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LOVE AND PARENTAGE: SOME KEY REGULARITIES IN DRYDEN'S HEROIC PLAYS

by

© JOHN OSBORNE THOMPSON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Love and Parentage: Some Key Regularities in Dryden's Heroic Plays," submitted by John Osborne Thompson in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Supervisor

Date 9 June, 1972

ABSTRACT

Dryden's heroic dramas have suffered neglect because they have been felt to be artificial, unrealistic and repetitious. But if we examine the plays in detail, we find that their characteristic stylization allows them to represent, with economy and often with verve, certain recurring human dilemmas.

By centering the actions of his plays on the success of a hero, Dryden is able both to provide his audience with "happy endings" and, more interestingly, to establish a recurring form for the resistances the hero must face. This form welds together three domains in which the hero acts: the political, the familial and the sexual. Each domain affords him appropriate figures to struggle against. Politically, his is the executive power of the general, in opposition to his ruler's unjust authority. In terms of the family, he is the Son at odds with (while at the same time searching for) the Father and the Mother. Sexually, he struggles to possess and deserve the woman he loves against the efforts both of rivals and of other women whose loves he cannot return. The institution of monarchy conveniently brings together the three domains, whose resources allow the dramatist to achieve both novelty and a tactfully moral disposition of the plot through various inversions and displacements.

In addition to this analytic presentation of typical forms of exterior resistance to the hero's desire, the plays are concerned with strains within the structure of desire itself. No sooner does the hero love than he loses both his own Self and access to the real Self of the loved one, to languish in the grip of the quasi-mechanical operation of

the loved one's attractive surface upon his senses. However, the pessimism of this view of desire is counterbalanced not only by the genre's commitment to the ultimate happiness of the hero but by its exploitation of various reversals whereby pain and pleasure in love may become interchangeable.

The manner in which the plays achieve representationality can be appreciated more fully if they are seen as products of neo-classical critical theory. As such, they are less like pictures of the real world, aiming at a mimicry of everyday appearance, than like models whose intention is both to show the underlying structure of reality and to exist as satisfactory artistic objects. That the history of taste has not validated this latter claim does not necessarily absolve us from investigating to what extent they do succeed in representing the structure of their chosen aspect of the real truthfully. Present-day readers, less committed to the dogmas of artistic "realism" than were their predecessors, may at last be ready, in this regard, to do them justice.

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ABBREVIATIONS

1. Citations from Dryden.

C = The California Edition of The Works of John Dryden, general eds. H. T. Swedenberg, Jr., and Vinton A. Dearing: Vol. VIII ed. John Harrington Smith and Dougald MacMillan, Vol. IX ed. John Loftis, Vol. X ed. Maximillian E. Novak.

S-S = The Works of John Dryden, eds. Sir Walter Scott and George Saintsbury.

E = Essays of John Dryden, ed. W. P. Ker.

Essay = Of Dramatic Poesie: 1668. Facsimile.

IQ = The Indian Queen (C VIII).

IE = The Indian Emperour (C IX).

TL = Tyrannic Love (C X).

CG = The Conquest of Granada, Parts 1 and 2.

A-Z = Aureng-Zebe.

Quotations from the C text of IQ, IE and TL are located by their C line-numberings, followed by the S-S volume number and pagination (there being no S-S line-numbering) in parentheses. Quotations from CG and A-Z, not yet available in C, use S-S's text; again, S-S volume- and page-numbers appear in parentheses.

2. Journals.

CL = Comparative Literature
DUJ = Durham University Journal
ELH = English Literary History
ELN = English Language Notes
HLB = Harvard Library Bulletin
HLQ = Huntington Library Quarterly
JEGP = Journal of English and Germanic Philology
JWCI = Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes
MLN = Modern Language Notes
MLR = Modern Language Review
MP = Modern Philology
N&Q = Notes and Queries
PLL = Papers on Language and Literature

PMLA	=	Publications of the Modern Language Association of America
PQ	=	Philological Quarterly
RECTR	=	Restoration and Eighteenth Century Theatre Research
RES	=	Review of English Studies
SAB	=	Shakespeare Association Bulletin
SB	=	Studies in Bibliography
SEL	=	Studies in English Literature
SP	=	Studies in Philology
TLS	=	Times Literary Supplement

I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to consider whether it is possible to make firmer claims for the value of Dryden's heroic plays than can rest on their historical interest alone.

This interest is doubtless very great, even if we take the plays' importance to be solely pathological. Dryden was the last great English poet to put dramatic writing at the center of his professional career. If his plays are unworthy of the attention of the non-specialist reader or theatre-goer today, this fact calls for diagnostic investigation. The rhymed dramas are the productions of a mind not otherwise conspicuously lacking in intelligence or discrimination. If they are judged simply to be failures, something must have led Dryden astray, and it becomes a task of literary history to reconstruct this "something."

But are the plays nonsense? Written by a man who at the outset of his playwriting career defined a play as "a just and lively imitation of human nature," can they be so wholly unnatural, so anti-mimetic as the modern reader thinks when first encountering them?

At the end of the last century, Margaret Sherwood wrote a small book entitled Dryden's Dramatic Theory and Practice which conveniently epitomizes the case against her subject. "Few plays are more undramatic than those of Dryden," she begins; and ninety-nine pages later she is ready to conclude, "Dryden's dramatic work is imitation, not organic creation. It lacks vital centre, and it has not endured."[1] Her assurance,

her certainty that she is in a position to define good dramatic writing, makes her adverse judgment of Dryden particularly enlightening. Later critics have been more cautious about setting forth their pre-suppositions.[2]

We ought not to let the slightly old-fashioned tone of the following passage blind us to the extent to which it still expresses the expectations we bring to the drama:

> Drama, meaning the re-creation of a significant moment or crisis in human life, demands, on the part of the dramatist, peculiar insight into the entangled motives that lie at the heart of the simplest human action . . . . He must have imaginative grasp of the entire situation, wholeness of view, immediate perception of the action and interaction of character and circumstance, of will and will. Perhaps no other kind of art is so deep a searcher into the heart of the artist, of what he has thought, perceived, felt, or so true a measure of his power to objectify his appreciations. He must be able, inasmuch as his work is not built up on an abstract idea but presents an actual, concrete picture, to create, to suggest, to make vivid the life with which he is dealing, not simply to state, to explain.[3]

By these standards the heroic play is plainly a deviant: "These plays are so different in motif, language, and construction from ordinary drama that a standard of judgment is hard to form for them."[4] Still, Dr. Sherwood is able to use Dryden's remarks about the epic origins of the heroic drama[5] to establish clearly the distance between "epic drama" and the truly dramatic:

> The epic is objective, deals with events which are connected through the fact that they have to do throughout with the same persons. The drama is subjective, deals with action and choice, and demands, in the relation between its happenings, causality.[6]

Incoherence must haunt an epic drama, if its events hang together so loosely. "Naturally, the action is not the result of character;" it is merely a "series of events:" "the aim is to keep great happenings

constantly upon the stage, and one crisis is hardly more important than another."[7] The crucial term here is evidently "character". For events to involve "the same persons" is not enough: only from the exploration of the "subjective" can a "causality" emerge to organize the action. Instead, in the heroic drama we are faced with types of characters who

> do not lend themselves to profound dramatic treatment. The complexity in character which gives significance to drama, in the representation of the action and reaction of character, and circumstance, is not here. Each person is a single trait, dominated by passion . . . . These distinct types love in precisely the same fashion, express their love in the same way. There are no subtle strokes in character-treatment. There is no growth through choice and the consequences of choice, as in genuine drama. The characters are the same at the end of the play as at the beginning, except for the change coming in certain cases through sudden access of passion.[8]

These characters' subjectivities have not been entered by their creator: perhaps it would be better to say that he has given them no subjectivities to enter. Since the drama is "so deep a searcher into the heart of the artist," such a failure reveals Dryden's own barrenness of heart: "Lacking the distinctive point of view, personality, an individual way of looking at things, Dryden lacks, necessarily, development, growth."[9] Such a man's work fails both to represent the world satisfactorily and to achieve a satisfying unity of its own:

> Of Dryden it must be said that either he did not study life in its actual workings, or, looking at it, failed to make his own any aspect which could endure in literature. He took his pleasure in the detached, the fragmentary, and his work lacks wholeness.[10]

So much for Dryden in 1898! Today the ad hominem element in Dr. Sherwood's argument looks crude, and in her failure to acknowledge the quality of Dryden's creative achievement in areas other than the

drama we can see what a shift in critical opinion has occurred since she wrote. What is valuable in Dr. Sherwood's account is that it embodies assumptions about the drama which are still, generally, our own, but does so in terms just unfashionable enough to make the interlocking structure of these far-from-inevitable assumptions more clearly visible than they might be in a more tactfully up-to-date treatment.

If Dr. Sherwood's conclusions are not to be accepted as the last word on Dryden's heroic plays, we must find some sort of solvent for her premises. These will be reconsidered in detail at the conclusion of the third chapter of the present study. At the outset, a more general appeal to our culture's current movement away from simple confidence in the permanent validity of its own code-systems must serve.

In his important recent study, Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman insists that we must jettison as a myth our everyday assumption that some systems of representation are per se more faithful to the real than others, more "natural", more accurate in "copying the object just as it is."[11] It would take us too far from our present business to follow through Goodman's argument in detail.[12] His conclusion, however, is pithy and germane:

> Realism is relative, determined by the system of representation standard for a given culture or person at a given time. Newer or older or alien systems are accounted artificial or unskilled.[13]

At a given point of time in a given society, there will certainly be a realism, or realisms. Statements about the degree to which a representation is realistic can thus be intersubjectively valid within the community in question, and its members may well infer that this validity

is guaranteed by an absolute relation of resemblance between the representation and some real or possible object. Goodman will not allow this inference.

> Realistic representation . . . depends not upon imitation or illusion or information but upon inculcation. . . . Our addiction, in the face of overwhelming counter-evidence, to thinking of resemblance as the measure of realism is easily understood. . . . Representational customs, which govern realism, also tend to generate resemblance. That a picture looks like nature often means only that it looks the way nature is usually painted. Again, what will deceive me into supposing that an object of a given kind is before me depends upon what I have noticed about such objects, and this in turn is affected by the way I am used to seeing them depicted. Resemblance and deceptiveness, far from being constant and independent sources and criteria of representational practice are in some degree products of it.[14]

Admittedly, though arguments such as this may lessen our dogmatic assurance that we know what is "dramatic realism" and what is not, Dryden's plays are not automatically salvaged the moment we acknowledge that our spontaneous reaction to them is determined by our own cultural inculcations. Dr. Sherwood can appeal to the examples of Sophocles and Shakespeare, whose realisms our culture--at least our "high culture"--can grasp imaginatively though they differ in many respects from current representational practice. Indeed, the "height" of "high culture", its distance from mass culture, is to a considerable extent a function of the number of different representational languages which those who participate in it are able to understand. The question remains: is Dryden really employing a representational language to which even we in the "high culture" have somehow lost the key? Or is Dr. Sherwood right in seeing him as working incompetently in a field of writing governed by conventions of representational practice we understand perfectly well?

What is ultimately at issue in these questions is the relation

of the plays to our knowledge of the world. The difficulties involved in art's claim to provide knowledge are notorious, yet we must fall back upon this claim once time separates us from an intuitive "feel" for the delights afforded by a genre at its height to its public. Indeed, the historical evidence for this delight, though it would seem to tell strongly for the "lost language" view of the plays, itself needs bolstering by a truth claim. Faced with that evidence alone, Dr. Sherwood can retort that the plays "reflect only a passing whim, and . . . died even before the audiences of the court of Charles the Second were broken up."[15] Even had the vogue of the plays been less evanescent, the possibility of a large-scale aberration of taste can only be ruled out by showing that the taste in question was not aberrant, that in their way the plays "tell the truth".

This is not to say that the recovery of the plays' representational language in itself guarantees that they employ that language truthfully (which is to say optimally): we have no difficulty recognizing works belonging to genres whose "realism" is not in question for us but which, as individual works, ring false.[16] More fundamentally, we may criticize the selection of representable aspects of the real characterising a particular genre as not providing the sort, or the amount, of information we want from art.[17] But the merits of works within genres, and of the genres themselves, can hardly be determined until the existence of the genre in question is established and its manner of representing the world understood. And this comprehension cannot be worked for save by postulating the genre's intent, at some level, to tell the truth, to represent the real.

The best checks against our merely moving in a circle, extracting from the work a "truth" which does no more than reflect our first postulate, are coherence and surprise. If, pace Dr. Sherwood, we find a coherence in Dryden's heroic plays, and if the vision of the world embodied in that coherence is not identical with the vision of the world we brought to the plays, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the plays are indeed "showing us something", and consequently that we must have been at least partially successful in reconstituting the representational practice by which that showing was effected.

What follows is an attempt to extract and to "read" the underlanguage of the heroic drama as it manifests itself in recurring situations, constituting assumptions, formal effects of the genre's systematic analytic simplification of experience. We shall first examine a cluster of motifs having to do with the way in which politics and the family interlock. Next, our discussion of this drama's notion of love will open out onto the larger question of its notion of character. Finally, we shall relate the results of these investigations to Dryden's own theoretical understanding of what he was doing, and to the more general neo-classical assumptions on which this representational practice depends.

II

THE FATHER AND HIS GENERAL

1

The characters in Dryden's heroic plays exist and act within three orders: the political, the familial, and the sexual. It is the political order which allows a wound to open in itself which becomes the space where the dramatic action can unfold. Always it is a political crisis which puts families in motion, and which, even when it does not actually bring lovers together for the first time, is at least responsible for preventing their settling down to enjoy one another.

The political order's visible manifestation is the court: a ruler surrounded by a few key subjects. In each of the four mature plays we are shown a single court in peril. That peril may in part consist of a threat from external military force (Cortez's band in The Indian Emperour, the forces of the Roman senate in Tyrannic Love, Philip's Spain in The Conquest of Granada), but this force never solidifies into a fully articulated, hence conflict-torn, second court. We are not shown "Rome" at all; Philip's Spain is monolithically contented; Cortez's band, while not perfectly cohesive, owes its internal strains entirely to its members' involvement with the women or property of Montezuma's court--strains which consequently acquire little or no independent dramatic weight. Only in The Indian Queen do we find two courts, the Peruvian court of the Ynca and the Mexican court of the usurping Zempoalla, and the Ynca's court remains embryonic. Significantly, of

the six rulers of crisis-threatened courts in the five plays (the Ynca, Zempoalla, Montezuma IE, Maximin, the Old Emperor), only the Ynca is allowed, perfunctorily, to remain at the play's end in charge of his kingdom.

The court's peril is always its ruler's fault: it is just that he or she be replaced. On this depends the curious optimism which the heroic drama maintains in the face of violent political upheaval. Each play involves the punishment of the ruler: even the Ynca is punished by humiliation in defeat, and four of the five remaining rulers die. The Old Emperor does survive, only to abdicate after receiving from his son a forgiveness he finds singularly punishing:

> Can you forgive me? 'tis not fit you should.
> Why will you be so excellently good?
> 'Twill stick too black a brand upon my name:
> The sword is needless; I shall die with shame.[1]

The punishment of the Bad King would seem an explosive motif to figure at the center of a dramatic genre flourishing in an only recently re-established (and, indeed, soon to be overturned) monarchy. No doubt genres owe much of their popularity to their ability to handle dangerous materials: the typical traits of the genre represent obsessively returned-to "resolutions" of the continuing scandal lurking in the given subject-matter. But, since in political matters the dramatist must tread especially carefully, we find extra precautions being taken in the heroic drama to ensure that the fictional court is clearly marked as different from the real court Dryden knew. Probably all the strangenesses of this drama served as such marks, and this may have been an important subterranean pressure pushing the heroic play towards

formalization at all levels. The formalized marks itself as unlike the real by its ingenious symmetry, its neater-than-life organization. Rhyme itself, a formalization of the phonetic substance of language, serves excellently as a mark of difference between dramatic court-speech and the conversation of real courtiers.[2] The nature of the formalizations operating in these plays on other levels will emerge in the course of our enquiry. And, to distance the action still further, marks of the exotic are distributed through the plays' fabric, on occasion verbally but chiefly in the spectacle: the action is always set in countries far from England, whose inhabitants can be as richly and strangely costumed as the company's finances allow.

But perhaps the most useful distinctions by which the dramatist separates the states imperilled in the plays from the states familiar to his audience are religious. Not one of the represented states is Christian. Indeed, two of them (Montezuma IE's Mexico, Boabdelin's Granada) are in direct conflict with Christian military force, and a third (Maximin's camp) is "morally invaded" by S. Catherine's faith. Paganism usefully allows the dramatist to draw upon its barbaric customs and institutions to impel the plot forward. The action of The Indian Queen hangs on Zempoalla's vow to sacrifice to her gods all the prisoners she takes. The plot of Aureng-Zebe is put in motion by the Indian custom whereby an Emperor must upon his succession to the throne put to death all his brothers. The style of Maximin's tyranny is influenced by the (contemptuous) nature of his faith in his gods. Even in The Indian Emperour, where Dryden uses Montezuma's pagan stoicism as a stick with which to beat Christian sectarian dogmatism,[3] we are at first shown a

Mexico conspicuously bloody in its rituals:

> The Incense is upon the Altar plac'd,
> The bloody Sacrifice already past.
> Five hundred Captives saw the rising Sun,
> Who lost their light ere half his race was run.[4]

Only in The Conquest of Granada does the religious difference between Moor and Christian seem purely nominal, perhaps because the exotic element in the Granadan polity is a civil matter: the tribal rivalry between the Abencerrages and the Zegrys.[5]

Exoticism in the plays is never allowed to coalesce into a fully-elaborated model of a society essentially other than Dryden's own. Scott, in his prefatory note to The Conquest of Granada, observed:

> Were it not a peculiar attribute of the heroic drama, it might be mentioned as a defect, that during the siege of the last possession of the Spanish Moors, by an enemy hated for his religion, and for his success, the principle of patriotism is hardly once alluded to through the whole piece. The fate, or the wishes, of Almahide, Lyndaraxa, and Benzayda, are all that interest the Moorish warriors around them, as if the Christian was not thundering at their gates, to exterminate at once their nation and religion . . . . Nor is it an inferior fault, that, although the characters are called Moors, there is scarce any expression, or allusion, which can fix the reader's attention upon their locality, except an occasional interjection to Allah or Mahomet.[6]

Nation, religion, locality--those elements which in his own novels Scott put into play in so revolutionary a manner[7]--are indeed denied any density here: nothing so opaque must come between the audience and the formal relations to be exhibited. Dryden allows the exotic to play its part in the plays only to the extent that it does not hinder the thrust towards formalization. Indeed, he makes it contribute to that thrust by furnishing an excuse for the introduction of customs and practices the primitive simplicity of which makes more plausible the condensation

of action on which formalization depends. Formalism aims to give us access to the structure of a Nature which is, as Dryden observes, the same everywhere and at all times.[8] So exoticism is irrelevant to the question of the plays' representationality: they represent the realities beneath the surface of life at Charles's court as much (or as little) as they represent any reality. But, since the level at which representation takes place is certainly not that of day-by-day political appearances, Dryden sensibly mobilizes the exotic to distract the spectator from undue parallel-drawing. This serves as well to provide him with an alibi should "the wrong" (dangerous) parallels be drawn.

2

The next question to be answered might seem to be, "For what is the ruler punished?" But this would be to attempt to center the heroic drama on the tragedy of the ruler, whereas, notoriously, the center around which the optimistic action of these plays turns is the Hero. Montezuma IQ, Cortez, Porphyrius, Almanzor, Aureng-Zebe:[9] it is these men whose strength and virtue outweigh their rulers' weakness and/or wickedness.

With the single exception of Cortez, all the heroes stand to the rulers in the relation of general to supreme commander. Montezuma IQ indeed serves successively both the Ynca and Zempoalla in a general's capacity. So it is necessary that at some point in the action the ties of duty binding general to commander be broken if the general is to survive his commander's defeat. Whatever the other reasons for the ruler's punishment, an important part of his guilt is his having given his general cause to forsake him.

How does the conflict between ruler and general come about? In The Indian Queen, Montezuma switches his allegiance from Peru to Mexico after a quarrel with the Ynca arising from Montezuma's desire for the Ynca's daughter Orazia. The Ynca bids Montezuma "Ask such a Guift as may for ever bind / Thy service to my Empire, and to me,"[10] but the (female) gift Montezuma asks for, and who fits the terms of the Ynca's gift so exactly, is refused him. The Ynca has, however, already given him, unasked, the (male) prisoner he has taken. Once Montezuma defects to the Mexican camp, it is over the question of his right to possess his own prisoners (now both male and female: Orazia again, plus her father) that he breaks with his new ruler Zempoalla, who has vowed to sacrifice all the Peruvian prisoners to her gods.

In The Conquest of Granada, the second of Almanzor's many quarrels with Boabdelin arises over the general's right to dispose of his own prisoner, as Zulyma reports:

> I met Almanzor coming back from court,
> But with a discomposed and speedy pace,
> A fiery colour kindling all his face:
> The king his prisoner's freedom has denied,
> And that refusal has provoked his pride.[11]

The prisoner in question is the Duke of Arcos, who, it will emerge, is Almanzor's father.

Aureng-Zebe's father is also his ruler and his commander. Like the Ynca (though motivated not by pride but by lust), he withholds from Aureng-Zebe the captive Indamora whom they both love, over Aureng-Zebe's protest:

> Your royal promise, when I went to fight,
> Obliged me to resign a victor's right:
> Her liberty I fought for, and I won,
> And claim it, as your general, and your son.[12]

Thus in four quarrels in three different plays we find deployed, in addition to the basic ruler (commander) / general opposition, only three extra elements: father, loved one, status-as-prisoner. Twice the father is prisoner, twice the withholder of the loved one (once as father, once as ruler). Two fathers are rulers whose rule must crumble, the third a prisoner whom only time will reveal to be a father (the same time that will bring his ruler, Philip,--for the Duke of Arcos is a general too--to unchallenged power). Two prisoners are fathers, two are loved ones. Both loved ones are withheld by fathers--one by her own father, the other by her lover's father (who is also a lover). Plainly we have here a recurring formula, variously employed, whereby, in establishing on the political plane the commander's ill-treatment of his general, Dryden puts into play the familial and the sexual as well.

Some of the same facts reveal new configurations and alliances if we look for the conventional "eternal triangle" in this connection. The pattern in Aureng-Zebe of ruler-general rivalry for the same woman emerges in The Conquest of Granada as the basis for the most serious quarrel between Almanzor and Boabdelin: their rivalry over Almahide, Boabdelin's queen. Likewise, in Tyrannic Love, the Emperor Maximin's wife Berenice loves and is loved by the heroic general Porphyrius. But Tyrannic Love yokes this pattern to an inversion of one found in The Indian Queen as the Ynca-Montezuma-Orazia relationship: whereas in the earlier play the general unsuccessfully seeks from the ruler the ruler's

daughter, the later play finds Maximin unsuccessfully seeking to wed his daughter Valeria to Porphyrius his general. And we must note that in a sense Porphyrius is the Emperor's son as well, by adoption upon the death of Maximin's real son Charinus.

We are caught in a bewildering network of identities and differences. The Boabdelin-Almahide-Almanzor triangle appears structurally identical to the Maximin-Berenice-Porphyrius triangle. Yet are not the two rendered crucially dissimilar by the different attitudes to the situation of Boabdelin, who loves his wife, and Maximin, who is contemptuously indifferent to his? Such differences must of course not be left out of account. Dryden is not Orrery,[13] and in the course of his five rhyming plays very little is repeated without variation. On the other hand, very few structures discernable in any of the plays fail to be echoed in some manner elsewhere. Thus: if Maximin is not, in attitude towards his wife, the double of Boabdelin, he strongly resembles Morat in Aureng-Zebe, and if Morat's wife Melesinda, continuing to love a man who no longer loves her, fails to remind us of Maximin's Beatrice, she can hardly fail to recall Porphyrius' Valeria.

A limited number of preoccupations govern Dryden's deployment of his dramatic forces, and the formalism of his procedures allows us a more immediate access to these preoccupations than is usually granted by more "illusionist" art. But this immediacy is balanced by an elusiveness, an intangibility, as each structure's positivity dissolves in the network of possibilities from which it is drawn. Hence we must proceed in a circle, at once extracting from the individual plays the elements which constitute the vocabulary of the genre, along with the

recurring relations among these elements which constitute its syntax, and re-establishing the particularity of each play in the specific manner in which it "speaks" this language it shares with its fellows. With this in mind, we can now proceed to consider the plays individually in some detail.

3

In four of Dryden's five heroic plays the Sonship of the hero is of direct importance to the dramatic action. This section will confine itself to treating these four plays, while the fifth (The Indian Emperour) will be considered later.

A. The Indian Queen

> Young and a Stranger to your Court I came,
> There by your Favour rais'd to what I am:
> I Conquer but in right of your great fate,
> And so your Arms, not mine, are fortunate.[14]

These are Montezuma's first words in the play: they register both his almost-filial obligation to the Ynca and his status as an outsider. The latter element soon proves, for the moment, decisive. "Young man of unknown Race,"[15] thunders the Ynca once Montezuma claims Orazia as the prize for his victories. A Peruvian has just whispered of the Ynca, "His Looks speak Death:" the Ynca himself goes on:

> Ask once again, so well thy merits plead;
> Thou shalt not die for that which thou hast said.[16]

Montezuma, in turn, is restrained from murderous revenge only by a timely word from his prisoner and rival-in-love Acacis: "It is Orazia's

Father you wou'd kill."[17] And Montezuma's desertion to the Mexicans is explicitly presented as an alternative to (hence in a sense an alternative form of) killing the Father:

> But since Orazia's Father must not dye,
> A nobler vengeance shall my actions guide,
> I'le bear the conquest to the conquered side,
> Until this Ynca for my friendship sues,
> And proffers that his pride does now refuse.[18]

It is his status as stranger which Montezuma uses to absolve himself from the guilt of insubordination-as-subject: "Subjects are bound, not strangers, to obey."[19] The Father is consequently toppled by the man without a father,[20] the man still free from (excluded from) the state-family and its Law.

This proves not to be a solution, as Montezuma discovers once the Ynca and Orazia are his prisoners. The new power-relationship is the occasion for a curious, beautiful scene for which the verse broadens from couplet rhyme to an abab pattern. Montezuma's self-justification is poignant in its very weakness:

> Princes see others faults but not their own;
> 'Twas you that broke that bond, and set me free:
> Yet I attempted not to climb your Throne,
> And raise my self; but level you to me.[21]

The Ynca makes it clear that what is now in question is esteem, the Father's approval: Montezuma's plan to reduce the Ynca to "suing" for friendship and "proffering" Orazia has consequently failed miserably.

> Thou art but grown a Rebel by success,
> And I that scorned Orazia shou'd be ty'd
> To thee my slave, must now esteem thee less:
> Rebellion is a greater guilt than pride.[22]

Nothing is left for Montezuma but to offer to change sides again, and for the moment it is too late for this: he is caught, will soon be literally a prisoner, in the Mother's kingdom.

Zempoalla is the False Queen, having usurped a kingdom from the rightful queen Amexia (who will be revealed, once restored, to be the True Mother of Montezuma). She is herself mother to the (fatherless) Acacis, that "pattern of exact virtue."[23] If Montezuma's treatment of the Ynca is a bit like that of the Bad Son's disobedience to the Father he refuses to recognize as such, Acacis' relations with Zempoalla embody the Good Son's necessary disobedience to the Wicked Mother (agonizedly admitted by him to be the real mother: "Horror choaks up my words...").[24]

Before the play opens, Zempoalla has killed her brother, Amexia's husband (hence Montezuma's father). Of Acacis' father we are told nothing; in his place we find Traxalla, Zempoalla's general and lover:

> Nor does my Mother seem to reign alone,
> But with this Monster shares the guilt and Throne.[25]

This situation seems a variant of the Clytemnestra-Aegisthus-Orestes relationship, with the Orestes figure split into a son-of-the-murderous-mother and a son-of-the-murdered-father--both of whom, in different ways, the wicked mother loves.

A significant symmetry is revealed if we diagram the three parent-child pairs in the play:



Leaving aside Amexia, whose role is to appear at the eleventh hour to resolve all, we find Montezuma dangling, unparented, between a father-daughter pair and a mother-son pair. A Father and a Mother successively are his rulers; both refuse his demands (specifically, his demand to be given his love's person); both claim that his demands merit death. But neither kills him. It is not made clear whether the Father, having uttered the words "Thou deserv'st to die," means to carry them out.[26] As for the Mother, she no sooner sentences Montezuma to death than she falls victim to an equal and opposite passion:

> Kill him------hold, must he dye?------why let him dye;
> Whence shou'd proceed this strange diversity
> In my resolves?
> . . . . . .
> 'Tis love, 'tis love, that thus disorders me.[27]

Her vacillation between love and murderous hate is finally resolved in a splendid coup de theatre in Act V: setting a dagger to Montezuma's breast, she declaims:

> Dye then, ungrateful, dye; Amexia's Son
> Shall never triumph on Acacis Throne:
> Thy death must my unhappy flames remove;
> Now where is thy defence------against my love?
> [She cuts the cords, and gives him the Dagger.[28]

His blade restored to him, Montezuma is irresistible. His

enterprise now is once again to win the Ynca's esteem:

> Now Ynca hate me, if thou canst; for he
> Whom thou hast scorn'd will dye or rescue thee.[29]

But: "As he goes to attaque the Guards with Traxalla's Sword, Enter Amexia, Garrucca, Indians, driving some of the other Party before them." The True Queen has arrived; a Messenger has already brought the crucial news:

> King Montezuma their loud shouts proclaim,
> The City rings with their new Sovereigns name;
> The banish'd Queen declares he is her Son,
> And to his succor all the people run.[30]

So Montezuma and Amexia take their places in a son-mother pairing happily balancing father-daughter Ynca and Orazia, while the unhappy stand-in son-mother pair Acacis and Zempoalla remove themselves through suicide (Acacis before the final revelations, Zempoalla not until the play is almost over).

Once Zempoalla is dead, Father, Mother, Son and Daughter register their amity, as the older man gives the younger woman to the younger man:

> Mont. Your pardon royal Sir.
> Ynca. You have my Love.
> [Gives him Oraz.
> Amex. The Gods my Son your happy choice approve.[31]

It only remains to mourn the dead Acacis.

B. The Conquest of Granada

The structures we have just examined in The Indian Queen are partially reconstituted in The Conquest of Granada, though they play a

smaller role in determining the action of the later play. Almanzor, like Montezuma IQ, begins as the stranger-to-all-kingdoms, the outsider hero, as he taunts Boabdelin:

> Obeyed as sovereign by thy subjects be,
> But know, that I alone am king of me.
> I am as free as nature first made man,
> Ere the base laws of servitude began,
> When wild in woods the noble savage ran.[32]

But Almanzor will renounce this freedom once he discovers the identity of his parents, and accept the authority of his living parent's State. This surviving parent will turn out to be the Father.

The Mother is also present in the play, however: her ghost appears to her son in Part Two, Act Four. There is a strange skittishness in Dryden's handling of the ghost's approach. It follows upon a song celebrating the union of lovers' souls after their deaths. Almanzor, waiting for his (forbidden) love Almahide, finds himself seized by a chill:

> A hollow wind comes whistling through that door.
> And a cold shivering seizes me all o'er;
> My teeth, too, chatter with a sudden fright:--
> These are the raptures of too fierce delight,
> The combat of the tyrants, hope and fear;
> Which hearts, for want of field-room, cannot bear.[33]

The comedy broadens once the ghost appears, but it is the Comedy of Unease:

> Well mayst thou make thy boast whate'er thou art!
> Thou art the first e'er made Almanzor start.
> My legs
> Shall bear me to thee in their own despite:
> I'll rush into the covert of thy night,

> And pull thee backward, by thy shroud, to light;
> Or else I'll squeeze thee, like a bladder, there,
> And make thee groan thyself away to air.
> . . . . . [The Ghost retires.
> The grudging of my ague yet remains;
> My blood, like icicles, hangs in my veins,
> And does not drop;--Be master of that door,
> We two will not disturb each other more.
> I erred a little, but extremes may join;
> That door was hell's, but this is heaven's and mine.
> [Goes to the other door, and is met again by the Ghost.[34]

The Ghost of the Mother stands between Almanzor and his illicit love for Boabdelin's wife. The sensual "heaven" Almanzor has in mind is not opened to him. Instead, Heaven, on the verge of accepting his dead mother, bids her

> To warn that little pledge I left behind;
> And to divert him, ere it were too late,
> From crimes unknown, and errors of his fate.[35]

The tone now steadies, as Almanzor acknowledges the voice of the Mother:

> Speak, holy shade; thou parent-form, speak on!
> [Bowing.
> Instruct thy mortal-elemented son;
> For here I wander, to myself unknown.[36]

And her message to him (apart from a not-very-effectual injunction to desist from "crimes of lawless love")[37] is of the Father.

But a second intervention will be required to keep Almanzor from slaying this unknown father in battle. After it is all over, the Duke of Arcos recounts what happens. In the midst of the fighting, he recognized his son's birthmark, as well as "a ruby cross in diamond bracelet tied:"

Struck with these tokens, which so well I knew,
And staggering back some paces, I withdrew:
He followed, and supposed it was my fear;
When, from above, a shrill voice reached his ear:--
"Strike not thy father!"--it was heard to cry;
Amazed, and casting round his wondrous eye,
He stopped; then, thinking that his fears were vain,
He lifted up his thundering arm again:
Again the voice withheld him from my death;
"Spare, spare his life," it cried, "who gave thee breath!"
Once more he stopped; then threw his sword away;
"Blessed shade," he said, "I hear thee, I obey
Thy sacred voice;" then, in the sight of all,
He at my feet, I on his neck did fall.[38]

This scene inverts the relations among elements already in combination at the end of The Indian Queen, where death of the Son at the hands of the Wicked Mother is averted by the Mother's cutting the Son's bonds and handing him the knife with which he immediately stabs a False Father (Traxalla): here the death of the Father at the hands of the Son is averted by the intervention of the Good Mother, who causes the Son to throw his weapon away.

Apart from this finding of a mother and father for Almanzor, The Conquest of Granada is not much occupied with parent-child relations directly. When Almanzor asks for Almahide's hand, just as Montezuma IQ asked the Ynca for Orazia's, the refusal comes from two mouths rather than one, since the roles of Ruler and Father, which were united in the Ynca, are now divided between Boabdelin and Abenamar.

Almanz. Emboldened by the promise of a prince,
[Putting one knee to the ground.
I ask this lady now with confidence.
Boab. You ask the only thing I cannot grant.
[The King and Abenamar look amazedly on each other.
But, as a stranger, you are ignorant
Of what by public fame my subjects know;
She is my mistress.
Aben. --And my daughter too.[39]

Almanzor's retort is perhaps the most impudent made to a Father in all the plays:

> Believe, old man, that I her father knew:
> What else should make Almanzor kneel to you?--[40]

But so little is the Abenamar-Almahide relationship emphasized elsewhere in the play that the father's withholding his daughter here does not acquire much weight. The other straightforward exploitation of the theme occurs in the Benzayda-Ozmyn subplot, in which both lovers have fathers (Zegry and Abencerrage respectively) bitterly opposed to the match. First Benzayda's father Selin is won over by Ozmyn's fighting his own father to save Selin's life (for Benzayda's sake),[41] then Ozmyn's father-Abenamar again-is symmetrically won over by a splendidly vigorous piece of pleading by Benzayda. These exact balances in the conflict and its resolution seem only too suited to the scale of events in a well-subordinated subplot. Here, and only here, does Dryden's treatment of parent-child conflict approach the bland.

But the Ozmyn-Benzayda subplot is only an incident in the larger family conflict which provides so much of the play's material: the Abencerrage-Zegry rivalry. Each tribe is an "extended family", and the immediate cause of their enmity is a death in one of these families:

> No, murderer, no; I never will be won
> To peace with him, whose hand has slain my son.[42]

Zulyma is speaking: his own family (in the strict sense--himself, his brother Hamet, his sister Lyndaraxa) makes up half the individuated Zegry cast, the other half consisting of Selin and Benzayda plus one Gomel

who exists only to be killed by Almanzor in Act I, Scene i. There are fewer individuated Abencerrages than Zegrys: another three-member family (Abenamar, Ozmyn, Almahide) plus the unattached chief Abdelmelech. Thus each of the two "extended families" collapses for practical purposes into a pair of real families (leaving Gomel aside and counting Abdelmelech as a single-member family). Perhaps we can go further, and see the two tribes as augmented versions of rival brothers. Abdalla hopes this brotherhood will be recognized in the face of the common enemy:

> The two fierce factions will no longer jar,
> Since they have now been brothers in the war.[43]

But Abencerrage and Zegry are as irreconcilable as Aureng-Zebe and Morat. The root of Boabdelin's political failure is his inability to act as the strong Father maintaining peace between these "sons".

C. Tyrannic Love

In both The Indian Queen and The Conquest of Granada the son-general is securely installed as the dramatic protagonist. In Tyrannic Love, however, the protagonist is the Father, and the Son's role is primarily passive, reactive. Aureng-Zebe will both re-install the Son at the center of the action and maintain his passivity: the Son as Perfect Victim. But Tyrannic Love is essentially Maximin's play, not Porphyrius'. In this respect it is like The Indian Emperour, which similarly centers on the doomed ruler rather than on the hero who is to replace him.

The replacing of the Son by the Father as focus for our attention involves, as a corollary, an inversion of the family problem

which has so far defined our protagonists' plight. Montezuma IQ and Almanzor are fatherless sons: in Maximin we find embodied the sonless father.

The play opens as Maximin awaits the approach of Porphyrius, his victorious general. So well-disposed is he toward Porphyrius that his son, Charinus, fears the loss of his rights. The minor character Albinus warns Charinus that

> This new pretender will all pow'r ingross:
> All things must now by his direction move;
> And you, Sir, must resign your Father's love.[44]

Charinus, to regain the esteem of the Father (we have seen Montezuma IQ similarly occupied), resolves "some noble action [to] undertake,"[45] and leaves the stage as Porphyrius is about to enter:

> He comes: We two, like the twin Stars appear;
> Never to shine together in one Sphere.[46]

The next we see of him is his body "born in dead by Souldiers."[47] He has perished in his attempt to win back his father's favour.

This precipitates the transference of the Sonhood which Charinus had feared. Maximin announces to Porphyrius:

> Porphyrius, since the Gods have ravish'd one,
> I come in you to seek another Son.[48]

Ruler and general are to be bound to each other as father and son-and-heir, with the "son" linked to the father's daughter (Valeria) not as brother to sister but as man to wife:

> And 'twixt us two my Daughter be the chain,
> One end with me, and one with you remain.[49]

Maximin's aim is a tightly-packed union of the familial and the political, and Porphyrius' first embarrassed reaction conveys his sense of the heaviness of the package:

> You press me down with such a glorious Fate,
> [Kneeling again.
> I cannot rise against the mighty weight.
> Permit I may retire some little space,
> And gather strength to bear so great a grace.[50]

The difficulty is that this "great grace" constitutes yet another barrier against Porphyrius' own already-thwarted desire for Maximin's wife Berenice. Already there is a double bar against this love, Berenice being (i) married, and (ii) married to Porphyrius' ruler. Now, in addition, Maximin has made it involve the "Son" in a struggle with the Father for the "Mother", as well as (since Valeria's desire coincides with Maximin's plans, while Berenice's reciprocates Porphyrius') precipitating a rivalry between "Mother" and "Daughter" for the "Son".[51] So Maximin could hardly have "found a Son" in his general in a more dangerous way.

If real sonhood has vanished from the play with the death of Charinus, it is doubly replaced by the daughterhoods of Valeria and S. Catherine. Valeria's suicide will ultimately echo her brother's death, but at the same time bring about the death of the tyrant-father, as Maximin's erstwhile tool Placidius turns Valeria's avenger. This patricide-at-one-remove is oddly anticipated in the scene involving S. Catherine's mother, Felicia. Maximin threatens S. Catherine with her mother's death,

sardonically yoking the threat to a lover's conventional plea to his cruel mistress:

> Ask her, if she will yet her love deny;
> And bid a Monarch, and her Mother dye.[52]

Felicia fears death, and appeals to her daughter to capitulate, even reminding her of how she saved her as a child from the flooding Nile. But S. Catherine is swayed as little by this as by Maximin's de Sade-like description of the intended manner of her mother's execution:

> Go, bind her hand and foot beneath that Wheel:
> Four of you turn the dreadful Engine round;
> Four others hold her fas'ned to the ground:
> That by degrees her tender breasts may feel,
> First the rough razings of the pointed steel:
> Her Paps then let the bearded Tenters stake,
> And on each hook a gory Gobbet take;
> Till th' upper flesh by piece-meal torn away,
> Her beating heart shall to the Sun display.[53]

This speech cuts several ways at once: showing us Maximin's cruelty at its fullest extent, thus preparing us to accept his coming death as good, it allows us a morbidly thrilling participation in the Parent's death at the same time as we reject it in horror. S. Catherine, strong in her faith, accepts her mother's death: that she accepts it for herself as well as for her mother is presumably meant to make this all right, but it may be felt that Dryden shows a certain want of dramatic tact in allowing her to reprove her mother to the last:

> No more, dear Mother; ill in death it shows
> Your peace of mind by rage to discompose....[54]

The pietistic forms of the scene as a whole hardly succeed in disguising

its quasi-matricidal content.

Tyrannic Love is the only one of the plays to flirt thus with parenticidal situations; elsewhere, the out-and-out Bad Parent obligingly commits suicide (Zempoalla, Nourmahal) or reforms (the Old Emperor). Perhaps it is significant that the sex of the Child here, and nowhere else, is female: the Son is still kept from being implicated. (It is also interesting, and in line with the generational bias of this drama, that the Child rises from the dead in the Epilogue so strikingly.)

Behind the sexual reversal we can glimpse a configuration familiar from The Indian Queen: Maximin-Valeria-S. Catherine restate the Zempoalla-Acacis-Montezuma triad of Bad Parent, Good Child, Captive Object of Parent's desire.[55] Maximin-Beatrice-Porphyrius, on the other hand, looks forward to The Conquest of Granada's Boabdelin-Almahide-Almanzor. We have seen above how the Maximin-Valeria-Porphyrius triad inverts the Ynca-Orazia-Montezuma IQ relationship. These three triangles may be represented in a single diagram, showing the relations between Maximin and each of his chief antagonists:



The outer "rays" turn out to be sexual, the inner familial (given Maximin's project to make Porphyrius a Son); ultimately, each ray represents a different defeat for the tyrant-father. Tyrannic Love seems a good deal more impressive than it has usually been found when the economy with which

these structures are fitted together is appreciated.

D. Aureng-Zebe

The political institution common to all the heroic plays, beneath their various exotic trappings, is monarchy, and the whole point of monarchy is that it solves the problem of transferring power from one generation to the next by installing at the head of the state a family man whose estate the state is. Political succession can then be ruled by the comparatively straightforward conventions governing family inheritance. Ideally, supreme power passes from the ruler to the eldest son at the time of the ruler's death. Yet in Dryden's five heroic plays only one ruler succeeds in passing on his estate to his son--the Old Emperor in Aureng-Zebe. This play is also singular in representing a state faced with no external threat. But this is no more than a corollary to the successful succession, since the function of the "outside" in the other plays is to provide the base for a solution to the threatened monarchy's problems. Here the solution is worked out within the state, conventionally, though, unconventionally, the father remains alive.

This remaining-alive of the Father contrasts with the death-centered nature of the crisis which puts the play's action in motion. This crisis arises from an exotic Indian succession custom:

> When death's cold hand has closed the father's eye,
> You know the younger sons are doomed to die.[56]

Naturally the Emperor's four sons, as soon as they think their father near death, go to war against each other, "nature's laws are by the state's destroyed,"[57] and (in a significantly-chosen figure):

> Indus and Ganges, our wide empire's bounds,
> Swell their dyed currents with their natives' wounds:
> Each purple river winding, as he runs,
> His bloody arms about his slaughtered sons.[58]

Only two of the Emperor's sons remain as the exposition gives way to the play's action: Aureng-Zebe, the Emperor's eldest remaining son and his general ("His father's cause upon his sword he wears"),[59] and Morat, son of the Emperor's present wife. Morat is something of the Naughty Son, "too insolent, too much a brave."[60] We first see the Emperor as he angrily interviews an ambassador sent by Morat, the interview concluding with a motif with which we are by now familiar:

> Amb. Since you deny him entrance, he demands
> His wife, whom cruelly you hold in bands:
> Her, if unjustly you from him detain,
> He justly will, by force of arms, regain.
> Emp. O'er him and his a right from Heaven I have;
> Subject and son, he's doubly born my slave.
> But whatsoe'er his own demerits are,
> Tell him, I shall not make on women war.
> And yet I'll do her innocence the grace,
> To keep her here, as in the safer place.[61]

(The Father, as we have already seen, will seek to withhold the loved one from the son in a more sinister way later in the play, when Aureng-Zebe's Indamora is in question. The kindness the Emperor claims to be showing will there provoke Aureng-Zebe's bitter rejoinder:

> I know the kindness of her guardian such,
> I need not fear too little, but too much.[62]

Equally, Aureng-Zebe's claiming Indamora's liberty "as your general, and your son" echoes this "subject and son" rationale for the Emperor's refusing Melesinda to Morat.)

The ambassador dismissed, the Emperor turns his attention to reports of his good son's victories on his behalf--but with a guilty heart. "I look on Aureng-Zebe with rival's eyes,"[63] he confesses to the faithful Arimant: he has fallen in love with "the captive queen of Cassimere," Indamora. He bids Arimant warn Indamora to say nothing of this to Aureng-Zebe:

> Though Aureng-Zebe return a conqueror,
> Both he and she are still within my power.
> Say, I'm a father, but a lover too;
> Much to my son, more to myself I owe.[64]

The Father's "duty to himself", to his own desire--the Father's lust--makes him want to abandon the responsibilities[65] while retaining the rights of his fatherhood. The Son is thus not only threatened as a lover by a rival (a rival wielding the power of the ruler), but he is left fatherless, bereaved. This emerges in the first exchange between the Emperor and Aureng-Zebe, as the Emperor begs his son not to "speak so tenderly:"

> Knew you what shame your kind expressions bring,
> You would, in pity, spare a wretched king.
> Aur. A king! you rob me, sir, of half my due;
> You have a dearer name,--a father too.
> Emp. I had that name.
> Aur. What have I said or done,
> That I no longer must be called your son?
> 'Tis in that name, Heaven knows, I glory more,
> Than that of prince, or that of conqueror.[66]

The Emperor has robbed Aureng-Zebe of a crucial "name". But his own loss is greater, though self-imposed. When he threatens his son through Indamora--"Remember, he and you are in my hand"--she retorts:

> Yes, in a father's hand, whom he has served,
> And, with the hazard of his life, preserved.
> But piety to you, unhappy prince,
> Becomes a crime, and duty an offence;
> Against yourself you with your foes combine,
> And seem your own destruction to design.[67]

The Emperor's attempt to deny his own fatherhood is a self-mutilating act[68] crucially undermining the Right on which his power rests. It leads him to combine with Morat against Aureng-Zebe, a literal combining-with-the-foe-against-himself which leaves him powerless against Morat's eventual recapitulation of the argument to his own advantage:

> Emp. Suppose (what I'll not grant) injustice done;
> Is judging me the duty of a son?
> Mor. Not of a son, but of an emperor:
> You cancelled duty when you gave me power.
> If your own actions on your will you ground,
> Mine shall hereafter know no other bound.
> What meant you when you called me to a throne?
> Was it to please me with a name alone?[69]

So the Emperor's attempt to un-name himself Father results in the power bound up in the name Emperor passing to Morat. The Emperor, caught in the hubris generated by the interplay between his political, familial roles on the one hand and his (would-be) sexual role on the other, has tried to use his prerogatives in the first two realms as leverage in the third. But his aspirations as lover, in involving him in a dishonourable rivalry with his son, not only undercut his position as a father--which he is willing to forego--but his position as ruler, since that depends, now he is old, on the support of that son as his only faithful general.

As for his two sons, they embody contrasting ways of reacting to the Bad Father problem. Morat is all thrust, Aureng-Zebe all passive resistance. A recapitulation of the Zempoalla material in The Indian

Queen is used to heighten the Morat/Aureng-Zebe difference: Nourmahal, like Zempoalla, is the Bad Mother threatening Aureng-Zebe simultaneously with murderous hate (motivated by a desire to seize dynastic power for herself and her own full son) and quasi-incestuous love. The situation in the later play distinguishes itself from that in the earlier by means of heightening and inversion: not only is Nourmahal's love for Aureng-Zebe treated as more directly incestuous than Zempoalla's for Montezuma,[70] but Acacis' "quasi-fraternal" friendship with Montezuma through all the vicissitudes of political and amorous rivalry is inverted to Morat's blunt hostility towards his real half-brother Aureng-Zebe. Further, the temperaments of the two Sons are reversed in respect to their function: mother's-son-and-usurper Morat is impetuous and energetic like Montezuma, while Aureng-Zebe is as fully a "pattern of exact virtue" as Acacis.[71] In centering Aureng-Zebe's heroism on stoic endurance rather than thrust, Dryden makes explicit the reservations about the "positive" hero which had always lurked near the surface of his treatment of such dynamos as Montezuma IQ and Almanzor and which in a different way motivated his handling of Maximin. We have seen how Montezuma IQ's military prowess collapses, at the moment of its fullest exercise, into the agency whereby both he and his love become prisoners. Maximin fails in all his projects. Even Almanzor finds that the moment of victory towards which he has been fighting turns out to involve the throwing-away of his sword and the recognition, in the Enemy, of the Father (plus, incidentally, his own side's military defeat). Now, by splitting the Son into Aureng-Zebe and Morat, Dryden retains misguided filial thrust as a presence in the play while unburdening the Hero of responsibility for it.

Aureng-Zebe's refusal to press forward, to become the characteristically over-insistent presence of the "huffing hero", is registered as actual absence in the play at a crucial point: he is the only hero in the five plays who for a time we believe dead. Morat, as the other half of the split Son, dies before our eyes, kissing Indamora's hand. Life and death of the Son intertwine elaborately: Aureng-Zebe expresses the renewal of his energies at the end of Act IV--

> My father's kind, and, madam, you forgive;
> Were Heaven so pleased, I now could wish to live.
> And I shall live.
> With glory and with love, at once, I burn:
> I feel the inspiring heat, and absent god return.[72]--

in the same figure on which Morat's very impressive dying words depend:

> I leave you not; for my expanded mind
> Grows up to heaven, while it to you is joined:
> Not quitting, but enlarged! A blazing fire,
> Fed from the brand.[73]

Aureng-Zebe returns from battle victorious, announcing that

> Our impious use no longer shall obtain;
> Brothers no more by brothers shall be slain.--[74]

only to find his love comforting his dying brother-rival. But the breach this makes between the Son and his love provides the occasion for a final, and benevolent, intervention by the Father:

> [To him the EMPEROR, drawing in INDAMORA. . . .]
> Emp. It must not be, that he, by whom we live,
> Should no advantage of his gift receive.
> . . . . . .
> [To INDAMORA.]
> I have not quitted yet a victor's right:
> I'll make you happy in your own despite.[75]

After the suicide of the Bad Mother, the succession/abdication can end the play happily--the Emperor having the last word:

> Receive the mistress you so long have served;
> Receive the crown your loyalty preserved.
> Take you the reins, while I from cares remove,
> And sleep within the chariot which I drove.[76]

One feels that Aureng-Zebe can afford this perfect resolution of the father-son conflict because it has dared pose the problem more directly, with fewer structural displacements, than have the other plays. Aureng-Zebe's stoic passivity has been the buffer absorbing all the shocks of this: since nothing can provoke Aureng-Zebe to raise a hand against his father, the anti-parental material of the play can be faced with no fear that it will get out of hand.

The play is perhaps more emotionally rich than its fellows because Aureng-Zebe's stoicism does not stop at being structurally useful but becomes the Dying Life to which Virtue is condemned in the face of the Father's waywardness. The play escapes the smugness to which celebrations of stoic virtue are prone--the smugness of Addison's Cato, say--by allowing Aureng-Zebe to feel the full gloom of his position:

> How vain is virtue, which directs our ways
> Through certain danger to uncertain praise!
> Barren, and airy name!. . . .
> . . . . . .
> The world is made for the bold impious man,
> Who stops at nothing, seizes all he can.
> Justice to merit does weak aid afford;
> She trusts her balance, and neglects her sword.[77]

The world, at this point, is Morat's: virtue is only a name. A few lines earlier, Aureng-Zebe has said, "Even Death's become to me no dreadful

name,"[78] which diminishes death equally. And life, in turn, shrivels:

> My life I would not ransome with a prayer:
> 'Tis vile, since 'tis not worth my father's care.
> I go not, sir, indebted to my grave:
> You paid yourself, and took the life you gave.[79]

The best-known passage from the play ("When I consider life, 'tis all a cheat. . . .")[80] generalizes this, but the first formulation is more to our purposes: it chrystallizes the ambiguity whereby the Father is at once the source of the Son's life and the greatest threat to it. If the value of life is dependent upon the "father's care", the Son is horribly at the mercy of the careless Father. Of course, Aureng-Zebe does not actually collapse into this suicidal quietism. "Sons may have rights which they can never quit:"[81] Aureng-Zebe's love and his virtue together constitute values which may derive from the Father[82] but exist independently of subsequent vacillation in the real father's conduct. But Aureng-Zebe's speeches make us feel what the full collapse would be like--hence the play's emotional power.

4

We have so far set aside The Indian Emperour as not presenting us with a struggle between a heroic general and his ruler. Many of the structures we have been discussing are nonetheless to be found there in modified form.

The Indian Emperour divides the role of Hero between Cortez, the general into whose hands the state ultimately falls, and Montezuma, who, although a king, retains the heroic status established for him (as general) in The Indian Queen.[83] Since they are connected by no ties of

family or of state (Cortez is fighting for a Spain which, like Philip's in The Conquest of Granada, is the absolute antagonist to which the represented state is doomed to succumb), they are, paradoxically, free to recognize each other as worthy antagonists, even as friends. Montezuma just manages to resist his love Almeria's demand that Cortez be killed. Later, Cortez rescues the nearly-dead Montezuma from Spanish torturers. On this occasion, his first words to the old king make explicit a theme we might expect to be invoked:

> Ah Father, Father, what do I endure
> To see these Wounds my pity cannot Cure![84]

Montezuma's reply seems designedly ambiguous:

> Am I so low that you should pity bring,
> And give an Infants Comfort to a King?[85]

The principal meaning of "an Infants comfort" is "comfort suited to be given to an infant" (thus by contrast emphasizing Montezuma's age), but the alternative sense, "comfort bestowed by an infant", hangs in the air as well, reminding us of Cortez's youth. As a whole, the scene's analogue is the Old Emperor's reconciliation with Aureng-Zebe. Montezuma is similarly guilt-ridden--

> You're much to blame;
> Your grief is cruel, for it shews my shame. . . .
> . . . . . .
> You have forgot that I your Death design'd,
> To satisfie the Proud Almeria's mind:
> You, who preserv'd my Life, I doom'd to Dye.[86]--

and suicidal:

> But I, by living, poorly take the way
> To injure Goodness, which I cannot pay.[87]

But, as hero, Montezuma is strong enough to confront his guilt and loss of power squarely. He becomes the only hero in the plays flawed enough, the only flawed ruler noble enough, to choose suicide. Cortez is left to help preside over the "Great Father's Funeral Pomp."[88]

What of Montezuma's real sons? They are rivals in love, like Morat and Aureng-Zebe. But their rivalry is part of a larger situation whose parallel is to be found in The Conquest of Granada: a feud, already in progress at the beginning of the play, between two families, here Montezuma's and the dead Indian Queen's. Montezuma carries over from The Indian Queen a guilt which he reactivates by falling in love with one of his old enemy's daughters, leaving his sons to vie for the other daughter while Montezuma's own daughter becomes the object of the love of the Indian Queen's son. The perfect symmetry of the two families makes all the more cruel the asymmetry of their members' desires. On the one hand, a father with two sons and a daughter, on the other, a mother with two daughters and a son: the two families could interlock perfectly. Instead, the play opens with the Indian Queen long dead, her death well-remembered by her daughters: when Montezuma's own queen's death leaves his fancy free to fall upon Almeria, she immediately reminds him that

> By thee, Inhumane, both my Parents dy'd;
> One by thy sword, the other by thy pride.[89]

She has already in asides to her brother and sister put the blame on Montezuma's pride, and promised a strictly reciprocal destructiveness:

> My birth I to that injur'd Princess owe,
> To whom not only he his love deny'd,
> But in her sufferings took unmanly pride.
> . . . . . .
> If news be carried to the shades below,
> The Indian Queen will be more pleas'd, to know
> That I his scorns on him, who scorn'd her, pay.[90]

Just as Almeria's scorn for Montezuma mirrors Montezuma's earlier rejection of her mother, so does Cydaria's scorn for Orbellan: in the first case, the direction of the scorn is reversed, in the second, sexes are reversed while the original direction of the scorn is maintained. Meanwhile, Montezuma's desire, directed diagonally towards a member of the next generation, leaves only one woman in that generation for his two sons' desires to aim at. The spectre of direct rivalry between father and sons rises briefly before Montezuma's choice is made known. Odmar expresses his fear of this:

> My Father this way does his looks direct,
> Heaven grant he give it not where I suspect.[91]

As it happens, Odmar's prayer is answered, but ultimately he fares no better for it. His elimination is necessary if, out of the tangle of unreciprocated desires and old scores to be settled, a single mutual love--that of Alibech and Guyomar--is to be salvaged.

In The Indian Queen Montezuma is presumably about the same age as Acacis, Zempoalla's son. In The Indian Emperour he and the dead Zempoalla seem to be contemporaries. Still, the earlier play's resonances keep Montezuma IE feeling something of a Son as well as a Father. The Wicked Mother is dead, but her ghost returns to prophesy that the aging Son will soon be hers:

> The hopes of thy succesless Love resign,
> Know Montezuma, thou art only mine;
> For those who here on Earth their passion show,
> By death for Love, receive their right below.
> Why doest thou then delay my longing Arms?
> Have Cares, and Age, and Mortal life such Charms?[92]

Montezuma's rage at the apparition collapses strangely into an acquiescence to its bidding:

> Would my short Life had yet a shorter date!
> I'm weary of this flesh which holds us here,
> And dastards manly Souls with hope and fear;
> These heats and colds still in our breasts make War,
> Agues and Feavers all our passions are.[93]

The coupling "hope and fear" will recur in this scene's double in The Conquest of Granada, where, as we have seen, Almanzor just before the appearance of his mother's ghost is seized by a "cold shivering" which he attributes to

> The combat of the tyrants, hope and fear;
> Which hearts, for want of field-room, cannot bear.[94]

There too the ghost of the Mother will stand between the lover and the beloved. But the benign mother of the optimistic later play is, in the earlier, the retribution-demanding shade of a (sexually threatening) Mother-love which Montezuma, now that he is himself old, must redefine as a love proffered by a woman his own age--a woman whom he has spurned and whose consequent death is on his head. Montezuma IE is thus again like the Old Emperor in Aureng-Zebe, whose guilt consists in his abandoning the older woman proper to his own age and seeking a woman from the next generation.

But The Indian Emperour is not organized so as to make Montezuma

such a Bad Father as the Old Emperor is. Montezuma's crimes are in the past, in another play (and are not in that play treated as crimes). In the dramatic present, Cortez's victory over Montezuma does not seem particularly just: it is made to derive from the conqueror's superior weapons rather than from any flaw in Montezuma's character. The general feeling is of a vague fatality hanging over Montezuma, having something to do with his age, something to do with his past, something to do with his present infatuation, but reducible to none of these. Montezuma is, in other words, not accused, as the Ynca, Maximin, Boabdelin, and the Old Emperor are. In the end he is still the fiery Son grown older; and his "sufferings and constancy"[95] align him more with Aureng-Zebe than with that prince's father.

5

To recapitulate: in four out of five plays (exception: The Indian Emperour) a general and his king are at odds over the object of the general's desire. In four out of five plays (exception: The Conquest of Granada) the king is a father--of the loved one in The Indian Queen and The Indian Emperour, of the general in Tyrannnic Love (metaphorically) and Aureng-Zebe (really). The roster of fathers is completed by the Duke of Arcos in The Conquest of Granada, who is "lost" through the body of the play, and Good.

Equally, all the plays contain mothers. The two of these who are Good are also "lost": Amexia, who like Arcos is finally "found", and Almanzor's Mother, who remains ghostly. There are two live Bad Mothers (Zempoalla and Nourmahal) and a ghostly one (Zempoalla's Ghost

in The Indian Emperour). Of these, the Good Mothers are the heroes' own, while the Bad Mothers, who desire them sexually, are never their blood-relations. A sixth mother, Felicia in Tyrannic Love, seems, as we have seen, a target of authorial aggression.

All the kings come into conflict with the general-heroes: militarily in The Indian Emperour, amatorily[96] in the remaining plays. Reconciliation is achieved thrice (with the Ynca, Montezuma IE, the Old Emperor) and denied twice (with Boabdelin and Maximin--who are fathers neither of the general nor of his love).

What remains constantly embodied or masked in the plays' various configurations is a struggle between authority-power (king-father, queen-mother) and a more youthful executive-power (general-son) over the latter's Desire. We must now turn our attention to determining the sort of analysis of Desire these plays achieve.

III

HEROIC LOVE

1

Each of Dryden's heroic plays ends with a pair of lovers happily mated. Two plays give us an additional happy pair in the subplot: The Indian Emperour (Guyomar-Alibech), The Conquest of Granada (Ozmyn-Benzayda).[1]

The links by which Love relates the characters to each other lend themselves to being diagrammed. The most straightforward organization of linked desires is that common to Tyrannic Love and The Indian Emperour (main plot):



In words: Montezuma loves Almeria, who loves not him but Cortez, who loves not her but Cydaria, who loves him to the exclusion of her other lover Orbellan; Placidius loves Valeria, who loves not him but Porphyrius, who loves not her but Berenice, who loves him to the exclusion of her husband Maximin, who loves not her but S. Catherine, who rejects him. Each chain begins and ends with a character involved with only one other

character. The rest must each contend with the desires or resistances of two, and only two, other characters.

Less elegant are The Indian Queen's arrangements:



Only Acacis is singly involved, while the remaining four characters pursue and flee each other in a ring, or a parallelogram--the latter figure better suggesting the formation's resources as quarry for Eternal Triangles. The Conquest of Granada, on the other hand, maximizes the number of singly-involved members of its main plot.



This is an augmented version of the Indian Emperour figure: attached to Lyndaraxa and Almahide (corresponding to Almeria and Cydaria) are not one but two singly-attached lovers each. The women in the cast thus play a more focal role in the revised formation--a tendency taken a step further in Aureng-Zebe.



Indamora is firmly established at the center of an elegant structure which allows all four male characters to be in love with her.

2

These diagrams reveal, on the sexual plane, a precarious balance between optimism and pessimism similar to that which we have seen the plays maintain politically. The plays all end "happily", yet each diagram incorporates only a single unbroken line: the ratio of rejection to acceptance is high. And even the eventually-successful lovers are faced, through most of each play, with the likelihood that events will thwart their love.

The rejected fall into two groups: the Bad, who deserve rejection, and the Good, who do not. This distinction generally coincides with that between active and passive characters: the guilty are of more importance to the plot than the innocent because their crimes or errors contribute more actively to the structure of blockages which stands between the hero and his Desire. Both The Indian Emperour and The Conquest of Granada thus make do without any wholly innocent unrequited characters. (Montezuma's love for Almeria, and Abdelmelech's for Lyndaraxa, cannot be wholly innocent given the wickedness of their objects: both loves lead these flawed heroes to acts of imprudence

costing their side dearly in military terms.) The remaining three plays each contain one innocent--Acacis, Valeria, Melesinda--the pathos of whose fate is exploited fully. Tyrannic Love and Aureng-Zebe both accommodate a further innocent: in the former, S. Catherine (an interesting experiment in investing innocence with energy), in the latter, Arimant (a useful but minor character whose pathos is touched on comparatively lightly).

It may be worth noting, in the light of the preceding chapter, that of five innocents two are Daughters, one is a Son, one substitutes himself for the Son (Arimant, who dies Aureng-Zebe's death for him), and one is a Son's wife. None are Fathers or Mothers.

The relative guilts of the less-than-perfect are a function of their thirsts for blood. To be wicked in this drama is to be murderous. Traxalla and Zempoalla have killed a king before The Indian Queen opens; in the course of the play Traxalla nearly kills Montezuma, while Zempoalla is by her vow committed to the slaughter of all the prisoners. In The Indian Emperour, Odmar threatens to kill Guyomar, while Almeria, in attempting to stab Cydaria, wounds Cortez. In executing S. Catherine and Felicia, Maximin in Tyrannic Love becomes the only villain actually to succeed in bringing about a death not on the field of battle, while Placidius, having done his best to bring about the death of Porphyrius, ends by stabbing (and being stabbed by) Maximin. The villains in The Conquest of Granada conduct much of their villainy on the battlefield, but a more intimate murderousness brings together Lyndaraxa, Zulema and Hamet in an attempt to take advantage of Almanzor and Ozmyn in their combat in defense of Almahide--whom, in turn, Boabdelin is preparing to

execute. Like Boabdelin, the Old Emperor in Aureng-Zebe shows no positive blood-lust, but acquiesces in the murderous plans of others: he merely commits Aureng-Zebe to prison, then listens without protest as Morat and Nourmahal speak of the "deadly draught" they mean to administer to him there.[2]

All these villains--with the notable exception of the Old Emperor[3]--die, as they deserve to. But so do the innocents, suicidally. Acacis, Valeria, Melesinda all kill themselves, and to their ranks may be added the more compromised Montezuma IE and Abdelmelech: a suicide per play. And the two "second innocents", S. Catherine and Arimant, both choose to die, though their deaths are not literally self-inflicted.[4]

In nineteen cases out of twenty, then, to be involved unhappily on the sexual plane in these plays is to die. So frequent a recourse to death, threatened as well as actual, as a formal element in the disposition of the action cannot but drain it of most of its real-life force. At times the plays' language strives to renovate death, nowhere more strikingly than in Tyrannic Love, with Maximin's description of the tortures awaiting S. Catherine, or Valeria's

> The Empire groans under your bloody Reign,
> And its vast body bleeds in ev'ry vein.
> Gasping and pale, and fearing more, it lyes;
> And now you stab it in the very eyes:
> Your Caesar and the Partner of your Bed;
> Ah who can wish to live when they are dead?[5]

But the attempt collapses: the vividness of "stab it in the very eyes" is offset by the blanket coverage of "Ah, who can wish to live . . .?" just as the heightening achieved by "vast" and "every" is at the expense

of our feeling any of this blood to be limited enough to be real.

The true emotion towards which the reiteration of death moves (the reiteration of "death" the word, and also of the threat or fact of death distributed like a repeated word in the larger "sentence" which is the action of each play) is the weary numbness of Aureng-Zebe's resignation: "Death, in itself, is nothing."[6] This Nothing has as its function the deliverance of the unhappy from the cages of their miseries: "Grim though he be, Death pleases, when he frees."[7] The recurrence of death is only a way of registering the recurrence of these cages: death is the Outside of the cage, and naturally the animals within are always gazing at it, appealing to it, straining towards it. This is as true of the murderers as of the suicides. Murder is a way of attempting to free oneself from the cage by removing what one takes to be the external support of the cage's power, whereas suicide abolishes imprisonment by abolishing the imprisoned subject.

3

It will be best to begin our examination of the sort of cage Heroic Desire builds around its unfortunate victims in medias res.

By the end of the third act of Aureng-Zebe, all the love-elements of the play have been put in motion. Since most of these involve Indamora, it is fitting that she should be left alone on stage to muse on the events swirling around her. She concludes, perhaps not very originally, that

> Whom Heaven would bless, from pomp it will remove,
> And make their wealth in privacy and love.[8]

But she begins, a few lines above, more strikingly:

> Beauty is seldom fortunate, when great:
> A vast estate, but overcharged with debt.
> Like those, whom want to baseness does betray,
> I'm forced to flatter him, I cannot pay.[9]

She speaks out of the pain and fear necessarily inflicted upon her by the heroic drama's economy of means: the problems of love (the sexual) are hopelessly ensnarled with those of politics and the family. "Pomp" is the condition of the monarchic political family, from which love is in flight (a flight found necessary by Guyomar and Alibech at the end of The Indian Emperour). Yet Love is compelled by Beauty, and Beauty itself is "a vast estate". Earlier in the play, Indamora has put this even more strongly:

> Beauty a monarch is,
> Which kingly power magnificently proves,
> By crowds of slaves, and peopled empire loves.[10]

Naturally, then, the dispute over who is to possess Indamora is structured like the play's political dilemma. Morat, speaking of Aureng-Zebe, makes this clear at the moment he himself becomes an interested party:

> My brother does a glorious fate pursue;
> I envy him, that he must fall for you.
> He had been base, had he released his right:
> For such an empire none but kings should fight.
> If with a father he disputes this prize,
> My wonder ceases when I see those eyes.[11]

In Morat's speech we can read the dilemma which renders great Beauty so seldom fortunate. The eyes of the heroine are here, as always, a synecdoche for her beauty: Morat, having perceived and named this, the

prisoner's Value, is immediately trapped by the logic of his perception. Melesinda asks, shrewdly, "And can you, then, deny those eyes you praise?"[12] Beauty as Value captivates, tyrannizes: "Her tyrant beauty never grows more mild,"[13] the Old Emperor laments. Yet it is out of its bearer's control. At the same time it is both Indamora's (is, indeed, Indamora) and an object, a "prize", for others to fight over. As a prize, it renders its bearer herself subject to tyranny, since those who desire it will seek, if it cannot be freely offered to them, to imprison it. For Indamora, her beauty is a power, hence a possession ("a vast estate") which entails a "debt" of equal power, a fate in whose grip she is powerless.

In its most extreme form, this paradox's logic is the logic of suicide. Aureng-Zebe, in his outrage at his stepmother's amorous advances, includes himself in his call to the gods to reply with "just vengeance" to Nourmahal's "incestuous meaning": "I, too, deserve to die, because I please."[14] Nourmahal's desire for her step-son springs, like the Emperor's and Morat's desire for Indamora, from the sheer visibility of Aureng-Zebe's merit, as she makes clear to her confidante:

> Could Aureng-Zebe so lovely seem to thee,
> And I want eyes that noble worth to see?[15]

Aureng-Zebe's "noble worth" thus stands to him as Indamora's beauty to her: a half-separate almost-thing, the object of another's desire. "But happy, happy she," Nourmahal exclaims, ". . . Whom you yourself would, with yourself, reward."[16] Aureng-Zebe is to be at once the giver and the gift--a splitting-of-self which he disgustedly confirms: "In me a horror of myself you raise."[17]

There is a certain irony to all this, since Aureng-Zebe's "worth", unlike Indamora's beauty, is a conscious achievement. At the end of Act I, he announces his program:

> To a son's and lover's praise aspire,
> And must fulfil the parts which both require.[18]

He is thinking, of course, of his relations with his father and Indamora, but his words foreshadow precisely what Nourmahal will want him to be for her. And, later, it is his putting his moral intentions successfully into practice in his Act III dispute with his father and Morat which first leads Nourmahal to love him. It is revealingly characteristic of the sexual assumptions reigning in these plays that, while both hero and heroine suffer the unwelcome admiration of lovers whose love they cannot or will not return, the female's admirable properties are passive, unearned, accidental, whereas the male's are his own - his active prowess and virtue.[19] Perhaps this is why the plays accept it as natural, though distressing, that female beauty's semi-detached existence should threaten possessor and beholder alike, while the hero's finding his achievement correspondingly becoming the object of another's desire (and as such a threat to, literally, his self-possession) is felt to be unnatural, deeply evil.

On this sense of evil depend the overtones of the characteristic bondage-scenes--missing only in Tyrannic Love[20]--in which the hero is "courted" by a threatening woman. The mildest, least serious of these, Lyndaraxa's courtship of Almanzor, is especially instructive. What is at stake is more clearly visible in the absence of the hysteria with which

its sister-scenes are invested.

Like Nourmahal, Lyndaraxa is moved to court the hero after hearing him speak to the man who is (unknown to them all) his father. "Ah, what a noble conquest were this heart," she exclaims; but the nobility she has in mind is a matter of Value, not of virtue:

> In gaining him, I gain that fortune too,
> Which he has wedded, and which I but woo.[21]

Lyndaraxa's motives are, unlike those of Dryden's other villainesses, asexual, purely ambitious: the hero's good-fortune becomes the semi-detached attribute she desires to possess. She cannot tell Almanzor this, but the lie she uses has much the same structure as the truth. She speaks of hoping "To make your noble pity her defence:"[22] the hero's pity becomes a possessible thing, to be used as though it were a sword or a wall. Almanzor's gallant response personifies Beauty, and invests it with power, in the usual way:

> Beauty, like yours, can no protection need;
> Or, if it sues, is certain to succeed.[23]

Though mendacious, Lyndaraxa's reply epitomizes the general predicament of the Loved Woman:

> You cannot, sir, but know that my ill fate
> Has made me loved with all the effects of hate:
> One lover would, by force, my person gain;
> Which one, as guilty, would by force detain.[24]

Not "me", but "my person"! She proceeds to flatter Almanzor with an exaggerated description of his heroic Power, but his modest denial of its truth ("I am not that Almanzor whom you praise")[25] achieves a happier

escape from the ravages of feminine admiration than is available to Aureng-Zebe.

Now Lyndaraxa changes her strategy, turning her rhetorical skills to the task of dampening Almanzor's love for Almahide. She represents this love as "a consumption, which your life does waste:"[26] not an integral part of his life, but an infection attacking it. Almanzor's reply is startling:

> My love's now grown so much a part of me,
> That life would, in the cure, endangered be:
> At least, it like a limb cut off would show;
> And better die than like a cripple go.[27]

So physical has the figure become that to read it Freudianly as a castration-image surely does it no violence. Nothing could better illustrate the strange relation between attribute and essence which supports the heroic character and determines the crises it characteristically encounters. Almanzor's love is part of Almanzor and to cut it off would disfigure him, yet it is a separate thing, an independent growth which has somehow attached itself to him regardless of his will. To be sure, by the end of the scene Almanzor has revised this picture of the relation between his Self and his Love:

> My love's my soul; and that from fate is free;
> 'Tis that unchanged and deathless part of me.[28]

But this more flattering relocation of love still leaves it a distinctly anomalous "part" of the hero.

Meanwhile, Lyndaraxa responds to Almanzor's first formulation in lines which both remind us of the scene's affinity with the more lurid

bindings-of-the-hero in the other plays and very beautifully express the theme of self-division:

> You must be brought like madmen to their cure,
> And darkness first, and next new bonds endure:
> Do you dark absence to yourself ordain,
> And I, in charity, will find the chain.[29]

Love is a madness (as Almanzor immediately agrees), and madness must be cured by imprisonment, bondage. The principal sense of the third line is that Almanzor himself (as opposed to Lyndaraxa) is to enforce upon himself absence from Almahide, but "dark absence to yourself" forms a single phrase as well: the lover, to be cured, must absent himself from the Self which is diseased. (This meaning is involved in the principal sense too, in that the sane "you" who is to ordain absence must be separate, already absent, from the mad "yourself" who is to be cured.) The alliteration binding together "charity" and "chain" recapitulates with great economy the whole love-and-bondage paradox.

It is in Lyndaraxa's interest to argue against "constancy in love", to insist that "Faith ties not hearts; 'tis inclination all."[30] Almanzor's love must be dissolved if she is to obtain his luck: the former object blocks her way to the latter. Yet it is on the "inclination" to which Lyndaraxa appeals that Love's terrible solidity in these plays is based, because inclination is enforced by the loved one's power to inspire love, and this is taken to remain constant.[31] The fact that the person loved by the unrequited lover loves someone else is thus out of both parties' control, as is the unrequited lover's love itself. Commanded (in the case of a man's loving a woman) by Beauty, Love is equally semi-detached from the lover's Self. As Almanzor makes clear,

it is more stable than the Self. (Even Maximin's Self-obsession withers when confronted with it: "Fool that I am to struggle thus with Love!")[32] So heroic characterization is made at once both static and evanescent: the more thinglike the solidity ascribed to the characters' attributes, the more the "character itself"--the Self--recedes, dwindles into an impotent spectator of the interplay of "its" Desires in which its own interests are lost.

A later scene involving Lyndaraxa illustrates more bloodily the dilemma of the split man. As The Conquest of Granada draws to a close, Lyndaraxa proposes the imprisonment of her lover and dupe Abdelmelech (thus inverting the usual imprisonment situation, in which it is the imprisoning woman who loves and the imprisoned man who rejects that love):

> I'll cage thee; thou shalt be my Bajazet,
> I on no pavement but on thee will tread;
> And, when I mount, my foot shall know thy head.[33]

But at this point Abdelmelech stabs her, crying, "This first shall know thy heart."[34] Throughout the play, knowing Lyndaraxa's heart has been what he has most signally failed to do: we recall Cydaria's cry to Almeria when the latter stabs Cortez: "Was there no way but this to find his Heart?"[35] "Heart" stands synecdochally for the wholeness of the person the lover wants to possess, yet it is itself only a part: it is, literally, a vital part (the point of the more harmless uses of the figure), and is consequently hidden, buried, kept from the lover--becoming all the more valuable to him because unattainable. The poniard's heart-thrust shows us both the hopelessness of the unfortunate lover's

attempt to possess (since in attempting by force to gain the part--the "wholeness part"--he loses the whole) and the violence to which he is driven by his consequent despair.

Abdelmelech immediately proceeds to take his own life, and his dying speech is rich in devices by which to make himself darkly absent from himself.

> I do myself that justice I did her.
> Thy blood I to thy ruined country give,
> [To Lyndar.
> But love too well thy murder to outlive.
> Forgive a love, excused by its excess,
> Which, had it not been cruel, had been less.
> Condemn my passion, then, but pardon me,
> And think I murdered him who murdered thee.[36]

Lyndaraxa's "blood" is owed to her country (thus does her newly-acquired "vast estate" discharge its "debt"). Love is still in action, however, still semi-detached, of a certain size bound up with its character: a certain sort of object. Its separation from the lover is such that it (as "passion") is to be condemned while he is to be pardoned: this "he" is the "I" who does justice, not the guilty "myself", "him who murdered thee". How many entities are in play here? Love itself splits into a cruelty to the loved one and a kindness to her (the size of which is somehow directly proportional to the cruelty) showing itself in a symmetrical cruelty to the cruel Self. Lyndaraxa's death splits into an act of justice and a murder, as does Abdelmelech's suicide. It is not surprising that to the end Lyndaraxa deliriously denies ownership of this death: "Sure destiny mistakes; this death's not mine. . . ."[37]

4

The supernatural enters into the first four heroic plays in a remarkably spatialized way, the space it offers being one in which the vicissitudes of Desire are suspended.

In The Indian Queen, Zempoalla engages the priest Ismeron to raise a prophesying spirit; he succeeds only in summoning the God of Dreams, who declines to oblige. To restore the Queen, who "droops under the weight of Rage and Care,"[38] Ismeron calls upon the Aerial Spirits to sing to her.

> Poor Mortals that are clog'd with Earth below
> Sink under Love and Care,
> While we that dwell in Air
> Such heavy Passions never know.
> Why then shou'd Mortals be
> Unwilling to be free
> From Blood, that sullen Cloud,
> Which shining Souls does shroud?
> Then they'l shew bright,
> And like us light,
> When leaving Bodies with their Care,
> They slide to us and Air.[39]

Freedom from Love (whose coupling with Care seems to equate it with the Rage of a few lines earlier) is being offered by way of a dis-embodiment which human beings can achieve only in death. The oppositions are Earth (i.e. Body)/Air, and Blood (as Cloud)/Light. But Zempoalla sweeps the offer aside with a brusque "Death on these Trifles."[40] She is interested in solving her difficulties within Desire's terms:

> The Captive Stranger, he whose Sword and Eyes
> Where ere they strike meet ready Victories:
> Make him but burn for me in flames like mine,
> Victims shall bleed, and feasted Altars shine.[41]

This is addressed to the gods: in again offering them sacrifices, as earlier she did for military victory, she re-affirms her involvement with the Blood, while her speaking of her capture by the Captive's eyes reminds us that she is in the grip of the lure of the Body.

The magic scene in The Indian Emperour follows its predecessor at the outset more in form than in content. The unsatisfactory being first summoned is now "An Earthy Spirit." He is followed by a female spirit who does prophesy--like the Aerial Spirits, in song. But new apparitions more to our present purpose follow: first the ghosts of Traxalla and Acacis appear silently, then "The Ghost of the Indian Queen rises betwixt the Ghosts with a Dagger in her Breast." The Earthy Spirits have already been conjured in terms applicable to this new apparition:

> . . . ye Immortal Souls, who once were Men,
> And now resolv'd to Elements agen,
> Who wait for Mortal frames in depths below,
> And did before what we are doom'd to do;... . .[42]

In another connection we have already spoken of this ghost's speech and Montezuma's response.[43] Here we may note that, though the supernatural space the Ghost inhabits and graphically describes is a Below, not an Above, it is similarly offered as an alternative to "Cares, and Age, and Mortal Life,"[44] and that Montezuma responds to the offer, first by expressing weariness with "this flesh which holds us here," then by complaining of temperature-extremes in the breast (though not exclusively "Loves flames"):

> These heats and colds still in our breasts make War,
> Agues and Feavers all our passions are.[45]

The most elaborate irruption of the supernatural occurs in Tyrannic Love, where there is a return to Zempoalla's project: the spirits, by bringing S. Catherine erotic visions in her sleep, are to replace "the Melancholy Love / Of those remoter joys above" with the "more sprightly fire" of these dreams.[46] Nakar and Damilcar are airy spirits, descending from an Above to "relieve the care / Of longing Lovers in despair."[47] But their Above is as a Below to S. Catherine's Guardian-Angel, Amariel, who himself descends "from the bright Empire of Eternal day" to guard his "loyal charge" from "the Daemons of the Air:"

> Vain Spirits, you that shunning Heav'ns high noon,
> Swarm here beneath the concave of the Moon. . . .[48]

Damilcar accepts Amariel's rebuke in terms which recall our Indian Queen oppositions:

> Thou, Prince of day, from Elements Art free;
> And I all body when compar'd to thee.
> Thou tread'st th' Abyss of light!
> And where it streams with open eyes canst go:
> We wander in the Fields of Air below:
> Changlings and Fooles of Heav'n: and thence shut out,
> Wildly we roam in discontent about:
> Gross-heavy-fed, next man in ignorance and sin,
> And spotted all without; and dusky all within.[49]

These spirits are the middle term of the ratio "humans:spirits::spirits: angels." Damilcar expresses the effect upon him of Amariel's pure light in the same sword-less-powerful-than-sight terms familiar from the love-and-bondage scenes: the banishment of the bearer of the impure vision is accomplished by a pure vision whose effects on that bearer are a signal illustration of the lure of the visible. Amariel, indeed, having threatened Damilcar with imprisonment Below--"Full fifty years I'le chain

thee under ground"[50]--imposes dreams upon the vanquished spirit: "Go expiate thy guilt in holy dreams."[51] S. Catherine, however, has her dreams swept away, and slumbers "disturb'd no more / With dreams not thine."[52] So, while in the first two plays a character in the throes of unhappy desire is offered freedom from that desire by an apparition from an other place (first above, then below), here a character untroubled by sexual desire is first threatened with it in the form of a dream imposed from the "lower air", then saved from it by the intervention of a spirit from "higher air"--Heaven--representing the state of desirelessness in which she wishes to maintain herself.

S. Catherine is, as a waking presence in the play, herself a sort of Amariel: she announces herself to Maximin as "high Heav'ns Embassadour",[53] and her message to him resembles that of earlier supernatural emissaries:

> You roam about, and never are at rest,
> By new desires, that is, new torments, still possesst.[54]

Speaking of political glory, she has already made it clear that "No happiness can be where is no rest;"[55] at the end of the play she dies both invested with and in quest of Peace, divested of all traces of Blood (Earth):

> No streak of blood (the reliques of the Earth)
> Shall stain my Soul in her immortal birth;
> But she shall mount all pure, a white, and Virgin mind;
> And full of all that peace, which there she goes to find.[56]

She bears continuous witness to man's potential access to desire-free space. The earlier magic-scenes adumbrated the same possibility, but as

breaks in, rather than components of, the dramatic action.

Turning to The Conquest of Granada, we find the Ghost of Almanzor's Mother descended, like Damilcar, from an Above which is only middling-high:

> But, when my soul to bliss did upward move,
> I wandered round the crystal walls above;
> But found the eternal fence so steeply high,
> That, when I mounted to the middle sky,
> I flagged, and fluttered down, and could not fly.[57]

Like Damilcar's, her place is lunar ("upon the Mountains of the Moon, / Is my abode"),[58] but this is only in preparation for her further movement upwards:

> Blessed souls are there refined, and made more bright,
> And, in the shades of heaven, prepared for light.[59]

As we have already seen,[60] her task is in part to warn Almanzor against "crimes of lawless love."

She does not explicitly relate the Beyond she represents to the question of Desire: her message is rather to do with the missing Father. Yet her apparition follows directly upon the (non-supernatural) Song with which Almanzor courts Almahide, in which elements of the complex we have been discussing are clearly present. The Unhappy Lover sighs for his Phyllis in vain:

> From without, my desire
> Has no food to its fire;
> But it burns and consumes me within.[61]

Death is the only solution, as the Response confirms:

What her honour denied you in life,
  In her death she will give to your love.
Such a flame as is true
After fate will renew,
  For the souls to meet closer above.[62]

The promised post mortem reunion is like that foreseen by the Ghost of the Indian Queen, with an Above in place of her Below.

The play's other two songs likewise repay attention as in-but-not-of the action in much the same manner as the magic-scenes (themselves excuses for music in the first three plays). Both occur in the play's First Part. The second is a mate to the song we have just considered: it is used by Abdelmelech to court Lyndaraxa, and again involves the Unhappy Lover and his Phyllis. "She too well knows her own power:"[63] this power is transmitted by the usual sense, acts in the expected place ("When Phyllis I see, my heart bounds in my breast"),[64] and splits the lover,-the split making itself evident, however, in a new way.

When angry, I mean not to Phyllis to go,
  My feet, of themselves, the way find:
Unknown to myself I am just at her door. . . .[65]

The Lover, "asleep or awake", is "never at rest" when "from his eyes Phyllis is gone."[66] In his sleep, dreams still bring him the sight of his beloved:

Sometimes a sad dream does delude my sad mind;
But, alas! when I wake, and no Phyllis I find,
  How I sigh to myself all alone![67]

This notion is used as the taking-off-point for the play's first song--surely one of the most superbly poised achievements in all Dryden.

The song is sung by a Lover who, falling asleep, dreams "Phyllis, the object of my waking thought:"

> Undressed she came my flames to meet,
> While love strewed flowers beneath her feet;
> Flowers which, so pressed by her, became more sweet.[68]

For once, the loved one's beauty is in some detail beautifully evoked:

> From the bright vision's head
> A careless veil of lawn was loosely spread:
> From her white temples fell her shaded hair,
> Like cloudy sunshine, not too brown nor fair;
> Her hands, her lips, did love inspire;
> Her every grace my heart did fire:
> But most her eyes, which languished with desire.[69]

The clouded nature of fleshly beauty is here something admirable, and the loved one's eyes, unusually, express her own desire. Soon Death is in question again:

> No, let me die, she said,
> Rather than lose the spotless name of maid!--
> Faintly, methought, she spoke; for all the while
> She bid me not believe her, with a smile.
> Then die, said I: She still denied;
> And is it thus, thus, thus, she cried,
> You use a harmless maid?--and so she died![70]

This is the bawdy "die" pun, of course: the next stanza makes it gracefully clear that the Lover has ejaculated in his sleep-"Fancy had done what Phyllis would not do!"[71] Clearly a different level of realism is involved here than that on which the heroic drama usually operates, and the effect is to throw a new light on what is really involved in Desire's obsession with the image as a token of its object. Here the "other place" to which the lover can flee for "rest" (satisfaction) is

despatialized, resolved into a faculty--Fancy--and a state, dreaming, which the song's last line insists is not confined to sleep: "Asleep or waking you must ease my pain."[72] Consummatory death is both less and more serious now: less because the bawdy pun is the main meaning rather than a secondary suggestion, more because the Lover's waking does kill the phantom loved one so completely. The peculiar bitter-sweet melancholy of the song is the result of its demonstrating that, if Love is simply an interior fire lit by the loved one's Beauty, the fantasy-possession of that Beauty in thought must suffice as well as real physical possession could. The Lover cynically treats this conclusion as comforting, but the evidently unsatisfactory loneliness to which this conclusion commits him invests the cynicism with pathos: indeed, since it is his loneliness which inspires the dream and the song, his apparent cynicism can appear as a gallant attempt to maintain a stoic-epicurean stance in the face of the desired one's obdurateness. But the evident falseness of the conclusion around which these various tones play, for all its wit, puts the whole image theory of Beauty on which the plays depend in doubt. It is not surprising that we are whisked away from the song by "a tumultuous noise of drums and trumpets,"[73] the alarums of a Zegry attack.

The nearest thing to an irruption of the supernatural in Aureng-Zebe is Nourmahal's mad-speech just before her death. The place it brings before us is not one from which Desire's pains are excluded, but rather a locale constituted by them at their highest pitch. The earlier plays' magic scenes offer the Lover an other space independent of his desire, hence physically "objective", whereas here the Lover herself is the subjective space of her own burning:

> I burn, I more than burn; I am all fire.
> See how my mouth and nostrils flame expire!
> I'll not come near myself----
> Now I'm a burning lake, it rolls and flows;. . . .[74]

The Self can now maintain no distance between itself and its disease, Desire's *ravages*. Nourmahal's body, racked by the effects of poison, has become the place where physical pain fulfills the pain-of-desire metaphor in an only-too-localized way:

> Quench me: Pour on whole rivers. 'Tis in vain:
> Morat stands there to drive them back again:
> Within those huge bellows in his hands, he blows
> New fire into my head: My brain-pan glows.
> See! see! there's Aureng-Zebe too takes his part;
> But he blows all his fire into my heart.[75]

The heart burns with frustrated sexual desire, and the head, presumably, with disappointed dynastic ambition (the intersection of politics and the family as determinants of Desire). The horrors of fire give way to the horrors of sight as the speech draws to its close. Nourmahal hallucinates Aureng-Zebe and Indamora embracing:

> They kiss; into each other's arms they run:
> Close, close, close! must I see, and must have none?[76]

Sight without possession is here Desire's culminating torment, as elsewhere it has been its inaugural one:

> Will you?--before my face?--poor helpless I
> See all, and have my hell before I die![77]

5

It would be wrong to suppose that true lovers in these plays

create for themselves a privileged space from which the characteristic dilemmas of unhappy love are excluded. Quite the contrary: true lovers must fill out their conversations with the same material as the unhappy. Thus the jealousy plaguing Boabdelin in The Conquest of Granada is reconstituted to form the thematic basis for Aureng-Zebe's three dialogues with Indamora, while Almanzor's falling in love with Almahide is of the capture-by-the-captive sort with which we are now familiar. Both Almahide and Beatrice are led by their sense of honour to deny themselves to those they love. A similar denial by Alibech is necessary to her testing of her two lovers. Where neither denial nor quarrelling furnish matter for discussion, the action itself must keep them apart: in no scene in The Indian Queen are Montezuma and Orazia alone together, and The Indian Emperour affords Cortez and Cydaria only two private moments --the latter of which (II.iii) has to be filled out first with a comparison of European and Indian courting customs, than with Cydaria's jealousy of Cortez's dead wife.

The first of these scenes, however, does try to render the rapture of a mutual discovery of love. For greater expressivity, the heroic couplet gives way to the abab stanza. The two lovers' attempts to speak of their respective loves proceed lyrically along lines which, while they may meet at that love's infinity, seem to find some difficulty crossing each other. Cydaria is struck by her sudden fixedness--

> My Father's gone, and yet I cannot go,
> . . . . . .
> I find my self unwilling to depart,
> And yet I know not why I would be here.
> . . . . . .
> But what's the cause that keeps you here with me,
> That I may know what keeps me here with you?[78]--

which she associates with loss:

> Sure I have something lost or left behind!
> . . . . . .
> Stranger you raise such storms within my breast,
> That when I go, if I must go again;
> I'le tell my Father you have rob'd my rest. . . .[79]

Cortez, however, experiences love in visual rather than motor terms:

> Like Travellers who wander in the Snow,
> I on her beauty gaze till I am blind.[80]

The common factor of their experiences is that they can be expressed in the language of injury. Cydaria, robbed of rest, will "to him [i.e. her Father] of my injuries complain,"[81] and Cortez counters:

> Unknown, I swear, those wrongs were which I wrought,
> But my complaints will much more just appear,
> Who from another world my freedom brought,
> And to your conquering Eyes have lost it here.[82]

In this scene--so much more delicate than this butcherly dissection suggests--Dryden gives his characters words of pain and bewilderment to express their feelings of joyful delight in each other: the point is not that the scene is meant to be harrowing (its playfulness is as perfectly calculated as its lyrical grace) but that the tone depends upon a discrepancy between language (pessimistic, pain-ridden) and feeling (ecstatic) which means that the latter can be found in the former only by way of a sort of decoding procedure. The full complexity of the relationship between sad language and happy reality is at work in what seems at first sight an almost irrelevant exchange following Cortez's "lament" for his loss of freedom:

> Cyd. Where is that other world from whence you came?
> Cort. Beyond the Ocean, far from hence it lies.
> Cyd. Your other world, I fear, is then the same
> That souls must go to when the body dies.[83]

Cydaria translates "beyond" into the usual meaning it bears in these plays, and, without warning, Death enters the text. The audience knows how "properly" to interpret Cortez's reference to Spain, so now it has before it both his meaning and the new meaning constituted by Cydaria's misunderstanding. One effect of this is to remind it that Spain will mean death politically to Mexico and personally to most of the cast. But at the same time, in the ecstatic context, a re-translation of Cydaria's translation presents itself, via the bawdy "death" pun: Cydaria's soul (which is surely what has been "lost or left behind", captured by Cortez) feels the call of "Your other world" (with its sense of "the other world that is yours" shading towards "the other world that is you") as the place it "must go to". (The rather nineteenth-century stage-direction "Swooningly" vulgarly describes the way in which we might imagine Cydaria's lines might be delivered.) So the passage both darkens and further eroticizes the atmosphere by means of what, on the literal level, is no more than a moment of quaint "noble savage" ignorance. On the other hand, the darkening effect is itself taken up into the general transfiguration of sad language by the dialectics of love's "pleasant pain".

That ecstasy has no other language than that of pain is not so much a single typical irony in this genre as the generator of a number of its most pervasive, and most elusive, tones. The body of materials considered earlier in this chapter thus has a dramatic meaning richer

than the literal meanings we found recurring in it: those meanings, as pain-language, serve to a varying extent as the language of the very desire of which they seem a severe critique. We are faced with a text in which pain-talk can express both pain and pleasure: if this is sometimes a means of saying that pleasure is (only) pain, at other times we find it telling us that pain is (really) pleasure in the sense that it is the mark of pleasure. So pain-language veers between being an analysis of and a hyperbolic expression of the love-effect, the judgment it implies in its former role being inverted to the degree that we feel the love in question to be a good, a good which the pain-hyperbole serves only to emphasize. Heroic love is a love which, in Abdelmelech's phrase, "had it not been cruel, had been less."

This radical multivalence of feeling attached to the heroic analysis of Desire does not affect that analysis' structure, since the multivalence arises precisely because that structure is maintained unchanged through the most pleasant and most painful situations. Desire unsatisfied is still a cage, and death is still the outside of the cage, but "death" can be consummation as well as extinction.

6

In Chapter I we heard Dr. Sherwood's opinion of the mode of characterization with which the heroic plays sustain their analysis of desire. "Each person is a single trait, dominated by passion." All the characters "love in the same fashion, express their love in the same way." Worst of all, "there is no growth through choice and the consequences of choice," so "the characters are the same at the end of

the play as at the beginning. . . ."[84] These hints are enough to allow us to reconstruct the ideal of characterization which Dr. Sherwood thinks these plays fail to embody. Important to it is the notion that the individual is irreducibly idiosyncratic. The fully-realized dramatic character must be "individualized", made unlike his fellows, in the interest not only of variety but of representing the particularity of the history of each man. The individual character, bearing the mark of his personal past, is installed at the center of a network of possibilities in terms of which he creates his own history, through "choice", and suffers it, through "the consequences of choice"--consequences which, however passively he receives them, cluster around him as his passion.

Whatever our view of the adequacy of the theory of man this theory of the drama serves, certain problems attend it in its own realm. These arise from the fact that linguistic meanings are always in themselves general; to move from the general term "tree" to a particular tree one must either intervene indexically ("'This tree' [pointing]") or delimit by the intersection of several meanings a particular reference ("The third oak tree from the left outside my front window"). Neither avenue of particularity is available to the fictional utterance, which by definition lacks the specific rapport with the real which pointing or cumulative delimiting are meant to achieve. The best that fiction can manage in this line is a sort of "pseudo-reference": it can mime the precisions or the indications whereby other utterances do grasp the real. Its true thrust is always towards the typical: even the "realism" that Dr. Sherwood demands is achieved through a pseudo-reference effect which itself proposes (legitimately) a very general idea of what men are like.

Dryden's dramatic practice does not set itself the task of masking the generality of fictional meanings. The recurrences within the plays testify rather to his interest in working towards the dramatic representation of general structures underlying the phenomenal superstructures with which everday life presents us. To return to the "cages" metaphor, it could be said that the point of the heroic play in Dryden's hands is its showing us a variety of cages built out of a very few elements. The source of these elements is ultimately the real world, but the cages are built up as self-sufficient formal systems without further imitative reference to the real. Their adequacy as representations of the real networks in which men find themselves bound depends upon their elements being truly "elemental", (that is, operative at the sub-phenomenal level where the great regularities of human life reign), or serving as convenient metaphorical tokens for the real elements.

The characters in Dryden's drama are thus subservient to the representation of underlying law. Their function is to enable us to see that law (the operations of which are veiled in everyday life by exactly those appearances of variety, contingency, freedom which Dr. Sherwood would like the drama to mirror). To fulfill this function they necessarily embody the regularity which is the essence of law, so that, if they all "love in the same fashion, express their love in the same way", they do so to put before us what Dryden takes to be the laws of love.

IV

THE "SPRINGS OF HUMAN NATURE" AND THEIR HEROIC MODEL

1

The two features of Dryden's heroic plays which have contributed most to their unpopularity are their sameness and their difference: their sameness one to another and their difference from representations of the real world both of Dryden's time and of our own. The chief issues raised by any attempt to rehabilitate them are, correspondingly, repetition and representation. We shall attempt in this chapter to show how closely these two issues are related within the conceptual field in which Dryden's criticism participates and in the light of which his plays were written: neo-classicism.

A quick way to put ourselves at the heart of the neo-classical theory of representation is to consider the word "model". Not that the word itself was especially important to the theory at its height, or that all the meanings we have for it were available to Dryden, whom we shall find consistently employing the word in a single sense. But the current range of meanings for "model" seems to have so evolved as to be symptomatic of strains existing within the neo-classical mimetic, strains of which its theorists often remained partly or wholly unconscious but which may be evoked by making the word the vehicle of a sort of systematic punning.

The OED groups the relevant meanings of "model" into three chief classes: "representation of structure", "type of design", and "an

object of imitation". Five meanings, one each from the first two classes and three from the third, are in question:

> 2. A representation in three dimensions of some projected or existing structure, or of some material object artificial or natural, showing the proportions and arrangement of its component parts.
>
> 7. Design, structural type; style of structure or form; pattern, build, make.
>
> 10. A person, or a work, that is proposed or adopted for imitation; an exemplar.
>
> 11. A person, or, less frequently, a thing, that serves as the artist's pattern for a work of painting or sculpture, or for some portion of such a work; spec. a person whose profession it is to pose for artists and art-students.
>
> 12. A person or thing eminently worthy of imitation; a perfect exemplar of some excellence.[1]

The three classes of meanings share a common implied reference to a production/reproduction process of some sort, as punning can quickly make clear. At its simplest: someone makes a model (m2) of some thing, either as an end in itself or as a means toward reproducing, in whole or in part, that thing. (The model need not be constructed in the physical world. It can be a purely mental object, the thing-to-be-made-or-remade's anticipation in thought.) The make--the model (m7)--of thing produced depends on the particular object the maker chooses to take for his model (m10). His choice normally implies that he considers this first object to have been a model (m12) object, worth imitating.

We can make the apparent contradiction between the model as starting-point (m10) and as intermediate tool or end product (m2) vanish by expanding our hypothetical production-sequence suitably, so that the

m2 sense carries us half-way through and the m10 sense takes over to the end. Thus: starting with the object (whether existent or only projected) which we wish to produce or reproduce, we construct a model (m2) of it. This model represents the first object, and if we now take it for a model (m10) we can, in making a new object which imitates the model, duplicate our original object. The fidelity of the reproduction ensures that the first object and its new mate can be spoken of as being on (of) the same model (m7). The m2-m10 contradiction of course re-emerges if this sequence is curtailed or telescoped.

Neo-classical theory sees the art-work as a sort of model, so the neo-classical work subsists within the tensions the various implications of model-making generate amongst themselves. Its relation to the real is that of model (m2) to original. Is it intended to assist the physical reproduction of its original? The ethical dimension of neo-classical theory suggests a sense in which this is so: patterns of virtue transmitted from the real via the work are to be reproduced in the lives of its audience. (The work here functions as a pointer to who or what in the real the audience should make their model [m10, 12].) Otherwise, the work does not aim at real reproduction. Its effects are knowledge (production not of a new object but of a new understanding of the old) and delight: the utile and dulce of the classic Horatian formulation.[2]

But if we shift our attention from the representationality of the work to its own conditions of production, its status as model takes on a new aspect. Now the work's predecessors enter the picture as m10 models, exemplars of the kind (m7) of work the artist wishes to produce.

In turn, the new work may serve as the model (m10) for future work, inasmuch as its own value as model (m12) object is secure. Dryden's own use of the word "model" is of this sort, as we shall now demonstrate.

2

To flatter Lord Dorset, Dryden writes:

> For my own part, I must avow it freely to the world, that I never attempted anything in satire, wherein I have not studied your writings as the most perfect model. I have continually laid them before me; and the greatest commendation, which my own partiality can give to my productions, is, that they are copies, and no further to be allowed, than as they have something more or less of the original.[3]

Doubtless this is graceful nonsense, but Boileau's relationship to Tassoni is similarly imagined:

> Boileau, if I am not much deceived, has modelled from hence his famous Lutrin. He had read the burlesque poetry of Scarron, with some kind of indignation, as witty as it was, and found nothing in France that was worthy of his imitation; but he copied the Italian so well, that his own may pass for an original.[4]

The artist must exercise discretion in his choice of models: "Imitation is a nice point, and they are few poets who deserve to be models in all they write."[5] This caution occurs in the context of reservations about Cowley and Milton. Elsewhere, Spenser is reproved:

> For there is no uniformity in the design of Spenser: he aims at the accomplishment of no one action; he raises up a hero for every one of his adventures; and endows each of them with some particular moral virtue, which renders them all equal, without subordination, or preference. . . . Had he lived to finish his poem, in the six remaining legends, it had certainly been more of a piece; but could not have been perfect, because the model was not true.[6]

Here it is the artist's own plan which is inadequate. When, on the other

hand, as in the Aeneid, "a perfect idea was required and followed," a work is produced which "all succeeding poets ought . . . to imitate."[7] All succeeding poets, Dryden means, who labour at that kind of poetry: he makes this clearest while discussing the apparently irrational intention of opera "to please hearing rather than to gratify the understanding."

> It appears, indeed, preposterous at first sight, that rhyme, or any consideration, should take place of reason; but, in order to resolve the problem, this fundamental proposition must be settled, that the first inventors of any art or science, provided they have brought it to perfection, are, in reason, to give laws to it; and, according to their model, all after-undertakers are to build. Thus, in Epic Poetry, no man ought to dispute the authority of Homer, who gave the first being to that masterpiece of art, and endued it with that form of perfection in all its parts that nothing was wanting to its excellency. Virgil therefore, and those very few who have succeeded him, endeavoured not to introduce, or innovate, anything in a design already perfected, but imitated the plan of the inventor; and are only so far true heroic poets as they have built on the foundations of Homer. Thus Pindar, the author of those Odes, which are so admirably restored by Mr. Cowley . . . ought for ever to be the standard of them; and we are bound, according to the practice of Horace and Mr. Cowley, to copy him. Now . . . whosoever undertakes the writing of an opera . . . is obliged to imitate the design of the Italians, who have not yet invented, but brought to perfection, this sort of dramatic musical entertainment.[8]

Notwithstanding which, Cowley as a writer of pindarics is open to criticism because he has not quite brought the genre to perfection anew: "Yet if the kind itself be capable of more perfection, though rather in the ornamental parts of it than the essential, what rules of morality or respect have I broken, in naming the defects, that they may hereafter be amended?"[9] Nor is perfection everything. Models may still be inadequate to the demands of the current cultural milieu, though themselves perfectly regular:

It remains that I acquaint the reader, that I have endeavoured in this play to follow the practice of the Ancients, who, as Mr. Rymer has judiciously observed, are and ought to be our masters. . . . Yet, though their models are regular, they are too little for English tragedy; which requires to be built in a larger compass.[10]

It is striking to what a degree Dryden's discussions of models depend upon the image of the poet as builder. In the Essay of Dramatick Poesy, Eugenius is arguing, against Crites, that it is an imperfection of the Greek drama that it does not employ act and scene divisions. It occurs to him that the various modern national dramas are not precisely uniform in this regard, so he clarifies his point thus:

But since the Spaniards at this day allow but three Acts, which they call Jornadas, to a play; and the Italians in many of theirs follow them, when I condemn the Antients, I declare it is not altogether because they have not five Acts to every Play, but because they have not confined themselves to one certain number: it is building an House without a Modell: and when they succeeded in such undertakings, they ought to have sacrific'd to Fortune, not to the Muses.[11]

Perhaps even more suggestive is a passage from the Preface to Secret Love:

'Tis a question variously disputed, whether an Author may be allowed as a competent judg of his own works. As to the Fabrick and contrivance of them certainly he may, for that is properly the employment of the judgment; which, as a Master-builder he may determine, and that without deception, whether the work be according to the exactness of the model; still granting him to have a perfect Idea of that pattern by which he works: and that he keeps himself always constant to the discourse of his judgment, without admitting self-love, which is the false surveigher of his Fancy, to intermeddle in it. These Qualifications granted (being such as all sound Poets are presupposed to have within them) I think all Writers, of what kind soever, may infallibly judg of the frame and contexture of their Works. But for the ornament of Writing, which is greater, more various, and bizarre in Poesie than in any other kind, as it is properly the Child of Fancy, so it can receive no measure, or at least but a very imperfect one of its own excellencies or failures from the judgment. Self-love (which enters but rarely into the offices of the judgment) here predominates. And Fancy (if I may so speak), judging

of it self, can be no more certain or demonstrative of its own effects, then two crooked lines can be the adaequate measure of each other.[12]

Even in such a passage as this, wherein the model comes close to being a subjective construct by the artist (his own "idea" in the everyday current sense), any collapse into subjectivity is avoided. The "master-builder" can judge his own success in executing his work according to "the model" (which, significantly, is not spoken of as "his") only if his subjective apprehension ("idea") of "that pattern" is "perfect", and if subsequently his execution is not interfered with by such influences as "self-love". The artist's subjectivity is here as potentially a menace as on a modern factory floor.

Subjectivity fares no better in the splendid extended treatment, in the "Dedication of the Aeneis", of invention and originality. Here the mere copier ("that servile imitator, to whom Horace gives no better a name than that of animal")[13] is distinguished by his lack of invention from the proper imitator--"for a poet is a maker, as the word signifies; and he who cannot make, that is, invent, has his name for nothing."[14] But invention itself can be learned[15] ("by reading Homer, Virgil was taught to imitate his invention; that is, to imitate like him; which is no more than if a painter studied Raphael, that he might learn to design after his manner"),[16] and exhibits itself in an eminently objective guise in "the argument of the work, that is to say, its principal action, the oeconomy and disposition of it."[17] "Oeconomy" here means "the structure, arrangement or proportion of parts, of any product of human design,"[18] so the originality, the individuality, of the maker's product resides in the manner in which he structures his materials. These he does not create,

since they are imitated from the objective world. Homer no more invented the Matter of Troy than did Virgil: "There was not an old woman, or almost a child, but had it in their mouths, before the Greek poet or his friends digested it into this admirable order in which we read it."[19] (The distance between Dryden's notion of originality and invention and any form of individualism is well illustrated by the ease with which the phrase "or his friends" slips in: evidently the "oeconomy" of the work need not proceed from the solitary creative labours of the artist's subjective imagination.) Again the parallel is with architecture:

> Is Versailles the less a new building, because the architect of that palace hath imitated others which were built before it? Walls, doors, and windows, apartments, offices, rooms of convenience and magnificence, are in all great houses. So descriptions, figures, fables, and the rest, must be in all heroic poems; they are the common materials of poetry, furnished from the magazine of nature; every poet hath as much right to them, as every man hath to air or water.[20]

3

Representation, in neo-classical theory, is always said to be a matter of "imitating", "copying" Nature. But since, as the texts we have been examining make clear, in the execution of his work the artist usually copies previous works in the relevant genre, the new work constitutes an imitation in two dimensions: imitation of the real, imitation of tradition. A diagram may make this double linkage between the new work and its "grounds" clearer:



Here the sequence W_1, W_2 . . . W_n represents a succession of works within the same genre. Each of these, save the first, imitates its predecessors (m10 models) while maintaining a "vertical" relation to the real as an m2 model (imitation, copy) of it.

Dryden's "fundamental proposition" that "the first inventors of any art or science, provided they have brought it to perfection are . . . to give laws to it" expresses the privileged status often accorded W_1, most memorably by Pope:

> When first young Maro in his boundless mind
> A work t'outlast immortal Rome design'd,
> Perhaps he seem'd above the Critic's law,
> And but from Nature's fountains scorn'd to draw:
> But when t'examine ev'ry part he came,
> Nature and Homer were, he found, the same.[21]

The principle is the same even if, possessing no single work which embodies the genre's full range of perfection, the artist draws eclectically upon several works. The problem of adjudicating between the demands of representation and those of tradition (generic continuity) is solved by denying that any contradiction arises.

Clearly neo-classical theory, in insisting on the practical identity of what are obviously two distinct avenues of reference for the artist, is faced with having to justify its confidence in the continuing representationality of the model work, the classic exemplar. Dryden, to this end, balances between two sorts of validation, in whose features we can see the very problem reappearing that was to have been solved by equating Nature and Homer: the appeal to the classic's longevity, and the appeal to common sense. The work's capacity to provide delight over

a period of time guarantees its links with the real: "those things, which delight all ages, must have been an imitation of Nature. . . ."[22] But the time-span is important, because, in the short run, delight is not enough:

> That picture, and that poem, which comes nearest to the resemblance of Nature, is the best. But it follows not, that what pleases most in either kind is therefore good, but what ought to please. Our depraved appetites, and ignorance of the arts, mislead our judgments, and cause us often to take that for true imitation of Nature which has no resemblance of Nature in it. To inform our judgments, and to reform our tastes, rules were invented, that by them we might discern when Nature was imitated, and how nearly. I have been forced to recapitulate these things, because mankind is not more liable to deceit, than it is willing to continue in a pleasing error, strengthened by a long habitude.[23]

The Rules draw their authority in part from their ordering our collective past experience of Delight:

> Aristotle raised the fabric of his Poetry from observation of those things in which Euripedes, Sophocles, and Aeschylus pleased: he considered how they raised the passions, and thence has drawn rules for our imitation.[24]

However, the Rules represent not only a distillation of the "horizontal" tradition but also a direct appeal to the real via common sense:

> If the rules be well considered, we shall find them to be made only to reduce Nature into method, to trace her step by step, and not to suffer the least mark of her to escape us: 'tis only by these, that probability in fiction is maintained, which is the soul of poetry. They are founded upon good sense, and sound reason, rather than on authority; for though Aristotle and Horace are produced, yet no man must argue, that what they write is true, because they writ it; but 'tis evident, by the ridiculous mistakes and gross absurdities which have been made by those poets who have taken their fancy only for their guide, that if this fancy be not regulated, it is a mere caprice, and utterly incapable to produce a reasonable and judicious poem.[25]

Common sense itself is the residue of the experience of many men over a

period of time, so it is not a purely "vertical" (individual, contemporary) apprehension of the real. As might be expected from the turn the passage just quoted takes, if tradition and what seems one's own "good sense" come into conflict Dryden tends to argue that tradition is to be trusted over the private judgment:

> Generally to have pleased, and through all ages, must bear the force of universal tradition. And if you would appeal from thence to right reason, you will gain no more by it in effect, than, first, to set up your reason against those authors; and, secondly, against all those who have admired them. You must prove, why that ought not to have pleased, which has pleased the most learned, and the most judicious; and, to be thought knowing, you must first put the fool upon all mankind.[26]

He does, indeed, continue:

> If you can enter more deeply, than they have done, into the causes and resorts of that which moves pleasure in a reader, the field is open, you may be heard: but those springs of human nature are not so easily discovered by every superficial judge: it requires Philosophy, as well as Poetry, to sound the depth of all the passions; what they are in themselves, and how they are to be provoked: and in this science the best poets have excelled.[27]

Plainly he does not think "you" have a very good chance of discovering radically new truths about Nature. Between them, tradition and common sense already have the truth about Nature securely in hand.

The truth in question, however, is a truth specific to "this science", artistic practice. This emerges strikingly at one point in the Essay of Dramatick Poesie. Eugenius is replying to Crites, who had backhandedly used the "present age's" superiority over the Ancients in science to bolster his literary anti-Moderns case: the age's energies are all going into scientific pursuits, leaving little talent for the arts. Eugenius begins, "I deny not what you urge of Arts and Sciences,

that they have flourish'd in some ages more then others; but your instance in Philosophy makes for me: for if Natural Causes be more known now than in the time of Aristotle, because more studied, it follows that. . . ." We might expect his argument to be that, since Nature is now better known (Crites has averred that "in these last hundred years . . . almost a new Nature has been reveal'd to us"),[28] its imitations can draw on all this new knowledge, excelling the works of the Ancients accordingly. Actually he continues, ". . . Poesie and other Arts may with the same pains arrive still neerer to perfection."[29] Progress within the arts may be made, but it is not dependent on, indeed seems to bear little relation to, the progress of knowledge outside them.

The reason for this lies in Dryden's conception of art as an affective practice. He introduces his most succinct formulation of the case for the Rules--

> The way to please being to imitate Nature, both the poets and the painters in ancient times, and in the best ages, have studied her; and from the practice of both these arts the rules have been drawn by which we are instructed how to please, and to compass that end which they obtained, by following their example.[30]--

by quoting "what Hippocrates says of physic, as I find him cited by an eminent French critic."[31] Evidently the practice of representational art, like the practice of medicine, can progress by taking account of past successes in achieving its particular end. As the end of the practice of medicine is curing, so the end of the practices of painting and writing is "to please". This might seem to exalt the dulce at the expense of the utile, and certainly Dryden was prepared to maintain this emphasis: "delight is the chief, if not the only, end of poesy:

instruction can be admitted but in second place, for poesy instructs as it delights."[32] But here as elsewhere his aim is only to show that mimetic art's specific mode of action, in distinction from other arts and sciences, operates through its pleasing its audience. He makes this clearest in the Parallel of Poetry and Painting, where, writing in support of the proposition that "the imitation of Nature is . . . constituted as the general, and indeed the only, rule of pleasing, both in Poetry and Painting,"[33] he rejects Aristotle's account of why the arts please for another, sent him by "a most ingenious young gentleman," Walter Moyle. Aristotle's view, which is "that imitation pleases, because it affords matter for a reasoner to enquire into the truth or falsehood of imitation, by comparing its likeness, or unlikeness, with the original," is rejected because it fails to distinguish poetry from other modes of knowledge: "by this rule every speculation in nature, whose truth falls under the inquiry of a philosopher, must produce the same delight; which is not true."[34] Moyle's correct view of the matter runs thus:

> Truth is the object of our understanding, as good is of our will; and the understanding can no more be delighted with a lie, than the will can choose an apparent evil. As truth is the end of all our speculations, so the discovery of it is the pleasure of them; and since a true knowledge of Nature gives us pleasure, a lively imitation of it, either in Poetry or Painting, must of necessity produce a much greater: for both these arts, as I said before, are not only true imitations of Nature, but of the best Nature, of that which is wrought up to a nobler pitch. They present us with images more perfect than the life in any individual; and we have the pleasure to see all the scattered beauties of Nature united by a happy chemistry, without its deformities or faults. They are imitations of the passions, which always move, and therefore consequently please; for without motion there can be no delight, which cannot be considered but as an active passion. When we view these elevated ideas of nature, the result of that view is admiration, which is always the cause of pleasure.[35]

This is a rich and in some respects difficult formulation. Knowledge

gives pleasure, but not all knowledge takes the form of an imitation. "Lively imitation" produces more pleasure than other knowledge, since it adds to knowledge's pleasure the delights of seeing (i) "images more perfect than the life in any individual" and (ii) "imitations of the passions". Thus images of "the best Nature" by means of which art delights are characterized by their passion-ate perfection, at once general (species-ideal rather than individual), exemplary (since purged of faults), and moving (through having to do with human drives rather than with the inanimate, un-affective world of the natural philosopher). The utile of such images is as clear as their dulce, yet it is only in the service of the dulce that the traits distinguishing them from philosphical or scientific knowledge emerge.

The emphasis Moyle's formulation puts upon the passions serves as a corrective to an error into which the architectural tone of Dryden's discussions of play-building might lead us. The tendency of this tone is to focus attention on the solid, spatialized aspect of the model-structures the artist makes, at the expense of any sustained consideration of what specific field of Nature it is whose structure is to be imitated by these models. Dryden's explicit concern in his criticism is generally with what he feels the artist's own structures need to make them solid enough to carry out the imitative task. He says very little about the knowledge which stands to be achieved if the task is carried out successfully. But Moyle confirms what we have indeed heard him say: that it is in the field of the passions--"those springs of human nature"[36] --that the artist is an expert, knowing how to model them and, at the same time, arouse them in an audience by means of the model.

For neo-classicism, art is the applied science of the passions. The neglect Dryden's plays have suffered is the result of a pardonable failure to realize to which branch of this science Dryden's art makes its contribution.

4

The repetitions to which neo-classical genres owe their existence are determined at the juncture, basic to their operating as delightful instruction, of their m2 and m12 modelling. As m2 model, the neo-classical work imitates, reveals the structure of, the real. In the service of delight, it addresses itself to "the best Nature"--that in the real which is available as an m12 model. More precisely, by its "happy chemistry" it constitutes an ideal, m12-model world. The grasp of the real attained in this way has several partially-overlapping instructional advantages. In portraying the real as it ought to be, the work is morally educative: it re-enforces (repeats) the moral precepts bound up in its notion of that "ought". In working to render the general rather than the particular, it aims directly at the representation of those repetitions in Nature on man's collective experience of which all knowledge is founded. In refusing to be constrained to the "photographic"[37] rendering of the (particular) surface of quotidian appearance, it frees itself to represent beneath-the-surface regularities, structures underlying and generating the superstructures of the visible--structures composed of elements endlessly repeated in different arrangements. Finally, in accepting its position as only the latest in a chain of works whose achievement it is to re-embody, it accepts the

responsibility to repeat whatever has been found by "the best judges" to be permanently pleasing in its generic predecessors.

We must now try to establish, with the aid of this synoptic view of Repetition's potential place in any neo-classical work, the actual status of the repeated structures which have been exposed to view in our two preceding chapters. First, let us consider the king/father-general/son material of Chapter II.

Exploiting the dramatic resources implied by the (real) institution of monarchy, Dryden condenses political, familial and sexual structures into a single reservoir, organized around an opposition whose generality makes it hard to name. In family terms, it is the opposition of father to son, in political terms of regal right to executive power, in sexual (biological) terms of age to youth. Since it is this opposition which is at the heroic play's generic heart, let us simply call it the heroic opposition.

The resources of the reservoir allow for considerable play of variation in the deployment of the heroic opposition in individual instances. The age/youth polarity is absent from the opposition Boabdelin/Almanzor, undeveloped in the opposition Maximin/Porphyrius. The ruler/general polarity takes on a different weight according to whether or not the hero is a member of the political unit over which the ruler holds sway. Porphyrius and Aureng-Zebe are, Cortez is not, while Montezuma IQ and Almanzor are both anomalous "strangers" who claim exemption from the obligations of subjects. The father/son polarity allows for the most variation, by virtue of the shifting reference of family terms. It is easy to arrange matters so that the hero struggles

against a Father who is not his own. The oppositions Montezuma IQ/Ynca, Cortez/Montezuma IE, Almanzor/Abenamar all install the opposed father as father of the loved one, while the Porphyrius/Maximin opposition sets up Maximin as both an intended "father" to Porphyrius and the real father of a girl who loves him. This displacement allows the quest for the "real father" to function as a motif, as in The Indian Queen and, notably, The Conquest of Granada.

Mention of the Almanzor/Abenamar conflict reminds us that variation can be achieved by a multiplication of heroic oppositions. The hero may face a second antagonist who actualizes the opposition in terms left unexploited by the first conflict. Thus, on the sexual plane, a proliferation of rivals is generated. Montezuma IQ disputes sexual possession of Orazia with Acacis and Traxalla, not with the Ynca (whose withholding his daughter is a family matter). Cortez clashes not with Montezuma IE but with Orbellan over Cydaria, and Aureng-Zebe clashes not only with his father but with Morat over Indamora. The Conquest of Granada moves in the other direction, with Abenamar placed at one pole of the father/son, age/youth oppositions missing from the Boabdelin/Almanzor conflict.[38]

The heroic opposition requires a subject-matter to activate it. This role is generally filled by the heroine, or, more exactly, the question of the possession of the heroine. A secondary motif is the question of the possession of the hero's prisoner, which serves excellently to actualize the regal right/executive power antinomy. The further political question of the possession of state-power itself is generally removed to a safe distance from the ambition of the hero (in

the villains it is allowed full play)--the exception being Cortez, whose enterprise however is not a matter of personal ambition and is regarded by him at times with some distaste.

The fact that the same heroic reservoir supplies the elements out of which the heroic opposition is newly constructed for each play guarantees that we will find those elements repeated: "they are the common materials of poetry, furnish'd from the magazine of nature."[39] But it is not these elements, many of which (family relationships, for instance) turn up everywhere in art and life, which are generically distinctive. Rather it is the reservoir's prior organization around the heroic opposition. Repetition of elements--always duly varied in their "oeconomy and disposition"--serves the more basic repetition whereby that opposition so insistently, obsessively dominates the plays. So now we must confront the key questions of our whole enquiry. Of what sort of regularity in Nature is the repetition of the heroic opposition a model? To what analytical level beneath the directly-observable surface of social reality does it give us access? What "oughts" does it embody and propagate?

The aspect of Nature which the heroic opposition models is the nature of the <u>intermixture</u>, in reality, of the political, familial, and sexual realms. The plays are not much concerned with the reality of each of those realms as it functions autonomously. Their obsession is with the scandal of the over-determination by which in certain situations we find ourselves enmeshed in the laws of two realms at once, or indeed of all three. Other art is full of the representation of characters caught in a conflict between the incompatible demands of two of the

realms. What distinguishes the heroic drama, at least in Dryden's hands, from this sort of imitation is that it addresses itself to representing not the realms' incompatibilities but their complicities, the potentially frightening manner in which their demands interlock, mirror each other, stand in for each other.

More specifically, the plays pose the question of the spilling-over of family-realm demands into the political on the one hand and the sexual on the other. It is their preoccupation with the perils of interweaving the familial with the sexual which accounts for the Freudian cast of many of the structures we have examined: Freud's work similarly situated itself at the point, characterized by the incest-taboo, of forbidden intersection between the erotic and the parental. It is easy to relate the relevant heroic structures to the classic Oedipal formation. Whereas the latter imputes to the infant Son a rivalry with the Father for the Mother, our plays present us with (i) the grown-up Son in rivalry with the old Father for a Beloved his own age (The Indian Queen, Aureng-Zebe, vestigially in The Indian Emperour, inverted in Tyrannic Love [Porphyrius-Maximin-Valeria]); (ia) the General in rivalry with the unjust Ruler for the latter's wife (Tyrannic Love, The Conquest of Granada); (ii) the grown-up Son in flight from the sexual love of the Mother (The Indian Queen, Aureng-Zebe, spectrally in The Indian Emperour). Each of these formations can be construed as a denial of the Oedipal, (i) through age-shifts, (ia) through denying the rival's status as Father, (ii) through reversing the direction of desire and condemning it. But in each case other elements from the reservoir are brought in to maintain (until the dénouement) a tension undercutting the denial, re-instating

the Oedipal. So long as the Father asserts his Fatherhood against the Son, the Son still languishes in the position of Child (Montezuma IQ), and so long as the Father asserts his Manhood he claims effective contemporaneity with the Beloved (Montezuma IE, the Old Emperor). According to patriarchal political theory, the Ruler's rights are of the same nature as those of a Father. And the Mother is put in possession of state-power whereby she can keep the hero in a bondage the metaphorical equivalence of which to the bondage of desire is so much stressed. So it is only at the plays' conclusions that the structural neutralizations of the Oedipal are allowed to take effect, letting the hero's love for the heroine rest securely in a sexual realm purified of all familial (in the last instance incestuous) interferences.

To the other scandal, the political's complicity with the familial, we are less sensitive today. In the Restoration period, however, this was a burning issue, since the patriarchal theory of royal authority as upheld by Sir Robert Filmer among others justified the authority of the monarch over his subjects in terms of the child's subjugation to the Father. Locke's Two Treatises of Civil Government[40] show, in their horrified response to this doctrine, the same sort of effort to keep state and family considerations well-separated that the denial of the Oedipal represents in its field: failing such separation, the subject risks losing his right to exist, to take charge of his own desire, and instead lives only at the whim--indeed, as the whim--of his parents.[41] This danger is most explicitly embodied in Aureng-Zebe, where the Old Emperor trespasses both sexually and politically in the name of an authority fundamentally paternal. The threat to the hero posed by the

head-of-state's right to bind him is not in these plays dissolved in the acid of Whiggish argument: only if events remove the ruler from his position of right can the hero continue to live. The "happy ending" demanded if the work of art is to please may seem contrived, inorganic. But it frees Dryden from the temptation to succumb to an ideology (Lockean or otherwise) which, by denying the implications of the interweaving of paternal with monarchical right, would have prevented him from achieving his special end, the representation of the real insofar as, like it or not, the reality of authority does rest on this interweaving.

The optimistic resolution of the heroic opposition is the hero's coming-into-his-own: "his own" because it is his power that upholds the state and with which he has won what (i.e. whom) he desires. By the end of the plays both his services and his right-to-possess have been recognized. But as the plays move towards this happy moment, a second area of repetition opens out around the question of Desire itself. This is the area we have examined in Chapter III of this study.

Heroic desire is the effect of the loved one's attributes upon the lover. The mechanics of this effect are as described by Hobbes:

> As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is . . . onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the reall effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.[42]

The "apparence" in question is wider in scope, as Hobbes points out, than those physical configurations we find beautiful or ugly. Its scope is that of the Latin pulchrum and turpe:

But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in others Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and Evil.[43]

The heroic plays unfold for us the implications of this fascination with the mien of another. They may be condemned for stopping short of representing the good which the mien promises, but their modesty in this respect is also Hobbesian. For Hobbes, "whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good."[44] Man desires the good, but the good is whatever is the object of his desire: from this circle the only escape offered by Hobbes is through grounding the Good in the judgment of some sort of trans-individual subject, whether "(in a Common-wealth,) . . . the Person that representeth it [i.e. the Hobbesian monarch]" or "an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof,"[45] and obviously the individual cannot cede his sexual desires to any such higher authority. So Dryden represents his lovers caught in the repetitions characteristic of this circle at its most claustrophobic, bound by the effects of the loved one's Countenance in enforced defiance of all circumstance and indeed of the loved one's interior Self-hood itself.

5

While there are other repeated structures worth examining in the plays--especially those relating to ambition (desire manifesting itself in the political realm)--those constituting the heroic opposition

and heroic love must serve, for the purposes of this introductory investigation, to suggest how an extreme formalism is not incompatible with the demands of representationality. The fact remains that most of us find it difficult to experience the plays' realism spontaneously. On first encountering them, who does not agree with Dr. Sherwood, or for that matter with Macauley ("we blame Dryden, not because the persons of his dramas are not Moors or Americans, but because they are not men or women")?[46] There seems to be an irreducible strangeness to Dryden's method which still demands to be characterized.

Perhaps a further passage from Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art, outlining the difference between the diagrammatic and the pictorial, can provide a helpful analogy.

> Compare a momentary electrocardiogram with a Hokusai drawing of Mt. Fujiyama. The black wiggly lines on white backgrounds may be exactly the same in the two cases. Yet the one is a diagram and the other a picture. What makes the difference? . . . The answer does not lie in what is symbolized; mountains can be diagrammed and heartbeats pictured. The difference is syntactic: the constitutive aspects of the diagrammatic as compared with the pictorial character are expressly and narrowly restricted. The relevant features of the diagram are the ordinate and abscissa of each of the points the center of the line passes through. The thickness of the line, its color and intensity, the absolute size of the diagram, etc., do not matter; whether a purported duplicate of the symbol belongs to the same character of the diagrammatic scheme depends not at all upon such features. For the sketch, this is not true. Any thickening or thinning of the line, its color, its contrast with the background, its size, even the qualities of the paper--none of these is ruled out, none can be ignored. . . . Some features that are constitutive in the pictorial scheme are dismissed as contingent in the diagrammatic scheme; the symbols in the pictorial scheme are relatively replete.[47]

In terms of this distinction, the neo-classical model is ambiguous: its dependence upon the ut pictura poesis formulation pushes it towards the pictorial, but its drive towards rendering intelligible essence rather

than naturalistic appearance, how things work rather than how they look, cannot but involve it in diagrammatic clarification. In the case of Dryden, we find the latter tendency uppermost in practice, expressed somewhat misleadingly in theory as the search for "the best Nature"--misleading because "best" bears both an ethical and an epistemological weight. We may well wonder how the world of the heroic plays can possibly be called "best" ethically, and in fact the ethical obligations of the neo-classical drama tend to be discharged chiefly in the construction of plot-designs ensuring a proper distribution of rewards and punishments among the characters ("poetic justice"). Much more important to Dryden is the sense in which "best" means something like "clearest, most typical, least sullied with contingency". Our difficulties with this clarity arise from our expecting the surface of the plays to achieve pictorial richness and unity rather than diagrammatic consistency, economy and logic.

Whatever its virtues, picturing is not in itself capable of rendering structure visible. It could be argued that, given the unavoidable generality of words themselves, literary modelling should aim at the meaningfully diagrammatic rather than feign a "painterly" repleteness of specific detail to imitate the vision of the subjective eye, if that imitation is to be achieved at the cost of concealing the general knowledge determining the shapes of the fiction. But there is no need to replace the intolerance which rejects Dryden's plays with an equal and opposite intolerance. Both naturalistic and formalistic representations must be judged on their merits, and the merits of Dryden's diagrams are clear: they chart the structure and boundaries of a certain

view of a man's "success".

To read the heroic plays with enjoyment we must first abandon the expectation, instilled in us by life and most other art, that our attention should center on the characters as individuals. It is better to think of them as points on a number of diagrams, whose inner being and actions are in turn the subjects of diagrams. They are effects of an analysis rather than analysts themselves. If all that is worth representing of Man is the way the individual makes his own the codes, habits, contradictions, patterns of movement of his society, always-already-given at the moment he exerts himself in action or speech, then Dryden's drama deserves the neglect that has befallen it. But to the extent that all these patterns are worth representing in their own right, Dryden deserves our attention, and to the extent that the whole truth about Man is increasingly seen to include his subjugation to as well as his mastery of his patterns, Dryden's representational practice may even come to be recognized as faithful to aspects of reality which more conventionally "humanist", individual-centered art necessarily suppresses.

Diagrams are dry, unfeeling things, and it is easy on initially encountering Dryden's plays to find them arid and cold. But as one's acquaintance with them grows, this impression changes. Their central paradox--the representation of the structures of the heroic with such clarity that the hero himself diminishes to no more than a function of them--generates an emotional charge of its own. In this, rather than in the diagrammed emotions which are part of the plays' subject-matter, the plays' words find their true feeling. In turn, the characters who speak those words begin to live, in an unexpected, modest, but intriguing and

valuable way.

F O O T N O T E S

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]Sherwood, pp. 5, 104.

[2]These, however, are no more germane to the central issue of this thesis.

[3]Sherwood, p. 5.

[4]Ibid., p. 59.

[5]Cf. Dryden, Essays, I, 101; I, 150 (". . . an heroic play ought to be an imitation, in little, of an heroic poem. . ."); and II, 156 ("For the original of the stage was from the Epic Poem"). Of course, Dryden was conscious of the differences between narration and stage representation; they are treated at length in the "Dedication of the AEneas" (II, 156-165). See also II, 42-44.

[6]Sherwood, p. 59.

[7]Ibid., pp. 66, 68.

[8]Ibid., p. 66.

[9]Ibid., p. 103.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Goodman, p. 6.

[12]Goodman cites (p. 7n.) Ernest Gombrich's Art and Illusion (New York, 1960), as well as more technical studies of cultural influence on visual perception: "The case for the relativity of vision and of representation has been so conclusively stated elsewhere that I am relieved of the need to argue it at any length here" (p. 10). His detailed argument against the anti-conventionalist position takes the form of a refutation of the absolute claims made for the "laws" of perspective even by Gombrich. Then, after a detour clarifying the distinction between pictures with denotations (portraits, representations

of real landscapes) and those without (generalized landscapes, pictures "of" non-existent beings such as unicorns or Mr. Pickwick), he proceeds to discuss ambiguities in the notion of "representing-as" which lead him back to the crucial question of Invention: "If representing is a matter of classifying objects rather than of imitating them, of characterizing rather than of copying, it is not a matter of passive reporting. . . . Classification involves preferment; and application of a label . . . as often effects as it records a classification" (pp. 31-32). This effecting is invention; it takes place against a background of convention, that is, the body of classifications needing at a given moment only to be recorded, their validity assumed. "The 'natural' kinds are simply those we are in the habit of picking out for and by labeling" (p. 32): convention is made "natural" by repetition, but it is really a sort of congealed invention. Goodman concludes by disposing briefly of the argument that "the most realistic representation is the one that provides the greatest amount of pertinent information" (p. 35); he points out that two pictures identical save that in the second "the perspective is reversed and each color is replaced by its complementary" yield exactly the same information. "The alert absolutist will argue that for the second picture but not the first we need a key. Rather, the difference is that for the first the key is at hand. For proper reading of the second picture, we have to discover rules of interpretation and apply them deliberately. Reading of the first is by virtually automatic habit. . . . Just here, I think, lies the touchstone of realism: not in quantity of information but in how easily it issues" (p. 36).

[13]Goodman, p. 37.

[14]Ibid., pp. 38-39. Cf. p. 39n.: "Neither here nor elsewhere have I argued that there is no constant relation of resemblance; judgments of similarity in selected and familiar respects are, even though rough and fallible, as objective and categorical as any that are made in describing the world. But judgments of complex overall resemblance are another matter. . . . In sum, I have sought to show that insofar as resemblance is a constant and objective relation, resemblance between a picture and what it represents does not coincide with realism; and that insofar as resemblance does coincide with realism, the criteria of resemblance vary with changes in representational practice."

[15]Dryden's heroic plays did not die quite such a sudden death as Dr. Sherwood insists. Both Aureng-Zebe and (especially) The Indian Emperour held the stage well into the eighteenth century. See Van Lennep et. al. (ed.), The London Stage: 1660-1800, Parts 1-3, especially Part 3, I, cxl: in the 1729-30 season "Drury Lane audiences . . . saw a good many of the older Restoration heroic dramas of Dryden and Lee. . . ." Perhaps this accounts for the appearance of Fielding's Tom Thumb (1730).

[16]Thus it is only once the nature of the heroic drama's representational practice is understood that the several levels of its

practitioners' competence can be sorted out. It is necessary to be especially wary of critics judging before understanding when an exotic genre is in question.

[17]A famous example of such criticism applied to an area of Restoration literature is L. C. Knights' "Restoration Comedy: The Reality and the Myth" (in Explorations, pp. 131-149). The present study does not directly attempt either to defend or to condemn the heroic drama in such "ultimate" terms.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1] A-Z IV.i (V, 277).

[2] On rhyme's relationship to "ordinary language", see Wimsatt, "One Relation of Rhyme to Reason," in The Verbal Icon, and Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in Sebeok (ed.), Style in Language.

[3] See IE V.ii.1-105 (II, 395-399).

[4] IE I.ii.3-6 (II, 327).

[5] Even here, one of the Zegry charges against the Abencerrages is that "Their mongrel race is mixed with Christian breed; / Hence 'tis that they those dogs in prisons feed."--1 CG I.i (IV, 42).

[6] S-S IV, 6.

[7] Cf. Lucacs, The Historical Novel, Ch. I.

[8] Cf. Essays, II, 134: "For Nature is still the same in all ages, and can never be contrary to herself."

[9] Zebouni (Dryden, pp. 15, 20) finds it necessary to present arguments to show that Porphyrius rather than Maximin is the hero of Tyrannic Love. The confusion arises from Maximin's position in the action (protagonist) and his possessing in extreme form certain "huffing hero" traits; that, nevertheless, Porphyrius belongs in the sequence of Heroes, both as general and as son, will emerge clearly from our examination of the play.

[10] IQ I.i.14-15 (II, 229).

[11] 1 CG II.i (IV, 58).

[12] A-Z II.i (V, 233).

[13] Of whose fifth play Pepys wrote, ". . . the play, though admirable, yet no pleasure almost in it, because just the very same design, and words, and sense and plot, as every one of his plays have, any one of which alone would be held admirable, whereas so many of the same design and fancy do but dull one another; and this, I perceive, is the sense of every body else, as well as myself. . . ." Clark (ed.), Dramatic Works of . . . Orrery, I, 84.

[14]IQ I.i.6-10 (II, 229).

[15]IQ I.i.38 (II, 230).

[16]IQ I.i.39-40 (ibid.).

[17]IQ I.i.64 (II, 231).

[18]IQ I.i.69-74 (II, 232).

[19]IQ I.i.77 (ibid.).

[20]We hear of Montezuma's belief that Garucca is his father only in Act V, in the course of that belief's being proven false. This seems a real dramatic clumsiness, especially since Garucca's name is mentioned in the course of Acacis' recounting the story of his mother's usurpation without Montezuma's registering any reaction (II.iii.15-37 [II,245]). Possibly this strengthens the case for Sir Robert Howard's especial responsibility for II.ii-iii. Cf. the Commentary to the play in C VIII, 283.

[21]IQ II.i.33-36 (II, 239).

[22]IQ II.i.29-32 (ibid.).

[23]Dryden's phrase; see Essays, I, 157.

[24]IQ II.iii.33 (II, 245).

[25]IQ II.iii.31-32 (ibid.).

[26]IQ I.i.47 (II, 231).

[27]IQ III.i.31-33, 37 (II, 248).

[28]IQ V.i.204-207 (II, 276).

[29]IQ V.i.214-215 (ibid.).

[30]IQ V.i.192-195 (II, 275).

[31]IQ V.i.301-302 (II, 279).

[32]1 CG I.i (IV, 43).

[33]2 CG IV.iii (IV, 188).

[34]2 CG IV.iii (IV, 188-189).

[35]2 CG IV.iii (IV, 189).

[36]2 CG IV.iii (ibid.).

[37]2 CG IV.iii (IV, 190).

[38]2 CG V.ii (IV, 217).

[39]1 CG V.ii (IV, 105).

[40]1 CG V.ii (IV, 106).

[41]See 2 CG II.i (IV, 139-141) and IV.i (IV, 179).

[42]1 CG I.i (IV, 41).

[43]1 CG II.i (IV, 49).

[44]TL I.i.132-134 (III, 390).

[45]TL I.i.141 (ibid.).

[46]TL I.i.145-146 (ibid.).

[47]TL I.i between 225 and 226 (III, 393).

[48]TL II.i.97-98 (III, 400).

[49]TL II.i.117-118 (III, 401).

[50]TL II.i.119-122 (ibid.).

[51]So overdetermined is this tangle, indeed, that Dryden can afford to leave the "Mother"-"Daughter" rivalry as such untreated: Valeria and Berenice do not exchange a word in the course of the play. And the

heavily incestuous structure of the whole situation is tactfully lightened by making Berenice Valeria's step-mother; cf. the handling of Nourmahal's passion for Aureng-Zebe.

[52]TL V.i.186-187 (III, 450).

[53]TL V.i.245-253 (III, 452).

[54]TL V.i.345-346 (III, 455).

[55]Politically, both Zempoalla and Maximin are usurpers, and both have based their usurpation on a murder (Zempoalla of her brother, Maximin of his wife's brother--cf. I.i.283-284 [III, 395]).

[56]A-Z I.i (V, 204).

[57]A-Z I.i (ibid.).

[58]A-Z I.i (V, 203-204).

[59]A-Z I.i (V, 206).

[60]A-Z I.i (ibid.).

[61]A-Z I.i (V, 209).

[62]A-Z II.i (V, 233).

[63]A-Z I.i (V, 212).

[64]A-Z I.i (V, 213).

[65]This hatred of his own fatherhood has already been mentioned in the exposition, in another connection: "The name of father hateful to him grows, / Which, for one son, produces him three foes." (I.i [V, 206]).

[66]A-Z I.i (V, 213).

[67]A-Z II.i (V, 225-226).

[68]A sort of castration, one might almost say. The idea may seem paradoxical, given the Emperor's lustful motives, but in his dispute with

his queen (II.i) much is made of "an abandoned bed," and "an absent husband in my arms." Nourmahal is finally quite explicit: "The bloom of beauty other years demands, / Nor will be gathered by such withered hands: / You importune it with a false desire, / Which sparkles out, and makes no solid fire" (V, 229). Cf. Morat's remarks (V, 269), and Nourmahal's dying mad-scene: "Ha, ha! how my old husband crackles there! / Keep him down, keep him down; turn him about: / I know him,--he'll but whiz, and straight go out" (V, 301).

[69]A-Z IV.i (V, 268).

[70]Zempoalla is in fact Montezuma's aunt, but we do not know this until he is established as Amexia's son--that is, until he is out of danger--and even then the fact is not commented upon.

[71]It is worth noting that, in the earlier play, Montezuma offers himself to Zempoalla finally as Acacis' brother, that is as a substitute son: "O that you wou'd believe / Acacis lives in me, and cease to grieve" (V.i.284-285).

[72]A-Z IV.i (V, 278).

[73]A-Z V.i (V, 293).

[74]A-Z V.i (V, 292).

[75]A-Z V.i (V, 298).

[76]A-Z V.i (V, 302).

[77]A-Z II.i (V, 236).

[78]A-Z II.i (V, 235).

[79]A-Z III.i (V, 249).

[80]A-Z IV.i (V, 258).

[81]A-Z II.i (V, 234).

[82]Since in the realms of sexual and ethical conduct the father is the son's natural model, the totality of society's codes of conduct, as the son internalizes it--that is, of society's notions of male "model behavior"--takes on the aspect of a symbolic Father. It is from this Father, the ultimate principle of all social authority, that the real

bad father derives the authority he misuses against the good son, but it is also from this Father that the son acquires his right to resist.

[83]It would perhaps be over-ingenious to see this doubt about the identity of the hero mirrored, and made explicit, in the Odmar-Guyomar-Alibech action: it is necessary for Alibech to distinguish between Odmar and Guyomar, though at the outset they appear to be equally virtuous and gallant.

[84]IE V.ii.117-118 (II, 400).

[85]IE V.ii.119-120 (ibid.).

[86]IE V.ii.143-144, 146-148 (II, 400-401).

[87]IE V.ii.157-158 (II, 401).

[88]IE V.ii.376 (II, 410).

[89]IE I.ii.41-42 (II, 329).

[90]IE I.ii.26-28, 33-35 (II, 328).

[91]IE I.ii.21-22 (ibid.).

[92]IE II.i.88-93 (II, 344-345).

[93]IE II.i.105-109 (ibid.).

[94]2 CG IV.iii (IV, 188).

[95]"Connexion of the Indian Emperour, to the Indian Queen", C IX, 27 (S-S IV, 322).

[96]As parent of the loved one in The Indian Queen, as rivals in the three other plays.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]In both cases, subplot and main-plot love-involvements are kept rigorously separate. The cast of The Indian Emperour splits into a major group of five (Montezuma, Almeria, Cortez, Cydaria, Orbellan) and a minor group of four (Guyomar, Odmar, Alibech, Vasquez); no love-ties join any member of one group to any member of the other. The Conquest of Granada splits its cast simply into a major group of nine and a minor of two. The comparatively great importance the subplot in The Indian Emperour is given may be intended to compensate for the sombre nature of Montezuma's sexual and political defeat.

[2]Cf. A-Z III.i (V, 248). Boabdelin is more guilty than the Old Emperor in that he is finally goaded by his jealousy into a more positive murderousness: "by Almanzor's death" he will "at once remove / The rival of my empire, and my love" (2 CG V.ii IV, 210). This resolve is taken only very late in the day, and Boabdelin's final doomed attempt to assert himself is frustrated by the final Spanish assault.

[3]But compare what was said about the quasi-suicidal nature of the Old Emperor's repentence in the previous chapter.

[4]The author of The Censure of the Rota (1673) charges Dryden's sort of hero--"born . . . in that Poeticall Free-State, . . . where all were Monarchs (without Subjects) and all swore Alleagiance to themselves, (and therefore could be Traytors to none else)"--with pretending to have "the power of Life and Death so absolutely, that if he kill'd himself, he was accountable to no body for the murder" (in Kinsley [ed.], Dryden: The Critical Heritage, p. 55).

[5]TL V.i.508-511 (III, 461).

[6]A-Z IV.i (V, 257).

[7]A-Z IV.i (V, 267).

[8]A-Z III.i (V, 257).

[9]A-Z III.i (ibid.).

[10]A-Z II.i (V, 222).

[11]A-Z III.i (V, 254-255).

[12]A-Z III.i (V, 255).

[13] A-Z I.i (V, 212).

[14] A-Z IV.i (V, 261).

[15] A-Z III.i (V, 250).

[16] A-Z IV.i (V, 260).

[17] A-Z IV.i (V, 262).

[18] A-Z I.i (V, 219).

[19] A plain heroine is impossible in this genre. Virtue and intelligence are doubtless additional attractions, and Maximin's interest in S. Catherine is augmented by her intransigence--in which he obviously sees a mirror-image of his own. But Love is first and foremost the effect of the other's visibility, and the mode of Woman's visual desirability is Beauty.

[20] The scene is not really missing from Tyrannic Love either, though no woman holds a man captive. Maximin's imprisoning, threatening, finally killing S. Catherine, while loving her largely for the force of character with which she resists him, is basically the same material with the sexes of the two parties reversed.

[21] 2 CG III.iii (IV, 170).

[22] 2 CG III.iii (ibid.). Lyndaraxa's use of the third person effects a sort of "presentation of self" which splits her into presenter and presented: "You see, sir," she begins, as if she were showing Almanzor a picture of herself appealing to him.

[23] 2 CG III.iii (ibid.).

[24] 2 CG III.iii (IV, 171).

[25] 2 CG III.iii (ibid.).

[26] 2 CG III.iii (IV, 172).

[27] 2 CG III.iii (ibid.).

[28] 2 CG III.iii (IV, 174).

[29]2 CG III.iii (IV, 173).

[30]2 CG III.iii (ibid.).

[31]The giving-way of a love to a new love (Morat's transferral of his affections from Melesinda to Indamora, for instance) does not involve the waning of the first loved one's charms; it is a matter of the new attraction's being more powerful in absolute terms, and takes place with the same immediacy and irreversibility with which Love invades the hearts of those who have no previous commitments. No doubt the instantaneous nature of the love-effect in this drama was promoted by the need Dryden felt to move towards observing Unity of Time.

[32]TL V.i.370 (III, 456).

[33]2 CG V.ii (IV, 219).

[34]2 CG V.ii (ibid.).

[35]IE IV.iv.116 (II, 387).

[36]2 CG V.ii (IV, 219).

[37]2 CG V.ii (IV, 220).

[38]IQ III.ii.115 (II, 257).

[39]IQ III.ii.119-130 (ibid.).

[40]IQ III.ii.131 (II, 258).

[41]IQ III.ii.147-150 (ibid.).

[42]IE II.i.17-20 (II, 342).

[43]See above, pp. 40-41.

[44]IE II.i.93 (II, 345).

[45]IE II.i.108-109 (ibid.).

[46]TL IV.i.114-116 (III, 424).

[47] TL IV.i.45-46 (III, 421).

[48] TL IV.i.159-160 (III, 425).

[49] TL IV.i.173-181 (III, 426).

[50] TL IV.i.185 (ibid.).

[51] TL IV.i.194 (ibid.).

[52] TL IV.i.195-196 (ibid.).

[53] TL IV.i.353 (III, 432).

[54] TL IV.i.384-385 (III, 433).

[55] TL III.i.46 (III, 410).

[56] TL V.i.346-350 (III, 455).

[57] 2 CG IV.iii (IV, 189).

[58] 2 CG IV.iii (IV, 190).

[59] 2 CG IV.iii (ibid.).

[60] Above, p. 22.

[61] 2 CG IV.iii (IV, 187).

[62] 2 CG IV.iii (IV, 188).

[63] 1 CG IV.ii (IV, 86).

[64] 1 CG IV.ii (IV, 85).

[65] 1 CG IV.ii (ibid.).

[66] 1 CG IV.ii (ibid.).

[67] 1 CG IV.ii (ibid.).

[68]1 CG III.i (IV, 66).

[69]1 CG III.i (ibid.).

[70]1 CG III.i (IV, 67).

[71]1 CG III.i (ibid.).

[72]1 CG III.i (ibid.).

[73]1 CG III.i (ibid.).

[74]A-Z V.i (V, 300-301).

[75]A-Z V.i (V, 301).

[76]A-Z V.i (ibid.).

[77]A-Z V.i (ibid.).

[78]IE I.ii.349, 355-356, 369-370 (II, 340-341).

[79]IE I.ii.350, 357-359 (II, 340).

[80]IE I.ii.351-352 (ibid.).

[81]IE I.ii.360 (ibid.).

[82]IE I.ii.361-364 (ibid.).

[83]IE I.ii.365-368 (ibid.).

[84]Sherwood, p. 66.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]OED, s.v. "model". Two subheadings below meaning 2 may be worth quoting: "2b. Something that accurately resembles something else; a person or thing that is the likeness or 'image' of another. 2c. An archetyal image or pattern." The first of these, active in Dryden's time, has fallen into disuse. The second has always been rare. Between them, they make more explicit the tension within m2 between the model's resemblance (to how a thing appears) and its cognitive function (its grasp of the quasi-Platonic "form" of which the concrete thing is only a particular, often inadequate realization--a form with which appearance may well be at odds).

[2]Horace, Ars Poetica, ll. 343-344: "omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci, / lectorum delectando pariterque monendo." H. Rushton Fairclough's translation (Loeb Classical Library) reads: "He has won every vote who has blended profit and pleasure, at once delighting and instructing the reader."

[3]E II, 19-20.

[4]E II, 107.

[5]E I, 268.

[6]E II, 28.

[7]E II, 128.

[8]E I, 271-272.

[9]E I, 267-268.

[10]E I, 200.

[11]Essay, p. 17 (E I, 46).

[12]C IX, 115-116.

[13]E II, 199.

[14]E II, 197.

[15]Other texts contradict this, e.g.: "Invention is the first part of Painting and Poetry, and absolutely necessary to them both; yet no rule ever was or ever can be given, how to compass it. . . . How to improve it, many books can teach us; how to obtain it, none; that nothing can be done without it, all agree." (E II, 138). The contradiction does not affect our argument: it confirms that, if invention is to be thought about at all within the neo-classical framework, it must be something objective, teachable. To the extent it is not, it passes beyond the theory's reach, as Dryden admits. There is still no question of putting the subjective, intangible element in invention at the center of aesthetic theory, as the Romantics tend to do.

[16]E II, 201.

[17]E II, 198.

[18]OED, s.v. "economy", definition 7a.

[19]E II, 197-198.

[20]E II, 198.

[21]Pope, An Essay on Criticism, ll. 130-135 (Works, ed. Davis, p. 68).

[22]E I, 184.

[23]E II, 136-137.

[24]E I, 183.

[25]E I, 228-229. The passage is a quotation from Rapin.

[26]E I, 183.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Essay, p. 9 (E I, 36-37).

[29]Essay, p. 15 (E I, 44).

[30]E II, 134.

[31]Ibid. The citation reads: "Medicine has long subsisted in the world. The principles of it are certain, and it has a certain way; by both which there has been found, in the course of many ages, an infinite number of things, the experience of which has confirmed its usefulness and goodness. All that is wanting to the perfection of this art will undoubtedly be found, if able men, and such as are instructed in the ancient rules, will make a farther inquiry into it; and endeavour to arrive at that which is hitherto unknown, by that which is already known. But all who, having rejected the ancient rules, and taken the opposite ways, yet boast themselves to be masters of this art, do but deceive others, and are themselves deceived; for that is absolutely impossible."

[32]E I, 113. Cf. comments collected in Aden, The Critical Opinions of John Dryden, s.v. "Ends of Poetry" (pp. 81-82).

[33]E II, 137.

[34]Ibid.

[35]E II, 137-138.

[36]E I, 183.

[37]Today, when representational validity is so often assumed to be in direct proportion to the degree of "photographic realism" the representation achieves, it is especially important to insist on the limitations of photography. Rarely can the photographic image claim to "represent structure," to show "proportions and arrangement of parts"--that is, to provide an explanatory picture of its object. The neo-classical model is more like a set of plans for a machine than like a photograph of it. While the plans do not usually look much like the machine's exterior, so faithfully copied by the camera, they are considerably more useful than the photograph if we are interested in knowing how the machine works.

[38]This is also an example of displacement-of-elements into the subplot, since Abenamar's father-role, only sketchily put in action with regard to Almanzor, finds its full deployment in his involvement in the Ozmyn-Benzayda material.

[39]E II, 198.

[40]See Peter Laslett's introductions to his editions of Locke, Two Treatises of Government (especially pp. 45-71) and Filmer, Patriarcha.

[41]Mannoni's The Child, His "Illness" and the Others is relevantly illuminating on the difficulties that can arise for the child if the place he occupies in the structured field of his parents' desire is such as to block his access to Desire on his own part.

[42]Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 121.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., p. 120.

[45]Ibid., pp. 120-121.

[46]Quoted in King, Dryden's Major Plays, p. 1.

[47]Goodman, pp. 129-130.

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