The Music-World Relationship in Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century European Thought: Musical Modernity as Musical Subjectification

by

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore manifestations of musical subjectification in European musical thought in the decades leading up to and following 1800 by examining the shifts in the music-world relationship. Highlighting particular historical moments in the development of music and its Otherness, I study the process through which a modern autonomous identity of music, that is, a perceived separation between the musical and the extra-musical in the modern European concept of music, was constructed. I study this fissure between the musical 'self' and the surrounding non-musical world in the context of three important musico-conceptual developments: (1) the historical 'movement' of the music-painting dichotomy, (2) the clash of two musical outlooks embodied in the shift from the madrigal principle towards the sonata principle, and (3) the change in the meaning of the musical sublime. I argue that what is significant about and unifies these three manifestations of musical autonomy is the way in which they all reflect areas where music's relationship to nature has been revolutionized; they all display some kind of otherization of nature, or the subjectification of music. More specifically, in Chapter 1, I survey how a new musical discourse was shaped partially through the otherization of music's sister art, painting, leading to a conceptual independence of music from *other* arts; in Chapter 2, I explore a movement from a "realistic" approach to the music-world relationship historically exemplified in the madrigal towards a sonata-based principle that announced an increasing prominence of form in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century music; and, in Chapter 3, I discuss a decisive shift in the history of the musical sublime around 1800 in order to shed light on an aesthetic change that reflects a new meaning for greatness in music, no longer sought in external nature but in the *subjective* notions of freedom and infinity.

My conclusion is that what cements the three outlined manifestations of musical modernity is a modern—and also a romantic—treatment of music as a subject. That is to say, with modernity, the nature of music underwent a transformation that enabled it to be perceived as attaining some degree of autonomy and self-determination that was similar to the one attributed to the modern human subject. Through seemingly fragmented moments in some parallel histories in musical thought (the music-painting comparison, madrigal-sonata contrast, and subjective turn in the musical sublime), this research traces part of the history of that conceptual transformation, without any attempt to argue for or against its legitimacy.

To My Parents, for always loving and supporting me.

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Prologue

I. Introduction:

This dissertation responds to a scholarship in musicology that defines its main task—whether explicitly or implicitly—as identifying and explaining 'musical modernity,' a development in Western musical thought and/or practice that at a particular moment in music history has revolutionized the entire experience and understanding of music. The most common account of 'musical modernity' examined from a variety of perspectives and approaches in musicology is the study of the paradigm shifts that occurred in Western musical thought and practice around the year 1800.[1] While a vigorous controversy exists over the aesthetic, political, social, and philosophical significance and extent of these shifts, there is a consensus on the emergence and

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[1] The following works discuss different aspects of the paradigm shifts that are either explicitly or implicitly considered by their authors as fissures between the old and the new in Western music history: Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Karol Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; an Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure of Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Julian Johnson, *Out of Time: Music and the Making of Modernity*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). Daniel Chua's account of musical modernity focuses on 1600's musical developments. See Daniel K. L. Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature," in *Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

development of a new understanding of music as an autonomous art in the late eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries.[2] From a historical perspective, and as a multi-faceted concept,

musical autonomy manifested a wide range of ideas, including the independence of music from

its extra-musical—or to be specific, its religious, social, and political—functions, and its

'emancipation' from language, as well as from other forms of art. However, these ideas

concerning the autonomy of music were not united around a central concept. Instead, they were

united based on their contributions to the configuration of a new plane of significance, a new

conceptual territory or 'kingdom' of music—a sonic space other than or outside the external

world. Despite the variegation of its manifestation, this new discourse was almost unanimously

meant to construct, or rather re-construct a conceptual severance between music and the

natural world by demonstrating music's perceived independence from everything that stood

outside the musical. It is the study of this conceptual severance that is at the centre of my

research. This dissertation, more specifically, investigates historical moments in the

development of music and its Otherness by examining what I call the subjectification of music, a

process through which a modern autonomous identity of music was constructed. In other words,

to study this autonomous understanding of music, I will focus on the formation and

development of a musical otherness through which a separation, or rather a perceived

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[2] However, there is no consensus over whether this musical autonomy happened only in the realm of ideas or indeed whether an actual autonomous music arose. In other words, musicologists' views vary on the actuality of autonomous music. Realists, i.e., those who think musical autonomy is a historical fact, emphasize concepts such as absolute music or autonomous music to explain what they consider to be a new musical *reality* that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century and flourished in the works of the great Viennese composers (Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven)—embodied in a rich profusion of instrumental compositions that did not serve any extra-musical functions. However, several musicologists in the late twentieth century have stressed the entanglement of this 'modern' music with the social and political life of the time, arguing that the independent music or aesthetically autonomous music was but a myth or fiction. While the former view, that of the realist, was the most commonplace view until the last decades of the 20th century, the critical position appeared in 1990s and has since then been the dominant view among musicologists. This critical view can be read in Susan McClary's "Narrative Agendas in 'absolute' music: Identity and Difference in Brahms's Third Symphony" published in Susan McClary, *Reading Music: Selected Essays* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007[originally published in 1993]); Daniel K. L. Chua, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Berthold Hoeckner, *Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-Century German Music and the Hermeneutics of the Moment* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Richard Taruskin, "Is There a Baby in the Bathwater? (Part I)." *Archiv Für Musikwissenschaft* 63, no. 3 (2006): 163-85, and Richard Taruskin,."Is There a Baby in the Bathwater? (Part II)." *Archiv Für Musikwissenschaft* 63, no. 4 (2006): 309-27.

separation, between the musical and the extra-musical in the modern European conception of music was established.

My dissertation focuses on the developments of the decades around 1800 in Western musical thought to explain a determining shift in the conception of music.[3] I consider this shift as a musical modernity without precluding other accounts of musical modernity.[4] The modernity of 1800 in music history has an important characteristic: during the few decades before and after 1800, musical thought dealt with a variety of new concepts and discourses that, in their entirety, contributed to a new notion of music, what may be referred to as music as a *subject in itself*, reflected in the autonomous treatment of art music in European musical thought. By studying the history of this new understanding of music, I will examine its formation through a modern musical discourse molded out of music's new—and maybe revolutionary—relation with its Not-I reflected in its novel interactions with the external world, the text, and the self. Since its emergence, this new understanding has constructed a very significant part of our modern understanding of music, an important sign of which is the critical views that have been offered recently to challenge, undermine, and deconstruct this historically established 'fact'.

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[3] One important point must be made regarding controversies over the 1800 paradigm shift in music history. Critiquing the popularity of the 1800 musical modernity, Matthew Riley writes: "Perhaps following the strategies of literary criticism of an earlier generation, musicologists like to search for a hiatus in the decades around 1800—akin to a 'paradigm shift' or change of 'episteme'—which divides a recognizably modern outlook from a now far-distant musical *ancien régime*. This moment is variously said to mark the emergence of the 'work' concept, the prestige of instrumental music, or metaphors associated with organicism, and to signal the final decline of the notion of musical rhetoric and of direct analogies between music and language. The eighteenth century is thus stamped with 'otherness' (the musician being portrayed, say, as an orator engaged in the supposedly predictable imitation or arousal of the passions) and the scholar traces the replacement of that outlook by something seemingly more familiar to our own musical culture, sometimes in tones of celebration, sometimes of lament." Matthew Riley, *Musical Listening in the German Enlightenment: Attention, Wonder and Astonishment* (Aldershot, Hants, England; Ashgate Pub. Co., 2004), 3-4. Although Riley tries to deconstruct the 'paradigm' of 1800 paradigm shift, he does not fully overcome the attraction of 1800; similar to Mary Sue Morrow he merely (yet aptly) underlines how from decades before 1800 similar ideas that are normally attributed to the paradigm shift of 1800 were around. But it is important to see that what Riley does in this book is not essentially different from the literature discussed here. He takes pains to find the 1800-paradigm-shift sometime earlier in the eighteenth century, around the middle of the century. He believes that, for instance, with Forkel the departure from musical rhetoric had already started: "[Forkel's] final remarks on attention indicate a new outlook which points ahead to nineteenth-century formulations of the problem. Attentive listening is no longer linked to rhetorical devices or an aesthetic force. It is now the responsibility of listeners themselves and is conceived as the acute, diligent observation of complex musical objects." Ibid, 5. Also see Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[4] As will be discussed in Chapter Two, we can talk of at least two musical modernities, through which different components of music as a concept underwent revolutionary changes.

The formation of this musical self-determination or autonomy and the nature of music's disconnection from other aspects of its own previously perceived identity is the study of music's latest grand conceptual development too. It rests under a bigger discourse in musical studies that has attracted several recent musicologists and has been referred to by some of them as musical modernity. This particular notion of musical modernity, which focuses on musical autonomy, or the idea of the self-sufficiency of musical sound and its detachment from language or any other external source or context of meaning, has been an established scholarship in musicology by which my dissertation is informed. From Carl Dahlhaus's writings on the aesthetic and historical aspects of the emergence of absolute music to Rose Subotnik's study of musical autonomy in Western classical music, from Daniel Chua's critical approach to the notion of absolute music to the more recent studies on the conceptual history of the absoluteness in music (as in Mark Evan Bonds), Western musicology has demonstrated an increased focus on thinking and rethinking musical autonomy in general.[5]

A critical approach to musical autonomy represented by recent musicologists challenges the idea from various standpoints underlining ways in which the modern conception of musical autonomy dominates our understanding of the entire musical sphere. For example, Lawrence Kramer suggests that music is "worldly through and through" and any self-contained notion of music is a "chimera" that overlooks the unyielding influence of social, economic, cultural, and political conditions on musical life.[6] There are others, however, who deem as imperative a

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[5] See Carl Dahlhaus, *The Idea of Absolute Music*, trans. Roger Lustig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Subotnik, *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music*; Daniel K. L. Chua, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Other critical studies of the notion of autonomous music can be read in Arnold Whittall, "Autonomy/Heteronomy: The Contexts of Musicology," in *Rethinking Music*, ed. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 73–101; and in Lawrence Kramer, "The Musicology of the Future," *Berkeley, CA; University of California Press* 1, no. 1 (1992): 5–18; Mark Evan Bonds, *Absolute Music: The History of an Idea* (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014).
[6] Lawrence Kramer, "The Musicology of the Future," *Berkeley, CA; University of California Press* 1, no. 1 (1992): 5–18, 9. The literature on the criticism of the notion of autonomous music is vast. See Arnold Whittall, "Autonomy/Heteronomy: The Contexts of Musicology," in *Rethinking Music*, ed. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 73–101. Also see Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Chua, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning*; and Richard D. Leppert and Susan McClary, eds., *Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance, and Reception* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

thorough study of the intellectual contexts in which musical autonomy as a concept emerged.[7]

Presuming that we continue to be—to a large extent—constrained by the intellectual conditions

whose foundations emerged during the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and their

subsequent intellectual developments, this latter group underlines the epoch-making fissure

that took place in almost all domains of Western life during the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries.

Based on the latter view, the said time period, usually referred to as modernity, witnessed

similar transformations in musical practice and thought—transformations that altered many of

the pre-modern assumptions about music, thus creating a decisive shift in music history.

Referring to this critical turn, Lydia Goehr believes that with modernity, "music as an art took

on an autonomous, musical, and 'civilized' meaning; it came to be understood on its own

terms."[8] Far from being ephemeral mutations, these changes occurred in tandem with the

emergence of a massive network of philosophical, political, social, and aesthetic concepts, and

therefore contributed to the rise of a modern notion of music that has since formed the

underlying framework of Western art music. A pivotal component of this shift has been the

formation of a new function for music, which Karol Berger refers to as "proclaiming human

autonomy." According to Berger, "for the moderns, for us, art is mainly a tool of self-

affirmation."[9] Consequently, in this viewpoint, examining musical modernity provides a setting

for a more solid understanding of the current conception of musical meaning.

Drawing upon Goehr's and Berger's approach, my research explores musical modernity as

the subjectification of music; that is music becoming an autonomous subject, a disjuncture that

happened between music and the external, or extra-musical, world.[10] This development made

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[7] See James Webster, "Between Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: 'First Viennese Modernism' and the Delayed Nineteenth Century," *19th-Century Music*, 2001. Also, look at Bonds, *Absolute Music: The History of an Idea*.

[8] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 122.

[9] Karol Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; an Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 42.

[10] This is one of the main reference points for those who have studied musical autonomy in the context of intellectual

music conceptually independent from premodern extra-musical contexts and contributed to the formation of a self-referential perception of musical language, resulting from a fissure between the musical 'self' and the surrounding 'non-musical' world, which in turn amounted to a new emphasis on music's autonomy. To fulfil this task, I will examine three aspects of 1800 musical modernity, or rather three manifestations of music's dissociation from external nature: the historical development of the music-painting dichotomy, the clash of two musical principles embodied in the shift from the madrigal principle towards the sonata principle, and the shift in the meaning of the musical sublime. What is significant about these three manifestations of musical autonomy and unifies them is how they all reflect areas where music's relationship to nature (the Other) has been revolutionized; they all display some kind of musical subjectification.

Before I introduce a more detailed description of my three main chapters, a brief clarification of the historical relationship between music and the external world is necessary. Disregarding our belief in an integrated or disintegrated version of music's interaction with its external world, the historical understanding of this relationship in the Western (European) civilization is very dynamic. Whereas the medieval Christian notion of music considered the religious and cosmological context indispensable from musical meaning, or the many thinkers and musicians in the 1500s and thereafter conceived music deeply integrated into the text or human emotions, the more modern notion of music that developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries sought a new plane of significance for music. Music as a concept was detached from other components of cultural and social meanings and was defined based on its own terms. Many of the conceptual constituents of music that were previously considered as 'musical' came to be regarded as extra-musical or the Other in relation to the musical. This development was not unproblematic, though. A paradoxical consequence was a crisis of meaning or significance.

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developments of 1800. See Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), as well as Subotnik, *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music*, and Lawrence Kramer, *Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

In order to be autonomous and internally valuable, music needed to be independent from external contexts of meaning, but by doing so it risked losing all the conditions under which music was meaningful and thereby significant, a problem that resonates in the historical question of "Sonata, what do you want of me?"[11] This problem of musical meaning, which is from another perspective a historical problematic of the music-world relationship, can be seen in its full expression in the development and new formulation of a long-lived comparison between music and painting. The study of this comparison constitutes my next chapter, where I will explore music's severance from the conditions of visual arts and the formation of new abstract musical conditions. Discussing this subject in Chapter 1, I will survey how a new musical discourse was constructed partially through the otherization of music's sister art, i.e., painting, leading to a conceptual independence of music from *other* arts. Painting that prior to the aesthetic and intellectual developments of 1800 was superior to music because of its representational capacity, came to be understood as inferior to music for the same reason. Through this comparison, painting acted as the exemplification of all the extra-musical elements that were perceived to make music associated with expressible meanings. In other words, painting began to represent the otherness that music had to avoid (or exclude) in order to become more musical, more specifically musical, that is to say, more 'itself.' At the heart of this otherness is nature, what music and human being came to share as their not-I. As I will examine in further detail in my first chapter, the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century discourse defending music against figurative arts is not merely a demonstration but a constituent of the shift toward a subjective notion of music.

Second, I will look at the music-nature conflict in the context of the historical development of musical genres and forms. This study, which appears as Chapter 2, explores a shift from a "realistic" approach to the music-world relationship historically exemplified in the madrigal

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[11] For a detailed study of the historical popularity and significance of this question in the context of eighteenth century musical thought, see Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century*, 4-18.

towards a sonata-based principle that announced an increasing prominence of form in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century music. Although the heydays of the madrigal and the sonata as musical genres/forms stand at least more than two centuries apart, they nonetheless reflect not only some of the most important ideologies governing the Western musical thought from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries but also the complexities of each ideology. In my reading of these two terms, they appear to be the embodiment of two "modern" sets of issues, questions, solutions, and tensions about musical meaning. While early modernity in music history, exemplified in—but not limited to—the sixteenth-century madrigal, was defined in terms of music's representational relationship with the external world through the text, the later modernity embodied in the 1800 principles of the sonata was conditioned by a new abstract musical *language*.[12] The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries exhibited a new emphasis on form in musical thought that was nourished on the self-world rupture, particularly on the separation of music from its previously granted sources of meaning, such as religion, social functions, and text. Drawing on literary historian and philosopher György Lukács's theory of the rise of the novel as a modern form, I argue that in music, the modern compositional treatment and aesthetic understanding of form epitomized in the development of sonata form was an effort—and also a challenge—to build and conceive a musical world from *within*.[13] In other words, similar to the novel whose rise was—according to György Lukács—a *formal* response to the modern break in the totality of life and meaning, sonata form embodied a possible structure for a new musical world that had lost its external point of reference. Creating a world with an autonomous form, sonata form (like the novel) was instrumental in establishing the modern musical world—a world, which can rely neither on God nor society (sacred texts or social functions) for its meaning—*subjectively* to construct and resound a musical wholeness.

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[12] By juxtaposing two seemingly contradictory ideas of 'abstraction' and 'language', I attempt to emphasize one of the complexities of the sonata as a form that preserved certain aspects of narrative content.
[13] György Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature* (London: Merlin Press, 1971).

Modern formal thinking provided music with a new, abstract meaning which, as Lydia Goehr notes, was regarded as surpassing the capacities of verbal language.[14]

In Chapter 3, I examine a decisive shift in the history of the musical sublime around 1800 in order to shed light on an aesthetic development that reflects a new meaning for greatness in music, not sought in external nature any longer but in the *subjective* notions of freedom and infinity. This third part of music-nature relationship seeks to reveal a shift in the ways in which the musical sublime was perceived in the decades around 1800. Although the musical sublime has been conceived mainly in association with states of astonishment and horror, a pre-Kantian notion of the sublime is different from what was inspired by Kant's theory and pursued later by romantics. While a classical account of the sublime emphasized the musical representation of the natural sublime, the romantic formulation of the musical sublime highlighted its subjective quality, underlining the distinction between two types of the musical sublime. Whereas the objectively sublime involved a musical reconstruction of sublime nature, the subjectively sublime was perceived to be a portrayal of the self and its interiority. The new accent that Kant put on the subjective aspect of the sublime and was pursued by Christian Friedrich Michaelis in musical thought contributed to a new association of music with the notions of "infinity" and "ineffability" expressed in E.T.A. Hoffmann's writings. I will argue that the Kantian shift in the notion of sublimity (a shift towards subjectivity: "our own nature") had a crucial impact on the romantic understanding of music.

My conclusion is that what cements the three outlined manifestations of musical modernity is musical subjectification, that is, the process of music's becoming a subject. I argue that with modernity, the nature of music underwent a transformation that enabled it to attain some sort of autonomy and self-determination that was similar to the one attributed to the modern human subject in Kantian philosophy and German Idealism. Through seemingly fragmented moments

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[14] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, 157-9.

in some parallel histories in musical thought (the music-painting comparison, madrigal-sonata contrast, and subjective turn in the musical sublime), this research traces the history of that conceptual transformation, without any attempt to argue for or against its legitimacy.

II. Methodology: Broadly speaking, this is a dissertation in historical musicology and my method is located within a cross-disciplinary understanding of the study of music history. Hence, it will be informed by other disciplines and fields such as conceptual history, philosophy, the history of aesthetics, music analysis, and social and cultural histories of music. The main resources for my research are texts by contemporary and past centuries' authors, but I will also look for places where I can buttress my claims through musical evidence.[15] In my reading of the texts, especially the non-contemporary writings, it is not the pursuit of 'truth' but rather the historical concepts, discourses and their development that will be my focus. That is to say, I will not develop arguments to reinforce or disapprove of a certain position; instead, I will seek to elaborate on how that thought contributed to the emergence, formation, continuation, or discontinuation of the concepts under question. This will make intellectual or, more accurately, conceptual history the main approach of my research.[16]

Western music history can be and has indeed been studied from a variety of perspectives. It has been taken as the history of musical sound, thought, theory, science, expression, sociality etc. As a species of music history, conceptual history of music is used in my dissertation to study the emergence, development and possible death of musical concepts or principles, in order to incorporate the main theme of this research, namely, musical modernity, in the intersection of

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[15] I am not offering a new history of music in this dissertation, and therefore strictly speaking, I am not writing as a historian. I draw on the histories of music and musical thought offered by scholars, original writings, and musical examples to offer new connections and associations between ideas, genres, forms, works, etc.

[16.] Conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) is distinguished from other methods, such as intellectual history or history of ideas, by its "units of analysis." According to Melvin Richter, it is "the choice of concepts as units of analysis in the history of thought which distinguishes *Begriffsgeschichte* from alternative methods focusing on other topics: individual authors, texts, schools, traditions, persisting problems, forms of argument, styles of thought, discourses, ideologies." Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4.

various domains. Focusing on musical concepts and their historical development is related to

the study of music as a historical *concept*. From this perspective, music is constituted of

intellectual, political, social, scientific, theoretical, and other meanings, and therefore is not a

disparate phenomenon, comprised of scattered random patches brought to each other

arbitrarily; it is not a concatenation of a series of unrelated events. The main task of the unifying

orbit of a concept is to host paradoxes and contrasts that have shaped understanding of music as

a phenomenon. Indeed, the lively and dynamic nature of concepts, i.e., their openness to change

or, as Goehr puts it, their 'dynamicity' is possible only because of certain constellations of

meaning within a concept that congregate or disperse historically. The focus of a conceptual

history of music, based on Melvin Richter's general notion of conceptual history

(*Begriffsgeschichte*), is to shed light on the continuities, shifts, and innovations in meaning of

musical concepts.[17]

A history of concepts, i.e., the study of the emergence and historical development of concepts

and examination of changes in their meanings within a broader intellectual, social, and political

context, is not unprecedented in musical studies.[18] A classic example of the history of musical

ideas and concepts in English-speaking scholarship is Leo Spitzer's meticulous examination of

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[17] Melvin Richter explicates the point. He suggests that studying conceptual history is to examine how "periods of crisis, accelerated or radical or revolutionary change produce fundamental disagreements about the languages of politics and society." These changes and continuities are very important in the development of political and social languages, as they lead to the formation of mentalities. Therefore, studying conceptual history is to understand the mentalities that shaped and were shaped by concepts. According to Richter, the tools that are applied in this kind of history are "diachronic and synchronic analyses of language, semasiology (study of all meanings of a term, word, or concept), onomasiology (study of all names or terms for the same concept), and semantic field theory." Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10-12.

[18] For a brief but insightful discussion of some of the recent studies in musicology—other than the ones I have discussed here—that have also integrated the music history into the intellectual history, see John E. Toews, "Integrating Music into Intellectual History: Nineteenth-Century Art Music as a Discourse of Agency and Identity," *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 2 (August 1, 2008): 309–31. He believes that, despite the substantial significance of music in the self-construction and identity-formation, or, in his words, "the organization of individuals into historical subjects (the *Bildung* of modern individuals)" and "the integration of individuals into collectivities through processes of subjective identification" in certain European cultures, "the history of music has not fully entered the mainstream of intellectual and cultural history." He thinks that the shift that has occurred in the recent intellectual and cultural history of music, has been primarily the result of "the primary efforts to integrate the interpretation and history of music into the history of culture," what Toews believes has been introduced by "historical musicologists in departments of music." *Ibid*, 309-310.

the history of the word "Stimmung" and the idea(s) of world harmony.[19] William S. Newman's *A History of the Sonata Idea*, a colossal three-volume work on the development of sonata as a genre, form, idea and principle, is a great example of a historico-musicological work that is tremendously compelling from the perspective of music conceptual history.[20] Recent studies have taken the intellectual (in some cases, also the social and political) aspects of musical developments more seriously. Some of the recent historical analyses of musical concepts or music as a concept, are Lydia Goehr's examination of the "work-concept," Mark Evan Bonds' historical study of the concept of "absolute music," and Karol Berger's genealogy of Western art music.[21] Goehr's is an interesting case, because methodology in itself is at the heart of Goehr's study. Her book is a response to the shortcomings of analytic philosophy of music—a philosophy that according to Goehr is not historically informed—in examining the ontology of musical work. Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* shifts the attention from musical work as an object to musical work as a *concept*. Historicizing the musical-work question by studying those aspects of the musical experience that have transformed historically, the author shifts from "staticity" of objects to the "dynamicity" of concepts. In particular, she considers "the different roles [or uses of] concepts [. . .] within a practice," seeking to show how these roles determine the identity of music.[22] According to Goehr, this view of concepts distances itself from a "traditional, essentialist or realist theory of meaning," and regards humans' "power and control

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[19] Leo Spitzer, Anna Granville Hatcher ed., and Rene Wellek pref., *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word "Stimmung"* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1963). The book is an expanded version of two articles that Spitzer had originally published in 1944-5.

[20] See William S. Newman, *The Sonata In the Baroque Era*. Rev. ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966; *The Sonata In the Classic Era*. 2d ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972; and The Sonata Since Beethoven. 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972.

[21] See Goehr. *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works;* and Bonds, Mark Evan. *Absolute Music: The History of an Idea*, (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014). Elaborating on his methodology, Bonds writes: "Philosophers of art both past and present have tended to treat absolute music as a constitutive concept, a quality or set of qualities that are (or are not) inherent within music and that we may (or may not) perceive in listening to music; I prefer to approach absolute music as a regulative concept, a premise that can be neither proven nor disproven but that provides a framework for discussing other ideas, most important among them the relationship between music's perceived essence and its effect. In practice, constitutive and regulative constructs can overlap considerably, and regulative constructs used in the past can enrich current thinking about the essence of music, even if the reverse is not always the case." Ibid, 6. Also, look at Karol Berger's *A Theory of Art*, the chapter called "Genealogy of Modern European Art Music." (Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108-161).

[22] *Ibid.*, 90.

over their language and concepts" as important and "decisionary."[23] This approach regards the practice or use of concepts as an essential tool in determining the meaning of concepts: concepts "acquire their meaning just by functioning in particular ways within practices. And since practices are not known or learnt about a priori, knowledge of conceptual meaning can be no different."[24] To capture the relative particularity of concepts one must (as she does) turn to the practice of concepts in music history and investigate how concepts—in the case of her study, "the work-concept"—have emerged historically. Goehr's "historically based ontology" is the examination of continuity (expansion or modification of definitions) and discontinuity (shifts and turns in the application of concepts' meanings) in the lives of concepts.[25]

   Building upon the methodologies discussed above, I attempt to identify and examine the development of the relationship between music and the external world (the world outside music) within the historical context of musical concepts that conditioned a new autonomous, self-regulating understanding of music (music as a self-determining subject that relies on its own internal rules). Although my focus is on the developments in musical history around 1800, I limit my research to three historical cases in Western musical thought that all demonstrate a fundamental shift in the nature of music according to which music detached itself from the natural and became more and more subjective. These three cases are: first, a departure in the aesthetic conditions of music from the painterly to the musical; second, a shift in the aesthetic principle of music from the madrigal to the sonata; and third, a move from a nature-based to a subjective understanding of the musical sublime.

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[23] *Ibid*, 91.
[24] *Ibid*, 91.
[25] Goehr clarifies the historical nature of her methodology: "This account is called historical for convenience; it might also have been called genealogy, cultural metaphysics or anthropology, or historically based ontology. The last name is most revealing because it rightly stresses that the account does not demand a complete break from ontology. To replace analysis entails looking for a new way of thinking ontologically about concepts and objects. At no point do I try to offer a complete justification for my approach (as if such a thing were possible). I never claim it is the best, or the only, alternative to analysis. To travel that route would make the book unbearably long as well as transform it into a study of pure methodology. My aim is less ambitious and more focused on musical matters. It is to show the advantages of the historical methodology by using it to treat the concept of a musical work. The proof, therefore, will be mostly in the pudding." *Ibid*, 7.

In writing this dissertation, I do not consider musical writings and treatises as documents detached and dissociated from social and cultural practice. Practices shape and are shaped by ideas and concepts, the main 'characters' of my story in this study. A musical writing such as Galilei's treatise (discussed in my second chapter) is as representative of the musical trends, thoughts, ideas, preferences, and complexities as musical compositions created around the same time.[26] Without reducing the meaning of works to the musical writings contemporaneous to them, in my methodology musical writings are treated as 'works' that—although not necessarily more explicitly than other musical objects, such as scores, performances, instruments, etc.— could show us the way music as a concept, an object, or a practice was understood, interpreted, and developed. They all could equally reveal the means and goals of the cultural practice we call music. The study of the conceptual or intellectual aspects of music history, although never complete in itself, can sharpen our concepts, the main tools we have in *understanding* (interpreting) any kind of history.

History writing is creating new meanings by making associations between the objects of that particular history. While the connections could be made through causal or dialectic ties or through the conditions of possibility, the objects of the connections could be events, things, ideas, people, etc. While no history can easily claim to be able to take all sorts of objects into

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[26] My approach to musical writings is not from the viewpoint of their influences on the practices, compositions, or the listener's perceptions of those practices. This would require an intensive, chronological study of the ideas and their interaction with the intellectual and cultural environment around them. A great example of such a scholarship is Bellamy Hosler. Drawing on Leonard B. Meyer's musico-aesthetic reinterpretation of the psychological notion of "preparatory set," Hosler defines her own work as the historical study of those ideas that played a significant role in shaping the preparatory set of perceiving instrumental music in the eighteenth century. Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music in 18th Century Germany* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1981), x. Leonard B. Meyer's own explanation of the "preparatory set" could be helpful here: "Like other intentional activities listening to music is preceded by a number of mental and physical adjustments, performed consciously or unconsciously, which serve to facilitate and condition the subsequent responses made to the expected stimulus. These adjustments are known as a 'preparatory set.' The specific adjustments made are products of (1) the listener's beliefs about aesthetic experience in general and musical experience in particular, (2) the experience and knowledge previously acquired in listening to and studying about music, and (3) information gathered on the particular occasion in question." Leonard B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music*, Pbk. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 73. This approach is different from the one I am adopting in this research. My dissertation emphasizes the historical frameworks of thinking and conceiving music by identifying their interconnections within a certain historical concept. For example, in Chapter Three, the musical sublime as a concept represents a way of thinking about music that carries its own preferences, assumptions, expectations, and regulations, a shift that would be equal to a transformation in the meaning of the concept. The study of that historical shift, I believe, can tell a lot about the historically changing nature of music itself.

considerations, the study of each kind of historical object could provide us with one aspect through which the constructed history can be seen. For instance, my connections between the madrigal-principle and sonata-principle in my Chapter Two, or the association between the sonata-question and the sonata-form are efforts to create coherence and meaning. The risk is always there: constructing a 'wrong' history, and simply making illegitimate associations between ideas. While I am aware of the restricted nature of conceptual approach to history, I believe the questions that this history addresses can bring into attention the necessary interconnections between concepts and objects in history and the type of access we have to the historical realities. Conceptual history, or any kind of history that defines its main task the study of the emergence and development of concepts and connections between them, is supported by the theory that practices, works, and events in history are available to us only through concepts.[27] On the other side, musical works can also act as texts that can convey things inaccessible to other modes of 'communication.'[28] As Susan McClary has observed, musical 'texts' could tell stories, as other texts can. Musical texts enter dialogue with, and in some cases

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[27] On the philosophical assumptions of conceptual history, see D. Timothy Goering, "Concepts, History and the Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons: A Defense of Conceptual History," *Journal of the Philosophy of History* (Brill, January 1, 2013). Goering writes: "The premise of Conceptual History […] is the notion that concepts, not intuitions or sense-data, form the foundation of knowing and knowledge-claims. And accurately examining the uses of concepts in the past should therefore be one of the dominant ambitions of every historian." Ibid, 429. Reinhardt Koselleck's name is associated with conceptual history. His historical writings and his theoretical writings on history are among the main sources for conceptual historians. His colossal work as editor and participant, i.e., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (Basic Concepts in History; 8 vols., 1972–92) is written based on this premise. As Goehring has emphasized, Koselleck believed in the interconnection of language and experience and believed that in order to learn anything about the experience, one must learn the language in which that experience is expressed. "Reconstructing the past will inevitably mean reconstructing language, because of the simple fact that rendering experiences intelligible is only made possible by the success of using concepts." Ibid, 428. While the entire *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* has not been translated into English, some of the entries as well as Koselleck's introduction to the collection are available in English translation. See Reinhart Koselleck, "Introduction and Prefaces to the 'Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,'" trans. Michaela Richter, *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 6, no. 1 (2011): 1–37.
[28] On communication in music see Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). Agawu's claim about the classic era, that its "composers, perhaps more explicitly than any others in the history of Western music, wrote decidedly listener-oriented music" can be applied to many other styles and genres in European music history (and probably a variety of musical cultures). See V. Kofi Agawu, *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 4.

even, anticipate, complicate, or add nuances to discursive thoughts. They "can do [what] language cannot, even at its most ingenious."[29]

III. Literature Review: If one looks for explicit discussions of musical modernity in music scholarship, one might rush to a conclusion that, unlike intellectual historians' serious attempts to determine the shift that gave rise to the emergence of modernity, music historians and scholars (except in the past few decades) have shown a remarkable disinterest in identifying and locating a similar turning point in music history that could be recognized as a shift from pre-modern into modern music. However, with a more flexible reading of the many musical writings that discuss the developments of 1800 in music history, one can see that although musicologists have not, in all cases, talked about the emergence of a musical modernity or a revolution in music history, they have nonetheless explored many aspects of a huge shift that one can only use the term revolution to describe.[30]

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[29] Susan McClary, *Modal Subjectivities: Self-Fashioning in the Italian Madrigal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 3. In her explanation of her approach to music history and musical texts—a term she uses to refer to musical events in general—McClary gives the credit of this idea (writing history through the study of the music) to the historiographer Hayden White who asks musicologists to reveal those aspects of history that are "not available except through music." Ibid, 7. An important part of McClary's study of the madrigal, as I will touch upon briefly in my Chapter Two, is to show that musical language is not purely formal and offers insight into the logic of other languages. Ibid, 12.

[30] Maybe one of the main reasons why in music scholarship writers have not openly discussed a revolutionary shift that music has experienced is music's own peculiar history (style history), which has created some kind of a perceived 'autonomous progression' detached from broader developments of history. For instance, in intellectual history, the importance of historical occurrences and developments such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the subsequent intellectual movements like romanticism and German Idealism cannot be overemphasized, but in music history, style history (the 'conventional' periodization of music history into style periods)—which is still the commonest way of thinking, or at least teaching and learning music-historical developments—brings attentions to certain developments in musical style that might not necessarily synchronize with political, philosophical, or social changes. Talking of a musical '*ancien regime*' and the beginning of a 'new' age in musical thought is not a common way of looking at music history. Conventional music histories mark none of the stylistic shifts—e.g., from the baroque to the classical or from classical to romantic, etc.—as the main turning point in the entire music history, or as *the* move from pre-modern to modern music. Being followed by the French Revolution, being contemporaneous with the philosophical developments known as German Idealism, or being coeval with what we might call 'modern Europe', or modern European nation-states, has turned none of the musical styles to an epoch-making 'event'. In music history as narrated through stylistic periodization, so to speak, one can neither in the history of musical thought nor in musical practice easily find a movement with the same weight, significance, and revolutionizing effect as one, for instance, can see in the 'Renaissance,' 'Enlightenment' or 'French Revolution' chapters of political or intellectual histories. Music historians' reservation of the term 'modern' for the early twentieth century movements in music history indicates how an autonomous understanding of music history has been influential in shaping their understanding of 'modern' as a quasi-isolated concept detached from its intellectual context. One can search for the emergence of the modern notion of 'subject' in music history in the very formation and emergence of *purely musical* music histories; in the very fact that music with its specifically musical principles began to be regarded as its own source of developments. Glenn Stanley considers François-Joseph Fétis'

Furthermore, there have recently been new approaches to looking at music history from a more holistic view. Although many historical discussions in musicology still follow the periodization-based terminology and concepts, new shifts in the way historical turning points in music are conceptualized have been the subject of some scholarship over the past few decades. The shift has led to the emergence of several accounts of "musical modernity," a terminology some of the scholars offering them use explicitly or allude to. The literature that constitutes this review all share one important feature: they all attempt to transcend style history and look at historical development in music from a more foundational perspective than only changes in musical style. Although they do not take musical styles out of their consideration, they look for other contexts—political, social, conceptual, etc.—in order to explain how the changes in question occurred or what they meant. These accounts are very different, and based on the differences they have I discuss them under two broad categories: those which try to find the revolutionary, historical shift in the *creation* of music itself, i.e. its compositional processes, and those which underline the *experience* of music as the locus of determining shifts in music history. Although all of these accounts, at some point, refer to stylistic features of music in order to showcase changes that happened to the musical sound, none of them consider these features as rigid lines between two fundamentally different musical eras.

For instance, the emergence and disappearance of basso continuo, according to conventional style history is, among other changes, an essentially important marker of a certain musical style, the baroque. Calling the baroque style the age of basso continuo, as it has been widely described since Hugo Riemann's music history, or approaching the musical development of a period under a few main compositional styles—in this case the seventeenth and part of the eighteenth

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historiography, due to its emphasis on the decisive role of 'musical principles' in the historical movement of music and its extensive use of "immanent-musical designations for historical periods," as "one of the first proponents of the idea of autonomy" in music-historical thinking. To read more about the ideal of autonomy in historiography, and for the increasing emphasis on "genre, style, and compositional-technical procedures" as the "dominant criteria for periodization," and for the problems associated with the use of the terms 'modern' and 'new' in music history, see Glenn Stanley. "Historiography." *Grove Music Online*. *Oxford Music Online*. Oxford University Press.

centuries—is the result of an exclusively stylistic reading of music history.[31] Although this specifically musical reading of music history can shed some light on the theory and practice of music in the related era, it cannot provide us with an explanation of why these devices mattered in the whole civilization of the era and why they mattered culturally. In other words, style history, while giving us a solid understanding of the changes that occurred in the different ways in which musical elements were approached, cannot explain the historical "meaning" of the stylistic changes. Connecting the stylistic changes to another level of significance, whether cultural, political, conceptual, or social, is what provides us with why they really mattered and what they meant. The literature discussed in this review pursues the same goal in a more fundamental fashion. They all try to offer an account of a shift in music history (either in creation or experience of music, or both) by offering a distinction between two historical paradigms that are different in different accounts.

In a general organization, these different tales of musical revolution or musical modernity have examined the decisive shifts from three different perspectives. All these accounts are centered around one or more of three ways in which a musical story/history can be told; they tell their modernity story by considering music as an object and/or as an experience or concept, or as both. Some of those accounts pivot on the creation of music as the place where the modern revolution has happened, providing their readers with a stylistic comparison between the premodern and modern musical idioms, trying to offer an explanation of what Karol Berger, in his discussion of the significance of Hoffmann's writings, has characterized as considering music "in terms of aims rather than means."[32] These accounts heed the meaning of the developments and seek to explain the foundational idea or aim each compositional means or device served. For instance, Berger's own elaboration on how time was treated differently in the music of the late eighteenth century, especially in sonata form, provides us with a deeper layer of Western music's

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[31] Hugo Riemann, *Handbuch Der Musikgeschichte; Das Generalbasszeitalter*, ed. Alfred Einstein, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1922).
[32] Ibid., p. 7.

meaning in the post-Enlightenment intellectual, social, and political context. Whether focusing

on the forms or works that took the "temporal ordering of events" seriously (as in the case of

Karol Berger's account) [33], underlining the acceleration of time in Beethoven's middle period

compositions (as in Reinhold Brinkmann's view)[34], or a revolution in tuning (as in Chua's

theory)[35], these accounts focus on music as an object in the hands of its creators and look for

musical modernity in a certain treatment of this object in "modern" compositions.

The second category of musical modernity accounts in my literature review include those

stories that involve the *experience* and/or concept of music as the place where a decisive

revolution in music history occurred. These stories include a variety of approaches, including

accounts that have focused on the act of listening (experience) to music and those that have

highlighted the concept of music as the locus of musical modernity. Lydia Goehr's classic study

of the emergence of a modern notion of music as a work is an example of this second category.

Her comprehensive story of the historical development of the musical thought around 1800 is

meant to capture this moment in music history. While she does not call her theory one of

musical modernity, her tale of the modern in music history is immersed in the genesis of the

modern concept of musical work. Hence, my reading of her "musical modernity" relies on what

she understands as the conditions which made the emergence of the work-based concept of

music possible, a "genesis" that according to Goehr, moved music into its modern time.[36]

Another example of the second category that I will discuss below is the theory that the

revolution in the act of listening was a major shift in music history and contributed to the

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[33] Berger's account is put forward in details in Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; an Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity*. A gist of this account has been offered in the opening article, "The eighteenth-century origins of modernity. Time's arrow and the advent of musical modernity," in Karol Berger, Anthony Newcomb, and Reinhold Brinkmann, eds., *Music and the Aesthetics of Modernity: Essays*, 1st ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Dept. of Music, 2005).
[34] Reinhold Brinkmann, "In the Time(s) of the 'Eroica,'" in *Beethoven and His World*, ed. Scott Burnham and Michael P. Steinberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 1–26.
[35] Daniel K. L. Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature," in *Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 17–29.
[36] Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*.

emergence of a modern concept of music. As exemplified in the important study Mark Evan

Bonds has led on this topic based on the experience-based musical modernity, the revolution in

listening had already occurred in the consciousness of music listeners before the "great" or

"serious" music of the early nineteenth century pioneered by Beethoven emerged. Finally, the

last report of the experience-based accounts of musical modernity involves the studies that have,

in one way or another, regarded the revolutionary change in music's relationship with language

as the turning point in musical history in the modern era. These accounts, as exemplified in

John Neubauer's account, underline the "emancipation" of music from language, or broadly

speaking from rhetorical functions.[37]

An important feature shared by all these accounts, from both categories, seems to be the

general way in which their authors have attempted to formulate their tales of musical modernity

in intellectual and in some cases philosophical terms. All of them are, in their own unique way,

structured through an integration of musical meanings into larger intellectual plots. This is the

main reason why I try to read these tales of musical modernity, asking myself how illuminating

each account is in identifying and explaining *what* style history has not been able to show—

whatever that "what" is depending on each theory's point of focus. The "right"—though not

necessarily the correct—answer, I assume, must include the missing explanations, illuminations,

or understandings in the style history of music that have been captured in each of these accounts

of musical modernity. Examining these accounts, I will ask: *What* was not possible to be

achieved in style history that could, with the aid of these accounts, and through their search for

the "biggest musical development" or *the* "musical revolution," become accessible to us?[38]

Therefore, my focus in discussing these accounts will be on the ways in which each of them have

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[37] See John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure of Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).
[38] Style histories of music are not unified in the negligence of a possible 'musical revolution' in history. Friedrich Blume treated classical and romantic music under the same stylistic characterization. Also, Einstein's *Short History of Music* has two main chapters. The second is "modern" and starts with the classical style. Taruskin's music history treats certain moments in history as turning points for music; for instance, the shift into serious and great music that happened with Beethoven is a significant development in his view.

or might have succeeded in connecting, and (if necessary) explaining, various approaches to and

orientations in musical thought that are regarded stylistically as bifurcations or even

contradictions within certain periods. For instance, a challenge for Berger is whether,

considering the "static" treatment of time in Beethoven's late style, the succeeding romantic

music could be conceived as a return to a premodern understanding of time, that is the pre-

sonata approach to formal organization in music. If successful, Berger's efforts to provide a

solution for this problem would suggest a new scaffolding for contextualizing romantic music

within the values and expectations that musical modernity created.

  Karol Berger's *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow: An Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity*

(2007), an important contribution to the modernity question in music history, is about the shift

from a 'cyclical' to 'linear' conception of time, which, according to the author, happened not only

in art and music, but also in the whole intellectual sphere of European thought in the decades

surrounding the French Revolution. The shift is contemporaneous with the time when a

distanced notion of the 'past' was constructed because of the massive transformations that

occurred in European, especially French, lifestyles and ways of thinking. The change was

understood by contemporary thinkers as one which put an end to an older understanding of the

world and gave rise to a new world and human subject.[39] For Berger this historical shift matters

crucially to music history and to us and our time, because, in his view, the consciousness about

it "still rings through."[40] This 'conviction' is essential to the view that sees history in a large-scale

historical division of old and new, whose borders can be rendered somewhere from the second

half of the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century. As Berger reminds us, this

approach is shared among a variety of twentieth-century thinkers (including Adorno and

Horkheimer, and Heidegger) who all emphasize the "important, profound, and catastrophic"

developments of the late eighteenth century as a time when a fundamental shift occurred,

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[39] Karol Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; An Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 1-2.
[40] Ibid, 2.

although they might have had different views about the legitimacy of the developments they characterize as modernity.[41] In other words, Berger asserts, notwithstanding the intellectual or political positions we adopt in response to our world, whether we like or dislike it, "we still locate its origins in the political, economic, social, and cultural developments of the late eighteenth century. It is then that our modernity was born."[42]

Applying this insight to the study of music history, Berger seeks to examine the musical developments of the late eighteenth century under the same belief that constitutes the foundation of the histories of other disciplines (including politics, economics, society, culture, literature, and art) but has been neglected to a great extent in the study of music history.[43] Berger's core idea in defining musical modernity is that in the new music "the temporal order in which events occur always matters."[44] Underlining that the prominence of this temporal order can be found in "the Viennese sonata genres," Berger argues that the temporal organization of sonata events, i.e., exposition, development, recapitulation, and their inner temporal structures, is essential to the meaning of the work. To understand a sonata is, therefore, to understand how "the material being developed has earlier been exposed, or that what is now being recapitulated has already, in some form, been heard before."[45] But Berger's account is broader than a theory of the sonata form or sonata-based genres; he suggests that the new understanding and practice of musical time, which was, before everyone else, predominantly employed by the Viennese classics, has conditioned and fashioned our "musical expectations and values to such an extent that we expect these values to inform any music we encounter."[46] He maintains that we, influenced by the classics, attribute what he names "time's arrow"—the notion of time progressing in a linear fashion—to the *essential quality* of music. Therefore, although Berger's

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[41] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[43] Berger acknowledges the significance of Adorno's musical writings as an exception. Also, Berger udnerlines the fact that the term "modern" is used, in music history, only for the twentieth-century modernism, and in rare occasions for "early modern music" of Monteverdi by Leo Schrade. *Ibid.*, p. 6
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Ibid.*, 8.

prototypical examples of the two notions of time, which differentiate old from new music, are

respectively fugue and sonata, his claim is about a difference between two conceptions of music

per se. As an example whereas in a sonata or a concerto movement by Mozart, the order in

which the musical materials appear and are experienced by the listener, relies on an

understanding of "the temporal ordering of events,"[47] understanding the fugue or other pre-

modern musical forms and genres is mainly independent of the linear arrangement of the

sections or materials in general.[48]

    Berger's observation of this significant difference between the pre-modern and modern

approaches to the musical form leads to two conclusions that are the main claims of his study.

First, he maintains that the linear progress of time from past to future has a 'serious' role in

determining the meaning of the music, and that it gained this role only from a certain point in

history, that is the late eighteenth century. Before this historical period, music due to its

inherently temporal nature was simply constructed and experienced 'in time.' In other words,

the components of music were arranged in some kind of order but the order in which these

events were unfolding did not have a decisive role in the experience of the music. The new

emphasis on this temporal order provided significant difference to when different sections of the

music were showing up. In this respect, the meaning of the new music was essentially dependent

on its temporal organization. In Berger's words, "music added the experience of linear time, of

time's arrow, to its essential subject matter;" therefore, to understand the music that came in

and after this era, one had to take the 'temporal ordering of events' seriously.[49] The second

conclusion Berger achieves is that, this new emphasis on the linearity of musical movement did

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[47] Karol Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow*, 9.

[48] Those who listen with understanding to a sonata movement by Haydn, Mozart, or Beethoven always know where within the movement they find themselves, what has happened since the beginning, and what must still come before the movement can end. Most important, we can anticipate long in advance, the moment when the piece will end. This does not happen when listening with understanding to a Bach fugue. Here, we do not really care how much longer the piece will go on. In fact, more often than not, Bach goes out of his way to announce the ending emphatically a few measures ahead, so that its arrival will not be completely unexpected. In a fugue, unlike in a sonata, we are usually not sure where we are within the piece, nor does understanding what goes on at any given moment depend on such awareness (as it emphatically does in a sonata movement). Ibid, 8.

[49] Ibid, 9.

not only happen to music, but was coeval with and part of a larger development or transformation in the Europeans' experience and understanding of historical time in general. Music represented only one aspect of this new model of time or temporality.[50]

Benedict Taylor's *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* can be read from a view as a response to Berger's theory of musical modernity as linear temporality. While Berger's account relies on the notion of time in order to relate one of the most fundamental ideas of the Enlightenment (i.e., progress) to an essential feature of music (that is, musical time), and treats music as philosophy (music, here, demonstrates through sound what philosophy can reveal about the age through words), Taylor's account does not draw a continuing line from the Enlightenment to our time. Taylor explores a cyclic treatment of form and time in the works of romantics, in particular Mendelssohn, arguing that although an Enlightened, linear, progressive notion of time can be applied to most of the compositions in the classical style, the romantic movement influenced by a Platonic mystical understanding of time as cyclical displayed a different approach to musical time.[51] Berger seems to have already anticipated this criticism when he wrote: "The Beethovenian abstraction out of time is the obverse of the Beethovenian heroic quest and its temporal teleology. Music had no sooner acquired its "classical" ability to represent linear time than it began "romantically" to undermine and question it by exploring moments of timelessness. Similarly to Rousseau's writing, Beethoven's composition is torn between the ideal of engagement in the historical social world and the wish to disengage from it, to escape into the private refuge beyond or within.[52] Beethoven, Berger suggests, transcends "the simple opposition of cyclical and linear time."[53] Building upon Berger's observations, we might say that the romantic sense of timelessness

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[50] Ibid.
[51] See Benedict Taylor, *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[52] Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow*, 17
[53] Ibid.

became possible only after a consciousness of linear time. In other words, it is a 'self-conscious'
view of timelessness.

As mentioned above, an important presumption of Berger's account was the conviction that
the late eighteenth-century modernity is not fundamentally different from our modernity.
Rejecting this assumption, James Webster partially agrees with the long continuity in different
aspects of 'modern music', from its early stages in the eighteenth century to its high and late
stages in nineteenth century and up to the 1970s. To Webster, we are not musically modern
anymore, as he thinks that musical modernity came to an end in the last decades of the
twentieth century. Referring to 'early modern music', or what he calls 'the First Viennese
Modernism', Webster suggests that the continuity can be traced in its "unbroken tradition of
performance and study from its own day to ours," as well as being "an essential component of
the original canon of masterworks created in the late eighteenth and (especially) early
nineteenth centuries, 'against' which, in turn, twentieth-century modernism was created."
Although, as he writes, "until recently the canonical sense of twentieth-century modernism
would have fatally compromised any concept of 'First Viennese Modernism' before and after
1800," according to Webster, if we look at the history from our present standpoint, we can see
that the "twentieth-century modernism no longer enjoys its quasi-mythical status as the goal of
post-revolutionary history in the arts—*a status whose authority depended on the belief that it
was in the course of being realized in one's own 'present.'*" For Webster, modernism, like any
other style, is nothing more than a name for a period and its modernness paradoxically belongs
to the past.[54]

Daniel K. L. Chua's "Vincenzo Galilei, modernity and the division of nature," offers a different
tale of musical modernity that emphasizes a change in the 'nature' of music. He thinks musical
modernity was "the grounding of music in the 'natural'," which has been the main approach in

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[54] James Webster, "Between Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: 'First Viennese Modernism' and the
Delayed Nineteenth Century," *19th-Century Music*, 2001, 2-3. 108-126, 119-122.

music theory in the last four centuries. Drawing on Max Weber's work, Chua thinks modernity's identity is tied to a "disenchanted," desacralized world and the naturalization of music is indeed nothing but a symptom of this disenchanted world. Modernity has created a condition that is altogether distinct from the pre-modern music theory that would reach to the supernatural and unnatural in order to support its claim.[55] The new relation between music and nature or, as Chua calls it, the alliance of these two concepts defines a tremendous shift in music history and "lies at the epicenter of an epistemological earthquake," whose origins, for him, unfolds in Vincenzo Galilei's music theory.[56]

Nature, in the modern understanding of the concept, is not delimited within the borders of the supernatural anymore but is itself a standard based on which knowledge is weighed up; modern notion of nature makes the core of what constitutes the world. This is the meaning of Max Weber's account of modernity as the disenchantment (*Entzauberung*) of the world.[57] The modern disenchanted world is one that is prepared to be controlled by human rationality.[58] For Chua, the problematic consequences of the modernity's disenchantment are also important, since we encounter the same issue when it comes to a comparison between the world and music. A disenchanted world has lost its integrity and is not a *uni*verse anymore; it is divided into two separate realms: self and world, or subject and object; hence the emergence of an alienation. Naturalization of music has led to a similar chasm through which the nature of music is divided

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[55] Daniel K. L. Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature," in *Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 17.

[56] Ibid.

[57] In *Science as a Vocation*, Weber explains his notion of disenchantment (also translated as "the elimination of magic") through what he sees as the modern "growing process of intellectualization and rationalization," which for him means "we are not ruled by mysterious, unpredictable forces, but that, on the contrary, we can in principle *control everything by means of calculation*. That in turn means the disenchantment of the world. Unlike the savage for whom such forces existed, we need no longer have recourse to magic in order to control the spirits or pray to them. Instead, technology and calculation achieve our ends. This is the primary meaning of the process of intellectualization." Max Weber, *The Vocation Lectures*, ed. David S. Owen and Tracy B. Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 2004), 12-13. Also, famously, he writes: "Our age is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization, and above all, by the disenchantment of the world. Its resulting fate is that precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have withdrawn from public life. They have retreated either into the abstract realm of mystical life or into the fraternal feelings of personal relations between individuals. Ibid, 30.

[58] Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature", 18.

and suffers the same type of alienation that can be found in the self-world division. A comparable fissure has happened in music too, which can be seen in the intellectual relocation of music at the end of the sixteenth century from the mathematical-centered medieval *quadrivium* to the rhetorical arts of the *trivium*." This shift, in Chua's view has "split the nature of music [putting music] in opposition to itself."[59] Within this historical shift in musical thought, each fragment of music found a different destiny, one remaining in the *quadrivium* and the other transferred to the *trivium*:

> First, the music that remained in the quadrivium was modernised in the name of *natural* science; music was objectified as an acoustic fact; it became natural matter for the control of empirical experimentation and the verification of the ear. Second, the transfer of music from the quadrivium to the trivium collapsed the music of the spheres into the rhetorical will of the human ego, shifting the magic of the cosmos to the voice of human nature.[60]

For Chua, the divisions reflect the ambivalent relationship of the modern world with the past: modernity promotes its scientific approach against the superstitious old world, while at the same time "laments its loss of meaning."[61] Modernity has a contradictory mission: it aims to "simultaneously [. . .] disenchant and re-enchant the world."[62] To summarize Chua's point, unlike the ancient and medieval cosmological account of music in which the inner soul and celestial spheres nature are brought under a musico-mathematical concept of harmony and thereby the magical nature of music is guaranteed, with the sixteenth-century modernity, this entire cosmic order or magical harmony is shattered and instead music becomes an object of empirical science. Hence, a modern effort to reconstruct the 'organic' enchantment of the pre-

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[59] Ibid. It might be useful to know that mathematics (and the mathematical sciences of quadrivium) was itself, according to the Aristotelian account – and alongside physics and first philosophy (metaphysics) – a theoretical science.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid., 19.
[62] Ibid., 19-20.

modern musical world through the power of human voice.[63] The new music of the decades

around 1600, with its revival of the ancient singing in the form of monody, and later opera, is, in

Chua's view, the re-collection of the fragmented world into a human, or subjective identity in

which singing, with its *human* rather than *divine* essence seeks to reconstruct, so to speak, the

effect of the lost cosmic order and the lost soul. The fact that this nostalgic effort was

accompanied with a burning desire to rationalize music through scientific or empirical methods

is, in Chua's view, a contradiction that is essential to the modern music's nature.[64]

Lydia Goehr's *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* offers a comprehensive account of

modern music. Its central claim is how "the work-concept began to regulate a practice at a

particular point in time."[65] Adopting a historical approach, the author investigates the

emergence of this work-concept in music in order to shed more light on the problems that

analytic approaches were puzzled about and unable to solve.[66] As an example, for her, a

metaphysical question such as "whether ornaments affect either the quality or the identity" of a

certain musical work can be answered more decisively with a close attention to the historical

period in which the piece was composed. In other words, the answer to such a question (or many

other ontological questions about the 'musical work') differs depending on whether we refer to a

piece composed before the time when the new work-concept emerged or after.[67] Music, which

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[63] From this view, the huge interest in song and monody in the late sixteenth century is indeed part of a bigger context that is determined and conditioned by disenchantment; in other words, it is "a nostalgia for an ancient age enchanted by music [and] a symptom of disenchantment," rather than a *true* return to the ancient unity of the nature. Ibid. Hence, Chua suggests, the early operas' obsession with the Arcadian pastorals "filled with singing nymphs" and Orpheus whose "song is the eco-system of the enchanted world." Music becomes a character on stage and becomes both "the subject of enchantment [and] the *medium* of enchantment." He sees "music about music" as an effort to respond to the "*anxiety*" that had been generated from the disenchantment having taken place for the past couple of decades. The early opera writers, those who made music reflect upon itself, "wanted to revive the bardic magic of monadic song, for modern music, they claimed, had come into a crisis of identity: music had lost its power [and] magic on the soul" it used to possess in the ancient world. Ibid.

[64] Ibid., 29. Chua maintains that within the bigger context of modernity, reflected in the self-world fissure, music's nature is also split in two: "a desacrilised object that can be scientifically interrogated [and] a moral subject searching for meaning, even to the point of aestheticizing instrumental reason as monadic power." And, this is altogether tied to the destiny of the modern subject: "Modern humanity, having disenchanted the world by draining out the musical substance of cosmos, posits itself as the new music that will re-enchant the world with an instrumental 'image' that, by definition, can never regain the ancient unity it yearns for." Ibid.

[65] Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89.

[66] To read more on Goehr's methodology, see the methodology section, above.

[67] Ibid.

before 1800 was primarily defined in terms of extra-musical ideals, came to stand on its own feet and was understood in terms of its own inner rules and structure. This shift created a chasm in the regulative forces of music leading to the formation of an autonomous, serious, work-based understanding of music.[68] On one side stands the pre-modern, i.e., pre-1800, that was meant to "perform extra-musical functions" either as an "homage to God" or as an obedience to "the wishes of employers."[69] On the other side, however, stands the modern music that was centered around a regulative, objectified notion of musical compositions embodied in 'musical works.' According to Goehr, this work-based conception of music is modern, in the sense that from the time this concept emerged, "its existence is taken so much for granted that we find it difficult to think of the practice without it."[70]

To contextualize and highlight the significance of the modern concept of musical work, Goehr studies theories, beliefs, laws, and activities that have shaped the modern understanding of instrumental music or music liberated from text and extra-musical meanings and relying on "purely musical criteria of value and classification." The freedom of musical sound from poetry and sacred texts, and "the inclusion of music under [. . .] the concepts of fine art and the autonomous work of art" were instrumental in the formation of 'serious,' *romantic* music.[71] For this to happen, some developments were necessary: first was "the fusion of two traditional concepts: music and productive art." This rejected the old understanding of music as merely a performative activity and emphasized the element of creation and productivity but free from an Aristotelian notion of final causality.[72] Based on a distinction between art and its aesthetic value

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[68] Ibid, 122.
[69] Ibid, 178.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid, 121. Goehr explicates that an important contribution to the conceptual independence of music (and art in general) from religion, morality, and philosophy was the modern notion of aesthetics introduced by Baumgarten and developed later by philosophers such as Kant. Aesthetics emancipated the concept of art from the government of God, reason, and the good, and created a new realm for studying and perceiving art, which was called "sensory cognition," (perceived by the faculty of the imagination) the main topic of which was understood as the beautiful and the sublime.
[72] Ibid, 149. An elaborate study of the shift in the aesthetic view of the instrumental music in the eighteenth century has been put forward by Bellamy Hosler. She writes, "During the eighteenth century instrumental music rose from being considered the poor, insignificant sister of vocal music, the 'handmaid of poetry,' and the ready source appropriate dance, dinner, and festive fanfare sounds—from functioning to provide the 'allowable recreation' of the

on one side and craft and its functional utility on the other, music did not have to serve a

purpose or to be useful in order to be an art, because the artness of art for many romantics was

due to its power to "transport us to higher, aesthetic realms."[73] This was an essential stride made

in the direction of the fusion between music and productive art—that is, musical

objectification—without risking music's autonomy; music was a product that stood beyond

everyday use or function. This new musical 'object' needed a space detached from the everyday

life and world: concert halls 'framed' musical works, and 'stripped' them of their "local,

historical, and worldly origins, even [their] human origins."[74] Autonomous musical works could

only be performed in such places that had been built exclusively for instrumental music. In

Goehr's view, concert halls provided musical works with what plastic artworks had gained in

museums and art galleries. Concert halls embodied the decontextualization of music, the

'estrangement' of musical work "from its original external function."[75] However, whereas this

process of seeking artness of works within themselves was straightforward in other arts, for

music it was problematic, since there was not any *thing* in music that could be placed in musical

museums. Music as a performative art "had to find a plastic or equivalent commodity, [. . .] a

permanently existing product" that could be turned into an aesthetic 'object': an object that

"could be divorced from everyday contexts [. . .] and be contemplated purely aesthetically."[76]

This object that, according to Goehr was found not through an empirical observation but

through some kind of metaphysical "projection or hypostatization," was named 'the work.' The

emergence of this objectified notion of music and the formation of the imaginary museum in

which musical 'objects' were housed, were both dialectically interconnected with the regulative

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bourgeoisie and the 'ear-tickling' divertissement of bored aristocrats—to be viewed by the early Romantics as the symbol of the multifarious, mysterious stream of man's inner life: the highest and 'most romantic of all the arts,' as E.T.A. Hoffmann was to write in the early nineteenth century." Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music*, ix.
[73] Ibid, 152.
[74] Ibid, 173.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid, p. 173-4.

force that belonged to the concept of musical work, a force that was part of "the emancipation of the musical world."[77]

While Goehr's study encompasses a wide range of social, intellectual, musical, and political changes that came together to form a new concept of music, some other studies have focused on more 'local' revolutions that occurred in the experience of music around almost the same historical period. One of these studies that examines revolutionary shifts in the history of music listening—which can be called a perception-theory of musical modernity—is offered by Mark Evan Bonds in his *Music as Thought*: *Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven*.[78] Bonds suggests that around the time Beethoven was composing his symphonies, a new philosophy of perception had developed that revolutionized the act of listening to instrumental music. This shift which was exemplified in—but not limited to—the perception of Beethoven's music, gave rise to a new approach to the experience of instrumental music in general and symphonic works in particular. The age of Beethoven was the age of experiencing symphonies as vehicle of thoughts, "ideas that go beyond the realm of sound."[79] However, this new notion of symphonic music was not the result of Beethoven's music and was already in place by the late 1790s. Beethoven "was the direct beneficiary of this new outlook."[80] This change was reliant on the rise of the new understanding of all arts in the decades around 1800, partially affected by the new Kantian theory of aesthetic experience (represented in Kant's third Critique) and partially by the romantic view of music as a source of truth rather than a means of entertainment

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[77] Ibid.
[78] Bonds, Mark Evan. 2006. *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Other works that have studied a historical development of listening in Western music history are James H. Johnson, *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Matthew Riley, *Musical Listening in the German Enlightenment: Attention, Wonder and Astonishment* (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Ashgate Pub. Co., 2004; William Weber, "Did People Listen in the 18th Century?," *Early Music* 25, no. 4 (1997): 678–91; Leon Botstein, *Music and Its Public: Habits of Listening and the Crisis of Musical Modernism in Vienna, 1870-1914*, (diss. Harvard) 1985; Daniel Cavicchi, *Listening and Longing: Music Lovers in the Age of Barnum* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2011); Leon Botstein, "Toward a History of Listening," *The Musical Quarterly* 82, no. 3–4 (October 1, 1998): 427–31; (This issue of the Musical Quarterly's theme is hearing and includes several historical studies of listening.).
[79] Ibid, xiii.
[80] Ibid, 28.

(manifested in Hoffmann's review of the Fifth Symphony).[81] Kant's emphasis on the role of the human subjectivity in the formation of experience in general and aesthetic experience in particular, was a big shift from a passive to an active understanding of the beholder in arts (and listener in music).

Bonds's emphasis is, therefore, on the role of listeners and "the premises of perception rather than on the work themselves" in this "transformation of attitudes toward instrumental music."[82] Although for Kant music was still considered as a form of entertainment, his new notion of experience provided later authors such as Hoffmann a platform for exploring novel capacities of musical perception. For Hoffmann, it was only through certain modes of listening that one can grasp the depth of Beethoven's music. The new way of listening, as Bonds observes, was based on the foundations that were partially offered by the same philosopher who downgraded instrumental music by providing "a philosophical basis for the creative role of beholder in all arts including music."[83] The aesthetic revolution that occurred with Kant and continued with German Idealists, focused on the act of perception rather than on the artists or their repertories.[84] It was a shift in listeners' responsibility: it is they who *must* understand the work in order to experientially unveil its truth and therefore—as romantics such as Hoffmann insisted—if a listener cannot perceive the sublime in music, it is the former's "fault alone."[85] This responsibility, as Matthew Riley also has observed, was previously on the composer's shoulder. Composers had to make sure to use techniques (such as periodicity) to make the melodic or harmonic structure more comprehensible to regular audiences.[86]

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[81] Ibid, xiii, xv, and 4.
[82] Bonds, *Music as Thought*, xviii.
[83] Ibid, 10. What Bonds claims here is based on Kant's transcendental idealism: the general philosophical thesis that the beholder constructs the structure of the world by providing the condition of the possibility of the experience.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid, 36-7.
[86] Riley, *Musical Listening in the German Enlightenment*, 18. Unlike Bonds, Riley believes that the shift into the audience-centred model of musical intelligibility happened earlier in the eighteenth century reflected in the writings of Sulzer and Rousseau. See Ibid, 63-9.

Besides the above-mentioned studies that discuss musical modernity through highlighting a paradigm shift that occurred in a specific historical period, two more general studies on the conceptual history of music are worth mentioning here: a complete conceptual history of Western art music offered by Karol Berger and a history of absolute music as an idea pursued by Mark Evan Bonds. The third chapter of Berger's *A Theory of Art* offers a concise yet elaborate, holistic genealogy of Western art music. Taking art as a "historically evolving cultural practice or family of practices" rather than a "permanent unchanging feature of human nature," Berger looks at the history of musical practice and thought to understand how the meaning and function of music has evolved and changed throughout time.[87] A central question that Berger aims to find an answer for is when the music became autonomous meaning it developed its own "internal aims." In other words, for Berger it is significant for his story to emphasize the shift from functional understanding and practice of music to an autonomous treatment of it. The most important point in Berger's genealogy is that he does not look for a specific moment when this shift occurred but rather for moments in music history where so to speak, features of autonomous music as we know, were accumulated gradually.[88]

The first major development in the formation of musical autonomy, or music as a social practice with its internal aims, was fulfilled through the "development of notation which allowed the products of composition to persist independently of performance."[89] Notation developed through the eleventh to fourteenth centuries created the possibility for the process of *creation* to be an independent activity with its own pedagogical and theoretical discourse. Notation as developed in the Western tradition was not only for the purpose of communicating with performers, but also and importantly for "scrutiny independently of the real time of a performance" the compositional process being more and more elaborate so that without

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[87] Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 109.
[88] Ibid, 116.
[89] Ibid.

notation composition would become almost impossible.[90] In Berger's view, this separation of composition and performance is so important that he claims without it, "the development of modern European music would be unthinkable."[91]

The rise of an understanding of composed works that considered them as "independent of real time," was an important conceptual revolution in the development of Western art music. This shift and other changes in the notion of music—such as the emergence of mimesis and arousal of passions as the main goals of music, the shift from the predominance of harmony to the supremacy of melody, or the rise of abstract music—were rooted in the ancient origins of musical thought. Music as a concept was formulated by Greek philosophers and early Roman thinkers as having two components: it was the embodiment of harmony (*harmonia*) and was able to cause passions (pathos) in humans and form their character (ethos). Berger believes that in each period of the development of European art music, the "ideal aim" of music has constantly changed and this has given rise to different understandings of music and its significance.

Bonds's *Absolute Music: The History of an Idea* (2014) focuses on another aspect of this genealogy. For him, the history of Western musical thought is a continuing movement toward a separation between music and its effect, a formalistic move that is accomplished theoretically in Eduard Hanslick. Bonds, therefore, examines the emergence and formation of the idea of absolute music by focusing on the semantic components of music as an idea (or concept) and studying the historical relationship between music's essence and music's effect.[92] For Bonds, this autonomous idea of music which found its first strong formulation in Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, was a radical shift, because it was for the first time in history that someone had decided to "cordon off" music's essence and music's effect "so profoundly."[93] It was

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[90] Ibid, 117.
[91] Ibid, 118.
[92] Bonds uses the term 'idea' without substantial difference with 'concept.' His history of the idea of music is similar to conceptual history of music. See Bonds, *Absolute Music: The History of an Idea*, 2014.
[93] Bonds, *Absolute Music*, 9.

the first time that music, isolated from its effects, was considered as a valuable art, as something that mattered. Bonds quotes and agrees with Jean-Jacque Nattiez's remark that Hanslick's treatise is a text "fundamental to musical modernity."[94] The historical journey that music as a concept took to become an autonomous art is in Bonds' view a three-phase evolution. Until 1550, according to him, "music's essence was understood as the direct cause of its effect", that is to say, the power of music in moving and effecting people "lay in its very essence."[95] The second phase of this development, that seems to stand between the old (Pythagorean-Platonic) and the new (Hanslick's formalism) notions of music, is the three centuries from 1550 to 1850 during which musical writers relied on various ideas such as expression, form, beauty, autonomy, and "disclosiveness" to explain the power of music.[96] This phase is not considered modern for Bonds since these various qualities, as he suggests, were "mutually reinforcing."[97] In other words, nobody before Hanslick tried to emphasize one of these qualities and disprove other qualities in order to construct an essence for music which excludes music's effect (e.g., expression). Modernity in music starts with Hanslick who "decoupled the essence of music from its effect."[98] For Hanslick the listeners' response to music was unrelated to the essence of music, and from a broader perspective, music's content is not constituted by feelings.[99]

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I started my PhD program with the idea of studying ethnomusicology and working on Iranian music, due to my long interest and engagement in that musical culture, my background in playing and teaching Persian setar and my experience in some research about the musical heritage. But my first year in PhD was really determining. I found out that within the context of

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[94] Ibis, 3.
[95] Ibid, 10.
[96] Under the term "disclosiveness," Bonds introduces and investigates late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century theories of music that conceived the composer as an oracle. According to these theories, music "had the capacity to disclose the 'wonders' of the universe in ways that words could not, and that the greatest composers were in effect oracles, intermediaries between the divine and the human." Ibid, 112.
[97] Ibid, 11.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid, 141.

Persian scholarship on music, some of the questions I had, especially my questions about historical change and innovation, that is how musical styles and ideas develop throughout history, could not be easily raised and explored. With some courses I took and audited in the first few semesters, I began wondering if we could talk of music history in Persian music exactly in the same way that it is conventionally discussed in Western art music, i.e. from a stylistic perspective. This made me extremely interested in something that up until almost 10 years ago, I was not quite interested in: history, and how change happens in history. My short philosophy background was my Masters' degree work on Ludwig Wittgenstein and I still remember my fascination with this quote from his *Notebooks*: "What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world." But gradually and influenced by the readings from a variety of approaches in musicology, I started thinking about the differences between Persian music and Western music especially in the ways in which music from the past and present are related. (This also made me interested in historiography, i.e., how history is written and different approaches based on which historians define change and development in music history.) I had two choices: (1) studying Persian music and trying to come up with some ideas about the possibility or maybe impossibility of a style and/or intellectual history in Persian music—or in other words the possibility of some kind of development and change in how music has been practiced, perceived and thought in Persian civilization and culture; (2) exploring Western music history first and learn more about how different music histories in this tradition have been written. I decided to take the second path with the hope that one day in future I would go back to the first topic too. (Indeed, I have never quit thinking, playing, and presenting on Persian music since then.)

But the question, then, was where to locate the research. This took a quite long time, a journey that was long but very rewarding. I looked for one central theme that could connect me to this history in a way that both is relevant to my philosophical background and provides me with a more or less general perspective of the history. In the midst of these searches, I came across several works that played significant roles in specifying my topic: a book by Karol Berger

that offered a theory of musical modernity, an article by Daniel Chua which was an attempt to understand an epoch-making shift in European musical thought and practice, and then with these somehow integrated into my perspective, I reread Goehr's book on the emergence of a work-based concept of music.[100] The main theme of these writings, whether explicitly or implicitly, was "musical modernity," which was perfect for my purpose and provided me with some kind of sense of direction. I noticed that musical modernity as a discourse or topic about music history offers a unique perspective: its emphasis on *modernity* and therefore the whole idea of a fundamental change in music history that has created a fissure between the *old* and the *new* challenges but at the same time uses aspects of style history of music.

This holistic view of European music history provided me with a general, and in a sense a "more complete", perspective of European music history. While this was advantageous to my purpose, exactly for the same reasons, it was terrifying too. Highly complicated and scholarly sophisticated matters have been discussed under this theme by different musicologists, and scholars from various disciplines. To limit this, I tried to focus on two things: the time period and the perspective. I focused on the European thought about music and its interaction with the non-musical or the external world in the decades around 1800. However, I didn't hesitate to bring into my discussion any relevant moment of change in musical thought from the past. An example is Artusi-Monteverdi controversy as a historical moment when the development in practice was accompanied by some kind of awareness about the goals of the new style or approach to practice. I found moments like this fascinating: I read them as historical pauses and reflections on the goal of music and reconsideration of the means needed to achieve those goals. These 'philosophical' moments in music history were moments when questions such as

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[100] Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; an Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Daniel K. L. Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature," in *Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

"What is music? What does it mean? and Why does it matter?" were rethought. In my writing, I also tried to understand moments such as these in bigger conceptual contexts. Hence, my writing became an attempt to offer possible connections between thoughts from different times and eras in music history that were related through the concerns and questions they were addressing.

While my main thesis in this dissertation is informed by some of the main ideas and arguments offered by the thinkers discussed in my literature review, especially Berger, Chua, and Goehr, I have tried to underline a specific aspect of musical modernity by focusing on the historical significance and manifestations of music-nature relationship in Western musical thought. Berger's emphasis on the sonata remains especially important in my research, and is discussed in my second chapter but from a different perspective. Goehr's comprehensive account of musical modernity as the rise of a work-based concept of music is so thick that it cannot be bypassed easily in research that bears the title of modernity. But while Goehr's account relies on the idea of objectification to highlight the process through which a fluid, process-based notion of music became institutionalized and imprisoned in an imaginary museum, I emphasize the idea of subjectification to underline the autonomous nature of the new music from a different, but not necessarily opposite, perspective. Chua's account has particularly informed Chapter 2, in which I examine the first phase of musical modernity as the sonorous response to the demands of the modern human subject, as well as in my discussion of the historical move from this-worldly and natural notion of music to an abstract (yet still 'meaningful') understanding of the art. However, I have tried to show how the first phase was not merely embodied in the increasing popularity of monody and later the invention of opera, but first and foremost reflected in the principles that were already in effect in the mimetic essence of the madrigal, a musical philosophy that sought to naturalize music through its realistic approach to text-setting.

In this dissertation, I have sought to offer a coherent but not homogenous picture of the developments that occurred in Western musical thought around 1800. Although I have aimed to provide an intelligible account of the tensions and paradoxes of the autonomous conception of music in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, I have not tried to dissolve the characteristic tensions of the time. In this respect, although I have not shied away from using generalized aesthetic concepts such as abstraction, mimesis, expression, formal thinking, etc. due to their power in shaping and constructing historical understanding of musical moves, I have attempted to base my analysis on more aesthetically and musically specific notions such as sonata, madrigal, painting, and sublime. Using the latter group of concepts, I believe, has helped me not only to draw attention to the particularity of music history and the specific ways in which, let's say, the madrigal can paint or can express, but also to highlight the complexities and tensions of this history. As an example, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, the way the sonata dissociated itself from the madrigalistic conditions of music cannot be completely explained through the notion of abstraction as it contains significant—and probably essential—elements of drama and expression that need to be taken into consideration. In this respect and more specifically, as McClary has shown, the complexity that the madrigal represents in the way it paints and expresses cannot be explained under the general notion of musical mimesis. Even if there is such a thing as musical mimesis, it is essentially important to discuss when, what and how music was/is or wasn't/isn't conceived to be equipped with such a feature. From this perspective, I find concepts such as the madrigal or the sonata much more powerful in understanding the relationship between music and its meaning than abstract concepts such as mimesis.

I want to impart an important note regarding the relation of my study to the musicological scholarship referred to throughout this dissertation. At nearly every point I noticed—sometimes quickly and in some cases after a while—that someone had been there before me. Although my first impression was a feeling of frustration, the second (more appropriate) feeling was an

assurance that my thoughts have been in the 'right' place. As someone quite new to the field, being accurate and intelligible seemed more urgent than being original. But since a PhD dissertation can be nothing but original, I have sought to offer original *associations* between ideas, historical observations, musical hearings, and arguments of other music scholars in cases where I was unable to put forward my own.

Finally, writing this dissertation was a kind of excursion inside the dense bushes of the musicological works and research that in the past few decades have been conducted on the eighteenth and nineteenth century music and musical thought in European history. The excursions made me more and more interested both in the music of the time and music history itself. For me, 1800 became the point from which I looked backward and forward—what came before and after in music history and history of musical thought. This might have brought certain biases into my perspective. I do not try to deny them and indeed I wonder if a scholarship cleansed from all biases is ever possible or even interesting. While admitting some limiting aspects of this perspective, I hope it could prove to be enabling in other respects.

Chapter One: Autonomous Music, the *Indefinite*, and Empty Self

From the Painterly to the Musical in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries

> For a long time, the notion of what was worthy of representation in music was governed by remarkable prejudices. Here, too, there was fundamental misunderstanding about the principle that the imitation of nature should determine the art. For some, the mimicking of everything audible was considered the essential business of the composer, from the rolling of thunder to the crowing of the rooster. A better kind of taste gradually begins to spread. The expression of human sentiment replaces noise lacking a soul. But is this the point at which the composer is to remain, or is there a higher goal for him?[101]

> Christian Gottfried Körner

Musical autonomy—the dissociation of the musical from the extra-musical—is a multi-layered concept that began to take shape in European writings on music at the turn of the nineteenth century. An important aspect of this musical self-sufficiency was defined in the conceptual

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[101] Christian Gottfried Körner, "Ueber Charakterdarstellung in der Musik" (1795). In Wolfgang Seifert, *Christian Gottfried Körner: Ein Musikästhetik der deutschen Klassik*, Regensburg: Gustav Bosse, 1960, 147-58, 147. Quoted and translated by Mark Evan Bonds in *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 19.

relationship between music and other arts, notably painting. Within the context of and through this relationship music historically developed into an art with a distinct identity determining its conditions independent from other arts. This process, through which music was defined by its own self-contained conditions and aesthetics separate from the other arts, manifested in a common theme in musical writings in the decades around 1800: a comparison of or dichotomy between music and painting.[102] In almost all instances, the dichotomy was the background against which the status of music was elevated.

Although one might be inclined to consider this modern reverence for music to be a *consequence* of a paradigm shift in the aesthetics of the time—from mimesis to expression or abstraction—the present study examines how the dichotomy and the conceptual apparatus that developed around and through it contributed to the way the new conception of music was articulated.[103] That is to say, the music-painting dichotomy acted as a concrete template from which the new understanding of music as self-determining was molded. Music established its autonomy from painting by turning painting into the other or the 'Not-I' against which music's new self-contained identity or 'I' was asserted. This process of establishing autonomy, which was built upon othering painting, instigated a paradox: the constructed, modern, autonomous notion of music was *negatively* reliant on its rival sister, painting—its Other. As a concept, music became what the sister was not: an art that did not belong to this world and, therefore, did not rely on reference to any external (extra-musical) object for its meaning. In this respect,

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[102] Within the particular context of my argument, in order to emphasize certain aspects of music-painting comparison, I use the term 'dichotomy' instead of 'contest' or '*paragone*,' which are more common terms used to refer to the comparison made between arts usually in order to exalt one of them. The reason for my choice is because in my writing I deal with music and painting as concepts (rather than objects) which, in their historical understanding, involve certain conditions and assumptions. By dichotomy, I refer to the opposition between the conceptual conditions and properties of these arts, the way they were historically *conceived* as arts. This point will be further illuminated throughout the chapter.

[103] The following works discuss different aspects of this paradigm shift: Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Karol Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; an Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure of Mimesis in Eighteenth- Century Aesthetics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

this dichotomy contributed to a shift in music's approach to nature (or external world) as an external reference of meaning and thereby to the formation of an autonomous musical subject around 1800. From this perspective, the dichotomy was instrumental to the way in which the new musical self was dissociated from nature and came to be perceived as an independent self or, in the romanticist terminology, a world in itself. It is the development of this new conception of music, the conceptual tension it generated, and the dynamism of this new music-world relationship that frame the main concern of this dissertation.

In order to study the development of the self-sufficient notion of music in the context of its conceptually taxing relationship with its sister art, this chapter looks at seemingly disparate moments in the history of this relationship from the renaissance to the nineteenth century. It begins with a glance at an important transitional 'moment' in this history, showing how, in their writings, the eighteenth-century writers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles Batteux, and Johann Jakob Engel contributed to the emergence of the then new formulation of the music-painting dichotomy while also continuing to adhere to earlier musical thought. I then consider that 'earlier musical thought' by discussing the rise of a renaissance view that originated in the writings of thinkers and artists such as Leonardo da Vinci to provide a historical background against which the revolutionary shift in the music-painting relationship at the turn of the nineteenth century can be understood more vividly. Finally, I discuss this revolutionary, 'modern' or romantic version of the dichotomy and its role in the articulation and conceptualization of music's new identity exemplified in the musical writings of such nineteenth-century thinkers as Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann (1776-1822), touching on some of the critical views that exposed challenges to the new notion of music.

One important point should be made regarding my use of the term painting: my references to the art of painting, as to music, are more conceptual than objective. As historically shaped and conditioned concepts, music and painting are treated in this chapter as historically evolving and changing sets of ideas, values, expectations, perceptions, and—in a word—meanings

associated with the 'objects' we know as visual or musical artworks. The music-painting dichotomy that I examine concerns the complicated relationship between these two historically shaped concepts and their associated meanings in specific historical backgrounds. In the context of aesthetic thought at the turn of the nineteenth century, painting and music represented and were associated with certain key ideas. For instance, as will be discussed later, music's adherence to or distance from painting was, from this perspective, a platform for music to be associated with or dissociated from the painterly conditions of art, i.e., the representation of nature or the external world, objectivity, empirical truth, and so forth. In other words, the art of painting was the perceived embodiment of these conditions or ideas.

While the local goal of this chapter is focused on the ways in which music-painting dichotomy has shaped the European understanding of music in the early nineteenth century, the function of this chapter in the context of my dissertation is to examine ways in which this dichotomy contributed to a shift in the relationship between music and nature (or external world) and the formation of an autonomous musical subject around 1800. In this context, the dichotomy was instrumental to the way in which the new musical self was dissociated from nature and came to be perceived as an independent self or, in the romanticist terminology, a world in itself. From one perspective, this chapter completes one side of a three-sided story that recounts the music-nature severance: the relationship between music and world reflected in music's relation to the art of nature, painting.

I. Music-Painting Dichotomy: Against Music

Within the context of European musical thought, until the late eighteenth century it was painting that regulated the conditions towards which music had to aspire.[104] However, around 1800 and within the span of only a decade or so, a fundamental shift in the assumptions on

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[104] I draw on Walter Pater's well-known statement that "all art consistently aspires to the condition of music." Walter Horatio Pater, "The School of Giorgione," in *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 124.

which this relationship was based turned the music-painting comparison on its head. A new

aesthetic framework emerged that fostered a notion of art as free and spontaneous and as

relying on its own inner rules. Music, especially instrumental music, became the epitome of this

so-called free and autonomous (from Greek *autos* + *nomos* "prescribing its own rules," in

Tieck's words) art for the same reason that it had previously been downgraded—that is, for being

inherently incapable of representing nature.[105] As some studies of eighteenth-century musical

thought have stressed, the mimesis-based understanding of art that pervaded the eighteenth

century was not the fertile soil on which music as a concept could flourish and develop as an

autonomous art form.[106] This mimetic notion of art provided the grounds for conceiving music

as inferior to its sister arts, painting and poetry—a view reflected in its most philosophically

robust form in Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) famous belittling remarks on music as "least

amongst the fine arts" and merely a "play of sensations."[107] Efforts by several eighteenth-century

aesthetic thinkers to demonstrate the power of music in depicting nature were deemed a failure

when it came to the comparison between music and painting: the latter was the art of

representation par excellence and provided the criteria according to which the former was

evaluated.

   Even for Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), an admirer of music, it was through the act of

painting and imitating objects and passions that music responded to its own *raison d'être*:

conveying sentiments to the human heart in order to move it. But Rousseau—as in other aspects

of his thought—was not a 'purely' eighteenth-century musical writer. Indeed, a possible starting

point for studying the shift in the nature of the music-painting dichotomy is found in his

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[105] Ludwig Tieck, "Symphonien," cited and translated in John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure of Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 199-200.

[106] See Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music*; John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure from Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986); and Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[107] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 206 (5:239).

writings; although standing inside the eighteenth-century paradigm of art, Rousseau

nonetheless took pains to push the borders of mimesis to its furthest point and, in certain

respects, contributed to the formation of the new aesthetic thought that appeared in the early

nineteenth century. His admiration of music resonated with the mimesis-based conception of

music that was common at the time while also acknowledging the uniqueness of music. In an

insightful passage in which Rousseau defends music against painting by emphatically

recognizing a unique relationship between music—vocal music in particular, but music in

general—and the listener, Rosseau underlines, foremost, the distinctive trait of music and its

power to hint at the presence of another human subject, a notion that Julia Simon has aptly

characterized as creating a condition for "the subject of musical aesthetic judgment" to

experience "a glimpse at human community."[108] Rousseau writes,

> [...] painting is closer to nature and [...] music depends more on human art. One
> also senses that the one holds more interest than the other precisely because it
> brings man together with man to a greater degree and always gives us some idea
> of our fellows. Painting is often dead and inanimate; it can transport you to the
> depths of a desert; but as soon as vocal signs strike your ear, they proclaim a
> being similar to yourself; they are, so to speak, the organs of the soul, and if they
> also depict solitude for you, they tell you that you are not alone there. Birds
> whistle, man alone sings, and one cannot hear either a song or an instrumental
> piece without immediately saying to oneself: another sensitive being is present.[109]

To Rousseau, music—or more specifically, musical *performance*—is the artistic "announcement"

of the existence/presence of "another" sensible or "sentient being" (*un autre être sensible*).

Unlike painting, which reconstructs the external world through its representation and thereby

"transports you to the depths of a desert," music alludes to another human subject through its

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[108] Julia Simon, "Rousseau and Aesthetic Modernity: Music's Power of Redemption," *Eighteenth-Century Music* 2,
no. 1 (2005): 54–55.
[109] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music*, ed. John T. Scott
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1998), 326.

peculiar nature: the very fact that musical sound cannot be produced without the presence of a human being.[110] Painting, according to Rousseau, is only capable of representing objects that can be seen, whereas music is "able to depict things that cannot be heard."[111]

Despite this strong—seemingly romantic—admiration of music's unique power, Rousseau still expounds music's conditions from an eighteenth-century view that considers imitation to be the "common principle" through which "all the fine arts are connected," and therefore, music, in order to be taken seriously as an art, must depict, albeit in its own manner. In the *Dictionary of Music* (1767), Rousseau further elaborates on musical mimesis suggesting that unlike painting, which relies on the sense of seeing, and poetry, which requires the imagination, music relies on the sense of hearing to paint invisible objects but—and here Rousseau gives expression to an important assumption behind musical mimesis—"by a magic almost inconceivable, it seems to place the eye in the ear."[112] Rousseau admits that there is something unique and different about music, but in his view this difference is to a great extent conditioned by a mimetic framework. For him, ears are not, so to speak, autonomous organs and they must therefore rely on eyes to be able to perceive music as an art form.[113]

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[110] One might be inclined to argue that living in an age when electronic music or recorded music had not made a "subjectless sound" or music of a subjective absence possible, Rousseau was deftly able to declare that "one cannot hear either a song or an instrumental piece without immediately saying to oneself: another sensitive being is present." As a response, a romantic reading of Rousseau would draw on Rousseau's emphasis on the subjective promise of music, which distinguishes it from visual arts. For him, music, especially vocal music, veneers a soul—not one belonging to the "celestial spheres" but an unreservedly human one. One possible reading of the passage, from this romantic perspective, is to stress not the fact that *somebody*'s presence is announced through music but the very power of music is in making such an *announcement*. In this reading, according to Rousseau, no verification of the presence of a subject is required when a musical sound is heard. Music, by its nature, is subjective, indicative of the presence of the subject; the other sensitive or sentient being is felt through music itself, not through the perception of the performer or composer's presence. Therefore, even recorded music is not purely subjectless.

[111] Rousseau, *Essay*, 326.

[112] Piero Weiss and Richard Taruskin, eds., *Music in the Western World: A History in Documents* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1984), 284. One of the arguments Rousseau puts forward in order to favour melody over harmony is based on his belief in the mimetic nature of art. He suggests that unlike melody, harmony "furnishes no imitation by which the music, forming images, or expressing sentiments, may be raised to the dramatic or imitative genus, which is the most noble part of art, and only energetic one." (Quoted in Carl Dahlhaus, *The Idea of Absolute Music*, trans. Roger Lustig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 49.)

[113] Rousseau, of course, never believed in the transformation in the nature of different arts. He thought each art must perform in their own, as it were, zone of action, but in order to experience art 'beautifully' or to perceive them as beautiful arts, one must prioritize the condition of paintings. It is his emphasis on aesthetic perception rather than artistic creation that turns painting into a higher art: "[...] each sense has a field proper to it. The field of music is time, that of painting is space. To multiply the sounds heard at the same time or to develop colors one after another is *to change their economy*, to put the eye in the place of the ear, and the ear in the place of the eye." Rousseau, *Essay*, 325. [Emphasis is mine.]

Rousseau's explication of how the mimetic conditions of painting are necessary for turning music into an art reveals some of the tension that exists in his musical aesthetics between a painterly and musical conception of music. According to him, imitation is the essential component of art; music must imitate in order to be an art. In Rousseau's non-formalist view, "painting is not the art of combining colors in a way pleasing to the sight," and it is the element of design or drawing that is essential to the construction of painting as an art, because it is through drawing that imitation becomes possible in painting. In a similar vein, "music [is not] the art of combining sounds in a way pleasing to the ear," and therefore one must be able to locate in music an element that is similar to drawing, something that can make musical mimesis possible. The mimetic elements in both painting and music are essentially important, because without them, painting and music "would both be counted among the ranks of the natural sciences, and not the fine arts. It is imitation alone that elevates them to that rank. Now, what makes painting an imitative art? It is design. What makes music another? It is melody."[114] Melody confers on music the imitational power it needs to be a fine art. Rousseau writes: "Melody does in music precisely what design does in painting; it is melody that indicates the contours and figures, of which the accords and sounds are but the colors."[115] But how does music do the imitation? "Melody, by imitating the inflections of the voice, expresses complaints, cries of sadness or of joy, threats, and moans; all the vocal signs of the passions are within its scope. It imitates the accents of languages, and the turns of phrase appropriate in each idiom to certain movements of the soul; it not only imitates, it speaks, and its language, inarticulate but lively, ardent, passionate, has a hundred times more energy than speech itself."[116] Music imitates but at

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[114] Ibid, 321. Comparing "non-artistic" aspects of music to science seems to be a significant component of the argument against musical formalism here. In a different yet not completely unrelated context, Frantz Liszt writing in about a century after Rousseau, uses the same argument to defend the significance of thoughts, images, and expression in music against a sheer emphasis on its technical aspects. Using poetry as an example, he suggests that the technical side of poetry (grammar, vocabulary, etc.) is "the affair of science, not of art." Strunk, *Source Readings*, 1167.

[115] Rousseau, *Essay*, 320.

[116] Ibid, 322.

the same time transcends sheer imitation and reveals what is hidden in speech. In other words, it speaks, but much more forcefully than language.

Since, according to Rousseau, imitation is the standard based on which music can be considered as an art (and melody, due to its power to 'delineate' is its essence), harmony is but a 'coloristic' element possessing the same status in music as color does in painting. He writes,

> By itself harmony is even inadequate for the expression that appear to depend uniquely upon it. Thunder, the murmuring of waters, winds, and storms are poorly rendered by simple chords. Whatever one may do, noise alone says nothing to the mind, objects have to speak in order to make themselves heard, in every imitation a type of discourse always has to supplement the voice of nature.[117]

Art is representational and to represent it cannot be nature itself; the main problem of harmony, in Rousseau's view, is its being close to the conditions of nature. As strangely as it might seem, harmony, according to Rousseau, is analogous to noise and is, as it were, a somewhat 'purely natural' element in music: "The musician who wants to render noise with noise is mistaken; he knows neither the weakness nor the strength of his art; he judges it without taste, without enlightenment."[118] In order to imitate nature, one cannot literally bring nature into music or, in Rousseau's words, "render noise with noise;" instead, one has to "render noise with song" when they paint nature. In other words, nature must be painted musically rather than naturally: "if [the musician] would make frogs croak, he has to make them sing. For it is not enough for him to imitate, he has to touch and to please, otherwise his glum imitation is nothing, and, not interesting anyone, it makes no impression."[119] This, for Rousseau, creates an essential connection between melody, the 'voice' of all kinds of music so to speak, and affections: "The sounds of a melody do not act on us solely as sounds, but as signs of our affections, of our

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[117] Ibid, 323.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.

feelings; it is in this way that they excite in us the emotions they express and the image of which we recognize in them."[120] Rousseau's *Dictionary of Music* offers further details on how this 'indirect' mimesis work: "the art of the musician consists in substituting, for the insensible image of the object, that of the movements which its presence excites in the heart of the contemplator."[121] So, for music to be able to depict, say fire, it must evoke the same movements in the "heart" of the listener that watching real fire can provoke.

The 'indirect' mimesis or representation is one of the ways in which eighteenth-century aestheticians understood music's power to imitate nature.[122] As Mary Sue Morrow suggests, mimesis applied to music in the eighteenth century either through the "pure imitation of nature" or the imitation/expression of passions. Therefore, whether we think of music in the eighteenth century as an "imitative art" or as an "expressive art," both of these conceptions of music "remained closely entwined in mimetic theory throughout the century."[123] This representational

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[120] Ibid.

[121] ibid.

[122] Talking of an indirect mimesis is reading history backwards. It is under the more modern understanding of emotions that the 'baroque' approach to musical expression is regarded representational. According to Manfred F. Bukofzer, the baroque's approach to emotions in music was rooted in "the musical expression of the text or what was called, at the time, expressio verborum. This word does not have the modern, emotional connotation of 'expressive music' and can more accurately be rendered as 'musical representation of the word.' The means of verbal representation in baroque music were not direct, psychological, and emotional, but indirect, that is, intellectual and pictorial. The modern psychology of dynamic emotions did not yet exist in the baroque era." Manfred F. Bukofzer, *Music in the Baroque Era: From Monteverdi to Bach* (New York: Norton, 1947), 4-5. To read more about this "modern psychology" and the paradigm shift in the conception of emotions in the Western thought, see Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[123] Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7. On the mimesis-based understanding of expression in the eighteenth century, besides the sources mentioned above, see John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language; Departure from Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986). Neubauer argues against the imitation-expression pole emphasizing the continuity between the "musical mimesis" of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and "musical expression" of the later eighteenth century. For him, the shift, at least in music history, unlike what Abrams suggested in his well-known theory of mirror-vs-lamps, is not from representation to expression but from representing/expressing "stock affects" to representing/expressing "individualized and personal emotions." Ibid, 6-7. A similar but earlier criticism of the use of Abrams's theory in music history is offered in an earlier study by Bellamy Hosler. She introduces and critiques two of the early adaptations of Abrams's imitation-expression dichotomy in the secondary literature of music scholarship and offers several criticisms of such studies. One of Bellamy's main points is that the problematic of the 'new' instrumental music in the eighteenth century, that is its perceived meaninglessness, was that for many eighteenth-century critics it was neither an imitation of nature, nor expression or self-expression. Imitation and expression—and even to some extent self-expression—were indeed older coexisting notions according to which the more 'conservative' music of the eighteenth century was listened to and perceived. See Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music*, xiv-xix. Abram's theory can be read in his well-known classic book in literary theory: M. H. Abrams. See M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). Also, see Simon Shaw-Miller, "*Opsis Melos Lexis*: Before and Around the Total Work

understanding of musical expression, or in other words, understanding musical expression

under mimesis, is reflected in the works of the other writers of the time. Charles Batteux's (1713-

1780) treatise, *Les Beaux arts réduit à un même principe* (1746), as its title suggests, offers a

fundamental principle with which all fine arts work; that principle is the imitation of nature and

applies to all, even those that might seemingly resist such a principle. Taking painting as the art

that is patently built on this principle and treating it as some kind of a criterion, Batteux

maintains that poetry and even dance and music, are mimetic. Imitation of nature is a principle

shared among all the fine arts, and only the fine arts, as other arts such as the mechanical arts

and architecture *use* nature rather than imitate it.[124] While the non-fine arts use nature either as

a means or as a combination of means and pleasure, "the fine arts do not use nature at all. Each

of the fine arts imitate it, each in its own way."[125] Elaborating on musical mimesis, Batteux

speaks of two kinds of music, one that he compares with landscape painting, and one that he

likens to portrait painting: "There are two sorts of music: the first imitates only inanimate

sounds and noises. This sort of composition is to music as the landscape is to painting. The

other sort of music expresses animate sounds that are associated with emotions. This music is a

portrait of a persona."[126] Whether imitative or expressive, according to Batteux, "the musician is

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of Art," in James H. Rubin and Olivia Mattis, eds., *Rival Sisters, Art and Music at the Birth of Modernism, 1815-1915* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014). 37-51. Shaw-Miller follows Neubauer in not thinking of imitation and expression in the eighteenth century as poles. He writes, "for many writers in the eighteenth century, 'expression' continued to be perceived as a species of imitation, as an element of affect theory." *Ibid*, 41.

[124] For a useful introduction to the concept of mechanical art in the early modern Europe, see Jim Bennett, "The Mechanical Arts," in *The Cambridge History of Science*, edited by Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston, 3:673–95. The Cambridge History of Science. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also, see Guichard, Charlotte. ""Liberal Arts" and "Free Arts" in Paris in the Eighteenth Century: Artists Between the Guild and the Royal Academy", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, (vol. no 49-3, no. 3, 2002), 54-68.

[125] Charles Batteux, *The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle*, trans. James O. Young (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015), 3-4. See page 9 for Batteux's implicit reference to painting as a kind of self-evident, clear art of mimesis and representation. Ironically, but meaningfully, while he spends many pages (more than fifty in Young's critical edition) on establishing detailed reasons for how poetry imitates the beautiful nature, Batteux does not think it is necessary to discuss painting, and only in two paragraphs or so explains how everything he has said about poetry applies to painting. Aside from the fact that poetry has a central significance in this writing, it is quite interesting to note that in the opening page of the treatise, it is painting that acts as poetry's reference for depicting objects (i.e., mimesis) and relating to the world: "Like eloquence, poetry speaks, it argues, and it tells stories. Like music, it has a regular rhythm, tones, and cadences which combine to form a sort of harmony. Like painting, it depicts its objects, it colours them, and it blends in nuances of nature." (Ibid, 1) Batteux's task is not to prove whether painting imitates, but to show how this conspicuous fact can be applied to other seemingly non-mimetic fine arts.

[126] Ibid, 137.

no more unconstrained than the painter. All of his works are continuously subject to comparison to nature."[127] Quite similar to Rousseau's, Batteux's theory pivots on mimesis, while tries to open some space for the specificity of music in relation to the expression of emotions. But a late eighteenth-century, probably more systematic, study of musical mimesis, or how music 'paints,' was offered by Johann Jakob Engel.

Engel maintains that unlike language that represents reality or an object mostly through 'arbitrary' signs, painting represents by "bringing that object before the perception of the senses by means of natural signs."[128] An important difference for Engel between natural and arbitrary signs is that arbitrary signs do not specify this or that object and work through "general notions for the understanding" while natural signs represent the particular and individual. Artistic use of language, i.e., poetry, is an effort to create this particularity and individuality in representation and this is achievable through the poet's giving the representations more "sensuousness and animation through more precise specification,"[129] as specificity helps imagination to think of images "with a superior power and clarity."[130] Another way in which the poet can make language more artistic (poetic) is by bringing "the mechanical—the sound of the words and the cadence of the meter—into agreement with the inner meaning of the discourse."[131] In this way, the poet "makes his arbitrary signs approximate the natural signs."[132]

Music is different from language because it lacks any kind of arbitrary signs that represent general notions. That is to say, music does not have the problem of language to be solved but at the same time it cannot use the first technique of the poet, i.e., painting reality through further

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[127] Ibid. As will be discussed later in this chapter, this stands in contrast with Schiller's view later in the century. Schiller believed that landscape painting and music had more in common, especially because they both distanced themselves from human embodiment and historical events, becoming free arts. See Charles Rosen's *Romantic Generation*. For a discussion of Batteux's thought on expression and representation, see James O. Young's introduction to his translation of Batteux's treatise. Young writes, "[Batteux's] view is that music represents emotion by being expressive of emotion." Charles Batteux, *The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle*, trans. James O. Young (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015), xlvii-xlviii.
[128] Strunk, *Source Readings*, 955.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.

specification of general notions. Therefore, according to Engel, only the second possibility applies to music: "introducing a resemblance with the represented object itself into the perception of the signs that signify these objects."[133] Musical notes are not arbitrary signs; they are natural signs and "make their effect not by something signified through them, but by themselves alone, as particular kinds of impressions on our hearing." (ibid) Since in music there are no "notions of the understanding," musicians must use tones themselves as natural signs to "stimulate representation of other related objects." The musician is the poet, "in the second sense."[134]

There are two ways of painting in arts: *complete painting* (which is not available to music) that "brings the entire phenomenon before our perception," and *incomplete painting*, which brings only parts or properties of a phenomenon before our perception and is the way in which music paints.[135] Whether it paints an external object or an inner feeling aroused by an object, music always deals with general properties of the painted and can individualize it "only through a particular representation of the object arousing it."[136] A feeling cannot be specified and individualized,

> … except by a particular representation of the object arousing it. In this respect music must always be far behind. All it can do, with the concentrated power of all its devices, is indicate classes or types of feelings, even if they consist of low-level, more specific type of feelings. The more special and individual aspects—whatever must be first apprehended from the particular nature and context of the object— remains consistently unspecified, precisely because music cannot also indicate that special nature and context.[137]

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[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Engel explicates: "Complete painting [in music] obviously takes place only when the object itself is audible, and compatible with regular tones and measured rhythm." Ibid, 955. One can imagine that music (not tonal music and one that Engel had in mind) could paint completely only through an exact imitation of a sound in the external world, by 'rendering noise with noise,' using Rousseau's terminology.
[136] Ibid, 956.
[137] Ibid, 959.

Therefore, although music is not good at representing objects, it can represent the feelings aroused by them, and it can do this in the best way, since music can "signify [a feeling] by a multitude of very particular similarities."[138] Music is the best at this, because "by nothing else […] are these vibrations so certainly, so powerfully, so variously produced, as by tones."[139] This is why "nature herself makes use chiefly of tones in order to stir up the instinctive sympathy that exists among beasts of the same species."[140] Feelings expressed in nature are conveyed through *sounds* more powerfully than other media. So, the art of sound should paint feelings not objects of feelings. But how does music paint incompletely? In different ways: in circumstances when the object is perceived through different senses, music can imitate the audible sense data to "arouse in the imagination the representation of the whole."[141] Engel's examples of this particular type of musical painting are the musical representation of a battle, a storm, or a hurricane; the other way in which music can imitate is when the object cannot be perceived through ears—because it "contains absolutely nothing audible"—but it shares some general properties with audible tones. Here, the similarity is between objects of different sense. Engel calls these similarities transcended similarities.[142] Examples are: slowness or quickness. Transcended similarities are important as they provide the composer with way more opportunities to represent nature or external reality. Finally, the composer "imitates not a part or a property of the object itself, but impression that the object tends to make on the soul."[143] Although being an incomplete painting, this is the best and broadest way in which music can paint. In this mode, unlike other modes of musical painting—i.e., direct imitation of natural sounds or 'transcendental' imitation in which music shares certain characteristics with the

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[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid, 958.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid, 956.
[142] Transcended similarity seems to be the type of musical painting that a great extent of the idea of program music relies on.
[143] Ibid, 956.

object portrayed—it is not the object and its qualities but the impression they have on the soul that is the subject of musical mimesis.

The elaborate ideas of Rousseau, Batteux, and Engel on the ways in which music represents or depicts things that are beyond sensible perception are rooted in a generally mimesis-based notion of music as an art that must remain painterly even in its distinctive powers or effects.[144] For example, although Rousseau's high commendation of music compared to his derision of painting signals a nuance in the musical thought of the eighteenth century, it is, nonetheless, still deeply rooted in a mimetic understanding of art. In other words, despite the romantic inflection of his musical thought, Rousseau is not 'fully' romantic. That type of musical romanticism that is marked, among other things, by an effort to make the case for listening exclusively through the ears and think of hearing as an autonomous sense that is enough/complete for perceiving music, is not present in Rousseau's thought. For Rousseau, as for other pre-romantic musical writers, the sense of hearing is not a pathway to an autonomous musical world because, to him, hearing must rely on seeing for the desired effects to be created, and the ears' competence for sonic perception remains dependent on the eyes and their conditions of visual perception.[145]

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[144] This expressionist view of musical mimesis was common among the majority of the eighteenth-century music writings. As Wye J. Allanbrook has explicated by studying further instances of the eighteenth-century music writings, theories such as Rousseau's and Engel's were based on the older baroque doctrine of affections that acted as the basis of understanding the later instrumental music we know as 'classical.' Common among these theories was the strong relationship between motion and emotion: "It was the consensus in the eighteenth century that the link that binds music and passions is motion—that music imitates the passions by means of musical movement." Wye J. Allanbrook, "'Ear-Tickling Nonsense': A New Context for Musical Expression in Mozart's 'Haydn' Quartets," *The St. John's Review* (38, no. 1, 1988), 7.

[145] As another—so to speak—transitional figure in the aesthetic paradigm shift of the late eighteenth century, Goethe reformulated and modified the prevalent conception of art in the late eighteenth century. According to him, there is a universal law that is expressed through different media, whether music or painting, or poetry. Although Goethe's discussion of universal law might resemble Rousseau's "common principle," or even Batteux's "*même principe,*" Goethe's is closer to the romantic aesthetics of music. For him, the universal principle is not imitation, but the *invisible* essence of all arts. To read more about Goethe's aesthetics and in particular his understanding of music, see Stephanie Campbel, "Seeing Music: Visuality in the Friendship of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Carl Friedrich Zelter," in Morton and Schmunk, *The Arts Entwined: Music and Painting in the Nineteenth Century*, (New York: Garland, 2000), 47-62. Later in the nineteenth century, this invisible essence is defined *musically* and is identified with musicality. Music as the "invisible" art turns out to be the best possible locus of the essence of art, the artness or universal principle. One can legitimately wonder to what degree music must have been thought separated from its performance context to be conceived as an invisible art. Karol Berger's story of the genealogy of Western art music is partially reliant on this separation. See the chapter "Genealogy of Modern European Art Music" in Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 108-161. Also look at Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary*

The superiority of seeing over hearing was not a new Rousseauian invention and had been a commonplace at least for over two centuries before him, serving as a reason for some renaissance writers and artists to argue painting's superiority over music. As early as the fifteenth- and early sixteenth-centuries, one can trace the notion of musical mimesis to the ideas of writers and artists such as da Vinci who defended painting against music based on the empirical ways in which they are perceived. Painting constituted, indeed, part of the conditions used as the yardstick against which music was devalued as an incompetent art. The emergence of these painterly conditions and their accreditation as the standard of art *par excellence* during the renaissance era were themselves a pointer to a shift from the medieval conception of art and music. During the renaissance, for the first time, the conceptually secure place of music in the system of Liberal Arts that was developed in the middle ages began to be shaken due to the increasing prominence of empiricist knowledge in the Western consciousness.

The status of music in the medieval system of knowledge was built upon the Pythagorean theory of music, which considered music not merely as organized sounds but a mathematical interrelations between the 'sound,' the soul, and the universe; as a concept, music was not—from a medieval perspective—conceivable outside this complex scheme.[146] The harmony that could exist between the constituent parts of the human soul was a reflection of the harmony that existed in the universe and these two could find their musical articulation in the mathematic relations within musical intervals.[147] This system was obviously built on a non-empirical

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Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music, Rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). In 1783, Carl Friedrich Zelter stressed the same essentialist notion of art suggesting in a conversation that there is one "general art" of which music and painting are different fields. Marsha L. Morton, "'From the Other Side'; An Introduction," in Morton and Schmunk, eds., *The Arts Entwined,* 1. This view that Philippe Junod refers to as "parallelism" can be seen, according to him, in some of the romantic composers such as Schumann and Liszt. Schumann believed that the aesthetics of arts are the same and they are different only through their materials. See Philippe Junod, "The New Paragone; Paradoxes and Contradictions of Pictorial Musicalism," in Morton and Schmunk, *The Arts Entwined*, 23-46.

[146] I put the word sound in quotation marks to emphasize the fact that when referring to sounds or tunes, Medieval writers speak about sounds that we might not really hear, as the tunes or sounds that they believed the motions of planets produced. On the non-empirical, cosmological-mathematical approach to music see Bonds, *Absolute Music*, 30-34.

[147] To read more about the intellectual aspects of music history in the Medieval time, see Thomas J. Mathiesen, *Apollo's Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1999). Also see Rebecca A. Baltzer, "Ecclesiastical foundations and secular institutions" in Mark

understanding of music as a concept in which the actual sound of music (*musica instrumentalis*) was marginal, and even distracting from the higher 'reality' of music (*musica mundana*) which, strictly speaking, could be perceived only through the intellect.[148] The threefold classification of music in medieval musical thought, as Bonds suggests, is connected with the hierarchical distinction between the mind and the senses.[149] As late as the mid-sixteenth century, Bonds observes, the three types or manifestations of music as described by Boethius—*musica mundana* (the mathematical order of the universe), *musica humana* (the harmony of the human body and soul), and *music instrumentalis* (audible or sounding music)—lay the foundation of Western musical thought and were the dominant intellectual understanding of music. Relying on a cosmological structure rather than an empirical consideration of musical sounds, the medieval philosophy of music left almost no room for senses.[150] Within the theological context of the medieval understanding of art and music, the non-empirical notion of music favored music's high status as an abstract and spiritual art. As Tim Shephard in a writing on the history of the *paragone* between arts suggests, the status of music in the Middle Ages was higher than painting.[151] In other words, until the fifteenth and

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Everist, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 263-275. For a classic intellectual history of the world harmony, see Leo Spitzer, *Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word "Stimmung,"* ed. Anna Granville Hatcher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1963).

[148] One should avoid reifying the medieval admiration for the intellectual in musical experience. As Chadwick Jenkins asserts, the later medieval and renaissance formulation of the hierarchy of the reflective and the practical (empirical) in music was quite complex. Although it was the reflective and intellectual that stood in a higher position in this hierarchy, a perfect state was one within which the reflective was accompanied with the musical actuality. The perfect musician was considered as the one who had the reflective knowledge about as well as the practical skill in music. See Chadwick Jenkins, "Giovanni Maria Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science," *Acta Musicologica* 81, no. 1 (2009): 75–97. 80-4.

[149] See Bonds, *Absolute Music*, 32-3

[150] Ibid, 30. For a recently published discussion of Boethius's view within the context of a broader notion of 'world harmony', see Andrew Hicks, *Composing the World: Harmony in the Medieval Platonic Cosmos*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[151] "Leonardo and the Paragone" by Tim Shephard in Tim Shephard and Anne Leonard, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Music and Visual Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 229-237. However, an important point is made by Shephard. He underlines that while music's reliance on mathematics and the high prestige of music in the time guaranteed the liberal status of music, it was the speculative, that is the philosophical and theoretical aspects of music, which were considered as a high art. He writes: "Strictly speaking, the prestige of music's Liberal Arts status did not attach to musicians by merit of practical skill. (Ibid, 230-231) [...] A distinction was made by some musical authorities in the Renaissance—drawing on earlier practice and inspired ultimately by Boethius—between the *musicus*, who possessed a philosophical understanding of music, and the *cantor*, who merely knew how to sing." (Ibid, 231) Shephard underlines that visual arts had no place in the system of the liberal arts, because painting and other visual arts "were classified as "mechanical" and not suited to the education of gentlemen." (ibid) In this context,

sixteenth centuries, the very fact that music as a concept was not first and foremost the *sound*

that musicians produced when performing, but rather an abstract, harmonic mathematical

science and one of the four main areas of measurement constituting the *quadrivium* was indeed

a blessing for music's status.

The later renaissance emphasis on the empirical aspects of music as essential constituents of

it, that is, the 'conceptual discovery' of sound as an object, was instrumental in later radically

scientific approaches to the study of music reflected in the works of Vincenzo Galilei, who as

Chua has shown, subjected musical sound to "the instrumental reason of empirical science."[152]

What Chua sees as the significance of Galilei's experiments lies, first, in the very notion of

"experiment," i.e., an empirical observation to "demonstrate *real* things" and to stop the ancient

process of mystification of the nature of music. The result was music being conceived as the

physical reality and an audible *fact* divorced from celestial *values*.[153] Music was therefore heard

as an empirical sound-object, the facts of which were only accessible to experiments that could

be verified by aural perception.[154]

But before Galilei, it was Leonardo da Vinci who adopted an empirical approach to the study

of arts and music based on which he concluded that painting is better than music. Underlining

the objective rather than theoretical or philosophical aspects of music, he could 'easily' defeat

music and open room for painting as the art of nature. In the context of this new empirical

notion of music, the painting's reliance on mimesis as its 'obvious' artistic condition was indeed

extended to the conditions of music. Under the post-medieval, or renaissance, values, music's

power is justified in mimetic terms: the representation of the human's inner nature, namely,

passions, as well as the portrayal of the external nature. In other words, a conceptual version of

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the Renaissance humanists' defense of painting was an effort to demonstrate that painting is also liberal both because according to them it was practiced by "noble souls" in ancient Greece and also because of its geometrical and mathematical foundations.

152. Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature", 23.
153. *Ibid.*
154. *Ibid.*

musical ekphrasis—that is, understanding music under visual terms—became possible when painting came to determine the conditions based on which the hierarchy of arts was reorganized. An obvious yet highly significant result of this new framework was that the new hierarchy of arts pivoted on the visual, or the eye-based, conditions of painting. As an example, writing in 1435, Leon Battista Alberti had emphasized the significance of the eye in mediating between the representation of nature in painting and the power of representation in moving the emotions.[155]

Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century efforts undertaken by other renaissance thinkers-artists such as Leonardo da Vinci to redefine painters as liberal artists rather than merely craftsmen, as well as their revolutionary emphasis on the transience of musical material, i.e., sounds, clearly emphasizes *musica instrumentalis* as an experienced happening rather than an intellectual phenomenon and introduces it as the central theme of his musical thought. Leonardo da Vinci's arguments in favor of painting and against other arts including music, which according to Claire Farago are "the first important contribution to the renaissance debates on the preeminence of the visual arts," underline the worldly empirical nature of both arts.[156] This shift in where to

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[155] See the translator's introduction in Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting and On Sculpture. The Latin Texts of De Pictura and De Statua*, ed. Cecil Grayson and Leon Battista Alberti (London: Phaidon, 1972), 14. It is hard to draw a clear historical line between a medieval notion of music understood in intellectual and mathematical terms and a renaissance (and later, a baroque) empirical conception of music. The conceptual history of music also displays interesting continuities and discontinuities in this regard. The conflict created by the fusion of an old theory (music *theory* as mathematics) with a new understanding of music (musical *sound* as the depiction of affects) finds its best expression in Gottfried Leibniz's remark that "Music is an unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind does not know that it is counting." (*Musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi.*) Only an amalgamation of a 'modern' sonic *reality* of music with the *speculative* notion of music inherited from the medieval thought could have led to a statement such as Leibniz's, which sounds more like a necessary conclusion based on specific rational maxims than an observation of how music 'really' affects the soul. Interestingly, in the early next century, Schopenhauer rephrased the same statement displaying the new episteme under which music was understood as a philosophical path towards truth: "Music is an unconscious exercise in metaphysics, in which the mind does not know that it is philosophizing." See, Arthur Schopenhauer, *Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Representation.*, ed. Christopher Janaway, trans. Judith Norman, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Alistair Welchman, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 282-92. Schopenhauer, in these pages, explains how he moves from an arithmetic to a philosophical understanding of music's relationship to the world.

[156] Claire Farago, *Leonardo da Vinci's Paragone: A Critical Interpretation with a New Edition of the Text in the Codex Urbinas* (Brill, 1992), 3. These texts where da Vinci has compared painting with other arts in order to demonstrate the supremacy of the former, are known today as *paragone*, which as Farago explains comprise the opening section of the *Codex Vaticans Urbinas Latinus 1270* (collected from eighteen of Leonardo's notebooks). In the original manuscript, the title of this section is *The Book on Painting by Leonardo da Vinci, Florentine Painter and Sculptor*. It is comprised of 46 passages, referred to as "chapters" in Farago's edition. Chapters 29-32 are devoted to music-painting *paragone*/comparison.

locate the 'reality' of music is an essential component of Leonardo's reasoning for painting's superiority over other arts including music.[157] An argument he offers to defend the superiority of painting over music mainly is based on what he takes as the power of eyes and the supremacy of seeing over hearing: "Music is to be regarded none other than the sister of painting since it is subjected to hearing, a sense second to the eye."[158] He contends that the eyes are "the windows of [the soul's] dwelling" since it is through the former that the latter is able to observe the various entities in nature.[159] Hence, "the soul is content to remain in its human prison" and those who lose their eyesight "leave [their] soul in a dark prison."[160] He concludes that "there is no one who would not prefer to lose his senses of hearing and smell than to lose an eye."[161] Because painting is praised and "performed" by means of the most "worthy" and "noble" sense, it is "a true daughter of nature" and therefore the best among arts.[162] Painting is even better than poetry in da Vinci's opinion, because although poetry can imitate and depict nature through descriptive language, painting's mimetic power is bigger because it uses a universally communicable 'language'—i.e., one that can be instantly and universally recognized by the organ of sight—to depict "the works of nature with more truth and certitude" than other arts do. Painting directly touches the soul through the eyes, and therefore "needs no interpreters of

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[157] While my emphasis in this summary of Leonardo's thoughts is more on his attempts to denigrate music's status, Tim Shephard has underlined other aspects of Leonardo's writing, where the latter tries to elevate the status of painting by appropriating some of the music's capacities for painting. According to Shephard, "Leonardo's view of sight also informed a reconfiguration of the mechanics of imitation that transferred the honor of imitating God's design for a universe of harmonious proportions from music to painting. Painting, Leonardo argued, represents nature in its permanent and unchanging forms, just as they are apprehended by the soul. ... The painter, therefore, imitates the proportional beauty of the universe as it has been created by God. [...] Leonardo appropriates for painting more-or-less exactly the privilege that musicians had previously claimed as their exclusive province—that of imitating the construction of the universe." ibid, 235-6. Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472), the Renaissance author and architect, in *On the Art of Building*, relied on the same argument to defend painting. For him, harmony was not limited to music and could be *seen* in painting: "The very same numbers that cause sounds to have that concinnitas, pleasing to the ears, can also fill the eyes and mind with wonderous delight." Quoted by Peter Vergo in Peter Vergo, *That Divine Order: Music and the Visual Arts from Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century* (London: Phaidon, 2005), 135.
[158] Farago, *Leonardo da Vinci's Paragone*, 241.
[159] Ibid, 225.
[160] Ibid, 229.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid, 237.

different languages as letters do."[163] The eye, da Vinci concludes, is "the true intermediary"

between the object and its impression on the soul or mind.[164]

Another argument that da Vinci offers to demonstrate that music is inferior to painting is his

emphasis on the transient nature of music compared to the lasting character of painting: "[...]

painting excels and rules over music, because it does not immediately die after its creation the

way unfortunate music does."[165] It is due to this difference in the qualities of music and painting

that, according to him, the painterly "harmony" or, as he puts it the harmony of proportionality

is better than musical harmony or the harmony of "varied voices."[166] The former is eternal and

timeless while the latter is conditioned by temporality. Like poetry, in da Vinci's view, music is a

temporal art, and constituents of temporal arts "are dead as soon as they are born."[167] While

painting has the superpower of not only depicting nature through its representation but also

preserving and giving a *lasting* life to perishing nature or objects, music is totally incapable of

even surviving its own transient essence.

The hierarchy of the senses, with touch, taste, and smell below hearing, and seeing on top of

all of them, remained more or less intact up until the late eighteenth century. Although in the

first half of the eighteenth century French aesthetic writers such as Charles Batteux, as

mentioned above, began to regard hearing as a sense that was capable of perceiving beauty, it

was under a mimetic, painterly condition that ears grasped the beauty of sounds. Leonardo's

recourse to nature for deciding which art fulfills the conditions of art more than other arts is not

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[163] Ibid, 185-7.
[164] Ibid, 85. On the meaning of the term "*impressiva*" (rendered as 'impression' in my writing) in the context of da Vinci's writing, see Farago's commentary notes in *Leonardo da Vinci's Paragone,* 301-2.
[165] Ibid, 241.
[166] Ibid, 217 and 235-6. Also see Farago's commentary notes on page 363.
[167] Ibid, 191 and 241. To read more about the significance of seeing in Leonardo's thought and its relation to the importance of observing nature, see Richard Shaw Pooler, *Leonardo Da Vinci's Treatise of Painting: The Story of the World's Greatest Treatise on Painting, Its Origins, History, Content and Influence* (Wilmington, Delaware: Vernon Press, 2014), 194-5.

essentially different than Batteux's endorsement of the imitation of nature, or more specifically *belle nature*, as the fundamental aesthetic principle common among fine arts.[168]

II. Music-Painting Dichotomy: For Music

Art's reliance on the external world as its point of reference or source of meaning was not questioned fundamentally until the late eighteenth century and then only gradually. In an essay published in 1785, Johann Gottfried Herder pictures "a divine colloquy," between the Muses of painting and music in front of their Father Apollo while sitting "beneath his beloved tree, with the youngest and dearest of his daughters, Poetry, in his lap."[169] As narrated by Herder, the debate is won by the Muse of music with strong claims of being original, deeper, and more inward-looking than her sister (the Muse of painting), capable of articulating and expressing the language of hearts and feelings. According to Herder, despite its non-representational and, from a mimetic view of art, obscure nature, music possesses more expressive power and effect.[170]

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[168] While by *belle nature*, 'beautiful' or 'ideal nature', Batteux meant a version of reality that does not necessarily exist in actual nature and appears as an "archetype or model" than particular events or objects, as James O. Young suggests in his introduction to the treatise, "Batteux makes clear that the artist must draw on nature" in the process of creating this ideal or beautiful version of nature. In this aesthetic framework, Batteux's thought on music was common to his time: music is the imitation of human sentiments and passions. For further readings on the Eighteenth-century musical expression and its roots in mimesis, see Charles Batteux, *The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle*, trans. James O. Young (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015), xliv-xlvi; Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music*; and Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Also see Wye Jamison Allanbrook, *The Secular Commedia Comic Mimesis in Late Eighteenth-Century Music*, ed. Mary Ann Smart and Richard Taruskin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014). Allanbrook adopts a large-scale approach to the notion of mimesis. She thinks, "from the Athens of fourth century BC down to late eighteenth-century Europe, in the accounts of both philosophers and musicians, mimesis is no mere servant to the dead hand of the word but an active mode of representation that catches the essence of our humanity either in relation to an unvarying and omnipotent God or in terrestrial images ghosting human characters and passions." (Ibid, 54) She takes the mimetic principle even further into the nineteenth century and claims that expression and self-expression in nineteenth-century musical thought are but the continuation of mimetic theory.

[169] Johann Gottfried Herder, "Does Painting or Music Have a Greater Effect? A Divine Colloquy" in *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*, ed. Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 347.

[170] Writing at roughly the same time when Kant wrote his third critique, Herder's musical thought is different. Kant admired painting and other figurative arts against music, for music, according to him, unlike visual representational arts, is only capable of expressing sentiments and therefore is the art of "the play of the beautiful play of sensations." See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 201. The effect of Kant's aesthetics on the future musical thought is complicated. Although he explicitly criticized music for its incapacity or limited capacity to enlarge "the faculties that must join together in the power of judgment for the sake of cognition," his allusions to musical formalism, that is music's indifference to concepts and merely involving in indistinct ideas, was advantageous to musical autonomy. See the second chapter of Jeffrey Swinkin, *Teaching Performance: A Philosophy of Piano Pedagogy* (Cham: Springer, 2015). Also, look at chapter 10 in Rose Rosengard Subotnik, *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). From the romantic view that came after Kant and offered an alternative aesthetic view,

Herder's defense of music is significant as, unlike the more typical eighteenth-century accounts of music, it proposes an explanation of music's importance, or uniqueness, based on its own merits and outside the painterly conditions of mimesis. However, Herder's is but the beginning of an increasing admiration of music's non-figurative essence.

In the 1790s, Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder also attributed a "superiority" to the art of music due to its contradictory qualities of "profundity" and "sensual power," which enable the human heart to become "acquainted with itself in the mirror of musical sounds."[171] A stronger praise of music's self-sufficient nature appeared a few years later in Ludwig Tieck's writings in which he attributed "independence and freedom" to instrumental music, recalling the Kantian notion of human autonomy. Tieck writes, "Art is independent and free in instrumental music; *it prescribes its own rules all by itself...* it completely follows its dark drives and expresses with its triflings what is deepest and most wonderful. . . . [The] sounds which art has miraculously discovered and pursues along the greatest variety of paths . . . *do not imitate and do not beautify*; rather, they constitute a separate world for themselves"[172] [My emphasis]. A few years after Tieck, Christian Friedrich Michaelis used the specific condition of music as an argument against the theory of mimesis in art presuming music an original, ideal art, the furthest from nature: "No other art so clearly illustrates the fallacy of the argument that beauty in art consists of a simple imitation of nature. How poor any art would be if it were no more than a simple

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Kant was correct in claiming that musical 'language' is indistinct and vague, but wrong in overlooking the profundity of this vagueness. Bonds has underlined Kant's complex case in music history from another view. According to him, Kant and German Idealism's emphasis on the human subject's constructive contribution to the formation of its knowledge about the world and the active role it plays in the acts of perception (including the act of listening), had revolutionary impacts in music history and how instrumental music, and especially the symphony, was perceived in the age of Beethoven. See Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[171] Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, *Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder's Confessions and Phantasies*, ed. Mary Hurst Schubert (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1981), 359. This is from his essay "The Characteristic Inner Nature of the Musical Art and the Psychology of Today's Instrumental Music." Art is, according to Wackenroder in his "A Letter by Joseph Berlinger", a "substance [...] that [more than any other substances] concentrates in itself the intellectual and spiritual power of the human being and makes him to such a degree an autonomous, human god!" Ibid, 373.

[172] Ludwig Tieck, "Symphonien," cited and translated in John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure of Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 199-200.

repetition of the sounds that can be heard in the animate or inanimate world!"[173] This new aesthetic paradigm seeks to disentangle the essence of music from imitation and thereby from the external world. According to Michaelis, there is an "enchantment" in music that is reflected in the way it "uses its melodic and harmonic composition to call into being an entire world of its own and to make it appear in our imagination, though it would be vain to seek the original in a reality devoid of art."[174] Music was perceived as capable of constructing a world entirely independent from the external world.[175] The newly perceived self-contained essence of music became one of the main themes for defending music against its historical accusations and turned what Charles Rosen succinctly called music's "traditional weakness" into a new unique strength.[176]

Modern accounts of music's uniqueness in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were offered not only by its defenders. A critic of musical abstraction, Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of art offered an understanding of the modern conditions of music that connected it strongly to human subjectivity while at the same time risking its meaningfulness. He suggests that music is the "manifestation" of "the inner life [...] as a *subjective* inwardness" or "complete withdrawal, of both the inner life and its expression, into subjectivity."[177] In other words, whereas through painting or other visual arts the inner life is objectified, through music the inner life is subjectified. This is explicated by Hegel through his argument that, "taken by itself as real objectivity, sound in contrast to the material of the visual arts is wholly abstract. Stone and colouring receive the forms of a broad and variegated world of objects and portray them as

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[173] Christian Friedrich Michaelis, "Ueber das Idealische der Tonkunst," *Allgemenie musikalische Zeitung*, Leipzig, Breitkopf u. Härtel, no. 29 (1808), col. 449.) Translated and quoted in Julie Ramos "Caspar David Friedrich and Music: A 'Divine Kingdom of Hearing'?" in James H. Rubin and Olivia Mattis, eds., *Rival Sisters, Art and Music at the Birth of Modernism, 1815-1915* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 56.
[174] Ibid.
[175] In my Epilogue, drawing on Beiser's interpretation of the romantic philosophy, I will discuss the relationship between this autonomous artistic (or musical) world and the external world.
[176] Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 132.
[177] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 889.

they actually exist; sounds cannot do this."[178] By this account, music is an expression of the "object-free inner life," that is abstract subjectivity. "The chief task of music," then, for Hegel "consists in making resound, not the objective world itself, but, on the contrary, the manner in which the inmost self is moved to the depths of its personality and conscious soul."[179] Music, according to Hegel, is therefore fundamentally different from a representational art such as painting since the former—at least in its instrumental and non-functional form—is dissociated from life, that is the external world, and therefore is not capable of bridging the gap between the inner and outer worlds. The 'expressive' aspect of music is, from this perspective, different from painterly *ex*pression by which the inner life can find an objective and material medium to be objectified. In music, the inner life returns to itself: it mirrors the self in a different sense of the word. Extending the metaphor of a mirror, one might claim that unlike painting in which the expressive mirror stands in a proper angle between self and world projecting the interiority of the self into the outer world, in music this mirror is positioned towards the soul and reflects the inner life back to itself, only to deepen this interiority infinitely. From a Hegelian point of view, the essential problem of musical abstraction is that it can never reach out to the world and remains subjective and empty.

Through his articulation of the music-painting dichotomy, Hegel underlined the new locus of music in the human subject's inner life and stressed music's abstract (non-representational) and "object-free" nature. Although the position adopted by Hegel was an essentially critical one and against music, or at least 'modern' instrumental music, it contributed to the romantic conception of music. Thus the romantic view essentially cannot be distinguished from Hegel's or even Kant's critical insights: the critical perception of music as a contentless and deeply subjective art was not far from the romantic conception of it as an immaterial and subjectively deep art. The defect was simply reinterpreted as perfection. Hegel's suggestion of the

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[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid, 891.

romanticization or, perhaps, spiritualization of music as an abstract art was advanced by

Friedrich Theodor Vischer. In the third volume of Vischer's colossal *Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft*

des Schönen (1846-57) under the section "Die subjective Kunstform oder die Musik" (§763),

Vischer added an escapist tone to the music-defense theme:

> Because of music's clinging, mobile nature, because of the immensely reduced
> body weight of its apparatus in relation to the massivity of the figurative arts, it is
> completely differently equipped and called upon from the latter for its immediate
> influence on life, society, the family, the individual; dilettantism is in no art so
> beneficial and legitimate as in this one; and thus it can lift every moment from the
> midst of life's empirical circumstances, above the inert gravity of time which is
> felt as a burden, and thus, as it were, idealize time within itself."[180]

Vischer interprets Hegel by observing that for the philosopher, musical time is an escape from

the everyday time: "Hegel traces the innate basis of the bar or measure back to spiritual life, to

self-awareness: it is the ego returning to itself from the indistinct continuity of its temporal

existence, its interrupting this line in order to be aware of, and with, itself—something that

confronts us directly in musical time."[181] Music's peculiar quality, its temporal identity, was from

a romantic view, an advantage as it gave this art a power none of the other arts possessed: music

was not only a non-spatial, and therefore abstract, art but also could build a temporality

independent from the empirical time we experience in everyday life. This quality, or as

romantics thought, this competence, was essential to music's unique status. It was not the art of

this world because it was both spatially and temporally dissociated from the world and

associated to a different realm. Whether we focus on Hegel and define this realm only in terms

of pure subjectivity or align ourselves with those romantics who associated it with religious or

quasi-religious ideas, there is no doubt that the musical understanding of the time emphasized a

non-objective and non-worldly notion of music. The evanescent nature of music that about three

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[180] Carl Dahlhaus and Ruth Katz, eds., *Contemplating Music: Source Readings in Musical Aesthetics*, vol. III,
Essence, Aesthetics in Music 5 (New York: Pendragon Press, 1987), 152.
[181] Ibid, 144.

centuries before Hegel had been used by Leonardo to downgrade the art of sound, became an important reason why music was perceived as a romantic art. The romantic understanding of 'timelessness,' unlike Leonardo's, did not emphasize the criterion of permanence but tried to define it rather as a space or 'atemporal mode' outside worldly temporality. Being short-lived and fleeting was no longer a weakness for music. Hegelian emphasis on the 'lightness' of music compared with his references to the 'massivity' of the visual arts existed in tandem with the romantic stress on music's ethereal and otherworldly essence, its being beyond the natural world and its salutary incompetence in depicting the external world. In a word, its craved freedom.

Goehr's explanation of this romantic view is helpful here. She thinks that the romantic aesthetic theory mainly constituted of two main claims or 'moves' "which we nowadays separate more sharply than theorists originally did": the *transcendent* doctrine made a "move from the worldly and particular to the spiritual and universal" and the *formalist* doctrine the "move which brought meaning from music's outside into its inside" possible.[182] These seemingly contradictory doctrines enabled music to overcome the previous problems without having to prove itself to be capable of what was previously expected from it: without losing its autonomy or having to be "a worthy contribution to a moral, rational, and religiously upright society." In the new aesthetics, the fact that music without words lacked a "specific content" was not a defect but blessing. Therefore, "the very idea […] that led to the rejection of such music as unworthy, turned out to be the key to finding for this music its long-sought-after respectability."[183] Music's indeterminacy, regarded as an imperfection, or even as the 'original sin' with which music had been born, came to act as the main distinctive feature for music not only compared to its past

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[182] Goehr, Lydia. *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 153.
[183] Ibid, 153.

but also among other contemporaneous arts. In short, freed from both external 'goals' and from 'words' music became, in Herder's words, a "self-sufficient art."[184]

One must note, however, that Hegel's and the romantics' modern, secular or half-secular-half-religious emphasis on the connection between music and the depth of human soul was not, of course, a new discovery. A few decades before him, as I discuss below, Friedrich Schiller had formulated ideas of music's ability to be the sonorous embodiment of the human subject's inner world in the context of a review he wrote on Matthisson's poems. Although these ideas, in one sense, anticipated Hegel's by connecting music to the interiority of the self, there is, nonetheless, a significant distinction between them. While Schiller stresses the power of music in objectifying the inner soul and materializing the subject's depth of interiority and in this respect tries to find an answer for the Kant's disdain for music's sensuous nature and therefore its lower status among arts, Hegel sharpens the Kantian critique of musicality underlining the abstract nature of music and its *in*competence to materialize in the first place. A closer look at some related writings by both of these writers will clarify the point.

In a passage that seems to be a defense of music against Kant's allegations of being an "agreeable" (*angenehm*) rather than a "fine" (*schön*) art against music, Schiller (1794) asserts that the only way in which emotions can be represented is through the representation of their form rather than their content. He maintains that music fits this task since it "has no other object than this form of feeling" and therefore even if other arts such as poetry or painting (landscape poetry or landscape painting) aim at expressing emotions, they need to "work musically" and provide "an imitation of human nature" by representing the subjective form of emotions. Stating that "we consider each painterly and poetic composition as a kind of musical work, and we subject them in part to the same laws," he takes pain to connect music to the human soul: "The entire effect of music (as a fine art and not simply as a decorative one)

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[184] Ibid, 155.

consists in accompanying and making perceptible the inner movements of the spirit analogously through outer ones"[185] [My emphasis]. According to Schiller, music provides access to the soul by being the sonorous reflection of emotions' formal structure. It is the sensuous and objectified manifestation of the soul. Simply put, it is the sound of the soul. In this respect, whereas Schiller emphasizes a process of objectification to explain music's relationship with the human soul or subject, in Hegel's view music, especially instrumental abstract music, unlike painting, does not objectify emotions, but rather subjectifies them (makes them even more subjective) and, therefore, dissociates them from the external world. This is why for Hegel instrumental music is the resonance of the subject's "empty self," what can never happen for painting as a representational art. Schiller, on the contrary, does not draw any fundamental distinction between music and painting in their power to objectify the inner feelings. He contends that the true way of painting is thus to paint the soul and depict its inner movements. Arguing that through the common ground (necessary laws) that exist between the inner movements of human nature and the outer movements of phenomena such as sound and light, human e*motion* can be symbolically expressed through the *motion* of natural objects. He continues,

> If the composer and the landscape painter penetrate the secret of the laws which
> rule the inner movements of the human heart, and study the analogy which exists
> between these movements of the spirit and certain outer movements, they will be
> transformed from ordinary image makers [of common nature] into true soul
> painters.[186]

In this vein, according to Schiller, landscape painters could follow the path of composers and distance themselves from the conditions of visual arts governing 'plastic artists' (plastischen Künstler) who are the portrayers of '*outer* person' (*äußern* Menschen) and become the *poet* of the 'inner' life. In short, according to Schiller, the composer can find access to the human

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[185] Friedrich Schiller, "On Matthisson's Poems." ("Über Matthissons Gedichte") Translated by Charles Rosen quoted in Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 1st Harvard University Press pbk. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 127. Rosen has translated the phrase "angenehmer Kunst" as "decorative art." In order to make this fit the Kantian distinction between "angenehm" and "schön," I have replaced "decorative" with "agreeable," which is alongside "fine" more common English translations of these two Kantian terms.
[186] Ibid, 127-8.

interiority (the human depth) and materialize it into audible vibrations. This is possible due to music's power in imitating the form of feelings. Hegel, however, constructs a different kind of relationship between music and the human soul which originates in music's complete detachment from any worldly matter. In Hegel's view, because of its "lightness," music cannot *objectify* the inner soul. As a purely subjective art music can only *subjectify* the inner life. To Hegel, "what alone is fitted for expression in music is the object-free inner life abstract subjectivity."[187]

Similar to romantics such as Wackenroder and Tieck, for Hegel music is an independent world that is devoted to the expression of the self's withdrawal or seclusion from the objective world, a movement towards the interiority of the soul. In an interesting passage, Michaelis discusses what he characterizes as feminine sublime music, speaking of moments in music whose modes are "noble humility *[edlen Zurückgezogenheit]*" and "depressed resignation *[schwermütige Resignation]*."[188] This backward motion to the inner world rather than an encroachment on the external world was a strong image used to define the new conception of music.[189] In the context of this particular understanding of music as a free and independent art, it is important to note that such freedom was in effect understood as freedom from the conditions of painting. It is from this perspective that one can read a rhetorical use of painting as Other against which music was defined. The freedom that was recognized as the essential constituent of music was mostly defined by authors in negative terms as freedom from the painterly conditions of representation that had dominated musical aesthetics before 1800. From the new perspective that emerged around 1800, music could determine its artistic rules

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[187] Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 891.
[188] Quoted and translated in David Schwarz, *Listening Awry; Music and Alterity in German Culture*, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2006, 31. I think the term "*Zurückgezogenheit*" could be translated in this context as "seclusion" or rather "withdrawal" which both literary and contextually demonstrates Michaelis's point more strongly.
[189] One might use this imagery of withdrawal as a quintessential feature of the new musical language, i.e., romanticism. But as Scott Burnham has shown, certain techniques to sonify this inner motion were used before the romantic movement began. He demonstrates that a move towards interiority of the self was reflected in the modulations to minor or subdominant keys in Mozart's certain works. See my Chapter Three, section IV, for a further discussion of Burnham's point in the context of my analysis of Schubert's String Quintet in C major.

independently, without the interference of rules governing the external world. Whether condemned or endorsed, music *becomes* exactly what painting is *not*. The idea that music does *not* imitate and does *not* paint contributes to the construction of a new conception of music, which is described by Tieck as music's "separate world for itself."[190] What is peculiarly interesting about this notion of "separate world" is its reliance on a negative notion of freedom. The "separate world" was conceived as a quasi-mystical space where music was *free-from*. This *freedom-from,* or negative liberty, shaped within the music-painting dichotomy, was instrumental in exemplifying the conceptual framework according to which the identity of music was fashioned in the years around 1800.

This dichotomy, however, was far from being unproblematic. There was a tension in this opposition and the way in which it was formulated at the time and used to elevate the status of music. Tension resided in the fact that for the construction of the new autonomous understanding of music the formation of a painterly Otherness or reliance on painting as the Other was necessary: music's autonomy or *freedom-from* was conceived not *entirely* as the attribution of a self-sufficient merit to music but to a great extent in its relation to painting, and as its opposite. In other words, this new concept of music was not built from *within* the music itself, or based on what music *is*, but from *without*, on the basis of what music *is not*; admired not because of what it *does* but to a great extent because of what it does *not* do. Hence, paradoxically, through this comparison, music was ironically elevated as an autonomous art on the basis of the condition of visual arts. This latest point is further explicated through an examination of one of the most important accounts of this conceptual shift that appeared in E.T.A. Hoffmann's review of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* in which the author—

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[190] Ludwig Tieck, "Symphonien," cited and translated in John Neubauer, *The Emancipation of Music from Language: Departure of Mimesis in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 199-200.

unintentionally—exemplifies Hegel's insight and concerns about the destiny of that which he

believed was the "recent" inclination in the instrumental music of his time.[191]

Hoffmann's writing demonstrates how indefinite (*unbestimmt*) this new understanding of

music was. For him, music was the language of infinity, the unknown world. The term "infinity,"

as used by Hoffmann (notwithstanding all the ambiguity it carried with itself) became a

fundamental basis for the new understanding of music. In "Beethoven's Instrumental Music"

Hoffmann uses both terms "infinite" (*unendlich*) and "indefinite/vague/indistinct"

(*unbestimmt*) to describe the romantic mood of longing or yearning.[192] The central concept in

his review of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is *Sehnsucht*: both yearning and longing. Apart from

its suggestion of "absence" of the thing to which yearning attends, *Sehnsucht* is preceded in most

cases by different attributes and adjectives that all hint at some kind of uncertainty and

ineffability. It is preceded twice in Hoffmann's article by *unaussprechlich* (unspeakable), once

by *unendlich* (infinite), once by *ängstlich* and *unruhvoll* (anxious and restless), twice by

unnennbar (unspecifiable/unnamable/ineffable), and once by *unnennbar ahnungsvoll*

(ineffablly mysterious or premonitory).[193] The most important feature of these adjectives is their

negative structure through the use of the prefix 'un' and their *indefinite* nature; rather than

being the descriptions of different attributes, they are all denials of certain attributes. They refer

to what *Sehnsucht* is not: it cannot be spoken of, lacks certainty, and is mysterious—the latter

being the only positive adjective that is used![194] Hoffmann defines music in non-visual terms:

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[191] For Hegel's possible answer to Hoffmann's musical thought, see James H. Donelan, *Poetry and the Romantic Musical Aesthetic*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 87-9.

[192] Ibid, 96-102.

[193] Hoffmann uses the word '*unruhvoll*' in the context of his remarks on the opening theme that is performed in unison without a harmony providing any harmonic scaffold which could provide the key. In Hoffmann's view, the uncertainty of the key makes the opening theme anxious and restless. For a discussion of the interrelation of Hoffmann's analysis of Beethoven's music and the 'problem' of musical modernity, see Comen, Craig. "Hoffmann's Musical Modernity and The Pursuit of Sentimental Unity." *Eighteenth Century Music* 15, no. 1 (2018): 9–28.

[194] One important point: all these adjectives are not exclusively used to describe Beethoven's music. They are used for Mozart too, but from the perspective of the time's music-painting dichotomy, in a drastically different way. One might say that according to Hoffmann, Mozart still "paints" because it only gives us an idea of infinity. Hoffmann might have added that the music is not infinite itself. Hoffmann's description of Mozart's musical depiction of "idea of infinity" (Ahnung des Unendlichen) is very visual. "The night dissolves and opens into a bright purple glow." Hoffmann's description becomes less and less visual when he moves from Haydn and Mozart to Beethoven. For further elaboration on this latest point, look at Bonds, *Music as Thought*, 48-51. Bonds explores some of the main

the more distant his characterization of music becomes from the painterly conditions of art, the more vague and indistinct (*unbestimmt*) his description of the musical world.

In her "'All Art Constantly Aspires to the Condition of Music' —Except the Art of Music: Reviewing the Contest of the Sister Arts" Lydia Goehr raises important questions about the historical tension between music's dual conceptions considered both as an *art* and as *condition* of all art. She asks: "what […] is meant by 'aspiration' if not that an art can fail either generically or given a specific example? And if this, can music as an art fail to meet its own condition? And if it can, might this happen when it 'mistakenly' tries to step into the 'territory' of the 'other' sister arts, of reference and representation?"[195] An historically informed answer to this question is, Yes: even music can fail, at least according to the romantic understanding of what musical condition is. Whether we agree with the romantics that the condition of all art was inherent in music as an art or was external to it but could be captured in its perfect scale by music, Hoffmann and Tieck and other early romantics were considering both invisibility and unworldliness as the main conditions of music to which Schiller suggested earlier that all the arts must aspire, or as Hegel had warned, all other arts had already aspired. Music, from a 'modern' perspective then, can fail when it is not autonomous, "purely musical," or in Hoffmann's words, infinite.[196]

Hoffmann went further and used the concept of infinity as an evaluative tool to critique musical compositions and detect music's failure to meet its own conditions. According to Hoffmann, instrumental music, the most distanced type of music from painting or the most non-representational art, is the *locus* of *unendliche Sehnsucht*. Beethoven's "less successful"

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themes of Hoffmann's writings on Beethoven's music. One of these main themes, according to Bonds, is the notion of incorporeality. Bonds suggests that for Hoffmann, Beethoven's music is the least visual and corporeal/sculptural. It is a music that has "no reference to dance."

[195] Paul A. Kottman, ed., *The Insistence of Art: Aesthetic Philosophy after Early Modernity* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2017).

[196] However, my answer to the second important question is No. She asks: "But does this now mean that all the other arts ought also to renounce this territory, to relinquish their powers of reference and representation to achieve a condition more 'musical'?" Again, a historical context shows that the way 1800 thinkers were looking at the notion of abstraction was different from the later understanding of the concept. The 1800 perception of musical abstraction was paradoxically highly integrated into a pre-conceptual sensuous notion of musical sound.

vocal music is, to Hoffmann, a merit because vocal music "does not permit indefinite longing",

inexpressibility and vagueness. Beethoven, although being "a purely romantic composer"

because of his power to compose the inexpressible, fails as the composer of vocal music because

music with text carries with itself inflections from *other* arts' conditions, and is adulterated with

a representational layer, a this-worldly and definite quality.[197] Hoffmann emphasizes that in

order to be infinite, i.e., to be *not* finite or restricted by external conditions, music has to avoid

clear and distinct images or emotions. Referring to programmatic symphonists of his time, he

writes, "How little do they recognize the unique essence of music, those composers that sought

to represent those definite sentiments, or even events, thus handing in a representative fashion,

the art that is the very opposite of representation."[198] Referring to Dittersdorf and similar

composers who treat instrumental music in a representative or "sculptural" manner, Hoffmann

bitterly condemns such program symphonies to "total oblivion as ridiculous aberrations."[199] His

harshest critique of these symphonists is to show (albeit subtly) how erroneous these composers

are in their understanding of instrumental music. He states that in vocal music in general and

even in opera—which is probably the most *visual* musical genre he was able to point to at the

time—the 'romantic power' of music saves them from their painterly flaw:

> In singing, where the juxtaposed poetry suggests precise moods through words,
> the magical power of music acts like the philosopher's miracle-elixir, a few drops
> of which make any drink wonderfully delicious. Any passion—love, hate, anger,
> despair, etc.—presented to us in an opera is clothed by music in the purple
> shimmer of romanticism, so that even our mundane sensations take us out of the

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[197] E. T. A. Hoffmann, *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, Music Criticism*, ed. David Charlton, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 98.

[198] "Wie wenig erkannten *die* Instrumentalkomponisten dies eigentümliche Wesen der Musik, welche versuchten, jene bestimmbaren Empfindungen, oder gar Begebenheiten darzustellen, und so die der Plastik geradezu entgegengesetzte Kunst plastisch zu behandeln!" E.T.A. Hoffmann, review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* XII/40 (4 July 1810); XII/41 (11 July 1810), 652-59. The translation is by Mary Sue Morrow. See Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 15. Martyn Clarke's translation of the same passage reads: "How dimly was this particular nature of music perceived by this instrumental composers who tried to represent such circumscribed sensations or even events, and thus to treat sculpturally the art most utterly opposed to sculpture!" E. T. A. Hoffmann, *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, Music Criticism*, ed. David Charlton, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 236.

[199] Ibid, 237.

everyday into the realm of the infinite. Such is the power of music's spell that,

growing ever stronger, it can only burst the fetters of any other art.[200]

III. Music-Painting Dichotomy and the Romantic Tension

In "Music, the Pythagoreans, and the Body," Susan McClary argues that from Plato to Adorno,

the main element that has "truly organized music in the West" is the tension between "the

inescapable body" and "the West's deep-seated need to control or transcend the body through

intellectual idealism."[201] While this chapter has been an effort to show that the tension in the

nature of music suggested by McClary is reflected in its volatile history of the relationship

between music and painting from the renaissance era to the nineteenth century, this historical

demand for an intellectual or, in some cases spiritual, dominance over the physical reality of

sound has, however, manifested itself differently in different eras. In other words, although the

tension has not disappeared, it has changed constantly. The developments in musical thought in

the decades around 1800 demonstrates a historical transformation in the nature of this tension.

In these decades, quite uniquely, the opposing views about the nature of music, both the one

that advocated for a sensuous notion of music such as Kant's and to some extent Hegel's and

that which pursued a spiritual conception of music such as Tieck, Wackenroder, Hoffmann (and

again to some extent Hegel) served the same goal. Through either an extreme subjectification or

a primitivization of music's nature, both sides of the early nineteenth-century version of this

tension paradoxically contributed to the formation of an independent, autonomous notion of

music. That is to say, these two concurrent approaches, one emphasizing the mere sensuousness

and the other accentuating the subjective purity, both served the same purpose: they denied the

embeddedness of music in the human subject's meaningful engagement in *life* and contributed

to the formation of a modern understanding of music that was autonomous, that is, free from

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[200] Ibid.
[201] Susan McClary, "Music, the Pythagoreans, and the Body," in *Choreographing History*, ed. Susan Leigh Foster (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 83.

any external meaning, whatsoever. Musical modernity, in one sense, is the integration of this paradox or tension into the nature of music. In other words, in their extreme forms, the body-intellect or object-subject oppositions were centrifugal forces that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries pulled music away from the gravity of representation exemplified in the mimetic art of painting.

This 'emancipated' understanding of music represented the condition of all art and affected the general notion of art. The climax of the tension is reflected in the final episode of the music-painting dichotomy (and their struggle for supremacy) when painters and aesthetic thinkers spoke of the 'music' of painting as the essence of painting.[202] Music, whether completely disembodied (being the sound of empty self or pure subjectivity) or extremely reified (becoming the sound of a pre-conceptual world, pure nature), embodied aesthetic freedom. In other words, the 'musicality' of music came to be understood as something that was beyond music as art. Hence the romantic writers' profuse references to music's abstract, invisible, infinite character as the essence of art as such.[203] It should be noted that while my focus here has been on the way in which the music-painting comparison has affected the formation of music's identity, a quick glance at the 'other' side of the comparison and the painterly perspective can shed additional light on the modern tension of music between its sensuousness and spirituality and is worth a brief digression here.[204]

According to James H. Rubin and Olivia Mattis, in the romantic age "the rhetoric of musicality" became the central concept through which not only musicians and musicologists

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[202] See Charlotte de Mille, "Art History for Musicologists," in Tim Shephard and Anne Leonard. *The Routledge Companion to Music and Visual Culture*. New York: Routledge, 2014, 27-34. De Mille writes: "By the beginning of the nineteenth century, comparisons between music and painting were increasingly common. Ostensibly non-visual, music offered the painter an alternative trajectory through which to negotiate multi-sensual experience or to defeat mimetic representation." (Ibid, 27)

[203] On the use of the notion of 'musicality' in the art criticism and the nineteenth-century references to the 'musical' qualities of visual art, look at the second chapter of Peter Vergo, *The Music of Painting: Music, Modernism and the Visual Arts from the Romantics to John Cage* (London: Phaidon, 2010).

[204] Larry Shiner has offered a brief yet readable account of different aspects of the shifts in the perception of painting as an art that occurred gradually in the course of the Renaissance era and the seventeenth century. See L. E. Shiner, *The Invention of Art: A Cultural History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 35-42.

explained the essence of music, but also how artists and art historians tried to explicate the new

shift in painting. While in music the rhetoric of musicality was a precondition of understanding

music as an autonomous art, in painting the rhetoric gave rise to an emphasis on "pictorial

abstraction" and independence of painting from representation.[205] Art historian Cordula Grewe

further underlines this musical awareness among painters and art critics and their "orientation

towards music" as "an act of emancipation." For them, inspired by music "[p]ainting no longer

had to represent *something*."[206] Music's perceived 'lightness' or abstraction, or in Philippe

Junod's words music's "represent[ing] an ideal of immateriality," was an important reason "why

music was regarded as a pioneering art and a model for painting."[207] In the late nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries, painting followed music in detaching itself from nature and becoming

an art "sufficient unto itself."[208] In short, the new conception of painting pivoted on musical

conditions, themselves being the negation of the older conception of painting.

Musicality, as non-naturalness, abstraction, self-sufficiency, and in a word, autonomy of art,

which is most famously reflected in Walter Pater's 1873 statement that "all art consistently

aspires to the condition of music."[209] The perceived "obliteration" of the distinction between

matter and form exemplified in music, was introduced as the ideal of art *par excellence*, and an

alchemy through which painting could be transformed into a freer art.[210] Instead of being the art

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[205] See James H. Rubin and Olivia Mattis, "Musical Paintings and Colourful Sounds: The Imagery and Rhetoric of Musicality in the Romantic Age," in Rubin and Mattis, *Rival Sisters*, 4.

[206] Cordula Grewe, "Schwind's Symphony: Beethoven, Biedermeier, and the Cruelty of Romance." In *Rival Sisters; Art and Music at the Birth of Modernism*, edited by James H. Rubin and Olivia Mattis, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 227.

[207] Philippe Junod, *Counterpoints: Dialogues between Music and the Visual Arts*, ed. Saskia Brown (London, UK: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2017), 53.

[208] Philippe Junod provides a short but useful historical account of "the origins of abstraction," offering a review of the main thoughts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which emphasized musical abstraction as the new model for painting. This emphasis on musical purity, referred to as musicalism by Junod, began in the late eighteenth century and acted as a model for modernist painting. See Philippe Junod, "The New Paragone," 33-35.

[209] Pater continues: "For while in all other works of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it. That the mere matter of a poem, for instance—its subject, its given incidents or situation; that the mere matter of a picture—the actual circumstances of an event, the actual topography of a landscape—should be nothing without the form, the spirit, of the handling; that this form, this mode of handling, should become an end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter:—this is what all art constantly strives after, and achieves in different degrees." Walter Horatio Pater, "The School of Giorgione," in *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 124.

[210] A search for musicality in art, that according to Rubin and Mattis became stronger around 1900, in my view,

of the expressible, relying on nature as its referential source, painting found the opportunity to

become increasingly "musical" and determining its own rules without recourse to nature or any

external context of meaning. Eugene Delacroix's notion of "the music of painting," as James H.

Rubin and Olivia Mattis have suggested, was a way to refer to the essence of art and in

particular, "those psychological effects for which one could find no other name."[211] This is

strikingly similar to Hoffmann's notion of the "unknown realm," the *place* where Beethoven's

music or any other 'truly' romantic artist can take us. As Rubin and Mattis suggest, the idea that

music must become the condition of other arts, had begun to appear as early as 1795, when

Schiller underlined the "direct sensuous presence" of music and believed that from this

perspective, plastic arts "must become music."[212] This musical directness or immediacy gave

music an advantage that made it capable of direct communication without the mediation of

concepts.[213] Schiller's deconstruction of Kant's formulation of music as a play of sensation

idealized music by affirming the Kantian truth that music was directly present and therefore

lacked any conceptual mediation, but negated that this musical presence and immediacy were

insignificant and meant nothing.[214] The identification of music with a "pre-verbal" or non-

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relates to the unknown and ineffable realm that Hoffmann introduced in the early years of the nineteenth century. As Charlotte de Mille suggests, "Ostensibly non-visual, music offered the painter an alternative trajectory through which to negotiate multi-sensual experience or to defeat mimetic representation. Through alertness to the emotive affect of instrumental music (and of Wagner's in particular), critics extolled a 'higher Realism,' shifting the intention of painting from mimetic illustration to the realization of psychological experience." ("Art History for Musicologists" in Tim Shephard and Anne Leonard, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Music and Visual Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 27) Charlotte de Mill refers to Clement Greenberg's writing in mid-twentieth century that underline music's abstract nature as understood during the romantic era.

[211] Rubin Mattis, "Musical Paintings and Colourful Sounds," 4.

[212] Ibid, 10.

[213] Kant would not have fundamentally disagreed with this, as long as by "communication" Schiller did not mean literal communication through concepts.

[214] Hegel also refers to some conditions in painting in which colouring creates the certain magical effects that he believes creates musical effect: "The third point, finally, which we must mention concerns *sfumato,* the magical effect of colouring. This magic of the pure appearance of colour has in the main only appeared when the substance and spirit of objects has evaporated and what now enters is spirit in the treatment and handling of colour. In general, it may be said that the magic consists in so handling all the colours that what is produced is an inherently objectless play of pure appearance which forms the extreme soaring pinnacle of colouring, a fusion of colours, a shining of reflections upon one another which become so fine, so fleeting, so expressive of the soul that they begin to pass over into the sphere of music." Hegel, *Lectures on Fine Arts*, 848. Charles Rosen, in *The Romantic Generation,* has correctly explained how the notion of abstraction (musical abstraction) was perceived at the time. See Ibis, 131-3. Another passage from Hegel clarifies the point: "Then, thirdly, this entry into the perfect life of the existence and dramatic movement of situations and characters carries with it the ever greater and greater importance placed, in the conception and execution of the work, on individuality and on the complete vitality of the coloured appearance of all objects, because, in painting, the highest degree of liveliness can be expressed only in colour. Yet this magic of pure

conceptual language, or in Ernst Hagen's words, "musical mysticism,"[215] which Schiller had

hinted at in the final years of the eighteenth century, or Hoffmann in the opening years of the

nineteenth, began to determine the conditions of art, as Delacroix wrote in 1824: "painting, like

music, is above thought; that is their advantage over literature."[216]

Autonomous music as a concept was the integration and at the same time recognition of the

conflict between music's sensual nature and its presumed profundity. Contrary to the

premodern cosmological-mathematical context of meaning, which sought to connect music to

the human soul, the modern conception of musical depth, contingent upon a subjective

platform, was in a Hegelian sense, empty: it was an infinite emptiness with no content. Drawing

upon Pater, one could say that music itself had no conditions to rely on or aspire to; it became

an 'absolute' unconditional art, with an infinite depth without anything inside that depth.[217]

Indeed, there is an enchantment in the romantic viewpoint which brings together and

emphasizes ideas about music that romanticize the nature of this art by offering a liberated

conception of it. The emphasis on the "sensual power" and immediacy of music rooted in Kant's

belief that music engages in indistinct or unclear ideas and is a mere play of sensations, is

divorced from the outer nature—for the same reason that it cannot engage clear images or ideas

of the world—and is instead connected to the interiority of human subject.

This sensual power—formulated in a negative statement—i.e., the very fact that music does

not say anything with the mediacy of concepts (understood by Kant as an imperfection for

music) was reinterpreted by early romantics as what made music a perfect 'language.' As Charles

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appearance may ultimately be asserted so preponderantly that the subject of the painting becomes in comparison a matter of indifference. In this way, just precisely as sculpture in the further development of reliefs begins to approach painting, so painting in the pure *sfumato* and magic of its tones of colour and their contrast, and the fusion and play of their harmony, begins to swing over to music." Hegel, *Aesthetic*, 853.

[215] In 1837, Ernst August Hagen, the nineteenth-century art critic and writer, (in a comment on a painting by Caspar David Friedrich), emphasizes the mysterious musicality, or in his own words, "musical mysticism" to describe the painter's symbolism. (Ernst August Hagen, "Beschreibung der Diesjährige, Gemäldeausstellung in Königsberg, Danzig, Stettin und Breslau," *Kunstblatt* (1837): 77, CDF Cat, 126). Translated and quoted in "Caspar David Friedrich and Music: A 'Divine Kingdom of Hearing'?" by Julie Ramos, in *Rival Sisters*, 57.

[216] Rubin and Mattis, "Musical Paintings and Colourful Sounds," 11.

[217] See Lydia Goehr, "'All Art Constantly Aspires to the Condition of Music'—Except the Art of Music: Reviewing the Contest of the Sister Arts," in Paul A. Kottman, ed., *The Insistence of Art Aesthetic Philosophy after Early Modernity* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2017),140-169.

Rosen has suggested, for the romantic generation of the early nineteenth century, "the significance of music was not […] based on an arbitrary system like that of language, where words mean what they do simply because the dictionary and the culture it represents say so. Music worked in a more *physical*, even *animal*, fashion"[218] (emphasis mine). It is more through these two extremes of 'animality' and infinity (that is sensuousness and abstraction, or rather primitive objectivity and pure subjectivity), that music's identity was defined in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and less through the middle point, that is the painterly representation. The new nature of music, rendered as an artform isolated from life, pushed music to stay outside the sociality of lived experience. Whether pushed to an extreme of pure, pre-conceptual objectivity or pulled into an extreme of total subjectivity, music was defined as a non-spatial, non-representational art that unlike the art of painting stood outside the lived experience. The new conception of music preserved and even elevated the status and significance of music while at the same time admitted its meaninglessness and abstractness, as well as its non-referential nature.

The sensuous-profound tension is reflected in the way the sense of hearing is simultaneously elevated to an autonomous status independent from the sense of seeing and considered as a sense that strives to absorb its sense data (namely, sounds) as non-material, light, other-worldly objects, that is, as entities beyond sounds. The sense of hearing acts as a path to a transcendent reality (usually negatively defined though), the recognition of which is felt as necessary for music to "break the chains connecting it to every other art."[219] In the romantic perspective, music as the most independent and immediate art could—or rather had to—be heard with 'closed' eyes, without dependence on the mediacy of any images/concepts whatsoever. Seeing, from the romantic perspective, was considered distractive because, as Leonardo had argued—in a disparaging tone, though—it opened the window toward the nature or the outer world from

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[218] Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, 132.
[219] Bonds, *Music as Thought*, 51.

which the new conception of music tried to detach itself. In this respect, the painting-music

binary directly connected to hearing-seeing binary and contributed to the detachment of music

from the conditions of seeing and the outer world. A visualization of this modern, autonomous

mode of listening can be seen in the painting, *Listening to Schumann* (1883) by Fernand

Khnopff. The focus of the painting, as the title suggests, is on the listener but one whose face

cannot be seen and has turned her back to the piano. The listener cannot see the piano and

listens to Schumann's music independently of any images in the world and even the image of the

instrument which is a necessary factor in producing the sound.[220] One must note the extreme

distinction between this view and the one offered by da Vinci who thought since the soul can

'truly' access the world only through the eye, once that access has been fulfilled, due to the

richness of visual perceptions achieved by the eye, the soul could overcome its discontent to

"remain in its human prison."[221] Under the new aesthetics, not only music finds its own

specifically musical conditions for being perceived, even the perception of visual art is deeply

influenced by musical terms. Schlegel hints at this paradigm shift when he writes: "Some people

prefer to look at paintings with closed eyes, so as not to disturb their imagination."[222] As Bonds

suggests, it is listening and hearing that becomes the main and "innermost" of five senses within

the romantic aesthetics. It is through closing the eyes and opening the "innermost" sense that

one can be led to a world beyond.[223] Music, as understood by Hegel and the romantics, required

a different type of window in the soul, a window that paradoxically opened from a 'deeper inside'

toward the inner world of the human subject: listening to music, Hegel underlined, was listening

to the depth of human subject; Wackenroder suggested, human heart becomes "acquainted with

itself in the mirror of musical sounds;" and Michaelis believed that music "presents entirely and

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[220] For a deconstructive view of this painting that deviates from the more conventional interpretation offered above, see Richard D. Leppert, *The Sight of Sound : Music, Representation, and the History of the Body* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 230-3.

[221] Farago, *Leonardo da Vinci's Paragone*, 241.

[222] Friedrich von Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 40.

[223] Bonds, *Music As Thought*, 21-24.

purely the spirit of art in its freedom and individuality."[224] Schlegel announced that hearing was "the most noble of the senses,"[225] and Vischer, influenced by Hegel, believed that "the organ through which the world of objects dissolved into tones penetrates to within us is our sense of temporal perception, our sense of hearing."[226]

IV. Conclusion

The 1800s discourse or rhetoric around the music-painting dichotomy mitigated elevating the status and significance of music while admitting its allegedly perceived meaninglessness, its abstractness or non-referential nature. How could music have defined this new "indefinite" identity, or identification with a new paradoxical plane of 'abstract meaningfulness,' other than through what it was not? What was better than painting to stand as a background against this identity-definition to be enacted? The paradox of the most autonomous and free art was its (negative) ontological reliance on the conditions of painting, its othered sister. Painting provided a concrete background against which music's new identity could be negatively defined. Therefore, the dichotomy between music and painting was instrumental in shaping the modern essence of music; it provided music with a new understanding of a previously conceived defect— its representational impotence—now redefined as a power. But the music-painting dichotomy was not merely a dispute between two arts, but a clash between two sets of conditions: two worlds. By distancing itself from painting, music also detached itself from the external world and its representation, intending to create a musical world independently and specifically constructed through its own structures. The new identity of music was elevated beyond the natural world partially through the new historical consciousness about its differences with its sister art, painting: through the formation of an *Otherness*.

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[224] Ibid, 25.
[225] Ibid, 22. As Bonds maintains, Schlegel thinks hearing can take us "beyond the tyranny of the physical object."
[226] Dahlhaus and Katz, *Contemplating Music: Source Readings in Musical Aesthetics*, 149.

Deeply rooted in this formulation of music's non-representational and autonomous identity, there was a complexity or tension, partially emanating from the way musical autonomy was perceived as an inherent quality of music itself. Musical self-sufficiency was paradoxically incapable of thoroughly and positively indicating what the nature of music *was*. Instead, the essence of music was conceived in the negative sense in relation to painting, through what painting was *not*. In other words, it was more through music's conditions of the *im*possibility (its incapability of painterly representation) and less through the specific and distinct conditions of the possibility (e.g., its power to create a novel language) that the new notion of music as a 'free' art was constructed.

This claim is buttressed by the observation that as a perceived abstract art in the early nineteenth century, music disentangled itself from the painterly conditions of art, eluding the representation of nature and seeking refuge into the two clashing extremes of sheer objectivity and pure subjectivity. These opposing poles offered two contrasting loci for where music's fundamental quality is situated—one locating it in the sheer sensuousness of a primitive, pre-representational or pre-verbal nature and materiality, and the other situating it in the pure subjectivity, or, borrowing Hegel's terminology, the 'empty self.' However, despite their contrast, they worked in tandem by severing music from conceptual or meaningful reference to the world. Therefore, both contributed to a negative construction of music's identity as a 'content-free' art—what painting, or any 'contentful' art of nature, is not.

This paradoxical association with the external world and the problematic conditions of meaningfulness were not limited to music's tortuous relation with other arts. Music's inner historical life also contained a paradox. The conditions musical genres or forms have gained or lost their significance throughout history are, to a great extent, intertwined with important questions like "What does music mean?" or "What goal should music serve?" For instance, the enquiry into whether music *per se* is better defined and exemplified in a certain historical era under vocal or instrumental genres mirrors how music is structured in that particular time. I

outline a specific version of this enquiry in the next chapter. By discussing a shift from a

madrigal-centered toward a sonata-based mode of musical thought, I examine different aspects

of tension that was essential to musical modernity of 1800. This is partially reflected in the move

from realism towards a special kind of abstraction that cannot be easily defined under

formalistic terms.

Chapter Two: Tale of Two Musical Modernities

From the Madrigal- towards the Sonata-Principle

"If you go to the old ruins [of Baden], think that Beethoven lingered there; if you wander through the mysterious fir-forests, think it was there Beethoven often poetised [gedichtet], or, as it is called, composed [komponiert]."[227]

Ludwig van Beethoven

A historical account of musical subjectification, or music becoming a subject independent from its external world, cannot be merely a story of music's relationship with (an)other art(s). Furthermore, it must show how music as a historical concept came to terms with the painterly, extra-worldly components of its own nature. This chapter responds to this necessity by exploring this musical inner conflict embodied in what I picture as a contrast between two principles that I associate with two genres/forms that exemplify those principles, namely, the madrigal and the sonata. As an *intramusical* mirror of the contrast studied in the previous chapter between painterly representation and musical abstractness, the madrigal and sonata reflect not only two genres/forms but two ways of conceiving music. In other words, while the

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[227] Ludwig van Beethoven, *Beethoven's Letters*, ed. Alfred Christlieb Kalischer, J. S. Shedlock, and A. Eaglefield Hull (New York: Dover Publications, 1972), Letter to Frau Nanette Steicher in 1817. 229.

previous chapter dealt with a dichotomy that existed within arts, in particular between the visual and sonic arts, in this chapter I focus on how within music a dichotomy developed between an early modern representational aesthetics best exemplified in the madrigal and a later abstract conception of music represented by the sonata. The madrigal-sonata dichotomy discussed in this chapter reveals the inner struggles of music with the painterly aspect of its identity, that is the madrigalistic approach to sound. It should be noted, however, that my discussion of the madrigal and sonata is only *partially* an engagement with the historical genres and/or forms that appeared and developed in certain historical periods under these names and possessed distinct structural and stylistic features. This study of the madrigal-sonata dichotomy is, more importantly, an examination of two opposing principles that, although best reflected in the genres and/or forms bearing their names, are nonetheless not limited to them. In short, the madrigal and sonata bear witness to two different ways of approaching musical sound, and thinking about and regulating the music-world relationship.

By 'the madrigal-principle,' a terminology I have built parallel to the 'sonata-principle,' I mean the *rationale* of the genre that emerged and developed in the Italian music of the sixteenth century, and "became the most popular form of secular polyphony in the second half of the sixteenth century, serving as a model for madrigals and madrigal-like compositions in languages other than Italian throughout Europe."[228] Highlighting the madrigal-genre as the cradle of a musical thought and aesthetic principle rather than a collection of specific stylistic features, I examine some determining moments in the history of this musical philosophy; moments that reflect the formation and development of a principle based on which the main mission of music was to integrate external life, nature, or human emotions into the realm of artistic sounds and to use these external resources as the main context of musical meaning.[229]

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[228] Kurt von Fischer, Gianluca D'Agostino, James Haar, Anthony Newcomb, Massimo Ossi, Nigel Fortune, Joseph Kerman, and Jerome Roche. "Madrigal." (*Grove Music Online,* 2001).
[229] I am considering everything that is not in itself musical, but could provide some kind of content to music as external. In this respect, human emotions and nature are equally external to music.

From the viewpoint that I explain and defend in this chapter, the musical practice and thought of the sixteenth-century madrigal or the emerging roots of the operatic music that appeared and developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, aspired to the conditions of this principle.

In this respect, a main task in the first section of this chapter is to display the continuity between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by underlining main assumptions of the madrigal as a principle that continued as the foundation for the dramatic music of an era that we know as the baroque. In order to demonstrate the continuity between these two historical moments, I emphasize the juxtaposition of the sixteenth-century madrigalism and the early seventeenth-century 'expressionism' by underlining their fundamental rationale, which is exemplified in some kind of realistic or rather naturalistic approach to musical meaning. Many music historians of the baroque era have regarded the expressive or strictly speaking the shift towards a rhetorical approach to musical meaning that happened in the decades around 1600 and defined the main purpose of the European music for over a century as the single unifying theme for this historical period.[230] As I will discuss later in this chapter, this unifying theme, which was usually referred to as the doctrine of affections and defined as the depiction of emotions in music in order to move the listener's feelings or (to be more precise) affects, was founded on the main premises and presuppositions that shaped and conditioned the madrigal genre, that is the madrigal-principle. The conception that music is capable of reaching out to depict and convey the meaning and feelings of the text was an essential step for the doctrine of affections to be applicable to music.

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[230] I am using the term "expressive" with certain considerations here. As some scholars have stressed—and I will discuss in this chapter—this shift is indeed a shift towards rhetorical persuasion. Therefore, the musical expressivity that can be seen in the musical writings of the seventeenth and most of eighteenth centuries must be read under rhetorical terms, i.e., the theory of rhetoric in music, rather than a romantic understanding of emotions common in literary theory and inspired by the classical research of M. H. Abrams. See M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

Similarly, yet on an opposing axis, the sonata will be discussed in the second section of this chapter as a principle that represented a shift from the madrigal ideology towards the subjectification of music by becoming the form (sonata form) of a genre (sonata) or genres that, due to their instrumental and ostensibly 'pure' nature, had lost their access to the previous, conventional, extra-musical sources of meaning, i.e., text, social functions, or the external world.[231] Defined as the rules or musical features that serve a certain musical aim or, as the writers of "sonata" entry in *Grove Music Online* state, "sonata-derived procedures and formal properties [that] influenced a vast number of pieces not explicitly designated 'sonatas'," the sonata principle is a term that is normally used to illuminate a shift from the regulation of the musical language of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century under representational terms towards an abstract understanding of music in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[232] Drawing on this common understanding of the sonata principle, I will try to show some of the complications of the sonata as a principle, emphasizing that musical abstraction is only one aspect of the paradoxical nature of the sonata. As a musical thought concretized in the sonata-genre, the sonata-principle went beyond a simple negation of madrigalism. By offering a new understanding of musical drama, which paradoxically was both musically abstract and programmatic, the sonata integrated into its new musical language the madrigal's dramatic aspect while leaving out the madrigal's reliance on the real world for its narration. In other words, unlike the music conditioned by the madrigal principle, the sonata relied on form as its main reference of significance/meaning. To show this seemingly contradictory nature of this new regulation, I will interpret the sonata principle in the light of the romantic conception of *romantische Poesie* as the essence of not only modern art but the fragmented modern world.

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[231] The sonata principle has been explored by music scholars from different perspectives. While I draw on these studies, my emphasis will be on the goal-oriented nature of the music that is conditioned and regulated by this principle. The literature will be discussed later in this chapter.

[232] Sandra Mangsen, John Irving, John Rink, and Paul Griffiths. "Sonata." (*Grove Music Online*, 2001).

A final introductory point must be made with regards to my references to musical works. Although I discuss few particular musical compositions attributing to them some of the values and assumptions of the madrigal or sonata principles, my focus is to a great extent on the musical *thought* that accompanied the historical development of each of these two important musical genres/forms/principles. In this respect, my ultimate purpose in this chapter is to shed further light on two modes or rather two phases of musical modernity: the madrigal-based modernity of the sixteenth century that was an attempt to make music serve the humanist demands of early modern Europe on one side and the sonata-based modernity of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that contributed to the conception of music as an autonomous and self-sufficient entity on the other.

I. Madrigal-Principle and Musical Realism

The best place to see the unity of the madrigal both as a genre and a principle is in the famous Artusi-Monteverdi debate. The debate can be not only read as the manifestation of the madrigal's perceived representational and rhetoric power in the closing years of the sixteenth and opening of the seventeenth centuries but also reveals the clash between two theories of what music is and what its mission should be with more permanent repercussions for the entire baroque musical era.[233] "At the heart of the disagreement," Curtis Price writes, "was the changing relationship between poetry and music."[234] On one side of this debate stands Giovanni Maria Artusi, a cleric, wholehearted proponent and devoted student of Zarlino, follower and admirer of old contrapuntal rules, and advocate of musical perfection who defends flowing counterpoint through a 'correct' use of part-writing and polyphonic techniques, prepared dissonance and equality of voices.[235] Artusi condemns the other side of the debate, the composer

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[233] Paolo Fabbri, *Monteverdi*. Translated by Tim carter, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 34.
[234] Curtis Price, "Music, Style and Society" in Curtis Alexander Price, *The Early Baroque Era: From the Late 16th Century to the 1660s*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1993), 3.
[235] To read more about the philosophical backgrounds of Artusi's ideas (coming mostly from Aristotle and Boethius) and the influence of Zarlino's thought on him see Jenkins, "Giovanni Maria Artusi and the Ethics of Musical Science."

Claudio Monteverdi for the latter's breaking the rules of perfection in counterpoint by including irregular harmonies, intervals, and melodic progressions. Although the 'problems' Artusi finds in Monteverdi's compositions are not limited to the treatment of dissonances, it builds the main focus of his concerns. Improper deployment of dissonance (mainly seconds and sevenths) is the main reason why Artusi associates Monteverdi's music with imperfection.[236] Artusi's rationale is that consonance and dissonance are of different or, in his words, "contrary" nature and that is why they must be treated differently. He thinks due to the modern irresponsibility in the use of dissonances in music, "we have reached the point of absurdity." He shows more serious concerns though: "it is altogether possible that these modern composers will so exert themselves, that in time they actually find a way to turn dissonances into consonances and vice versa."[237]

Artusi justified his attack on Monteverdi further by characterizing the modern composers' understanding of harmony as a subjective rhetorical tool for bestowing expressive force on the text. For Artusi, harmony is a reflection of perfection in both music and the world and the rules of harmony exist to protect this perfect state. Monteverdi's 'modernist' view approaches harmony not as a goal towards which other elements of music (rhythm and words) were oriented; on the contrary, he seeks to "make the words the mistress of the harmony and not the servant."[238] As Monteverdi observed, Artusi was "chiefly concerned with the perfection of the harmony," and a perfect harmony was nothing but a situation where "harmony is *not ruled*, but *rules*, is not the servant but the mistress of the words."[239] Conversely, Monteverdi advocates a style in which harmony is ruled by the demands of representation and expression. According to Artusi, the modern sounds that are heard in madrigals such as Monteverdi's "Cruda Amarilli"

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[236] For a detailed discussion of all the errors that Artusi found in Monteverdi's three madrigals ("Cruda Amarilli", "Anima mia, perdona", and "Che se tu se' il cor moi"), see Fabbri, *Monteverdi*, 36-40.
[237] Piero Weiss and Richard Taruskin, eds., *Music in the Western World: A History in Documents* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1984), 172.
[238] W. Oliver Strunk, *Source Readings in Music History*, Rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1998), 532.
[239] Ibid, 534.

(Example 1) are "harsh and little pleasing to the ear," because they "violate the good rules." He condemns these compositions as they are "deformations of the nature and propriety of true harmony," and announces: "these novelties do not please me; they deserve blame, not praise."[240] According to Artusi, Monteverdi's "new order of composing" is entirely "contrary to what is well and good in the institution of harmony" and is therefore based on "new principles founded on sand."[241]

Artusi's understanding of the aim of the new music does not seem to match what Monteverdi himself thinks; Artusi thinks the purpose of the musician is "delectation" and maintains that harmonic imperfections do not fulfill that purpose.[242] He suggests that analogous to the tradition of "predecessors," the new goal of music is to "temper to some degree the harshness of dissonance" but in "another way." Ignoring the significance of the text in the new style, he thinks it is only the way in which particular musical elements are implemented that makes the two styles different. For Artusi, even singing must be judged based on its 'correctness' and not its connection to the text and the meaning of the text. This, however, does not mean that he is altogether ignorant of the rationale of the new practice. Teasing 'modern' composers and singers' expressiveness in music-making, Artusi defines the 'perfection' of the new music under expressive terms. He states that Monteverdi and other modern composers "teach the singers to sing their compositions, accompanying themselves with many movements of the body, and in the end they let themselves go to such an extent that they seem to be actually dying—this is the perfection of their music."[243] At least, this is a point upon which both sides of the debate completely agree.

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[240] Ibid, 527

[241] Ibid, 528 and 533. Karol Berger asserts that the sixteenth-century revolution in the harmony-word relationship, which was reflected in a revived interest in the ancient view of "the subordination of harmony to words," was one of the two main aspects of a bigger paradigm shift in the nature of music from harmony to passions. The other cause of this shift was that the idea that harmony in music was founded on "cosmic harmony" was shaken by the sixteenth century because of the revolution that happened in natural sciences. (Berger, *A Theory of Art*, 130)

[242] Ibid, 527.

[243] Quoted in Fabbri, *Monteverdi*, 40.

Monteverdi's response to Artusi, who had accused him of deviating from the "good rules" left by authorities of counterpoint," and searching for "extravagant novelties," demonstrates Monteverdi's awareness of the differences his music had with the old style or of the *prima pratica*.[244] Setting his goal as proving that the harmony is the servant of words and not its servant, he discredits Artusi's critiques because in his view Artusi paid no "attention to the words but neglecting as though they had nothing to do with the music."[245] Monteverdi (represented by his brother), however, draws our (and Artusi's) attention to the nature of the relation between text and harmony in the old style (what he calls the First Practice) and undertakes to reveal Artusi's assumptions. "By passing judgment on these 'passages' without the words, [my brother's] opponent implies that all excellence and beauty consist in the exact observation of the aforesaid rules of the First Practice, which make the harmony mistress of the words."[246] The well-known case of "Cruda Amarilli" is where this "subordination of harmony to words," as Karol Berger puts it, can be seen clearly.[247]

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[244] Strunk, *Source Readings*, 528. Monteverdi included a very brief response to Artusi in his fifth book of madrigals in 1605. Two years later, his brother Giulio Cesare Monteverdi wrote an explanation of the composer's response that was included in Claudio's *Scherzi musicali* (1607). This explanation is normally taken as Monteverdi's own words or at least his own position. See Strunk, *Source Readings*, 535.
[245] Ibid, 538.
[246] Ibid.
[247] See Berger, *A Theory of Art*, 130.

Example 1 Claudio Monteverdi, "Cruda Amarilli", in *Madrigals Book Five*, mm. 12-27

The unprepared dissonances that can be seen in, for instance, measure 13 between the note A

in the soprano and G in the bass (example 1, m. 13) was not only completely justified for

Monteverdi but necessary as it was the required sonorous response to the word "*ahi lasso*"

(Alas!). The same justification would apply to the diminished fifth in measure 21 between B in

the bass and F in the tenor (on the word "*amaramente*" meaning "bitterly") as well as in other

places marked in example 1. Monteverdi then refers to the theorist Zarlino who has written

down "the extremely well-thought rules" of this practice. First Practice, in Monteverdi's view, is

the style that is mainly concerned with the perfection of the harmony forgetting and

"disregarding the perfection of the melody" or in other words a style that "considers the

harmony not commanded but commanding, and not the servant but the mistress of the

words."[248] He reinforces his view about the relation between words and music by basing them

on Plato's ideas about music discussed in *Republic*. According to Plato, different elements of

music such as the rhythm and harmony should follow the demands of the text or the words and

"the manner of the diction and the words follow and conform to the disposition of the soul."[249]

Similar to other advocates of the new style, Monteverdi attempted to found the new practice on

the ancient tenets about the interconnection of drama and music underlining an affective

relation between music and text as the former's main obligation. As Gary Tomlinson asserts,

"Monteverdi's implicit view that the foremost goal of his music was to move the passions

provided the rational basis for his Second Practice."[250] According to Monteverdi, this new

musical movement began with "Cipriano de Rore, later followed and improved upon by

Ingegneri, Marenzio, Giaches de Wert, Luzzasco, still more by Jacopo Peri, Giulio Caccini, and

finally by yet more exalted spirits who understand even better what true art is."[251] Mentioning

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[248] Strunk, *Source Readings*, 540. Taruskin has explored and traced the history of this conflict between *ars perfecta* and what he characterizes as "literary music" back to the mid-sixteenth century and madrigalists such as Jacques Arcadelt, Rore, and Marenzio. See Richard Taruskin, *Music from the Earliest Notations to the Sixteenth Century*, The Oxford History of Western Music: V.1 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 721-7.

[249] Plato, *Republic*, 398d, 400d. Quoted in Gary Tomlinson, *Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 25.

[250] Tomlinson, *Monteverdi*, 25.

[251] Monteverdi, 'Declaration' (1607) in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 173.

madrigalists such as de Rore and Marenzio, Monteverdi probably had moments such as the simple but extremely effective opening gesture of Rore's *O sonno* (example 2; mm. 1-3) in mind, where slow, homophonic motion from D minor to its dominant chord (A major) on the phrase "O Sleep!" ("O sonno"), and afterwards a sudden shift towards the more distant ('secondary dominant') E major chord on "o della" introduces the paradoxical mood of Giovanni della Casa's poem suggesting a hush and quietness that overspreads an intensity prevalent in the rest of the poem;[252] he could have equally thought of the opening twenty-four measures of Luca Marenzio's *solo e pensoso,* where a one-octave fully chromatic motion responds musically to the expression of loneliness and purposelessness of Francesco Petrarch's opening verse in the poem.

Example 2 *Cipriano de Rore, O Sonno*, mm. 1-6.

Monteverdi demonstrates his support for the priority of the text in his preface to the eighth book of madrigals (*Madrigali guerrieri et amorisi*, 1638), where he offers his understanding of *doctrine of affections* and the way in which he represents passion and affections in his compositions, in particular his *Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda*. He contends that the main passions or affections are "anger, equanimity, and humility," and music can represent

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[252] In his analysis of de Rore's *O Sonno*, Palisca shows how the composer, using old techniques of "chord progressions" or the juxtaposition of different meters, attempts to show musically the meanings of the text or in Palisca's words, to use every opportunity "to make his representation of the text vivid and moving." Palisca regards de Rore as a composer who through his works provided the next generation with practical ideas of how to shift into a more expressive music. See Palisca, *Baroque*, 15-6.

these three affections through three main different styles: *concitato* (agitated), *molle* (soft), and *temperato* (moderate). He critiques past composers who never used *concitato,* a style that according to him was the same as what Plato meant by the style of a brave warrior's speech and inflections.[253] Monteverdi introduces his project as the "recovery" of this forgotten style. He becomes specific about how he represents "anger and scorn" in music, where in his preface to *Madrigali guerrieri et amorisi* writes: "Since according to all the best philosophers the fast pyrrhic foot was used for agitated, warlike dances, and the slow spondaic foot for their opposites, I took the whole note and proposed that one whole note correspond to one spondee. Dividing this into sixteen sixteenth-notes, struck one after the other and joined to words expressing anger and scorn, I could perceive in this brief example a resemblance to the emotion I was seeking."[254] He emphasizes the novelty of the idea and stresses that the expressiveness of the style could easily vanish if we perform the basso continuo in the "normal" way: "At first, the musicians, especially those whose task it was to play the basso continuo, thought it ridiculous to strike a single string sixteen times in one measure, and so they reduced it all to one stroke per measure, thereby producing the spondee instead of the pyrrhic foot, and destroying all resemblance to agitated speech. Be assured, therefore, that the basso continuo must be played just as written, along with the other parts."[255] Monteverdi's specific instructions about the rhythmic figures and articulation of his basso continuo notation are justified by his reference to the imitation of the text's emotional content. That is to say, It is not the musical inner rules that make this possible but rather the external reference, which is the reality or more specifically the meaning of the text.

Returning to the debate, Artusi is not only attacking specific compositional decisions made by Monteverdi, but also denouncing an emerging ideology that was fundamentally in effect from earlier madrigals in the sixteenth century. That new ideology had—in practice if not in theory—

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[253] Ibid.
[254] Ibid., 174.
[255] Ibid., 174.

reshaped what music and its mission is and had already formulated a new relationship between the musical and non-musical. The controversy between Artusi and Monteverdi provides a chance to look at the madrigal principle from the perspectives of two first-hand observer-thinkers. Whether or not we are interested in deciding whose argument is stronger, we cannot underrate the value of the knowledge it gives us about the establishment of mimetic principles in Western musical thought. Furthermore, the very fact that the conflict is triggered by certain musical figures used by Monteverdi in a madrigal makes the quarrel completely relevant to any study of the historical development of the madrigal as an idea. Finally the debate reveals certain assumptions in which the new understanding of the text-music relationship was rooted; assumptions that served the new goal of music in the seventeenth and part of the eighteenth centuries, that music must express and evoke emotions.

Monteverdi's modernist acceptance of what Artusi regarded as "harsh" sounds into his new music was possible due to the new belief that conceived music no longer as the sonorous reflection of perfection or perfect harmony, but rather as the locus of emotions and rhetorical demands of the modern man. The Second Practice or the "new modes of composing" was rationalized by virtue of the needs and requirements of expression (words and rhetoric), and required that harmony is redefined constantly at the mercy of the drive of the extra-musical.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

The picture one might draw of the madrigal as a musical idea and principle is never complete without considering another critical moment in the life of the genre. Vincenzo Galilei's *Dialogo della musica antica e della moderna* (*Dialogue on Music Ancient and Modern*), published in 1581, around two decades before Artusi's reactionary critique of the madrigal's realism was published, claimed that the technically complex music of his time had nothing to offer to satisfy the expressive demands of music-users. If Artusi was to attack the madrigal's capacity of expressive and progressive treatment of dissonance in music, Galilei came from a totally

contrasting standpoint. He expected more expressivity from the madrigal as in his view music was meant to express "passions of the soul" and arise similar affections in the listeners. The goal of music is not to produce *delight*. The final purpose of counterpoint and its rules (formulated in Zarlino's treatises), in Galilei's view, is "nothing but delight of the ear," but the rules do not lead the musicians to any "ways of expressing the passions of the soul and impressing them with the greatest possible efficacy on the minds of the listeners."[256] Therefore, the main purpose of music, Vincenzo Galilei suggests in his *Dialogo*, lies somewhere else: in its "appropriate" relation with text and its competence in "expressing the emotions of the words with the proper affect." The main reason for Galilei's harsh critique of contrapuntal rules and techniques is that they "cover nothing more than how to move about among the musical intervals, seeing to it that the melody vies with varied harmonies according to their percepts, and without further thought to expression of emotion or the sense of the words."[257] In one of his later treatises, Galilei clearly criticizes Zarlino and his rules of counterpoint repeating his argument that "the principal part of music … is none other than to induce in the listeners the same affections of those who recite mainly through the means of the well-expressed text." So, "the value of music does not consist, as Zarlino wishes, in the movement that the parts of a vocal piece make rising and descending, whether in similar or contrary directions, not in the collocation of the consonances in their proper places."[258] He clearly rises against a kind of "formalistic" approach to music and intends to define an expressive duty for music. Text and its impacts on music not only does not make the music impure or defective but contributes to its expressive and rhetorical empowerment; what, Galilei thought, music is meant to be. The "expressionist" movement that Galilei was advocating for had already started in practice with the sixteenth century madrigalists whose compositional

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[256] Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 166.

[257] Galilei, *Dialogo*, trans. in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 166.

[258] Vincenzo Galilei, *Il primo libro della prattica del contrapunto intorno all'uso delle consonanze* (1588-91) trans. in Claude V. Palisca, *The Beginnings of Baroque Music: its Roots in Sixteenth-Century Theory and Polemics*, PhD diss. (Harvard University, 1953), 221-2. Cited in Tim Carter, *Music in Late Renaissance and Early Baroque Italy* (London: B.T. Batsford Limited, 1992), 51.

practice privileged expressive goals over formalized musical principles, an approach to music-making that later was theorized under the notion of Second Practice.

Although Galilei's thoughts on the problems of his contemporary "practicing contrapuntists"—a term he used to refer to those who were following the strict rules of counterpoint written by theorists such as Zarlino—has been read as a revolutionary break from the musical conditions established in the sixteenth century contrapuntal madrigals, a closer look at Galilei's ideas proves otherwise. Galilei believed that the main problem with the "madrigalists" or the "modern contrapuntists" who had already introduced some rule-breakings, such as chromatic movements, unprepared dissonances or unacceptable leaps is that they do not go beyond word-painting. But what is beyond text-painting? According to him, drama and the art of oratory. He maintains that musicians should learn from actors in drama to go beyond the mere representation of words and express the emotions and passions (affections) of characters along with interactions between them.

Galilei as a defender of expressivity in music, gives voice to a musical thought that became the prominent view according to which most music of the seventeenth and part of the eighteenth centuries was created and perceived, the idea that music is meant to affect listeners. Music, from this perspective, was seen alongside another important art whose purpose was to move the listeners, that is, public oratory. And almost all the rhetorical means and skills associated with oratory began to find equivalents in music. Monsieur de Saint Lambert in *Principles of the Harpsichord* (1702), claimed that a "piece of music somewhat resembles a piece of rhetoric."[259] Composers were meant to imitate orators in employing rhetorical devices to control and direct the emotions of their audiences, to move (*movere*) listeners. Being an originally ancient Greek idea, music as a moving art was revived in early modern Europe and affected the way music was created and experienced. The revival, as many have observed, was a shift from a mathematical

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[259] Saint-Lambert, Michel de. *Principles of the Harpsichord*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 32.

towards an understanding conception of music. George Buelow observes in his *A History of Baroque Music* that through this return to classics, an important shift occurred in the status of music among Arts. But one must note that in order to affect the listener, music needed to be capable of communicating or "speaking" and to do so, it needed to be *realistic*, or to be connected to or correspond with matters in the world. This was a process through which music became a sonic language capable of demonstrating actions, objects, behaviors, etc. Using music as a language to communicate was foremost the contribution of the madrigal and its composers. Therefore, Galilei's passionate defense of expressivity in fact retains the assumption of the seconda prattica, the idea that music is capable of and *should* be sensitive to the representation of the 'non-musical' through which it gains the conditions for being a meaningful practice. These strong 'madrigalistic' tendencies toward drama and dramatic elements provided the next generation of composers with the aesthetic and theoretical foundations of a new style which came to be known as *stile rappresentativo*.

To sum up this last point, Galilei does not challenge the mimetic basis of the madrigal. He thinks music must imitate the manners in which people communicate their feelings or meanings. Whether we call this an expressive shift or not, we should note that Galilei's distinction between the musical portrayal of objective reality and musical depiction of feelings does not draw a dividing line between two paradigms. In other words, the seventeenth-century notions of "expression" and text-painting, are not fundamentally incongruous; they are both conceived under the idea of musical mimesis and share the assumption that music represents. The new 'baroque-era' addition to this, i.e., the ideology that music must move listeners, is indeed based on the representational nature of music confirmed in the madrigal principle. From this perspective, Galilei would have had the same position as Monteverdi did in the debate with Artusi. Galilei assumes that since music's power in expressing passions has nothing to do with the regular devices his contemporary composers would use in their music, they all need to go back to study the rhetorical aspects of different dramatic situations. He thinks "when musicians

go [...] to the tragedies and comedies," they should "observe in what manner the actors speak, in

what range, high or low, how loudly or softly, how rapidly or slowly they enunciate their words,

when one gentleman converses quietly with another."[260] His list of the situations a musician

should consider also includes the way a gentleman speaks with one of his servants, or "one of

these with another," how the prince talks with his subjects or a petitioner, "how one speaks

when infuriated or excited, and various other situations."[261] Finally, he concludes that seeing

these, musicians can learn how emotions or meanings can be expressed: "[f]rom these diverse

observations, if they are carried out attentively and considered with care, one can deduce the

way that best suits the expression of whatever meanings or emotion may come to hand."[262]

Galilei's "behaviouristic" treatment of how music relates to the reality is grounded in a visual-

representational understanding of musical mimesis; he does *not* ask musicians to *only listen*

carefully to what different characters say when they have certain feelings, but to *see how* they

act while they speak. In this respect, his strong disapproval of word-painting remains merely an

aversion to the use of a musical tool than a criticism of the fundamental rationale or goal behind

that tool or technique.

    This rationale or goal that remains intact in Galilei's questioning of text-painting in the

contrapuntal madrigal is nothing but—in Richard Taruskin's words—some kind of musical

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[260] Galilei, *Dialogo*, trans. in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 167-8.

[261] Ibid.

[262] Ibid., 168. The influence of Greek tragedy on the supporters of the new music in late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was very significant and has been largely discussed. The attempts to link Greek tragedy to music was apparently aimed at finding ways in which they can tie the "language" of drama to certain musical elements. Aristotle had defined tragedy as "an imitation of some action that is important, entire, and of a proper magnitude—by language, embellished and rendered pleasurable, but by different means in different parts." His explanations for "pleasurable language" might have convinced early Florentine opera composers that he was talking about musical elements when he described the language of tragedy as a "language that has the embellishments of rhythm, melody, and metre." Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449b20, cited in Donald Jay Grout and Hermine Weigel Williams, *A Short History of Opera* (Third Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 12. In his first chapter of the above book (Ibis, 11-15), Grout briefly explores the role of music in some Greek dramas (tragedies and comedies) and the possibility of the use of any kind of music in them. The case of Greek drama and the—probably—wrong belief that it was entirely sung, gains its importance through the fact that it provided the early opera composers with an artistic justification to use some existing unrelated materials to form a new unity. See chapter three in Grout, *A Short History,* 25-45, for a detailed study of these materials (Ballet, Intermedio, Pastorale, and Madrigal Comedy) and how the early opera composers used all or some of them yet went beyond to "transform the relation between drama and music from a mere association into an organic union." Ibid., 34. Also, for a more detailed historical account of the development of early opera see Carter, *Music in Late Renaissance*, 202-18.

realism, is not disputed. As Taruskin has shown, the origins and foundations of the

"revolutionary movement" that centered around the madrigal, were rooted in a new realistic

approach to text-music relationship that remained intact even when the genre itself was

criticized for its contrapuntal texture—perceived as unrealistic in certain contexts. Drawing on

Taruskin's view, one might argue that the main musical clash in the sixteenth century that

culminated in the developments giving rise to the baroque music was between the proponents of

the *ars perfecta*'s "relative indifference to words" exemplified in Zarlino's theory and

Palestrina's practice, and the proponents of a revolutionary movement that Taruskin refers to as

"literary music" that he believes was defended "in the name of expression, which implicitly

denied universal or autonomous musical values."[263] Literary music, according to Taruskin, the

"music that embodies or is responsive to semantic meaning, […] was a revolutionary movement,

and it transformed music *fundamentally and irrevocably* [my emphasis]."[264] Music was one

component of this movement, because as Taruskin underlines, the literary music of the

sixteenth century became possible only when it married the literature of the time: works of poets

such as Petrarch and Bembo whose poems were used by composers of madrigals providing them

with humanistic representations of "violent emotional contrasts, that could be effectively linked

with musical contrasts—high/low, fast/slow, up/down, consonant/dissonant, major/minor,

diatonic/chromatic, homo-rhythmic/imitative—as bearers (or at least suggesters) of semantic

meaning."[265]

The mimetic nature of the new music, which was nurtured in the madrigal more than any

other genre, was a new musical logic that could include different kinds of sensitivity to the

reality outside the music. The external reality could be the meaning of the text or in some cases

the emotions or behaviours of the speakers whose voices are expressed in the text. For instance,

as Taruskin has shown, in the middle section of Cipriano de Rore's madrigal "Dalle belle

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[263] Taruskin, *Music from the Earliest Notations*, 722.
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid, 723-4.

contrade d'oriente" what is depicted is not the meaning of the words through above-mentioned

musical devices, but rather "the actual speech" of the speaker.[266] As will be discussed later, a

musical depiction of the *manner* in which a text would be read by a speaker lay the foundation

of the new singing style as it was considered the best way to move the listener's feelings. The

most important point here is that what made this peculiar type of 'mannerism' possible in the

madrigal was the mimetic nature of the genre or what Taruskin has referred to as the 'realism' of

this genre. Ironically, it was on this central principle that the madrigal itself was criticized by

Galilei. As Taruskin puts it, "in its very realism, the expressivity of the madrigal contained the

seeds of its own undoing."[267] That is to say, the madrigal as a principle could even critique the

madrigal as a genre. While stylistically, the madrigal was not a representative of the new music,

it was an intellectual and philosophical embodiment of a newly predominant mode of musical

thought that might be termed "early modern." The realistic relationship with the text and

therefore with the world remained as the main principle based on which music was connected to

life and the world and this was to some considerable extent the heritage of the madrigal.

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"Era l'anima mia," a madrigal that Monteverdi published in his *Fifth Book of Madrigals* and

that was mentioned as an example of musical imperfection in the second part of Artusi's

critiques (1603), begins with what Fabbri describes as a "recitative-like declamation."[268] For

Artusi, declamations like these are written in "a certain amusing manner which induces men to

laughter and to make fun of it," but they give us instances where the madrigal as a genre

transcends its own status aspiring to the conditions of the madrigal as a principle.[269] In this

respect, the madrigal connects to the musical developments that followed the extreme

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[266] Ibid, 726-7.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Fabbri, *Monteverdi*, 43.
[269] *Seconda parte dell'Artusi, overo Delle imperfettioni della moderna musica* (Venice, 1603) quoted and translated in Fabbri, *Monteverdi*, 43.

expressivity of the late sixteenth century madrigals culminated in the emergence of *stile rappresentativo*. Monteverdi's musical setting of the opening verse (Era l'anima mia già presso l'ultim'hore e languia come langue alma che more)[270] is not radically different from the style of the recitatives written by himself and others at the time. The three lower voices that open the madrigal remain for a quite long time in a D minor chord by 'moving' statically and poignantly and pointing at the possibility and closeness of death to the subject's soul through a rhythmic and melodic configuration that is extremely recitative-like (Example 3, mm. 1-4).[271]

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[270] "My soul was already close to its final hour and languished as languishes a dying soul;" The text and translation is from *Free Choral Music*: http://www1.cpdl.org/wiki/index.php/Era_l%27anima_mia
[271] See Fabbri, *Monteverdi,* 41-43.

Example 3 Claudio Monteverdi, *Era l'anima mia*, mm. 1-14

Passages like these are examples of those moments in madrigals that the critics of the second practice such as Artusi would have denounced as being written for "the delight of the ear" rather than the contemplation of reason.[272] These moments that would have been characterized by the proponents of the new practice as expressive than merely for a sensuous pleasure, were also exemplified through a new emphasis on the performative aspects of modern compositions, and on the role of performers and their essential contributions to the communication of feelings and affects in music. "In this 'practice'," Fabbri writes "an important role was also given to the expressive capabilities of singers, on whom it was encumbent to display ('represent', says L'Ottuso) the 'affetti' ('affects') set to music: 'and remember that since the singer is the soul of music, and that which represents the true sense of the composer, in which representation according to the diversity of the subject the voice is sometimes strengthened, sometimes sweetened, for thus it is necessary to hear so spirited a manner of compositions done by extraordinary singers'."[273]

Recognizing the expressive, declamatory potential of the madrigal as one of its important features was not limited to Monteverdi and is reflected in the approach of other composers of Monteverdi's generation. As Taruskin emphasizes, it was in the context of his *Nuove musiche*

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[272] Artusi seems to have been receiving the new style of madrigal-making (the second practice) from a perspective common in his time and—especially before him—in the fifteenth century. As Christopher Page has studied this musical thought, according to this Aristotelian view, although the interactions of sensual pleasure and intellectual pleasure in the perception of music must be appreciated, one should note that the former needs to contribute to the latter. As Christopher Page shows, the renaissance binary of sensation versus intellect is not as rigid as one might expect. He discusses interesting cases of synesthesia ("intercrossing" of the boundaries between two or more senses, in Tinctoris's case, the two senses of smell and hearing) in the theoretical writings of Tinctoris in the fifteenth century, explicating the issue in an intellectual context conditioned by the philosophical and theological thought inherited from the ancient Greek and Christian medieval thinkers such as Aristotle, St. Augustin, and St. Ambrose. Page's interpretation of Tinctoris's description of the Guillaume Dufay and other early renaissance composers' sonority as "perfumed with sweetness" shows how much this apparently sensuous description of a specific musical style is infused with theological meanings. See Christopher Page, "Reading and Reminiscence: Tinctoris on the Beauty of Music," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 49, no. 1 (1996): 1–31; in particular see 22-7. For a similarly deconstructive reading of Tinctoris's famous phrase look at Rob C. Wegman, "Sense and Sensibility in Late-Medieval Music: Thoughts on Aesthetics and 'Authenticity,'" *Early Music* 23, no. 2 (1995): 299–312. Wegman writes: "Part of the subtlety of Tinctoris's musical sensibility [...] lies precisely in the fact that outward and inward are not really distinct to him." Ibid, 303-4. For a more general study of the ways in music was listened to and experienced in the late medieval time and renaissance, see Rob C. Wegman, "Music as Heard: Listeners and Listening in Late-Medieval and Early Modern Europe (1300–1600)," *The Musical Quarterly*, 1998.
[273] This quote is from L'Otussi who, according to Fabbri has remained unidentified, but whose conversations with Artusi has been quoted in the latter's writings (appendix to the second part of *Seconda parte dell'Artusi, overo Delle imperfettioni della moderna musica* called *Considerationi musicali*).

madrigals that Caccini's experiments led to his discovery of "stile recitativo, the style that, better than any other, could *muovere l'affetto dell'animo*: 'move the soul's affection,' or as we might put it now, move the listener emotionally."[274] The common musicological understanding of the madrigal also reflects the historical development of the genre as one that remained a through-composed composition with free form reliant on the text's structure. Taruskin's definition of the madrigal stresses the same point: "Any setting of a single stanza in a word-sensitive style that employs no formulaic repetitions or refrains could be called a madrigal."[275] It is because of this emphasis on a general understanding of word-sensitivity rather than specific text-painting that as Taruskin suggests, "only monody could really do a madrigal's job."[276] The shift, indeed, occurs within the musical assumptions of the madrigal itself to celebrate the introduction of speech or dialogue into music, *instead of*—or in many cases *besides*, or even as exemplified in "Era l'anima mia," *combined with*—madrigalistic text-painting. In other words, although the new focus puts a new weight on the rhetorical dimensions of musical language, it never disrupts its mimetic nature. Expression of passions or affections as the main function of the baroque music and the prominent tool for the composers of the time to make music meaningful was later described by critics as "confused in its harmony, charged with dissonances and modulation, unnatural in its melody."[277] Interestingly, Rousseau's description of baroque music that was given towards the end of this era was, at least from a sonic perspective, similar to Artusi's precautions about the first appearances of the same musical language. Artusi had described the same approach to music making as "a tumult of sounds, confusion of absurdities, an assemblage of imperfections"[278] What really matters here, and which was reflected in both Artusi's and

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[274] Taruskin, *Music from the Earliest Notations*, 813. Caccini's quote is from: Giulio Caccini, preface to *Le nuove musiche* (1601), ed. Angelo Solerti, in *Le origini del melodrama: Testimonianze dei contemporanei* (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1903), 56, trans. Piero Weiss in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music,* 143.
[275] Taruskin, *Music from the Earliest Notations*, 813.
[276] Ibid. Taruskin provides an analysis of a Caccini's madrigal (*Amarilli mia bella*, a song for solo voice with figured bass), showing how some of the rhetorical effects are rooted in the madrigal.
[277] "Baroque," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Dictionnaire de musique,* (Paris : la Veuve Duchesne, 1768), 41. Cited in Claude V. Palisca, *Baroque Music.* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1991), 2.
[278] Strunk, *Source Readings*, 534.

Rousseau's critique of the Baroque principle was that the aesthetic basis of this "confusion" and deviation from the norm or "the natural" came originally from outside music—from fields such as literature, oratory, or as we will see even from drama—and generally pursued the same rhetorical goal, namely charging music with more feelings and giving music a power to arouse or move the feelings (passions and affections) of the listeners.[279]

The new rhetorical movement was begun in the form of some challenges that the madrigal faced at the end of the century that—maybe ironically—contributed to the further establishment of the mimetic principles based on which the madrigal was built. The emergence of other musical genres such as the recitative and the general style that was referred to as the representational or dramatic style (*stile rappresentativo*) and that were meant to surpass the madrigal in their rhetorical effectiveness was not by any means an attack on the central principle of the madrigal, and indeed reaffirmed the realism of the new music. As Susan McClary's brilliant study of some of the most popular and frequently performed Italian madrigals of the sixteenth century has revealed, the madrigal as it was practiced by its great masters such as Monteverdi, Arcadelt, de Rore, Willaert, and others, could never be reduced to a mirror of the text. The madrigal, in her view, through the polyphonic setting and modality could in most cases go beyond text-painting and, with tools that were only accessible to music, display further complexities of the concepts or themes dealt within the text. From this perspective, the madrigal offers some insight into the ways in which different aspects of the early modern subject, i.e., its desires, emotions, body, etc. were perceived.[280]

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[279] It should be noted here that the term 'emotion' in its modern sense has been around only since the nineteenth century and before that other terms such as 'passion' and 'affect' (in the seventeenth century) and 'sentiment' (in the eighteenth century) were mostly used to discuss feelings or emotions. See Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; and, Amy M. Schmitter, "17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2014), edited by Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17th18th/>. A classic general history of theories of emotions is found in: Norman Gardiner, *Feeling and Emotion: a History of Theories* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970).

[280] See McClary, *Modal Subjectivities*. In particular see the third chapter (57-77). McClary warns us against the reduction of the madrigal to madrigalism or text-painting, that is, the understanding of the composers of madrigals as ones who "stumbled blindly from line to line, relying for coherence on their chosen verses like children requiring training wheels on their bikes." Ibid, 12. Notwithstanding her important insight into the complex relationship between the madrigal's music and text, McClary's understanding of the madrigal is, broadly speaking and using

The dramatic movement in music in the early seventeenth century began with a consciousness about demands for specific elements, devices or effects in music, an awareness that continued the madrigalistic *efforts* that were mainly directed toward finding ways in which 'the extra-musical' could be expressed in music.[281] The use of oratory and rhetorical techniques was a way to empower music in depicting emotions by making use of musical figures in the same way that these techniques had been used in language can make ordinary speech more effective and persuasive by employing figures of speech. What Curtis Price describes as a musical "disarray" or "stylistic dead ends and failed experiments" exemplified in the contrast between "Gesualdo's ultra-chromatic madrigals" and "desiccated early monodies in which virtually all contrapuntal interest was sacrificed to dramatic declamation of the text" can be unified under a principle that was for the first time established in the Italian madrigal.[282] The new musical outlook that was meant to move the listeners and was theoretically fed by the early modern theories of emotions known as doctrine of affections became possible only through a kind of relationship with the text that had been already developed in the sixteenth-century madrigal. This new dramatic movement in music was first and foremost focused on the invention of a new singing style referred to as *stile rappresentativo* (representational/representative/dramatic style), which although different from multi-voice madrigal in the texture, shared the same approach to the text. Indeed, Monteverdi's exploration with adding basso continuo to polyphonic madrigals and Caccini's references to his solo through-composed songs as madrigals show the extent to which the madrigals were defined by their representational conditions rather

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Engel's insight, under painterly terms—although more on an expressive than representational axis. Although one could agree with her that the meanings of the madrigal cannot be reduced to those of the poem, it is important for our purpose to note that the meanings that the madrigal aim at are external to music: the human being's Selfhood and its psychological structure. McClary's defense of the madrigal's musicality is not due to its challenges for painterly conditions in art but on the contrary for its power to depict what the new singing style, *stile recitativo*, could not render. As a "multivoiced medium" the madrigal was "honed to perfection in the sixteenth century as a means for depicting the phenomenological interior Self." Ibid, 4.

[281] See Giulio Caccini, *Le nuove musiche*, edited by H. Wiley Hitchcock, Second Edition, (Wisconsin: A-R Editions, Inc., 2009). In his prefatory notes, Hitchcock clarifies that *affeto* is used by Caccini in two ways: a general sense that today we understand it as 'affections' (German *Affekt*) and "a more particularized meaning" referring to the techniques (such as embellishments like tremolo, the trill, etc.) used to produce the desired affect (first meaning). The particularized meaning can be understood through "modern English 'device' or even, in one of its meanings, 'effect.'" Ibid, 4.

[282] Price, "Music, Style and Society," 1.

than technical musical elements per se. An outstanding result of the new expressive approach to

music, the invention of a new singing style, namely recitative, was founded on the new text-

music relationship. Strictly speaking, in the "speech-song" of the recitative, which according to

Bukofzer displays a "complete subordination of the music to words", one can hear the realization

of Monteverdi's madrigalistic ideal.[283] The early seventeenth-century composers' interest in the

dramatic capacities of the new music was rooted in the novel conception of music as a

representational art, which itself became possible through the historical, well-built relationship

between text and music. This relationship was not one-sided, though; music served the

expressive purpose of and enhancing the affective power of the text, thereby becoming more

strongly equipped with sonorous tools of expression for moving emotions: what originally

belonged to the realm of rhetoric.

Rhetoric was traditionally seen by Greeks, Romans and the writers coming after them in

Middle Ages as a tool belonging to the verbal discourse: how to use words and speech to

persuade, move, delight and instruct.[284] The composers and musicians of the decades around

1600 were the first ones who *consciously* discussed the possibility of fulfilling rhetorical tasks

through music. The new ideas in the writings of the time concerning text-music relationship

were indeed serious attempts to find solutions for the rhetoric problem in music. It is from this

perspective that Monteverdi's claim that in his music he aimed to create a new status for the text

and make it "the mistress of the harmony rather than the servant," must be understood.[285] As we

will see, the consequences of this new relation were not meant to be limited to certain changes in

the singing style; and, as Tomlinson suggests, the "Second Practice," which emerged, among

other things, through a different approach to music's capabilities in communicating meanings of

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[283] See Bukofzer, *Music in the Baroque Era*, 5-6.
[284] See Blake Wilson, et al. "Rhetoric and music." *Grove Music Online*. *Oxford Music Online*. Oxford University Press, accessed July 7, 2015.
[285] Monteverdi, 'Declaration' (1607) in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 173. Monteverdi issued his answer to some critical writings through his brother. The writing is named 'Declaration' and appended to his brother's (Giulio Cesare's) first book of *Scherzi musicali* (1607). See Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 172. In my paper, I assign all the ideas in this writing to Monteverdi himself.

the text, was able to make the words "the mistress of the harmony" *in order to* go beyond and

"increase the affective power of the composition as a whole."[286] It should be noted, however, that

it was only with the presence of the new *idea* of music as a mimetic art that the new musical

ideal—that is moving the listener's emotions—became possible.

Of course, the new ideal could justify a lot of stylistic changes such as freer use of

dissonance, less strict approach to musical structure, etc., but without the mimetic shift that had

already happened with the madrigal, the very idea of subjecting music to the depiction and

arousal of an extra-musical reality (here, emotions) would be non-existent. What Tomlinson

believes to be the "the composer's first concern" in the new practice, i.e., "expressive force, not

structural perfection"[287] pivoted on musical mimesis. In Palisca's words, "musical consistency"

could be easily sacrificed "to mirror the poet's every image."[288] Recitative was indeed the result

of an encounter between this new musical ideal (expressive force) and the musical idea (music's

ability to mirror). That is to say, operatic sensitivity to every particular meaning and feeling of

the text in order to arouse emotions in the listeners led to the construction of a new musical

language which was perceived as a musical speech. The new singing style, which was

characterized by some of the composers as *stile rappresentativo* (representational or dramatic

style), demonstrates a response to the musicians' attempts to find a way to *speak musically*, or

make music "a faithful servant of the text."

As a musical idiom through which any device or rule of composition served to communicate

the emotional content of the text, recitative did not diverge far from the madrigal principle. As

Palisca demonstrates, a part of the new (Second) practice, in some cases, was to make a

purposeful use of old techniques in composition to fulfil the new goal, which was to go beyond

mathematical beauties of music and "communicate feelings and ideas."[289] This conscious

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[286] Tomlinson, *Monteverdi*, 25.
[287] Ibid., 23.
[288] Palisca, *Baroque*, 12.
[289] Ibid, 15.

attempt to create a "new idiom" first and foremost continues the intensity of text-music relationship bequeathed to the new style by the madrigal. The dual nature of recitative which oscillates between speech and singing introduced a new area where music could accomplish a mission that had started from the birth of the madrigal, nothing but 'serving the text' and enabling musicians to *speak in tunes* (or *sing in speech*).[290] This can be explained further by looking at one of the earliest accounts of the new dramatic style in music.

Although Giulio Romolo Caccini, composer and the author of *Le Nuove Musiche* (1601) published his book one year after Jacopo Peri's theory of recitative was released, we do not know if he had read the theory.[291] We know, however, that Caccini was one of the first musicians who, along with others, tried to find an answer to the question of "drama" in music. While solo singing with simple accompaniment was not an entirely new musical idea and was rooted in "a long tradition in Italian courtly circles,"[292] Caccini was one of the first to attempt to enrich the idea with *rhetorical* elements and introduce oratory into music. His main concern, not dissimilar to Galilei's, was to free the melody and the text from the necessities of counterpoint in order to empower music emotionally.

In an introduction to his *Le nuove musiche*, Caccini admires the ideas of those musicians, intellects, philosophers and poets who regularly met together in Giovanni Bardi's house and were "urging" and "forcing" him to publish his new compositions meant to be entirely different from "that sort of music which, preventing any clear understanding of the words, shatters both their form and content, now lengthening and now shortening syllables to accommodate the counterpoint (a laceration of poetry!)."[293] His ideal was to create a music that was "rather to

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[290] Ibid, 31.
[291] Pirotta has done a very detailed historical and comparative study of the early ideas which led to the emergence of the early opera and aria. He has discussed the similarity and differences between Peri and Caccini's understandings of *stile rappresentativo* and *stile recitativo* which he thinks refer to "a mode of performance, be it called a representation or recitation." See Nino Pirrotta, "Early Opera and Aria," in Nino Pirotta and Elena Povoledo, *Music and Theatre from Poliziano to Monteverdi*, trans. Karen Eales, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 237-80. In particular see pages 245-257.
[292] Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 143.
[293] Caccini, *Le nuove musiche*, 3.

conform to that manner so lauded by Plato and other philosophers (who declared that music is

naught but speech, with rhythm and tone coming after; not vice versa)."[294] The aim of such a

music was, according to Caccini, "to enter into the minds of men" and achieve certain "admired"

effects. In order to explain these effects, he relies on rhetoric and clearly regards music as a

rhetorical art. He says the kind of music that he hears "ringing" in his mind is of "total grace," a

term he probably borrows from Baldassare Castiglione who had published his well-known *The

Book of the Courtier* (1528), an early sixteenth-century 'etiquette for dummies' kind of book on

how to be a perfect courtier. As an important concept for Castiglione, *grazia* (grace) was

something far beyond what one could learn. As H. Wiley Hitchcock elaborates in his explanatory

notes on his translation of Caccini's introduction ('To the Reader') to *Le nuove musiche,* the

concept was later used by Vasari to characterize an idea opposed to beauty, "as an artistic idea,

along with *facilitia* – speed and ease of execution, technical effortlessness."[295] *Grazia* was a

"natural gift" that could not be gained through effort and study but through certain other

manners that were characterized as *sprezzatura*, another important concept in *The Book of the

Courtier* borrowed by Caccini.[296] What makes the examination of these terms essential to our

purpose is that Caccini's conception of the nature of the new music displays the same aesthetics

that Monteverdi and Galilei were supporting but under new terms. Caccini claims that the

problem of the old style was its being aimed to be "embellished and beautiful" in order to give

pleasure "solely to the sense of hearing" while not being able to move the mind.[297] To him, the

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[294] Ibid.

[295] See Hitchcock' notes in Giulio Caccini, *Le nuove musiche*, edited by H. Wiley Hitchcock, Second Edition, (Wisconsin: A-R Editions, Inc., 2009), 2-3. Hitchcock believes that "in the usage of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (as exemplified in the dictionary of the Accademia della Crusca), *grazia* stood for 'bellezza … che rapisce altrui ad amore' (beauty … which seduces one unto love)." Ibid, 3. Similarly, Peter Burke believes that the term has entered the discussion of behaviour through Castiglione's ideas for the first time and was originally used in the context of literature or art. See Peter Burke, *The Fortunes of the Courtier; The European Reception of Castiglione's Cortegiano,* (Cambridge: Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995), 30.

[296] Eduardo Saccone agrees with Anthony Blunt's view that according to the aesthetic views of the time, grace was a natural gift. It was an "extra quality" that one could add to what they have acquired through precept. Grace, however, cannot be learnt; "it is a gift from heaven; and it comes from having a good judgment." Anthony Blunt, *Artistic Theory in Italy 1450-1600*, (Oxford, 1940), 97-98, cited in Eduardo Saccone, "Grazia, Sprezzatura, Affettazione in the Courtier" in Robert W. Hanning and David Rosand (eds.), *Castiglione; the Ideal and the Real in Renaissance Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 46.

[297] Caccini, *Le nuove musiche*, 3.

old music ignored the meaning of the worlds and for this reason although it was beautiful, it

lacked *grace*. His solution to the problem was to "introduce a kind of music in which one could

almost *speak in tunes*, employing in it […] a certain noble *nonchalance* (*sprezzatura*) of song,

sometimes passing through several dissonances while still maintaining the bass note," in order

that the musician can "express some affect."[298] The important point here is that for Caccini,

"speaking in tunes" or "almost speaking in tunes" is the same as "expressing some affect." The

only way in which music can convey affects is through speaking words, i.e., communicating

words and making them intelligible. Caccini's magic tool to reach the desired grace was

Sprezzatura, a rhetorical technique that according to Castiglione was meant to be used to "avoid

affectation" and "conceal design and show that what is done and said is done without effort and

almost without thought." He stresses the idea that grace is derived from this effortlessness,

because "everyone knows the difficulty of those things that are rare and well done, and therefore

facility in them excites the highest admiration." His example of those who have achieved grace

through *sprezzatura* shows that he assigns a rhetorical power to the concept. He attributes the

characteristic to some great ancient orators who hid their knowledge of letters and offered their

knowledge as if it was "composed simply" and pretending that what they know, do, or say

"springs […] rather from nature and truth than from study and art." Interestingly, he thinks this

is also true with music; repetition of perfect consonances produce satiety and "too affected

harmony" but is avoided in favour of begetting a kind of contrast, "whereby our ears are held in

suspense, and more eagerly await and enjoy the perfect consonances."[299] As Hitchcock points

out, Caccini might have had this in mind when he supported the idea of neglecting the rules of

counterpoint or regular rhythm to arise certain affects in the listeners' minds and souls.[300]

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[298] Ibid. My emphasis. "*sprezzatura*" has also been translated as "negligence," "neglect," and "carelessness."

[299] Baldassare Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. Leonard Eckstein Opdycke (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), 35-7. My quotes from *The Book of the Courtier* are all from Opdycke's translation. I have also seen and partially used Hitckcock's translation of some phrases. To read more about Caccini's other usages of the term, see Hitchcock's notes in Caccini, *Le nuove musiche*, 3.

[300] Peter Burke's studies of the term (*sprezzatura*) shows that the term was originally used in a slightly different sense. It was originally meant 'setting no price on,' or in other uses of the word it meant 'calm self-confidence,' but it means more than previous meanings did in Castiglione's usage. "It also involves giving the impression of acting 'on the spur

Although the effortlessness in composing and performing the new music was received by

some critics as a sign of carelessness and laziness, and as a tendency to escape from the

difficulties of "playing from score" and performing contrapuntal parts, this new "simple" way of

accompanying solo singing became very popular.[301] Basso continuo was for composers like

Caccini a flexible "practice" which could let them give the vocal line the best space to express the

meanings of the text—in Caccini's words, "the imitation of the sentiments of the words"—and

communicate the passions or affections of the characters. For Caccini, representing the meaning

or the sentiments of the words (he refers to this also as "the imitation of the ideas of the words")

is interwoven with the power of music to move the listeners.[302]

In the preface to his *Le musiche sopra l'Euridice* (1600), Peri, assuming that Greeks and

Romans sang entire tragedies on the stage, argues that they had a special style in singing their

tragedies, "an intermediate form" in which they "employed a melody that, elevated beyond

ordinary speech," yet at the same time "descended from the melody of the song."[303] The

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of the moment' (*all'improviso*)." Burke's explanations here also show that the term has strong rhetorical connotations. The spontaneity hidden in the meaning of *Sprezzatura*, according to him, is "a more dramatic version of *neglegentia diligens* (studied negligence) which both Cicero and Ovid advocated in their different ways." It's worth noting that *neglegentia diligens* for Cicero was a device in which "the orator concealed his skill in order to give the audience the impression that he was not using rhetoric at all, but was more concerned with the ideas than with the words chosen to express them." Peter Burke, *The Fortunes of the Courtier: The European Reception of Castiglione's Cortegiano* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), 11 & 30-1. See Ibid, 52-4, for a brief discussion of the term's resonance in music and art. Tim Carter has also shortly discussed the significance of the term in Caccini's view. See Carter, *Music in Late Renaissance*, 1992, 189-90. Also, for a discussion of how Caccini's treatment of the concept finds its best realization in Peri's recitatives rather than in Caccini's own music, see Claude V. Palisca, *Studies in the History of Italian Music and Music Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 463-5. A more exact description of musical *sprezzatura* in Caccini's usage of the word can be found in Pirrotta, "Early Opera" in Pirotta and Povoledo, *Music and Theatre*. Pirrotta thinks that for Caccini, in a musical context, *sprezzatura* can be characterized as "the intangible elements of rhythmic buoyancy and dynamic flexibility of the performance, [...] the reduction of polyphonic accompaniment to an essential lineal minimum, the continuo, allowing a maximum of flexibility also to the accompanist and insuring expressive predominance and freedom to the singing voice." Ibid, 246.

[301] It was not an entirely false conviction; in the dedication to his *Euridice*, Caccini, a strong supporter of the device (basso continuo) connects his favourite idea of *sprezzatura* to the way he sets the bass under the voice. He writes: "Thus the harmony of the parts reciting in the present *Euridice* is supported above a *basso continuato*. In this I have indicated the most necessary fourths, fifths, sixths, and sevenths, and major and minor thirds, for the rest leaving it to the judgment and art of the player to adapt the inner parts in their places. The notes of the bass I have sometimes tied in order that, in the passing of the many dissonances that occur, the note may not be struck again and the ear offended. In this manner of singing, I have used a certain *sprezzatura* which I deem to have an element of nobility, believing that with it I have approached that much nearer to ordinary speech." Caccini, *Euridice* (1600), trans. in W. Oliver Strunk, *Source Readings in Music History*, Rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1998), 606. Adriano Banchieri, a church musician, in his book published in 1609, criticized those organists who were playing basso continuo on their instruments describing them as "Bassists, who, overcome by sheer laziness, are content with simply playing the Bass." Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 179.

[302] Strunk, *Source Readings*, 606 & 609.

[303] Jacopo Peri, *Le musiche sopra l'Euridice* (Florence: Giorgio Marescotti, 1600 [dedication dated 1601, modern

reconstruction of this ancient style of singing ("intermediate between song and speech") led Peri

to a special style called "diasematic" in which the speed of the singer was "somewhere between

the slow, sustained movements of song and the rapid movements of speech," a style that

according to him was used by ancients in reading "heroic poems and verses." Looking for a

pattern in ordinary Italian speech that suits this style he "recognized […] that in our speech

certain sounds are intoned in such a way that a harmony can be built upon them, and in the

course of speaking we pass through many that are not so intoned, until we reach another that

permits a movement for a new consonance."[304] He becomes more specific about the relation

between the voice and the bass and maintains that he decided to put the sustained vowels or as

he puts it, "a syllable that [is] intoned in ordinary speech" on the bass in a consonance, and

syllables that are normally fast in speech "passed over quickly between the sustained vowels;"

the dissonance, therefore, usually occurs in the relation between fast short syllables and the

bass. He emphasizes that the movement of the bass should follow a rule: "[k]eeping in mind

those manners and accents that serve us in our grief and joy, and similar states, I made the bass

move in time with these, faster or slower according to the affections."[305] The result seemed to be

successful as Marco da Gagliano (1582-1643), who was himself one of the early opera composers

and used the very first opera's libretto around a decade later to compose his own opera (*La

Dafne*, 1608), described Peri's use of the style or what calls the "artful manner of reciting in

song" in *Dafne* (1597) as a style admired by "all Italy" due to its power to "impress on the

listener the affection of [the text.]"[306]

Although recitative was not the only solo singing style practiced in the time and before the

rise of *stile rappresentativo*, other types of monodies were around, the new style (also

style]); Bibliotheca musica Bononiensis, ed. Giuseppe Vecchi (Bologna : Forni, 1969), 'Alettori' trans. in Palisca, *Studies*, 453. Palisca's studies imply that Peri's main source for the belief that Greek and Roman tragedies were sung in their entirety was "the humanist and classical scholar Girolamo Mei" who had discussed the issue in his *De modis musicis antiquorum* (written between 1566 and 1573) as well as in his letters to Galilei.
[304] Peri, *Le musiche,* 1600, cited in Palisca, *Studies*, 1994, 456-7.
[305] Ibid., 458.
[306] Marco da Gagliano, *La Dafne* (1608), Preface, trans. in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 176.

characterized as *stile recitativo*) along with its peculiarly novel way of accompaniment gave a

unique expressive power to music, the same ideology that madrigalists pursued via a different

means. Solo singing with a high level of virtuosity and use of embellishments that did not suit

the contrapuntal madrigal was able to stand out as the "main" or central part of a piece by which

the main "ideas" were supported to convey or communicate. Using non-musical features such as

facial expressions and physical gestures, singers promoted themselves as the central "character"

of the music bearing the main burden of expression in the music. Vincenzo Giustiniani (1564-

1637) witnessed and described the expressive aspects of solo singers in a performance in late

sixteenth century:

> … they moderated or increased their voices, loud or soft, heavy or light, according
> to the demands of the piece they were singing; now slow, breaking off with
> sometimes a gentle sigh, now singing long passages legato or detached, now
> groups, now leaps, now with long trills, now with short, and again with sweet
> running passages sung softly, to which sometimes one heard an echo answer
> unexpectedly. They accompanied the music and the sentiment with appropriate
> facial expression, glances and gestures, with no awkward movements of the
> mouth or hands or body which might not express the feeling of the song. *They*
> *made the words clear in such a way that one could hear even the last syllables of*
> *every word, which was never interrupted or suppressed by passages and other*
> *embellishments*" [my emphasis].[307]

The perception of basso continuo was similar to how solo singing was received by the sixteenth-

century audience; it was praised for its contribution to the conveying and intelligibility of the

text. Basso continuo or thoroughbass as "the most pervasive and instantly recognizable

characteristic of Baroque music," a tool for harmonically supporting the affections or ideas of

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[307] Cited in Palisca, *Baroque Music*, 17. As Palisca suggests, freedom of embellishments and other similar elements in composed pieces for solo singers had the expressive effect of improvisation which could give an opportunity to the singer to heighten the emotional aspects of the music. This is supported by Palisca's studies on the period which indicate that the novelty of the early seventeenth-century music was mainly "the result of a gradual transformation of performance practices" by responding to the musical tastes of the listeners. "The singer, being in direct contact with audiences, was sensitive to [listeners'] eagerness to be moved by music they could understand and their admiration for brilliant technique and soaring, smooth vocality." The main point is that the freedom was conditioned and regulated by the text's meaning as an ideal. Palisca, *Baroque Music*, 19.

the upper voice rather than independently move based on contrapuntal rules.[308] For instance, Agostino Agazzari (1578-1640)—as a musician who, according to Weiss and Taruskin, has provided us with "one of the earliest descriptions of the basso continuo"—not only argues for the significance of basso continuo, but also points out some important remarks that show how the idea of the expression of meaning in music, solo singing, and basso continuo were all connected in the early seventeenth-century musicians' perspective. He writes, "since the true style of expressing the words has at least been found, namely, by reproducing their sense in the best manner possible, which succeeds best with a single voice (or no more than a few), as in the modern airs by various able men, and as in the constant practice at Rome in concerted music, I say that it is not necessary to make a score or tablature for the organ. A Bass, with its signs for the harmonies, is enough."[309] The judgment he makes about the old styles of composition shows that the invention of these new techniques in composition was affecting the new composers' and critics' evaluations of the previous devices: "but if someone were to tell me that, for playing the old works, full of fugues and counterpoints, a Bass is not enough, my answer is that vocal works of this kind are no longer in use."[310] Disregarding the accuracy of this historical observation about the practice of contrapuntal vocal music in the early seventeenth century, the important point here is that the purpose or goal is perceived to be the "expression of the words" and it is only in order to achieve this goal that one should look for a "true style" of singing.

The dramatic (representational, mimetic) power of music made it possible for this art to be a language for communicating emotions or affections, and "speaking in tunes". Composers' rethinking of the relationship between text and music and how some special treatment of the words can empower music to communicate the emotional content of the words was essential to this development. The quest for the expression and arousal of feelings was strongly connected the new reverence for the text and rhetorical empowerment that came from the text. The new

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[308] Price, "Music, Style and Society," 10.
[309] Agazzari, Agostino, *Del sonare sopra il basso con tutti li stromenti* (1607) trans. in Weiss and Taruskin, *Music*, 178.
[310] Ibid.

approach to the text-music relationship which was first introduced to music through the madrigal was instrumental to this development. This empowerment, however, did not provide music with some kind of autonomy or "agency." The madrigalist concern, that is to say, was never musical autonomy but rather a humanist approach that wanted music to be capable of fulfilling an ideal that served the humanist's purpose; being the sonorous depiction of passions. The madrigal-based shift in music history was a shift in the nature of music in order to serve a new function; it was, therefore, a change in the goal music must serve and by virtue of that a modification of what conditions it must aspire to. In short, the newness that the madrigal principle offered, was a *humanist* and not a '*musicalist'* modernity.

While I agree with Tim Carter that the main concern for Galilei was "how to revive the kind of music reputed to the ancients and capable of producing an appropriate rhetorical effect," I believe that without the mediacy of the madrigal principle and the musico-textual potentials explored within the context of the madrigal as a genre, the new musical rhetoric would not have been possible. From this perspective, i.e., from the viewpoint of aims, it is in the Monteverdi-Artusi debate that the real quarrel between the ancients and the moderns can be located and not in Galilei's *Dialogo*. However, from the perspective of musical means, Galilei's approach is novel; he asks musicians to avoid or "subordinate" the rules of counterpoint as much as possible.[311] Instead, as Tim Carter explicates, Galilei advocates for "a style of music that was melody-dominated with at most a homophonic accompaniment, and, ideally performed by a solo voice."[312]

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[311] "[...] to the text's true expression are subordinated whatever laws might have been given or might ever be given regarding the use of consonance and dissonance." Galilei, *Il primo libro della prattica del contrapunto intorno all'uso delle consonanze* (1588-91) trans. In Claude V. Palisca, "Galilei, Vincenzo." *Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online*. Oxford University Press, accessed July 2, 2015, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/subscriber/article/grove/music/10526.

[312] Carter, *Music in Late Renaissance*, 186. A common understanding of the shift from the renaissance to the baroque music, as reflected in Tim Carter's "The North Italian Courts" is a tripartite division of the transitional stage into "the decline of Renaissance styles [...], Mannerist excess, [and] their eventual replacement by emerging Baroque styles." See Price, "Music, Style and Society," 25. According to Carter, Monteverdi's modern operatic music is "redolent of sixteenth-century techniques :for example, even in the 'new' recitative, he exploits expressive devices first explored in his 'traditional' five-part madrigals, including carefully crafted vocal lines, dissonances and chromaticism." Tim Carter, "The North Italian Courts," in Curtis Alexander Price, *The Early Baroque Era: From the Late 16th Century to the 1660s*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1993), 35. While Carter considers Monteverdi's use of these "sixteenth-

II. Sonata-Principle; Beyond Musical Abstraction

'Sonata' is one of the richest terms in Western music history; it is not easy to think of many other musical terms that have been so heavily loaded with technical, theoretical, historical, analytical, and philosophical associations. Being already confusing and misleading enough as both a genre and a form—at least, for first-year music students—the term has been further explored by music scholars as an idea, and even further as a principle. While one might try to make distinctions between different usages of the term—as lecturers would normally do to clarify the difference between the word 'sonata' as in, let's say, Mozart's Piano *Sonata* No. 16 in C major (K. 545) and the first movement of the same work laid down in a *sonata* form, i.e., in an exposition-development-recapitulation organization—I pursue a different goal here. My approach is to see how the sonata as a concept, i.e., as the culmination of the historical evolution of different aspects of its identity, as a genre, form, idea, and *especially* as a principle has interplayed with and contributed to the formation of the modern conception of music as an autonomous art. I will argue that the sonata as a concept was a musical response to what early romantics characterized as the 'poetry' of artwork, what they believed can romanticize the world and thereby transform the modern fragmented world into a meaningful whole.

The broader application of the term 'sonata' and its derivatives, with no less than five centuries of usage in musical literature, is almost always associated with instrumental music. Although like many other terms 'sonata', especially in its early stages of development, is not devoid of ambiguities. Within the early seventeenth-century instrumental music it is not quite clear how to make distinctions between different types of instrumental music such as sonata,

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century techniques" as "backward-looking" and as the "'Renaissance' aspects of the opera", (ibid, 35) my emphasis on the madrigal principle in this chapter introduces a different historical perspective about the transitional 'moments' of 1600: the introduction of a new text-music relationship (the madrigal principle) within the Renaissance contrapuntal musical language (the madrigal and madrigal-like genres) provided the new musical structure, i.e., solo singing and basso continuo, with a realistic theory of relationship between the musical and extra-musical. The shift from the madrigal to monody was not a rupture, but rather it included continuity and discontinuity at the same time: while the madrigalist approach to the relationship between music and text was buttressed, the contrapuntal language was annulled.

fantasia, ricercar, or toccata. It was in this context that the term 'sonata,' "finally displaced its competitors as the most appropriate term for such instrumental works."[313] An important characteristic of the 'sonata' is what Newman has discussed under two of "six basic traits that have prevailed throughout at least the main currents of sonata history."[314] These two traits, which were completely integrated into the sonata as a concept as early as the early 1700s, were: first, sonata's more or less absolute nature, and second, its mostly "aesthetic or diversional rather than a utilitarian" function or purpose. This historical nature of sonata that remained with it for most of the eighteenth century, its being independent but at the same time perceived as a non-referential, i.e., meaningless, music has formed what I refer to as the 'sonata problem.' Sonata as a new musical 'object' or phenomenon, as it were, developed in the absence of a thought that could justify its status as a significant art.[315] As Sandra Mangsen shows referring to Brossard (*Dictionaire*, 1703), the early eighteenth-century notion of the sonata involved an understanding of the term as a kind of instrumental music that "was designed 'according to the composer's fancy', free of the constraints imposed by dance, text or the rules of counterpoint."[316]

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[313] Mangsen, Sandra, John Irving, John Rink, and Paul Griffiths. "Sonata." *Grove Music Online*. 2001; Accessed 7 Jun. 2020. https://www-oxfordmusiconline-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000026191.

[314] William S. Newman, *The Sonata in the Baroque Era*, Rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 7. The other four traits Newman discusses are: the sonata has always been an instrumental piece; it has been largely limited to solo or chamber music; it has comprised of a cycle of several contrasting movements; it has provided the most extended designs in 'absolute' music. Ibid.

[315] My claim here is indeed a reformulation of what Carl Dahlhaus influentially declared about the relationship between musical practice and theory in the eighteenth century ("Reflexion und kompositorische Praxis klafften auseinander"). Drawing on Dahlhaus's insight, one might argue that the abstraction based on which sonata was working during the eighteenth century, was experienced as a problem than a natural property of instrumental music. See Carl Dahlhaus, "Romantische Musikästhetik Und Wiener Klassik," *Archiv Für Musikwissenschaft* 29, no. 3 (1972), 168. Dahlhaus's view has been challenged by more recent scholars. Two of these critical approaches, which could be considered as representing two types, are offered by Morrow and Allanbrook. Based on Allanbrook's critique of Dahlhaus's view, focusing on the eighteenth-century musical reviews and writings that described the instrumental music of their time as "ear-tickling nonsense" or "nothing but mere noise" does not allow us to acknowledge the fact that our emphasis on the discrepancy between theory and practice in the late eighteenth-century music is the result of our modern unease with any representationalist or expressionist theory of 'pure' instrumental music. Challenging this "powerful legacy left by writers on music aesthetics in the nineteenth century," she suggests that "[t]he very aesthetic theories that devalued instrumental music—the body of mimetic doctrine—nevertheless provide a surer foundation for understanding its late-eighteenth-century flowering than any theory that followed." Wye J. Allanbrook, "'Ear-Tickling Nonsense'," 2.

[316] Mangsen, Sandra, John Irving, John Rink, and Paul Griffiths. "Sonata." *Grove Music Online*. 2001; Accessed 2 Jun. 2020. https://www-oxfordmusiconline-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000026191.

Although at some points there have been some occasional religious functions for the sonata, as in the case of the sonata *da Chiesa,* the sonata problem, that is its 'meaninglessness', remained as the main characteristic of instrumental music in its entirety, the broader music category that sonata was only a representative of.[317]

The problem, best stated in what Mary Sue Morrow has referred to as the sonata question, i.e., "Sonate, que me veux tu? (Sonata, what do you want of me?"), was a theoretical predicament that modern, autonomous notion of music in general was facing. Morrow maintains that it is not an answer to this question ("Sonate, que me veux tu?/Sonata, what do you want of me?") that defines and characterizes the new aesthetics but the irrelevance of the very question under the new conditions. The conceptual shift that occurred in the perception of music gave rise to new questions and evaporated old ones.[318] The meaning or goal of instrumental music—or what sonata 'wants' of listeners—turned out to be a trivial matter within the new framework. Being founded on an entirely different bedrock, the new aesthetics did not require instrumental music to have meanings in order to be significant. While the logic of arts was mainly *mimesis* through the eighteenth century, music was always a problematic case since it "did not imitate nature very well."[319] Music, especially instrumental music, was regarded as "vague, incapable of expressing even the simplest objects clearly enough that listeners could figure out what was being represented."[320] Simply put, in the eighteenth century, according to Morrow, instrumental music "meant nothing at all" and "could never rise about the level of empty sound."[321] "If vocal music was *standing* on the bottom rung of the ladder of aesthetic

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[317] The brilliantly written first chapter of Bellamy Hosler's book on the aesthetics of the instrumental music in the eighteenth century provides an excellent explication of the way the problem of the new (Italian) instrumental music was perceived among the German writers and reviewers. At the end of the chapter, she has summarized different aspects of the problem, offering a list of all the issues felt about this music at the time: instrumental music was thought to be meaningless, boring, merely a craft to represent virtuosity and technique, unable to move the listener or provoke moral response, etc. See Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music*, 1-30.

[318] Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic Issues in Instrumental Music* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.

[319] Ibid, 5.

[320] Ibid.

[321] Ibid.

values, instrumental music was clinging by its very fingertips."[322] Drawing on Morrow's thesis

and connecting her claim to the first section of this chapter, I argue that this evaluation of

instrumental music was on the basis of the madrigal principle.

An important assumption of Morrow's study is Carl Dahlhaus's claim that "by 1800 there was

no classical music aesthetics that corresponded to the compositions of Haydn and Mozart."[323]

Morrow's book is an attempt to show that while this claim applies to the aesthetic and

philosophical writings of the eighteenth century, the lighter musical writings of the time show a

different approach. Her study shows that in the last four decades of the century, reviews and

observations that were offered about the instrumental music of the time were, in a sense, some

kind of "preparation" for the new aesthetics that emerged from 1800, the one we mostly refer to

as romanticism. While Morrow's study focuses on the musical writings that were published

before 1799 (when Tieck and Wackenroder's aesthetics writings began to appear), one could

extend her main enquiry into the years around and especially after 1800 and ask what new

assumptions contributed to the formation of a romantic response to a classical dilemma.[324] But

before discussing this response, a closer look at the meaning of the problem would be helpful.

The question "Sonata! What do you want of me?", as Violaine Anger has shown, seems to

have had different meanings even in the short period between Fontenelle (who raised the

question) and the last decade of the eighteenth century (when it received responses in the

romantic notion of musical freedom and independence) and in the musical works that treated

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[322] Ibid.

[323] Ibid, 8. Morrow has provided bibliographical notes regarding similar views in musicology in her endnotes. See Ibid, 160. The main point is summarized in Zeal Zaslaw's statement that "aestheticians of the eighteenth century had difficulties with the concept of 'abstract' art." Neal Alexander Zaslaw, *Mozart's Symphonies: Context, Performance Practice, Reception* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Quoted in Morrow, *German Music Criticism,* 160.

[324] Morrow writes: "By 1799, when Tieck and Wackenroder's essays began the chain of aesthetic events that secured the aesthetic value of abstract, non-mimetic instrumental music, the German-speaking public had already had forty years to get used to the idea. In the same way that an advertising slogan can insinuate an underlying message into the public consciousness much more effectively than a learned essay on consumer trends, the review collective had continuously hammered home the idea of an instrumental music that could and should be judged on its own terms. That task had been accomplished by 1798, the cutoff point for this study. I did not, however, choose that date simply to provide a tidy package of concepts neatly wrapped up before the publications of Tieck and Wackenroder in 1799; other signs indicate that the collective itself had approached a significant juncture in its development." (Morrow, *German Music Criticism,* 151.

instrumental music with principles that promoted an autonomous yet narrative approach to 'pure' musical sounds. If the meaning of the problem itself is historically variant, then the answer must be a specific answer to a specific version or interpretation of the question. An important point about the problem is that it was applicable to a very specific and quite limited repertoire of the seventeenth and eighteenth music: *instrumental music that served no ends.*[325] But the fact that 'pure' instrumental music that was not meant to accompany dance or any other kind of ceremonies did not play a central role in the practice of the time does not minimize the significance of the problem but only verifies the scepticism towards instrumental music.

In her *« Sonate, que me veux-tu ? » Pour penser une histoire du signe,* Anger demonstrates how the question "Sonate, que me veux-tu?" shifted meaning when stated by different authors in different historical contexts from 1750s to 1760s.[326] It is important for Anger to see the gradual development of the aesthetics of instrumental music in the mid-eighteenth century that manages to accept and come to terms with the meaninglessness of instrumental music. However, at each stage, it is the absence of a particular musical element that turns out to be fatal in instrumental works. For Rousseau, as an example, it doesn't matter that the music is not based on a story or a specific feeling or even some kind of abstract narrative, but it is essential to carry some kind of vocal spirit. Anger's view shows a gradual move in the understanding of the question that reflects the move towards the romantic aesthetics of music. The first documented reference to Fontenelle's question is by d'Alembert who complains about and strongly condemns the instrumental music of his time that is "devoid of purpose and object, speaks neither to the spirit nor to the soul and deserves to be asked with Fontenelle: 'Sonata, what do you want from

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[325] Violaine Anger has explicated the question elaborately: "« Sonate, que me veux-tu ? » Cette phrase apocryphe de Fontenelle a fait florès. Comment la musique instrumentale peut-elle intéresser, voire nous toucher, alors qu'elle n'a pas de texte, qu'elle se réduit à du son organisé, sans finalité autre que son existence même ? Ces sons n'accompagnent ni une danse ni une cérémonie quelconque. Une « sonate », prise dans l'acception de Fontenelle, c'est une pièce qui « sonne », par opposition à une « cantate », qui, elle, chante, donc travaille des mots. Comment comprendre l'existence de ce qui ne fait que « sonner » ?" See Violaine Anger, « Sonate que me veux-tu », essai sur la signification musicale, Ens éditions, 2016, Avant-propos (https://books.openedition.org/enseditions/7144)
[326] As Violaine Anger explains, we do not know the original context of the question when first time stated by Fontenelle. See Violaine Anger, « Sonate que me veux-tu ».

me?'" Without "an action or an expression to paint," d'Alembert claims, music is nothing but

noise. Here, the question, or rather the sonata-problem, is nothing but the absence of what turns

music into music, i.e., pre-given rhetorical or expressive meanings, or dance moves.[327] But as

Anger suggests the problem of instrumental music is slightly but significantly different when it

comes to Rousseau. Since music, especially through the melody, works without the mediation of

concepts by a direct access to emotions, music's incapacity of imitating external objects is not a

huge concern for Rousseau. Therefore, the difference between these two "mimetic approaches"

to musical meaning is that, for the first one music must paint external objects to be meaningful

whereas, for the second, music must copy the expressive effects of the voice. Besides this

important difference between the understandings of the sonata-problem, they share an

important feature: instrumental music is not evaluated according to its own terms but rather

based on a realist philosophy that had been developed and established through the madrigalist

musicality.[328]

　　The sonata form as it was perceived and developed, alongside the principles it shaped, was

indeed a response to this problem of intelligibility of instrumental music.[329] Philip T. Barford

has emphasized the significance of sonata as a principle. In his view, the sonata acts as a "basic

standpoint" or "vintage-point" from which one can view the music of the eighteenth century and

"the achievements of Beethoven."[330] The principle is defined as "an inclusive and synthetic mode

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[327] Ibid.

[328] Anger makes clear that a third and a fourth understandings of the sonata-question (offered by Boyé and Herder, respectively) provide the problem with certain answers both of which admitting and celebrating the meaninglessness of instrumental music, therefore advocating for sonic pleasure in music or a transcendent, meditative, and mystical response to the music's purity and freedom from language or the world. See Violaine Anger, « Sonate que me veux-tu ». Whereas Violaine Anger thinks that Rousseau's formulation of the sonata-question and his musical aesthetics goes beyond musical mimesis and rejects the requirement of d'Alembert that "music must imitate," my interpretation of Rousseau differs significantly. I think Rousseau's emphasis on melody in music as the elements that makes music more subjective, by reconstructing the expressive features of voice, although not naively mimetic, it cannot be interpreted as an autonomous understanding of musical sound. According to Rousseau, voice has an immediate link to emotions and for that reason instrumental music must be ruled by the conditions of voice and text and therefore should be more 'singable,' that is less 'instrumental.' In other words, instrumental music should be dependent on the conditions of vocal music.

[329] For a history of the term 'sonata-form' and its first appearances in the music-theoretical writings, other than William S. Newman's three-volume study, see
James A. Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late Eighteenth-Century Sonata*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 14-16.

[330] Philip T. Barford, "The Sonata-principle, a Study of Musical Thought in the 18th Century", *The Music Review*, No.

of musical thought not sufficiently explained by the traditional account of sonata-form or of the conventional structure of the sonata as a whole."[331] From this perspective, sonata principle is not merely a way to arrange musical materials but is a way of thinking about music that "certain general principles of musical structure are expressed in it."[332] In other words, sonata form when conceived as a principle, provides certain conditions that cannot be limited to certain organizational rules, i.e., an "abstract sonata-form scheme," but as Barford suggests, involves a "higher principle of organization" that acts as a program or meaning-giver leading to a "truly organic" music.[333] In a sense, the sonata form conceived under its core principles was paradoxically both *abstract* and *contentful*. On an abstract plane, the sonata was conceived as a form that resulted from the pure activities of tonality: "The essence of such a sonata principle was a (usually harmonic) opposition or polarity set up early in a work, which, after a heightening of resultant tensions, experienced eventual resolution and reconciliation in the last third or so of the piece, principally through tonal adjustments."[334] Whereas this abstract conception of the sonata principle, as Barford maintains, constituted the eighteenth-century (classical) understanding of formal musical thought, the romantic approach to sonata in particular and musical form in general was more complicated. The new romantic language not only shaped the ways in which formal thinking, and especially sonata form was perceived in later thoughts, such as the ones offered by Marx, but also pushed the compositional thought into further exploration of some kind of musical drama within the constraints of abstract musical genres and forms. A perceived exemplar of this abstract type of musical drama, a *prima facie* contradictory category, has been the *Eroica* symphony.

13, 1952, 255.

[331] Ibid.

[332] Ibid.

[333] Ibid, 256.

[334] Mangsen, Sandra, John Irving, John Rink, and Paul Griffiths. "Sonata." *Grove Music Online*. 2001; Accessed 2 Jun. 2020. https://www-oxfordmusiconline-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo-9781561592630-e-0000026191.

Before examining a particular case of dramatic abstraction or abstract drama (depending

where the emphasis is put), an important point must be made here. The notion of musical

autonomy discussed above considers music's independence from text and social functions not as

a total disengagement from the conditions that made vocal music or any kind of 'impure'

instrumental music meaningful. As the musicological studies that have focused on topic theory

during the last four decades show, instrumental music drew on a variety of gestures, stylistic

patterns, phrase structures, types and styles of music, or, in general, *topoi* borrowed from social

and vocal musical genres in particular from the opera and functional music such as music for

dance or even folk music. As the pioneers of topic theory such as Wye J. Allanbrook or its other

recent scholars have demonstrated, the instrumental music of the second half of the eighteenth

century, especially the music of Mozart and Haydn, abounds in the use of these *topics*, what

Robert L. Martin has defined as "allusions within a piece of music to well-known kinds of music

associated with various social settings, such as the hunt, the courtly dance, religious rituals,

etc."[335] Influenced by Ratner's classic study on musical topics, topic theory suggests that the

instrumental music of the late eighteenth century provided a new abstract, formal context for a

novel delivery of originally operatic gestures.[336] The commonality of this musical language and

its reliance on musical allusions to a variety of recognizable styles, genres and types, can be

imagined as possible only in the context of a culture in which music acts as some kind of means

of cultural 'communication,' through which social meanings, values, and preferences are

conveyed.[337] Therefore, it should be noted that the whole idea of musical topics, i.e., a

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[335] Robert L. Martin, "Musical 'Topics' and Expression in Music," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53, no. 4 (1995): 417. Also look at Wye J. Allanbrook, "'Ear-Tickling Nonsense'."

[336] Danuta Mirka, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1-3. Also look at Leonard G. Ratner, *Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1980). As a classic, self-aware writing on topic theory which introduces the most important topoi in a brief helpful manner, see Wye J. Allanbrook, "'Ear-Tickling Nonsense'," 13-14.

[337] Alongside the sources on musical communication introduced in my Prologue, also see Danuta Mirka and V. Kofi Agawu, eds., *Communication in Eighteenth-Century Music* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). In this volume, see in particular the introduction written by Danuta Mirka as well as "Listening to Listeners" by Mark Evan Bonds. Also look at the "Communication and verisimilitude in the eighteenth century," written by Paul Cobley. In the "Afterward" Kofi that Agawu has written to the collection of articles published in the book, he discusses some of the challenges that the idea of 'music as communication' must face. See Ibid, 310 ff.

dissociation between a musical gesture, technique, or device from its original context (textual or

functional) and introducing it in a new context that, in Martin's words "provid[es] a musical link

to the extramusical," is nothing but an exemplification of the particular notion of musical

autonomy that is not purely formalistic.[338] This autonomy is not equal to musical abstraction:

while the musical or elemental difference between the first and second themes of a sonata-form

movement may in one sense appear autonomous—i.e., dissociated from any specific

representational difference between two themes such as the semantic difference of two verses in

a poem, or two different characters in a drama—as scholars like Mary Hunter have shown, the

difference draws on concrete melodic, rhythmic, and textural grounds rooted in music's

historical engagement with the text, social functions, and drama. The influence is complex:

while instrumental music is 'enriched with' topicality through the historical involvement of

musical elements with the representation and construction of drama (as in opera), it shows

capacities that are not easily found in vocal music.[339] Mary Hunter captures this seemingly

paradoxical moment in her elaboration on the relationship between instrumental music and

comic opera in the late eighteenth century. Exploring the "instrumental music's readiness for

the comic mode," she shows that in the understanding of the eighteenth-century musical

thought, chamber music (the purely instrumental music of the time), was more flexible for

incorporating dramatic effects in it: "It was an eighteenth-century commonplace—uttered

throughout the century—that the *Cammerstyl*—that is, the style of most purely instrumental

music—allowed for a more disjunctive (and, by implication, topically or affectively various)

melodic progress than could the church and theater styles."[340] The fact that 'purely instrumental

music' was perceived to be more capable than sacred or operatic music of the representation of

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[338] Martin, "Musical 'Topics' and Expression in Music," 417.
[339] Mary Hunter's "Topics and Opera Buffa" includes musical examples from eighteenth-century instrumental compositions from a variety of genres such as concertos, symphonies, and string quartets that manifest the subtle ways in which instrumental music was dealing with operatic topics. Mary Hunter, "Topics and Opera Buffa," in Danuta Mirka, *The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory*.
[340] Mary Hunter, "Topics and Opera Buffa," in Danuta Mirka, *The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory*, 72.

dramatic action or movement, confirms yet at the same time transcends the abstract

understanding of musical autonomy.

Instrumental music's flexibility in developing and expanding on the operatic suggestions, in

Hunter's view, made it possible for this music to draw on but also go beyond representational

language:

> Instrumental music, with its propensity to variety and expressive subtlety and/or
> multiplicity, was in a sense by midcentury already discursively primed not only to
> accommodate the topical mélange of opera buffa, but also to turn it into
> something more finely wrought. In other words, opera buffa was surely a potent
> resource for topical variety in instrumental music, but sonatas and symphonies
> also translated the habits of opera into instrumental music's already well
> established habits of variety and fluidity.[341]

In other words, musical quotes that referred or alluded to topoi were not necessarily (and

indeed most often not) direct. The background topical knowledge required to make operatic

gestures intelligible in case they are used out of their context, let's say in a string quartet, acts

similar to a shared language which offers a common ground but could always been transcended,

played with, and its rules being bent.[342]

Listening to European music with ears that are informed of topicality, or based on a

communicational approach, is not limited to the interpretation of eighteenth century

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[341] Ibid, 73. Focusing on the sonata form as an idea or concept that was significantly influential in shaping 'pure' instrumental music by providing a solution to the meaning problem this type of music was facing in the eighteenth century, is not a denial of the prominence and popularity of opera in many European cities in the nineteenth century. One can easily notice that the problem that sonata faced in the eighteenth century was not experienced by opera at all. If the nineteenth-century opera faced any problems at all, it must have been of a different nature. Contrary to instrumental music that needed to incorporate semantic elements from vocal music in order to overcome the sonata-problem, opera composers felt they had to make this dramatic genre sound more "musical" or, in a sense, more "instrumental." The nineteenth-century insistence on coherence in the structure of the opera reflected in Wagnerian strategies such as thematic transformation or the extensive and structural use of leitmotiv, might be interpreted as the extension of the logic of instrumental music into vocal music.

[342] I am using language as an analogy here. I do not think that eighteenth-century writers, despite their rhetorical or expressive associations between music and language, had any doubts about significant distinctions between music and language. As an example, Engel's treatment of this matter—which sounds still fresh—does not lead to the identity of music and language. He maintained that music is different from both language and painting. Unlike language, music lacks any kind of arbitrary signs that represent general notions and unlike painting it cannot bring an object before the perception of the senses through the use of natural signs. What music can do is to create a sonic resemblance between its signs and the related objects; musician uses tones as natural signs to "stimulate representation of other related objects." (Strunk, *Source Readings*, 955). See chapter one in this dissertation for further discussion of Engel's music aesthetics.

compositions. It also includes a semiotic understanding of the musical style of the nineteenth century, which on the surface seems to be inconsistent with the romantic perception of music under non-imagery terms. Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, the power of topic theory in revealing moments of communication between the composer/composition and the audience can help us understand the complexity of romantic conception of music in the late and early nineteenth centuries. In other words, unless we attempt to expose a later formalistic notion of music on early romantic understanding, it is the seemingly paradoxical combination of musical autonomy and musical expression (a dramatic approach to the sonata) that characterizes the ways in which the 'pure' instrumental music of Beethoven and next generation was received. In this respect, while my brief discussion of the opening theme of the Beethoven's *Eroica* symphony (Op. 55) below, and its contemporary perception seeks to show ways in which it dissociates from the principles that governed older musical thought, it nonetheless avoids listening to the work under later structural, and in many cases merely formalistic terms.[343]

The novelty of Beethoven's third symphony, especially its first movement, is probably the main reason why the work has secured a strong consensus among its contemporary and modern listeners, commentators and musicologists.[344] After the public premiere of the symphony, which happened on April 7th, 1805, some—but not all—listeners found the work ground-breaking, ingenious, and belonging to the future. A review written right after this performance observed a common response according to which the *Eroica* "does not please at present, it is because the public is not sufficiently educated in art to be able to grasp all of these elevated beauties. After a

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[343] My references to the perception of Beethoven's *Eroica* are not based on an examination of the topoi in this work. For a brilliant study of the symphony from this perspective, see Vasili Byros, "Topics and Harmonic Schemata: A Case from Beethoven," in Danuta Mirka, *The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory,* 381-414. Following and drawing on his own extensive and elaborate PhD dissertation, Byros offers a discursive understanding of the symphony listening to it as a philosophical 'treatise' which communicates themes of "suffering, self-sacrifice, and death." For a more general study of Beethoven with a semantic approach see Robert S. Hatten, *Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

[344] Scott Burnham has referred to "the usual bias toward first movements," which according to him applies to A. B. Marx's analysis of the *Eroica* too. See Adolf Bernhard Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on Theory and Method*, ed. Scott G. Burnham (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 157.

few thousand years, however, they will not fail to have their effect."[345] The work was also

perceived as a convoluted and complex symphony that although "contains many beautiful

qualities," was nonetheless experienced as "perhaps most difficult of all symphonies" which

"exhausts even connoisseurs, becoming unbearable to the mere amateur."[346] Those who

denounced the work agreed on its unprecedented features such as "strange modulations and

violent transitions, [and] placing together the most heterogeneous things" and stressed the

novelty of the musical language emphasizing its being "difficult and too long."[347] The main

concern behind these sorts of critique was intelligibility:

> They fear, however, that if Beethoven continues on this path, both he and the
> public will come off badly. Music could quickly come to such a point, that
> everyone who is not precisely familiar with the rules and difficulties of the art
> would find absolutely no enjoyment in it, but, oppressed instead by a multitude of
> unrelated and overabundant ideas and a continuous tumult of the combined
> instruments, would leave the concert hall with only an unpleasant feeling of
> exhaustion.[348]

Beethoven himself had announced his determination for creating a new musical language. A few

years before *Eroica* was composed, he wrote to a friend: "I am far from satisfied with my past

works: from today on I shall take a new way,"—a decision that seemed to receive the 'right'

response from listeners.[349] Gerald Abraham's comment that alongside the fifth symphony, the

third's first movement "set a new standard of musical logic, of symphonic thought (if you will, of

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[345] *Der Freymüthige* vol. 3, Vienna, 17 April 1805 (17 April 1805): 332. Reprinted in translation in Wayne M. Senner, Robin Wallace, and William Rhea Meredith, eds., *The Critical Reception of Beethoven's Compositions by His German Contemporaries* (Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press, in association with the American Beethoven Society and the Ira F. Brilliant Center for Beethoven Studies, San José State University, Vol. 2, 2001), 15.
[346] *Der Freymüthige* vol. 3, Vienna, 17 April 1805 (17 April 1805): 332. Reprinted in translation in Senner, Wallace, and Meredith, *The Critical Reception of Beethoven's Compositions by His German Contemporaries*, 15.
[347] Ibid.
[348] Ibid, 16.
[349] Beethoven's famous emphasis on the novelty of the Eroica is based on Carl Czerny's quote. He stated: "About the year 1800, when Beethoven had composed Opus 28 he said to his intimate friend, Krumpholz: 'I am far from satisfied with my past works: from today on I shall take a new way.' Shortly after this appeared his three sonatas Opus 31, in which one may see that he had partially carried out his resolve." O. G. Sonneck, ed., *Beethoven, Impressions of Contemporaries*. (New York: G. Schirmer, 1926), 31.

musical organism)" is common knowledge among not only Beethoven scholars but many music-lovers.[350]

The novelty of *Eroica* has been explained in a variety of ways some of which refer to the specifically musical aspects of the work as its harmonic, thematic, rhythmic, or/and formal procedures while others refer to philosophical meanings by exploring to some kind of consciousness as the main 'theme' or achievement of the symphony, particularly the first movement. Scott Burnham, writing on Beethoven's heroic style, suggests that 'Beethoven's music successfully models human self-consciousness. [His heroic] works […] enact an affirmative model of the development of self while projecting a sense of awareness of the full course of that development."[351] The fusion of both structural and 'programmatic' interpretation of Beethoven's heroic style is evident in most of the old and new commentators of various compositions in this style, including the *Eroica*. Burnham writes,

> [t]he telling presence of Beethoven's heroic style—the narration that somehow enacts, the enactment that somehow narrates—gives this music its special place as the deepest keynote of the *Goethezeit*. For the quality of a perspective simultaneously subjective and objective allows the heroic style its particular presence as a modelling of ironic self-consciousness, while the narrated projection of an end-oriented process both linear and cyclical (and thus spiral) expresses the ethos of the self as hero—whether as an individual realizing a personal destiny or as the cosmos coming to know itself. The great defining experiment of the age of both Goethe and Hegel was to model consciousness in this way. Beethoven simply does it best.[352]

A simultaneously subjective and objective reading of the heroic style, one that finds traces of self-consciousness in autonomous, absolute compositions is not a recent musicological approach. As early as 1859, A.B. Marx not only testifies that "the heroic symphony, […] has held our attention for so long already", but also announces that the work is not just a masterpiece; it

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[350] Gerald Abraham, *A Hundred Years of Music*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1964), 26.

[351] Scott G. Burnham, *Beethoven Hero* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 142.

[352] Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, 146.

is the beginning of a process that defines music as paradoxically an autonomous and dramatic art at the same time; *Eroica*, he writes, "is not merely one great work among others; in addition, it initiates a new era for the arts and, as far as we can judge from all the evidence within music and outside of it, *it is definitive for the realm of musical art* [my emphasis]. For it is that work in which musical art without allying itself with the poet's word or the dramatist's plot autonomously and with an autonomous work first leaves the play of formation and of vague excitations and feelings for the sphere of more lucid and determined consciousness, in which it comes of age, now placing itself, as a peer, in the circle of its sister arts. This progress cannot be superseded; it can only be further pursued, with greater or lesser success, within the newly attained sphere."[353]

This consciousness has been related by scholars to, probably the most important 'character' (maybe a villain?) in this symphony, the C# that appears on the downbeat of m. 7 in example 4, after we have heard two emphatic Eb major chords on the downbeats of measures 1 and 2, as well as a theme that—as Richard Taruskin puts it—is structured in an Eb major 'arpeggio' format on cellos. The sudden appearance of the C# as a distant dissonance that cannot be easily connected to the home key (Eb) is most likely the main reason why this single note has attracted so much attention. This "uncanny chromatic note," according to Richard Taruskin, "is possibly the most famous single note in the entire symphonic literature, for the way it flatly contradicts all the fanfare's implications."[354] The first movement of *Eroica* is, in one sense, about this C#; it has been perceived not merely as a dissonant note that reflects or depicts a musical tension but as the main element of a process that shapes the subject (main theme) , or as the beginning of an unrest that triggers a process of 'Becoming' and "a sense of turbulent dynamic *growth*" [my emphasis].[355] [...] The theme is not so much presented as it is achieved—achieved through struggle." This "struggle-and-achievement paradigm" (in Taruskin's words) has been an

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[353] Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven*, 174-5.
[354] Taruskin, *Music in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 658.
[355] Ibid, 659.

influential factor in the interpretation of the first movement of *Eroica*, as a sonorous reflection

of the human subject's political, social, or psychological self-realization.[356]

Example 4 Ludwig van Beethoven, *Eroica Symphony*, mm. 1-12

Interpretations of the *Eroica* as music that is about the self and consciousness is strongly

connected to another observation made about Beethoven's music in general: that in essence,

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[356] Ibid.

Beethoven's music is, simply, about music itself. Charles Rosen writes: "The use of the simplest elements of the tonal system as themes lay at the heart of Beethoven's personal style from the beginning. It was only little by little, however, that he realized its implications."[357] The opening theme of *Eroica*, as the paragon of a conscious use of this compositional strategy, starts with an expression of the tonic chord that, with its arpeggio articulation, is the very expression of tonality's possibilities and capabilities more than anything else.[358] It is indeed the quick appearance of the C# that makes the opening theme sound retrospectively as a pure expression of tonality; similarly, the dissonant entrance of the C# is heard as a threat against the theme, which is treated in the rest of the work not only as the hero of this 'music drama' but also the integrity, stability and 'meaning' of tonality itself, which is imperiled by this internal-external menace represented by C#. This aligns with Adorno's understanding of Beethoven's music as the artistic form in which the idea of *totality* is sonically embodied.[359] The C# is, from this perspective, a sonorous representation of the *border* that is needed to be drawn so that the 'musical subject,' i.e., the theme, sees itself in the mirror of the otherness.[360] It is, in a sense, music about music, or as it were, music thinking musically. It should be noted that the first appearance of the C# occurs on the cellos, the instruments that are playing the main theme; indeed, the C# could be heard as both the last note of the main theme as well as an external

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[357] Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 389.

[358] Although Taruskin has shown that Beethoven's main theme is similar to an opening theme from a Mozart's piano work, there are many other examples in Beethoven's works that show the same strategy. Other examples of this simplicity: Beethoven's piano sonata op. 57, his second Razumowsky quartet op. 59, op. 12/1; op. 30/3; op 70/1; op. 73; op. 96; and Op. 26. (This list is used from Thomas Pfau's "Etiology, Function, Structure, (with some reflections on Beethoven)" in Anja Ernst and Paul Geyer, eds., *Die Romantik: Ein Gründungsmythos Der Europäischen Moderne* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2010), 135.

[359] See Theodor W. Adorno, *Beethoven, the Philosophy of Music: Fragments and Texts*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), and Rose Rosengard Subotnik, "Adorno's Diagnosis of Beethoven's Late Style: Early Symptom of a Fatal Condition," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 29, no. 2 (1976): 242–75.

[360] One might compare this understanding of the relation between the 'musical subject' and the C# or otherness in the opening theme with what early Wittgenstein had in mind when discussing the relationship between the world and thought. He defined the task of his early philosophy as "to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e;., we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)." See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, (NY: Routledge, 1974), 3. Also, my use of the term 'musical subject' draws on Adorno. See Theodor W. Adorno, *Prisms*, 1st MIT Press ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 156.

attack on the main theme disrupting its integrity and wholeness, its being. The C# *is* and *is not*

part of the theme; it is the self and the other at the same time. In a sense, it draws the borders

within which the *self* is located. Through this journey of self-consciousness, the musical self

becomes aware of this relationship and finally defines its own integrity dissociated from the

dissonant C#: a reflective, ironic position to oneself through which the self is constructed.

This particular conception of the sonata form as a romantic reconstruction of a whole or

totality is reflected in the early romantic conception of art in general whose essence is

characterized as what Schlegel called *romantische Poesie*. In Fragment no. 116 from *Athenaeum*

Fragments (*Athenäums-Fragmente*), which J. M. Bernstein describes as "probably the most

famous, most frequently quoted of all Schlegel's fragments," Friedrich Schlegel offers a broad

conception of romantic poetry as the essence of art, life and nature:

> Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry. Its aim isn't merely to reunite
> all the separate species of poetry and put poetry in touch with philosophy and
> rhetoric. It tries to and should mix and fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and
> criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature; and make poetry lively and
> sociable, and life and society poetical; [...] It alone can become, like the epic, a
> mirror of the whole circumambient world, an image of the age. The romantic kind
> of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it
> should forever be becoming and never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no
> theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare try to characterize its ideal. It
> alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment
> that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself. The romantic kind of
> poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, that is, as it were, poetry itself: for
> in a certain sense all poetry is or should be romantic. [...][361]

The excerpt demonstrates some of the essential aspects of early romantic thought; that the

essence of all arts are one thing and through that the entire world, i.e., nature and human life

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[361] Friedrich von Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 31.

become works of art, that is poeticized. This has been further explained by Frederick C. Beiser.

Underlining *romantische Poesie* (romantic poetry) as a central theme of the early romanticism,

Beiser thinks that the main goal of romantic art is to romanticize the modern fragmented world.

The assumption behind this romantic view is that the modern world, unlike the ancient world, is

not a 'round', or in Schlegel words "a whole circumambient" world and the purpose of art, i.e.,

romantic art—and all arts should become romantic of course—is to create that lost roundness,

what Schlegel believed epic was capable of doing it in the pre-modern world. The modern world

can become a whole only through this romantic *poesie*, because as quoted above Schlegel

believes that "it alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, an

image of the age." *Poesie*, as Beiser explains, is nothing but the process of creativity and

productivity offered by the human subject as a practice of human freedom. This broad

understanding of poetry, as an essence of the romantic art, is widespread among the romantics,

and is reflected in Beethoven's understanding of his own productive activity. He referred to his

act of composing as "poetising" and writing to the poet Augustus Von Kotzebue, he expressed his

readiness to transfer the poet's "poetic soul" to his own "musical soul."[362] When publishing his

overture *zur Namensfeier* in 1825 (the work had been completed and first performed in 1815),

instead of simply saying 'komponiert' (composed) he used the term "gedichtet" (poetised or

poeticized).[363]

    The perceived goal of this poeticization or romanticization is best expressed by Novalis in his

often-quoted imperative claim that "the world must be romanticized. This yields again its

original meaning."[364] According to romantic thinkers and writers such as Novalis, the way in

which one could and should romanticize the world in order to make it a whole is at the same

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[362] Ludwig van Beethoven, *Beethoven's Letters*, ed. A. Eaglefield Hull, trans. J. S. Shedlock (New York: Dover Publications, 1972), 126.
[363] For a discussion of the poetic content of the piece, see Jonathan Kregor, *Program Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). In a letter to Bettina von Arnim, Beethoven wrote: "A musician is also a poet, and the magic of a pair of eyes can suddenly cause him to feel transported into a more beautiful world, where great spirits make sport of him, and set him mighty tasks." Beethoven. *Beethoven's Letters*, 135.
[364] See Novalis, *Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia : Das Allgemeine Brouillon*, ed. David W. Wood (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), xvi.

time the only way in which the world could have any meaning whatsoever. For the romantics,

this modern yearned-for wholeness was in a very essential manner different from the

premodern 'circumambient' world; unlike the latter, the former needed to be constructed in a

subjective fashion, because in the modern fragmented world it was only "the human spirit [that]

impresses its law on all things" transforming "the world [into] its work of art."[365] Beiser suggests

that from a romantic perspective, the literary genre in which this transformation could have

occurred in its perfect way, was indeed not poetry itself, but novel. Referring to Schlegel's

fragment that "every human being [...] contains a novel within himself", Beiser writes: "to

romanticize the world meant to make our lives into a novel or poem, so that they would regain

the meaning, mystery, and magic they had lost in the fragmented modern world."[366] The

creation, or recreation, of this lost wholeness, from a romantic perspective, was the subject's

practice and experience of freedom too. As A. B. Marx suggested in his writing on Beethoven's

Eroica, "insofar as man fashions the pressing circumstances and moods of real life into art, he

feels himself to be the master of this self-created world, and in its transfiguring reflection he

feels redeemed and freed from the real world."[367] In other words, 'poeticization' of the world

through art and music provided a condition for some kind of subjective redemption.

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[365] Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, 39.

[366] Frederick C. Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 19. Also, see Bonds, *Music as Thought*, 70. Bonds writes: "Schlegel recognized that this idea of integration was revolutionary, hence his juxtaposition of Goethe's novel with Fichte's treatise and the recent events in France. What all three phenomena share is a striving to overcome fragmentation, to make whole that which had been separated: subject and object, in the case of Fichte's philosophy; individual and society, in the case of Goethe's novel; levels of society, in the case of the French Revolution. All three manifest the fundamental drive of humanity to achieve a fuller degree of self-realization in ways ranging from the abstract (Fichte's epistemology) to the concrete (the French Revolution). These extremes are mediated by the individual (the title character of *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*), who must use both thought and action to acquire the kind of *Bildung* needed to integrate himself into the larger whole of society. What Schlegel considered characteristic of his era, then, was not merely these three phenomena in and of themselves—important as each might be in its own right—but their collective breadth and interconnectedness." Ibid, 70. Also, see "In the Time of *Eroica*" by Reinhold Brinkmann (translated by Irene Zedlacher) in Scott G. Burnham and Michael P. Steinberg, eds. *Beethoven and His World*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). Focusing on the German understanding of the French Revolution in the years around 1800, Brinkmann refers to German writers and philosophers such as Schlegel and Hegel who had all emphasized "the contrast between the thinking German with the acting Frenchman." For Hegel, German philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling was an intellectual parallel to the French Revolution. And for Schlegel (writing in 1798), the German offered a scientific and artistic expression of the French social life. Ibid, 3-5.

[367] Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven*, 176.

This romantic view was pursued further in Georg Lukács' *The Theory of the Novel* (1916); [368] although the book was published over a century after the early romantics such as Schlegel reflected on the philosophy of the novel, the book is written based on the same assumptions that informed the romantic understanding of the art's role in the modern world. The philosophical foundations of Lukács' theory of form is based on a Hegelian approach to the historicality of the self-world or self-nature relationship.[369] The epic as the main type of the premodern narrative genre developed in the ancient Greek time represents a conception of 'self' that is completely different from the one expressed in the modern age; the ancient self's access to the world was "immediate," and according to Lukács, this immediacy (or the unity of world and self) was reflected in the epic as a literary genre. The epic was not an effort to create a totality; it was a mirror in front of a pregiven totality or rather an "immediate wholeness" which already existed in real life. Consequently, the epic was not meant to give meaning or essence to real life. In Bernstein's words, "crudely, the epic world is one in which no distinction, analytic or otherwise, can be drawn between [life and form as] two components of experience,"[370] and as Fredric Jameson summarizes Lukács' viewpoint on the topic, "in [the epic], meaning or essence is still immanent to life, and genuine narration, epic narration, is possible only when daily life is still felt to be meaningful and immediately comprehensible down to its smallest details."[371]

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[368] A preliminary draft of my Lukács's section in this chapter was part of a paper that was submitted to a seminar taught by Professor Maryam Moshaver. In rewriting this section, I found her comments on the paper very useful.

[369] Hegel writes: "On account of the objectivity of the whole epic, the poet as subject must retire in the face of his object and lose himself in it. Only the product, not the poet, appears…. Because the epic presents not the poet's own inner world but the objective events, the subjective side of the production must be put into the background precisely as the poet completely immerses himself in the world which he unfolds before our eyes. This is why the great epic style consists in the work's seeming to be its own minstrel and appearing independently without having any author to conduct it or be as its head." G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, translated by T.M. Knox, Vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 1048-9. Quoted in Bernstein, 1984: 50-1.

[370] J. M. Bernstein, *The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism, and the Dialectics of Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 50.

[371] Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and Form; Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 170. Bernstein's summary of the life/form relation in Lukács might be illuminating here. He writes, "The theoretical pair which function throughout *The Theory of the Novel* as the bearers of conceptual coherence are 'form' and 'life'. Form is what in-forms, gives order and structure to any material substratum. […] [Forms] are principles of intelligibility in the dual sense of the cognisable and the meaningful; where it is assumed that not everything which is comprehensible is thereby meaningful. Life is what is in-formed by form; it is experience in its immediacy and vitality, with all its attendant corporeality and complexity. For Lukács life is not a bare substratum for the play of forms; it includes pains and pleasures, fears and desires, even social practices. But these of themselves do not make a life meaningful; they are rather a potential for meaningfulness. Finally, it goes without

The epic stands in contrast with the novel as the narrative form of the modern world. The novel, not only as a genre but also as a *form*, responds to the modern break in the totality of life and meaning. By creating a world through a subjective form, the novel restores the fragmented pieces of the modern world—a world, which can rely neither on God nor myth for its meaning— subjectively (produced by the human subject), and in so doing, creates a conceptual wholeness. The wholeness created in the novel is "artificial" rather than organic and natural, because the novel as a form responds to a modern problem: "The novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life is no longer directly given, in which the immanence of meaning in life has become a problem, yet which still thinks in terms of totality."[372] Thus, from one perspective, the difference between the epic and the novel is a mirror or representation of the worlds to which they are exposed. Whereas the epic, if it gives any kind of "form," gives it to "a totality of life that is rounded from within, the novel seeks, by giving form, to uncover and construct the concealed totality of life."[373] The "process" of giving form or structure to the world, is a subjective one that transcends the "objective" or the "directly given," since in the modern world the meaning of life is not immanent to it. Life's meaning awaits a "form-giving intention," through which the subject expresses his "recognition that neither objective life nor its relationship to the subject is spontaneously harmonious in itself."[374] This distinction between the epic and the novel directly affects the heroes of these two literary forms. Since the epic hero is not estranged from the world—he is part of the world, and therefore is not technically an individual or a subject—and the epic does not receive its formal totality through a subjective "process" of form-giving. Because the form is immanent in the epic, Lukács believes that "the

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saying, this dualism is primarily conceptual and not ontological, for it is just the understanding of the locus of form, its ground and origin, which fluctuates throughout the course of history." (Bernstein, *The Philosophy of the Novel*, 49-50.)

[372] György Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (London,: Merlin Press, 1971), 56. I use the word "artificial" in a neutral sense, meaning what for its essential identity needs to go through a *human* process of acting or making vs the "natural" which is "what is" independent of any subjective interference (any interference done/mediated by the human subject).

[373] Ibid, 60.

[374] Ibid.

epic hero is, strictly speaking, never an individual."[375] This stands in a sharp contrast with the

novel whose hero is exactly "the product of estrangement from the outside world." Lukács'

distinction between the premodern and modern conditions that shape the drastically different

relationships between the self and the world, as well as between selves can illuminate the point:

> When the world is internally homogeneous, men do not differ qualitatively from
> one another; there are of course heroes and villains, pious men and criminals, but
> even the greatest hero is only a head taller than the mass of his fellows, and the
> wise man's dignified words are heard even by the most foolish. The autonomous
> life of interiority is possible and necessary only when the distinctions between
> men have made an unbridgeable chasm; when the gods are silent and neither
> sacrifices nor the ecstatic gift of tongues can solve their riddle; when the world of
> deeds separates itself from men and, because of this independence, becomes
> hollow and incapable of absorbing the true meanings of deeds in itself, incapable
> of becoming a symbol through deeds and dissolving them in turn into symbols;
> when interiority and adventure are forever divorced from one another.[376]

On the other hand, Lukács believes that "the completeness, the roundness of the value system

which determines the epic cosmos creates a whole which is too organic for any part of it to

become so enclosed within itself, so dependent upon itself, as to find itself as an interiority—i.e.,

to become a personality."[377] Therefore, the relation between self and world (subject and nature)

has, according to Lukács, changed historically. The novel as a form fits the world in which the

human subject stands in an autonomous position in relation with the rest of the world. Form

responds to the separation between self and world by offering a subjective, autonomous way of

giving a conceptual totality to the materials in a fragmented world. The modern life's

meaninglessness, i.e., the absence of any wholeness that was immediate in the epic world can be

only overcome through a formally subjective and autonomous organization.[378]

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[375] Ibid, 66.
[376] Ibid. See Bernstein, *The Philosophy of the Novel*, 49-55 for his interpretation of Lukács' claim that the epic world did not include individuals or in Bernstein's words, it was "subjectless."
[377] Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, 66.
[378] Lukács writes: "Where no aims are directly given, the structures which the soul, in the process of *becoming-man,* encounters as the arena and sub-stratum of its activity among men lose their obvious roots in supra-personal ideal necessities; they are simply existent, perhaps powerful, perhaps frail, but they neither carry the consecration of the

Sonata form, from this romantic perspective, is a form that goes beyond being merely a pre-given form-provider or material-arranger.[379] It is the form of a sonorous world with lost contexts of meaning and a possible structure for the musical embodiment of human's self-assertion and search for autonomy, or as Scott Burnham has stressed, "sonata form emerges as the chief vehicle of [the] type of unity [that integrates the greatest possible degree of variety]."[380] Sonata form is a *formal* response to the modern break in the totality of sound and meaning represented in the sonata as a genre and instrumental music in general.[381] By constructing a world out of an autonomous form, the sonata, similar to the novel, puts together the fragmented pieces of the modern notion of music—a sonorous world, which cannot rely on God, the text, or any social functions for its meaning—and thereby *subjectively* restores a wholeness.[382] The sonata might appear to be indifferent or devoid of sympathy with the external reality. However, although the sonata as a form avoids any direct correspondence with the world, it nonetheless creates a symbolic structure—in this case a subjectively made symbol—that offers an alternative for a context, not a worldly or objective context, but a subjective one. Here, the modern form exemplified in sonata form acts as a subjective context of meaning, rather than an objective set

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absolute within them nor are they the natural containers for the overflowing interiority of the soul. They form the world of convention, a world from whose all-embracing power only the innermost recesses of the soul are exempt, a world which is present everywhere in a multiplicity of forms too complex for understanding. Its strict laws, both in becoming and in being, are necessarily evident to the cognizant subject, but despite its regularity, it is a world that does not offer itself either as meaning to the aim-seeking subject or as matter, in sensuous immediacy, to the active subject. It is a second nature, and, like nature (first nature), it is determinable only as the embodiment of recognized but senseless necessities and therefore it is incomprehensible, unknowable in its real substance." Ibid, 62.

[379] See Anthony J. Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The writer, in the second chapter gives a postmodern/critical reading of Lukács's theory.

[380] Scott Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, 66.

[381] According to Beiser, in his study of the early Gemran Romanticism in *The Romantic Imperative*, Friedrich Schlegel had the same view about modern literature in the early years of German romanticism: "The great vice of modern literature—its eclecticism—now became its great virtue. Its mixture of styles was now proof of that restless striving for wholeness, that eternal longing for unity, that was characteristic of modernity. It was the task of the modern age, Schlegel believed, to recreate the wholeness and unity of the ancient world, but now on a more sophisticated and self-conscious level that provided for the freedom and equality of every- one. What had once been given by nature to the ancient Greeks—unity with oneself, with others, and with nature—now had to be recovered through free activity by modern man. Modern literature, in its creative use of many styles, expressed this striving to regain wholeness and totality." In this regard, Beiser refers to two of Schlegel's writings: his early essay "Vom Wert des Studiums der Griechen und Römer," KA I, 621–642, and *Ueber das Studium der griechische Poesie*, KA I, 232–233. See Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, 12.

[382] Seth Monahan has discussed Georg Lukács' influence on Adorno's understanding of the symphony from a novelistic perspective. Using Hepokoski and Darcy's work on sonata form, he extends the analogy to the novel-sonata relation. See Seth Monahan, *Mahler's Symphonic Sonatas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), and James A. Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, *Elements of Sonata Theory Norms*.

of rules to organize and shape sonic materials. It is in this context that sonata might be considered as a form that goes beyond form, not only transcending its own conditions but also sublating (i.e., preserving and canceling) the conditions of the madrigal as a principle by relying on music's own inner rules rather than text to offer elements of dramatic events. Sonata becomes an abstract drama, a textless madrigal.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

The dual nature of the sonata form—being romantic, i.e., dramatic, and abstract at the same time—offered a solution to the historical problem of the sonata as a genre; broadly speaking, sonata principle as a solution to the historical problem of modern music in general. The "sonata problematic" or "sonata problem," expressed in the statement "Sonata! What do you want of me?", was the destined challenge of modern music that necessitated looking for other sources of meaningfulness in music. The critical significance and role of form not only in the compositional thinking but in the entire musical thought of the late eighteenth century and after that is organizing musical sounds but as a principle that could (and in a romantic sense, must) be applied to any kind of musical organization, was a response to this historical issue. The principle, at the heart of which lies a notion of 'organic unity' mirrors the early German romantic concept of *romantische Poesie*.

It is indeed the idea of *a subjective reconstruction or restoring the lost unity* (the activity of the inner life to make the external world meaningful) that comprises the core of the sonata form and the novel or the *romantische Poesie*. In his "Form in Music," Marx makes a strong connection between the concept of form and reason; form is reason, the subjective element that shapes the reality or matter.[383] "Art is reason in sensuous appearance; reason is its condition and its content."[384] he says: "Gaining shape—form—is nothing other than self-determination, a

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[383] Marx, *Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven,* 55-90.
[384] Ibid, 60.

being-for-itself apart from the Other." So, "form is not the opposite of content but its

determination."385 Music, in Marx's view, *is* music only through form, identified by him with

reason. In this respect, sonic materials need form or reason, a subjective condition, to become

music. For Marx, "to renounce form *per se*: this is to return to spiritual chaos."386 This modern

understanding of the musical form, similar to the earlier romantic conception of *Poesie* (or the

novel) introduces music per se as a subjective reality, i.e., as an art conditioned by the subject. In

short, whereas in the older conception of music it was the sacred text and rituals, and later with

the madrigal and operatic music the mimetic relationship with the reality that provided the

rational or the transcendental (non-objective) context of meaning, in the modern situation it is

form that gives the music its transcendental component, its non-objective reality. The reality of

modern music is subjective: "The spirit sets its musical content in musical form, sets it firmly

and, by so doing, comes to itself, its law, and its consciousness."387

Marx's understanding of music demonstrates a sharp contrast with the way music was

perceived through the madrigal principle. Unlike the painterly function of music and its

representational relationship with the outer world and the inner emotions, the new conception

builds the musical [or the musical world] in a different realm: "Only music appears as that

solitary maiden, not of this world, of whom the poet, speaking for most of us, would well have

had to say: 'one knew not from whence it came:' For music stands the farthest from the

appearances and language of worldly life; [my emphasis] because of this, life offers only the

faintest clue for music and its deeper understanding."388 Marx's Hegelian approach to musical

form, similar to Lukács's study of the development of the Western 'forms' of narration, is

evident in his historical understanding of musical forms. The historical development of forms in

music is the history of consciousness: "a history of forms (the like of which has not yet been

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385 Ibid.
386 Ibid, 90.
387 Ibid, 61.
388 Ibid, 61-62.

written and must remain unwritten for some time yet) would narrate the evolution of spirit in

music."[389] For Marx, musical form is the way in which the modern subject not only shapes the

world or life—in Schlegel's words, 'poeticizes' the world—but also experiences freedom:

> This is again a form of play, for the circumstances and their consequences are not
> really assigned from out-side; they are freely created in the formative spirit in the
> imagination, within which the spirit forms and shapes. But insofar as man
> fashions the pressing circumstances and moods of real life into art, he feels
> himself to be the master of this self-created world, and in its transfiguring
> reflection he feels redeemed and freed from the real world. In this resides the
> ecstasy of artistic creation and the consolation of art, its power of renewal for all
> those willing to receive it…"[390]

The perceived relationship between form and human consciousness, as Scott Burnham has

observed, is related originally to how Beethoven's music was experienced as representing the

musical values of "the heroic style." The enduring impact of these musical, Beethovenian values

("thematic/motivic development, end-orientation and unequivocal closure, form a process, and

the inexorable presence of line") is reflected not only in the music history after Beethoven but

also as how music as concept has been shaped by these values, so much that "Beethoven's music

is heard as the voice of Music itself."[391] And from this perspective, the heroic style is not only a

particular way in which Beethoven's music sonically represented human consciousness but went

further to represent a sense of purposiveness in music. It is indeed analogous to the sonata

principle, as it has been perceived theoretically and practically. Drawing on Berger's analysis of

the sonata form, the goal-oriented nature of musical time and the contribution of all elements to

that direction, is indeed how modern music connects to the modern human subjectivity. Strictly

speaking, the sonata form is the form of the modern world, the form of a fragmented world in

which only a linear, forward-looking, and progressive activity can lead to the formation of

meaning. Unlike the epic (demonstrated in Homeric texts), where according to Bernstein there

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[389] Ibid, 65.
[390] Ibid, 176.
[391] Scott Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, 110.

is no effort to mark a beginning or ending because "[epic stories] make sense only in a world where repetition is of the essence", the modern form embodied in the novel and the sonata is about *form*ation through progression and becoming, an essentially temporal happening.[392] This is why, strictly speaking, only modern music has a 'musical subject' in or at least it has a modern musical subject. The absence of heroes in Greek epic is similar to the absence of the musical subject in pre-sonata. As Bernstein explicates Lukács's point, the epic heroes do not go through changes and this makes them different from modern characters and heroes. Unlike ancient Greek heroes, but similar to sonata themes, modern heroes' "life-histories" are *not* "set forth once and for all." They go through transformations and they have some kind of modern conception of human subjectivity.[393]

While one can agree with McClary on the significance of the madrigal in shaping and giving voice to early modern subjectivities, one should note the difference between this 'modal' self-consciousness and the later modern 'tonal' or rather 'formal' subjectivity reflected in the sonata-principle. The former, as McClary herself informs us was "verbally manifested" through the Cartesian Cogito, which was a discovery of a modern subject with a specific relationship with the reality, one through which the human beings are "the masters and possessors of nature."[394] The latter, however, transcended this merely objective or objectifying relationship with the world and discovered in itself the conditions for formally constructing the outer world, and thereby acting as the meaning-giver of reality. Although the madrigal as a genre and a principle can never be seen as merely a representation of the world and acts more as a context in which early modern subjectivity is—using McClary's words—'performed,' the relationship music makes between itself and text and through that the external world (external to music) is essential to the

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[392] J. M. Bernstein, *The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism, and the Dialectics of Form* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 51.
[393] Ibid, 52-3.
[394] René Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences*, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Discourse VI, 62.

nature of the genre. The madrigal's "self-consciousness construction *in music* of subjectivities" does not gesture at the independence that later the sonata claimed, whether the latter was able to fulfil the wish or not.[395]

III. Conclusion: Two Musical Modernities

An important concluding question about the madrigal as a generic embodiment of a principle is whether it was a modern development in music history. While some kind of musical modernity can be attributed to the mimetic revolution of the sixteenth century and how it was reflected in writings on music, it should be noted that through the madrigalistic revolutionary transformations in the text-music relationship, music did not become modern *in itself*. By becoming capable of responding to the demands of the modern human, music offered a new function that was incompatible with its previously perceived function, i.e., symbolically responding to the needs of the Church and God.[396] In this respect, music gained new humanistic meanings, to serve human needs through a realistic representation of textual and natural realities. Therefore, music became the sonorous reflection of human desires.

This madrigalist development is different from romantic musical modernity that led to music as a modern art in itself. Music, under the *newer* condition, went beyond the human's self-expressive requirements. It became autonomous, meaning it was treated as a subject in itself, though closely associated with the human subject. Music became the expression of the human subject in a different sense; it became the sonorous reflection of its own dynamic self-sufficiency. Music became the sonic embodiment of modern subjectivity (the state of being a self-sufficient, autonomous entity). Whereas in the madrigal-based modernity of 1600 it was,

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[395] McClary, *Modal Subjectivities*, 6.

[396] My focus here is on the history of musical *thought*. From the perspective of musical *practice*, my idea above offers a limited, reductive understanding of music history before the sixteenth century. Unlike the written musical thought of the middle ages, which was shaped based on half-Christian, half-Greek cosmological and theological notions, the medieval practice demonstrates a variegated scene that responds to different aspects of everyday human life at the time. Drawing on Carl Dahlhaus's insight about the relationship between musical thought and practice in the eighteenth century, one can claim that in a quite similar way, the medieval musical thought, theory, and philosophy was not inclusive enough and did not respond to the colourfulness of musical practice.

drawing on Daniel Chua, the "rhetorical will" of the modern human subject that music had to

serve, the musical modernity of 1800 emphasized an abstract (*yet paradoxically expressive*)

will sought within the music itself.[397]

To clarify, one interconnection between these two phases of musical modernities must be

explicated. As mentioned above, an important difference between the first phase (the formation

and governance of the madrigal-principle) and the second phase (the formation and governance

of the sonata-principle) was that under the former conditions, music was steered towards the

human subject, while with the later, music became autonomous or significant in itself. The

second notion of music was, in a general, largely detached from previously assumed constituents

of the concept, including earlier sources such as mathematics, cosmic relations, and the human

soul, as well as later rhetoric-based doctrine of affections. Music *as a concept* freed itself from

its entanglement within the pre-modern network of mathematical, cosmological, political, as

well as rhetorical associations, and could thereby secure an independent space for itself under

the category of 'art.' This was reflected in the way sonata form—or more broadly speaking

sonata-principle—was experienced in theory (concept) and practice. But the main tension in the

nature of the sonata as a philosophical claim on the conception of music was its seemingly

paradoxical nature: on one side it was an effort to activate musical inner nature, but on the other

hand it was quite consciously approached (even if not constructed) in a way to be narrational. It

imitates the formal aspects of dramatic linearity. From this perspective, sonata was an effort to

integrate the autonomy of music into a *tonally dramatic* understanding of music, namely a

dramatic conception of the thematic and harmonic structure of music. Contrary to the

previously dominant ideology, i.e., the madrigal-principle according to which the representation

or expression of the text, an external reality, or an objective representation of emotions

comprised the main content of music, the sonata-principle pivoted on a novel understanding of

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[397] See Chua, "Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature", 28-29.

musical form as *abstract drama* (or rather *dramatic abstraction*), a paradoxical combination of musical autonomy and musical meaningfulness.

In my epilogue, I will discuss some of the musico-political aspects of this peculiar paradoxical approach to musical abstraction. But before that, I would like to explore a third facet of the modern music-world connection by examining the subjective turn in the history of the musical sublime. This coming chapter is particularly significant in my study since it is an attempt to display how a modern understanding of the musical sublime contributed to the subjectification of the musical *sound* itself. Therefore, while my previous two chapters (Chapters One and Two), respectively, dealt with the relationship between music and other arts, and the relationship between musical genres/forms, as the mirroring of the music-world relation, the next chapter highlights the perceived *direct* relationship between musical sound and nature. I will argue that the modern, subjective understanding of the musical sublime contributed to the shift from a naturalistic, empirical, and objective to a denaturalized, subjective conception of musical sound.

Chapter Three: Beyond the Natural Sublime

The Musical Sublime Revolutionized

Joseph Haydn's *Creation* was grasped by a listener contemporary with Haydn, namely the

music historian Charles Burney, as reflecting "the most sublime Idea in Haydn's work."[398] He

thought that Haydn's musical depiction, or in his words, *description* of "the birth of order by

dissonance and broken phrases" was sublime: "It struck me as the most sublime Idea in Haydn's

work, his describing the birth of order by dissonance & broken phrases! – a whisper here – an

effort there – a groan – an agonizing cry – personifying Nature – & supposing her in labour,

how admirably has he expressed her throes! Not by pure harmony & graceful melody, but by

appropriate murmurs … When dissonance is tuned, when order arises, & chaos is no more, what

pleasing ingenious and graceful melody & harmony ensue!"[399] Although the reception of the

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[398] Burney was an interested observer of the musical sublime. He has documented the sublime reception of the concerts commemorating Handel in 1784. See Claudia L. Johnson, "'Giant Handel' and the Musical Sublime," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 19, no. 4 (1986): 515–33.

[399] Quoted in David P. Schroeder, *Haydn and the Enlightenment: The Late Symphonies and Their Audience* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1990), 126.

Creation was not homogenous in different European cities, the perception of the work as

sublime, in particular its journey from the dissonant "chaos" to the creation of light depicted in

the *fortissimo* C major chord (Example 6, m. 86), was quite ubiquitous and far from being

limited to Burney's response.[400]

   The overture begins with a unison forte C (Example 5, measure 1), brilliantly described by

Melanie Lowe as "musical impossibility—the sound of infinite nothingness."[401] Lack of harmony

makes the tonally contextless opening C sound as if we are entering the realm of music from

without, a gesture that to some extent anticipates Beethoven's treatment of the opening theme

of his *Fifth Symphony*. Ironically, we are not quite welcome into this musical 'kingdom,' as the

passages that follow the initial C do not proffer stability; they move chromatically and formlessly

illustrating what the contradictory notion of a pre-creation world might sound like. The

wandering music in this section, as the title suggests is meant to be a representation of chaos

(*Die Vorstellung des Chaos*). The journey in the first 86 measures of the work is a path of

evolution and transformation; the opening C, through a dissonant path and a hesitant orchestra

wandering through the "chaos," finds its fuller expression in the *fortissimo* decisive C major

"light" performed by the full orchestra. The sublimity of the work is, in this respect, both the

representation of order manifested in the power and stability of as well as the celebration of

God's creating light through the "electrifying" warmth of the C major chord in measure 86 (see

Example 6).[402]

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[400] For a detailed discussion of the reception of the work among the contemporary and next few generations of listeners, see H. C. Robbins Landon, *Haydn: Chronicle and Works*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, v.4. *Haydn: The Year of 'The Creation'*, 1796-1800, 318-22; and Nicholas Temperley, *Haydn: The Creation*. Cambridge, [U.K.]: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 35-46.

[401] Melanie Lowe, "Creating Chaos in Haydn's Creation" HAYDN: *Online Journal of the Haydn Society of North America* 3.1 (Spring 2013), 1.

[402] It was reported by a participant in the rehearsal (F. S. Silverstolpe, a Swedish diplomat and friend of Haydn) that the C major chord rose a lot of excitement among the performers. Describing Haydn's behaviour at the rehearsal "biting his lips" probably trying to "conceal [the] secret" of the 'light' chord, "And in that moment when light broke out for the first time, one would have said that rays darted from the composer's burning eyes. The enchantment of the electrified Viennese was so general that the orchestra could not proceed for some minutes." Landon, *Haydn: Chronicle and Works*, v.4, 318.

The manner in which the appearance of an emphatic, resolute major chord ends the uncertainty of the hitherto chromatic music was received by listeners such as Burney as the portrayal of a sublime scene or event. That music could arouse sublime feelings in the same manner as nature could was a common understanding of the musical sublime by the end of the eighteenth century. More specifically, Burney's response to Haydn's *Creation* and other contemporary listeners who thought the work "caused a big stir" (or literally made a lot of noise) reflects the pre-Kantian notion of the sublime, one according to which elements in external nature (such as fierce thunderstorms, lofty mountains, etc.) are the source of the sublime.[403] As we read in Elaine Sisman's similar interpretation of this composition, the sublime event of God creating heaven and earth is reconstructed for listeners so that they "experience that creation as a work in progress."[404]

This 'objective'—as one might say—conception of the musical sublime was challenged around 1800 when to a certain degree Christian Friedrich Michaelis and more vigorously E. T. A. Hoffmann turned their attention to the human subject and its experience as the primary source of the sublime in music: a Kantian or Copernican revolution that contributed to the subjectification, or denaturalization, of the music's nature. In this vein, and less than two decades after Burney's objective reception of the sublime in certain acoustic features of Haydn's music, Hoffmann praised Beethoven's instrumental music not because of some specific grand or loud moments but rather because of its expression of the infinite, an important component in the Kantian sublime.[405] *This chapter studies the development of this new conception of the musical sublime and ways in which it was influenced by the Kantian shift in the philosophical explanation of the sublime.* My musical examples from Haydn and Beethoven in this chapter are

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[403] Princess Eleonore von Liechtenstein, after the open rehearsal on April 29th, in a correspondence with her daughter wrote: « Cette musique de Heiden de la création du monde fait grand bruit, on dit, que jamais on n'a rien entendu de semblable. » Ibid, 319.

[404] Elaine Sisman, "The Voice of God in Haydn's *Creation,*" in László Somfai, László Vikárius, and Vera Lampert, eds., *Essays in Honor of László Somfai on His 70th Birthday: Studies in the Sources and the Interpretation of Music* (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 163.

[405] E. T. A. Hoffmann, *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, The Poet and the Composer, Music Criticism*, ed. David Charlton, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 98.

meant to showcase two different understandings of the musically sublime. While Haydn's music and the way it was perceived at the time is a demonstration of an objective notion of the musical sublime, Beethoven's Piano Sonata No. 30, Op. 109, as will be discussed, is an expression of a sublime mental experience. But my final example is an effort to go even beyond this Beethovenian expressive account of the musical sublime. The Adagio movement of Schubert's String Quintet in C Major demonstrates how the musically sublime can go even deeper and provide some space for the subjectification of music. The Adagio can be and indeed has been studied from a subjectively sublime perspective, but my hearing of it draws attention to a more transcendental aspect of the work: unlike Beethoven's piece that is an expression (or roughly speaking a depiction) of the sublime manner of thinking, Schubert's Adagio can be heard as the movement of the subject itself towards a state of self-consciousness, a movement through which music's own subjectivity is shaped.

Example 5 Joseph Haydn, Creation, mm. 1-7

Example 6 Joseph Haydn, Creation, mm. 76-96

Example 6 (*cont.*)

The sublime is usually associated with feelings of terror and fear, considered as threats against stable subjectivity and as an opposing force to human rational and physical capabilities. In her article on the dreadful situation of the "subject" who faces the sublime, Suzanne Guerlac suggests that an "event of sublimity" leads to a disruption of "the stable identity of the subject."[406] According to Guerlac, and as reflected in her interpretation of Longinus's thought, the effect of the sublime is "not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them out of themselves."[407] The emphasis on the destructive aspect of the sublime is a common way of understanding this experience in musicological scholarship. Kiene Brillenburg Wurth reads Hoffman's review of Beethoven's 5th symphony as one of the earliest writings that acknowledged the destructive force of the sublime in Beethoven's music. Centering her understanding of the romantic musical sublime around ideas of indeterminacy and yearning (*Sehnsucht*), Brillenburg Wurth reads Hoffmann as a post-Kantian and non-transcendental interpreter of the musically sublime. She challenges Kantian theory of the sublime and advocates for an account of the sublime (shared among many pre- and post-Kantian theories of the sublime) that unlike Kant's is never aimed at the superiority of reason. Instead, she suggests, the sublime as reflected in the romantic approach to musical sound and concept is concatenated with suspension, longing, and uncertainty. In other words, the sublime is an experience that "branches off into a feeling that defers resolution as it undermines its own progress, or into a feeling that always defers completion because it suspends consciousness—and hence cannot be retrieved or resolved." In its relation to the subject, the sublime "resist[s] mediation and integration" and is therefore a destructive and not a constructive experience.[408]

Putting forward a different approach to the romantic sublime, I adopt an historical outlook on the musical sublime and underline the Kantian configuration of the sublime in musical

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[406] Suzanne Guerlac, "Longinus and the Subject of the Sublime," *New Literary History*, no. 2 (1985): 275.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Kiene Brillenburg Wurth, *Musically Sublime: Indeterminacy, Infinity, Irresolvability* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 9-10.

thought as the moment when the subject matter of this concept shifted from being understood as the representation of an external nature to the expression of the interiority of the self or subjectivity. I examine the ways in which Kantian understanding of the sublime influenced the history of the musical sublime by exploring how, in particular, Michaelis as a musical thinker contemporary with and influenced by Kant, reinterpreted and expanded the musical sublime into a broader spectrum of musical experience. I argue that the new Kantian conception of the sublime and its application to music in Michaelis's writings provided the foundation for associating greatness in music with the inner self and facilitated the transition from the rhetorical and representational conception of the musically sublime into a romantic, subjective understanding of the concept.

It should be noted that James Webster has recognized and emphasized the rise of a new type of the musical sublime around 1800. Taking "Mozart's and Haydn's late symphonies, *Don Giovanni* and *Die Zauberflöte*, and Beethoven's Third and Fifth Symphonies" as representatives of this new approach to the sublime, he states that this new sublime music was "analogous to Kant's newly formulated category of the 'dynamic sublime'." Elaborating on the new approach, he writes:

> Haydn's remarkable 'Presentation' or 'Idea' of Chaos (the German *Vorstellung* entails both senses) is not literally 'chaotic,' but paradoxical. This is essential to the sublimity of his First Day. The Creation of Light is overwhelming not in its own right, but because it resolves the disjunction and mystery of the entire Chaos music, as it resolves an unstable c minor into the radiant purity of C major. It culminates a progression across three separate movements (overture, recitative, chorus), from paradoxical disorder to triumphant order; it offers a perceptible and memorable experience of that which is unfathomable, unthinkable: the origins of the universe and of history.[409]

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[409] James Webster, "The Sublime and the Pastoral in The Creation and The Seasons" in Caryl Clark (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Haydn*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 153-4.

He has observed similar connections based on the sublime between Haydn's and Beethoven's

compositions in his other writings. He believes that "[Beethoven's] "heroic" music entered

directly into the heritage of the musical sublime that Haydn had created in his London

symphonies and especially his late sacred vocal music; it is this renewed and sustained tradition

that suggests reading the period 1780–1815 altogether as the age of the Kantian sublime in

music."[410] In his "The *Creation*, Haydn's Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Sublime," Webster

becomes more specific about this development and emphasizes the shift from what he refers to

as a rhetorical notion of the sublime into a romantic one.[411] Focusing on music as sound rather

than a concept, Webster believes that the *music* of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven can be

explained better in terms of the new Kantian sublime. Introducing Michaelis as the thinker who

offered "the earliest important discussion of the musical sublime in its newer sense," Webster

believes that Haydn's late symphonies and his oratorios are the best earliest examples of the

sublime in a Kantian sense.[412]

While this chapter draws on Webster's insight into *an* important shift that occurred in the

conception of the musical sublime around 1800, it differs from Webster's account in at least

three respects. First, drawing on the work of scholars such as Emily Brady and Robert Doran, I

have understood the Kantian shift in the history of the musical sublime as a shift from an

empirical or nature-based towards a subjective understanding of the notion, or as Lawrence

Kramer puts it a "turn from a phenomenal to a reflective sublime."[413] Second, my focus is not on

the sublime music *per se* but the conception of the sublime in music. This twist can make a

significant difference: whereas Webster hears Haydn's pieces as the musical *representations* of a

Kantian notion of the sublime, I look at the ways in which contemporary thinkers such as

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[410] James Webster, "Between Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: 'First Viennese Modernism' and the Delayed Nineteenth Century," *19th-Century Music*, 2001, 126.
[411] James Webster, "The *Creation*, Haydn's Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Sublime" in Elaine Rochelle Sisman, ed. *Haydn and His World*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
[412] Ibid, 61.
[413] Lawrence Kramer, "Recalling the Sublime: The Logic of Creation in Haydn's Creation." *Eighteenth-Century Music* 6, no. 1 (03, 2009): 43.

Michaelis, Hoffmann, and others perceived the sublime 'manner of thinking' beyond a *representational* approach. Therefore, the fact that Gustav Schilling's romantic hearing of Haydn's sublime music in 1830s stands in sharp contrast with Charles Burney's 'representational' hearing of the same music a few decades earlier tells us less about the sounds than about the way they were perceived by different generations.[414] Third, and more importantly, while Webster's account of the Kantian sublime in music relies on the ways in which musical materials represent the sublime nature using a Kantian model, I try to show how Kant's (unintended) contribution to the musical sublime provided a condition under which the musical sublime went beyond a representational model and was connected to ideas of freedom and consciousness which constituted the foundations of a sublime 'manner of thinking.'

I. The Sublime and the Subjective Turn

The history of the sublime is a history within history; it 'restarts' with a revival or an 'archeological' find. This found history begins with *On the Sublime* (*Peri Hupsous*), a first-century treatise written by Longinus, written on poetic 'excellence' and how to achieve elevated and effective literary language.[415] Longinian sublime dealt with "loftiness and excellence of language", which could affect the reader not by convincing or persuading him but by "[taking] him out of himself."[416] Weakening the role of reason or rationality, Longinus creates a space for the uncontrollable: "to believe or not is usually in our power; but the sublime, acting with an imperious and irresistible force, sways every reader whether he will or not."[417] According to him,

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[414] Webster quotes Schilling: "The concept of the sublime transcends all physical reality. . . . In music too the sublime achieves its most perfect expression and greatest power when it links the finite and the phenomenal, so to speak, with the infinite and divine. . . . Thus there is still no music of greater sublimity than the passage. 'And There Was Light' which follows 'and God said' in Haydn's *Creation.*" James Webster, "The *Creation*," 61.

[415] For a brief discussion of the modern revival and popularization of Longinus's writing ("the early-modern rise of interest in the Longinian sublime") and a more recent twentieth-century interest in the sublime, see Sarah Hibberd, and Miranda Stanyon, eds. *Music and the Sonorous Sublime in European Culture, 1680–1880*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 1-8. As Hibberd and Stanyon have suggested, James Porter explicates issues regarding dating and authorship of Longinus's book. See James Porter, *The Sublime in Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1-5.

[416] Longinus, *On the Sublime*, (trans.) H.L. Havell, (Macmillan and Co., London, 1st century (?)/1890) 2.

[417] Ibid.

we admire the sublime not through a judgment that we *can* make by using our reason but through a sense of bewilderment that we feel under the force of the sublime, a force which "eclipses that which is merely reasonable or agreeable."[418] Longinus states that in order to create a sublime work, poets can use five sources, two of which are directly related to the way the sublime was understood by later thinkers. For Longinus, the most prominent feature a writing must possess in order to be sublime is loftiness or "grandeur of thoughts"; the second source of the sublime is the poet's "vigorous and spirited treatment of the passions," a great emotional capacity that can be conveyed to the audience.[419] It is important to note that although for Longinus loftiness of thought is a natural and not an acquired faculty, he offers ways to make souls "ever big with noble thoughts" because he believes that "sublime thoughts belong properly to the loftiest minds" and therefore in order to be able to create the sublime you must nurture your thoughts and mind into a lofty and grand one.[420] The other three sources of the sublime are the result of nurture: noble diction, i.e., choice of words, use of metaphors and elaboration of language, and finally dignified and elevated composition, that is arranging all the other elements in the proper way.

As Peter le Huray and James Day observe, in the eighteenth-century interest in beauty in arts declined and were mostly replaced by an increasing interest in sublimity: Boileau's French translation of Longinus's treatise in 1674 raised a new interest in the idea of the sublime that focused on the "dynamic, overwhelming and even irrational qualities" of the sublime.[421] As Emily Brady has shown, the classic formulation of the concept, i.e., Longinian notion of the sublime as a lofty, elevated style in writing, and the power of forming great thoughts was transformed soon after its revival in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a new thought.

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[418] Ibid.
[419] Ibid, 13. According to Longinus, although some passions (like pity, grief and fear) are not vigorous enough to be sublime, genuine passion is a necessary part of sublimity and without vehement passions sublimity is impossible.
[420] Ibid, 15.
[421] Peter Le Huray and James Day, *Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4-5.

Around 1700 with John Dennis, the concept was introduced into an association with *external nature* as its new subject matter, a shift "from style to materiality" that according to Brady, was a result of the modern empiricist formulation of the concept in the 17th and most of 18th centuries.[422] The crucial significance of this development cannot be overstated because, through this shift, the sublime in its early modern sense was no longer primarily a matter of "style and rhetoric," or language and text in general, but was defined instead in terms of the human subject's relationship with nature. This development was established and expanded by the succeeding authors such as Joseph Addison, who stressed the role of imagination and the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime, and Burke, who investigated the feelings and qualities associated with the sublime. This important transformation in the meaning of the sublime found its comprehensive formulation in Burke's writings. Burke's contribution to the history of sublime, as many scholars have emphasized, is not limited to this, though. His emphasis on the role of feelings associated with the sublime—an approach that Henry Allison characterizes as psychophysiological[423]—provided later thinkers such as Kant with a new attention to the subject's side of the sublime.[424]

Burke investigated the feelings and qualities associated with the sublime—such as terror, astonishment, and awe—and characterized the sublime as the strongest emotion that the mind can feel, an emotion so strong that it could no longer be regarded as a source of pleasure. According to Burke, since the ideas associated with pain are "much more powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure," pains and torments we suffer have stronger and greater effects on us than pleasures.[425] The sublime is associated with these powerful feelings; it is "fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort

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[422] Emily Brady, *The Sublime in Modern Philosophy: Aesthetics, Ethics, and Nature*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15.

[423] Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 302.

[424] See Robert Doran, *The Theory of the Sublime From Longinus to Kant*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Emily Brady, *The Sublime*.

[425] Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, (Oxford, 1757/1998), 36.

terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a

source of the sublime."[426] While terror seems to be the most important component of the

modern notion of the sublime, one must note that for Burke a too close pain, terror or danger

cannot be a source of the sublime since it cannot give us any delight and as he puts it, is "simply

terrible." The same pain or danger "at certain distances, and with certain modifications [...] may

be [...] delightful."[427]

The passion that the sublime causes is, according to Burke, *astonishment*, which he defines as

suspension of all the motions of soul "with some degree of horror." The 'suspension' happens

because through the sublime the mind is entirely filled with its object and cannot have

engagement with other objects or with reason. This is Burke's focal point about the relation

between the sublime and reason. He underlines that in the sublime experience, "the mind is so

entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on

that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that far from being

produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force."[428]

For Burke, the sublime is dependent on the paralysis of the mind and its faculties. According to

him, fear, as a strong passion that is capable of engendering the sublime, is *itself* sublime

because it "robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning."[429]

Although Burke's theory shows a new focus on the role of emotions in the formation of the

sublime, the source of the sublime experience is, in this account, still external nature. Therefore,

it is with Kant that perhaps a more—arguably the most—radical shift in the history of the

sublime occurs. Following his Copernican revolution in his transcendental philosophy,

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[426] Ibid.
[427] Ibid, 36-7. Although this is an essential point in Burke's discussion of the sublime, unlike Kant he never builds a systematic theory to explain the philosophical necessity of "distance" in the human subject's experience of the sublime.
[428] Ibid, 53.
[429] Ibid. There are other sources that can make things "very terrible," thereby producing sublimity. Some of these sources are "obscurity," "power," "privation," "vastness," "magnificence," "difficulty," "sound and loudness," "suddenness," and "intermitting." Burke also writes: "A low, tremulous, intermitting sound, though it seems in some respects opposite to that just mentioned, is productive of the sublime." Ibid, 76.

according to which the conventional epistemological relationship between the subject and object

(self and world) is turned on its head, Kant similarly revolutionized the subject-nature

relationship in the sublime experience, underlining the faculty of reason and the subjective

mechanism through which this experience becomes possible.[430] Although in *Critique of the*

Power of Judgment (1790/2000) Kant initially defines the sublime as "that which is absolutely

great" or that which is "beyond all comparison" i.e., that "in comparison with which everything

else is small," he gradually shifts away from the object of the sublime and concentrates on the

subjective conditions of the sublime.[431]

The sublime experience, according to Kant, is a result of a pleasure we feel because of the

superiority of the power of our reason. Pleasure comes after a displeasure, and the displeasure

results from two possible sources, based on which two categories of the sublime can be

recognized: the displeasure might be a product of the frustration our imagination feels when it

strives but fails to come to a sensory apprehension of an object, but it *might* also be caused by

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[430] It was Kant himself who compared his own main achievement in philosophy, that is his transcendental idealism, with Nicolaus Copernicus's hypothetical model for explaining the order of the sun, the earth and other planets in the sky. According to this model, which is characterized as the beginning of a modern scientific revolution, if the sun rather than the earth is considered to be in the centre of the system many of the problems of the previous model (i.e., Ptolemy's positioning the Earth at the centre of the Universe) would vanish. Comparably, though on a totally different plane, Kant argued that if one assumes that it is the objects that must conform to the cognition and not the other way around, many philosophical problems would be solved. He explicated this point in his preface to the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them *a priori*; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, 1st paperback ed. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1781/1999), 110; B xvi–xviii.

[431] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Mathews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1790/2000), §25, 248. Kant was interested in the sublime as a philosophical topic since many years before he published his third *Critique*. His *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) was published before any of his Critiques were published. However, it is in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* that he offers an account of the sublime that has been ever since remained as the most systematic theory of the notion. See Immanuel Kant, *Immanuel Kant: Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings*, ed. Patrick R. Frierson and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Robert Doran, *The Theory of the Sublime From Longinus to Kant*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

the fear we feel when confronting nature. The former displeasure *can* lead to what Kant calls the mathematical sublime and the latter to the dynamical sublime. However, as Kant emphasizes none of these feelings of displeasure would necessarily lead to the sublime experience unless they are followed by a process that could guarantee a unique type of pleasure, a pleasure, that according to Kant, originates from reason's capacity to counteract the failure experienced by the imagination or reason's feeling of superiority to nature. In both cases, reason arranges a position of safety within which our mind can overcome the *failure* and *fear* we feel because of "the inadequacy of our imagination" (in the mathematical sublime) or "the awareness of our physical powerlessness in the face of nature's might" (in the dynamical sublime).[432]

Throughout the sublime experience, the subject's mental capacities, in particular her imagination and senses, are overwhelmed by the vastness of natural objects (such as high mountains), due to the imagination's "expansion and failure" in taking in the vastness and immensity of nature. According to Kant, imagination is the natural capacity needed for apprehending objects through senses. The faculty of the imagination is meant to have a sense of how big an object is. But there are circumstances when imagination comes across as something so huge that it cannot come to any kind of sensory apprehension. In this case, our imagination's *effort* ends up as a failure. And this is a circumstance where the mathematically sublime becomes possible. The overwhelmed imagination and its failure, according to Kant, induces the awareness in the subject that the senses and imagination cannot grasp the subject matter in its totality; this awareness is felt through a sense of 'frustration' that "awakens in us a feeling of a supersensible faculty" in our mind in which "there lies a claim to absolute totality." This faculty is reason and it can overcome the imagination's failure or as Kant puts it, its 'inadequacy'.[433] Reason achieves this by providing the subject with an idea of the infinite by which reason

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[432] Hannah Ginsborg, "Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2019, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kant-aesthetics/>.

[433] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §25, 248; See Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality* (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 208.

exceeds the magnitude of nature or in Kant's words, "surpasses every measure of the senses."[434] "Nature is," therefore, "sublime in those of its appearances the intuition of which brings with them the *idea* of its infinity" [my emphasis].[435] For Kant, it is only in this peculiar sense that an object can be called sublime.[436]

By constructing the notion of *infinity* in order to make sense of what is empirically infinite, reason takes refuge in a concept: "infinity." Infinity as a concept needs to have limits; in other words, it must be conceptualized as a whole so that it can become understandable. The concept of infinity is not itself infinite. Kant explains this in a very efficient way: "the mind hears in itself the voice of reason, which requires totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that can never be entirely apprehended."[437] This call for totality or as Kant puts it "even being able to think of [the infinite] as a whole," is an essential part of the sublime as an experience, because it "indicates a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of sense."[438]

Despite the 'call of reason' to create a totality of everything, such a whole does not exist in case of the infinite, because any notion of whole indicates a finite set or group of things surrounded by barriers. So, the notion of infinity is an invention of the faculty of reason to make sense of that which goes beyond imagination's capability. But the invention has a crucial significance: it is of high importance to our purpose that for Kant "to be able to think the given infinite without contradiction requires a faculty in the human mind that is itself supersensible"

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[434] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 134.

[435] Ibid, §26, 138

[436] Henry Allison's explication of Kant's uniquely subjective notion of the sublime is extremely helpful. Allison elaborates on the interconnection of two Kantian claims: (1) the fact that nature in itself is not sublime and therefore sublime must be sought in the human subject, and (2) the sublime is what "in comparison with which everything else is small." For Kant, the second claim has an important consequence, which is the first claim. The subjective notion of the sublime is, indeed, constructed in the midst of these two claims. Allison explains that, according to Kant, that "in comparison with which everything else is small" cannot be found in nature, and "if nothing in nature can possibly fit the description expressed in [the Kantian] definitions [of the sublime], then the possibility arises that the sublime is a mere fiction or 'phantom of the brain.' But since Kant clearly did not hold such a view, it became incumbent upon him to explain what justifies the use of the term and what experiences underlie it. It is in addressing these questions that Kant turns to a transcendental investigation of the subjective sources of the feeling of the sublime in the nature of our cognitive faculties." Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, 314.

[437] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment,* §26, 254

[438] Ibid, §26, 254.

or stands beyond sensory apprehension.[439] In this respect, reason finds itself in a higher position than the faculty of imagination, and the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure which results from the very fact that the mind possesses a faculty which, as Gene Ray puts it, can "compensate itself for the pain it feels when the imagination reaches its limit."[440]

In the case of the dynamically sublime—the sublime of force—the subject encountering a destructive power of nature, while residing in a safe position, finds herself physically small against nature's devastating forces. Her senses and imagination are overwhelmed, therefore she feels insignificant, and that leads to an experience of displeasure or pain. The subject's response here is of a resistance type:

> Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into
> the heavens, bringing with them ashes of lightning and crashes of thunder,
> volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they
> leave behind, the boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty
> river, etc., make our capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison
> with their power.[441]

Here the predicament is overcome by the mediation of practical reason helping the subject see herself detached and independent from the surrounding nature and therefore to feel free. Kant claims that "the irresistibility of [nature's] power certainly makes us, considered as natural beings, recognize our physical powerlessness, but at the same time it reveals a capacity for judging ourselves as independent of it and a superiority over nature."[442] That is why, as Kant suggests, through reason we identify nature as "a power that has no dominion over us."[443] We feel "we are in fact a measure to nature" and therefore, we feel admiration and respect for our own "idea of humanity in our subject."[444] External nature or objects could be, in Kant's words, "gladly" called dynamically sublime only because "they elevate the strength of our soul above its

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[439] Ibid.
[440] Gene Ray, *Terror and the Sublime in Art and Critical Theory from Auschwitz to Hiroshima to September 11* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 28.
[441] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 144
[442] ibid, 145.
[443] Ibid, §28, 260. Kant writes, "We can […] consider an object as fearful without being afraid of it …" Ibid.
[444] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 141. Also see Brady, *The Sublime*, 61.

usual level, and allow us to *discover within ourselves* [emphasis added] a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature."[445] It is only in this particular sense that external nature could be called sublime.

As we can see, although Kant begins his examination of the sublime with a traditional definition of it as the attribution of the object, he gradually turns away from this 'objective' explanation and offers a 'subjective' account of the experience exploring the human subject's state of mind during the experience. As Sarah Hibberd and Miranda Stanyon have stressed, with Kant the notion of the sublime becomes "interiorized."[446] Hence, his revolutionary contribution to the history of the sublime.[447] By attributing the sublime to the experience that the human subject goes through rather than the object of the experience, Kant directs our attention towards the moral aspects of the experience: "in our aesthetic judgment nature is judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but rather because it calls forth our power (which is not part of nature) to regard those things about which we are concerned (goods, health and life) as trivial."[448] The moral essence of the sublime experience, i.e., its affirmation of our freedom from nature, is only possible through the faculty of reason's recognition of itself in a superior position over nature. Gene Ray summarizes the point:

> [i]n both cases, the imagination is rescued from its pain and distress by the power
> of reason: the crisis or privation itself calls to mind the fact that among the mind's
> own powers is one that is supersensible and superior to nature. Reason produces
> the idea of infinity to soothe the pain of the mathematical sublime, and answers
> the dynamic sublime by reminding itself of the irreducible dignity of the human

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[445] Ibid, 144-5.

[446] Hibberd and Stanyon, *Music and the Sonorous Sublime*, 6.

[447] According to Kant, it is "the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain representation occupying the reflective judgement, but not the object, which is to be called sublime." (Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §25, 5:250) That is to say, what is experienced as sublime is due to certain processes in the subject's mind rather than an inherent character in the object. It is based on this subjective treatment of the sublime that Kant offers his final definition of the term: "That is sublime which even to be able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure of senses." (Ibid) Elsewhere, he writes, "Thus nature is here called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to the point of presenting those cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation even over nature." (ibid)

[448] Ibid.

calling to live as free moral agents, who legislate to themselves the law of their

own reason.[449]

The Kantian version of sublimity, presented in the final years of the eighteenth century, differed

from previous theories of the sublime in one important feature. Although Kant contended that

terror was an important component of the sublime experience, his account of this experience

was founded on the determining role that the human subject's reason—rather than the nature's

destroying force—played in giving rise to this experience. The Kantian revolution in the

conception of the sublime continued to accept the necessity of terror and feeling of fear evoked

by elements in the external world but went beyond previous accounts by recognizing the

subjective conditions of the possibility of the sublime experience; the rational subject must see

herself at a safe position that can be only guaranteed in her refuge in the faculty of reason. That

is to say, she should be able to use her power of reason in order to overcome the fear and

bewilderment with which the sublime experience was triggered but was never accomplished.

The sublime, therefore, does not disrupt subjectivity for Kant; on the contrary, it can be

experienced only through the subject's capability of using the faculty of reason to overcome the

threats to her integrity and stability (wholeness). The feelings associated with the fulfilled

experience of sublimity indicate a triumph for the subject; the subject, in Kant's words, "is […]

transported into an emotionally moving satisfaction."[450]

II. The Musical Sublime Subjectified

The influence of Kant on the conception of the musical sublime in the decades before and after

1800 is acknowledged by scholars such as James Webster. He suggests that the period 1780–

1815 can be read as "the age of the Kantian sublime in music" due to the continuity that can be

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[449] Ray, *Terror and the Sublime*, 28.
[450] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment,* §26, 252. The Kantian emphasis on the notion of independence and freedom has moral and political ramifications. As Allison has stressed, with the Kantian formulation of the sublime, the concept becomes connected to morality and, therefore, "offers us 'aesthetic education'," by evoking in us "a sense of our independence of, and superiority to, nature (both the sheer magnitude and power of external nature without and our sensuous nature within)." Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, 306.

seen in the "heroic" musical tradition established by Haydn, and further continued by Beethoven.[451] While Webster's focus is on the musical practice of the time, one could extend his point to the musical writings of the decades around 1800. An important figure in the introduction of the Kantian sublime into the musical thought of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was Christian Friedrich Michaelis. In his writings, one can find both a pre-Kantian nature-based as well as a Kantian subjective approach to the musical sublime. As I will examine below, he analyzes the musical sublime from two significantly different perspectives: first, he examines how music through its sonic features imitate the sublime in nature, an account that reflects his sympathy with the pre-Kantian understanding of the sublime and, second, the ways in which music is competent to express the mental state or as Kant puts it "the manner of thinking" involved in sublime experience.

In 'On the Sublime in Music', Michaelis defines the sublime as "crude unformed, unshaped objects," and announces that it "must be based on the idea of *infinity* or immeasurability" [my emphasis]. The best way for sublimity to be portrayed in music is therefore through devices which can disrupt the uniformity and wholeness of the listener's apprehension. When one hears in music long melodies, "frequent interruptions," "shattering intensity," and/or complexity of part-writing, their "imagination is severely taxed in an effort to grasp the whole, so that it feels in fact as if it is poised over a bottomless chasm, then the sublime manifests itself."[452] It is difficult for the faculty of imagination to grasp and recall sublime notes, figuration and harmonies since sublimity, unlike beauty, is not portrayed through "flowing melodies with gentle cadences," but by something that is uncontrollable and escapes from "rhythmic laws;"

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[451] James Webster, "Between Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: 'First Viennese Modernism' and the Delayed Nineteenth Century," *19th-Century Music* 25, 2–3, 2001, 126. Webster writes: "Before and after 1800 Beethoven gradually made the new Viennese modernism his own and then developed it decisively further. His "heroic" music entered directly into the heritage of the musical sublime that Haydn had created in his London symphonies and especially his late sacred vocal music; it is this renewed and sustained tradition that suggests reading the period 1780–1815 altogether as the age of the Kantian sublime in music." Ibid.

[452] James Day and Peter Le Huray, eds., *Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early-Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 203. This stands in contrast with the 'beautiful' music. Michaelis believes that beauty in music relates to "*form, outline, limitation*, the easily apprehended *image* of the object in space" through "the easily apprehended melody, the gentle harmonic and rhythmic play of emotions in time." (Ibid.)

something that is "frightful," "terrifying," and "almost violent," with no "immediately pleasant

effect on […] imagination."[453] Here, Michaelis, in the spirit of other eighteenth-century musical

writers understand the musical sublime under objective terms: musical sounds act as external

nature and through their violent characters affect our faculty of imagination in the same way

that the devastating power of any kind of force in nature (such as a thunder or a volcano) can

lead us to a sublime experience. Simply put, the listener encounters music as external nature.[454]

This is further explicated in his suggestion that Kantian mathematical sublime can appear in

music either by obstructing uniformity and wholeness or on the contrary by excluding variety:

> The feeling of sublimity in music is aroused when the imagination is elevated to
> the plane of the limitless, the immeasurable, the unconquerable. This happens
> when such emotions are aroused as either completely prevent the integration of
> one's impressions into a coherent whole, or when at any rate they make it very
> difficult. The objectification, the shaping of a coherent whole is hampered in
> music in two principal ways. Firstly, by uniformity so great that it almost excludes
> variety: by the constant repetition of the same note or chord, for instance; by
> long, majestic, weighty or solemn notes, and hence by very slow movement; by
> long pauses holding up the progress of the melodic line, or which impede the
> shaping of a melody, thus underlining the lack of variety. Secondly, by too much
> diversity, as when innumerable impressions succeed one another too rapidly and
> the mind being too abruptly hurled into the thundering torrent of sounds, or
> when (as in many polyphonic compositions involving many voices) the themes
> are developed together in so complex a manner that the imagination cannot easily
> and calmly integrate the diverse ideas into a coherent whole without strain.[455]

In both cases (musical uniformity and variety), the subject experiences the musical sublime in

the same way she experiences the natural sublime. In other words, the sonic materials are

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[453] Ibid. As Peter le Huray and James Day mention in their very short introduction to Michaelis' articles, he "was one of the first to investigate the application of Kant's aesthetic theories in music," and this makes him very interesting for the modern reader who is interested in Kantian sublimity in music. Ibid, 202-3.
[454] One must note, however, that in Michaelis's view, listeners cannot experience the musically sublime without necessary efforts; the listener must possess some kind of "spirit and sensitivity" to be able to feel the sublime: "frivolous, feeble and blinkered temperaments are not responsive to [the sublime]. It appeals only to men of spirit and sensitivity, men of the noblest intellect." Ibid, 203.
[455] Ibid, 203.

treated as external nature, as actual nature that through its certain sonic characteristics such as too many notes (in Michaelis's words, "innumerable impressions succeeding one another") distresses the imagination and intercepts this faculty's efforts to "integrate the diverse ideas into a coherent whole." (ibid)

This mimetic formulation of the musical sublime based on the Kantian model is not all that Michaelis offers. Michaelis' significant contribution to the notion of the musically sublime is the distinction he makes between two different pairs of musical sublime through which he, for the first time, opens way into a 'specifically musical' version of the sublime. In both pairs of these dichotomies, while the first category in each pair is what I have described above as a nature-based or objective account of the musical sublime, the second categories are entirely different and take the inner world of the subject as the subject-matter of the musical sublime. These include a distinction between the objectively sublime and the pathetically sublime in music on one side, and a second distinction between what Michaelis characterizes as the masculine sublime and the feminine sublime. The latter types of musical sublimity in each distinction, i.e., the pathetically and feminine sublime, dissociate the musical sublime further and further away from the materiality of sounds and introduce an inner, subjective account of them that locates the subject matter of the sublime experience not in the grandeur of the external nature but in the depth and infinity of the subject's interiority.

Michaelis's first distinction between two types of the musical sublime appeared in an article he published in 1805. There, Michaelis claims that music can arouse sublime feelings *either* "through an inner structure that is independent of any emotional expression," leading to an "objectively" sublime music *or* "portray the state of mind aroused by such a feeling" resulting in a "pathetically" sublime music. In the first case, sublime nature (raw and untamed) is depicted in music and music can "affect us the same way as nature does, to intensify our imagination and

to arouse in us ideas of infinitely great."[456] While this notion of the musical sublime is not different from the type of sublimity Burney found in Haydn's music, Michaelis's second type offers a different approach that looks for the sublime not in the depiction of external nature but "the portrayal of our own nature, as we are moved, stirred, roused to emotional change and enthusiasm."[457] But how can the composer portray human nature at the moment of sublime experience? Michaelis' suggestions include sudden alteration of the established tonality into unforeseen and surprising directions, "unconventional, surprising, powerfully startling, or striking harmonic progressions or rhythmic patterns," a delay in a "longed-for calm" by tempestuous passages. What Michaelis suggests here seems to be an account of music that is in itself the sublime in a subjective, i.e., Kantian notion. It is the sublime experience – partly the astonishment and awe and partly the stimulation of sublime ideas and feelings – that is portrayed in music. In other words, unlike objectively sublime music, the pathetically or as one might call it 'subjectively' sublime music must be the sonorous expression of what Kant would be willing to call a sublime "manner of thinking."[458]

In "On the Sublime in Music," Michaelis contributes further to the subjective turn in the musically sublime. Here he distinguishes between what he refers to as masculine and feminine sublimities:

> First there is the well-known version of the sublime in music which I would like to call the "masculine-, or ode-like sublime," after the analogy with the human character, suggesting an image of the sudden, courageous, and powerfully extroverted activities of Man. Second, there is a sublime which could be called an elegiac sublime, which, with its still enormity *[stillen Größe]* and noble humility *[edlen Zurückgezogenheit],* can be compared to the feminine character. The motion of modulations in this type [of the musical sublime] is serious . . . quiet and moderate; there is a greater simplicity; forward motion is less bold, less

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[456] Ibid, 202.
[457] Ibid.
[458] "[...] the sublime in nature is only improperly so called, and should properly be ascribed to the manner of thinking, or rather to its foundation in human nature." Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, §30, 280.

> sudden, than in the other type [the masculine sublime]. Depressed resignation
> *[schwermütige Resignation]* seems to determine its mood.[459]

Through this distinction, he makes room for what could not be easily considered sublime in the previous accounts of musical sublimity, ones that dominated the pre-Kantian theories of the notion that Michaelis refers to as "the well-known version of the sublime in music." The feminine musical sublime is not created through loudness of sound or tempestuousness of the emotions stirred by emphatic and forceful gestures in music but through serious calmness and deep, introverted motion. The greatness, here, is still and subtler than the masculine sublime.[460]

Through the pathetically sublime music, Michaelis goes beyond a mere translation of Kant's notion of the sublime into musical discourse. He builds a bridge between Kant and the romantic aesthetics of music creating a transition from a 'topical' understanding of the musical sublime into an infinity-based understanding of the notion.[461] If sublime music is supposed to portray the emotional procedures or the manner of thinking that is involved in the sublime experience, it cannot do so only by terrifying us. A Kantian theory of sublime in music must go beyond hearing a musical work merely as the object of the 'sublime', i.e., the sonic representation of magnitude or force; it must rather acknowledge the subjective essence of the experience. This is only possible through a synthesis of the main emotional components of the experience, i.e., pleasurable and displeasurable moments in music, a juxtaposition of terror and safety so intense that we consider the situation as "fearful without being afraid."[462] Through this emphasis on the subjective aspect of the musical sublime and a half-departure from the representational or

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[459] I haven't had access to a complete translation. I have seen the original article, but for this quotation, I am using David Schwarz's translation of the passage. See David Schwarz, *Listening Awry: Music and Alterity in German Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 31.

[460] Michaelis had probably moments such the opening section (Grave) of Beethoven's *Piano Sonata no. 8* in mind when he talked of the feminine sublime.

[461] For a topical or topos-based reading of the musical sublime, see Allanbrook, Wye J. "Is the Sublime a Musical Topos?" *Eighteenth Century Music*, 7, no. 2 (2010): 263–79. According to Allanbrook, classical and romantic styles share the same fundamental musical characteristic, i.e., strong reliance on tonal structures, which prevent them from transcending musical topoi and oratory and "transmogrify[ing] into the music of infinite longing." For her, all musical figures and gestures of tonal music that could be interpreted as sublime, whether in Mozart's or Beethoven's works, function merely as ways to "demarcate the compositional process: in a music dedicated to resolution it is the function of the darker styles to cede at the close to the music of ceremonial celebration." Ibid, 274.

[462] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment,* §28, 5:260.

nature-based understanding of the notion, Michaelis contributed to the romantic conception of infinity and freedom as the main meaning of music expressed most eloquently in the nineteenth century in Hoffmann's musical writings.

III. The Musical Sublime as the Sonification of the Sublime Experience

E.T.A. Hoffmann was arguably the first music critic to attribute to Beethoven's music certain powerful characteristics that are associated with the musical sublime. In his "Beethoven's Instrumental Music," he sought to show that not only is Beethoven's 5th symphony not a failure compared to his 1st and 2nd symphonies but that it is an entirely new form of treating emotions in music. He asserts that Beethoven's instrumental music—the product of "a high level of rational awareness"—"unveils before us the realm of the mighty and the immeasurable."[463] Here Hoffmann powerfully and musically romanticizes Kant's notion of the sublime and its connection to infinity, receiving Beethoven's instrumental music as a sonic threat to the subject's physical being that gives rise to the experience of infinity: "Here [in Beethoven's instrumental music] shining rays of light shoot through the darkness of night and we become aware of giant shadows swaying back and forth, moving ever closer around us and destroying *us* but not the pain of infinite yearning, in which every desire, leaping up in sounds of exultation, sinks back and disappears. Only in this pain, in which love, hope and joy are consumed without being destroyed, which threatens to burst our hearts with a full-chorused cry of all the passions, do we live on as ecstatic visionaries."[464] The Hoffmannian subject is the yearning-I that transcends the physicality of being and experiences the infinite. The joy and ecstasy that the yearning 'imaginative' subject experiences becomes possible through the 'awe,' 'fear,' 'terror,' and 'pain,' that the music of Beethoven can spark but only in order to awaken that vision of infinity and "draw the listener [...] into the spirit-realm of the infinite."[465]

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[463] Hoffmann, E. T. A. *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings*, 97.
[464] Ibid.
[465] Ibid, 98.

Clearly, and similar to aspects of Michaelis's understanding of the sublime, Hoffmann's

sublime reception of Beethoven's instrumental music is on a subjective plane, and in that

manner contrasts with the eighteenth-century understanding of the musical sublime reflected in

Burney's objective reception of Haydn's music, or Handel's commemoration concerts.[466] As

Claudia Johnson writes observing the eighteenth-century understanding of the musical sublime,

"when writers called Handel sublime, they were referring to more than the prodigious eminence

of his genius. Indeed, their comments often indicate that they associated certain acoustical

effects with the musical sublime."[467] Based on an empiricist account of the sublime, Handel and

Haydn were received in the eighteenth century as composers who created objective sublime

moments in some specific works. This eighteenth-century atomistic understanding of the

musical sublime, which focused on only certain musical moments as musically sublime, was

radically different from what appeared later in the writings of Hoffmann. Going beyond

conceiving the musical sublime as aesthetic quality and extending the notion to the essence of

music, Hoffmann's holistic view is not an effort to shed light on specific moments in music but

to revolutionize the whole concept of music.[468]

This, however, does not mean that a nature-based conception of music was completely

eradicated from the musical consciousness of the time. As Joshua Alton Waggener demonstrates

in his dissertation on sublimity in Mendelssohn, the fourth movement of Beethoven's symphony

no. 6 could be heard as an early nineteenth centurt example of a musical depiction of sublime

nature. Waggener's description of the musical devices Beethoven uses in his *Meeresstille und*

Glückliche Fahrt (Op. 112) such as "low string tremolos, timpani rolls, sudden dynamic changes,

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[466] See the opening paragraph of this chapter.
[467] See Claudia L. Johnson, "'Giant HANDEL' and the Musical Sublime," 524.
[468] On the musical sublime as being more than an aesthetic quality in Hoffmann see Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 45-7. Bonds writes: "[The sublime] was perceived by many as an epistemological means toward the integration of the finite and the infinite." (Ibid, 46) "F. Schlegel held that 'consciousness of the infinite' is a sensation 'from which all philosophy derives' and that there is nothing higher in humanity 'than the longing for the infinite.' Schlegel writes that the very 'essence of philosophy lies in longing for the infinite, and in the development of understanding.'" (Ibid, 47.)

and other means to represent a 'Gewitter' (thunderstorm)" exemplifies the pre-Kantian nature-based or objective understanding of the musical sublime that was probably how listeners at the time would perceive the work. Furthermore, Waggener introduces another sublime moment in Beethoven's music where the composer depicts vastness of the ocean "by the distance (over four octaves) between the high A in the sopranos and first flutes and low G in the basses and low strings."[469] (see Example 7) Here, the sudden unfolding of the open position version of the seventh-chord on the word "*Weite*" after we have heard the same chord in a very close position version, is interpreted as Beethoven's portrayal of the natural sublime, which is the spaciousness of the ocean.

Example 7 Ludwig van Beethoven, *Meeresstille und Glückliche Fahrt* (Op. 112), mm. 23–30

While such programmatic or vocal pieces have been more easily interpreted as musically sublime under the eighteenth-century terms, 'abstract' works of Beethoven resist such easy attributions. The first movement of Beethoven's piano sonata in E major (Op. 109) has been a controversial piece from an analytic point of view. With its alternating structure between *Vivace ma non troppo* and *Adagio espressivo*, the movement has prompted challenges for formal analysis. Donald Francis Tovey thinks that there are certain features in the first movement which make it "unprecedented;" however, his analysis is quite straightforward: the first

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[469] Joshua Alton Waggener, "Mendelssohn and the Musical Sublime," (Durham theses, Durham University: 2014), 109-16.

movement is in sonata form with theme A from measures ½/1-4 and 5-8, which is the first

Vivace part in E major, modulating into the dominant, where the second group begins in a

minor key and through a couple of key changes comes back to the dominant key (B major).[470]

This is also the first appearance of *Adagio espressivo* in this movement. Then, we hear the

development section which covers part of the second appearance of the *Vivace* and goes through

many key changes (B major, C# major, C# minor, G# minor, D# minor, F# major, home

dominant, i.e., B major), and after that leading to the recapitulation constituted of three parts:

first group, that is, a reappearance of the first 6 measures of the *Vivace* part rescored and the

last 4 measures of the *Vivace* part transferred to tonic but compressed from 4 measures to 3,

closing into second group, the reappearance of the *adagio espressivo* with additional ornaments

or "compression of details" as well as some small changes in the chord progression, and finally a

coda, which is a second reappearance of the *Vivace* part. (See Example 8)[471]

As mentioned above, in spite of his conventional analysis of the sonata, Tovey thinks there

are some unusual points about the first movement. The first thing that makes the first

movement "unprecedented" is the "reversal of the order of the two tempi." In the earlier cases of

tempo shifts in Beethoven's piano sonatas, he preferred to start with a graver tempo and then

break from it to a lively one—a common device which is characterized by Tovey as "a light-

hearted thing"—but here Beethoven does the reverse. The second unusual point is that

Beethoven has given the minimum of time to the quick tempo (theme A) to "assert itself" (two 4-

measure phrases of short measures).[472] The reversal of the order of the two tempi as well as the

fact that the lively beginning part (*vivace*) is very short helps Beethoven to introduce the *adagio*

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[470] Tovey uses ½ to show that the piece starts from the second half of the measure.

[471] While Charles Rosen has not given us a full analysis of the movement, his treatment of the first and second group has a small difference with Tovey's analysis. Rosen thinks that the entire first group is stated in the first 4 measures and he calls the 5th measure "beginning of the counter-statement" and hears the next three measures (6-8) as a bridge passage which lead us into the second group that is the *adagio espressivo* section. Charles Rosen, *Sonata Forms*, Rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1988), 356.

[472] Donald Francis Tovey, *A Companion to Beethoven's Pianoforte Sonatas: Bar-by-Bar Analysis*, ed. Barry Cooper, Rev ed. (London: Associated Board of the Royal Schools of Music, 1998), 243.

part with a shock. This is where some analysts have tried to explain the peculiarity of what is going on in the first movement through a new formal design, namely "parenthetical structure."

Disagreeing with Tovey's (as well as Rosen's) schematic analysis of the sonata, William Kinderman thinks that in his last sonatas, Beethoven demonstrates an intense interest in what he calls "parenthetical structures" which he defines as "[enclosing] musical passages within contrasting sections."[473] He thinks that an awareness of such a structure in Beethoven's late sonatas is very important for understanding the "formal design of the movement," which he believes "has resisted the schematic categorization so often advanced by analysts."[474] He asserts that in this movement there is an interruption in the *Vivace* material before it is completed and a second group begins. "The opening *Vivace* material is interrupted, [...] as it reaches the threshold of a cadence in the dominant of E major."[475] Instead of hearing the cadence, we receive a shock by the *adagio* section "whose elaborate arpeggiations make a striking contrast with the initial *Vivace* material, with its uniformity of rhythm and texture."[476] The effect of the parenthetical structure in Beethoven's late sonatas and in particular the interruption of the *Vivace* by the adagio section in Op. 109, according to Kinderman, is "a suspension of time in the contrasting section, or the enclosure of one time within another."[477]

Barry Cooper's analysis of the first movement of Op. 109 in his *Beethoven* stands somewhere between Tovey's "conventional" and Kinderman's different analyses. Although Cooper does not mention Tovey, he agrees with Tovey's idea that the piano sonata is in "a more or less conventional sonata form."[478] He also agrees that there is something unprecedented about it but goes into details and attributes some kind of sublimity to the adagio sections: "[The piano sonata's] most striking feature is its fantasia-like alternation between *vivace* and *adagio*

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[473] William Kinderman, *Beethoven*, (University of California Press, 1995), 219.
[474] Ibid, 220.
[475] Ibid, 219.
[476] Ibid, 220.
[477] Ibid.
[478] Barry Cooper, *Beethoven*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 301.

sections, with three flowing *vivaces* interspersed with two *adagios* that differ from them not only in tempo but in almost every other way: a contrast between 2/4 and 3/4, dynamism and stasis, regular and irregular rhythm."[479] He is critical, though, of Kinderman's analysis of the first movement as a parenthetical structure and suggests that it is not an exact analysis since "with a true parenthesis, the material on either side could be joined without any change in register or dislocation of metre, but this does not happen here."[480] He thinks that in the case of the *vivace* sections, if they get combined with a removal of the *adagio* parts, the music would not be "properly balanced."

Cooper's acknowledgement that the piece is a conventional sonata and follows Tovey's and Kinderman's observations that (1) there is a sharp contrasting metre between the materials of the *Vivaces* and *adagios* that they believe has made the movement more complex than a normal sonata form, and (2) their perspective on an unusually short first theme and transitionally unprepared appearance of the second group.[481] "Thus the whole of this *adagio* section can be viewed on several different levels, and its quality of continual disruption of metre, register, tonality, dynamic level, rhythm, and texture sets up a diametric opposition to the smooth continuum of the *vivace*. Such bipolarity is a common feature in late Beethoven, although it is rarely as prominent as here."[482] While all three analyses appreciate the anomalous nature of the first movement in this sonata, none of them discusses this anomaly in terms of any unified emotional or intellectual content.

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[479] Ibid.
[480] Ibid.
[481] Cooper observes that anomalous to the formal conventions in sonata form, "the second group is not announced by the usual strong cadence and affirmation of the new tonic." Ibid, 302.
[482] Ibid, 303.

Example 8 Ludwig van Beethoven, Piano Sonata No. 30 in E major, Op. 109, mm. 1-98

Example 8 (*cont.*)

Example 8 (*cont.*)

Example 8 (*cont.*)

Christopher Bader's analysis of Op. 109 is based on Burke's distinction between the sublime and

the beautiful.[483] Bader believes Beethoven's late style is mostly a synthesis of the sublime and

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[483] This article has not been published in any journal. The website I found the article in suggests the citation to be as follows:
Bader, Christopher Kennedy, "The Feeling of Infinity: Late Beethoven and the Aesthetics of the Sublime and the Beautiful" (May 10, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2039142

beautiful, that is to say each work, for instance the first movement of Op. 109, has moments of beauty and sublimity together. He concludes that by "presenting two apparently opposing elements and then synthesizing them" Beethoven has been able to bring together the sublime and beautiful in Op. 109.[484]

The first movement, according to Bader, highlights the contrast between *vivace* sections and *adagio* sections as the appearances of the beautiful and the sublime, respectively. He uses Burke's as well as Kant's definitions of the sublime and the beautiful in an attempt to find sublime and beautiful elements in the alternating contrasting sections of the movement and to demonstrate why *vivaces* are beautiful and the *adagios*, sublime. Although there is indeed a huge contrast in the rhythm, melodic gestures, range of register, and texture between adagio and *vivace* sections, I do not think we can attribute Kantian beauty to the *vivace* sections and sublimity to the *adagios* if we are interested in analyzing the movement in its entirety and with a uniform feeling. While the beautiful-sublime juxtaposition analysis approaches sound as external nature and therefore looks for the objectively sublime in the movement, in my analysis below, I offer a 'pathetically sublime' hearing of the piece focusing on the complexity of sublime experience as the composition's main subject-matter. Whereas Bader interprets the displeasure moments of the piece as sublime and the dancelike portions as beautiful, my interpretation attempts to hear the entire piece from the perspective of a subject who is going through a sublime experience. I rely on Michaelis's view that the sublime can be portrayed in music through "the portrayal of our own nature, as we are moved, stirred, roused to emotional change and enthusiasm." My analysis attempts to show how the first movement might be listened to as the sonorous reflection of *one's own inner experience* of sublimity and not a sublime object.

I hear the whole first movement as a portrayal of a sublime experience that depicts two essential elements: pleasure and displeasure (or safety and danger). This analysis sees the

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[484] Ibid, 38.

movement as the portrayal of the subject's "manner of thinking" when it experiences the

sublime. The sublime element resides not in the representational aspects of the piece but in its

expressive force; therefore, rather than focusing just on certain threatening moments as

sublime, I read Beethoven's work as a sonic formulation of the subjective conditions of the

sublime experience. Drawing on Cooper's interpretation of the formal design of the movement

and some of Bader's technical observations about the piece, I describe below my hearing of the

pleasurable moments interrupted by displeasure moments that nonetheless form a unified

experiential content. The sublime reveals its synthesis of fear and safety in this movement

through an organic (or purposive) enclosure of fearful moments inside safe ones.

   The first eight measures are the first appearance of what I hear as pleasure moments; these

are quickly interrupted by the first appearance of the danger. As almost all the analysts agree the

first 8 measures enjoy a uniformity in texture and rhythm. I think the main source of safety and

pleasure in these beginning 8 measures resides in the element of predictability in them. The

rhythmic and melodic straightforward pattern is not only predictable to our mind but also easily

incorporated into our possible bodily movements. The whole section is constituted of playful

leaps in both hands. For the right hand, each leap starts from where the previous one ends or on

a neighbouring note. It starts from G# to B, then goes on from B to F#, E to G#, G# to D#, C# to

E, E to B, and so on. This gives a playful dancelike motion to the music, one without any risk;

not only the listener's mind but also the pianist's body feels safe and balanced easily

accommodating themselves into the movement of straightforward and clear rhythm. The music

in the first 8 measures is therefore "familiar" both to mind and body. The familiarity of the

music, though, does not last long and is suddenly (even without a cadence) interrupted by a

different kind of music in terms of the rhythm, harmony, and register of the melody. Playfulness

is replaced by seriousness and to some extent a feeling of disruption and danger that is contrary

to the balance created through the opening measures. This section is not uniform and

predictable. We do not know (neither physically nor mentally) where the music's motion is

heading. It starts with a disruptive diminished 7th and what we would normally expect, namely a B major chord functioning as the cadence of the *vivace* section, is postponed to measure 15 after we have wandered aimlessly in unexpected key realms.

As Bader points out, the whole *adagio* section, with its wide range of the arpeggiated chords (Example 8, measures 12-13) and long scales of the closing theme (measure 15) is a portrayal of vastness, a vastness that, I think, could be experienced as a bodily disorientation. The wide range of arpeggiations and long scales make a huge shift from the familiar movements of the *vivace* section taking it to an unfamiliar territory where the risings and fallings are not easy for our 'imagined body', to 'grasp.' The temporary stability of the listener's body achieved by the playful and predictable jumps of the *vivace* is disrupted and replaced by a sudden journey to the highest and lowest registers of the instrument as well as beyond the 'registers' of our mind and body. It is, in a sense, a shift from the familiar to the unknown, from the sociality of the *vivace*, easily communicable and translatable to our bodily movements, towards the private language of the *adagio* which goes beyond obvious communicability. From this perspective, the movement portrays a tension between safe moments of the *vivaces* and dangerous interruptions by the *adagios*; it is—using Michaelis' terminology—a portrayal of the subject's sublime experience or the "pathetically" sublime music. It depicts "the state of mind aroused by [the sublime] feeling." The depiction of the sublime experience becomes possible only through the tension that exists between the safe and dangerous moments, i.e., between the sudden attacks of the *adagio* sections alternating with the safe *vivaces*.

IV. Musical Sublime and Self-Consciousness

Contextualizing Michaelis's view in the history of the musical sublime and drawing on Brady's account of this history, one could argue that with the first development, i.e., the shift from style to materiality, musical sublime was perceived as the represention of the sublime in nature by imitating the sublime nature. After all, music is sound and could bear some of the features one

could find in the external nature: it could stir up feelings of frustration and fear in imagination

and the senses through its similarity to the sublimely frustrating and fearful phenomena in

nature. With the second development, that is the Kantian turn in the subject matter of the

sublime from external nature towards the inner self, music was equipped with other capacities

for portraying the sublime. Music could arouse sublime feelings, according to Michaelis, by

portraying the sublime cast of mind. This subjective, or rather subjectified, conception of the

musical sublime, dissociated from its previously perceived subject matter, external nature, was a

necessary shift for the romantic encroachment on the conception of the musically sublime.

One must note, however, that the subjective shift in the understanding of the musically

sublime went beyond a redefinition of the concept itself and contributed to, or interacted with,

the emergence of a novel conception of music in general, an unprecedented experience of the

'modern music' of the time exemplified in the reception of Beethoven's compositions. Richard

Taruskin suggests that with Beethoven and the new musical aesthetics of his time, "[f]rom now

[i.e., Beethoven's time] on, music expressive of the new world-transcending values would be

called not beautiful music but 'great music'."[485] According to Taruskin, this was the first time

that the notion of sublimity was used "with reference to secular music."[486] Long before Taruskin,

Richard Wagner (1870) had articulated this historical shift from the predominance of the

beautiful to the reign of the sublime through Beethoven's music, underlining the composer's

emancipation of melody. He believed that with Beethoven a new approach to or a new 'type' of

melody emerged: "an eternal purely-human type."[487] Wagner declared that through "the

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[485] Richard Taruskin, *Music in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, The Oxford History of Western Music: V.2 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 649.

[486] Ibid, 644. This was obviously a shift in the conceptual paradigm of the time and not necessarily in the creation of music. As Taruskin has stated, the new aesthetics was employed in the perception of the previous composers: "The history of music in the nineteenth century—at any rate, of a very significant portion of it—could be written in terms of the encroachment of the sublime upon the domain of the beautiful, of the 'great' upon pleasant. And the process of encroachment applies to retrospective evaluation as well, as we are in the process of discovering where Mozart is concerned." Ibid.

[487] Richard Wagner, *Prose Works*, (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & co., ltd., 1895), vol. V, 103.

historical advance which the art of Music made through Beethoven," it "mounted far beyond the region of the aesthetically Beautiful, into the sphere of the absolutely Sublime."[488]

Interestingly, the creator of this 'modern sublime music' was intellectually attracted to the new discourse. Beethoven, a composer who lived in a time when, as Berger writes, a "soft Kantianism suffused the intellectual life of the period," wrote excitedly in 1820 in one of his conversation books: "The moral law within us, and the starry heavens above us Kant!!!"[489] The complete quote with which Kant opened the conclusion to his second *Critique* relates these two *things* to sublime feelings: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence [or awe], the more frequently and persistently one's meditation deals with them: *the starry sky above me and the moral law within me*."[490] Kant explicates the sentence immediately: the first one, according to him, refers to the external world and connects the subject to the immensely large world or worlds outside itself. The second one, though, as Kant says, "starts from my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world that has true infinity but that is discernible only to the understanding."[491] While the first sight, for Kant, "annihilates my importance […] the second sight […] elevates infinitely my worth" by "revealing to me a life independent of animality."[492] Despite Beethoven's perceived (and probably historically and institutionally constructed) biographical and musico-analytical attachment to this 'modern' Kantian notion of the self, one can also hear the sonorous expression of this "world of true infinity" that resides within the "invisible self" in the younger generation of the early nineteenth-century composers. In this respect, the examination of Beethoven's musical ideas must not be understood as emphases on exclusive features of a 'genius' composer whose work represent features detached from his historical context, but rather the exploration of a new

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[488] Ibid.

[489] Karol Berger, *Bach's Cycle, Mozart's Arrow; an Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 337.

[490] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1788/2002), 203.

[491] Ibid.

[492] Ibid.

approach to music-making and musical understanding that relied on ways in which ideas such as infinity, freedom and self-consciousness can be introduced into the realm of sounds.

The second movement of Franz Schubert's String Quintet in C major, D956, a 'cello quintet' he completed in September 1828 about a month before he died, is a sonorous articulation, or rather musical unfolding, of this Kantian notion of "invisible self," or as one might say, it is the sound of this modern notion of subjectivity or self-consciousness. The piece, having triggered analytic controversies due to what some scholars have characterized as its harmonic anomaly, can be heard as sublime not because it could be listened to as the reflection of the sublime objects or even as the sonic representation of a sublime experience (although these two approaches could find enough evidence in the piece), but in a more fundamental and deeper sense. Schubert, in this three-part ABA adagio movement, has invited his listeners to hear and reflect on those human conditions that make the sublime manner of thinking possible, and therefore the Adagio is the musical disclosure of a consciousness that can give rise to a freedom essential to the sublime experience. From a representational point of view, therefore, one can interpret the opening section (Example 9.1 mm. 1-28) as a sonic mimesis of spaciousness imitating the sublime vastness in nature through a wide tessitural space created between the low pizzicato cello and high chirping violin; or the loud, busy middle section (Example 9.2) could be interpreted as the musical representation of the mathematical sublime. Seeking to go beyond this 'objective' listening of the musical sublime in the Adagio, I argue that the sublimity of the piece lies in its pursuit of self-consciousness, an effort to 'understand' the self, the Kantian true home to infinity. In particular, my interpretation opposes the analyses of the piece that have sought to associate it (and other similar works by Schubert) with unconscious, 'dream-like' modes.[493]

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[493] Gingerich maintains that "[t]he opening section of the second movement, the Adagio, provides the most extreme illustration in Schubert's entire instrumental oeuvre of a 'utopian' or 'static dream tableau.'" John Michael Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 318. According to Gingerich this state of dream is not free of tension. In other words, although "a sense of an alternative reality" is present in the Adagio, right from the beginning it "carries within it the fatal seed of knowledge that such happiness is attainable only in

The Adagio begins with a serene, somewhat blithe E major music in the A section (first 28 measures). This section features a trio of sustained inner voices with lyrical and rhythmically unified motion on top of which fragmented motivic figures in the violin chirp in dotted figures, and in the bass line, the second cello intensifies the contrast between layers with pizzicatos. Despite the general, predominant serene mood of the A section, its second half, starting from measure 15 in example 9, features three subtle changes: the first violin joins the second cello in *pizzicato* gesture, the dynamics are reduced from *pianissimo* to *pianississimo*, and the harmony begins to move towards "darker" keys. At measure 28, this apparently calm musical 'moment' is shattered by an outburst, when a unison trill leads to a turbulent middle section in F minor. Here, the listener can distinguish a long list of disparities between the A section and the B section: the mode shifts into minor; for the first time after 28 measures with a very slow tempo, one can hear a forte music—the shift is sudden, from the pianississimo to fortissimo. Additionally, we can experience a song-like yet passionate and restless melody on the first violin doubled by the first cello, which stands in sharp contrast to the fragmented figures on the first violin in the A section. Also, the serenity of the inner voices is replaced by a rhythmically active and agitated accompaniment on the second violin and the viola. Finally, the pizzicati of the second cello disappears and instead, the instrument becomes actively involved in intense reactions to the restless melody. After another 28 measures, all this explosive and intensely agitated music suddenly turns into a spacious retransition, quiet and slow alternations of chords and rests leading to the modified return of the A section in measure 64. This return starts with considerably ornamented versions of the top and bottom voices using some of the figures and melodic features of the B section. The music is generally calm and even maybe carries less tension with itself than it did in its initial version. But, a few measures before the movement

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dreams." Ibid, 320.

ends peacefully, we hear the trill gesture again in measure 91, this time only on the first violin

leading to an F minor *fortissimo* chord as a reminiscence of the troubled section.

Example 9.1 Franz Schubert, *String Quintet in C Major*, 2nd Movement, Section A (mm. 1-28)

Example 9.1 (*cont.*)

The most important event of the piece is considered to be the sudden shift from the A section to the B section, that is from E major to F minor in measures 28-29. The shift to such a distant key is actually one of the main topics of the analyses written about this piece. The transition to B section is extemporaneous: the tonic note of the home key, i.e., E, trilled with the semitone, becomes the leading-note of the new key, which gives a strong impression of a dominant-like gesture for the F minor key leading to an F minor chord in measure 29. It is a sudden tonal change from E major to F minor, from the tonic major key to the minor key of the lowered second degree, a key that is only a semitone higher. In other words, the new key is the *minor* Neapolitan key—giving an even more 'distant' feeling to the modulation than if transitioned into a Neapolitan key, a typically major key. The divergence between the A and B sections is so fierce

that one can clearly distinguish two psychological (or even existential) modes, characterized by Gingerich as plunging from "a vivid but fragile Edenic dream [...] into nightmare."[494]

According to some commentators, this unanticipated shift from the A to B sections must be analyzed and understood in the broader context of other late works by Schubert, especially those that he composed at the same time while he was working on the Cello Quintet. For instance, discussing these late works, Benjamin Korstvedt writes that there are some 'adventurous tonal schemes' which, among other innovative features, "characterize Schubert's music with increasing intensity starting around 1824."[495] He continues, "these gestures involve a quick change in musical perspective, through a distinct harmonic shift, often enharmonic, almost always chromatic and usually exploiting a mediant or Neapolitan modulation to open into a new musical space and a new way of feeling."[496] Drawing on Korstvedt, one can argue that the tonal shift in this piece from E major to F minor is one of these musical gestures in Schubert's late works that express such a new musical space. (A quite similar relation exists between the initial key of the Quintet's Scherzo, the third movement, and its Trio, a shift from C major to Db major.)[497] Some have referred to this harmonic gesture as a "tonal anomaly." Susan Wollenberg calls these shifts 'poetic transitions'; she thinks their suddenness gives the new key "the quality of a revelation."[498]

While all these commentators agree that this sudden transition (whether referred to as a tonal anomaly or a poetic transition) is significant and must mean something, their interpretation of this meaning differ. Korstvedt thinks: "These acts of musical disjunction, perspectival jolts, sudden subjective reorientations [...] alienate themselves from the objective

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[494] Ibid, 390.
[495] Benjamin m. Korstvedt, "'The prerogative of late style': thoughts on the expressive world of Schubert's late works" in Lorraine Byrne Bodley and Julian Horton, eds., *Schubert's Late Music: History, Theory, Style* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 404.
[496] Ibid.
[497] The shift here from a major key to another major key a half step higher is not equally radical because in this case the shift is to the mode "expected" of the Neapolitan.
[498] Susan Wollenberg, *Schubert's Fingerprints: Studies in the Instrumental Works* (Farnham, Surrey: Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 47.

social forces embodied in the norms of classical tonality, sonata design, conventional musical 'logic'."[499] And the shocking effects of these moments are so powerful (maybe even sublime?) that Korstvedt believes that maybe this is "one of Schubert's great formal innovations: the creation of large-scale forms in which it is possible to feel that the bulk of a movement exists for the sake of certain splendidly distinctive prolonged moments, not for the sake of the whole."[500] In other words, it is plausible to listen to the whole A section as a preparation for a shock that happens in the middle section. Gingerich has focused on the dream-like or deeply trance-like quality of the A section and the interruption of that dream by the turbulent middle section.[501] Gingerich emphasizes the idea of "remembrance" and demonstrates how the middle section of the Adagio (the troubled section), what he refers to as "the music of obsessive loss" is remembered at the very end of the whole work, the last cadence of the fourth movement through both cellos' trill on D-flat (reminding of the Phrygian motive of the middle section); elements that have no justification in the las movement and are just reminders of the anguish and turbulence of the inner section. Gingerich sees an anti-Beethovenian approach here. He thinks the music of the cello quintet, unlike the heroic music that is centered around a determinate ultimate goal, and therefore does not care much about the past, is "music of tremendous courage in its refusal to shrink from the remembrance of loss or from the self-dividing consequences of introspection."[502]

In my interpretation of the Adagio, while drawing on many insights offered by the abovementioned scholars and accepting the shocking effect of measures 28-29 which transition us from the tranquility of the A section to the perturbation of the B section, I seek to demonstrate relations between these two sections by examining certain melodic and harmonic

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[499] Korstvedt's "'The prerogative of late style'," 421.
[500] Ibid.
[501] As well as Wollenberg; see Susan Wollenberg, *Schubert's Fingerprints: Studies in the Instrumental Works* (Farnham, Surrey: Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011).
[502] John M. Gingerich, "Remembrance and Consciousness in Schubert's C Major String Quintet, D. 956," *The Musical Quarterly*, no. 4 (2000): 631.

associations between them. In order to do this, I underline 'tiny' but significant moments in the A section that trigger the purportedly anomalous shift towards the turbulent section and discuss particular intervallic relations that contribute to a sense of wholeness in the movement. The tempestuous forces that are unleashed and come to the surface in the middle section are, from this view, the result of a longer 'search-like' activity that comes forth from the opening measures. Contrary to the more common interpretation of the A section, I believe the music of the first 28 measures is Schubert's effort to make sonorous a search in different harmonic and intervallic directions for uncovering or at least throwing light on a feeling or event, or even an existential mode. Far from wandering purposelessly, the music experiments with the dominant axis escalating to the dominant of the dominant in measures 4-10, but withdrawing unsuccessfully. The subdominant axis displayed in Example 9, measures 11-13, is promising. A quick hint at the key of A major triggers a motion towards a different direction, in the context of which the second phrase starting from measure 15 appears to be even more purposive. Distant keys are explored and finally some little hints show up that finally determine the music's new path taken in the B section. What comes to be decisive in the determination of the new path is the chromatic note C—a minor sixth degree in relation to the tonic E, and a retrospectively significant note that happens to be the dominant note of the middle section's key. The C appears first in the inner voices in measure 18 in the first cello, then on the first violin in measure 20 as a neighboring tone doubled by the second violin, and more vigorously in measures 25 (doubled by viola) and 27 (doubled a bit longer by the second violin). Ironically, it is the key of the whole work, a note that was already there but not seen: an invisible note.

This idea of a 'search-like' activity being predominant in the A section—at least in its first phrase and half of the second phrase—is supported by the way the 'serenity' of the A section seems to have—using Gingerich's terminology—a "fragile" status, never building up to create a meaningful melodic unit. As Gingerich has highlighted, despite the efforts made in the inner voices of the second violin, the viola, and the first cello to create a melodic line, it is the musical

element of harmony rather than melody that carries the main meaning of this section.[503] This

does not mean though that there are not any efforts to create some kind of linear motion.

Despite the A section's calmness and tranquility demonstrated in the serene inner trio and first

violin's slow steps all supported by the second cello's pizzicatos, the dotted notes on the first

violin alongside its intermittent leaps give the impression of some kind of active motion

enhancing the harmonic 'search'. In other words, although I agree with John Gingerich that the

first violin "seems to be building up a stock of gestures, of motives," but fails to construct a

singable melody or any "long-breathed song" and only continues "commenting," I think the first

violin's big melodic strides—despite their melodic failure—are significant efforts. The absence of

a pronounced, self-evident melody, as it were, is not accepted by the musical forces; the serenity

is not absolute and unquestionable in the A section.[504]

If we agree with Gingerich that there is a motion from brightness towards darkness that

starts from the distance from F# towards E and then darker keys in the second phrase, we may

extend the observation claiming that the search for the existential mode or event begins

optimistically with happy or extrovert modes but falls flat, and the music achieves a result only

when it starts to look into more inner and private modes—which explains why the second phrase

is shorter: because the search is almost complete. Here, the minor keys and the subdominant

keys explored and experimented within the A section, drawing on Scott Burnham's insight in his

article "On the Beautiful in Mozart," indicate a pull towards the interiority of the self.[505] This

stands in contrasts with those parts of the A section (opening measures), where a "move

outward" is tried. In other words, while the search in the external (outside the 'musical self') is

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[503] Gingerich, "Schubert's Beethoven Project," 375-6.

[504] I am relying on Gingerich's observation regarding another important component in my argument. As he states, "the three 'harmonic' inner voices" cannot be wholeheartedly accepted as the carrier of a melody. Their melody is too slow to sing, (there is no gap for breath) and hard to remember, and "its extreme deliberation defies our usual understanding of melody." John Michael Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 319.

[505] See Scott Burnham, "On the Beautiful in Mozart," in Karol Berger, Anthony Newcomb, and Reinhold Brinkmann, eds. *Music and the Aesthetics of Modernity: Essays*. 1st ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Dept. of Music: 2005), 46-48.

unsuccessful, the search within leads to the discovery of a new zone embodied in the F minor of the B section. In this inward search, an important 'sound' is discovered: the note C. To explicate this point I will look more closely at measures 15-19.

A pull towards the lower third degree (G) starts right from the beginning of the second phrase. The B minor chord, as the minor dominant of E, has a direct relation to G, as its mediant chord. (We heard the B minor chord in measure 11 as well. Interestingly, it enters as the first chord after E in the second phrase.) Extending Gingerich's observation that this is a pull towards darker keys, one might ask why this search stops quickly. After the tonicization of G and appearance of its major chord, obviously a move inward from the standpoint of the home-key happening in 5 measures from 15 to 19, we return to E quickly. But why not going further, if this was promising? Something seems to have been found, namely the note C. After we hear a one-measure-long C on cello in measure 18, and then the G chord in measure 19, there is a return to E major through two dominant sevenths, and then a cadence similar to the cadence of the first phrase in measure 14 (maybe even more affirming, as the figure on the last two beats of measure 23 melodically supports the tonic from above and below). The C appears briefly in measure 20, in the two higher voices, maybe just as an assurance that it will be 'remembered.' The music has found something significant, and this is why the second phrase ends sooner than we might expect. The remaining task for the A section, the codetta, is to tell us why C matters. Here, the relation between C and E, a potential dominant chord for the F minor of the B section, is explored two times in measures 25-27. Indeed, it is within the context of this exploration that the idea of the F minor seems to emerge.

The relation between C and E is, at least retrospectively, very strong. They can, among other things, simply contribute to the formation of a dominant chord for the forthcoming F minor key. The contrast creates two harmonic contexts in which the note E could be interpreted drastically differently: E is a stable and secure note in A section but is suddenly transformed into a destabilized note, the leading tone, in a new key. But more importantly than the relation between

C and E, another new sonority is discovered: minor 6th, an influential, significant interval not only

in section B but in the entire movement. The minor 6th plays an essential role in the discovery of

the inner mode; it starts (the leap from C to A-flat in the transition in measures 29-30) and ends

the event within the context of the 'Phrygian' motive in measures 55-56.

Example 9.2 Franz Schubert, *String Quintet in C Major*, 2nd Movement, mm. 29-63

Example 9.2 *(cont.)*

Example 9.2 *(cont.)*

Example 9.2 *(cont.)*

Example 9.2 *(cont.)*

The note C, which is reached through a leap from the tonic E, explains many of the important aspects of this piece: it is the key of the entire piece; it acts as a chromatic note in the context of the A section's E major key, but paradoxically at the same time creating a context in which E is retrospectively reinterpreted as a leading tone, which in return makes C the dominant key of the middle section and main key of that section; C makes a minor 6th interval with E; it also builds the same significant interval with A-flat which is the first highest note we hear at the beginning of the movement—the G# (enharmonically Ab)—on the second violin in measure 1, the target of the leap at the beginning of the B section melody on the first violin in measure 30, and also the first note we hear in A' section on the free-moving melodic gestures again on the first violin. Offering a mediatory service, the C has an auxiliary role in giving rise to this self-aware status, this new consciousness; a task that from a performative perspective is fulfilled by the second cello, the 'additional' instrument. This last point should be further elucidated. In the context of the interpretation of the Adagio offered above that relied on the notion of consciousness to

explain specific features of the piece, I believe we can also find an answer to a seemingly superficial but definitely significant question regarding the performing forces of this quintet: what does the second cello do and how does it contribute to this self-consciousness? I believe that there are signs that show the second cello has a mediatory role (somehow similar to the one played by the note C) in this process. Some of these signs are: In the beginning, while the inner trio is playing a harmony together, the only engaged dialogue we hear is between the first violin's dotted fragments and the second cello's pizzicatos. This interaction becomes more interesting when the first violin adopts the pizzicato and responds to the second cello in the latter's style. Also, in the middle section, although the turbulence and agitation is visible among all the instruments, the division of labor is significant: again, the inner trio does not enter a dialogue with the first violin. While the second violin and the viola accompany the melody in a quite pianistic way and the first cello doubles the first violin, helping the melody be heard amongst the turmoil, the second cello adopts a totally different strategy; it responds actively, mostly contrapuntally, to the main melody. Sometimes these responses include some kind of suggestions to the first violin's melodic line, such as in measure 39, where the appoggiatura to the dissonant G ends on A-flat in the first violin's melody, but is "corrected" by the second cello ending on F. This is where the fourth degree of C minor is tonicized and finishing the line on F gives more stability to the music or at least lessens the agitation, what repeats two more times.

- The rhythmic figure that initiates the B section (on the trill), (the very-short — very-long figure) and is adopted by the cello quickly and heard at many points during the B section on the second cello, comes from the very initial figure played on the first violin. If we remove the first note (the dotted note), then we have the same figure. This is an important figure: it is implicitly present everywhere in the A and B sections. At the end of the B section, while the music is to return to the A' section, this figure is played six times (mm. 58-61) carrying on the retransition to E major.[506]

- At the end of the movement, when there is a quick reference to the N(IIb) chord again, the

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[506] Can we say the second cello's pizzicato figure (the eighth note followed by a quarter note which is followed by a longer rest) is an augmented version of this figure?

preparation for the chord (trill on E) is played only on the first violin, the inner trio accompany, and interestingly the second cello continues its pizzicato figure. Also, in the beginning of the A' section (mm. 64-77), unlike the inner trio that is completely indifferent to the turbulence that has just happened in the B section, the second cello displays more sympathy by offering variations of some of the motifs from its own part in the B section this time in the home key and also in a non-turbulent manner; in particular, it transfers a stable 'version' of the agitated triplet figures from the B section to the A' section, which are now reformulated in rising 32nd notes responding sympathetically (almost affirmatively) to the now 'free-spirit' and 'self-aware' first violin.

Example 9.3 Franz Schubert, *String Quintet in C Major*, 2nd Movement, mm. 61-94

Example 9.3 *(cont.)*

Example 9.3 *(cont.)*

Example 9.3 *(cont.)*

To sum up, if we agree that the main achievement of the search-like activity (inner reflections, in a sense) of the A section's inward move was to find the Ab (or G#) in the context of its intervallic relationship with C, i.e., its 6th minor degree quality, we might argue that this disclosure is extremely subtle; The *adagio*'s discovery of the 'hidden' mode or quality, is not finding something completely unknown to the musical subject; the self was 'there' right from the beginning of the Adagio, and was therefore only an "invisible self."[507] We needed the entire move from E major to a very distant (but at the same time, and pitch-wise, very 'close'!!) key to be able to 'hear' it. The G# of the opening measure exists; but its mode of existence is not the one that makes its existence problematic or perceptible. It is heard/noticed and 'recognized' when it is put in a different context. When the G# shifts enharmonically into a 'new' note (Ab), this time heard in a high soprano note played on the first violin in an inward minor mode. This is the context where the G#/Ab can be recognized. One should note that despite the *far* tonal distance

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[507] This invisible self can be 'seen' in another important 'composition' of the time, namely *Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer,* a romantic painting by Caspar David Friedrich painted about ten years before Schubert's quintet was written. The painting was perceived to share the ambiguity or infinity—some kind of "musical mysticism", in Ernst August Hagen's words—experienced best in musical works (See Chapter One for the reference to Hagen). The central character of the painting, a man with his back to the viewer, creates a significant ambiguity: is the painting about the nature in front of the man or about the man himself? We are asked to look at the nature from the standpoint of the central figure but we cannot ignore the presence of the man. The paradoxical status of this self, its being visible and invisible, being absent and present, or in a sense being both a viewer but also at the same time a 'viewpoint,' is an effective way in which the Kantian subjectivity (a priori conditions of seeing and experiencing the world, in this case sublime nature) can be depicted through a then-representational art.

between E major and F minor (with respectively four sharps and four flats), the whole shift from E to F is frequency- or pitch-wise the *closest* possible move too. It is, in one sense, at the same time the farthest and slightest shift for the 'subject' to be able to see things from the right perspective, to be able to perceive what was concealed and could not be seen from the wrong perspective.[508]

V. Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to examine a decisive shift in the history of the musical sublime shedding light on a subjective turn in the decades around 1800 that conditioned the perception of not only particular moments in music but music *per se*. Exploring this transformation in the perception and experience of the musical sublime, I also explored the formation of a new music-nature relationship by exploring the reverberations of Kant's notion of the sublime in musical thought: the sublime not sought in music's representation of external nature but in its being the expression of the sublime experience, or rather the sonorous embodiment of ideas of freedom and infinity.[509] As it was discussed, whereas an earlier modern account of the musical sublime focused on the representation of the sublime in nature and underlined feelings that threaten the integration and stability of the subject, the later understanding of the musical sublime that was formulated based on Kant's insights on the sublime highlighted the essentially subjective quality of this experience. While earlier sublime involved a musical reconstruction of sublime nature, later notion of the sublime was perceived to be the sound of the inner self.

The term sublime, referring to a motion up to limits or beyond a threshold, was used before Kant to characterize a style or experience that could transcend the subject. With the subjective

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[508] And the G# or the Ab is significant from this perspective because in relation to E major, F minor is the only key whose third is exactly the same pitch as the third of E major, but within the context of a new tonality and modality.
[509] From one perspective, this chapter tried to go beyond the common understanding of Kant's aesthetics of music highlighting not his most notorious degrading treatment of music as "least amongst the fine arts" and merely a "play of sensations," but the conceptual possibilities that his philosophy of the sublime offered the musical thought of the time. Kantian shift in the history of the sublime had a crucial impact not only on the way this aesthetic experience was conceived in music but on the very conception of music *per se*.

turn, the sublime came to be conceived as 'passing through a threshold,' which leads not up to a world beyond the subject, but rather into the world within—a shift from "the starry heavens above" (or the giant objects outside the subject) into a depth within. This depth or inner greatness, as in the case of Schubert's Adagio, was *subtle*; in a literal sense of the word, it was sub-*tilis* (derived from *tela* meaning web, net, warp of a fabric), under the threshold.[510] With the romantic reformulation of this thought, it went into the unseen and untouched realm under the web and fabric of both language and representation. It went under the 'warp' (*tilis*), the finest and most essential thread of being. In short, whereas in a premodern account of sublimity the subject is elevated, uplifted to somewhere beyond, from without, with the new turn, the subject finds the 'beyond' somewhere 'sub*tle*/sub-*tilis*', from within.

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[510] The term sublime constituting of *sub* (meaning under) + *limen* (meaning lintel, the horizontal support above a door or window, and in general threshold), has been associated with going beyond, either from above, or under or through a threshold.

Epilogue

Dialectic of Distance-Engagement

The purpose of the core of this dissertation was to explore manifestations of musical subjectification in European musical thought in the decades leading up to and following 1800 by examining the shifts in the music-world relationship. This concluding chapter of my dissertation intends to offer a summary of the chapters and put forward observations about some socio-political implications of conceiving music as a subjectified art. An important goal for me is to address the question of whether the process of music becoming an autonomous 'subject' or an independent art led to a loss of its engagement with the world. In the course of arguing there was not a loss of engagement, I will examine the seemingly paradoxical state of musical autonomy, the fact that autonomous music was not disengaged with reality, or in other words, musical *autonomy* did not mean musical *abstraction*. To examine this important issue or conceptual dilemma that has historically resulted from, and displays the tension of, musical autonomy, I will touch on the significance of Kantian formalism for music, and the political implications of musical autonomy in the early nineteenth-century thought. I will argue that the early nineteenth-century understanding of musical autonomy was paradoxically the main

ground based on which a modern perception of the relationship between music and the world became possible, one through which the perceived independent and free nature of music exemplified human freedom, an allegedly necessary condition for free, autonomous and therefore moral action. The novel understanding of music as an autonomous art conditioned not only the way music was conceived as a meaningful art in itself, but also as a necessary condition for it to be socially and politically significant.

My story of the modern shift in the perception of music-world relationship began in Chapter One with a discussion of how the rhetoric of music-painting dichotomy around 1800 elevated the status and significance of music without denying the perceived meaninglessness and abstractness of music. The chapter was also an attempt to shed light on a paradox of this most autonomous and free art by highlighting the fact that the conceptual reliance of music on the conditions of painting was part of the process through which the modern essence of music was shaped: a new identity that was built based on an *Otherness*, a negative formation of what music as an art is. The 'empty self' of modern music, whether taken as its romantically perceived pure materiality or abstract subjectivity, was centered around a non-conceptual (or an abstract) relation to the world, one through which the world seems distant. In other words, the modern painting-music *paragone*, or rather the new musical battle against painting and the representational conditions of painting, worked towards separating music from objective nature. In order to be the sound of the human subjectivity, music had to become subjective by being detached from nature; nature that was exemplified in painting. By identifying itself different from the art of nature, i.e., by being less painterly, music became less natural.

Chapter Two was an attempt to deepen the enquiry into the music-world relationship by exploring the internally historico-musical moves that created a fissure within the understanding of music as a representational medium and thereby making divisions between two musical modernities. Under the ideology of the madrigal-principle, which seems to have governed the musical philosophy of the sixteenth to most of the eighteenth century, music was conceived as a

rhetoric tool to convey textual meaning or objective emotions. This earlier modernity in music history pivoted on a mimetic-expressive revolution in the nature of music which became possible partially because of the madrigalistic transformations in the text-music relationship. I argued that under this madrigalistic regime, the function of music, or rather the authority to whom music was subjugated, found a humanistic determination. In this early musical modernity, demonstrated in the emergence and establishment of the madrigal (especially the Italian madrigal), music began to serve the modern human being and their—mainly expressive— needs and desires and therefore was not an autonomous but rather a human art. In a later modernity, i.e., the modernity of 1800, music pursued the paths of autonomy and was perceived as an art that followed self-legislated rules and musts. This did not mean that music became an abstract dehumanized art; on the contrary, music's self-sufficiency was the sound of the modern, autonomous subject. The paradoxical status of the modern music as an autonomous art, i.e., that it does not serve any ends while at the same time it claims to be the representation of the modern human subject, is best exemplified in the sonata as a principle.[511] The seemingly paradoxical nature of the sonata form, its simultaneously pure and narrational character, is in one sense the condition of modern music *per se*. Integrating the autonomy of music into a *tonally dramatic* understanding of the thematic and harmonic structure of music, the modern music sublated (drawing on Hegel's notion of *Aufhebung*) the madrigal-principle: it reaffirmed and rejected the madrigal-principle at the same time.

Chapter Three was an effort to complete the music-world relationship picture by looking at the way the relation of musical sound to nature developed within the context of a modern understanding of the musical sublime. Examining the 'Copernican' or a subjective turn in the meaning of the musical sublime that occurred in the decades around 1800 and contributed to

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[511] I use 'representation' here to emphasize that modern/romantic understanding of music perceived the sounds of music not as the expression of humans' feelings but as the embodiment of the human subject itself. The music without being representational (that is through its capacity to represent objects or emotions) and indeed through its 'purity' came to represent, or rather sonify, the autonomous subject.

the formation of a new musical thought, this chapter explored a new aspect of the modern

music-nature relationship through which music was perceived not as the representation of

sublime nature but as the sonification of the notions of freedom and infinity. This was a move

toward the subjectification of the musically sublime, that is conceiving music in its

entanglement with the modern subjectivity: emphasis on the sublime in nature and the subject's

fear and instability was replaced by a modern understanding of the musical sublime perceived as

the sound of the self's inner greatness and even further as the self-consciousness.

　While in the previous chapter, I emphasized the significance and role of Kant's aesthetics in

the historical shift in the understanding of the musical sublime, and more generally in musical

thought, it should be noted that it is not only with regard to the sublime that Kant's influence is

important. His significance must be, and has indeed been, underlined in relation to the modern

elevation of music's status in general.[512] The elevated standing of music became possible when

the attitudes toward the reference of musical meaning shifted. Instrumental music, or rather

that type of instrumental music that had no specific external reference of meaning (program,

dance, social ceremonies, etc.), exemplified the problematic of musical meaning and was

regarded as an aesthetic issue in the eighteenth century. The fact that within a span of decades,

music began to be conceived as the art of the infinite and therefore highest of all art forms,

shows a great turn in the way meaningfulness as a philosophical issue was conceived. Influenced

by Kantian philosophy, human subjectivity came to be considered as the main context within

which the world can be understood and interpreted.[513] Within this framework, and

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[512] For examples of studies in musicology that have emphasized the significance of Kant's philosophy in music history, see Rose Rosengard Subotnik, *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); and Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[513] This is reflected in Kant's Copernican revolution based on which the subject simultaneously perceives and constructs the world as it provides the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of knowledge. My understanding of Kant's critical philosophy is based on Henry Allison's interpretation of the philosopher. See Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, Rev. and enl. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). Allison interprets Kant's own claim of his Copernican revolution in philosophy (that rather than our cognition conforming to the objects, it is objects that must conform to our cognition) as an "anthropocentric model of cognition," according to which the "epistemic conditions" of experiencing the world are subjective (provided by the subject): in Allison's words, "objects must conform to the *conditions* under which we can alone present them to ourselves as objects." Ibid, 37.

complimented with a romantic spirit, the detachment from the external world was not regarded

as enough reason for music to be meaningless. Another worthwhile realm was recognized which,

despite its being contentless and unrelated to the world of the senses, was nonetheless

considered as significant and containing a bigger 'truth.' In other words, although Kant's

aesthetics in itself did not seem to be promising for instrumental music, his philosophy

contributed to the significance of music by turning the human subject (and subjectivity) into the

main source of the construction of truth about the world. The only step for the later thinkers to

take was to connect music (and mainly 'pure' instrumental music) to the inner world of the self.

Kant was, as it were, the weapon which both struck and healed the wound.[514] Although he

showed that instrumental music had no content, since he empowered the notion of subjectivity,

he also provided the conditions for the possibility of a new status for instrumental music and

contributed to the new aesthetics unintentionally. In this respect, a great contribution to the

new aesthetics of music (romanticism) comes from the philosopher who thought music was

nothing but "play of sensations" and therefore the lowest among the arts.[515]

This notion of music that stressed the emptiness and contentlessness of music, remained as

a presumption or at least as a point of tension within the later understandings of music. In

particular, the romantic view of music had to come to some kind of terms with this 'fact' or

conviction about music and hence romanticism did not fundamentally reject the sensual nature

of music. The notion of infinity was indeed an effort in this direction: it built on the Kantian

'formalistic' understanding of music but at the same time opened up toward a space in which

music could play not merely with sensations but some 'deeper' thoughts or feelings. From this

perspective, the contemporaneity and relation of the emergence of the modern notion of human

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[514] Wagner, *Parsifal*, "Nur eine Waffe taugt: die Wunde schliesst der Speer nur, der sie schlug." ("One weapon alone will serve: only the spear that struck you heals the wound.")

[515] From this perspective, one could argue that the ideology of music as entertainment (exemplified in an historical move we refer to as the gallant style) mattered. Music-as-entertainment divorced music from previous contexts of meaning, thereby downgrading music to an art of entertainment but at the same time bringing it one step closer to independence. To read more on the way the eighteenth-century gallant style and in general court music influenced the musical creation and experience, see Robert O. Gjerdingen, *Music in the Galant Style* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

subject and musical modernity was not coincidental.[516] Musical modernity was formed and

shaped within modern subjectivity that was reliant on a fundamental turn in the modern

philosophical thought. The modern subjectivity explored and conceptualized in Kantian and

post-Kantian philosophy, as Robert Pippin suggests, was centered around a speculative

conception of the subject leading to the "denial of any immediate presence to the mind of, or

possible direct reliance on, the world, […] the denial of the 'myth' of the given."[517] The formation

of this modern subjectivity was the announcement of a new relation between the subject and the

world, one through which the human subject is a "meaning-*making* […] self-conscious subject

[…] in this active, self-determining relation to itself in all experience as well as in all action."[518]

This revolutionary conception of the human subject was deemed as a necessary condition for the

subject's autonomy and freedom, a common denominator of philosophy by and inspired by

Kant.[519] The simultaneous move towards contentlessness and subjectivity, which provided music

with conditions for determining its own meaning from within, was more or less comparable to a

similar transformation to the understanding of the human subjectivity triggered by Kant and

followed by other German Idealists. Musical emptiness or abstraction was redefined as depth,

i.e., as meaning.

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[516] Any discussion of musical modernity carries a paradox with it: what to do with pieces that are not 'modern' but are created and experienced in the modern world? An example is Beethoven's vocal music for Hoffmann. But maybe the very consciousness about some kind of coexistence of past and presence through the contemporaneity of different musical styles is another aspect of the notion of modernity. In a sense, while change is 'natural,' one might argue that the awareness about the change or more strictly speaking the problematic consciousness about that change is not. This modern tension between past and presence is reflected in Hoffmann, who characterizes some of his contemporary music as the music of the past. But this is not exclusive to Hoffmann; later, Franz Liszt also speaks of the program music of Berlioz as the music that belongs to future. And Adorno talked of some of the music of his time as regressive music, or music that was not modern enough. From this progressivist view, some phenomena existing in a particular time are always regressive and belonging to the past. In a sense, the actual is not actually the truth. While these points are not directly related to my discussion in this dissertation, they can develop into a topic for my future studies.

[517] Robert B. Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2.

[518] Ibid.

[519] According to Allison, Kant's "virtual identification of selfhood with freedom" provided material for idealistic successors. See Henry E. Allison, "Spontaneity and Autonomy in Kant's Conception of the Self," in *The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy*, ed. Dieter Sturma and Karl Ameriks (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 11-29, 11.

The similarity between musical autonomy and human autonomy was not merely a conceptual development affecting the way the nature of music and human subject was perceived but also the way their relation to ethics and politics was conceptualized. Kantian formulation of morality as the expression of the subject's freedom and autonomy seemed to be a background against which a new moral and political responsibility for music was defined. It should be noted that Kant's moral philosophy is deeply rooted in his theory of subjectivity, that is the new understanding of human experience in the world as one whose meaning was not pre-given but constructed through subjective conditions. In other words, the principle of subjectivity and through that the autonomy of the subject were the condition of the possibility of morality.[520]

This Copernican revolution in the self-world relationship, with all its strong moral reverberations, might shed light on the enquiry into the relation not only between music and the external world but also between music and society. From this half-Kantian, half-romantic perspective, modern music's 'empty self' or meaninglessness was nothing but its political power. That is to say, the political power of music resulted from its independence from the world. This stands in contrast with the older view of why music was politically significant. For instance, Boethius believed that the real musician was the person who possessed the faculty of judging, a power which helped him to decide on the modes, rhythms, etc. of the music.[521] From this political understanding of the musician's role, the musician (performer or/and composer) in one

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[520] "Kant both regards autonomy as the supreme principle of morality and denies that any view of agency that does not acknowledge autonomy in this sense is capable of accounting for the possibility of morality." Ibid, 18. Although autonomy as a value had its roots in the Enlightened value of intellectual and moral self-sufficiency, Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical apparatus provided a new framework to understand this modern value. According to Pippin, Kant's philosophy is philosophy of freedom. It seeks to find an answer for the question: "How is it possible that individual subjects could uniquely, qua individuals, direct the course of their own lives?" Ibid, 2. Here, in this philosophy, notions of the independent, rational, reflective individual come together to explain this unique kind of being. By developing a critical philosophy, Kant underlined that there is no immediate relationship between the mind and the world. By giving meaning and structure to the world, the human subject makes the construction of the object and world possible. In this view, mind and world are inseparable and the subject/self is the condition of the possibility of any kind of knowledge about the world. As Kant himself had highlighted, the subject finds in the world what it has already added. In other words, the rules under which the external world can be conceived are subjectively conditioned. Pippin writes: "It is relatively recently in Western history that we began to think of human beings as something like individual, pretty much self-contained and self-determining centres of a causal agency." According to him, understanding the condition of possibility of this type of subjectivity was a new task that Kant invented for philosophy. Robert B. Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7.

[521] Strunk, *Source Readings*, 142-3.

way or another controls the time and soundscape of the performance and therefore to some

extent conditions the space within which the listeners are 'living,' i.e., experiencing life. In other

words, in Boethius's view, during a performance, music-makers have a political authority, and

through conditioning the performative environment, music can exert social and political power.

While this picture still applies to the political significance of music in the modern era, it seems

to be incomplete: modern music is not—merely—political due to its external function but also

because of its internal organization. The modern autonomy of music, i.e., its independence from

the conditions of performance, was a necessary condition for its responsibility.[522] Social

emancipation and political commitment to freedom as an ideal found its artistic expression in

the apparently formalist view of autonomous music, which became possible by being

subjectified rather than objectified. It was through the projection of a general notion of human

subject onto music in general and musical works in particular that the autonomy of music

became possible. John E. Toews, drawing upon Michael Steinberg's studies, illuminates the

point perfectly:

> From the perspective of the history of subjectivity, the emancipation of art music
> as an autonomous form becomes a less paradoxical and contradictory
> phenomenon. The liberation of instrumental music as the maker of its own
> meaning from its traditional functions as a representation of religious meaning or
> natural truth, as a support for political power or social distinction, as a servant of
> visual spectacle or of the written and spoken word, did not necessarily imply that
> music was somehow purified of its relations to the world, or that it constituted a
> refuge or escape from mundane reality. Rather, the emancipation of music as an
> autonomous art form allowed it to act and react as a subjective agent in relation
> to the world.[523]

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[522] On the relationship between music as a concept and performance in the Western musical thought and practice and
how their relationship has shaped the development of music as an art, see Karol Berger, *A Theory of Art* (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000). In particular see the chapter called "Genealogy of Modern European Art Music."
108-161.
[523] John E. Toews, "Integrating Music Into Intellectual History: Nineteenth-Century Art Music As a Discourse of
Agency and Identity," *Modern Intellectual History* 5, no. 2 (August 1, 2008), 314. A different view of the enlightened-
romantic binary has been offered by Sanna Pederson in her "Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism,
1800-1850," where she, focusing on the nature of music criticism in nineteenth century, distinguishes between the
pedagogical aspect of the criticism that was endorsed by the Enlightenment values on one side and the 'unworldly'

Furthermore, autonomous music goes beyond the ideal of self-expression (giving expression to the human self) and—through creating its own musical world—becomes the expression of its own subjectivity, that is becomes a subject in itself. Such music does not need to be directly involved in or be an expression of political freedom—although in most cases it is—to be socially responsible. More than anything else, it ought to be an autonomous art, possessing self-determining structure and reliant on inner laws. Musical autonomy, the necessary condition for music to be morally significant, became possible only with the annihilation of music's *necessary* external affiliations.

This freedom of music from external reality was paradoxically the elimination of any kind of function or use for music that would make music dependent on extra-musical meanings, and at the same time the introduction of a new 'function' into music: representing the free, autonomous, spirit of the modern subject. Wackenroder associated 'good' music with its power to enable the listeners to free themselves from their "own preoccupations by focusing on the music rather than" themselves.[524] Seeking freedom in the free activity of musical sounds was a romantic, but not necessarily apolitical, ideal that, as discussed above, became possible only through the new understanding of music as a 'subject' in itself reconstructed based on the human subject's autonomy. Music was valuable/worthy in itself, because similar to the human subject, it was conceived as freed from worldly matters—either from the extra-musical in the autonomy-oriented account, or from the ordinary, in the romantic/poetic view. The modern conception of musical works as 'purposeless' works, as Pederson convincingly observes, was necessary for piece of music to be judged as an independent artwork.[525] The freedom of music, Pederson states, relied on moral approaches to the role of music in modern society. Schumann

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subjective and transcendental nature of the romantic criticism and reception of musical work. See Sanna Florence Pederson, "Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800-1850," *Dissertations available from ProQuest,* 1995.
[524] Quoted in Pederson, "Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism, 1800-1850," 37.
[525] Ibid.

criticized composers who "gave in to the masses."[526] It was regarded as a 'sin' in the Enlightened view and therefore resisting against it was a moral "commandment."[527] Schumann was attempting to save the higher status of the composer and his music above the people's ordinary (in Pederson's words, "prosaic") and entertainment-based approach to music. This might be regarded as the 'morality' of the new music (how to keep music autonomous by retaining its distance from the mass's taste) but the term must be used with caution—with an attention to the different orientation of the music with regard to its relation to what is 'good' and what is 'bad.' In other words, the modern sense of 'sin', that of giving in to the extra-musical, is defined and determined *within* the independent world of the musical work, rather than through appealing to the purposes that are imposed from the *outside*.[528]

Freedom, in a negative sense, became the meaning of the new music. Freedom meant emptiness or lacking any semantic association with the world. Goehr, however, sees this "two-pronged emancipation" problematic, since a new 'obligation'—"to be meaningful in extra-musical, spiritual, and metaphysical ways"—had been created for music and a next step was needed to emancipate music from the new commitment: the intelligibility of music was attributed to its internal, structural coherence rather than something outside of it.[529] Art, regarded as "an end in itself" and liberated from external ends or functions, gained its "own

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[526] Ibid, 96.

[527] Ibid, 85-95.

[528] This is an interesting fact, because with regard to Nazi and Soviet Union's use of music for their own political agendas, formalism in music or music as form became a rebellious act in itself. *Ironically*, music as refuge became an act of protest! Formalistic aesthetics was a threat for the politicized aesthetics because the former was recognizing an independent zone/area/world over which the politics and power of the Nazi/communist regime did not have any control. One can claim that Hanslick's or similar disengaged formalisms was reinterpreted politically in new political contexts.

[529] Goehr, *Imaginary Museum*, 154-6. Goehr's treatment of the romantic theory of music is interesting here, since she believes the main components – or doctrines – of this theory finally came together to reconcile the tension that existed between the *formalist* and *transcendent* view. She suggests the reconciliation was achieved through Schelling's aesthetics "by using the notion of pure form in two ways: to show how music, of all arts, could be the universal and spiritual language and to show how music could have purely musical meaning." Goehr quotes Schelling here: "Music brings before us in rhythm and harmony, the [Platonic] form of the motions of physical bodies. It is . . . pure form, liberated from any object or from matter. To this extent, music is the art that is least limited by physical considerations in that it represents pure motion as such, abstracted from any other object and borne on invisible, almost spiritual wings." Ibid, 156. She explains that "the precise sense in which religious and moral attitudes could continue to exert their influence on the character of music without that influence threatening music's new-found autonomy." Ibid, 157.

musical and aesthetic end," a new autonomy.[530] In other words, if any type of purpose or end for

music could be imagined, it had to come "entirely from within," and the autonomy did not,

therefore, make art meaningless or useless; it emphasized a shift from 'outside' into 'inside',

from outer goals into inner ends. According to Goehr, this liberation from worldly matters was

concurrent with the artists' attempts to give an artistic expression to their social and political

ideals such as political freedom. Michaelis's statement that music "presents entirely and purely

the spirit of art in its freedom and individuality" is an expression of the new ideal that was

common between the modern music and modern subjectivity.[531]

    The socio-political understanding of musical autonomy was reflected in the earliest critical

writings of Beethoven's instrumental music. As Alexandre Chèvremont has studied, the

apparently aesthetic claims of musical autonomy had a serious political layer reflected in his

interpretation of E.T.A. Hoffmann's review of Beethoven.[532] Hoffmann's review of Beethoven's

fifth symphony, which was published in 1810 and after the 1808 concert, is according to

Chèvremont a great example of how a defense of musical autonomy could be in a certain context

a political announcement. Hoffmann's review, based on Chèvremont's reading, is not a purely

musical and romantic document. Its central concept, i.e., *Selbständigkeit* (autonomy), has both

political and metaphysical ramifications. According to Chèvremont, the main themes of

Hoffmann's review, which are in one way or another centered around the notion of autonomy,

have political resonances. Hoffmann's critique of program music as a music that was meant to

represent a tangible reality in the world was at the same time an attack on the type of music that

served the purposes of despotism.[533] Refuting representational music was on a par with the

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[530] Ibid, 171.

[531] Christian Friedrich Michaelis, "Ueber das Idealische der Tonkunst," Quoted in Bonds, *Music as Thought*, 25.

[532] Alexandre Chèvremont, "Autonomie de la musique et autonomie politique. La recension par E. T. A. Hoffmann de la Cinquième symphonie de Beethoven" in Philippe Grosos and François Félix, eds. *Musique Nationale: Philosophes et Musiciens Dans l'Europe Du XIXe Siècle*. (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2016), 25-35.

[533] "How dimly was this peculiar nature of music perceived by those instrumental composers who tried to represent such circumscribed sensations or even events, and thus to treat sculpturally the art most utterly opposed to sculpture! Dittersdorf's symphonies of this type, as well as all the newer *Batailles des Trois Empereurs* etc., should be condemned to total oblivion as ridiculous aberrations." Hoffmann, E. T. A. *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings*, 236-7.

refutation of the kingdom of world (Napoleon's kingdom).[534] Hoffmann's claim that Beethoven's

music opens another kingdom (*Reich*) totally unknown to man has striking political layers. The

music of Beethoven is for Hoffmann the embodiment of the controlling self and authority that

was missing on the political scene: "[Beethoven] is nevertheless fully the equal of Haydn and

Mozart in rational awareness (*Besonnenheit*), his controlling self detached from the inner realm

of sounds and ruling it in absolute authority."[535] As Chèvremont interprets this passage,

Hoffmann's Beethoven "does not confuse his subjectivity with the inner realm of sounds and

commands it as an absolute sovereign."[536] From this perspective, musical autonomy is not so

much about instrumental music as it is about how music *per se* relates to the world and how it

deals with the sonic materials. For Hoffmann, the similarity between sacred polyphony of

Palestrina and Beethoven's symphony was that they lean on a capacity to transcend the definite

images of this world and introduce an indefinite, or rather infinite, realm, whether in the world

beyond (transcendent) or the world within (transcendental).[537] Autonomous music was

perceived as a free art that promotes the freedom of the subject. This is connected to the Kantian

metaphysical notion of liberty from nature: only if the laws of morality come from inside me, I

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[534] Chèvremont, "Autonomie de la musique," 27.

[535] Hoffmann, E. T. A. *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings,* 238.

[536] Ibid, 27. Beethoven "ne confond pas sa subjectivité avec le royaume intérieur des sons et commande à celui-ci en souverain absolu." As Chèvremont observes, Hoffmann here uses the term *Reich* (kingdom) eleven times: "Ayant perdu sa souveraineté dans le monde sensible, la nation allemande ne demande-t-elle pas à Beethoven de restaurer sa grandeur sur un plan spirituel?" One could add to Chèvremont's observation that music here stood alongside or rather embodied the German pull toward freedom in philosophy exemplified in the philosophies from Kant to Hegel. Ibid.

[537] The analogy between Palestrina (or older sacred music) and Beethoven (or generally speaking the 'pure' instrumental music) could be extended to the spaces where these musics were performed and the social and cultural meaning they served. Bonds suggests that the performance of symphonies in the modern secular context of concert halls could be compared with the 'performance' of the Mass in the religious context of the Church. The secular, autonomous background of concert halls provided music with a chance to be heard as a serious yet secular cultural product carrying social and communal meanings, "a kind of ritualized enactment of community." (*Music as Thought*, xv) In a secular context, symphonies were heard "as the expression of a communal voice." Ibid. Matthew Riley offers similar observation: "In the case of western 'high' concert culture of the last hundred years and more, the dominant listening practices have been defined in terms of silent, motionless attentiveness. The ideal is more than a matter of social etiquette (although it is certainly that too). It is embedded in post-Romantic traditions of musical aesthetics and compositions [...]. The various notions of 'absolute music' and 'art religion' that arose in the early nineteenth century prompted demands for the kind of reverential attitude on the part of listener that previously would have been more appropriate in a place of worship. [...] Close, sustained attention during the performance of such works would facilitate an experience of self-revelation by, as it were, re-directing the stream of perception back into the recesses of the listener's own soul. [...] Pictorial representations of musical listening portrayed individuals lost in rapt concentration, their eyes pensive and downcast." Riley, *Musical Listening in the German Enlightenment*, 1.

am free; autonomy is freedom from the external rules, whether it be natural, religious, or political. And as Chèvremont observes it is within this intellectual context that one should see the privilege of music among arts. Autonomous music can be vocal music as long as it is not attached to (or 'serves') words or images. Hoffmann's interest in Palestrina's vocal music is indeed a respect for a music that transcends words and images, an aesthetic claim that was for Hoffmann and other romantics equally practical (ethical and political).[538]

The interconnection between aesthetics and ethics or politics can be best seen in the concept of romanticization. For the romantics, art and music must reconstruct the world in a *better* fashion. The artist "must *idealize* his material."[539] Friedrich Schlegel writes:

> Many people find it strange and ridiculous when musicians talk about the ideas in their compositions; and it often happens that one perceives they have more ideas in their music than they do about it. But whoever has a feeling for the wonderful affinity of all the arts and sciences will at least not consider the matter from the dull viewpoint of a so-called naturalness that maintains music is supposed to be only the language of the senses. Rather, he will consider a certain tendency of pure instrumental music toward philosophy as something not impossible in itself. Doesn't pure instrumental music have to create its own text? And aren't the themes in it developed, reaffirmed, varied, and contrasted in the same way as the subject of meditation in a philosophical succession of ideas?[540]

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[538] Bonds has similar views about the political significance of music and other cultural activities for the early nineteenth century Germans: "Through various public and semi-public associations, then, Germans were able to sublimate political expression through philosophy, literature, and the arts—including, as we shall see, instrumental music. The seemingly insurmountable political fragmentation of German-speaking populations helped to make early German nationalism all the more cultural rather than territorial. Indeed, many German nationalists of the early nineteenth century considered it to be the mission of any future German state to provide a model of cosmopolitanism for the rest of the world, a state based on cultural rather than territorial or military might. Paradoxical as it may seem, particularly in light of German history in the twentieth century, Beethoven's contemporaries for the most part saw no fundamental conflict between the dual beliefs of nationalism and cosmopolitanism: Germany as a nation was to become the cosmopolitan state par excellence, not through its territorial power but through its accomplishments in music, art, philosophy, literature, and the sciences." Bonds, *Music as Thought*, 82. Bonds suggests that as a new development in Beethoven's time, instrument music or listening to instrumental music became politicized. Symphony was heard as an idealized expression of social unity and political democracy. Listening to symphony from a formalist point of view, probably practiced by us the moderns, was an anomaly in Beethoven's time. "Beethoven's contemporaries would have had great difficulty imagining such a strictly formalistic, apolitical attitude toward the symphony." Ibid, 104-5.

[539] Körner, quoted in Bonds *Music as Thought*. Mark Evan explains that "Only through art, Körner maintained, can the infinite be made perceptible, however dimly, for it can otherwise only be imagined. Thus the artist "must raise us up to himself and represent the infinite in perceptible form." Mark Evan Bonds, *Music as Thought*, 19.

[540] Fragments; 444.

Finally, Hoffmann has described the political and moral mission of music as a free art:

> In singing, where the juxtaposed poetry suggests precise moods through words, the
> magical power of music acts like the philosopher's miracle-elixir, a few drops of which
> make any drink wonderfully delicious. Any passion—love, hate, anger, despair, etc.—
> presented to us in an opera is clothed by music in the purple shimmer of romanticism, so
> that even our mundane sensations take us out of the everyday into the realm of the
> infinite. Such is the power of music's spell that, growing ever stronger, it can only burst
> the fetters of any other art.[541]

For Hoffmann, as for many other romantics of the time, the free art of music not only can free
other arts but has the power to turn the world into a better, "more delicious" place.
Romanticizing the world is in fact the moral activity of a free, autonomous art. A duty such as
this can be only pursued by an art that is autonomous, free from the representational conditions
of the world. Like the Kantian subject, free music does not conform to the world; it is the world
and worldly materials of other arts (such as words, images, actions, etc.) that must conform to
the conditions of music, thereby being romanticized, "clothed by music in the purple shimmer of
romanticism."

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[541] Hoffmann, E. T. A. *E.T.A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings,* 237.

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Allison, *Henry E. Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic
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