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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

**THE ROLE OF FEELINGS
IN
KANT'S THEORY OF THE HUMAN WILL**



**BY
LLOYD SCIBAN**

**A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS.**

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1990



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L. Sciban
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7007-106 Street,
Edmonton, Alberta
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DATE: *June 28, 1990*

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE ROLE OF FEELINGS IN KANT'S THEORY OF THE HUMAN WILL submitted by Lloyd Sciban in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Fred Van De Pitte

Fred Van De Pitte

Supervisor

Margaret Van de Pitte

Margaret Van de Pitte

J. Cameron MacKenzie

J. Cameron MacKenzie

Eamonn Callan

Eamonn Callan

Date... June 25, 1990

ABSTRACT

My thesis is that Kant underestimates the role feelings can play in the moral determination of the human will. Kant's belief that feelings cannot have such a role arises directly from his belief that nothing of sensible origin can contribute, in any way, to moral determination of the will. This latter assertion arises in turn out of his perceived need to seat epistemic or ethical necessity solely in rationality, to the exclusion of sensibility. I try to render Kant's perceived need suspect by showing some of the problems that are created with regard to it.

After showing that Kant's theories are internally suspect, I proceed to present an alternative view to Kant's, i.e., Max Scheler's. Scheler's theory is that feelings can intend an a priori given value, and thus play a role in moral willing. My point is that there were valid options for Kant. Given this, and the internal problems with his own theory, his blanket preclusion of sensibility, which included feelings, from a role in moral determination of the will was a misjudgment.

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Abbreviations of Textual References

To avoid the use of footnotes, references to Kant's and Scheler's works have been placed in the text. For Kant, the abbreviation for a work is first given, followed by the page number(s) of the German edition of that work issued by the Königl. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften of Berlin, and finally the page number(s) of the English translation used, if any.¹ For Scheler, the page numbers of the German edition are omitted. The abbreviations for the texts are as follows:

I. Kant

- A and B:** Respectively, the first (1781) and second (1787) editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1961).
- CJ:** The Critique of Judgment, trans. by James C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906).
- CPR:** Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).
- G:** Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Herbert James Paton (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964).

¹ The exceptions are Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone and Enthusiasm in Any Person Metaphysically for which the page numbers of the German edition are not given.

- LL:** **Lectures on Logic**, Vol. XXIV of Kants gesammelte Schriften, no translation available (Berlin: Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902ff).
- MM:** **The Metaphysics of Morals**, trans. by James Ellington, Book II in Kant's Ethical Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
- P:** **Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics**, trans. by Paul Carus (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1949).
- R:** **Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone**, trans. by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960).

II. Scheler

- F:** **Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism**, trans. by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

I. Introduction

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) provides coherent and detailed support for the view that there is an objective criterion for morality. For him this criterion¹ is the formal principle he calls the moral law. While his arguments demonstrate the possibility of an objective criterion for morality, they are problematic. The difficulty is to comprehend how, what is for Kant a highly formal principle, can determine a will that is sensually affectable. On the one hand, Kant denies that a will morally determined² can be

¹. "Criterion" may seem to be a strange term by which to refer to Kant's moral law. Moreover, it would be if one took "criterion" to mean a standard that is distinct from that which it is a standard of. However, if one understands "criterion" as a principle that operates within willing to ensure conformity to itself, one is closer to understanding Kant's concept of the moral law. The fact that Kant emphasized that the human will must conform to the moral law in order to be moral indicates that "criterion," more than a term like "basis"--which being metaphorical is ambiguous--better describes the moral law.

². From this point on the term "moral will" will refer to a human will that has been morally determined, i.e., a will that has been brought to will morally good actions. One should note that the will, for Kant, is a complex faculty. For example, both the faculty of choice and faculty of desire are contained in what Kant calls "*Willkür*" in the original German; as well, there is the moral law with its capacity to affect the faculty of desire, and which Kant terms "*Wille*." For a detailed explanation of Kant's concept of the will, see John Silber's "The Ethical Significance of Kant's *Willkür*," introduction to Rationality within the Limits of Reason Alone by I. Kant (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969), lxxix-cxxiv.

empirically so.³ But on the other hand, he offers a dubious explanation of how the moral law determines the will.

This latter claim cannot be taken too seriously, for the sole concern of the Critique of Practical Reason is whether and how reason can directly determine the human will <CPR 46, 47>. Kant holds that reason through its practical function, the moral law, morally determines the human will. If after careful investigation one finds Kant's description of this process unconvincing, one cannot consider him successful in achieving his stated purpose in writing the Critique of Practical Reason.

It is my thesis that Kant does not succeed and this is due, at least in part, to his underestimation of the role feelings can play in the moral determination of the will. After describing Kant's theory and problems with it, I will present some related views of Max Scheler (1874-1928). Scheler's alternative to Kant's theories shows that feelings can contribute to moral determination of the will, and furthermore, avoid problems in Kant's theories.

³ It is with trepidation that I attempt to define any important concept that Kant holds concerning the realm of experience. His concepts are highly technical and because of their inter-relatedness, a definition of one seems to require a definition of them all. However, since Kant does have special meanings for many of the terms he uses, it is important that they be dealt with if his philosophy is to be adequately understood.

For Kant "empirical" describes the condition of experience and knowledge, and their forms, of being affected by sensation. Examples of Kant's uses of the term include: "empirical conditions," which he describes as "those belonging to a world of sense" (CPR 29, 28); "empirical intuitions," which refers to an intuition related to an object through sensation (A 28, B 34, 65); and "empirical concept," which refers to a concept that is "a result of many impressions taken together and considered as one" (L.L. 451, no translation available). Feelings, as well, are considered to be empirical (A 15, B 29, 61).

When Kant denies that the moral will can be empirically determined, he means that the ultimate determiner of this will is necessarily practical reason in the form of the formal moral law. It is described as "formal" because it is formulated without regard to the effects of its implementation <CPR 27-29, 26-28>, and it is because formulation of the moral law involves no empirical considerations, that Kant believes it can morally determine the human will. On the other hand, feelings, such as those of pleasure and displeasure, being empirical effects of sensations cannot be what determines a will morally. The feeling of respect is seemingly an exception in that it serves as an incentive to determine the will morally. On this last point, see below pp. 19-21, and 34-35.

II. Kant's Theory of Moral Determination of the Human Will

In this chapter I will proceed as follows. I will first describe Kant's complex and highly coherent theory of how the will is morally determined. Any criticism of it, to be both fair and appreciated, can only be based upon a solid understanding of it. I will also discuss in detail the role the ends or objectives of human willing, and feelings, play for Kant in the determination of the human will.

Kant tells us that the function of reason in its practical employment is to make actual certain objects <B ix-x, 18; cf., A 550, B 578, 474>. Actualization entails the existence of these objects in time (A 145, B 184, 185), and thus they are experienceable. If reason is to effect this actualization of objects, it requires a faculty whereby its purely rational nature can affect the experiential realm. That faculty is the human will. The will has the power to bring into existence the objects of practical reason (CPR 15, 15) by initiating actions which occur in and affect the experiential realm <A 549, B 577, 474>. It follows from this that reason in its practical employment "deals with the grounds determining the will" <CPR 15, 15>.

Awareness of practical reason's employment and effect upon the will comes with consciousness of the maxims which are proposed as guides of action for the will. These maxims can conform to the moral law which is the "fundamental law of pure practical reason" <CPR 30, 30; cf., *ibid.*, 32, 32>, as well as being "independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition" <CPR 29-30, 29; cf., *ibid.*, 31, 31>; or they can be maxims which have incorporated into themselves consideration of the empirical effects of their ends or objects.⁴ Therefore, along with consciousness of the moral law,

one can also be aware of empirical forces affecting the will; for example, anticipation of pleasure arising out of the existence of an object can be a determining ground of the human will (CPR 23, 21). Furthermore, these empirical forces can be opposed to the actions of a moral will.

It is at this point that morality arises.⁵ The human will is confronted with a choice between two kinds of conflicting influences, that of moral law and that of inclinations arising from one's sensuous nature <R 31>. The choice of the moral law to be the determining ground of the human will means that the will will be morally determined. The choice of empirical desires indicates that it will not be. Given a propensity to do the morally right thing,⁶ one searches for a suitable course of action. One finds himself proposing courses of action on grounds independent of any pleasure or pain that may result from them.⁷ If one does decide on a maxim which prescribes this kind of course of action,⁸ one's decision is determined by a criterion distinct from empirical influence. That criterion is the moral law. Kant says "what is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly determine the will" <CPR 71, 74>.

⁴. Kant distinguishes between the function of practical reason in the first case, terming it "pure practical reason," and in the second case, terming it "empirically conditioned reason" <CPR 15, 15>.

⁵. Morality entails choice for Kant. If man were a being that only exercised self-legislating reason, he would be holy, but he would not be moral <CPR 82, 84-85>; and if man were solely affected by empirical influences, he would be an animal incapable of moral behavior.

⁶. John Silber discusses in detail Kant's concept of the disposition, cxiv-cxx.

⁷. Kant brings his point home with the example of a man who would forfeit his life rather than make "a false deposition against an honorable man" <CPR 30, 30>. No thought of the pain that he will suffer causes him to perjure himself.

⁸. Kant does not explain how one moves from what seems to be the common consciousness: consideration or decision on concrete action for a specific case, to consideration or decision on a maxim. My surmise is that Kant is referring to one's realization that the criterion for one's specific willing takes the form of a maxim. For example, upon contemplating my decision not to steal a small bottle of whiskey out of the liquor store, I find no explanation for it except the force of the maxim that one should not steal.

The moral law determines the will by being chosen as the form of one's practical rules or maxims. This form consists in the universality of these rules <G 436, 103>.⁹ What happens is that in searching for a course of action one considers whether any of the rules considered can apply in every occurrence of the same situation he is intending a course of action for, for all possible human subjects of the action. One enquires whether the rule applied universally will promote its own use or eventually lead to undermining its own basis for support. If it is the former, the form of one's rule is the moral law.¹⁰

The moral law is not a criterion that determines one's will on the basis of the objects to be realized in willing <CPR 34, 34-35>, or the feelings that may arise in anticipation of their realization <CPR 22-23, 20-21>. Kant holds that a will determined on the basis of objects to be realized is empirically conditioned <CPR 34, 34-35>.¹¹ Kant denies that a will determined on this basis is a moral will. There are two basic problems with an empirically conditioned will: its determination would be neither necessary nor universal <CPR 34, 35>.¹² It would not be necessary because any choice determined on this basis is influenced by anticipation of the pleasure gained through

⁹. Kant gives various formulations of this universality: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" <G 421, 88>; "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" <G 429, 96>; and "Every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a law-making member in the universal kingdom of ends" <G 438, 106>.

¹⁰. The fact that I am discussing choices to be decided on the basis of a moral criterion precludes the possibility that the form of one's rule would be a principle of prudence. The principle of protecting oneself may give universality to the rule: "Wear proper clothing when the weather is cold," but it is not necessarily related to concepts, such as freedom, which are essential to Kant's concept of morality. For a discussion of these see below pp. 9-15.

¹¹. A detailed description of Kant's views on objects of willing follows below p. 16.

¹². Actually, for Kant these two criteria "are inseparable, though in their employment one may be more useful than the other" <B 4, 44>. A distinction between the two criteria is discussed below p. 13, n. 22.

that choice <CPR 59, 61>. This would make the willing useful <ibid.>--that is to say, it would be a means to an end--however, it would have no intrinsic or necessary value. What value it did have would disappear with the discovery of a more efficient means to achieve that end. In short, there is no necessary connection between any action willed and the ultimate empirical end of that willing. Empirically conditioned willing would not be universal either. That which is pleasurable depends upon the subjective nature of the subject experiencing it,¹³ and thus could differ from one individual to another. In this case something that might have value for one person, would not for another if it did not produce the same result. Kant sums up his views on the will determined by empirical influences by saying that such a will is pathological <A 802, B 830, 633>, not moral.

Kant presents a few examples of how one can test to see if the maxim of his proposed action can be made into a rule conforming to the moral law <G 421-23, 89-90>. For this purpose, he uses one formulation of the moral law: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature" <ibid.>. In one case, a man in despair proposes to end his misery by committing suicide. Kant points out that a rule of action arising out of this proposition could hardly become a universal law of nature. It would be contradictory if man's natural desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, which supposedly functions to preserve and continue human life, were to be the basis of its destruction. A natural system tends to eliminate or avoid those circumstances that could lead to its own extinction. Man as a microcosm of such a system would also avoid them. As well, although the chance of the whole human race simultaneously desiring to commit suicide is rare, it is still there. Any proposition that permitted it could not become a universal law of nature.

¹³ Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 256; cf., CPR 36, 37; cf., *ibid.*, 34, 34.

In presenting this example Kant shows that one can determine what actions will conform to the moral law. If the rule governing the actions willed conforms to a formulation of the moral law, one can know that the actions will also conform. In the case in question, the formulation that is tested for is compared to a law of nature. The contradiction between the maxim of the proposed action and the formulation shows that such actions do not conform to the moral law.

Finally, in this general discussion of Kant's theory on how the will is morally determined one should note that morality is realized as soon as the moral law is incorporated into the maxim of willing. This means that having good intentions is sufficient for being morally good. The will is a faculty for bringing objects into existence, but it is also a faculty that determines itself <CPR 15, 15>. In selecting the moral law to determine the will one has already willed morally. Willing morally does not depend upon the realization of any end. As Kant says:

A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes--because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone--that is, good in itself <G 394, 62>.

The past discussion has touched on, but not dealt in detail, with two issues that are now important to address: the objects of willing, and feelings. The ends of willing, or objects as Kant refers to them,¹⁴ cannot be factors in moral determination of the will. This becomes apparent in Kant's discussion of the moral law as a categorical imperative where one reads that the will is determined "without being based on, and conditioned by, any further purpose to be attained by a certain line of conduct" <G 416, 83-84>.

¹⁴ Kant officially defines the "object of willing" as an "effect possible through freedom" <CPR 57, 59>. For Kant it is a fact that "every volition must have an object" <CPR 34, 34>. After all, the practical law which determines the will "concerns the existence of an object" and "implies necessity with reference to the occurrence of an action" <CPR 67, 70>. Kant's point is that although one's willing must have an object, it should merely be a place-holder so to speak. It should exert no influence on the willing itself <CPR 21, 19; of., *ibid.*, 22, 20>.

Kant believes that the legislative form of the moral law is the only sufficient determining ground of the moral will <CPR 28, 28>.

It is important to note that Kant's view of how the will is morally determined is also based upon a certain view of the nature of the objects of willing. Firstly, Kant considers whether there are two possible grounds for moral determination of the will: rational and empirical <CPR 91-92, 95; cf., *ibid.*, 62, 64>. If the will is determined by the moral law, the grounds are rational. Objects of willing belong to the latter possibility. Here, Kant does not initially preclude the objects of willing from being the grounds of moral determination of the will. However, his explanation of how the will is morally determined centers on the concept of determination of the will by the legislative form of the moral law, and this concept is explained in terms that preclude the influence of objects on the will <CPR 29, 28-29; cf. *ibid.*, 31, 31>.

What is crucial to understanding Kant's reasoning here is a certain view of the objects of willing. The point is that there is something about the nature of these objects that for Kant precludes them from being conditions in the moral determination of the will. This fact is further confirmed by Kant's general line of discussion on the matter. In conjunction with confirming the moral law as the only sufficient determiner of the will, he also explains that the "free will must be independent of all empirical conditions" <CPR 29, 28-29>,¹⁸ thus independent of any consideration of the objects to be realized. As Kant explains, pure practical reason recognizes any empirical influence as an interference to moral determination of the will, and thus rejects it <CPR 91-92, 95>. In understanding the nature of the objects of willing, he knows that their influence can only hinder moral determination of the will.

¹⁸. Here Kant is referring in part to what he terms "freedom in the strictest sense, or complete independence from the law of causality. As Kant explains, this must be the case if only the universal legislative form is to serve as a law for the will.

I have described briefly why Kant denies that consideration of the objects to be realized can be a condition in the moral determination of the will. Kant's rejection of the consideration of objects is best understood as part of a rejection of all empirical grounds for the moral determination of the will. He holds that when an object of willing is considered, one is adopting empirical conditions for determination of the will. That is because the object is chosen for its ability to effect pleasure <CPR 63-64, 66; cf., *ibid.*, 41, 42>.

Now the question becomes why Kant denies that there can be empirical grounds for moral determination of the will. I believe that Kant's reasons can be understood by analyzing the concept of morality which leads him to believe that determination of the will by man's rational faculty is morally superior to its determination by his empirical faculty or faculty of sense. Firstly, though, it should be noted that Kant sees these as the only two possible determiners of the human will. His discussion of the will's determination is couched in terms of "rational and empirical grounds of determination" <CPR 92, 95> or questions of whether and how pure reason can determine the will without empirical influence <CPR 15, 15; cf., *ibid.*, 28, 28>. For Kant there are no other vehicles besides these two that can determine the human will.

There are three essential aspects to Kant's concept of morality: Freedom, duty, and the necessary connection between moral value and determination of the human will by reason. Without freedom there can be no morality. Without the ability to choose in a manner incorporating one's own powers of self-legislation (autonomy), one cannot be moral. For Kant this ability is especially important because he holds that all events originating in the empirical realm are governed by the laws of cause and effect <A 445-46, B 473-74, 409-10>. If one's actions were all determined through his faculty of sense, whose stimulation originates in the empirical realm, they too would be governed by these laws, and one would not be free. All one's actions, including those one seemed to will deliberately, would be the result of the myriad forces at play in the empirical world. If

one is to be free, one must have the ability to originate actions outside the empirical realm. It is just this ability that Kant attributes "to living beings so far as they are rational" <G 446, 114; cf., *ibid.*, 447-48, 115-16, underlining added>.

Linked necessarily to the idea of freedom is that of autonomy. This necessary linking underscores the fact that in one's exercise of freedom one is self-legislating. Kant points out that reason must look upon itself as the author of its principles" <G 448, 116>; otherwise, the subject "would attribute the determination of his power of judgement, not to his reason, but to an impulsion" <*ibid.*>. Reflecting this, Kant envisions a qualitative difference between choosing on the basis of rational principles and choosing on the basis of empirical principles. Choosing on the basis of the moral law, which is contained in reason <CPR 19,17>, one is giving oneself the law <CPR 33, 34>. In contrast, choosing on the basis of empirical principles, one is submitting to "pathological laws" <*ibid.*>, natural laws which dictate that some pleasure or displeasure will follow from a certain course of action.³⁶ In the latter course of choosing, one is forsaking the power to be the author of those principles which will determine the will. Instead, one is allowing certain natural laws, which control on a sensual level, to replace principles of one's own making. Reason's role, thus changes from that of formulating the principles which would determine the will to one of facilitating the realization of objects presupposed in the empirical principles that do determine it.

The second aspect of Kant's concept of morality, which helps explain why he holds that determination of the will by man's rational faculty is morally superior to determination by man's faculty of sense, is duty. To understand well the concept of duty it is first necessary to be familiar with aspects of the will that have not been touched on so far in this paper.

³⁶. Kant also refers to these feelings as "alien influences" <G 448, 116>.

As I have explained, the faculty of sense, through man's inclination for pleasure, is capable of affecting and determining the human will. When the moral law determines the will, the inclination to realize a morally unworthy object that would give pleasure is checked. This naturally leads to frustration and displeasure, a phenomenon which Kant calls the negative effect of the moral law <CPR 72-73, 75>. However, in thwarting those desires that are empirically grounded, the moral law becomes an object of respect by awakening one to the fact that it checks the inclinations <CPR 74, 77>, and by serving as a positive assistance to reason's causality <CPR 75, 78>.¹⁷ This feeling of respect further promotes acceptance of the moral law as the determiner of the human will <CPR 76, 78>.

The above discussion establishes that in a being whose will can be determined both rationally and empirically, reason's determination of the will entails affecting one's sensual nature. The moral law, for finite¹⁸ rational beings, is a law of duty <CPR 82, 85>; that is to say, one is aware of moral necessity¹⁹ as a constraint <CPR 81, 84>. Actions which arise out of this awareness are actions done from duty, so duty is the motive to act on the basis of the moral law <G 397-99, 65-67; cf., *ibid.*, 400, 66>.²⁰

It should be clear that the concept of duty is essential to that of morality. As Kant points out "morality or moral worth, can be conceded only where the action occurs from duty, i.e., merely for the sake of the law" <CPR 81, 84; *underlining added*>. In

¹⁷. The effects of the moral law are further described below pp. 19-21.

¹⁸. Being "finite" means one exists in time and space, i.e., in experie... and thus is affected empirically.

¹⁹. The necessity to exclude empirically based considerations from the determination of the will.

²⁰. With the use of the term "motive" to refer to duty <G 398, 65>, Kant is pointing out that one has the ability to act on the basis of a feeling, and still act morally. One knows that acting from duty is acting on the basis of a feeling because Kant equates acting from duty with acting out of respect for the law <CPR 81, 84>, and respect for the moral law is a feeling <CPR 73, 76>.

acting from duty one's actions take on moral worth; no other motive can gain this for him <G 399, 67-68>.

Even though the concept of duty arises out of the fact that the human will can be determined both by the rational faculty and the faculty of sense, it is still not derived from empirical grounds. "Such grounds can furnish no concept of duty, inasmuch as this concept (the categorical ought) has its root in pure reason alone" (MM 382, Bk. II, 40). The concept of duty entails both that one can act from a motive arising from the moral law, and that the moral law can affect empirical inclinations, checking their ability to determine the will. Since for Kant, duty, and thus morality, cannot arise in determination of the will by the faculty of sense, his concept of duty demonstrates another aspect in which determination of the will by reason is morally superior to determination by the faculty of sense.

The last aspect of Kant's concept of morality that helps explain why determination of the human will by the rational faculty, instead of by the faculty of sense, is morally superior is the necessary relation of the law of reason, the moral law which determines the will, to moral value <CPR 60, 62>. Allow me to review some important factors for this discussion. Determination of the human will by the rational faculty, reason, occurs when the legislative form of the moral law is incorporated into the practical rule which determines the will. This is morally good. The sole alternative to this is determination of the will by the faculty of desire.

The reason why this latter alternative cannot be morally good, and can even lead to evil, can be partially understood through a consideration of Kant's emphasis on the concept of necessity. If consideration of the objects to be produced, which are objects of the will because of their empirical effects, could morally determine the will, they would possess moral value. They would be morally good because they had led one to will morally. However, for Kant, these objects can only have a conditioned value; for if

there were no inclinations toward pleasure and "the needs grounded on them,"²¹ these objects would be valueless <G 428, 95>. Obviously, there can be no necessary connection between moral value and determination of the human will by the objects of willing. As Kant further explains, all principles which presuppose a desired object as the determining ground of the will fall under the general principle of one's own happiness <CPR 36, 37; cf., G 444, 111>. The value conferred "depends very much on the very changeable opinion of each person" <ibid.>,²² so the rules adopted in willing can hardly be necessarily good.

Having shown that there is no necessary connection between moral value and determination of the will by the objects of willing, neither will Kant allow that the feelings of pleasure themselves towards which one is inclined, have any moral value. This feeling of pleasure is not something that can be considered good (or bad), it is only well-being <CPR 62, 64>.²³

There is a necessary connection, though, between the satisfaction of one's immediate physical needs and the pleasure that their satisfaction causes; however, this a natural necessity, the necessity of cause and effect. Kant denies that this relationship--the immediate satisfaction of one's physical needs by any action capable of doing so--can be the basis of moral value <ibid.>, even though it is a necessary relationship. For one thing there is no way that humans can act on the basis of such a relationship and

²¹. Patten notes: "We might expect inclinations to be grounded on needs, but Kant appears usually to take the view that needs are grounded on inclinations" <G 138, note 65, n. 1>.

²². In these sections quoted, as well as others, Kant also refers to the universality of practical principles. As I understand him, necessary principles are universal principles. He uses "universal" to describe them in order to discuss necessity in a context of human acceptance, for example, in contrasting universal acceptance with general acceptance <G 424, 92>, in showing the possible complexity of this acceptance <CPR 34-35, 35>, and in describing the universal communicability of the concepts of good and evil <CPR 38, 66>.

²³. The means to it may be considered good--but not necessarily good <CPR 62, 64>.

still be autonomous, a quality that is essential to Kant's concept of morality. One's actions would be dictated by one's physical wants, over which, if it were not for reason, one would have no control.

If a man is to be autonomous, and thus create moral value with his choices, he must be able to employ reason in determining his actions. The problem is that in supposing that the pleasure obtained from a certain object, or the object which leads to that pleasure, is the bearer of value on the basis of which the will is determined, the faculty of reason can only have a mediate value. It is good as a means to attain that pleasure or object, and thus it would be useful, but not morally good in itself <CPR 58-59, 60-61; cf., CPR 62, 64>. If the attainment of pleasure is the goal of reason, then man's "reason does not in the least raise him in worth above mere animality" <CPR 61, 63>. Reason would serve the purpose which among animals, is taken care of by instinct, fitting him for no higher purpose (than satisfying his animal needs) <CPR 61, 63>. No moral value could arise from reason's function in these circumstances.

As well, by adopting the attitude that reason's sole function is to facilitate satisfaction of man's physical wants, one opens up the possibility for evil to occur. Reason has a higher purpose which is to determine the will through the moral law--~~without consideration of empirical desires arising out of the objects of willing~~. When man does not choose to let the moral law determine the will, and thus withstand the influence of empirical objects, evil occurs <R 31>. This is a decision to subordinate the demands of the moral law, and thus reason, to the demands of one's sensible nature, and for Kant it is this decision which makes a man evil <ibid., 31-32>.

One now sees the outcome of the alternative to determination of the will by the moral law. Determination of the will by the objects to be realized provides no necessary connection between moral value and determination of the will. Any value which arises out of such a determination either is only the contingent value of being useful, or precludes completely the autonomy essential to Kant's concept of morality. Either one

opens up the possibility of evil occurring when the demands of the moral law are subordinated to the desire for pleasure arising out of the objects willed.

It remains, however, to explain why Kant thinks that there is a necessary link between determination of the will by the moral law and moral value. In the concluding note of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant discusses the relation of reason and necessity: "It is an essential principle for every use of reason to push its knowledge to the point where we are conscious of its necessity" <G 463, 131>. This "push" continues through the insight that one gains into conditioned necessities, such as the law of cause and effect.²⁴ However, what reason "unrestingly seeks" is "the unconditionally necessary." For practical reason this search is for "the supreme principle of morality," and this principle is one from which moral value is derived. Kant goes on to say that this supreme principle is an "unconditioned practical law" <ibid.>. Keeping in mind that a practical law contains a determination of the will <CPR 17, 17>, one should see that moral value is created through determination of the will by the unconditioned practical or moral law. This law, as the supreme principle of morality, creates moral value in its determination of the will. This relationship, for Kant, is unconditionally necessary.

Although Kant's view of moral values is related to his view on moral determination of the human will, it is overshadowed by the latter. This overshadowing is so extensive that one might consider unfruitful any discussion of Kant's views on values. However, since this paper will be dealing with Scheler's views on Kantian ethics, and a salient subject of disagreement between them is that of values, the topic takes on added importance here.

²⁴. The law of cause and effect is necessary on the condition that time is an a priori condition of experience and the category of cause and effect is a pure concept of the understanding.

Kant's view on values follows closely his view on the role of objects to be realized in the determination of the will. Those objects, as long as they are derived from inclinations toward pleasure or away from displeasure, cannot morally determine the human will. Even so, there is a type of value that objects have because of their relation to these inclinations <G 427, 95>. However, it is not a moral value, for moral value is given in a judgement of reason alone <CPR 62, 64>.

Kant distinguishes two types of objects of willing as possible bearers of moral value, but rejects them both. One type is the object, realizable through one's actions, which serves as a means to attaining pleasure or avoiding pain. Kant points out that while one does associate value with this type of object <CPR 62, 64>, it is only its relation to one's "power of appetite" which gives it its value <G 427, 95>. The second type of object, slightly different from the first, is that which is immediately associated with pleasure or avoidance of pain <CPR 58, 60>. Of course, Kant denies that any moral value can be given to this type of association. For one thing, like the first type of object, there can be no necessary connection between the object and the pleasure immediately associated with it <ibid.>; therefore, the value could only be conditional. Secondly, the feelings of pleasure and pain themselves have no absolute value <G 428, 95>. Since for Kant moral value must be necessarily linked to its bearer, Kant obviously rejects as non-moral the values that arise from the objects to be realized in willing.

For Kant moral value can only be derived in moral determination of the will <CPR 60, 62>. Since such determination can only be a product of the moral law, it determines all moral value <G 436, 103>. Here again, Kant's beliefs should primarily be seen in light of his attempt to show that the objects of willing cannot be the determiners of the will and moral value still be created. The will determined by such objects would have no moral law as a criterion, and "the criterion of good or evil could be placed only in the agreement of the object with our feeling of pleasure or displeasure" <CPR 63, 65>.

Kant's view on feelings is part of the blanket preclusion his theories place on empirical influence in moral determination of the will. Kant is definite in his denial that feelings can have a role in morally determining the human will:

If the determination of the will occurs in accordance with the moral law but only by means of a feeling of any kind whatsoever, which must be presupposed in order that the law may become a determining ground of the will, and if the action thus occurs not for the sake of the law, it has legality but not morality <CPR 71, 74>.

From this quote one sees that feelings, even if capable of producing results compatible with morality, do not do so morally. This is because feelings cannot determine the will morally <CPR 71, 74>. Feelings are sensuous <ibid.; cf., MM 211 n. 1, Book II, 9-10>; therefore, empirical <CPR 75, 75>. Kant's view is that nothing empirical can morally determine the will <CPR 68, 70; cf., ibid., 91-92, 95, and 31, 31> which obviously precludes feelings from doing so.

Kant further details his reasons for his rejection of feeling's role in the determination of the will. They are subjective because they are dependent upon the nature of the subject having them, which means that they are personal and private.²⁵ All aspects of feelings--their incitement, intensity, duration, etc.--are subject to the nature of the particular individual who experiences them. As such, any commonness of feelings is just coincidence. There can be no objective feeling that individuals can recognize and consider universal to all. Therefore, if feelings play a role in the determination of the will, as subjective conditions, they can provide no universality for those rules which take them into consideration in determination of the will <CPR 34, 34>.²⁶

The same person, in exactly the same situation twice, cannot be guaranteed to have the same feeling the second time since the make-up of his faculty of feeling may

²⁵. Beck, 217.

²⁶. Therefore Kant says, "They (rules) are subjective or maxims, when the condition (of determination of the will) is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will" <CPR 19, 17; brackets, words inside brackets and underlining added>.

change. Consequently the rule which follows from his feelings, and which determines the will for this situation, will not necessarily be the same on a different occasion. If the feeling is different, the rule could be different. In contrast, the same person in the same situation has access to a universal criterion, the moral law. Of course, it is possible that the person concerned will refuse to adopt the moral law into the rule which determines his will. However, as long as he is rational he necessarily can choose to.²⁷ At first the idea of a necessary possibility may sound strange,²⁸ but when compared with the experience of a feeling it becomes clearer. There is no guarantee that one will experience the same feeling in an identical situation; however, one has guaranteed access to the moral law for determining the will. One can choose that his rules be universal, but not when they are based on feelings.

What would happen if feelings could give universality to the rules which take them into consideration in determination of the will? It would shake the foundations of Kant's moral theory. If feelings could give universality to those rules, feelings could have the same role as reason in determination of the will. One of the essential aspects of Kant's concept of morality is the necessary connection between moral value and determination of the will by reason. It explains in part why Kant believes determination of the will by man's rational faculty is morally superior to determination by man's faculty of senses. If there were the same necessary connection between moral value and determination of the will by a particular feeling--which the assumption that feelings give universality to rules certainly allows for--there would be much less support for the view that determination of the will by reason is morally superior to determination by feelings.

²⁷. Even if he is forced to do or not do an action, he can will otherwise.

²⁸. Actually Kant goes to some length to explain the concept of absolutely possible, saying that "it would mean what is in every relation (in all respects) possible" (A 334-25, B 381, 317). The relationship between reason and the moral law is necessary for Kant. Therefore, in all circumstances where one can utilize reason one has access to the moral law.

By showing that feelings cannot give universality to their rules, Kant is supporting his own theory.

One other point to be noted about Kant's views on feelings is the blandness to which he reduces the experience of feelings. For him it seems, all feelings are either of pleasure or pain.³⁹ This view is supported by the remarkable fact that Kant believes that any empirical effect on the will is experienced as a feeling of pleasure or pain <CPR 92, 95>. He reduces the influence of dissimilar objects on the will to the same feeling of pleasure which can only be distinguished by degree <CPR 23, 21>. This reduction is reflected in his claim that there is no qualitative difference between the feeling that is experienced or anticipated in learning and that derived from gambling <CPR 23-24, 22>. The will does not have the power to distinguish them qualitatively.

In Kant's view on feelings there is one area of exception: his views on the feeling of respect for the moral law. This respect is the feeling produced by the moral law as it checks one's sensual inclinations in moral determination of the will <CPR 73-74, 75-77>. Kant describes how the moral law as a negative effect on feeling, blocks sensual inclinations producing unpleasantness and humiliation <CPR 74-75, 77>. This feeling in reason's judgement is also "esteemed as a positive assistance" to reason's causality and as such can be called "a feeling of respect" for the moral law as reason's agent <CPR 75, 78>. It assists reason's causality by removing "the counterweight to the moral law which bears on a will affected by the sensibility" <CPR 76, 78>. Reason is, thus, less hindered in its function of determining the will.

In fact, respect for the moral law is caused by reason <CPR 73, 76; cf., *ibid.*, 75, 78>; it is not of empirical origin, which means it does not arise from the faculty of

³⁹. In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant describes feeling as "the susceptibility to pleasure or displeasure" <211; Book II, 9>. Obviously by "feeling" he means the faculty of feeling. On the same page he uses "feeling" similarly, calling it "the ability to take pleasure or displeasure in a representation" <*ibid.*>. The point is that for Kant one is only capable of experiencing feelings of pleasure or pain.

sense's contact with, or imagination of, some pleasure or pain inducing object. Two things follow from the fact that respect for the moral law is produced by reason. First, respect, unlike feelings caused by objects of the senses, is not pathological; second, the object of respect is the moral law as duty. Kant gives two similar definitions for "pathological": "only contingently related to the will" <CPR 18, 20>, and "grounded on the inner sense" <CPR 80, 83>.²⁰ For Kant, respect is not contingently related to the will because it is possible through "a prior (objective) determination of the will and the causality of reason" <ibid.>; that is to say, independently of any subjective conditions.²¹ Given determination of the will by the moral law, respect for the moral law will manifest itself. Nor is respect "grounded on the inner sense," which, because it can only be gained through experience, is empirically conditioned <B xi-xii, 34-6>. Respect, as a product of reason and not the understanding, is grounded in reason. It is a feeling which can be derived simply from the idea of the form of the moral law <CPR 80, 83>.

The other significant difference that follows from the fact that respect for the moral law is the product of reason is that its object is the moral law as duty <CPR 81, 83-84>.²² Kant contrasts actions that arise from respect for duty with those great sacrifices, which may seem noble or magnanimous, but whose determining ground is not respect for duty, but rather strongly aroused feelings <CPR 85, 87-88>. The object of these feelings is the merit seen in the actions of great sacrifice apart from their conformity to the moral law. As such, the actions that follow from these feelings are not

²⁰. According to Henry Allison, by "inner sense" is meant a sense through which one can become perceptually aware of the self and its states, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 83. For examples see A 23, B 37, 67; and B xi, 34-35.

²¹. Although respect can be "regarded subjectively as an incentive" <CPR 76, 78> having an influence on the sensibility of the subject, it is objective because its cause is in pure practical reason. It will occur in all rational beings in an identical situation.

²². In fact, as Kant points out, the concept of duty entails respect for the moral law <CPR 81, 84>.

necessarily moral. Respect for the moral law must be their determining ground if that is to be the case.

I have been trying to show how the feeling of respect is an exception to Kant's belief that nothing sensual can determine the will morally. In conclusion, let me note that given Kant's views he has no other choice but to make an exception of some kind of feeling.⁸⁸ Man's nature, as well as his will, is constituted of both rational and empirical elements. Kant holds that only determination of the will by pure reason is moral. However, sooner or later in the process of determination, man's sensual nature will be affected. After all, the function of practical reason is to produce its object. That entails contact with the empirical world. Kant, himself, describes its necessity:

If we are to will actions for which reason by itself prescribes an "ought" to a rational, yet sensuously affected, being, it is admittedly necessary that reason should have a power of infusing a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty, and consequently that it should possess a kind of causality by which it can determine sensibility in accordance with rational principles <G 460, 128; bold type added; cf., CPR 73, 76>.

It seems strange that an exception would be inevitable in a system so technically refined as the one that Kant describes. However, as I hope to show immediately following, Kant's theories are problematic. His attempts to explain problem areas in his theories could easily have led him to make exceptions.

⁸⁸. This inevitability is discussed in greater detail below p. 33-34.

III. Problems in Kant's View of Moral Determination of the Will

The previous chapter has attempted to demonstrate that Kant's theory of how the human will is determined is coherent and well thought out. However, there are problems with it for which there are two main causes. The first is the sharp distinction that Kant draws between the sources of experience, sensation and form.²⁴ This distinction allows Kant to distinguish further between states of awareness that are experiential, such as having feelings, and those which are not, such as consciousness of the moral law. Most importantly, the distinction allows Kant to say with credibility that the necessity of knowledge or of the moral law is contributed by man's rational faculty.²⁵

The second main reason why Kant's description of the moral will is problematic is his narrow view of feelings. Feelings, for him, are either of pleasure or pain. There is no other type of feeling, and no necessary connection between feelings and moral value.²⁶

Kant's description of the make-up of experience becomes suspect when one sees that his motives for presenting it may have been a reaction to the arguments of David Hume (1711-1776). It is often suggested that Kant's views on the nature of experience

²⁴. Sensation is the effect of an object upon one's sensibility. Form is that which orders sensations in certain relations <A 19-20, B 33-34, 65-66>. The sensation originates in the object and the form in the faculty of the understanding <ibid., taking "thought" in the clause "they (objects) are thought through the understanding" to mean "given order to">.

²⁵. The necessity of knowledge cannot be contributed by man's sensual nature since Kant holds that necessary knowledge is a priori knowledge <A xv, 11; cf.; A 2, B 4, 44>, and "a priori" is defined as "absolutely independent of experience" <A 2, B 3, 43>.

²⁶. Kant's view on feelings is, in part, a consequence of his view that the form of experience, which includes necessity, originates outside experience, in man's rational faculty. Feelings, on the other hand, originate in sensation and have no attribute of necessity.

were in large part an attempt to refute Hume's epistemology.³⁷ Kant describes being awoken from a "dogmatic slumber" by Hume's denial that the relation between cause and effect could be known necessarily a priori. It was this challenge that gave his investigations new direction <P Introduction, 5-7>.

There are two tenets of Hume's epistemology that influenced Kant's views on the nature of experience. The first, Kant apparently accepts as true; the latter he opposes. Hume holds that experience provides no basis for necessary knowledge. He also holds that reason is limited to the extent that it also cannot provide necessary knowledge. These views are most evident in Hume's discussion of cause and effect. He holds that one has no basis for predicting the necessary production of a certain "effect" from a certain "cause." Experience only reveals what has happened, it cannot tell us what will happen.³⁸ The constant conjunction that one may have experienced in the past of a certain "cause" and "effect" gives him no notion of a necessary connection beyond the accustomedness with which he views their conjunction.³⁹ Nor can reason somehow surpass the bounds of experience and demonstrate real necessity of knowledge. In the case of cause and effect, reason cannot discover the "ultimate connection of causes and effects."⁴⁰ The most it can do is make plausible conjectures which, without verification through the actual event, can be nothing but uncertain.^{41 42 43}

³⁷. For an example see Allison, 12.

³⁸. A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: University Press, 1978), Bk. I, Part III, Sec. IV, 91.

³⁹. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sec. VIII, Part I, 64; in Essays concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 82.

⁴⁰. A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, Part III, Sec. VI, 91.

⁴¹. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sec. V, Part I, 36 n.; in Essays, 44.

⁴². Kant points out that Hume inferred from reason's incapacity to make use of the principle of causality in any manner that transcends experience "the nullity of all pretensions of reason to advance beyond the empirical" <A 760, B 760, 607>.

Kant accepts Hume's assumption that experience provides no basis for necessary knowledge.⁴⁴ However, he still holds that necessary knowledge is attainable. His response is to deny Hume's second assumption and say that reason can provide one with necessary knowledge. He distinguishes two "very dissimilar elements" in experience: "the *matter* of knowledge [obtained] from the senses, and a certain *form* for the ordering of this matter, [obtained] from the" mind⁴⁵ <A 86, B 118, 121; cf., A 20, B34, 65-66>. These two elements ground the distinction between pure and empirical knowledge which opens the Critique of Pure Reason <B 1, 41>. Pure knowledge, which is independent of experience and sensations, "is entitled a priori" <B 2-3, 42-43>, and any knowledge which is a priori is absolutely necessary <A xv, 11>. Discussing Hume, Kant points out that it is through the faculty of knowledge, either through pure understanding or pure reason, that one attains necessary knowledge. Hume overlooks this type of knowledge thinking that the association of impressions gives us the most certain form of knowledge <A 765-66, B 793-94, 609>.

⁴³. To keep this discussion within the perspective of moral theory, it is useful to note the repercussions Hume's epistemological views had on his moral theory. He denies that reason is able to determine morality. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Sec. VI, Part I, 196; in Enquiries, 239. Interestingly, Hume still wants to say that there are necessary (universal) moral values, and his explanation of how they are determined is to say through feelings, *ibid.*, Sec. IX, Part I, 221; in Enquiries, 271-72.

⁴⁴. I find it difficult to understand, given Kant's views that necessary knowledge is attainable, why he would have accepted this assumption so wholeheartedly. Since I believe that this assumption by Kant is part of the reason for the sharp distinction that he draws between the components of experience, I cannot say that this sharp distinction caused Kant to accept Hume's assumption.

⁴⁵. Instead of "mind," Kant's exact words are "from the inner source of the pure intuition and thought...." however, in other places he talks of the form lying ready in the mind <A 20, B 34, 66>, and the pure intuition existing in the mind "as a mere form of sensibility" <A 21, B 35, 66>.

Kant's reaction to Hume has two main consequences for his moral theory.⁴⁶ One, it allows for states of awareness distinct from experience; and second, it means that feelings, as sensually based, are contingent. It follows that there can be states of awareness distinct from experience because the faculty of knowledge, in order to produce knowledge that is independent of experience, must operate independently of experience. As well, it is an active process, not merely passively waiting for sensation to affect it, but imposing its form upon sensations.⁴⁷ Therefore, it should be "observable" distinct from experience, and one's "observation" of it would be a state of awareness distinct from experience.

For theoretical reason such awareness can be of the pure concepts of the understanding <A 78, B 104, 112>; for practical reason though, it is consciousness of the moral law. Consciousness of the moral law occurs as soon as one constructs maxims for the will. This consciousness is devoid of empirical conditioning <CPR 29-30, 29> and therefore, is not experience. Kant describes the moral law as "an empirically unconditioned causality,"⁴⁸ the reality of which is supported by no intuition;⁴⁹ and as "exhibited

⁴⁶. Considering how well these consequences allow Kant to match his moral theory with his epistemology, one may further suspect Kant's distinction between sensation and form. One's thinking would be that the distinction had been carefully designed to facilitate correspondence between his epistemology and moral theory. However, although Kant was primarily concerned with morality, he felt he had to work through his epistemology before he began his moral theory <CPR 16, 16; cf., A 840-41, B 868-69, 698-99>. That is why the Critique of Pure Reason is the first critique. One should not suspect him of anticipating the writings to come and then deliberately setting up a framework to support them. The fact that Kant's demonstration of the reality of freedom differs from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals <G 447, 53> to the Critique of Practical Reason <CPR 47, 48-49> is sufficient to show that the content of Kant's writings was far from completely pre-planned.

⁴⁷. Kant speaks of the understanding bringing the synthesis of a manifold of sensations to concepts <A 77-78, B 103, 111-12> and of introducing a transcendental content into its representations <A 79, B 103, 112>. He also speaks of the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge <A 51, B 75, 93>.

⁴⁸. Kant does not actually mention the moral law in the section being quoted <CPR 36, 36>; however, in other writings he points out that the moral law is a law of unconditional causality through freedom <CPR 47, 49>.

⁴⁹. Intuitions originate in sensibility <A 19, B 33, 65>.

in concreto in intentions or maxims," which is to say that "its reality can be pointed out" <CPR 56, 58>. Henry Allison discusses the consciousness/experience distinction, explaining that for Kant certain states of consciousness are considered non-empirical-- therefore not experienced--because they are mental states outside reference to time.^{80 81}

Consciousness or awareness of the moral law supports Kant's belief that there is morality. For the possibility of experience, the categories of the understanding are necessary <A 125, 147>, for the possibility of morality the moral law is necessary. While one has experience to demonstrate the existence of the categories of the understanding, one cannot directly point to experience and say convincingly that there is morality.⁸² However, to assume morality with absolutely no basis would give little credence to Kant's moral theory. It is the awareness of the moral law that demonstrates the possibility of morality.⁸³

Kant's distinction between the two components of experience also enables him to explain how necessity can be perceived in experience, but not be based in any part on sensibility. Any necessity perceived in experience is based on the form of experience. There is an analogue for the moral law in Kant's description of respect. If respect, a feeling, originated in sensibility in any way, there could be no necessity associated with it. However, as Kant describes it, because respect is "produced by an intellectual cause"--the moral law--it can be known a priori, and has discernible necessity <CPR 73, 76>.

⁸⁰. Allison, 275-78; cf., below p. 30.

⁸¹. Time is an essential form of any experience, including subjective experience, which is what such mental states would be if they were experienced.

⁸².As well, since morality is not necessary for experience, the possibility of experience does not offer grounds for the existence of morality. Also, the matter of experience is empirical, thus contingent upon the subject as a perceiver. The contingency of any particular experience upon the particular subject means that any morality based upon it would lack the essential quality of universality.

⁸³. Basically, once this point is established Kant assumes that there is morality and describes what further conditions, such as freedom of the will, are necessary for morality.

This necessity lies in the fact that respect is absolutely commanded by the moral law and is necessary for determining the will morally <CPR 81, 84; cf., G 400, 68>.

The second reason that Kant's description of the determination of the moral will is problematic is his restricted view of human feelings. For Kant, feelings are either pleasurable or not.⁶⁴ Any other distinction between feelings reduces to one of degree <CPR 23, 21-22>; or as Lewis Beck notes, "All other feelings, such as the feeling of sublime, the beautiful, and respect are defined by the accompaniments, contexts, causes, or 'objects' of the pleasure or pain we feel."⁶⁵

Kant is aware of an alternative to his views in the writings of Frances Hutcheson (1674-1746) <CPR 40, 41>. Hutcheson describes a difference between the feelings one has for moral value and those one has for his personal advantage.⁶⁶ He offers a variety of examples and arguments in attempts to demonstrate the reality of the distinction he wants to draw. In one he describes one's supposed reactions to the service of two men: one who serves for altruistic motives, the other for selfish ones. Even though the actual advantages one receives from the two men are identical, one's feelings toward him who has served altruistically are qualitatively different. One perceives his actions as morally commendable.⁶⁷ Hutcheson also explains that feelings arise even when there is no chance of one's being affected by the actions of others, such as those of a faraway place or age. These feelings towards actions are not selfishly motivated on one's part because one cannot credibly believe that he himself gains from them, and thus they are seen as arising from virtuous motives.⁶⁸

⁶⁴. Beck, 93; cf., CPR 23, 21-22.

⁶⁵. Beck, 93.

⁶⁶. An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good, in British Moralists, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), Vol.1, 73.

⁶⁷. *Ibid.*, 74.

⁶⁸. *Ibid.*, 76.

Kant's criticism of Hutcheson's views is that they reduce everything to the desire for one's happiness; therefore, "consciousness of virtue is directly associated with satisfaction and enjoyment, while consciousness of vice is associated with mental restlessness and pain" <CPR 38, 40>.⁶⁰ At this point, Kant's argument seems to lose force. His reason for opposing this view is that any concept of good not derived from the moral law and its determination of the will "can only be the concept of something whose existence promises pleasure, and thus determines" the will to produce it <CPR 58, 60>. This is the exact conflation that Hutcheson opposes and which readers of Kant have taken him to task for.⁶⁰ Kant in putting forward an opposing view should show how the view opposed is in error. It is this that he has failed to do convincingly.

To a certain extent, Kant's view on feelings originates from his view on the make-up of experience. In his repugnance for relativism in ethics he sought a form of absolute moral values.⁶¹ The component of experience contributed by sensations,

⁶⁰. Kant also implies that if Hutcheson's views are not these, then they must agree with his own in that the concepts of morality and duty must precede feelings of delight in doing good or misery in doing bad. Otherwise, how would one know that certain feelings indicate moral goodness or evil.

⁶⁰. Lewis Beck believes that Kant:

confuses two very different things that the British philosophers had kept properly separate, viz., the disinterested pleasure experienced in doing something righteous or in contemplating a righteous action, whatever it may be that makes it righteous, and the interest we have in the pleasure accruing to us if we do or contemplate a certain action which may be righteous or unrighteous, 103-6.

⁶¹. Alexander Murray MacBeath in his essay "Kant on Moral Feeling," quotes a note written in an interleaved copy of Kant's *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen* (1763) in *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. XX, 46: "Everything is in a state of flux, passing before us in a continual stream, and the changeable taste and the differing guises of man make the whole game uncertain and delusive. Where am I to find fixed points in nature, fixed points which man can never move, and which can provide him landmarks to indicate along which bank he ought to steer[?]" *Kantstudien*, 64 (1963): 204, n. 4.

Specifically regarding feelings Kant says, "(F)eelings, differing as they naturally do from one another by an infinity of degrees" are little able to "supply a uniform measure of good and evil" <G 442, 116>.

including feelings, could not supply this necessity, so Kant's goals precluded their consideration in his search for absolute moral value.

It is odd that Kant's description of how the human will is morally determined would be problematic. He himself believes that:

What is required in accordance with the principle of autonomy of choice is easily and without hesitation seen by the commonest intelligence <CPR 36, 38>.

It would seem that any process which would give such a clear result should itself be lucid. In pointing out what moral action would be, Kant should only have to make one aware that one does easily see what is required and explain why one does. The task seems simple enough for an item of descriptive knowledge. Knowing that A is in city B, one also knows that A is not in city C. One easily sees this because it follows from the Law of Contradiction that an individual cannot be in two places at once. As obvious as this process of knowing is, one cannot discount the problems with Kant's description of how the will is morally determined. This is seen all the more when one considers some specific problems that arise out of the two general causes for them, i.e., the sharp distinction Kant draws between the two contributors to experience, form and sensation, and his views on feelings.

First, his distinction between the states of awareness, consciousness and experience, essential to supporting his views, is difficult to grasp and seemingly artificial. Second, his views preclude the variety of moral virtues that some hold as paradigms of morality, making instead the moral law the sole criterion of moral value. Third, his description of the occurrence of respect is problematic.

I have tried to explain how the distinction between consciousness and experience is essential for Kant. If one's awareness of the moral law were seen to be based in experience, it would, at least in part, be sensually constituted and as such contingent upon the subjective nature of the perceiving subject. Awareness of the moral law is necessary, though, to give credibility to Kant's belief in morality. The problem is that

the distinction seems contrived. Why is one's consciousness of the moral law not a phenomenon occurring in space and time, and thus also an experience? Henry Allison in attempting to defend Kant's views quotes a paragraph from the Reflexion: "Is it an Experience that we Think." The gist of the paragraph is that if consciousness of an act of thinking were itself empirical, "then the same time determination would again have to be represented as contained under the conditions of the time determination of my state."

⁶³ For Kant, this reduces to an absurdity because "there would be a time in which and simultaneous with which a given time flows."⁶³ There cannot be two time frameworks for Kant. As well, for the argument that this consciousness can itself be thought of as occurring in time--that is to say, one can be conscious of his being conscious in time--Kant has the response that thinking cannot be given to itself as an object. Any attempts to do so only provide a facsimile of the real thing.⁶⁴

The end result is that Kant has put forward a description that supports his own theories, particularly because the state of consciousness it describes is not an experience which would fall under the laws of cause and effect. He has explained what must be so in order that his theories be coherent and in a sense placed his view beyond the criticism that would arise out of his own theories.⁶⁵ In questioning Kant's description here, one could mention Scheler's view that every moment of consciousness contains the "threefold division of being-present, being-past, and being-future" <F 427>. Or, there is Paul

⁶³. Reflexion 5661. Kants gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XVIII, 319; quoted in Allison, 277.

⁶⁴. Ibid.

⁶⁵. This response is actually given by Henry Allison, 278; however, it seems one that Kant implies in the quoted paragraph from the Reflexion and one he must make to prolong the argument. Otherwise, how does he respond to the argument that one can be conscious of oneself thinking in time, for example, being conscious of one's logical derivation of a formula which involves steps.

⁶⁶. Namely, that if awareness of the moral law were an experience, it would be subject to the law of cause and effect. This would preclude autonomy, an essential aspect of Kant's concept of morality.

Ricoeur's view that the consciousness constitutes itself as future.⁶⁸ These are views that, in spite of the fact that they are only supposed to be direct descriptions of a given phenomenon, seem to disagree with Kant's contention that consciousness cannot be a process in time or cannot be an object for itself.

Another matter of question arising out of Kant's distinction between the components of experience is an uncommon view of the virtues. The fact that only the universal form of the moral law is sufficient to determine the will morally means that the variety of virtues, such as seen in ancient Greek philosophy, is artificial. Distinctions among what is considered justice, what is considered charity, what is considered fortitude, etc., are merely a matter of convention, whether individual or societal. One's perceptions of them have no significance outside these conventions and the traditions that reinforce them.

For Kant "nothing can have a (moral) value other than that determined for it by the (moral) law" (G 436, 103). However, the universal form of the moral law, while not

⁶⁸ Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, translated by Erasmus V. Kohák, fifth edition (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1984), 50.

contentless, has only a very general content.⁶⁷ It does not contain the basis for distinguishing particular virtues.

It would be different if the moral law were a series of electives to which appeal could be made in determining action. One could then term these electives a priori criteria for the virtues. For example, a tenet in the law could say "If an action is intended to accumulate the greatest possible benefits to others in need, that action has moral value," and on the basis of this tenet one would have a criterion for the virtue of charity. However, the moral law does not have such content; so for Kant there is no "a priori" basis for distinguishing the virtues.⁶⁸ It follows that what are referred to as virtues can only be arbitrarily defined and traditionally reinforced. There is no basis in the moral law for the differences necessary to distinguish them essentially.⁶⁹

⁶⁷. What should be noted is that Kant holds that an object of willing must be incorporated into the form of moral willing. This follows from the facts that every free action has an object or end <MM 384-85, Book II, 42; cf., CPR 34, 34>, and that "(t)he material of a practical principle is the object of the will" <CPR 27, 26>.)

If an action is to conform to the moral law, the latter must be able to encompass the ends of willing in its form. Therefore, the categorical imperative, or moral law "combines the concept of duty with the concept of an end in general" <MM 384-85, Book II, 42>. The end that is incorporated into the moral law is what Kant terms an "objective end," that is one which "serves the will as an objective ground of its self-determination;" and since it is given by reason alone, it is "equally valid for all rational beings" <G 427, 95; Paton notes that he has substituted "subjective" for "objective" in the quote above, 138, n. 63, n. 2. L. W. Beck's translation, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1909), however, restores the term "objective," 51>. This end is something which as an end "in itself could be a ground of determinate laws" <G 428, 95>. Kant goes on to say that man's rational nature is such an end <ibid.; cf., ibid., 437, 105>, and the fact that he does shows that the universal form of the moral law can be described in terms of it having a content. However, it also shows that this content is highly general; something Kant seems to concede when he says it must "be conceived only negatively," not as an end to be produced, but one against which one should never act <G 437, 105>.

⁶⁸. A concrete example that shows that such is the case is Kant's explanation that the happiness of others as a moral determining ground of the will is not one that one can presuppose in every rational being. Therefore, it cannot be the condition of a universal moral law <CPR 34, 35>.

⁶⁹. There have been attempts by scholars to give a more substantial description to the very general ends and content of the universal form of the moral law. A notable example is Robert B. Louden's "Kant's Virtue Ethics," *Ethics* 61, no. 238 (Oct. 1986): 473-89. Louden's view is that Kant's concept of the moral law can be described in terms

One last problem in Kant's view on feelings is his description of the origination of the moral feeling, respect. In spite of Kant's insistence that empirical content, that is to say, sensations, cannot be determiners of a moral will, his introduction of the moral feeling as something which does just that seems to have been an inevitable step in his description of the moral determination of the will.⁷⁰ Firstly, for Kant any willing must have a motive which is manifested in the faculty of desire; therefore, one finds him saying "to will something, and to take a delight in its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical" <CJ 209, 48: cf., G 460 n., 128>.⁷¹ This is the reason why Kant

of its virtuous nature. This view involves showing: one, that the will that determines itself morally is one that manifests virtue, 477; two, that one's underlying attitude or virtue is one's principle of moral willing, 479-81; three, that promotion of one's own virtue is a necessary goal of willing, 482-84; and four, that being motivated by one's virtuous nature is identical to being motivated from duty, the motive of the moral law, 484-86.

Given views such as Louden's, one wonders if an a priori basis for distinguishing the virtues as they are known in the Greek tradition cannot be derived from the concept of the moral law. A reading of the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals, seems to support the view that this is possible. Kant presents a series of descriptions of what he refers to as "duties of virtue" <MM 383, Book II, 40>. For Kant certain goals of willing are at the same time duties; for example, the "duties (a) of beneficence, (b) of gratitude, (c) of sympathy" <ibid. 452-53, Book II, 116-18>; and the duties of moderation <ibid. 462, Book II, 127>, of friendship <ibid. 469-71, Book II, 135-38>, of social intercourse <ibid., 473-74, Book II, 140-41>, etc.

However, in spite of views such as Louden's and Kant's descriptions of the duties of virtue, there still does not seem to be any a priori basis for distinguishing virtues. The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue contains, along with descriptions of the duties of virtue, a clear statement by Kant that the considerations of the circumstances by which one distinguishes the duties of virtue do not reveal various forms of moral obligation--for there is only one of these, virtue in general. What these considerations do reveal is the kinds of applications this virtue has. These applications differ "according to the differences in the subjects to which the principle of virtue (which is formal) may be applied in cases issuing from experience . . ." <ibid., 468-69, Book II, 134-35>. In other words, since the nature of these applications is contingent upon the subjective nature of the agent of action, they cannot be known a priori. If they cannot be known a priori, then there is no a priori basis for distinguishing them, which is Kant's conclusion <ibid., 469, Book II, 135>.

⁷⁰ Kant legitimates moral feeling's role in two ways. One, he equates the moral law and moral feeling <CFR 72, 73>; two, he emphasizes that the moral will is determined prior to and without consideration of the moral feeling <CFR 88, 83>. (There is a tension between these two explanations that exemplifies Kant's discussion of the moral feeling. If the moral law and moral feeling are equated, how can the moral will be determined prior to and without consideration of the moral feeling.)

believes that he must "determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes an incentive and...to see what happens to the human faculty of desire as a consequence of this determining ground" <CPR 72, 75>. Secondly, Kant has a very definite concept of evil which originates in part because of man's sensual nature.⁷³ Moral goodness results from giving priority to one's rational nature over one's sensuous nature <ibid.>. This entails that one's sensuous nature will be affected in some way; thus, Kant posits what he describes as the feeling "which we can know completely a priori and the necessity of which we can discern" <CPR 73, 76>.

Given Kant's assumption that any willing must have some type of feeling as a motive, he is pressed to explain why given the presence of this feeling in any moral decision, heteronomy--determination of the will by something other than the moral law <G 441, 106>--is not a foregone conclusion. This involves explaining how the moral law can originate in the faculty of desire a feeling which serves as an incentive or motive for the faculty of desire. The procedure that Kant describes follows these main steps. As the will is morally determined, sensuous impulses which are antagonistic to the law are rejected <CPR 73, 75>. For a subject who has the ability and attempts to rationalize giving supreme value to his inclinations,⁷⁴ the restricting of these inclinations and resulting unpleasantness is humiliating <CPR 75, 76>.⁷⁴ His attempts to make his inclinations supreme have been struck down. But in experiencing this humiliation, one recognizes that an obstacle to determination of the will by the moral law has been

⁷¹. This fact also follows from the fact that the faculty of desire as a participant in the process of willing must be determined by something which will affect it <CPR 72, 75>. It is a faculty of feeling and as such can only be determined by a feeling.

⁷². Kant explains that evil results from subordinating the moral incentive (moral feeling) to those of one's sensuous nature <R 31>. The fact that man has a sensuous nature whose demands can subordinate the moral law is necessary to there being evil.

⁷³. Kant describes the propensity to rationalize as a self-conceit <CPR 74, 77>.

⁷⁴. Thus, Kant describes moral feeling as a negative incentive <CPR 72-73, 75>.

removed. By diminishing the obstacles to moral willing, the moral law furthers its being chosen as the form of the maxim which determines willing <CPR 79, 82>, and "this dislodgement of an obstacle is, in the judgement of reason, equally esteemed as a positive assistance to its causality" <CPR 75, 78>. Explaining the latter part of the this quotation, Kant says:

On the other hand, since this constraint is exercised only through the legislation of one's own reason, it also contains something elevating, and the subjective effect on feeling, in so far as pure practical reason is its sole cause, can also be called self-approbation with reference to pure practical reason, for one knows himself to be determined thereto solely by the law and without any [sensuous] interest; he becomes conscious of an altogether different interest which is subjectively produced by the law and which is purely practical and free. Our taking this interest in an action of duty is not suggested by an inclination, but the practical law commands it and also actually produces it. Consequently, it has a very special name, viz., respect <CPR 81-82, 83-84; bold type added>.

As brief as this description of the origin and role of the moral incentive in willing is, it should provide the context for an explanation of problems I see arising out of it. Simply stated, it is difficult to accept Kant's account of how reason can initiate those incentives which allow it to determine the faculty of desire. Before beginning my criticism I must point out, in fairness to Kant, that he holds that it is impossible to explain "why the universality of a maxim as a law" should interest man <G 460, 128>. It "is an insoluble problem for the human reason. . . . identical with the problem of how a free will is possible" <CPR 72, 73>.

Still, there are two areas in Kant's description of the moral law's effect upon the will which are problematic. One is how the causality of reason is able to initially thwart inclinations toward pleasure, and the other is how the elevating effect of respect is caused. Depending on one's view of willing there is a sense in which moral willing is already taking place even before the moral feeling or respect is aroused. As one thwarts these inclinations that would lead him heteronomously, one is already determining the

will morally.⁷⁶ At this point, though, there seems to be no incentive for the faculty of desire to submit or allow its inclinations to be thwarted. Therefore, the question arises how this is possible. Proceeding to the point where respect for that which has thwarted one's inclinations arises, the question again arises how the causality of reason is thus able to affect the faculty of desire.

With these questions in mind and the suspicion that Kant was either being indiscriminate or did not mean that they were unanswerable, one has to wonder what plausible descriptions there are of reason's role in affecting the faculty of desire. Two explanations seem to be the only ones that offer hope of securing Kant from criticism. The first, simply stated, is that it is within reason's power to directly affect the faculty of desire, what Kant's terms the causality of reason <CPR 75, 78; *ibid.* 73, 76>. The second is that the faculty of desire anticipates, through the imagination, the pleasure-like respect⁷⁶ which is "inseparably bound with the idea of the moral law" <CPR 80, 82-83>.

Taking the second possible explanation first, I believe it can be dismissed out of hand. It is doubtful that the imagination would ever have a basis for representing the pleasure-like respect to the faculty of desire. Experience will eventually lead one to adopt a law of prudence;⁷⁷ however, in the case of the moral law, experience does not offer such a lesson. Attempts to act in conformity to the moral law lead to a thwarting of the inclinations and pain. On the level of the faculty of desire, one would proceed no

⁷⁶. The picture that arises out of this description is one of the moral determination of the will's being a series of stages in which the origin of the feeling of respect can be compared to a push over the summit. It is only at the point where the faculty of desire offers most resistance to the moral law that reason must solicit a strong incentive for the faculty of desire to submit to the autonomous course of reason.

⁷⁶. It is not likely that a feeling of humiliation would be an incentive for the faculty of sense. However, Lewis W. Beck points out that in Kant's basic description of respect <CPR 71-89, 74-94>, although he "never says explicitly that there is a pleasurable component in respect," in other places he does, calling it a negative pleasure <CJ 245, 91> and saying it has the same effect as pleasure on the will <CPR 117, 122>, 220.

⁷⁷. One need only to have burnt oneself sufficiently to vow to be careful with heat.

further. The threshold of pain would prevent the faculty of desire from ever discovering respect. The faculty of desire as a faculty of stimulus-response would resist the course of action prescribed by the moral law and based on this experience would continue to do so in any future prescriptions.

Furthermore, even if the faculty of desire could somehow "unnaturally" be inclined to incur pain and forego pleasure, the faculty of desire does not have the capacity to react to the fact that it is the moral law which is the ultimate thwarter of its inclinations. The faculty of desire, as Kant explains it, can only react to the strongest incentive. There may seem to be an anticipated incentive in the moral law's determination of the will, but the result would be "feeling respect because one was about to feel respect," which is incoherent.

The first explanation for reason's power of causality on the faculty of desire offers more promise, but eventually it too seems to be faulty. The case would be that reason would have at least as much control over the faculty of desire as Kant describes. It would be able to enter into conflict with and defeat inclinations, and cause itself to become the object of respect <CPR 74, 76>. However, the problem with this explanation is that it allows too much power to reason in determining the will. If reason can determine the will according to its own criterion without obstruction from the faculty of desire, which forms part of that will, the possibility of evil is precluded. The will would always be determined by the moral law and there would be no question of its demands being overruled by one's desires. Evil, though, is a very real possibility for Kant.⁷⁰ Therefore, one seems forced to conclude that Kant's description of how the moral feeling can be aroused lacks credibility.

⁷⁰. A large part of Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone is concerned with the topic of evil; specifically, Book I, 15-50. Also John Silber discusses Kant's concept of the origination of evil, *op. cit.*

In Kant's defense, John Silber has pointed out that Kant's concept of the human will is highly complex. One aspect of it, *Willkür*, includes both the faculty of choice and the "stimulus-response" faculty of desire.⁷⁹ The faculty of choice in this concept has the ability to decide what will be the cause of the strongest impulse which determines the faculty of desire. Silber proceeds to quote Kant: "freedom of the *Willkür* is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine *Willkür* to an action *only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim* (has made it the general rule in accordance with which he will conduct himself)."⁸⁰ And Kant's words following this are "only thus can an incentive whatever it may be, co-exist with the absolute spontaneity of the will [*Willkür*], i.e., freedom" <R 19, German in square brackets added>. In the *Willkür* Kant has a faculty that is not only determined by the strongest feeling, but also can recognize the power of reason to arouse feeling, and has the power to determine what the origin of that feeling will be.

While this explanation is more sophisticated than what I was previously considering, it too seems problematic. Why is the concept of *Willkür* problematic? For one thing, it remains that Kant does not provide sufficient description of how the incentives that it chooses arise in the faculty of desire. It does not seem either that this question should fall under the scope of the unknown attached to free-willing. The scope of indefinitiveness in Kant's description of moral willing is troublesome. Granted, it seems that in any description of the operation of a free will there must be something which ultimately is inexplicable in terms of cause and effect. The capacity to decide morally entails the ability to initiate spontaneously a causal chain. If this ability were limited in any way, such as by its being the effect of a particular cause, one could not be truly free. Also in Kant's case it seems that one should grant that it is too much to ask why a

⁷⁹. Silber, *nciv-exi*.

⁸⁰. R 19; quoted in Silber, *n. v.*

person would will to reject his freedom by willing heteronomously.⁸¹ However, Kant seems to believe that the scope of what is unexplainable is broader than this. He wants to say that not only why the moral law determines the will but also how it does so are impossible to explain <G 460, 128>. For the sake of argument, one can grant Kant that *Willkür* can choose the moral law as that to which its maxims will conform; however, if his explanation of moral willing is to be considered credible the process that follows the choosing should be clear. It is for this reason that the unanswered questions that I have pointed out above: "How does the moral law initially thwart the inclinations?", and "How does humiliation become respect?", seem to require answers.

The problem with Kant seems to revert back to his initial distinction between the formal and material sources of experience. This distinction is the basis of his belief that it is "wholly impossible to comprehend...how a mere thought containing nothing sensible in itself can bring about a sensation of pleasure or displeasure" <G 460, 128>. In facing the question he did, it seems that Kant should have questioned his initial distinction rather than treat the questions above as impossible to comprehend.

There is one other issue that seems to show that Kant should have been able to provide a more detailed explanation of the process of moral willing. He was positive of the existence of evil or immoral willing. This is not a belief that one should hold unless one is absolutely sure that it is true. The fact that Kant puts forth such a view would indicate that the existence of evil is not in any way indefinite, so Kant should be able to give a full description of it.

Perhaps one could be more sympathetic toward Kant if he were not seen as the author of his own problems. His answer to Hume separated reason and sensation into different sources of experience. This and his view that feelings were limited to those of pleasure and pain led him to oppose reason and sensation in the forms of moral goodness

⁸¹. There seems to be no rational explanation for it in Kant's theory. As well, a person cannot be forced to will immorally, so there can be no causal explanation for it.

and desire. However, as I have attempted to show, it was inevitable that for Kant moral willing would have empirical effects. In attempting to conciliate the opposition between moral goodness and pleasure with the necessity to coordinate the functions of reason and the faculty of desire in determining the will morally, Kant is left with little room to maneuver.

As I describe Scheler's beliefs on the relationship between reason and sensations, and some of his other views, it should become apparent that Kant could have avoided some of the problems I have attempted to describe.

IV. Max Scheler's Alternative to Kant

This chapter presents Max Scheler's views on feelings' role in the moral determination of the human will as an alternative to Kant's.⁶⁹ I will first discuss Scheler's alternative to Kant's description of the source of experiential certainty. Then, in light of this alternative I will present Scheler's views on feelings and their role in determining the moral will. Though this framework will be partly based on my previous discussion of Kant, I hope to utilize it to present Scheler's pertinent views in detail, thereby fleshing out what would otherwise appear to be merely a critique of Kant rather than an attempt "to establish a strictly scientific and positive foundation for philosophical ethics with respect to all its fundamental problems" <F xvii>.

The keystone of Scheler's critique of Kantian ethics can be found in the definition he gives to the term "a priori," which is his criterion for certainty. Earlier I pointed out that for Kant "a priori" means "absolutely independent of experience" <A 2, B 3, 43>.⁶⁸ For Scheler "a priori" describes "all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an *immediate intuitive* content in the absence of any kind of positing [Setzung] of subjects that think them and of the real nature of those subjects, and in the absence of any kind of positing of objects to which such units of meaning are applicable" <F 48>. The key term in Scheler's descriptions is "given." It implies that particular parts of one's experience are presented/perceived with the force

⁶⁹. Scheler takes Kant as a reference in presenting his own ethical philosophy, and one of his objectives being a critique of Kant's ethical theories <F xvii>. As well, mentions of Kant and his theories see Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Formalism, the index giving over one hundred <F 606>.

⁶⁸. Refer above p. 22, n. 35.

of clearness and distinctness that makes them both completely apparent and immediately recognizable.

Scheler classifies this experience as phenomenological experience, which is distinguished from all other experience because, one, it yields facts "immediately, i.e., not in a way mediated by symbols, signs or instructions of any kind" <F 50>; and two, it is immanent, in that "only what is *intuitively* in an act of experiencing . . . never anything that is *meant* [vermeint] as a content outside of, or separated from, such an act--can belong to it" <F 51>.

Scheler's description of the "given" is augmented with his assertion that "(a) priori contents can only be pointed to" utilizing what he calls criteria of essence <F 50>-- essence being what is given <F 48>. These criteria include the fact that in attempting to "observe" the essentialness of a given content, it must have already been intuited in order to give the observation the presupposed direction; the fact that "essential interconnections" (among essences) are in no way suspendable in counter-factual thinking; and the fact that in attempting to define or explain a priori concepts or propositions, one finds that one can only be circular; that is to say, at some point in the definition or explanation one must refer back to the concept or proposition itself <F 50>. The nature of these criteria shows that for Scheler the a priori contents of experience are not something that are to be proven or deduced; rather, the criteria serve to make these contents "seen" or to 'demonstrate' them in isolation from everything else" <F 50>.

While Scheler's descriptions emphasize the given as being a priori, they also attempt to define what "the given" is by stating what is *not* given. This explains the meaning of the term "positing" in Scheler's definition. That part of experience that is given or a priori is not taken to imply the existence of an entity apart from that experience whether as a source of, or as a subject capable of perceiving that experience. Scheler distinguishes between two types of experience: "pure and immediate experience and the experience conditioned and mediated by positing the natural organization of a

real bearer of acts" <F 52>. In the former, certain facts are immediately presented, such as, to use Scheler's example, the presence of a materially extended cube; certain other facts are not, such as the fact that the sides of the cube are all the same color. The latter fact is only revealed in a series of observations <F 55ff.>; therefore, it is thus not immediate. In experience of the former type, all judgements pertaining to the worldly existence of the subject of consciousness and the objectivity of the physical world are suspended. Attention is focused instead upon the experience itself. For Scheler that means having in the viewing of the cube just that experience of the cube and not say the perception of a perspectival side of the cube.

For a perspectival side to be the contents of the consciousness, a series of subjective acts must precede it. First, one must become aware of himself apprehending the cube. Second, one must apprehend that the perception of the cube happens through an act of seeing "in which not everything appears that was first given, e.g., the 'materiality', or the cube's 'having an inside'" <F 56>. Finally, one must become "aware of the existence and the determinateness of the place of the *lived organism* (apprehended as belonging to the perceiving 'ego') which performs the act of seeing," as well as *those* parts of the lived organism to which the activation of the visual function is attached" <F 57>, in this case the eyes. Because this latter experiential content is one that is arrived at through a series of apprehending acts, it is not immediately given or a priori in Scheler's mind.

Scheler's concept of the a priori becomes even clearer when seen in conjunction with his criticism of Kant's concept. Based on his general view that Kant's theory of the synthesis of the understanding was constructive <F 66> and that the contraposition of reason and sensibility did not sufficiently describe human experience, Scheler questioned specific elements in Kant's concept of the a priori. Of course, he would deny that the a priori is independent of experience, since for him it is immanent in experience <F 51>.

He also criticized two important elements in Kant's concept: those of necessity and universality.⁸⁴

Scheler makes two points concerning Kant's concept of necessity: one, it pertains solely to propositions; two, "necessity is a *negative* concept, insofar as only that whose opposite is impossible can be necessary" <F 74>. The first point shows that Kant's concept of necessity and what Scheler calls the a priori cannot be equated because for the latter, the a priori facts of intuition are experiences not propositions. They may be described in propositional form; however, that does not change their natures as given facts. As for the second point, Scheler believes that Kant's perspective does not adequately reveal what the a priori is. It reduces to mental constraint in that one cannot envision something and its opposite simultaneously existing. However, for Scheler, a priori insight is a positive insight, the contents of which are evident <F 74>. It is the basis of any necessity one finds in propositions, and this necessity only comes to light when it is seen that the propositions in question "contradict evidentially true propositions" <F 75>.⁸⁵ A priori givenness is still the basis for Kant's necessity.

Scheler summarily dismisses universality as a criterion for the a priori, asserting that "universal validity' has nothing to do with the a priori" <F 76>. In Scheler's mind, a proposition being universal entails that it is valid for all the human species; however, there can be a priori insights that only one individual can have.⁸⁶

⁸⁴. Necessity and universality, as I have tried to show above, are entailed in moral determination of the will for Kant. Refer above pp. 5-6, 12-15.

⁸⁵. Scheler brings this point across succinctly by pointing out that "the proposition that one of the two propositions, 'A is B', and 'A is not B', is a false proposition is true only on the basis of the phenomenological insight into the *fact* [*Escheinsicht*] that the being and non-being of something are irreconcilable (in intuition)" <F 53, underlining added>. It is the actual experience of attempting to negate the a priori awareness of the existence of a certain thing that gives force to the above proposition.

⁸⁶. While attempting to describe Scheler's concept of the a priori, I believe that I have also raised questions concerning it. One is how Scheler explains awareness of universality. While having stated that "universal validity' has nothing to do with the a priori," the concept of universality still has epistemic significance for Scheler. "Universal" is equated to "formal" and is taken to describe propositions that can be applied to any object, such

Scheler's redefinition of the a priori provides a credible alternative to Kant's moral philosophy, particularly, the latter's views on the role of feelings in indicating moral value. Given the existence of the a priori contents of emotive acts such as "feeling, preferring, loving, hating and willing" <F 63>, Scheler now has a partial basis for his own moral philosophy. Reflecting his opposition to Kant, Scheler emphasizes that these a priori contents are not derived from the functions of the understanding, and are also ones which "ethics must show to be independent of logic" <F 63-64>. These contents consist of such things as values <F 15>, the rank of values <ibid.>, and the "a priori interconnections between values and their bearers" <F 85>.⁸⁷

as the formula $2x2=4$ can be applied to plums and pears alike <F 53-54>. However, the question arises that since universality has nothing to do with the a priori, what epistemic status does it have. Concerning the epistemic status of the universal in Scheler's mind, I believe that his statement that "universal validity" has nothing to do with the a priori" should be interpreted as an attempt on his part to emphasize that the two are not equitable. One of his criticisms of Kant is that he did just that--equate them <F 74>.

Scheler's point is that while one's awareness of universality is and must be a priori given, this does not exhaust the range of what is a priori. One sees this fact in his discussion on the subjectivity of moral values <F 317-28>. There are universal value-propositions and universal norms <F 323>; however, there is also the realm where the conscience works, "when the question involves solutions which are not regulated by the objective and universal part of evidential-value propositions and the norms based on them (and which cannot be regulated according to the nature of such propositions and norms)" <F 324-25>. In this realm there are particular goods for the individual agent or situation and one can come to know them through a priori awareness, not through their meeting the criterion of universality.

This is not to say that the universality of propositions or moral laws is not based on the experience of the fact that they are evident a priori. Scheler's statements that evidential value propositions can have a universal part <F 324-25>, and his assertion that formal propositions, as well as non-formal ones, can be given a priori <F 54> show that what he refers to as the "objective and obliging cognition of universally valid" or the "universal insight in regard to value-propositions and norms that are valid for all men" <F 325> fit the description of a priori awareness.

⁸⁷. My immediate reaction to Scheler's statements here was to desire examples: descriptions of experiences that I could share, and thus become aware of the a priori. However, Scheler chooses to keep his descriptions of the a priori on a mainly theoretical level.

For the a priori experience of ethical values, he points out that a value is not a conceptually definable property of man <F 14> (only man or his deeds can be the bearer of ethical values <F 86>). As he states, ethical values cannot be made certain by, nor do they consist in, the constant presence of certain characteristics <F 14>. These values are intuitively given and "(j)ust as it is senseless to ask for the common properties of all blue or red things, since they have nothing in common except their blueness or redness, so it is senseless to ask for the common properties of good or evil deeds, moral tenets [Gesinnungen], men, etc." <F 15>. Reflecting the impossibility of defining moral values is

In putting forward his view that values of good and evil are experienceable phenomena, Scheler realizes that he is directly opposing Kant's opinion <F 25>.⁶⁸ Still, he holds that there clearly are feelable values and asks the reader to see "precisely what is immediately experienced in feeling good and evil" <ibid.>.⁶⁹ In his discussion of feelings Scheler's preliminary step is to distinguish between intentional feeling and feeling-states. Scheler contrasts these two by pointing out that one can be continually in the same state of pain; however, one's emotive intentionality toward this state changes, e.g., one can suffer, endure, tolerate, or even enjoy (intentional feelings) the same state of pain (feeling-state) <F 256>.

Scheler's assertion of the "ultimate independence of the being of values with respect to things and states of affairs" <ibid.>. Scheler seeks to prove this assertion with an example of one's grasping the agreeableness of a man clearly and evidently without "being able to indicate how this comes about" <ibid.>.

Scheler makes very strong statements concerning the a priori givenness of rank of values, saying that "(i) in the totality of the realm of values there exists a singular order, an 'order of ranks' that all values possess among themselves" <F 86> and "the 'ordered ranks of values' are themselves absolutely invariable" <F 88>. The worry that Scheler is being dogmatic or arbitrary here might have been somewhat waylaid if Scheler had laid out at least part of the ranking he refers to. However, such a task is hardly a simple one given the factors that for Scheler influence the ranking. He does list, nevertheless, five characteristics which go into making a value higher: endurance, indivisibility, fundamentality, contentment associated with it, and its lack of relativity <F 89-93>; eight different types of essential relations between heights of values and their bearers <F 100-4>; and there are what Scheler refers to as the value modalities, ranking highest to lowest as religious, spiritual, vital, and sensible <F 104-16>. Obviously, to map out the ranks of values according to these factors would be highly complicated and given that a priori awareness of an individual value includes its relation to other values present in that awareness, there is no practical need to do so. One is able to act morally based on this awareness without knowledge of all values and their relation.

Two a priori interconnections between ethical values and their bearers are that the latter "can never (originally) be given as 'objects,' since they belong in essence to the sphere of the *person* (and not-being)," and "ethical values are those belonging to bearers as *real*, not to merely (appearing) pictorial objects" <F 86>, or in my interpretation, not to those representing reality.

⁶⁸. The premise here is that for Kant one is conscious of these values, but does not experience them. For a description of Kant's distinction, see below pp. 23-27 and 29-30.

⁶⁹. Scattered throughout his writings Scheler does not cease to reiterate that values are a priori feelable phenomena <F 93, 243, 188, 14, 16, etc.>.

It is the distinction of, for example, being in the state of ease after an alcoholic drink (feeling-state) and the repulsion one feels as he sees that a vehicle involved in a serious accident is leaving the scene without having stopped. The former is an experience without the sense of direction toward any object; it is merely a state of pleasure without any consciousness of that state being directed toward the value borne by a set of material circumstances. In the latter case, though, a moment's reflection makes one aware that the repulsion one feels is directed toward the callousness that is manifested in the actions of the hit-and-run driver.

The feeling-state may also be connected with an object, but if so, the connection is always mediate <ibid.>; that is to say, that object is subsequently considered to be the cause of the feeling-state <ibid.>. Intentional feeling, though, is related of itself to an object; it contains an original directedness "toward something objective, namely values" <F 257>.

Scheler further contrasts intentional feelings and feeling-states by pointing out that intentional feelings are "capable of 'fulfillment' and 'non-fulfillment'" depending on whether the values they "intend" are or are not fulfilled <F 258>.⁶⁰ A feeling-state has no intended value, and as such any empirical reaction to it can only be seen as a causal result of their presence, e.g., I drank water because I was thirsty.

In spite of his emphasis on the theoretical level Scheler does discuss examples of the intending of values in feeling. One of the more detailed examples that Scheler gives is of feelings which are indicators of nutritive value, the value borne by foods in contributing to the well-being of an organism <F 16-17, 245-46>. This value is given as an object of the feelings of appetite: feelings ranging from "inviting" to "disgusting."

⁶⁰. Scheler asserts that if value demands appear to be unfulfilled, one suffers as a result. For example, one becomes sad because he "cannot be happy about an event to the degree that its felt value deserves," and one feels sad that he cannot be as grieved "as the death of a beloved friend 'demands'" <F 258>.

A big part of Scheler's description is devoted to showing that objects apart from values cannot be what is intended in the feelings of appetite. Feelings of nutritive value are "different from hunger, which is a non-directional urging accompanied by burning and searing stresses of pain and organic sensations; hunger can neither yield a value-difference nor have an opposite ('appensement of hunger' being only a state during the satisfaction of this drive)" <F 245>. As well, the variations of feelings of nutritive value and their degrees "are independent of the variations and degrees of hunger. I can be disgusted by a meal even when I am extremely hungry, and I can have all degrees of appetite with little or no hunger" <F 246>. Scheler also distinguishes the awareness of nutritive value from the anticipated feeling-states of pleasure associated with certain tastes, e.g., sweetness, anticipated in the food. The feelings of nutritive values precede any anticipation of pleasure arising from these sensations <ibid.>. Therefore, the value felt is definitely something distinct from the anticipated or already realized pleasure derived from the object.

Scheler's purpose in emphasizing that hunger, pleasure, impulses, etc., do not account for feelings of nutritive value seems to be to clarify the non-contingency of the values that are perceived in feelings. Values are autonomous and as such they are not dependent upon their bearers. Scheler argues that this independence is apparent in two facts:

one,

We know of a stage in the grasping of values wherein the value of an object is already very clearly and evidentially given apart from the givenness of the bearer of the value <F 17>.

and two,

Further, the meaning of an object in regard to "what" it is (whether, for example, a man is more "poet" or "philosopher") may fluctuate to any degree without its value ever fluctuating <F 17-18>.

For examples of the first "fact," Scheler relates that one finds a work of art "beautiful" without "knowing in the least which properties of the contents of the work prompt this" <F 17>. An extreme example of this is the case of a value being given even before its bearer, as when one is aware that a certain day in August last year "was beautiful," without it being given that at that time one was visiting an especially close friend <F 18>.⁹¹

In asking the reader to visualize what he feels in his awareness of nutritive values Scheler is seeking to have the reader see directly the values that Scheler believes there. True to his own arguments that any definition of values can only be circular, he can only point to values. His attempts to show that nutritive values are not the effects of hunger, taste, or impulse to eat, etc., force the reader to see these values distinct from their bearers and the effects of these bearers.

Turning to another of Scheler's less theoretical discussions of value-feeling, he asserts that "*loving and hating* constitute the highest level of our intentional emotive life....The difference between them and reactive responses is marked even in language:

⁹¹. The counter argument to Scheler's views here is that values are contingent on factors of which one may not be entirely aware, though one is clear on their effects. In response, supposedly in the case of nutritive values, Scheler has considered and rejected all factors that could be the cause of one's awareness of values. As well, Scheler should be able to point to the qualitative difference in the relation between values and their supposed causes and the relation between a cause and its effect. The former in Scheler's mind is at most tenuous. The value is given distinct from its bearer <F 17> and an awareness of their relation can even be absent. In the latter, however, there is the constant linking of an observed effect and some supposed cause, even in cases where the cause is not immediately apparent, as when a sudden throbbing occurs in one's head and one begins to massage the temples manifesting the relating of tight facial muscles with the pain.

Concerning the fact that the meaning of a value will remain constant even though its bearer may fluctuate, Scheler does not explain his point in detail; however, since he is discussing the independence of values, it is safe to assume that the fluctuations in the bearer of the value refer to non-essential changes, such as in those aspects of the object which would be pleasure-causing. With this in mind an example would be the over-riding love one feels for a person in spite of his changing behavior which may or may not be pleasing, or the admiration of the prowess of a soldier no matter if he is also the enemy. The value one sees in these persons or their deeds does not change even though their effect on one does.

we speak not of loving or hating 'about something' or 'in something,' but of loving or hating *something*" <F 260>. In discussing the qualities which determine the height of values, Scheler shows that there is an essential connection between love and unceasing endurance <F 91>. When one regards the value of a person such that the value, and the feeling that indicates this value, are considered outside the temporal dimension, one is said to love that person <ibid.>. The uniqueness of the value borne by that person, and one's feeling toward him, contrasts to the value borne by a slight acquaintance of whom we have no deep interaction. We can understand how, given time, the value borne by the latter may change; however, we cannot conceive of the value borne by the former ever changing.

As well as noting the intentional aspect of feelings, Scheler also points out that in feelings there is "an *immediate* feeling of the 'relativity' of value" <F 96>. In this, one finds a more related role of feelings to willing. For Scheler moral values are materialized when a higher value is chosen, as an object of willing, so willing entails an awareness of a value's status relative to other values that can be realized. For this reason Scheler asserts that "choosing must be grounded in the cognition of a higher value" <F 87>. The fact that feelings indicate a value's relative status shows that for Scheler feelings play a significant role in the process of willing.

A description of feelings' role in indicating general values and materializing moral ones naturally leads to the question of willing. Scheler defines willing as "(w)hat tends to realize the given, which is to be realized because of its being given as an (ideal) ought-to-be" <F 32>. Since "every ought has its foundation in a value" <F 184>, the basic motivation for willing is the value to be materialized²³ with the existence of objects or

²³ M. Frings and R. Funk's translation uses the term "realized" which is confusing considering that Scheler holds that the being of values is autonomous <F 187>. They would always be real but perhaps not in a form perceivable in the physical realm.

situations <F 133-34>. For Scheler it is this value, "given in feeling." which sets willing in motion <F 134, underlining added>.

Scheler distinguishes two aspects in the goal of willing,⁸³ the value component and the picture-component.⁸⁴ The former founds the latter and the latter is "differentiated according to its possible suitability to the realization of the value component" <F 34>. Willing begins in a "preferring" wherein the "fact that one value is 'higher' than another is apprehended" <F 87>.⁸⁵ This initial cognition wherein a value's relative height is determined is particularly fundamental for Scheler. This is because ethical values, most pertinent to willing, are realized indirectly by "realizing a higher positive value (given in preferring)" <F 27>.⁸⁶

The next step in willing for Scheler is choosing and it is here that morality is materialized in the process of willing. Choosing, unlike preferring, is an act of conation. It entails a motivational force because in choosing, one value is chosen to be materialized which entails the material sacrifice of other values and their bearers.⁸⁷ Still, choosing is

⁸³. Actually, Scheler uses the terminology "goal of conation;" however, since willing is a type of conation "in which a content to be realized is given" <F 123>, my substitution of "willing" is allowable.

⁸⁴. Scheler does not define "picture-content" but his discussion of it, ranging over F 30-40, especially F 34, implies that it is the object or situation that is visualized as the concrete bearer of value in conation.

⁸⁵. Manfred Frings gives an actual example of preferring: "I may be busy taking care of my room and suddenly find myself watering my plant. The life-value of the plant is clearly at and 'in' this moment preferred to 'usefulness.' It discloses 'itself' in a distinct location of its amiability as something 'alive'." "Scheler, Kant, and the Good," Kant and Phenomenology (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research & University Press of America, 1984), 106.

⁸⁶. The potential for evil also exists in preferring when one chooses to ignore preference for a higher value and choose instead a lower one, what Scheler refers to as a "deception of preferring" <F 88; cf., F 26>. However, the question of evil in regards to Scheler's theories is certainly more complex than this, as Philip Blazer shows, "Scheler's Alternative to Kant's Ethic" (Ph.D. diss., Duquesne University, 1985), 285-97. However, a more detailed discussion is both beyond the scope of this paper and, because much of the complexity arises from Scheler's belief in God (Blazer, 289), irrelevant to proving his main thesis.

⁸⁷. Of course, this resembles greatly Kant's description of respect.

founded on the preferring of values <F 87; cf., *ibid.* 260>. Scheler sums up this complicated relationship:

The purpose in willing originates in an act of choosing, whose occurrence is based on value-goals of given conations and has its foundation in these value-contents through the act of preferring among them <F 41>.

In regard to my thesis it is important to note the role that Scheler sees for feelings in this process of willing. The main function of feelings in this process is that of a medium of value-cognition⁸⁸ or value-intuition, as Scheler also terms it <F 68>. Value cognition is becoming aware of the presence of a certain value. Scheler emphasizes that values are intuited, and occur in functions that are completely different from perception and thinking <F 68>.⁸⁹ Rather, one must grasp values in a process of awareness in which values are conveyed to the subject through sensation in a broader meaning of the term than what one understands as governed by the laws of cause and effect.

Underlying Scheler's assertion that value-cognition "comes to the fore in feeling" <F 68> are his beliefs that it belongs to the essence of a value given "in conation the possibility of having this value in feeling" <F 37-38>,⁹⁰ and that it is particularly in ethical cognition that value-experience occurs in feeling and preferring <F 326>. For Scheler one is capable of becoming aware of values through feelings and such is commonly what happens, particularly in moral decisions.

⁸⁸. Scheler's use of this term is interesting. In spite of what follows immediately in my paper, it implies that there is a rational aspect to the feeling of values. Refer F 246 and F 298.

⁸⁹. Scheler is clear in describing the awareness of moral values as not occurring at the level of sensibility <F 68>.

⁹⁰. This principle is further reflected in many statements that Scheler makes such as "Values are clearly *feelable* phenomena" <F 16>, and "Without a doubt it belongs essentially to these qualities (values) to be given originally only in a 'feeling of something'" <F 343; brackets and contents added>.

V. Conclusion

In the preceding pages, I have attempted to describe Kant's and Scheler's views on willing. It is revealing to relate the two theories and draw out specific differences pertinent to my thesis that Kant underestimates the role feelings can play in moral determination of the will. The crux of the disagreement between the two is whether the specific value to be realized should have a role in willing. In Kant's mind the moral law in determining the will does so solely on the basis of its form without any consideration of the object of willing, whether this is considered to be a concrete set of circumstances or the value realized <G 428, 95-96; cf., *ibid.*, 416, 83-84>. Scheler's views are just the opposite. Consideration of the value to be realized, before determination of the will, is essential to determining the will morally.¹⁰⁸ As Scheler says "First, we must remember the evidential fact that the *primary* intention of willing always remains directed toward the *realization* of a state of affairs or a 'value-complex' when an original volitional content is proven possible and is realized by acting and deeds (as in normal cases of willing)" <F 126>.

Scheler agrees with Kant to the extent that he holds that moral value does not accrue to the means to any end. He is adamant as Kant in asserting that moral value cannot be contingent <F 30-34>. However, Scheler holds that consideration of value or its bearer prior to determination of the will is not necessarily for the sake of realizing an end apart from that value <*ibid.*; cf., F 11>; rather that value is the sole object of willing.

¹⁰⁸. In fact, if a value is self-given--that is to say, is absolutely evident--willing its materialization becomes necessary <F 69>.

Important to Scheler's assertion is his distinction between a feeling-state and an intentional feeling. Kant had held that there was no basis for distinguishing types of feelings <CPR 22-23>. This most likely is part of the reason why Scheler holds that Kant was unable to recognize that value-cognition had a significance apart from that of being derived from the effects produced upon the human faculties for feeling pleasure and displeasure. By failing to distinguish between feeling-states, i.e., states of pleasure lacking direction, and intentional feelings, Kant was less able to recognize that the latter could be directed toward a value that is independent of influence by anticipated feelings of pleasure <F 11-12>.

In this regard Scheler's main point is that, although values are feelable phenomena, they are not based on the relation between an object and feelings of pleasure <F 241-47>. Given the autonomous existence of values and one's ability to be a priori aware of them, there is no necessary connection between them and a feeling-state of pleasure.¹⁰⁰ In feeling-states of pleasure, a "picture-content already hovers before us" and one takes pleasure in it <F 33>. In contrast, a feeling of value is an "experientiable being-directed (which has a special and unmistakable quality) toward a specific value" <ibid.>. Values are autonomous and the feeling that marks awareness of them is distinct from that of being in a state of pleasure or displeasure.

In the third chapter of this thesis I pointed out three problems that arose out of Kant's distinction in the structure of experience and his narrow view of feelings. The first was the problematic distinction between consciousness and experience, the second was Kant's unwillingness to allow any a priori basis for distinguishing particular virtues, the third was uncertainty surrounding the exact role of feeling, respect, in moral willing. At this point it should be obvious that Scheler does not accept Kant's presuppositions. He is able to recognize necessity as given within experience, and thus has no need to suppose

¹⁰⁰ Scheler does explain, though, that a feeling-state can be a bearer of value <F 33-36>. However, that type of value is one of many, and not among the highest.

it sourced outside experience. In part, because of this view he is able to recognize the phenomenal richness in the experience of feelings.

Because Scheler perceives the source of moral necessity as arising within experience, there was no need for him to make a problematic distinction between consciousness of the a priori and experience itself. Value cognition, possible through the medium of feelings, is recognized as necessary, i.e., definitely the case, because of the givenness or force of that experience. This qualitative difference from say a deductively arrived at fact, i.e., something whose necessity is not immediately given, marks value cognition off as a special kind of experience, but still as experience. Kant, in order to make credible his distinction, was forced to contrive an awkward theoretical framework. Scheler, though not claiming that phenomenological awareness is easy, asks only that one train himself to recognize what he is experiencing.¹⁰⁸

A second specific problem arising out of Kant's moral philosophy is the view of virtues implied therein. Since Kant would not allow that any value of specific content could be instrumental in morally determining the will, the distinctions between virtues as they had been perceived in ancient Greece could only be a matter of convention. While Scheler does not address the question of virtues and their ontological status directly, his theories do provide for them an ontological status greater than that originating out of convention. A preliminary view shows that the values that Scheler holds are given a priori in experience are similar to the virtues of Greek philosophy in that values have a concrete content and an autonomous existence. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to show that the values intimated in Scheler's method are or are not equitable to the Greek virtues, Scheler's theories at least give some credence to the predominant ethical theories of that age. Scheler's more complimentary position allows the possibility that the proponents of these theories were not completely in error.

¹⁰⁸. This is implied in Scheler's definition of the a priori when he asks the reader to "leave aside all kinds of posing" (p. 42).

The final problem is the lack of detail of the moral feeling's role in willing. As I pointed out, Kant seems unable to explain how the causality of reason is able initially to thwart inclinations toward pleasure, and also produce the elevating effect of respect. In analysis, the problem of inexplicability for Kant is one of his own making. It is key to his ethical philosophy that rationality be the sole determiner of the human will. Under this strict criterion, any sensible phenomena, apart from respect, is excluded from contributing to the will's moral determination. However, by denying that sensible phenomena could contribute in any way, Kant is forced to view respect as an exceptional case. Willing entails a conative force; therefore, there must be some sensation in willing. For moral willing that sensation is respect. However, in denying its origin in the sensibility, including the faculty of desire, Kant does not have recourse to the standard explanation of the origin of sensations.

Compared with Kant's, Scheler's perspective on the role of sensibility, particularly feelings, in willing seems more coherent. Reasoning still retains the dominant role, but determines the will in conjunction with the faculty of sensibility. Therefore, feelings that arise naturally, are taken into account and allowed to contribute to the determination of the will. There is no need for a special case to account for the conative element of willing. Feelings fulfill that role in motivating non-moral practical actions, e.g., the sensation of thirst leading to a desire and eventual action of drinking water. Extending this function to moral willing follows naturally and it does not lead to any incongruities. The result is that there is no need to make an exception, like Kant does for respect, and thereby incur the responsibility of explaining it.

My thesis has been that Kant underestimated the role feelings could play in the moral determination of the human will. Kant's belief that feelings could not have such a role arose directly from his belief that nothing sensible could contribute, in any way, to moral determination of the will. This latter assertion arose in turn out of his perceived need to cast epistemic or ethical necessity solely in rationality, to the exclusion of

sensibility. I have tried to render Kant's perceived need suspect by showing some of the problems that are created with regard to it.

Having shown that Kant's theories are internally suspect, I proceeded to present an alternative view to Kant's, i.e., Scheler's. Scheler's theory is that feelings can intend an a priori given value, and thus play a role in moral willing. My point is that there were valid options for Kant. Given this, and the internal problems with his own theory, his blanket preclusion of sensibility, which included feelings, from a role in the moral determination of the human will was a misjudgment.

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