, key decision processes, and access to information sources are granted to only a few individuals at the top of the organization. In organizations where power is dispersed, a variety of groups, in addition to the elite group, have access to key decision processes and access to information sources. The concentrated power structure can either facilitate or constrain change depending on the commitment of the elite group to particular values and interests. In organizations where there are predominantly competing values and interests, a dispersed power structure, can obstruct change (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

Power is shared within organizations. Power at any point in time is dependent on the situation at that time. Most organizations distribute power in a way that aligns the corporation with the critical realities it faces within both its internal and external environment. Power is accrued to those individuals or groups within the organization that have the ability to deal with the critical problems and uncertainties facing the organization. There is, thus a struggle for the control of those activities critical to the organization. Control over such activities increases individuals' or groups' power and hence, increases their ability to make decisions regarding the allocation of scarce critical resources that will enhance their survival. The degree of power accrued to particular individuals or groups may profoundly affect the type of changes that will occur (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings & Schneck, 1974).

Other factors may also influence the power accrued to a particular department. Enz (1988) suggests that the extent to which departmental members' values are perceived to be congruent with those of top management determine, in part, the extent to which the department accrues power. Enz suggests that a department's ability to bring about outcomes is dependent on the extent to which the members of the department have independently identified the same values as being critical to the organization that members of top management have.

Using the concepts in the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model for understanding organizational change, to study change in H&S, it is important to identify the abilities of particular individuals and groups within the organization to affect decisions about H&S. A relative judgment about the extent to which power to determine H&S outcomes has been relatively "dispersed" with numerous groups, or "concentrated" with a few elite members within the Health and Safety Unit or the entire organization is necessary. A relative judgment about the number of people and groups affecting H&S decisions, and the distribution of those individuals and groups horizontally and vertically is important to understand how power may have impacted changes in H&S.

Traditionally, many human resource activities have received substantial financial cuts during economically difficult times. Progressive and/or rapid developments within the human resource function have been limited in this way (Butler et al., 1991). However, since there has been an increased awareness that human resources are key components increasing corporations' competitiveness, survival and success (Butler et al., 1991; Ellig, 1986), it can be suggested that the human resources function, and the H&S function in many corporations may have gained power in recent years. These functions may thus become more able to influence decisions affecting them.

Power relations that occur within the Health and Safety Unit are particularly important for understanding change in H&S. With the increased number of multi-disciplinary personnel involved in corporate H&S, the extent to which each of the groups are able to handle things seen as critical to the Health and Safety Unit and/or the organization generally, may impact the types of changes that occur. It can be inferred that the extent to which the values of those responsible for H&S are perceived by top management to be congruent with their own, will affect the degree of power those with H&S responsibilities are granted. As well, the extent to which the values of the H&S personnel are perceived by top management to support the implementation of programmes higher level management prefer, will affect the degree of power H&S personnel are granted. Similarly, it can be suggested that the extent to which members' values within a particular aspect of H&S (e.g., OHNs in the medical sub-unit; fitness personnel in fitness centres, safety advisors in the field) are perceived to be congruent with those in senior management positions for H&S, may in part, determine the extent to which each of the groups accrues power within the unit.

Power relations affecting H&S may be complex because in large companies H&S programmes and policies must extend out to many different worksites, and be interpreted by many individuals. Geographical dispersion of the company may result in people lower in the hierarchy having considerable power to affect health and safety issues. Movements toward involving employees more in decision making in health and safety (Jenkins, 1990; Reber et al., 1989) have applied pressure for changes in the design and provision of H&S. For changes to be successful, support from various levels is often required.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY "enabling dynamic of change"

Organizational capacity refers to the capabilities and competencies within the organization to carry out change. The extent to which transformational leadership rather than transactional management permeates the organization is one consideration in determining an organization's capacity to change. The extent to which knowledge and skills (both technical and social) exist within the organization in order to identify necessary change, gain commitment to change, and technically produce change, is another consideration (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

Senior management's leadership (underpinned by their personal values and interests) influences the values, the strategic directions, and the organization's internal structuring. Leadership also elicits commitment toward those directions. Because of this, the type of leadership employed in an organization is important for any change that occurs (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984).

Dependent on the degree to which stability or change is required by the organization, different types of leadership may be more or less effective. Tichy and Ulrich (1984) suggest that a "transactional leader" supports organizations which are stable. However, they suggest that a "transformational leader," one who: is a risk taker, takes a stand despite the status quo, believes in people, empowers people, and builds consensus among them, is required for major change to occur.

The link between leadership style and organizational change is strong. However, the type of leadership exhibited is more or less important for change depending on the particular stage of development of an organization (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Schein, 1986; Kimberly & Rottman, 1987). In the early stages of an organization, leadership may be instrumental in defining the culture of an organization. In the later stages, the culture

affects the type of leadership that arises, thus creating a situation where change is more difficult to achieve (Schein, 1986). Also, in the founding stages of an organization, leaders identify the realm within which the organization will operate. At later stages, operations tend to become institutionalized and change more difficult to achieve (Kimberly & Rottman, 1987). It appears that both the personal qualities of a leader (i.e., his/her values) and the leadership style he/she employs at a particular point in time within an organization will be critical for the types of changes that occur.

The multitude of exchange processes within which senior managers are involved often affords them the opportunity to be instrumental in maintaining stability or facilitating change. The nature of their exchange processes (transactional or transformational), at a particular point in time, and their understanding of the consequences of these exchanges, is important for determining the organization's capacity for change. Leaders' knowledge about the culture of the organization (Schein, 1986) and about the structures, systems, and process of the organization (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) establish the organization's capacity for change.

Because leadership is structured in a particular way within an organization, through a network of power relationships, those individuals responsible for particular changes, need to build appropriate coalitions for the success of the change process (Kanter, 1983). An organization's capacity for change will be influenced by the extent to which those individual(s) responsible for change have the skills to ensure that sufficient knowledge about the required change exists among all individuals in positions to affect change. Also, the extent to which those responsible for change have the skills to ensure that the specific structures and systems required for the change are established affects change (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

The nature of senior executive leadership is important in defining the capacity for change in the design of H&S. For example, the support of senior executives has been shown to be critical for the success of fitness and other health promotion initiatives (Levine, 1988). Senior managers involved in H&S suggest that there is a "culture of safety" that accompanies the upgrading of certain H&S initiatives within any organization. The commitment of the Chief Executive Officer has often been required to establish new programmes which can facilitate health and safety upgrading, and create the safety culture necessary for other major changes (Kasperson et al., 1988).

Also, the leadership styles of those individuals or groups who, over time, have had major responsibilities for H&S in the organization need to be identified. The backgrounds of the leaders, and the leadership styles they employ (transactional or transformational) relative to the evolution of H&S in the organization, will provide understanding of their roles in H&S change. The increasing number of professionals from multi-disciplinary backgrounds entering H&S; changing coalitions; and changing ways of interaction (transferring values), have significantly impacted the type of leadership that exists within Health and Safety Units. These changes have influenced the capacity for change in the design of H&S.

The knowledge and skills pertaining to change processes generally, and H&S changes specifically, are important for understanding an organization's capacity to change the design of H&S. For example, health and safety committees are legislated requirements in many corporations; but the success of the committees, as part of the design of H&S, is dependent on a number of abilities of the leaders within the Health and Safety Unit. Success depends on leaders' abilities to communicate to the employees the need for the committees; to provide the necessary standards and guidelines for the operations of the

committees; and to ensure the committees receive the support from line managers that they require to be successful (Reber et al., 1989).

In the case of establishing a worksite fitness facility the H&S manager's ability to 1) create a vision for change; 2) establish allegiances with key persons throughout the organization that can affect change (e.g., line managers); 3) link one part of the programme to another; and 4) ensure resources and mechanisms for the technical aspects of the change are possible (i.e., gain financial and human resource commitment from top executive), determines the organization's capacity for this particular type of change (McLeod, 1986; Hartmen & Cozzetto, 1984).

INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE FIVE DYNAMICS

The Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model for understanding change emphasizes that structure/value congruency underpinning stability and change, results from the interpenetration of the five dynamics of change: situational constraints, values, interests, dependencies of power, and organizational capacity. Structure/value congruency is either maintained or destabilized by one or more of the five dynamics. The degree of change that occurs is thus dependent upon the forces that occur in each of the dynamics, and on the changes that are stimulated in each of the other dynamics as a result of those forces.

Hinings and Greenwood (1988) establish that change within any organization is very dependent upon the contextual and institutional arena of which it is a part. It is necessary to understand the organization's arena in order to understand the interplay of the five dynamics of stability and change. Initial pressures for organizations to adopt particular changes generally arise from the context of the organization. The pressures may become institutionalized as certain ways of operating are seen to be successful. It is the contextual

and institutional pressures that are interpreted by members with particular values and interests. The power structure is important for determining those values which will be predominate and affect the design of the organization, and thus the organization's relationship with its environment.

The most obvious example within the context of H&S, has been the pressure of legislative requirements in many areas of H&S. Based on senior executives' and senior H&S managers' interpretations of those pressures, decisions are made about the extent to which each of the requirements will be met.

As previously discussed, there have been contextual pressures for corporations to adopt extensive health promotion programmes. It has been recognized that these programmes have the potential to decrease absenteeism; increase productivity; contain health care costs; and give companies the competitive edge when it comes to retaining and recruiting workers (Fielding, 1982; Shepard, 1983; Spilman, Goetz, Schultz, Bellingham & Johnson, 1986; Abramson, 1988). The extent to which managers interpret those potential benefits as pressures for change, underlies the design and provision of H&S.

Also, there have been pressures for organizations to adopt EAPs as society in general has recognized the consequences of stress (Major, 1990; Minter, 1990). The extent to which senior managers perceive stress to be affecting the company's workers, and consequently the company's absenteeism and "bottom line," will determine in part whether an EAP is implemented. Also, the extent to which senior managers interpret the consequences of not having an EAP, in light of the fact that other corporations have adopted EAPs, will impact senior managers' choices to adopt a programme or not, therefore affecting the design of the H&S.

There have been pressures for corporations to be more "corporately responsible" in

terms of the environment and their employees. As well, pressures for corporations to be concerned about "corporate image" have increased (Kasperson et al., 1988). The extent to which management interprets those pressures to be important, and perceives certain H&S programmes (e.g., ergonomics, fitness) as addressing those pressures, will affect the design of H&S.

Until recent years, it has been senior executives and senior managers in H&S whose values pertaining to H&S predominated and affected the design and provision of H&S in most corporations. However, demands for H&S initiatives have increased and resulted in a more multi-disciplinary approach to H&S. More expertise in different areas of H&S is available. Because of these factors, the prominence of certain groups' values have changed. More importantly perhaps is the fact that the development of health and safety committees has meant that lower level employees' values have increasingly become important for affecting the design and provision of H&S. As the need for H&S in the workplace increases, and as more people with multi-disciplinary backgrounds take on responsibilities for H&S, understanding various groups' interpretations of pressures for change and their preferences for certain outcomes, is important for understanding change in the design of H&S.

Throughout this chapter, the way in which the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model can provide a useful framework for understanding change in the design and provision of H&S has been provided. The primary notion guiding the development of this framework, is that the value/structure congruency underpinning change and stability in the design and provision of H&S can be understood in terms of the interpenetration of situational constraints, members' values and interests, relations of power, and organizational capacity.

More specifically, for this study, H&S change is understood by first identifying

changes in the internal and external context of H&S, with a primary focus on environmental changes, and changes in ideas related to health and safety. After identifying the pressures that exist for change in H&S, the extent to which there is consensus and commitment among organizational members to general values that affect H&S, and their preferences for specific initiatives and implementation plans, needs to be identified. More specifically, to understand change an assessment is made in terms of the extent to which competitive, reformative or status quo commitment to values has existed over time. Also, for understanding change in H&S, the relative level of dissatisfaction that has existed in terms of: the amount of financial resources allocated to the Health and Safety Unit relative to other units; the amount of financial resources allocated to certain areas of H&S relative to other areas; and the human resources available for certain H&S initiatives are assessed. Important in this analysis of change is an assessment of those dynamics that can enable change. As part of this inquiry a relative assessment of the extent to which power (ability to affect H&S outcomes) has been concentrated or dispersed (within the Health and Safety Unit and within the organization) is made. Finally, efforts to understand the leadership qualities of significant H&S role holders over time are identified, and a relative assessment of the technical and social knowledge and skills existing in the organization to enable change is made. The knowledge and skills relevant to change generally, and to H&S change processes specifically, are important.

Given the number of changes occurring in the external and internal context of H&S, pressures for change are considerable, and some effort and movement toward new H&S programmes is likely to be identifiable in most companies. Although there may be a significant number of changes in the context of H&S which apply pressures for change, it is those factors that top management and those responsible for H&S choose to respond to

that are important for change in the design and provision of H&S. The extent to which

these individuals or groups agree on the important factors and responses will impact change.

As well, the degree of satisfaction with the allocation of resources will impact change.

Where there is little value consensus and agreement about the responses to pressures for

change, the types of changes will be dependent on the values and interests of those with

power to determine outcomes.

The extent to which decisions to change actually result in change will be determined

by the leadership abilities of those making decisions to skilfully execute the change process

by ensuring that appropriate social and technical networks are in place for its creation. For

example, change or stability in H&S will be strongly influenced by the extent to which senior

H&S managers are able to do the following: create a vision for each change; communicate

effectively and convince organizational members of the need for each change; and identify

and bring "on side" all the different levels of the organization that can impact the success

of each particular change. Change or stability in H&S will also be influenced by the senior

managers' ability to secure top management's commitment to H&S generally, and to each

specific change; coordinate the efforts of multi-disciplinary professionals; and finally,

adequately train and hire people with the technical skills necessary for each planned change.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

It is imperative in any study of change that an appropriate research design be applied. This chapter explains the research design and methods used to conduct this research. The chapter is divided into four s 'ons. The first section provides a discussion about the longitudinal retrospective case study approach that was used for this investigation and about the theoretical framework that guided the process of analysis. The second section presents the criteria underlying the selection of the organization for investigation, and briefly describes the company chosen. The third section describes the multiple data gathering techniques used in the study and focuses on interviewee selection, and the interview process. In the final section, the details regarding the treatment and analysis of the data are explained.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE THEORETICAL MODEL FOR ANALYSIS:

For this study, which focused on understanding the dynamic processes underlying change in the design and provision of H&S in a major corporation, a longitudinal, retrospective case study was chosen as the most appropriate research design. This type of design supports the two primary recommendations for studying change, that the study of change be holistic in nature and provide for the examination of change over a relatively long period of time (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). A longitudinal, retrospective case study of change is congruent with Pettigrew's (1990) idea of "contextualism" as a method of understanding change. Underpinning contextualism as a theory of method is the idea that research on change should involve an understanding of the context (both internal and

external), content, and process of change throughout time (Pettigrew, 1990).

Pettigrew (1990) emphasizes that only by studying change over a long period of time can the relationship between antecedents and events be established, and insight gained about the mechanisms and processes through which change is attained. Ideas underlying Kimberly's (1987) biographical approach to studying organizational change also provide support for this type of research. Kimberly suggests that a historical analysis of change should begin with the inception of the organization. For this study therefore, historical reference is made to the time organizational members believed to be the inception of H&S as an organizational function.

What is identifiable from the preceding discussion is that there is substantial agreement, whether looking at change in a sector of organizations or in one organization, that only a study of change that assesses multiple factors over a long period of time can provide the insight into the processes of change required for a thorough understanding of transition (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Kimberly, 1987; Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990).

SELECTION OF THE COMPANY FOR INVESTIGATION:

Given the objectives of this study it was felt that the company selected for the investigation should meet a number of criteria. First, it was important that the organization selected demonstrated evidence of change in its overall H&S programme and indicated a commitment towards further change efforts. Second, it was felt that the organization should be presented with numerous challenges in designing and providing H&S programmes as a result of the multiple sectors involved in its workforce. For example, selecting an organization which requires a diverse range of occupations; blue, pink, and white collar

workers; unionized and non-unionized workers; as well as shift work employees and employees who travel extensively, was important. Similarly, it was felt that an organization that is geographically dispersed, faces additional challenges in the design of H&S, and would thus provide for an understanding of additional dynamics related to change. A final criteria for the selection of the organization for enquiry was that it be an organization that had undergone a substantial amount of change, organization wide, so that there would be the opportunity to assess the interplay of H&S change with other major changes that were occurring.

*Letco[1] Utilities was chosen because it met each of these criteria. Change in H&S over the past 25 years was evident, and a commitment towards expanding H&S had been made. The many challenges for change in H&S that face this company made it a particularly good organization to study. The company has a large diverse workforce that is geographically dispersed throughout the province. In 1986 major restructuring of the company took place, and more recently the company was privatized. The company has faced the implications arising from deregulation, and thus subsequently falling under federal rather than provincial health and safety legislation. The substantial change within this organization over the past years, provided an opportunity to assess the interplay between H&S and broader organizational changes. The fact that this company was easily accessible to the researcher, and management was open to being investigated, were two additional and very important reasons for the selection of this company for investigation.

As with any longitudinal study of change it was necessary to select appropriate beginning and end points for the analysis of H&S within this company. Again the work of Hinings and Greenwood (1988), Pettigrew (1990), and Kimberly (1987) provided ideas that

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[1] The company name is fictitious to protect anonymity

assisted in the selection of the time frames relevant to H&S (i.e., establishing natural breakpoints or transition points which indicate change).

Three major transitions in the company's H&S became apparent during the early stages of data gathering. From approximately 1965 until the mid 1970's, H&S flourished within the company to the extent that the company received national awards for its excellence in this area. Around 1980, the emphasis on H&S began to decline dramatically as a result of the economic recession within the province at the time. The decline in H&S activities continued over the next five years. In 1986, as a result of significant changes within the company as a whole (changes in mission, strategy and structure), there was an attempt to revive the emphasis towards H&S. These attempts have continued to the present time. The most substantive amount of information available pertained to change efforts since 1986. This allowed for a more thorough analysis of the changes within that period. A significant number of details of the periods prior to 1986 provided important historical information for understanding change subsequent to 1986. An emphasis on the changes after 1986, is supported by the fact that the greatest number of attempts to implement changes in H&S have occurred since 1986. This emphasis is also supported by Kimberly (1987) who suggests that decisions underlying recent changes strongly impact on the direction of future change (Kimberly, 1987) and therefore need to be understood.

As in any study of change it was also important that the criteria for change be clearly depicted (Pettigrew, 1990). For the purposes of this study, changes in the quantity or quality of the H&S programmes, policies, or services; changes in the way the company's H&S programmes, policies, or services were distributed or implemented; and changes in the processes or structuring of H&S as a sub-unit of the company's HR Division, as perceived by interviewees, or as found to be explicitly stated in company documents, constituted

change. Change defined in this way was then explained and theorized in terms of the situational circumstances relevant to H&S, the organization's capacity for H&S change, the members' values and interests, and the power relations in H&S (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUES:

Triangulated methodology is suggested for case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989: Denzin, 1978), and especially for studies dealing with change (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). This involves using multiple data collection and analysis methods. For this study, company documents dealing with H&S were accessed; health and safety committee meetings were attended; and a field excursion was completed in order to better understand the H&S issues as perceived by the field employees. Also, extensive interviews were conducted with a number of individuals in various positions within the company who, at sometime during the time frame of the study, held responsibilities for H&S, or were knowledge. le about H&S programmes. Given the size of the company and the fact that it is dispersed, an effort was made to speak with individuals in all seven of its primary locations, plus one location considered by the company to be somewhat "remote." It was felt that if an accurate depiction of the development of H&S within the company was to be achieved, individuals outside of the company's corporate headquarters needed to be accessed to provide information.

Documents:

Documents pertaining to the company and its H&S initiatives were obtained. Both primary and secondary data sources were accessed. The documents included: H&S policy

statements, departmental memos and proposals; as well as health and safety committee guidelines, agendas and meeting minutes. Information was also obtained from public documents such as newspaper articles and annual reports.

Observation:

Observation was also an important part of the investigation. Time was spent at health and safety committee meetings. A luncheon, closed to the general public and media, in which the President for the company spoke about changes and new directions of the company provided additional information and insight for this study. Perhaps the most significant observation experience for the study came out of the opportunity for the researcher to go directly on-site where many of the ground crew operations were being performed. This was important for understanding various dimensions of the company, and also because it provided an opportunity for the researcher to gain insights pertaining to H&S from many individuals at all levels of the organization.

Interviews:

Initially, six interviews were conducted with either personnel in the Corporate Health and Safety Unit, or with other individuals who were considered to hold key responsibilities for aspects of H&S within the company. From these interviews, key issues relevant to the company's H&S activities, and to the changes in these activities over the past years were identified. Subsequent to the initial interviews, names of individuals knowledgeable about H&S in the company were provided by personnel in the Corporate Health and Safety Unit. Twenty-five additional employees were interviewed with interviews ranging from 1 to 2 1/2 hours in length. These interviews encompassed discussions with

individuals within the company who were instrumental in implementing current H&S initiatives or who were, through their experiences, knowledgeable about H&S within the company at a particular point in time. The interviewees included: chairpersons and other health and safety committee members; task force members for particular H&S issues; occupational health nurses (OHNs); H&S managers and advisors from the various semi-autonomous business units; fitness professionals; union representatives; human resource personnel; and finally other corporate level individuals not directly responsible for any aspect of H&S.

An effort was made to ensure that representatives from all major groups within the company, (i.e., management, professional and craft) were interviewed. At the completion of each interview an assessment was made regarding whether there were additional people that should be interviewed in light of any new information obtained. This technique of "theoretical sampling" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), is necessary for qualitative research in which attempts are being made to establish theory or, as in this case, to further develop existing concepts.

Topics of discussion for the interviews were developed from the six initial interviews and from an analysis of the H&S literature. An open-ended, informal, interview format was established. Questions focused on broad issues relevant for the design and provision of H&S. All interviewees subsequent to the initial six were asked to: describe the conditions that led to certain H&S initiatives; indicate the people they recognized as being involved in the initiatives; identify any factors they felt either facilitated or constrained particular initiatives; and describe their feelings about the results of any initiatives. Interviewees were also asked about initiatives they felt should be considered for implementation, and to identify any factors that they felt might influence the development of such initiatives. The

interview format was altered slightly for the different groups of interviewees. This ensured that the questions remained mostly focused on topic areas each group was familiar with. The interview format used with members of health and safety committees is provided as an example in Appendix A.

The questions were derived with the theoretical model for strategic change (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988) in mind. It was felt that questions based on the concepts comprising the model would allow the researcher to gain sufficient information about the antecedents, processes, and outcomes of changes in H&S that are essential for a rigorous analysis of change (Pettigrew, 1990). However, in line with the fundamental notions underpinning the value of qualitative research, the researcher made sufficient opportunity available to each interviewee to initiate other areas of discussion which they felt were important to the development of H&S (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As necessary, changes were made to the interview format to allow for the assessment of the newly surfacing ideas throughout the entire interviewing process.

The interviews were taped and transcribed. Although it has been argued that taping creates a situation in which interviewees may be hesitant to expound on issues, it was felt that the type of information being requested was not of such a sensitive nature that this would be of particular importance. It was also felt that since the study was in-depth and exploratory (in the sense that change in H&S has not been studied using such an encompassing definition) it was important to capture all of what individuals had to say, and to capture it in precisely the context in which the interviewees intended. Also because of the open-ended nature of the interview and the need for the researcher to effectively focus questions relative to each individuals' experiences, it was felt that taping would allow the researcher to focus more on the direction and flow of the interview than on note taking.

Field notes relevant to each interview were written immediately following every interview. The purpose of the field notes was to link the most recent interview with previous ones, and to raise questions for subsequent interviews which ultimately would lead to clarification of the change process (Strauss, 1987). The field notes were instrumental in allowing a continual interplay between data collection, analysis, reflections on the guiding framework, and evolving understanding.

TREATMENT AND ANALYSIS OF DATA:

The treatment and analysis of data for this study were intricately linked from the beginning of data collection. Newly gathered data was continuously compared with prior information in order to identify any new directions for investigation. To as great a degree as possible, data analysis put the company's H&S Unit and its programmes and policies into a historical context and traced how H&S had been shaped by external events and forces generally and, perhaps more importantly, by the H&S Unit's interactions with other aspects of the organization.

The research question was made clear prior to selection of the organization and collection of data. The five dynamics seen to underlie macro-organizational change were believed to be potentially important for explaining change in H&S, thus were constructs that were established *a priori*. Because these constructs proved important as the data collection progressed, they were maintained throughout the study as the focus of data collection and of analysis. However, caution was preserved to ensure that the theoretical perspective did not drive the findings (bias or limit the analysis), but rather provided sufficient guidelines for the data collection and analysis so that "data asphyxiation" (Pettigrew, 1990) was not a problem. No particular categories of the constructs were established "a priori" but emerged

throughout the data collection/analysis process. These categories were instrumental in guiding the measurement of the constructs in the initial stages of the computer analysis that was undertaken once data collection was complete.

The choice to transcribe all interviews was made in light of the fact that there is growing support for the use of computers to aid in the process of qualitative data analysis (Conrad & Reinharz, 1984; McTavish & Pirro 1990; Gephart & Wolfe, 1989). It was felt that the computer would aid in organizing the complex information about H&S change and provide insights beyond those possible from solely human comparisons of data and theory.

As suggested by Conrad and Reinharz (1984), McTavish and Pirro (1990), Gephart and Wolfe (1989), computer-aided qualitative analysis allows the data to be more easily and rapidly retrieved than conventional manual content analysis methods. The computer did a lot of the mechanical work (reduced the tedious tasks of cutting, pasting, and filing of data done in conventional analysis) leaving the researcher more time for analytic work. Using the computer programme for coding the data ensured that all examples of the content requested became available simultaneously. This reduced the chance that information relevant to a particular construct could be ignored. Also, the explicit instructions used for coding or retrieving data, which were required by the computer programme, were explicitly displayed on all print outs and allowed the researcher the opportunity to carefully scrutinize the procedures used, and assess whether more organizing of the data was necessary in order to enhance analysis. Using this approach to assist analysis addresses the criticism that qualitative data analysis methods are most often insufficiently reported in case studies (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990).

Computer-aided approaches to qualitative analysis have been criticized for their potential to be used to define the problem rather than assist with a problem (Conrad &

Reinharz, 1984), and for their potential to crunch words so that the meaning of the content

retained by traditional qualitative methods dissipates (Gephart & Wolfe, 1989). Recognizing

these potential limitations of computer-aided approaches, an attempt was made to increase

the rigor of the qualitative analysis through the use of the computer while not limiting the

analytical processes required by the researcher throughout the coding process. This was

accomplished in two ways. First, th   worked a significant amount of the time

with the organized and printed inter-   on paper, rather than on screen. Second,

charts and matrices of information were   -ioped manually, in addition to the organization

of the data by computer methods.

The Ethnograph computer programme for qualitative data analysis (Seidel, Kjolseth,

& Seymour, 1988) was applied to all the transcribed interviews to assist the researcher with

the task of analysis. The Ethnograph computer programme was specifically chosen for its

ability to, through a set of interactive menu driven computer programmes, assist with all the

mechanical aspects required for the large amount of data collected. Initially the computer

provided printouts of all interview data. Every line of data was numbered so the researcher

could depict, by line, particular segments (units of text) of the data as crucial for the

analysis. From the numbered printout of the interview data, the researcher devised a "code

map," or a way to organize the data into conceptual and categorical collections.

Each line of data was considered, and the lines of data which indicated one of the

concepts of the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model for change, were identified by a code

word on the numbered interview printouts. Particular categories of the concepts were

likewise allocated a code word (See Appendix B). The code words the researcher allocated

to the lines of data referring to a concept, or category of it, were entered into the computer.

The computer then, upon request, readily searched for, retrieved and printed out segments

of data the researcher had coded in a particular way.

By using the computer programme the researcher drew together all sentences indicating the presence of each of the five concepts and categories of them. For example, all statements coded as being indicative of **situational constraints** were selected, retrieved, and printed by the computer. More specifically, all statements pertaining to the **external environment** in a particular time period (a category of situational constraints) were obtained. Sometimes segments of data were "nested" within other segments. In other words, a segment of data coded as being indicative of a **values** issue was contained within a segment of data coded indicative of a **power** issue. Similarly, segments of coded data were sometime "overlapped" such that one segment was partially contained in another segment. All examples of nests and overlaps became available on all printouts. Indicated on every printout was the following information: 1) speaker identification (I-interviewee, R-respondent); 2) the searched code (SC) word; 3) the external nests or overlaps with the code word searched (E); and finally other codes co-occurring with the code searched for (indicated just above the lines of text retrieved). The information provided on each printout allowed the researcher to readily identify that perhaps some analytical or theoretical interpretation was required to investigate the interaction of the concepts. Part of the printed output from a single code search for external environment factors in time period two is provided as an example in Appendix C.

The researcher modified the coding scheme so that segments of data related to particular time periods could be searched, retrieved, and printed by the computer. Also, since the basis of analysis of values, interests, power, and organizational capacity relied on the differentiation of interviewees into groups, the researcher "catalogued" the individual interviewees into groups and had the computer retrieve the ideas relevant to each group.

These groups consisted of: health and safety committee members, OHNs, task force members, line managers, business unit H&S managers and advisors, H&S group (key personnel within the Corporate H&S Unit), fitness personnel, and the senior executive (the Chief Executive Officer and the vice presidents reporting to him).

Essentially, the capabilities of the computer allowed for codes to be applied to lines of data indicative of concepts or categories believed to be related to change in H&S. It also allowed segments of data relevant to certain time periods, or to certain groups of interviewees to be isolated. By means of the computer, the researcher was able to categorize and re-categorize in various ways that could facilitate the analysis. The data, organized into these conceptual and categorical collections allowed the researcher to assess each dynamic relative to each time period, and to draw inferences about change. The following section provides examples of how statements were coded and thus used to understand H&S change.

Specific Coding of the "Dynamics":

1. Situational Constraints

Interviewees were asked to describe characteristics of the company, or circumstances either inside or outside the company that they felt affected H&S. The responses to those questions were critical to the analysis of situational constraints. However, any statement made during the interview which indicated that certain factors either inside or outside the organization, underpinned any type of reaction or change in H&S, was coded as indicative of a situational constraint.

Codes were specified for various categories of situational constraints, discussed in chapter two. Statements referring to the economic recession; the provincial gold rush; the

activity of the union; changing health and safety legislation; were coded as external environmental factors causing pressures for change in the design and provision of H&S. For example, the impact of federal government legislation on H&S design was clear in the following quote thus was coded as an external environment factor impacting H&S change, "the federal codes, safety codes and health codes are very different from the provincial codes and more encompassing. Now that we are under federal jurisdiction we have to comply to those codes and that takes a lot of changing." Statements referring to the corporate reorganization; technological change in the company; and attitude changes towards employees, were coded as internal environmental factors applying pressures for change in H&S. For example, the following quote was placed into this category, "I look at health and safety and fitness as being part of a total modernization programme within Letco Utilities."

2. Values

Based on the interviews, the researcher identified certain values as important to change in H&S. The researcher identified that the extent to which there was an intense and widespread belief among H&S groups that employees' health and safety (well-being) contributed to the success of the company and the extent to which there was commitment of groups to H&S for this purpose, appeared to hold implications for H&S change. The following quote was coded as an example of values in this regard, "there is really a depth of attitude that is required for proper health and safety and wellness. It has to be something you live and you believe, that you come from the premise that this employee is a person and what's best for that person will eventually be best for me as a corporation."

The extent to which organizational groups agreed with, and were committed to having empowered employee groups involved in resolving H&S seemed to hold implications

for change in the design of H&S. "I think by and large that Letco Utilities personnel are not quick to involve the line people to that kind of extent" was seen as an example of senior managers' values towards empowering employees to make decisions about H&S.

It also appeared that the extent to which H&S groups agreed with, and were committed to establishing a Corporate H&S Unit separate from the Employee Relations (ER) Department held implications for change in H&S. Groups' values in this regard were assessed. The following statement was representative of the OHNs preferences in this regard, "I feel that until we are out from under HR we are never going to amount to much."

As well, it was obvious throughout the interviews, that groups' preferences for certain types of H&S initiatives over others, were important for understanding change in H&S. For example, some H&S groups preferred that fitness not be included within H&S initiatives at all. Other groups felt that fitness was a key component of H&S, and felt that it was an essential aspect of the design of H&S if the company was concerned about meeting the H&S activities in many of the organizations the company competed against. Interviewees had been asked to provide their opinions on various H&S programmes or initiatives. These discussions provided the information that was focused on for an analysis of groups' preferences for certain H&S initiatives.

Because consensus and commitment to values were the key dimensions of values guiding this study, computer coding was done such that sentences indicative of values of one group, were combined and separated from those sentences indicating the values of another group. This allowed for easy comparison of the values of the various groups. By identifying the extent to which, H&S groups believed H&S was important to the success of the company; believed in empowerment of the employee to make decisions about his/her health and safety in the workplace; and believed in an autonomous H&S Unit, differences in

groups' values could be assessed and pressures for change inferred. Also identifying the extent to which various H&S initiatives were preferred provided an understanding of change.

3. Interests

Statements made by interviewees that provided information about H&S resource allocations, and/or statements pertaining to any individuals' or groups' action to prevent or initiate change in H&S resources, relative to other units in the company, was seen as critical information for the analysis of interests. As well, statements which made reference to resource allocations to competing areas within the Health and Safety Unit, and evidence of actions taken by various groups to secure their resources were seen as critical pieces of information for the assessment of interests and H&S change. For example, an incidence of a group of employees getting together to go to the government to ask for a grant to get a fitness facility going, was coded by the researcher as an example of one group's dissatisfaction with the resources going to particular areas of H&S. The researcher's coding scheme allowed for incidence of H&S groups' dissatisfactions with resources in each time period to be analyzed; and thus each time period could be assessed relative to each other.

4. Power Dependencies

Interviewees were asked to describe the individuals or groups they felt had influenced key aspects of the design or provision of H&S over time. Computer coding was done so that the researcher could assess the dispersion of the groups, and the level within the company of those groups that affected decisions underlying the design and provision of H&S over the years. In this way, the extent to which power has been concentrated or

dispersed at the various periods of time, and the affect it may have had on change, could be inferred.

For example, changes in the responsibilities of the health and safety committees were coded indications of the power structure b   ning more dispersed. This statement, "now we're being empowered to insist that items of the federal code be followed. I think we will play a much stronger role," was coded as important for assessing power, and provided evidence that the power structure was becoming more dispersed.

As well, interviewees that held higher level positions pertaining to H&S were asked to comment and provide evidence indicating the importance of H&S relative to other units over time. Those statements provided an assessment of whether or not H&S had become more or less critical to the organi. ition over time and allowed for inferences to be made about the impact this may have had for change in H&S.

Interviewees responsible for a particular aspect of H&S were asked to comment on their relationships and changes in their relationships (essentially their ability to affect decisions) over time with others responsible for other areas of H&S. These responses served as critical data for analysis of the affect of certain power relationships within the H&S Unit on overall change in H&S.

5. Organizational Capacity

Statements which made reference to the personality characteristics, the values, and the task accomplishments of the various leaders in H&S (i.e., H&S Manager, H&S Advisor, and Employee Relations (ER) Director), were coded. Transactional/transformational ways of operating by the leaders were identified and inferences were made about the impact leadership may have had on H&S change at particular points in time. For example, the

statement, "he was the prime mover," was coded by the researcher as perhaps one example of the presence of transformational leadership holding implications for understanding change during that time.

Statements which provided information about the various leaders' specific backgrounds and skills pertaining to H&S, or about the leaders' understanding of the organizational culture and their ability to work within it in order to create change, were coded and were seen to be important aspects of organizational capacity with the potential to impact on H&S change.

Analysis:

Further to the coding process, guidance for the analytical interpretation of the data drew on the work of Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990). Strauss and Corbin (1990) describe a qualitative coding paradigm that facilitates the analytic processes involved in qualitative data analysis. Acknowledging this paradigm, there was an effort made during the process of analysis to understand how the four items comprising the paradigm; conditions, interactions among actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences, were related to each category believed to be important for H&S change. As each category was identified, the researcher contemplated the following questions based on the coding paradigm:

1) What were the consequences for change arising from this particular category being present?

2) What conditions were present such that this particular category affected change?

3) What strategies were employed (that may have created or constrained change) as a result of this particular category being present?

4) Why did this particular category impact change in the way that it did, at the time that it did? Were there interactions that allowed the category to make change possible or impossible?

For each category identified in the data, the researcher went through a critical thought process given impetus by the paradigm. Effort was focused on identifying the consequences for H&S change as a result of the presence of the category, as well as the conditions that allowed the category to affect H&S change the way that it did. As well, for each category identified in the data the researcher identified particular H&S strategies that were employed as a result of the category. Finally, with each category identified, the researcher analyzed the affect of each category on H&S change relative to each time period. The framework helped to ensure a critical thought process accompanied the identification of those categories felt to underpin changes in the design of H&S programmes.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH FINDINGS

The previous chapters established the objectives of this research; the theoretical

background underlying the investigation; and the research design used to accomplish those

objectives. The primary purpose of this chapter is to present the changes that have occurred

in the structural design and provision of H&S within the organization studied, and most

importantly, to discuss the dynamics underlying that change based on the Hinings and

Greenwood (1988) model for understanding change.

Change in H&S, for the purpose of this paper, was defined in previous chapters as

any changes in the quantity or quality of the H&S programmes, policies or services; any

changes in the distribution or implementation of H&S programmes, policies or services; and

any changes in the processes/structuring of H&S as a part of the HR Division. As

discussed in the previous chapters there were three periods that clearly indicated that H&S

had changed within this company. From approximately 1965 until 1975, H&S programmes

flourished within the company to the extent that the company was renowned for its

excellence concerning employee health and safety. In the late 1970's until 1985, emphasis

on H&S declined, initially as a result of the economic recession at the time, and due to the

decision by the senior executive to cut back the financial and human resources to H&S.

Beginning in 1986, there was considerable effort to revive the emphasis toward H&S,

indicated by the increase in the number of people with responsibilities for H&S, and the

number of H&S programmes that were initiated.

Based on the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) model for understanding change, the

analysis proceeds by discussing the inter-relationships of; contextual pressures for change

(situational constraints); organizational members' choices of H&S design based on their interpretation of the environment (values and interests of those groups with responsibilities for H&S); and factors which enable change (power and organizational capacity). The discussion focuses on how these dynamics help to understand the changes that occurred in the design and provision of H&S over the three time periods of this study. More description and analysis of H&S change after 1986 is provided because a greater amount of change occurred in that period and the substantial amount of information available for that period allowed in-depth analysis.

Funda~nental to this analysis is the idea that the structural elements and processes of H&S will either be held in place or will be destabilized due to circumstances in its external and/or internal context. Similarly, the structural design and provision of H&S will remain in a particular form or be destabilized dependent on the congruence between that H&S structure/system, and the values, interests, and power relations among groups with responsibiliti~s for H&S. Substantive congruence is likely to result in little change. Leadership within the H&S Unit (H&S group as referred to by some interviewees) is also assumed to play an important role in sustaining structures/systems (transactional leadership), or destabilizing them (transformational leadership).

The basis of much of the analysis relied on the differentiation of interviewees into groups, therefore the following groups are often made reference to throughout the analysis: health and safety committee members, occupational health nurses (OHNs), H&S task force members, line managers, business unit H&S managers and advisors, the H&S group (key personnel in the Corporate H&S Unit), fitness professionals, the ER Director, and the senior executive (the Chief Executive Officer and the Vice Presidents reporting to him).

DESIGN AND PROVISION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY: 1965-1975

From the mid 1960's to approximately the mid 1970's the H&S programmes which existed in the company were mostly implemented by a corporate H&S group consisting of a Corporate H&S Manager, and four to five corporate safety advisors who were regionally dispersed throughout the province. Responsibilities for H&S also lay with the line managers within specific worksites. The company was exemplary in its overall H&S policies and programmes, relative to other companies in the province. In most respects H&S activities exceeded the requirements imposed by provincial legislation. The design of H&S reflected the fact that the crux of the company's operations was in construction. Most programmes focused on driver training, first-aid training, and safe work procedures. This had been the focus in previous years, and there were substantive efforts throughout this time period, primarily by the corporate H&S group, to maintain existing H&S programmes.

Occupational Health Nurses (OHNs) and two part-time medical advisors were located in two locations in the province. The OHNs focused mostly on minor medical treatments and pre-employment medicals. As well, the OHNs in conjunction with the Provincial Alcohol and Drug Commission administered the company's alcohol and drug policy that provided employees with assistance in addressing those types of problems. Some interviewees referred to the OHNs as "tongue depressors" and suggested that their role was a "reactive" one. There were no external ideas or social pressures present at this time to create pressures for the personnel in the H&S group to implement stress management, fitness, or other health promotion types of programmes.

At this time, the utility company, existed in a protected, monopolistic and stable environment. There were few changes occurring within the organization, as there were few external pressures for the company to deal with. The internal environment that this created

for many years at Letco Utilities was one described as maternalistic. There was a feeling among employees of being cared for by a "big family." The caring for the employee was articulated in good benefits (relative to other companies), and job security within a stable industry. The history of the company allowed employees to go into one job and to stay there doing exactly the same thing until retirement. For many this provided comfort, and the feeling of being taken care of.

The company prided itself in being essentially self-sufficient. That pride was reflected in a feeling among employees that their needs could be met within the "family," and they too did not need to go outside the company to have their needs taken care of. This was essentially a "utility mentality," rather than a mentality unique to Letco Utilities. It existed in a number of North American utility companies, and had its origins in the notion that large utilities took care of everyone. With the existence of such deep-seated values, there was resistance to change in structures or systems in many areas of the company.

There was a goodness of fit (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988) between the structure and provision of H&S, and the external and internal environment in which it existed. The design and provision of H&S was congruent with what Cottington and House (1986) suggest was happening in terms of H&S in most organizations at the time. In other words, H&S activities were mostly directly work-related, and were substantive enough to ensure legislative requirements were met. The design of H&S was also congruent with the internal, family type environment, that had evolved.

Among those having responsibilities for H&S, there was widespread commitment toward what H&S encompassed, and how activities were carried out. The members of the corporate H&S group agreed with, and were committed to a H&S design that focused on H&S concerns in construction essentially because of the similarity of their backgrounds, and

experiences as worksite safety specialists. The OHNs accepted the reactive nature of their role at the time. That role was typical of the role OHNs played in a number of large organizations.

Line managers and employees were committed to the existing design and provision of H&S. Health and safety programmes and policies were respected, and seen to be something to be complied with. In the event that there was not a health policy in place that could meet the needs of an employee, there was an unstated, but ever present idea within all areas of the company, that any employee health crisis, would be handled by one level of management or another. It may have been an "under the table kind of care" that was provided, as described by one interviewee, but the employee was cared for. The design of H&S was congruent with the preferences H&S groups had for it. There was a pattern of status quo commitment toward the structure and provision of H&S, which worked to stabilize the H&S design over this 10 year time period.

Some dissatisfaction among the OHNs regarding insufficient resources available for them to become more proactive arose near the end of this time period. However, this minimal level of dissatisfaction with the financial and human resources that were allocated to the H&S groups, did not cause any concrete action to be taken to change the design or provision of H&S. Because of the reactive nature of OHNs role, they had limited access to key groups within the organization (e.g., line managers, senior executive), and thus no way of bringing attention to some of the H&S issues they began to feel were important. Because of this, the OHNs' increasing dissatisfaction with resources to certain health concerns did not induce a response in terms of change in the design and provision of H&S during this time period. Dissatisfactions among the nurses were repressed because they had little power.

The power structure operating at this time supported the maintenance of the design and provision of H&S for this 10 year period. The power structure for H&S was fairly concentrated among three groups who were committed to a H&S design focused mostly on H&S relevant to construction work, and on meeting legislation. The senior executive made decisions about the financial allocations for H&S. The corporate H&S group, essentially the corporate H&S Manager, had the ability to make most of the decisions about the allocation of H&S dollars to the various H&S programmes to be implemented and/or maintained by the corporate H&S group. Line managers were able to affect the nature of H&S activities within specific work locations. Line managers had little input into decisions pertaining to corporate policies and programmes that were developed and implemented, but they made decisions about their own commitment to, and adherence to certain programmes and policies. They also made decisions about the extent to which they would ensure adherence to H&S policies from their workers. This power was not only a result of their position (overseers of operations), but also a result of the dispersed nature of the company and thus the certain degree of autonomy line managers had from Corporate Health and Safety. Line managers also had power as a result of their access to resources. It was stated this way by one interviewee:

> Letco Utilities line management has a fair amount of clout
> and if there is any indication, without or within for that
> matter, that gives them that feeling that we had better get
> going and roll on it, they have a lot of resources at their
> disposal (Interview, October 15, 1990).

Line mangers made decisions about allocating money to certain health and safety features for the job, or to particular initiatives that did not come out of the corporate level .

This power structure ensured that the values and interests of the senior executive, the H&S Manager and line managers were articulated in the structural design and provision

of H&S, and ensured that few changes occurred. Overall, the design of H&S was congruent with: the internal/external context of H&S; H&S groups' value commitments and interests; and the structure of power throughout this 10 year period, thus the pressures against change were quite strong.

In addition, The H&S Manager's leadership was critical to the maintenance of the H&S design over these ten years. His leadership style was very much transactional in the sense that his focus was towards maintaining many of the H&S programmes that had been in place in previous years, and toward ensuring that H&S skills and knowledge relevant to the worksite continued to exist within the company. For example, he expected that new workers would have extensive training, such that there was a health and safety focus built right into the job.

What was evident was that the H&S Manager at this time had the ability to ensure the commitment of organizational members to H&S, especially the line managers, whose support was critical to the retention of the design of H&S throughout this period. The leadership of the H&S Manager was such that most line managers made decisions consistent with those of the H&S Manager.

One interviewee in describing the H&S Manager said, "he was very autocratic, like he was just an old fashioned guy ..." To the extent that this is an accurate depiction of the H&S Manager and an indication of his leadership style there are implications for understanding stability of H&S at this time. The autocratic leadership style has been shown to operate best in mechanical types of organizations (Hall, 1977), such as the company studied. One can infer from this that given the structure and culture in Letco Utilities, and in the Corporate H&S Unit at the time, (i.e., emphasis and acceptance of protocol) the autocratic style of the H&S Manager was likely an important factor that worked to stabilize

the H&S design for 10 years. This leadership style was also congruent with the internal context.

The maintenance of this design and provision of H&S was facilitated not only by the H&S Manager's leadership style, but also by the worksite H&S expertise he had. He ensured that all the personnel in the Corporate H&S Unit who reported to him had the technical abilities in health and safety to sustain H&S programmes throughout the company. Interviewees provided numerous examples of the H&S Manager's expertise in H&S. His expertise was evident in the fact that he had a complex array of driver training programmes; a comprehensive supervisor health and safety training programme; safety standards that were well established and up to date; as well as a method of audit in place. He also had the compan. volved in corporate first aid competitions. At one point, the company was asked not to enter because it was receiving all the rewards! The H&S Manager was intricately involved in each of these initiatives because most of them were developed and implemented internally. He essentially orchestrated all of it. One of the business unit H&S managers stated:

> We had at one time an expert like the Safety Advisor now ...
> People still remember him. All the people he worked with
> set up such an excellent programme. He had first aid
> competitions and like we used to win regularly national
> competitions in first aid with first aid teams. Our defensive
> driving programme was second to none, and supervisor safety
> training ... all our safety standards were right up to snuff.
> We used to put out a booklet quarterly on stats and what was
> being done as a result of accidents and what not ...
> (Interview, October 15, 1990).

Tushman and Romanelli (1985) work helps, in two ways, to explain the stability of H&S throughout this period. They state:

> During convergence periods, executive leadership

> concentrates on symbolic actions and behaviour and leaves to middle-managers the responsibility of implementing incremental substantive changes ... Legitimation, explanation, and rationalization are constant requirements of executive leadership during convergent periods (p. 209).

On one hand, given that the company was in a convergent period, it appears that the senior executive left considerable responsibility to the H&S Manager to attend to the incremental changes in H&S that were required to be consistent with the external and internal context, and thus to sustain an overall strong H&S programme. He had the knowledge and skill to do this successfully. On the other hand, it appears that the H&S Manager, as the leader for the H&S Unit, played an executive leader role and legitimized and rationalized the design and provision of H&S. It was suggested by a number of interviewees that this H&S Manager's leadership and expertise gave the H&S Unit the credibility that was necessary for H&S to have the respect of other departments and units within the company.

DESIGN AND PROVISION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY: LATE 1970'S - 1985

Significant pressures for change in H&S, and destabilization of the design and provision of H&S began to occur in the late 1970's. During this period the external context of the company began to change and the internal organization changed in response to external pressures. The movement towards utility de-regulation in the United States provided pressures for the company to become more competitive. In Canada, the regulatory environment also began to move towards an open market. Although this movement did not cause immediate policy changes, the competitive mood became increasingly prevalent. The senior executive of the company identified a need for the company to undergo fairly dramatic changes in its business operations if it was to remain competitive.

Simultaneous, with these occurrences, there was an economic recession which further

facilitated the senior executive's concern with the company's ways of operating. Like many other companies it had to "tighten up its belt" and the "bottom line" began to be emphasized. Subsequent to the economic recession there was the "provincial gold rush" from approximately 1983-1985. The company was hard pressed to keep up with the demand for its services. Productivity became the essential thrust of the company.

The senior executive of the company, in interpreting these changes began to question the existent "family" company culture given new demands the company was facing in terms of increased competitiveness. The executive began to feel that existing values were no longer consistent with the environment. During this period there was an effort made by the senior executive to let go of the old values, and the old family culture in the company. There was a struggle to identify new values and ways to create a new overriding culture that would enable the company to meet the demands of the changing environment in which it found itself. There was a search for ways that the company could better align itself with its environment.

The interaction of the external pressures on the organization and the internal organizational response to those pressures between the late 1970's and 1985 provided a considerably different context for H&S than that which existed in the 1965-1975 era. There were a number of both implicit and explicit pressures for change in the design and provision of H&S. The senior executive became dissatisfied with the amount of financial resources that were being allocated to H&S. The outcome of that dissatisfaction was budget cuts to H&S. The senior executive also became dissatisfied with the human resources that were allocated to H&S. The senior executive hired a general human resources specialist, rather than a H&S specialist to replace the Corporate H&S Manager who retired around 1975. Gradually as corporate H&S advisory positions became vacant, they were not filled.

Using the ideas of Hinings and Greenwood (1988), the senior executive's interests were connected to an alternative pattern of commitment for the design and provision of H&S. The strategic choices made by the members of the senior executive at this time were a result of their beliefs that human r⊥(r ·c∵·, issues, and especially H&S issues were not important (relevant ∴ other corporate func'.⸜ ns) to the success of the company. The senior executive preferred a design that would merely meet the minimum standards and requirements of H&S prescribed by pro⸜ .icial H&S legislation. Perhaps, more accurately, they were comn.✄ted to a H&S design that was enforced by the provincial agency governing H&S. Differentiaticn between prescribed standards, and enforced standards 's an important one. Because Letco Utilities was a crown corporation (a government organization like the regulating H&S body) the enforcement of H&S standards was sometimes lenient. This flexibility from the standards afforded the company considerable opportunity to let many of the company H&S programmes deteriorate. A few interviewees suggested that the company chose to maximize that flexibility throughout this period.

The various H&S groups' preferred options for the scope and provision of H&S activities began to change from that of previous years. By the early 1980's there was evidence c. a fairly strong movement toward a pattern of reformative commitments regarding the design and provision of H&S. Increasingly, there was commitment to a H&S design which entailed no more than what was necessary to meet enforced standards of provincial H&S legislation.

In fact, there appeared to be little retention of status quo commitme its to r .e design and provision of H&S, and essentially no strong competing commitments t the decrease of H&S policies, standards, and programmes by any H&S groups. With the decline of the H&S personnel, there was neither a strong preference for the worksite health and safety

focus of the past, nor or a strong preference for much activity in H&S at all. The movement toward reformative commitment (de-emphasis of H&S) was articulated in the preferences of line managers and employees as well. Often times the corporate H&S group had been seen as regulators who required employees and line managers to comply. The decline of H&S programmes worked to resolve any tensions created by the inconsistency of the former H&S design and the new set of values pertaining to H&S.

Throughout the "boom" years for the company (approximately 1983-1985), there was further movement of H&S groups toward a pattern of reformative commitments for the design and provision of H&S to play only a very minimal role in the operations of the company. The senior executive made decisions to ensure that the company capitalized on its opportunity to make up for the financial difficulties it had experienced throughout the recession, and there was an intensified push toward productivity and "bottom line" objectives. Productivity was the predominate concern and any previous emphasis toward the employees' health and safety was gone. Given the company emphasis on productivity, the H&S Manager's commitment was towards other human resource functions believed to be more intricately linked to facilitating productivity.

With the intensified push toward productivity line managers began to feel as though there was no time for H&S programmes of any kind. That attitude was supported by the fact that management evaluations were very strongly tied to productivity. There was the belief that attention to H&S threatened productivity, thus there was fairly widespread agreement among line managers towards having former H&S policies, standards, and programmes dissipate. This is vividly described by one line manager,

> 1983-1985, it was boom years in the province. It was go, go,
> go, produce, produce, produce ... You go, go, and get your
> work done. Don't worry about these other little things. We
> found that a lot of health and safety programmes were like

skipped over for productivity (Interview, October 12, 1990).

Employees were no longer constrained by H&S programmes and regulations. They too were attempting to meet productivity demands, thus their preferred options were for a H&S system that did not impose on their opportunities to meet the demands of productivity. Also, the culture of the company was still one in which many employees believed that their real important health or safety needs would be taken care of by one level of management or another.

The considerable degree of dissatisfaction with too many resources going to H&S rather than other corporate functions by the senior executive, H&S Manager, and line managers was an important factor resulting in the decline of H&S programmes. Power relations for H&S shifted slightly throughout the late 1970's and early 1980's from what it had been in the 1965-1975 era. The power structure became even more concentrated than in previous years, and moved primarily within the hands of the senior executive. The ability of those in the H&S Unit to make decisions about H&S began to lessen in the late 1970's because there was little financial support from the senior executive for maintaining or implementing any type of H&S initiative. As well, the turnover and decline in number of personnel for H&S took away the leadership and expertise required to maintain H&S as it was, resulting in a decrease of the power the Corporate H&S Unit once had.

Senior line managers were the only other H&S group that had some degree of ability to affect H&S programme outcomes. Many H&S programmes were maintained only if the senior line managers chose to finance the programme for their workers from their area budgets. However, it became increasingly unlikely for line managers to maintain programmes given the emphasis on, and rewards for, maintaining productivity. This groups' interest position was neither connected to status quo commitment, nor a competitive

commitment, but was connected with a pattern of reformative commitments towards minimal H&S standards, policies, and programmes. Few line managers believed that H&S was crucial to the success of their operations.

The H&S Manager that had held the OHNs in a very traditional role was no longer with the company. Despite tight resources for H&S, the OHNs were allocated enough finances to travel to field locations and in this way become somewhat more proactive. In 1982, the OHNs were able to implement a blood pressure screening programme throughout the company. This got the nurses communicating with line managers. The nurses attempted to sustain emphasis toward H&S through these communications. Their initiatives, although rather minimal, got some line managers thinking about health and safety in more terms than specific worksite related types of issues. However, many of the programmes initiated by the OHNs were on an adhoc basis. Many of their initiatives were financed by the line managers who remained committed to H&S despite the direction the company was moving in terms of H&S.

The OHNs proactive efforts in field locations; their increased visibility to, and communications with line managers who had the resources to directly impact H&S in their areas; and the OHNs increased ability to consult with one another, increased their access to information, and thus somewhat their power. However, their increased power was not significant for them to be able to maintain a company emphasis toward H&S. Pettigrew (1975) in discussing groups' sources of power, suggests that a group's control over information; its ability to gain political access; and its ability to build group support affords it more power. It appeared that the OHNs did not have access to information of substance to enable them to gain sufficient power to bring about H&S changes of their preferred choice. Although gaining access to line managers facilitated their efforts to emphasize H&S,

the OHN's were not able to convince all line managers of the importance of H&S. Also, they were not able to gain access to the elite group making key decisions about Corporate H&S in order to persuade them that H&S needed to continue to be emphasized.

The outcome of this power structure for H&S was that the senior executive's preferred options were optimized in the design and provision of H&S. Political access and sensitivity as referred to by Pettigrew (1975), appeared to further provide a strong base of power for the senior executive. According to Pettigrew, political access refers to a group's ability to link with others that can support the implementation of the group's ideas. Political sensitivity is a group's consciousness of the social network and the reciprocity in those interactions that can support the implementation of the group's ideas. Both direct and indirect interpersonal relationships can affect the linkages created, and thus the degree of support that can be gained for the group's ideas. In this study analysis supports Pettigrew's ideas of political access and sensitivity. Specifically, interviewees commented that some members of the senior executive had established interpersonal relationships and linkages with the government officials overseeing H&S standards and enforcement. The relationships established allowed the company some flexibility from the standards. As well, the company was provided information, prior to inspection, about health and safety areas where leniency would not be granted. One interviewee described the situation in this way:

> You won't get a lot of the people here in Letco Utilities to admit to it, but we have been told by some fairly connected people that because Letco Utilities was a crown corporation and occupational health and safety was also, they used to work a few deals between each other, not to the detriment of the employees but if there was an unsafe condition, instead of occupational health and safety going once they got the call, they would phone the people within Letco and say this is the situation, go and fix it, so that kept all the figures good and you don't know how many violations there were and that is going to be one of the big differences here. The feds don't allow for that stuff (Interview, September 13, 1990).

The relationship between company officials and government officials essentially allowed the values of the senior executive to be articulated in a design of H&S activities that did not always meet all aspects of legislative requirements. Without government enforcement of standards in the company the power of other H&S groups (e.g., union, corporate H&S group) to sustain an emphasis on H&S was minimal.

The senior executive's budget cuts to H&S limited the extent to which the Corporate H&S Manager could retain the design of H&S. As well, he was not personally committed to retaining the past design and provision of H&S and he lacked the expertise in the H&S function necessary to ensure knowledge and skill about H&S continued within the company. One commenting on this H&S Manager's leadership said, "he wasn't a H&S oriented manager ... he was getting direction from the top that H&S wasn't important." One of the business unit H&S advisors made explicit reference to the leadership towards H&S at this time:

> We lost dedication with respect to our management and we didn't have the professional so consequently there was a downturn in the emphasis both internally and externally with respect to health and safety. We had no drive to give us a feeling of an emphasis on health and safety (Interview, October 30, 1990).

The fact that the H&S Manager did not have the support from the senior executive to invest effort into H&S; did not have expertise specific to H&S; and did not value H&S as a important factor for the operations of the company, supported the destabilization of the array of H&S programmes.

Using the concepts of Hinings and Greenwood (1988) to understand the changes that occurred up to 1985, one can see that in 1965, status quo commitment in the midst of a concentrated power structure resulted in no change in the design and provision of H&S

for approximately 10 years. There wer⁀ no precipitating dynamics for the alteration of status quo. Pressures against any kind of change where enhanced by the transactional leadership of the H&S Manager.

Then in the late 1970's, given impetus by changes that occurred in the external environment (e.g., economic recession, provincial gold rush), the pattern of commitments underlying the design and provision of H&S began to change. Any emphasis toward the employee was seen by members of the senior executive to be at the expense of productivity, the primary focus of attention. Although line managers had considerable ability to affect H&S outcomes, many chose not to encourage H&S because it threatened their manager evaluations which had become tied to productivity. Change occurred with reformative commitment toward a de-emphasis in H&S within a fairly concentrated power structure.

By approximately 1984, a pattern of reformative commitment prevailed over the status quo commitments in the 1965-1975 era. Most former H&S programmes and policies had dissipated. There were no persistent, alternate ideas pertaining to the design or provision of H&S existing among H&S groups. One could even suggest that there was a movement toward a pattern of status quo commitment based on meeting only the enforced requirements of provincial legislation.

The consequence of the lack of senior executive commitment to H&S, and the lack of leadership and expertise in H&S was that only a very small group of H&S advisors dispersed throughout the company remained to attend to H&S concerns. One business unit H&S manager described the situation in this way:

> It became a very difficult thing when you were asked to be a
> safety professional. At that stage of the game you were up
> in one place on a Saturday night giving a presentation to
> family who came through, somewhere else on Sunday, to go
> somewhere else on Monday morning. You kind of changed
> clothes in mid stream and that became a way of life and the

professionals kind of dragged their butts there for awhile and
they were burnt out (Interview, October 15, 1990).

Essentially, it appeared that the Corporate H&S Unit lost its focus almost entirely. It also lost its credibility among other divisions and departments.

DESIGN AND PROVISION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY: 1986-1990

The contextual pressures for Letco Utilities came to a head within the early 1980's. Deregulation of the industry and the resultant competition (a new phenomenon to the industry) eventually caused Letco Utilities to make changes in its operations. In 1985, in a concrete response to this change, the senior executive put in place a directional plan for the company, with the primary objective of evolving the organization into a world class company by 1995.

The directional plan involved a modernization programme (technological upgrade) in 1986. This was the largest upgrade the company had ever undertaken. The technological upgrade created a number of pressures for change in the design and provision of H&S. In the distant past, the focus of H&S had been relevant to craft jobs (i.e., construction). Safety procedures around construction sites, driver training, and first aid training were emphasized. The need for H&S initiatives specific to the construction area intensified with the technological upgrade as indicated by one line manager:

> The industry is changing so fast that there are tools that we
> used five years that we no longer need and there is new
> costly stuff on the market that we have to get. As the stuff
> comes on board it is all more electrically orientated and not
> manual so now you have more and more safety things
> (Interview, October 12, 1990).

The technological upgrade also got the company involved in numerous other businesses. Each of these businesses had health and safety hazards specific to their

operations which created pressures for new H&S programmes consistent with the new operations. As well, rapidly changing job demands as a result of the changes in technology, caused considerable stress for employees. Many senior managers interpreted this as an indication of a real need for change in the way H&S was approached in the company.

Also, in 1986 there was a reorganization of the company into business units in an effort to move operations closer to the customer. In conjunction with the reorganization there was a decision by the senior executive to involve employees at levels they had not been involved in the past. The "word empowerment" began to be discussed frequently at the senior executive level, and began to show up in corporate correspondences. The reorganization and the increased emphasis on the employee were purposely undertaken in an effort to become a more competitive company that could operate in the private sector.

As part of the changes focused toward improving the company's chance of being successful in the private sector, there were implicit and explicit pressures for change in the design and provision of H&S. Most explicitly, privatization would result in the company falling under federal H&S legislation, rather than provincial legislation. The federal requirements would impose many more stringent requirements, and would apply more strict enforcement than the provincial governing body.

The status quo commitments toward HR generally, and towards the nature of H&S more specifically, became increasingly less congruent with the progressive and complex HR/H&S structures and systems in what would be competing organizations. In becoming competitive, the senior executive, influenced by beliefs outside of the company, was forced to begin to think more about the employee as a valuable resource. The following quote from the senior executive perspective indicates the impetus behind the alternate set of ideas for HR and the increased emphasis towards H&S:

> You have to look at what is happening within not only your industry environment but what is happening in the whole labour relations environment and again, it [empowerment of the employee] is just something that the time has come for it and its happening throughout the professional working world. We have programmes of employee recognition, and health and safety are being improved everywhere. Again it is almost part of a ground swell of change and you know you take your clues from what's been happening around you (Interview, November 2, 1990).

The changing values of the senior executive were the first challenges to the status quo commitment that had developed relative to the H&S. The idea that the employee was important and that programmes and policies were important to implement, arose out of the need to align H&S more effectively with external and internal changes. It had become apparent that the existing nature of HR, and the design and provision of H&S as part of that, was not consistent with the corporate environment the senior executive wished to create. The change in values of the senior executive caused the executive to decide on another corporate reorganization in 1988 to better align human resources and finance systems with the business unit concept. In this reorganization, the HR Division gained a more prominent position within the company as did H&S.

Not as part of the initial directional plan, but because of the strong "Total Quality" movement in the external environment, the senior executive implemented the Total Quality concept. Total Quality was being perceived by an increasing number of corporations as a key philosophy for creating change in operations, and for achieving success in a competitive industry (Borins, 1991). The objective of Total Quality was to examine and improve work processes (both product and services) in order to improve quality. Inherent in Total Quality is the idea that organizations need to recognize the employee as a key valuable resource because it is the employee that facilitates the attainment of quality products and services.

The adoption of Total Quality applied some pressure for H&S to be designed quite differently than it had been in the past. This is expressed in this quote from the perspective of the senior executive:

> Total Quality means empowering employees with the proper support for their mental health, physical health, abilities on the job, and for their training ... Total Quality places an emphasis on the employee, and when you are concerned about the employee, the whole concept of wellness within the corporation is raised. That enhances cultural change because it re-enforces care for the employee in what they are doing, how safely they are doing it, and the impact the environment is having on them ... (Interview, November 2, 1990).

Although changes in the internal context of H&S began in 1986 and created pressures for change in the H&S, little happened in the way of concrete change in H&S until the reorganization in 1988. Essentially, this can be attributed to the fact that, even after the 1986 reorganization and the senior executive's verbal commitment toward a greater emphasis on human resources, there was not the leadership or expertise in the Human Resources Division or the H&S Unit to enable change in H&S. There was a Director of Employee Relations (ER) who was responsible for labour relations and H&S. He had been hired in 1986 as a change agent in the HR area. However, for a year and a half the ER Director had no Corporate H&S Manager to assist him because the former manager had retired, and a search process for a new manager was slow. Also, during that time there was a heavy period of bargaining going on, and the company had some major issues to resolve with the Canada Relations Board. The individuals with the power to create change in H&S, the Employee Relations Director and the Vice President of Human Resources, were not able to focus on such change.

The real precipitating dynamics for the alteration of the status quo towards H&S came with the reorganization in 1988 that aligned human resources and finance systems with

the business unit structure. Human resource groups moved into each business unit, and a Corporate HR Division remained to be involved in planning and development for human resource issues that extended across the organization. As a result of this reorganization, responsibilities for corporate human resources were divided into two directors' areas: Director of Employee Relations, and Direc or of Employee Development. The ER Director who was responsible for labour relations and H&S p .cr to the reorganization, acquired the additio:ial functions of compensation, benefits, and employment.

In some cases the movement of human resource groups into each business unit resulted in a H&S Manager, and one or two H&S advisors being assigned to the unit. However, not all business units had received personnel dedicated to H&S initiatives. Instead, in addition . H&S, an individual was also assigned the responsibility for employment, recruitment, and employee relations. Some business units had the expertise to facilitate change in H&S, others did not. Also, as part of the reorganization a new corporate H&S group was formed. This group included two H&S professionals, one in the position of Corporate H&S Manager, and one in the capacity of Corporate H&S Advisor,

om reported to the Corporate ER Director. The two H&S professionals became ey dynamics of change.

As well, a Coordinator for Corporate Health and Fitness had been hired through the benefits group prior to the reorganization. This individual became part of the new corporate H&S group. Also, a fitness representative that had been contracted in 1987 to oversee the development of a fitness centre; a director who managed the day to day operations of the facility; four professional staff involved in the operations of the facility; and an employee advisory committee for the fitness facility, together, became an appendage of the corporate H&S group. The seven OHNs and one medical advisor remained part of

the corporate H&S group. Line managers continued to have responsibilities for H&S in their areas. With the rapid increase in the number of players with responsibilities for H&S, there evolved a pattern of competitive commitments toward the design and provision of H&S.

Although the senior executive ha.¹ hired the Corporate ER Director, the H&S Manager, and the H&S Advisor fr.jm outside to create change, the senior executive was cautious in proceeding with change The source of the financial resources for a number of initiatives was not clearly establis.\e 1 In cases where the source of finances had been established, the funds were insufficient for the types of proposals for H&S change that were advanced. A struggle for a favourable distribution of financial and human resources for H&S initiatives began. With the influx of people into previously unfilled corporate H&S positions, and into newly created positions, the number of individuals and groups with abilities to make decisions affecting H&S increased substantially. Also, more than ever before, the company had individuals with the health and safety experience, expertise, and leadership ability needed to enable change.

Members of the senior executive, the ER Director, the H&S Manager, and the Advisor, were essentially responsible for financial and human resource decisions pertaining to H&S in 1988. They strongly believed they needed to emphasize the employees' overall well-being for the organization to be successful. There was agreement that the "old under the table kind of caring for employees," as described by one interviewee, was no longer appropriate. There was substantial commitment by the H&S Manager as well as the Advisor, to develop and implement a number of concrete H&S programmes and policies, and to gain even more commitment from the senior executive and the ER Director for progressive changes in H&S. However, the commitment to H&S change varied considerably

across all groups holding responsibilities for various aspects of H&S.

With the reorganization, the former role of the corporate H&S group (developing and implementing programmes throughout the province), moved more towards a coordinating role. The corporate H&S group developed the H&S initiatives and became resources for business unit H&S managers and advisors. The managers and advisors became responsible for the implementation of the H&S programmes and policies within their business units. However, not all business units received the personnel they required to carry out some of the new H&S initiatives. Business units varied in terms of whether they had a manager and/or an advisor(s), and in terms of whether those individuals had part-time of full-time responsibilities for H&S. Given the limited human resources for H&S the role of the H&S managers and advisors in the business units often became one of being a resource to senior line managers. Line managers then often had the direct responsibility of implementing H&S programmes in the business units. Among the groups with responsibilities for some aspect of H&S, there was no agreement about the best structures and systems for creating change; about which elements of change were the most important; about the amount of financial and human resources that needed to be allocated for change; and no agreement about the speed at which change needed to occur.

This created the situation where there was varied commitment toward H&S between business units. In some of the business units the H&S manager, and advisors felt that the corporate H&S group should be maintaining some implementation responsibilities because it was not feasible for the smaller business units to handle all the new initiatives of H&S, along with all their other responsibilities. Some of the H&S managers and advisors did not have the knowledge and skill required to ensure implementation of some initiatives, and felt it was more efficient for the corporate H&S group to maintain responsibility for the

implementation of a number of programmes. Many of the H&S managers and advisors, and the OHNs felt that the implementation of H&S initiatives out of the business units, rather than corporate as in years past, resulted in inefficient use of financial and human resources. Two advisors could show up at the same location to give the same course.

Many line managers were dissatisfied with having to provide financial and/or human resources for H&S initiatives developed by Corporate H&S. Many line managers were not committed to the H&S changes being implemented because some of the dollars for H&S were coming out of their operating budgets. There was no separate budget within any department for H&S, and many line managers were not ready to relinquish operating funds for H&S. Line managers felt they were working under operations and productivity constraints and that H&S was an additional burden. Many of the line managers felt that if the corporate H&S group wanted certain initiatives as part of the overall H&S programme, then they could implement it and the Corporate H&S Unit could pay for it. The re-newed emphasis toward H&S initiatives was seen by some managers as inconsistent with their interest position which resulted in a lack of commitment to many initiatives. Some line managers simply refused to provide money for certain initiatives as indicated by this quote from one worker:

> I'm not sure where the money is coming from but I got told
> when I was asked to be on that task force [provincial wellness
> task force] by my management that there was no way that he
> was going to give me a dime to go on a committee like that
> because it didn't pertain to his work unit (Interview, October,
> 23, 1990).

Some managers withheld information from employees regarding upcoming H&S seminars or made decisions that only particular employees could have access to the initiatives. One worker described this type of situation in the following way:

> My boss tells me he can't schedule me for a stress
> management course because he wants me to take a business
> systems course, so the bottom line is money. Their
> [management] view point is that if we are technically trained
> that's all that we have to look for and that safety can come
> later (Interview, October 24, 1990).

In order to understand the complexity of change in H&S from 1986 to the completion of

data gathering in December 1990, an understanding of the dynamics underlying the various

H&S activities is important. Therefore an analysis of the following is provided: 1) the

implementation of health and safety committees; 2) the development of the Employee and

Family Assistance Programme (EFAP); 3) the implementation of the Workplace Hazardous

Materials Information System (WHMIS); 4) the re-establishment of H&S programmes of

the past; 5) and the development of health promotion kinds of initiatives.

1. Implementation of Health and Safety Committees:

In 1988, the Corporate H&S Manager quickly established that, with the chances of

privatization increasing, the company had to move quickly to develop and implement health

and safety committees throughout the province. Health and safety committees are

recommended by provincial health and safety legislation, but are mandatory for corporations

which fall under federal health and safety legislation (Canada Labour Code, 1990). The

committees are essentially groups of managers and workers that come together to identify

and resolve workplace health and safety issues. The committees ensure workers a voice in

determining the conditions in their work environment.

Although higher level health and safety committees were not required by any level

of government legislation, the H&S Manager convinced the senior executive that the

company should not only implement the local health and safety committees, but should also

implement a number of regional committees, and a Senior Joint Management Health and

Safety Committee. The latter committee comprised representatives from both the union and the senior executive, and was established to ensure that H&S issues not resolved at the local anu regional levels were resolved at a senior level. The development of the health and safety committees substantially increased the number of players with responsibilities for H&S. Close to fifty health and safety committees were implemented throughout the province by 1990. Because of this development, the union was more actively involved in H&S than ever before.

The union attended health and safety committee meetings and began providing information to the committees to get health and safety back on track. The union encouraged committees to adopt the appropriate guidelines and fulfil their responsibilities. As well, the union was involved in the decision making processes at all Senior Joint Management H&S Committee meetings. One of the union representatives said, "we are finally getting more involved pro-actively this time than we were in the past seventy-five years."

The senior executive's commitment to the development and implementation of these committees was a dramatic and tangible indication of the senior executive's commitment to empowering employees, and to giving them an opportunity to affect the conditions in their work environment affecting their well-being. However, not all H&S groups agreed with the health and safety committee concept and the empowerment of the employee, nor were all groups committed to it. There were a number of workers on health and safety committees who felt that the committees lacked sufficient guidelines in which to operate. In some committees there was a prevalent idea that the health and safety committees were likely to be similar to all other committees in the company in that they never accomplish anything. More optimistic committee members were quickly disillusioned when their recommendations

were only attended to by line managers if they did not cost money and thus, some of the committees were not active because members lost interest in pursuing health and safety issues.

The lack of commitment of some workers to the opportunity to participate in decisions about H&S may be explained, at least in part, by what Tichy and Ulrich (1984) describe as cultural resistances to change. The authors state:

> A . organization's culture may highlight certain elements of
> the organization, making it difficult for members to
> conceive of other ways of doing things ... There is security in
> the past ... Cultures which require a great deal of conformity
> often lack much receptivity to change (p. 244).

Traditionally, Letco Utilities developed committees for everything, but the idea of "empowered" committees was new. As well, despite some efforts toward change, worker communication with higher levels of management was not part of Letco Utilities culture. As well, within this company protocol was emphasized, employee discipline was often exercised, and many workers were intimidated by managers. The following quotes from two interviewees provide insight into these cultural elements which caused barriers for workers to be involved in H&S decisions and thus, barriers to change in H&S. One first level manager, a former craft worker, provided insight into the culture of the company in this way:

> There is a lot of people who are afraid to do anything. Even
> today the mentality's there. I don't know if you've talked to
> any of the craft people, but they're afraid to talk to their
> management. They are afraid to talk to their managers now,
> and if that manager's manager walks into the room, you leave
> cause you don't want this person to even know who you are
> just in case something might happen where you come inside
> here (Interview, October 12, 1990).

Communication barriers are implicit in the attitudes indicated in this quote by one

line manager who was expressing the ideas of his workers:

> It was pointed out the last time the brochure [stress management brochure] came around, "they are good for the so called downtown clowns, but what about the grunts in the field?" It is wrong to call them downtown clowns, and it is wrong to down grade themselves here as grunts, but a lot of times, that's what comes from us. We are the peons, the grunts so to speak and they are downtown clowns (Interview, October 12, 1990).

It appeared that there was varied commitment by line managers to the empowerment of workers to make decisions pertaining to H&S. One business unit H&S manager expressed the situation this way:

> There will be those [line managers] that say this is great and in turn will run with it ... There will be those that will say, "whoa, that's some sort of threat to me and I don't want to have anything to do with it. I'm going to run my own shop. Health and safety is my responsibility and I will administer it" (Interview, October 15, 1990).

Line managers had always had a considerable amount of power to affect decisions about H&S in their work areas, and many were not prepared to relinquish that to the committees. Recommendations for changes to features in the work environment for the purposes of H&S had to be financed out of the line managers' department budgets, and some were not prepared to grant finances for some of the recommendations put forth by the committees. This control of resources allowed them to maintain their interest position. Those line managers that were not convinced that the exchange of power in regards to H&S decisions could benefit the department and company, resisted the empowerment of the committees (Tichy & Ulrich, 1984). Line managers' interests were not connected with reformative ideas about health and safety committees or other progressive changes affecting the design and provision of H&S.

Despite some resistance to the implementation of the health and safety committees

there were a number of committees that had accepted responsibilities for H&S issues arising in the workplace. These committees accepted responsibilities mostly because they had the support of their line managers. These committees had made substantial gains toward correcting a number of health and safety problems. Problems that would have eventually created legal problems for the company. Some of these committees had implemented a number of H&S programmes that had deteriorated. Some of the committees were even establishing their own H&S awareness programmes in their worksites.

When the committees were first developed the company was under provincial legislation which limited committee input to recommendations for change. With the movement of the company under federal legislation, as a result of privatization in November 1990, the power of the committees increased and line managers were imposed upon even more to comply with the H&S decisions made by the committees. Federal audits of unattended to H&S concerns of the committees, facilitateu workers involvement in H&S.

With the change in power allocated to committees, and with more movement of employees toward accepting empowerment, the H&S committee concept appeared to be what Kanter (1983) might refer to as an "action vehicle" for change. The health and safety committee structure was a concrete change in the design and systems of H&S that was manifest throughout the organization and appeared to hold significant implications for future cultural changes. The beliefs that employees' well-being was important for the success of the company and that employees should be empowered to be instrumental in their own health and safety within the worksite were strong values intricately linked to the whole health and safety committee structure. These were values necessary for a number of future changes affecting the design of H&S. The health and safety committee structure had the potential to institutionalize the importance of H&S.

2. Development of the Employee and Family Assistance Programme (EFAP):

The rapid technological change in the company created insurmountable stress for a lot of workers. The increasing recognition of the negative consequences of stress both outside and inside the organization, created substantial pressure for the company to implement a comprehensive employee and family assistance programme (EFAP) that would extend the traditional alcohol and drug programme that was in place. The pressures were for a programme that would entail confidential services for employees wanting to seek assistance in resolving various issues they believed to be negatively affecting their life and work. There was widespread agreement and commitment by all H&S groups towards implementing an EFAP.

The union had been suggesting for a couple of years, at various levels of the organization, the need for an EFAP. From the union perspective, an EFAP was essential for the employees. The union also thought an EFAP was in the best interest of the company given that "stress" was increasingly being seen as an "industrial disease" and thus a workers' compensation issue.

Commitment of groups toward an EFAP was also evident in the fact that the OHNs had submitted proposals to the senior executive in the past for the development of an EFAP. The Corporate ER Director had been instrumental in the implementation of employee assistance programmes within two companies he had been with previously. However, it was the H&S Manager that was the most committed to getting an EFAP programme implemented. He did extensive research and was able to convince the senior executive that 80,000 days of absenteeism per year were being lost as a result of employee stress related problems. The senior executive decided in 1989 on a substantial increase to the H&S budget, strictly for the purposes of an EFAP.

A task force was developed, comprising senior executives and representatives from the union. The task force was to ensure coordination of H&S groups to increa·.. input into the decision concerning a contractor for the programme. By December 1990, there was a comprehensive EFAP within the company.

3. Implementation of the Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System:

The Workplace Hazardous Materials Information System (WHMIS) is a national system that requires employers to obtain information, and to train employees properly, about hazardous materials used within the worksite. WHMIS legislation began in 1985 and increased substantially over the years. This had created pressure for the company to meet those requirements. The Corporate H&S Advisor was committed to not only meeting the requirements of the WHMIS programme, but also to ensuring that a variety of environmental issues were addressed and became a primary focus of the company's overall H&S efforts. The business unit H&S advisors were committed to ensuring that WHMIS received sufficient attention within the business units to keep it maintained. There were no competing views regarding the implementation of the WHMIS programme.

It appeared that the senior executive was committed to those programmes that were necessary to meet federal legislation. The senior executive believed this programme and all others that were required to meet legislation were in its best interest position, thus were committed those activities. There seemed to be widespread support for this programme. There were indications from interviewees that attention to environmental issues had become legitimated as a necessary way of operating. One business unit manager said, "1990 is going to be the decade of the environment. That is going to influence a lot of things that are going to happen in this company or for that matter any company." One of the personnel

from the corporate H&S group said, "as with any company right now, environmental issues are of course paramount and our number one concern ... " The legitimization of the importance of the environment could account, in part, for the widespread support for WHMIS.

4. Re-establishment of Former Health and Safety Initiatives:

There were considerable pressures for the H&S group to re-establish all H&S programmes which had existed in the 1960's and early 1970's. The pressure for the implementation of these programmes increased as the possibility of privatization increased. The Corporate H&S Manager and the Advisor began to work on getting a driver training programme and a first aid certification programme back in place. As well, developing an up to date safety standards manual, and a health and safety information system were priorities. A supervisor safety training programme was also initiated. The implementation of these programmes was through the business units and line managers. Each of these programmes was going to meet with resistance from some business unit H&S mangers and advisors as well as some line managers. The resistance, as previously mentioned existed because they did not want the responsibility of implementation, nor of financing the initiatives.

5. Development of Health Promotion Kinds of Initiatives:

The Corporate ER Director, the H&S Manager, and the Advisor, as well as the OHNs, agreed that the role of the nurses needed to move from being essentially reactive (e.g., first aid treatment) towards a more pro-active role if the company was going to meet the demands of a changing environment that was posing new H&S challenges. The ER

Director described the situation this way:

> We have a lot of people that are not properly employed right
> now, and that is a bit of a concern. For example we have a
> nursing function with six nurses, but they recognize and we
> recognize that we no longer need the traditional type of
> nursing role to sort of respond to emergencies that come up
> here in the course of a day or to act as a counsellor and what
> not. We want the nursing function to be more involved in
> things like occupational health and WHMIS type
> programmes, environmental monitoring, health studies, like
> back care and noise control programmes, and an employee
> assistance programme, all those kinds of things (Interview,
> September 10, 1990).

The nurses were developing and implementing a number of health promotion kinds of

programmes. Specifically, they coordinated stress management seminars available to 4100

employees between February, 1988 and June, 1990; they implemented a smoking cessation

programme; and a back care programme was also being developed. In addition, a proposal

for a designated first aiders programme had been developed and was being reviewed. This

was a programme which would ensure that a number of employees within every workplace

were trained in first aid. The OHNs were also attending health and safety committee

meetings providing health and safety information.

There appeared to be an opportunity to advance numerous health promotion

initiatives through the coordination of OHNs and the fitness professionals within the

company, who had also been seeking to advance these types of programmes. However, one

of the nurses commented that she could not see how responsibilities could possibly be

worked out between the nurses and a group that was only contracted. There was little effort

by the leaders in the corporate H&S group, or any of the H&S groups to orchestrate

anything in that regard.

May (1988) suggests that territorial boundaries can be a real barrier to H&S

initiatives. He suggests that communication among groups with responsibilities for H&S, and coordination of the systems becomes important for territorial boundaries to be broken down. Neither sufficient communication nor coordination among H&S groups had occurred at the completion of data gathering. In a large part this lack of focus in these new initiatives was because the Corporate ER Director did not have the technical expertise to clearly articulate the new role of the OHNs. On occasion, the ER Director had mentioned that one of the nurses should be trained in ergonomics and industrial hygiene, indicating the lack of knowledge about the depth of expertise required for that type of work, and about the training that would be necessary. The lack of clarity in the OHNs role resulted in the OHNs focusing a lot on day to day operations and not attending to long term planning necessary for the successful implementation of many of these initiatives.

The OHNs were strongly dissatisfied with the lack of resources available for the new initiatives, and with the lack of orchestration of these activities. As a group, the OHNs strongly believed that the well-being of the employees was critical to the success of the company and for H&S to be effective within the company, the H&S Unit had to come out from under the ER umbrella. This is explicit in the following quote:

> We have always, I would say certainly since occupational health and safety has been in being, for the last 23 years I think, they've always come under that ER/HR umbrella. They haven't been a department on their own and as such we come under the usual budget restrictions of that particular department which can sometimes be hampering ... Certainly in the past, since I've been with Letco Utilities, it has been discussed, and it has also been 'nope we can't do that.' I'm not saying that it can't be brought up for discussion in the future, I think there is a great need for it. The greatest number of people in the Employee Relations group is Corporate Health and Safety, but our budget doesn't match that and because we don't have a budget of our own, we tend to get lost in that ... The last thing I heard this morning was that we must cut down and we can't continue the way we are and I think part of the problem, in fact I know part of the

> problem is, we don't have a budget for health and safety per
> se, we slide in. I said to the Corporate H&S Manager this
> morning, sometimes I feel like an armpit to the umbrella, you
> know right there, we can't get out from under there, and
> we're just smothered and we have to do what the shoulders
> do. And we really need to get ourselves our own budget but
> give us time we will get there (Interview, August 17, 1990).

The union supported the idea that there should be a central body to establish a comprehensive array of H&S activities to meet the needs of the province. They supported the idea of a separate budget for H&S and the idea of a medical director to orchestrate the H&S activities. In late 1990 these groups' dissatisfactions had remained repressed by the power structure. The evolution of the power structure, however, held the potential for significant pressure to arise to create change in the degree of autonomy of H&S.

One health promotion initiative that had received significant input of finances was fitness. Beginning in the mid 1980's there were pressures for the corporation to begin implementing fitness opportunities. Essentially, the pressures existed because many large companies were adopting such programmes and Letco Utilities primary concern was remaining competitive at all levels. As well, an Assistant Vice President of the company was championing the facility and there was space available to accommodate this interest. The primary impetus for the development of a fitness facility, and initial plans for further expansion of fitness in the corporation emerged out of the Benefits group in 1987.

After the implementation of the facility there were numerous other initiatives related to fitness that emerged throughout the company. These included: a proposal for an expansion to the existing facility; negotiations with building contractors for a second fitness facility; and numerous proposals put forth for other types of fitness options such as fitness subsidy. As well, there were developments towards a task force to establish a comprehensive "wellness" (health promotion) programme for the entire province.

However, fitness was the area within H&S that contained the most dissension among H&S groups. The senior executive, by 1988, was not really "on board" with fitness initiatives. This was expressed clearly by the Corporate ER Director:

> Our concern is that, I guess we look back and say why did we go ahead with this fitness facility. Why you know. We didn't have a long term health and safety plan or a whole bunch of other things that are just as important as investing dollars in fitness. Now we have kind of put the brakes on extending the fitness programme until we know where we're going overall with health and safety. So we're sort of doing a lot of hind sighting here when it comes to talking about the fitness facility ... Looking at options, all that costs money when you've got all these other priorities you've got to work at (Interview, September 10, 1990).

The ER Director was dissatisfied with the amount of money allocated to fitness because he felt that there were a number of employees in the company who required crisis level support, and that money allocated to fitness could have advanced the implementation of an EFAP more quickly. An EFAP, he felt, was more decisively linked to "bottom line" issues within the company. He also felt that H&S policies, programmes, and standards, required by law, should have been advanced instead of fitness.

From the reorganization in 1988, to the development of the Senior Joint Management Committee in 1989, the ER Director had considerable control over the flow of information and financial resources for fitness proposals and many other H&S programmes. He used this power to ensure that few advancements were made in the area of fitness. Because of his control over resources he had the ability to maintain his interests. First, there was no budget growth for the fitness facility in its three year history, despite its growth in membership. Second, after considerable negotiations for the building of a second fitness facility, all plans were cancelled due to budget restraint. Third, a task force developed in the spring of 1990 to establish a comprehensive wellness programme to meet

the needs of the whole province, dissipated. Memos were sent out in the fall of 1990 stating that management was disbanding the committee indefinitely due to budget restraints. Forth, numerous times employees were encouraged by the Coordinator of Health and Fitness to submit proposals for obtaining assistance in getting fitness opportunities in their areas. The proposals included requests for, on-site facilities, assistance in linking with existing facilities in their communities, and for a subsidy programme. All proposals, up to 1990, had been rejected. Fifth, the employee advisory committee, which was initially established to make decisions regarding the implementation of the fitness facility, had its role changed from a policy making role to an advisory role. As well, the ER Director ensured that the Health and Fitness Coordinator's role, which was to get the fitness facility operating, and to establish other fitness options around the province, evolved to encompass broader H&S responsibilities.

The H&S Manager and the Advisor, along with the Coordinator for Corporate Health and Fitness, felt that fitness opportunities should not be overlooked. They felt that it was an important part of employee health and safety. These individuals who believed that fitness facilitated "bottom line" objectives were committed to convincing the senior executive and the Corporate ER Director of the merits of fitness. The representative for the company that was hired to operate the fitness facility, and all the professional staff involved with the facility also tried to advance fitness opportunities within the company. These groups were aware that Letco Utilities did not come close to providing comparable levels of health promotion programmes provided by other companies. The fitness consultant hired by Letco continuously presented proposals to advance fitness and wellness initiatives; all the proposals were rejected. The employee advisory committee for the fitness facility was another group that attempted to facilitate fitness efforts in the company, mostly in terms of

expansion of the existing facility. At one point they met with the Vice President of Human Resources to gain assurances that a recent budget restraint on the fitness facility was in no way indicative of the demise of fitness initiatives. They were assured it was not.

There were competing views about the implementation of fitness in the company. Many of the H&S managers and advisors within the business units did not condone the idea of the fitness facility within the company. One of the advisors stated:

> Fitness centres to my mind, if they look at their stats, are probably ten percent of the people in this building. Those people would go somewhere anyway. What is going to motivate me, a couch potato, which is the other ninety percent of the people, to use that facility? I don't think that anything is, so I think we are spending a lot of money and I am more than willing to go along with it but I may not participate in it ... In my opinion we have some other priorities that are way up the ladder that should be resolved before we take a look at this one (Interview, October 15, 1990).

Another advisor stated, "my perception is that they put a lot of money in to address a few and the benefits may be questionable." There was a wide range of reactions by line managers to the fitness facility. Some provided an informal flexitime option for employees wanting to use the facility in order to ensure its success, while others flatly refused to do so.

The union representatives were not sure that the union really had a position on fitness. The union felt that it had not been brought in on much of the decision making that occurred in the initial stages of development, and therefore remained mostly indifferent to it. From the union perspective, a lot of people were not using the facility because rather than seeing the facility as something the company provided for them as a person, some thought the implementation of the facility had to do with management wanting to increase workers' productivity. The union representatives felt that the employees' view of the company philosophy needed to change before the company was ready for a fitness facility.

This is consistent with the ideas of Santa-Barbara (1987) who suggests that a particular culture needs to be in place prior to the implementation of a facility if it is to be successful. This idea along with the following quote by one of the union representatives helps provide insight into the limited success of fitness in the corporation:

> I think this type of programme [fitness] would work once other programmes like the EAP were on line so that the employees could get a good check as to how serious the company is on employee well-being. I believe that if we do well on health and safety, and it's sold to the people and their corporate policy is that you are a person first and we care about you to do it properly for your own safety, if that comes in and works and is sold that way, and they believe it, then I think they will relax to the point where they say, gee, the facility is there, I will use it. I think there is a line there now. They could give them all sorts of things but they want to keep that separation between themselves and the company ... The people out there don't believe the company is sincere [about H&S], and we are having a hard time telling them they are sincere (Interview, October 15, 1990).

The "individual champion," as described by one interviewee, that had been instrumental in getting the fitness facility going had the knowledge and skills that were required to gain the support of the senior executive in 1987 for the initial implementation. Nadler and Tushman (1989) discuss the importance of visions for change or what they call the "vision principle." They warn that visions poorly thought out or articulated prematurely, lead to negative consequences such as scepticism by employee groups and loss of management credibility. A vision for fitness in the company was articulated by one Vice President of Human Resources sending letters throughout the corporation, promising that facilities would be built in other locations by 1989. However, the leadership responsible for the implementation of the fitness facility, had not been successful in establishing support from, or linkages with, other areas of the company. Other facilities were never realized.

According to Pechter (1986) and Feldman (1989) an essential element for the

success of fitness within the corporate setting is the support and involvement of the union.

Pechter states: "wellness originated in the managerial ranks, and the workers tend to regard management's brainstorms sceptically ... health programs are more likely to succeed if blue-collar workers are involved in planning and designing them" (p. 14). The fitness centre, contracted out, remained isolated from the main stream of the company. This hampered the fitness professionals' access to information, and therefore their effectiveness was limited. Fitness in the corporation seemed to go stagnant after the individuals supporting the initial facility implementation left the company.

Kanter (1983) states that:

> It is when the structures surrounding a change also change to support it that we say that a change is "institutionalized" - that it is now part of legitimate and ongoing practice, infused with value and supported by other aspects of the system. "Innovation" requires other changes to support the central innovation, and thus it must touch, must be integrated with, other aspects of the organization. If innovations are isolated, in segmentalist fashion, and not allowed to touch other parts of the organization's structure and culture, then it is likely that the innovation will never take hold, fade into disuse, or produce a lower level of benefits than it potentially could (p. 299).

Despite much resistance to fitness programmes in the company, there were groups of employees that strongly supported the fitness centre, and a number of employee groups who wanted additional fitness opportunities. There was a lot of anger among some employees that one office tower was granted a facility, and other worksites were denied access. Despite numerous failed attempts by some groups, to access corporate dollars for fitness opportunities, a number of employee groups were continuing to try and facilitate something in the way of fitness at the time data collection for this study was complete. This is indicated in the following quote:

We're going as far as going to government to try and get grants from the government to help us do something ... There is just so many different avenues we are trying, we're considering doing fundraising, anything, and I think that's carrying it a little too far, that we should have to go externally for most of the money, we will you know, we do want to, we want something (Interview, October 12, 1990).

At the completion of this study, the Coordinator for Corporate Health and Fitness who was described by interviewees as "dedicated" and "committed" to getting fitness opportunities available to all sites in the province, had not been able to maintain the initial impetus behind fitness. She lacked any source of power to have her preferred options for fitness articulated in the design and provision of H&S. Those with the power to affect key decisions about the direction of fitness were not committed to it. It appeared that the ER Director had been successful at minimizing or removing the systems that had been established to facilitate fitness (i.e., Corporate Health and Fitness Coordinator's role; employee advisory committee's role). Significant advances were not likely to occur until there was change in the power structure. Because the initial vision for fitness was created and communicated, but was not realized, H&S groups (i.e., H&S committee members, H&S task force members, fitness professionals) had become sceptical of management's sincerity toward fitness and toward employee well-being.

There were two primary precipitating dynamics for the H&S changes that occurred between 1987-1990. Change resulted from the reorganization and the subsequent hiring of individuals with progressive H&S ideas, leadership abilities, and expertise in H&S to enable change. The individual hired for the position of Corporate H&S Manager had many of the qualities of a transformational leader as defined by Hinings and Greenwood (1988), Tichy and Ulrich (1984), and Tushman and Romanelli (1985). His transformational leadership style was most evident in his ability to bring awareness, and to communicate the need for

a re-newed emphasis toward H&S. The first year he spent considerable time in the field and brought the level of H&S awareness up, and by so doing "started the whole ball rolling" for H&S change as described by one interviewee. As described by another interviewee, he started the "whole churn" of change in H&S. His skills in H&S related procedures and processes enabled him to take on tasks that demonstrated his knowledge of the appropriate procedures. As a result, he gained the respect of craft workers and line managers and gained some commitment to H&S.

His foremost commitment was always toward what was best for the employee as a person. His depth of empathy toward the employee was recognized by many of the workers. To a certain degree this lessened workers' scepticism about the reasons management was pursuing change. This was particulary important in this company because workers were sceptical of management sincerity. Many workers believed strongly that productivity was all that was really important to the senior executive and senior level managers. This leader presented some challenge to those notions; notions that could create barriers to change.

He was a transformational leader in the sense that he identified himself as responsible to produce change and stood up against the status quo of the organization. He viewed the protocol as inhibitive to the H&S action that needed to be created, and there were indications that he surpassed protocol on occasion in order to create change.

Other evidence that this leader was in many respects a transformational leader, lay in the fact that he did create major change in terms of the design and provision of H&S. He was instrumental in bringing to the forefront the consequences of the high level of stress within the company. He got the senior executive to recognize and to believe that something had to be done to decrease the employee stress problems and the losses entailed by them. Proposals for an EFAP had been put forth and reviewed before, and budgets had been

available for it before, but the senior executive had never been convinced of the benefits. Many interviewees felt that this leader was the key or "prime mover" to the eventual implementation of the EFAP.

Members identified him as the driving force behind the development of the H&S committees. He had a vision for a number of local and regional committees to be developed. He also had a vision for a Senior Joint Management Committee which would ensure top management support of those committees. He communicated that vision, and gained substantial commitment to it. Nadler and Tushman (1989) discuss what they call the "magic leader." They suggest that a magic leader has the ability to create a sense of urgency for change. The H&S Manager certainly felt there was an urgency for H&S change, indicated in the fact that he sometimes avoided protocol to induce action. He did instill in the senior executive the sense that there was an urgency with respect to the development and implementation of the H&S committees, evident in the fact that approximately fifty committees were established within just over one year.

However, there were indications that he did not have all the knowledge and skills necessary to enable change which Tichy and Ulrich (1984) suggest are often associated with the transformational leader. Although he created a vision, and gained commitment to the H&S committee concept, the committees were created too fast, at the expense of sufficient guidelines to ensure their appropriate operation. In one of the company's recent contacts with an official from Labour Canada, the company was told that despite the good intention behind the formation of the committees, a H&S committee template somewhat inappropriate for this company had been followed. One year after the introduction of the committees, the number of local committees that had been established, and the usefulness of the regional committees were being reassessed, and some redirecting of the committees

was necessary.

The enthusiasm of the H&S Manager for what he believed in often took him off in too many directions. He lacked the ability to orchestrate the projects in a coherent manner. This resulted in some decisions that were not always timely. For example, he drew attention to the need for a hearing protection programme. The little bit that he did in this regard was advanced by one of the line managers. Unfortunately, the result in this case was that 1200 people had auditory assessments. Many did not even work in areas assessed to be noisy.

Tichy and Ulrich (1984) discuss how the transformational leader must be careful to communicate to all stakeholders the implications of change for them. This leader, in his commitment to the employee, did not always assess the extent to which the senior executive and higher levels of management perceived the changes to meet the company's needs.

As well, according to Schein (1986) a leader requires insight into the organizational culture and knowledge about how to intervene in that culture. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) stress that a leader also requires knowledge about the organization's structure, systems and processes in order to be successful at establishing change. Although implicit, there were numerous indications that this leader was not cognizant of the structure, culture and political processes within the organization to the extent that was necessary to create and sustain dramatic changes in H&S. One business unit advisor said:

> He found he had to many irons in the fire at once and this was one of the problems. I don't think he understood the diversity of Letco Utilities. He found himself in trouble that he couldn't handle, to pull all of them [the different areas of the company and the different initiatives] together (Interview, October 30, 1990).

In summary, this leader had an ability to identify and convey what needed to be done in terms of H&S in order to meet government regulations and to be comparable with

other companies. He also had the ability to create a vision and gain commitment to much of what needed to be done. However, he lacked the expertise to ensure the technical needs for implementation were in place; that the administration of the change was orchestrated; and the auditing of the change took place. He also lacked the expertise that was required to work within the culture of this organization.

The individual who came into the Corporate H&S Advisor position, also had numerous characteristics of a transformational leader. He identified the need for a new mission statement for Corporate H&S, and was instrumental in its development. Unlike, the H&S Manager who had the ability to generate commitment of the workers, the H&S Advisor had the ability to mobilize commitment of higher levels of management. One member of a H&S committee said, "it seems to me that the H&S Advisor deals more with the upper echelons of the company. He seems to be the high contact."

The H&S Advisor knew he had been brought in by the senior executive to bring about change, but he also recognized that the senior executive had constraints on acceptable change. He began to propose initiatives that required dollars for the training of the business unit managers and advisors. This ensured some of the necessary skills were available to create change. Unlike the H&S Manager, the Advisor did not propose initiatives requiring the hiring of more people. He quickly gained the confidence of the senior executive by indicating an ability to create change without substantial expenditure. His ability to communicate effectively with the senior executive and increase their commitment to H&S appeared to be especially critical in this company, because unless there was direction and commitment of top management towards particular changes, it was difficult to affect change throughout all the levels of the organization.

Tichy and Ulrich (1984) state:

> The transformational leader must possess a much deeper understanding of organizations and their place both in the wider society and in the lives of individuals. It is this deeper understanding of social systems that the transformational leader must intuitively know or have been formally prepared to comprehend (p. 252).

The H&S Advisor recognized his disadvantage of not being within the company for a long period of time, especially when it was not uncommon for many employees in the company to have 20, 30 or even 40 years of experience. Interviewees indicated that the Advisor aligned himself with employees that could help him identify where there was likely to be resistance to change. As well, unlike the H&S Manager, he was more tolerant of the culture that demanded protocol.

This leader had an eclectic H&S background and the skills necessary to orchestrate change within different areas of H&S. Also, according to statements provided by the interviewees, this individual had exceptional organizational abilities, and made timely and decisive decisions. One business unit H&S manager said:

> I think the Health and Safety Advisor is a more organized individual, you know if we are talking about individuals. The Health and Safety Manager is very knowledgeable about the actual operations in the field. He is excellent with that. But, I think that the Health and Safety Advisor is more of an organizer. He is better equipped to perform the function that has to be done right now (Interview, November 2, 1990).

The leadership exhibited by both of these individuals was critical for re-establishing an emphasis in the company towards H&S. Together these leaders were able to, at least functionally, get the senior executive to separate H&S from Employee Relations which had from a union and OHN perspective, been a barrier to H&S initiatives in the past. These leaders were successful at implementing the H&S committees which created structural and role changes that would have significant implications for future changes. The

implementation of the H&S committees challenged the political coalitions which signifies that these leaders had been successful in creating important change (Tichy & Ulrich, 1984; Nadler & Tushman 1989). The changes in H&S were working to lessen barriers between managers and employees. According to Schein (1986) such substantive change in the initial re-development stages of change can be instrumental in facilitating a particular culture for future change.

It was felt by many interviewees that H&S was gaining an increasingly higher profile, and was becoming a credible department in its own right as a result of the leadership and expertise of the H&S Manager and the Advisor. A quote by one interviewee demonstrates the high organizational capability in the H&S Unit during this period:

> They are both, in my mind, professionals at a very high level. The only difference is their approach. I'll have to leave it at that. We actually admire both of them. I think that they are the biggest asset that Letco Utilities has picked up in fifty years ... (Interview, October 15, 1990).

The Corporate ER Director reorganized the corporate H&S group in 1990. The Corporate H&S Advisor was assigned the role of Corporate H&S Manager, and the former H&S Manager began work on special projects related to H&S. Based on the ideas of Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and Kimberly and Rottman (1987), one could suggest that this reorganization within the Corporate H&S Unit was important given the particular stage of development of H&S. It may have been identified by the ER Director that the former H&S Manager's leadership style became less crucial after a substantial amount of commitment had been generated for H&S change. The leadership style and the expertise of the H&S Advisor, became more crucial as the orchestration of change became more vital.

Much of the change that had occurred under the direction of the former H&S Manager lacked focus. Many of the initiatives had not resulted in closure to the degree that

had been expected by the ER Director. As well, the H&S committee initiative was requiring re-visiting. Utilizing the idea of political resistance to change as discussed by Tichy and Ulrich (1984), it could be expected that the former H&S Manager would have a difficult time in committing to correct the problems with the H&S committee system, given that he was highly instrumental in developing and implementing the committees in their present form.

The former manager's expertise lay with his ability to gain the commitment of craft workers towards H&S. The new role acquired by this individual was one in which he was required to ensure the re-introduction of some H&S programmes that had gone by the wayside many years ago. These were programmes that had started to be developed again, but were not near closure. These special projects entailed: developing a driving training course and a first aid training course; establishing company H&S standards; and implementing a H&S Information System.

Enz (1988) states:

> Departments whose organizational values are perceived to be congruent with those of top management will possess power. Further, power is ascribed to departments in which employees independently identify the same subsets of critical organizational values as top managers (p. 284).

Some interviewees suggested that the H&S Advisor's values were closer to those of the ER Directors and the senior executive. It was suggested that the values of the initial H&S Manager were not similar. On one hand, it appears that the reorganization of the H&S Unit was an attempt by the ER Director to ensure that the ER Department was seen in the best light possible by the senior executive in order to increase the ER Department's power. On the other hand, it may have only been an attempt by the ER Director to increase the power of an individual who he thought shared similar values, and would thus facilitate his

preferred options for H&S within the ER Department.

At the completion of data gathering in December 1990, there were still strong pressures for H&S change. The technology within the company was continuing to change and with it there were certain H&S needs. There was a very strong commitment by the senior executive toward the business unit structure and there were pressures for H&S to operate efficiently and effectively within the business unit structure. However, within that structure, H&S continued to be plagued with scarcity and uncertainty of resources.

As well, as a result of privatization, there was federal legislation imposing on the H&S Unit to fulfil a number of H&S requirements. This was viewed, by the senior managers in H&S and by the senior executive, as a crisis that had to be managed. There was recognition that non-compliance would result in insurmountable costs to the company. As part of federal H&S legislation the H&S committees had power to make decisions. As these committees began to recognize that power and utilize it, the pressures for H&S change increased. Also, pressures for progressive change in H&S were still strong because of the fact that many of the companies Letco Utilities was competing with had more advanced H&S programmes, policies and standards than it did.

In summary, the company and the H&S Unit had made efforts since 1986 to resolve some of the contextual pressures for change toward a more pro-active H&S Unit. Because of the inconsistencies of pressures (e.g., provincial legislation or federal legislation) and the scarcity of both financial and human resources for H&S throughout the company, the H&S Unit seemed to make gains but then slide back. There remained numerous inconsistencies between the design and provision of H&S and its external and internal environment. The various H&S groups' values pertaining to what they believed the design and provision of H&S should be, were not congruent with the existing structure. A pattern of competitive

commitments by H&S groups was strong. There still was neither agreement nor commitment by all groups with responsibilities for H&S about the extent to which Corporate H&S was important for the success of the company. Also there was neither agreement nor commitment concerning the extent to which employees should be intricately involved in decision making for H&S. Increasing consensus and commitment toward these values appeared to be crucial for H&S to become more aligned with the context in which it existed.

A value that was identified in this study as very important for change in H&S pertained to the beliefs about the autonomy of the H&S Unit. As previously mentioned, the H&S groups did not agree on whether or not H&S should be maintained within the HR/ER umbrella. The senior executive and the ER Director were adamant that H&S should be maintained within the ER function. The following quote identifies the elite groups' preferences regarding autonomy of the H&S Unit:

> It all comes together in the sense that if you look at the functions in my group, that's why they've been clustered together because there is a lot of overlap and synergy between them. Health and safety, employee relations, employment, compensation and benefits, and information systems are all in my group and they are all inter-related ... It is for job design purposes you have to create some separations, but you find that there is a lot of overlap between these areas. So that is why they've been grouped within what we call the ER function here (Interview, September 10, 1990).

The OHNs, the groups involved in fitness in the company, and the union were adamant that H&S should not be maintained within ER. One of the nurses stated, "people always tend to focus their resources where their own priorities are, therefore it is not to the advantage of H&S to be under the ER umbrella." Another one of the nurses stated:

> The fact that we are under a HR Manager, that affects us because he is an HR specialist and we are health and safety specialists. Right now I don't see where there is any meeting of the minds at all. We [H&S Unit] are something to be put

up with, but we are not an important component of the department, and I think that until we are out from under HR, we are never going to amount to much. You look at the size of our company and how many health and safety people we have, and you know how important we are (Interview, October 12, 1990).

One individual within the corporate H&S group stated that:

I think number one, H&S has to be out from under Employee Relations. I don't think that's an area for them. I think at this present time things have developed to the point where you need your own department, you need your own medical director to report to who understands both health aspects and safety aspects and is going to look at the whole area ... The way we are set up, its not efficient, it could be more efficient under someone else like a medical director (Interview, August 15, 1990).

One of the interviewees from the union stated:

When the corporation broke up into the six units they created six little companies with six directors. They don't each have a director of safety so they are running off on their own. It's the power play, that is why I don't think they will do it [separate H&S from ER]. There is a budget consideration, and there is the fact that they believe that they can make it work in the business units and we haven't got anybody convinced at the top (Interview, October 15, 1990).

After the announcement of privatization there was an increased emphasis toward "bottom line" objectives. The dissatisfactions among H&S groups regarding the financial and human resource allocations intensified. There was immediate concern among the OHNs that finances for the newer health promotion kinds of initiatives would not be available. There was already an indication that this was going to be the case. Nurses were no longer able to put in for time in lieu or over-time pay. This was essential for them to maintain some of the activities they had going. The focus appeared to be almost entirely on the implementation of the EFAP programme, and those initiatives enabling the company to

meet the requirements of federal legislation. Essentially, initiatives believed to be linked to "bottom line" objectives.

The power structure for H&S was becoming more dispersed and more decentralized. There was an increasing number of groups interpreting the pressures for change, thus the perceptions and values of many more people (at every level of the organization) were going to impact on the design of H&S than in the past. It can be expected that the H&S leadership and expertise that is in the H&S Unit, and the evolving power structure will be key dynamics of future change and will determine the extent to which the H&S Unit becomes aligned with the competitive environment in which it exists.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

This final chapter is comprised of two major sections. The first section provides a summary of the conceptual model underlying this research; a brief overview of the research design used for this study; and finally a summary of the dynamics of change in H&S within the company studied. In the second section, the implications of the research findings and theoretical model for understanding H&S change are discussed. Also, three issues for future research in the area of corporate H&S are identified.

SUMMARY:

Conceptual Framework:

Underlying this study was the idea that although there is some knowledge of the factors providing impetus for change in the design and provision of corporate H&S programmes, there is very little understanding of the processes of that change. It was felt that a focus on understanding the dynamics of H&S change would allow the potential challenges to change to be identified; uncertainty over certain change processes to be reduced; and clearer strategies developed for implementing, maintaining, and expanding H&S within corporations.

Given that there was no body of literature pertaining explicitly to the processes of H&S change to draw upon, the literature pertaining to macro-organizational change processes by Hinings and Greenwood (1988), Kimberly (1987), and Pettigrew (1990) was drawn on fairly extensively. Five concepts that comprise part of a model of macro-organizational change developed by Hinings and Greenwood (1988), were utilized to help

understand the dynamic of change in the design and provision of H&S.

According to this framework, organizational structural elements and processes are either held in place or destabilized due to circumstances in the organization's context. The greater the changes in the context of the organization, the greater the pressures for change. Similarly, structural elements and processes may remain in a particular form or be destabilized, depending on the congruence between the structures and processes and the values, interests, and power relationships within the organization. As well, the leadership style and the expertise of the leader to orchestrate change, works to sustain or to destabilize structures and processes.

Research Design:

The particular theoretical perspective used for this study required that change be looked at over a long period of time and examined in a holistic manner, therefore, a longitudinal retrospective case study approach was used. Three major transitions in H&S within the company studied were used to demarcate the appropriate time periods for the analysis of change. From approximately 1965 until the mid 1970's, this company exceeded many other companies in terms of the number and quality of H&S programmes. In the late 1970's and early 1980's there was a dramatic decline in the emphasis on H&S primarily as a result of external forces. Most H&S programmes previously established dissipated. In 1986, as a result of dramatic changes both inside and outside the organization (i.e., deregulation of the industry, increased competition, internal reorganization) H&S programmes began to be revived.

Changes in the quantity or quality of the H&S programmes, policies, or services; changes in the distribution or implementation of the company's H&S programmes, policies,

or services; and changes in the structuring or processes of H&S as a sub-unit of the HR Division comprised the definition of change for this study.

Multiple data collection methods were used to obtain information on H&S. Company H&S documents were assessed, H&S meetings were attended, worksite locations were visited, and 31 interviews were conducted with individuals knowledgeable about H&S within the company. The flexible open ended nature of data collection allowed the researcher to obtain more information about the company, (i.e., its history, its culture) than other types of data gathering methods (Berg, 1989). This information was important in this study for understanding change given that, over time, economic and cultural factors played such a significant role.

Taping of the interviews served to strengthen the research primarily because of the large amount, and the complexity of the information obtained in many of the interviews. Taping also provided the researcher an opportunity to assess, and constantly improve upon, the interviewing technique. Furthermore, there was only one individual in the sample who did not wish to have the interview taped, and there was no visible indication that those who did allow taping, were at all inhibited by it.

The interview data was transcribed, and the Ethnograph computer programme (Seidel et al., 1988) was used to organize the data and to facilitate analysis. Also, to facilitate the analytic process, the qualitative coding paradigm described by Strauss and Corbin (1990) was used. The paradigm provided a set of questions to stimulate the researchers' thinking about the relationships between the concepts surfacing in the data, and about relationships of the data to concepts in the literature.

A considerable amount of time was invested in becoming familiar with the capabilities of the Ethnograph computer programme (Seidel et al., 1988), identifying those

features most useful for the purposes of this study, and then in becoming effective at using the programme. Numerous hours were also required to transcribe the interview data and to input the coding scheme into the computer. However, once the data had been prepared and the programme learned, there were considerable advantages in using Ethnograph to facilitate the analysis. Primary to this study was an understanding of the interaction between dynamics and their affect on H&S design. When retrieving any segment of data, coded and requested by the researcher, Ethnograph readily identified the other concepts that were overlapped with, or embedded in, the one retrieved. This continually triggered the researcher to critically think about interactions of the concepts.

Although a lot of qualitative analysis that is done focuses totally on the emergence of concepts from the data (Strauss, 1987) the researchers' choice to adopt a framework to facilitate analysis provided many advantages for understanding change in H&S. First, because of the large data base and mass of detail to consider, systematic description was important, and was facilitated by the use of the framework. Second, the focus of this study was on processes of change which were facilitated by using the framework. Had the researcher focused only on concepts that emerged in the data, the process of change may not have been as easily identifiable. Limiting qualitative analysis to emergent concepts in the data reduces generalizability. One of the appealing features of using this framework was the opportunity to assess its utility at a different level of organization. In addition, the proximity and availability of the "framework founders" assisted the researcher in applying the framework.

The longitudinal approach and theoretical perspective assisted in the identification of changes in the external economic environment as key pressures for H&S change. It also facilitated drawing attention to the fact that the extent to which H&S groups (primarily

those with power) believe that H&S is important for the success of the company is of primary importance to H&S change. As well, the longitudinal focus of this study allowed the role of organizational culture to be identified as an important pressure concerning change in H&S.

Identifying the significance of leadership and expertise in the H&S Unit as an important dynamic underlying the design and provision of H&S was made possible only through the longitudinal approach. Through this approach it was identified that a strong overall H&S programme from 1965-1975 was sustained because of the presence of a transactional leader; virtually no explicit H&S policies and programmes existed in the late 1970's toward the mid 1980's because there was no leadership and expertise in the H&S Unit to sustain such programmes; and then movement toward a complex array of H&S programmes and policies in 1990 existed because transformational leadership and expertise were present and enabled change.

Dynamics of Change in H&S Within Letco Utilities:

Between 1965 and 1975 there was little change in the external or internal environment of H&S so there were few pressures for change in H&S. There were well established H&S programmes in place which focused primarily on H&S within the construction worksite. There was strong commitment throughout the company toward sustaining the "family" type of atmosphere and ensuring that employees felt taken care of. There was a pattern of status quo commitment toward a design and provision of programmes which consisted mainly of specific worksite health and safety programmes by the groups with responsibilities for H&S (senior executive, personnel in the corporate human resource (HR) group, occupational health nurses (OHNs), line managers).

At this time, only the OHNs were dissatisfied because they wanted more resources to allow them more pro-active involvement in addressing health issues throughout the company. The power structure related to H&S was concentrated between the senior executive, and the H&S Manager, therefore the dissatisfaction of the OHNs was easily contained. The H&S Manager at the time was a transactional leader who had the knowledge and skills necessary to sustain the existing H&S programmes that were in place. He ensured that, proper safety training took place, that H&S knowledge was disseminated, and adherence to H&S was monitored, in order to ensure the maintenance of the design and provision of H&S.

There was sustained congruence between the design and provision of H&S and the context within which it existed. As well, there was congruence between the H&S structure/processes, and the values, interests, and power relations existing among H&S groups. The leadership style and expertise at this time supported the H&S structure and processes to a level that allowed sustained congruence with the external/internal environment of H&S for a relatively long period of time. These dynamics culminated to create a situation in which there was little pressure for change thus, the design and provision of H&S was maintained from approximately 1965-1975.

However, in the late 1970's changes in the external and internal context of H&S created pressures for change. The senior executive's concerns about the increasing competitiveness within the industry drove changes within the organization that slowly had implications for the design of H&S. As well, the economic recession in the early 1980's, followed by the boom years for the company from approximately 1983-1985, created more pressures for H&S change. The senior executive saw a need for the resources going toward H&S, to be used for other functions. Productivity was valued at the expense of any focus

on employee well-being. In the late 1970's, the H&S Manager that had facilitated the maintenance of the H&S design throughout 1965-1975 left the company. There was no leadership to create excitement about H&S nor was there expertise to challenge the decline of H&S. There was a fairly strong movement toward a pattern of reformative commitment to a H&S structure and system that pressured the company to only meet the H&S requirements enforced by provincial legislation.

From the late 1970's to 1985 there was dissatisfaction by key H&S groups regarding too many resources going to H&S. Dissatisfactions with too few resources to H&S were contained because the power structure was concentrated, and decision making for H&S lay almost entirely with the senior executive. Line managers had some ability to affect H&S within their areas. However, many chose not to emphasize H&S because the reward system emphasized productivity and H&S was perceived to be diametrically opposed to productivity. Essentially, the senior executive members controlled the organizational arrangements of H&S. Their values toward H&S were adopted by other H&S groups. The idea that H&S was not important, was reflected in the decline of a fairly comprehensive array of H&S programmes. By approximately 1984, there was a new pattern of status quo commitment toward minimal emphasis on H&S.

Many corporations had, through the economic recession, made cuts to service types of programmes, like H&S, within their organizations. However, by 1985 other companies had moved to implement strong H&S programmes, and pressures for H&S to be emphasized within Letco Utilities began to mount. An interaction between the external and internal context of H&S created significant pressures for change in the design and provision of H&S. The senior executive felt forced to make internal changes in the organization in light of deregulation and increasing competition. Ideas infiltrating from the outside

suggested that an increased focus on the employee was important for facilitating the kinds of changes the senior executive perceived necessary to remain competitive. The senior executive exhibited an alternate pattern of value commitments from the status quo commitments sustaining the H&S design throughout 1984 and 1985. Senior executive members began to talk a lot about the importance of the employee for the operations of the company, and the need for employees to be actively involved in decision making pertaining to issues directly related to their work.

The senior executive reorganized the company into separate operating business units in 1986, and further reorganized in 1988 to better align certain systems to the business unit structure. As part of the reorganizations, Human Resources and H&S gained a more prominent position within the company. The reorganization was a tangible indication that the senior executive's values toward employee well-being in the worksite had shifted. As part of the 1988 reorganization there were two individuals in particular that were brought into the company to lead change in H&S. As well, a number of other positions were created that included responsibilities for H&S. The activities of the two leaders quickly resulted in the involvement of other players with responsibilities for H&S. They provided substantial impetus for the involvement of almost 50 health and safety committees and the union.

As a result of the reorganizations, many groups had responsibilities for H&S. These included: the senior executive; a corporate H&S group, comprising, among others, the OHNs, medical advisors and fitness professionals; H&S managers and advisors within the separate business units; line managers; health and safety committees; and the union. The groups brought with them different ideas about the design and provision of H&S. There was strong movement toward a pattern of competitive commitment toward H&S. There

were different ideas about the importance of worksite H&S for the employees and the company, and different ideas about the importance of employees being involved in decisions pertaining to H&S. In particular, there were also different ideas about what H&S should encompass, and how programmes should be operated.

During this time (1988-1990) there developed a high level of dissatisfaction regarding the distribution of resources to the various H&S groups. A high level of dissatisfaction arose because Corporate H&S assumed a different role than in the past. Much of the financial and human resources required for implementation of programmes came out of various operating budgets. Dissatisfaction among groups intensified after the company moved from the public to the private domain because there was significant budget restraint on the dollars from Corporate H&S. After privatization the focus was on the implementation of the EFAP, as well as H&S programmes that were necessary to meet legislation. There was almost an immediate restraint on H&S initiatives that were not legislated, thus programmes the OHNs had begun to develop were threatened.

As part of legislated change, the introduction of the H&S committees in 1989 started a shift in the power structure. Privatization of the company in 1990 moved the company from the pressures of provincial H&S law to those of federal law which provided the H&S committees with substantially more power. Many line managers were resistant to relinquishing any of their power to affect H&S within their areas. A recent reorganization in the H&S group (1990) resulted in the former H&S Manager being moved to the position dealing with "special projects", a position with considerably less power. The former H&S Advisor gained power by moving into the H&S Manager position. OHNs gained power through a new reporting relationship in which the nursing supervisor reported directly to the ER Director rather than to the H&S Manager. As the power structure moved to be more

dispersed and decentralized and H&S groups began to recognize their potential to influence decisions, groups' dissatisfactions intensified.

The transformational leadership and expertise of the H&S Manager and the Advisor was a key dynamic of much of the change in H&S from 1986-1990. Federal legislation provided further impetus for change and required exceptional leadership abilities and expertise in orchestrating the H&S systems.

IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS:

In this study the initial impetus for major changes in H&S (i.e., the decline of H&S beginning in 1980; the revival of an emphasis toward H&S in 1986) occurred because of changes in factors external to the organization that caused the senior executive to be particulary concerned about the company's economic situation, and to make changes within the organization. Pressures such as the economic recession, provincial gold rush, deregulation, and increased competition caused internal structural changes and a re-direction of corporate emphasis, which in turn affected the design and provision of H&S.

Impetus for change in the design and provision of H&S was provided by this environment. However, Hage and Dewar (1973) state it is the values of the organizational elite that will influence how the pressures in the environment are interpreted and enacted. Hage and Dewar state, "the values of leaders, elite, or members can determine goals and therefore performance ... there will be a direct relationship between what the elites value and what the organization accomplishes" (p. 280). The elite group as defined by Hage and Dewar consists of the circle of people that allows for the efficiency of decisions to be achieved. In this study, members of the senior executive, along with the ER Director after 1987, constitutes the elite group.

Progressive changes in H&S began after 1986 because key members of the senior executive started to believe that employees' well-being was important for the company to operate in a more competitive environment, and they thus became more committed to a greater emphasis on HR generally, and H&S specifically. Pressures for the company to be competitive and external ideas about how that could occur (e.g., focus on human resources) strongly impacted on the senior executive members' perceptions of the need for H&S, and thus, affected its design.

This study indicated that the extent to which the elite group believed that the employees' H&S was important to the economic success of the company was particularly important to H&S change. The values of this elite group were crucial because of its control over the allocation of resources to H&S relative to other functions. The major change in H&S beginning in 1980, and the other major change beginning in 1986, occurred when the senior executive's beliefs about the importance of employees' health and safety to the success of the company, were no longer congruent with the existing design and provision of H&S. Cut backs to H&S programmes began to occur in 1980 along with the recession because the senior executive felt that relative to other functions, H&S was not important to the success of the company. As well, during the boom years for the company, the senior executive valued productivity. Emphasis on the employees' health and safety through programmes and policies was not believed to be decisively linked to productivity, therefore H&S was not considered important.

These findings pertaining to change in H&S are consistent with Hinings and Greenwood's (1988) findings pertaining to broader organizational change in primarily three ways. First, movements and changes external to the organization were critical factors providing impetus for change. Second, incompatibility between the design of H&S and a

new pattern of commitment, provided substantial impetus for change. Organizational members' values pertaining to H&S were a potent precipitating dynamic of H&S change. Third, the potency of this dynamic for change, similar to cases in the Hinings and Greenwood (1988) study, was strengthened because the value commitments underpinning H&S change in the time periods in this study were consistent with values existing in the company's institutional environment.

Dissatisfaction of interests in this study did not appear to be a key dynamic for change in H&S relative to the other dynamics. This is also consistent with the findings of Hinings and Greenwood (1988) in their analysis of broad organizational change. Based on their findings the authors concluded, "dissatisfaction with interests may have low potency as a precipitator of change" (p. 135). However, it remains unclear whether dissatisfaction of interests has "low potency" as a precipitating factor for H&S change, or whether the retrospective nature of this study made the role of interests in change difficult to assess. Degree of dissatisfaction pertaining to resources is the most difficult concept to assess without access to those who were most intimately involved in resource allocations during the particular time periods. Information relevant to the assessment of other dynamics was more easily accessed retrospectively than information relevant to interests.

Perhaps another reason interests was not a key precipitator of change in H&S in this company is that until 1990, there was a fairly concentrated power structure that controlled dissatisfactions. Any groups that were dissatisfied could not mobilize commitment. Because dissatisfactions were contained, motivations for change were not identifiable in observed behaviours. It can be suggested, however, that dissatisfaction of interests could be a significant precipitator of future change in H&S, given the movement toward a more dispersed power structure and the opportunities in that type of structure for

concerns of many groups to be heard.

Also consistent with Hinings and Greenwood (1988) findings on organizational change, this study showed that the leadership style and expertise that was present in the corporate H&S group at particular points in time were crucial for enabling or constraining certain changes in H&S. Hinings and Greenwoods's (1988) research indicated that often transactional leadership was present when external and internal factors were congruent with the structural form of the organization. They found this leadership to sustain that congruence. In this study the maintenance of the array of H&S programmes from 1965-1975 would not have been possible without the transactional leadership of the H&S Manager throughout that time period.

Also Hinings and Greenwood's (1988) findings indicated that organizational capacity was key to enabling design change. Consistent with this, it was found in this study that the changes that began to occur in 1988, regardless of top management's commitment to a greater emphasis on H&S, would not have been started had it not been for the transformational leadership of the H&S Manager, and the transformational leadership and expertise of the Corporate H&S Advisor to orchestrate the change. However, it needs to be recognized that change did occur in time period two (late 1970's - 1985) without the presence of leadership and expertise in the H&S Unit. The nature of that change (decline of H&S programmes) was achieved through the concentrated power structure.

Power, as a dynamic of change, appeared to be more important for change in H&S than it appeared to be in the findings of Hinings and Greenwood (1988). Over most of the time frame of this study the power structure for H&S was fairly concentrated among the senior executive and the ER Director, one or two individuals within the corporate H&S group, and line managers. Power became increasingly important as a factor to impede or

facilitate change as the number of groups with responsibilities for H&S increased, and as changes in legislation occurred. Primarily, the implementation of the H&S committee structure in 1989, and then the power legislated to those committees in 1990, resulted in power having significant implications for change in H&S.

First, the pattern of competitive commitments pertaining to the design and provision of H&S, and the increasing level of dissatisfaction over the distribution of financial and human resources to various groups were no longer going to be contained or neutralized by a concentrated power structure. Second, the value preferences of the senior executive and ER Director would not solely determine the design and provision of H&S. Other groups' values would have more opportunity to impact changes in the design of H&S. The extent to which these groups believed that H&S programmes were important for the success of the company, and the extent to which the various groups believed in the employees involvement in defining how H&S programmes and policies should exist in the company, were going to play a greater role than ever before. Based on this study it also appeared that the extent to which H&S groups believed that the H&S Unit should be autonomous from HR/ER was going to be important for H&S change.

With the competitive commitments towards H&S design, and a high level of dissatisfaction regarding H&S resource allocations existing within a increasingly dispersed and decentralized power structure, it can be inferred that the dynamics of future change in H&S will become increasingly complex and change more difficult to achieve. Based on their research findings on organizational change, Hinings and Greenwood (1988) predict that where there are pressures for change and pressures against change existing in equilibrium, power is likely to be a crucial variable to change. For Letco Utilities change will be difficult to achieve because a dispersed power structure among a pattern of competitive

commitments will likely impede efforts toward change. What is likely to be crucial to change is the extent to which the various groups can gain reformative commitment to their ideas. To the extent that any group can do this, the dispersed power structure may then facilitate change. Using these ideas to predict future H&S change, it appears that leadership and expertise may become a more important dynamic enabling H&S change than power.

At the completion of this research, the design of H&S had moved from being totally misaligned with its environment in 1985, towards being partially aligned with its environment in 1990. There were strong pressures for H&S to be structured in a way that the company could meet new and continuously evolving federal H&S legislative requirements. There were also pressures for H&S to consist of an array of H&S programmes similar to those in other companies with which Letco Utilities was competing.

Based on the research findings in this study, there appeared to be two mechanisms that could facilitate change in the design and provision of H&S to allow it to move closer in alignment to the environment in which it exists. The leadership and expertise within the corporate H&S group and the H&S committee structure, appeared to hold significant implications for future change in H&S. In fact, one can suggest that both of these mechanisms can be considered what Kanter (1983) calls "action vehicles" for change. Kanter describes action vehicles as structures or systems that are tightly coupled to organizational members' values. They are structures/systems that are critical to other changes that need to occur for a particular design to be achieved.

The action taken by the senior executive to alter the organizational structure to accommodate positions for leadership/expertise in H&S was indicative of the senior executive's belief that H&S was important to the success of the company: The Corporate

H&S Manager and the Advisor were seen in the company as the vehicles to support change in H&S. Their presence, and their activities were intricately linked to the belief that H&S in the worksite was important for the company. They were identified as the coordinators of action toward H&S.

Employee involvement and empowerment, as well as team work were all aspects of the culture the senior executive believed were important to create for the success of the corporation. The coordinating role of the H&S Manager and the Advisor can be seen to be intricately linked with a belief in a team approach to H&S change. The leaders were to bring groups of individuals with responsibilities in H&S together in an effective and efficient way. Given the size of this company, the fact that it is very dispersed, together with the increasing demands from the environment for extensive programmes to deal with H&S, the team concept toward H&S was important for future change. The presence of the Corporate H&S Manager and Advisor to coordinate H&S processes symbolized this importance.

In this corporation territorial boundaries existed between H&S groups. The H&S leaders, as a mechanism for the coordination of H&S efforts, provided competitive commitments to those sustaining territorial boundaries. They were a key mechanism for establishing values and commitment about H&S that are necessary for the design and provision of H&S to be better aligned with its environment. As Kanter (1983) states:

> To manage such change as a normal way of life requires that people find their stability and security not in specific organizational arrangements but in the culture and the direction of the organization. It requires that they feel integrated with the whole rather than identified with the particular territory of the moment, since that is changeable (p. 133).

Kanter (1984) suggests that new initiatives need to be related to the overall business strategy and plans of the organization. She also suggests that coordination of efforts toward

change is important because if groups can launch efforts on their own initiative, unnecessary competition can occur or a number of groups may be addressing the same problems. Without a coordinating mechanism, Kanter suggests that there will be dysfunctional competition and wasted resources. At the completion of data gathering for this study, the leaders within the corporate H&S group had been partially successful in identifying the overall plans for H&S. They were partially successful in linking that strategy with the broader organizational strategy of the company and in coordinating programme and policy change efforts. It appeared that their role was going to continue to be a key mechanism to the overall change in H&S. As well, the increased demands of new legislation, the complex array of programmes required to remain competitive with the H&S programmes in other companies, and the increased depth of knowledge required to deal with these types of H&S issues, made the expertise in H&S a critical enabling factor and an action vehicle to future H&S change.

There was also significant evidence that the H&S committee structure was a potential mechanism (action vehicle) that could create the kinds of changes in H&S that were necessary for H&S to become more aligned with its internal and external environments. The H&S committee structure embodies core values that are important for H&S change. Inherent in the H&S committee structure, is the belief that the well-being of the employee in his/her workplace is important, and the belief that the worker should be involved in making decisions pertaining to his/her H&S in the worksite. The H&S committee structure had the potential to ensure continuity of effort toward H&S and to ensure follow-up on H&S programmes and policies. Given the size of this company, the committee structure appeared to be key to the company getting on line with federal health and safety legislation.

The health and safety committees were a challenge to the political coalitions that existed for H&S, and to the culture of the organization. For example, the committees pressed for substantive changes in the ways that management and workers communicated. As well, members of these committees crossed over business units because the committees were based on particular work locations. Some committees were working towards establishing communications with other committees in the company, as well as with other H&S committees in other companies within their communities. It appeared that the increased interaction among employees, and the crossing over of territorial boundaries could hold meaning and benefits beyond those specific for H&S. Kanter (1983) states that, "other structures and patterns also need to support the new practices" (p. 300). It was clear that the H&S committees were affecting other systems surrounding them.

Although the H&S committees, appeared to have the potential to be action vehicles for change, there were indications in this study that there was the potential for these committees to be adopted ceremoniously (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) if they were not managed sufficiently. Kanter (1984) suggests that "abdication of managerial responsibility" in connection with participative type of change efforts often occurs. She states that:

> This confuses the particular kinds of responsibility that might appropriately be exercised with the notion of maintaining some responsibility. If there is none at all, then the participation is not connected to on-going tasks, is not appropriately coordinated, and lacks the support that alone will enable it to be fully effective (Kanter, p. 210).

In this study there was an indication that these committees were developed somewhat prematurely, and that some backtracking was necessary. Some committee members lacked in an understanding of their operating guidelines, responsibilities, and power.

According to Kanter (1983) an action vehicle must prove its value in the early stages

of implementation in order to be successful. In this study, there were indications that many committees were very successful and the workers experienced success through the committees. A number of the H&S committees had made very concrete changes pertaining to H&S within their worksites. For example, some were successful at getting fire evacuation and fire safety regulations and procedures established in their building. Other committees ensured building ventilation was appropriate, and still others had begun to coordinate seminars on a variety of H&S related topics in order to raise awareness of H&S. A few committees had discussed ways to get fitness opportunities in their areas. The committee structure appeared to be key to driving a progressive H&S attitude among the greatest number of people.

There were also a number of committees, however, which were essentially inactive after making some unsuccessful attempts at change. When the committees became mandatory through legislation there was increasing potential for them to be adopted more to legitimize the H&S Unit and the company, than to be adopted for the technical purposes of ensuring appropriate H&S standards, policies and programmes and to facilitate a positive attitude about H&S. The extent to which these committees are managed will determine their success as action vehicles to overall change in H&S. It can be expected that only through the management of these committees will behaviourial change accompany legislated change and become a symbolic indicator of an emphasis toward H&S.

Based on the findings of this study, the importance of leadership and expertise in future change efforts in H&S cannot be overstated. Central to any change efforts will be the ability of leaders to build a collective leadership with a high level of expertise throughout the company. It appears from this study that strong collective leadership with a high level of expertise will be required to maintain groups' dissatisfactions about the distribution of

H&S resources and to gain reformative commitment to values underpinning progressive ways to ensure worker health and safety in the corporate environment.

Future Research Directions:

Further study within this organization, replications similar to this study in different types of organizations in other industry sectors, and comparisons of those studies, would provide a clearer understanding of the dynamics underlying H&S change. However, there appear to be three issues of particular interest for understanding dynamics of change in H&S that should be considered focal points of future research.

The first issue evolves out of the fact that many interviewees suggested that the design and provision of H&S would be considerably different if the H&S Unit gained autonomy from Human Resources/Employee Relations. The corporate H&S group, the union, and the business unit H&S managers and advisors, all agreed that this should occur. However, the senior executive was committed to the business unit structure, and thus, did not support the movement of H&S outside the HR/ER umbrella. Similarly, the ER Director was committed to maintaining H&S within ER. With the power structure becoming a more dispersed and decentralized system, the possibility of an autonomous H&S Unit has increased. There is a real need to better understand how H&S is structured relative to HR/ER, or other functions within a number of organizations. The dynamics underlying these various arrangements and the implications this has for the design and provision of H&S need to be understood. These factors may have important implications for employee well-being in the workplace.

Second, a research focus on what Kanter (1983; 1984) refers to as action vehicles for change (changes in structures or systems that are crucial to a number of other changes)

would be applicable for future H&S research. The leadership and expertise found within the H&S Unit, and the development and implementation of H&S committees, appeared to be key mechanisms for change in H&S in this study. These both deserve future research investigation. These two mechanisms for change appeared to be intricately linked to values important for H&S change. The identification of other action vehicles for H&S change in different types and sizes of organizations would also provide significant knowledge about H&S change processes.

More specifically, given the increasing number of groups who have responsibilities for H&S, the role of H&S experts in enabling change needs to be understood. How the leadership and expertise of leaders successfully breaks down the territorial boundaries between groups, coordinates the activities of H&S groups, and achieves the necessary communication between groups needs to be understood.

More specific to H&S committees, research should address H&S change in companies with H&S committees and those without. Also, future research should investigate change both in companies where committees are mandatory, and in companies where they have been initiated voluntarily. In the province in which this study was conducted, provincial H&S committees are only able to recommend change. However, committees within companies under federal legislation can make some very important H&S decisions. In this study it appeared that the increased power granted to the committees as a result of moving under federal legislation was going to have significant impact on change. Research should address the extent to which H&S committees affect change dependent on whether they have the power to recommend or to make decisions.

As previously mentioned, Kanter (1983) suggests that an action vehicle must be prove its value and be successful very early in its implementation stage. In this study, some

of the committees were initially successful, others were not. Consequences of various levels of initial success of these H&S committees for H&S change are important. Research should also try to identify the most successful ways of developing, implementing, and maintaining these H&S committees and overall committee structure.

The third research issue that would be fruitful to address arises out of the evidence in this research of considerable "back tracking" on some H&S initiatives. For example, the emphasis on corporate fitness that began in 1987 never gained momentum, and by 1990 was virtually stagnant. The fitness idea arose within the company because there was a strong emphasis on corporate fitness in the external environment in 1987, space available for the facility, and an individual championed the facility. However, the enabling dynamics were not sustained. It appeared that competitive commitments toward fitness became evident and that the back tracking in the fitness area, was to a considerable degree, the result of changes in power. The ER Director had fitness "thrown in his lap" as he described it, approximately one year after the facility was implemented. The ER Director was not convinced that fitness could be associated with any "bottom line" issues, and did not believe it to be important for the success of the company. He preferred it not be part of the present H&S strategy. The consequence of this backtracking was that there appeared to be considerable bitterness among some employees because promises for other fitness opportunities were never upheld.

The reassessment of the H&S committee structure is another example of backtracking in terms of H&S initiatives. It was felt that the number of committees in the province had to be reduced, and the regional committees perhaps disbanded. It appeared that back tracking was occurring because it was felt by the senior executive and H&S managers and advisors that the H&S committee structure could be more effective if it was

changed. It seems apparent that an understanding of the reasons underlying backtracking, and the consequences of their occurrence are important for understanding H&S change.

An understanding of H&S change could be facilitated by research efforts which track on a real time longitudinal basis the interactions pertaining to specific programme developments and implementations over a period of time. Understanding of the timing and conditions surrounding specific programme developments appears necessary for the success of particular initiatives. Tracking H&S change on a real time basis would alleviate the problem of lost, misfiled or otherwise inaccessible information required to do a thorough analysis of H&S change.

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Appendix A
Open-ended Interview Format[2]

Demographics:

How long have you been with the company?

In what capacities?

What has your involvement been in H&S?

Development of health and safety committees:

When was your committee formed?

How did you become involved?

To your knowledge what led to the development of the committees?

What do you think of having these committees?

What do you feel is the role of the committees?

Has Health and Safety in the company been influenced by these committees?

If yes:

    How?

Would you like to see changes in the structuring or functioning of the committees?

If yes:

    What changes?

    Why?

Health and safety programmes:

Will you please list the health and safety programmes or initiatives that you are aware of that exist within the company now.

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[2] The interview format presented was used for all interviews with health and safety committee members. The format was altered slightly for other groups.

For each programme/activity listed:

To your knowledge what were the circumstances that led to the health and safety programme or activity being implemented?

Who were the individuals or groups who were involved in the implementation?

Have there been any consequences, that you can describe, that have arisen out of the implementation?

If yes:

> How have these consequences been dealt with?

Are you aware of and health or safety programmes/activities which were implemented within past years, but were later not maintained?

If yes:

> What circumstances led to the programme not being maintained?
>
> What individuals or groups underlied the programme/initiative not being maintained?
>
> Have there been any consequences of the programme not being maintained?

Are there any health/safety programmes/initiatives in place that you feel should not be maintained?

If yes:

> Why?

Are you aware of any health/safety programmes/initiative presently being considered for implementation?

For each programme/activity listed:

What circumstances led to this health/safety programme/initiative being considered?

What people are involved?

What results are expected from the implementation?

What factors do you feel may facilitate the implementation of the programme or initiative?

What factors do you feel might create barriers for the implementation.

In your opinion is the consideration of the programme/initiative good?

Are there any other health and safety initiatives you feel should be developed and implemented?

If yes:

> Why?

Has the initiative been discussed?

If yes:

> By whom?
>
> What were the consequences of those discussions?

Has the company been progressive in its health and safety initiatives?

If yes:

> Why?

If no:

> Why not?
>
> Any consequences of above?

What is the role of the occupational health nurse in your area?

Has the role changed over the years?

If yes:

> How?

Can you describe the type of employee assistance programme(s) that is available within the company.

Has there been change in the types of programmes available to employees in regards to such services?

Fitness/recreation:

I am aware of the Energizer facility in Edmonton. What were the underlying circumstances of the fitness development?

What people were involved in the development and/or implementation?

Are you aware of any consequences that have arisen out of the fitness facility?

Can you describe the interest that has been shown in having fitness opportunities in your area?

Has initiative been taken to get fitness opportunities available for the employees in your area?

If yes:

    By whom?

What circumstances do you feel will int̲r̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲s of fitness opportunities made available?

What people or groups do you feel ʒʌiⅼ iɴ̄ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ the fitness opportunities available?

End of interview:

Are there any other programmes/initiatives related to health and safety that I have neglected to ask about?

What health and safety initiatives are most important for the employees and the company now?

Are there any particular characteristics of this company that you feel have impacted the development of health and safety in the company?

What factors do you think will significantly influence health and safety programming or initiatives in the near future?

Appendix B

Example: Interview (partial) With "Code Mapping"[3]

NUMBERED VERSION OF FILE 31BU.ETH   3/27/1991   13:01

I:	In your opinion, how has	111	
	the re-organization into	112	
	the business units	113	
	influenced health and	114	
	safety initiatives?	115	
R:	That would be the re-org	117	
	in 86, the main one?	118	
I:	Yes	120	
R:	At that time, actually	122	**INENREORG**
	health and safety almost	123	(internal envi-
	took a back seat to the	124	ronment factor,
	whole restructure. There	125	reorganization)
	was no health and safety	126	
	positions as such, not even	127	
	identified under the new	128	
	organization, so it didn't	129	
	really come back in again	130	
	until 89. 86 there was no	131	
	positions for health and	132	
	safety that I can remember.	133	
I:	Prior to 86?	135	
R:	Prior to 88 Letco had a very	137	**EXEN2**
	active role ... in about,	138	(external envi-
	let's say right up to about	139	ronmental factor,
	the early 80's then it took	140	time period two)
	a real down turn ... but up	141	
	to let's say 80 or 82 there	142	
	was a very strong health	143	
	and safety department.	144	
I:	What were the reasons for the sort of	146	
	down turn?	147	
R:	Oh, it was strictly cost.	149	**EXEN2**
	The economy took a down	150	

---

[3] Code mapping refers to the way the data was organized into conceptual and categorical collections

NUMBERED VERSION OF FILE 31BU.ETH   3/27/1991   13:01

	turn and health and safety	151	**INENREORG**
	went with it. The final	152	
	coupe de graw of that was	153	
	of course the re-	154	
	organization in 86 or maybe	155	
	more so the...that would	156	**OCSKILLHS**
	have been in about, I'm	157	(organizational just
	trying to think of	158	capacity, skills
	when we had that early	159	for H&S)
	retirement package....I	160	
	think the first early	161	
	retirement package was	162	
	about in 85 to 86 to get	163	
	ready for the re-org and	164	
	that took out most of our	165	
	health and safety people	166	
	that were residents of the	167	
	company at the time and	168	
	then from there on of	169	
	course it kind of lost	170	
	focus.	171	(end EXEN2, iNENREORG, OCSKILLHS)
I:	Were those people	173	
	replaced, immediately	174	
	replaced?	175	
R:	Not really, no.	177	
I:	Have they ever been	179	
	replaced?	180	
R:	I guess that technically	182	**OCSKILLHS**
	you might say that they	183	
	have never been replaced	184	
	except that now we have	185	
	five advisors, but	186	
	certainly not in the same	187	
	capacity, because before	188	
	that these health and	189	
	safety people, or safety	190	
	people more so, where	191	
	focused onto the driving	192	
	and they where located	193	
	throughout the areas. Mill	194	
	Creek had one, there was	195	
	somebody in Century,	196	

NUMBERED VERSION OF FILE 31BU.ETH   3/27/1991   13:01

	Saint Peters[4] had some out they	197	
	were not pulled together	198	
	like this, they we	199	
	dispersed throughout the	200	
	line.	201	
I:	I see. O.K. The health	204	
	and safety committees are	205	
	relatively new and there is	206	
	getting to be an increasing	207	
	number of them. Is it	208	
	strictly the federal	209	
	legislation do you think	210	
	that got the	211	
	committees getting going?	212	
R:	I suspect that may	214	
	have been, that certainly	215	
	has, that did impact on	216	
	them. I don't think that	217	EXEN3 (external
	was the only reason though.	218	environment factor,
			time period three)
	Phil Martin[5] came aboard here	219	OCLEAD
	in about, I guess, now	220	(organizational capa-
	let's see, he was here	221	city, leadership)
	about a year or so when I	222	
	got here and that was in 89	223	
	so he was in there in about	224	
	87 or 88 somewhere in there	225	
	and at that time, whether	226	
	now he was already starting	227	
	to tailor towards the labor	228	
	code or whatever, I don't	229	
	know, but he certainly was	230	
	following a template that	231	
	was being used in B.C. and	232	
	keeping in mind that B.C.	233	
	by in large, or a large	234	
	portion of that was under	235	
	labor Canada guidelines,	236	
	that may have impacted it	237	
	but I do know that the	238	
	program that we are	239	
	following, the template	240	

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[4] All names (interviewees, cities, and company) have been changed to protect anonymity

[5] All names (interviewees, cities, and company) have been changed to protect anonymity.

NUMBERED VERSION OF FILE 31BU.ETH   3/27/1991   13:01

	that we are following is	241	
	focused on B.C.'s	242	(end OCLEAD, EXEN3)
I:	So, do you think that the	244	
	committees would have been	245	
	formed anyway?	246	
R:	I think the committees, in	248	
	this case would have been	249	
	formed, yes, cause we were	250	
	well on our way already to	251	
	forming them when....but	252	
	then on the other hand???	253	
	?????????????	254	
	privatization had been	255	
	sitting on the horizon for	256	
	a while too, so it's really	257	
	hard to say what was	258	
	pushing which.	259	
I:	What have been the main	261	
	challenges in setting up	262	
	the committees?	263	
R:	The committees themselves?	265	
I:	Yes	267	
R:	I think by in large the	269	**POW/POWCOM**
	Letco[6] personnel is not, we're	270	(power of
	not quick to involve the	271	committee)
	line people to that kind of	272	
	extent, so for example,	273	
	it's easy to say that the	274	
	committee will be	275	
	empowered, especially under	276	
	the labor Canada Regs, the	277	
	committee is empowered to	278	
	do that, well with that	279	
	empowerment goes certain	280	
	obligations, certain	281	
	responsibilities and not to	282	
	be-little our committees,	283	
	some of them are picking up	284	
	on it and some are doing	285	
	very well in fact and they	286	
	have literally taken hold	287	

---

[6] All names (interviewees, cities, and company) have been changed to protect anonymity.

and are running with it.	288	
I'm sure that for every one	289	
of those there are also one	290	
or maybe two that really	291	
are not familiar with this	292	
idea of empowerment and	293	
really don't know what to	294	
do with it, and I think	295	
that is going to be our	296	
biggest challenge right	297	
now. It's more of an	298	
education process whereby	299	
we are going to have to go	300	
back and say look guys	301	
these are your	302	
responsibilities as a	303	
committee and these are the	304	
obligations that go with	305	
that responsibilit, and	306	
we'll be here as a resource	307	
to you while you are	308	
getting your act together	309	
but your act together you	310	
must get so to speak. I	311	
think that will be the	312	
biggest step. Education is	313	
going to be the biggest	314	
step and that actually will	315	
extend right through to the	316	
line managers.....	317	

I:		
I was just going to say,	319	
would it be accurate to say	320	
that the committees, to	321	
some degree, are hampered a	322	
little bit right now by the	323	
responses of various	324	
managers, like some would	325	
be very receptive and some	326	
would not co-operate.	327	

R:		
Yes, that's right. No,	329	POW/POWCOM
very true. Not only the	330	
managers, the people	331	
themselves. The committees	332	
themselves, are probably	333	
their own worst enemy in	334	
some instances, the people	335	
they deal with are not	336	

NUMBERED VERSION OF FILE 31BU.ETH   3/27/1991   13:01

accustomed to having these	337
committees nor are they	338
accustomed to that kind of	339
thinking and certainly the	340
managers, there will be	341
those that say this is	342
gre. 'l in a run with	343
them, and he's going to	344
start running and they	345
won't be able to keep up	346
and then conversely there	347
will be those that will say	348
whoa, that's some sort of a	349
threat to me and I don't	350
want to have anything to do	351
with it. I'm going to run	352
my own shop, health and	353
safety is my responsibility	354
and I will administer it.	355

Appendix C

Partial Printout for Single Code Search
(EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT FACTORS, TIME PERIOD 2)

SORTED OUTPUT FOR FILE 31BU
SORT CODE: EXEN2

31BUR   R   +ID31 BU
SC: EXEN2

#-EXEN2

:	R: Prior to 86 Letco[7] had a very	137 -#
:	active role....in about,	138 #
:	let's say right up to about	139 #
:	the early 80's then it took	140 #
:	a real down turn...but up	141 #
:	to let's say 80 or 82 there	142 #
:	was a very strong health	143 #
:	and safety department.	144 #

31BU   R   +ID31 BU
SC: EXEN2

#-EXEN2

:	R: Oh, it was strictly cost.	149 -#
:	The economy took a down	150 #

$-INENREORG (internal environment factor, reorganization)

:	turn and health and safety	151 # -$
:	went with it. The final	152 # |
:	coupe de graw of that was	153 # |
:	of course the re-	154 # |
:	organization in 86 or maybe	155 # |

%-OCSKILLHS (organizational capacity, skill in H&S)

:	more so the...that would	156 # | -%
:	have been in about, I'm	157 # | |
:	just trying to think of	158 # | |
:	when we had that early	159 # | |
:	retirement package....I	160 # | |
:	think the first early	161 # | |
:	retirement package was	162 # | |
:	about in 85 to 86 to get	163 # | |
:	ready for the re-org and	164 # | |
:	that took out most of our	165 # | |
:	health and safety people	166 # | |
:	that were residents of the	167 # | |
:	company at the time and	168 # | |
:	then from there on of	169 # | |
·	course it kind of lost	170 # | |
:	focus.	171 -# -$ -%

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[7] Company name has been changed to protect anonymity.

SORTED OUTPUT FOR FILE 14   4/13/1991   14:11
SORT CODE: EXEN2

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14   RM   + ID14

SC: EXEN2

#-EXEN2

: RM: ....and to understand	534 -#	
: that, the down turn of the	535 #	
: economy in the 80's,	536 #	
: rushed out and brought in	537 #	
: proud foot just a whole	538 #	
: hockey sock full of	539 #	

$-INENOTH (internal environment factor, productivity)

: consultants. The big	540 # -$
: stress there was on	541 # |
: productivity. That's why	542 # |
: safety got bumped, so now	543 # |
: we are having a hard time	544 # |
: getting those managers to	545 ⋇ |
: separate productivity from	546 # |
: safety. Safety is	547 # -$
: something that you have to	548 #
: do first. Productivity	549 #
: will come as a part of it	550 #
: if you are doing it safely.	551 #
: And that is one of the key	552 #
: stumbling blocks. Even the	553 #
: people, you know, because	554 #
: the staff has been down	555 #
: sized to such an extent	556 #
: that I think that they tend	557 #
: not to think safety first.	558 #
: They will do whatever it is	559 #
: going to take cause they	560 #
: know that they have ten	561 #
: orders that they have to do	562 #
: today and if they don't	563 #
: they are going to get their	564 #
: ass kicked, so they may as	565 #
: well....if they can cut a	566 #
: few corners to do it they	567 #
: will do it.	568 -#

SORTED OUTPUT FOR FILE 26BU
SORT CODE: EXEN2

26BU   M   +ID26 BU

SC: EXEN2

#-EXEN2
    :   M: The big gold rush that the   430 -#
    :   province experienced at that   431 #
    :   time where we had   432 #
    :   absolutely no time for   433 #
    :   anything but service.   434 -#

26BU   T   +ID26 BU
SC: EXEN2

#-EXEN2
    :   T: That is the same time   48?? -#
    :   frame tht I tried to refer   490 #
    :   to as far as HR was going.   491 #
$-OCSKILLHS
    :   We lost dedication with   492 # -$
    :   respect to our management   493 # |
    :   and we didn't have the   494 # |
    :   professional at the same   495 # |
    :   time the demand from the   496 # |
    :   field required a   497 # |
    :   professional and we didn't   498 # |
    :   have it so consequently   499 # |
    :   there was a down turn in   500 # |
    :   the emphasis both   501 # |
    :   internally and externally   502 # |
    :   with respect to health and   503 # |
    :   safety.   504 # -$
    :   #
    :   M: At the time that the need   506 #
    :   was probably the   507 #
    :   greatest...   508 #
    :   #
$-OCLEAD (organizational capacity, leadership)
    :   T: We had no drive to give us   510 # -$
    :   feeling of an emphasis on   511 # |
    :   health and safety.   512 # -$