

University of Alberta

Lyric Philosophy and Temporal Phenomenology

by

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For my grandparents

Gordon & Doris Oliver

Whose wit, warmth and love have been my strength.

ABSTRACT

This thesis develops and discusses a conflict between Jan Zwicky's lyric philosophy and Heidegger's temporal phenomenology. Professor Zwicky claims that genuine understanding is fundamentally spatial in organization. Her claim follows the enhancement of philosophical clarity through lyric philosophy, which she insists is atemporal. I interpret lyric's atemporality in terms of what I call spatial priority. I argue that this interpretation warrants a phenomenological reading of her work. Zwicky's twofold reliance on directionality, reasonably taken as a concern with intentionality, brings her into conflict with Heidegger's temporal phenomenology. I present Heidegger's argument for the temporal structure of intentionality and sketch his conflict with Zwicky concerning the basis of understanding. I critically discuss the sketched conflict in terms of two critical replies. I conclude by suggesting that Merleau-Ponty's re-conception of transcendence resolves the conflict, and that important parallels can be discerned between his thought and Zwicky's philosophy.

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HIC FINIS EST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRÆFATIO	1
ENHANCING CLARITY: INTRODUCING JAN ZWICKY'S LYRIC PHILOSOPHY	6
§1. MEANING/UNDERSTANDING AS COLLABORATIVE	8
§§1. METAPHOR AND GESTALT	9
§§2. LYRIC MEANING AND NATURAL LANGUAGE	14
§§3. UNDERSTANDING AND <i>THISNESS</i>	21
§2. ZWICKY'S CRITIQUE OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS	26
§§1. ANALYTIC-SYSTEMATIC CLARITY	27
§§2. ZWICKY'S CRITICISMS OF ANALYTIC-SYSTEMATIC CLARITY	33
§§3. ENHANCING CLARITY BY AUGMENTING ANALYSIS	46
§3. LYRIC CLARITY	49
§§1. METAPHORS FOR CLARITY	51
§§2. AURAL RESONANCE, SEMANTIC COHERENCE, AND GESTURAL INTEGRITY	53
§§3. LYRIC CLARITY AS SYNAESTHETIC INTEGRITY	63
LYRIC'S ATEMPORALITY	68
§1. LANGUAGE AND CHRONOMORPHICITY	70
§2. ATEMPORALITY AS SPATIAL PRIORITY	76
§3. DIRECTIONALITY AND SPATIAL PRIORITY	86
ORIGINAL TIME AS TEMPORALITY	95
§1. PRIORITY OF FUTURITY AND PRIORITY OF POSSIBILITY	99
§2. ORIGINAL TIME IN <i>THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY</i>	105
§3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ZWICKY AND HEIDEGGER	118
CRITICAL DISCUSSION	126
§1. FIRST CRITICAL REPLY: "TIME AND BEING"	129
§2. SECOND CRITICAL REPLY: MERLEAU-PONTY	134
§3. CRITICAL EVALUATION	140
§4. CONCLUDING REMARKS	143
BIBLIOGRAPHY	146

PRÆFATIO

A QUESTION CONCERNING TIME inspired this paper. In the foreword to her first book, Canadian poet-philosopher Jan Zwicky declares that *Lyric Philosophy* can be seen “as a book about time” (1992, ix). This theme continues to be developed in her second philosophical work, *Wisdom & Metaphor*. How this theme is developed in Professor Zwicky’s books was the inspiration for my central question. The question itself is a curious one. It can roughly be posed in this way: “is time really basic to *all* our understanding?” I was first drawn to Zwicky’s apparent condemnation of time. “It is for taking us from the world that time must be forgiven” (1992, L280, p. 506). My paper addresses how time takes us from the world, what it means for time to do this to us, and the way in which Zwicky weaves this meaning into her account of understanding. I do not address our obligation to forgive time this atrocity, although it is arguably the more important claim.

Zwicky's condemnation of time follows from her view that our most basic mode of understanding is not temporally constrained. This sounds strange to our received Kantian heritage, for which time is an enabling condition of understanding and not merely a limiting constraint. Indeed, I will argue that this view brings Zwicky into direct conflict with Heidegger's philosophy (which, in its earlier form, can still be considered as *philosophy* and in the Kantian tradition). But Zwicky is well aware of such potential tension. Her initial claim is that what she calls lyric philosophy is atemporal. The Foreword to *Lyric Philosophy* recounts how its aims began with a question concerning the timelessness of Freud's "primary process." Her book arrives at a re-conception of phenomenological temporality. It arrives there by way of an intricate account of lyric thought in the service of philosophy. What Zwicky means by her claim that lyric is atemporal can only be understood on the basis of this account.

Accordingly, my thesis is disproportionately divided into four chapters. The first, and longest, attempts a general introduction to Zwicky's philosophy, with a strong focus on lyric. Lyric philosophy furnishes academic philosophy with a new conception of clarity. Her lyric conception of clarity is, in itself, a significant philosophical achievement. There is a suspicious lack of attention to the meaning of clarity in philosophy, despite its widespread and longstanding status as an academic aim. I daresay Zwicky has done more to strum the dusty strings of clarity than any thinker since Wittgenstein, whose influence is everywhere to be felt in her work. And I spend a considerable portion of this paper construing the results of her effort for an audience accustomed to the

method of thought she holds responsible for the obscure state of clarity. I use lyric clarity as a toehold on Zwicky's overall philosophy. It connects to her central ideas concerning metaphor, gesture, gestalt shifts, meaning, understanding, *thisness*, and perhaps most importantly for academic philosophy, her critique of analysis.

My second chapter turns to Zwicky's curious insistence on lyric's atemporality. I develop this insistence, as she does in *Wisdom & Metaphor*, in terms of spatiality. I interpret Zwicky's claim to be about what I call the spatial priority of understanding. Her view is that our most basic thinking connects spatially with being. But it does not simply connect, it *colludes* with being. There is a collaboration between thinking and being which obtains in, and as, a resonant space. How we understand the world in the most basic sense is not aided by the influence of time or temporal organization. Thought bears a spatial orientation to being in such a way that space has priority over time. I further interpret this claim concerning spatial priority in terms of directionality. I argue that two central components of Zwicky's later thought, namely metaphor and gestalt, each require directionality in order to perform their roles. This allows me to engage Zwicky on the battleground of intentionality as addressed by the phenomenological tradition.

My third chapter brings Heidegger into the argument. I argue that Zwicky's claim regarding the spatial priority of understanding, interpreted as a claim about our basic directionality, brings her philosophy into direct conflict with Heidegger's argument that intentionality's directional structure is grounded

in transcendent temporality. Thus my third chapter is also part explication, designed to paint an image of the conflict between Zwicky and Heidegger regarding the ultimate basis for meaning-rich human understanding. I mainly reserve my focus in this chapter to *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, where the conflict is most clear. The conflict consists in Zwicky's reliance on directionality to make her claim regarding the priority of spatiality for understanding. If it is appropriate, as I contend, to take her claim in terms of directionality, then we quickly learn from Heidegger that there is nothing atemporal about directionality at all. Temporality transcendentally constitutes the openness in which the directionality of intentionality gets its original bearing. Directionality therefore has its basis in temporality. Zwicky's insistence that thought could be basically atemporal would thus be untenable if Heidegger's arguments are correct.

I close with a chapter devoted to critical discussion. I entertain two critical replies to my argument that Zwicky's philosophy conflicts with Heidegger. The first reply comes from the viewpoint established in his later essay on "Time and Being," in which Heidegger has come to reject some of his earlier arguments. This reply does not successfully resolve the conflict I sketch, albeit for reasons that do not directly stem from Zwicky's account, but rather from later Heidegger's emphasis on the self-concealing source of thinking. The second reply proves decisive. Merleau-Ponty enters the discussion to deliver Zwicky from Heidegger. Strictly speaking, the conflict is not resolved, but rather

overcome by the advancements of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology beyond that of Heidegger, most notably by his re-conception of transcendence.

Perhaps the only academic contribution this paper makes is a critical introduction to the novelty and quality of Professor Zwicky's philosophy. Her thoughts on clarity are by themselves enough to warrant further study. In contextualizing her thought, and in contrasting it with that of Heidegger, I aim to achieve some measure of critical perspective on her work. I feel I have achieved this, and that it points the way to an interesting interpretation of Merleau-Ponty. My readers must judge for themselves.

ENHANCING CLARITY

INTRODUCING JAN ZWICKY'S LYRIC PHILOSOPHY

THAT THE NOTION of philosophical clarity stands in need of clarification is not only ironic but also highly important for the analytic tradition. That clarity so stands has been pointed out by a number of eminent philosophers, most notably Ludwig Wittgenstein, but few have made any serious effort to address the question of the meaning of clarity. Wittgenstein was one. Jan Zwicky, a Canadian poet-philosopher currently teaching at the University of Victoria, is another. More recently, Newton Garver and Hans-Johann Glock have explicitly taken up this issue in relation to Wittgenstein's work. Both Garver and Glock chastise analytic philosophers for heralding clarity as a chief aim while completely neglecting its meaning. My view is that Zwicky's approach is far more compelling than those of the few others who have addressed this question. This chapter introduces the general thought of Jan Zwicky on the philosophical issues of meaning, clarity, and

understanding. Zwicky's notion of lyric clarity possesses some highly puzzling yet intriguing features, chief among which, as I discuss in the next chapter, is her insistence that lyric thought is atemporal. Just what this means in the context of temporal phenomenology is the central topic of my thesis.

Zwicky is not interested in laying blame for the current obscure state of clarity, although in her view it is important to point out where analysis has gone astray of wisdom. This would be wherever it insists on what she takes to be a false distinction between style and logical criteria, and where it exclusively employs logical criteria to legitimate thinking. She is interested in enhancing the idea of analytic clarity with her own notion of lyric clarity, rooted in a different perceptual metaphor. This chapter first considers Zwicky's views concerning meaning and understanding, which must be developed in order to properly present her own notion of lyric clarity. I then present her characterization of analytic-systematic thinking. On the basis of this characterization, Zwicky gives several criticisms of such thinking, which are then examined. A final section explores Zwicky's notion of lyric clarity. I suggest that lyric clarity is best interpreted as what I call *synaesthetic integrity*, drawing on Zwicky's own terminology.

A difficulty arises in that Zwicky's thought does not lend itself to that rational reconstruction of arguments one expects in academic philosophy. Rather than constructing such linear, rational arguments as might be *reconstructed* in the customary fashion, her thought "proceeds" lyrically. What it means to lyrically develop thought will emerge in the course of this chapter. But giving an account of the lyric integrity of her own thought will, ironically and unavoidably, serve to

distort that very integrity. However, one who seeks academic advancement does not ignore scholarly conventions of style. I wish to present Zwicky's philosophy of meaning, her views on lyric clarity, and her conception of understanding, all with an eye toward lyric's atemporality. Doing so does not require that I attempt to emulate her unique style of writing.

Zwicky's two primary philosophical texts, *Lyric Philosophy* and *Wisdom & Metaphor*, have more in common with the styles of Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, and other poetic-aphoristic writers than with any other style. But in reflection of her central thesis concerning understanding, the expression of her thought is collaborative. She sets her own words in page-by-page juxtaposition to the words, images, and compositions of other writers and thinkers from a wide variety of arts and disciplines. To understand her meaning is to understand in resonant relation to the meaning of others. It is a philosophical style unique to her, and one that simply cannot be mimicked in an academic essay. Now in order to begin to appreciate Zwicky's originality and profundity, I shall attempt to consider her ideas in the usual analytic style and let the limitations of so doing manifest themselves as I proceed.

§1. MEANING/UNDERSTANDING AS COLLABORATIVE

Understanding as the experience of meaning is a central theme for Zwicky. It is necessary to solidly grasp this theme before plunging into her critique of analytic clarity and her own notion of lyric clarity. More importantly, it gives rise to the conflict I wish to explore in this thesis, namely that the

atemporality of lyric thought is experienced on the basis of time. What it means to claim that atemporal meaning is experienced and understood in time cannot be stated unless we first examine how Zwicky uses these terms. As I argue in my next chapter, this is a claim about the spatial priority of understanding.

The notions of metaphor and gestalt are key to that of understanding, and to these I have devoted the first part of this section. Zwicky's notion of metaphor is itself a metaphor for what we mean by wisdom and understanding. Thereafter I consider the question of meaning as it arises for natural language. The final subsection focuses on Zwicky's treatment of understanding in connection with her notion of *thisness*. The chief aim of this section is to introduce enough about her conception of the collaborative essence of understanding as the experience of meaning to allow us to make sense of her critique of analytic-systematic thinking, and to grasp the advantages of lyrically enhanced clarity. In the following chapter, the question of lyric's atemporality will necessitate further development of Zwicky's conception of understanding in light of her thesis that it is fundamentally spatial in organization.

§§1. METAPHOR AND GESTALT

In *Wisdom & Metaphor*, Zwicky relies heavily on metaphor to characterize the phenomenon of metaphor. She likens metaphor to geometric demonstration, to the experience of significance (2003, L36), and to a linguistic short-circuit (2003, L68). Her most explicit statement describes metaphors as “non-rule-governed meta-phenomena emergent on language-games” (2003,

L110). “By ‘metaphor’ I mean the linguistic expression of the results of focussed analogical thinking” (2003, L5). Metaphors use language to make and trace patterns that ordinary uses of language cannot do. Metaphors connect gestures.

According to Zwicky, a gesture is the human response to presence (1992, L242, p. 438). Such responses might take the form of a look, a feeling, a movement, a memory, an image, a sound, a poetic expression, or something altogether new. That which presences is the world, i.e. what Zwicky variously calls “what-is,” being, and ontological structure. Gesture as a response to the world’s presence involves collusion between that aspect of being which gestures and that to which its gesture responds. This collusion gives rise to meaning in a collaborative way. “To mean is to make a gesture,” i.e. to reciprocate with being (1992, L241, p. 438). But “we do not grasp the meaning as something distinct from the gesture, something the gesture possesses *in addition* to being a gesture. Our understanding is unmediated” (1992, L245, p. 444). Meaning as gesturing is a collaboration between two aspects of being, that which responds and that which presences. The meaning achieved in this collaboration between human response and ontological presence is not primarily linguistic. Collaborative meaning as understanding is closer to our direct, embodied perception of our world. I more fully discuss the collaborative nature peculiar to understanding when I come to Zwicky’s notion of *thisness*. We are here concerned to note that it is this kind of meaning/understanding that operates in metaphor.

A good metaphor connects distinct gestures by drawing an isomorphism between them (2003, L9). Metaphors bring out what Wittgenstein called an

“internal relation” between gestures. Zwicky conceives an internal relation to be a sort of inner form within a language-game. A metaphor points to a commonality between two initially disparate gestures, as an expression of the inner form that connects them. Metaphor reveals that the gestures are actually connected by a relation internal and inexpressibly fundamental, in ordinary speech, to the language (game). Metaphors “show” what language cannot say. But here we resort to a misleading visual metaphor. To understand what-is-common is to perceive its resonance, which does not only mean to see. “Metaphor understands connectedness as resonance, revealed in the shift of gestalts” (2003, L105).

A gestalt shift is a kind of perceptual coalescence, a *recognition* in which an awareness of similarity between two aspects gradually dawns on the perceiver. At L25 of *Wisdom & Metaphor*, Zwicky mentions two kinds of gestalt perception: insight and seeing-as, the latter of which requires “imagination”, i.e. a capacity for sensitivity to resonance. “Seeing-as is the result of the natural attunement of our capacities for perception to the world” (2003, L26). Seeing-as is the primary means by which humans achieve understanding. Insight refers to the original tracing of outlines that would support a gestalt shift. Now it appears I have mixed our metaphors by connecting seeing-as, a visual characterization of understanding, to resonance, an aural term operating as a key perceptual metaphor for that which is common to connected gestures. But for Zwicky, seeing-as involves all our perceptual capacities, not only that of sight. It is primarily spatial, rather than aural or visual, although admittedly Zwicky tends to favour

visual characterizations. Vision has the virtue of being already closely connected with traditional characterizations of understanding, but her notion of gestalt retains priority over that of seeing-as. A gestalt shift occurs when one's experience is re-organized to become aware of a connection not perceived before, as "an act of contextualization" (2003, L1). This can occur throughout our full range of perceptual experience.

Metaphors incite gestalt shifts by short-circuiting language and drawing our attention to a connection not perceived before. In such shifts, the meaning expressed in one gesture carries over, *meta pherein*, to the other, and the two are recognized in virtue of what is common to them. A resonance opens up between the two gestures. (We should note there is no reason to think it would be limited to two, but that this is merely the most convenient instance for discussion.) It is here, in this resonance that opens between two gestures connected by metaphor, that we get our first taste of lyric. Metaphor takes one gesture and points to what it has in common with another. In saying that one gesture literally "is" another, a resonance is expressed that is not literally true. In fact, it is essential to this notion of metaphor that its expression be literally false; e.g. it is *literally* false that time is money. But a connection rings true even as literal falsity manifests. The resonance expressed by metaphor has lyric truth even though its particular expression has no literal truth. "The explicit 'is' of metaphor is its lyric aspect. For this reason, a metaphor is true to the degree that it is resonant" (2003, L47).

The resonance to which a metaphor draws our attention does not result in a fusing of the gestures thus connected (*ibid.*). They remain distinct yet

connected in order for gestalt to obtain. Understanding comes in the recognition that a connection exists between two gestures, two problems, two ideas, two contexts, two experiences, etc. It does not collapse two into one. It acknowledges and focuses their connectedness. Resonance sounds what is common to both, as revealed in language by metaphorical isomorphism and recognized in understanding by perceptual gestalt.

Understanding consists in an experience of meaning common to several (i.e. at least two) gestures. However, not all that we come to understand is old hat to us. We often acquire new understanding, though it is not necessarily altogether new (e.g. lessons are new for students, but familiar for professors). The creation of new meaning is, in principle, no different than the creation of understanding. Gestures are joined in novel collaboration to produce new experiences of meaning, both in general and for individuals. New meaning is not created haphazardly. One does not simply join gestures together at random to produce new instances of meaning and understanding. Only when two gestures are joined that are also connected by a common, isomorphically identifiable pattern or underlying form, as when a metaphor exposes an internal relation within a language-game, can there be said to be a new instance of meaning. Gestalt shifts as perceptual coalescences are pivotal to the creation of new meaning. I will later interpret this creation of new meaning in terms of synaesthetic integration, but I have not yet introduced Zwicky's notion of integrity.

Newly created meaning is perceived by a gestalt shift before it is expressed. The linguistic exemplar of such shifts is metaphor. Metaphorical

language allows us to express what is understood by gestalt shift. Metaphor allows us to express what we understand by the truth of our perceptual embodiment. Ordinary language, and especially written English, is not conducive to expressing the truth of embodiment owing to its tendency to focus on predicates and reified subjects. But language in general pulls us away from our perceptual, embodied understanding, as we shall soon see. Metaphor makes some headway toward pulling us back. The title of *Wisdom & Metaphor* expresses Zwicky's central thesis in that book, namely that what happens in metaphor is itself a metaphor for what we mean by wisdom, i.e. understanding. Metaphors are enormously important because, for Zwicky, "[a] metaphor is a *way* of thinking" (1992, L217, p. 396). In philosophy, the thinking by which wisdom is pursued seeks clarity, for which a single metaphor is employed. As we shall see, Zwicky's argument will be that this sole metaphor for clarity in philosophy leads to a palpable lack of resonance. Her remedy for enhancing philosophical clarity suggests that a more robust metaphorical repertoire is necessary to create more resonant wisdom.

§§2. LYRIC MEANING AND NATURAL LANGUAGE

"Both Herakleitos and Wittgenstein...insist that some fundamental aspect of linguistic meaning defies straightforward linguistic expression" (2003, L83). Zwicky takes this point to be central to grasping the role of meaning in natural language. What makes language meaningful is not itself fundamentally linguistic. Aspects of linguistic meaning defy straightforward linguistic expression because

they draw our attention to what is lyrically meaningful. Lyric meaning achieves ontological insight. Zwicky's term "insight" refers to the dawning of aspects, as in the grasping of an image. Such dawning insight is one of two forms of gestalt perception (2003, L25). In achieving insight, we come to experience meaning that was not previously understood. To gain insight is to perceive new meaning where before there was only confusion and incomprehension. It is to see the solution to a problem come together, or to hear the right movement that resolves a musical fragment, or to taste the flavour that tells you the proper mixture has been achieved amongst a swirling mess of ingredients to which the right amount of heat has been applied, or to imagine the conclusion of a story from what you have been told so far. We feel insight when we gain it, but we tend to express this in terms of *seeing* the meaning we experience embodied as insight.

Such meaning is ontological, although in *Lyric Philosophy* Zwicky calls it lyric meaning and "proto-linguistic" (1992, L254, p. 460). Ontological meaning is the root from which the tree of linguistic meaning sprouts. "Lyric meaning is proto-linguistic. It underlies linguistic meaning and is, at the same time, broader in scope" (1992, L251, p. 454). This metaphor of the root comes from Zwicky (1992, L254, p. 460) and is developed to emphasize the basic multiplicity and difference that underlies linguistic meaning, which usually attends to singular distinctness. In *Wisdom & Metaphor*, it is clear that this proto-linguistic meaning is, in fact, our world in its being. The internally related ontological structure of what is common, the ecology of what-is, grounds the way in which language means. On Zwicky's view, language alienates us from the ontological.

The question concerning technology as tool use is important to Zwicky's argument here. "The domination of the world...by human technology is a predictable though not inevitable consequence of our capacity for language use" (1992, L125, p. 232). Linguistic capacity is a prerequisite for technological capacity. Language grounds technology by allowing its users to view their world as external to them. "It is the ability to see something as an object external to oneself that is concomitant with the capacity for language use" (1992, L126, p. 234). On the same page Zwicky argues that this ability, connected with our capacity for language, is a precondition for the technological exploitation of objects in our world. This is not to say that language leads to exploitation, but rather that it cannot occur without the linguistic capacity to view oneself *as* a self at a distance from one's environment. Zwicky claims that phenomenological selfhood is also attendant on linguistic capacity.

My claim is empirical, a hypothesis about human neurobiology: that the neuronal conditions which must be present for human language use incidentally give rise to a *phenomenological* sense of self, i.e., of oneself as distinguishable from features of the environment. The distinction of self from environment does not cause language use; nor does language use *per se* give rise to a sense of self. A phenomenological sense of self-as-distinct-from-the-environment is emergent upon the neuronal organization necessary for language (1992, L127, p. 236).

Language is not to blame for alienating us from our world. It bears the same degree of responsibility for this alienation as the stimulation of C-fibres bears for our experience of pain, to borrow another of Zwicky's analogies. But the result is that we achieve the precondition necessary for the technological exploitation of that world once we have alienated ourselves from it as selves. For "it is this subjective phenomenological content [of self-as-distinct] that is the essential condition of what I mean by a technological being" (*ibid.*). One must cut oneself

off from ontological presence before one can exploit the world as though it were composed of insignificant objects. “As beings with the capacity for language use, it is our nature to be able to see a thing in a way which obscures ‘presence’” (*ibid.*).

At this point we may consider a potential difficulty. Language use in general is not the only precondition of technology. Zwicky identifies a particular kind of language use as the precondition of tool use. Syntactic language is the precondition for technology. She does not conceive all natural language as necessarily syntactic. Syntax is an idea imposed on speech activity, likely in the course of developing its literal written rules and conventions. “The idea of syntax is the idea that only certain (non-empirically determined) types of associations are capable of ‘making sense’” (1992, L128, p. 238). Syntax does not structure natural language in a conditioning sense. We might infer from Ivan Illich and Barry Sanders’ *ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind* that the tradition of rhetorical instruction played a central role in the emergence of syntax, but I will not digress to discussion in this thesis. Suffice to say that the practice of committing speeches to memory, a highly valued skill in antiquity, required tricks of repetition and other manufactured linguistic devices to allow speakers to call material forth at will. These tricks and devices became ingrained in the central instructional texts on rhetoric: the anonymous *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, Cicero’s *De Oratore*, and Quintillian’s *Instituto Oratoria*. In addition to the variety of conventions for teaching reading and writing, these lessons eventually became so refined that they attained the status of rules of the languages themselves.

In the next section of this chapter I will begin to focus on Zwicky's critique of systematic thought. System and syntax are closely connected in her account. "Syntax is the beginning of system. The neuronal organization necessary for syntax *also* serves to make the idea of tool-use possible. The experience of self is the ground of all technology" (1992, L129, p. 240). Syntax imposes an absolute ordering upon the rich ambiguity of linguistic expression, leading speakers to think that only certain ordered forms of expression are meaningful. This amounts to a systematization of language, in the sense of 'system' we will encounter in the following section. The difficulty for the present discussion is that Zwicky does not make explicit whether it is language in general or syntactic language that is the ground for technology and for the obscuring of presence. This question comes down to whether it is language in general or syntax in particular that grounds selfhood. I am concerned that Zwicky tries to hedge her bets on this issue by restricting her condemnation of language to syntactic language.

A charitable reading of her argument might reconcile the difficulty in the following way. Phenomenological selfhood is emergent on linguistic capacity and thus grounds the *possibility* of technology. Language obscures ontological presence and places the distinctness of things in the forefront. But syntax is what leads to tool-use. Syntactic language orders those objects which language makes available in their distinctness. Language grounds technology, but syntax achieves it.

Language conceals ontological structures the meaning of which we otherwise understand by way of perceptual embodiment. Language inadvertently conceals the presence of these structures in its inability to express them. They are perceivable by insight but inexpressible within a given language-game because they condition its expressions. A crucial distinction is to be noted here between metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of language within natural language-games.

‘Non-metaphorical language’ is the sum total of expressions proper to the language-games of any given language at any given moment. Metaphors are one way of expressing insights whose *form* prevents expression *in* a language-game. Such insights have to do with the way human forms of life are connected to the *phusis* of what-is (2003, L19).

We can still understand and perceive the inexpressible by gaining insight into what grounds the meaning of that form of life in which a language is possible. Metaphors are necessary where non-metaphorical language fails. We cannot linguistically express the form of these ontological structures because they are too deeply meaningful to be made literally meaningful. ‘Literal’ is used in its full sense here, because the advent of writing has obscured what-is even more by giving text its own reity, its own thingliness. Insight connects us to what grounds both speech and letters. Language obscures and conceals this ground not only in its attendant alienation from the world, but also in the fact that language names and emphasizes the distinctness of things. This draws attention away from their connectedness. Even speech is literal in that it attends to the distinctness of the various parts of what-is as things. “Non-metaphorical language enacts the way it is with things-in-their-distinctness. Metaphorical language, as its etymology suggests, links them” (2003, L32). Language is not merely a smokescreen of

concealment. It focuses our attention on the distinctness of things as objects, but in a way that does not emphasize their particularity or what Zwicky will call their *thisness*.

Linguistic meaning is therefore essentially incomplete. Metaphor supplements this incompleteness by directing language toward meaning that we experience as ontological insight. This insight is lyric meaning. But metaphor does not complete language, nor does it totally reconcile language and being. It helps us along toward lyric insight by helping us to circumvent the distance at which language holds us. “Lyric springs from the desire to recapture the intuited wholeness of the non-linguistic world, to heal the slash in the mind that is the capacity for language” (1992, L124, p. 230).

Lyric meaning is central to Zwicky’s general account of meaning. Lyric speech and writing allows the connections which constitute that wholeness, and which are obscured by the focus of language on the distinctness of things, to resonate within language the way an image or picture might resonate within one’s memory. Lyric is profoundly meaningful because it echoes what is original to meaning—the being of the world. “In bearing the trace of lyric experience of the world, words have meaning for human beings” (1992, L221, p. 404). Lyric speech permits language to express a glimpse of ontological insight which can usually only be understood perceptually. And to achieve lyric insight is to understand, in an essential sense. When we collaborate with being in feeling the resonant connections made clear by lyric, we experience meaning in a basic, original way. “The intuition of resonant relation is the experience of meaning”

(2003, L49). To understand is to intuit resonant lyric meaning. For natural language to express such intuition, it too must resonate with being, as images and music do.

§§3. UNDERSTANDING AND *THISNESS*

I began this section by introducing Zwicky's notions of metaphor and gestalt, which are crucial to her account of understanding as the collaborative experience of meaning. These notions led to a more general discussion concerning both lyric and linguistic meaning. This discussion, in turn, led back to the question of understanding. Along the way I introduced the notion of *thisness*. *Thisness* is another key notion for Zwicky's account of understanding. This subsection will discuss the role that her notion of *thisness* plays in making sense of her views on understanding. Zwicky gives a rather pointed definition of understanding, enhanced by metaphor:

Understanding is the experience of meaning. It is collaborative. To understand, one must be capable of sympathetic resonance, capable, that is, of meaning. If to mean is to go up to someone, to understand is to extend one's hand (in anger, in sympathy, in joy). (1992, L250, p. 452.)

Her metaphor is parallel to Wittgenstein's metaphor for meaning, in which meaning is a physiognomy (2003, R113). She has also made use of his metaphor in her account of meaning in terms of making a gesture. Both gesture and understanding defy mediation, according to Zwicky. Gesture is immediate, while understanding is unmediated (1992, L242/L245, p. 438/444). Her claim about understanding being unmediated is made in the context of remarks about gesture being indistinguishable from meaning, and so it seems that she does intend to

distinguish “immediate” from “unmediated”. Understanding becomes an acknowledgement of what has been meant in a gesture, hence her emphasis on collaboration. Meaning is a physiognomy in that gesture responds to what looks at us, to its presence. Meaning is immediately given in a gestural sense, while understanding as the experience of gestural meaning is only achieved in the reciprocal response to gesture. The reciprocation of gesture, which constitutes understanding as collaborative, is unmediated in the sense that understanding is like interpretation—it consists in reading what has been written; it is the experience of dealing with what confronts one, with what looks directly at one. “Extending one’s hand” presumes that the confronting presence to which a response is directed is already within reach, awaiting one’s touch. The presence to which gesture responds enters into collaboration with gesture. In the collusive co-response of collaborative gesture, understanding is achieved.

Presence is key to this account of understanding. What can be understood about the world is not knowledge in the philosophical sense (i.e. self-contained or representative). It is more integrated than anything knowledge has on offer. Understanding is firmly rooted in the pre-logical and the somatic (1992, L248, p. 448) where the presence of the world cannot be at issue. Understanding in Zwicky’s sense has more to do with what Stanley Cavell calls “acceptance”, the necessary-because-undeniable need to acknowledge the presentness of the world, which “to us cannot be a function of knowing” (1992, R61, p. 113). We understand rather than know the presence of what-is, because its presence is undeniable if understanding is achieved. Here Zwicky is suggesting that our

usual notion of understanding is rather too epistemic, and that understanding is reciprocally direct, unmediated ontological engagement. Her affinity with Heidegger on this point is evident. Understanding proceeds by ontological attention and attunement. “Ontological attention is a response to particularity” (2003, L52).

Zwicky refers to the perceiving of such particularity as *thisness*, in which “we respond to having been addressed” (*ibid.*). Understanding is a striving for integrity (a central notion to which we shall return) by uncovering the world’s unity as it presents itself in details to which we attend. The presence of those details is the contribution of the world to the collaboration—*thisness* is how the world “speaks” to us, i.e. how it looks at us. The world gestures through its details as human beings do through their senses and emotions. In instances of *thisness*, the world’s gestures are present for our response, and responding is an attunement to those gestures. We attend to the presence of being because its presence as *thisness* is how the world addresses us in our form of life.

That understanding is essentially collaborative shows why sensitive, sympathetic resonance is a necessary capability to understand something. One must be able to reciprocally engage, to echo, to collude with the presence of what-is. One must be open and transparent to presence in order to experience meaning. “To mean, then, is to be transparent to presence. To grasp meaning is to apprehend presence, to become vulnerable. And what is present *is* that: present. It stays with one. That is, it has meaning” (1992, L244, p. 442). To gain

ontological insight and to understand means that one co-responds and sings along with what is understood, with what we open up toward.

In his essay on “The Thing,” Heidegger delivers some remarks that may be instructive here. Zwicky’s notion of *thisness* attempts to capture how the presence of the world can be transparent to us through a particular thing. The whole of being, as it were, is compacted into one’s perception of a single thing as an anchor on the ontological. In a later section, I will discuss the integrity of the world that is revealed by such presence. The presence itself, however, is given in a single thing, in a single instance of *thisness*. I see a certain affinity here between the *thisness* of particularities and the thinging of things, of which Heidegger speaks. “If we let the thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let ourselves be concerned by the thing’s worlding being. Thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing” (Heidegger 1971, 181). The thing as thing is present to us in its fullness when it is full of the world’s being. The presence of the world is present to us in the thing’s thinging, which makes the world transparent. In the transparency of its presence through the *thisness* of the thing, the world calls us to respond to it. The *thisness* of the thing seems similar to what Heidegger calls the nearness when he describes thinging as “the nearing of the world” (*ibid.*). A thing that is seen and felt in its true being as thinging thing allows the world to show itself near to us, and to be fully present for us. *Thisness* brings the world impossibly near.

Heidegger also warns that this view requires a step back from representational thinking toward “the thinking that responds and recalls” (*ibid.*). The nearness of the world also demands a response on the part of mortals, as does *thisness* in Zwicky’s philosophy. As Heidegger proposes it, the step back “takes up its residence in a co-responding which, appealed to in the world’s being by the world’s being, answers within itself to that appeal” (Heidegger 1971, 181-182). The being of the world appeals to us as mortals who join in that being. Our answer as mortals to being’s appeal is a co-response jointly undertaken by being and human being. In Heidegger’s essay, this co-responsive “mirror-play” is performed by a fourfold unity of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. But for the purposes of shedding light on Zwicky’s notion of *thisness*, the key lesson is that of the co-responsiveness engendered by the presence of the world anchored in the thing.

Part of the explication of resonance will involve reference to such collusive co-response. Sympathetic resonance is *synaesthetic*. By this term, I do not refer to the medical condition by which bodily senses are coupled. To experience meaning by opening up in transparency to the presence of ontological structure is to achieve perceptual synthesis. Genuine understanding is the co-responsive integration, the matching up or sympathetic resonance, of one’s perceptual capacities with the world as it presences in the *thisness* of particular things. A great deal more will be said concerning synaesthetic integrity as I mount an interpretation of what Zwicky calls lyric clarity. But first, I shall discuss her critique of the dominant notion of clarity: analytic clarity.

§2. ZWICKY'S CRITIQUE OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS

The first section of this chapter covered Zwicky's views on understanding as the collaborative experience of meaning. Zwicky's style of writing reflects these views. She sets her own propositions and utterances in a page-by-page juxtaposition with excerpts from other works such as philosophical texts, scientific writings, images, musical compositions, poetry, mathematical theorems, and literature. Always on the dextrous page, these chosen excerpts have their own presence in her books. Her meaning cannot be fully extracted from the relation it bears to the presence of these excerpts. Consequently, my extraction of her words cannot possibly convey her full meaning. I have therefore attempted an analytic construal of that meaning, which unavoidably falls short of an accurate rendering of her thought. This is a far more serious problem than merely taking words out of their context. The very meaning of her words is achieved in the response they constitute to the excerpts she has selected. Understanding her thought must take into account that its meaning consists in this reciprocal response.

I regard the presentation of Zwicky's philosophy of meaning, understanding and clarity as necessary for discussing what she means when she insists that lyric thought is atemporal. My aim is not to reciprocally engage Zwicky except on the question of time, which is an important theme in both her books. Its importance requires that a good deal of her thought be spelt out in order to understand her views on this question. In particular, her notions of lyric

clarity and lyric thought must be discussed in order to properly engage her views on time. And in turn, in order to properly engage her account of lyric clarity, it is necessary to discuss her characterization and critique of analytic clarity, which is the dominant philosophical conception of clarity. She refers collectively to the style, method, and aims of this manner of thought under the rubric of analytic-systematic thinking. This section's subsections introduce Zwicky's characterization of analytic-systematic clarity, the criticisms she levels against it, and the approach she suggests for enhancing it with the successes of lyric insight. The next section, the last in my first chapter, will explore Zwicky's account of lyric clarity in depth.

§§1. ANALYTIC-SYSTEMATIC CLARITY

“Philosophy is thinking in love with clarity,” on Zwicky's view (1992, L18, p. 32). Her conception of the basic nature and aims of philosophical activity is: thinking whose eros is clarity. (As we shall see, lyric philosophy is also thought in love with clarity, but informed by intuitions of coherence [1992, L103, p. 192].) In this description, “clarity” is the most troublesome term. For the ancient Greeks, the sense was that philosophy, and wisdom in general, was concerned with that which presented itself as most readily disclosed, and was therefore available to be seen. Ancient Greek uses the same word (*oida*) to say “I know” as to say “I see,” a custom continued in metaphor down to our own day. In the same vein, Descartes' emphasis on clarity and distinctness was so influential and well received that clarity became a hallmark of the philosophical

project for three centuries thereafter. But despite this long, hallowed tradition of thinking in love with clarity, and despite varied attempts to achieve clarity concerning clarity, it remains a highly underdeveloped ideal.

Attesting to the obscurity of philosophical clarity, philosophers since Plato have employed a single metaphor for clarity. Our colloquial expression “clear as a bell” is not philosophical in that it refers to the accuracy with which one hears sound (“crystal clear” is closer to the philosophical metaphor). The metaphors thinkers employ in their thoughts and writings are enormously important. The single, dominant metaphor for clarity in philosophy is light—a visual metaphor. Light as the radiant revealer of truth; the cold light of reason; the Sun as the Good in Plato’s cave allegory; the often literal luminescence of truth and of beauty. Gadamer remarks that “the close relationship that exists between the shining forth of the beautiful and the evidentness of the understandable is based on the metaphysics of light,” making reference to Blumenberg (2004, p. 478). Platonic, neo-Platonic and scholastic philosophy accepted that the real was also the visible, and that light was therefore the primary aid of vision, and so also of philosophy in search of clarity.

According to Zwicky, the drive to see well (i.e. clearly and distinctly) has led philosophers to identify clarity with analytic-systematic thinking and with the method we call logical analysis. “Our present image of philosophical clarity and our concept of logical precision are virtually identical” (1992, L22, p. 40). An identification between clarity and analysis has excluded (from what is recognized in philosophy as meaningful thought) all thinking that does not lend itself to

logically precise analysis. On the basis of this exclusion rests Zwicky's characterization of analytic philosophy as "systematic" thinking. "I use 'systematicity' to denote that characteristic of thinking that assumes intelligibility is correctly and exhaustively characterized as a commitment to analytic structure and/or specifiable criteria of justification as the test[s] of clarity, and/or meaningfulness, and/or truth" (2003, p. 490). Zwicky has appropriated this term 'systematicity' from its usual sense in reference to coherent wholes, and uses it to express the way in which clarity conceived as analysis *systematically* prefers analyzable intelligibility. Clarity in philosophy has become synonymous with showing that meaningful utterances are analytic in structure.

Zwicky focuses on two features of analytic-systematic clarity. She argues that analytic-systematic clarity disavows style in the expression of thought. Second, she argues that criterial conceptions of truth and meaning at work in analytic-systematic thought are, in fact, forms of legitimation. "Analysis is...allied to a criterial conception of truth; and is itself susceptible to criterial evaluation" (1992, L55, p. 100). In this context, 'criterial' refers to "a decision procedure for the application of a term...criteria construed as 'objective' standards—standards, that is, whose application can be determined mechanistically" (1992, L43, p. 78). Rational criteria are individual, stylistic standards for systematically judging cases of truth and meaning.

In North American philosophy departments, to provide criteria has frequently come to mean to supply a decision procedure for the application of a term. Indeed, it is only when criteria are so construed that providing them could be regarded, in an analytic context, as a type of clarification (1992, L43, p. 78).

Zwicky charges analytic-systematic thinking with conflating the publicity of individual standards of disciplined expression with objective, rational criteria for truth, meaning, and clarity (1992, L42, p. 76). She remarks that “in analytic philosophy, discipline has been externalized in the form of criteria” (1992, L184, p. 340). Logical analysis insists on a distinction between style and criteria (for truth, for meaning, etc.) that Zwicky takes to be false or, at best, conventional and culturally specific. The central point is that analytic-systematic thinking enforces certain criteria by which clarity is to be achieved if that achievement is to be meaningful. These criteria systematically serve to exclude genuine cases of meaningful philosophical thought. Zwicky does not say whether this exclusion occurs in cases where one’s style does not accept these systematic criteria as absolute but, perhaps, as merely conventional.

The analytic method for achieving clarity focuses on the logical analysis of what is meant or said by an utterance, i.e. what is expressed by an expression: content. This method of interpretation achieves clarity by laying bare before logic all the components of an utterance or argument and examining them for holes, logically undesirable features, inconsistencies, contradictions, etc. Analysis disavows style as relevant to thought. It does this by focusing so completely on the logical aspects of thought that form and structure are disregarded in a systematic fashion. As Zwicky says, “the style of analysis conveys the thought that style is irrelevant to conveying thought” (1992, L172, p. 320). Analytic-systematic method does not take into account the bearing of individual form (style) on the meaning of an utterance or expression. It rules out in advance the

possibility of the relevance of style. The implicit rules of expression that determine a 'style' are, for analysis, left to logic while at the same time treated as something greater than style, namely, as rational criteria for reflecting logical meaning.

The second feature of analytic-systematic thinking is that it is a legitimizing mode of thinking. Analytic-systematic thinking employs a criterial conception of truth and meaning to legitimate certain expressive forms while excluding those that fail to meet its criteria. For example, on the sinister page of the eighty-third entry in *Lyric Philosophy*, Zwicky discusses some traits of the philosophical literature on poetry and metaphor. She notes that philosophers of poetry seem preoccupied with the question 'How does metaphor work?' and that "developing an understanding of metaphor is taken to be tantamount to developing a *theory* of how metaphor manages to (appear to) mean" (1992, L83, p. 152). These concerns highlight "the fact that systematic philosophy's notion of understanding is in a fact a form of legitimation: a person cannot claim to have understood the meaning of a metaphor unless he or she can provide a 'rational reconstruction', *criteria*" (1992, L83, p. 152). Poetry has been excluded from the realm of genuine thinking because its expressions fail to adhere to such criteria.

Now one may hold that all thinking directed toward knowledge must inevitably legitimate thought. To regard the legitimation of thought as a feature of analysis does not provide grounds to criticize it as a method of acquiring knowledge, since as a means to acquire knowledge it does not pretend to do otherwise. Any mode of enquiry that aspires to acquire knowledge surely has the

right to employ criteria for the expression of that knowledge. There must be some way to judge whether a given utterance or expression is adequate to be called knowledge. In some respects, this question comes down to the way in which a discipline or knowledge-seeking community regards the criteria upon which its members rely to adjudicate knowledge claims. It is plausible that all enquiry that pursues knowledge will legitimate thought by accepting only the fruits of certain methods of thinking. But this does not mean that the criteria employed for such legitimation must rule out other methods and forms of thinking as inadequate or insufficiently meaningful. It simply means that only those methods will be accepted, not that only those methods will be recognized. What we have in the analytic method is the latter. Philosophical analysis fails to recognize other methods as genuine, which leads it to reject their fruits by imposing its criteria rather than merely relying on them.

In academic philosophy, to claim that something is understood entails that an account can be given which shows, by rational or logical methods of expression, just what is understood. How such accounts are given in terms of 'rational showing' is to be judged according to certain criteria held in common by members of the academic philosophical community. What counts as meaningful in philosophy must meet certain criteria imposed within the profession by the widespread reliance on these methods. These criteria, please note, do not legitimize this method of philosophical enquiry. Analytic philosophizing legitimates itself by means that are largely political. The leadership of publication governance and professional associations prefers the style of philosophical

writing and teaching imparted to it by reputation, convention, and convenience. By placing what amounts to stylistic expectation under the guise of logical criteria for adequate thought, analytic philosophy legitimates and thus perpetuates itself and its hold on the standards of professional philosophy. The expectation that logical criteria must be met is not itself a logical criterion but rather a manifestation of style. These criteria are determined objectively in the sense that they are held in common independently of any one particular utterance. They are presumed to derive from logic or even from reason itself, where the intuitiveness of these notions still resides in public domain. Analytic-systematic adherents fail to admit that what is held as logical and rational amounts to a style of expression rather than strict criteria for meaning. Zwicky thus contends that a false distinction is perpetrated in analytic philosophy between logical criteria and the notion of style.

§§2. ZWICKY'S CRITICISMS OF ANALYTIC-SYSTEMATIC CLARITY

Zwicky's characterization of analytic-systematic clarity leads, unsurprisingly, to a critique of this conception of clarity. In the thirty-second entry of *Lyric Philosophy*, Zwicky suggests that 'analysis' cannot be all we mean by 'clarity' in philosophical thought. And in the twenty-sixth she asks: "What grounds analysis as a metaphor for clarity more deeply than metaphors which emphasize depth of understanding, depth of emotional resonance, exactness of analogy, precision of tone, comprehensiveness, elegance, dignity?" Zwicky raises

this question by way of four criticisms of the systematic method of logical analysis.

These criticisms are directed toward the central features of analysis I introduced in the previous subsection. The disavowal of style in analytic-systematic thinking yields the criticism that analysis eliminates resonance. Second, and perhaps most telling of all, the logical method of analytic-systematic thinking fails to acknowledge the somatic origin and basis for meaning. We shall see how this failure is also connected with the first criticism. A third criticism follows from the nature of analytic-systematic thinking as a form of legitimation. Zwicky charges that the predetermined analytic ideal of meaning, rationally derived from a publicly held criterial determination of truth following from logic alone, fails to produce thought that coheres in her specific sense. What analysis achieves is merely “stability through rigidity” (1992, L104, p. 194). Lastly there is Zwicky’s charge of unidimensionality, behind which lies the claim that philosophical clarity can be achieved in an utterance whose “axes of coherence” are multiply resonant.

Resonance was introduced in the first section of this chapter as a central feature of lyric thought and lyric clarity. What this means has yet to be discussed in full. For the time being, I would suggest that we confine our imagination to the notion of resonant language used in the expression of lyrically clear thinking. Resonant language sounds a linguistic resonance that originates with the world (1992, L219, p. 400). This means that language that is resonant enacts in our understanding of its words a resonance with the being of the world, the

ontological structure that initiated it through us. Such language is deeply imagistic and musical. It arrives in words that are aware of their own being as words and the sounds they depend upon for their meaning. Poetry uses resonant language, as do songs and metaphors. Resonant language is patently not the kind of language used in scientific or academic writing, especially in analytic philosophy. It does occasionally slip through in the writings of those who either cannot avoid it or who are simply such masters at wielding the method of analysis that they can achieve an integration of penetrating analysis with linguistic resonance. But on the whole, the model of clarity and the linguistic styles used to pursue it tend to eschew resonant language.

I read Zwicky as asking whether the philosophical aim of clarity must be taken as fundamentally analytic, i.e. disintegrative and/or (synthetically) additive. Zwicky's response in *Lyric Philosophy* is that other forms of clear thought are both possible and useful. Clarity can be integrative. Clarity can be resonant. But in philosophy, as its practice has been encouraged since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, clarity has meant disambiguating analysis rather than resonant integration, and discussion of clarity has failed to extend beyond a single metaphor. As argued in the preceding subsection, the visual metaphor of light, taken over from the Platonic/neo-Platonic/scholastic metaphysics of light, has been the sole ruling metaphor for clarity in philosophy. Zwicky finds this state of affairs somewhat stifling. It seems far more plausible to have multiple metaphors for clarity than to have only one (1992, L74, p. 136). But what possible harm could be done by a lack of metaphorical resources for the aim of clarity? What

reasons have we to think that clarity can be made more robust and, well, more *clear*, with an enhanced metaphorical repertoire?

Let us focus on the first criticism. The concern is that logical analysis eliminates resonance. “Analysis, as a style of thought, aims at minimal resonance because it is believed that the ideals of precision and clarity cannot be achieved where there are many elements to co-ordinate and many axes of co-ordination” (1992, L168, p. 314). Analytic-systematic thinking strives for clarity through disambiguation and precise *determination*. Set alongside this passage on the dextrous page is the following excerpt from Lewis White Beck’s ‘Philosophy as Literature’. “The rich ambiguity, the overdetermination, and the invitation to diverse levels of interpretation which rivet our attention to a literary text would be faults in a scientific treatise” (1992, R168, p. 315).

At several points Zwicky claims that Anglo-American analytic-systematic thinking and writing has strived, since the seventeenth century, to model itself on the methods and discourses of modern science, and in particular those of physics. Scientific methods are regarded paradigmatically because they promote great precision and because they rely on collective scrutiny to ensure the greatest degree of disambiguation. Beck refers in the above passage to Darwin and nineteenth-century biology but his remark extends to all of natural science. As is suggested by her placement of the excerpt, Zwicky would extend his comment even further to characterize logical analysis as a method of thinking about philosophical questions. Her point is that analysis does not permit the appreciation of the interplay multiple features of an expression can have within

that expression to emphasize themes and deliver meaning, nor does it consider them material to what is said or expressed. These rich levels of meaning must be unpacked in order to be properly understood, i.e. analyzed.

Analytic-systematic clarity requires that expressions of genuine thought be entirely transparent and singular. Analysis demands singularity, as opposed to unity or harmony. “Philosophy is thinking in love with clarity; and such thinking, in itself, is not a source of problems. What will not let us rest is the thought that what is clear must also be single; we are addicted to the elimination of ambiguity” (2003, L116). Zwicky proceeds to argue that this addiction is simply at odds with our perception and our experience, in which the phenomena of the world admit of ambiguity, multiplicity, and resist being cut at methodologically predetermined joints. The problem is not that ambiguity exists. The problem is that the methods of thinking we take as meaningful refuse to recognize the potential for ambiguity to enhance our clarity of understanding. Ambiguity does not entail confusion and irresponsible thinking. To presume such entailment prematurely disregards the possibility that meaning operates on more than one “level”. We use the metaphor of a level or plane where multiple dimensional axes of meaning are present. “Dimension” is used figuratively, in reference to the component aspects of a particular expression (OED 1989). It is possible to further enhance the clarity of an utterance by recognizing the presence of these multiple axes. The analytic addiction to disambiguation is closely connected with the disavowal of style. Zwicky’s criticism is that style can in fact serve to enhance clarity by making use of multiple, ambiguous axes of meaning available in resonant language and lyric

speech. This is not to equate clarity with ambiguity, but rather to acknowledge the interplay (and interdependency) of form and content in style.

In his first Appendix to *Truth and Method*, Gadamer notes that the term “style” has been used since the sixteenth century “to describe the manner in which something is presented in language. Obviously behind this usage is the view that certain apriori demands—especially, for example, unity—are made of artistic representation, and these are independent of the content of what is represented” (2004, p. 494). Gadamer notes the basic normativity of the concept of style. “Style is by no means a mere peculiarity of expression; it always refers to something fixed and objective that is binding on individual forms of expression” (2004, p. 495).

Analytic style denies the relevance of style for its own expressive conventions, according to Zwicky. “What analysis objects to is style in the sense that analysis itself makes possible: tone-as-political-means rather than resonance-as-ontological-necessity” (1992, L282, p. 510). But any such denial is misguided, since the very disavowal of style, to the extent that it is fixed and binding on individual writers, will itself constitute a style guiding the expression of thought. Zwicky’s suggestion seems to be that to explicitly disavow style in this way is to insist on what she takes to be a false distinction between style (i.e. linguistic expression) and logically derived, normative criteria for meaningful expression. These criteria allow analysts to focus on the ‘content’ of utterances rather than on their presentation, since these elements are regarded separately. The ‘style’ of analytic philosophy manifests as the insistence on a distinction between the form

and the content of an utterance or meaningful expression, by which distinction style can be disavowed in the name of content. Once the community of professional philosophers managed to impose upon itself the sentiment that ‘content’ is to be valued over form and presentation, style was disavowed. However, this normative imposition of hierarchical preference amounts to a more politically ominous manifestation of style.

Style, for Zwicky, is “a form of grace” (1992, L164, p. 306). She arrives at this characterization after giving a series of examples that call into question any attempt at a stylistic taxonomy (*ibid.*). “There is no *taxonomy* of style in general...[t]he ways in which we use words, individually and in relation to each other, reveal the absence of hard boundaries between *how* we express our thought and *what* we are thinking” (*ibid.*). Grace has no explicit sense apart from its usual meaning. Zwicky’s conception of style seems to be that an expression of thought can be said to have style as it manages to achieve greater and greater ‘coherence’. “The more complex a thought, and the greater the degree of coherence achieved, the more the pressure of style will be felt...style emerges under the *pressure* of the intuition of coherence” (1992, L194, p. 360). We have not yet explored her notion of coherence in depth. However, I can say in a preliminary fashion that it has to do with the connections drawn by the complexity of thought. An expression of thought that manages to say something profound while also tracing its implications and the steps leading up to it, as well as the philosophical and ideological presumptions that condition it, may well achieve coherence. Style as it emerges from the drive to coherent expression can

be reflected in sensitivity to an expression's own resonance with other expressions and related experiences, its own history, its own limits, its own peculiar aims, and its own language. Lyric takes this one step further. "No style of thought is without an ideology: lyric's is a meta-ideology: to strive for sensitivity to the ideological commitments of any given style" (1992, L209, p. 284). A lyric style of writing and thinking thus aims for maximal resonance.

The second criticism I wish to discuss is connected in an important way to the first. Here I refer to the failure of analytic-systematic thinking to acknowledge the visceral, somatic origin of meaning. That there is such an origin follows from the ability of natural language to produce distinct sense through tonal association and other sonorous means alone. Meaning relies on countless elements that are physically perceived by a speaker and his/her auditor. Zwicky discusses such elements under the rubric of sonority.

Sonority refers to the way in which our understanding responds to somatic rhythm (2003, p. 504). In a way similar to how a good story or a great musical work moves us, a well written poem or thoughtfully composed linguistic expression can too. To criticize analysis on the grounds that it fails to acknowledge this somatic basis of meaning is to say that analysis does not account for the embodiment of what it analyzes. Zwicky takes the sonority of an utterance as an aspect of its (philosophical) meaning. If sonority partially determines meaning, this is both logically and philosophically significant. The physical construction of an utterance, its tonality, the delivery of its rhythm, the shape of the sound it makes and the peculiar structure of its form, all work

together to determine what is meant. In Zwicky's words, "the aural resonance of a phrase or sentence has consequences for our understanding of it" (1992, L240, p. 436).

In a sense, this point is similar to McLuhan's cliché that "the medium is the message" which illustrates a persuasive philosophical point: style is part of meaning. How one speaks and how one expresses his or her thought cannot be disregarded or divorced from what is said or from the meaning that is conveyed. A simple example: the same sentence uttered by both a native and an accented speaker will not be semantically identical because in each there is conveyed information about the background of the speaker and perhaps even their motives for speaking. Alternatively, this essay's supervisor has suggested the examples of men falling in love with women on account of seductive accents, or the assumption of intelligence with respect to moronic individuals who speak with Oxbridge tongues. Such aspects of speech are strictly sonorous but can convey information that changes the meaning of utterances, even in the case of manufactured accents. And in general, the style in which an utterance is expressed can greatly influence how that utterance is determined as meaningful.

The explicit disavowal of professed style in favour of method(ology) by analytic-systematic thinking tends to promote the impression that any emergence or embrace of style makes a work less likely to achieve genuine meaning. An embrace of logical criteria that also disavows style, while not an escape from style, is thus closely connected with a failure to acknowledge the somatic origin of linguistic meaning. The elimination of resonance in analytic-systematic

thinking is also related to Zwicky's fourth central criticism concerning the alleged unidimensionality of such thinking. (It should be noted that none of these criticisms are unrelated, of course, and that discussing them in an enumerated fashion is simply more illustrative.)

Zwicky's third criticism builds on her claim that analytic-systematic thinking is a form of legitimation. Legitimation serves (wittingly or otherwise) to treat certain methods and modes of expression as illegitimate, which can lead to exclusion on grounds of meaninglessness. The criticism here is that the particular methodological ideology serving to legitimate thought in academic philosophy itself fails to produce coherent thought. A coherent thought must convey in its details and particularities an awareness of what that work achieves as a whole, and sensitivity to the resonant connections that work enacts. The work must also in some way imply or prefigure the presence of those particular details of which it is composed.

Analytic-systematic thinking fails to achieve coherence for the following reasons. Such thinking makes great headway in the area of logical clarity, but the political extension of its methods imposes that clarity upon areas where it actually obscures what is meaningful, e.g. emotional and poetical contexts, where clarity can also be achieved. Analysis shuns certain details in the attempt to achieve logical precision, such as how a thought makes one feel. The exclusion, and at best distortion, of emotional details is merely one example of a more general pattern. "What system achieves is not coherence as much as stability, through rigidity" (1992, L104, p. 194). Analytic-systematic thinking employs a

predetermined ideal for identifying meaning, based upon a criterial conception of truth (1992, L99, p. 184) conceived by a tradition that thinks truth and clarity under a single metaphor. Such thinking thus fails to achieve coherence because it does not permit recognition of the presence of emotional details in our perception of a thought. Their presence is suppressed rather than dismissed as irrelevant. The key question arising out of this criticism that proponents of analytic-systematic thinking must address is: “Why should emotionlessness make a way of thinking *good*?” (1992, L46, p. 82). It is of course not only emotional details that are excluded from what is deemed meaningful thought, but this prime example will serve to demonstrate Zwicky’s third criticism.

Zwicky is fairly explicit on the meaning of her fourth criticism of analytic-systematic thinking. Analysis yields unidimensional thinking, i.e. the form of absolute ordering applied to expressions of thought. Unidimensionality, as a feature of thinking conditioned by analytic method, amounts to a style of thinking only in an ironic sense because, in a point made by comparative metaphor, “tone-deafness can only ironically be construed as a form of musicality” (1992, L172, p. 320). “In pure, schematic argument, ‘content’ is of no interest. The form does not arise *from* it. The form itself is unidimensional. Only the most minimal resonance is possible, the most rudimentary of non-algebraic meanings. The spaces in analysis are necessarily discontinuities, not [resonance] chambers” (1992, L34, p. 64). The third entry in *Lyric Philosophy* defines the notion of unidimensional form: “A unidimensional form is one that possesses a single axis of connectedness.” Be it used in reference to connectedness or coherence, the

notion of an axis is a metaphor for the formal aspects of an utterance or expression. How the structure of an expression is presented, the structural “shape” it takes on is its form. In analytic-systematic thinking, this form is generally restricted to a single dimension, i.e. to a particular aspect of meaning. That single dimension is modeled on Newton’s representational schema for time, according to Zwicky. “Arguments are a species of logico-linguistic analysis. Analysis in general has Newtonian chronic form; that is, it is unidimensional” (1992, L3, p. 4). An argument is, by definition (1992, R2, p. 3), sequential, and thus always an exercise in chronic arrangement. This particular sequential form derives from the scientific notion of absolute time provided by Newton, “arguably one of the most abstract notions we possess” (1992, L7, p. 10). A conceptual ordering, for which the root inspiration is absolute time, is applied to argumentation. The order of time, as it exists for logic, is absolute, i.e. “it is absolutely independent of space” (1992, L1, p. 2). It will help to quote Zwicky in full here.

The root conceptual order of a valid argument has the form of Newtonian time. Regardless of the literal order of the sentences, propositions, or functions which comprise it, any given valid argument can, *without loss of meaning*, be given a representation whose schematic form is the same as that of Newtonian time. For arguments, this form is manifest as a conceptual hierarchy. What is meant by validity is a function of this hierarchy: if the conceptual sequence is altered, the argument makes no sense, is incoherent. Such a hierarchy does not preclude the possibility of conceptual independence any more than the concept of Newtonian time precludes the possibility of simultaneity.—A river may have many branches, and each branch may have many tributaries, but all water always flows in the same direction: down. (1992, L2, p. 2.)

The very concept of a river entails a downward flow, just as the essence of an argument presumes the absolute onward flow of time as *conceptualization*, and depends on this for its validity. Formal validity is unidimensional in a chronic

sense; Zwicky connects this to what she calls *chronomorphic* thought, as I will discuss later. The sequentiality of formal validity is modeled on the idea of absolute time in modern scientific discourse, for which Newton's representational schema is the root. Analysis is unidimensional in the sense that the conceptual hierarchy by which it proceeds is a *chronic* hierarchy, a conceptualizing movement—an absolute conceptualization. But the absolute conceptual hierarchy entailed by this sequentiality is suspect—its necessity has nowhere been established. The conceptual hierarchy that grounds our analytic notion of formal validity is largely taken for granted. Zwicky would likely contend that it has been imposed by political means, under the aim of transforming philosophical discourses into something that more closely resembles that of scientific enquiry. Thus the necessity of a conceptual hierarchy as the sole permissible form for philosophical clarity is questionable. This is what Zwicky means when she criticizes analytic-systematic thinking for being unidimensional. Unidimensionality belies a rigid conceptual hierarchy that stands neither justified nor necessary as the sole available model of clarity.

Zwicky has given four compelling, distinct (yet related) reasons for asking whether 'analysis' can be all we mean by 'clarity' in philosophical thought. In the following section we shall introduce her alternative method and style for achieving philosophical clarity, namely *lyric clarity*. But first we take a look at the idea that polydimensional style can augment analysis and enhance philosophical clarity.

§§3. ENHANCING CLARITY BY AUGMENTING ANALYSIS

Perhaps the least contentious example of a philosopher who successfully enhanced philosophical clarity is Ludwig Wittgenstein. “Wittgenstein was driven by a desire for clarity which matches that found in the best Anglo-American analytic philosophy; but his work embodies a notion of clarity which is more complex” (1992, L117, p. 218). His *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* are examples of rigorous polydimensional thinking. His fragments emphasize the claim that all things of value fall outside the possibility of purely logical articulation (1992, L174, p. 322). Some scholars even claim that Wittgenstein abandoned analysis in favour of pursuing clarity for its own sake and in all its forms. “I see this declaration [of the intrinsic value of clarity] (1930) as a continuation of [Wittgenstein’s] views at the time he wrote the *Tractatus* (1918), though of course the fact that clarity is pursued in a different manner (no longer through logical analysis) may well mean that a different kind of clarity is in view” (Garver 2006, p. 19). In his later work, which aimed to understand the essence of things, “Wittgenstein strives for clarity through examples, intermediate cases, and broader context rather than through logical analysis” (*ibid.*).

The clarity Wittgenstein achieves defies logical articulation because the moves he makes are extralogical, as when he employs complex semantic elements to reinforce what his words express, e.g. in the final sentence of the *Tractatus*. (And to the extent that its English translation does not reflect sensitivity to those connections expressed by the German original, the meaning expressed by the English version will be less coherent than the German, in Zwicky’s sense.) Such

clarity is not achieved by hasty rejection of analytic-systematic thinking, however. Zwicky repeatedly emphasizes that the point here is simply to show that analysis does not exhaust what can be called “clarity” in philosophy. Clarity also includes the unity one finds operating on different levels of a work, such as its aesthetic presentation, organization, origin, particular language of expression, etc. Analysis is not sufficiently complex to capture all that can be clearly perceived as meaningful. Garver argues that Wittgenstein rejected analysis as a means of pursuing clarity, and in fact devotes an entire chapter section to the notion of “Clarity without Analysis” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However, this heading is slightly misleading because Garver’s claim amounts to saying that analysis is not the only road to clarity for Wittgenstein, which is not an outright rejection of analysis.

The stout analytic might here object that while analysis may not exhaust all that can be made clear in a philosophical sense, analysis has shown itself to be the most reliable method for achieving clarity. Analysis has done the best work and made the furthest strides in getting clear on the questions posed by philosophers, on the kinds of answers we should accept, and on the practices we follow in this exchange. Be this as it may, there is no way to separate such observations from the criteria analysis itself uses to scrutinize and “analyze” analytic-systematic thinking. However, these criteria are to a certain degree modeled on those employed by scientific disciplines, which have made demonstrable advances in clarity regarding certain obscure questions. Philosophy can therefore adopt the successes of other fields and experiment by trial and error.

Zwicky would respond that what is at issue is not whether analysis is reliable. She fully accepts its reliability. At stake is the need for analysis, in its self-representations, to establish itself as the sole means for achieving clarity, even if that simply means, “most trusted”. There is a certain obsession with progress at work in analytic-systematic thinking, as Wittgenstein noted throughout his *Philosophical Investigations*. And there is a danger that the way in which analysis legitimates thought will lead, and has led, to the suppression of other legitimate realms of thought. This has already occurred in many areas, such as poetry and art, which have been relegated to the status of expressive pursuits that make little contribution to genuine thinking. The spread of analysis is the relentless replication of a methodological virus, which destroys all thinking that is not like itself. But like the viruses we use for vaccinations, analysis serves a valuable purpose for certain problems and matters (such as the demonstration of its own limits and the protection against the pull of its own seductive power).

Our stout friend may then retort, in a noticeably more venomous tone, by asking why the results of non-analytic thinking should be called ‘clarity’ at all? Thought that not only embraces ambiguity but thrives on the indeterminacy of aural and extra-linguistic factors of meaning, paying attention to perceptual and emotional features, does not seem to harbour a solid commitment to clarity. Our preliminary characterizations of lyric thought seem to fall nowhere near what one could seriously call ‘clarity’. Clarity is clear, not ambiguous. Clear thought is detailed and determinate. Clear thought should not be susceptible to the

subjective whims of perception and feeling. How can these features be hallmarks of a form of clarity of which analysis falls short?

Such questions are natural. I hope to show how an account of lyric clarity might tackle them, head on. I will now turn Zwicky's account of lyric clarity.

§3. LYRIC CLARITY

The criticisms of analytic-systematic thinking I have presented on Zwicky's behalf would seem naturally to follow from her critical characterization of philosophical analysis. She does not appear to leave much room for praising analytic methodology, as I have presented her views. However, this is not entirely fair to analysis. A more detailed consideration of Zwicky's remarks would show that her characterization is as critical of the political culture of our technological society as it is frustrated with the lack of clarity ironically engendered by analytic methodology. Such methodology is not itself the primary target of her critical views. Her real target is the exclusivity with which this method is wielded to suppress other ways of thinking.

As a method, analysis focuses on the content of thought to the extent that its presentation and style are disregarded. Logically discerned criteria are used to judge the adequacy of arguments under the rubric of analytic methodology, as though all clear thinking naturally lends itself to being analyzed and broken down. Logic has not led philosophers to this error; philosophers have. Developments in scientific disciplines came to be regarded as advances and successes in the quest for truth conceived as the production and acquisition of knowledge. Science

became the model for critical discussion. And from its roots in mathematics, analytic methodology became the chief tool of science. A reverence for the progress of science lends credibility to its analytic methodology, and so that methodology is adopted for other purposes in order that similar results may be achieved in areas such as philosophy, psychology, philology, and, later, linguistics, sociology, and so on, throughout the entire academy.

The associations of analysis, whatever its particular rules or subject matter, have always been strongly mathematical; and since the seventeenth century, scientific; and since the late eighteenth century, technological. Hence 'analytic philosophy', characterized by a number of particular emphases: on applied science as the ultimate framework for anything that aspires to the status of knowledge; on language and logic, specifically language *qua* logic; on the virtual exclusivity of analysis as a critical tool and compositional technique; on a distinction between philosophy and the study of art, and between philosophy and history, including, frequently, the history of philosophy (1992, L19, p. 34).

The adoption of analytic methodology for the practice of critical philosophy not only changed the way philosophers philosophized. It also changed the way in which they presented and taught the history of their own discipline to themselves and to their students. It became habitual to think and to teach that the traditional pursuit of truth and clarity was analytic. But what likely began as an emulation of scientific progress eventually became a methodological regime.

While there are problems inherent to this as to any method, four of which I have presented in §2. §§2. above, Zwicky is not launching a revolt against a method. That would be as fruitless as waging a "war on terror." Her discontent rests with "the virtual exclusivity of analysis" in the practice of philosophy. "To say that clarity of thought is best served by *making* analysis the philosophical method of choice assumes that prior to identifying clarity with analysis, we would know clear thought when we saw it; that independently of 'analysis' as a

definition, we know what clarity is” (1992, L23, p. 42). Perhaps proponents of exclusive reliance on the analytic method do know what clarity is apart from its pursuit in analysis. The literature does not support this thesis, however. There is a veritable lack of developed discussion concerning clarity. (As I suggested at the opening of this chapter, this lack is in the initial stages of recognition and redress.)

Zwicky’s aim is to provide a conception of clarity in addition to that furnished by analysis. “I am looking for a way of thinking that in addition to using analysis can travel by extra-logical connections of images, similarities in overtone and structure; thought that is at once clear *and* resonant; in which clarity can assume the form of resonance” (1992, L48, p. 86). She calls this enhanced conception ‘lyric clarity’. ‘Lyric’ immediately suggests a musical vocabulary, doubtless by her own intention. Here Zwicky appeals to our auditory perceptual sense in a way parallel to the appeal to sight in traditional philosophy. In this section, I briefly consider the traditional metaphor for clarity in order to introduce Zwicky’s aural metaphor. Then I examine the primary elements of Zwicky’s account of lyric clarity: aural resonance, semantic coherence, and gestural integrity. My aim in the closing section of this chapter is to present an interpretation of lyric clarity as thought that achieves *synaesthetic integrity*.

§§1. METAPHORS FOR CLARITY

Metaphors are commonly regarded as mere stylistic or rhetorical devices, little more than literary tools. But for Zwicky, as we have seen, metaphors reveal the very essence of understanding, in which an experience of meaning is carried

across from one context to another. “A metaphor is a *way* of thinking. Like an analysis: it is an attempt to say something about the nature of what is” (1992, L217, p. 396). As a way of thinking, metaphor serves to enframe all thinking and enquiry for a particular tradition. By the same etymology, such “ways of approach” are enshrined in the methods of particular traditions, and are necessary to theorize about any subject matter (Burch 2004, 388). For the tradition of philosophy arisen from Plato, thinking about clarity, as with thinking about beauty, truth, and the good, drew almost exclusively on the visual metaphor of light to enframe these notions. The traditional metaphor of light became explicitly tied to clarity in Descartes, and thereby attained a more literal status. The key feature of this metaphor for our purposes is that it entails a primarily visual characterization of knowledge. This visual metaphor for clarity became wedded to the analytic method. What can be clearly and meaningfully expressed as thought or known can also be seen, illuminated, laid out in front of one, and eventually represented in analyzable form. Connected with these features of the metaphor is a peripheral notion of depth—genuine clarity has depth (in geometrical-metaphorical opposition to breadth).

Zwicky does not seek to dismiss or to replace the traditional metaphor, only to augment and enhance it. Lyric clarity employs the notion of resonance as an alternate root metaphor. The sense to which lyric appeals is an intuitive listening to the “echo” of the world. Clarity can be aural as well as visual; both can serve as primary frameworks or ways of thinking. The aural metaphor of resonance is even similar to that of light in that both are spatial. Depth, however,

takes on the quality of polydimensionality for lyric, i.e. clarity that functions on multiple related “levels”. The variety of ways in which sounds, like musical notes and themes, can resonate and feed off one another is parallel to the way in which light “reveals” what is hidden. I will now more closely consider this metaphorical notion of resonance, its relation to what Zwicky calls “coherence”, and the connection of both to gestural integrity as three primary elements of lyric clarity.

§§2. AURAL RESONANCE, SEMANTIC COHERENCE, AND GESTURAL INTEGRITY

Lyric clarity cannot be characterized in a neat, systematic fashion. But truth be told, this is not how Zwicky has characterized the analytic method for clear thinking, either, so there should be no expectation that I alter my proceedings for this topic. The aim here is to discuss what I take to be the three primary elements of lyric clarity. Zwicky discusses lyric in terms of resonance, coherence, and integrity. I deploy adjectives to more plainly indicate the senses in which I take her terms to be used.

In brief, aural resonance refers to the contribution textual sonority makes to the meaning of a lyric work. But as I argued above, resonance is more than the way something sounds. Aural resonance can be heard when a work sounds a connection between its sonorous features and what is expressed by those structures. The resonance of a work is its ability to touch, “at once” (i.e. in a single gesture), several aspects of how its meaning is perceived, and to “vibrate” those aspects as though they shared a central unity. Aural resonance serves as a metaphor for the way in which lyric clarity appeals to a multiplicity of perceptual

facets. “Resonance here is a root metaphor. To sound an utterance in a resonant thought-structure is, among other things, to produce sympathetic vibrations of varying intensities throughout—to cause other utterances to sound, some less faintly, some more” (1992, L33, p. 62). Resonance is heard when component utterances are directed toward one another in aural space.

Sympathetic vibrations can manifest as emotional, spiritual or intellectual connections, as well as in connection with perceptual experiences, memories, familiar themes, etc. The connections made by the resonant structure of the work serve to enhance our understanding of its meaning, its relation to other works, and the meaning of those other works as well. “Emotional resonance is one among several ways a human being has of coming clearly to understand or perceive something” (1992, L45, p. 80). In written language and in speech, this sympathetic, vibrational interplay is achieved through dense, musical language that displays the interconnections between ideas and thought almost as though they were images expressed in words. Zwicky has selected an excerpt from Charles Kahn that addresses the concept of resonance with respect to the fragments of Herakleitos.

By linguistic density I mean the phenomenon by which a multiplicity of ideas are expressed in a single word or phrase. By resonance I mean a relationship between fragments by which a single verbal theme or image is echoed from one text to another in such a way that the meaning of each is enriched when they are understood together. The two principles are formally complimentary: resonance is one factor making for the density of any particular text; and conversely, it is because of the density of the text that resonance is possible (1992, L23, p. 43).

This excerpt comes very close to expressing how Zwicky uses the term ‘resonance’, and this is doubtless why she chose it. Although order is not necessarily significant in Zwicky’s texts, I find it significant that this excerpt

appears in the entry following her first explicit mention of resonance (though she earlier alludes to “resonant form” at L6, p. 8). Kahn’s account is obviously intended to furnish her own meaning.

Later Zwicky states that “resonance is a form of acknowledgement of other axes of human experience than the logico-linguistic. It is an acknowledgement of the relevance of these other axes *for* the logico-linguistic” (1992, L172, p. 320). This description is somewhat vague and obscure, but it cuts to the heart of things. The linguistic turn in philosophy has overshadowed every other question. Philosophers are uncertain what to make of discussions concerning the limits of language because if the analytic method is to be reliably trusted, then there can be none. Support for the thesis that language is ubiquitous comes also from the continental tradition, most prominently from Heidegger. But for analytic philosophy, the absence of linguistic syntax (i.e., “the idea that only certain [non-empirically determined] types of associations are capable of making sense” [1992, L128, p. 238]) means that the meaning of a work cannot be logically analyzed because its meaning is not syntactically determined. “In the absence of syntax...meaning as it is possessed by logical argument does not exist. Meaning, as it exists for chronomorphic thought, is entirely linguistic” (1992, L271, p. 490). Analysis demands that all meaning be rendered not only linguistically, but syntactically, in order to be understood. Otherwise it cannot be analyzed. (“Chronomorphic thought” is explained in the next chapter.)

Against this logico-linguistic reduction of meaning to syntax, Zwicky has pointed out that our experience is not entirely linguistic (Wittgenstein is an

essential progenitor of her argument here). Therefore some aspects of human experience, of which we may aspire to gain wisdom, cannot be adequately explored by analytic methodology. There are “other axes of human experience,” and other dimensions of meaningful human being that resist strictly linguistic assimilation, and thus analysis also. Such meaning is commonly expressed in music, in art, in poetry, in prayer, in images, in touch and bodily movement, in memory, in taste and smell, and in a wide variety of ways. Resonance alerts us to their bearing on a work. Resonant language allows their presence to be expressed in rich, densely ambiguous speech and writing where the full space of thought is compressed into words that contain multiple axes of meaning. “Resonance presupposes at least two axes of coherence” (1992, L234, p. 428), while analysis is unidimensional in that it insists on thought that has no more than a single, syntactic, logico-linguistic axis. As we shall see, the unidimensionality of analytic thought makes it chromorphic and thus dependent in a certain sense upon temporal organization. Lyric is not dependent in this way, according to Zwicky.

Resonance is heard or sensed where there exists integration between the various parts of a whole work, meaning that resonance is a function of integration (1992, L34, p. 64). Zwicky’s notion of lyric integrity is thus basic to that of resonance, as it also is to that of coherence. I wish to explore the latter notion before I explain how integrity grounds resonance and coherence. We may also glean insight into the nature of style from the way in which these three notions relate.

Our next topic, semantic coherence, is a somewhat more intuitive notion than that of resonance. Zwicky is closer here to the usual meaning of the term than she is to its more technical variant found in epistemology. Zwicky writes that lyric philosophy is driven by profound intuitions of coherence (1992, L103, p. 192), and that style emerges under the pressure of such intuitions. But lyric coherence will be seen to depend on her notion of lyric integrity. “The delineation of coherence, if achieved, is integrative: expression that enacts and acknowledges a web of emotional, perceptual, and intellectual comprehension. Something that for an instant joins the ear, nose, skin, tongue, and heart with the eye and the mind” (1992, L65, p. 120). And what is integrated as coherent is in fact a whole(ness), not a unity of distinct parts or details.

Lyric coherence is not like the unity of systematic structures: its foundation is a heightened experience of detail, rather than the transcendence (excision) of detail.

Details are at once centres and peripheries. That is: there is only centre, there are only details.

Lyric speaks of, and to, a wholeness that is not merely additive. (1992, L66, p. 120.)

Coherence achieves integrity through wholeness in multiplicity.

It is in this way, then, that philosophy might assume lyric form: when thought whose eros is clarity is driven also by profound intuitions of coherence—when it is also an attempt to arrive at an integrated perception, a picture or understanding of how something might affect us as beings with bodies and emotions as well as the ability to think logically...When philosophy attempts to give voice to an ecology of experience. (1992, L68, p. 124.)

The “eros” of lyric, that which arouses and stimulates it, is a drive to coherence, according to Zwicky (2003, p. 490). Lyric philosophy coheres in the sense that lyric achieves a wholeness in which a multiplicity of aspects of a work—emotional, perceptual, structural—are related in both their detail and in their wholeness.

The thing about lyric is that you *must* have it both ways: the immediate preciousness [*thisness*, particularity] of each individual thing and the coherence of the whole. The relation of details to the complete work in lyric composition enacts the coherence of the whole in lyric vision. (1992, L111, p. 206.)

The phrase “lyric vision” here is awkward. Its use resurrects the visual metaphor I have sought to avoid in characterizing Zwicky’s aural metaphor. But its use is not wholly unjustified if we recall that lyric thought is imagistic. Images are polydimensional. They convey thought along multiple axes. For this reason, they support the co-ordination and interplay of ambiguity along multiple axes of meaningful expression in lyric composition. But the coherent vision enacted in such language is imagistic, and so the visual metaphor is actually intended more literally than usual.

Fusion of semantic elements would be the ultimate fulfillment of the intuition of coherence, but for this very reason it cannot be characteristic of coherence. By definition, coherence joins together what is not the same, i.e. what is distinct and separate. “Coherence does not imply similarity. Coherence insists on connectedness, but it may be characterized by difference or reactivity” (1992, L202, p. 374). The connection made in the achievement of coherence does not fuse together the elements that are connected, and in fact depends on their remaining separate and distinct, rather than fusing into a single identity. “What gives the megalithic circle its power?—Not just size. The stones are separate, but each listens to the others listen” (*ibid.*). Lyric coherence expressed in language is characterized by what we might call an echo, drawing on the aural metaphor. The details used in lyric writing, e.g. the metaphors and phrases one uses, the rhythms deployed and the beats created, will bear traces not only of the whole of the work

but also a connection with other details and devices that bear them. The coherence of lyric writing consists in the joining together of disparate details to express a whole and to achieve its meaning through interconnection. This expression of a meaningful whole by the stitching together of interconnection in separate details is the achievement of semantic coherence that characterizes lyric thought.

Some works achieve semantic coherence only with much difficulty. Style emerges under the pressure of this difficulty, by the effort required to echo the connections between elements of a work. “The greater the apparent differences among the constitutive elements that must be co-ordinated, the greater the insistence on coherence, the greater will be the tension under which the work comes into being” (*ibid.*). That tension is what gives style its flavour. The normativity of style is always present in the expectation that what one expresses in contribution to established discourse will cohere with what has been established. Thought cannot be identified unless it attempts to cohere with such establishments. Stylistic peculiarity arises from the degree of tension which individuals attempt to resolve in their own writing. The peculiar degree of difficulty they take on will determine the flavour of their own style.

Integrity is the more difficult of the three notions that characterize lyric clarity. Zwicky speaks of (dis)integration, integrity, and gestural integrity. Integrity is achieved in gesture. The basic idea is that gestures will respond with greater or less transparency to the presence of the world. Integration refers to the degree of integrity a gesture achieves with respect to the world. Neither

resonance nor coherence is possible without integrity. The meaning of lyric philosophy lives in Zwicky's notion of integrity. "Lyric is based in an integrity of response and co-response; each dimension attending to the others. The mouth of lyric is an ear" (1992, L181, p. 336). Each gesture appeals to the others. Heidegger's notion of co-responding again comes to mind. A gestural co-responding characterizes integrity. Disparate gestures collude in their appeal to one another. In speaking, words listen. In aroma, the nose tastes a flavour. Gestural connectedness achieves integrity in the collusive co-response between gestures, and in the way that each bespeaks the others.

This integrity at the basis of lyric philosophy grounds the coherence of interconnected details in their resonance with each other as traces of the whole of a work's meaning. "Integrity is a form of attunement" (1992, L34, p. 64). The particular components of a whole are said to be integrated when they attend toward each other in support of that whole, i.e. when they echo and reflect each other, pay tribute to each other, acknowledge each other in difference and contrast, and make the most of ambiguity to achieve greater and more profound expression. Music and poetry are examples of works that have integrity in this sense. The meaning of tones, sounds, and words are held in tension, withdrawn, hinted, until the full gesture has been made. The components connect to make an experience of meaning by attending to one another, responding to each other's attunement, and co-responding as a whole to which one can respond as a meaningful presence.

If a thing is *truly* the path down, we think, it cannot also truly be the path up; at least one of these, we say, must be an appearance. But this is not to think clearly. It is to fail to attend to what experience shows. It is to stop short of

wisdom, which recognizes clarities that non-metaphorical language cannot render. Different wholes occupy the same space (2003, L116).

Zwicky is adamant that integrity is not the fusing of components or elements of expression by which we perceive the meaning of a whole. “Integration is not fusion. If the mind is not distinguishable from the heart, or hand, or voice, it cannot be responsive to them, nor they to it” (1992, L181, p. 336). But what sustains the integration is a desire for an “impossible fusion” (1992, L134, p. 250). Lyric desires that selfhood be overcome. “[Lyric] desires fusion as the lifting of the screen of ‘self’ that separates us from the world, fusion as the complete fulfillment of the intuition of coherence” (1992, L133, p. 248). But since language is essential to our being as part of the world, this desire can never be fulfilled. What we can achieve is integration, by which we think in such a way that the world’s transparency comes through. Clarity of thought is about transparency of thought. “An utterance, a gesture, is clear if it is transparent;...if it facilitates the integrity of our being in the world” (1992, L25, p. 46). Lyric clarity is gained in those expressions of thinking where we use our linguistic veil to see past not only itself but ourselves, to the being of the world of which we are a part. We return to our basic lyric experience of the world’s being when we think lyrically clear thought. “Achieved lyric expression is transparent to human lyric experience. It bespeaks an awareness that is vulnerable to the world. Open” (1992, L71, p. 130). To use language to achieve lyric clarity is to bend words “to the shape of wordlessness” (1992, L137, p. 256). We use words to overcome themselves in revealing the being of the world.

Words are transparent only to the extent that their being as words is acknowledged. A transparent utterance reveals the presence of the world

through language. Integrity is determined both within a context of utterance, and in the larger sphere in which language is also a *part* of the world (L260, p. 472).

Integrity thus refers to the lyric use of language and to the desire to fuse one's self with the being of the world. Integrity characterizes those uses of language and those experiences of meaning in which the world's presence becomes transparent. This extra-linguistic sense of integrity captures what is original to our own being. We are the world, yet we hold ourselves apart from it by the grip of language. And yet we use language to gesture toward this original, unreachable fusion.

Gestural integrity is central to lyric clarity in a way that will provide closure to my discussion of lyric clarity. "Lyric clarity is gestural integrity," Zwicky bluntly announces (1992, L259, p. 470). "It is central to the philosophical reading of a lyric text that we remain alive to its gestures of integration" (1992, L155, p. 292). Gestures, as I discussed at the outset of this chapter, are human responses to presence. To gesture is to reciprocate with the presence of the world's being and to enact a collaboration between presence and human thinking. Gestural integrity refers to the *gesturality* of the way in which elements of a text might respond and co-respond with each other. Their integrity consists in their being joined together. Their gestural integrity consists in their being joined together in such a way that they fit, echo, and co-respond to one another. Such gestural integrity is the primary feature of lyric. It will also point the way toward the notion I propose as the lynchpin of lyric clarity, namely *synaesthetic integrity*.

For the linguistic achievement of (gestural) integrity, the two main characteristics are polydimensionality (1992, L5, p.8) and complexity (1992, L183, p. 338). Speech and language that are constructed along multiple axes of

meaning, e.g. perceptual, emotional, musical, spiritual, etc., and that play on these axes of complexity to cohere and to resonate their connections with ontological transparency, can achieve the synaesthetic integration in which lyric clarity consists.

§§3. LYRIC CLARITY AS SYNAESTHETIC INTEGRITY

To conclude my first chapter, I suggest that lyric clarity is most adequately conceived in terms of what I wish to call *synaesthetic integrity*. Both terms are derived from Zwicky's lexicon. 'Integrity' largely retains the flavour it has been given in the preceding discussion. The adjective 'synaesthetic' is adapted from the sixty-third entry of *Lyric Philosophy*. "Clarity as a form of synaesthesia rather than synaesthesia as a form of confusion," Zwicky declares, following her contrast between clear thought that enables us to hear and the more traditional commitment to clear thought that enables us to see. On the dextrous page Zwicky has placed three entries from Ernest Klein's *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*: 'clear', '[a]esthete', and 'audible'.

The Latin adjective *clārus* (bright, shining, clear, plain, manifest, illustrious, famous, glorious) stands for *clā-rus* and is related to *clāmāre*, which can mean 'to call, cry out, shout, declare' (the root of our verb 'to claim'), and the root Indo-European base for which means 'to shout, resound'. The suggestion is that the original sense of 'clear' was something like "clear-sounding," and that it presumably took an effort by Latin writers to adopt the visual sense of the term that grounds our own use. Next is the noun 'esthete' or 'aesthete', from which the

adjective ‘aesthetic’ is formed. The transliterated Greek root *aisthanesthai*, ‘to perceive, to feel’, also has auditory connotations, and is cognate with the Latin *audiō*. This noun does mean “one who perceives,” according to Klein. The adjective ‘aesthetic’ would thus mean ‘perceptible’ or ‘perceptual’, although its etymology seems to refer to aural perception. Last on the page is ‘audible’ from the Latin *audiō, audīre*, ‘to hear’, connected to the Indo-European base meaning ‘to perceive’ and related to the Avestic *āvish*, ‘openly, evidently’. The upshot of all this is that ‘clarity’ would seem to find some original ground in aural moorings, as does the literal meaning of our adjective ‘aesthetic’ in its perceptual connotation. Talk of clarity or perception has some linguistic basis to bear the aural in mind. (Even more interesting is that Klein’s etymology of ‘see’ [1992, R62, p. 115] reveals that its Indo-European base **seq-* is “etymologically identical” with another sense of the same base which means ‘to point out, to say’. This could suggest that the linguistic meaning of aural perception grounds that of visual perception, but I cannot digress on this possibility.)

When Zwicky invokes this term ‘synaesthesia’ to her own purposes, we must bear both its perceptual and aural connotations in mind, as the placement of definitions suggests that she fully intends them. The Greek prefix ‘syn-’ means ‘together’. ‘Together’ connotes joining, as opposed to mere addition which groups but does not join. We may thus take this term to mean something like ‘perceived together’, where the aural connotation is dominant. ‘Synaesthetic integrity’ would mean something like ‘integrated components [transparently co-responsive] perceived together [primarily, but not exclusively] by hearing’. I

propose that ‘lyric clarity’ in philosophical writing and thinking refers to work that has synaesthetic integrity.

While Zwicky repeatedly emphasizes the role of integrity in lyric clarity, the notion of synaesthesia appears only once. It is joined on the opposite page by etymologies for ‘clear’, ‘aesthetic’, and ‘audible’. There would seem to be a particularly strong resonance here between her notion of synaesthesia and the aural-perceptual metaphor for clarity she has developed. Even the tone of her own words on the sinisterous page is unusually pronunciatory. “Clarity as a form of synaesthesia,” clarity as a perceptual togetherness that achieves more than mere synthesis. To feel a musical performance is to achieve more than hearing the notes and seeing the musician use the instrument. It is to experience the meaning of the performance. To understand it is to reciprocate that experience, perhaps on another instrument, or in another expressive medium. To understand is to gesture in co-response to the presence of being. To understand in a way that is lyrically clear is to attend to the gestural integrations of ontological presence along multiple perceptual axes. It is to *feel* the integrity of the world, as opposed to merely seeing it, hearing it, tasting it, smelling it, or touching it.

There is one further notion I must present in order to secure my argument that lyric clarity is synaesthetic integrity, namely that of lyric closure. This is the gesture that acts as the lynchpin of a lyric work.

Lyric closure: A composition of any length usually consists of a number of lyric ‘motifs’, each with its own gestural integrity. But there is frequently also one gesture that stands in lyric relation to the others, and about which the others turn—which gives the piece its torque, so to speak (1992, L211, p. 388).

The gesture that provides lyric closure is central in the sense that it holds the meaning of the other elements in the balance; without it, they would not have their meaning (1992, L212, p. 390). I think that Zwicky's notion of synaesthesia, referred to as a form of clarity and given next to the etymologies of 'clear', 'aesthetic', and 'audible', sounds a sufficient loud resonance in her work to suggest that it provides lyric closure to the motifs of *Lyric Philosophy*. (*Wisdom & Metaphor* has lyric motifs, but its purpose is more general than her earlier proposal of a different conception of clarity.) It stands relatively isolated in her work, and touches each of her main themes. It seems to hold the lyric conception of clarity "in the balance." It comes relatively early in the text, but as I have pointed out before, order is not necessarily significant, and can even be misleading when reading Zwicky. I think this suggestion is sound.

One might ask "how does what you call synaesthetic integrity differ from gestural integrity?" Zwicky bluntly says that lyric clarity is gestural integrity. Her own words suggest that gestural integrity is the most adequate way to understand what she means by "lyric clarity." Furthermore, I've made reference to gesture in explicating my notion of synaesthetic integrity. Is there anything that this notion of synaesthetic has which is lacking from the notion of gesture?

For one, gesture does not sufficiently emphasize the auditory meaning of 'integrity'. I think I might prefer gestural integrity as a notion for understanding lyric experience, i.e. the lived embodiment of lyric thinking *as one does it*, because 'gestural' conveys that lived sense of experience. Lyric clarity, on the other hand, is a feature of philosophical thinking as it manifests in texts, i.e. in

writing. This is not to say that the experience of reading a text is not a lived experience, but rather that 'gestural' places the emphasis of integrity on lived response rather than aurally perceived relations of meaning. 'Gesture' is perhaps too full to be used to describe the clarity of texts.

But more generally, the experience of meaning by which one understands in a lyrically clear sense is, for texts, perceptual rather than gestural. One does not participate in the gestures of textual meaning in the same way as one does in a gesture. One responds to texts by listening, not by affecting. Gesture is more affective than perceptual. Gesture involves living collaboration. The collaboration of lyric clarity is perceptual, the joining together of perceptual capacities to appreciate the integration of form and content, structure and meaning, word and message. One need not gesture in order to read. It is enough to join together one's perceptions of multiple dimensions of a work in order to appreciate the lyric clarity it achieves.

Now what about achieving lyric clarity by writing, rather than appreciating it by reading? Surely poets gesture. I do not dispute this. I accept that gestural integrity may be the best way to characterize the act of writing that achieves lyric clarity. But I have only been concerned to characterize lyric clarity as it would appear in philosophical thought, according to Zwicky. My task has not been to account for or to characterize the actual production of lyrically clear work. I have been setting the stage for a closer examination of one feature of lyric clarity in particular, its atemporality. My next chapter undertakes this task.

LYRIC'S ATEMPORALITY

I HAVE NOW GIVEN my general introduction to Jan Zwicky's philosophy. Zwicky's thought is not widely read by professional philosophers, but it has been well received in the circles one would expect to be most sympathetic to it. Not surprisingly, those circles do not have as much to learn from her as do those where analytic-systematic clarity holds sway. None the less, her attempt to enrich philosophical clarity is important. It does not obscure what philosophers already regard as clarity. In fact, her work draws attention to the ironic lack of discussion concerning the nature of clarity. For the sole reason that Zwicky has done more to clarify the ideal of clarity than any thinker since Wittgenstein, I think her work deserves academic attention.

However, such attention invariably invites criticism. As original and important as Zwicky's thought undeniably is, her account of lyric clarity includes claims that are not only puzzling but difficult to understand. Such difficulty

partly arises from her aphoristic literary style. Zwicky's manner of expression simply does not provide the precision of meaning that philosophers have come to expect. And while this concern fails to recognize that the commitment to precision, as an addiction to disambiguation, is a potentially problematic legitimation of certain forms of thought, one should also recognize that ambiguity cannot clearly be endorsed by ambiguous means. There are places where Zwicky has not been adequately clear, even on her enhanced conception of clarity, given the scope of the claims she attempts to make. As I say, this is partly due to style, partly to an over-reliance on metaphor (i.e. using metaphor where it seems unhelpful), but partly also to a failure to adequately show what is meant. What Zwicky has achieved, by expressing her conception of clarity in a work that also manifests this conception, is admirable. But several important aspects of its manifestation remain unrefined, and consequently her full meaning remains obscure.

One such aspect is Zwicky's claim that lyric philosophy is atemporal. I have briefly touched on her notion of chromorphic thought, which she develops to contrast with the atemporality of lyric philosophy. But I have delayed close examination of this topic till now. In this chapter I shall discuss why Zwicky insists that lyric is atemporal. What she means by this claim does not emerge in its developed form until her later text *Wisdom & Metaphor*. The earlier claim that lyric philosophy is atemporal leads to the later, deeper claim that all genuine understanding is fundamentally spatial in organization (2003, L3). I thus propose to interpret the atemporality of lyric thought in terms of what I call the spatial

priority of understanding. Developing this interpretation constitutes the chief aim of the present chapter. In the course of its development, I must first spell out the relation between syntactic language and chromorphic thought. This relation provides a contrast against which the precise sense of atemporality can be characterized. I then proceed to interpret this characterization in terms of spatial priority, following Zwicky's moves in *Wisdom & Metaphor*. My interpretation concludes with the suggestion that it is spatial orientation, i.e. directionality, that is basic to understanding in Zwicky's philosophy, rather than abstract spatiality itself. I cite two components of her thought, metaphor and gestalt, in support of this conclusion.

§1. LANGUAGE AND CHROMORPHICITY

Zwicky's notion of chromorphic thought is closely related to her views on language. Unidimensional thought is chromorphic, i.e. it possesses what we might call *chromorphy*. Chromorphic, unidimensional thinking results from the systematic analysis of language. In the previous chapter, I argued that logically analytic-systematic thought is unidimensional because it has "Newtonian chronic form," according to Zwicky. "Arguments are a species of logico-linguistic analysis. Analysis in general has Newtonian chronic form; that is, it is unidimensional" (1992, L3, p. 4). Newtonian chronic form means that an absolute ordering is applied to thinking. Analysis relies upon an absolute conceptual ordering for its notion of validity. The first point Zwicky makes in *Lyric Philosophy* is that the order of time, as it exists for logic, "is absolute; it is

absolutely independent of space” (1992, L1, p. 2). (This is significant because Zwicky wants to dispel the notion of an absolute order of thought in what would, for most books, be the first entry in such an order.) An absolute conceptual hierarchy, applied according to the schematic model for representing absolute metric time, is at work in the analytic method for evaluating linguistically expressed argument.

This conceptual hierarchy serves as a framework for the logical-syntactic analysis of language. One cannot evaluate the validity of an argument without presuming the onward flow of reasoning. (Zwicky’s use of “validity” could also refer to the more general notion of logical consequence.) It is this absolute hierarchical conceptualization that is grounded in Newton’s idea of absolute time. The method of logical analysis can be said to have Newtonian chronic form because it relies upon absolute conceptualization in the onward entailment of a conclusion by its premises. Classical logic said that a conclusion was “contained” in its premises. But this was a metaphorical way of saying that the conclusion is guaranteed by the premises in a valid argument. The premises yield or entail the conclusion. Conceptually speaking, there is a step from the premises to the conclusion by way of a truth-value interpretation, a proof, or a model. It is this conceptual movement, this onward step of thought, that has been schematically modeled on absolute time. And since we credit Newton with the schema for absolute metric time, thinking that relies on analytic validity may be said to possess Newtonian chronic form.

Zwicky does not hold Newton solely to blame for the temporally derived schema of modern analysis. Other thinkers helped to enshrine the conceptual hierarchy that permeates logical thought (1992, L278, p. 502). But the fact remains that Newton's representational schema for his absolute idea of time is the basis for modern logical syntax. His schema has carried over to the systematic, logical-syntactic style of applying analysis to natural language in academic philosophy. Logical syntax does not permit the polydimensional expression commonly found in natural language. Even less permissible are expressive structures that make reference, implicitly or explicitly, to themselves. In natural language, such expressions can convey meaning sonorously, creating interpretive difficulty and logical incompleteness (i.e. ambiguity). Twentieth-century logicians tirelessly worked to purge self-referentiality from logical syntax. However, it was shown that this is only fully possible for a syntactically weak formal system (Gödel 1931).

Logical syntax cannot fully be applied to language by the analytic method. The conceptual hierarchy necessary for analysis is an absolute ordering. Such ordering does not fully capture the polydimensional ambiguity of language. Absolute ordering cannot coordinate elements of expressions and aspects of meaning that admit of ambiguity, i.e. that cannot be given full or precise interpretation. The absolute ordering of analysis requires that the meaningful aspects of an expression be given along a single axis. There can be no room for ambiguity. Analysis effectively separates components from a whole by treating the whole as though it were added together from constituents. Separation allows

each component to be regarded on equal terms with every other, along a single axis of interpretation. However, for all the reasons covered in my first chapter, such analysis fails to pay adequate attention to the rich density of language. The imposition of syntactic grammar has made room for an analysis of language, but syntax does not manage to track all the moves made by purely natural language. Syntax is, after all, an ordering applied to speech. Syntactic rules do not fully determine meaningful speech.

Chronomorphic thought is connected to syntactic language. Syntax is an attempt to systematically order and arrange linguistic expression. Systematic ordering lends itself to schematic absolute ordering. Newton's schema for representing time as an absolute idea, which becomes our conceptual hierarchy for validity and logical consequence, can be used as a schema for the logical analysis of syntactic language. That is, the logical analysis of syntactic language owes its representational schematic structure to Newton's idea of absolute time. All analytic thought is therefore chronomorphic. Logical analysis thus presupposes an absolute notion of time. ("Absolute" here means fully independent, i.e. absolutely independent of space.) This presupposition has consequences for the kind of meaning that is intelligible for analysis. "Meaning, as it exists for chronomorphic thought, is entirely linguistic" (1992, L271, p. 490). It is only possible to analyze meaning that is expressed linguistically. Language is the sole medium for analytic thought. In particular, syntactically governed language yields the systematically ordered intelligibility necessary for analysis. Analytic thought, as chronomorphic, can only be achieved in syntactic language.

The relation between language and chronomorphic thought is that chronomorphic analysis is only intelligible in syntactic, i.e. systematically ordered, language.

Thus we see the relation of chronomorphic thought to language. Linguistic syntax, an earlier attempt at systematic thinking, is also an attempt to impose an absolute, independent order upon the world. Linguistic syntax is an early version of system, “the beginning of system” (1992, L129, p. 240). “The idea of syntax is the idea that only certain (non-empirically determined) types of associations are capable of ‘making sense’” (1992, L128, p. 238). Syntax, as it was developed to facilitate the transition from oral to written language and to govern correct linguistic and rhetorical instruction, excludes certain forms of meaning from the range of meaningful expressions. Syntax applies an absolute order upon our rich, dense linguistic perception. As noted before, Ivan Illich has provided adequate support for the claim that the application of conventional syntactical rules in the instruction of natural language, by the invention of the alphabet and rhetorical traditions, gave rise to a systematic view of language. Language itself came to be regarded as absolutely ordered in the sense that it can perfectly and independently reflect the world.

In the relation between chronomorphic thought and syntactically governed language, each presupposes an absolute order applied to our world. Syntax, as original system, is an attempt to precisely state an ordering of rules for meaningful linguistic expression that accurately reflects the world. Chronomorphicity is a conceptual hierarchy rooted in a conception of time as absolutely independent of space. Linguistic meaning is all that can exist for

chronomorphic thought because language based on syntax is all that is intelligible for chromorphicity. Logical syntax is of time, according to Zwicky (1992, L8, p. 12). This means that logical syntax cannot be applied where an absolute ordering is not given. Analysis makes no sense, is useless, where there is no temporal conceptual order. Logical syntax does not unfold in time, but it requires a notion of absolute temporality to ground the conceptual hierarchy that characterizes validity. Both language and chromorphicity serve to set us apart from the world. For Zwicky, they are both “axes of experience” that set us apart from the world, i.e. make us independent from the space of the world and our spatial experience. Language, understood as that which has been syntactically organized, lends the impression that what is abstracted from by language is external to oneself. “It is the ability to see something as an object external to oneself that is concomitant with the capacity for language use” (1992, L126, p. 234). Language and logical analysis distance us from the world.

Chronomorphic thought obscures our synaesthetic integrity with the world such that we are set against space and against the fundamental spatiality of understanding. “The idea of Newtonian time is the idea of a solitary axis of experience, a dimension *set against* space” (1992, L276, p. 500). But “in [lyrically integrated] moments, we achieve freedom from our capacity for chromomorphic thought which, on the whole, sets us alongside rather than in the world” (1992, L279, p. 506). On this same page, Zwicky also points out that time is not *of* the world in the way a human being is of the world, meaning that time is applied to the world in a systematic fashion. The world, including our own

human being, is rich with non-systematic, atemporal ambiguity. Its diverse elements are densely polydimensional. Chronomorphic thought serves to remove us from the world by skewering that rich, polydimensional, ambiguous density and applying systematic rarity in its place. Logical analysis pigeon-holes the world into a unidimensional temporal framework where time flows on, unimpeded, absolute and ever-present. What we usually understand time to be is an “hypostatization” of the form of resonance-insensitive thought (2003, L72), meaning that our concept of time results from our failure to attend to the world’s resonant integrity. Time removes us from the basic spatiality of being. Chronomorphic thought goes a long way toward informing our ordinary view of time and the unfolding of our experience. Our ordinary view of time is metric, regular, mechanical, linear—the stuff of clockwork. The resonance of the world, the structure of being, is obscured by this idea of time. Its pervasiveness serves to conceal the genuine, essential nature of understanding, which is primarily spatial rather than temporal.

§2. ATEMPORALITY AS SPATIAL PRIORITY

Lyric is atemporal because time does not belong to the world. According to Zwicky, time is not *of* the world (1992, L279, p. 506), which complements her claim that arguments are *of* time (1992, L8, p. 12). In this section, I consider the meaning of these claims. This consideration requires that I discuss Zwicky’s suggestion that time’s phenomenological dimensionality is illusory. The origin of this dimensionality is the emphasis on theoretic understanding. Ultimately, I

interpret atemporality in terms of what I call *spatial priority*. This phrase refers to the priority of spatiality for the understanding of meaningful phenomena. Zwicky's claim is that, although we do ordinarily understand "in time," spatial organization is basic to understanding. My interpretation characterizes the fundamental spatiality of understanding in terms of directionality, as I explain in the following section.

Zwicky insists that lyric will essentially lack temporal organization (1992, L201, p. 372). She seems to be saying that lyric philosophical expression defies temporal organization. For instance, she regards Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* as a work of lyric clarity. One need not read this book from start to finish, in its arranged order, to understand its meaning. (We can ignore, for the sake of argument, the grammatical fact that sentential composition is temporally organized.) In fact, Zwicky picks random excerpts to demonstrate their resonant meaning. But this book is an exception. Most books (Zwicky points to Plato and to instructional texts on logic in particular) do need to be read from start to finish and in that order. Their meaning depends on an organizational schema that builds through time. They can therefore be said to rely on temporal organization.

In this same passage (L201), Zwicky also refers to lyric awareness. "Lyric awareness does not include temporal awareness," she claims. To understand a work of lyric philosophy is to be lyrically aware of its meaning. Since this meaning must lack any reliance on temporal organization, that awareness will not attend to its own temporal structure. Even though one thinks the meaning under temporal conditions, the meaning itself lacks temporality. And the experience of

thinking it seems to grant some reprieve, however small, from the temporal conditions of understanding.

Lyric awareness is temporal, i.e. it does occur in time as does all experience and therefore all awareness, but it does not include temporal awareness. This means that lyric awareness creates a feeling of being restricted by time, even as it takes time to create this feeling. As one understands and becomes aware of the atemporal meaning of a lyric work, one is aware of that meaning as more basic than the meaning of the temporal conditions of thinking. One perceives lyric truth as more basic than temporal organization. Temporality confines, restricts, and obscures this more basic meaning. Such meaning is perceived instantly, it seems. “Lyric comprehension, no matter how temporally sustained from some perspectives, has the phenomenological quality of occurring in a flash. These two aspects of lyric thought—its resonance and its atemporality—cannot be simultaneously, consistently, modelled in Newtonian terms” (1992, L235, p. 430). Lyric meaning and lyric awareness defy the sequential nature of analysis, which unfolds as chronic succession. Lyric meaning is perceived all at once, as an instantaneous bolt of insight. Rather than steps leading to a final point, the structure of lyric consists of parts gesturing “all at once” toward a central point. There is no sequence to the way in which parts gesturally support their centre. In fact, any attempt to apply sequentiality to lyric will confuse its meaning by giving the impression that the centre somehow comes after the parts, rather than being implicated by them. Arguments that rely on analytic structure are essentially sequential, and therefore they are *of* time.

It might be asked whether this contrast between the temporal structure of analysis and the atemporal structure of lyric is rooted in a conflation of two distinct senses of the term ‘temporal’. The first sense would be the metric, sequential sense, and the second would be a durational, experiential sense. The question is perhaps a distraction, for in the next chapter Heidegger will subsume both senses under his account of original time as temporality. Let it here suffice to say that Zwicky has not conflated these senses. She fully recognizes the extent to which experiential temporality can be influenced by the prevalence of other senses of this term. Our experience of time is largely informed by our measurement of time, and the metric schema for measuring time (as opposed to earlier, cyclical schemas) does apply the model of logical, analytical thought to our everyday experience. Many people pride themselves on being able to “think logically,” which amounts to taking things one step at a time by emphasizing the sequential structure of experience, whether that structure is phenomenologically basic or not. Since it is possible for other senses of temporality to inform the experiential sense, no conflation has been committed.

In a bold move, Zwicky questions whether space and time are both dimensional in a phenomenological sense. The idea of time as it is understood in classical physics is related to the metric representation of space and spatial coordinates. The dimensionality of metric time metaphorically derives from that of space.

The Newtonian representation of time suggests that time is a peculiar kind of space. It *is* dimensional; but it is a single dimension. That is, the idea is at once highly abstract and highly metaphorical. It names no thing in our actual experience; and the only ‘particulars’ it might conceivably be said to be

abstracting from are spatial. The idea of Newtonian time is the idea of a solitary axis of experience, a dimension set *against* space (1992, L276, p. 500).

Newton's idea of time amounts to a purely metrical dimension, a measurement of spatial change. It is dimensional only in its metaphorical opposition to the spatial dimension. Phenomenological time does not possess such dimensionality. "We seem to be able to be directly aware of spatial dimension—through sight, touch, hearing, smell to some extent—in a way we seem not to be able to be aware of temporal dimension. Our 'sense' of time is always relative to images we take to be memories" (1992, L274, p. 496). The theoretical spatialization of time treats time as a basic axis of metric analysis, absolutely independent of the spatial axis. As this sense of spatialized time begins to inform experiential discourse and description, a metaphorical sense of dimensionality is applied to phenomenological time. Zwicky is making a basic phenomenological claim about awareness. That time passes or flows at all is an unintentional metaphor derived from the metric idea of time (and partly also from older metaphors, e.g. the stream). As I will argue, our sense of time is a collection of synaesthetic connections and integrations whose resonant relatedness lends the impression of temporal structure. There is nothing phenomenologically dimensional about time because there is no temporal field apart from the spatial field. Phenomenological time is not dimensional because temporality is not an axis of experience independent from that of spatial experience.

The pressure of this applied dimension is the pressure of chromomorphic thinking. Lyric grants a measure of reprieve from chromomorphic thought, which sets us apart from the world's basic spatial integration. The absolute

independence of time from space in chromomorphic thinking removes us from the world to the extent that we rely on chromomorphic thought to guide our experience and self-interpretations. Sequentiality and succession are essential to the idea of time as absolute, and therefore also to “logical” thinking. Chromomorphic thinking applies sequentiality and succession to the resonant, integrated relatedness we call thought. Chromomorphic thinking forces thought to *proceed*, to move in steps rather than attending to polydimensional contours of connectedness. The systematic application of logical, analytic thinking gives the impression that human thinking is in sequential motion, i.e. temporally structured as successive. This places an abstraction onto our integration with the world. Awareness conditioned by temporality serves to systematically disambiguate and order the world. It therefore serves to remove us from the world by disintegrating it. Lyric philosophy treats this imposed separation, but cannot fully dissolve it.

Lack of temporal awareness in lyric awareness means that one is exclusively attuned to the ambiguity of the world’s more basic spatial integration. Since temporality is not in itself an actual dimension or axis of experience, a lack of temporal awareness amounts to a focus on the spatiality from which this contrived temporal dimension has been metaphorically abstracted. Temporality is applied to the world, as independent from the spatial, by exclusively visual thought. In visual thought, there is a particular kind of sight, an ordering sight. Such sight is guided largely by “theory”, i.e. by systematic conceptualization of what is present to vision. Such sight is also imageless, i.e. opposed to imagistic

schematization. Professor Schmidt has drawn attention to the Platonic roots of prejudice against the image in philosophical thought.

When Plato first thematizes the possibilities of truth that are opened up from the perspective of the imageless seeing proper to *theoria*, and when he traces the path whereby this is translated into the language of the idea, he frequently finds it necessary to go to great lengths to differentiate this theoretical look to ideas from the sort of seeing practiced by those concerned with the [poetic] production of images in painting (2005, 142).

On the same page Schmidt writes: “Plato’s argument is that so long as one thinks of what it means to see ideas according to the model of seeing practiced by the painter [as a paradigm of poesis], one will never grasp the proper nature of seeing ideas” (2005, 142). A few pages later: “But this shift from painting to poetry as the paradigm of the work of art does not fundamentally alter the judgment about images that Plato first articulated: seeing remains judged from the standpoint of *theoria*. Images still are said to fail to grasp the truth opened to theory” (2005, p. 145). To know truth by seeing the ideas, one must not look on them as mere images. But by looking on ideas in a theoretic manner, one must adopt a conceptual hierarchy that disambiguates and pursues systematic, chromomorphic ordering. Wisdom as theoretic seeing is a systematic, chromomorphic thinking. Theory generates temporal awareness. To theorize is to temporalize. It resists the image and the imaginative in favour of systematic propositional analysis and explication. Plato opposes theoretical viewing to poetical viewing, arguing for the supremacy of the former in order to establish the monopolistic legitimacy of philosophical wisdom over poetical wisdom with respect to truth, and of theoretic over imagistic sight with respect to thought.

Zwicky's philosophy suggests that imagistic thought can handle the task of synaesthetic integration better than purely theoretic thinking. To speak the integration of the world, one must employ speech that bears the image of that integration. "Lyric speech is an echo of the image of integration" (1992, L219, p. 400). An image is a lyric idea (1992, L218, p. 398), and a true image "moves in sympathetic resonance with a line of force in the deep structure of the world" (1992, L219, p. 400). Zwicky characterizes imagistic thought as flexible and open-textured (1992, L237, p. 432). Images are ideal structures for conveying resonance. "To be resonant a structure must be flexible...Resonance presupposes at least two axes of coherence" (1992, L234, p. 428). By virtue of having more than one dimension, images meet the most basic precondition for resonance (1992, L236, p. 432), whereas theoretic speech does not. Musical, rhythmic speech best expresses lyrically clear imagistic thought by verbally tracing the patterns and contours of ontological integration. "Clear imagistic thought has resonant form. Linguistic music is literally resonant, but more importantly, in lyric speech it exists in resonant relation to imagistic thought" (1992, L239, p. 434). Lyrically clear speech is imagistic in its flexibility, its integrity, and its resonance. The power of image to show us the world's integration is best expressed in lyric speech where language draws on its musical roots. Such speech manipulates language's propensity for chromorphicity and displays the world's integrity. For example, richly descriptive poetry can express an emotion more clearly than a psychological explanation. Does this establish that imagistic speech is the clearest way to strike a resonance with ontological structure in thought?

Ostensibly so. Image fits the aural and visual metaphors for thinking. Imagistic speech can resonate with the integrated contours of being in poetic description. “The world has patterns, of which our thinking is a part” (2003, L114). Image connects understanding to being by way of imagination. Image can also be depicted visually, as in geometric thought. Indeed, some mathematicians have argued the benefits of imagistic proof over the verbal proof method. “Pictures can sometimes even expose verbal fallacies,” according to James Robert Brown (2003, R39). Imagistic speech and thought are spatially organized because they lack the temporal awareness of theoretic thinking. Thought is primarily meaningful in its spatial relatedness. Imagistic speech expresses this basic meaning by creating verbal, rhythmic resonance in dense, musical language that displays ontological integration. It promotes an “elasticity of time,” according to Zwicky (1992, L237, p. 432). Image can depict sequence and temporal organization, but is bound by neither. (Many sequential artists, i.e. comic artists, prefer this narrative medium for precisely this reason.) The imagistic speech of lyric evades dependence on temporal organization by exploiting linguistic rhythm to trace the outline of ontological integration. The pressure of time is present in lyric speech, which remains, after all, linguistic and, for Anglophones, syntactic. But time’s weight is held at bay. Musical language manipulates chromorphic temporal organization to bear an image of being’s integrity as it exists beneath syntactic confines.

We cannot achieve explicit awareness of a temporal dimension, for none exists but that which has been metaphorically abstracted from spatiality. We

cannot see time, either to theorize or to poeticize about it. Time has no phenomenal content on the order of intentional objects. Time is an impression of connectedness—construed as sequential succession by chromomorphic methods of thinking—that inheres in the resonant relations between experiential images. The objects of intentional experience are connected; our experience relates to itself in manifold ways. In this connectedness, temporal organization can be construed by certain methods of thinking and interpretation, particularly that of systematically disambiguating analysis. But the connectedness itself is spatially organized. Relations of meaning between experiential components are spatially arranged. “All genuine understanding is a form of seeing-as: it is fundamentally spatial in organization” (2003, L3). I consider this the spatial priority thesis.

The manifold of phenomenal experience is spatially integrated. The phenomenal field is itself a resonance. “To say that an utterance is not resonant is...to say that it has no phenomenology” (2003, L37). What we call our understanding is that integrity. Understanding consists in this spatial integrity, this attunement and sensitivity to resonant connectedness. There is a priority of the spatial for understanding. What it means to call that integrity “spatial” is not necessarily or entirely a visual meaning. “Although understanding is spatial in organization, it is not necessarily visual or tactile. All grasp of musical ideas, for example, involves perception of a gestalt. One might say: ontological understanding is rooted in the perception of patterned resonance in the world” (2003, L7). Understanding gathers as attention to resonance. Such patterned resonance is laid out before one, i.e. before one’s gaze, to speak metaphorically.

Understanding is the integrated connectedness between extant patterns. The resonance of the patterns can only be appreciated in the similarity of their structure. This resonance, this similarity, must therefore be determined spatially, and often visually. To understand is therefore to see-as, which is to perceive gestalts by attending to multiple wholes in the same space. This attending at the heart of understanding is an attending to spatial features of patterns of meaning. There is therefore a priority of spatiality for understanding.

§3. DIRECTIONALITY AND SPATIAL PRIORITY

To interpret lyric's atemporality as spatial priority raises several immediate questions. There is the question as to how spatiality could be "prior," since the meaning of this term is temporal. To say that space is "earlier" than time is already to invoke a temporal meaning. This phrase "spatial priority" therefore has an intrinsic tension which may negate its usefulness. There is also the question whether space as spatiality is too abstract. What does Zwicky really mean in saying that all genuine understanding is fundamentally spatially organized? To what sort of organizational relations does she refer? Is 'space' the same as 'spatiality'? Is she talking about metric space, perceptual space, extensional space, or is 'space' itself a metaphor for some other idea? In what sense is spatial organization "fundamental" for genuine understanding? What characterizes non-genuine understanding? How can time be an impression, if we take time to form that impression?

Answers to some of these questions have been suggested already, but most of them can be avoided altogether by giving some additional context to my interpretation of lyric's atemporality as spatial priority. Spatial priority leads us, by way of the notion of directionality, to that of phenomenological intentionality. In this section, I will show how Zwicky's thesis regarding the fundamentally spatial organization of our understanding is developed in terms of directionality. But first I wish to briefly prepare the way by suggesting that Zwicky is trying to get at the basic intentional relation we have to the world that resists phenomenological reduction.

One does not immediately associate Zwicky with any of the literature on intentionality. I have personally given much thought to how one might avoid this association. However, seeing no satisfactory way to avoid it, I must accept it and move on to consider how Zwicky's thought might relate to this literature. A strict philosophical reading of her books cannot escape the impression that in describing lyric thought as atemporal, she is actually characterizing lyric thought as thinking in which one's intentional relation to the world is most authentic. This suggestion poses very interesting consequences for language and linguistic meaning in any theory of intentionality, but these will not be the focus of my critical discussion. If I can speak at all about greater or less degrees of "intentional authenticity," I wish to speak of the bearing it has on phenomenological temporality. Husserlian concerns of linguistic intentionality will not be in play here. The temporal and spatial structures of intentionality will be my focus.

Spatiality is not prior in any temporal sense. Rather it is prior in the sense of being basic to understanding. Now if spatiality is to be prior in the sense of being basic to understanding, then it must be basic to the temporal meaning by which priority is understood. I will argue as much when I come to my critical discussion of Zwicky and Heidegger. In effect, it is the directionality of spatiality that gives the basis for all phenomenal meaning in our experience. And since the opposition of earlier from later, i.e. prior from posterior, relies on a certain expression of directional relatedness, in the sense that one places the earlier and prior *before* the later and posterior, directionality grounds the temporal meaning of priority.

Where in Zwicky do we find reference to directionality? In fact, the development of the spatial priority thesis in *Wisdom & Metaphor* employs directionality in some of its most abstract and crucial junctures. For instance, when Zwicky points out at L73 that, “in many mythologies, Time is a god: but never Space,” she places on the dextrous page some remarks spoken by Einstein as reported by Max Wertheimer. This is significant because here she invokes the person most directly responsible for altering scientific thinking about time and space in the twentieth century. His own process of understanding points to the basic form of his thought.

I once told Einstein of my impression that “direction” is an important factor in thought processes. To this he said, “Such things were very strongly present. During all those years there was a feeling of direction, of going straight toward something concrete. It is, of course, very hard to express that feeling in words; but it was decidedly the case, and clearly to be distinguished from later considerations about the rational form of the solution. Of course, behind such a direction there is always something logical; but I have it in a survey, in a way visually (2003, R73).

Einstein seems to have done his thinking by attending to what he viewed as real and concrete, which he perceived as located in a certain direction he could almost see. When Zwicky refers to the spatial, she literally means how things look to us, as we see them in their directional connectedness with our own thinking. At first glance, Zwicky seems more concerned with the shapes of things, and with commonality between patterns of meaning, than with directional orientation. However, two components of her thought suggest to me that directionality, i.e. directional orientation, lies at the basis of the basically spatial organization of understanding. First, there is the role of pointing in her account of metaphor and gestalt production. Second, her notion of attunement suggests, in a not so subtle way, that our gaze upon the world is necessarily directional.

As regards the first component, an essential though perhaps metaphorical notion of pointing props up Zwicky's account of metaphor. "The implied 'is not' in a metaphor points to a gap in language through which we glimpse the world. That which we glimpse is what the 'is' in a metaphor points to" (2003, L10). The way in which one *shows* how the world is, how things stand for it, the use of metaphor to say "Look! *This* is how things are!"—all this amounts to a pointing at the world, at some feature that has been concealed by language. Directionality manifests here in the stance we must assume as toward the world. For Zwicky, this sort of spatial stance is fundamental. It is always part of meaningful experience, but in metaphor this stance is all that can be provided to impart meaning. We can do no more than show by pointing. Understanding by metaphor is a fundamentally spatial experience of meaning in that one points to

something, in some direction, as a means of connecting. There is alignment at the heart of a good metaphor (2003, L36). Such alignment reveals, but does not create or impose, directionality as a shapely fit between contextual contours. There is also a strong connection between the nature of metaphor and the original sense of meaning, for Zwicky: “to mean is always, in some measure, to carry across: *meta pherein*” (2003, L51). Meaning itself is directional—it *crosses over* from one place to another. Zwicky quotes one passage in particular, from Simone Weil, which weighs heavily in my mind as I ponder the relation between directionality and the real.

In our sense perceptions, if we are not sure of what we see we change our position while looking, and what is real becomes evident. In the inner life, time takes the place of space. With time we are altered, and, if as we change we keep our gaze directed towards the same thing, in the end illusions are scattered and the real becomes visible (2003, R43).

This passage, despite its focus on time and eyesight, works well to illustrate how directional, attending focus reveals the real. Directional gaze maps out our attentional relation to the world.

Returning to the directionality of meaning, Zwicky places pointing at the heart of gesture. Meaning as gesture is unmistakably directional.

What any meaningful gesture must already possess in order to mean is not something that such a gesture can also ‘stand back from’ and point to. If you understand *that* it is pointing (or embracing or depicting), you have already grasped that it is pointing *at* something, or in some direction, as well as *how* it points (2003, L78).

Gesture is at the heart of Zwicky’s account of metaphor, as I argued in the first section of my first chapter. Metaphors connect gestures. Gestures are human responses to presence, by which the meaning we experience as understanding is created. We see now that to gesture is to point at something, i.e. in some

direction. A meaningful gesture cannot stand back from this pointing and point to the pointing itself, since that would beg the question, so to speak. The directional orientation of pointing cannot be pointed out or gestured to, because this is precisely what makes the pointing meaningful. Therefore meaningful phenomena are basically directional. Pointing is a directional act. The question of meaning in Zwicky's philosophy, which lies at the heart of the question of understanding as the experience of meaning, is a question about directionality.

Gestalt shifts, as I argued in my first chapter, are how metaphors connect gestures. A metaphor incites a gestalt as an act of re-contextualization that connects distinct responses to the world's presence. The perception of a gestalt is brought about by pointing. It is in this directional pointing that we perceive the meaning we experience as understanding. "Other than pointing and hoping, there are no rules, no algorithms, by which human perception of a gestalt may be facilitated" (2003, L117). Pointing is the most approximate and most accurate description of gestalt perception. "There is, however, no simple recipe for communicating gestalts; or rather, there is only the roughest and readiest: point and hope" (2003, L92). According to Zwicky, this basic fact about wisdom and understanding has consequences for our conception of the practice of philosophy. "That practice is better understood as an exercise of attention disciplined by discernment of the live, metaphorical relation between things and the resonant structure of the world" (2003, L117). The pursuit of wisdom as thinking in love with clarity is best understood as attentive attunement, as listening to how the structure of the world points in resonance with particular things. This pointing is

metaphor in the literal sense, where a crossing over is achieved by the pointing. It is toward an 'over' that metaphor points.

The second component of Zwicky's thought that suggests directionality as the basic spatially organizing feature of understanding is her notion of attunement, i.e. attending to the world. This follows from the first component, but is different in that attending is not the same as pointing. Both, however, presume directional orientation. Attunement is closer to something like a directional gaze. One perceives the meaning of the world by attuning oneself to it, by paying attention to it. Zwicky's notion of seeing-as basically amounts to our ability to pay attention to how the world directs itself toward us that we may mean with it in collusive co-response. "To see-as...is to grasp meaning...in seeing-as we are confronted with...the world, gesturing at us" (2003, L114). To understand meaning by seeing-as is to attend to how the world gestures at us, and to respond in like fashion. On this account, meaning involves a collusively directional relatedness, a carrying over that is a co-response between sides of a divide. The meaningful, the beautiful, and the real are all revealed in like fashion. One must attend *toward* them in order to perceive and understand their shapes and contours. "The poet produces the beautiful by fixing his attention on something real," as Weil elegantly puts it (2003, R102). Wittgenstein seems to make a similar point: "experiencing a change of aspect is similar to an action...It is a paying of attention" (*ibid.*). Here he furnishes Zwicky's notion of gestalt, where new meaning is produced or revealed by a perceptual shift. But I have already said that attending is not pointing, and gestalt shifts are ways of connecting gestures by

pointing. This is a significant problem if we continue to characterize the role of the world in understanding as essentially passive. But in attending, we look and do not point. It is the world that points *at us*. We pay attention to its directional bearing on our selves as structural components of its being. But the impetus for the directionality is the world itself. It points as we gaze. In the first component of Zwicky's thought, it was our own pointing that suggested directionality as basic to the spatial organization of understanding. In the second component, there is still pointing in a sense, but the world itself performs the pointing, while we attend to it.

Gestalt is basic to seeing-as, which is the basic form of all genuine understanding. The fundamentally spatial organization of understanding issues from the directionality of gestalt. The priority of spatiality for understanding is therefore a directional priority. Gestalt is directional in two respects. In the first, we perform the pointing as a way of connecting gestures to produce an experience of meaning. In the second, we are pointed at by the world. The first is an instance of the phenomenon of gesture, which is how we understand the world. The second is an instance of how the world presences so that we may respond to it with gesture. Together, these collaborate in an account of how we meaningfully perceive and understand our world. "Seeing-as is the result of the natural attunement of our capacities for perception to the world. In understanding (in seeing-as, in the experience of meaning) we show human thinking's fit with being" (2003, L26). The basic phenomenological event is a collusive co-response between collaborating directionalities, namely thinking and being. This account

returns us to an older, more original sense of 'intentionality', present in the root *intendo*. Led along this path, Zwicky's thought suggests much that is important about our intentional relation to the world. The remainder of this thesis is restricted to a consideration of the ramifications for temporal intentionality.

ORIGINAL TIME AS TEMPORALITY

ZWICKY'S PHILOSOPHY URGES that our notion of philosophical clarity stands in dire need of enhancement. Her enhanced conception of clarity, lyric clarity, offers an account of understanding in which spatial organization is fundamental. The atemporality of lyric thought is best understood in terms of this spatial priority for understanding. I have argued that what Zwicky calls "atemporality" in *Lyric Philosophy* becomes the fundamental spatiality of understanding in *Wisdom & Metaphor*. However, in both works this priority of the spatial amounts to a claim about the directionality of understanding. The collusive co-response of the integrity between thinking and being is a matter of collaborating directionalities in sympathetic resonance. The integrity by which thinking joins up in fit with being consists in the collusive, co-responsive gestures that echo between thinking and being. Lyrically clear philosophy achieves such integrity synaesthetically, by attending to resonances of

perceptual gestures in collaborative response toward the world. I have cited two specific, central features of her account of understanding that have their basis in directionality: the notion of pointing at the heart of metaphor, and the attunement involved in a gestalt shift. Each relies on directionality to construe understanding as the experience of meaning. Zwicky might have been more accurate had she claimed that all genuine understanding is fundamentally *directional* in organization.

My interpretation would suggest that Zwicky's philosophy speaks to what has been called intentionality in the phenomenological tradition. If I am correct, then it is acceptable to engage her on the battleground of that tradition. The most severe formulation of my central question thus becomes, "has Zwicky attempted an atemporal construal of intentionality?" If so, her philosophy directly conflicts with Heidegger.

Heidegger's phenomenology grounds the structure of intentionality in an original, transcendent temporality. To intend means to be directed toward something, to be oriented in some direction. Intentionality is the basic phenomenon in the Husserlian tradition of phenomenology. Phenomenological perception is basically directional. The structure of perception, i.e. how phenomena "appear" for us, is directional in that one is always oriented toward an intentum, i.e. a thing that one perceives. The things we perceive are intended in that our relation to them is directional. Perception is closely tied to what Heidegger calls comportment. Comportment [*verhalten*] has various meanings; most commonly, and bearing fully in mind the Cartesian connotations of

‘subject’, it means the subject’s experiences (1988, 61), or roughly one’s conduct or behaviour (1962, H. 4), i.e. one’s attitudinal constitution, in dealing with things and beings, including oneself. “Every comportment is a comporting-toward; perception is a perceiving-of,” (1988, 58) and “perceiving is intrinsically a comporting-toward, a relationship to the object, whether that object is extant actually or only in imagination” (1988, 60). The structure of comportment is intentional. Intentionality is the comportmental character of comportment (1988, 61), i.e. intentionality is what characterizes one’s perceptual experience. Intentionality, as Heidegger argues, is grounded in the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of the Dasein’s constitution, i.e. in the temporally self-projective understanding of being.

Intentionality—being directed toward something and the intimate connection of *intentionio* and *intentum* present in it—which is commonly spoken of in phenomenology as the ultimate primal phenomenon, has the condition of its possibility in temporality and temporality’s ecstatic horizonal character. The Dasein is intentional only because it is determined essentially by temporality (1988, 268).

Dasein is Heidegger’s term for the there-being as the entity which understands being on the basis of self-projective temporality. “This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term ‘*Dasein*’” (1962, H. 7). The self-projective character of temporality is its essential transcendence. Human Dasein is therefore transcendent. His account of time posits an original, transcendent temporality upon which the human understanding of being is projected. The projectivity of this understanding, which is basic to perceptual and experiential intentionality, is thus grounded in this original, self-projective temporality that ecstatically

transcends or “oversteps” itself. Heidegger’s original time as transcendent temporality is the open, ecstatic horizon by which the directionality of human intentionality can orient and direct itself.

If Heidegger’s account is accurate, as I argue, then serious problems arise for Zwicky. The structure of intentionality is essentially temporal, and the understanding of being that grounds all human perception and experience cannot be construed as fundamentally spatially organized. If it is appropriate to engage her thought along phenomenological lines, then it seems she has simply misconstrued intentionality to the extent that it shapes her thought. But Zwicky is a reputable scholar, poet, and philosopher. She would not dispute Heidegger in this way without good reason. My task in this chapter is to closely spell out Heidegger’s phenomenology in order to determine how it conflicts with Zwicky’s philosophy.

I undertake this task in three parts. First, I discuss Charles Sherover’s account of Heidegger’s philosophy of time. This provides a secondary view, held by a recognized authority on the philosophy of experiential time, to clearly introduce Heidegger’s own views. Sherover characterizes Heidegger’s philosophy in terms of the priority of futurity as the priority of possibility, as he reads it in *Sein und Zeit*. I then examine Heidegger’s argument as he makes it in the text of his lectures concerning *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. This text more clearly lays out the temporal ground of intentionality. My final section spells out the conclusion of this argument as it conflicts with Zwicky’s

philosophy, in preparation for a critical discussion of my thesis in the final chapter.

§1. PRIORITY OF FUTURITY AND PRIORITY OF POSSIBILITY

Sherover characterizes Heidegger's philosophy of time in terms of the priority of the futural. "For the only temporal perspective which provides for deliberate decision, for self-creation, for action is the future" (Sherover 1975, p. 459). The fact that self-affecting being determines its existence as an onward creation means that human being is essentially oriented toward the future. Human temporality is a temporal synthesis under the "aegis" of futurity. The synthesis consists of a fixed past into which we are thrown but from which we may also choose certain representative elements, a present situation consisting of affective action, and a horizon of possibility from which our present is chosen and which thereby grounds our temporal constitution.

Heidegger himself refers to our futural mode of being in terms of anticipation. "Anticipation makes Dasein *authentically* futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, *as being*, is always coming towards itself—that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general" (1962, p. 373/H. 325). The notions of an "ecstasis" and of an ecstatic-temporal synthetic unity are crucial to Heidegger's account of time. To introduce these notions, let me describe an ecstasy as that characteristic of human being whereby it reaches out (literally stands outside or oversteps itself) toward its own past and its own future. The unity of the ecstatic-temporal synthesis is the

horizon formed by the juncture of these “reachings”. Within this unity, the futural ecstasis has priority. “In enumerating the ecstases, we have always mentioned the future first. We have done this to indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality...*The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future*” (1962, p. 378/H. 329).

Sherover identifies four issues of general concern raised by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit*. First, Heidegger raises anew the error of treating human beings as things, as inanimate objects. This is a concern because our language “has too freely used words derived from the description of inanimate things to describe persons” (Sherover 1975, p. 461). Heidegger introduces the term ‘existentials’ as a human parallel for the term ‘category’ with respect to things, “to describe the logical clusters of predicates justifiably used to describe the existential modes of persons” (*ibid.*). Those who dispute Heidegger’s work must still confront the need to treat human modes of existence in terms other than those used for ontic beings. The being of human Dasein establishes its own meaning by temporal self-interpretation. It cannot be both understood and reduced to the status of a thing that is not capable of making its own meaning through temporal self-interpretation. Human being establishes modes of being for itself in its questioning, its enquiring, and in its interpreting. Our accounts of human being must therefore recognize that Dasein is free to interpret and reinterpret its own temporal understanding of being according to whatever meaning it interpretively makes for itself. Descriptive terms are acceptable, but their descriptive meaning

must acknowledge that fixed categorial meaning cannot be imposed upon what establishes its own meaning for itself.

Second, Sherover considers Heidegger's distinction of ontological being from ontic being to be superior to Kant's distinction between the transcendental and the empirical understanding. In the text of *Basic Problems*, Heidegger refers to this distinction as the ontological difference. The thesis of this distinction is that being is not itself a being, i.e. not another entity among entities. This distinction arises early in the course of posing the formal structure of the question of the meaning of being in *Sein und Zeit*. "In the question which we are to work out, *what is asked about* is Being [*Sein*]*—that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity*" (1962, H. 6). *Sein*, or simply, in English, 'being', is not itself a being or an entity with a particular meaning, but rather a context of meaning on the basis of which the character of particular entities is always already understood. The ontological difference between being and beings resolves a significant concern of ancient ontology by not characterizing being, the necessary ground of beings, as itself an entity of a special sort. Being is not an entity at all. Being is the meaning we always already bring to any discussion concerning beings.

Third, Heidegger has established the need to emphasize verbal language in order to develop an experientially authentic ontology. "[An] experientially authentic language would focus on verbs as grammatical subject" (Sherover 1975, p. 462). Such emphasis reveals the essential temporality of our encounter with

objects in the world. Our most basic experience of objects is anticipatorily purpose-oriented. Things have meaning as ready-to-hand, i.e. as useful toward some anticipated project. On the basis of such verbal emphasis, Heidegger distinguishes between beings as ready-to-hand and as present-at-hand. Whenever we stay true to basic experience, objects are ready-to-hand, and their experiential meaning as ready-to-hand draws its potency from those projects we anticipate undertaking and carrying out. When we do not attend to this anticipatory experience, things cease to be tools and become mere objects on standing reserve. By characterizing our experience in verbal terms, we emphasize anticipatory experience in our dealings with things in their basic ontological mode in the service of projects. The distinction between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand draws attention to the utility and futurity of our being with beings by the former term and, by the latter, to their depersonalized objectivity and objective presence as hypostatized ontic beings.

Fourth, Heidegger identifies human understanding as “*the locus of possibility-retrieval and selection from the future*, as it brings futurity, in terms of conceived possibilities, into the ken of the present” (*ibid.*, p. 463). The manner in which temporalizing human understanding discloses being is the manner of a gathering-retrieval of possibilities from the futural ecstatic horizon into the constitution of the present. The being of beings is a retrieval of present compartments gathered from futural possibility. There are at least two remarkable features of this understanding that discloses in the manner of a gathering-retrieval. First, the disclosure is public as opposed to purely individual.

The originary reckoning with time on the basis of which clock-time is derived leads to the expression of a common now. “The ‘now’ which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of Being-in-the-world with one another. Thus the time which any Dasein has currently interpreted and expressed has as such already been *given a public character* on the basis of that Dasein’s ecstatical Being-in-the-world” (1962, p. 463-464/H. 411). The notion of the now is an essentially public notion. “Because this public time, which arises out of the need our futurity imposes for a common rubric of coordination of efforts, the notion of ‘now’ is developed as a mode of meeting” (Sherover 1975, p. 464). Our being together in the world, as concerned with our common future and shared anticipations, calls for some agreed method to coordinate activities. The method of metric chronic measurement serves this function well enough. Temporalizing human understanding publicly discloses one’s world; this is its first remarkable feature.

The second remarkable feature is that futural understanding is necessary in order to have anything like a metric clock-time to begin with. Our reckoning with chronic measurement occurs on the basis of a futurally-oriented original temporality. Sherover states that “our mechanisms for measuring the time ‘in which’ we find ourselves are not merely so that we can ‘locate’ the ‘now’ in which we do the measuring; they are, so that they may be used in a common utilization of our common futurity, in the transformation [gathering-retrieval] of selected possibilities into the actuality we usually call the real” (*ibid.*, p. 464). There is a more basic project transpiring beneath the chronic coordination of

human activity. Metric time depends upon a more basic time, in the measuring of which we all participate. Ordinary metric time thus presupposes common futurity as an original time.

This more basic time, an originary temporality according to Heidegger, is also the fundamental basis for human existence. Existence is achieved as the transcendence of this original temporality. The becoming, i.e. the temporalization by which human existence makes itself manifest as meaningful understanding, is a transcendence from the horizon of possibility. Human being as transcendent existential achievement is essentially constituted on the basis of futurity. Since the future is the horizon of possibility, the basic temporal transcendence of human existential being is this projection of the possible, i.e. of futurity. “The question of the nature of Time [i.e. ultimate/world-Time] (as of Being), as revealed in our temporalizing experience, is, as Heidegger has insightfully developed it, shrouded in the nature of the possible” (Sherover 1971, p. 283). Sherover further suggests “that the question of the nature of Time is transcendently the question of the ontology of the Possible” (*ibid.*, p. 284). Heidegger’s concept of the possible “defines the scope” of what he means by ‘transcendence’ (*ibid.*, p. 287). The possible is essential to ontological existence. What is ontological (i.e. human Dasein) exists by virtue of its temporal self-transcendence. Meaningful human understanding exists on the basis of the self-projective transcendence of the horizon of possibility, from which possibilities are selected and retrieved to constitute the present and retain the past.

There is thus a priority of the possible for the ontological. The futural horizon of possibility grounds human understanding in providing the range of meaning for thinking the meaning of being. A region of possibility is disclosed and the futurity of human being is selected from it. This grounds existence in temporality and, in particular, in the self-projective horizon of possibility. The selection of certain possibilities from this range, which are then taken as the possibilities most crucial to one's own existence, grounds transcendence in the sense that possibilities are projectively appropriated as ownmost to one's being. Human being projects and therefrom selects possibilities for its ownmost being, but the basis of this projection is the temporal self-projection of the futural horizon that serves as the horizon of possibility. The transcendent futural horizon is temporally, and thus ontologically, prior to the projection of possibility.

Sherover's claim that the priority of futurity is a priority of possibility conflicts with Heidegger's own remarks concerning the origin of possibility in *Basic Problems*. I now turn to this text, and to a closer examination of Heidegger's account of original time.

§2. ORIGINAL TIME IN *THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY*

Sherover has provided an insightful introduction to Heidegger's philosophy of time. However, he relies too much on the role of possibility in his presentation of Heidegger's views. Heidegger's own account of original time in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* shows that there is something prior to possibility, and that what is earlier than possibility is in fact temporality.

The first Part of Heidegger's *Basic Problems* is concerned with what he calls the four basic ontological problems. These are (1) the problem of the ontological difference, i.e. the distinction between being and beings; (2) the problem of the basic articulation of being, i.e. the essential content of a being and its mode of being; (3) the problem of the possible modifications of being and of the unity of the concept of being in its ambiguity; (4) the problem of the truth-character of being (1988, 225). The second Part, he states, is intended to devote a full chapter to the treatment of each of these problems so as to ask the "fundamental ontological question" of the meaning of being in general. But the text of this part of his lecture only gets as far as the first problem, that of the ontological difference. The problem of the ontological difference is one of Heidegger's most important and profound contributions to philosophy.

As noted above, the difference lies in the fact that being in general cannot be taken as any kind of entity at all, since being is what is always already understood as that which determines and characterizes entities as entities. This is to say that being itself, i.e. the understanding which makes possible our awareness of and comportment toward individual beings, cannot itself be treated as though it were one of these beings. To do so is to commit a severe category error. But even the notion of a category in this phrase "category error" serves to mislead us into thinking that the mistake is less serious than it actually is. The very notion of a category already presupposes a certain hypostatization of being. Now being itself is only properly regarded, and the problem of the ontological difference only adequately formulated, if we begin with that entity for which the understanding of

being is a prime concern, an essential question. That entity is human Dasein. Human Dasein is the being whose constitution is grounded in temporality (1988, 228). This has been revealed by the existential analytic undertaken in *Sein und Zeit*. However, Heidegger cautions at the outset of this chapter of Part Two of *Basic Problems* that temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] is to be distinguished from Temporality [*Temporalität*], a thematic term. “It [Temporality] means temporality insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and of ontology as such. The term ‘Temporality’ is intended to indicate that temporality, in existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand being” (*ibid.*). Hofstadter’s index adds that

the capital *t* could be taken as representative of the notion of the transcendental and the term Temporality may then be read as meaning temporality understood as transcendental horizon for the understanding of being and hence for the solution of the basic problem of ontology, namely, the problem of the meaning of being in general (1988, 385).

I think we can take the distinction in summary form as that between the phenomenon of original time, temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*], and this phenomenon when referred to in its transcendental role as Temporality [*Temporalität*]. I mainly focus on temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*], but make occasional reference to the thematic term.

Heidegger devotes the first section of the sole chapter of Part Two of *Basic Problems* to showing, by historical and genealogical analysis, how the common understanding of time as a metric concept already presupposes a more original time. The main target of Heidegger’s analysis is Aristotle’s treatment of time. Heidegger cites Aristotle and Augustine of Hippo as the two central figures

in the development of the common understanding of time in Western philosophy. According to Heidegger, prior to Bergson's work the entire tradition of thinking about time in the West was determined by the insights of Aristotle and Augustine. "Bergson's investigations are valuable because they manifest a philosophical effort to surpass the traditional concept of time," (1988, 232) which held sway over Leibniz, Kant, and even Hegel.

For Aristotle, time is connected with motion and with the measure of motion as it is counted by a soul. The now is fleeting and transitory, for "as now it is always the not-yet-now and the no-longer-now" (1988, 255). It follows that the now measures motion, since "each now is not a pure point but is intrinsically transition, the now, by its essential nature, is not a limit but a number...Aristotle interprets 'being in time' as being measured by time" (1988, 256). It is important to note, as Heidegger points out, that the essential connection between time and human being begins with the Aristotelian connection between time and the soul which measures its motion as the now. Augustine takes up this connection and solidifies it for the philosophical tradition. After Augustine, the essential relation between time and human being will rarely be questioned. However, the essential connection between time and the question of being will be forgotten. Time and being will remain related but opposed, and time will mark the degradation of being. Theories concerning the ultimate source of being, the being of beings, will associate atemporality and supratemporality with this source. Heidegger is the first to clarify the essential relation between original time and the understanding

of the meaning of being. I shall now trace the path of Heidegger's recovery of original time.

Aristotle's account of time largely reinforces what Heidegger calls the "common prescientific understanding of time," (1988, 257) doubtless doing much to establish the plausibility of this particular understanding. But Heidegger insists that this understanding of time presupposes an "earlier" reckoning with time that is more originary. "*By its own phenomenological content* common time points back to an original time, temporality...The characteristic traits of time as commonly understood must themselves become intelligible by way of original time" (*ibid.*). This original time grounds our ability to assign a given expression of time, the now, to the measurements of clocks.

Reckoning with time in the form of measuring time arises as a modification from the primary comportment toward time as *guiding oneself according to it*. It is on the basis of this original comportment toward time that we arrive at the measuring of time, that we invent clocks in order to shape our reckoning with time more economically with reference to time (1988, 258).

The now we assign to the reading of a clock is an expression of human Dasein whereby its matters of concern come under the guidance of temporal organization. "Now" refers to human Dasein as a self-expression of that which is of concern for it. "Saying 'now' is not a speaking about something as an object, but it is surely a declaration about something. The *Dasein*, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, *expresses itself*" (1988, 259). The cares and projects with which human Dasein concerns itself take time to carry out and accomplish, time which Dasein takes for itself and by which it expresses itself. In expressing the time these affairs take, one declares the now as an expression of human Dasein and the activities to which it comports. Heidegger extends this account of expressed time

to the future by the notion of the 'then' as an expectation of such cares and concerns. He also extends it to the past by the notion of 'at that time' as a retention of achieved and accomplished projects. The present expression is 'enpresenting', an explicit expression of extant presence. Expressed time is also public, and the notion of the now is shared. "The expressed now is intelligible to everyone in our being with one another. Although each one of us utters his own now, it is nevertheless the now for everyone. The accessibility of the now for everyone...characterizes time as public" (1988, 264). A certain affinity with Hegel is evident here, but I must refrain from digression.

Expressed time is an existential phenomenon. Each of the three modes of time has its root in an existential temporal determination. Existential original time gives rise to the common time-determinations of the now (enpresenting), the then (expecting), and the at-the-time (retention). These are each determined by the characteristics of the basic constitution of original time, i.e. temporality, which is existential.

The essence of the future lies in *coming-toward-oneself*; that of the past [having-been-ness] lies in *going-back-to*; and that of the present in *staying-with, dwelling-with*, that is, being with. These characters of the *toward, back-to, with* reveal the basic constitution of temporality. As determined by this toward, back-to, and with, temporality is *outside itself* (1988, 266-267).

These three basic characteristics constitute original time as what Heidegger calls an ecstatic unity. Each of the three aspects of temporality is regarded as an ecstasis. An ecstasis literally means something which stands outside (itself) or "oversteps" itself. It is something stretched forth into its existence by having stepped forth beyond itself, as in a reaching. "As the primary outside-itself, temporality is stretch itself" (1988, 270).

“It is with this ecstatic character that we interpret existence, which, viewed ontologically, is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes-back-to-self, and enpresents [dwells-with]. In its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of the Dasein’s being” (1988, 267). Although the three ecstases are united with “co-equal originality,” the characterization of the futural ecstasis inspires that of the other two ecstases. Futurity is ecstatic in that the future carries away as intrinsically toward (*ibid.*); Dasein places itself ahead in such a way that it comes toward itself. In its retentive ecstasis, it goes behind in order to come back to itself, and in its enpresenting it dwells with other entities and goes to them. Temporality is the ecstatic basis for the existence of human Dasein because these three modes of time compose a unity of stretch, of overstepping or of going-beyond-self.

Now the components of this ecstatic unity are given directional descriptions. In each case, they are said to be carrying-away toward something, which implies direction. But the directionality is not basic to the ecstases. There is rather an openness by which the temporal unity oversteps as stretch. What is opened up in ecstatic stretch is a horizon. Each ecstasis, in its remotion toward something, opens upon a horizon. Each ecstasis has a horizon toward which it is open. It is toward this horizon that each manages to go beyond itself in its ecstatic overstepping. Existence as ecstatic unity is horizontal, according to Heidegger.

A peculiar *openness* which is given with the outside-itself, belongs to ecstasis. That toward which each ecstasis is intrinsically open in a specific way we call the *horizon of the ecstasis*. The horizon is the *open expanse* toward which remotion as such is outside itself. *The carrying-off opens up this horizon and keeps it open*. As ecstatic unity of future, past, and present, temporality has a

horizon determined by the ecstases. Temporality as the original unity of future, past, and present, is *ecstatically-horizonal* intrinsically (*ibid.*).

Horizontality, as an open region opened and kept open by the overstepping of ecstatic stretch, is what each ecstasis oversteps toward. The open region of ecstatic horizontality is basic to the toward of directionality. Because of the grounding of directionality in the ecstatic horizon, Heidegger is able to determine the condition of the possibility of intentionality as temporality. As I quoted in my introduction to this chapter:

Intentionality—being directed toward something and the intimate connection of *intentio* and *intantum* present in it—which is commonly spoken of in phenomenology as the ultimate primal phenomenon, has the condition of its possibility in temporality and temporality's ecstatic horizonal character. The Dasein is intentional only because it is determined essentially by temporality (1988, 268).

The intentional character of human Dasein therefore derives from the ecstatic-horizonal nature of original temporality. And since intentionality as directionality is regarded in phenomenology as the “ultimate primal phenomenon,” i.e. the most basic feature of human understanding, perception, and experience, it is warranted to describe existent human Dasein as an essentially temporal being. “If original time qua temporality makes possible the Dasein's ontological constitution, and this being, the Dasein, *is* in such a way that it temporalizes itself, then this being with the mode of being of existent Dasein must be called originally and fitly the *temporal entity simply as such*” (1988, 271). The being of human Dasein has original time's ecstatic character to thank for its very existence. “Within itself, original time is outside itself; that is the nature of its temporalizing. It is this outside-itself itself...within its own self, intrinsically, it is nothing but the outside itself pure and simple” (1988, 267). To be is, for human

Dasein, to be as a temporal unity that literally oversteps itself to achieve ecstatic existence by opening up a horizontal expanse. Original time as temporality is outside-itself-ness.

In the final pages of this first section of the lone chapter in Part Two, Heidegger briefly discusses how original time has been covered up by and in favour of the common understanding of time. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger introduced the notion of being fallen, i.e. the fallenness of human Dasein. Our default existence, i.e. our usual, given way of being in the world, finds us engrossed in concerns and involvements that are bound up with extant particular beings. This fallen mode of existence leads us to regard as an ontic being what cannot properly be regarded as such. Thus we are led to interpret being itself, and human Dasein, and worst of all temporality, as beings on the order of usual things. Bolstered by the Aristotelian account of time, original time as temporality comes to be interpreted solely on the basis of derivative time that is in fact already grounded in original time as temporality. Dasein “has the tendency to understand itself primarily by way of things and to derive the concept of being from the extant [*Vorhandenen*, i.e. present-at-hand]” (1988, 272).

A similar situation unfolds with respect to original time. “As the Dasein encounters time, time gets interpreted also as something somehow [present-at-hand], particularly if it reveals itself as being in a certain connection precisely with [present-at-hand] nature” (1988, 272). Our fallenness with beings leads us to cover up original time by interpreting it as yet another entity, or at best on the basis of such entities. In this way, original time as temporality is concealed and

forgotten by human Dasein. *Sein und Zeit* claims that temporality is essentially falling. This making-present brings out our dependence on spatial terms to characterize the essential temporality of Dasein, although this dependence, which also makes intelligible the independence of space from time, is grounded in ecstatic-horizonal temporality (1962, H. 369). But this dependence “manifests itself in the well-known phenomenon that both Dasein’s interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by ‘spatial representations’. The priority of the spatial in the Articulation of concepts and significations has its basis not in some specific power which space possesses, but in Dasein’s kind of Being. Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present” (*ibid.*). Our language and self-interpretations must reckon with the making-present that is essential to the temporalizing understanding of being which is the fundamental task of Dasein. But the ecstatic-horizonal temporal unity remains the ground and essential source of Dasein’s being. Heidegger’s recovery of original time as temporality has been outlined above.

The second section of Heidegger’s final chapter in *Basic Problems* concerns the topic of temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] and Temporality [*Temporalität*]. He begins by discussing understanding. He draws a distinction between understanding as an act and understanding as an achievement. An act of understanding “is an original *determination of the Dasein’s existence...*[and] a basic determination of existence itself” (1988, 276). Achievements of understanding, e.g. the explanatory understanding common to scientific

knowledge, already presuppose rather than determine existence. Understanding as an achievement, in the sense of explanatory knowledge, is always already involved with particular beings and ontic concerns. Such understanding presupposes the act of understanding being, which originally and essentially determines and characterizes the existence of such beings in their being as entities.

Thus the act of understanding being is itself prior to any achievement of understanding, which always presupposes existence. Heidegger characterizes this prior act of understanding in terms of projection and possibility. The act of understanding is closer to something like an ability to be (1988, 276), or what he calls potentiality-for-being in *Sein und Zeit*. This is the form of understanding that essentially determines human Dasein's existence as understanding of being. "To understand means, more precisely, *to project oneself upon a possibility*, in this *projection* to keep oneself at all times in a possibility. A can-be, a possibility *as possibility, is there* only in projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be" (1988, 277). Heidegger's remarks on projection are given here.

The phenomenon of projection contains two things. First, that *upon which* the Dasein projects itself is a can-be of its own self...Secondly, this projection *upon* something is always a projecting *of*...If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is unveiling itself as this can-be, in this specific being. If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and understands itself in that possibility, this understanding, this becoming manifest of the self...[this] projection is the way in which I *am* the possibility; it is the way in which I exist freely (1988, 277).

The essence of the act of understanding is human Dasein's projecting onto a horizon of possibility. This projection is a temporally-constituted disclosing of the possibilities Dasein takes itself to be. Heidegger refers to this understanding as ontical or existentiell. Keeping with his habit of invoking more originary

versions of his own notions, Heidegger also speaks of a more basic form of projection. He asks “whether time is indeed that upon which being is itself projected—whether time is that by way of which we understand the like of being” (1988, 280). Original time as temporality is the most basic projection. Self-projective ecstatic-horizonal temporality is the earliest, most basic horizon for the projection of being, and thus for the understanding of being that is essential to transcendent human Dasein. “The *ecstatic character of time makes possible the Dasein’s specific overstepping character, transcendence*, and thus also the world” (1988, 302). Temporality’s ecstatic-horizonal unity, as a self-projection, is the basis for the transcendence that makes the understanding of being possible.

“Transcendence means to step over; the transcendens, the transcendent, is *that which oversteps as such* and not that toward which I step over” (1988, 299). The openness of the transcendent region, not the direction of the transcendence, is basic. Dasein is transcendence as an understanding of world that precedes the understanding of beings. Transcendent Dasein literally stands outside itself in overstepping itself to ground its own selfhood for itself. This transcendent character of human Dasein is made possible on the basis of the ecstatic-horizonal character of self-projective temporality. In §21 Heidegger claims that world-understanding as transcendent Dasein is constituted in the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality. Heidegger attempts here a “Temporal interpretation of the being of those [present-at-hand] entities in our nearest neighbourhood, handiness...[by which means] it is proved that the function of time is to make possible the understanding of being” (1988, 303). This attempt focuses solely on the ecstatic

horizon of the present, namely *praesens*. Praesensial projection is Temporal projection (1988, 307). A temporal horizon is shown to be necessary for the projection of possibility that is human Dasein's understanding of being.

Thus "we can say that temporality is, intrinsically, original self-projection simply as such, so that wherever and whenever understanding exists...this understanding is possible only in temporality's self-projection" (1988, 307). At last we arrive at the result of Heidegger's penetrating analysis, which takes its cue from the "series" of projections of human Dasein (1988, 308), its "levels" as we say metaphorically. We as human Dasein have an understanding of beings grounded in a projection upon being. This in turn is grounded in our understanding of being in general. The understanding of being in general is grounded in a projection upon time. Here this reductive series "has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality" (1988, 308). However, "this end is nothing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all projecting" (1988, 308), which as we now see is the self-projective openness of the temporal horizon. It is this open region of the temporal horizon that is basic to the directionality that characterizes intentionality. Without the self-projective temporal horizon, no direction or orientation could have bearing. Thus the structure of intentionality as directionality is essentially temporal.

Before discussing this result in detail, I should note that it also conflicts with some of what we learned from Sherover. For Sherover, Heidegger's priority of futurity was interpreted as the priority of possibility. Sherover indexes the meaning of Heidegger's 'transcendence' to the concept of the possible. On

Sherover's account, there is a priority of possibility, much as there is in Kant and other traditional metaphysics, in the sense of the *a priori*. But Heidegger's reasoning diffuses this argument. In order for there to be a priority of the possible, there must be priority, which is a patently temporal notion. Temporality itself grounds the *a priori*, as the earlier, in that temporality is basic to any earlier. "Because the original determinant of possibility, the origin of possibility itself, is time, time temporalizes itself as the absolutely earliest. *Time is earlier than any possible earlier* of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition for an earlier as such" (1988, 325). Temporality is what grants the possible, as an *a priori* condition of being, its meaning as an earlier. So while there is a priority of possibility in Heidegger's philosophy of time and an essential role played by possibility in his account of understanding, in both cases the function of possibility is characterized by temporality, rather than the way in which Sherover suggests.

§3. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ZWICKY AND HEIDEGGER

The basic structure of intentionality is temporal. Temporality provides a horizon of openness upon which possibilities are projected as the understanding of being. This temporal horizon, an ecstatic-horizonal unity, is provided in the transcendent self-projection of temporality. This transcendence also grounds intentionality. The direction of self-relation that characterizes one's intentional comportment toward beings is only possible on the basis of the temporal horizon's self-projected openness. Intentionality, as the directional orientation

toward entities that are understood in perception and in experience, cannot possess directional bearing or orientation unless it already finds itself in a transcendent openness that permits such bearing. This openness is the temporal horizon. Therefore the structure of the ecstatic-horizonal temporal unity is basic to intentionality.

Now if my argument that, at the basis of Zwicky's claim regarding the atemporality of lyric, she conceives spatial directionality to be fundamental to human understanding, and if it is conceded that this directionality can be interpreted in terms of what has been called intentionality, then it seems difficult to deny that the essential structure and ground of this spatial directionality could be anything other than the original time as temporality offered by Heidegger. We would be led to admit that what Zwicky calls atemporality in her characterization of lyric meaning and understanding has an underlying temporal structure that makes possible the directional orientation of the human understanding of being. In this section I give Heidegger's justifications for his claim that the essential structure of intentionality is temporal. My aim is to clearly state the conflict between Zwicky and Heidegger on the basic (a)temporality of understanding before dealing with critical considerations in my final chapter.

As the reader will recall, in *Wisdom & Metaphor* Zwicky develops an account of understanding that portrays this phenomenon as fundamentally spatial in organization. Her account develops the claim in her earlier book that lyric thought is atemporal. I interpreted Zwicky's claim that lyric is atemporal as a claim about the basic spatiality of human understanding. Lyric's atemporality

amounts to a priority of the spatial in the sense that spatial organization is basic to the temporal organization of thought. Time has been applied to basically spatial thinking by a methodological emphasis on sequentiality and successiveness. But this unidimensional structure applied to thinking merely obscures the more basic spatial structure of the fit between thinking and being. Temporal dimensionality does not exist in phenomenological experience as independent of the spatial dimension. The basic phenomenal manifold of perceptual experience is spatially integrated, and the synaesthetic integrity by which we understand the world's being is a basically spatial integration.

The understanding of the world achieved in wisdom is characterized by Zwicky in terms of the pointing of metaphor and the attunement to being of gestalt (e.g. seeing-as). I have argued that these components of her account reveal the spatial priority of understanding to involve a basic directional sense as she construes them. Both components, metaphor and gestalt, rely on directionality. In metaphor, understanding is achieved in the experience of a gesture that connects two patterns of being. We point toward a connectedness. In our gestalt attunement to the contours of being, those contours and ontological patterns look back at us. As Wittgenstein described it, the meaning we experience as understanding "is a physiognomy," which is to say it *looks* at us (2003, R113). This looking at our attunement suggests that the meaningful structure of the world is basically directional. Understanding as the experience of this meaning is a collusive co-response that achieves a fit between thinking and being. This fit is the collaboration between resonant directionalities. The sympathetic way in

which directionalities join together as an integrity can also resonate perceptually; linguistic expressions of such synaesthetic integrity achieve lyric clarity.

To sum up Zwicky's account, understanding as the experience of meaning is said to be fundamentally spatial. This spatiality consists in two forms of directionality. The two forms are identified with basic components of Zwicky's account. Our thinking points toward the contours of the world both in metaphor and in gestalt, which connect gestures as responses to the world's presence. But the world itself also partakes in this fit between thinking and being. We attune to these contours of being because they are directed at us, exposed to us, present to us—they *look* at us. Understanding as the experience of meaning is therefore a collaborative experience. The world colludes with our gesturing in a collusive co-responsive experience of meaning. This collusive co-response is what it means to understand, and such meaning is clearly directional. The fundamental spatiality of understanding is therefore a directional experience of meaning.

Directionality appears to be key to Zwicky's account of understanding as I have presented it, in that the gestural experience of meaning is directional. I feel this is a faithful rendering of the way she construes the account. The question thus arises whether Zwicky's philosophy conflicts with Heidegger's philosophy. She construes the experience of meaning as fundamentally spatial in terms of its directionality. But for Heidegger, any possible directional orientation has an underlying temporal structure. The openness, upon which any possible directionality has its toward, is a self-projective temporal horizon. The openness of the temporal horizon grounds directionality. But Heidegger's notion of

directionality is that involved with intentionality. I have suggested that this must also be true of Zwicky's notion of directionality, but is this certain?

One major difference between Zwicky and Heidegger is that in Zwicky's philosophy, directionality characterizes both "sides" of understanding. Both thinking and being are directional. For Heidegger, Dasein is directed in its comportments toward beings, but those beings toward which it comports are not themselves directional. In terms of a perceptual relation, the perceivedness of the beings perceived is not characterized by the same directionality that characterizes self-directed perception. The two components of intentionality, the *intentio* and the *intentum*, do not exist in the same sense. Intentional Dasein, as *intentio*, intends as a self-relating directedness. An *intentum* thus intended does not share in such directedness, although it too exists transcendently. But the existence of the *intentum* is intended by the *intentio*. Heidegger argues that Dasein uncovers the *intentum* in intending it, for Dasein exists as an uncovering (1988, 70). But the directionality of the intentional structure of *intentio* and *intentum* originates with the *intentio* of Dasein. And, as I argued at length in the previous section, there is no more basic directionality than what is involved with Dasein as the understanding of being, since this directionality is oriented in the openness of the self-projecting temporal horizon. On Zwicky's view, both thinking and being are directional. These terms are not analogous to *intentio* and *intentum*, unless perhaps we interpret her notion of being through her notion of *thisness*. In *thisness*, the structure of being is compacted through a particular being. In attunement to this particular being, the directionality of the world is given directly

and without mediation. The 'intentum' is thus directional, since the being of the world presents itself to our attunement through this particular *thisness*.

Does this pose a problem for interpreting Zwicky's construal of understanding (in terms of directionality) as a concern with intentionality? Perhaps if we restrict ourselves to Heidegger's conception of intentionality. But Heidegger designs his argument concerning the underlying temporal structure of intentionality with an eye toward all phenomenological theories of intentionality, so we need not restrict ourselves. However, it seems that on any account of intentionality, the key feature is an emphasis on directionality or the phenomenon of being directed, i.e. self-direction. Zwicky's account of understanding certainly meets this basic criteria. But her account goes further, and makes directionality a key feature of the world's being as well. The world itself becomes imbued with directionality. To the extent that the directionality of being is not then also the source of the directionality of thinking, I will take this to mean that her emphasis on directionality not only suggests a concern with intentionality, but demands it. One cannot propose an account of understanding in which spatial priority as directionality is the key feature of understanding, yet resist an intentional interpretation of that account.

But if one cannot resist an interpretation in terms of intentionality, then Zwicky conflicts with Heidegger in characterizing understanding as "fundamentally spatial." We were led to this characterization of understanding by Zwicky's insistence that lyrically clear philosophical wisdom is atemporal. However, Heidegger has shown that original time as temporality is basic to the

intentional directionality. Of course, he mounts this argument because of the extreme importance of the question concerning directionality. It was not clear how the meaning of directionality comes about. “In our first consideration of intentionality we stressed that the question how directive sense, the understanding of being, belongs to *intentio*, and how *intentio* itself is possible as this necessary reference, is not only unanswered in phenomenology but not even asked” (1988, 314). The question was unposed before he posed it. Although I have attempted to present his answer to this question, it is far from conclusive that the question is dead. Were it so, Zwicky’s thought would be much less compelling.

The conflict between Zwicky and Heidegger arises in that his answer to the question of intentional directionality is decisive, if not conclusive. To the extent that the phenomenon of understanding is directional, it is grounded in temporality. Zwicky insists that understanding is fundamentally spatial, and I have fleshed out this insistence as a claim about the basic directionality that characterizes understanding. However, as Heidegger has shown, transcendent temporality is the basis of directionality.

We know, however, that this self-direction toward something, *intentionality*, is possible only if the Dasein as such is intrinsically *transcendent*. It can be transcendent only if the Dasein’s basic constitution is grounded originally in *ecstatic-horizonal temporality*. The whole of perception’s intentional structure of perceiving, perceived, and perceivedness—and that of every other mode of intentionality—is grounded in the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality (1988, 314-315).

The orientation of directionality, the fact that it reaches outward, toward something or in collusion with another gesture, presumes an openness upon which that orientation can find its bearing. That openness is the transcendent horizon of temporality. Directional understanding which projects upon this self-projected

horizon is thus grounded in original time as temporality. Understanding is therefore basically and essentially temporal rather than spatial, which is where Zwicky conflicts with Heidegger.

CRITICAL DISCUSSION

HAVING DELIVERED MY argument that Zwicky's philosophy conflicts with Heidegger's temporal phenomenology, I wish to consider, by way of conclusion, two possible replies to my argument that might speak in Zwicky's favour. The first critical reply draws upon Heidegger's essay "Time and Being," in which the contentious notion of the open might be seen to support Zwicky's account. The second critical reply turns to Merleau-Ponty's brand of phenomenology in an attempt to re-conceive transcendence in such a way as to resonate strongly with Zwicky's account. I suggest that his advances over Heidegger's phenomenology undermine any conflict she may have with it. In my evaluation of these replies, the second is decisive in Zwicky's favour.

It is evident that Zwicky has an affinity with Heidegger on several fronts. His later thought can be strongly felt in her concept of attunement and clearly heard in her notion of integrity. But traces of opposition can also be sensed.

Zwicky's philosophy of language differs markedly from Heidegger's. He embraces language as the "House of being," while she tends to distrust it. This leads to further differences on the question of meaning. I have not been concerned to explore these particular traces of opposition, but they are apparent. I have been concerned to spell out the conflict between Zwicky and Heidegger with respect to the temporal basis of understanding.

Zwicky insists that her lyric philosophy is characterized by atemporality. One's lyric awareness is said to essentially lack temporal awareness. The mode of understanding deployed in perceiving the clarity of a lyric work is more basic than any mode that relies on temporal organization. In *Wisdom & Metaphor*, this insistence on the atemporality of lyric philosophy is developed as a claim about spatial organization as basic to understanding, which I have called spatial priority. Genuine understanding traces the contours of being by spatially organized pointing and attunement. Such pointing and attunement, which respectively characterize what Zwicky has called metaphor and gestalt, are our most basic gestures of understanding toward the world. The gestural fit between thinking and being, i.e. the understanding of being, is synaesthetically integrated. Our perceptual gestures join together in a co-responsive integrity that collaborates with the presence of being to achieve the meaning we experience in understanding. This collusive integrity is basically oriented toward the world, in a sense where the priority of spatiality leaves no room for temporal organization to dominate thought.

I have argued that the basic spatiality of the integrity by which thinking

understands being turns on the notion of directionality. According to my argument, at least two central components of Zwicky's account suggest that directionality is the basic spatial feature of understanding. Firstly, metaphors connect gestures (i.e. responses to the world's presence) by pointing to an ontological connection, similarity, or overlap in the way two or more gestures respond to being. Secondly, in gestalt, the world's presence looks toward us and points directly *at* us. In both cases, the pointing of metaphor and the physiognomic perception of gestalt, a directional orientation is basic and necessary to a central component of Zwicky's account. Directionality thus appears to be at the heart of Zwicky's account of understanding. It therefore seems difficult to avoid an interpretation of her philosophy in terms of intentionality.

But as soon as we allow an intentional reading of Zwicky's philosophy, that of early Heidegger comes into play. The essentially temporal structure of intentionality conflicts with Zwicky's claim that spatiality has priority for understanding. The concept of intentionality was introduced precisely to characterize the ultimate primal phenomenon of meaningful understanding, i.e. directionality. But Heidegger has argued that any such directionality must be grounded in temporality. In order for directional orientation to have any bearing in the first place, it must have it in an open region. The openness of this open region arises as the self-projecting horizon of temporality. Any notion of directionality necessarily presupposes this transcendent temporal horizon. Temporality's transcendence is therefore basic to the directional orientation of

space, which means that Zwicky has not given us the full picture.

§1. FIRST CRITICAL REPLY: “TIME AND BEING”

An initial reply to my argument arises in the question concerning the openness of the temporal horizon. If this transcendent horizon of temporality is the basis for any possible directionality, then Zwicky’s emphasis on directionality amounts neither to a priority of the spatial nor to atemporality. But if this open region, as the transcendent temporal horizon, does not sufficiently ground directionality, then the conflict between Zwicky and Heidegger is not as damaging as I have suggested. We must therefore reflect on the openness of the transcendent temporal horizon.

Much of Heidegger’s terminology in characterizing original time as temporality in *Basic Problems* and elsewhere can be read metaphorically. He is well aware of the traditional spatialization of time in philosophy and science. In prioritizing time as the transcendent ground of the *a priori*, Heidegger’s characterization of temporality draws heavily upon overtly spatial terms, such as ecstasis, horizon, region, etc. To a certain degree it is acceptable to interpret these terms metaphorically. They point toward an implicit objection to the traditional conception of time in terms of spatial dimensionality that is at the heart of Heidegger’s early philosophy. Due to their metaphorical use, they cannot be exploited in the service of an objection stating that Heidegger himself seeks to spatialize temporality. Furthermore, in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger already makes clear that the means by which Dasein articulates and interprets itself are

thoroughly permeated by spatiality, in that the stock of concepts and significations available in language tend to prioritize spatial representations (1962, H. 369).

However, not all his terms can be taken metaphorically. His most basic term for describing the transcendence of temporality is not metaphorical. I am convinced that Heidegger is speaking quite literally when he characterizes the transcendent temporal horizon in terms of an openness. This openness remains part of his thinking from *Sein und Zeit* and *Basic Problems* to the later essay on “Time and Being.” It underlies his derivation of Dasein’s characteristic spatiality from its temporality, and is also key to understanding the account that later rejects this derivation, which involves his notion of the “prespatial region.” An openness as the transcendence of primordial temporality is responsible for the spatiality that corresponds to Dasein’s temporality in Heidegger’s earlier thought. In *Sein und Zeit* §70. *The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characteristic of Dasein*, Heidegger argues that “Dasein’s specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality” (*ibid.*, H. 367). The components of spatiality (directionality and deseverance) are grounded in the ecstatic-horizonal temporal unity. In the previous section, he has just argued that the world’s transcendence is ecstatic-horizonal. Heidegger goes on to conclude that “*Only on the basis of its ecstatic-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space*” (*ibid.*, H. 369). In his later essay on “Time and Being,” he rejects this conclusion as untenable. However, this notion of transcendent openness that characterizes horizonal temporality remains central.

In his later essay, Heidegger’s approach to the question of time marks a

significant shift from the way he approached it in *Sein und Zeit*, where the temporal horizon “has to do with directionality and openness” (Stambaugh 1972, viii)—although openness, I have argued, is basic to directionality. For Heidegger in this essay, true, “original,” incipient time is characterized in terms of a time-space. This time-space refers to a prespatial region which, as true time, is the realm of the open. Here Heidegger continues to argue for a “prespatial region,” although in this account that region is the realm of the open rather than the horizon of temporality. He makes use of a spatial characterization in his notion of the openness of the open region, but this characterization is not metaphorical. The account has shifted from temporality to time-space, but openness as transcendence remains basically intact. Therefore it would seem acceptable to literally interpret Heidegger’s reference to the prespatial open region. I think Heidegger’s own words suggest that he is not to be read metaphorically.

Dimensionality consists in a reaching out that opens up, in which future approaching brings about what has been, what has been brings about futural approaching, and the reciprocal relation of both brings about the opening up of openness. Thought in terms of this threefold giving, true time proves to be three-dimensional...the unity of time’s three dimensions consists in the interplay of each toward each...we call the first, original, literally incipient extending in which the unity of true time consists “nearing nearness,” “nearhood” (*Nahheit*). (1972, p. 14-15.)

In characterizing the openness of the prespatial time-space, Heidegger emphasizes that he intends the literal incipience of “extending” and “approaching”.

Now it also seems that in this characterization, Heidegger has not purged the prespatial region of directionality. This is evident when he says that dimensionality consists in a “reaching out” in which there is a futural approaching brought about by what has been. The reaching out is what opens up the openness of the open region. It seems that directionality must be basic to the

inward/outward upon which this reaching out opens up. Reaching out entails that an “out” lies in a different direction from an “in”. The reach in which dimensionality consists, whereby openness is opened up, must already have an out, as opposed to an “in,” that it may reach toward. Furthermore, futural approaching also seems to rely on a sense of directionality in that what is futural must first be away from what has been in order to be characterized as approaching. The notion of an “away” is a patently directional notion.

Lastly, Heidegger says that the unity of true time’s three dimensions, what he once called the ecstatic-horizonal unity, consists “in the interplay of each *toward* each” (*ibid.*, p. 15, my emphasis). This interplay constitutes the fourth, fundamental dimension of true time, as “the giving that determines all” (*ibid.*). It is this interplay that perhaps most explicitly suggests a sense of directionality. Heidegger claims that the unity of true time’s three dimensions, which as the fourth and fundamental dimension is true extending, consists in the interplay of each *toward* each. Now my German is functionally non-existent, but if the term (or constellation of terms) which Stambaugh translates by the English “toward” bears even a slight synonymy to our term, then this account of true time must be furnished by a sense of directionality that is basic to the opening up of the prespatial open region. The “interplay of each toward each” also suggests what Zwicky called integrity, although this is not a verbal notion. True time as the gift of appropriation in this essay consists in the activity of interplay, of the mutual implication, i.e. the resonance, of each of the three dimensions in the others.

Perhaps it is the case that Zwicky’s account helps us to determine

Heidegger's meaning in this later essay. Can we think the dimensional interplay as an integrity by which true time as the prespatial time-space extends itself by virtue of each aspect of the dimensional unity sounding its own resonance in the others? Recall Zwicky's account of understanding as the experience of meaning that gestures in resonant response to the presence of being. Heidegger refers to the sending of presence and the extending of the time-space that opens out (*ibid.*, p. 21). True time opens and conceals, allowing us to "think Being in the sense of presencing and allowing-to-presence" (*ibid.*). But the fact remains that time must open *outward*. In this later essay he recognizes that the open opens outward in the extension of the time-space. This outward opening up allows for presencing, which presences back upon its ground in the thinking of being. There is a strong sense that perhaps directionality is not grounded in openness after all.

If directionality is indeed already bound up with, or actually basic to, the openness opened up as the outward extending of the prespatial time-space, then this later essay perhaps also marks a return to phenomenology for Heidegger. But his style and conclusion suggest that he has moved well beyond such aims. What remains is an account of the dimensional temporal unity as an interplay in which a basic time-space opens outward and a presencing is sent forth in letting-be. Both occur together in the mutual appropriation of being. Both require notions of directionality as basic as, or perhaps even basic to, that of the openness. "In the phrase 'Being as Appropriation,' the word 'as' now means: Being, letting-presence sent in Appropriating, time extended in Appropriating. Time and Being appropriated in Appropriation" (*ibid.*, p. 22). The presencing of the world is now

central in a way it was not in *Sein und Zeit* or in *Basic Problems*. Complimentary to this sending-forth as the letting-be of presence there is withdrawal, a holding back, which Heidegger merely intimates. This withdrawal holds back what is peculiar and perhaps already present in the gift of appropriation. Heidegger's tendency to characterize it as self-withdrawal, self-withholding, suggests a resonance in what is not given. If what has been is sent and presence is let-be, yet withheld, then a resonance would be created in which gift and giving would co-respond.

Zwicky is thoroughly familiar with Heidegger. What is more, she has a strong affinity with his later thought, as we saw before. It is therefore plausible that her philosophy attempts a clarification of his later thinking. Her contribution is to bring out the basic directionality that resides in his earlier and later characterizations of the open region. She presents the thinking of being as appropriation in which the extending interplay of time and the letting-be of presence are, in the clarity of lyric philosophy, a co-responsive integrity. Zwicky develops Heidegger's account of appropriation into that of the integration of thinking and being. Far from being a phenomenological error, her philosophy takes what is most profound in Heidegger's post-phenomenological thought and develops a highly novel account of understanding in its wake.

§2. SECOND CRITICAL REPLY: MERLEAU-PONTY

A measure of support for Zwicky's philosophy comes from another thinker in the phenomenological tradition, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-

Ponty's conception of temporality equates time with subjectivity. But his notion of the temporal present as a totality of intentionalities leads him to re-conceive transcendence. His re-conception of time and transcendence supports his account of meaning and understanding, and establishes directionality as fundamental for these. This constitutes a notable advance over Heidegger and potentially resolves the conflict between his philosophy and Zwicky's. As a proper account of Merleau-Ponty requires far more space than I have allotted, I allow his words to speak for themselves in select passages quoted at length.

A brief overview of Merleau-Ponty's theory of meaning is called for. For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenon of meaning is directional. His argument for this thesis, given in his seminal text, *Phénoménologie de la Perception*, is partly etymological. The French *sens*, 'sense' or 'significance' in English, also means 'direction'. This ambiguity reveals that the significance of things, i.e. their phenomenal meaning, is always given as an orientation. Our very perception of things is an oriented gaze, for "if the subject of perception were not this gaze which takes a grip upon things only in so far as they have a general direction," perception would not exist at all (2005, 295). The being of entities, as we perceptually understand it, is therefore directional. "[S]ince the perceived world is grasped only in terms of direction, we cannot dissociate being from orientated being" (*ibid.*). Expressive linguistic meaning too is essentially directional, which recalls Zwicky's argument that meaning gestures toward the world. "The spoken word is a gesture, and its meaning, a world" (2005, 214). Linguistic meaning is gestural because phenomenal meaning is intentional; both are essentially

directional. So far, this establishes Merleau-Ponty's affiliation with the phenomenological emphasis on directionality in his approach to the questions of phenomenal and linguistic meaning.

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of perception also offers a new conception of perceptual understanding and meaning, supported by his analysis of time. He repeatedly thematizes the limits of objective thinking, which obscures a more basic existential space in which directionality relates thinking and being. "In order to realize what is the meaning of [mythical] space, we have no means other than that of resuscitating in ourselves, in our present perception, the relationship of the subject and his world which analytical reflection does away with" (2005, 340). Merleau-Ponty fully accepts that naturalism has important lessons for philosophy, but these are incidental to those of phenomenology. He frequently takes objective analysis to task for its failure to attend adequately to the pre-objective involvement consciousness has with the world, which is basically intentional. The conscious subject itself constitutes time in its gaze upon the world. Subjectivity is not in time *per se*, but rather takes up time for itself in living time (2005, 491). This notion of temporality as subjectivity entails that perceptual consciousness (i.e. our most basic understanding of the world we inhabit) is, according to Merleau-Ponty, timeless in the strictest sense.

We are saying that time *is* someone, or that temporal dimensions, in so far as they perpetually overlap, bear each other out and ever confine themselves to making explicit what was implied in each, being collectively expressive of that one single explosion or thrust which is subjectivity itself. We must understand time as the subject and the subject as time. What is perfectly clear, is that this primordial temporality is not a juxtaposition of external events, since it is the power which holds them together while keeping them apart. Ultimate subjectivity is not temporal in the empirical sense of the term... We may say that ultimate consciousness is 'timeless' (*zeitlose*) in the sense that it is not intratemporal (2005, 490-491, citing Husserl's *Zeitbewusstsein* p. 442).

To describe ultimate consciousness as 'timeless' is reminiscent of Zwicky. Her insistence on lyric's atemporality also meant that understanding is not fundamentally "of" time. Zwicky provided reasons for thinking that the phenomenological temporal dimension might actually be resonance within the network of directionally related meanings that make up one's integrated phenomenal manifold. Here Merleau-Ponty describes primordial temporality as the power that holds external events together and keeps them apart. On his view, there seems to be a certain degree of relational resonance that binds the events of the 'external world'. Time is this binding, this mutual implication between meanings which "bear each other out." But the understanding of the meanings themselves is basic. It is the resonance between elements in an intentional network that gives rise to our impression of temporal dimensionality.

Merleau-Ponty's analysis of time results in a new conception of the present that marks a significant advance over Heidegger and is, it seems to me, thoroughly spatial. He construes the present as a totality of intentionalities. This totality includes the past and the future. "A past and a future spring forth when I reach out towards them...my present is...this instant, it is equally this day, this year or my whole life" (2005, 489). The basic structure of these intentionalities is not a temporal structure. Intentionality is a response to gestures of being. Consciousness is in every case an awareness of the being of the world, a consciousness of its presence. Our own awareness only comes about as a result of this more basic, directional awareness of the actual gesture of the existent world.

This ultimate consciousness...is the consciousness of the present. In the present and in perception, my being and my consciousness are at one...because 'to be

conscious' is here nothing but 'to-be-at ...' (*'être à ...'*), and because my consciousness of existing merges into the actual gesture of 'ex-sistence'. It is by communicating with the world that we communicate beyond all doubt with ourselves. We hold time in its entirety, and we are present to ourselves because we are present to the world (2005, 493).

Here Merleau-Ponty argues that consciousness, as perceptual understanding that is also a meaningful existence communicating with the world, is the whole of time. What we call the present is the whole of our being, the space in which consciousness and embodied being are joined. What we consider our 'present' is whatever is of significance to us when pressed to consider it. This is similar to Heidegger, but Merleau-Ponty embraces the lack of distinction between time and this notion of significance (2005, 495). The temporal dimensionality of human being is not separable from the meaning of our relation of 'to-be-at' the world, of our aim toward it. This meaning, the meaning of the presence we have toward the world in being present to it, is essentially directional.

Our ability to be temporal, to temporalize, is rooted in our ability to have relations of significance with the world, i.e. to collude with it. These relations of concern that ground our being and our conscious, perceptual understanding are only significant in that they are directional. To perceive, to be conscious, to understand things and concerns that we experience in the world, is to join up with the world by gazing upon the presence it has for us, upon the gesture it extends to us. This gazing upon the world is the basis of meaning and intentionality.

We have no way of knowing what a picture or a thing is other than by looking at them, and their *significance* is revealed only if we look at them from a certain point of view, from a certain distance and in a certain *direction*, in short only if we place, at the service of the spectacle, our collusion with the world...there would be no direction without a being who inhabits the world and who, through the medium of his gaze, marks out the first direction as a basis for all others (2005, 499).

This gaze opens up a space, but the openness is not basic to the orientation of the gaze; quite the opposite, in fact. The gaze is our bearing a present upon the world's presence. The gaze itself is time, but time conceived as a directionality. What Heidegger called transcendence is transformed by Merleau-Ponty. He makes of it the means by which we direct ourselves toward and upon the contours of being. The world lies before us, and we collude with it by gazing upon it in a transcending-forth-toward it, in a collaborative gesture that traces being. All this happens on the basis of directionality.

In all uses of the word *sens*, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of the subject as *ek-stase*, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the world. The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains 'subjective' since its texture and articulations are traced out by the subject's movement of transcendence. Hence we discovered, with the world as cradle of meanings, direction of all directions (*sens de tous les sens*), and ground of all thinking...we can designate something by this word [i.e. time] only because we are the past, present and future. [Time] is literally the tenor [*sens*—direction] of our life, and, like the world, is accessible only to the person who has his place within it, and who follows its direction (2005, 499-500).

Transcendence does not open up a horizon upon which understanding can be projected, as in Heidegger. Transcendence traces along the contours of the world, feels outward and gazes upon its patterns in order to share in their meaning. The open space between the world and us is not the basis for the directionality of our intentional totality. This transcendent space is our collusion with being. Time, understood as the present, is the totality of this transcendence.

This re-conception of transcendence that informs Merleau-Ponty's new notions of meaning and of understanding has much in common with the shape of Zwicky's thought. In fact, the similarities provide an interesting resolution to the

conflict between Zwicky and Heidegger in favour of Zwicky. Transcendence is a gesture in which human beings and the world's being participate. But this collusive, gestural transcendence is directional rather than temporal. In this sense it is also spatial, but only in so far as one permits an abstract understanding of spatiality in terms of directionality. The extension of space itself seems to presuppose directionality, and Merleau-Ponty himself equates space with the existential in reference to its "inner necessity" by which it opens on to an "outside" (2005, 342). The orientation of the outside is directional, as is existence. There is a priority of the spatial, with its basis in the directional, that helps to resolve the conflict I have sketched between Zwicky and Heidegger.

§3. CRITICAL EVALUATION

The preceding replies to my central argument constitute considerable points in favour of Zwicky. The construal of openness as a basis for directionality in my third chapter, where I present Heidegger's argument for the temporal structure of intentionality to sketch the conflict between his philosophy and Zwicky's, does not sufficiently account for the development of his later thought. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty's re-conception of the notion of transcendence is an advance over Heidegger which calls into question the severity of the conflict as I have sketched it. Both replies expand our understanding of the openness on which my argument for the conflict relies. By favouring Zwicky, they serve to weaken my argument that her thought, understood in the context of the phenomenology of intentionality, conflicts with that of a canonical

phenomenologist.

Yet it remains unclear whether these replies are decisive. For example, in the first critical reply concerning Heidegger's essay on "Time and Being," it is possible that my discussion of appropriation is not adequate. If so, then it may be incorrect to attribute a notion of directionality to openness. Let us consider this possibility.

Heidegger says that time is extended in the appropriation of time and being. This appropriation involves the letting-presence sent forth from being, and the extending out of time that opens up an open region. I have attempted to merge his thinking with Zwicky's by arguing that this extending that opens by reaching out does so toward an outside, i.e. in a certain direction. But Heidegger also says that appropriation is not *there*, in a spatial or any other sense, and that it is a distortion to put the matter this way (1972, 24). "Directionality" may not properly characterize the extending by which the time-space opens up the prespatial open region. Such characterizations do not "say the Same in terms of the Same about the Same" (*ibid.*). The appropriation appropriates. This is its basic activity, the appropriation of being and time. Nothing more can be said about this activity in a lecture prepared by this author, let alone in a graduate thesis.

What remains is intended as a guide for thinking. But the essential sway of this guidance is that we ought not to let thinking get away from the path of thought to which it is called by its source. The call of this source does not abide such characterizations as "directionality." Directionality is not the source which

binds thinking. It is not the oldest self-concealing source of thought of which Heidegger speaks. This source is concealed, but its presence can be felt in the openness opened up by the extending of true time in appropriation. This source is not, however, properly characterized by such terms as “directionality.” If it could be so characterized, it would cease to be concealed, and could no longer serve as the source. Therefore, in my failure to pay adequate heed to the source in my earlier discussion of appropriation, we must disregard any support gleaned from that discussion that may have benefited Zwicky.

Against the second critical reply, I might proceed as follows. It is clear that time, directionality, and subjectivity are all essentially related in Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology. Time is literally that direction by which our subjective gaze upon the world projectively traces out the totality of our present habitation of being. He re-conceives meaning and understanding by re-conceiving transcendence in his analysis of temporality. The perceptual understanding of ultimate consciousness is atemporal or “timeless,” strictly speaking, because time is the direction by which our life bears itself toward being, i.e. toward what is not the self. Time as subjectivity is imbued with meaning in this tracing transcendence. Meaning is re-conceived as the direction in which what-is-not-me lies, but along which I trace myself out in collusion with being.

What is not clear is how directionality relates to spatiality on this account. The second critical reply entirely ignores Merleau-Ponty’s entire account of embodiment, space, and motility. While this oversight is due primarily to the short-sighted aims of the reply in the context of this paper, it cannot be

overlooked. The self as subject and time as subjectivity are not readily distinguished from those habitual practices which ground our perception, in Merleau-Ponty's thought. A great deal has been left out, albeit by necessity, from this preliminary attempt to use his thought to buttress Zwicky. But this does not mean the reasoning found above is in some way flawed. In fact, it presents some striking similarities between the more abstract points of Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality and Zwicky's views on understanding. It is impossible to judge, without a more detailed comparison of these two philosophies, whether these alleged similarities hold fast or wither away upon closer scrutiny. This is admittedly a "cop-out" but as the reader must also see by now, the parallels between these accounts are plain. Therefore it is with a charitable heart that I assign a preliminary victory to Zwicky. Given the received impression that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy constitutes an important advance over Heidegger in the realm of phenomenology, the sympathetic support his thought brings to bear on hers will stand to sufficiently close the present discussion.

§4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper set out to address a curious question: is time really basic to *all* our understanding? Should philosophers revere it as a condition, or condemn it as an obstacle to clear thinking? These questions have barely begun to be addressed here. Zwicky has offered an intriguing condemnation of time. I have argued that her claim, understood in terms of the directionality basic to spatial priority, conflicts with Heidegger's temporal phenomenology. I have also entertained two

critical replies to this thesis. The first, though initially convincing, was seen to offer no support to Zwicky after all, albeit due to no fault of her own reasoning. The second, however, has been seen to harbour much more potential. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of time confirms his own re-conceptions of meaning and understanding. These have many parallels with the overview of Zwicky's thought given in my first chapter. Owing to my inability to consider the matter in further depth in such limited space, I must assign victory to Zwicky on the question whether time, or directional space, is basic to our meaningful understanding of the world. Understanding is basically spatial, I conclude.

This conclusion in favour of Zwicky has two immediate consequences. First, it shows that a great deal of interpretive work remains to determine the accuracy of my presentation of her philosophy. Much has been left out, regrettably so. To sketch in greater detail the implications of her account of clarity holds much promise for philosophers. In my estimation, no better work has been done on the question of clarity than Zwicky's work in *Lyric Philosophy*. I fully encourage any interested reader to pursue this task.

Second, and even more enticing, is the question I have posed in my suggestion that Zwicky's philosophy closely parallels that of Merleau-Ponty. Even more study is required on my part to ascertain the legitimacy of this suggestion. My intention is to revisit this issue. The question of transcendence is perhaps the most important question for phenomenology. If Zwicky's philosophy can be brought to bear on this question, then it requires greater work to show that. If, however, her effort has merely succeeded in a different appropriation of

Merleau-Ponty, then this also deserves to be pointed out. I can only suggest this course of reflection.

The priority of the spatial, as it appears to arise in Merleau-Ponty, has also arisen in other, more surprising places. I shall end by noting the preponderance of spatial metaphors in moral philosophy. Most notably, Charles Taylor, who owes much to Merleau-Ponty, makes frequent use of such metaphors. An entire chapter of *Sources of the Self* is entitled “The Self in Moral Space.” He deploys a spatial metaphor to characterize human agency, but he also suggests a more literal sense. “To understand our predicament in terms of finding or losing orientation in moral space is to take the space which our frameworks seek to define as ontologically basic...we take as basic that the human agent exists in a space of questions” (1989, p. 29). The space in which we meaningfully question is the space in which we *are*. I suspect that unearthing the roots of this moral metaphor in phenomenology leads to a more literal discovery.

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