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University of Alberta

*The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Oslo Process: Persistent  
Analytics and Practices*

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial  
fulfillment of the  
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The “unfree will” is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of *strong* and *weak* wills.

- Friedrich Nietzsche

A very popular error: having the courage of one’s convictions; rather it is a matter of having the courage for an *attack* on one’s convictions.

- Friedrich Nietzsche

If I traded it all  
If I gave it all away for one thing  
Just for one thing  
If I sorted it out  
If I knew all about this one thing  
Wouldn’t that be something  
- Finger Eleven

To my loving parents, Lois and Joe McMahon. You rescued me from an abyss in  
2001-2002. Everything I am and have I owe to you.

## ABSTRACT

My thesis is that the Oslo Process was an articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Furthermore, the general effect of this discourse was the same after the Oslo Process as before the process.

I develop my thesis over the course of eight chapters. In chapter one I explain the importance of studying the Oslo Process as well as the analytical utility of archaeological and genealogical method. In chapter two I demonstrate that the Oslo Process was interpreted and represented as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations and that this interpretation and representation served a political function for the PLO, Israel and the U.S. In chapters three through seven I conduct my archaeological and genealogical analysis of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. I identify and describe three systematic silences involving: 1) the Zionist idea of transfer; 2) the territorial maximization inherent in Zionism; and 3) Zionism's denial of the Palestinian nation and this nation's right to self-determination. I also identify and describe three rules of formation: 1) representing Israel as conciliatory and Arabs generally and Palestinians specifically as intransigent rejectionists; 2) positing as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship or representing Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship; and 3) assuming that Israel would or will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. In chapter seven I study three persistent Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians: 1) Israel's settlement policy; 2) Israeli attempts to produce "acceptable" interlocutors; and 3) Israel's

proffering of initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

By studying these analytics and practices I demonstrate that the Oslo Process effected no discursive or non-discursive change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. The analytics and practices persisted through and were institutionalized in the Oslo Process. It comes as no surprise then that the process culminated in direct Palestinian-Israeli violence. I close by demonstrating how recent initiatives such as the “Roadmap” and Geneva Accord reproduce these persistent analytics and practices and can not be reasonably expected to produce peace. I conclude my project by arguing that a discursive change is necessary to change Palestinian-Israeli relations.

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## CONTENTS

<b>Chapter One – Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Why Study the Oslo Process? .....	4
The Dominant Reading of the Oslo Process .....	6
The Paradox of the Oslo Process .....	8
Archaeological and Genealogical Method.....	12
Organization of My Project .....	29
<b>Chapter Two – Reading the Oslo Process.....</b>	<b>33</b>
The Oslo Process.....	34
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements .....	36
Cairo Agreement, Early Empowerment Agreement and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities.....	37
Oslo II, the Hebron Protocol and the Wye River and Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandums .....	38
Trilateral Statement and President Clinton Remarks.....	39
Corpus 1 – Oslo as Peacemaking Breakthrough.....	40
DOPOISGA as Peacemaking Breakthrough.....	42
Explaining the Peacemaking Breakthrough.....	49
Peacemaking Breakthrough as an Analytical Point of Departure.....	53
Post-2000 Reproduction of Peacemaking Breakthrough .....	62
Corpus 2 – Oslo as Negotiated Surrender.....	66
DOPOISGA as (Israeli) Capitulation.....	67
Oslo Process as Dangerous Endeavor.....	68
DOPOISGA as Ideological Disintegration .....	70
DOPOISGA as (Palestinian) Capitulation.....	71
Corpus 3 – Oslo as Occupation by Other Means.....	73
DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as Continuity/Apartheid .....	74
Post-2000 Reproduction of DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as Continuity/Apartheid .....	83
The Dominant Reading.....	86
Political Functions of the Dominant Reading.....	90
Conclusion .....	102
<b>Chapter Three – Pre-1993 Systematic Silences Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations .....</b>	<b>105</b>
Silence 1 – Transfer .....	112
Silence 2 – Territorial Maximization.....	127
Silence 3 – Denial of Palestinian Nationhood .....	138
Conclusion .....	156
<b>Chapter Four – Pre-1993 Rules of Formation Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations .....</b>	<b>157</b>
Rule 1 – Arabs/Palestinians as Rejectionists, Israel as Conciliatory.....	157



Rule 2 – Israel as Victim; Symmetrical Relationship.....	181
Rule 3 – A Sovereign Palestinian State in Mandate Palestine.....	196
Conclusion .....	223
<b>Chapter Five – Post-1993 Systematic Silences Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations .....</b>	<b>224</b>
Silence 1 - Transfer.....	225
Institutionalization of Discursive Silence .....	225
Rule Governed Knowledge Production .....	228
Persistence of Practice .....	249
Silence 2 – Territorial Maximization.....	253
Institutionalization of Discursive Silence .....	253
Rule Governed Knowledge Production .....	258
Persistence of Practice .....	266
Silence 3 – Denial of Palestinian Nationhood .....	269
Institutionalization of Discursive Silence .....	269
Rule Governed Knowledge Production .....	278
Persistence of Practice .....	288
Conclusion .....	295
<b>Chapter Six – Post-1993 Rules of Formation Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations .....</b>	<b>296</b>
Rule 1 – Arabs/Palestinians as Rejectionists, Israel as Conciliatory.....	297
Institutionalization of Discursive Rule .....	297
Rule Governed Knowledge Production .....	301
Persistence of Practice .....	317
Rule 2 – Israel as Victim; Symmetrical Relationship.....	326
Institutionalization of Discursive Rule .....	326
Rule Governed Knowledge Production .....	331
Persistence of Practice .....	337
Rule 3 – A Sovereign Palestinian State in Mandate Palestine.....	341
Rule Governed Knowledge Production .....	342
Institutionalization of Discursive Rule .....	354
Persistence of Practice .....	359
Conclusion .....	369
<b>Chapter Seven – Persistent Israeli Practices.....</b>	<b>370</b>
Pre-1993 Non-Discursive Practices .....	372
Settlement .....	373
Producing “Acceptable” Interlocutors .....	376
Proffering Initiatives Ostensibly Aimed at Ending the Occupation .....	383
Post-1993 Non-Discursive Practices.....	390
Settlement .....	390
Producing “Acceptable” Interlocutors .....	394
Proffering Initiatives Ostensibly Aimed at Ending the Occupation .....	409
Conclusion .....	416

<b>Chapter Eight – Conclusion</b> .....	417
Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations .....	419
Chapters One and Two.....	420
Chapter Three.....	423
Chapter Four .....	425
Chapter Five.....	428
Chapter Six.....	431
Chapter Seven .....	437
Implications.....	439
Recent Initiatives – The Roadmap.....	439
Recent Initiatives – The Geneva Accord .....	441
Recent Initiatives – Sharon’s Disengagement Plan .....	446
Discursive Change .....	457
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	461

## TABLES

Table	Page
1. Corpus 1 – Peacemaking Breakthrough.....	41
2. Corpus 2 – Surrender .....	67
3. Corpus 3 – Critical.....	74
4. Media Representations.....	87
5. Israeli Settlement 1976-1993 .....	374
6. Israeli Settlement 1993-2001 .....	392
7. Analytics and Practices .....	424

## Chapter One – Introduction

On 13 September 1993, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOPOISGA). President Clinton hosted the signing ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House. The declaration was heralded as historic. Clinton called it “an extraordinary act in one of history’s defining dramas”,<sup>1</sup> Israeli Foreign Minister Peres called it a revolution in Palestinian-Israeli relations;<sup>2</sup> and Arafat explained that because of the declaration Palestinians and Israelis stood on the threshold to a new historic era.<sup>3</sup> The international media shared the assessments of political figures in deeming the declaration a “Middle East breakthrough”<sup>4</sup> and a “landmark peace accord.”<sup>5</sup> Not to be outdone, pronouncements in the scholarly literature characterized the declaration as “the mother of all breakthroughs”<sup>6</sup> and as “one of the most momentous events in the twentieth-century of the Middle East.”<sup>7</sup> The cumbersome title of Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

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<sup>1</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), p. 130.

<sup>2</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 132.

<sup>3</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 138.

<sup>4</sup> Page title, *The Guardian*, September 13, 1993, p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Greenberger, “Long-Time Foes Shake Hands as PLO, Israel Sign Landmark Peace Accord,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 14, 1993, p. A3.

<sup>6</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): p.24.

<sup>7</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p.24.

Government Arrangements was soon replaced with the phrase “Oslo Accord”<sup>8</sup> – this owing to the fact that the declaration was negotiated and initialed in Oslo, Norway. The initial document produced further agreements, protocols and memorandums thereby constituting the “Oslo Process”.

The idea that the Oslo Process was a peace process and as such a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations specifically and Arab-Israeli relations more generally became the dominant or hegemonic reading. In fact, as Guyatt correctly notes, “Scepticism, let alone opposition to Oslo, has been condemned as a threat to peace. Peace and Oslo have become synonymous; to question the latter has implied the abandonment of the former.”<sup>9</sup>

The fact that peace and Oslo were made synonymous should not be taken to mean that there was not skepticism towards, and even outright rejection of, the Oslo Process. In fact, there is an entire corpus of literature that rejects the idea that the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process was a breakthrough. Not only does this literature see the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a continuity it also rejects the idea that the Oslo Process was about peace. This corpus sees in the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process the continuation of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a more economical and efficient form. Said states unequivocally that the Oslo Process amounts to “[Israeli] occupation by other means.”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” pp. 24-40.

<sup>9</sup> Nicholas Guyatt, *The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Zed Books, 1998), p.x.

<sup>10</sup> Edward W. Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), p.14.

Paradoxically, for the dominant reading, the Oslo Process ground to an inconclusive halt on 28 September 2000 with the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. By the fourth anniversary of the *intifada* the provocations and responses, attacks and counter-attacks, bombings, curfews and house demolitions had resulted in 3,236 Palestinian deaths and 27,645 injuries<sup>11</sup> and 999 Israeli deaths and 6,665 injuries.<sup>12</sup>

My thesis is that the Oslo Process was an articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Furthermore, the general effect of this discourse was the same after the Oslo Process as before the Oslo Process. Through the Oslo Process the discursive rules and non-discursive practices defining Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period were continued. It should come as no surprise then, that the effect of these rules and practices in the post-1993 period was the same as that of the rules and practices in the pre-1993 period – namely, direct violence between Palestinians and Israel.

I challenge the interpretation of the 1993 Oslo Process as a breakthrough or new beginning in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Such an interpretation has been imposed on the process because it was advantageous to the PLO, Israel and the United States. Alternatively, I argue that the Oslo Process affected no discursive or non-discursive change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Discursively, the analytics of truth according to which Palestinian-Israeli relations have historically been interpreted and represented were institutionalized by the Oslo Process; the

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<sup>11</sup> Palestine Red Crescent Society, "Intifada Summary," Web page, [accessed 29 September 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestinercs.org/intifadasummary.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israeli Government's Official Website," Web page, [accessed 29 September 2004]. Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa>.

agreements are articulations of the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Non-discursively, practices initiated by Israel toward Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have persisted despite the 1993 “breakthrough”. The persistence of these analytics and practices through the Oslo Process (re-)produced the conditions for direct violence between Palestinians and Israel.

In the following five sections of this introductory chapter I will justify my study and distinguish it from other work on the Oslo Process as well as introduce and explain the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. Further, I will rationalize my use of Foucault-inspired archaeological and genealogical methods. Finally, I conclude this introduction by briefly outlining the remaining chapters of my project.

### *Why Study the Oslo Process?*

Before proceeding, I must briefly address the question: why study the Oslo Process? Sharon has repeatedly, over the course of two Israeli elections, declared “Oslo dead.”<sup>13</sup> Braghouti stated as early as 2000 that “the Oslo period of the long war over Israel/Palestine is finally over.”<sup>14</sup> In 2000 Said clearly articulated his assessment of the state of the Oslo Process publishing a book entitled *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After*. Finally, and possibly most damningly, Finkelstein has written that “there can be little doubt that, consigned to a footnote, Oslo will one day be dismissed as a sordid detour on the path to a just and lasting

---

<sup>13</sup> “Likud: Oslo is dead, but Sharon supports Palestinian state,” 9 February 2003, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>, (9 February 2003).

<sup>14</sup> Graham Usher, “The Al-Aqsa Intifada,” *Middle East International*, no. 635 (13 October 2000): p.6.

peace.”<sup>15</sup> The combination of political statements, academic interpretations and the continuing violence causes one to wonder as to the importance of studying a cadaverous detour.

I study the Oslo Process for two reasons. First, I analyze the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a breakthrough, because it was heralded as a breakthrough. From 1993 to 2000 massive amounts of currency, both political and economic, were expended in accordance with the belief that the Oslo Process was making peace between Palestinians and Israelis. The fact that the DOPOISGA and the start of the Oslo Process were marked as important was made most starkly in 1994 with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Arafat, Rabin and Peres. Without wanting to make a tautological statement, I analyze the Oslo Process as important because it was interpreted and represented as important.

Second, I study the Oslo Process because of its effects. The Oslo Process did not produce peace. It did not reconcile. It did not produce agreement. Instead, the process ended with the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. My argument is that the persistence of the analytics of truth governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and of Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians created the conditions for the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. My study is necessary to determine the kinds of fundamental discursive and non-discursive changes that would have to occur for peace between Israelis and Palestinians to be established and to persist. This is much more far-reaching than merely asserting that peace would be achieved once Arafat was replaced or Israel ceded to a Palestinian state the spatial equivalent of

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<sup>15</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: Verso, 2003), p.183.



100% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This involves changing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

### *The Dominant Reading of the Oslo Process*

The dominant reading interprets the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough. According to this reading the DOPOISGA was revolutionary because, *inter alia*, it provided Israel with security it could not obtain militarily, represented a historic territorial compromise between Jews and Palestinians and changed intra-Palestinian relations, Palestinian-Israeli relations and Arab-Israeli relations. On the narrative level it is argued that the DOPOISGA reversed a century of mutual denial and rejection by both Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms. With regard to territory, the DOPOISGA is supposed to have replaced maximization with compromise and the acceptance of the long delayed partition of Palestine. Finally, on the level of state policy the DOPOISGA has been understood as opening the doors to normalization between Israel and Arab regimes in the Middle East. All things that according to the dominant reading were only realized through the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process.

A skeptical, or more accurately, a critical reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process offers a different interpretation. Authors in this corpus see the continuation of Israeli hegemony over the territory, resources and people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the Oslo Process. Whether it is Said's identification of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as Israel's surrogate occupier in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), or Halper's examination

of Israel's continuing construction of a matrix of control of roads, parks and army bases in the West Bank and Gaza Strip or Selby's study of Israel's ongoing control of water resources in the OPT, all the authors in the critical corpus see Israel maintaining its hegemonic dominance over the people and territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1993. In fact, according to this corpus not only did the Oslo Process make possible the persistence of Israel's system of control of the OPT, water and Palestinians through the creation of Bantustans, it did so in a more efficient and effective manner.

Where the dominant reading sees peacemaking breakthrough in 1993, this corpus sees the persistence of occupation; where the dominant reading sees reconciliatory discontinuity in the DOPOISGA, this corpus sees hegemonic continuity. The critical corpus sees no Oslo-induced change to the asymmetrical power relations between Palestinians and Israelis or to Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians. The DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process did not usher in practical change or discontinuity.

My project draws on both corpuses, but differs in kind from both. My argument is that the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process affected no discursive or non-discursive change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. In fact, I argue that pre-1993 analytics of truth and Israeli practices persisted despite the initiation of the Oslo Process. Further, my project adopts the continuity tenet that characterizes the critical corpus. For example, I examine the persistent Israeli practice of settlement construction. This same practice is examined, and identified as persistent, by the research and publications of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. In several

instances I examine practices studied by the critical corpus and characterize them as persistent. However, I also examine the analytics of truth governing the production of knowledge bearing on Palestinian-Israeli relations that are not treated by the critical corpus and I find continuity here too. In contradistinction to both corpuses my object of analysis is not the DOPOISGA or the Oslo Process but rather how Palestinian-Israeli relations are talked about. I compare the “how” of talking about Palestinian-Israeli relations pre- and post-1993 with the DOPOISGA posited as a potential point of discursive rupture. I see continuity in the conceptual mechanics that lie behind or underneath truthful knowledge regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations; conceptual mechanics that are not studied systematically by the critical corpus. In so doing, I draw on literature from the first corpus that while speaking of “breakthroughs” and discontinuities ironically perpetuates these persistent mechanics.

Fundamentally, what distinguishes my project from the work of the critical corpus is that while both examine persistent practices I connect these practices to the discursive analytics of truth. Rather than studying non-discursive practices in relative discursive isolation I understand them as articulations of discursive analytics of truth. Put another way, my study emphasizes that words matter, framing the context for political actions and reactions.

### *The Paradox of the Oslo Process*

The various manifestations of what I call the dominant reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process are characterized by the notion of

reconciliation. This starts with the DOPOISGA shorthand label. The DOPOISGA is referred to popularly and academically as the Oslo Accord, and the process sometimes cumulatively as the Oslo Accords. An accord is defined as a formal act of reconciliation or agreement or a treaty of peace.<sup>16</sup> The Oslo Accord is not a peace treaty, but rather a more limited “agreement to agree;”<sup>17</sup> it is understood as the formal act of reconciliation. Somewhat redundantly, reconciliation, in turn, can be understood as the action of bringing to agreement, concord or harmony.<sup>18</sup> More interestingly, reconciliation can also be understood as the action or practice of rendering one account consistent with another by balancing apparent discrepancies.<sup>19</sup> This is a bookkeeping concept, but applicable in the present case because of the term’s derivation from the verb to reconcile. Putting aside the verb’s idea of re-establishing a previously extant state of friendship, concordance or peace (not the case in Palestinian-Israeli relations) we are left to understand it as the act of making consistent or compatible actions, statements and/or facts.<sup>20</sup> Fundamentally, the Oslo Accords are understood as a settling of a dispute.

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<sup>16</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>17</sup> Rashid Khalidi, “A Palestinian View of the Accord With Israel,” *Current History* 93, no. 580 (1994): p.62.

<sup>18</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>19</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>20</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

The couplet of the idea of reconciliation derived from the label accord is compromise. This is, in fact, a term used endlessly to describe the negotiations that produced the DOPOISGA and even more recently the Camp David negotiations of 2000. Compromise means “to adjust or settle conflicting claims between parties.”<sup>21</sup> It also means “to settle differences by mutual concession”<sup>22</sup> and “to come to an agreement by the partial surrender of position or principles.”<sup>23</sup> Interestingly enough, particularly given some of the security based criticisms of the Oslo Process from Israeli political figures such as Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon compromise also means “to expose oneself to risk or danger.”<sup>24</sup>

Thus, for the dominant reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process, Palestinians and Israel formally agreed in 1993 to settle their dispute by making consistent, through mutual concessions and vulnerability, national discrepancies. This presumption faced stresses and strains from 1993 to 2000 while issues such as the redeployment from Hebron were being negotiated. It unraveled however, in September 2000 and after with the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. Fundamentally, this violence, significantly more brutal than the first *intifada* from 1987 to 1993, became paradoxical for the dominant reading. It can not be explained given the

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<sup>21</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>22</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>23</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>24</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

dominant interpretation of the process. Here were two people who had negotiated for 7 years, after making such profound breakthroughs, now bombing refugee camps and buses. If peace had been negotiated for the better part of a decade, why were Palestinians and Israelis effectively at war? The images, public statements and political policies ran contrary to common opinion of the process and appeared inconsistent with established truth.

A number of explanations have been forwarded to explain the paradox. Most centered around Yasser Arafat. He was variously described as lacking the courage to finally settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and so unleashed a war on Israel;<sup>25</sup> he could not extract from Israel sufficient concessions so he tried to use violence to obtain what he could not get at the bargaining table;<sup>26</sup> or most simply, he was an obstacle; a corrupt, unredeemable terrorist who could never be converted into a state-builder.<sup>27</sup> Some blamed Ariel Sharon for his 28 September 2000 incendiary visit to Al-Haram Al-Sharif with an armed guard of 1,000 Israeli police. Others blamed insufficient concessions by one, the other or both sides during the negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was blamed for being too uncompromising on the issues of repatriating Palestinian refugees and Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem at the Camp David negotiations of 2000. Similarly, Arafat was decried for wanting more than the 96% of the West

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<sup>25</sup> Barry M Rubin, and Judith Colp Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Alan M Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

<sup>27</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinians Leadership," Web page, [accessed 11 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>.

Bank and 100% of Gaza that he demanded at the same Camp David negotiations. Still others blamed Israel's continuing policy of settlement construction or Arafat's failure to destroy the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as reasons for the violence.

### *Archaeological and Genealogical Method*

I conduct a Foucault-inspired archaeological and genealogical analysis of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. These methods allow me to: 1) highlight the politicized nature of language; 2) excavate an ontology of the unthought;<sup>28</sup> 3) identify persistent practices and the political function of meanings imposed up on them; and 4) conceive of a relationship between truth and power.

First, language is not a transparent means of communication. Nietzsche asserts that language itself is an expression of power.<sup>29</sup> The fundamental significance of language lies in the fact that "language is constitutive of our categories of thought and thereby of the perceptions these categories order."<sup>30</sup> Language is important and power(ful) because it produces, rather than merely mediates, thought. The specific language used will frame and inform, if not determine, the specific thought it produces.

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<sup>28</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 326.

<sup>29</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, and Walter Arnold Kaufmann, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p.26.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Mahon, *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject*, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 58.

The power of language can clearly be seen in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Names and terminology are hotly contested. They are clearly invested with political significance. Certain labels and phraseologies legitimate claims and/or eliminate histories. Examples abound: the label for the 1948 hostilities – Israel calls this the War of Independence, but for Palestinians it is *al-nakba* (the catastrophe); similarly the war of 1973 has been labeled both the Yom Kippur War and the Ramadan War; the same body of water is identified as the Sea of Galilee and Lake Kinneret; Jerusalem is described both as occupied and united, while some foreign correspondents report from Jerusalem and others from Tel Aviv (foreign correspondents traditionally report from the recognized capital of the state); Yasser Arafat, was identified either as Chairman Arafat (as he was forced to sign in his 1993 letter to Rabin) or President Arafat (as he signed his correspondence after the PLO's 1988 Declaration of Independence), Arafat led either the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian *National* Authority; Israeli established locations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip such as Netzarim, Ariel and Maale Adumim are simultaneously settlements, colonies and violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions which are expanded, grow naturally, are thickened and are deepened; and the space home to the Dome of the Rock and the *Al-Aqsa* Mosque is labeled the Temple Mount by Jews and the *Al-Haram Al-Sharif* (the noble sanctuary) by Muslims.

A further example of the power of language is notable in the drafting of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1322 of 2000. During the resolution's drafting the United States tried unsuccessfully to insert the phrase



“Temple Mount” into the first operative clause that already included the phrase “al-Haram al-Sharif”. The unsuccessful attempt is not as important as the fact that there was a struggle over the language. Even as it was being condemned for its draconian measures at the outset of the *intifada*, Israel sought legitimacy for its claims to the space; the Palestinian delegate prevailed in denying equality or symmetry between the claims of Israelis and Palestinians on this question.

Since 2000, the struggle over terminologies has intensified. Now, Israel conducts what it calls “targeted assassinations”, and what Palestinians and the international community call “extra-judicial killings”. Israel builds what it calls its “security fence” or “security barrier”. Palestinians call the exact same structure an “apartheid wall”. And, of course, there is the Israeli terminology of “terrorists” in contradistinction with the Palestinian phrase of “martyrs”.

The most contentious label involves the spaces that remained outside Israeli sovereignty after 1948, most often referred to as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These spaces have variously been identified as “Judea and Samaria”, constituent parts of “Eretz Israel”, “liberated territories”, “disputed territories”, “Palestine”, “occupied Palestine”, “the occupied territories”, “the occupied Palestinian territories” and even “the unallocated territories of the Palestine mandate”. The labeling of these spaces is contentious because it carries with it religious and legal implications. If, for example, the spaces are part of Greater Israel promised by God to Jews, then, as Whitlam notes, “it is not a conquest but

a gift, it is not dispossession but possession ceded by God.”<sup>31</sup> Similarly, if the territories are occupied rather than liberated, then the Hague and Geneva Conventions apply to Israeli policies and actions vis-à-vis the subject populations.

Finally, there is the issue of what to call the conflict, or even if it should be called a conflict. Again, different labels with different political implications abound. Bickerton and Klausner speak of the “Arab-Israeli conflict”.<sup>32</sup> Finkelstein writes of the “Israel-Palestine conflict”.<sup>33</sup> Said wrote a polemic on *The Question of Palestine*.<sup>34</sup> Pappé has written both of the “Arab-Israeli conflict”<sup>35</sup> and *The Israel/Palestine Question*.<sup>36</sup> Rodinson wrote on Israeli colonialism;<sup>37</sup> Palumbo on Israeli imperialism;<sup>38</sup> and Marwan Barghouti spoke of the “war over Israel/Palestine.”<sup>39</sup> Not satisfied with only two subjects Saunders speaks of “Arab-Israeli-Palestinian relations.”<sup>40</sup>

Interestingly, it is a statement by Saunders, as Deputy Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, that demonstrates the political stakes involved in labels,

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<sup>31</sup> Keith W. Whitelam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: the Silencing of Palestinian History* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.93.

<sup>32</sup> Ian J. Bickerton, and Carla L. Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995).

<sup>33</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*.

<sup>34</sup> Edward W. Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).

<sup>35</sup> Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1992).

<sup>36</sup> Ilan Pappé, *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

<sup>37</sup> Maxime Rodinson, *Israel: a Colonial-Settler State?* (New York: Monad Press, 1973).

<sup>38</sup> Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza* (London: Bloomsbury, 1992).

<sup>39</sup> Graham Usher, “The Al-Aqsa Intifada,” p.6.

<sup>40</sup> Harold H. Saunders, *The Other Walls: the Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective*, Rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

names and terminology. In 1975 Saunders testified before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives that

... the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiations of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians.<sup>41</sup>

Quandt reports that the “Saunders document, as it came to be called, infuriated the Israelis and encouraged the Arabs.”<sup>42</sup> Why did this statement so “infuriate” the Israelis? For two closely related reasons: 1) it identified Palestinians as a people while Israeli policy was still denying the existence of Palestinians (in 1975 Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was referring to the “so-called Palestinians”) and 2) it undermined the Israeli assertion “that the heart of the conflict was not the Palestinian problem but Arab refusal to accept Israel.”<sup>43</sup> In this instance, the very naming of Palestinians and the idea that they had interests (but, it must be noted, not rights) had political implications.

Both Said and Pappé are sensitive to the importance of naming. Said states that “[t]he very mention of the name [Palestine] constitutes for the Palestinian and his partisans an act of importance and positive political assertion, and on the

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<sup>41</sup> Saunders, *The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective*, p.9.

<sup>42</sup> William B Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Berkeley: Brookings Institution; University of California Press, 1993), p.244.

<sup>43</sup> Saunderson, *The Other Walls: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective*, p.9.

other, for the Palestinian's enemies it is an act of equally assertive but much more negative and threatening denial."<sup>44</sup> He continues: "to call the place Palestine, and not, say Israel or Zion is already an act of political will."<sup>45</sup> This is, in fact, the case with almost all of the terminologies associated with Palestinian-Israeli relations. In the preface to *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-51* Pappé recognizes that Jews and Palestinians, with specific reference to the violence of 1948, "describe the same event in contradictory ways" which "point to two different historical approaches."<sup>46</sup> He opts to identify the war by its calendar name.

For the purposes of my project, I, too, subscribe to the use of calendar references. In the case of "wars" I will reference the year (i.e. 1948, 1967, 1973). In the case of spaces, I will alternately use the terms "West Bank and Gaza Strip" and "occupied Palestinian territories (OPT)". I deploy these labels, particularly the latter, because they represent the overwhelming international consensus on the status of the spaces. Finally, as regards the label for the "conflict" I reject the phrase "Arab-Israeli conflict" because it miscasts the nature of, and primary actors involved in, the activity. I prefer the conceptualization that attends Saunders' use of the term "relations". However, I am not inclined to adopt his triumvirate of actors, namely Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians; primarily because I agree with the assessment of authors such as Flapan and Pappé that understand that "the history of the Palestine Question ... is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli

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<sup>44</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p.4.

<sup>45</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p.10.

<sup>46</sup> Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-51*, p.xi.

conflict”<sup>47</sup> and that the Arab-Israeli conflict grew out of the more localized dispute between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, I use the term “Palestinian-Israeli relations”.

Second, archaeology excavates an ontology of the unthought. This excavation is premised on the subjectlessness of knowledge. By this I mean that knowledge is not attributed to individual authors. As a method, archaeology rejects the idea that there is a sovereign, founding subject of knowledge.<sup>49</sup> This should not be taken to mean that the author is irrelevant. Instead, the author must be understood and investigated as a subject position. The author is not the originating subject, but rather a subject implicated in and penetrated by discourse. Foucault suggests that the following questions be asked of the author (function): “[h]ow, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy in each type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and by obeying what rules?”<sup>50</sup> Foucault surmises by explaining that “it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.”<sup>51</sup>

Archaeology is not a history of who said what and why. Instead, it is a “story about the web of specific sentences that were uttered, and a theory, called

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<sup>47</sup> Pappé, *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories*, p.1.

<sup>48</sup> Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1947-51*, p.x.

<sup>49</sup> Michel Foucault, and Lawrence D Kritzman, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984* (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 50.

<sup>50</sup> Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 118.

<sup>51</sup> Rabinow and Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, p. 118.

archaeology, of what made it possible for those sentences to be uttered (largely regardless of who uttered them).”<sup>52</sup> This shifts the analytical focus from questions of whom to questions of how. In other words, the guiding question of archaeology is: *how* do some statements come to be articulated and accepted while others remain unarticulated or articulated, but unaccepted?

In place of the author principle, archaeology studies the production of truthful knowledge in accordance with extra-textual rules. These rules determine what statements are accepted and count as true. The rules of knowledge formation are never formulated in their own right,<sup>53</sup> but do form a system which serves to produce knowledge.

For archaeological purposes, truth is not understood as a quality that is in accordance with reality. Rather truth is a set of extra-textual rules or protocols of knowledge formation. As Foucault wrote: “by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’, but rather the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true.”<sup>54</sup> He continued: “[t]ruth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements.”<sup>55</sup> These rules both regulate and distribute

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<sup>52</sup> Ian Hacking, “The Archaeology of Foucault,” in *Foucault: A Critical Reader* ed. David Couzens Hoy, p. 31.

<sup>53</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, p. xi.

<sup>54</sup> Michel Foucault, and Colin Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 132.

<sup>55</sup> Michel Foucault, and Colin Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, p. 133.

statements as well as police some statements from being made. Truthful knowledge is produced so long as the author of the knowledge abides by these rules and protocols.

Archaeology catalogues these extra-textual rules, what Foucault also variously calls the “conditions of possibility” and the “analytics of truth”. The term “analytics” is used because archaeology, in contrast to structuralist analysis, studies statements that are actually articulated, not statements that could have been made.<sup>56</sup> Archaeology restricts itself to statements that were manifest somewhere, or articulated on something, such as a text or conversation. The object of archaeological study is not the object of the truth debate, but instead the rules in accordance with which truthful knowledge about the object is produced. Archaeology answers the question: what are the rules and exclusions by which an author must abide if (s)he is to produce truthful knowledge about an object?

Further to this discussion of extra-textual rules of formation, archaeology attempts to “reveal a *positive* unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature.”<sup>57</sup> Positivistic science views the unconscious of the subject of knowledge negatively. This unconscious is seen to contaminate positivistic studies as it violates the postulate of objectivity and hence the positivistic requirement that implicit assumptions,

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<sup>56</sup> See Hubert L Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p.56 and Mahon, *Foucault's Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power, and the Subject*, p. 122.

<sup>57</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, p. xi.

philosophies, values be disclosed. Archaeology, on the other hand, recognizes that this unconscious is a part of scientific discourse; it embraces the unconscious as providing the *a priori* conditions of thought and as a rich, fertile, productive part of cognition. In fact, archaeology is premised on the revelation that thought is rooted in the unthought.<sup>58</sup> Unconsciously invoked knowledge rules are a prerequisite for and make all truth possible.

Archaeological analysis starts from the premise that what gets said depends on something other than itself or on the author's intentions.<sup>59</sup> This "something other" are extra-textual rules by which authors must abide in order to make truthful statements. Archaeology uncovers an author's taken-for-granted commitments.<sup>60</sup>

Archaeology enables me to analyze the literature on the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process. I study the analytics of truth according to which authors produced truthful knowledge prior to and after the start of the Oslo Process. In other words, I posit the Oslo Process as a potential discontinuity in the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. By examining discursive rules of knowledge formation I find that the analytics of truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations did not change with the initiation of the Oslo Process. In fact, these analytics were institutionalized by the Oslo Process. The DOPOISGA did not alter the rules of formation according to which Palestinian-Israeli relations have historically been

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<sup>58</sup> Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, p. 324.

<sup>59</sup> Dreyfus, Rabinow, and Foucault, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p. 64

<sup>60</sup> Dreyfus, Rabinow, and Foucault, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p.37.



interpreted and represented. The Oslo Process was not a rupture or discontinuity in the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Third, genealogy<sup>61</sup> records and studies the history of changing meanings imposed upon persistent practices. Genealogy rejects the idea that a procedure has an immutable or eternal meaning. Instead, it understands that interpretations are ascribed to practices. These interpretations are not natural, they are created and imposed.<sup>62</sup> Genealogy understands further that practices precede the meanings assigned to them and recognizes the assigned meaning to be impermanent. Changes in force relations result in the assignment of new interpretations to persistent practices.

This aspect of genealogical analysis is neatly surmised by Nietzsche in the *Genealogy of Morals*. Explains Nietzsche:

whatever exists, having come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a *becoming master*, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous

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<sup>61</sup> Foucault's shift from archaeology to genealogy was a way for him to move beyond the limits of his hyper-archaeological study evident in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Foucault's inaugural lecture at the College de France and his 1971 text entitled "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" mark this shift. This should not be misconstrued to mean that Foucault's work can be easily categorized into pre- and post-archaeological or genealogical periods. Rather in different periods different methods were emphasized in his analyses. For excellent texts on Foucault's methods, the limitations of these methods, and contentious issues surrounding and challenges to these methods see Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* and Hoy Foucault: *A Critical Reader*.

<sup>62</sup> Dreyfus, Rabinow, and Foucault, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p.107.

“meaning” and “purpose” are necessarily obscured or even obliterated.<sup>63</sup>

He continues: “the entire history of a ‘thing’, an organ, a custom, can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another.”<sup>64</sup> Practices endure, but meanings are malleable. The ascription of meaning to practice is a result of changing force relations. The dominant ascribes meaning, and when power relations change the emergent dominant re-ascribes meaning.

Genealogy recognizes interpretation of or the ascription of meaning to a practice or procedure as a political act – a political act, moreover, in which the interpreter is penetrated by and implicated in a matrix of power relations. It follows from this that hegemonic ideas and interpretations are not naturally hegemonic. They are the product of power relations and political interests.

In the case of my research, these genealogical ideas produce an analysis of persistent practices and the interpretation of the Oslo Process as a peace process. The genealogical emphasis on persistent practices focuses attention on Zionist/Israeli practices in mandate Palestine. I demonstrate that these practices have persisted despite the initiation of the Oslo Process.

Genealogy also directs attention to the political interests served by the interpretation of the Oslo Process as a peace process. Interpretations of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process are contested. One specific interpretation – that depicts the Oslo Process as a peace process – has emerged as dominant. I argue

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<sup>63</sup> Nietzsche and Kaufmann, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p.77.

<sup>64</sup> Nietzsche and Kaufmann, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, p.77.

that a process open to myriad readings was interpreted and represented as a peace process because of the political functions served by this interpretation. This specific interpretation was author(iz)ed in the interests of particular parties. Specifically, the PLO, Israel and the United States all benefited from this interpretation of the Oslo Process.

Fourth, archaeology and genealogy enable me to conceive of a relationship between truth and power. Genealogy begins by rejecting the idea that “renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge.”<sup>65</sup> Instead, Foucault argues that:

We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.<sup>66</sup>

This statement should not be misconstrued to mean that knowledge/power is power/knowledge, but rather that there exists a relation of implication between knowledge and power. Hoy explains that “the relation is such that knowledge is not gained prior to and independently of the use to which it will be put in order to achieve power (whether over nature or over other people), but it is already a function of human interests and power relations.”<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 27.

<sup>66</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 27.

<sup>67</sup> David Couzens Hoy, “Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School,” in *Foucault: A Critical Reader* ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 1986), p.129. Hoy goes on to

Foucault's remarks in a 1983 interview are prescient in this regard: "when I read – and I know it has been attributed to me – the thesis, 'Knowledge is power' or 'Power is knowledge,' I begin to laugh, since studying their *relation* is precisely my problem."<sup>68</sup> Truth – rule governed knowledge – is *not* power. Equally important, knowledge is never emancipated from power. There is no knowledge separate from the exercise of power; knowledge will not be produced independent of power. Knowledge, and truth, changes when the matrix in which they exist changes. Phrased differently, knowledge is produced by a certain regime of truth and knowledge only exists within that regime. Another knowledge or truth can exist, or come into existence, but only within the context of a new truth regime.

In this framework power, or more properly, power relations are positive and productive. Foucault is explicit on this point:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.<sup>69</sup>

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explain that "the concept of power/knowledge is a [heuristic] device for studying the social and scientific practices that underlie and condition the formation of beliefs. He [Foucault] is offering an interpretation of how what counts as knowledge and power has historically come to be so counted." p. 129.

<sup>68</sup> Foucault and Kritzman, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, p. 43.

<sup>69</sup> Michel Foucault, and James D Faubion, *Power, Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*; (New York: New Press,: Distributed by W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 120.

Power is not merely prohibition. Power produces reality, it produces subjects, knowledge, domains of objects and rituals of truth.<sup>70</sup> In this sense power is positive. Power makes. It constitutes.

A discourse is the matrix of extra-textual rules to which the effects of power are attached. A discourse is politicized truth - rule governed knowledge.

Foucault's own statement on the politics of truth bears quoting at length:

truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power; ... Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.<sup>71</sup>

Truth is worldly. It is incited, produced, transmitted, consumed and debated.<sup>72</sup>

Most importantly, "effects of power are attached to the true."<sup>73</sup> "Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it."<sup>74</sup> Power is embedded in truth; truth is political consequences. Discourses are/have political effects.

Truth and power are mutually constituting and mutually dependent; are joined together in discourses; and their relations constitute hegemonies. To

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<sup>70</sup> Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, p. 194.

<sup>71</sup> Rabinow and Foucault *The Foucault Reader*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>72</sup> Rabinow and Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, p.73.

<sup>73</sup> Rabinow and Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, p.74.

<sup>74</sup> Rabinow and Foucault, *The Foucault Reader*, p.74.

change political effects it is not sufficient to try to emancipate truth from power.<sup>75</sup>

In fact, this is an otiose endeavor from the outset because truth has no meaning outside of its defining and producing order of power. To change the political effects of a discourse requires that changes be made to the rules that govern the production of truthful knowledge.

An example of the genealogical coexistence between knowledge and power, and a text germane to my larger discussion, is Keith Whitelam's *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The silencing of Palestinian history*. Whitelam argues that "[t]he history of ancient Palestine has been ignored and silenced by biblical studies because its object of interest has been an ancient Israel conceived and presented as the taproot of Western civilization."<sup>76</sup> Whitelam's research can be read to neatly sum up the productive relationship between knowledge and power. First he states: "[t]he history of the debate on the emergence of Israel in Palestine illustrates quite clearly that the discourse of biblical studies has been shaped by contemporary political struggles over the question and future of Palestine."<sup>77</sup> Particular relations of power and networks of political interests are embedded in and constitute knowledge claims that circulate through, *inter alia*, universities, governments and the media. Next Whitelam states that: "the search for ancient Israel is not about some disinterested construction of the past but an important

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<sup>75</sup> Ian Hacking, "The Archaeology of Foucault," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader* ed. David Couzens Hoy, p.39.

<sup>76</sup> Whitelam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The silencing of Palestinian History*, p.1.

<sup>77</sup> Whitelam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The silencing of Palestinian History*, p.72.

question of contemporary identity and power.”<sup>78</sup> Knowledge bearing on ancient Israel induces, sustains and extends a particular configuration of power relations.

Similar ideas were published by *Ha'aretz* in 1999. States Ze'ev Herzog: “[t]his is what archaeologists have learned from their excavations in the Land of Israel: the Israelites were never in Egypt, did not wander in the desert, did not conquer the land in a military campaign and did not pass it on to the 12 tribes of Israel.”<sup>79</sup> Herzog notes that “the archaeology of Palestine was not engendered at the initiative of museums but sprang from religious motives.”<sup>80</sup> More specifically, archaeology was deployed in Palestine “to refute the critical claims against the historical veracity of the Bible stories.”<sup>81</sup> Herzog maintains that these religious motives are still present, though they now dominate Israeli society because the biblical stories legitimate Israel’s existence. Herzog opines that:

Any attempt to question the reliability of the biblical descriptions is perceived as an attempt to undermine “our historic right to the land” and as shattering the myth of the nation that is renewing the ancient Kingdom of Israel. These symbolic elements constitute such a critical component of the construction of the Israeli identity that any attempt to call their veracity into question encounters hostility or silence.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Whitelam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: The silencing of Palestinian History*, p.73.

<sup>79</sup> Ze'ev Herzog, “Deconstructing the walls of Jericho,” *Ha'aertz*, 29 October 1999, <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/jerques.htm> (4 August, 2004).

<sup>80</sup> Ze'ev Herzog, “Deconstructing the walls of Jericho,” *Ha'aertz*.

<sup>81</sup> Ze'ev Herzog, “Deconstructing the walls of Jericho,” *Ha'aertz*.

<sup>82</sup> Ze'ev Herzog, “Deconstructing the walls of Jericho,” *Ha'aertz*.

In this case, knowledge is silenced because of political interests. Both Whitelam and Herzog acknowledge that knowledge induces and sustains effects of power relations and effects of power relations produce, extend and support knowledge.

Archaeology and genealogy enable me to explore the discursive and non-discursive (re-)creation of direct violence between Palestinians and Israel. I reject as explanations for the ongoing violence, *inter alia*, those premised on Arafat's intransigence or Barak's uncompromising bargaining. Rather, the continuation of specific analytics of truth and Israeli practices such as settlement construction (re-)produced the conditions for direct violence between Palestinians and Israel. Furthermore, I propose a discursive shift that must be made in order to change this discursive effect.

### *Organization of My Project*

I argue my thesis over the course of eight chapters. The present chapter is foundational. It structures the dissertation. I have also used it to explain the analytical utility of archaeology and genealogy. I have articulated my thesis and now explain the manner in which I will execute this argument.

The second chapter is my literature review. This chapter performs three tasks. First, in it I catalogue and organize the literature on Palestinian-Israeli relations and the Oslo Process into three different corpuses. The first corpus is the dominant or hegemonic reading of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the wake of the DOPOISGA. This corpus interprets and represents the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. The



second corpus interprets and represents the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a negotiated surrender, from both the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. The third corpus, what I have identified (in response to Guyatt's assessment of the Oslo Accords) as the critical corpus, interprets and represents the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as occupation by other means.

Second, I rationalize my labeling the first corpus, that which interprets the DOPOISGA as a peacemaking breakthrough, by demonstrating that it has been popularly adopted and that power has been exercised in accordance with it. Third, I analyze why the dominant reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process has been propagated; I study the political function of this reading. More specifically, I outline the manner in which the PLO, Israel and the U.S. benefited from propagating, and subscribing to a reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as peacemaking breakthrough.

I examine the analytics of truth governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in chapters three through six. I identify six analytics dividing them equally into systematic silences and rules of formation. Then, positing the DOPOISGA and the start of the Oslo Process as a potential discursive discontinuity I study these analytics before and after 1993. Chapter three describes the pre-1993 silences of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations; chapter four the pre-1993 rules of formation; chapter five the post-1993 silences; and chapter six the post-1993 rules of formation. I demonstrate that the rules of exclusion and formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations

did not change with the start of the Oslo Process. In chapters five and six I also show that the Oslo Process, in fact, institutionalized these analytics and that these silences and rules persist into the contemporary period.

In chapter seven I study Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians. Positing the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a potential non-discursive discontinuity I study these practices or procedures before and after 1993. I focus specifically on Israel's settlement construction, moves to produce "acceptable" interlocutors and initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation. Here I demonstrate that non-discursive practices initiated by Israel with regard to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have persisted throughout the Oslo Process "breakthrough".

Chapter eight concludes my project. In it I outline the logic of my argument that persistence of the discursive analytics of truth studied in chapters three through six and the non-discursive practices examined in chapter seven (re-)produced conditions for direct violence between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead of accepting the hegemonic reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough and then trying to come to grips with years of subsequent violence, I argue that the Oslo Process did not serve as a rupture in the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and that the continuation of rules of formation and exclusion and practices and procedures produced the conditions for and perpetuate the current and ongoing direct violence.

I close with an outline of the implications of my analysis. I evaluate recent initiatives intended to end Palestinian-Israeli violence and offer a suggestion intended to encourage Palestinian-Israeli peace. Rather than outline the

percentages of land that might be exchanged between Israel and a nascent Palestinian state or produce an inventive solution to the question of sovereignty in Jerusalem, I suggest a change to the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

## Chapter Two – Reading the Oslo Process

This chapter reviews the literature surrounding the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process specifically and Palestinian-Israeli relations more generally. I have made three assertions regarding this literature: 1) the dominant reading of the Oslo Process interprets and represents the process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations; 2) there exists a critical corpus of literature that rejects the idea that the DOPOISGA was a landmark peace accord and sees in it instead the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by other means; and 3) the dominant reading is dominant because subscription to it was beneficial to the PLO, Israel and the U.S.

In this chapter I make evident these claims. I do so in three stages. First, I catalogue and organize the literature into three categories. The first corpus authors and reproduces an interpretation of the Oslo Process as a landmark peace process and a political discontinuity that fundamentally changed the nature of Palestinian-Israeli relations. I demonstrate that it is this corpus which identifies the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough. The second corpus interprets and represents the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a negotiated surrender from either the Israeli or Palestinian perspectives. Like the first corpus, this body of literature sees in the Oslo Process a fundamental change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. The third corpus, what I have referred to previously as the skeptical corpus, is the dissenting literature. It challenges the notion that the Oslo Process was a peacemaking breakthrough. Reviewing this

literature I more fully explain the manner in which it sees the continuation of the Israeli occupation through the Oslo Process. Second, I justify my labeling the first corpus the dominant or hegemonic reading of the Oslo Process. I demonstrate that this reading has been popularly adopted, institutionalized and power has been exercised in accordance with it. Third, I explain the political function of the dominant reading. I show how the PLO, Israel and the U.S. benefited from an interpretation and representations of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough.

### *The Oslo Process*

First, a brief review of the DOPOISGA and the subsequent agreements, protocols and memorandum constituting the Oslo Process is in order. The Oslo Process is a series of agreements, protocols, memorandums and the attendant negotiations that was initiated in 1993. The process began 20 January 1993 as a series of meetings between two Israeli academics and three PLO officials, including Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) in Oslo, Norway – hence, the term Oslo process. After five months the Israeli delegation was upgraded to include Uri Savir, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry and Yoel Singer. These meetings produced an exchange of letters between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Arafat's letter, signed Chairman of the PLO as opposed to President as he had signed documents since the 1988 Declaration of Palestinian independence, of 9 September 1993 stated that:

The PLO recognized the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

The letter also explained that the PLO renounced the use of terrorism and other acts of violence.<sup>2</sup> Rabin's single sentence response to Arafat's letter announced that "in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process."<sup>3</sup>

These letters, in turn, precipitated the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on 13 September 1993. The DOPISGA was followed by the Cairo Agreement of 9 February 1994<sup>4</sup>, the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of 29 August 1994<sup>5</sup>, the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of 27 August 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip<sup>6</sup> of 28 September 1995, the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and its appended Note for the Record of 17 January 1997, the Wye River

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<sup>1</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement : a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 128.

<sup>3</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 129.

<sup>4</sup> The Cairo Agreement is also identified as the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.

<sup>5</sup> The literature also refers to this agreement as the Early Empowerment Agreement.

<sup>6</sup> The literature also identifies this agreement as Oslo II.

Memorandum of 23 October 1998, the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations of 4 September 1999 and the more recent Trilateral Statement of 25 July 2000<sup>7</sup> and the remarks made by U.S. President Clinton and Egyptian President Mubarak following the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit of 17 October 2000.<sup>8</sup>

*Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements*

Article I of the DOPOISGA states as the aim of the negotiations:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the 'Council') for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the DOPOISGA notes that the interim period would begin with Israel's redeployment of military forces out of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area; outlines that issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, borders and relations and cooperation with neighbors would not be broached until permanent status negotiations; and commands that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) "establish a strong police force" while Israel retains

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<sup>7</sup> This followed the negotiations at Camp David.

<sup>8</sup> The literature identifies this round of negotiations as the Taba Round.

<sup>9</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 117.

responsibility for external security, settlements, military installations, Israelis and foreign relations (this last point is repeatedly emphasized, including in the agreement's Annex II).

*Cairo Agreement, Early Empowerment Agreement and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities*

The Cairo Agreement began the partitioning of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by transferring Jericho and parts of the Gaza Strip to the PNA (the maps depicting these areas were not made public) and adumbrating that Israeli settlements and military installations in the Gaza Strip would remain under Israeli authority. Further, it emphasized that Israel had overriding responsibility for security and defined the residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank as those Palestinians recorded in the population registry of the Israeli military government. The Early Empowerment Agreement and its extensive annexes transfer powers, responsibilities and authority for education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and Value Added Tax on local production from the Israeli military government to the PNA; reaffirms that responsibility for Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, Israelis and foreign relations remains with the Israeli military government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; allows the PNA to promulgate "secondary legislation" provided it is not opposed by Israel; requires that the PNA assume financial responsibility for any acts or omissions that occurred during the Israeli military government's occupation; outlines that the Israeli military government retains power over criminal matters in the West Bank; and explains that the PNA has no authority to take enforcement measures against



Israelis. The Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities consigns the authorities, powers and responsibilities for labor, commerce and industry, gas and petroleum, insurance, postal services, local government and agriculture from the Israeli military government to the PNA. This protocol explains that PNA jurisdiction does not apply to permanent status issues. Furthermore, its annex concerning the sphere of statistics, transfers to the PNA, the authority and means to gather information and statistics on the Palestinian populations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

*Oslo II, the Hebron Protocol and the Wye River and Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandums*

Oslo II superseded the three previous agreements. Oslo II reaffirms that the PNA has no responsibility for foreign relations and that Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are excluded from the PNA's authority; twice instructs the PNA that it must establish a strong police force responsible for internal security and public order (Israelis are excluded from this force's purview); commands that Israel and the PNA cooperate in combating criminal activity; and partitions the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a more detailed manner by redeploying the Israeli military and assigning different power and responsibilities to Areas A, B and C (Area A being under Palestinian administrative and security control, Area B being under Palestinian administrative control and Israeli security control and Area C being under Israeli administrative and security control). The Hebron Protocol still further partitions the West Bank and Gaza Strip by transferring responsibility for the town of Hebron, except for the Israeli enclave in the heart of the city, to

Palestinian administrative control through a redeployment of Israeli forces. The Hebron Protocol also demands that the PNA fight terror and prevent violence by strengthening security cooperation with the Israeli military government and combating terrorist organizations and their infrastructure. The Wye River Memorandum furthered the partition of Israel/Palestine by transferring a total of 13% of Area C to Areas A and B (1% to Area A and 12% to Area B, 3% of the latter being designated a nature reserve). The Wye River Memorandum also attached a timeline for the implementation of three phased Israeli redeployments. The Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, like previous steps in the process, continued the partition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by transferring different percentages of land between different areas. These transfers were phased according to a timeline for Israeli redeployments. This memorandum also set a timetable for the resumption of permanent status negotiations and the conclusion of a final, comprehensive agreement.

#### *Trilateral Statement and President Clinton Remarks*

The Trilateral Statement that concluded the Camp David negotiations of 2000 simply states that the two parties will endeavor to conclude an agreement on all permanent status issues as quickly as possible. President Clinton's remarks following the recent Sharm El-Sheik Summit called for an end to the ongoing violence in Israel and the OPT.

### *Corpus 1 – Oslo as Peacemaking Breakthrough*

Even before the DOPOISGA was signed it was being hailed as historic. In his 9 September 1993 letter to Prime Minister Rabin Arafat explained that the “signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East.”<sup>10</sup> He continued by expressing that the “PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger the peace and stability.”<sup>11</sup> Less than two weeks after the signing ceremony, during his submission of the DOPOISGA to the Israeli Knesset, Rabin said that he believed the declaration had opened a gate of peace for Israel,<sup>12</sup> and that it “symbolized a victory for Zionism which [had been] recognized by its most adamant and bitter enemies.”<sup>13</sup>

The academic literature on the Oslo Process authors and reproduces an interpretation of the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. In contrast to the immediacy and descriptive nature of public and media statements, it is in this corpus that one finds explanations as to the meaning of the term “breakthrough”. The scholarly literature best explains the various usage of epithets such as historic and characterizations of the DOPOISGA as a discontinuity in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Table 1 summarizes the thematics and representative statements that are discussed below.

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<sup>10</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 128.

<sup>11</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 128.

<sup>12</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 149.

<sup>13</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 155.

Table 1. Corpus 1 – Peacemaking Breakthrough

Thematic	Representative Statements
DOPOISGA as Peacemaking Breakthrough	<p>“the mother of all breakthroughs” (Shlaim)</p> <p>“[t]he rules of the game in the entire Middle East have radically changed” (Shlaim)</p> <p>“a watershed in the history of the Middle East” (Peres)</p> <p>the DOPOISGA was without precedent (Savir)</p> <p>“[the DOPOISGA] signaled to the whole world a new beginning” (Ashrawi)</p>
Explaining the Peacemaking Breakthrough	<p>“Arab-Israeli conflict has been largely resolved” (Rubin)</p> <p>the PLO was deprived of its Soviet ally after 1991, denied funding from its Arab patrons, challenged by political rivals and confronted by an American hegemon (Rubin)</p> <p>macro-level force evolutions and the Oslo micro-process produced “a fundamental breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Kelman)</p> <p>Rabin created cultural space in Israel that allowed for “a major foreign policy change” (Barnett)</p> <p>“crisis in Palestinian fortunes ... brought the PLO to the negotiating table” (Beilin)</p>
Peacemaking Breakthrough as an Analytical Point of Departure	<p>“Oslo Peace Process [be] considered within the category of other extended processes of negotiations and attempted reconciliation” (Lustick)</p> <p>“the [Oslo] peace process has marked a turn in history” in which Europe must be more involved (Olson)</p> <p>use the Oslo Process to analyze prenegotiation processes (Watkins and Lundberg)</p> <p>Oslo process as study in post-war bargaining (Aggenstam and Jonsson)</p> <p>Oslo Process as case study for ripeness theory, process analysis and theories of mediation (Zartman, Bercovitch and Kadayifc)</p>
Post-2000 Reproduction of Peacemaking Breakthrough	<p>“there is no alternative to a peace process in the Middle East” (Lalor)</p> <p>“there is no alternative (or no better alternative) to the resumption of peace talks at some point in the months ahead” (Rothstein, Ma’oz and Shikaki)</p>

*DOPOISGA as Peacemaking Breakthrough*

I will begin my survey of the academic literature with Avi Shlaim. Shlaim called the DOPIOSGA “the mother of all breakthroughs”<sup>14</sup> and “one of the most momentous events in the twentieth-century.”<sup>15</sup> Elsewhere he has identified the Declaration of Principles as “a historic breakthrough.”<sup>16</sup> As recently as 2000, Shlaim stated that “[f]uture generations will look back on Monday, 13 September 1993 ... as one of the most momentous events in the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century.”<sup>17</sup>

Again, in his Spring 1994 article Shlaim stated that: “[t]aken together, the two parts of the Oslo accord fully merit the overworked epithet ‘historic’.”<sup>18</sup> Shlaim reasons that the accord “reconcile[s] the two principal parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict” by leaving behind the mutual denials and rejections of Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms and replacing them with mutual recognition. Furthermore, he asserts, the declaration represents a historic territorial compromise by which both Palestinians and Israelis accept the partition of Palestine.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): p. 24.

<sup>15</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> Avi Shlaim, “Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor and the Palestinians,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 2 (1994), p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed. (New York : W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 517.

<sup>18</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 25.

<sup>19</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” pp. 25-26.

According to Shlaim, the DOPOISGA should also be understood as a historic breakthrough because it has wider implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>20</sup> “The rules of the game in the entire Middle East have radically changed”<sup>21</sup> because “PLO recognition of Israel legitimizes the normalization of relations between the rest of the Arab world and Israel”<sup>22</sup> and because Israel’s recognition of the PLO changes the established Zionist policy of courting heads of states and bypassing local Arab leaders.<sup>23</sup>

Shlaim’s statements are neither excessive nor hyperbolic, but they are representative of a much larger corpus of literature. Similarly laudatory statements have been made by Peres, Savir, Ashrawi, and Rubin. Israel’s Foreign Minister in 1993, Shimon Peres reproduces the peacemaking breakthrough reading of the DOPOISGA. In his introductory chapter entitled “The Dawn of Peace” Peres called the DOPOISGA “a watershed in the history of the Middle East.”<sup>24</sup> Peres’ rationale for this claim is that the declaration provided Israel with security impossible to obtain militarily, its longed for recognition by the PLO, and ushered in new relations between Israelis and Palestinians and the other Arab states in the region. It effectively revolutionized political relations in the Middle East – hence, the title of the book, *The New Middle East*. Uri Savir, deputy to Peres and chief Israeli negotiator in Oslo, represented the Oslo Process as a breakthrough (title of the first section) and the dismantling of occupation (the title

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<sup>20</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 26.

<sup>21</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 27.

<sup>22</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 26.

<sup>23</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 27.

<sup>24</sup> Shimon Peres, and Arye Naor, *The New Middle East*, 1st ed ed. (New York : Henry Holt, 1993), p.1.

of chapter 7) in his text *The Process: The 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*. Reproducing the landmark peace accord reading, he variously notes “the agreement’s momentous importance,”<sup>25</sup> that the DOPOISGA was without precedent,<sup>26</sup> and that because of the Oslo agreement the region was about to be transformed.<sup>27</sup> For Savir:

The whole region was about to be transformed, and every faction was forced to define its core interests and how it meant to protect them. On September 13, 1993, the kaleidoscope of colliding interests and new symmetries had begun to turn. The Oslo agreement was wedged between faith in an evolving new reality and ingrained suspicions and prejudices; between common pragmatic economic interests and traditional religious and cultural convictions. But the sharpest clash over Oslo was between the supporters of a delicate, intricately crafted peace process and its ideological and physical opponents; between two partners who had decided upon a division of assets as a strategic objective and forces that wanted to have it all; between those who wished to see the walls of hate crumble and those who saw in them a necessary protection of traditional values.<sup>28</sup>

According to Savir, the DOPOISGA was a breakthrough because it represented a territorial compromise between Jews and Palestinians and a psychological discontinuity with the past; now in place of ancient hatred, violently articulated, Jews and Palestinians could be accommodating and conciliatory and negotiate.

Hanan Ashrawi, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, also reproduces an interpretation of the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Ashrawi was a Palestinian negotiator during the Madrid

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<sup>25</sup> Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 58.

<sup>26</sup> Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East*, p. 61.

<sup>27</sup> Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East*, p. 87.

<sup>28</sup> Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East*, p. 87.

Conference. She also helped in the last-minute drafting of the DOPOISGA and was in attendance for the White House signing ceremony. Ashrawi helped found the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights, stood for and was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PNC) and is currently Secretary General of MIFTAH – the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy.

Ashrawi's *This Side of Peace* encapsulates her oft contradictory positions vis-à-vis the Oslo Process. Various Ashrawi notes that security for Israelis meant repression and human rights violations for Palestinians,<sup>29</sup> that the PNA served as a surrogate occupier for Israel in the West Bank and Gaza,<sup>30</sup> and that the Palestinians were legalizing apartheid in Palestine.<sup>31</sup> She also calls the Gaza-Jericho agreement “a flawed agreement, diminished by the dictates of the disequilibrium of power and self-preservation.”<sup>32</sup> At the same time, she does not challenge the interpretation of the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough stating that the DOPOISGA “signalled to the world a new beginning.”<sup>33</sup> What was Ashrawi's rationale for this statement? First, through the Oslo Process, or because of it, Ashrawi sees the opportunity for Palestinians to build nationhood and democracy through civil societal institutions.<sup>34</sup> Second, “a whole new

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<sup>29</sup> Hanan Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p.12.

<sup>30</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p. 293.

<sup>32</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p. 300.

<sup>33</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p.11.

<sup>34</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p. 302.



dynamic developed in ... Palestinian-Israel relations.”<sup>35</sup> Third, the DOPOISGA “also signaled to the Arab world that other separate bilateral deals were permissible and that normalization (particularly economic) with Israel could commence.”<sup>36</sup> For Ashrawi, the Oslo Process was a breakthrough because it affected intra-Palestinian relations, Palestinian-Israel relations and Arab-Israeli relations.

Usher describes Ashrawi as a pro-Oslo Palestinian due to the merit she saw in the DOPOISGA, specifically its reference to UNSC Resolution 242 and the implications of this reference as they pertain to international jurisprudence and the (now recognized) occupied status of the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>37</sup> I concur with Usher’s assessment, Ashrawi’s criticisms from *This Side of Peace* notwithstanding. Because of this I have elected to associate her with the dominant interpretation and representation of the Oslo Process.

While they do not explain the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process, mention must be made here of other Palestinian political functionaries who have reproduced the interpretation of the Oslo Process as peacemaking process. Saeb Erakat<sup>38</sup> was a member of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Conference initiated in 1991. He was also present at the 1993 DOPOISGA signing ceremony.

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<sup>35</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p.11.

<sup>36</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p.11.

<sup>37</sup> Graham Usher, *Palestine in Crisis : the Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*, Transnational Institute Series: Transnational Institute Series (London, East Haven, Conn.: Pluto Press, 1995), p.9.

<sup>38</sup> It should be noted that the spelling “Erekat” is also prominent in the literature. I have adopted this spelling from his 1995 interview for the *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Saeb Erakat, and Sharif S. Elmusa, "Facing the Critics on the Long Road to Self-Rule.," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (1995): 73-79.

Following the constitution of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) Erakat was named Minister of Local Government Affairs. It was as minister that he was interviewed for the *Journal of Palestine Studies* and defended the Oslo Peace Process.<sup>39</sup> Erakat complained of roadblocks, settlement expansion, land confiscation, house demolitions and the Israeli quarantine of Gaza and was critical of the pace of negotiations but remained dutifully obedient to the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process; for Erakat the Oslo Process was a peace process.

In addition to Ashrawi and Erakat other prominent Palestinians similarly endorsed the Oslo Process and thereby (re)produced the hegemonic reading. Faisal Husseini as a member of Palestine's original landowning elite was also a delegate to the Madrid Conference and perused the initialled DOPOISGA. Despite his concerns regarding "the gaps, ambiguities, lack of detail, and absence of implementation mechanisms"<sup>40</sup> Husseini tirelessly represented Palestinians in Jerusalem after 1993 in accordance with the Oslo agreements. Marwan Barghouti (now imprisoned by Israel as a terrorist) as head of Fatah in the West Bank campaigned on a platform supporting the Oslo Process in his successful bid for a seat in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Like Ashrawi, Usher identifies Barghouti as a pro-Oslo Palestinian.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, like Erakat and Ashrawi

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<sup>39</sup> Saeb Erakat, and Sharif S. Elmusa, "Facing the Critics on the Long Road to Self-Rule.," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (1995): 73-79.

<sup>40</sup> Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, p. 260.

<sup>41</sup> Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: the Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*, pp. 9-10.

Barghouti reproduced the idea that the Oslo Process was a peace process between Palestinians and Israel.

Finally, note must also be made of the role played by Ahmad Qurei and Mahmoud Abbas in the (re)production of the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the Oslo Process. Qurei was the PLO's treasurer in 1992. More importantly, he met 'illegally' with Yai Hirschfield (sent by Beilin) in December 1992.<sup>42</sup> These meeting were moved to Oslo in 1993 during which time Qurei was joined by Arafat's political advisor Abbas.<sup>43</sup> Qurei and Abbas are chiefly responsible for producing the DOPOISGA in Oslo which other negotiators such as Ashrawi and Hussein subsequently read after it had been initialled by Arafat. As recently as 2002 Abbas endorsed the now tattered process which he helped to midwife. While criticizing the militarization of the current *intifada* Abbas reminded his audience (the heads of the popular committees of the Gaza Strip refugee camps) that: "We must not forget that when we came here via the Oslo gateway, we came in order to complete the *peace* process. Therefore, at the very heart of our struggle, there is a goal that we must achieve."<sup>44</sup> With this reminder Abbas explicitly reproduces the dominant reading of the Oslo Process.

Why are these two Palestinian functionaries worthy of noting in this discussion? Arafat is also known as Abu Ammar. Similarly, Qurei is known as Abu Ala and Abbas as Abu Mazen. The attentive reader will note that in reverse

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<sup>42</sup> Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: the Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*, p. 7.

<sup>43</sup> Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: the Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup> "Mahmud Abbas's Call for a Halt to the Militarization of the Intifada," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 2 (2003): p. 74. My emphasis added.

order these two were the first Palestinian Prime Ministers appointed by Arafat at the behest of the U.S. and Israel. The two Palestinians selected by Arafat as Israel's interlocutors since the collapse of formal institutionalized negotiations in 2000 are both ardent supporters of the Oslo Process.

Pre-eminent Israeli and Palestinian political figures/functionaries have (re)produced the reading of the Oslo Process that interprets and represents the process as a reconciliatory discontinuity in Palestinian-Israeli relations and as a peace process. Even those not privy to the initial discussions in Oslo, namely Ashrawi, Husseini and Barghouti, have reproduced the dominant interpretation.

### *Explaining the Peacemaking Breakthrough*

Returning now to scholarly explanations for the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process, Rubin declared in 1996 the Arab-Israeli conflict over,<sup>45</sup> that "the Arab-Israeli conflict ha[d] faded as a central problem of this area's [the Middle East] politics"<sup>46</sup> and that the "Arab-Israeli conflict ha[d] been largely resolved."<sup>47</sup> According to Rubin the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process was a breakthrough because it achieved original Israeli goals, namely, "ending the conflict, gaining recognition and peace from the Arab side, and securing its pre-1967 borders."<sup>48</sup>

While Rubin also makes a number of statements bearing on compromise, concessions, impracticality and Israel's conciliatory nature to which I will return

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<sup>45</sup> Barry Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over," *Middle East Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (1996): p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over," p.11.

<sup>47</sup> Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over," p.11.

<sup>48</sup> Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over," p. 9.

in subsequent chapters, I want to focus on his explanation for the “breakthrough”. Rubín argues that Palestinian and Arab intransigent rejection of Israel changed gradually over the course of several decades due to a number of events. With specific reference to Palestinians, Rubín contends that their acceptance of Israel was necessitated because the PLO was deprived of its Soviet ally after 1991, denied funding from its Arab patrons in the aftermath of the UN’s action against Iraq, challenged by political rivals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and confronted by an American hegemon allied with Israel.<sup>49</sup>

Rubín is not the only author to accept the premise that the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process was a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations and then explain it as such. In fact, a number of authors reproduce the dominant reading by explaining the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough; they take as an analytical point of departure the interpretation of authors of statements and texts such as Arafat, Peres, Savir and Rubín. Included in this corpus are Kelman, Barnett, Said Aly and Beilin.

Kelman contends that evolving macro-level force evolutions – long-term changes and short-term strategic and domestic-political considerations – as well as unofficial interactions between Israel and the PLO induced participation at Oslo.<sup>50</sup> Once the decision to negotiate was taken, suggests Kelman, the micro-process provided by Oslo contributed to the success of the negotiations.<sup>51</sup> While an interesting argument, it is of secondary importance to my current exegesis.

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<sup>49</sup> Rubín, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” p. 8.

<sup>50</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): p. 183.

<sup>51</sup> Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” p. 183.

What is more important to note is the manner in which Kelman reproduces the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the Oslo Process. In fact, this interpretation pervades his work: the title of his article is “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough”<sup>52</sup>; he opens with the statement that “[d]espite some of the asymmetries, ambiguities, and contradictions of the Oslo agreement, it represents a fundamental breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”<sup>53</sup>; he states further that “[e]ven if the peace process initiated by the Oslo accord was to collapse ... the accord has fundamentally changed the character of the conflict”<sup>54</sup>; and he asserts that “the Oslo accord marks a major turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”<sup>55</sup> Kelman re-authorizes all of the elements of the dominant reading: the Oslo Process is a peace process and a historic breakthrough, a discontinuity, in Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Barnett answers the question: “[w]hat forces within Israel made possible its embrace of the Oslo Accords?”<sup>56</sup> He explains Israel’s acceptance of the DOPOISGA by blending constructivist and institutionalist claims to argue that Rabin sought to create “a cultural space in Israeli politics in which withdrawal from the territories became desirable and legitimate.”<sup>57</sup> Again, my interest is not so much with his argument as with the fact that he dutifully reproduces the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process in his analysis. Barnett identifies

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<sup>52</sup> Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” p.183.

<sup>53</sup> Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” p.183.

<sup>54</sup> Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” p.183.

<sup>55</sup> Kelman, “Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough,” p.184.

<sup>56</sup> Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): p. 5.

<sup>57</sup> Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” p. 5.

Israel's acceptance of the DOPOISGA as a "major foreign policy change."<sup>58</sup> This is the breakthrough motif. More importantly, he repeatedly refers to the "peace process." In fact, he too, re-authorizes the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation by concluding his article with a consideration of the "peace process under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu."<sup>59</sup>

In 1994 Said Aly declared that "[n]ever in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict have the prospects for peace been better than today."<sup>60</sup> Highlighting the Second Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union Said Aly explains the negotiation of the DOPOISGA and discusses the prospects for regional Middle East peace observing that the states of the region had embarked on a new era.<sup>61</sup> Again, in this explanation of the Oslo Process the author re-authorizes the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the dominant reading. States Said Aly: "Clearly, then, a breakthrough has taken place in the Arab-Israeli peace process."<sup>62</sup> Further to my point Said Aly entitled the fifth section of his article "Breakthrough: From Washington to Oslo"<sup>63</sup> and the sixth section "Prospects for Peace and Challenges of the Future."<sup>64</sup> Both titles are clear in their reproduction of the Oslo Process as peacemaking breakthrough interpretation.

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<sup>58</sup> Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," p. 5.

<sup>59</sup> Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," p. 9.

<sup>60</sup> Abdel Monem Said Aly, "The Road to Oslo and Beyond," *Security Dialogue* 25, no. 1 (1994): p. 37.

<sup>61</sup> Said Aly, "The Road to Oslo and Beyond," p. 49.

<sup>62</sup> Said Aly, "The Road to Oslo and Beyond," p. 38.

<sup>63</sup> Said Aly, "The Road to Oslo and Beyond," p.45.

<sup>64</sup> Said Aly, "The Road to Oslo and Beyond," p.48.

Beilin focuses on intra-Palestinian politics to explain the start of the Oslo Process. Beilin repeatedly states that Palestinian negotiators in Oslo were aware that “the PLO was in danger of losing ground to HAMAS;”<sup>65</sup> the PLO was in a parlous state;<sup>66</sup> the PLO was in “danger of losing its primacy over HAMAS;”<sup>67</sup> the negotiators “feared the growing power of HAMAS”<sup>68</sup> and that it was the “crisis in Palestinian fortunes which had brought the PLO to the negotiating table.”<sup>69</sup> Beilin, like Kelman, Barnett and Said Aly reproduces the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the Oslo Process entitling his book *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to the Final Agreement*.

#### *Peacemaking Breakthrough as an Analytical Point of Departure*

This is not the extent of the literature reproducing and re-representing the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a reconciliatory discontinuity in Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli relations. In fact, an even larger corpus of secondary literature has been produced that takes as its analytical point of departure the interpretations of the dominant reading. Again, the arguments and analyses in this literature are not as important as the fact that these authors reproduce the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation by using it as an analytical assumption. This interpretation has been deployed by authors such as Lustick, Kelman and Olson in their studies of the Oslo Process. It has also been used by authors such as

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<sup>65</sup> Yossi Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999), p. 61.

<sup>66</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 65.

<sup>67</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 67.

<sup>68</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 81.

<sup>69</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 122.



Watkins and Lundberg, Aggenstam and Jonsson and Rouyer to produce further knowledge bearing on, *inter alia*, conflict resolution studies and regional riparian concerns.

Both Lustick and Morag reproduce the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the Oslo Process in their studies. Lustick examines the manner in which opponents of the Oslo Process intentionally treat the constituent agreements as a legal codex rather than a political framework.<sup>70</sup> By so doing, opponents supplant an ambiguous framework for incubating trust and reconciliation with an adversarial legal environment.<sup>71</sup> Framing the agreements as rigid legal requirements rather than a more flexible framework allowing for deviation borne of ambiguity, says Lustick, allows Israeli opponents of the Oslo Process to continuously demonstrate Palestinian “intransigence” and failures to comply. In other words, the Oslo Process is interpreted in a specific manner and this interpretation, in turn, is politically deployed in an attempt to undermine and defraud the process.

In making this argument Lustick reproduces the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process. To open the article Lustick suggests that the “Oslo Peace Process [be] considered within the category of other extended processes of negotiations and attempted reconciliation.”<sup>72</sup> He closes his article with the suggestion that the Oslo Process is one of many “peace agreements designed to

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<sup>70</sup> Ian S. Lustick, “The Oslo Agreement As an Obstacle to Peace,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, no. 1 (1997): p. 62.

<sup>71</sup> Lustick, “The Oslo Agreement As an Obstacle to Peace,” p. 62.

<sup>72</sup> Lustick, “The Oslo Agreement As an Obstacle to Peace,” p.61.

end protracted conflicts.”<sup>73</sup> Such statements are representative of the fact that the interpretation that the Oslo Process was a peacemaking process pervades Lustick’s work.

Morag is even more straightforward in his reproduction of the dominant reading. This is evident in the title of his article ‘ “Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process”’.<sup>74</sup> This reading is further evident in the following statement:

the opaque nature of the Oslo process, which effectively left all options open for the final settlement, served the needs of the negotiators and their political bosses by enabling the parties to achieve a breakthrough without, at the same time, relinquishing strongly held positions as to the nature of the final settlement.<sup>75</sup>

Finally, the peacemaking interpretation of the Oslo Process is reaffirmed by Morag in his conclusion with three references to “the peace process”<sup>76</sup> and some suggestions as to how it might be sped to its logical conclusion of “creating a Palestinian state in much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with some type of link to East Jerusalem.”<sup>77</sup>

Everything about Kelman’s research indicates a subscription to the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. His article entitled “Building Sustainable

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<sup>73</sup> Lustick, “The Oslo Agreement As an Obstacle to Peace,” p.66.

<sup>74</sup> Nadav Morag, “Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process,” *Israel Affairs* 6, no. 3/4 (2000): p. 201.

<sup>75</sup> Morag, “Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process,” p. 201.

<sup>76</sup> Morag, “Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process,” pp. 218 and 219.

<sup>77</sup> Morag, “Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process,” p.220.

Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations”<sup>78</sup> was “based on the 1997 Lifetime Contributions to Peace Award address”<sup>79</sup> and was published in *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*. In the process of arguing “that the strictly pragmatic, step-by-step approach of Oslo has reached a dead end and that cajoling the parties into signing an agreement is now irrelevant”<sup>80</sup> Kelman states that: “[t]he Oslo agreements represented a major breakthrough in the conflict”<sup>81</sup> and that “the Oslo agreement represented a move toward a principled solution of the conflict, toward a historic compromise, opening the way to reconciliation.”<sup>82</sup> Kelman concludes with an argument for the need and elements of a principled peace; how “to move the peace process in the direction of a principled peace and ultimate reconciliation.”<sup>83</sup>

A year later the same journal published Abu-Nimer’s “Peace Building in Postsettlement: Challenges for Israeli and Palestinian Peace Educators.”<sup>84</sup> In his

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<sup>78</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” *Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 5, no. 2 (1999): pp.101-115.

<sup>79</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 115.

<sup>80</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 101.

<sup>81</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” 101.

<sup>82</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” p.104.

<sup>83</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” p.109.

<sup>84</sup> Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “Peace Building in Postsettlement: Challenges for Israeli and Palestinian Peace Educators,” *Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 6, no. 1 (2000): pp.1-21.

examination of “the dynamics of postsettlement peace-building activities and priorities as perceived by Israeli and Palestinian educators”<sup>85</sup> Abu-Nimer stated:

The Oslo agreement and the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signing ceremony of September 1993 were viewed by politicians and scholars as remarkable *breakthroughs* in the course of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For the first time in the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations, leaders on both sides recognized each other’s right to existence and acknowledged each other’s national identity. Following this *historic accomplishment*, supporters of the *peace* process had hoped to transform images of the other side, to present them as partners for peace rather than as quiet holders of guns or aggressors.<sup>86</sup>

This statement contains and reproduces all of the elements of the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the Oslo Process.

Not to be outdone, Shikaki is even more absolute in his reproduction of the Oslo Process as peacemaking breakthrough reading. The title of his article is “The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies.”<sup>87</sup> Over the course of his examination into the future of the Oslo Process and possible Palestinian strategies in the wake of Benjamin Netanyahu’s election as Israeli Prime Minister in 1996 he references the “peace process” no less than 10 times. He also reproduces the breakthrough motif of the dominant reading arguing that:

[u]nder the Oslo process, Israel *for the first time* recognized three essential facts which it cannot fully reverse: It recognized the existence of a Palestinian people with political rights; it recognized the PLO as the representative of that people; and it recognized that the West Bank and

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<sup>85</sup> Abu-Nimer, “Peace Building in Postsettlement: Challenges for Israeli and Palestinian Peace Educators,” p.1.

<sup>86</sup> Abu-Nimer, “Peace Building in Postsettlement: Challenges for Israeli and Palestinian Peace Educators,” p.3. My emphases added.

<sup>87</sup> Khalil Shikaki, “The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 1 (1996): pp. 82-88.

Gaza Strip constitute a single territorial unit. These facts were followed by facts on the ground: Israel's withdrawal from most of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the creation of a political entity in the Gaza strip resembling a state and another in the West Bank with less resemblance to a state.<sup>88</sup>

In parallel fashion Olson asserts that the “the [Oslo] peace process has marked a turn in history.”<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, in arguing for further European inclusion in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations Olson makes no less than 13 references to the “peace process.”

The equation of the Oslo Process with peace process has been deployed as a foundational assumption upon which a larger edifice of knowledge has been built. While not as explicit in their articulation of the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation as others, authors such as Hermann, Watkins and Lundberg and Zartman all use this interpretation as their point of analytical departure, thereby reproducing the dominant reading. Hermann<sup>90</sup> and Tessler and Nachtwey<sup>91</sup> examine Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of and attitudes toward the Oslo Process studying, for example, the Israeli public's involvement in “high politics”<sup>92</sup> and the (non)relationship between Islamic piety and attitudes toward

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<sup>88</sup> Shikaki, “The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies,” pp.82-83. My emphasis added.

<sup>89</sup> Robert K. Olson, “Partners in the Peace Process: The United States and Europe,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 4 (1997): p. 78.

<sup>90</sup> Tamar Hemann, “Israeli Perceptions and the Oslo Process,” *Peace Review* 10, no. 4 (1998): pp. 647-654.

<sup>91</sup> Mark Tessler, and Jodi Nachtwey, “Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data From the West Bank and Gaza,” *Israel Studies* 4, no. 1 (1999): pp. 22-43.

<sup>92</sup> Hermann, “Israeli Perceptions and the Oslo Process,” pp. 647-654.

either Arab-Jewish coexistence or peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO.<sup>93</sup>

As regards conflict resolution literature, Watkins and Lundberg develop a framework using the Oslo Process to analyze prenegotiation processes.<sup>94</sup> These authors attempt to understand changes in the balance of myriad forces such as geopolitical, internal, political and psychological that lead to negotiated settlements. Mazen uses the Oslo process to focus on the differences between conflict resolution and conflict settlement.<sup>95</sup> Aggenstam and Jonsson use the Oslo agreements as a case study in post-war bargaining to highlight the saliency of timing, domestic leadership, (re)framing of enemy images and the effectiveness of third party intervention.<sup>96</sup> Calling the Oslo negotiations “one of the most dramatic peace initiatives in the history of the Middle East conflict,”<sup>97</sup> Mor investigates the relationship between public opinion and peace initiatives and the utility of theoretical analysis grounded in war-proneness literature. Sucharov studies the Oslo Process to investigate “the function of national sovereignty conceptions in

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<sup>93</sup> Tessler and Nachtwey, “Palestinian Political Attitudes: An Analysis of Survey Data From the West Bank and Gaza,” pp. 22-43.

<sup>94</sup> Michael Watkins, and Kirsten Lundberg, “Getting to the Table in Oslo: Driving Forces and Channel Factors,” *Negotiation Journal* 14, no. 2 (1998): pp. 115-136.

<sup>95</sup> Abdelmagid M. Mazen, “When Settlement and Resolution Are in Conflict: Searching for a Mideast Peace Dividend,” *Negotiation Journal* 14, no. 4 (1998): pp. 357-368.

<sup>96</sup> Karin Aggenstam, and Christer Jonsson, “(Un)Ending Conflict: Challenges in Post-War Bargaining,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): pp. 771-793.

<sup>97</sup> Ben D. Mor, “Peace Initiatives and Public Opinion: The Domestic Context of Conflict Resolution,” *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 2 (1997): p. 206.

predicting the resolution of territorial conflicts.”<sup>98</sup> Zartman uses the Oslo Process to evaluate the explanatory usefulness of ripeness theory, process analysis and theories of mediation in conflict resolution.<sup>99</sup> Hirschfeld and Roling explore the people-to-people strategy (direct dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis not mediated by the state) as a means of building and consolidating sustainable peace between Palestinians and Israelis.<sup>100</sup> Bercovitch and Kadayifc understand the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a complex intractable conflict. They argue that such conflicts have multiple “ripe moments” that allow for the intervention of mediators. The authors contend that 1993 was one such ripe moment and that the U.S., the EU, Japan and Russia must work in concert to create another such ripe moment.<sup>101</sup> Finally, Jamal examines the relations between conflict transformation, recognition of Palestinian equal worth, peace leaders’ discourse in Israel and the traditional Zionist narrative.<sup>102</sup> While by far the most critical piece included in the dominant corpus as it engages issues of recognition and cultural and symbolic hegemony, the Jamal text nonetheless accepts the peacemaking breakthrough reading of the Oslo Process.

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<sup>98</sup> Mira Sucharov, “Regional Identity and the Sovereignty Principle: Explaining Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking,” in *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernism* ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), pp. 177-196.

<sup>99</sup> I. William Zartman, “Explaining Oslo,” *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): pp. 195-215.

<sup>100</sup> Yair Hirschfeld, and Sharon Roling, “The Oslo Process and the People-to-People Strategy,” *Development* 43, no. 3 (2000): pp. 23-28.

<sup>101</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and S. Ayse Kadayifc. “Conflict Management and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: the Importance of Capturing the “right Moment”. *Asia-Pacific Review*. 9:2 (2002), pp. 113-129.

<sup>102</sup> Amal Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): pp. 36-51.

These texts treat disparate themes such as psychological inclination towards peace, bargaining and negotiation methods, theory testing and means of consolidating peace. More importantly, they also, by virtue of the fact that they mobilize it as their analytical point of departure, re-authorize, reproduce and re-represent the dominant reconciliatory discontinuity reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process.

Rouyer treats the salient issue of regional riparian concerns within the context of the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. It should be noted that Rouyer's is not the only article I reference in regards to riparian issues – another is cited in the third corpus. Its adoption of the dominant reading does however make this a representative piece and worthy of inclusion in this first body of academic literature. Rouyer's article is entitled "The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process."<sup>103</sup> In it he correctly states that while water concerns are important to both Palestinians and Israelis, the crucial problem is inequality in the distribution and use of water between the two parties. In support of this assertion he makes the following statements: "In 1995, at the time of the Taba Agreements, Palestinians constituted 31% of the population of Israel and the Palestinian territories, but consumed only 10% of its water;"<sup>104</sup> "[r]oughly 25-30% of Israel's total water resources come from the West Bank, but, more importantly, about 50% of its drinking water;"<sup>105</sup> and "an estimate [on settler water-consumption] would be that settlers use 1/3-1/2 of all the water consumed

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<sup>103</sup> Alwyn R. Rouyer, "The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process," *Survival* 39, no. 2 (1997): pp.57-81.

<sup>104</sup> Rouyer, "The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process," p.62.

<sup>105</sup> Rouyer, "The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process," p.63.



in the West Bank, most of it for irrigation. Settlers numbering around 130,000 consume 60-100 mcm, while 1.2 million Palestinians consume 100-140 mcm.”<sup>106</sup> These interesting and telling statements are made in the context of the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process. In fact, Rouyer’s project is to realize an equitable share of scarce water resources through the final status negotiations of the Oslo peace process.

### *Post-2000 Reproduction of Peacemaking Breakthrough*

The academic literature reproducing and re-presenting the Oslo Process as peace process interpretation has not lost its authority as agreements were reneged upon, redeployments were postponed, and the body count has risen in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. In 2000, Kingston with Haklai and Hashemi contemplated the state of the Middle East in *International Journal*.<sup>107</sup> Their review is again premised on the equation of the Oslo Process with peace process. State the authors: “[d]espite... the apparent setback to the peace process, we argue that the Middle East region is now underpinned by new strategic and political realities that will prevent a return to the patterns of conflict of the past.”<sup>108</sup> In their conclusion the authors also speak to the “deterioration of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process”<sup>109</sup> as a condition that will not fundamentally destabilize the region. Similarly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published

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<sup>106</sup> Rouyer, “The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process,” p.63.

<sup>107</sup> Paul Kingston, Oded Haklai, and Nader Hashemi, “Entering the 21st Century,” *International Journal* 55, no. 4 (2000): pp. 647-654.

<sup>108</sup> Kingston, Haklai and Hashemi, “Entering the 21st Century,” p.647.

<sup>109</sup> Kingston, Haklai and Hashemi, “Entering the 21st Century,” p. 654.

an update on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in its annual *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* in 2001.<sup>110</sup> The article variously states that: the peace process was in its worst crisis;<sup>111</sup> there was “increasing disenchantment with the Oslo peace process;”<sup>112</sup> the “[Israeli] government was torn by problems that had little to do with the peace process;”<sup>113</sup> there was a high “degree of Palestinian frustration with the peace process;”<sup>114</sup> and “[i]ntensive diplomatic efforts by various parties to secure a ceasefire and get the peace process back on track failed.”<sup>115</sup> After observing that “[t]he Oslo process was in ruins, fighting between Palestinians and Israelis was continuing and relations between the two sides and between Israel and the Arab world were at their lowest point since 1993”<sup>116</sup> the article ends with the categorical assertion “that there is no alternative to a peace process in the Middle East.”<sup>117</sup> Both of these articles subscribe to and reproduce the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. The interpretation of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as peacemaking breakthrough structured or framed both analyses.

Even more recent are the Rothstein, Ma’oz and Shikakai and Reuveny texts. In their 2002 publication Rothstein *et al* are absolutely committed to the

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<sup>110</sup> Paul Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 162-173.

<sup>111</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p.162.

<sup>112</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p.164.

<sup>113</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p.166.

<sup>114</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p.169.

<sup>115</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p.170.

<sup>116</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p.162.

<sup>117</sup> Lalor, “Appendix 2C. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 2000,” p. 173.

equation of Oslo Process with peace process.<sup>118</sup> The preface identifies the “Oslo peace process” as an “evolving international issue” and asserts, much like SIPRI update, that “there is no alternative (or no better alternative) to the resumption of peace talks at some point in the months ahead.”<sup>119</sup> Ma’oz’s contribution to this edited volume, “The Oslo Peace Process: From Breakthrough to Breakdown”, encapsulates in its title this text’s reproduction of the peacemaking breakthrough interpretation of the Oslo Process. Reuveny’s 2003 article in *Political Geography* entitled “Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian conflict”<sup>120</sup> asks the question “why did the Oslo peace process fail to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?”<sup>121</sup> Reuveny argues that “the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict is driven by Israeli colonialism”<sup>122</sup> and that in order to resolve the conflict Israel must end its colonial enterprise by withdrawing from all of the West Bank and Gaza and evacuating all of its settlements.<sup>123</sup> Reuveny’s article is interesting because while it is sufficiently critical to note that Palestinian terrorism

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<sup>118</sup> Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma’oz and Khalil Shikaki. *The Israeli-Palestinians Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure: Perspectives, Predicaments and Prospects* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002).

<sup>119</sup> Robert L Rothstein, Moshe Ma’oz, and Khalil Shiqaqi, *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo and the Lessons of Failure: Perspectives, Predicaments and Prospects* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), p.vii.

<sup>120</sup> R. Reuveny, “Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Political Geography* 22, no. 4 (2003): pp. 347-380.

<sup>121</sup> Reuveny, “Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli Palestinian conflict,” p. 348.

<sup>122</sup> Reuveny, “Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli Palestinian conflict,” p. 347.

<sup>123</sup> Reuveny, “Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli Palestinian conflict,” p. 347.

is merely symptomatic of the underlying malaise of Israeli colonialism<sup>124</sup> and decolonisation is a necessary condition for peace,<sup>125</sup> it is argued in accordance with the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. The interpretations of this reading quite clearly inform his research question – the Oslo Process was a peace process and it can be judged to have failed given that it did not produce peace and reconciliation but rather violence. Furthermore, the interpretations also permeate his arguments as to how the process might be rescued or successfully concluded – Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip and parts of East Jerusalem, a financial settling of Palestinian refugee claims, constructive engagement with Palestinian Islamists and Israeli fundamentalists and Israeli decolonization.<sup>126</sup>

Between 28 September 2000 and 28 September 2004 more than 3,266 Palestinians and 999 Israelis were killed, more than 3000 Palestinian homes were razed and the Israeli army re-occupied all of the West Bank and portions of the Gaza Strip, yet the dominant reading of the Oslo Process continues to exercise authority in the academic literature. While each of the four cited texts published since 2000 have recognized that the process is in crisis, none of the texts dissented from the consensus that the Oslo Process was in fact a peacemaking breakthrough.

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<sup>124</sup> Reuveny, "Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli Palestinian conflict," p. 370.

<sup>125</sup> Reuveny, "Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli Palestinian conflict," p. 376.

<sup>126</sup> Reuveny, "Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli Palestinian conflict," pp.375-376.

## *Corpus 2 – Oslo as Negotiated Surrender*

Having reviewed the first corpus of academic literature and its reproduction of the peacemaking breakthrough reading of the Oslo Process, I now turn to the second body of scholarly work on the Oslo Process. The second body interprets and represents the Oslo Process as a text of capitulation and submission. Both the first and second corpuses interpret and represent the Oslo Process as a political discontinuity; as marking a fundamental change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Texts in this second corpus are divided as to whether the Oslo Process was a peace process. Some reject this interpretation thereby distinguishing themselves markedly from the first corpus. Other texts, however, do subscribe to the interpretation of the Oslo Process as a peace process. However, these texts in contradistinction to those in the first corpus, understand it as a peace arrived at, not through reconciliation, but through surrender. The DOPOISGA and the Oslo agreements are the terms of either Israeli or Palestinian surrender. While an alternate interpretation of the Oslo Process, this corpus is significantly smaller in size, number of articulators and reproductive capacity. Table 2 summarizes the thematics and representative statements that are discussed below.

Table 2. Corpus 2 - Surrender

Thematic	Representative Statements
DOPOISGA as (Israeli/Palestinian) Capitulation	<p>“[t]he Israeli government is not signing a peace treaty. It is signing a document of capitulation.” (Shamir)</p> <p>“accord is not a compromise, but a one-sided victory for Israel” (Baram)</p> <p>the Oslo agreements are “a negotiated surrender” (Ellis)</p>
Oslo Process as Dangerous Endeavor	<p>the DOPOISGA was a dangerous experiment for Israel (Bar-Ilan)</p> <p>through the DOPOISGA Israel offered historic concessions in an attempt to “buy peace with aggressive neighbors.” (Feith)</p>
DOPOISGA as Ideological Disintegration	<p>the DOPOISGA ushered in “an ideological disintegration [in Israel] whose magnitude and meaning defy comprehension.” (Hazony)</p>

*DOPOISGA as (Israeli) Capitulation*

Even before the signing of the DOPOISGA Moshe Shamir was denouncing the agreement as a “false peace”<sup>127</sup>, “a document of capitulation”<sup>128</sup> and a “black paper”<sup>129</sup> that was entered into by a gullible Israeli government. Shamir is categorical: “[t]he Israeli government today legitimises with its signature the sentence of death and destruction, written in the poison of Arab hatred and soaked in the blood of thousands of our dead.”<sup>130</sup> Furthermore, he

<sup>127</sup> Moshe Shamir, “It Will Not Be,” *Middle East International*, no. 459 ( 24 September 1994): p. 24.

<sup>128</sup> Shamir, “It Will Not Be,” p. 24.

<sup>129</sup> Shamir, “It Will Not Be,” p. 24. This is a direct reference to the British/Churchill White Paper of 1922 which re-examined and depreciated the currency of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which had promised Jews a homeland in mandate Palestine.

<sup>130</sup> Shamir, “It Will Not Be,” p.24.

asserts: “[t]he Israeli government is not signing a peace treaty. It is signing a document of capitulation.”<sup>131</sup> For Shamir, the DOPOISGA was not a peace agreement. It did however, mark a fundamental change in Palestinian-Israeli relations; the change being that Israel’s government had surrendered to “Arab-Muslim Nazism.”<sup>132</sup> While this piece is not strictly academic (it originally appeared on the front page of *Ma’ariv*), I have included it in this corpus because it is representative and, more importantly, because it was reproduced and published in the periodical *Middle East International* two weeks later. This re-presentation entered these statements into academic discourse.

#### *Oslo Process as Dangerous Endeavor*

Not to be outdone, in late 1993 David Bar-Ilan, editor of the *Jerusalem Post* and subsequently head of policy planning and communications in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office, intimated that the DOPOISGA was a dangerous experiment for Israel.<sup>133</sup> According to Bar-Ilan the change wrought by the Oslo Process was to open the door to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This Palestinian state, in turn, could not be guaranteed not to threaten Israel – according to his title it remained a mortal threat to Israel. In fact, Bar-Ilan speculates that with the founding of a Palestinian state the entire Arab world might unite to finally eliminate Israel. The changes to Palestinian-Israeli relations ushered in by the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process prompts Bar-Ilan to conclude

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<sup>131</sup> Shamir, “It Will Not Be,” p.24.

<sup>132</sup> Shamir, “It Will Not Be,” p.24.

<sup>133</sup> David Bar-Illan, “Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat,” *Commentary* 96, no. 5 (1993): pp. 27-31.

with a warning: “Now Saddam Hussein’s ally and staunchest supporter [Arafat] will have his headquarters in Jericho – a 30-minute leisurely drive from Jerusalem. And make no mistake: when Arafat and his associates say ‘Next Year in Jerusalem,’ they mean it.”<sup>134</sup>

By 1996 the same author, in response to the previously cited Rubin article, was arguing that Palestinians specifically and Arab regimes generally decided that open war with Israel was no longer an option so instead they opted to destroy Israel through stages – the first of which was to accept the Oslo agreements.<sup>135</sup> Says Bar-Ilan: “[t]hese [Arab] regimes have finally realized that the chances of defeating Israel in open war are slim, and that the most viable alternative is the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Phased Plan of June 9, 1974, a blueprint for Israel destruction that Yasir Arafat regularly cites in speeches and interviews to justify the PLO’s acceptance of the Oslo agreements.”<sup>136</sup> Again, for Bar-Ilan the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process had changed the nature of Palestinian-Israeli relations; the change was that Israel had effectively surrendered by entering into a process which would only end with its own destruction.

Similarly, in 1994 Douglas Feith argued that the DOPOISGA was a breakthrough and pondered the nature of this breakthrough. Stated Feith: “No one can doubt that these agreements [the DOPOISGA and the Arafat and Rabin

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<sup>134</sup> Bar-Ilan, “Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat,” p. 31.

<sup>135</sup> David Bar-Ilan, “No, That’s Too Logical,” *Middle East Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (1996): pp.12-14.

<sup>136</sup> Bar-Ilan, “No, That’s Too Logical,” p. 12.



letters] are significant; but what exactly do they signify?”<sup>137</sup> First, Feith compares the DOPOISGA to the Camp David Accords noting that: “[p]lacing the 1978 accord side by side with the 1993 DOP highlights the historic and unprecedented nature of Israel’s concessions in the latter agreement.”<sup>138</sup> Next, he critiques the Israeli policy of trading occupied land for peace with the surrounding Arab states. His conclusion is that by initiating the Oslo process Israel had offered unprecedented and dangerous concessions to a recalcitrant enemy. The discontinuity of the DOPOISGA in this case was that Israel started “to try to buy peace with [its] aggressive neighbors.”<sup>139</sup>

#### *DOPOISGA as Ideological Disintegration*

Finally, Hazony argues that the DOPOISGA betrays Zionism.<sup>140</sup> Further, the Oslo Process initiated, and is speeding, Israel’s ideological disintegration.<sup>141</sup> According to Hazony, the early Oslo agreements call into question the ideational motivations that have guided Israeli behavior for more than a century. Palestinian-Israeli relations are being changed, according to Hazony, because the DOPOISGA ushered in “an ideological disintegration [in Israel] whose magnitude and meaning defy comprehension.”<sup>142</sup> Hazony’s article is apocalyptic. It shares with the dominant reading of the Oslo Process the discontinuity tenet. However, the

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<sup>137</sup> Douglas J. Feith, “Land for No Peace,” *Commentary* 97, no. 6 (1994): pp. 32-36.

<sup>138</sup> Feith, “Land for No Peace,” pp. 32.

<sup>139</sup> Feith, “Land for No Peace,” p. 36.

<sup>140</sup> Yoram Hazony, “The End of Zionism and the Last Israeli,” *Weekly Standard* 1, no. 4 (1995): p. 33.

<sup>141</sup> Hazony, “The End of Zionism and the Last Israeli,” p. 34.

<sup>142</sup> Hazony, “The End of Zionism and the Last Israeli,” p. 34.

article's focus on Israel's ideological collapse is much more akin to the capitulation tenet of this second corpus than the peace/reconciliation tenet of the previous corpus.

### *DOPOISGA as (Palestinian) Capitulation*

Palestinians, as well as those associated with the cause of Palestinian national self-determination, have also decried the Oslo Process as one of capitulation. Like Shamir, Baram was denouncing the DOPOISGA even before its signing. In the 10 September edition of *Middle East International* Baram remarked that in agreeing to start the Oslo Process the "Palestinians have given in completely."<sup>143</sup> In a return to my definitional exercise in the introduction he also stated that the "accord is not a compromise, but a one-sided victory for Israel."<sup>144</sup> For Baram, the DOPOISGA was a change – Palestinians had finally capitulated in their struggle against Israel. Furthermore, the Oslo Process was not about peace through reconciliation, but rather peace through surrender and submission.

Lastly, Ellis, in keeping with the motif of this corpus, calls the Oslo agreements a "negotiated surrender."<sup>145</sup> Also of note is his engaging argument regarding the separation of Jews and Palestinians envisioned and institutionalized by the Oslo Process.

Separation allows for a cleansing of Jewish history, to  
maintain that no one was displaced, no villages were

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<sup>143</sup> Haim Baram, "Victory for Israel's Doves," *Middle East International*, no. 457 (10 September 1993): p. 4.

<sup>144</sup> Baram, "Victory for Israel's Doves," p. 5.

<sup>145</sup> Marc H. Ellis, "The Future of Israel/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p. 63.

destroyed, no resisters were murdered. The cleansing of separation is twofold: Palestinians are cleansed from their land and Jews are cleansed of their deeds. Victory is assured, and with clean hands, as if the crime of displacing a people had not been committed.<sup>146</sup>

According to Ellis, the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process mark a change in Palestinian-Israeli relations, not because they initiated a peace process, but because they mark a new stage in the struggle for Israel/Palestine. Says Ellis: “the [Oslo] accords can be viewed as bringing the almost century-long struggle of Jews and Palestinians to a new stage, the outcome of which remains undecided.”<sup>147</sup> For Ellis, the Oslo Process is a new stage in which one of the competitors for Israel/Palestine has capitulated; the modalities of surrender are to be worked out.

Here, I must note that in looking towards the future Ellis asserts that “[t]o allow Israel and Palestine to remain in their present configuration is to consign Palestinians to a ghettoized, apartheid-like series of Bantustans.”<sup>148</sup> It is with this idea that I move from reviewing the second corpus of literature to the third. Recall, that the first two bodies of literature share an interpretation of the Oslo Process that sees it as a discontinuity in Palestinian-Israeli relations. Recall further, that both corpuses understand the Oslo Process as a peace process – in the case of the first corpus peace through reconciliation; in the second, peace through surrender. The third corpus rejects both the tenets of the dominant reading of the process – the Oslo Process is neither a breakthrough or discontinuity in

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<sup>146</sup> Ellis, “The Future of Israel/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle,” p. 58.

<sup>147</sup> Ellis, “The Future of Israel/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle,” p. 57.

<sup>148</sup> Ellis, “The Future of Israel/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle,” p. 64.

Palestinian-Israeli relations nor was the process about peacemaking through reconciliation.

### *Corpus 3 – Oslo as Occupation by Other Means*

The third body of academic literature dealing with the Oslo Process is critical. It rejects the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. This corpus interprets and represents the Oslo Process as a repackaging of the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Table 3 summarizes the thematics and representative statements that are discussed below.

Table 3. Corpus 3 – Critical

Thematic	Representative Statements
DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as Continuity/Apartheid	<p data-bbox="652 327 1219 355">“[the DOPOISGA] consolidated Israeli occupation.” (Said)</p> <p data-bbox="652 385 1103 412">“self-rule is occupation by other means” (Said)</p> <p data-bbox="652 442 1224 519">“the dynamic of occupation and resistance continues [after the DOPOISGA], transformed but not replaced by anything that remotely can be termed ‘peace’.” (Stork)</p> <p data-bbox="652 549 1235 604">“Israel intends that the Palestinian entity will have much less power and dignity than a Bantustan” (Shahak)</p> <p data-bbox="652 634 1157 661">“[Palestinian] independence is a chimera” (De Jong)</p> <p data-bbox="652 691 1246 795">“hegemonic system imposed by Israel ... did not disappear with the implementation of the peace process but was maintained ... via the Palestinian Authority (PA) set up under Oslo” (Roy)</p> <p data-bbox="652 825 1240 902">“much of what had previously been patron-client relations under occupation were suddenly discursively repackaged and represented as ... cooperation” (Selby)</p>
Post-2000 Reproduction of DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as Continuity/Apartheid	<p data-bbox="652 959 1235 987">“[Palestinian entity is a] Bantustan-style statelet” (Chomsky)</p> <p data-bbox="652 1017 1224 1093">“[the Oslo agreements are a] caricature of South Africa’s Bantustans, the Palestinian territorial jurisdiction comprises scores of tiny, isolated fragments.” (Finkelstein)</p> <p data-bbox="652 1123 1246 1178">“[the Oslo Process is] a sordid detour on the path to a just and lasting peace.” (Finkelstein)</p>

*DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as Continuity/Apartheid*

The most prominent and ardent challenger of the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process was Edward Said. He articulated his dissenting interpretation of the Oslo Process immediately, refusing to attend the DOPOISGA signing ceremony on the White House lawn. A week after the signing ceremony he published his first engagement with the Oslo Process in *The Nation*. This article

places in quotes the epithet “historical breakthrough.”<sup>149</sup> It also reminds the reader that the agreement still leaves Palestinians in a subordinate position vis-à-vis Israel and raises many important questions.

Said also denounced the Declaration of Principles as a Palestinian capitulation,<sup>150</sup> specifically Arafat’s capitulation.<sup>151</sup> While this denunciation reads as similar to those I have grouped in the second corpus, one must appreciate that this is not the extent of Said’s critical engagement with the Oslo Process. Said’s critique is premised on the idea that the agreements “consolidated Israeli occupation”<sup>152</sup> of the territories. Said sees the Oslo process constructing an Israeli protectorate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>153</sup> The process gives the PNA enough authority in the autonomous areas to act as Israel’s enforcer of order and transforms the PLO into an agency responsible to Israel for any failure in public order.<sup>154</sup> Through the Oslo process “Israel has secured ... official Palestinian consent to Israeli occupation, which continues in a streamlined and more economical form.”<sup>155</sup> For Said, “self rule is occupation by other means.”<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Edward W. Said, “Arafat’s Deal,” *The Nation* (20 September 1993): pp.269-270.

<sup>150</sup> Edward W. Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*, 1st ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 38.

<sup>151</sup> Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 121.

<sup>152</sup> Edward W. Said, and Mouin Rabbani, “Symbols Versus Substance: A Year After the Declaration of Principles,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (1995): p. 61.

<sup>153</sup> Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>154</sup> Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 70.

<sup>155</sup> Edward W. Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), p. 14.

Joe Stork, editor of *Middle East Report*, in writing the foreword to Usher's *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo* states that "the dynamic of occupation and resistance continues [after the DOPOISGA], transformed but not replaced by anything that remotely can be termed 'peace'."<sup>157</sup> He continues: "With Oslo and particularly with the subsequent Cairo Accord of May 1994, the 'peace process' has shifted to some extent, with the important exception of Jerusalem, from an imposition of occupation to an imposition of separation – not in the form of two states, Israeli and Palestinian, but in a manner resembling that of South Africa's structuring of apartheid."<sup>158</sup> Usher himself notes that the DOPOISGA "is not a peace treaty but an agenda for negotiations."<sup>159</sup> Usher's later statement regarding interpretation of the start of the Oslo Process bears quoting at length:

If Rabin's notion of the DOP was almost entirely security-based, there was another Israeli vision underlying it – that of Moshe Dayan and his contemporary protégés, Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin. Dayan was Israel's minister of defence when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, and he has increasingly argued that Palestinians should be granted 'functional autonomy' over all civic matters that concerned them, while Israel would keep a firm grip on the territories' resources and security. In this scenario, it ultimately mattered little what the Palestinians called their 'functional cantons' – self-government, statehood or confederation – nor which polity controlled them – the PLO, a Palestinian National Authority or Jordan. What

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<sup>156</sup> Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 177.

<sup>157</sup> Joe Stork, foreword to *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo*, by Usher, p. viii.

<sup>158</sup> Stork, foreword to *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo*, by Usher, p. ix.

<sup>159</sup> Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo*, p. 8.

mattered was that modalities of Israel's rule in the territories – its hegemony over 'resources and security' – would be sustained. In the Declaration of Principles, they are.<sup>160</sup>

Writing a year later and highlighting the fact that the Oslo II agreement did not fundamentally change the asymmetrical power relationship between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but rather shifted the burden of policing recalcitrant Palestinian forces from that of the Israeli army to the Palestinian police services – empowering natives to police the natives – Usher offers an elucidating quote from Rabin. Cites Usher quoting Rabin:

“The Palestinians will be better at it than we were,” he said in September 1993, “because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the Israeli Association of Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by their own methods, freeing, and this is most important, the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they do.”<sup>161</sup>

Usher makes the point that Rabin, quite clearly, envisioned no modification to Israeli hegemony over the territories nor any change to the practice of disciplining Palestinians. All that would change would be the disciplinarian.

Others have articulated ideas similar to those of Said, Stork and Usher, some invoking the term “Bantustan” explicitly as regards the results of the Oslo Process. While Mouin Rabbani subsumes his own evaluation of the Oslo Process under an outlining of the views of “Oslo rejectionists”, he does call the spatial organization of territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip a “textbook case of

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<sup>160</sup> Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo*, p. 12.

<sup>161</sup> Graham Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 2 (1996): p. 28.



Bantustanisation.”<sup>162</sup> Similarly, noted Israeli human rights activist Israel Shahak quotes the chief political correspondent for *Ha'aretz*, Uzi Benziman, as saying that “Israel intends that the Palestinian entity will have much less power and dignity than a Bantustan.”<sup>163</sup>

Others have spoken to the controlling and imprisonment of Palestinians through the Oslo Process without specific reference to the South African system of apartheid.<sup>164</sup> Valerie York saw in the Oslo process a “new system of control.”<sup>165</sup> In 1993, Adoni recognized that the Oslo “agreement involve[s] a number of Palestinian commitments to discipline Palestinians in the occupied territories.”<sup>166</sup> Four years later Adoni saw in the subsequent Oslo agreements the transfer of responsibilities to the PNA but no sovereignty for Palestinians.<sup>167</sup> Aruri saw Israel’s illegal occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip continuing with the Oslo Process. He identified in the Oslo agreements a push for “Palestinians to assume the burdens of administration but not the responsibility for controlling

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<sup>162</sup> Mouin Rabbani, “Gaza-Jericho First: the Palestinian Debate,” *Middle East International*, no. 459 (24 September 1993): p. 17.

<sup>163</sup> Israel Shahak, “The Oslo Accords: Interpreting Israel's Intentions,” *Middle East International*, no. 461 (22 October 1993): p. 18.

<sup>164</sup> For journalistic articulations of these ideas see: Amira Hass, “Israel has failed the test,” *Ha'aretz*, 18 October 2000, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com> (18 October 2000) and Amira Hass, “Lies accompanied by bullets,” *Ha'aretz*, 11 October 2000, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com> (11 October 2000).

<sup>165</sup> Valerie York, “The Middle East's Slow March Towards Peace,” *World Today* 50, no. 5 (1994): p. 88.

<sup>166</sup> Lamis Andoni, “The Role of Arafat's Opponents,” *Middle East International*, no. 459 (24 September 1993): p. 8.

<sup>167</sup> Lamis Andoni, “Redefining Oslo: Negotiating the Hebron Protocol,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p. 27.

their own lives.”<sup>168</sup> Finally, Hagopian offered the instructive comment that Palestinians were “incarcerated by Oslo.”<sup>169</sup> Rather than deploy the specific term “apartheid”, these texts identified in the Oslo Process a more general, or possibly generic, disciplinary regime which denied Palestinians meaningful political independence. Of course, the implications are the same whether the text is explicit or not – Palestinians are to remain objects of constant surveillance and positive and negative sanctions, be segregated, politically, socially and economically, from themselves and Israelis, into discontinuous cantons invested with few resources and even less sovereignty. Further to the point, all of these texts identify in the Oslo Process the continuation of Israeli policies and practices. The DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process was not a breakthrough, but rather a continuation. Moreover, this continuity was not about peacemaking through reconciliation but rather the maintenance of Israeli hegemony over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In addition to the more general literature cited above, some excellent research has been conducted as regards the specific structuring of space in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the political functions served by Israeli infrastructure in the construction of Palestinian bantustans. De Jong examines Israel’s settlement policy and determines that settlements, highway systems and construction in and around Jerusalem are intended to deprive the incipient Palestinian state of natural resources such as water and arable land as well as Jerusalem as an economic center. He concludes that the space of mandate

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<sup>168</sup> Naseer H. Aruri, “Early Empowerment: The Burden Not the Responsibility,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (1995): p. 39.

<sup>169</sup> Elaine C. Hagopian, “Is the Peace Process a Process for Peace? A Retrospective Analysis of Oslo,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1997): p. 21.

Palestine is being organized so as to make Palestinian “independence a chimera.”<sup>170</sup> Even more interesting is Halper’s contention that “Israel has laid a matrix of control over the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza.”<sup>171</sup> Halper makes this argument by identifying and explaining the manner in which bypass roads, industrial parks and army bases function as mechanisms of political control. It is through such mechanisms, says Halper, that Israel is able to offer Palestinian negotiators 94% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip without relinquishing hegemony over the territory. In keeping with the themes prevalent in this corpus, both of these texts refer to Israeli designed “bantustans.”<sup>172</sup>

Roy studies the political economy of Israel’s “occupation by other means.” Roy has followed her *The Gaza Strip: A Demographic, Economic, Social and Legal Survey* and more specifically *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development* with articles such as “Separation or Integration: Closure and the Economic Future of the Gaza Strip Revisited”,<sup>173</sup> “De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo”<sup>174</sup> and

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<sup>170</sup> Jan de Jong, “The Geography of Politics: Israel’s Settlement Drive After Oslo,” *After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems* eds. George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning, (Chicago: Pluto Press: 1998), p. 94.

<sup>171</sup> Jeff Halper, “The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix of Control,” *Middle East Report*, no. 216 (2000): p. 15.

<sup>172</sup> see de Jong, “The Geography of Politics: Israel’s Settlement Drive After Oslo,” *After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems* eds. George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning, p. 88 and Halper, “The 94 Percent Solution: A Matrix of Control,” pp. 15 & 19.

<sup>173</sup> Sara Roy, “Separation or Integration: Closure and the Economic Future of the Gaza Strip Revisited,” *Middle East Journal* 48, no. 1 (1994): pp. 11-30.

<sup>174</sup> Sara Roy, “De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 3 (1999): pp. 64-83.

“Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility”.<sup>175</sup> In the most recent work, Roy’s analysis sees structures of Palestinian dependency and underdevelopment producing a militarized society and, concomitantly, undermining civil societal institutions and any semblance of the rule of law. Says Roy: “at no time since the beginning of Israeli occupation in 1967 had the Palestinian economy been as weak and its people as vulnerable as during the seven Oslo years.”<sup>176</sup> Palestinian social structures are in a similarly ruinous state. Israel’s closures of the dependent occupied Palestinian territories, along with other draconian measures, have meant devastating economic losses for the Palestinian economy, increasing instances of child malnourishment and labour and extraordinarily high unemployment rates. This, in turn, she argues has incubated a frustration finally articulated in the ongoing *intifada*.

More to the point of locating Roy’s political economy of the occupation in this third corpus of literature, Roy states conclusively that Israel, through the Oslo Process, turned Palestinian territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip into bantustans<sup>177</sup> and that the fundamental objective of the process was the cantonization of Palestinians and their land.<sup>178</sup> Most importantly, she asserts that “[t]he hegemonic system imposed by Israel during twenty-six years of direct rule did not disappear with the implementation of the peace process but was

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<sup>175</sup> Sara Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” *Journal of Palestine Studie* 30, no. 4 (2001): pp. 5-20.

<sup>176</sup> Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” pp. 9-10.

<sup>177</sup> Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” p. 11.

<sup>178</sup> Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” p. 14.

maintained, with certain modifications, via the new Palestinian Authority (PA) set up under Oslo.”<sup>179</sup>

I closed my review of the first corpus with reference to an article treating riparian concerns and a discussion of the continued reproduction of the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process as peacemaking breakthrough. In the interests of parallel construction, here I will do the same but in the second stage focus instead on the continued invocation of the ideas of apartheid and Israel’s creation of Palestinian Bantustans to characterize the Oslo Process as a continuation of occupation.

The title of Jan Selby’s article demonstrates quite clearly why it has been located in this third corpus: “Dressing up domination as ‘cooperation’: the case of Israeli-Palestinian water relations.”<sup>180</sup> On a general level Selby states clearly that with the initiation of the Oslo Process “[m]uch of what had previously been patron-client relations under occupation were suddenly discursively repackaged and represented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian ‘co-operation’.”<sup>181</sup> In the tradition of other authors in this corpus such as Said, Usher and Roy, who are cited in the text, Selby includes a sub-heading that reads “repackaging of occupation.”<sup>182</sup> Speaking specifically to the issue of water Selby asserts that:

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<sup>179</sup> Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” p. 6.

<sup>180</sup> Jan Selby, “Dressing Up Domination As ‘Cooperation’: the Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2003): pp.121-138.

<sup>181</sup> Selby, “Dressing Up Domination As ‘Cooperation’: the Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations,” p. 123.

<sup>182</sup> Selby, “Dressing Up Domination As ‘Cooperation’: the Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations,” p. 127.

The formalisation of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation had enabled Israel to divest itself of some of the most onerous burdens of occupation, without losing control of either water resources or supplies to Israeli settlements, and without having to forego its discriminatory pricing policy.<sup>183</sup>

Analyzing the effects of the Oslo Process on specifically Israeli-Palestinian water relations Selby comes to the same conclusion as the authors he cites – the Oslo Process made for a more effective and efficient Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The DOPOISGA and subsequent agreements were not breakthroughs, but rather cosmetically masked continuities.<sup>184</sup>

*Post-2000 Reproduction of DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as Continuity/Apartheid*

The start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada* did not stop the production of texts mobilizing the concept of apartheid and the idea that the Oslo Process perpetuated Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by other means. One such text is *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid* published in 2001.<sup>185</sup> This text collects between two covers a number of challengers to the dominant reading of the Oslo Process, including several I have already noted – Said, Rabbani, Roy and Adoni. Chomsky's introduction effectively establishes the tenor of the text. In it he states that to call the Oslo Process a peace process is to chose "terminology

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<sup>183</sup> Selby, "Dressing Up Domination As 'Cooperation': the Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations," p. 131.

<sup>184</sup> Further to this point, Selby actually states in his introduction that the aim of his article is to offer a counternarrative emphasizing the continuities between the different Oslo periods. Selby, "Dressing Up Domination As 'Cooperation': the Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations," p.122.

<sup>185</sup> Roane Carey, ed., *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid* (London; New York: Verso, 2001).

that would not have surprised Orwell.”<sup>186</sup> Further on Chomsky refers to the envisioned Palestinian state as a “bantustan-style statelet.”<sup>187</sup> Following from this introduction the contributors speak to the repression of the Israeli occupation through and after the Oslo Process as well as Palestinian resistance to this repression.

Even more recent is Finkelstein’s *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict* published in its second edition in 2003.<sup>188</sup> Finkelstein clearly belongs in this third corpus entitling his seventh chapter “Oslo: The Apartheid Option”. While examining the Oslo I and II agreements he makes specific reference to Said and Benvenisti. Having already reviewed Said’s work, I will briefly note here Finkelstein’s own characterization of the Oslo Process (because Finkelstein contends that “the actual picture is ... even bleaker than Said suggests”)<sup>189</sup> as well as those he mentions of Benvenisti. Finkelstein asserts that the territorial bifurcation of the occupied Palestinian territories resulting from Israeli redeployments in accordance with Oslo II is a “caricature of South Africa’s Bantustans, the Palestinian territorial jurisdiction comprises scores of tiny, isolated fragments.”<sup>190</sup> Challenging the assertion that anything had to be an improvement on the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1993, Finkelstein suggests that “the new reality [of the Oslo Process] will more than

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<sup>186</sup> Noam Chomsky, Introduction to *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid* ed. Roane Carey, p. 12.

<sup>187</sup> Chomsky, Introduction to *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid* ed. Roane Carey, p. 19.

<sup>188</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: Verso, 2003).

<sup>189</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, p. 173.

<sup>190</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, p. 175.

likely allow for the tightening of Israel's grip on the Palestinians."<sup>191</sup> In line with this suggestion he quotes Benvenisti as writing "It goes without saying that 'cooperation' based on the current power relationship is no more than permanent Israeli domination in disguise, and that Palestinian self-rule is merely a euphemism for Bantustanization."<sup>192</sup> Concluding this analogous relationship between South African apartheid and the Oslo Process's organization of Palestinian space, Finkelstein tellingly observes that "Bantustans did not serve as a transit point to true emancipation; rather, they proved a major obstacle to it."<sup>193</sup> Hence, his conclusion that the Oslo Process is a sordid detour in the history of peace in Palestine.<sup>194</sup>

Phrases such as "Bantustans", "consolidated occupation", "matrix of control", "maintenance of the hegemonic system", "repackaging domination", "tightening the grip" and "permanent domination" are not the language of peacemaking breakthroughs. The authors of the third corpus of literature deploy these phrases because they are not talking about the Oslo Process as a reconciliatory discontinuity in the Palestinian-Israeli relations. Instead, what this critical corpus is talking about is the continuation of the Israeli occupation through the Oslo Process. The third corpus of literature rejects the idea that the DOPOISGA was a landmark peace accord and sees in it instead the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by other means.

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<sup>191</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, p. 177.

<sup>192</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, p. 177. See also Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

<sup>193</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, p. 180.

<sup>194</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, p. 183.



### *The Dominant Reading*

Why do I assert that the first corpus of literature, and not the third corpus for example, is the dominant reading of the Oslo Process? I have two reasons for this labeling.

My first reason is because the interpretation of the first corpus has been popularly adopted. To claim in conversation or an editorial that the Oslo Process is anything but a peace process is to commit heresy. Recall Guyatt's statement that: "Scepticism, let alone opposition to Oslo, has been condemned as a threat to peace. Peace and Oslo have become synonymous; to question the latter has implied the abandonment of the former."<sup>195</sup> The international media played a pivotal role in (re)producing the interpretation that the Oslo Process is a peace process and a discontinuity in Palestinian-Israeli relations; in establishing the tenets of the first corpus as social truisms. See Table 4 for a summary of international headlines relating to the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process.

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<sup>195</sup> Nicholas Guyatt, *The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Zed Books, 1998), p.x.

Table 4. Media Representations

Thematic	Representative Statements
DOPOISGA as Peacemaking Breakthrough	<p data-bbox="671 331 1150 391">“[DOPOISGA is a] landmark peace accord” (<i>Wall Street Journal</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 417 1119 476">“[DOPOISGA is a] Middle East breakthrough” (<i>Guardian</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 502 1172 527">“Israel and PLO sign peace pact” (<i>Washington Post</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 553 1150 612">“[on 13 September 1993] Arafat arrives in U.S. to ‘Make Peace’” (<i>New York Times</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 638 1157 697">“[13 September 1993 marked a] Rendezvous With History” (<i>Los Angeles Times</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 723 1150 783">“[on 13 September 1993] Israel makes peace with PLO” (<i>Globe and Mail</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 808 1166 868">“Israel – OLP: La Reconnaissance Mutuelle Et L’ Accerleration du Processus De Paix” (<i>Le Monde</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 893 1188 953">“[DOPOISGA is a] Breakthrough in the Middle East” (<i>Newsweek</i>)</p> <p data-bbox="671 978 1182 1051">“That handshake [between Arafat and Rabin] was a milestone, no doubt about it. Israelis and Palestinians are ready for peace at last.” (<i>Economist</i>)</p>

The media’s representation of the Oslo Process as peace process firmly established the tenets of the first corpus as axiomatic. The media did not and does not, however, (re)produce the reading that understands the Oslo Process as a peace process and a political discontinuity for no good reason. These representations reflect the fact that the effects of power have been attached to the understanding that the Oslo Process is a peace process.

My second reason for labeling the first corpus the dominant reading is because effects of power have been attached to the idea that the Oslo Process is a peace process and as such marks a fundamental change in Palestinian-Israeli relations. As I have already noted, following the signing of the DOPOISGA each

of the present heads of state, including Arafat, and ministers cast the agreement as a peacemaking breakthrough. This initial interpretation was re-enforced by such events as Clinton's attendance at the 1998 Palestinian Legislative Council meeting in which articles and provisions of the covenant were rescinded in accordance with Arafat's 1993 letter to Rabin.

Even more recently, particularly since the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*, the tenets of the first corpus have continued to prove their authority. With the start of the *intifada* in September of 2000, the United Nations passed UN Security Council Resolution 1322. This resolution called for the "immediate resumption of negotiations [between Palestinians and Israelis] within *the* Middle East peace process."<sup>196</sup> More recently, UN Security Council Resolutions 1397 and 1402 of 12 March 2002 and 30 March 2002 respectively, announced support for efforts intending to "resume *the* peace process."<sup>197</sup> The Sharm el-Sheik Summit of October 2000 called for a fact-finding committee to investigate the recent violence, the nascent Al-Aqsa *intifada*. This committee produced the Mitchell

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<sup>196</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1322 (2000) on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question," Web page, [accessed 19 March 2001]. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/679/37/PDF/N0067937.pdf?OpenElement>. My emphasis added to the definite article.

<sup>197</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1397 (2002) The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question," Web page, [accessed 10 May 2002]. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/283/59/PDF/N0228359.pdf?OpenElement> and UNSC Res. 1402 S/RES/1402 (2002) 30 March 2002. United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1402 (2002) The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question," Web page, [accessed 10 May 2002]. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/310/53/PDF/N0231053.pdf?OpenElement>. My emphasis added to the definite article.

Report. The Mitchell Report of 20 May 2001 repeatedly speaks of the Oslo Peace Process and concludes with a forceful suggestion that the state of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) resume negotiations within the context of the Oslo Process.<sup>198</sup> Canada endorsed these UN resolutions and supports the Mitchell Report's recommendations; Canada also continues to champion the bilateral negotiating framework of the Oslo Process.<sup>199</sup> Finally, largely unnoticed in President Bush's 2002 call for a change of regime in the PNA was his mention of its inclusion in *the* peace process.<sup>200</sup> Bush wanted Palestinians to elect a new leadership, but expected this leadership to return to the negotiating process initiated in Oslo. Apparently Williams' observation, made a scant two months after the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*, remains prescient – the Oslo Process is the only show in town.<sup>201</sup>

I have labeled the first corpus of literature on the Oslo Process and Palestinian-Israeli relations the dominant reading because it is almost unanimously agreed upon socially. Most importantly, power has been exercised in

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<sup>198</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

<sup>199</sup> Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "An Address to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the Situation in the Middle East," Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at [http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication\\_id=379266&Language=E](http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id=379266&Language=E).

<sup>200</sup> George W. Bush, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership," Web page, [accessed 11 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>. My emphasis added.

<sup>201</sup> Ian Williams, "Involving Annan," *Middle East International*, no. 640 (24 November 2000): p.7.

accordance with this corpus's interpretation of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations.

### *Political Functions of the Dominant Reading*

Having demonstrated that the first corpus interprets and represents the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations and that this reading is the dominant reading, it is now imperative to recognize that this reading would not have become dominant in the absence of political authorization. As the reader will recall, knowledge and power have a correlative relationship;<sup>202</sup> the exercise or production of one creates or induces the effects or production of the other.<sup>203</sup> The exercise of power produced the hegemonic reading; the dominant reading induced the effects of power. Power produced the peacemaking breakthrough reading of the DOPOISGA because it served political functions for the three primary players to the process.

I have already reviewed the various statements made by Arafat, Rabin and Clinton as to the reconciliatory and discontinuous nature of the Oslo Process. Each proclaimed the DOPOISGA a landmark peace accord and thereby author(iz)ed the peacemaking breakthrough reading. This is not the end of the matter however. The PLO, the state of Israel and the U.S. consistently

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<sup>202</sup> Hubert L Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 203.

<sup>203</sup> Michel Foucault, and Colin Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 52.

author(iz)ed this reading because, in their own ways, each party benefited from the interpretation that reads the Oslo Process as a peace process.

The signing of the DOPOISGA resurrected the PLO. This is the primary political function of the PLO's propagation of and subscription to the hegemonic interpretation. By September 1993 the PLO was on the verge of collapse facing the worst crisis since its inception.<sup>204</sup> It was financially destitute and politically marginalized both from the wider Arab world and its constituency in the Occupied Territories. Baram characterizes the organization as "caught penniless and on the verge of political disintegration."<sup>205</sup>

In 1991 Arafat supported Saddam Hussein's attempt to link Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This resulted in the revocation of Kuwaiti and Saudi financial support for the PLO. This cost the PLO Kuwait's annual contribution of \$24 million<sup>206</sup> and Saudi Arabia's annual contribution of \$72 million.<sup>207</sup> Equally devastating was the Kuwaiti decision to expel the 400,000 Palestinians working in Kuwait. This severely curtailed the amount of foreign remittances sent to relatives in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After the second Gulf War the PLO was alienated from the wider Arab world. The populations of the Arab states overwhelmingly opposed

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<sup>204</sup> Lamis Andoni, "Arafat and the PLO in Crisis," *Middle East International*, no. 457 (28 August 1993): p. 3.

<sup>205</sup> Haim Baram, "Victory for Israel's Doves," *Middle East International*, no. 457 (10 September 1993): pp. 4-5.

<sup>206</sup> This does not include the PLO "tax" imposed on Palestinian workers in Kuwait that generated and estimated \$50 million annually for the PLO. Philip Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," *Middle East Journal* 48, no. 1 (1994): p.44.

<sup>207</sup> Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," p. 44.

Iraq's actions in 1990. Arafat's apparent condoning of the invasion of Kuwait put him at odds with regional public opinion. His support of linkage made him a regional pariah.

This regional isolation was compounded by the PLO's weakness in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The *intifada* started in 1987 was not directed by the Tunis-based PLO. In fact, it was beyond the organization's control. Whatever direction it had was given it by such local leaders resident in the territories as Marwan Barghouti. Also participating in the uprising were groups representing militant Islam. HAMAS and Islamic Jihad actions against Israeli targets resulted in an alarming growth in their popular following.<sup>208</sup> These factors combined threatened to completely displace Arafat specifically and the PLO generally from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>209</sup> Recall Beilin's comments on intra-Palestinian politics and the political displacement of the PLO in 1993. Stated Beilin in *Touching Peace*: "the PLO was in danger of losing ground to HAMAS"<sup>210</sup>, the PLO was in a parlous state<sup>211</sup>, "the PLO was in danger of losing its primacy over HAMAS"<sup>212</sup>, and the Organization "feared the growing power of HAMAS."<sup>213</sup>

Recall further that Beilin surmises that it was the "crisis in Palestinian fortunes which had brought the PLO to the negotiating table."<sup>214</sup> Similarly, a month before the DOPOISGA Rabin characterized the PLO as an organization

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<sup>208</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 515.

<sup>209</sup> Joel Beinin, "Palestine and Israel: Perils of a Neoliberal, Repressive *Pax Americana*," *Social Justice* 25, no. 4 (1998): p.28.

<sup>210</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 61.

<sup>211</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 65.

<sup>212</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 67.

<sup>213</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 81.

<sup>214</sup> Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, p. 122.

that “was on the ropes”.<sup>215</sup> Perlmutter goes so far as to characterize the PLO as the weakest of all parties among politically active Palestinians.”<sup>216</sup> As a beaten boxer, the PLO accepted the DOPOISGA before its total loss was declared; the PLO threw in the towel to avoid a decisive knockout. Initiating the Oslo process rescued the PLO from political irrelevancy; it was the PLO’s towel.

The first benefit Israel accrued from accepting the hegemonic interpretation of the Oslo Process was the delivery of an emasculated, but willing, negotiating partner. Given the PLO’s dire straits, Rabin thought it probable that Arafat would drop some of the PLO’s long held negotiating principles. It was important to secure the PLO as interlocutor because it was the only Palestinian organization willing to negotiate with Israel. (This willingness was expressed in the PLO’s 1988 acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as its Declaration of Independence, both of which tacitly recognized the state of Israel.) In the absence of the PLO Israel would have been left with politically ascendant, and absolutist, groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad both of which forsake any negotiations while Israel remains in any of the territory conquered in 1967. Antedating the conclusion of Shikaki’s piece in *Foreign Affairs*, either Israel could choose to deal with the PLO in 1993 or deal with HAMAS later<sup>217</sup> (of course, there are different connotations to the phrase ‘deal with’ when discussing each organization).

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<sup>215</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.515.

<sup>216</sup> Amos Perlmutter, “The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (1995): p. 63.

<sup>217</sup> Khalil Shikaki, “Peace Now or Hamas Later,” *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 4 (1998): pp. 29-43.



The second benefit Israel accrued from accepting the hegemonic interpretation of the Oslo Process was an end to the six-year old Palestinian *intifada*. The end of this legitimate and justified exercise in civil resistance<sup>218</sup> improved Israel's international image and saved the state men and material. The international media represented the original *intifada* as a struggle between a technologically advanced army and teenage stone throwers. Images of young boys challenging tanks with rocks and slings only to be greeted with sniper fire, attack helicopters and aerial bombardment were broadcast globally. Pictures of this seriously asymmetrical engagement damaged Israel's international standing and produced numerous condemnations from organizations such as the Arab League and the United Nations. More important than improving a tarnished image however, was the fact that the start of the Oslo Process allowed Israel to substantially reduce the costs incurred by the state as a direct result of policing the *intifada*.

Economic benefits accrued by Israel's business elite<sup>219</sup> and derived from the appearance of Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking also enticed Israel to propagate

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<sup>218</sup> For an excellent article on the legitimacy of the Palestinian resistance during the first *intifada* see Richard Falk, and Burns H. Weston, "The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defence of the Intifada," *Harvard International Law Journal* 32, no. 1 (1991): 129-157 and Richard Falk, and Burns H. Weston, "The Israeli-Occupied Territories, International Law, and the Boundaries of Scholarly Discourse: A Reply to Michael Curtis," *Harvard International Law Journal* 33, no. 1 (1992): 457. See also Richard Falk, "International Law and the Al-Aqsa Intifada," *Middle East Report* 217 (2000), [http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217\\_falk.html](http://www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_falk.html).

<sup>219</sup> Here I am thinking of groups and enterprises such as Israel Discount Bankholdings, Ofer, Koor, Danker Group and Arison Holdings with principal holdings in such businesses as Discount Bank, Bank Adanim, Koor Properties,

and subscribe to the hegemonic reading. Peacemaking became a competitive prerequisite for the success of Israel's business elite. The Oslo process enabled the state of Israel to meet two demands of this elite: 1) attract foreign capital and 2) open new markets to Israeli penetration.

Shafir and Peled characterize Israel as a rentier state.<sup>220</sup> As such, it has an “unparalleled financial dependence on non-investment type foreign capital, mostly in the form of unilateral transfers (... better described as foreign subsidies).”<sup>221</sup> Israel received only a very small share of global foreign investment and capital flows into Israel were unilateral, they were not market driven.<sup>222</sup> Two of the major reasons for Israel's exclusion from the international financial markets was its constant state of military belligerency with its neighbours and the Arab boycotts. The uncertainties that accompany states of belligerency are an obvious impediment to attracting foreign capital. The Arab boycotts, however, were a more significant obstacle to the economic prosperity of Israel's business elite.

After the War of 1948, the Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, instituted a boycott of Israel. This boycott had three components. First, there was a primary boycott. This prohibited trade between any Arab state and Israel. Second, a secondary boycott boycotted companies that had business dealings with Israel. Third, a tertiary boycott

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Bank Hapoalim and Eurocom. Jonathan Nitzan, and Shimshon Bichler, *The Global Political Economy of Israel* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 86.

<sup>220</sup> Gershon Shafir, and Yoav Peled, *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), p. 6.

<sup>221</sup> Shafir and Peled, *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*, p. 6.

<sup>222</sup> Shafir and Peled, *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*, p. 7.

involved the blacklisting of companies that traded with companies with business ties to Israel.

The secondary and tertiary boycotts limited the amount of foreign capital invested in Israel. Capital was not eager to see potentially lucrative contracts with countries ranging from Morocco in the West to Iran in the East withheld because it had elected to invest in Israel. As Shafir and Peled explain, while the Arab boycott remained in place Israel's business elite could only partially participate in globalization.<sup>223</sup> The start of the Oslo Process marked the beginning of the end of the Arab boycott. In fact, by 1994 several Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates announced the cancellation of the secondary and tertiary boycotts. (At the same time, some states even began to ignore the primary boycott. Qatar, Oman and Morocco negotiated deals with Israel within a year and half of the signing of the DOPOISGA.) The cancellation of the secondary and tertiary boycotts meant that capital no longer had to weigh investment rewards in Israel against losses in the Arab states. The initiation of the Oslo Process enabled Israel's business elite to fully integrate itself into the global economy.

The boycotts also restricted the access of this elite to foreign markets both Arab and non-Arab. Shafir and Peled explain that “[f]or Israeli companies, the Arab economies held promise as potential markets, suppliers of cheap labour, sub-contractors, business partners and objects or targets of investment.”<sup>224</sup> They continue: “[b]ut benefits were expected not only from the opening of the Arab

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<sup>223</sup> Shafir and Peled, *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*, p. 257.

<sup>224</sup> Shafir and Peled, *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*, p. 258.

markets... but even more so of other markets, closed as part of the secondary boycott.”<sup>225</sup> The Arab markets were desirable but the primary targets of Israel’s business elite were the more lucrative secondary markets. The appearance of peacemaking exponentially expanded the number of markets and consumers exposed to Israeli penetration. Moreover, the possibility of investing Israeli capital in these newly opened markets offered even more potential than increased levels of trade.

One example of the manner in which the start of the Oslo Process has rewarded Israel’s business elite and integrated it fully into the processes of globalization were the annual MENA (Middle East/North Africa) Summits.<sup>226</sup> With the signing of the DOPOISGA the United States government, World Bank and organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum worked to transform the bilateral peace accords into broader regional cooperation and development.<sup>227</sup> The MENA Summits were the vehicle by which Israel was to be economically integrated into the Middle East. The MENA Summits were the first regional trading bloc to include Israel. So, by the most minimal of measures the summits were a success for Israel’s business elite. This, however, is not the extent of the derived benefits. They were also designed to nurture business contacts and “expose private sector investors to opportunities

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<sup>225</sup> Shafir and Peled, *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*, p. 259.

<sup>226</sup> The Summits met from 1994 to 1997. The Arab states refused to attend after 1997 to protest the policies of the Netanyahu government.

<sup>227</sup> Jonathan Paris, “Regional Cooperation and the MENA Economic Summits,” in *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization* eds. Shafir and Peled, p. 266.

in the region.”<sup>228</sup> Israel’s trade with Jordan is an example of MENA’s economic success - since the start of the Oslo Process Israel’s trade with Jordan has doubled.<sup>229</sup>

Beinin also lists some of the benefits accrued to Israel’s business elite since 1993. A wave of foreign investment brought the average annual rate of economic growth to a peak of 7% in 1994 and 1995. Foreign investors more than doubled their holdings of Israeli stocks from January 1995 to September 1996. Major new investments were initiated by U.S. high-technology companies. In addition to investments from Microsoft and IBM, Intel agreed to build a \$1.6 billion plant in Israel.<sup>230</sup> For Israel, and more specifically its business elite, there was a direct connection between the appearance of peace and profits.

All of the benefits accrued by the U.S. from the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process relate to American hegemony in the Middle East. Phrased differently, the equation of Oslo Process with peace process serves the overarching interest of a Middle East *Pax Americana* by meeting a number of subsidiary or secondary policy goals. These secondary policy goals can be surmised as follows: 1) offering Arab leaders “progress” on the Palestinian-Israeli front following the second Gulf War, 2) exploding what little was left of Arab unity, 3) efficient management of resistance to the Israeli occupation, and 4) regional integration of the U.S. client state.

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<sup>228</sup> Paris, “Regional Cooperation and the MENA Economic Summits,” in *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization* eds. Shafir and Peled, p. 271.

<sup>229</sup> Paris, “Regional Cooperation and the MENA Economic Summits,” in *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization* eds. Shafir and Peled, pp. 265-278.

<sup>230</sup> all numbers from Beinin, “Palestine and Israel: Perils of a Neoliberal, Repressive *Pax Americana*,” p.34.

First, the hegemonic interpretation of the Oslo process helped maintain “moderate” Arab regimes in the region. In exchange for their participation in the international coalition against Iraq in 1990/91, Arab states demanded progress on the Palestinian issue. These demands were met by the first Bush administration in the form of the Madrid Peace Conference. The fact that an Israeli administration was compelled to enter dialogues with Arab representatives was valuable currency for heads of state such as Mubarak of Egypt and Faud/Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Mubarak and Abdullah could insist domestically that cooperation with the U.S. was responsible for these dialogues and thereby placate restive Egyptian and Saudi civil societies. These regimes needed evidence of progress to allay charges of complicity and servitude in the swift punishment of an Arab state guilty of ignoring UN Security Council Resolutions while Israel’s violation of Security Council Resolutions went on in perpetuity. Compared with the endless rounds of the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Process appeared to represent real progress. This appearance was used to legitimize state policy and regime practice.<sup>231</sup> More importantly, it was deployed domestically to mollify societies with the potential to threaten the regimes of U.S. client states in the Arab world.

Second, the hegemonic reading also served the U.S. policy of further fracturing the Arab world. Until 1979, Arab policy had been to reject any unilateral peace with Israel. In other words, Arab policy was such that Israel could only make peace with one Arab state through a comprehensive peace agreement

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<sup>231</sup> For example, the DOPÓISGA was used by Mubarak to retroactively legitimize Egypt’s Camp David Accords. Rather than being an Arab pariah, Egypt was recast as the vanguard state in making peace with Israel.

which included all the Arab states from the 1948 and 1967 Wars. Egypt was the first to defect from this consensus in 1979. The PLO shattered what remained of the consensus by defecting in 1993. This left states such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon with outstanding issues to negotiate on their own. Instead of encountering a unified bloc, Israel was left to negotiate with relatively (economically and militarily) disempowered and isolated states. The appearance of peace further divided an Arab world that was unlikely to withstand American and Israeli hegemony even if it remained united. Fractured, divided, offering no united opposition or dissenting voice, the Arab states were completely incapable of opposing American designs for the Middle East.

Third, the dominant reading of the Oslo Process has made for a more efficient management of resistance to Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Rather than conceive of militant Islamists such as HAMAS as movements that contest the order imposed through the occupation, rather than recognize that these movements deploy violence to achieve political ends, and rather than try to understand these political ends, equating the Oslo Process with peace process enables those forces aligned with the dominant reading to simply label opposition groups "enemies of peace". This simplistic reduction depoliticises dissenting movements and completely removes them from history. This depoliticising and ahistoricizing, in turn, marginalizes such groups from potential supporters in the U.S.; it manufactures an unbridgeable gap between "us" – supporters of peace – and "them" – the enemies of that which we endorse.

The ANC in South Africa deployed a combination of political violence and international media campaigns to attract attention to the injustices of apartheid and eventually dismantle the regime. Those opposed to the political order imposed by the Oslo Process resident in the Occupied Palestinian Territories deploy the same political violence. The difference is that the latter organizations are ostracized from civil society in the U.S. Forces aligned with the dominant reading of the Oslo Process are not threatened by initiatives for change emanating from American civil society because the society is unwilling and/or unable to undertake such initiatives. Potentially critical questions are not asked of U.S. administrations because the state and its media have discredited the indigenous voices of criticism and opposition. In the absence of critique, all manner of U.S. sponsored Israeli state violence against any suspected “enemy of peace” becomes permissible.

Fourth, the hegemonic interpretation facilitated the integration of the U.S.’s most important client state into the Middle East. Equating the Oslo Process with peace process allowed for the integration of Israel into the Middle East. A regional pariah until 1993, notwithstanding Israeli-Egyptian peace, Israel was able to participate in the MENA summits, benefited from the dismantling of the Arab tertiary and secondary boycotts and even began peace negotiations with Syria because of the start of the Oslo Process. U.S. policy was in line with Ashrawi’s thinking: the start of the Oslo Process signaled to Arab states that normalization of relations with Israel was permissible and acceptable. This normalization, in turn, was to contribute to greater regional stability. Stability, or maintenance of



the existing order, is ultimately in the interest of a reactionary global hegemon such as the U.S.

As Beinlin states, the appearance of peace through the Oslo Process “corresponds with the strategic interest of the United States.”<sup>232</sup> Ultimately, reading the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough “is consistent with maintaining a Middle Eastern *Pax Americana*.”<sup>233</sup>

### *Conclusion*

My argument is that the persistence of the analytics of truth governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and of Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians created the conditions for the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. My argumentative point of departure is to reject the interpretation of the 1993 start of the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. I developed this facet of my thesis in the present chapter.

The preceding discussion made evident three of my assertions regarding the literature surrounding the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process specifically and Palestinian-Israeli relations more generally. First, I demonstrated that there exists a corpus of literature that interprets the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. I also established that this was not the only reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process; interpretations of the

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<sup>232</sup> Beinlin, “Palestine and Israel: Perils of a Neoliberal, Repressive *Pax Americana*,” p. 34.

<sup>233</sup> Beinlin, “Palestine and Israel: Perils of a Neoliberal, Repressive *Pax Americana*,” p. 34.

DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process are contested. More specifically, I showed that the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process were also interpreted as negotiated surrender and occupation by other means and the imposition of an apartheid regime of governance. Second, I established that the first corpus is the dominant reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process. Third, I confirmed that the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process served political functions. I outlined the manner in which the PLO, Israel and the U.S. all benefited from an interpretation of the DOPOISGA and subsequent agreements as a landmark peace accord.

Now, recall that my object of analysis is not the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process specifically or Palestinian-Israeli relations more generally. Instead, my object of analysis is *how* Palestinian-Israeli relations are talked about. I posit the DOPOISGA as a potential point of discursive discontinuity, or moment of change concerning the analytics of truth. In studying the DOPOISGA and its effects authors such as Rubin and Ashrawi see a fundamental discontinuity – the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example. In contrast, I see continuity in the analytics of truth. Hence, my rejection of the dominant interpretation of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process as a breakthrough. The Oslo Process did not usher in a fundamental change or discontinuity in Palestinian-Israeli relations because it did not change *how* Palestinian-Israeli relations are talked about.

The following four chapters bear out my argument regarding continuity in *how* Palestinian-Israeli relations are talked about. In these chapters I will demonstrate that the signing of the DOPOISGA and the start of the Oslo Process

does not represent a point of discursive discontinuity because it did not change the analytics of truth governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. This argumentation draws on the literature surveyed here in the first corpus, as well as additional literature, to reveal, paradoxically, that even as certain authors speak of “breakthroughs” they do so in a manner that mobilizes and perpetuates certain unspoken rules of truth production.

## Chapter Three – Pre-1993 Systematic Silences Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations

This is the first of four chapters examining the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Recall that archaeologically truth is rule governed knowledge. In other words, in order to be counted as truthful a statement must abide by extra-textual rules. In this chapter I describe three silences that systematized thought on Palestinian-Israeli relations from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century until the start of the Oslo Process in 1993. These silences or discursive exclusions involve the guiding principles of Zionist thought and practice. What is not talked about in the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations pre-1993 are 1) the Zionist idea of transfer intended to realize demographic homogeneity in Israel, 2) the territorial maximization inherent in Zionist thought and 3) Zionism's denial of the existence of the Palestinian nation and this nation's right to self-determination.<sup>1</sup> This chapter takes as its point of analytical departure the critical scholarship of Simha Flapan as presented in his *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*.

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<sup>1</sup> For an excellent text on the discursive silencing of Palestinian history see Keith W. Whitlam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: the Silencing of Palestinian History* (New York: Routledge, 1996). I assume that rights to a territorially defined state and self-determination follow from nationhood. This is, admittedly, an assumption of the meta-discourse of modernity. An argument can be made that this *modern* assumption is the unthought that undergirds Palestinian-Israeli relations. Furthermore, just as this assumption created violence in Europe in its realization, it led to the establishment of the state of Israel, informs the Palestinian struggle, and produces violent Palestinian-Israeli relations. It is beyond the scope of my project to further develop such a meta-discursive consideration, however it is incumbent upon me to identify it as a discursive silence in this text.

First, four notes of clarification, the first on the idea of discursive exclusion: the idea here is not that there has been complete silence on or no statements made pertaining to these ideas and practices. This is evident in the fact that even as I describe the exclusions I do so through recourse to published materials. Instead, it is that the literature documenting and studying these ideas and practices has been discursively silenced (and the effects of power have not been attached to them).

For those disinclined to accept this line of reasoning I ask: if this peer-reviewed, published and widely available material has not been marginalized by the discourse, why do you not hear talk of Israel's 1948 ethnic cleansing of Palestine for instance? The fact that I can cite published texts engaging these ideas and practices demonstrates that the research exists. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that this research has not informed the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. It is not the case that statements have not been made or texts not written pertaining to Israel's ethnic cleansing, but rather that these statements and texts have been excluded from the discourse and consequently remain little cited and even less talked about.

Second, on the idea of myths: Flapan's *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* is a catalogue of what the author identifies as the myths located at the core of Israel's self-perception.<sup>2</sup> While I build on Flapan's research, I reject his conceptualization of these ideas or narratives as "myths". To label an idea or narrative a "myth" is to juxtapose it to a different reality, to a truth below the

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<sup>2</sup> Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p.8.

fiction. Such a juxtaposition is evident in Flapan's title – he is contrasting “myths” with “realities”.

Rein citing Sargent notes that “Sorel ... replaced the word *ideology* with *myth* to indicate that social groups, particularly political movements, develop key myths in order to generate solidarity among members.”<sup>3</sup> This is certainly apt in the Israeli case. Archaeology does not study myths or ideology because 1) as Hoy notes “the very ideas of false consciousness and of the critique of ideology imply the possibility of nonideological thinking or of *true* consciousness”<sup>4</sup> and 2) “[t]he concept of ideology ... implies the traditional view that knowledge must be disinterested, that truth can be ascertained only in the absence of distorting power relations.”<sup>5</sup> When we recall the relationship between knowledge and power as understood by Foucault we recognize that no such nonideological or disinterested knowledge exists.

Archaeology is not a method for uncovering nonideological truth, it is a method for describing the ensemble of rules that is truth. Rather than uncover the truth behind Israel's national “myths”, I understand these “myths” as rules of discourse. I do so in keeping with archaeological method because these myths/rules inform scholarship, and more importantly, have power exercised in

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<sup>3</sup> Sandra Rein, “Radical Political Ideologies,” in *Critical Concepts: an Introduction to Politics*, Janine Brodie ed, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> David Couzens Hoy, “Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lujes, and the Frankfurt School,” in *Foucault: A Critical Reader* ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 1986), p.131.

<sup>5</sup> David Couzens Hoy, “Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lujes, and the Frankfurt School,” in *Foucault: A Critical Reader* ed. David Couzens Hoy, p.131.

accordance with them. Flapan himself actually acknowledges that these “myths have become accepted as historical truth.”<sup>6</sup> I treat them as such.

Third, a note on my use of the phrase “Zionist idea and practice” – when I deploy this phrase I do not mean that the idea and practice in question are uniquely Zionist. For example, when discussing the idea and practice of transfer I do not mean that only Zionism conceived of and emptied the territory it coveted of that territory’s indigenous people. Obviously, European colonial movements in North America and Africa removed indigenes from territory desired by the colonial power. Rather, I mean that the idea and practice of transfer was employed by Zionists to realize the goals of Zionism.

This begs the question, then, what is Zionism? Zionism is Jewish nationalism. While the term “Zionism” was used as early as 1892, it gained prominence in Europe in 1896 with the publication of Theodore Herzl’s *Der Judenstaat*.<sup>7</sup> After reporting on the Dreyfus Affair, the notoriously anti-Semitic treason conviction of Capt. Dreyfus in France, Herzl set about to find a solution to the “Jewish question” in Europe. *Der Judenstaat* was Herzl’s answer to the “Jewish question”. The title of Zionism’s essential text “has been translated loosely as *The Jewish State*. In fact, it is *The Jew-State*.”<sup>8</sup> Herzl makes three key arguments in *Der Judenstaat*. First, “Jew-hatred was an ineluctable fact of life; it

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<sup>6</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.8.

<sup>7</sup> Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p.xiii.

<sup>8</sup> Howard Morley Sachar, *A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, 1st ed., rev ed. (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 39.

would not be wished away.”<sup>9</sup> Second, the “Jewish question” was not a religious question. Wrote Herzl: “I think the Jewish question is no more a social than a religious one, notwithstanding that it sometimes takes these and other forms. It is a national question, which can only be solved by making it a political world-question to be discussed and settled by the civilized nations of the world in council.”<sup>10</sup> Third, the solution to the Jewish national question, according to Herzl, was for the Jews to have a state of their own. Wrote Herzl: “[l]et the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves.”<sup>11</sup> Herzl entertained two territories as prospective locations for his envisioned state: Palestine and Argentina.<sup>12</sup>

Israel self-identifies as a Jewish state. It is more than that however. Israel is a Zionist state. Finkelstein explains that Zionism conceived of as a political movement “proposed that the Jewish nation resolve the Jewish Question by (re-) establishing itself in a state that ‘belonged’ to it.”<sup>13</sup> Israel is that state. Israel is the state that belongs to Jews; says Shahak, “Israel ‘belongs’ to persons who are defined by the Israeli authorities as ‘Jewish’ irrespective of where they live, and to them alone. On the other hand, Israel doesn’t officially ‘belong’ to its non-

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<sup>9</sup> Sachar, *A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time*, p. 40.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Laqueur, and Barry M Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Rev. and updated ed., Pelican Books (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1984), p.6.

<sup>11</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, p.9.

<sup>12</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, p.11.

<sup>13</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York;, London: Verso, 2003), p. 8.



Jewish citizens.”<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, Laqueur observes that “many of its [Zionism’s] functions have been taken over by the state of Israel.”<sup>15</sup> Jewish proprietorship of the state of Israel, combined with the fact that the state that “belongs” to Jews assumed the functions of Zionism, mean that Israel is a Zionist state.

The fact that Israel is a Zionist state uniquely informs Israeli policy. This results in discriminatory policies domestically. For example, “the JNF (Jewish National Fund) [an affiliate of the World Zionist Organization that regulates the administration of land owned by the state] denies the right to reside, to open a business, and often also to work, to anyone who is not Jewish, only because he is not Jewish.”<sup>16</sup> It also results in a uniquely Zionist foreign policy. Telhami argues that interpretations of Israeli foreign policy that focus on security calculations are not sufficient to explain state policy. He concludes, in fact, that “the Israeli ‘national interest’ cannot be simply posited as a function of maximizing relative or absolute gains in the domains of power and security alone; it has an ideological component that is derived from competing core beliefs about Israel’s Jewish identity.”<sup>17</sup>

Shahak is even more forceful in coming to a similar conclusion. He asserts that Israeli expansionism, what I identify later as the idea and practice of

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<sup>14</sup> Israēl Shahak, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: the Weight of Three Thousand Years*, Pluto Middle Eastern Series: (London,; Boulder, Colo.: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, p.xiii.

<sup>16</sup> Shahak, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: the Weight of Three Thousand Years*, p.5.

<sup>17</sup> Shibley Telhami, “Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-type or a Breed of Its Own?” in *Israel in Comparative Politics: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom*. eds. Telhami Shibley and Michael Barnett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 47.

territorial maximization, is an “ideologically motivated pursuit”<sup>18</sup> grounded in Zionism. Challenging, or more accurately dispensing with the security calculations mentioned by Telhami, Shahak also asserts that “[i]t is this exclusivist ideology [Zionism], rather than all the ‘security needs’ alleged by Israeli propaganda, which determines the takeovers of land in Israel in the 1950s and again in the mid-1960s, and in the Occupied Territories after 1967.”<sup>19</sup> Most tellingly, Shahak explains that “close analysis of Israeli grand strategies and actual principles of foreign policy, as they are expressed in Hebrew, makes it clear that it is ‘Jewish ideology’, more than any other factor, which determines actual Israeli policies.”<sup>20</sup>

Zionist ideas and practices laid the foundation for the state of Israel. Zionism is the ideology that underpins the behavior of this state. Quite simply, the practices of the state of Israel are Zionist practices.

Fourth and finally, I need to define the geographic scope of my phrase “in mandate Palestine” which will appear in subsequent chapters. Following the First World War, the San Remo Conference of 1920 assigned the mandate of Palestine to Britain. Later that same year the San Remo arrangements were incorporated into the Treaty of Sevres, which was in turn ratified by the League of Nations in July of 1922. The original mandate of Palestine included what is today Israel, the Gaza Strip and West Bank and Jordan. However, in September 1922 Colonial

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<sup>18</sup> Shahak, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: the Weight of Three Thousand Years*, p.8.

<sup>19</sup> Shahak, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: the Weight of Three Thousand Years*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>20</sup> Shahak, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: the Weight of Three Thousand Years*, p. 9.

Secretary Churchill changed the boundaries of the mandate. Churchill excluded modern-day Jordan from the mandate. This meant that post-1922 mandate Palestine encompassed the territory west of the Jordan River – what we refer to today as Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. When I use the phrase “in mandate Palestine” I am referring to the territory of post-1922 mandate Palestine.

### *Silence I – Transfer*

In 1947 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181 (by a vote of 33 in favor, 13 opposed and 10 abstentions) thereby partitioning mandate Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. According to the partition resolution “[t]he Arab state was to occupy 4,500 square miles and contain 800,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The Jewish state was to be of an area of 5,500 square miles and contain 498,000 Jews and 468,000 Arabs.”<sup>21</sup> Effectively this meant that 33% of the population of mandate Palestine was gifted 55% of the land by the United Nations. At the time of partition Jews “held less than seven percent of Palestine.”<sup>22</sup>

Between the partition plan of 1947 and the 1949 cease-fire agreements between Israel and the surrounding Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon 700,000<sup>23</sup> to 750,000<sup>24</sup> Palestinians left/were driven from the nascent

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<sup>21</sup> Ian J Bickerton, and Carla L Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), p.90.

<sup>22</sup> Walid Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948 (1988): p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.83.

Jewish state (as well as territory that the nascent state conquered during the course of the 1948-1949 War) and 350 villages were razed.<sup>25</sup> Translated this means that 80% of the Palestinian population was exiled.<sup>26</sup> This is the birth of Palestinian refugees.

The discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations holds that these people left the space partitioned to the Jewish state (as well as territory that the nascent state extended itself into through the course of the 1948-1949 War) on the orders of the Arab leadership. The discursive truth is that:

The flight of the Palestinians from the country, both before and after the establishment of the state of Israel, came in response to a call by the Arab leadership to leave temporarily, in order to return with the victorious Arab armies. They fled despite the efforts of the Jewish leadership to persuade them to stay.<sup>27</sup>

In the literature this truth has even received its own shorthand label. It is identified in the literature as the “order theory”.

The chief proponent of this “theory” has been Jon Kimche.<sup>28</sup> Kimche articulates all of the components of this “theory” in his *Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War*.<sup>29</sup> Expressing the idea that the Arab leadership issued an order calling for Palestinians to leave temporarily Kimche first states

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<sup>24</sup> Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p.175.

<sup>25</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.96.

<sup>26</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.175.

<sup>27</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.81.

<sup>28</sup> Walid Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” p.5.

<sup>29</sup> Jon Kimche, and David Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill; Britain and the Palestine War* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1960).

that "...persistent rumors spread among them [Haifa's Arabs] that they should clear out to enable the Arab air force to bomb Haifa without harm to themselves. They were assured that the departure was temporary and would help the Arab fighting forces in the Haifa area."<sup>30</sup> He continues this line of argumentation by asserting that

the evidence [in Haifa was] that the Arab leadership had encouraged the exodus, if it had not actually ordered it. It had done this both by either direct or indirect instruction to the Arab negotiators and by its scare-propaganda designed to frighten the Haifa Arabs into the belief that if they did not leave they would suffer the same fate as Deir Yassin [a Palestinian village in which 250 residents were slaughtered by Yitzhak Shamir's Lehi Group in April 1948].<sup>31</sup>

Furthermore, Kimche articulates the idea that the Jewish leadership tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Palestinians to stay, he even rationalizes why the Jewish leadership opposed a Palestinian exodus. Says Kimche, in April of 1948, "[t]he Haganah [the mainstream Zionist paramilitary in Palestine]... was actually worried by the growing Arab emigration from Haifa. The Jewish leadership ... could keep the Haifa port going only if Arab labour continued to be available. Haganah policy, therefore, was to encourage the Arabs to stay."<sup>32</sup> Kimche suggests that the Zionists wanted the Arabs to stay because they needed their labour.

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<sup>30</sup> Kimche and Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill; Britain and the Palestine War* p.123.

<sup>31</sup> Kimche and Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill; Britain and the Palestine War*, p.124.

<sup>32</sup> Kimche and Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill; Britain and the Palestine War*, p.123.

In 1961 *The Spectator* published correspondence generated by the appearance of Erskine Childers' "The Other Exodus" which examined the Palestinian exodus from Palestine. This correspondence included among its participants, Childers, Walid Khalidi and Kimche. In this exchange Kimche was less assertive as regards the evacuation order, but remained steadfast in his perpetuation of the idea that Arabs bore responsibility for the Palestinian exodus and that Israel had most certainly not ethnically cleansed Palestine. Kimche's interventions bear quoting at length. First, stated Kimche:

... there is now a mountain of independent evidence to show that the initiative for the Arab exodus came from the Arab side and not from the Jews. For example, the files of the British CID headquarters in Haifa have a whole series of reports on the situation between April 26 and the end of the month. Let me conclude with a sentence from the report of April 28, 1948 (AAIGCID). 'The Jews,' it says 'are still making every effort to persuade the Arab population to remain and settle down to their normal lives in the town...' It is signed 'A.J. Bidmead for the Superintendent of Police.' But the Arab leaders insisted that the Arab population be evacuated and that the British military authorities should provide them with the necessary transport.<sup>33</sup>

Later, Kimche responded that:

What the Arab leaders did was much more serious – and effective: first, they encouraged the Arabs to leave by running away themselves; then, they so frightened the leaderless mass, who had stayed behind, with atrocity propaganda that it fled as well; and, finally, they prevented a truce settlement in Haifa.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, Jon Kimche, Erskine B. Childers, Walid Khalidi, Edward Atiyah, and David Cairns, "Appendix E: The Spectator Correspondence," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948 (1988): p.54.

<sup>34</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, Jon Kimche, Erskine B. Childers, Walid Khalidi, Edward Atiyah, and David Cairns, "Appendix E: The Spectator Correspondence," p.59.

Finally, Kimche asserted that:

There is, in fact, no slick explanation of the Arab exodus from Palestine. During this initial phase, the responsibility was partly that of the British Administration and largely that of the Arab leadership – those who should have set an example were the first to go. Later, the responsibility was in part that of the invading Arab armies and the Israelis who ‘encouraged’ and in some cases forced the Arabs to leave. But, in general, it was the initial propaganda pattern set by the Arab leaders that created panic whenever the Israelis appeared, and led to indiscriminate flight.<sup>35</sup>

Kimche’s argument absolves Zionist thought and Israel of any responsibility for the creation or maintenance of Palestinian refugees. This absolution has been perpetuated by Israeli state policy since 1949. Parroting Kimche, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion once declared that “[not] a single Arab resident had been expelled by the Government since the establishment of the state of Israel” and that “the fugitives had fled under the orders of Arab Leaders.”<sup>36</sup>

This truth survived and was reproduced because the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations strategically silenced the Zionist idea of transfer intended to realize demographic homogeneity in Israel. The following discussion describes this discursive silence in two parts. First, I describe the Zionist idea of transfer primarily through reference to the work of Masalha. Second, I describe the Zionist practice of transfer – Plan Dalet – through reference to the work of Walid Khalidi.

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<sup>35</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, Jon Kimche, Erskine B. Childers, Walid Khalidi, Edward Atiyah, and David Cairns, “Appendix E: The Spectator Correspondence,” p.60.

<sup>36</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, Jon Kimche, Erskine B. Childers, Walid Khalidi, Edward Atiyah, and David Cairns, “Appendix E: The Spectator Correspondence,” p.52.

Masalha has written extensively on the idea of transfer in Zionist thought in his aptly entitled book *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought 1882-1948*.<sup>37</sup> Masalha opens his text by explaining that "transfer" is a Zionist "euphemism denoting the organized removal of the indigenous population of Palestine to neighboring countries."<sup>38</sup> Masalha then makes the categorical assertion that "the idea of transfer is as old as the early Zionist colonies in Palestine and the rise of political Zionism."<sup>39</sup> Countering the idea that there exist significant differences between Zionist moderates and extremists Masalha states that "[v]irtually every member of the Zionist pantheon of founding fathers and important leaders supported it [transfer] and advocated it in one form or another, from Chaim Weizmann and Vladimir Jabotinsky to David Ben-Gurion and Menahem Ussishkin."<sup>40</sup> Said Hertzl of transfer in 1895: "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries while denying it any employment in our own country."<sup>41</sup> Similarly, Ben-Gurion variously said of transfer: "there is nothing morally wrong in the idea [of transfer]"<sup>42</sup>; "We must expel the Arabs and take their places ... and, if we have to use force – not to

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<sup>37</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*.

<sup>38</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.1.

<sup>39</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p. 9.

<sup>42</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.53.



dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and Transjordan, but to guarantee our own right to settle in those places – then we have force at our disposal”<sup>43</sup>; “It would be better that as few a number as possible of Arabs would remain in the territory of the [Jewish] state”<sup>44</sup>; and in response to a question from the Israeli Defense Forces’ Chief of Operations Yigal Allon as to what was to be done with the civilians of the Palestinian towns of Lydda and Ramle<sup>45</sup> in July 1948 Ben-Gurion answered either with “a gesture of ‘drive them out’”<sup>46</sup> or a gesture and the words “expel them.”<sup>47</sup>

Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who is represented as Ben-Gurion’s chief political and ideational challenger for leadership of the Zionist movement, disagreed with Ben-Gurion, not as regards the morality of transfer, but rather its practicality. As Masalha notes, “with regard to ultimate solutions relating to the ‘Arab problem’ ... there was little difference between them [Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky].”<sup>48</sup> Parenthetically, it should be noted that Jabotinsky’s idea of “an iron wall” will be recalled in chapter eight as a harbinger of Israel’s “security fence”.

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<sup>43</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.66.

<sup>44</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.179.

<sup>45</sup> It must be noted that the man responsible for the cleansing of these two villages was none other than “the brave man of peace” Yitzhak Rabin.

<sup>46</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.81.

<sup>47</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.191.

<sup>48</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.28.

Jabotinsky wrote what is considered his political classic “The Iron Wall (we and the Arabs)” in 1923.<sup>49</sup> In it Jabotinsky states unequivocally that “the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine is absolutely impossible in any form. There will always be *two* peoples in Palestine.”<sup>50</sup> He continued to assert that:

Zionist colonization, even the most restricted, must either be terminated or carried out in defiance of the will of the native population. This colonization can, therefore, continue and develop only under the protection of a force independent of the local population – an iron wall which the native population cannot break through. This is, *in toto*, our policy towards the Arabs. To formulate it any other way would be hypocrisy.<sup>51</sup>

He then proceeded to argue “that all Zionists believed in the iron wall”<sup>52</sup>: “One [Zionist] prefers an iron wall of Jewish bayonets, the other proposes an iron wall of British bayonets, the third proposes an agreement with Baghdad’s bayonets – a strange and somewhat risky taste – but we all applaud, day and night, the iron wall.”<sup>53</sup> Jabotinsky concluded with the now prophetic assertion that “[a]ll this does not mean that any kind of agreement [with the Arabs] is impossible, only a voluntary agreement [with the Arabs to leave Palestine] is impossible.”<sup>54</sup>

Jabotinsky, like Hertzl and Ben-Gurion endorsed the idea of transfer; he only objected to the idea that the Palestinians resident in Palestine would leave voluntarily. Instead, an iron wall would be needed to separate Jews from Arabs.

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<sup>49</sup> Lenni Brenner, *The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir* (London:, Totowa, N.J.: Zed Books; US distributor, Biblio Distribution Center, 1984), p.73.

<sup>50</sup> Brenner, *Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir*, p.73.

<sup>51</sup> Brenner, *Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir*, pp.74-75.

<sup>52</sup> Brenner, *Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir*, p.75.

<sup>53</sup> Brenner, *Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir*, p.75.

<sup>54</sup> Brenner, *Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir*, p. 75.

This idea of transfer was directly related to the partitioning of mandate Palestine and by extension the Zionist aim of making Israel as demographically homogenous as possible. In 1937 the Peel Commission introduced the idea of partition as a means of settling the competing claims of Jews and Palestinians to mandate Palestine. For the leaders of the Zionist movement “the evacuation of the Palestinian Arabs, or at least most of them, to Transjordan and other neighboring countries was an essential prerequisite for accepting the Peel Commission’s partition plan or, for that matter, any other partition of Palestine.”<sup>55</sup> “[P]artition was unacceptable without transfer.”<sup>56</sup> This was because in the absence of such a transfer of large numbers of Palestinians from the space partitioned to the Jewish state, the Jewish character of the state would be undermined. Recall, for example, that according to the later UN partition of Palestine the state of Israel was to be composed of 498,000 Jews and 468,000 Arabs. For Zionists transfer had to attend partition because it was the only means of guaranteeing demographic homogeneity in the Jewish state and of insuring its Jewish character. Flapan surmises these ideas particularly well stating that:

According to the [1947] partition plan, the Jewish state would have had well over 300,000 Arabs, including 90,000 Bedouin. With the Jewish conquest of areas designated for the Arab state (western Galilee, Nazareth, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, villages south of Jerusalem, and villages in the Arab Triangle of central Palestine), the Arab population would have risen by another 300,000 or more. Zionist leaders feared such numbers of non-Jews would threaten the stability of the new state both militarily – should they

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<sup>55</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.67.

<sup>56</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.68.

become a fifth column for Arab armies – and socially – insofar as a substantial Muslim and Christian minority would challenge the new state’s Jewish character. Thus the flight of up to 700,000 Arabs from Palestinian villages and towns during 1948 came to many as a relief. Chaim Weizmann was hardly alone when he described it as “a miraculous simplification of the problem.”<sup>57</sup>

Now, Weizmann was disingenuous in using the term “miraculous” to describe the Palestinian exodus. As Masalha states, “the de-Arabizing [of mandate Palestine] was less a miracle, than the culmination of over a half a century of effort, plans and (in the end) brute force.”<sup>58</sup> I will very briefly note some of these “efforts” here but my concern lies primarily with the practical realization of transfer through the planned exercise of brute force in the form of Plan Dalet.

These Zionist efforts included *inter alia*: 1) the establishment of the first Population Transfer Committee in November 1937 which studied means of transferring Palestinians so as to reduce the size of the Palestinian population and free up land for Jewish use;<sup>59</sup> 2) the June 1948 establishment of the third Transfer Committee which recommended that “Arabs should not amount to more than 15 percent of Israel’s Jewish population”;<sup>60</sup> and 3) the drafting of the “Retroactive Transfer Memorandum” which called for

preventing Arabs from returning to their homes; destroying Arab villages during military operations; preventing cultivation (and harvesting) of Arab lands; settling Jews in Arab towns and villages; instituting legislation barring the return of the refugees; launching a propaganda campaign

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<sup>57</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, pp.83-84.

<sup>58</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.175.

<sup>59</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, pp.93-94.

<sup>60</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.103.

designed to discourage the return of refugees; and campaigning for the resettlement of the refugees in other places.<sup>61</sup>

As Flapan states succinctly: “[d]uring and after the exodus, every effort was made – from the razing of villages to the promulgation of laws – to prevent their [the exiled Palestinians’] return.”<sup>62</sup>

Let me take a step back. The Retroactive Transfer Memorandum sought to make permanent the Palestinian exodus. But how did this exodus come to be? How did the Zionists practically realize the idea of transfer? The answer – Plan Dalet.

Plan Dalet (Plan D) was finalized by the Haganah on 10 March 1948<sup>63</sup> and implemented in the same month, though it only officially went into effect on 14 May 1948 the day Israel was declared independent.<sup>64</sup> In the aforementioned *Spectator* correspondence Khalidi stated that Plan D “aimed at the de-Arabization of all areas under Zionist control [according to the UN’s 1947 partition plan].”<sup>65</sup> In other words, Plan D was intended to make the Jewish state as Jewish as possible. I have already mentioned two instances of the operationalization of Plan D: the inhabitants of Ramle and Lydda were expelled in accordance with the plan

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<sup>61</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.189.

<sup>62</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 83.

<sup>63</sup> Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” p.24.

<sup>64</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.93.

<sup>65</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, Jon Kimche, Erskine B. Childers, Walid Khalidi, Edward Atiyah, and David Cairns, “Appendix E: The Spectator Correspondence,” p. 67.

and while the inhabitants of Deir Yassin were massacred by LEHI, the group's actions were sanctioned by the Haganah, again in accordance with the plan.<sup>66</sup>

Minimizing the number of Palestinians in the state of Israel through transfer was not the end of Plan D however. According to the plan's introduction

[t]he objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at *gaining control of the areas of Jewish settlement and concentration which are located outside the borders [of the Hebrew state]* against regular, semi-regular, and small forces operating from bases outside or inside the state.<sup>67</sup>

Plan D sought to consolidate Zionist control of the space allocated to the Jewish state *as well as space allocated to the Arab state*. Plan D was offensive in nature. According to Khalidi, “[t]he plan visualized a series of operations which, if they had succeed, would have left the whole of Palestine in 1948 under Zionist military occupation.”<sup>68</sup> This point is borne out in a statement made by the Haganah's Chief of Operations Allon who is quoted by Khalidi: “*If it wasn't for the Arab invasion there would have been no stop to the expansion of the forces of Haganah* who could have, with the same drive, reached the natural borders of western Israel.”<sup>69</sup>

It is because of this research into the Zionist idea of transfer and practice of Plan D that Flapan, Masalha and Khalidi dismiss the discursive truth that the Palestinian exodus was the result of a call from the Arab leadership to leave

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<sup>66</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.94. For an exhaustive accounting of the villages and towns emptied during the implementation of Plan D see “Appendix D: Maps: Arab Villages Emptied and Jewish Settlements Established in Palestine, 1948-49,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 1, Special Issue: Palestine 1948 (1988): pp. 38-50.

<sup>67</sup> Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” p.24. My emphasis added.

<sup>68</sup> Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” p.17.

<sup>69</sup> Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” p.19.

temporarily and Kimche's "order theory". Flapan states that "the declassified material [state and Zionist archives and Ben-Gurion's war diaries] contradicts the 'order theory'"<sup>70</sup> and that the material Zionist and Israeli sources used to support the order claim was "largely fabricated."<sup>71</sup> Masalha, in responding to the suggestion that Palestinian expulsions were not carried out in accordance with a pre-meditated plan, that the exodus was not the Zionist practice of transfer, states that "it is difficult – in light of the systematic nature of the 'clearing out' operations and the sheer magnitude of the exodus (not to mention the careful efforts to prevent the return of the refugees) – not to see a policy at work."<sup>72</sup> Khalidi is the most categorical and damning. Various he speaks of the Israeli government's "propagation of the lie that in 1948 the Arab leaders broadcast orders to the Palestinians to evacuate their country preliminary to its 'invasion' by the regular Arab armies";<sup>73</sup> "the Israeli lie of evacuation orders";<sup>74</sup> "the red herring of the Arab evacuation orders";<sup>75</sup> and the evacuation orders as "a piece of mythmaking" and "a skillful propaganda tactic."<sup>76</sup> In direct response to Kimche Khalidi summarizes his research findings as follows:

- (1) There are countless broadcasts by Zionist radios which indicate deliberate psychological warfare against the Arabs.
- (2) There is not one single instance of an Arab evacuation order or a hint of such an order.
- (3) There is an impressive stream of explicit Arab orders to the Palestinian Arab

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<sup>70</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.85.

<sup>71</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.86.

<sup>72</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.180.

<sup>73</sup> Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," p.4.

<sup>74</sup> Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," p.6 and p.7.

<sup>75</sup> Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," p.5.

<sup>76</sup> Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," p.9.

civilians to hold their ground and remain in their towns and villages. (4) A similar stream between March and May [of 1948] announces plans for the setting-up of a Palestinian administration and urges Arab civil servants to stay at their posts. (5) Many Zionist broadcasts repeat and comment on the Arab announcements, referred to in (3) and (4). (6) Even at the darkest of times Arab broadcasts consistently belittled Zionist atrocities.<sup>77</sup>

Khalidi's research was originally published in 1963. Flapan's research was published in 1987. Despite Khalidi's almost 25 year old research Flapan was still moved to state that the "[t]he myth of a voluntary Palestinian exodus in response to Arab 'orders from above' has survived with an astounding perseverance."<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, Masalha published his research in 1992 and was compelled then to speak to the claim that Palestinians were not expelled in accordance with a pre-meditated plan. The Zionist idea and practice of transfer has been discursively silenced.

Bickerton and Klausner's *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* makes evident this silencing. For example, the text simply does not discuss the idea of transfer. The text does mention Plan D, but only in the context of the Lehi massacre in Deir Yassin. While it is stated that the intent of the plan "was to undermine the morale of the Arab population through the use of terror, and to 'cleanse' the area of the Arab inhabitants,"<sup>79</sup> no hint is given of the other 349

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<sup>77</sup> Hedley V. Cooke, Jon Kimche, Erskine B. Childers, Walid Khalidi, Edward Atiyah, and David Cairns, "Appendix E: The Spectator Correspondence," pp.57-58.

<sup>78</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.117.

<sup>79</sup> Ian J Bickerton, and Carla L Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), p.98.



villages, other than Deir Yassin, that were emptied in accordance with the plan. Plan D is represented as only being practiced in isolation.<sup>80</sup>

This, in turn, enables the authors to reproduce the discursive truth that Palestinians left Palestine on orders from Arab leadership; the silences surrounding transfer are integral to the reproduction of the “order theory”. Bickerton and Klausner start with the Israeli government position, which I have already shown is in perfect symmetry with Kimche’s “order theory”. They then proceed to note that the evidence supporting the Israeli position is “inconclusive”.<sup>81</sup> They do not, however, reference any of the works that challenge this claim; the Israeli government position is posited as *a priori* legitimate, but not uncontested. This is a far cry from the absolute rejection of the order theory by Khalidi and Flapan – of whom it must be noted no mention is made. Bickerton and Klausner then proceed to outline reasons for the Palestinian exodus none of which include mention of transfer or Plan D. Admittedly passing reference is made to Benny Morris’ research into the possibility of a deliberate campaign to drive Palestinians out, but as I will show in a later chapter, even this research falls short of seeing the practical realization of the Zionist idea of transfer. By referencing Morris’s research, but not that of Khalidi, Flapan or Masalha (all of whom published before the appearance of the Bickerton and Klausner text) *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* stands as an exemplar of the

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<sup>80</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.98.

<sup>81</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.99.

discursive silencing of the Zionist idea and practice of transfer and reproducer of the “order theory” truth.

### *Silence 2 – Territorial Maximization*

Plan D was not about maintaining the status quo in mandate Palestine following partition. Instead, it was about revolutionizing the status quo.<sup>82</sup> Plan D sought, through forcible transfer, to reduce to as low as possible the number of Palestinians in the Jewish state. Plan D was the Zionist practice of transfer. It also sought to expand, through offensive measures, the geographic scope of the Jewish state. As such, Plan D was also the Zionist practice of territorial maximization. This is the second systematic exclusion under the larger heading of discursive silences involving the guiding principles of Zionist thought and practice.

The Zionist idea and practice of territorial maximization is the second systematic exclusion from the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. This exclusion allows for the authoring and reproduction of the following discursive truth:

Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, was a far-reaching compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned the concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized the right of the Palestinians to their own state. Israel accepted this sacrifice because it anticipated the implementation of the resolution in peace and cooperation with the Palestinians.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” pp.14-15.

<sup>83</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.13.

This truth mobilizes a number of rules of formation that I will examine later. Here I want to focus on the systematic exclusion that allows for this truth's articulation.

Finkelstein states unequivocally that “[f]rom beginning to end, Zionism was a conquest movement.”<sup>84</sup> Plan D is evidence of this claim, however the claim is made more robust if one examines closely Zionist ideas of the 1930s and 1940s as well as the War of 1967. The Zionist movement first laid claim to mandate Palestine, what the Zionists identified as Eretz-Israel, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The geographic scope of this claim was extensive, considerably larger than what is today identified as Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Eretz-Israel included the whole of mandate Palestine, Transjordan and southern Lebanon as far north as the Litani River.<sup>85</sup> This was the beginning of the Zionist idea of maximum territory.

Much like the idea and practice of transfer, the idea of territorial maximization was almost unanimously accepted by the Zionist movement, dissention focused on the feasibility or practicality of the maximization, not its desirability. According to Shafir, “Zionists, one and all, were territorial maximalists.”<sup>86</sup> Ben-Gurion was a “pragmatic expansionist.”<sup>87</sup> His pragmatism dominated the Zionist movement and produced an incrementalist approach to

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<sup>84</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.108.

<sup>85</sup> Nur Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: the Politics of Expansion* (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), pp.5-6. This explains the previous Allon quote which referred to “western Israel”. Western Israel is that part of Eretz-Israel to the west of the Jordan River; it is less than half of the claimed whole.

<sup>86</sup> Gershon Shafir, “Zionism and colonialism: a comparative approach,” in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* ed. Ilan Pappé (New York: Routledge, 1999), p.90.

<sup>87</sup> Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: the Politics of Expansion*, p.6.

territorial maximization. What is important to note here is that Zionist acceptance of the partition of Palestine was an increment in this approach; acceptance of partition was *not* as the discursive truth represents it – abandonment of the idea and practice of territorial maximization. As Masalha states: “the reduced [Jewish] state provided by partition was but a temporary expedient, a way station en route to the realization of a way state in the whole of Palestine.”<sup>88</sup>

Ben-Gurion was absolutely clear on this point in 1938 at the Twentieth Zionist Congress. Said Ben-Gurion of the Peel Commission’s recommendation of partition: “[I am] not satisfied with part of the country, but on the basis of the assumption that after we build up a strong force following the establishment of the state – we will abolish the partition of the country [between Jews and Arabs] and we will expand to the whole land of Palestine.”<sup>89</sup> He also said “I see in the realization of this plan practically the decisive stage in the beginning of full redemption and the most powerful lever for the gradual conquest of all of Palestine”;<sup>90</sup> “*I do not see partition as the final solution of the Palestine question.*”;<sup>91</sup> and that

[t]his [the Peel partition plan] is only a stage in the realization of Zionism and it should prepare the ground for our expansion throughout the whole country through Jewish-Arab agreement ... the state, however, must enforce order and security and it will do this not by moralizing and

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<sup>88</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.62.

<sup>89</sup> Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: the Politics of Expansion*, pp.6-7.

<sup>90</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, pp.21-22.

<sup>91</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.22. Emphasis in the original.

preaching ‘sermons on the mount’ but by machine-guns,  
which we will need.<sup>92</sup>

Ben-Gurion was not alone in his tactical acceptance of partition. In particularly prophetic terms, terms I encourage the reader to remember for my coming discussion of the War of 1967, Weizmann (Israel’s first President) told the British High Commissioner in 1937 that “[w]e shall expand in the whole of the country in the course of time ... this [partition] is only an arrangement for the next 25 to 30 years.”<sup>93</sup> Weizmann was exactly right – by 1967 Israel had taken control of all of mandate Palestine.

This ideational trend continued and was realized in the 1940s. The Zionist movement also accepted the UN partition plan of 1947 tactically. Palumbo notes that “[t]he Zionists accepted this scheme [the UN partition plan] since they hoped to use their state as a base to conquer the whole country.”<sup>94</sup> Similarly, Flapan states that “[Zionist] acceptance of the resolution in no way diminished the belief of all the Zionist parties in their right to the whole of the country [Palestine]”;<sup>95</sup> and that “acceptance of the UN Partition Resolution was an example of Zionist pragmatism par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction – a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more

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<sup>92</sup> Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: the Politics of Expansion*, p.7.

<sup>93</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p. 62. Flapan offers a similar Weizmann quote from 1938 which reads as follows: “partition might be only a temporary arrangement for the next twenty to twenty-five years.” In this case Weizmann would have been off by 4 years.

<sup>94</sup> Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza* (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p.19.

<sup>95</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.31.

judicious.”<sup>96</sup> Plan D and the War of 1948-1949 created such judicious circumstances for the realization of territorial maximization. Not wanting to go too deeply into the details of the Arab war effort in 1948-1949, the Zionist war effort or events such as the Lausanne Conference<sup>97</sup> what must be recognized is that both Plan D and the war served to expand the size of Israel beyond the borders demarcated by the UN partition resolution. According to Flapan, the Zionist movement “exploited military conflicts for territorial gains.”<sup>98</sup> By the conclusion of Plan D and the War of 1948-1949 these gains amounted to an additional 2,500 square miles or the equivalent of another 20% of mandate Palestine. The practical realization of the Zionist idea of territorial maximization resulted in Israel controlling 75% of what was mandate Palestine by the end of 1949.

Masalha makes a prescient remark that neatly closes my discussion of Israeli expansionism through the War of 1948-1949 and leads directly into my next point. Observes Masalha: “most of Israel’s wars were ‘wars of choice’, motivated (in part) either by expansionist territorial ambitions or by the desire to maintain control of territories taken from the Arabs.”<sup>99</sup> The War of 1948-1949 was just such a war of choice, as was the War of June 1967. In June 1967 Israel attacked Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Israel’s actions have been interpreted as just and discursively represented as defensive. I will speak to this interpretation and

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<sup>96</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, 33.

<sup>97</sup> For an excellent treatment of the War of 1948-1949 see Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*.

<sup>98</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.34.

<sup>99</sup> Masalha, *Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: the Politics of Expansion*, p.14.

representation momentarily, now I want to show that, in fact, the War of June 1967 was a war of choice. In June 1967 the Israeli government chose to continue to practically realize the idea of territorial maximization by seizing control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.

Both Finkelstein's review essay of Michael Oren's *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* and his "To Live or Perish: Abba Eban 'Reconstructs' the June 1967 War" in *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict* catalogue Oren's and Eban's omissions and the manner in which these omissions serve to reproduce interpretations and representations of the war as just and defensive.

In *Image and Reality* Finkelstein challenges "the main premises that underpin the standard depiction of the June war."<sup>100</sup> First, Finkelstein demonstrates that Israel goaded or provoked Syria and Egypt's Nasser into war. As the historian of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) Martin van Creveld stated, the "IDF under Rabin [was] spoiling for a fight and willing to go to considerable lengths to provoke it."<sup>101</sup> The provocation of Syria produced border skirmishes and the provocation of Egypt led to the removal of UN troops from the Sinai. Finkelstein describes the border skirmishes as follows:

Israeli tractors would move into disputed areas [the post-1949 demilitarized areas], often with the support of armed Israeli police. The Syrians would fire from their high ground positions, and would often shell Israeli settlements in the Huleh valley. By trying to oppose the Israeli

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<sup>100</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.123.

<sup>101</sup> Norman Finkelstein, "Abba Eban With Footnotes," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 3 (2003): p.82.

challenge, Syria drew on its head punitive Israeli raids, including air strikes.<sup>102</sup>

The recount is in keeping with Moshe Dayan's more contemporaneous account of the same border skirmishes. Dayan was Israel's Minister of Defence in 1967. Said

Dayan:

I know how at least 80 percent of all of the incidents there [Syrian-Israeli armistice line] started. In my opinion, more than 80 percent, but let's speak about 80 percent. It would go like this: we would send a tractor to plow ... in the demilitarized area, and we would know ahead of time that the Syrians would start shooting. If they did not start shooting, we would inform the tractor to progress farther, until the Syrians, in the end, would get nervous and would shoot. And then we would use guns, and later, even the air force, and that is how it went ... We thought... that we could change the lines of the cease-fire accords by military actions that were less than a war. That is, to seize some territory and hold it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us.<sup>103</sup>

These provocations of and "reprisals against" Syria, in turn, compelled Nasser to move, ostensibly, against Israel. According to Finkelstein, "[e]ven Moshe Dayan conceded that 'the nature and scale of our reprisal actions against Syria and Jordan had left Nasser with no choice but to defend his image and prestige in his own country and throughout the Arab world.'"<sup>104</sup> In mid-May 1967 Nasser requested the removal of UNEF (first United Nations Emergency Force) troops from the Sinai. Political machinations resulted in the complete removal of this force. This, however, was not Nasser's intent. Nasser did not want UNEF out of

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<sup>102</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.132.

<sup>103</sup> Finkelstein, "Abba Eban With Footnotes," pp.76-77.

<sup>104</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.127.



the Sinai, instead he wanted the UNEF forces redeployed. Says Finkelstein, Nasser “wanted only that UNEF readjust its deployment in the Sinai but did not desire a UNEF withdrawal, especially from Sharm-el-Shayk.”<sup>105</sup>

Nasser sought redeployment rather than removal because removal would raise the stakes of a war Nasser did not want. Nasser’s disinclination to wage war was hardly a secret. The chief of Israel’s Mossad Meir Amit stated that: “Egypt was not ready for war; and Nasser did not want a war.”<sup>106</sup> Even more importantly, “Rabin [IDF Chief of Staff] remarked after Israel’s victory that he ‘did not believe that Nasser wanted war’. ‘The two divisions he sent into the Sinai on May 14’ the chief of staff surmised, ‘would not have been enough to unleash an offensive. He knew it and we knew it.’”<sup>107</sup> Ostensibly, Nasser was preparing for war against Israel. These preparations, however, were intended for Arab consumption. Concomitant with these preparations, Nasser was also seeking a face-saving compromise to extract himself from the increasingly tense situation. Nasser sent Egypt’s vice-president to Washington in an attempt to secure just such a compromise (said Secretary of State Rusk of the scheduled meeting: “we had a good chance to de-escalate the crisis”<sup>108</sup>). The vice-president was to arrive in Washington on Wednesday; pre-emptively Israel attacked on Monday.

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<sup>105</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.127.

<sup>106</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.134.

<sup>107</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.134.

<sup>108</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.129.

Subsequent admissions by senior Israeli military and political figures give lie to the idea that Israel faced an existential threat in June 1967. According to Finkelstein:

General (res.) Mattiyahu Peled, one of the architects of the June war, observed in 1972 that the claim Israel was under the menace of destruction was a 'bluff', adding that, for all the pretense that Israel is 'in the midst of an anguished struggle for its existence and can be exterminated at any moment', the truth is that, already 'since 1949' no country had been able to mortally threaten it.<sup>109</sup>

I ask the reader to recall Ezer Weizmann's earlier remark regarding partition as a temporary condition that Israel would change in 25 to 30 years because Finkelstein quotes Israel's first President as saying: "there was no threat of destruction' against Israel in 1967 and that the 'threat of destruction was already removed from Israel during the War of Independence."<sup>110</sup> Finally, Menachem Begin, a member of Israel's government in 1967 and future Israeli Prime Minister, made a particularly telling remark several years after the War of 1967. Said Begin: "*we had a choice*. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. *We decided to attack him*."<sup>111</sup> Why did Israel wage this war of choice in 1967?

Israel's war of choice in 1967, like that of 1948-1949, was waged to fulfill the Zionist idea of territorial maximization. Dayan suggested as much when he

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<sup>109</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.136.

<sup>110</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.136.

<sup>111</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., pp.134-135. My emphasis added.

stated that Israel seized territory along the Syrian-Israeli armistice line in the Golan Heights in the hopes that the enemy would eventually concede the space to the Israeli occupiers. Dayan was also very explicit in the reasoning behind Israel's choice of war against Syria and Egypt and the occupation of the Golan Heights and the Sinai. Said Dayan in early June: "Our success ... will be judged not on the number of Egyptian tanks we destroy ... but on the size of the territory we'll seize."<sup>112</sup> Moreover, in a postwar interview Dayan "stated with 'absolute certainty' that the main impetus behind Israel's seizure of the Golan was not Syrian shelling but 'good land for agriculture ... lust for that ground.'"<sup>113</sup> Yigal Allon was equally explicit as regards Israel's choice to go to war against Jordan and occupy the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Said Allon just prior to the War of 1967: "In the case of a new war, we must avoid the historic mistake of the War of Independence and, later, the Sinai Campaign [Israel's attack, in collusion with Britain and France, on Egypt in 1956]. We must not cease fighting until we achieve ... the territorial fulfillment of the Land of Israel."<sup>114</sup>

"Israel faced no significant threat, let alone mortal danger, in June 1967."<sup>115</sup> In fact, in 1967 Israel provoked a war of choice with Syria, Jordan and Egypt. It did so as a means of acquiring more territory in line with Zionist

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<sup>112</sup> Finkelstein, "Abba Eban With Footnotes," p.84.

<sup>113</sup> Finkelstein, "Abba Eban With Footnotes," p.85.

<sup>114</sup> Finkelstein, "Abba Eban With Footnotes," p.84.

<sup>115</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.141.

aspirations; “[w]ar with the Arab world ... offered Israel an opportunity to fulfill it territorial destiny.”<sup>116</sup>

Finkelstein’s reviews of the Oren and Eban texts demonstrate that both texts discursively silence this Zionist idea and practice. I am more interested, however, in another reproductive instance of this discursive silencing that Finkelstein notes only parenthetically. Finkelstein observes that “moral theorist Michael Walzer, for example, list[s] Israel’s preemptive strike [in 1967] as one of a handful of unambiguous cases of self-defense in the twentieth century.”<sup>117</sup>

Walzer uses the War of 1967 as an illustration in his *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. In four short pages Walzer (re-)produces an interpretation of the War of 1967 as defensive and, consequently, just. States Walzer: “[t]he Israeli first strike is, I think, a clear case of legitimate anticipation.”<sup>118</sup> Walzer relies on a number of discursive rules of formation, that I will develop later, to make this argument. For example, he mobilizes the idea of Arab rejectionism of Israel in stating that “[t]he Egyptians believed that the founding of Israel in 1948 had been unjust, that the state had no rightful existence, and hence that it could be attacked at any time.”<sup>119</sup> He also mobilizes the idea of Israel as conciliatory state to make statements that are clearly contradicted by the historical record. Walzer asserts, for example, that “Israel’s leaders sought a

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<sup>116</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.143.

<sup>117</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.140.

<sup>118</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p .85.

<sup>119</sup> Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations*, p.82.

political resolution to the crisis”<sup>120</sup> despite the fact that Israel provoked the conflagration and initiated outright military action before Egypt’s vice-president could arrive in Washington to de-escalate the crisis.

Walzer’s analysis is not informed, in the least, by the idea that Zionism is a conquest movement. In fact, the Zionist idea and practice of territorial maximization is excluded from Walzer’s study. This is obvious and logical. If it were otherwise, he could not possibly interpret the War of 1967 as defensive and just. Instead, he would have to represent it as the practical realization of a long-term Zionist goal. Moreover, it is only because of this exclusion that Walzer is able to accept and unconsciously and implicitly reproduce that part of the discursive truth which says that in accepting the 1947 partition of mandate Palestine, Zionists abandoned the idea of a Jewish state in all of Palestine. Speaking of territorial maximization as a facet of Zionism would explode the idea that Israel just wanted to exist within its borders and that the War of 1967 *just happened* to expand the geographic scope over which Israel exercised hegemony and produce territorial *fait accomplis* long sought by Zionists.

### *Silence 3 – Denial of Palestinian Nationhood*

Having examined the discursive silencing of the Zionist ideas and practices of transfer and territorial maximization, I now move to the third systematic exclusion – Zionism’s denial of the existence of the Palestinian nation

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<sup>120</sup> Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations*, p. 84.

and this nation's right to self-determination. The discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations does not talk about the manner in which Zionism negates, refuses to acknowledge and effaces Palestinians and their national rights.

Said makes two elucidating statements bearing on the denial of Palestinians and their political rights. “[I]n order to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on a desired land, the Zionists convinced themselves that these natives [Palestinians] did not exist, then made it possible for them to exist only in the most rarefied forms.”<sup>121</sup> And “Zionism first refused to acknowledge the existence of native inhabitants in Palestine, and when it did, it recognized only native inhabitants with no political or national rights.”<sup>122</sup> I will outline this discursive silence along this broadly conceptualized continuum, starting with the negation of Palestinians.

The idea and practice of denying Palestinians and their national rights, like the previous two silences, is as old as Zionism itself. In 1901 Israel Zangwill made the now classic formulation (though it is often inaccurately attributed to Herzl) that Palestine was a land without a people for a people without a land.<sup>123</sup> In 1914 Weizmann parroted Zangwill almost verbatim saying:

In its initial stage, Zionism was conceived by its pioneers as a movement wholly depending on mechanical factors: there is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and, on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite

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<sup>121</sup> Edward W Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p.19.

<sup>122</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, pp. 230-231.

<sup>123</sup> Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1992), p.2.

this people with this country? The owners of the country [the Turks] must, therefore, be persuaded and convinced that this marriage is advantageous, not only for the [Jewish] people and for the country, but also for themselves.<sup>124</sup>

Doumani speaks directly to Zionism's construction of Palestine's "emptiness".

"Emptiness", of course, did not denote, except for the most ignorant, the physical absence of the native population. Rather, it meant the absence of "civilized" people, in the same sense that the Americas and Africa were portrayed as virgin territories ready for waves of pioneers. The famous Zionist slogan, "a land without people for a people without a land" was, therefore, but a manifestation of a wider European intellectual network characterized by chauvinistic nationalism, racial superiority, and imperialistic ambitions.<sup>125</sup>

Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion's official biographer, offers a similar explanation. Wrote Bar-Zohar:

Whatever became of the slogan: *A people without a land returns to land without a people?* The simple truth was that Palestine was not an empty land, and the Jews were only a small minority of its population. In the days of the empire building, the Western powers had dismissed *natives* as an inconsequential factor in determining whether or not to settle a territory with immigrants. Even after the [First] world war, the concept of self-determination ... was still reserved exclusively for the *developed* world.<sup>126</sup>

Masalha and Said share these readings of the imperial epistemology undergirding this Zionist idea. Says Masalha of Zangwill and Weizmann's statements on the "emptiness" of Palestine: "[t]hey did not mean that there were no people in Palestine, but that there were no people worth considering within the framework

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<sup>124</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, pp.5-6.

<sup>125</sup> Beshara Doumani, "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine" in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories*, ed. Ilan Pappé, p.15.

<sup>126</sup> Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion: a Biography* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1979), pp.45-46.

of the notions of European supremacy that they held sway.”<sup>127</sup> Said relates the Zionist idea of “emptiness” to the larger discourse of Orientalism. Said suggests that “there is the entrenched *cultural* attitude toward Palestinians deriving from age-old Western prejudices about Islam, Arabs and the Orient. This attitude, from which in its turn Zionism drew for its view of the Palestinians, dehumanized us, reduced us to the barely tolerated status of a nuisance.”<sup>128</sup> Palestine was empty, according to Zionism, because its inhabitants were something less than human; they were less than human because they were not European.<sup>129</sup>

Flapan says that Zionist attitudes toward Palestinians “ranged from total obliviousness to their presence (‘the land without a people for the people without a land’) to patronizing paternalism and indifference to outright denial of their national rights.”<sup>130</sup> Similarly, Pappé states that “like other Zionists, Herzl was unaware of or gave little thought to the indigenous Palestinian population.”<sup>131</sup> The idea that Zionist thought was oblivious to or unaware of Palestinians is not quite accurate however. Finkelstein quoting Sternhall asserts that “[c]ontrary to the claim that is often made, Zionism was not blind to the presence of Arabs in Palestine.”<sup>132</sup> This assessment is shared by Masalha. Citing early Zionist texts, Masalha states that “the Palestinian Arabs were far from being an ‘unseen’ or

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<sup>127</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.6.

<sup>128</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. xl. See also pp.15-37.

<sup>129</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p.66.

<sup>130</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.36.

<sup>131</sup> Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, p. 2.

<sup>132</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. xi.



‘hidden presence’.”<sup>133</sup> Challenges to the claim of Zionist obliviousness to Palestinians notwithstanding, Doumani, Masalha, Said, Flapan, Pappé and Finkelstein all agree that Zionist thought was not blind to the presence of an indigenous people in Palestine, even if the territory was conceptualized as empty.

The Zangwill quote represents one pole along Said’s continuum – the denial of Palestinians. The subsequent assertions all represent some ideational movement away from this pole. In other words, the arguments of *inter alia* Masalha and Said suggest some Zionist acknowledgement, in rarefied forms, of an indigenous people in Palestine. Zionist acknowledgement of this people involved two closely related ideas: 1) the people were Arabs and *not* Palestinians and 2) these Arabs were not worthy of political consideration or consultation as regarded the final dispensation of mandate Palestine.

First, Zionist thought denied the existence of a distinct Palestinian identity and Palestinian nationalism. According to Masalha, “the dominant and fundamental view among the Zionist leadership was to deny anything akin to Palestinian national feeling.”<sup>134</sup> Rather than acknowledge that the people in Palestine constituted a distinct Palestinian nation, Zionist thought identified the people as Arabs. The indigenous people in Palestine begrudgingly acknowledged by Zionism were conceptualized as a regional subset of the larger Arab nation or Arab community. Zionist thought is replete with references indicting this conceptualization. In 1920 Zangwill asserted, in connection with a larger

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<sup>133</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.6.

<sup>134</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.19.

argument regarding transfer that: “We cannot allow the *Arabs* to block so valuable a piece of historic reconstruction [the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine] ... After all, they have all Arabia with its million square miles ... There is no particular reason for the *Arabs* to cling to these few kilometers [of mandate Palestine].”<sup>135</sup> In his 1923 political treatise Jabotinsky mobilized the same conceptualization. The title, again, of Jabotinsky’s article was “The Iron Wall (we and the Arabs). Furthermore, Jabotinsky spoke of “the expulsion of the *Arabs* from Palestine.”<sup>136</sup> Ben-Gurion most clearly articulated this Zionist denial of Palestinian nationalism in 1936. Said Ben-Gurion: “There is no conflict between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism because the Jewish nation is not in Palestine and the Palestinians are not a nation.”<sup>137</sup> A corollary of this idea that the Arabs of Palestine were not a distinct nation was that this people had no national aspirations and/or any national political rights. As Flapan says: “[i]n the eyes of the Zionist leadership, the Palestinian Arabs were not a people with national rights, but an ‘Arab population’ that could be moved to some other Arab territory.”<sup>138</sup> Zionist thought unilaterally abrogated a competing nationalism in Palestine, any attachment this nationalism had to the territory and/or any right to a state in this territory.

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<sup>135</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.14. My emphasis added.

<sup>136</sup> Brenner, *Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism From Jabotinsky to Shamir*, p.73. My emphasis added.

<sup>137</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.19.

<sup>138</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 40.

What must be recognized here is that Zionist denial of Palestinians and Palestinian nationalism was interconnected with the Zionist ideas of transfer and territorial maximization. In fact, the ideas were interwoven and mutually supportive. Masalha offers an excellent example of this kind of cross-ideational rationalization in which the conceptualization of Palestinians as Arabs legitimates transfer and transfer, of course, realized the aims of Zionist territorial maximization. Says Masalha:

... if the Palestinians did not constitute a distinct, separate nation and were not an integral part of the country with profound historical ties to it, but instead belonged to the larger Arab nation, then they could be shifted to other territories of that nation without undue prejudice. Similarly, if the Palestinians were merely a local part of a larger body, then they were not a major party to the conflict with Zionism; thus Zionist efforts to deal over their heads with outside Arabs was completely justifiable.<sup>139</sup>

The second sentence in this quotation speaks to the second rarefied form of people acknowledged by Zionism. More specifically, it references the Zionist idea, and later practice, mentioned in previous statements attributed to Weizmann, Bar-Zohar and Masalha; namely that the Arabs of Palestine, according to Zionism, were not worthy of political consideration or consultation as regarded the final dispensation of Palestine.

Zionist thought, when it did see Arabs in Palestine, did not see them as partners or interlocutors with whom Zionists would negotiate the future of mandate Palestine. The Arabs *in situ* in Palestine were politically irrelevant. Finkelstein states quite succinctly that “the Palestinian Arabs were not even

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<sup>139</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.20.

viewed as the relevant party for reaching a settlement of the Palestine conflict.”<sup>140</sup> Recall, for example, Weizmann’s 1914 quote speaking of the emptiness of Palestine. Weizmann stated that Zionism needed to convince the Turks of the benefits of transforming Palestine into a Jewish state. This is merely an early indicator of Zionism’s long-standing practice of disregarding Palestinians in favour of other interlocutors. This, I think it can be argued, was in perfect keeping with the epistemology of imperialism undergirding Zionism.

In 1917 Zionist lobbying efforts directed at the British Government produced the Balfour Declaration, a letter from Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild stating that the “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”<sup>141</sup> Here Zionists negotiated with the British as to the dispensation of mandate Palestine. In 1918 and 1919 Weizmann met with Emir Feisal, son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca and later king of Syria, and produced the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement. This agreement “stated that, provided the rights of the Arab peasant and tenant farmers were protected and that there were no restrictions on religious freedom, the Arabs [represented by Feisal] would work with the Jews to implement the Balfour Declaration.”<sup>142</sup> In this instance Zionists negotiated Palestine’s future with an Arab leader. In 1922 Zionists opposed the British White Paper limiting Jewish immigration to mandate Palestine. Again, Zionist efforts to determine the future of Palestine were directed,

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<sup>140</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.17.

<sup>141</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, p.18.

<sup>142</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.42.

not toward Palestinians, but toward the British. Similarly, in 1937 Zionists negotiated with the British regarding the partition of Palestine following Britain's publication of the Peel Commission and in 1944 Weizmann received a guarantee from Prime Minister Churchill that the British would find an acceptable solution to the question of Palestine.

By 1944 the Zionists had also broadened the geographic scope of their political consultations and lobbying efforts. Rabbis Wise and Silver lobbied the American Congress and had resolutions introduced "calling on the United States to urge Britain to permit unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine."<sup>143</sup> Also in the U.S., Zionists lobbied the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1947 as to the nature of the dispensation of Palestine. In this case, Zionists discussed Palestine's future with a group of countries including Canada, Australia, Sweden and India, but not Palestinians. "Zionists ... lobbied hard for U.S. support for partition [and recognition from 1947 to 1949]"<sup>144</sup> President Truman was the primary target of these latter Zionist efforts. "Referring to Zionist pressure, Truman wrote that he had never had so much pressure put on him as he had on the question of Palestine."<sup>145</sup> Zionist efforts to determine the future of Palestine were also exerted *through* Truman. The American president instructed the Philippines, Haiti, Liberia and France (which was threatened with a total

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<sup>143</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.72.

<sup>144</sup> Andrew Cockburn, and Leslie Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison: the Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), p.26.

<sup>145</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.89.

cessation of American aid) to support Zionist designs for Palestine, namely partition.<sup>146</sup> Finally, in 1948 Zionists paid Somoza of Nicaragua \$200,000 and gifted him a large diamond to recognize Israel.<sup>147</sup>

Zionism waged the battle for Palestine globally, persuading, conferring and arguing with and cajoling Turks, Arabs, the British, Americans and states such as Canada, Sweden, the Philippines and Nicaragua in order to realize its designs for Palestine. Concomitantly, Zionism systematically denied, minimized the importance of and refused to acknowledge Palestinians as a party relevant to the dispensation of mandate Palestine.

The establishment of the state of Israel did not put an end to Zionism's ideational and/or practical denial of a distinct Palestinian identity and/or acknowledgement of Palestinians in rarefied forms. Since 1948 Zionism has continued to deny Palestinians a national distinctness and refused them national self-determination. In fact, this systematic exclusion from the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations has been further internationalized and institutionalized in the post-1948 era.

Examples abound evidencing this discursive silencing. In my introduction I referenced the Saunders document and the fervor it created by identifying Palestinians specifically while Israel's Prime Minister was still speaking of "so-called Palestinians." The Saunders document infuriated Israel because it violated the Israeli practice of denying Palestinians, this in 1975. However, Prime Minister

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<sup>146</sup> Cockburn and Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison: the Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship*, 1st ed., pp.26-27.

<sup>147</sup> Cockburn and Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison: the Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship*, 1st ed., p.216.

Rabin was not the first Israeli head of state to negate Palestinians. In addition to Israel's first Prime Minister Ben-Gurion declaring, albeit in 1936 before the establishment of the state, that "the Palestinians are not a nation"<sup>148</sup> Golda Meir, Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir have all memorably negated Palestinians and their attachment to Palestine. In 1969 Meir said that "[i]t is not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."<sup>149</sup> Concomitantly, Israel's bureaucracy was asserting that Palestinians were, in fact, "South Syrians".<sup>150</sup> When Begin was not dehumanizing Palestinians by calling them "two-legged beasts" and allowing his Chief of Staff to describe them as "drugged cockroaches in a bottle", he identified Palestinians only as the "Arabs of Eretz Israel". Finally, at the start of the Madrid Conference in 1991 Shamir said the following of the Land of Israel: "[t]o others, it was not an attractive land. *No one wanted it.* Mark Twain described it only a hundred years ago as 'a *desolate* country, which sits in sackcloth and ashes, a silent mournful expanse, which not even imagination can grace with the pomp of life."<sup>151</sup> All of Israel's heads of state in the pre-1993 period dehumanized Palestinians and/or denied them and their attachment to the land of Palestine.

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<sup>148</sup> Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948*, p.19.

<sup>149</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), p.311.

<sup>150</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p.138.

<sup>151</sup> Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel, "Address by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel [to Madrid Conference]," Web page, [accessed 25 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Peace%20Process/1991/ADDRESS%20BY%20MR%20YITZHAK%20SHAMIR%20-%2031-Oct-91>. My emphasis added.

This Zionist idea was not somehow localized to the opinions of Israel's heads of state. Israeli state policy also practiced the negation of Palestinians and their national rights, particularly that of national self-determination. Starting in the immediate post-war period, for example, the Jewish Agency conspired with Abdallah, the King of Transjordan, to implement his Greater Syria Scheme.<sup>152</sup> The first stage in this secret agreement involved partitioning Palestine between Israel and Transjordan; Israel would be established according to the UN partition plan and Abdallah would annex the territory allocated for the Arab state. Flapan describes the Greater Syria Scheme as "a tacit agreement [that] stipulated that Abdallah would be allowed to control the part of Palestine intended for an Arab state and in return would not interfere with the establishment of the Jewish state."<sup>153</sup> The politics of this agreement are not as important as the intended Zionist effects of this agreement vis-à-vis Palestinians. As Flapan notes, "Both Transjordan and Israel pursued a policy of 'politicide,' seeking to liquidate any Palestinian leadership striving for an independent state."<sup>154</sup> Furthermore, "Israel encouraged Abdallah to annex certain areas of Palestine and to mobilize the Palestinians to call for unification with Transjordan under his rule."<sup>155</sup> For Zionists the realization of the Greater Syria scheme was a means of practically realizing the ideational negation of Palestinian nationalism and self-determination; it would deny a Palestinian state in Palestine.

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<sup>152</sup> For a complete treatment of the Greater Syria Scheme see Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*.

<sup>153</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.136.

<sup>154</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.150.

<sup>155</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.150.



Zionism's effacing of Palestinians and their national rights has been reproduced by the United Nations. Recall that UN Resolution 181<sup>156</sup> called for the partitioning of mandate Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state, not a Palestinian state. There is no sense that the resolution is creating a national home for Palestinians, realizing Palestinian national self-determination; it is yet another Arab state. Now, the resolution does reference "Palestinian citizens", but these are the citizens of the mandatory government. Otherwise, the resolution refers only to Jews and Arabs. There is no recognition in the resolution of a distinct Palestinian national identity; it speaks exclusively of an Arab community. UN Resolution 181 denies a Palestinian distinctness and this national group's right to self-determination.

The UN further reproduced this negation of Palestinians following the partition of Palestine. In the case of both UN Resolution 194 and UN Resolution 242 the international institution completely effaced any Palestinian identity. For example, resolution 194 of 11 December 1948

*Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 181 (II) (1947) Future Government of Palestine," Web page, [accessed 29 October 2004.]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253?OpenDocument>.

<sup>157</sup> United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 194 (III) (1948) Palestine - Progress Report on the United Nations Mediator," Web page, [accessed 29

Here, no reference is made to the national identity of these refugees, or if they even have such an identity. They are represented as nationless. Similarly, resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, while often cited as a cornerstone for Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking (recall it is cited in Article I of the DOPOISGA) makes not a single reference to Palestinians. It affirms the necessity of finding a just settlement to the anonymous refugee problem<sup>158</sup>. Like resolution 181 before them, resolutions 194 and 242 “deny the *national* dimension of the Palestinian question.”<sup>159</sup> All three resolutions completely efface a Palestinian identity.

The 1978 Camp David Frameworks for Peace provide yet another example of the persistence of this idea and practice of denying Palestinian identity and national rights, though in a less straightforward manner than their exclusion from the aforementioned resolutions. The agreement includes statements such as: “the representatives of the Palestinian people”, “the Palestinian problem” and “Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians.”<sup>160</sup>

Interestingly, the agreement also states that “the negotiations [on a self-governing authority to follow from the framework] must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians

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October 2004]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/c758572b78d1cd0085256bcf0077e51a?OpenDocument>.

<sup>158</sup> United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,” Web page, [accessed 29 October 2004]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/59210ce6d04aef61852560c3005da209?OpenDocument>.

<sup>159</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 226.

<sup>160</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, p.611.

will participate in the determination of their own future...”<sup>161</sup> These statements would seem to invalidate my claim that Palestinians are negated by and through this agreement; not only are Palestinians spoken of, so too are their rights.

This is not the case, however. Telhami explains that

[a]lthough the term “Palestinian people” is employed in the text of the Camp David Accords, a letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin, written at the latter’s urging and appended to the accords, stated that Carter acknowledged that “in each paragraph of the agreed framework document, the expressions ‘Palestinians’ or ‘Palestinian People’ are being and will be construed and understood by you as ‘Palestinian Arabs’.”<sup>162</sup>

This is a continuation of the Zionist practice of subsuming Palestinian identity under the larger Arab nation. This rarefied acknowledgement was furthered by the letter’s distinction “between ‘residents of Judea and Samaria’ and Palestinians residing outside the territories.”<sup>163</sup> The Camp David Accords differentiated between Palestinians still *in situ* in mandate Palestine and those that had been refugeed from mandate Palestine. In keeping with persistent practice Israel only selectively acknowledged Palestinians.

Further on the issue of Palestinian rights, it must be recognized that the autonomy mentioned in the Camp David Framework was *not* to be the realization of Palestinian national self-determination in the form of a state. It was something

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<sup>161</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, p.612.

<sup>162</sup> Shibley Telhami, “Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or a Breed of Its Own?” in *Israel in Comparative Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom* SUNY Series in Israeli Studies ed. Michael N. Barnett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 39.

<sup>163</sup> Telhami, “Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or a Breed of Its Own?” in *Israel in Comparative Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom* SUNY Series in Israeli Studies ed. Michael N. Barnett, p. 40.

significantly less. According to the agreement and subsequent negotiations the occupying Israeli army would not withdraw from the autonomous areas and concomitantly the autonomous inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza were to have no control over *inter alia* water resources, foreign and security policy and/or immigration. It is because of the Camp David Framework's empty references to "Palestinians" and autonomy plan for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that I have identified the agreement as another instance of denial of Palestinians and their national rights.

The preceding has catalogued instances of the effacing of Palestinians and their national rights in state policy, international resolutions and international agreements. This negation has also been reproduced discursively in text. The prime example of this discursive reproduction of the negation of Palestinians is Joan Peters' *From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over Palestine*.<sup>164</sup>

Peters published her text in 1984. The book was positively reviewed in *The Atlantic*, *The Washington Post*, *Commentary*, *The New Republic*, and the *New York Times*, received endorsements from, among others, Barbara Tuchman and Saul Bellow and went through eight hardcover printings.<sup>165</sup> Finkelstein explains that Peters' thesis was "that a significant proportion of the 700,000 Arabs residing in the part of Palestine that became Israel in 1949 had only recently settled there,

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<sup>164</sup> Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial: the Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over Palestine*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).

<sup>165</sup> Edward W. Said, "Conspiracy of Praise" in *Blaming the Victims : Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* eds. Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens (London;, New York: Verso, 1988), p.23.

and that they had emigrated to Palestine only because of the economic opportunities generated by Zionist settlement.”<sup>166</sup> He continues: “[t]herefore, Peters claims, the industrious Jewish immigrants had as much, if not more, right to this territory than the Palestinian ‘newcomers’.”<sup>167</sup> Finkelstein meticulously examines Peters’ sources and citations and concludes that “Peters’s demographic ‘study’ is a carefully contrived, premeditated hoax”<sup>168</sup> and that her text in general “is among the most spectacular frauds ever published on the Arab-Israeli conflict.”<sup>169</sup> This is an assessment shared by Said, Albert Hourani in *The Observer*, reviewers in the *London Review of Books* and Cockburn in *The Nation*.

Peters’ thesis is a clear example of the effacing of a Palestinian past or any Palestinian attachment to Palestine. The publication of her text may well have remained quite unremarkable (given that it reproduced a long-established negation) except for the fact that attempts to expose its fraudulent nature were systematically rebuffed by the media. Says Finkelstein in the postscript of his review of the Peters text:

The periodicals in which *From Time Immemorial* had already been favorably reviewed refused to run any critical correspondence (e.g. *The New Republic*, *Atlantic*, *Commentary*). Periodicals that had yet to review the book rejected a manuscript on the subject as of little or no consequence (e.g. *The Village Voice*, *Dissent*, *The New York Review of Books*). Not a single national newspaper or

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<sup>166</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.23.

<sup>167</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.23.

<sup>168</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.39.

<sup>169</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.22.

columnist contacted found newsworthy that a best-selling, effusively praised 'study' of the Middle East conflict was a threadbare hoax.<sup>170</sup>

Interestingly, not only did the media assist, through its reviews, in legitimizing Peters' denial of a Palestinian past or any attachment to Palestine, but it also refused to countenance any challenges to this denial or their legitimization of it. The media intentionally reproduced the denial of Palestinians and then consciously thwarted attempts to reveal it as a hoax. The media silenced attempts to refute Peters' negation.

My argument here is that Zionism has denied Palestinians, their national rights and their attachment to the land of Palestine and/or acknowledged them in rarefied forms (as Arabs and as politically irrelevant) and that these ideas and practices have been systematically excluded from the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Said's *The Question of Palestine* is testament to this discursive silencing.

*The Question of Palestine* was originally published in 1979 and republished in 1992. Said explains that in this text he has "tried to show that the Palestinian experience is an important and concrete part of history."<sup>171</sup> The aim of his polemic was to challenge the effacing of Palestinians from history. Evidently, Said was unsuccessful in locating Palestinians historically. It only stands to reason that if he had achieved his goal, the text would not have been republished 13 years later. The fact that the text was reissued evidences the ongoing discursive

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<sup>170</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.45.

<sup>171</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. xxxix.

silencing of the effacing of Palestinians. The republishing of *The Question of Palestine* indicated that Said still had to articulate the unarticulated by explaining to his readers that Zionism has denied Palestinians.

### *Conclusion*

This chapter was the first of four to describe the rules governing production of truth regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations. The focus was on three silences systematizing the discourse in the pre-1993 period. All of these silences involve the guiding principles of Zionism. Excluded from the discourse are statements bearing on the Zionist idea and practice of transfer and territorial maximization and Zionism's denial of Palestinian nationalism. The following chapter describes the rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period.

## **Chapter Four – Pre-1993 Rules of Formation Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations**

This is the second of four chapters examining the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The preceding chapter described three systematic exclusions from the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period. More specifically, it outlined transfer, territorial maximization and denial of Palestinians and their national rights as three Zionist ideas and practices that are policed and silenced by the discourse.

This chapter describes three rules of formation governing statements made in the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period: 1) representing Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists and Israel as conciliatory and peace-seeking, 2) representing Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or positing as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship and 3) assuming that Zionism would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. These rules systematize thought on Palestinian-Israeli relations such that their mobilization is a prerequisite in order to speak a truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

### ***Rule 1 – Arabs/Palestinians as Rejectionists, Israel as Conciliatory***

To speak truthfully about Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-Oslo Process period an author had to represent Arabs generally and Palestinians



specifically as intransigent and Zionists and subsequently the state of Israel as conciliatory. Moreover, the Arabs and Palestinians, discursively, are rejectionists and Israel is peace seeking. Flapan, Pappé, Said and Finkelstein all describe this rule in one form or another.

Arab/Palestinian intransigence and Israel's conciliatory nature feature prominently in Flapan's "myths" of the Israeli narrative. Recall the discursive truth I described in the preceding discussion of Zionism's territorial maximization:

Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, was a far-reaching compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned the concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized the right of the Palestinians to their own state. Israel accepted this sacrifice because it anticipated the implementation of the resolution in peace and cooperation with the Palestinians.<sup>1</sup>

The terms "compromise" and "sacrifice" convey the idea that Zionism was taking actions to overcome Arab/Palestinian hostility and make agreeable Arab/Palestinian and Zionist positions by making concessions. The terms suggest that Zionism surrendered some of its positions or principles in an attempt to realize a mutually acceptable agreement with the Arabs/Palestinians.

If Zionism was compromising, Arabs/Palestinians were, at the same time, intransigent. This is reflected in several of the other discursive truths described by Flapan. He identifies the ideas that "[t]he Palestinian Arabs totally rejected partition and responded to the call of the mufti of Jerusalem to launch an all-out

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<sup>1</sup> Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel : Myths and Realities*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p.13.

war on the Jewish state, forcing the Jews to depend on a military solution”<sup>2</sup> and that “[a]ll of the Arab states, unified in their determination to destroy the newborn Jewish state, joined together on May 15, 1948, to invade Palestine and expel its Jewish inhabitants”<sup>3</sup> as being central to Israel’s self-perception. Arab/Palestinian rejectionism is obvious in the first citation and Arab/Palestinian intransigence, the idea that Israel, no matter how small, would never exist in Palestine, is equally evident in the second reference. Encapsulating the juxtaposition of Arab/Palestinian intransigence and Israel’s conciliatory nature is the statement that “Israel’s hand has always been extended in peace, but since no Arab leaders have ever recognized Israel’s right to exist, there has never been anyone to talk to.”<sup>4</sup> Israel as a peace seeking, conciliatory state has sought but been denied peace partners because all the potential partners are intransigent rejectionists.

Flapan identifies these ideas as elements of the Israeli narrative. These ideas, however, did not remain confined to the realm of national self-perception. Pappé sees them articulated in literature on Palestinian-Israeli relations. Says Pappé: “Israeli historians conveyed the message that Israelis were the victims of the conflict and constituted the rational party in the struggle over Palestine, while the Palestinians were irrational if not fanatic, intransigent and immoral.”<sup>5</sup> Israel was the rational party because it was willing to compromise and make concessions in order to realize peace. Concomitantly, and this is obvious in

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<sup>2</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.55.

<sup>3</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 119.

<sup>4</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 201.

<sup>5</sup> Ilan Pappé, “Introduction: New historiographical orientations in the research on the Palestine Question” in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* ed. Ilan Pappé (New York: Routledge, 1999), p.2.

Pappe's verbiage, Palestinians were irrational and intransigent because they refused to compromise to resolve the conflict.

Said shares an assessment very similar to Pappé's, stating that "Israel represented (if it did not always play the role of) a nation in search of peace, while the Arabs were warlike, bloodthirsty, bent on extermination, and prey to irrational violence, more or less forever."<sup>6</sup> And in another text, Said explains that Palestinians have been defined as rejectionists while "Israel was routinely referred to in terms indicating morality and flexibility."<sup>7</sup> Importantly, however, Said does not limit such representations to Israeli historians. He sees the ideas of Arab/Palestinian intransigence and Israel's conciliatory nature dominating scholarship and political discourse.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, Finkelstein explains the Israeli flexibility noted by Said. His is not so much a discursive assessment as an explanation of a practice that allowed for the perpetuation of these ideas. Finkelstein notes that to transform Palestine into a Jewish state "required the formulation of [Zionist] objectives that appeared to be 'concessions'."<sup>9</sup> Recall that the Zionists accepted partition of Palestine as a stage in the realization of Eretz Israel. In this case, the objective was to realize any Jewish state in Palestine and expand when conditions were propitious. The fact

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<sup>6</sup> Edward W Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p. xiv.

<sup>7</sup> Edward W. Said, "Intifada and Independence" in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* 1<sup>st</sup> ed., ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1989), p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. xiv.

<sup>9</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: Verso, 2003), p.xv.

that this objective was represented as a concession is borne out by the Flapan quote that opened the present discussion.

Finkelstein's point specifically, as well as the larger assessment of Flapan, Pappé and Said, are evidenced by the statements of leading Zionists. In 1948 Moshe Sharett, Israel's first foreign minister, spoke to the UN Palestine Commission. Said Sharett:

The fact that today the world has initiated a solution which has met with Jewish acceptance but with rejection on the Arab side should not signify that it gives the Jews 100 percent of what they want or feel entitled to. It entails a painful sacrifice for the Jewish people in that it takes away from them, maybe for all the future, certain very important parts of the country which, through centuries past, they came to regard as their past and future national patrimony ... The Jewish people, as represented by the Jewish Agency, have declared themselves willing to cooperate in the implementation of the compromise solution because they made an effort to approach the problem in a realistic spirit, to understand and admit the legitimate rights and interests of the other section of the population of Palestine, namely, the Arabs of Palestine.<sup>10</sup>

In authoring this statement, Sharett mobilized the ideas and terminology of the discursive rule of formation that demands that Arabs be represented as intransigent and rejectionist and Israel as conciliatory. Words and phrases such as "Jewish acceptance", "rejection on the Arab side", "painful sacrifice", "cooperate" and "compromise", coupled with Israel's ostensible acceptance of the UN partition resolution reproduce the intransigent/conciliatory dichotomy.

Following the partition of Palestine and the War of 1948-1949, Yosef Tekoah, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations from 1968 to 1975,

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<sup>10</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel : Myths and Realities*, pp.15-16.

consistently (re)produced and spoke in accordance with this rule. Tekoah clearly represents Israel as conciliatory and peace seeking in the subtitle of his text *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace*. Referencing the War of 1948, which my discussion of Plan Dalet already demonstrated to be a Zionist offensive, in 1975 Tekoah said:

Israel emerged into independence appealing to its neighbors for peace. Israel has persisted in its calls for peace, offering its hand to the Arab States again and again. The aspiration to peace has dominated Israel's entire existence. It has shaped the policies of all Israeli Governments. The Arabs have persistently reacted, however, with a single sinister voice – the voice of war. They never made any secret of their objective – to eradicate the Jewish state and annihilate the people of Israel. They never renounced this objective.<sup>11</sup>

Elsewhere, Tekoah asserted that the Arabs as intransigent rejectionists never stopped waging this war of annihilation.

This war continues by the will of the Arab States. Despite United Nations decisions calling for permanent peace ... the Arab Governments went on and on with their warfare against Israel. It was waged through terror and sabotage, blockade and boycott. It was waged with persistence and malice. It ebbed at times, only to be resumed and pushed forward again in all its odious purposefulness. The publicly proclaimed aim remained unchanged: the total destruction of Israel.<sup>12</sup>

He also (re)produced the idea that Israel sought only peace and accommodation saying that “[t]he Security Council [after the War of 1967] established a cease-fire, and Israel pleaded again to be granted that elementary right not begrudged to

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<sup>11</sup> Yosef Tekoah, and David Aphek, *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), p.203.

<sup>12</sup> Tekoah and Aphek, *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace*, p.90.

other nations: the right to peace and security.”<sup>13</sup> Tekoah also (re)produced the idea of Arab/Palestinian intransigence and rejectionism expressing that “it is still war that our neighbors are offering us. Peace is still being rejected openly and unabashedly”<sup>14</sup> and that Israel and the world awaited “a sign that the Arab Governments are at last ready for peace.”<sup>15</sup>

Israeli Prime Minister Shamir in his aforementioned 1991 speech at the Madrid Conference also (re)produced this discursive rule of formation representing the Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists and Israel as conciliatory and peace seeking.

Regrettably, the Arab leaders, whose friendship we wanted most, opposed a Jewish state in the region; and, with a few distinguished exceptions, they claimed that the Land of Israel is part of the Arab domain that stretched from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. In defiance of international will and legality, the Arab regimes attempted to overrun and destroy the Jewish state even before it was born. The Arab spokesman at the UN declared that the establishment of a Jewish state would cause a bloodbath which would make the slaughters of Ghengis Khan pale into insignificance. In its declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, Israel stretched out its hand in peace to its Arab neighbours, calling for end to war and bloodshed. In response, seven Arab states invaded Israel. The UN resolution that partitioned the country was thus violated and effectively annulled.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Tekoah and Aphek, *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace*, p. 90.

<sup>14</sup> Tekoah and Aphek, *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace*, p.91.

<sup>15</sup> Tekoah and Aphek, *In the Face of the Nations: Israel's Struggle for Peace*, p.91.

<sup>16</sup> Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel, “Address by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel [to Madrid Conference],” Web page, [accessed 25 October 2004]. Available at

Later Shamir stated that:

“Our pursuit of accommodation and peace has been relentless. ... A nation [Israel] that faces such a gigantic challenge would most naturally desire peace with all its neighbours. Since the beginning of Zionism, we have formulated innumerable peace proposals and plans. All of them were rejected. The first crack in the wall of hostility occurred in 1977 when the late president Anwar Sadat of Egypt decided to break the taboo and come to Jerusalem... Regrettably, not one Arab leader has seen fit to come forward and respond to our call for peace.”<sup>17</sup>

Holding out hope that Arabs/Palestinians would reciprocate Israel’s willingness to accommodate and compromise Shamir concluded that “we [Israelis] hope you [Arabs] finally realize that you could have been at this table long ago, soon after the Camp David Accords were first concluded, had you chosen dialogue instead of violence, coexistence instead of terrorism.”<sup>18</sup>

Over the course of 43 years, Sharett, Tekoah and Shamir consistently deployed the same ideas and language to portray Israel as desirous of peace and willing to settle the Palestinian/Israeli conflict through concessions and Arabs/Palestinians as the antithesis – uncompromising, categorical, unequivocal and bent on destruction. It is hardly surprising that Zionists would author, and represent Israel in accordance with, this rule of formation – after all Flapan identified it as an element of the Israeli narrative. The (re)production of this rule does not end with the statements of Israeli representatives however. What must be

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<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Peace%20Process/1991/ADDRESS%20BY%20MR%20YITZHAK%20SHAMIR%20-%2031-Oct-91>.

<sup>17</sup> Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel, “Address by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel [to Madrid Conference],” Web page.

<sup>18</sup> Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel, “Address by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel [to Madrid Conference],” Web page.

recognized, and this is in keeping with the assessments of Pappe and Said, is that knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations has been produced according to this rule.

The discursive rule by which Arabs/Palestinians are represented as intransigent and rejectionist and Israel as conciliatory systematizes scholarship on Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-Oslo Process period. The Quakers, in a text explicitly conscious of the difficulties of reaching a fair judgment of the Arab-Israeli conflict, assert with certitude that “[t]hey [Al Fatah- the largest group in the PLO] reject a partition of Palestine, as Arabs rejected it in 1947.”<sup>19</sup> In spite of the text’s obvious commitment to the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it easily and without dispute or contest posits Arabs/Palestinians as rejectionists.

Similarly, Shlom Aronson in his *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective* speaks of Arab/Palestinians as rejectionists saying that: “[t]he hostile Palestinian element, which had declared war on Zionism in the late twenties, then refused to accept partition and left because of Arab promises to return after Israel’s destruction, could not return.”<sup>20</sup> Parenthetically, it must be noted here that Aronson mobilizes the discursive silence involving the Zionist idea and practice of transfer and invokes Kimche’s fictitious “order theory”.

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<sup>19</sup> American Friends Service Committee, *Search for Peace in the Middle East: a Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee*, Rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971), p.69.

<sup>20</sup> Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict & Bargaining in the Middle East: an Israeli Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p.5.



Aronson does not only represent Arabs/Palestinians as rejectionists. He also represents Zionists and Israel as conciliatory. Says Aronson:

The Israelis felt that they had conceded much by agreeing to partition. The Arabs had been allotted extensive areas of the country previously designated for a Palestinian state, which they flatly rejected. The proposed border between the two states was twisting and complicated, and Jerusalem was internationalized. By going to war, however, the Arabs were seen to have violated the conditions of this eminently fair compromise and thus to have released the Israelis from their commitment to the plan.<sup>21</sup>

Throughout the text, Aronson also speaks repeatedly of “Israeli compromises”, “concessions” demanded of Israel and Israel’s “retaliatory policy”. The first two phrases quite obviously posit Israel as conciliatory, as the party to the conflict being asked to, and willing to, concede its position. The third phrase mobilizes the idea that Arabs/Palestinians were waging a low-intensity war against Israel, as rejectionists are wont to do, and Israel was merely responding to these provocations. The Aronson text was produced in accordance with the rule of formation governing knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations that demands that Arabs/Palestinians be represented as intransigent rejectionists while at the same time Israel is represented as conciliatory.

Weizman’s *The Battle for Peace* is written in accordance with the discursive rule that Arabs/Palestinians are intransigent rejectionists and Israel is conciliatory and peace seeking. The title and tenor of the text point to the second part of this dichotomy. It is Israel that is constantly struggling for peace with the Arab world, according to Weizman and on the front flap of the dust jacket the

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<sup>21</sup> Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective*, p.3

author is described as an “eager advocate of reasonable [Israeli] concessions and compromise.” Further to the point that Israel is peace seeking Weizman states that “[i]t is our duty to convince such youngsters [high school students] that we are doing everything in our power for peace.”<sup>22</sup> This, in turn, blends seamlessly with the idea of Arab intransigence and rejectionism – if Israel is doing everything for peace, it must be the other parties that are unwilling to accommodate this lofty goal. Of Arab/Palestinian intransigence and rejectionism Weizman says: “[t]hose with an inclination to blame Israel for piling obstacles on the path to peace forget that the Arabs have not, in fact, modified their underlying intention. They still hope to erase Israel from the map – if possible.”<sup>23</sup> This text, too, was produced in accordance with this discursive rule of formation.

Yaniv and Peretz also write according to this rule. In a retrospective marking the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the War of 1967 Yaniv speaks of “Israeli territorial concessions”<sup>24</sup>, as does Peretz.<sup>25</sup> Peretz also speaks extensively of Arab/Palestinian-Israeli bargaining which, of course, mobilizes the idea of concessions, or the partial surrender of positions, in order to come to agreeable terms. Says Perez:

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<sup>22</sup> Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace* (Toronto, New York: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 200.

<sup>23</sup> Weizman, *The Battle for Peace*, pp.198-199.

<sup>24</sup> Avner Yaniv, “Israeli Foreign Policy Since the Six Day War” in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change*, Westview Special Studies on the Middle East eds. Yehuda Lukacs, and Abdalla M Battah (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p.13.

<sup>25</sup> Don Peretz, “Israeli Policies Toward the Arab States and the Palestinians Since 1967” in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change*, Westview Special Studies on the Middle East eds. Yehuda Lukacs, and Abdalla M Battah, pp. 27, 30.

Before its conquest of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan, and Sinai, Israel had little room for maneuver in its policies toward the Arab states and the Palestinians. Its cards in terms of territory were few, and there was little else that the country could offer at the bargaining table.<sup>26</sup>

He continues:

After 1967 there was greater room for diplomatic maneuver. The Arab territories under Israeli control were so extensive that large areas could be used as bargaining cards without jeopardizing national security. ... The 1967 conquests also strengthened Israel's bargaining position in the international community, with the Arab states, and with the Palestinians by considerably diminishing their terms for a settlement.<sup>27</sup>

For Peretz Israel's capture of territory meant that Israel could finally dislodge the Arabs/Palestinians from their intransigence and compel them to see the reasonableness of compromise; again, a compromise Israel was always willing to realize. In the case of both Yaniv and Peretz, Israel's conciliatory nature is emphasized with Arab/Palestinian intransigence and rejectionism identifiable through logical derivation.

Writing after Israel's second invasion of Lebanon in 1982 Thomas Friedman also produced knowledge in accordance with this same discursive rule of formation. In *From Beirut to Jerusalem* Friedman states that:

The Zionists then led by David Ben-Gurion, accepted this partition plan [the UN plan of 1947], even though they had always dreamed of controlling all of western Palestine and Jerusalem. The Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab

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<sup>26</sup> Peretz, "Israeli Policies Toward the Arab States and the Palestinians Since 1967" in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change* eds. Yehuda Lukacs and Abdalla M. Battah, p. 39.

<sup>27</sup> Peretz, "Israeli Policies Toward the Arab States and the Palestinians Since 1967" in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change* eds. Yehuda Lukacs and Abdalla M. Battah, p. 39.

states rejected the partition proposal. They felt that Palestine was all theirs, that the Jews were a foreign implant foisted upon them, and that they had the strength to drive them out. Just before the British completed their withdrawal on May 14, 1948, the Zionists declared their own state, and the next day the Palestinians, aided by the armies of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq launched a war to prevent Jewish independence and to secure control of all of western Palestine.<sup>28</sup>

The idea of Arab rejectionism and Israeli compromise is clearly mobilized to produce this statement. Furthermore, at the end of his text Friedman in the context of a discussion of Palestinian-American relations states that

Arafat wanted [Secretary of State under Reagan] Schultz around to use as leverage against the Israelis, in the hope that Washington would squeeze Israel on the PLO's behalf and spare him from having to make the concessions Israel would require for any kind of settlement.<sup>29</sup>

Interestingly, Friedman mobilizes the same discursive rule of formation, not to explain a historical event in the immediate post-war period, but to explain what was then a contemporary event. Rather than the Arabs/Palestinians being uncompromising about partition and choosing war in 1947, the Palestinians were trying to involve U.S. Secretary of State Schultz in negotiations in an attempt to remain intransigent and avoid making compromises in the late 1980s. Compromises, it must be added, Israel is represented as willing to make.

Walzer, too, produced his "The Green Line"<sup>30</sup> by conforming to the first discursive rule of formation. Walzer abides by other analytics (such as the

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<sup>28</sup> Thomas L Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1989), pp.14-15.

<sup>29</sup> Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, p.498.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Walzer, "The Green Line," *New Republic* 199, no. 10 ( 5 September 1988): pp.22-24.

positing of symmetries between Palestinians and Israelis that will be described as the second rule for formation), but emphasizes Arab/Palestinian intransigence and rejectionism. A cursory survey of this text reveals statements such as: "...haven't the Arabs been at war with Israel for 40 years now, always refusing (Egypt the only exception) to accept Israeli statehood?";<sup>31</sup> and "[t]he PLO must find some way of saying that it has finally and forever given up its hope of getting rid of Israel."<sup>32</sup> Walzer also explains that the Palestinian commitment to a peace settlement must be tested;<sup>33</sup> Palestinian movement away from rejectionism, itself a deviation, must be authenticated, proven. It cannot be assumed. Walzer's concluding thought is most telling. Says Walzer: "It is still not clear that the leadership of the PLO really wants a West Bank and Gazan ministate: they have missed so many opportunities to move toward that goal that one cannot help wondering whether they don't still have other goals in mind."<sup>34</sup> The obvious reference to Abba Eban's infamous quote "The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity" aside, what is striking is that Walzer still, even after discussing the conditions of a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, suggests that a settlement may only be ephemeral because the Palestinians may never truly abandon their rejection of Israel. Walzer's text represents Arabs/Palestinians as inherently or innately rejectionist, any deviation from this predisposition as ephemeral and/or strategic and Palestinians as being liable to return to this natural inclination; to rejectionist recidivism.

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<sup>31</sup> Walzer, "The Green Line," p. 23.

<sup>32</sup> Walzer, "The Green Line," p. 23.

<sup>33</sup> Walzer, "The Green Line," p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> Walzer, "The Green Line," p. 24.

Finally, Quandt also produced his *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* in accordance with this discursive rule of formation. Like previously cited authors Quandt speaks of Israel making territorial concessions in an attempt to gain Arab acceptance and produce peace.<sup>35</sup> More tellingly, he suggests that the U.S. “persuade other Arabs [other than Egypt] that diplomacy offered a better course for redressing grievances than military threats.”<sup>36</sup> Here again the ideas are that Israel will pacify the innately hostile and violent Arabs by surrendering some of its positions; Israel is to compromise to assuage Arab/Palestinian intransigence.

The veracity of this discursive rule is not borne out by the historical record. The research of Flapan and Pappé demonstrates conclusively that the Arabs/Palestinians have been accommodating and willing to compromise and that the Zionists have been intransigent. Furthermore, Finkelstein and Masahla explain Arab/Palestinian responses to Zionist ideas and practices that have been interpreted and represented as hostility and rejectionism.

Flapan makes three relevant points here: 1) most Palestinians “were not interested in a war against the Jews,”<sup>37</sup> 2) that “Arab leaders and governments were ready to negotiate a solution to the conflict before, during and after the War of Independence”<sup>38</sup> and 3) leading Zionists rejected possible negotiated solutions

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<sup>35</sup> William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.; Berkeley: Brookings Institution; University of California Press, 1993), p.17.

<sup>36</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p. 416.

<sup>37</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.74.

<sup>38</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, 203.

and actively pursued conflict. On this first point Flapan states that “[t]he Israeli myth that Palestinian Arab leaders were uniformly uncompromising is accompanied by the claim, equally erroneous, that their followers, the masses of Palestinian Arabs, eagerly embraced war with the Jewish state.”<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, he argues that: “[t]he Palestinians then neither wanted nor believed in war, and in the absence of official channels to express their opposition, they attempted to protect themselves against warfare by the only means at their disposal: local agreements with their Jewish neighbors against mutual attacks, provocation and hostile acts.”<sup>40</sup> Deir Yassin, the village wiped out by Shamir’s LEHI in 1948, had such a non-aggression pact.

According to Flapan, Palestinians did not want war in 1948. Initially, they were willing to accommodate the Jewish immigrants in a bi-national secular state in mandate Palestine and even after the War of 1948-1949 and the loss of further territory they were willing to acknowledge and accept the state of Israel. In fact, the Palestinian delegation to the Lausanne Conference of 1949 held as one of its positions “to *accept Israel as it existed* on the condition that each refugee be allowed to return to his home, *whether it was under Arab or Israeli jurisdiction.*”<sup>41</sup> Israel rejected this position at Lausanne, though it did agree to allow for the return of a small number of refugees under the guise of family reunification.

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<sup>39</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 72.

<sup>40</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.73.

<sup>41</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.222.

On the second point, Flapan demonstrates that the Arab states tried to avoid war with the Zionists. Arab attempts to avoid war included requests to prolong the mandate of Palestine and thereby keep British troops in residency to acceptance of an “American proposal for a three-month truce [in early May of 1948] on the condition that Israel temporarily postpone its Declaration of Independence.” Britain refused to extend the mandate; Ben-Gurion refused to declare independence on 1 October 1948 in accordance with UN Resolution 181, but rather early on 15 May 1948; and Arab armies moved into Palestine. Unilaterally advancing the independence timetable had dire consequences. Flapan cites Nahum Goldmann who claims that “by postponing the declaration of the Jewish state – a state that in any case already existed – Israel might have reached an accommodation with the Arabs.”<sup>42</sup> Flapan goes on to cite Goldmann as saying that “the invasion of the Arab states could have been avoided by changing the timing of independence.”<sup>43</sup> This was due, primarily, to the fact that it would have served as a face saving gesture for the Arab states’ whose civil societies were agitated by Zionist actions against Palestinian towns and villages in accordance with Plan Dalet.

When Arab attempts to avoid war with Israel failed, the Arab states went to war begrudgingly, with little preparation and against each other. In 1948 “[t]hey [the Arab states] sent less than half their forces against the Israelis – what the Arab chiefs of staff viewed as absolutely minimal for an effective war against

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<sup>42</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.156.

<sup>43</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.156.



Israel.”<sup>44</sup> These forces were poorly equipped because the Arab states had not made preparations for war against Israel, trying “until the last minute to prevent the invasion,”<sup>45</sup> and they were poorly coordinated due to the fact that the two most important and militarily powerful Arab states agreed to participate in the action only two weeks prior to the operation. Pappé explains that

a fortnight before the war the leaders of the Arab world were unable to guarantee Transjordanian and Egyptian participation in the war. In the two weeks left till 15 May they did succeed in enlisting Amman and Cairo, but one wonders to what extent that Arab armies could prepare themselves for an offensive in such a short time.<sup>46</sup>

The Arab states knew themselves to be unprepared for war. Flapan asserts that the Arab states knew that they could not defeat Israel in 1948.<sup>47</sup> And Pappé states that

...very few of the Arab leaders were sanguine about the chances of winning the military confrontation; it was impossible for them to avoid participating so late in the day, but they did everything possible to limit the disastrous repercussions which they expected in the wake of a defeat in Palestine.<sup>48</sup>

Pappé surmises that “[t]he number of soldiers employed, the level of preparation and the performance on the battlefield all clearly point to the ambivalent attitude of the Arab states towards the problem of Palestine.”<sup>49</sup>

Despite their bellicose statements, the movement of Arab armies into Palestine was “designed more to put an end to Abdallah’s Greater Syria scheme

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<sup>44</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 140.

<sup>45</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 140.

<sup>46</sup> Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1992), p.125.

<sup>47</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 140.

<sup>48</sup> Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, p.125.

<sup>49</sup> Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-51*, p.133.

than to destroy the newborn state [of Israel].”<sup>50</sup> Recall that Abdallah colluded with the Jewish Agency as regarded the dispensation of mandate Palestine; he was to annex those parts of the mandate assigned to the Arab state by resolution 181. The Arabs states knew of Abdallah’s collusion with the Jewish Agency. Arab attempts to prolong the mandate and endorsement of the May truce, which it must be noted Abdallah refused, were diplomatic attempts to “block the implementation of Abdallah’s agreement with the Jewish Agency.”<sup>51</sup> For his part, Abdallah’s collusion with the Jewish Agency explains, *inter alia*, the troop deployments of the different Arab states throughout the mandate, why the Arab Legion under Abdallah never attacked Israel’s “narrow waist” (the strategically vulnerable 12 mile space between the Mediterranean and Israel’s eastern most border) and the ill-preparedness of the Arab states noted by Pappe. As commander of the Arab forces, Abdallah sent his Arab Legion in to occupy the West Bank and Jerusalem in contravention of the Arabs’ Damascus Plan which envisioned Syrian forces being in place in the West Bank.<sup>52</sup> In other words, Abdallah made his army the occupying army in the territory he wanted to annex while he redirected other forces away from this territory. Abdallah, by not sending his forces against Israel’s glaring geographic point of weakness, also honoured his agreement with the Jewish Agency not to inhibit the establishment of the Jewish state. In fact, the Arab Legion only fought Jewish forces outside of the territory assigned to the Jewish state; in defensive positions. Finally, Abdallah contributed

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<sup>50</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 186.

<sup>51</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 181.

<sup>52</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 142.

to the ill-preparedness of the Arab forces by refusing to join the Arab coalition until early May 1948. Recall here Pappé's statement. Abdallah actively undermined Arab coordination in an attempt to retard the development of a united Arab position which might have threatened his agreement with the Jewish Agency and his designs for a Greater Syria. Flapan offers an excellent synopsis of the War of 1948-49. "Although militarily this was a war between Arabs and Jews, politically it was a war between Arabs and Arabs."<sup>53</sup>

Now, the mutual mistrust and internecine strife among the Arab states and their resultant ill-preparedness produced the expected outcome – through the course of 1948-49 War the Jewish state expanded its borders, more Palestinians were transferred out of the territory occupied by the Jewish state and the Arab states were humiliated militarily and politically. However, even in the face of these losses, after the armistice agreements

the Arab governments genuinely wanted peace and were ready to discuss repatriation [of Palestinian refugees] if two conditions were met: first, that Israel accept in principle the refugees right to repatriation; and second, that Israel make a gesture of good will by agreeing to pay compensation and accept the return of a certain number of refugees prepared to live in peace with their neighbors.<sup>54</sup>

This position, like the Palestinian position at Lausanne, was rejected by Israel. In fact, the Jewish Agency and later Israel pursued policies and rejected proposals that could have first defused the crisis and later resolved the conflict.

Prior to the start of the war with the Arab states in May 1948 the Jewish Agency lobbied against extension of the mandate and steadfastly refused to defer

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<sup>53</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.150.

<sup>54</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 219.

the declaration of independence. Both initiatives that could have prevented the war. Also prior to the conflict, the Jewish Agency encouraged radicalism among the Palestinian population by supporting the mufti of Jerusalem against more “moderate” Palestinian elements.<sup>55</sup> Here it must be noted that Ben-Gurion did so knowing full well that the Palestinians did not want war. Said Ben-Gurion: “[t]hey, the decisive majority of them, do not want to fight us, and all of them together are unable to stand up to us, even at the present state of our organization and equipment.”<sup>56</sup> Also prior to the outbreak of war the Haganah and other Jewish paramilitaries were terrorizing Palestinian civilians and realizing transfer through the implementation of Plan Dalet. Finally, the Jewish Agency rejected the American truce proposal and while it accepted a separate truce proposal for Jerusalem in early May,<sup>57</sup> it rejected a wider truce.

During the war Israel rejected Egypt’s peace proposal of September 1948. Elements of this proposal included an agreement to the repatriation of Palestinians to the territory of proposed Arab state (not to Israel) and guarantees against further Israeli expansion.<sup>58</sup> Israel also rejected a Syrian peace proposal in January 1949. Conditions of this proposal included “self-determination for the Palestinians and alteration of the international frontier through the Sea of Galilee in order to formalize the traditional fishing rights of the Syrian peasants.”<sup>59</sup> After the war

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<sup>55</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 67.

<sup>56</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 73.

<sup>57</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, pp. 179-180

<sup>58</sup> For a discussion of the Egyptian proposal see Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, pp. 205-208.

<sup>59</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 209. For a discussion of the Syrian proposal see Flapan pp. 208-212.

Israel rejected all Arab proposals to end the conflict as they would have required Israel to permit the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees. This would have reversed the realization of the Zionist idea of transfer accomplished during the War of 1948-1949.

Flapan's conclusions regarding Arab/Palestinian-Israeli relations in the immediate post-war period challenges the discursive rule of formation that represents Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists and Israel as conciliatory and peace seeking. These conclusions deserve quoting at length. First, there did not have to be a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Asserts Flapan "had the Jewish leadership so desired, alternative policies toward the Palestine Arabs, on both the political and military levels, could have been developed"<sup>60</sup> and that "according to the record, objective conditions for an alternative policy toward the Palestinian Arabs existed all along."<sup>61</sup> Second, this avoidable local conflict developed into an intractable regional conflict because of decisions taken by an uncompromising Israel. Says Flapan:

The period from 1948 to 1949 was certainly dominated by a tragic, cruel war, involving enormous suffering and losses for both sides. But it also offered opportunities for peace and reconciliation. The Arabs were strongly inclined to acquiesce to the existence of a Jewish state, as shown not only by their acceptance of the Lausanne protocol but also by proposals for compromise tendered at secret meetings held despite public refusals to sit down with the Israelis. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians were trying to save by negotiations what they had lost in the war – a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Israel, however, gave priority to its own economic, demographic, and military consideration, preferring tenuous armistice agreements to a

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<sup>60</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.78.

<sup>61</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, pp. 78-79.

definite peace that would involve territorial concessions and the repatriation of even a token number of refugees.<sup>62</sup>

Israel wanted peace, but the Arabs' basic price for this peace was unacceptable to Israel. To pay the price would have required that Israel compromise on the Zionist ideas of transfer and territorial maximization practically realized under the cover of war; Palestinian refugees would have had to be repatriated to Israel and conquered territory evacuated in accordance with the UN partition plan.

The preceding should not be taken to mean that there was not Palestinian opposition to the Zionist project. There was, in fact, Palestinian opposition. In 1920-21 Palestinians attacked Jewish areas in Jerusalem and Jaffa, in 1929 Palestinians attacked Jews in Jerusalem, Safed and Hebron and the Arab rebellion raged from 1936 to 1939. These events are often cited as examples of Palestinian hostility to and rejection of Jews and the Zionist project in mandate Palestine.

Both Finkelstein and Masahla explain this Palestinian resistance. Says

Finkelstein:

Arab opposition and resistance to the Zionist movement was rooted pre-eminently in the latter's intent to create a state that would, at best marginalize – and more than likely expel – them. The 'security' threat posed by the Arabs thus resulted from Zionism's ideological-political agenda.<sup>63</sup>

Masahla comes to the same conclusion explaining that:

... the resistance of the indigenous Arab population to Zionism before and in 1948 emanated from precisely the Zionist goal of establishing a Jewish state that would, at best, marginalize the Palestinians as a small, dependent minority in their own homeland, and, at worst, eradicate

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<sup>62</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 232.

<sup>63</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: Verso, 2003), p.85.

and ‘transfer’ them. The security ‘threat’ posed by the ‘transferred’ inhabitants of the Palestinian towns and villages resulted from the Zionist movement’s ideological premise and political agenda, namely the establishment of an exclusivist state.<sup>64</sup>

During the mandate period there was Palestinian resistance to or rejection of the Zionist project. This resistance, however, was an effect, an effect of the Zionist project. It was a rejection of the Zionist ideas and practices of transfer and territorial maximization, both of which were at the expense of Palestinians. As I have shown, after the War of 1948-49 Palestinians accepted the realization of the Zionist project in the form of the state of Israel with the only caveat being that the refugees be permitted to return to their homes and lands.

Now, one final word about the idea of Israeli territorial concessions, particularly in the post-1967 context. Yaniv, Peretz and Quandt all spoke of territorial concessions in their previously cited statements, and the idea carries even more currency in the post-Oslo period. Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip in an aggressive war of choice. To relinquish control of these territories is not to make a concession, it is not an act of granting the territory to the Palestinians. Instead, it is the returning of the territory to the rightful owner of the patrimony. Furthermore, to speak of Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in an aggressive war as a concession is to reproduce the image of Israel as conciliatory. Discursively, the deployment of the term “concessions” connotes an Israeli willingness to surrender its positions in the interests of peace. Concomitantly, it completely obscures the fact that Israel came to occupy those

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<sup>64</sup> Nur Masahla, “A critique of Benny Morris” in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* ed. Ilan Pappé (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 219.

positions by pursuing aggressive policies and exploiting military conflicts, by rejecting peace overtures in favour of territorial gains.

This subsection described representations of Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent and rejectionists and Zionists and Israel as conciliatory and peace seeking as the first discursive rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Quite evidently, this rule is only tenable if the foundational ideas and practices of Zionism are silenced. It would be impossible to represent Zionists as conciliatory for example, if at the same time an author engaged the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. In this case, as is the case with the totality of silences and rules of formation I describe in chapters three through six, the omissions and laws are complimentary. These analytics systematize and authorize truthful knowledge about Palestinian-Israeli relations in such a manner as to repress or leave unnoticed contradictions and reaffirm and strengthen the analytics themselves.

### *Rule 2 – Israel as Victim; Symmetrical Relationship*

The second discursive rule of formation governing production of knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations is to either 1) represent Israel as the victim of the conflict or 2) posit as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship, to assume an equality between the two parties.<sup>65</sup> In either case

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<sup>65</sup> For an example of the first aspect of this rule see my discussion of Walzer in the previous section dealing with the Zionist idea and practice of territorial maximization. In his text Walzer represents Israel as the victim of Arab aggression. This aspect is so prevalent in the discourse, primarily the theme of the



Palestinians are not represented as victims of the conflict. Pappé and Said both reference this rule; the former directly and the latter more inferentially.

Pappé's brief review of the historical literature on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the introduction to his *The Israel/Palestine Question* is very instructive. Pappé divides this literature into two categories – old and new. The new histories, according to Pappé, “perceive the Palestine conflict as one fought between a strong ex-colonial party – Israel – and a weaker one – a colonized party, the Palestinians.”<sup>66</sup> Most authors of the old literature, in contrast, represented Israel as the victim in the conflict. Pappé notes, however, that

several, although not too many scholars, outside the area attempted to write the conflict's history from a different perspective; they wrote under the assumption that both parties to the conflict should be treated as more or less equal in power as well as in guilt and justice.<sup>67</sup>

Bear in mind, whether it was the majority or minority of scholars contributing to the old corpus, neither represented Palestinians as victims of the conflict. Palestinians either victimized Israelis or were equally culpable and deserving of blame for the conflict as Israelis; Israel was either the victim or it was an equal partner to the conflict.

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Israeli David against the Arab Goliath, that it is unnecessary to focus on it in the same detail as I do the second aspect. I engage the second aspect in detail because its deployment in the discourse is more subtle.

<sup>66</sup> Pappé, “Introduction: New historiographical orientations in the research on the Palestine Question” in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* ed. Ilan Pappé, p. 2.

<sup>67</sup> Pappé, “Introduction: New historiographical orientations in the research on the Palestine Question” in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* ed. Ilan Pappé p. 2.

This analytic is further acknowledged in Said's work. Said's corpus on Palestinian-Israeli relations generally and his *The Question of Palestine* specifically are challenges to the notions of Israel's victimization and Palestinian-Israeli equality or symmetry. Rather than articulate this rule, however, his general argumentation and specific statements clearly challenge these notions as presented in other literatures.

For example, Said's challenges include: the title of his 1988 text *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, his statement characterizing Palestinians as "victims of the victims" and the title of chapter two of *The Question of Palestine* – "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims". In *The Question of Palestine* Said asserts that "Jewish national liberation ... took place upon the ruins of *another* national existence, not in the abstract"<sup>68</sup> and that "it has been the Palestinian who has borne the brunt of Zionism's extraordinary human cost, a cost not only large, but unacknowledged."<sup>69</sup> These are obvious statements representing Palestinians as victims of Zionism, not its victimizer nor its culpable equal.

So pervasive was this second discursive rule of formation that Said was compelled to explain that: "one forgets that the relationship between Israelis and Arabs is not a fact of nature but the result of a specific, continuing process of dispossession, displacement and colonial de facto apartheid. Moreover, one tends to forget that Zionists were *arrivals* in Palestine from Europe."<sup>70</sup> His historicizing

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<sup>68</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 52.

<sup>69</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 54.

<sup>70</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 37.

reminds the reader that Zionism and Zionists were introduced into Palestine and the Palestinian experience and since that introduction the Palestinian experience has been defined by dispossession, displacement and occupation. Said does not represent Israel as the victim of Palestinian aggression or as an equal bearer of responsibility for the conflict. Instead, Palestinians are represented as the victims of a foreign intrusion. Similarly, later in the text Said states that responsible scholarship “must ...discriminate between an invading, dispossessing, and displacing political presence [Zionism] and the presence it invades, displaces, and dispossesses [Palestinians].”<sup>71</sup> He continues: “[t]he two are not equal.”<sup>72</sup> Said’s challenge, and hence acknowledgement of the discursive rule is obvious. The first statement clearly rejects the Israel-as-victim representation and the second is unequivocal in its dismissal of the posited symmetry between Israelis and Palestinians.

One can see a clear articulation of this assumed symmetry in Galtung’s characterization of the conflict: “this is a peculiar conflict; a conflict not between right and wrong, nor between wrong and wrong, but between right and right – both Jews and Arabs in the same area having a right to settle – which makes it even more intractable.”<sup>73</sup> Galtung accords equal legitimacy to the claims and rights of both Palestinians and Israelis. He establishes a symmetry between the two parties – both are right. Similarly, Kelman, too, gives equal weight to the

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<sup>71</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 49.

<sup>72</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 49.

<sup>73</sup> John Galtung, “The ‘Peace Process’ Twenty Years Later: Failure Without Alternative?” in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades of Change* eds. Yehuda Lukacs and Abdalla M. Battah, p. 323.

claims and rights of Palestinians and Israelis explaining that: “the conflict centers on the competing claims of two peoples for the same land;”<sup>74</sup> “[w]hat each side wants from the other, in order to feel adequately reassured, is acceptance of its national identity and explicit recognition of its legitimate rights;”<sup>75</sup> and “[t]he Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents a clash between two nationalist movements, each struggling for its right to national identity and national existence and centering its claims on the same territory.”<sup>76</sup> Kelman, like Galtung, never questions the legitimacy of the competing claims and rights. Their equality is asserted in accordance with the second rule of formation. Reading Galtung and Kelman one never gets the sense, as Said notes, that one claimant to the land of Palestine was indigenous and *in situ* and the other an uninvited arrival from Europe.

I must note here that Kelman would reject my reading of his text as one that posits, in accordance with the rule, a symmetry between Palestinians and Israelis. In fact, Kelman repeatedly disavows just such a symmetry. In his 1978 article entitled “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance” Kelman states that “[t]here are many differences in the situations in which the two sides find themselves and there is certainly no perfect symmetry in their problems or resources.”<sup>77</sup> In his 1982 article entitled “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations” (the text cited above) he explains

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<sup>74</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 1 (1982): p. 45.

<sup>75</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 59.

<sup>76</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 62.

<sup>77</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance,” *International Security* 3, no. 1 (1978): p. 165.

his rationale for rejecting the idea that there is a symmetry between Palestinians and Israelis. Says Kelman:

This emphasis [on parallelisms in the perceptions, apprehensions, and identity concerns of Palestinians and Israelis] does not imply complete symmetry between the two sides, either in a moral or in an empirical sense. Clearly, the fact that Israel controls all of the land under dispute makes for an important asymmetry, to the disadvantage of the Palestinians. On the other hand, if the Arab states are put into the equation, there is an important symmetry, to Israel's disadvantage, in the ultimate risks to which the two sides are exposed.<sup>78</sup>

Kelman denies moral and empirical symmetries between Palestinians and Israelis as well as those involving problems and resources. This does not mean, however, that he does not still unconsciously posit a symmetry between the two parties. This unconscious symmetry does not involve the factors he lists, but rather an assumption of equal validity belonging to both Palestinian and Israeli claims and rights. Recall that according to Kelman both peoples' claims compete for the same land of Palestine and both peoples have legitimate rights to this land. Despite Kelman's pronouncements to the contrary, he puts Israeli claims and rights on par with those of Palestinians.

The positing of a symmetry or assuming an equality between Palestinian and Israeli claims and rights dehistoricizes the relationship between the two parties. The assumption requires one to ignore or silence, *inter alia*, 2,000 years of Palestinian history and presence in Palestine, the European origins of the Jewish immigrants and that decisions involving the dispensation of mandate Palestine were taken first by the imperial power and subsequently an international

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<sup>78</sup> Kelman, "Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," p. 43.

organization dominated by Occidental imperial powers with little or no consultation involving the indigenous people. Removing the Palestinian-Israeli relationship from history, or as Whitlam explains it to imagine uninterrupted connections between ancient Israel and modern Israel and thereby obliterate Palestinian history,<sup>79</sup> has the discursive effect of psychologizing the Palestinian-Israeli relationship/conflict. Instead of the relationship being historical, the conflict is represented and interpreted as mental, emotional and/or attitudinal. This psychologizing of the conflict, in turn, generates knowledge and policy recommendations centered on trust- and confidence-building measures.

The literature is replete with examples of this second discursive rule of formation governing the production of truthful knowledge about the Palestinian-Israeli relationship exploring the psychology of the relationship. In other words, the texts posit a symmetry between the two parties and proceed to examine/or and attempt to reconcile the mental and emotional states of the parties mobilizing the language of cognition.

The Quakers state clearly that “our position is one of concern for both parties and is based on the conviction that the rights and interests of both must be recognized and reconciled on some just and peaceful basis.”<sup>80</sup> This assumption of equality then produces the conclusion that “[t]he first step [towards peace] must

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<sup>79</sup> For a complete treatment of the manner in which Palestinian history is silenced and ignored in the search for ancient Israel and the manner in which ancient Israel, in turn, legitimizes modern Israel see Keith W. Whitlam, *The Invention of Ancient Israel: the Silencing of Palestinian History* (New York : Routledge, 1996).

<sup>80</sup> American Friends Service Committee, *Search for Peace in the Middle East: a Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee*, Rev. ed., p. 9.

be an effort at psychological and emotional disengagement.”<sup>81</sup> Psychological solutions to the conflict follow from the assumption of the conflict as one between equally valid claimants.

Kaplowitz’s research question is informed by this symmetry assumption. This assumption, in turn, leads him to identify “concerns with self-esteem and pride,”<sup>82</sup> “ego-defensive attitudes,”<sup>83</sup> and “threats to the ego”<sup>84</sup> as factors influencing Arab behavior in the Middle East conflict. Furthermore, the assumption also causes him to conclude that Arab “refusal to recognize Israel openly ... derives from a variety of cultural patterns and requirements for self-esteem which include concerns with humiliation, admission of defeat, images of surrender, and face-to-face negotiations.”<sup>85</sup> Because Kaplowitz abides by the second discursive rule of formation he studies the psychopolitical dimensions of the conflict; if the conflict is not rooted in history it must be rooted in mental and emotional attitudes.

Kelman, too, in his two articles writes in accordance with the second discursive rule and interrogates the psychological conditions necessary for peace negotiations. I have already evidenced his subscription to this second discursive rule. The knowledge products of his subscription include discussions of such

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<sup>81</sup> American Friends Service Committee, *Search for Peace in the Middle East: a Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee*, Rev. ed., p. 94.

<sup>82</sup> Noel Kaplowitz, “Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20, no. 2 (1976): p. 300.

<sup>83</sup> Kaplowitz, “Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict,” p. 305.

<sup>84</sup> Kaplowitz, “Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict,” p. 305.

<sup>85</sup> Kaplowitz, “Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict,” p. 313.

mental and emotional factors as “trust”, “stereotypes” and “attitudes”<sup>86</sup> as well as the two parties’ “needs”, “hopes”, “fears” and “images of the self and of the enemy.”<sup>87</sup> Consistent with this psychologizing of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship Kelman also suggests that “gestures of good will”<sup>88</sup> be made to reduce the cognitive gap between the two parties.

Kelman’s texts also further demonstrate the manner in which the matrix of discursive silences and rules cause to disappear contradictions and strengthen the analytics themselves. Kelman produced his 1978 article through the aforementioned subscription to the second discursive rule and the first discursive rule. Kelman posits a symmetry between the two parties and also represents Israel as conciliatory saying that “[t]he frequent statements by Israelis that they are prepared to give a great deal in return for real peace should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric.”<sup>89</sup> Similarly, Kelman’s 1982 article was produced through the mobilization of the second discursive rule and the first systematic silence. Kelman assumes an equality between Palestinians and Israelis and is able to do so because he silences the Zionist idea and practice of transfer, explaining that the Palestinians abandoned Palestine.<sup>90</sup>

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy similarly produced its 1988 publication entitled *Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East* by abiding by a combination of analytics. The report includes statements such as:

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<sup>86</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p.40.

<sup>87</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p.42.

<sup>88</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p.72.

<sup>89</sup> Kelman, “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance,” p. 175.

<sup>90</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p.62.



“Israel now feels it can take fewer risks for peace;”<sup>91</sup> “[a]ny Palestinian entity which emerges from such a [peace] negotiation would have to have its authority heavily qualified by the security requirements of Israel and Jordan;”<sup>92</sup> [t]here should be a prolonged period in which the intentions of the Palestinians to live in peace with Israel and Jordan could be tested;”<sup>93</sup> and “[Palestinians must] convince Israelis that they are ready to live in peace.”<sup>94</sup> Clearly, these statements are made in accordance with the first discursive rule mobilizing the ideas of Palestinian rejectionism and Israel’s conciliatory nature. Israel is assumed to be ready to live in peace with Palestinians, Palestinians must prove that they have abandoned their recalcitrance and rejectionism and are ready to live as peaceful neighbors. Also, Israel will take fewer risks, but because it is peace seeking it will still take risks for peace.

*Building for Peace* also propagates and subscribes to the second discursive rule of formation. Referencing the then ongoing *intifada* the report asserts that “[t]he onus is on both sides to find a way out of the vicious cycle.”<sup>95</sup> This is an obvious example of positing a symmetry between the two sides. Obliterated is the fact of a then 21 year old occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a

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<sup>91</sup> Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East (Executive Summary),” Web page, [accessed 31 October 2004]. Available at

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=9>.

<sup>92</sup> Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East (Executive Summary),” Web page.

<sup>93</sup> Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East (Executive Summary),” Web page.

<sup>94</sup> Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East (Executive Summary),” Web page.

<sup>95</sup> Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East (Executive Summary),” Web page.

legitimate right owing to the Palestinians to resist it. In its stead is established an equality of guilt for the violence and an equality of responsibility for ending it. Positing this symmetry leads to a psychologizing of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship and this, in turn, produces a recommendation for confidence-building acts. The report sees confidence-building acts as solutions to the psychological problems of reconciling the mental and emotional states of the Palestinians and Israel, reducing the cognitive or perceptual gap between the two parties and assuaging fears and concerns.

In his text *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, the thesis of which Quandt calls “tautological”<sup>96</sup>, Haass argues that “the Middle East is not a dispute ripe for resolution.”<sup>97</sup> Haass bases this conclusion on four issues: 1) the outlook of Palestinians and Israelis, 2) the absence of strong leaderships willing and able to compromise, 3) the lack of an acceptable negotiating formula, and 4) the absence of an acceptable approach to negotiation.<sup>98</sup> In comparing and contrasting Palestinian and Israeli positions on these issues Haass assumes a symmetry of power between the two parties. He assumes that each party has an equal ability to end the conflict; there is no hint of the power differential inherent in the occupier-occupied relationship.

In accordance with the paradigm I have established, Haass’ assumption of symmetry causes him to psychologize the Palestinian-Israeli relationship/conflict.

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<sup>96</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p. 386.

<sup>97</sup> Richard Haass, *Conflicts Unending: the United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1990), p.47.

<sup>98</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, pp. 47-49.

He addresses psychological issues such as Israeli attitudes to the prospects of an independent Palestinian state, Palestinian attitudes toward Israel and mutual (dis)trust. Haass concludes that “[f]or the foreseeable future the predicament of the Palestinians is one that cannot be solved, only managed.”<sup>99</sup> He cautiously notes, however, that “[t]he political environment could be improved (and the day brought nearer when such difficult issues could be raised) by introducing gestures intended to build confidence.”<sup>100</sup> Haass sees the conflict being ripened for resolution through an engagement with mental and emotional issues, primarily Israel’s security concerns.

Like Kelman’s texts as well as that of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Haass produced this text by abiding by a combination of analytics governing knowledge production of Palestinian-Israeli relations. In addition to his obedience to the second discursive rule of formation – the assumption of symmetry, he also writes according to the first discursive rule and the first and second systematic silences.

Haass represents the Palestinians as historically rejectionist and Israel as conciliatory. For example, he states that: “[i]t remains to be see [*sic*] whether a viable Palestinian state could be created that did not pose a potential threat to both Jordan and Israel.”<sup>101</sup> In this utterance, one reminiscent of a statement made in *Building for Peace*, Palestinians are not assumed to be inclined to peaceful co-existence. Rather, it is assumed that Palestinians are rejectionists. They would,

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<sup>99</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.53.

<sup>100</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.53.

<sup>101</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.53.

apparently, be obliged to prove the contrary, that they are capable of peaceful co-existence. Furthermore, Haass, when speaking of Israel, repeatedly deploys terms such as compromise<sup>102</sup> and phrases such as “risks for peace.”<sup>103</sup> This language of conciliation and peace seeking is not used in reference to Palestinians. Finally of note is the fact that it is the Palestinians who must undertake confidence-building measures. Palestinians must demonstrate that they are worthy of trust and have abandoned their historical rejection of Israel; they must assuage Israeli security concerns which are based on this Arab/Palestinian rejectionism. Israel is assumed to be trustworthy, it need not pursue measures to incubate trust, and is instead encouraged to end practices perceived to be obstacles to peace – i.e. remove troops from urban areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>104</sup>

Haass also abides by the first systematic exclusion of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations; he is silent on the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. Now, admittedly Haass does speak of transfer. He assigns the idea to Israel’s extreme right.<sup>105</sup> However, the manner in which Haass speaks of the idea of transfer does not constitute a violation of the first exclusion. This is because he speaks of it prospectively, as a possible *future* outcome, as something that might be caused to happen. Haass does not engage transfer as a Zionist idea and practice already realized, as something that was already caused to happen. Haass remains

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<sup>102</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.47.

<sup>103</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.47.

<sup>104</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, pp. 53-54.

<sup>105</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.43.

silent on the historical realization of transfer and hence obeys the first systematic exclusion.

Finally, Haass' text also obeys the second discursive exclusion – he is silent on the Zionist idea and practice of territorial maximization. Haass makes the following statement:

It took Israel just six days to defeat the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in June 1967. Israel came to control the territories along the West Bank of the Jordan River (formerly claimed by Jordan) and the Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt). Israel also gained (and later annexed) the Golan Heights, which had been Syria's and brought under its sovereignty all of Jerusalem, combining what had been claimed by Jordan with what had been Israeli.<sup>106</sup>

In making this statement Haass is silent on the fact that Israel attacked the Arab states. To read the statement is to understand that Israel just happened to be at war with Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June of 1967; there is no history, no context. Israel's aggression, and more importantly its underlying ideational motivation is expunged from his description. Furthermore, Haass remains silent on the fact that the results of the war were in keeping with then 60 year old Zionist ideas regarding the territorial scope of Israel. The language of "came to control" and "gained" convey the idea that the results were accidental or happenstance rather than designed and sought. Haass gives the reader no indication that the results he describes were the practical realization of Zionist ideas and thereby produces knowledge in accordance with the second systematic exclusion.

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<sup>106</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p.32.

This subsection described two aspects of the second rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations: 1) representing Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 2) positing as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Said poses a question that serves as an excellent point of summary for this rule. Asks Said:

Why is Israel itself not asked whether it is willing to coexist with a Palestinian state, or negotiate, or accept 242, or renounce violence, or recognize the PLO, or accept demilitarization, or allay Palestinian fears, or stop killing civilians, or end the occupation, or answer any questions at all?<sup>107</sup>

These questions are not asked because the assumptions governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations preclude them from being asked. Discursively it is assumed that due to its conciliatory and peace-seeking nature Israel accepts the prospects of coexisting with a Palestinian state and resolution 242. Furthermore, discursively Israel need not be asked to renounce violence because as the victim Israel only retaliates with violence but does not provoke violence; the victim of aggression should never be asked to renounce the right to retaliation. Israel need not be asked to accept demilitarization because the victim is not asked to leave itself defenseless. Israel need not be asked to allay Palestinian fears because Palestinians are not the victims of the conflict and their fears are groundless. And finally, Israel need not be asked to end the occupation because it is a condition that serves as a security measure for the historically victimized Israel and an

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<sup>107</sup> Said, "Intifada and Independence" in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* 1<sup>st</sup> ed., ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, p.19.

advantage that can be used in bargaining to persuade the Arabs/Palestinians to abandon their intransigence and join with Israel in sharing Palestine.

*Rule 3 – A Sovereign Palestinian State in Mandate Palestine*

The third rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations is to assume that the Jewish Agency and later Israel would have permitted, or would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. More specifically, the third rule of discursive formation is to assume that: 1) the Jewish Agency and later Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine; 2) Zionist acceptance of this state would be contingent on Arabs/Palestinians realizing certain occurrences and conditions, *inter alia*, recognition of Israel and demilitarization of the Palestinian state; 3) responsibility for realizing these occurrences and conditions lies with the Arabs/Palestinians; and 4) these occurrences and conditions would have to satisfactorily (as defined by Israel) assuage Israeli security concerns.

My description of this discursive rule develops in three stages. First, I cite sources identifying this rule. Second, I demonstrate the manner in which this rule governs the production of truthful literature bearing on Palestinian-Israeli relations. I evidence the functioning of this discursive rule. Third, I explain that Zionist idea and practice has always rejected the possibility of, and thwarted attempts to realize, a sovereign Palestinian state. Phrased differently, I show how there exists no historical grounding for this assumption, for this discursive rule.

First, a note about this rule in the larger matrix of analytics governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. In order to assume that the Jewish Agency and then Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in Palestine, an author must abide by previously described analytics. An author cannot make this assumption, for example, if (s)he does not silence discussion of Zionist transfer and territorial maximization. It is impossible to reconcile the assumption that Zionism would permit the emergence of a Palestinian state with a discussion of Zionist attempts to empty Palestine of non-Jews. Similarly, one makes this assumption because one also assumes that Israel is conciliatory and peace-seeking while Arabs/Palestinians are intransigent. The mutually supportive nature of these analytics is evident in the fact that Flapan identifies this third discursive rule in conjunction with the second discursive silence – Zionism’s territorial maximization – and the first discursive rule – conciliatory Israel.

Flapan referenced this third discursive rule in a previous citation. Recall that Flapan identified as a discursive truth the following statement:

Zionist acceptance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, was a far-reaching compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned the concept of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine and recognized the right of the Palestinians to their own state. Israel accepted this sacrifice because it anticipated the implementation of the resolution in peace and cooperation with the Palestinians.<sup>108</sup>

Of present concern is the phrase “the Jewish community ... recognized the right of the Palestinians to their own state.” What has been established as truth is the

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<sup>108</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 13.



idea that in accepting Resolution 181, which called for the partitioning of mandate Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, the Jewish Agency accepted the idea of a Palestinian state in Palestine. Later in the same chapter Flapan offers an assessment of the hold this truth has on the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Says Flapan, “[b]y some twist of vision, historians have generally taken Ben-Gurion’s acceptance of the idea of a Jewish state in less than the whole of Palestine [in accordance with Resolution 181] as the equivalent of an acceptance of the entire UN resolution.”<sup>109</sup> To rephrase Flapan in a manner more germane to the present discussion: scholars have assumed the Jewish Agency’s acceptance of partition to mean that it accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state, as well as that of a Jewish state.

Said also identifies this rule, though implicitly and in a very specific manner that requires generalization. He identifies, as one of the elements of the U.S. liberal argument surrounding the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979, the assumption that “once the process of self-rule [as provided for in the Camp David Accords] gets under way – with elections, normalized political life, etc. – things will *probably* evolve into a Palestinian state.”<sup>110</sup> Implicit in this, of course, is the assumption that Israel would let any incipient Palestinian entity – self-rule or other – develop into a state. Said limits these assumptions, both explicit and implicit, to a reading of the Camp David Accords. As Flapan has already noted, and as I will demonstrate in the following subsection, the implicit assumption,

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<sup>109</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 31.

<sup>110</sup> Said, *The Question of Palestine*, p. 213.

that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in Palestine, widely informs literature on Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Khalidi, interestingly, entitled his 1978 piece in *Foreign Affairs* “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State”.<sup>111</sup> This text makes the four assumptions associated with this third discursive rule. First Khalidi notes that his is not a blueprint for an overall settlement to the Palestine Problem, but “rather an inventory [of components for a settlement], followed by some reflections.”<sup>112</sup> The first and foremost component of a settlement, for Khalidi, is “the concept of Palestinian sovereignty. Not half-sovereignty, or quasi-sovereignty or ersatz sovereignty. But a sovereign, independent Palestinian state.”<sup>113</sup> Khalidi then goes on to explain that this component, and its political implications, “could not ensue from a Bantustan ‘federal’ formula under a Hashemite dressing, or the perpetuations of Palestinian minority status under international guardianship.”<sup>114</sup> Khalidi not only advocates Palestinian statehood in mandate Palestine as a component of an overall settlement, he also assumes it as a possibility.

Furthermore, he assumes that this sovereign state could be made acceptable to Israel provided *Palestinians* meet certain conditions. Under the subheading “The Foreign Relations of the Palestinian State” Khalidi says that “[g]iven the security concerns of its neighbours and the balance of power between it [the envisioned Palestinian state] and them, it would make sense for the

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<sup>111</sup> Walid Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” *Foreign Affairs* 56, no. 4 (1978): pp. 695-714.

<sup>112</sup> Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” p. 701.

<sup>113</sup> Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” p. 701.

<sup>114</sup> Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” p. 701.

Palestinian state to declare its nonaligned status vis-à-vis the superpowers and other powers particularly in the defense and military fields.”<sup>115</sup> This is an obvious reference to assuaging Israeli security concerns and that the onus for assuaging these concerns lies squarely with the Palestinians; they are the ones to declare nonalignment. Khalidi rejects the idea of demilitarizing the Palestinian state, but on the grounds that “[w]ithout national armed forces the political leadership of the state would become the laughing stock of the Arab world.”<sup>116</sup> Arming the state would be a means of ensuring Israeli security because it would indicate that the state was actually sovereign; that the issue of Palestine was legitimately settled. On the issue of settlements, Khalidi goes so far as to suggest that Israeli settlements in the southern Gaza Strip could be replaced with a U.N. buffer zone.<sup>117</sup> Again, this is an instance of the author developing means by which Palestinians might assuage Israeli security concerns in the belief that by doing so Israel would consent to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.

I referred to the title of Khalidi’s piece as interesting because it contradicts my own analysis. Admittedly, Khalidi was writing about a subject that was anathema to Israeli and American policy at the moment. This does not make the notion unthinkable however. In fact, the idea of a sovereign Palestinian state has been thinkable, since at least the 1947 UN Partition Resolution. The fact that this thought was not realized politically does not negate the fact that authors were

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<sup>115</sup> Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” p. 703.

<sup>116</sup> Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” p. 703.

<sup>117</sup> Khalidi, “Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State,” p. 712.

thinking it. Despite Khalidi's title, the unthinkable was being thought discursively.

This is evidenced by Kaplowitz's 1976 article. In fact, the author discussed "a Palestinian state alongside Israel"<sup>118</sup> under the broader heading of "The Possibilities for Cooperative Conflict Resolution." Quite evidently, the author assumes that a Palestinian state is a possibility. The assumption informs his interview questions. Moreover, Kaplowitz also outlines Palestinian initiatives such as recognition of Israel and its right to exist and guarantees such as open borders and an overhaul of Palestinian school curriculum that might move the conflict toward settlement. The Kaplowitz text explores the manner in which Palestinians might create the conditions necessary to assuage Israeli concerns. Kaplowitz and Khalidi make the same assumption and review policies and actions intended to assuage the same concerns. Responsibility for these policies and actions lie with the same actor. Ultimately, they both write according to the same discursive rule.

The fact that the unthinkable was being thought discursively is further evidenced by Kelman's "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance" also from 1978. Kelman opens his article with the statement that "[m]any observers of the Middle East conflict now regard the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as a promising long-run solution to the Palestinian problem."<sup>119</sup> Kelman assumes the possibility

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<sup>118</sup> Kaplowitz, "Psychopolitical Dimensions of the Middle East Conflict," p. 301.

<sup>119</sup> Kelman, "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance," p.162.

of this state; this text is a survey of the conditions that would have to be met in order to realize mutual acceptance as the first step towards this possibility. As previously discussed the conditions explored by Kelman are psychological; primary among these psychological conditions are Israeli security concerns. Says Kelman:

Israelis feel that an independent Palestinian state would not be consistent with the kinds of security arrangements that they consider essential. For example, demilitarization of the West Bank and Gaza could be negotiated if these territories were a part of a Jordanian/Palestinian state; if they constituted the entire state, however, demilitarization would represent an excessive infringement on that state's sovereignty. At the most profound level, most Israelis do not believe that a Palestinian state would be accepted by its leadership as a permanent solution.<sup>120</sup>

Now, these Israeli security concerns read as insatiable and impossible to disprove. A Palestinian state would not assuage these concerns, in fact it might make them more acute, and there is no way to prove them wrong unless this insecurity exacerbating step is taken. It is a Gordian Knot based on security. More importantly, however, the passage demonstrates that Kelman wrote his text according to the assumptions of the third discursive rule. A Palestinian state is not politically popular, according to Kelman, but it is still a political possibility provided Israeli insecurity is overcome. In addition to assuming that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, he speaks of Palestinian demilitarization as a remedial step towards addressing Israeli security concerns, insatiable or not. It does not matter that like Khalidi, Kelman rejects complete

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<sup>120</sup> Kelman, "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance," p.178.

demilitarization of the envisioned Palestinian state. The importance of the foregoing lies in the fact that a Palestinian initiative is offered and assessed as a means of assuaging Israeli security concerns and realizing the end of a sovereign Palestinian state.

Articulations of thinking the unthinkable and writing according to the third rule of discursive formation became more prolific after the signing of the Camp David Agreement. Texts with titles such as *A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives*, *A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel and Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: A European Perspective* were all published in the 1980s. Plascov is clear in his text. “It must be said that the ‘solution’ proposed here [a sovereign Palestinian state] is unlikely to be acceptable to the present leadership in Israel, in Jordan or of the PLO. Yet it may provide a basis on which all could come to reach agreement when the alternatives that each are currently proposing are deemed totally unacceptable to the others.”<sup>121</sup> The idea of a Palestinian state is not likely to be realized in the immediate, according to Plascov. However, the author still does manage to assume it as a realistic possibility.

Furthermore, in keeping with the assumptions of the third rule Plascov also assumes that as a possibility the state would have to realize conditions assuaging Israeli security concerns. For example, Plascov asserts that a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict would best be served if the Palestinian state were

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<sup>121</sup> Avi Plascov, *A Palestinian State?: Examining the Alternatives*, Adelphi Papers, 163 (London, Eng.: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 2.

demilitarized,<sup>122</sup> declared neutrality,<sup>123</sup> offered Israel security guarantees<sup>124</sup> and allowed these guarantees to be verified through Israeli monitoring.<sup>125</sup> These conditions, of course, are realized through the actions and policies of Palestinians.

Heller similarly wrote *A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel* in accordance with the assumptions of this third discursive rule. First, he assumes that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Now, Heller does acknowledge that "... even the possibility of formal peace based on the establishment of a Palestinian state is, at this stage [1983], purely hypothetical."<sup>126</sup> But he also concludes that

a settlement based on an independent Palestinian state which meets certain minimal conditions actually constitute a recommended strategic choice for Israel, because its combined threat minimization-capacity maximization value, while not high, is superior to that of the other, even less appealing, alternatives.<sup>127</sup>

There is no hint in this hypothetical notion that Israel would not permit the establishment of a Palestinian state in pursuit of this threat minimizing alternative. Building on his hypothetical notion, Heller is clear in his adoption of the second and third assumptions – that the Palestinian state is an outcome contingent on the actions and policies of Arabs/Palestinians. Says Heller: "this study explores, not a current option, but rather the implications for Israel of a policy whose viability is *contingent on a marked shift in the position of the Palestinians and their Arab*

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<sup>122</sup> Plascov, *A Palestinian State?: Examining the Alternatives*, pp.28-29.

<sup>123</sup> Plascov, *A Palestinian State?: Examining the Alternatives*, pp.30-31.

<sup>124</sup> Plascov, *A Palestinian State?: Examining the Alternatives*, pp.31-33.

<sup>125</sup> Plascov, *A Palestinian State?: Examining the Alternatives*, pp.33.

<sup>126</sup> Mark Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 4.

<sup>127</sup> Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel*, p. 5.

*supporters.*”<sup>128</sup> And, of course, Heller makes the fourth assumption – that these actions and policies would need to address Israeli security concerns. Says Heller: “the Palestinian state will [need to] accept certain verifiable restrictions on force levels, military equipment, and troop deployment, as well as on military relations with other states.”<sup>129</sup> In fact, chapter four of the Heller text adumbrates the security implications, for Israel, of an independent Palestinian state and the countermeasures available to Israel.

Weiler, too, made the assumptions of the third rule of formation in writing his *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: A European Perspective*. He is explicit about his adoption of the first assumption: “I adopt the assumption that the establishment of a Palestinian state is a necessary (though clearly not sufficient) condition for resolving the conflict.”<sup>130</sup> Weiler makes the second and third assumptions – that the state would be contingent on changed Arab/Palestinian actions and policies. Says Weiler: “... security safeguards proposed to Israel must not only be objectively suited to govern the transition from belligerency to peace, but must also take account of subjective Israeli concerns and sensibilities.”<sup>131</sup> Arabs/Palestinians must propose guarantees to Israel sufficient for it to permit the establishment of a Palestinian state. Finally, Weiler also assumes that the contingent Palestinian state need satisfy Israeli

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<sup>128</sup> Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel*, p. 4. My emphasis added.

<sup>129</sup> Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel*, p. 6.

<sup>130</sup> Joseph Weiler, *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: a European Perspective* (London,; Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 2.

<sup>131</sup> Weiler, *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: a European Perspective*, p. 20.



security concerns; “[o]f all the problems associated with the creation of a Palestinian state (the critical element in the bistate solution), the issue of security is, undoubtedly, the most acute and intractable. It is the single most important factor contributing to the Israeli consensus opposing the establishment of Palestine.”<sup>132</sup> According to Weiler, provided the Arabs/Palestinians undertake steps to address this most important factor Israel might permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.

This third rule continued to govern the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations into the immediate pre-Oslo period concomitant with events such as the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the Madrid Conference. Authors writing in accordance with and reproducing this rule include Haass and Pamir. In his *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* Haass assumes that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. In fact, he explores the prospects of two states in Palestine under the heading of “Possible Solutions”.<sup>133</sup> Says Haass: “*Two states*. This approach is one of partition. It would establish a second sovereign entity – a state of Palestine – in the area west of the Jordan River.”<sup>134</sup> Furthermore, Haass also assumes that this state would be contingent on Palestinian actions and policies that would serve to assuage Israeli security concerns. “Territorial adjustments and limits on the number and quality of arms to be allowed in the new Palestinian state would also

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<sup>132</sup> Weiler, *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: a European Perspective*, p. 122.

<sup>133</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, pp. 41-46.

<sup>134</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p. 43.

[in addition to American assurances] alleviate [Israeli security] concerns.”<sup>135</sup>

Haass is not sanguine about the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace premised on a two-state solution - recall his assessment that the conflict is not ripe for resolution. He does, however, make policy recommendations intended to create an environment in which the possibility, if not the probability, of a sovereign Palestinian state might be realized, and in so doing abides by the third rule of discursive formation.

One other statement by Haass deserves note. “It [a two-state solution including a sovereign Palestinian state] is in any event what most outsiders have in mind when they imagine a settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute.”<sup>136</sup> In making this statement Haass cites the American Friends Service Committee’s *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for the Middle East*. In this text, published in 1982, the Quakers declare that “... we believe that Palestinian self-determination should set the terms for the ultimate decision about the West Bank and Gaza Strip and that an independent Palestinian state on these territories should be supported if it is the chosen option of the Palestinian people.”<sup>137</sup> By 1990 the idea of a sovereign Palestinian state was widely shared, in fact it was being asserted in 1982. Quite evidently a Palestinian state was not unthinkable.

Pamir’s “Peace-Building Scenarios After the Gulf War” is also written in accordance with the assumptions of this third discursive rule. First, the author

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<sup>135</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p. 44.

<sup>136</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p. 43.

<sup>137</sup> Everett Mendelsohn, and American Friends Service Committee, *A Compassionate Peace: a Future for the Middle East: a Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 185.

assumes that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Under the heading of “Scenarios for peace-building” Pamir identifies as a constitute element of a postwar settlement “[r]ecognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (which could, for instance, result either in the creation of an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza, or a confederation with Jordan, etc.).<sup>138</sup> This recognition and its result are contingent of course. “The implementation of the above steps pertaining to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be contingent on a number of points.”<sup>139</sup> These contingencies, as expressed by the author, involve changes to both Israeli and Arab/Palestinian actions and policies. The author suggests that Israel withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories and enter into dialogue with the PLO (in 1992 it was still illegal for an Israeli to have any contact with the PLO). The author also recommends “formal Arab recognition of the right of the state of Israel to peaceful and secure frontiers and vice versa.”<sup>140</sup>

Some of Pamir’s contingencies involve changes to Israeli policy. At first blush this might seem to challenge the third assumption of the rule of formation – that responsibility for realizing conditions amenable to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state lies with the Arabs/Palestinians. This is not the case however. The author’s suggestions that Israel withdraw from the OPT and negotiate with the PLO are merely to realize the prerequisites for the assumed independent state that would articulate Palestinian self-determination. This is

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<sup>138</sup> Peri Pamir, “Peace-Building Scenarios After the Gulf War,” *Third World Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1992): p. 8 of 17.

<sup>139</sup> Pamir, “Peace-Building Scenarios After the Gulf War,” p 9 of 17.

<sup>140</sup> Pamir, “Peace-Building Scenarios After the Gulf War,” p 8 of 17.

accepted by all authors abiding by the third discursive rule of formation, because without these steps there would be no space for or leadership of the state.<sup>141</sup> As the steps are necessary for the fulfillment of the assumption, they do not constitute a violation of the third assumption of the rule of formation.

Pamir, in fact, makes the third and fourth assumptions. In footnote 29, following the recommendation of formal Arab recognition of Israel, Pamir asks and answers:

... what can the Arabs give Israel at the negotiating table which the latter does not have already (given its military preponderance and confidence in US assistance)? What the Arabs can offer in exchange for some form of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza is formal recognition and some expectation of future peace.<sup>142</sup>

The question is not asked “What can/will Israel give or offer?” The expectation here is that the Arabs/Palestinians will undertake steps to create conditions in which Israel would permit the establishment of a Palestinian state. While not explicit, the idea that the Arabs could provide Israel with some expectation of future peace can be read as assuaging Israeli security concerns; obviously insecurity is not as acute in conditions of peace as in conditions of belligerency. Overall, Pamir, like Khalidi (who is cited by the author), Kelman and Haass, wrote those sections of “Peace-Building Scenarios After the Gulf War” that

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<sup>141</sup> This reasoning does not necessarily hold if Palestinians establish, in Pamir’s words, a confederation with Jordan. An independent Palestinian state and a Palestinian entity confederate with Jordan are entirely different scenarios despite the fact that Pamir equates them. I will return to this later in my engagement with the idea of territorial compromise and the “Jordanian option”.

<sup>142</sup> Pamir, “Peace-Building Scenarios After the Gulf War,” p. 15 of 17 note 29.

address Palestinian-Israeli relations in accordance with the third discursive rule for formation.

The third analytic governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations is to assume that Zionism, articulated politically in the Jewish Agency or later Israel would have permitted, or would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. I have demonstrated the manner in which this rule produces truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Now, I will explain that there is no historical grounding for this assumption, for this discursive rule.

*In the pre-1993 period no Zionist leader/Israeli Prime Minister ever suggested or inferred that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine; no matter how qualified the state, no matter what conditions were met or concerns assuaged. Zionist idea and practice give no indication that such a state would have ever been permitted.*

Three previously made points bear restating at present. First, and to return again to Flapan's quote, in accepting the UN Partition Resolution the Jewish Agency did not accept the Arab state called for in the resolution. "[E]ven when the Zionist leaders accepted partition, they did not seriously acknowledge the establishment of a Palestinian state as a necessary result."<sup>143</sup> In fact,

... those parts of the [Partition] resolution less favorable to Zionist interests, Ben-Gurion unhesitatingly rejected them – beginning with the projected borders of the Jewish state and the transition period for the implementation of the various stages of partition (designed to ensure a proper transfer of vital services from the British to the two new

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<sup>143</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 37.

states), and ending with the establishment of the proposed Arab state.<sup>144</sup>

The establishment of the Arab state was rejected by the Zionists because they did not accept partition as final. Recall that the Jewish Agency intended to use the Jewish state established by partition as a way station en route to a Jewish state in all of Palestine. It would be immeasurably more difficult, if not politically impossible, to realize this goal, to revisit partition and expand Israel's borders further if there was a Palestinian state in the space. Zionism rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1948 because it would have institutionalized partition.

Second, the Jewish Agency colluded with Abdallah of Transjordan to realize his Greater Syria Scheme. Recall that according to this arrangement the Jewish Agency would establish Israel, with some border modifications obtained through Plan Dalet, and Abdallah would annex the West Bank. The collusion was intended "to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state"<sup>145</sup> by denying the territorial space for this state. Recall further that the collusion also meant that both parties pursued a policy of politicide that attempted to eliminate any Palestinian leadership seeking to establishment an independent state on the West Bank. With Abdallah's assistance, and by serving his regional ambitions, Zionism sought to deny the Palestinian people both the space and leadership required to establish a sovereign state in mandate Palestine.

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<sup>144</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.31.

<sup>145</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p.37.

Third, Zionism has always denied Palestinian nationhood. Recall that Zionism denied the existence of a distinct Palestinian identity and later acknowledged Palestinians in a rarefied form – as Arabs. Zionism’s denial of Palestinian nationhood allowed the movement to deny the Palestinians’ right to national self-determination articulated in a state. A distinct nation is entitled to a state, a local variant of a larger nation is not. This was expressed in the Zionist argument that as Arabs Palestinians already had 22 states, the Jews merely wanted one state.

It has been suggested that Palestinians would have received a state in mandate Palestine in 1948 in accordance with the Partition Resolution, if it had not been for the “Arab invasion”.<sup>146</sup> However, “the dominant thinking of ... the Zionist leadership on the eve of Israel’s independence could not accommodate the creation of a Palestinian state.”<sup>147</sup> This thinking and its expression in political policies did not change in the entire pre-1993 period. From the pre-partition period until the initiation of the Oslo Process Zionism did not, could not, conceptualize a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Paradoxically, the

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<sup>146</sup> For example, in his 1991 speech at the opening of the Madrid Conference Shamir said: “In its declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, Israel stretched out its hand in peace to its Arab neighbours, calling for the end to war and bloodshed. In response, seven Arab states invaded Israel. The UN resolution that partitioned the country was thus violated and effectively annulled.” This can be read to mean that in the absence of this “invasion” the resolution, with its establishment of a Palestinian state, would have been fulfilled. Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel, “Address by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel [to Madrid Conference],” Web page, [accessed 25 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Peace%20Process/1991/ADDRESS%20BY%20MR%20YITZHAK%20SHAMIR%20-%2031-Oct-91>.

<sup>147</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 37.

persistence of Zionist denial of a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine is evidenced by many of the same authors who assume that Israel would permit the establishment of just such a state.

Almost all Zionist parties denied the possibility of a Palestinian state in Palestine. According to Flapan:

“[t]he only Zionist party to recognize the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination was MAPAM (or, to be more precise, the Hashomer Hatzair element in the party, which continued to support the idea of a binational state). Of the two other Jewish groups that took such a position, Brit Shalom was not a party but an association of intellectuals, and the Communist party was not Zionist. There was only one short period, in 1948, when a number of official policy-makers considered the possibility of a Palestinian state in order to put an end to the vicious cycle of violence and bloodshed that was taking a heavy toll in human life.”<sup>148</sup>

With the exception of MAPAM, all political parties from the early Palestine Workers Party (MAPAI) to today’s Labor and Likud were and continue to be unwilling to recognize an independent Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

Kelman speaks to this, for example, in his 1978 article. Explains Kelman:

In Israel, the concept of an independent Palestinian state is considered unacceptable not only by the Begin government, but also by the Labor Party opposition. The Labor Party clearly differentiated itself from the Likud prior to the 1977 elections by declaring its readiness to withdraw from parts of the West Bank and Gaza, and it has continued to press this point while in opposition. However, it has consistently concurred with the Likud in rejecting the two-state option.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, p. 42-43.

<sup>149</sup> Kelman, “Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance,” p.162.



Weiler similarly states that “[i]n Israel among all but a few marginal political forces, there is a consensus that the creation of an independent Palestinian state is ... inconsistent with Israel’s vital interests.”<sup>150</sup> Both make my point regarding Zionist opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Palestine.

Kelman’s statement, however, also raises another salient point. According to him, Labor supported withdrawal but also rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state. Exactly what kind of political arrangement did Labor envision if it was going to withdraw from a territory that would not constitute the space of a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine? Labor supported “territorial compromise” or what is also referred to as the “Jordanian option”.

Heller explains territorial compromise. “The purpose of territorial compromise is to transfer the bulk of the Palestinian population to Jordanian jurisdiction, thus relieving Israel of the burden of direct rule, while allowing it to reserve strategically vital and (coincidentally) thinly settled areas in the West Bank.”<sup>151</sup> He also explains that territorial compromise is the preferred policy of Israel’s Labor party. According to Heller, “Jordan still remains [in 1983] the most visible and preferred alternative either to the so-called ‘Palestinian option’ – in its PLO and other variants – or even, at least for the Labor party, to the continuation of the status quo”<sup>152</sup> and “many Israelis, especially the Labor party, are convinced that only an agreement with Jordan could allow Israel to withdraw from the West

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<sup>150</sup> Weiler, *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State: a European Perspective*, p. 6.

<sup>151</sup> Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel*, p. 35.

<sup>152</sup> Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel*, p. 48.

Bank with a reasonable degree of security.”<sup>153</sup> The Quakers echo this understanding. “Labor seeks to negotiate a territorial compromise with Jordan involving the partition of the West Bank that would turn significant segments of the West Bank and Gaza over to Jordan, while Israel would retain areas designated as necessary for security.”<sup>154</sup>

Statements by Kelman in 1982 summarize these ideas. “The Begin government has made it clear that it has no intention of sharing the land with the Palestinians as a people – of relinquishing sovereignty over any part of the West Bank and Gaza and of permitting any form of political expression of Palestinian national identity.”<sup>155</sup> Furthermore,

The opposition Labor party differs significantly in philosophy and style from the present Israeli administration. Labor’s approach to the West Bank and Gaza is based on the principle of “territorial compromise” and ...[party proposals] call for retention of large parts of the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli sovereignty (while offering to restore Arab sovereignty over the heavily populated areas); they envisage no compromise on Jerusalem; they reject an independent Palestinian state, offering instead to return the territories to Jordan; and they rule out the PLO as a negotiating partner.<sup>156</sup>

The fact that neither Likud nor Labor conceive of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine belies Kelman’s statement pertaining to Labor’s different philosophy and style. Both are Zionist parties and both reject the idea of a

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<sup>153</sup> Heller, *A Palestinian State: the Implications for Israel*, p. 50.

<sup>154</sup> Mendelsohn, and American Friends Service Committee, *A Compassionate Peace: a Future for the Middle East: a Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee*, p. 75.

<sup>155</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 50.

<sup>156</sup> Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 50.

Palestinian state in Palestine. The differences between Likud and Labor are those of degree, not of kind.

Possibly the most momentous event, for Palestinians, for the Middle East, between Israel's capture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 and the start of the Oslo Process in 1993 was the signing of the Camp David Accords.<sup>157</sup> The Accords included provisions for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These provisions called for the election of a self-governing authority in the occupied territories the powers and responsibilities of which were to be determined in negotiations between Israel, Egypt and Jordan.<sup>158</sup> The election of this self-governing authority was to initiate a five year transitional period. Three years into this transitional period "negotiations [would] take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period."<sup>159</sup>

The autonomy provisions in the Camp David Accords should not be misinterpreted to constitute a violation of persistent Zionist ideas and practices regarding the impossibility of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. If we return to what Said characterized as the U.S. liberal argument surrounding the Accords – there is no basis to assume that the process of self-rule would

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<sup>157</sup> The Camp David Accords will be examined in more detail in chapter seven.

<sup>158</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p.447.

<sup>159</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p. 447.

evolve into a Palestinian state. In fact, the Accords were in perfect keeping with Zionist ideas and practices.

The persistence of these ideas and practices through Camp David, and the fallacy of the U.S. liberal argument, is evidenced by Begin's own actions and statements. Before signing the Camp David Accords, but after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem Begin made a "home rule" proposal for "Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District."<sup>160</sup> Quandt states clearly that "[t]he home rule proposal was intended as a permanent arrangement, not as a transition to the return of the territory to Arab political control once a peace agreement had been reached."<sup>161</sup> After signing the Camp David Accords Quandt says of Begin:

While he had agreed to postpone an Israeli claim to sovereignty during an interim period, he had not agreed to abandon such a claim. Indeed, when asked what would come after five years of Palestinian autonomy, Begin had a simple answer. Israel would at that point assert its claim to sovereignty; if the Arabs agreed, that would settle the matter. If they did not agree, autonomy would continue indefinitely.<sup>162</sup>

During this prolonged autonomy Israel would continue to build settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, continue to control Jerusalem as well as the territories' water resources.<sup>163</sup> If there remains any doubt that Palestinian autonomy would not lead to Palestinian statehood in mandate Palestine, that Israel had not deviated

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<sup>160</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p.271.

<sup>161</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p. 272.

<sup>162</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p. 326.

<sup>163</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, pp.326-327.

from established Zionist ideas and practices by agreeing to Palestinian autonomy, the Quakers offer an elucidating quote from Moshe Nissim, head of the Likud Bloc in Israel's eight Knesset following the initiation of autonomy negotiations. Said Nissim: "We are speaking of self-rule, not of statehood."<sup>164</sup> The PLO rejected the Camp David Accords because they did not provide Palestinians with statehood.

The first Palestinian *intifada* started in December of 1987. The following year King Hussein of Jordan declared that "Jordan is not Palestine" and the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the Palestinian parliament in exile, declared (through the Algiers Declaration) Palestinian independence/statehood, called for a peaceful settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, rejected terrorism and implicitly recognized Israel. Immediate Israeli responses included draconian measures imposed on the civilians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and instructions from Chief of Staff Rabin to break the bones of stone throwers<sup>165</sup> and a refusal to recognize the Palestinian declaration of independence.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Mendelsohn, and American Friends Service Committee, *A Compassionate Peace: a Future for the Middle East: a Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee*, p. 71.

<sup>165</sup> Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, p. 364.

<sup>166</sup> The Algiers Declaration was submitted to the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1988. UNGA Resolution 43/177 acknowledged the Algiers Declaration and affirmed "the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967." The resolution passed by a vote of 104-2 with 36 abstentions. The only two states to vote against the resolution and its acknowledgement of the Algiers Declaration were the U.S. and Israel. United Nations General Assembly, "A/Res/43/177 - Question of Palestine (1988)," Web page, [accessed 27 June 2005]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/146e6838d505833f852560d600471e25?OpenDocument>.

These events, like the signing of the Camp David Accords and the initiation of autonomy negotiations did not prompt a change in Israeli policy regarding a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. In 1990 Haass stated that:

The result [of the intifada] has been the disappearance, at least for the time being, of the one diplomatic route that appealed to many of Israelis (even if not a majority), namely the so-called Jordanian option according to which Israel and Jordan would divide the West Bank, allowing the Palestinians considerable political autonomy in the Jordanian portion.<sup>167</sup>

Haass' deployment of the phrase "at least for the time being" is intriguing because it suggests that Israel's Zionists had not foreclosed on the prospects of denying Palestinian statehood in Palestine through realization of the Jordanian option and that the idea/practice of territorial compromise might be resurrected again in the future. Also of note however is Haass' statement, again in 1990, that "[d]espite its divisions, Israel continues to be run by politicians who agree that there can be no separate Palestinian state."<sup>168</sup> A year later Saunders echoed Haass' assessment of Israel's ongoing rejection of a Palestinian state. "Israel does not include a Palestinian state in its conceptualization, but many Israelis acknowledge that a Palestinian identity must find political expression in Palestine apart from Israel."<sup>169</sup> This is, of course, a rather convoluted means of explaining that Zionist views still dominate and that Israelis acknowledge the prospects of territorial

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<sup>167</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p. 38.

<sup>168</sup> Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*, p. 48.

<sup>169</sup> Harold H Saunders, *The Other Walls: the Arab-Israeli Peace Process in a Global Perspective*, Rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 17.

compromise with Jordan. This is hardly new. In fact, it is persistent and consistent.

Finally, Bannerman's statements in 1993-1994 neatly bookend the present discussion. They demonstrate that Zionist ideas and practices of denying a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine persisted from the pre-partition period until, at least, the start of the Oslo Process. First, he shows that Shamir shared his Likud predecessor's view of (indefinite) Palestinian autonomy. He quotes Shamir as explaining after his 1992 election loss to Rabin that: "I would have conducted the autonomy negotiations for ten years, and in the meantime we would have reached half a million souls in Judea and Samaria."<sup>170</sup> Interim Palestinian autonomy would have been interminable and the prospects of Palestinian statehood continuously made dimmer through Israel's settlement policy.<sup>171</sup> Second, and more on point, Bannerman notes of the 1992 Madrid negotiations that "Israelis do not want an interim self-governing authority that would inevitably lead to an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza."<sup>172</sup> Palestinian self-government was to be an end in itself; it was not a way station to Palestinian independence. Here again is a refutation of the idea that Palestinian autonomy or self-rule would develop into a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

Before leaving this discussion I must state clearly that regardless of leader, governing party, language, arrangement, or time period pre-1993, Zionism and

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<sup>170</sup> M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Toward Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1993-1994): p. 150.

<sup>171</sup> Israel's practice of settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be treated much more extensively in chapter seven.

<sup>172</sup> Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Toward Peace," p.155.

Zionists have precluded the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. A confederation with Jordan is *not* a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Pamir is wrong to equate an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank with a confederation with Jordan. Recall that the author calls for Israeli recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and then elaborates parenthetically that this could result in either an independent state or a confederation with Jordan. Palestinian autonomy under Jordanian sovereignty is *not* a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Autonomy or self-rule or self-government is not statehood and this is why it is the “solution” supported by Israel’s Labor Party. Khalidi recognized in 1978 that a confederation with Jordan was not a sovereign Palestinian state. Recall that he called for a sovereign Palestinian state and rejected a confederation with Jordan calling it “a Bantustan ‘federal’ formula under a Hashemite dressing.”

The Jordanian option is also *not* a sovereign Palestinian state, nor is it in mandate Palestine. Trying to subsume the space of the West Bank under Jordanian sovereignty is a persistent Zionist practice. The Jordanian option or territorial compromise is nothing but an updated version of Abdallah’s Greater Syria Scheme. In both cases Jordan is expanded territorially and is responsible for the population of the West Bank and in both cases the same Zionist end is achieved –a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine is denied.

Moreover, Zionism has long declared that Jordan was the Palestinian state and/or that Palestinians could find political expression through the Jordanian state. Zionism has persistently supported a Palestinian polity on the East Bank of



the Jordan River. The East Bank specifically and Jordan more generally are, quite simply, outside mandate Palestine. Without wishing to sound tautological, it must be recognized that only a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank (and Gaza Strip) would constitute a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

This subsection described the third discursive rule of formation. This rule governed truthful knowledge production on Palestinian-Israeli relations by requiring authors to assume that the Jewish Agency and later Israel would have permitted, or would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. More specifically, I described the third rule as assuming that 1) the Jewish Agency and later Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine; 2) Zionist acceptance of this state would be contingent on Arabs/Palestinians realizing certain occurrences and conditions, *inter alia*, recognition of Israel and demilitarization/non-alignment of the Palestinian state; 3) responsibility for realizing these occurrences and conditions lies with the Arabs/Palestinians; and 4) these occurrences and conditions would have to assuage Israeli security concerns. I made textual reference to evidence the functioning of this discursive rule. I also demonstrated that, based on historical precedence in the pre-1993 period, there is no grounding for this assumption. I showed that Zionism rejects the idea and possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

## *Conclusion*

This chapter was the second of four to describe the rules governing production of truth regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations. I identified three rules of formation governing the discourse in the pre-1993 period. The three rules that must be mobilized in order to speak the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations are: 1) authors represent Arab/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists and Israel as conciliatory and peace-seeking; 2) authors represent Israel as victim or posit as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship; and 3) authors assume that Zionism would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

The next chapter describes the systematic silences governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period. It is the first of two chapters to demonstrate that the analytics governing the discourse did not change with the start of the Oslo Process, and that in fact the Oslo Process institutionalized these analytics.

## Chapter Five – Post-1993 Systematic Silences Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations

In the previous two chapters I described the analytics of truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period – prior to the start of the Oslo Process. My argument is that these analytics continued to define the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations after the start of the Oslo Process. The DOPOISGA and subsequent agreements, what so many authors described as breakthroughs, did not change these discursive rules. In fact, the agreements constituting the Oslo Process institutionalized and reproduced these rules.

In this chapter I begin to substantiate my claim that the rules of exclusion and formation according to which interpretations and representations of Palestinian-Israeli relations were produced prior to 1993 persist into the present. I study the same three silences that are examined in chapter three regarding the ideas and practices of transfer, territorial maximization and denial of Palestinian nationhood and right to self-determination. Where chapter three examined these analytics from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century until the start of the Oslo Process in 1993, this chapter studies these same analytics since the start of the Oslo Process.

I demonstrate that these analytics continued to govern the production of knowledge on Palestinian-Israeli relations through the period of the Oslo Process and the start of the second Palestinian *intifada* in September 2000. I show that the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations did not change with the start of the Oslo Process. Moreover, I demonstrate that the Oslo agreements themselves

institutionalized these analytics while they concomitantly reproduced these silences and that these ideas and practices persist into the present.

Organizationally, each analytic will be studied in three stages: 1) institutionalization of the discursive rule in the Oslo agreement(s); 2) examples of the manner in which the rule continues to govern the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations; and 3) the continuing persistence of the practice. Substantively, I will draw on, though not exclusively, literature from the first corpus I outlined that while speaking of “breakthroughs” and discontinuities ironically perpetuates these persistent analytics. I will demonstrate that in making their pronouncements regarding the breakthrough nature of the Oslo Process these authors continued to produce truthful knowledge about Palestinian-Israeli relations in accordance with long-established and persistent analytics.

### *Silence 1 - Transfer*

#### *Institutionalization of Discursive Silence*

The discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations continues to silence the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. The silence is deafening in the DOPOISGA and continues to define the production of truthful knowledge bearing on Palestinian-Israeli relations. The practical importance of this silence is magnified as transfer continues in mandate Palestine into the present period.

The Oslo agreements make no reference to the transfer of Palestinians out of the space allocated by the UN to Israel prior to and during the War of 1948. It is a practice on which the DOPOISGA remains completely mute. Nowhere is the

forcible removal of Palestinians from Ramle and Lydda recognized, for example. Moreover, the DOPOISGA specifically and the Oslo Process generally do not acknowledge the victims of transfer or their entitlement to return or compensation.

The fact that the DOPOISGA speaks of “refugees”<sup>1</sup> does not negate the Oslo Process’s total silence regarding transfer. To reference “refugees” is not to identify the Jewish Agency’s and Israel’s idea and practice of transfer. “Refugees” can be the result of the vicissitudes of war or environmental catastrophe. The “refugees” referred to in the DOPOISGA (and this we must infer because they are denationalized and abstracted from their historical and ethnic identities) were intentionally and forcibly refugeed. I will return to the idea that Palestinian refugees are the products of the vicissitudes of war and not a designed and desired outcome of the Zionist project when I engage the recent research of Benny Morris. Here it is sufficient to note that the DOPOISGA specifically and the Oslo Process generally is completely ahistorical as regards the emergence of the “refugees”. This ahistoricity perpetuates the discursive silence involving transfer. The question is intentionally avoided: how did these people come to be “refugees”?

This ahistorical silence is further reinforced by the international precedents cited by the DOPOISGA and the agreement’s attendant omission. The DOPOISGA references only two UN resolutions – UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 makes only one reference to the issue of

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<sup>1</sup> “Refugees” are identified as a permanent status issue not open to negotiation until at least three years into the process.

“refugees” stating that: “[the resolution] affirms further the necessity for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.” Resolution 338 simply calls for the immediate implementation of resolution 242 in all its parts. Neither resolution speaks of transfer. Furthermore, the DOPOISGA silences the Zionist idea and practice of transfer by not referencing UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948

*[r]esolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.<sup>2</sup>*

Resolution 194 is important on two counts. First, the resolution acknowledges the refugees right to return or to compensation. Second, the resolution acknowledges that governments are responsible for the repatriation or compensation of refugees. Again, the omission of resolution 194 perpetuates the discursive silence surrounding transfer because by not referencing it the DOPOISGA avoids governments, including Israel, from having to take responsibility for the creation of the refugees.

To speak opaquely and ahistorically of “refugees” is to make a political choice. Similarly, to cite resolutions 242 and 338 and not resolution 194 is to make a political choice. In both instances the political choice perpetuates, through

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 194 (III) (1948) Palestine - Progress Report on the United Nations Mediator,” Web page, [accessed 29 October 2004]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/c758572b78d1cd0085256bcf0077e51a?OpenDocument>.

the DOPOISGA and subsequent Oslo agreements, the analytic of truth that silences the Zionist idea and practice of transfer in truthful discussions of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

### *Rule Governed Knowledge Production*

Like in the pre-1993 period, in the post-1993 period the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations was governed by the discursive silence regarding transfer. Articulations of this silence characterize more general literature considering Palestinian-Israeli relations as well as literature focused precisely on the “refugee problem”. Examples of subscription to this discursive rule in the more general literature include Bickerton and Klausner’s *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*,<sup>3</sup> Gazit’s “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points”<sup>4</sup>, Little’s *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*<sup>5</sup>, and Reuveny’s “Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian conflict”<sup>6</sup>. The single most important articulation of truthful knowledge produced in accordance with this systematic silence in the specific literature is the research of Benny Morris.

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<sup>3</sup> Ian J Bickerton, and Carla L Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> Shlomo Gazit, “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555, no. Israel in Transition (1998): pp. 82-96.

<sup>5</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: the United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> R. Reuveny, “Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Political Geography* 22, no. 4 (2003): pp. 347-380.

As I noted previously Bickerton and Klausner's 1995 text is silent on the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. The Jewish Agency's Plan Dalet is referenced, but is represented as isolated practice rather than systematic expulsion. Furthermore, the authors make no reference to the research of Flapan or Khalidi. Instead, the only research cited by Bickerton and Klausner is that of Morris. Citing Morris, as I will show in my survey of the literature specific to the "Palestinian refugee problem", is tantamount to discursive dismissal of the idea and practice of transfer.

Gazit's 1998 article similarly silences the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. It does so by assigning responsibility for the Palestinian exodus to Palestinians themselves. Interestingly, Gazit's assignment of responsibility implicitly builds on the first rule of formation, namely that Palestinians are intransigent rejectionists. According to Gazit, Palestinians refused to compromise on the partition of Palestine (which Gazit explains was begrudgingly accepted by the Zionist leadership) and subsequently "[t]hey took up arms against the Jewish population but failed to achieve their objective."<sup>7</sup> Gazit continues: "their opposition ... brought disaster on the entire Arab population of Palestine"<sup>8</sup> and consequently "about half the Palestinian population were compelled to leave their homes and villages and become refugees."<sup>9</sup> On the following page, Gazit is even more explicit in attributing responsibility for the Palestinian exodus to

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<sup>7</sup> Gazit, "Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points," p.83.

<sup>8</sup> Gazit, "Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points," p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> Gazit, "Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points," p. 83.



Palestinians. As a result of their own intransigence, “about half of the Palestinian population had become a refugee population scattered throughout the various neighboring Arab areas.”<sup>10</sup> He continues: “[t]his unfortunate situation was aggravated by a decision of the Palestinians themselves, with the support of the Arab governments in the area, to reject every proposal for the resettlement of the refugees in their new surroundings.”<sup>11</sup> According to Gazit, Palestinians made themselves refugees through their own actions and perpetuated their condition through their own actions.

Gazit produced his truthful knowledge by obeying the first analytic of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. He does not acknowledge that the idea of transfer figured prominently in Zionist thought and was subscribed to, *inter alia*, by Weizmann, Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion. He does not acknowledge that for these Zionists transfer was a prerequisite for partition. And he does not acknowledge that transfer was practically and violently realized by the Jewish Agency’s Transfer Committee and the Haganah’s Plan Dalet.<sup>12</sup> In so doing, Gazit is able to intimate that had the Palestinians merely accepted partition, had they been able to suspend their innate and immutable opposition to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine, they would not have been displaced.

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<sup>10</sup> Gazit, “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points,” p. 84.

<sup>11</sup> Gazit, “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points,” p. 84.

<sup>12</sup> In the case of perpetuating their own refugee condition, Gazit refuses to acknowledge, even as Morris does, that Israel actively prevented the refugees’ return by razing villages and agricultural land.

Like Kimche and his “order theory” in the pre-1993 period, Gazit silences the Zionist idea and practice of transfer in the post-1993 period. According to Kimche, the Palestinian exodus came in response to evacuation orders issued by the Arab armies. According to Gazit, Palestinian violence against Israel, borne of rejectionism, resulted in Palestinian displacement. In both cases, the discursive silencing of transfer absolves the Jewish Agency and Israel of responsibility for the Palestinian exodus from Palestine. Furthermore, this silencing allows for the positing of this responsibility with the Arabs generally or Palestinians specifically.

Little’s *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* also reproduces, in the post-1993 period, the discursive silence regarding the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. This text, despite its title, is not critical. In fact, it is written in accordance with a number of the analytics I describe in this section; primarily Arab intransigence. Now, I want to focus on Little’s subscription to this first systematic silence. Discussing the period of the War of 1948 Little notes that “[d]uring the 1948 war and its aftermath 750,000 Palestinians fled their homes inside what would become Israel.”<sup>13</sup> Why did they flee their homes? Little gives two reasons. First, “[s]ome of the refugees were pressured to uproot themselves by the Arab Liberation Army ... which had been terrorizing Jewish farmers and bullying Arab villagers since early 1948.”<sup>14</sup> And second, “most of the refugees chose exile to avoid living under Jewish rule or to

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<sup>13</sup> Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p.269

<sup>14</sup> Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p. 269.

escape intimidation and death at the hands of extremist groups like Menachem Begin's Irgun, whose commandos slaughtered 250 Palestinian men, women and children at Deir Yassin."<sup>15</sup> The first reason Little furnishes is a twist on the "order theory". Instead of the Arab armies issuing an evacuation order, a specific Arab army terrorized the very population it was there, ostensibly, to protect and on which it was to rely for provisions into fleeing. Ultimately, the result is the same – Arabs bear responsibility for the exodus of these refugees.

Little's second reason for the displacement of Palestinians is premised on an erroneous assumption. It, like the Bickerton and Klausner text before it, isolates and individualizes acts of Haganah committed or condoned brutality, denying these acts their design and systematization. Little is wrong to assume that those who became refugees had the choice to live under Jewish rule. He articulates this erroneous assumption quite explicitly stating that "Ben-Gurion had long insisted that their new nation must be a peaceable commonwealth inside which Jews and Arabs would coexist."<sup>16</sup> Little's historical knowledge in this instance is either truncated or disingenuous. It was never an option available to Palestinians to remain in the space assigned to Israel. Leading Zionists such as Ben-Gurion could countenance Jewish-Arab coexistence in the nascent Jewish state, but only *after* transfer had been realized. In fact, there was consensus and near unanimity among the leading Zionists on the necessity and desirability of transfer. The majority of Palestinians were to be driven from their homes and

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<sup>15</sup> Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p. 269.

<sup>16</sup> Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p.269.

then, and only then, would the remaining coexist with Jews in the Jewish state. Recall that the UN partition plan would have created an Israel with 468,000 Arabs and 498,000 Jews. Such near parity was unacceptable to Zionists like Ben-Gurion because it undermined the Jewish character of the state from its outset. Zionism's idea and practice of transfer gave Palestinians two choices: 1) be exiled or 2) be killed. Most of those who became Palestinian refugees were never given the choice to live under Jewish rule before 15 May 1948.

Moreover, Little's second reason for the Palestinian exodus isolates Zionist acts of violence intended to terrorize Palestinian civilians in mandate Palestine. Little suggests that extremist Zionist organizations and rogue elements were responsible for intimidating and killing Palestinians. This suggestion is most certainly accurate and Little is correct to cite Deir Yassin as the most infamous massacre committed by the Zionist paramilitaries. Little is silent, however, on the institutionalization of transfer; on its ordering, arrangement and systematization first by the Jewish Agency and later by Israel. Admittedly he does acknowledge Ben-Gurion's July 1948 order to Allon to expel the inhabitants of Ramle and Lydda,<sup>17</sup> but this too is offered as an isolated incident.<sup>18</sup> Little makes no mention of the fact that the emptying of Palestinian villages was institutionalized by Plan Dalet and realized, not only by Irgun and LEHI, but more importantly by, and in cooperation with, the Haganah, the nascent Israeli army. Little represents the

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<sup>17</sup> Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p.269.

<sup>18</sup> Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, p. 269.

actions that resulted in the expulsions of Palestinians as ad hoc and improvised rather than planned and executed.

Little offers two explanations for the Palestinian exodus: 1) Arabs forced the Palestinians to flee and 2) the Palestinians chose to leave. Little refines the second reason and suggests that Palestinians chose to leave either because they did not want to live under Jewish rule or because they were terrorized by Jewish extremists. Both reasons posit agency for the Palestinian exodus with either the Arabs or the Palestinians and absolve Israel of any responsibility. Neither explanation speaks of the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. Like Bickerton and Klausner and Gazit in the post-1993 period, Little produced his truthful knowledge in accordance with the persistent discursive analytic that demands silence regarding this idea/practice.

Reuveny's even more recent "Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian conflict"<sup>19</sup> is also written in accordance with this first analytic. It too is silent on the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. This silence is surprising given that the text is nominally critical. Reuveny for example, argues that "the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict is driven by Israeli colonialism."<sup>20</sup> Given the state of knowledge production on Palestinian-Israeli relations generally, this is a fairly critical statement. However, this critical edge is blunted by several statements, most notably in the present instance that "[f]rom 1948-1967, Israel found itself as the de facto landlord of land vacated by

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<sup>19</sup> R. Reuveny, "Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," pp.347-380.

<sup>20</sup> R. Reuveny, "Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 347.

Palestinians in the wake of the War of 1948.”<sup>21</sup> This statement is a prime example of the discursive silence surrounding transfer. First, the phrase “Israel found itself ... landlord” connotes that Israel’s conquering of Palestinian land was a chance occurrence, happenstance. Second, the verb “vacated” suggests Palestinians decided to quit, gave up or relinquished their land and withdrew of their own accord.

Both statements are only possible because of the author’s silence regarding transfer. To discuss transfer in the form of Plan Dalet, for example, would explode the idea that Israel came to occupy Palestinian land by chance. Broaching the topic of the plan would indicate that the Jewish Agency and later Israel (upon assuming the Zionist functions of the agency after independence) intended to conquer Palestinian lands. It would reveal that Israel’s landlord status was designed. Furthermore, to discuss transfer would render the use of the verb “vacated” a near impossibility, to be replaced with “expelled” or “cleansed”. The suggestion that Palestinians chose to quit their land of their own volition would be supplanted with the idea that they were intentionally displaced by an agent that provided them the choices of death or displacement.

Admittedly, the War of 1948 is not the focus of Reuveny’s project. In fact, the preceding is but a small part of his text. Nonetheless, his statement is instructive. Quite evidently, Reuveny violates some of the rules governing the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations. For example, he does not posit a symmetry between the two parties, nor does he represent Israel as

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<sup>21</sup> R. Reuveny, “Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” p. 359.

the victim in the conflict. Instead, Israel is represented as colonizer. However, at the same time that he violates one of the rules of truth, he subscribes to another. Reuveny speaks of Israeli colonialism, but not of the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. This seems to indicate the robustness of this analytic, maybe even its determinant standing. As was the case of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period, there continues to be a silence surrounding transfer in the discourse's post-1993 period.

Avi Shlaim's *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* is also written in accordance with the discursive analytic demanding silence on Zionist transfer. Admittedly, unlike the other post-1993 authors I have surveyed, Shlaim does speak of Plan Dalet. This discussion should not be misconstrued however. The manner in which Shlaim speaks of Plan Dalet does not constitute a violation of this discursive silence. Shlaim manages to speak of what I have characterized as the practical realization of the Zionist idea of transfer, namely Plan Dalet, without speaking of transfer by relying on Benny Morris' research specific to the "Palestinian refugee problem".

Shlaim does admit that Plan Dalet was offensive in nature. He states that "[t]he aim of Plan D was to secure all the areas allocated to the Jewish state under the UN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them, so as to provide a solid and continuous basis for Jewish sovereignty."<sup>22</sup> He also acknowledges that Plan Dalet authorized the expulsion of

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<sup>22</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 31.

Palestinian-Arabs and that this authorization shared a part in producing a population of displaced Palestinians.

Although the wording of Plan D was vague, its objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians. By implementing Plan D in April and May, the Haganah thus directly and decisively contributed to the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem.<sup>23</sup>

Shlaim concludes that:

[t]here were many reasons for the Palestinian exodus, including the early departure of the Palestinian leaders when the going got tough, but the most important reason was Jewish military pressure. Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestine's Arabs: it was a military plan with military and territorial objectives. However, by ordering the capture of Arab cities and the destruction of villages it permitted and justified the forcible expulsion of Arab civilians.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, the opening sentence of this passage recalls Kimche's statements in his 1961 debate with Khalidi and Childers. More important to note, however is the fact that this passage ends with a reference to Morris' *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*.<sup>25</sup> This reference is what enables Shlaim to speak of Plan Dalet without speaking of transfer.

In the pages cited by Shlaim, Morris makes the following five statements bearing on Plan Dalet. Some of these statements are repeated, almost verbatim, by Shlaim; all are deserving of quoting at length. First, says Morris:

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<sup>23</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.31.

<sup>24</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.31.

<sup>25</sup> Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, Cambridge Middle East Library (Cambridge Cambridgeshire, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).



[t]he essence of the plan was the clearing of hostile and potentially hostile forces out of the interior of the prospective territory of the Jewish State, establishing territorial continuity between the major concentrations of Jewish population and securing the Jewish State's future borders before, and in anticipation of, the Arab invasion.<sup>26</sup>

Second:

Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestine's Arabs: it was governed by military considerations and was geared to achieving military ends. But, given the nature of the war and the admixture of the two populations, securing the interior of the Jewish State for the impending battle along its borders in practice meant the depopulation and destruction of villages that hosted hostile local militia and irregular forces.<sup>27</sup>

Third:

Plan D provided for the conquest and permanent occupation, or leveling, of Arab villages and towns. It instructed that Arab villages should be surrounded and searched for weapons and irregulars. In the event of resistance, the armed forces in the villages should be destroyed and the inhabitants should be expelled from the State. In the event of non-resistance, the village should be disarmed and garrisoned.<sup>28</sup>

Fourth:

The plan, which reached all brigade OCs and district commanders, and probably also many battalion-level commanders, was neither used nor regarded by the Haganah senior field officers as a blanket instruction for the expulsion of the country's civilian inhabitants. But, in providing for the expulsion of communities and/or destruction of villages that had resisted the Haganah, it constituted a strategic-ideological anchor and basis for expulsions by front, district, brigade and battalion commanders (who in each case argued military necessity)

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<sup>26</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, p. 62.

<sup>27</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, pp. 62-63.

<sup>28</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, p.63.

and it gave commanders, post facto, a formal, persuasive covering note to explain their actions.<sup>29</sup>

Fifth and finally: “Plan D aside, there is no trace of any decision-making by the Yishuv’s or Haganah’s supreme bodies in March or early April in favour of a blanket, national policy of driving out the Arabs.”<sup>30</sup>

What Shlaim also appropriates from Morris, without sourcing it, is the conclusion of *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* which is that the “Palestinian refugee problem” was borne of the vicissitudes of war, and not by design. According to Morris: “[t]he Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterised the first Israeli-Arab war; in smaller part, it was the deliberate creation of the Jewish and Arab military commanders and politicians.”<sup>31</sup> It is Shlaim’s subscription to this conclusion that enables him to assert that the Haganah contributed to the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. Zionist institutions did not transfer Palestinians and thereby constitute them as refugees, rather they were produced in the process of combatants waging war.

Three points bear making at this juncture. First, Morris explodes Kimche’s “order theory”. Morris is categorical when he states that:

[w]hatever the reasoning and attitudes of the Arab states’ leaders, I have found no contemporary evidence to show that either the leaders of the Arab states or the Mufti ordered or directly encouraged the mass exodus during April. It may be worth noting that for decades the policy of

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<sup>29</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, p.63.

<sup>30</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, p.63.

<sup>31</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, p.286.

the Palestinian Arab leaders had been to hold fast to the soil of Palestine and to resist the eviction and displacement of Arab communities.<sup>32</sup>

Second, Morris and Shlaim by citing Morris, even while exploding this idea and explaining Plan Dalet, perpetuate the discursive silence surrounding the Zionist idea and practice of transfer. Third, this analytic has been perpetuated into the post-1993 period and still governs the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. I will explain this second and third point in turn.

So, how can Morris explain Plan Dalet while, concomitantly, perpetuating the analytic surrounding transfer? Finkelstein notes three problems with Morris' argument. Cumulatively, they realize this silence. As Finkelstein notes:

Morris's analysis is flawed in at least three crucial aspects: (1) it simplifies the origins and dynamics of the first Arab-Israeli war, (2) it woefully understates the ideological-political motivations (apart from any security considerations) to expel the Arabs and enlarge the Jewish state's borders, and (3) it inverts the relationship between politics and security. All of these are common to the vast body of scholarly myth surrounding Israel's creation."<sup>33</sup>

In the case of the first point, Morris blames the War of 1948 on Arab aggression, refusing to recognize the Yishuv's responsibility for the conflagration because he casts the latter in a strictly defensive, reactive posture *vis-à-vis* the Arabs.<sup>34</sup> On the second and third points Finkelstein explains that while Morris does discuss transfer in his opening chapter,

it [this idea of transfer] barely figures in the explanatory framework he [Morris] uses to account for the origins of

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<sup>32</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, p. 66.

<sup>33</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York, London: Verso, 2003), p. 81.

<sup>34</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 83.

the refugee problems. Second, on the rare occasion that this factor is introduced, it is grounded in the concern with security – e.g. the Arabs were barred from returning to their homes because they were seen as a potentially subversive element.<sup>35</sup>

What Morris refuses to recognize is that

Arab opposition and resistance to the Zionist movement was rooted preeminently in the latter's intent to create a state that would, at best, marginalize – and, more than likely, expel – them. The 'security' threat posed by the Arabs thus resulted from Zionism's ideological-political agenda. Yet, in Morris's reckoning, this relationship is inverted: the Zionist leadership's ideological-political disposition for expulsion resulted from the 'security' threat the Arabs posed to the Jewish state.<sup>36</sup>

Taken together Morris' oversimplification, understatement and inversion enable him to silence Zionist transfer as the cause of the Palestinian exodus (and to exonerate Israel). The refugees were the product of a war, in which Plan Dalet was a campaign. This war was started by the Arabs; fault for the Palestinian exodus lies with the Arabs who started the war. Says Finkelstein: "the upshot of Morris's argument is that the Arabs – who, after all, were the aggressors, must bear the brunt of political (if not moral) responsibility for the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem."<sup>37</sup> In turn, Finkelstein asks: "What is this if not official Zionism's 'astonishing' flight of Palestine's Arabs now graced with Morris's imprimatur?"<sup>38</sup> Put quite simply, Morris' work is an academic rehashing, peppered with citations, of Weizmann's conclusion that the Palestinian exodus was "miraculous". As such it is a restatement of the first discursive silence.

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<sup>35</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 84.

<sup>36</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 85.

<sup>37</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 75.

<sup>38</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 87.

When one compares reviews of Morris' work an interesting pattern emerges. Finkelstein's assessment of Morris' work is "that Morris's own evidence points to the conclusion that Palestine's Arabs were expelled systematically and with premeditation."<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Masahla states that: "[i]t is difficult, using Morris's own evidence, not to see on the part of the leaders of mainstream labor Zionism a *de facto*, forcible transfer policy in 1948."<sup>40</sup> It is not particularly remarkable that two different reviewers produce the same evaluation. What is remarkable is that these two evaluations reference different texts; texts published before and after 1993. Finkelstein's assessment is of *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*<sup>41</sup> published in 1984. Masahla's evaluation is of *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* published in 1994.

This brings me to my third point regarding the perpetuation of the discursive silence surrounding transfer in the post-Oslo period. In 2004 Morris published *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*.<sup>42</sup> As the title suggests this is an updating of his 1987 text. More significantly, it is a rearticulation of his pre-1993 discursive silence on transfer.

In his introduction to the revised edition Morris states that:

what the new documents reveal is that there were both far more expulsions and atrocities by Israeli troops than tabulated in this book's first edition and, at the same time,

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<sup>39</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 53.

<sup>40</sup> Nur Masalha "A critique of Benny Morris," in *The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories* ed. Ilan Pappé (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 219.

<sup>41</sup> Benny Morris, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians*, Rev. and exp. ed. (Oxford: New York; Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>42</sup> Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 2nd ed., Cambridge Middle East Studies (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

far more orders and advice to various communities by Arab officials and officers to quit their villages or at least send away their women, old folk and children, substantially fuelling the exodus.<sup>43</sup>

Now, in the updated edition Morris 1) repeats his argument that there was no master plan for expulsion of the Palestinians and 2) acknowledges that the political project of Zionism necessitated the transfer of Palestinians from mandate Palestine and that transfer, in turn, produced Palestinian opposition to the project.

Says Morris, contradictorily:

My feeling is that the transfer thinking and near-consensus that emerged in the 1930s and early 1940s was not tantamount to pre-planning and did not issue in the production of a policy or master-plan of expulsion; the Yishuv and its military forces did not enter the 1948 War which was initiated by the Arab side, with a policy or plan for expulsion. But transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism – because it sought to transform a land which was ‘Arab’ into a ‘Jewish’ state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab population; and because this aim automatically produced resistance among the Arabs which, in turn, persuaded the Yishuv’s leaders that a hostile Arab majority or large minority could not remain in place if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure.<sup>44</sup>

While Morris accessed and cited more documents and expanded his chapter on the thought of transfer in the Yishuv in the second edition, his overall conclusion did not change. Asserts Morris: “[t]he first Arab-Israel war, of 1948, was launched by the Palestinian Arabs, who rejected the UN partition resolution and embarked on hostilities aimed at preventing the birth of Israel. That war and not

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<sup>43</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, p.5.

<sup>44</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, p.60.

design, Jewish or Arab, gave birth to the Palestinian refugee problem.”<sup>45</sup> In 2004 as in 1987 Morris posits responsibility for the Palestinian exodus with the 1948 War and responsibility for that war with the Arabs.

Overall, Morris’ 2004 revisiting of his seminal 1987 text was more heavily documented. It did not change argumentatively. Despite Morris’ important contributions to the study of the creation of the Palestinian refugees in 1948, both his *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* and *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* perpetuate the discursive silence surrounding transfer into the post-1993 period.<sup>46</sup> In these later works Morris continues, as Finkelstein observed in his earlier work, to exclude Zionism’s idea of transfer from the framework explaining the creation of the refugees and to ground Zionism’s practice of transfer in security concerns.

Morris sees a four step process: 1) Arabs were opposed to the Zionist project, 2) this opposition was articulated violently in the 1948 War, 3) this opposition and violence against the Zionist project created insecurity, and 4) this insecurity prompted transfer in the sense that Palestinian refugees were not permitted to return to lands assigned to or conquered by Israel in 1948-1949.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, p.588.

<sup>46</sup> Says Finkelstein of Morris’ work: “[Morris] has permanently redefined the parameters of legitimate scholarly debate on the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, dispatching into oblivion the standard Israeli claims about ‘Arab broadcasts’. ... Morris has tapped a wealth of archival material which no serious students of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can afford to ignore. In effect, Morris’ research will serve as the benchmark for all future scholarship on the topic.” Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., pp.86-87.

<sup>47</sup> Admits Morris: “In this sense [that refugees were preventing from returning by Israeli forces], it may fairly be said that all 700,000 or so who ended up as

This chronological arrangement serves to exonerate Israel by denying it agency in the creation of the refugees. Morris refuses to acknowledge that the War of 1948 served as convenient pretext for executing transfer;<sup>48</sup> and that an agent was responsible for its execution. In fact, the process should be understood as follows: 1) Zionism was a chauvinistic, exclusive movement that denied Palestinians their claims to Palestine and threatened them with expulsion, 2) this created insecurity among Palestinians and violent resistance to Zionism's project, 3) the conflagration of 1948 was the guise under which Zionism realized its long sought goal of transfer.

Admittedly, Morris does speak of transfer. Doing so does not amount to a violation of this first discursive analytic however. Morris reproduces this first silence by "explaining" the creation of Palestinian refugees as a passive displacement borne of war. To speak of transfer and violate this first analytic of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations an author must identify an agent responsible for executing transfer, responsibility for the creation of Palestinian refugees must be attributed to Zionism.<sup>49</sup>

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refugees were compulsorily displaced or 'expelled'." Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, p.589.

<sup>48</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p.85.

<sup>49</sup> It is particularly interesting to note that this discursive silence regarding the Zionist idea and practice of transfer was nearly institutionalized in the Oslo Process during the negotiations of 2000. According to Ross a paper drafted at Camp David included a section on refugees which did not suggest "that Israel was responsible for the problem – which is what the Palestinians wanted; instead we [the American negotiators] introduced a concept of responsibility that was collective and included Israel." Later, the Clinton parameters presented on 23 December 2000 stated that "Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 War and the need to assist the international community in addressing this problem." This is



The forgoing should not be misconstrued as simply “academic” discussion. Transfer as both Zionist idea and practice continues in mandate Palestine into the present period. Statements advocating the idea are made publicly in Israel and policies continue to be practiced by Israel. Interestingly, one of the most prominent advocates for transfer is again Benny Morris. In a 16 January 2004 interview with *Ha'aretz* Morris was very straightforward.<sup>50</sup> After asserting that “[t]here are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing”<sup>51</sup> and noting that “[t]he non-completion of the transfer [in 1948] was a mistake”<sup>52</sup> Morris, in response to a question asking if he supports transfer today, said:

If you are asking me whether I support the transfer and expulsion of the Arabs from the West Bank, Gaza and perhaps even the Galilee and the Triangle, I say not at this moment. I am not willing to be a partner to that act. In the present circumstances it is neither moral nor realistic. The world would not allow it, the Arab world would not allow it, it would destroy the Jewish society from within. But I am ready to tell you that in other circumstances, apocalyptic ones, which are liable to be realized in five or

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Morris’ argument, complete with his silence on Zionist designs and realization of transfer, that Palestinian refugees are the accidental byproducts of the War of 1948. Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), pp. 659 and 804.

<sup>50</sup> In addition to those cited below Morris also made the following elucidating statement: “From April 1948, Ben-Gurion is projecting a message of transfer. There is no explicit order of his in writing, there is not orderly comprehensive policy, but there is an atmosphere of [population] transfer. The transfer idea is in the air. The entire leadership understands that this is the idea. The officer corps understands what is required of them. Under Ben-Gurion, a consensus of transfer is created.” Ari Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest? An Interview with Benny Morris,” Web page, [accessed 26 October 2004]. Available at [www.counterpunch.org](http://www.counterpunch.org).

<sup>51</sup> Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest? An Interview with Benny Morris,” Web page, [accessed 26 October 2004]. Available at [www.counterpunch.org](http://www.counterpunch.org).

<sup>52</sup> Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest? An Interview with Benny Morris,” Web page, [accessed 26 October 2004]. Available at [www.counterpunch.org](http://www.counterpunch.org).

ten years, I can see expulsions. If we find ourselves with atomic weapons around us, or if there is a general Arab attack on us and a situation of warfare on the front with Arabs in the rear shooting at convoys on their way to the front, acts of expulsion will be entirely reasonable. They may even be essential.<sup>53</sup>

Quite evidently Morris can foresee a time and conditions in which Israel would finish the act of transfer left uncompleted by Ben-Gurion in 1948.

It would be wrong to think Morris' interview an isolated case of advocacy for transfer; Morris is not a lone voice in the wilderness calling for mass expulsions of Palestinians from mandate Palestine. In fact, politically, he is the least important advocate for transfer. Much more politically salient are the Israeli politicians calling for practical realization of the idea of transfer. According to Halper, "[s]chemes of 'transfer' have become a common and acceptable part of Israeli political discourse."<sup>54</sup> He goes on to add parenthetically that "[t]wo parties that have served in Sharon's government, the National Union Party of the assassinated minister Rehavam Ze'evi and Avigdor Lieberman's 'Israel is Our Home,' promote transfer as their main political program."<sup>55</sup> Segev, in the same volume, notes that "Ze'evi planned expulsion by agreement, agreement between

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<sup>53</sup> Shavit, "Survival of the Fittest? An Interview with Benny Morris," Web page, [accessed 26 October 2004]. Available at [www.counterpunch.org](http://www.counterpunch.org).

<sup>54</sup> Jeff Halper, "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control," *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin (New York: The New Press, 2002), p. 26.

<sup>55</sup> Halper, "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* ed. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 26.

the State of Israel and the state that would absorb the expelled.”<sup>56</sup> In 2001 Ze’evi was killed by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP). Ze’evi’s successor, Tourism Minister Benny Elon, has continued to advocate and threaten transfer. He is quoted by the Israeli National News Service as saying in 2001 that

Our solution [the voluntary exodus of Arabs out of Judea and Samaria] will lead to real peace, with a democratic Jewish state between the Mediterranean and the Jordan. Gandhi [the assassinated Rehavam Ze’evi, founder of the Moledet party that Elon now heads] taught us that there are different types of transfer: The forcible type, which is not desirable or democratic, occurs during wartime. It is sometimes justified as a form of punishment to those who start a war. Just as in the War of Independence, when they brought upon themselves a ‘nakba’ (catastrophe), and we celebrate our independence. If they continue to war with us, then that is what will happen again.<sup>57</sup>

Halper is correct to assert that talk of transfer is common and not marginalized to the extremes of Zionist discourse. Calls for transfer are not the exclusive purview of Zionist politicians from Yisrael Beitenu and Moledet. Politicians from Labor and Likud, the two mainstream parties in Israel, also advocate transfer.

Minister Ephraim Sneh [of the Labor Party] recently came out with a plan to transfer some Israeli Arab towns, including Umm al-Fahm, to Palestinian sovereignty. Like physical transfer, the legal transfer proposed by Sneh is an

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<sup>56</sup> Tom Segev, “A Black Flag Hangs Over the Idea of Transfer,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 202.

<sup>57</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories* 12, no. 1 (2002): p.3. The bracketed comments appear in the original.

expression of the desire to get rid of all the Arabs: those in the territories and those in Israel.<sup>58</sup>

And Uri Elitzur, Head of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Bureau, said that

Regarding the Arabs of YESHA [Hebrew acronym for the West Bank and Gaza], we must say clearly, yes, they are our responsibility. This will be a heavy price for us to pay in order to hold on the Land of Israel, but we have to pay it. This doesn't mean that I would rule out transfer, and I don't think it's an unethical solution, but I do think that it's not realistic for the next few decades at least.<sup>59</sup>

Transfer is spoken of across the Zionist political spectrum.

### *Persistence of Practice*

Quite evidently, the Zionist idea of transfer has persisted into the post-1993 period. Transfer has not remained only an idea in the post-1993 period however. Transfer has been, and continues to be, realized in the post-Oslo period.

Writing in 2002, Pappé asserts that from 1967 to 1993 Israel was "executing [in the West Bank and Gaza Strip] a policy of slow transfer."<sup>60</sup> This practice of slow transfer did not end with the start of the Oslo Process. As Halper states, in the contemporary period Israel is actively pursuing policies of displacement including "exile and deportation; revoking of residency rights; economic impoverishment; land expropriation; house demolitions and other means of making life in the occupied territories so unbearable that it will induce

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<sup>58</sup> Segev, "A Black Flag Hangs Over the Idea of Transfer," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, pp.202-203.

<sup>59</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, 12, no. 1 (2002): p.3.

<sup>60</sup> Ilan Pappé, "Break the Mirror Now," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* ed. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 110.

‘voluntary’ Palestinian emigration.”<sup>61</sup> The exodus from the West Bank village of Yanun is evidence of this slow transfer.

The Foundation for Middle East Peace<sup>62</sup> reports on the emptying of Yanun. The report deserves quoting at length.

Yanun is a typical example of how Palestinian villages have been wiped out as a result of successive Israeli government expansionist policies and as a result of the aggressive acts of the settlers. The settlers of nearby Itamar who are legally covered, protected, and fully armed have been carrying out several planned aggressive and terrorist activities intended to kick the people of Yanun out of their homes and impose their control, not only over the lands of Yanun, but over the nearby farms of Aqraba.

These activities include:

1. Repeatedly attacking people in their homes, throwing stones, shooting at windows and closed doors, terrifying young children and women.
2. Attacking families on their farms ...
3. Killing hundreds of sheep using poisonous injections and live bullets.
4. Blocking the main road to the village of Yanun.
5. Spoiling the only natural source of water in the village.
6. Burning down and destroying the only source of electricity, the electric generator that was donated by the Economic Development Group.
7. Preventing farmers from getting to their farms and attacking them using fierce dogs and live bullets.
8. Destroying the crops by ploughing the farmed land and burning crops that were harvested and ready to

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<sup>61</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* ed. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 26.

<sup>62</sup> The Foundation for Middle East Peace is “a nonprofit organization dedicated to informing American about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and assisting in a peaceful solution that brings security for both peoples.” Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Foundation for Middle East Peace,” Web page, [accessed 23 June 2005]. Available at <http://www.fmep.org>.

- transport, as evidence of possession and control. At least three cases of burning have been recorded.
9. In broad daylight, stealing olive trees that belong to local farmers.
  10. Imposing a siege around the natural pastures and preventing shepherds from getting to them.
  11. Preventing the relatives of the people of Yanun from visiting Yanun and shooting at the cars that go there, including the car of the mayor of Aqraba.
  12. Cutting off the main road from Aqraba to Nablus. This road, which was finished in 1935, is no longer safe to travel.
  13. Even teachers at Yanun elementary school were subjected to questioning and provocations by the settlers.<sup>63</sup>

The residents of Yanun were transferred through the combined acts of Israeli settlers and policies of the State of Israel. Such acts of slow transfer are not restricted to Yanun however; houses are demolished in Khan Yunis, Abu Dis and Hebron, land is expropriated from Beit Sahur and residents of East Jerusalem have their residency rights revoked. The practice of slow transfer is one of the defining characteristics of Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

I will make one concluding point regarding the persistence of the idea and practice of transfer into the post-1993 period – transfer is constantly denied its persistence. My recent citations of Halper and Segev are taken from a text entitled *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. As the title suggests, this is a critical text. Two specific statements in this text are particularly instructive. First, there is the previously cited Halper quote: “[s]chemes of ‘transfer’ have become a

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<sup>63</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories* 12, no. 6 (2002): p.6.

common and acceptable part of Israeli political discourse.”<sup>64</sup> Second, Segev states that “[a]n evil spirit is infiltrating public discourse [in Israel]: the spirit of expulsion.”<sup>65</sup> Both statements suggest that the idea of transfer has recently emerged into the Israeli discourse.

Tessler also suggests that the idea of transfer is emerging. “This is the policy of ‘transfer,’ and though it is not the official position of Likud or any other established party of the political right, the notion is no longer considered outside the bounds of legitimate political discourse, as it was before the current uprising.”<sup>66</sup> Interestingly, Tessler’s statement was made in 1990. Tessler, Halper and Segev all conceive of transfer as an emerging idea. According to Tessler the idea of transfer was emergent in 1990. According to Halper and Segev the idea of transfer was emergent in 2002. In all three cases the idea and practice of transfer are denied their persistence.

Admittedly, critical authors in the contemporary period do violate the first analytic of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. However, they do so by representing transfer as an emerging idea. The discursive effect of this representation is to perpetuate the first analytic; the idea of transfer can only be new or developing if its role as an ideational and practical cornerstone of Zionism is silenced. Quite paradoxically, the critiques of these critical authors and their

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<sup>64</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* ed. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 26.

<sup>65</sup> Segev, “A Black Flag Hangs Over the Idea of Transfer,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p.202.

<sup>66</sup> Mark Tessler, “The Intifada and Political Discourse in Israel,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 2 (1990): p.50.

violations of the first discursive rule realize the first rule. As Masalha says: “the Palestinian exodus is nothing if not testimony to the endurance of a vision that runs in an unbroken line from the early days of Zionist colonization to this day.”<sup>67</sup>

### *Silence 2 – Territorial Maximization*

The second analytic governing the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations is silence regarding the territorial ambitions of Zionist ideology. Phrased differently, to speak truthfully of Palestinian-Israeli relations an author must remain silent on the fact that Zionism was and is a conquest movement. As is the case with the Zionist idea and practice of transfer, this systematic silence too has persisted into the post-1993 period.

### *Institutionalization of Discursive Silence*

The Oslo Agreements are silent on Zionism’s territorial maximization. More accurately, the Oslo Agreements are silent on Israel’s forcible territorial conquests as well as the ideational foundations for these conquests. The DOPOISGA and subsequent agreements are clear in their aim and end. They are also ahistorical.<sup>68</sup> For example, there is no explanation for how Israeli military

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<sup>67</sup> Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians : the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p.208.

<sup>68</sup> The prologue of the DOPOISGA does state that the parties “agree that it is time to put an end of decades of confrontation and conflict”, but this can hardly be considered historicizing the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a*



forces came to occupy their positions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from which they were to withdraw in accordance in the DOPOISGA, or even the reason for a DOPOISGA.

The only historical references or precedents of note cited in the Oslo Agreements are UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338. The preamble of the Declaration states that “[t]he aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is ... a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.”<sup>69</sup> Watson asserts that “[a]s a legal matter, it [UN Resolution 242] is the most significant plank of the legal framework underlying the Oslo Accords.”<sup>70</sup> Yet, referencing UN Resolution 242 does not mollify the DOPOISGA’s ahistoricism. In fact, referencing UN Resolution 242 and 338 exclusively constitutes the West Bank and Gaza Strip as disputed territories and occults the Israeli practice of territorial maximization.

UN Resolution 242 emphasizes “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”<sup>71</sup> According to Watson, this implies that Israel should return all the territories it occupied in the War of 1967, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>72</sup> However, the English text of the resolution also “provides that peace

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*Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), p. 117.

<sup>69</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies. *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement*, p. 117.

<sup>70</sup> Geoffrey R Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 34.

<sup>71</sup> Walter Laqueur, and Barry M Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Rev. and updated ed., Pelican Books (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 365.

<sup>72</sup> Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements*, p.31.

‘should’ (not ‘must’) include withdrawal of Israeli forces ‘from territories occupied in the recent conflict’, not ‘from *the* territories occupied’ in that conflict.”<sup>73</sup> The intended absence of the definite article in the English text of Resolution 242 means that to be in accordance with the resolution Israel should withdraw from *some*, but not all of the territories occupied in 1967.<sup>74</sup>

The Oslo Process is premised on, and institutionalized, the ambiguity of UN Resolution 242. This ambiguity had to be resolved. The DOPOISGA establishes that it will be resolved through negotiation. Article XIII of the DOPOISGA explains that Israel will redeploy its military forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the entry into force of the Declaration.<sup>75</sup> Article XIV states that “Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area.”<sup>76</sup> Annex II of the Declaration elaborates on the withdrawal established in Article XIV: “The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.”<sup>77</sup> With the start of the Oslo Process Israel’s withdrawals from and redeployments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had to be agreed upon through negotiation.

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<sup>73</sup> Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements*, p.31. For the English text of the resolution see: Laqueur, and Rubin. *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*, p. 365.

<sup>74</sup> Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements*, p. 31.

<sup>75</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 120.

<sup>76</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 121.

<sup>77</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 122.

Overwhelmingly the international consensus since 1967 has been that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are occupied territories.<sup>78</sup> This is stated clearly, for example, in UN Security Council Resolution 476 of 1980 which “[r]eaffirms the overriding necessity for ending the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.”<sup>79</sup> The Oslo Agreements were used politically to negate just such resolutions (those other than 242 and 338)<sup>80</sup> and to institutionalize negotiating Israeli withdrawals and redeployments from some of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This, in turn, had the political effect of abrogating this international consensus; it constituted these territories as *disputed* rather than *occupied*.<sup>81</sup>

After the DOPISGA, negotiating over this “disputed” territory was further institutionalized and rearticulated by subsequent Oslo Agreements. “The parties haggled through the winter of 1993/4 over how to implement Israel’s promise to

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<sup>78</sup> See for example: Emma Playfair, *International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories: Two Decades of Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Oxford England:, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1992).

<sup>79</sup> United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 476 (1980),” Web page, [accessed 24 January 2005]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6de6da8a650b4c3b852560df00663826?OpenDocument>.

<sup>80</sup> Immediately after the signing of the DOPOISGA the Clinton Administration in the December 1993 UN session argued that “past UN resolutions [on Palestinian-Israeli relations] are ‘obsolete and anachronistic’ in light of the September 1993 Israel-PLO agreement.” Noam Chomsky, “Introduction” in *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid* ed. Roane Carey (London;, New York: Verso, 2001), p.11.

<sup>81</sup> Lamis Andoni, “Redefining Oslo: Negotiating the Hebron Protocol,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p. 24.

withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho.”<sup>82</sup> The result of this negotiating was the Cairo Agreement. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995 divided the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Areas A, B and C and called for Israeli military redeployments in the West Bank. The first redeployment was from Area A. The agreement also states that “further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases each to take place after an interval of six months.”<sup>83</sup> The scope of these redeployments was not laid out in the agreement and, in accordance with the DOPOISGA, were again negotiated. These negotiations, in turn, produced the Hebron Protocol of 1997 outlining Israeli redeployment in Hebron. The further redeployments called for in the Interim Agreement were never realized.

Ultimately, not one of the Oslo Agreements clearly established which and how much space would be transferred, through Israeli redeployment, between areas for the subsequent agreement. A redeployment did occur after the Interim Agreement, for example, but this agreement did not pre-establish the extent of the next redeployment. Each redeployment had to be negotiated and agreed upon. The Oslo Agreements are sequential expressions of negotiations over disputed land.

Constituting the West Bank and Gaza Strip as disputed posited Israel and the Palestinians as equal claimants to the territory. This occults the asymmetrical

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<sup>82</sup> Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements*, p. 42.

<sup>83</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

power relationship of occupier to occupied. It also silences the manner in which this asymmetrical power relationship came to be. It silences Israel's practice of territorial maximization as it was this practice that resulted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip being occupied in the first place.

### *Rule Governed Knowledge Production*

Silence regarding the Zionist idea and practice of territorial maximization is an analytic that continues to govern the production of truthful knowledge in the post-1993 period. Reuveny, Gazit, Walzer and Ross have all produced truthful knowledge in accordance with this discursive rule. I have already noted that Reuveny's "Fundamentalist colonialism: the geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian conflict" is a somewhat critical text. However, just as this author is silent on Zionism's idea and practice of transfer, he is similarly silent on Zionism's idea and practice of territorial maximization. I have also already cited his statement that "[f]rom 1948-1967, Israel found itself as the de facto landlord of land vacated by Palestinians in the wake of the War of 1948."<sup>84</sup> It silences the fact that Israel waged the War of 1948 to realize territorial expansion; Plan Dalet was offensive in nature.

This particular statement is of somewhat secondary importance to the artificial distinction Reuveny establishes between the settlement policies of Labor and Likud. I examine the Israeli practice of settlement much more extensively in chapter seven, but draw attention to this specific statement because of its

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<sup>84</sup> R. Reuveny, "Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Political Geography* 22, no. 4 (2003): p. 359.

representative nature. Reuveny states that “Rabin’s and Barak’s governments did not evacuate settlements, despite their inclinations to do so, out of fear of civil war.”<sup>85</sup> This in comparison to Likud-led governments like those of Begin, Shamir and Netanyahu which were not inclined to evacuate settlements. Here, Reuveny subscribes to the standard conception of the Israeli political scene which distinguishes between Labor’s conciliatory “doves” and Likud’s expansionist “hawks”.<sup>86</sup>

This is a false dichotomy. In fact, Reuveny’s assertion that Rabin and Barak were inclined to evacuate settlements is completely unfounded and without empirical proof. The governments of Rabin’s and Barak did not evacuate a single settlement during their terms. Moreover, more settlements were established under the Barak government than any Israeli government before it, including the allegedly “expansionist” governments of Begin, Shamir and Netanyahu.<sup>87</sup> Fundamentally, Israel’s two main parties whether led by Shamir or Peres or Rabin or Barak or Sharon are united in their settlement policy.

This is borne out by statements made by Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Labor’s Defense Minister in the 2000-2003 Sharon government, while Minister of Housing in the previous Sharon-Peres government, and Yossi Beilin, noted drafter of the DOPOISGA. “In 1996 Ben-Eliezer explained that Labor achieved its political ends quietly, without using means which attracted attention and

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<sup>85</sup> Reuveny, “Fundamentalist Colonialism: the Geopolitics of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” p. 372.

<sup>86</sup> Tessler makes a similar comparison noting that Labor’s political platform is one of territorial compromise while that of Likud is of territorial maximalism. Tessler, “The Intifada and Political Discourse in Israel,” p. 46.

<sup>87</sup> The Israeli practice of settlement is examined in chapter seven.

opposition to its policies. Beilin chastised the Netanyahu government for advertising its settlement policy.”<sup>88</sup> “The pronouncements of the Netanyahu government, he said, were boisterous and focused international attention on Israeli settlement activity in the territories.”<sup>89</sup> Labor and Likud are divided by the strategy used to realize their settlement policy; the former are pragmatic expansionists, but expansionists nonetheless.

The discursive effect of this false dichotomy, of positing Labor as a party of territorial compromisers, is to silence the Zionist idea and practice of territorial maximization. It suggests, as does Reuveny, that only religious zealots such as Gush Enumim pursue territorial maximization and that these groups prohibit Labor from realizing policies to which it is naturally inclined. What is silenced is the fact that territorial maximization is a defining element of Zionism and one supported since before the establishment of Israel by Laborites and Likudniks, by Ben-Gurion, Meir, Rabin, Shamir, Begin, Peres, Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon.

Gazit’s “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points” is a brief survey of the history of Palestinian-Israeli relations. While the text is written in accordance with a number of the analytics governing knowledge production of this discourse-object, most notably the idea that Arabs and Palestinians are intransigent rejectionists, it is particularly obedient to this second silence regarding territorial maximization. Silencing absolutely the manner in the early Zionists coveted, and conquered, more territory than was originally assigned

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<sup>88</sup> Sean F. McMahon, “Massacre of the Doves?: Interpreting Israel’s 2003 Elections,” *British Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 2 (2005): forthcoming.

<sup>89</sup> Chomsky, “Introduction” in *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid* ed. Carey, p. 16.

Israel by Resolution 181 Gazit states incredibly that “their [the Arabs of Palestine] defeat in the War of Independence caused large areas not included in Israel’s share according to the original U.N. partition plan *to fall into the hands of the Israelis.*”<sup>90</sup> With equal historical disregard for the provocations acknowledged by Dayan, Gazit also states that “[t]he Six Day War broke out suddenly, but it was clearly the inevitable result of two initiatives taken by the Arab states in the early 1960s.”<sup>91</sup>

Finally, Gazit summarizes the tumultuous fifty years of Israeli-Palestinian relations since the establishment of Israel with the observation that “Israel has paid a heavy price in human life, but it has won every war forced upon it.”<sup>92</sup> Of course, Gazit here mobilizes, in accordance with the second discursive rule of formation, the idea that Israel is the victim in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. More important however, at least to the present discussion, is that the author is absolutely silent on the idea that Israel has waged its wars, wars of choice, in pursuit of territorial aggrandizement. Gazit cannot even bring himself to be as ingenuous as Begin in admitting that the War of 1967 and Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon were wars of choice.<sup>93</sup> According to the author, it was forced on

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<sup>90</sup> Shlomo Gazit, “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555, no. Israel in Transition (1998): p. 83. My emphasis added.

<sup>91</sup> Gazit, “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points,” p. 84.

<sup>92</sup> Gazit, “Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points,” p.95.

<sup>93</sup> Israel’s invasion of Lebanon is often interpreted as an attempt to defeat the idea of Palestinian nationalism by destroying the PLO. See Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza* (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), pp. 165-169. Rokach shows that as early as 1954 the Israeli



Israel. Gazit's "history" does not devote one word to the territorial ambitions of Zionism and as such is a truthful statement on Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Walzer, too, focuses on the wars of Palestinian-Israeli relations in his 2002 text entitled "The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine".<sup>94</sup> This text, like his pre-1993 text, silences Zionist territorial maximization. It does so in two ways. First, Walzer mobilizes the same false dichotomy that I identified in Revueny's text.

Walzer argues that:

It was the great mistake of the two center-left prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Barak, not to set themselves against the settler movement from the beginning. They thought that they would most easily defeat the right-wing supporters of Greater Israel if they waited until the very end of the peace process. Meanwhile they compromised with the right and allowed a steady growth in the number of settlers. If, instead, they had frozen settlement activity and chosen a few isolated settlements to dismantle, they would have provoked a political battle I am sure they would have won; and that victory would have been definitive; a gradual out-migration of settler families from the territories would have begun.<sup>95</sup>

Walzer's speculation is unfounded. On what statements or policies does Walzer get the idea that Rabin or Barak would ever challenge the settlers? Walzer manufactures a difference where none exists; Rabin and Barak were no less territorial maximalists than were the settlers. In fact, they were likeminded. Any

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government including Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Dayan planned to invade Lebanon in order to create a Christian state and *expand Israel's geographic scope*. See Livia Rokach, and Moshe Sharett, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism: a Study Based on Moshe Sharett's Personal Diary and Other Documents*, 3rd ed., AAUG Information Paper Series, no. 23 (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1986).

<sup>94</sup> Michael Wazler, "The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine," *Dissent* ( Fall 2002): Full Text.

<sup>95</sup> Walzer, "The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine," p. 3-4 of 8.

historical accuracy would have necessitated that Walzer acknowledge that Rabin and Barak and the settlers, because the former were building settlements, shared a symmetry of interests and goals.

Second, and this is much more in keeping with the systematic silence realized by Gazit, Walzer states categorically: "I believe that the original seizure of the West Bank and Gaza was justified. In 1967, the Arabs were fighting a war ... against the very existence of Israel."<sup>96</sup> He then proceeds to describe the War of 1967 as a "victorious defense"<sup>97</sup> for Israel. Walzer does not speak of Zionism's historical coveting of all of mandate Palestine or of Israeli provocations of Syria and Egypt or how Israel attacked before the Egyptian ambassador could reach Washington. It is only by remaining silent regarding these ideas and practices that Walzer can claim that the War of 1967 was defensive for Israel. Walzer's 2002 text demonstrates that he continues to reproduce this discursive silence even in the face of Finkelstein's research. In other words, Walzer continues to produce truthful knowledge by reproducing the discursive silence regarding Zionism's territorial maximization.

Finally, Dennis Ross too reproduces this systematic silence in his *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*.<sup>98</sup> Ross' reproduction is at least as, if not more, important than the previously cited silences because it informed American policy on Palestinian-Israeli relations through both the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Process. Ross was the chief

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<sup>96</sup> Walzer, "The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine," p. 2 of 8.

<sup>97</sup> Walzer, "The Four Wars of Israel/Palestine," p. 2 of 8.

<sup>98</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*.

Middle East negotiator under George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton serving in this position for 12 years.

Ross' text abides by all six of the analytics of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations, though I have elected to reference his text selectively. As regards the silence of Zionism's territorial maximization, or more specifically Israel's territorial conquests of 1967, Ross states that:

After nearly two weeks of uncertainty – with bloodcurdling threats about the destruction of Israel coming from Egypt and ineffectual U.S. efforts still under way – Israel launched a pre-emptive attack against the Egyptian air force, destroying it in the first three hours of the war. In six days Israel went on to defeat Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, seizing considerable territory from all three: the Sinai Desert and the Gaza Strip from Egypt; the West Bank from Jordan; and the Golan Heights from Syria.

This paragraph concludes with an asterisk that asserts “[t]he best single book on the 1967 War is Michael Oren’s *Six Days of War*.”<sup>99</sup> By citing this text Ross reproduces Oren’s silence as regards Zionist territorial maximization. The reader will recall that Finkelstein reviewed Oren’s *Six Days of War* in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*. In fact, several of my citations in chapter three examining this silence in the pre-1993 period were taken from this review. I will not reproduce those citations here. Rather, I will surmise Finkelstein’s review. I do so in order to identify the exclusions or omissions of Oren and, by extension, Ross.

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<sup>99</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, p.22.

Finkelstein states that “Oren basically reiterates the official Israeli version of the June War.”<sup>100</sup> Interestingly, Finkelstein summarizes his review of the Oren text with reference to another text notable for its reproduction of the first systematic silence. According to Finkelstein:

Oren maintains that Israel’s sole objective in the June War was ‘eliminating the Egyptian thrust and destroying Nasser’s army.’ The conquests of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, West Bank, and Golan Heights were not ‘planned or even contemplated.’ In formulations strikingly reminiscent of Benny Morris’s account of the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem (‘born of war, not by design’), Oren avows that the Israeli offensives had been ‘determined less by design than by expediency’ and by ‘the vagaries and momentum of war, far more than by rational decision making.’ In fact, just as Morris’s formulation apologetically distorted the dynamics of the 1948 expulsions, so Oren’s formulations apologetically distort the dynamics of the 1967 conquests.<sup>101</sup>

Oren distorts the dynamics because he pays only scant attention to the political motives behind Israel’s attack<sup>102</sup> and Israel’s long-standing territorial desiderata.<sup>103</sup>

Finkelstein concludes his review with the following statement: “[i]n the introduction Oren states as his goal that the June War ‘never be seen the same way again.’ In fact, he simply repeats the same tired old apologetics.”<sup>104</sup> I would offer a slight modification to this assessment. Oren repeats the same silence

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<sup>100</sup> Norman Finkelstein, “Abba Eban With Footnotes,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 3 (2003): p. 74.

<sup>101</sup> Finkelstein, “Abba Eban with Footnotes,” p. 83.

<sup>102</sup> Finkelstein, “Abba Eban with Footnotes,” p. 82.

<sup>103</sup> Finkelstein, “Abba Eban with Footnotes,” p. 84.

<sup>104</sup> Finkelstein, “Abba Eban with Footnotes,” p. 86.

regarding territorial aggrandizement and produces his truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations according to the same discursive analytic.

Ross' textual silence is Oren's silence. Ross' short history of the War of 1967 represents Israel as facing an existential threat, as does the Oren text.<sup>105</sup> Ross, like Oren, is silent on the political motivations behind Israel's attack and Zionism's territorial desiderata, both ideational and practical. So, like Oren, Ross reproduces this second systematic silence and has produced his truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations by subscribing to the same discursive analytic.

### *Persistence of Practice*

As the discursive silence regarding Zionism's territorial maximization has persisted through the Oslo Process and the contemporary period, so too has Israel's practice of territorial aggrandizement. Again, I will examine this practice much more comprehensively in a subsequent chapter. To make my point briefly here I will cite the work of Halper.

In "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control"<sup>106</sup> Halper studies the manner in which Israel has overlaid the West Bank with settlements, bypass roads, highways, military installations, nature preserves and infrastructure thereby constituting what he calls a matrix of control. This matrix enables Israel to maintain hegemony over the territory (and resources) and people of the West

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<sup>105</sup> Finkelstein, "Abba Eban with Footnotes," p. 82.

<sup>106</sup> Halper, "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, pp. 20-40.

Bank without having to occupy all the space militarily. “Like the Go board [a board game the aim of which is immobilize your opponent by controlling key points], Israel’s matrix of control is an integrated system designed to allow Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian life in the occupied territories.”<sup>107</sup> For example, the bypass roads divide the Palestinian population among non-contiguous cantons and the movement of goods and people within and between these cantons is regulated by Israeli checkpoints.

Speaking specifically to the issue of the persistence of the Zionist practice of territorial maximization Halper states that “[w]hile a number of Israeli highways were built in the occupied territories before the Oslo accords, construction of a massive system of twenty-nine highways and bypass roads ... was begun only *at the start of the peace process*.”<sup>108</sup> These bypass roads are designed to link Israeli settlements and to incorporate the West Bank into Israel proper.<sup>109</sup> Halper continues:

Another mechanism of division and control that came into being with the signing of the Oslo II agreement in 1995 was the further carving of the occupied territories into Areas A, B and C (in the West Bank), H-1 and H-2 in Hebron, Yellow, Green, Blue White in Gaza, Israeli-controlled ‘nature preserves,’ closed military areas, and ‘open green spaces’ which restricted Palestinian construction in more than half of East Jerusalem. This

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<sup>107</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 22.

<sup>108</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 24. My emphasis added.

<sup>109</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 24.

system, which has become ever more formalized and controlled, confines Palestinian to an archipelago of some 190 islands encircled by the Israeli matrix.<sup>110</sup>

Like the Zionist practice of denying responsibility for the creation of Palestinian refugees in 1948 at Camp David and again at the Taba meetings of 2000, the Zionist practice of territorial maximization too was nearly institutionalized in the Oslo Process at Taba. According to Halper, the Israeli negotiating position at Taba of offering Arafat 93% of the West Bank<sup>111</sup> for a final end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict “revealed how much Israel could relinquish and still retain effective control over the entire country.”<sup>112</sup> Much as inmates remain imprisoned despite the fact that they live in and move within the confines of the prison, Israel can maintain hegemony over all the West Bank by retaining only 12% of the territory.

The Zionist practice of territorial maximization has persisted into the post-1993 period. Israel began to integrate the West Bank into Israel proper with bypass roads with the start of the Oslo Process. Israel divided the West Bank into non-contiguous cantons through a number of the Oslo Agreements. Israel

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<sup>110</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 24.

<sup>111</sup> The percentage of territory discussed at Taba is highly contested in the literature. According to Halper, “Israel does not consider East Jerusalem and ‘No Man’s Land’ around Latrun as part of the West Bank, but does include part of the Dead Sea, [so] Barak’s 93 percent was actually more like 88 percent of the actual Palestinian territory.” Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 28.

<sup>112</sup> Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, pp. 28-29.

continues to build settlements daily. Bypass roads, cantons and settlements are the infrastructure of the matrix of control and the matrix of control is intended to make Israel's presence in the West Bank permanent.<sup>113</sup> The mechanisms of Zionist territorial aggrandizement have changed from tanks and infantry units to relatively benign roads and houses, but the practice of territorial conquest continues.

### *Silence 3 – Denial of Palestinian Nationhood*

The third analytic governing the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations is silence regarding Zionism's original denial of Palestinian nationhood and this nation's right to self-determination, and subsequent recognition of Palestinians in highly rarefied forms. As is the case with the ideas and practices of transfer and territorial maximization, this systematic silence too has persisted into the post-1993 period.

#### *Institutionalization of Discursive Silence*

With the signing of the DOPOISGA and subsequent agreements, much has been made in the literature of Israel's recognition of the Palestinians. Authors such as Shlaim and Pappé, *inter alia*, see in the DOPOISGA a reversal of long-standing Zionist practice vis-à-vis Palestinians. As I will demonstrate, however, the Oslo Process does not embody any change in Zionist practice. In fact, the

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<sup>113</sup> Halper, "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 38.



agreements are in perfect keeping with this practice and, moreover, institutionalize this practice. Phrased differently, the Oslo Agreements institutionalize Zionism's refusal to recognize the Palestinian nation, this nation's rights and instead recognize Palestinians in highly rarefied forms.

As I have already noted, Shlaim characterized the DOPOISGA as "the mother of all breakthroughs"<sup>114</sup> and the Arafat and Rabin letters and the DOPOISGA as historic.<sup>115</sup> The reason the letters and agreement are historic is because they "reconcile the two principal parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict."<sup>116</sup> Shlaim goes on to explain that

Their [Jewish and Arab nationalism] history is one of mutual denial and mutual rejection. Palestinian rejection of Israel's legitimacy is enshrined in the 1968 Palestine National charter. Israel's rejection of Palestinian national rights was pithily summed up by Golda Meir's remark that there is no such thing as a Palestinian people.<sup>117</sup>

This, says Shlaim, changed with the signing of the DOPOISGA. "Now mutual denial has made way for mutual recognition. Israel not only recognized the Palestinians as a people with political rights, but formally recognized the PLO as its representative."<sup>118</sup> According to Shlaim, in initiating the Oslo Process Rabin abandoned a practice that had defined Zionist practice vis-à-vis Palestinians for a century.

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<sup>114</sup> Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): p. 24.

<sup>115</sup> Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," p. 25.

<sup>116</sup> Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," p.25.

<sup>117</sup> Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," p.25.

<sup>118</sup> Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," p.25.

Pappe, Shikaki, Kelman and Eisenberg and Caplan all share a similar interpretation of the importance of Israel's recognition of the Palestinians with the start of the Oslo Process. Pappe, interviewed in 1995 by Graham Usher, stated that "[t]he chief significance, and probably the only genuinely irreversible part of Oslo, is the mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. It has humanized the two parties to the conflict."<sup>119</sup> Shikaki in 1996 stated that "[u]nder the Oslo process, Israel for the first time recognized ... the existence of a Palestinian people with political rights ... [and] the PLO as the representative of that people."<sup>120</sup> In 1997 Kelman stated that:

In my view, the most important feature of the Oslo accord was the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel. In recognizing the PLO and agreeing to negotiate with it, Israel acknowledged Palestinian nationhood and the unity of the Palestinian people – both inside and outside the occupied territories.<sup>121</sup>

He continued by asserting that:

the mutual recognition of 1993 represented a fundamental shift in the relationship between the two peoples. Acknowledging each other's legitimacy was a significant affirmation of the other's national existence, which the two sides had systematically denied each other throughout the history of their conflict. It is this conceptual breakthrough that is irreversible, even if the current peace process were to collapse.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Graham Usher, "An Israeli Peace: an Interview with Ilan Pappe" in *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process* ed. Graham Usher (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p.34.

<sup>120</sup> Khalil Shikaki, "The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 1 (1996): pp.82-83.

<sup>121</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, "Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough," *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): p. 193.

<sup>122</sup> Kelman, "Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough," p. 193.

And even more recently in 1998 Eisenberg and Caplan wrote that “[Rabin’s] government was the first to recognize the Palestinian people, with the PLO as its representative.”<sup>123</sup> All agree that Rabin’s letter to Arafat and the DOPOISGA mark a fundamental change in Israeli policy; that Israel had abandoned the policy of negating and effacing Palestinians.

Such authors cite Rabin’s letter in response to Arafat’s 9 September 1993 letter to the Israeli prime minister and the preamble of the DOPOISGA in making their case. Recall that Rabin’s letter states that “the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”<sup>124</sup> Recall further that the DOPOISGA states that

[t]he Government of Israel and the P.L.O. team ... representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic compromise through the agreed political process.<sup>125</sup>

Shikaki and Shlaim are right to assert that with the DOPOISGA Israel recognized a Palestinian people with political rights. However, this recognition is not a violation of the established Zionist practice of denying the existence of the

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<sup>123</sup> Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, and Neil Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities*, Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 113.

<sup>124</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 129.

<sup>125</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 117.

Palestinian nation and this nation's rights. In fact, the wording of the Arafat-Rabin letters and the DOPOISGA institutionalized this established Zionist practice.

Three points bear being made at this point. First, Israel's recognition of a Palestinian people with political rights is not the same as a recognition of the Palestinian nation with national rights. Savir's commentary on the drafting of the DOPOISGA evidences this difference. Second, the recognitions made by the PLO and Israel were not mutual; they were asymmetrical. Shlaim, Pappé and Kelman are wrong in this regard. Jamal identifies this asymmetry at the start of the Oslo Process as well as its perpetuation through several of the subsequent agreements. Third, the Oslo Agreements perpetuated the Israeli practice of recognizing Palestinians in highly rarefied forms.

First, through Rabin's letter, the DOPOISGA and subsequent Oslo Agreements Israel did not recognize a Palestinian nation nor did it acknowledge any rights owing to this nation. The DOPOISGA's acknowledgement of Palestinian political rights is not synonymous with acknowledgement of Palestinian national rights. Savir makes this clear in his *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*.<sup>126</sup> Savir recounts the following exchange from a July 1993 negotiating session drafting the DOPOISGA. In the conversation both Abu Ala and Savir acknowledge that the DOPOISGA did not recognize Palestinian national rights. According to Savir, Abu Ala said to the Israeli negotiators: "You want full responsibility for security, but *you won't recognize*

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<sup>126</sup> Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998).

*our national rights*. The settlements are to remain intact. And you call this self-rule?”<sup>127</sup> Savir retorted that

We will not yield on security for Israelis. We will not make you responsible for it. Why should you be? We have been fighting for a century. We’re just now beginning to build mutual trust. *We will not recognize your national rights* because that means assenting to a state. We must distinguish between these talks on autonomy and subsequent negotiations on a permanent settlement.<sup>128</sup>

During the drafting of the DOPOISGA both the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators were well aware that the document denied Palestinian national rights. This Israeli policy did not change over the course of the DOPOISGA negotiations.

In mid-August the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams reconvened in Norway to continue drafting the DOPOISGA. Savir is explicit when he states that in return for some Palestinian concessions Israel agreed “to speed up the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and to recognize their political (though not national) rights.”<sup>129</sup> Israel’s purposeful denial of Palestinian national rights did not change as the negotiations progressed and was ultimately institutionalized in the DOPOISGA.

Second, despite the assertions of Pappé and Shlaim the recognitions made by the PLO and Israel were *not* mutual, they were asymmetrical. Compare Arafat’s 9 September 1993 letter to Rabin with Rabin’s response. Most importantly, Arafat’s letter states that: “[t]he PLO recognizes the right of the State

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<sup>127</sup> Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, p. 46. My emphasis added.

<sup>128</sup> Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, pp. 46–47. My emphasis added.

<sup>129</sup> Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, p. 53.

of Israel to exist in peace and security.”<sup>130</sup> Recall that Rabin’s letter states that “the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.”<sup>131</sup> As Jamal correctly notes, “while Arafat in his letter recognized, on behalf of the Palestinians, Israel’s legitimate right to exist in peace and security, the Israeli prime minister merely recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, without any mention of rights.”<sup>132</sup> In fact, according to Jamal the letters of recognition were only the beginning of an asymmetrical relationship that was continuously reinstitutionalized and rearticulated in and by the Oslo Process.

The asymmetry that characterized the letters of recognition continued to characterize the agreements signed between the two sides. The Declaration of Principles in September 1993, the Gaza-Jericho agreement of early May 1994, and the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo II) in September 1995 all maintain the unequal relationship. All maintain the distinction between the Palestinian people and their rights. And despite the reference in the agreements to the ‘Palestinian people,’ in fact all are addressed to only one segment of the Palestinians – the residents of the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>133</sup>

The recognitions contained in the Arafat and Rabin letters, the DOPOISGA and the subsequent agreements did not establish the parties as sharing the same status, nor the same attributes, namely rights. The recognitions were not mutual.

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<sup>130</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 128.

<sup>131</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 129.

<sup>132</sup> Amal Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): p. 43.

<sup>133</sup> Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” p. 43.

The closing sentence of the preceding Jamal quote brings me to my third point. The Oslo Agreements perpetuated the Zionist practice of recognizing Palestinians in highly rarefied forms. The Palestinian people referred to in both Rabin's letter and the DOPOISGA are only those Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As Bishara notes, "it [the DOPOISGA] refers exclusively to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza."<sup>134</sup> The Palestinian diaspora living in Lebanon or Jordan for example, are not part of the "Palestinian people" as defined by the Oslo Process. They are the ambiguously defined "refugees", not represented by the PLO and to be dealt with as a final status issue. Jamal makes the same point, though more expansively, when he explains that

Israeli proposals for local autonomy assume the Palestinians of the occupied territories to be entirely disconnected from the Palestinian problem as a whole ... this ahistorical approach is reflected in the Oslo agreement itself, which splits the Palestinians into groups to be dealt with in separate frameworks.<sup>135</sup>

To divide Palestinians into groups, and to identify a geographically located minority of the overall whole as the "Palestinian people" (who are political, though not national, rights bearers), is to recognize Palestinians in highly rarefied forms.

The Oslo Process institutionalized the persistent Zionist practice of denying Palestinians nationhood and national rights. Moreover, the process

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<sup>134</sup> Usher, Graham. "Bantustanisation or Binationalism? An Interview with Azmi Bishara." in *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process*. (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p. 61.

<sup>135</sup> Jamal, "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," p.40.

institutionalized the Zionist practice of recognizing Palestinians in highly rarefied forms. Jamal explains that Israel's

recognition of the Palestinians was not a matter of principle, but merely tactical. Israel was prepared to make an agreement with the PLO not as the representative of a people with legitimate rights with whom reconciliation was sought, but as the political instrument capable of exercising on its behalf a security role among the Palestinians and contributing to Israel's security.<sup>136</sup>

A similar assessment is shared by Usher and Khalidi. According to Usher, by April 1993 (after more than five years of *intifada*) Israel was "scared not just *in* the occupied territories but *of* them."<sup>137</sup> Khalidi acknowledges that "[i]n dealing directly with the PLO, the Israelis were undoubtedly doing the Palestinians a favor."<sup>138</sup> He continues to explain however, that "they [the Israelis] had already decided that in security terms they would be doing themselves an even bigger favor."<sup>139</sup> The Israeli recognition was strategic and as such it required, on the part of the Israelis, nothing more than recognition of a highly rarefied Palestinian; one that could be policed by its own representative, the PLO, in the interests of Israeli security.

Finally, the Oslo Process also institutionalized the persistent Zionist practice of deeming Palestinians politically irrelevant to the final dispensation of

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<sup>136</sup> Jamal, "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," p.45.

<sup>137</sup> Graham Usher, "Why Gaza Says Yes, Mostly," in *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Process* ed. Graham Usher, pp.12-13.

<sup>138</sup> Rashid Khalidi, "A Palestinian View of the Accord With Israel," *Current History* 93, no. 580 (1994): p. 63.

<sup>139</sup> Khalidi, "A Palestinian View of the Accord With Israel," p. 63.



mandate Palestine. Pappé is of the mind that the “Oslo agreement is a wholly Israeli formula” and that the Oslo Process is “an Israeli peace.”<sup>140</sup> Consequently:

[n]o refugee can return without Israel’s approval; no settlement can be dismantled without Israel’s say so; no land can be returned to the Palestinians without Israeli consent. *The peace process should be understood more as an internal Israeli debate about how much to concede of all that it controls, rather than as negotiations between Israel and Palestine.*<sup>141</sup>

As an internal Israeli debate the Oslo Process rendered the Palestinians irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine. Israelis would determine through negotiations with themselves how many refugees would be permitted repatriation; how many and the location of settlements to be dismantled; and how much and what land from which to withdraw or redeploy. The Oslo Process institutionalized the persistent Zionist practice of not consulting Palestinians regarding the final dispensation of mandate Palestine.

### *Rule Governed Knowledge Production*

In the post-1993 period the production of truthful knowledge continued to be governed by the analytic silencing Israel’s denial of Palestinian nationhood and Palestinian national rights. Paradoxically, authors such as Shlaim identify the historical denial of Palestinians, yet in doing so go on to perpetuate the discursive silence regarding this denial. Shlaim acknowledged Israel’s rejection of

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<sup>140</sup> Usher, “An Israeli Peace: an Interview with Ilan Pappé” in *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process* ed. Graham Usher, p.35.

<sup>141</sup> Glenn E. Robinson, “Israel and the Palestinians: The Bitter Fruits of Hegemonic Peace,” *Current History* 100, no. 642 (2001): pp.17-18. My emphasis added.

Palestinian national rights, but also tells the reader that that policy has been abandoned with Israel's 1993 recognition of a Palestinian people with political rights. In so doing, Shlaim reproduces the third systematic silence by not speaking of Israel's ongoing denial of Palestinian nationhood and their national rights; he speaks of those rights Israel has acknowledged, not those rights Israel continues to deny.

Shlaim is not alone in his perpetuation of the discursive silence regarding Zionism's denial of Palestinian nationhood. In the post-1993 period truthful knowledge has continued to be produced in accordance with the analytic which requires silence regarding Zionism's denial of Palestinian nationhood and Palestinian national rights. This truthful knowledge is articulated in two ways. First, those authors who write according to the first discursive rule of formation reproduce this discursive silence. Phrased differently, those authors who represent Arabs and Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists are silent on Zionism's denial of Palestinian nationhood. Second, authors continue to deny Palestinian nationhood outright. Dershowitz's *The Case for Israel*<sup>142</sup> is an example of this type of contemporary effacement.

Rubin's 1996 "The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over" in *Middle East Quarterly* is an example of concomitant subscription to both the first discursive rule of formation and the third systematic silence. He makes three particularly notable statements: 1) "the current solution pursued in the peace process negotiations – the existence of both an Israeli Jewish and a Palestinian Arab state

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<sup>142</sup> Alan M Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

– was the United Nations’s original proposal for 1948; and this solution was accepted by Israel in 1947 but rejected by the Arab side;”<sup>143</sup> 2) “[b]y 1948, the Palestinians could have obtained one-half of what they might have received in 1939, and by 1957, 1979, or 1993, their opportunities had been halved again;”<sup>144</sup> and 3) “Israel was always ready for peace with the Arab states, from its endorsement of the 1948 partition plan to the secret post-1967 war initiative offering to trade captured land for peace.”<sup>145</sup> Each statement reproduces the discursive silence regarding Zionist effacement of Palestinians.

The first and second statements are silent on Zionist collusion with Abdallah of Jordan in the realization of his Greater Syria Scheme. More specifically, the statements are silent on Zionist policies which ignored Palestinians *in situ* in Palestine and instead dealt with Abdallah as well as Zionist policies of politicide, which as the reader will recall, sought to “liquidate any Palestinian leadership striving for an independent state.”<sup>146</sup> Rubin makes no mention of the fact that Zionism denied the existence of a Palestinian nation in Palestine, that Zionism maneuvered politically around this denied nation and that Zionism sought to eliminate politically that which it denied.

In the second statement Rubin suggests that the Palestinians would have received a state in 1948. This is historical revisionism. It revises the fact that Palestinians did not exist in Zionist thought in 1948. It also revises the fact that

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<sup>143</sup> Barry Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” *Middle East Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (1996): pp. 3-4.

<sup>144</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over,” p. 6.

<sup>145</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over,” p. 8.

<sup>146</sup> Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p. 150.

the Jewish Agency had already partitioned Palestine with Abdallah. A nation that did not exist could not be a partner to partition. In both statements, Rubin is silent on the fact that the Jewish Agency did not consult with Palestinians regarding the final dispensation of mandate Palestine; that the Jewish Agency denied Palestinians as political interlocutors and deemed them politically irrelevant. In fact, in both instances Rubin is completely silent on Zionism's ideational and the Jewish Agency's practical denial of Palestinians.

The third statement also reproduces this discursive silence, albeit in a more straightforward manner. Obviously, Rubin mobilizes the idea that Israel is conciliatory and the Arabs and Palestinians rejectionists. I will leave this aside for the moment and focus instead on the author's reference to "Arab states". Now admittedly, provided certain criteria were met, Israel was ready for peace with the Arab states. Of course, in 1948 the Jewish Agency had arranged to partition Palestine with an Arab state – Jordan – and the post-1967 land-for-peace initiatives were to involve Jordan and Egypt, again Arab states. Both cases make my point that Zionism, as realized through the Jewish Agency, refused to acknowledge Palestinians as politically relevant actors. Rubin's statement is correct as far as it goes. Where it does not go is to acknowledge that the Jewish Agency and later Israel's "willingness" to make peace with Arab states was a concomitant denial and bypassing of the stateless Palestinians. Rubin's third statement is a clear post-1993 articulation of this third discursive analytic – it is a silence regarding Israel's denial of Palestinians and/or acknowledgement of Palestinians in highly rarefied forms (re: as politically irrelevant).

In the pre-1993 section I identified Joan Peters' *From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over Palestine* as the prime textual example of Palestinian effacement. In the post-1993 period, this dubious honor belongs to Dershowitz's *The Case for Israel*. In his text, Dershowitz interestingly cautions his readers that it "is always important to check the sources cited by Chomsky, especially when he is discussing Israel."<sup>147</sup> The reason this warning is interesting, and the reason that I recalled the Peters text, is that when one checks Dershowitz's sources one finds that he repeatedly cites Peters' work.<sup>148</sup>

Dershowitz's first citation of Peters follows the statement: "[a]ccording to some disputed accounts – which I do not rely on for my argument – even as early as the mid-1890s, there may have been a plurality of Jews in parts of Palestine that became the heartland of the Jewish area under the U.N. partition."<sup>149</sup> The citation reads as follows:

The research of a French geographer, Vital Cuinct are relied on for this conclusion. See Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial* (Chicago: JKAP Publications, 1984). Peters's conclusions and data have been challenged. See Said and Hitchens, p. 33 [*Blaming the Victims* (London, Verso, 2001)]. I do not in any way rely on them in this book.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 84.

<sup>148</sup> While I focus on Dershowitz's citing of Peters, I will draw attention to two others references made by the author. First, Dershowitz cites Oren's *Six Days of War*, the same text cited by Ross and critiqued by Finkelstein for its silences and omissions, a full dozen times. Second, Dershowitz, in the Palestinian effacing tradition of Shamir, also quotes from Mark Twain's 1867 visit to Palestine. Recall that Shamir quoted Twain regarding the desolate and undesirable nature of Palestine at the opening of the Madrid Conference in 1991.

<sup>149</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p.27.

<sup>150</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 247.

The textual reference to disputed accounts on which Dershowitz does not rely for his argument is unclear. The statement could be read to mean that Dershowitz is acknowledging that Peters' argument and findings have been dismissed, and consequently he does not rely on her text. It could also be read to mean that the work of Said and Hitchens is contested, and consequently he does not rely their text. Given that the citation that follows the statement is specific in its rejection of the scholarship of Said and Hitchens, and that Dershowitz cites Peters repeatedly in subsequent chapters, it seems evident that Dershowitz's (intentionally) opaque statement indicates that he is not acknowledging the fact that Peters' argument and findings have been dismissed. But rather that he is authorizing his work through reference to hers; that his argument does, in fact, rely on hers. This reading seems to be borne out by the fact that Dershowitz uses the exceedingly generous verb "challenged" to describe critiques of Peters' text. Recall here that Finkelstein called *From Time Immemorial* a "carefully contrived, premeditated hoax"<sup>151</sup> and "spectacular fraud."<sup>152</sup> Recall further that this assessment was shared by Said, Hourani and Cockburn.

Dershowitz himself provides further textual evidence that he does, in fact, rely on Peters' text to make his argument. The following four quotations from *The Case for Israel* are all sourced to Peters' text (the first is attributed to the former prime minister of Syria, the second to a report from the Institute for Palestine Studies, the third to the former foreign minister of Egypt and the fourth to a

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<sup>151</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 39.

<sup>152</sup> Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed., p. 22.

former Israeli lawyer who became a member of the Palestinian National Council):

1)

Since 1948 it is we who demanded the return of the refugees ... while it is we who made them leave. ... We brought disaster upon ... Arab refugees, by inviting them and bringing pressure to bear upon them to leave. ... We have rendered them dispossessed. ... We have accustomed them to begging. ... We have participated in lowering their moral and social level. ... Then we exploited them in executing crimes of murder, arson, and throwing bombs upon ... men, women and children – all this in the service of political purposes;<sup>153</sup>

2) 68% of refugees “left without seeing an Israeli soldier;”<sup>154</sup> 3) “it is well known and understood that the Arabs, in demanding the return of the refugees to Palestine, mean their return as masters of their homeland, and not as slaves. More explicitly, they intend to annihilate the state of Israel;”<sup>155</sup> and 4) “[W]hat happened was a ... population and property exchange, and each party must bear the consequences. ... [T]he Arab states ... must settle the Palestinians in their own midst and solve their problems.”<sup>156</sup> By reproducing Peters, Dershowitz reproduces Peters’ denial of Palestinian nationhood and Palestinian attachment to the land of Palestine

The first and third quotations reduce Palestinians to instruments or objects. The emphasis is on Palestinians as implements intended to realize political ends, *not* as people refugeeed from their homes, families and communities. The second and fourth quotations suggest that Palestinians have no real or intimate attachment

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<sup>153</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 84.

<sup>154</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 84.

<sup>155</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 85.

<sup>156</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 89.

to Palestine. If they were truly attached to the land they would not have left for no good reason, as the second quotation suggests, or they would not be represented, by an Arab, as burdensome merchandise in some reciprocal transaction, as they are in the case of the fourth quotation.

The quotations Dershowitz appropriated from Peters convey the idea that Palestinians were not attached to the land of Palestine. Save for the briefest mention of the refugees' dispossession and moral and social degeneration in the first quotation (of course, after this mention the refugees are reconstituted as murders), Dershowitz offers not even a hint of the fact that there was a society and polity connected to the land of Palestine and that this society and polity was destroyed when it was severed from the land by the creation of the state of Israel. Dershowitz refuses to acknowledge that Palestinian refugees are victims, and that they are victims because the land to which they were connected, with which they identified, in which they invested, was taken from them. Dershowitz is silent on this connection, this identification, this investment.

Furthermore, Dershowitz's denial of Palestinian attachment to the land of Palestine is conducted, chiefly, within the context of his denial of Palestinian nationhood. Dershowitz cites Peters almost exclusively in chapter 12 (his first Peters citation is in chapter 2, all subsequent citations appear in chapter 12). The title of this chapter is "Did Israel Create the Arab Refugee Problem?" It is immediately evident through the title that Dershowitz denies the existence of a separate Palestinian nation. This denial, in fact, characterizes the entire chapter. Various Dershowitz states that: "[w]hile the Arab armies tried to kill Jewish



civilians and did in fact massacre many who tried to escape, the Israeli army allowed *Arab civilians* to flee to Arab-controlled areas;<sup>157</sup> “Israel ... was prepared to extend full citizenship to whatever number of *Arabs* remained in the Jewish state;”<sup>158</sup> “Jaffa remained an *Arab city* [in Israel], and today its population includes thousands of *Arabs*. Haifa remained a mixed city [in Israel], whose current population includes thousands of *Arabs*. Some other towns and villages from which *Arabs* fled remain mixed today, while some have not seen a return of *Arab populations*;<sup>159</sup> “the last thing many *Arabs* wanted was to remain as minority citizens of the Jewish state of Israel in the villages and homes they had left;”<sup>160</sup> “472,000 to 750,000 *Arabs* became refugees from Israel;”<sup>161</sup> and “the *Arabs* deliberately encouraged *Arab refugees* to fester by keeping so many of them in camps, where many still remain, and refusing to integrate them into their more homogenous populations.”<sup>162</sup> Throughout the chapter Dershowitz denies a distinct Palestinian nation by subsuming its identity under the rubric of a larger Arab nation.

Dershowitz’s denial is made even more striking by the fact that his one reference to Palestinian refugees in the chapter is not even his own. Says Dershowitz: “[t]here are those who argue that the *Palestinian* refugees were different from the Jewish refugees in another respect: while the *Palestinians* were forced to flee from their homes, the Jews chose to leave their ancient

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<sup>157</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p.79. My emphasis added.

<sup>158</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 81. My emphasis added.

<sup>159</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 83. My emphasis added.

<sup>160</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 85. My emphasis added.

<sup>161</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 87. My emphasis added.

<sup>162</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 88. My emphasis added.

homelands.”<sup>163</sup> The one instance in the chapter where the refugees are identified as Palestinians is Dershowitz citing the arguments of others; others speak of Palestinians, Dershowitz does not.

I concluded my pre-1993 discussion of the discursive silence surrounding Zionism’s denial of Palestinian nationhood and Palestinian attachment to the land of Palestine with reference to Said’s *The Question of Palestine*. I described this text as a testament to this third discursive silence. James O. C. Jonah’s “The Middle East Conflict: The Palestinian Dimension”<sup>164</sup> is a similar testament in the post-1993 period.

Jonah’s is an abbreviated and incomplete historical overview of Middle East relations from the mandatory period through to the drafting of the Quartet’s Roadmap. The opening paragraph states that:

A significant flaw in the search for peace in the Middle East over the years has been the calculated avoidance of the centrality of the Palestinian dimension of the conflict. Only now are efforts being made to tackle the problem. But the recognition of the intractable nature of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship still offers the temptation to pursue other avenues of resolving the conflict. This kind of diplomatic approach to the conflict is both dangerous and futile. There can be no durable peace and stability in the Middle East until a just solution to the Palestinian plight is found.<sup>165</sup>

Through the course of his text Jonah recognizes that Israel played a part in the “calculated avoidance” of the “Palestinian dimension”. He acknowledges that

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<sup>163</sup> Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, p. 88. My emphasis added.

<sup>164</sup> James O. C. Jonah, “The Middle East Conflict: The Palestinian Dimension,” *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 8, no. 4 (2002): pp. 413–419.

<sup>165</sup> Jonah, “The Middle East Conflict: The Palestinian Dimension,” p. 413.

Israel has denied Palestinians relevance to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine. Further, he violates the discursive analytic that silences this denial. Jonah identifies this practice, violates the discursive analytic and warns against a return to this practice.

In the pre-1993 period Said evidenced this third systematic silence through his attempt to write Palestinians into history. In the post-1993 period, or more accurately after Sharon had declared Arafat “irrelevant” to negotiations in 2001 and had reoccupied all of the West Bank in early 2002 through Operation Defensive Shield, Jonah is reminding his readers that Palestinians should not be excluded from future history. It is telling that Jonah’s text reminding readers that Palestinians are central to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was published in 2002. It is further evidence that even after the start of the Oslo Process Palestinians continued to be denied relevance to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine.

### *Persistence of Practice*

As the discursive silence regarding Zionism’s denial of Palestinian nationhood and the relevance of the Palestinians to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine has persisted through the Oslo Process and the contemporary period, so too has Israel’s practice of recognizing Palestinians in highly rarefied forms (i.e. as politically irrelevant). The persistence of this practice is most evident in two instances: 1) U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s “Letter

of Assurance”<sup>166</sup> and the “Note for the Record”<sup>167</sup> appended to the Hebron Protocol and 2) the 1997 Labor and Likud members’ “National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians”, also known as the Beilin-Eitan Agreement.<sup>168</sup>

The Hebron Protocol was concluded in January of 1997. The Hebron Protocol is not so much a new agreement as steps to implement an annex of the Interim Agreement involving Israeli redeployment from the West Bank town of Hebron.<sup>169</sup> Appended to the protocol was a “Letter of Assurance” from U.S. Secretary of State Christopher to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and a “Note for the Record”. Christopher’s letter, requested by Netanyahu, explains to the prime minister that “I [Christopher] have advised Chairman Arafat of U.S. views on Israel’s process of redeploying its forces, designating specified military locations and transferring additional power and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority.”<sup>170</sup> According to Andoni, Christopher’s letter “offers full endorsement of Israel’s interpretation that it alone decides the scope and extent of its redeployments.”<sup>171</sup> This is because the letter identifies exclusively as Israel’s

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<sup>166</sup> “Doc. D U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, U.S. Letter of Assurance to Israel,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p. 139.

<sup>167</sup> “Doc. C Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, Note for the Record,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): pp.138-139.

<sup>168</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians’,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): pp.160-161.

<sup>169</sup> Andoni, “Redefining Oslo: Negotiating the Hebron Protocol,” p.18.

<sup>170</sup> “Doc. D U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, U.S. Letter of Assurance to Israel,” p.139.

<sup>171</sup> Andoni, “Redefining Oslo: Negotiating the Hebron Protocol,” p.25.

process that of redeploying forces. This is not a process in which Palestinians are involved nor one that is negotiated. This is Israel's process alone.

This exclusivist reading of the Warren letter, that Palestinians will have no part to play in determining the scope and timing of Israeli redeployments, is reinforced by Ross' "Note for the Record".<sup>172</sup> This document groups issues under four headings: 1) Mutual Understandings, 2) Israeli Responsibilities, 3) Palestinian Responsibilities and 4) Other Issues. The issue of further Israeli redeployments is located under the second heading. More importantly, further redeployments is listed under the subheading entitled "Issues for Implementation". It is not listed under "Issues for Negotiation".<sup>173</sup> According to the "Note for the Record" Israeli redeployments are under the exclusive purview of Israel, they are not an issue to be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority.

Statements by U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns and U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross confirm the veracity of the exclusivist reading of the "Letter of Assurance" and the "Note for the Record". Said Burns on 15 January 1997: "[t]he Note for the Record, prepared by the United States at the request of the parties, makes clear that further redeployment phases are issues for implementation by Israel rather than issues for negotiation with the Palestinians."<sup>174</sup> He continued: "[t]he letters of assurance which

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<sup>172</sup> "Doc. C Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, Note for the Record," pp.138-139.

<sup>173</sup> see Andoni, "Redefining Oslo: Negotiating the Hebron Protocol," p.25.

<sup>174</sup> "Doc. H U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Statement on Further Redeployments," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p.141.

Secretary Christopher intends to provide to both parties also refer to the process of further redeployments as an Israeli responsibility.”<sup>175</sup> In his on-the-record briefing two days later Ross first offered an explanation of the Interim Agreement which the Hebron Protocol was to implement. “The issue of further redeployment under the terms of the Interim Agreement, is an Israeli responsibility.”<sup>176</sup> After confirming the Israeli interpretation of Oslo II, as noted by Andoni, Ross then explained that this policy was perpetuated through the Hebron Protocol. “You’ve got to look at this [the negotiations culminating in the Hebron Protocol] in terms of further redeployment and also at the issue of borders. Borders are something to be negotiated.”<sup>177</sup> Obvious in its absence is the non-statement that redeployments are not to be negotiated.<sup>178</sup>

It is abundantly clear from the letter and note appended to the Hebron Protocol that during the Oslo Process the contours of the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be determined unilaterally by Israel. These two documents dismiss Palestinians as interlocutors to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine. Israel’s two primary political parties extended this dismissal by developing the “National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations

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<sup>175</sup> “Doc. H U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Statement on Further Redeployments,” p.141.

<sup>176</sup> “Doc. J U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, On-The-Record Briefing on the Hebron Agreements,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p.144.

<sup>177</sup> “Doc. H U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Statement on Further Redeployments,” p.145.

<sup>178</sup> Ross is disingenuous in his statement. Of course, unilateral Israeli redeployments, as interim steps, would affect the final status negotiations of the Oslo Process. This was made evident at the Camp David negotiations – Israel demanded that the Palestinian National Authority cede to Israel those spaces of the West Bank where Israel’s military was still *in situ*.

on the Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians” in late January 1997. Phrased differently, the Beilin-Eitan Agreement perpetuated the Zionist practice of recognizing Palestinians in highly rarefied forms, as a people not worthy of consultation regarding the final dispensation of mandate Palestine.

The National Agreement was a statement of understandings shared by members of the Labor and Likud parties in the Knesset; a compact between Israel’s “hawks” and the “doves”. The lead negotiators for the document were Yossi Beilin, former Israeli foreign minister under Rabin and Peres, and Michael Eitan, leader of the Likud bloc in the Knesset. Signatories to the agreement included Laborites Haim Ramon and Sholomo Ben-Ami and Likudniks Eliezer Zandberg, Zeev Boim, Yehuda Lankri and Meir Sheetrit.

According to the agreement three principles were to guide negotiations with the Palestinians:

1. ... it is necessary to permit the establishment of a Palestinian entity whose status will be determined in the negotiations between the parties and the limits on the sovereignty of which will be discussed in the following sections.
2. ... the State of Israel must preserve its ability to prevent every attack or risk of an attack on its territorial integrity, the safety of its citizens and their property and in its vital interests in Israel and in the world.
3. No agreement signed by the Israeli government can include a commitment to uproot Jewish settlements in the Western Land of Israel, nor will any agreement compromise the rights of the residents to keep their Israeli citizenship and their ties as individuals and as a community with the State of Israel.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians’,” p. 161.

On the issue of borders the agreement declares that “[t]here will be no return to the 1967 borders”<sup>180</sup> and that

[t]he residents of the Israeli settlements that will exist outside of the area that will be annexed by the State of Israel will receive special, agreed upon arrangements within the framework of which their Israeli citizenship and their ties with the State of Israel, as individuals and as a community, will be preserved. Thus their right of free and safe passage to the territories under full Israeli sovereignty will be preserved.<sup>181</sup>

On the issue of refugees the agreement states that “[t]he right of the State of Israel to prevent the entry of Palestinian refugees into its sovereign territory will be recognized.”<sup>182</sup> Interestingly, the agreement also states that what is open to negotiation is the number of refugees that will be permitted to return to the Palestinian entity. The number of refugees to be repatriated will be discussed in the context of Israeli security concerns and cannot be unilaterally determined by the Palestinians.<sup>183</sup> Finally, the agreement states imperiously that “[i]f the Palestinian entity subjects itself to the limits presented in this document, its self-determination will be recognized.”<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,’” p. 161.

<sup>181</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,’” p. 161.

<sup>182</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,’” p. 162.

<sup>183</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,’” p. 162.

<sup>184</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,’” p. 161.



Jamal assesses the agreement on three points. First, the agreement demonstrates the “comprehensiveness of the Israeli national narrative.”<sup>185</sup> This is a compact between Israel’s two main political parties; this is not a statement from a marginal or fringe group. Second, the “agreement disregards the connection of another people to the same land; its starting point is the Zionist narrative and the Jewish link to the land.”<sup>186</sup> The agreement is yet another articulation of the Zionist idea/practice of denying Palestinians an attachment to the land of Palestine. Third, in the agreement “[t]here is no question of a negotiating partnership: It is Israel that will determine the borders and dictate the nature of the final agreement.”<sup>187</sup> Israel dictates the parameters of agreement as, *inter alia*, no return to the borders of 1967 and no refugee repatriation to what became Israel, and only once these parameters have been accepted will Israel consider a Palestinian entity. The agreement reduces immeasurably the scope of negotiation and thereby perpetuates the Zionist practice of denying Palestinians as worthy interlocutors in the dispensation of mandate Palestine.

The systematic silence regarding Zionism’s denial of Palestinian nationhood and recognition of Palestinians in highly rarefied forms has continued through the post-1993 period. This discursive analytic did not change with the start of the Oslo Process. In fact, the DOPOISGA institutionalized this denial and highly rarefied recognition. The silence has been perpetuated by authors such as

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<sup>185</sup> Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” p.47.

<sup>186</sup> Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” p. 47.

<sup>187</sup> Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” p. 47.

Shlaim, Rubin and, most egregiously, Dershowitz. Moreover, the “Letter of Assurance” and “Note for the Record” appended to the Hebron Protocol and the Beilin-Eitan Agreement evidence Israel’s perpetuation of this Zionist practice.

### *Conclusion*

I examined the three discursive silences governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in this chapter. More specifically, I studied silences regarding the Zionist ideas and practices of transfer, territorial maximization and denial of Palestinian nationhood and the right of this nation to self-determination. In chapter three I examined these discursive analytics in the pre-1993 period. Here, I studied them in the post-1993 period.

I also began to substantiate my thesis. I demonstrated that these silences have persisted into the present. Furthermore, I demonstrated that these analytics were institutionalized in the Oslo Process. I also showed that these Zionist ideas and practices persist into the present.

In the next chapter I examine the rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. This study further substantiates my claim that the analytics governing the discourse persist into the present period.

## **Chapter Six – Post-1993 Rules of Formation Governing the Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations**

My thesis is that persistence of the analytics governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians, institutionalized in the Oslo Process, (re-)produced the conditions for violence between Palestinians and Israel. In the previous chapter I began substantiating my claim that the analytics governing the discourse as well as Israeli practices associated with these rules persist into the present period. In this chapter I further substantiate this claim.

I identified three rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period in chapter four. These three rules are: 1) representing Israel as conciliatory and Arabs generally and Palestinians specifically as intransigent rejectionists; 2) positing as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship or representing Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; and 3) assuming that Israel would or will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Recall that in the case of the second rule Palestinians are not represented as victims of the conflict. In this chapter I study the same rules of formation in the post-1993 period. More specifically, I explain the rule's institutionalization in the Oslo Process, evidence the manner in which it continues to govern the production of truthful knowledge and demonstrate that the Zionist ideas and practices related to the rule persist into the present. In the case of the third rule, I demonstrate that

there is no grounding to assume that Zionism would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

*Rule 1 – Arabs/Palestinians as Rejectionists, Israel as Conciliatory*

*Institutionalization of Discursive Rule*

The first rule of formation is to represent Israel as conciliatory and Arabs generally and Palestinians specifically as intransigent rejectionists. Moreover, as Said explained in a previously cited statement, discursively Israel is represented as “a nation in search of peace while the Arabs are [represented as] warlike, bloodthirsty, bent on extermination, and prey to irrational violence.”<sup>1</sup> This discursive rule was institutionalized by the Oslo Agreements, most specifically in the form of the Palestinian police/security forces.

The Palestinian police force was constituted by the DOPOISGA and reaffirmed in subsequent agreements. Article VIII of the DOPOISGA states that:

[i]n order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Edward W Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p. xiv.

<sup>2</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), p. 119.

In fact, the establishment of a strong police force is “one of the few unequivocal powers the PA is granted in the original Oslo agreement.”<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the Oslo II agreement twice instructs the Palestinian National Authority to establish a strong police force. Article XII, section 1 reads: “[i]n order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force.”<sup>4</sup> Article XIV, section 1 states that: “[t]he Council shall establish a strong police force.”<sup>5</sup> Again this agreement too states explicitly that this police force has jurisdiction over *only* Palestinians. In the context of redeployment the agreement explains that “[i]n Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians”<sup>6</sup> and that “[t]he Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.”<sup>7</sup>

Dajani connects these instructions to Arafat’s 9 September 1993 letter to Rabin. Asserts Dajani, “the prominence given in the letter to the recognition of

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<sup>3</sup> Graham Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 2 (1996): p.22.

<sup>4</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

Israel's 'right to exist in peace and security' implies that the Palestinians have a special obligation in relation to this right and that Israel has the right to remedy any situation it deems threatening to it."<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, "it implies an undertaking by the PLO to take certain actions in the event of any transgression against the peace. It is clear from the wording of this recognition that the Palestinian police force stipulated in the DOP is to protect Israel's security."<sup>9</sup> In other words, the Palestinian police force is the guarantor of Israeli security; a guarantor of security for Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and also in pre-1967 Israel.

Dajani's assessment is shared by Jamal and Said. Jamal explains that the Oslo Agreements constituted Palestinians as "'good' and 'bad' Palestinians according to whether they accepted or rejected the agreement[s]."<sup>10</sup> Those who opposed the Oslo Process were identified as terrorists and "enemies of peace." The "good" Palestinians were enlisted in Israel's struggle against the "bad" Palestinians.<sup>11</sup> Phrased differently, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people because the organization could be used "as the political instrument capable of exercising on its [Israel's] behalf a security role among the Palestinians and contributing to Israel's security."<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Said variously states that the Palestinian National Authority is "an instrument to maintain the

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<sup>8</sup> Burhan Dajani, "The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): p.6.

<sup>9</sup> Dajani, "The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis," pp. 6-7.

<sup>10</sup> Amal Jamal, "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): p.45.

<sup>11</sup> Jamal, "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," p.45.

<sup>12</sup> Jamal, "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," p.45.

occupation and assure Israel's security"<sup>13</sup> and that "he [Arafat] delivers security to Israel by punishing his own people."<sup>14</sup>

Now, the establishment of a Palestinian police force in itself does not evidence the fact that this force was constituted as a guarantor of Israeli security. Presumably, the force was constituted to fill the void left by the Israeli redeployments. This presumption is belied however by Rabin's own admission and Israeli state policy. In response to a question in cabinet in September 1994 Rabin stated that PA security services operated "with Israel's knowledge, and in cooperation with Israel's security forces *to safeguard Israel's security interests*."<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, Israel coordinated monitoring and surveillance activities with the Palestinian security forces and knowingly permitted the PA to exceed the security personnel numbers written into the Oslo Agreements.<sup>16</sup> According to Usher this is because "a strong and massive Palestinian intelligence force is an indispensable condition for the Oslo-inspired peace process. It is not so much *tolerated* by Israel as Israel's precondition for Palestinian movement toward

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<sup>13</sup> Abdullah al-Sinnawi, "Interview with Edward Said," in *Peace and Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* ed. Edward W. Said (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 172.

<sup>14</sup> Edward W. Said, "Are There No Limits to Corruption?," in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward Said (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), p. 180.

<sup>15</sup> Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security", p. 27. My emphasis added. Also according to Rabin: "[t]he Palestinians will be better at it [policing Palestinians to realize Israeli security interests] than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the Israeli Association of Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by their own methods, freeing, and this is most important, the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do." Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security," p. 28.

<sup>16</sup> Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security", p. 22.

‘self-rule’.”<sup>17</sup> A Palestinian guarantor of Israeli security was an Israeli precondition for the initiation of the Oslo Process.

The establishment of the Palestinian guarantor of Israeli security is a clear indication that the Oslo Process institutionalized representations of Israel as conciliatory and Palestinians as violent and intransigent rejectionists. Israel requires just such a guarantor because even while it, as is its nature, is taking chances trying to make peace, it is assailed by Palestinians, some of whom by their nature are violent, who will reject these overtures. This guarantor, in turn, is in place to realize Arafat’s guarantee that his authority will “discipline violators.”<sup>18</sup> Of course, the only guarantees are offered by Arafat – Israel made no guarantee to end the structural violence of the occupation for example – and the only potential violators are Palestinians – Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not referenced as potential violators of the Oslo Agreements. The unidirectional offering of guarantees and exclusivity of violators is obvious – discursively Israel is conciliatory and so desirous of peace that its violence is only ever retaliatory and Israelis would not endanger the agreement through recourse to violence.

### *Rule Governed Knowledge Production*

The discursive rule by which Arabs/Palestinians are represented as intransigent and rejectionist and Israel as conciliatory continues to govern the

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<sup>17</sup> Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security”, p. 28. Emphasis in original.

<sup>18</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 128.



production of truthful knowledge about Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period. Speaking truthfully as Shamir did at the start of the Madrid Conference in 1991, Rabin represented Israel as conciliatory in his 13 September 1993 speech at the start of the Oslo Process. Said Rabin:

This signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principle[s] here today, it's not so easy – neither for myself, as a soldier in Israel's war, nor for the people of Israel, not to the Jewish people in the diaspora, who are watching us now with great hope mixed with apprehension. It is certainly not easy for the families of the victims of the wars, violence, terror whose pain will never heal, for the many thousands who defended our lives with their own, and have even sacrificed their lives for our own.<sup>19</sup>

Rabin also represented Israel as magnanimous saying that "... we who have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you in a loud and a clear voice, enough of blood and tears. Enough."<sup>20</sup> And that "[w]e have no desire for revenge. We harbor no hatred towards you. We, like you, are people. People who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, live side by side with you in dignity, in empathy, as human beings, as free men, we are today giving peace a chance and saying to you ... and saying again to you: Enough."<sup>21</sup> Rabin's message is clear. First, Israel was flexible and willing to make sacrifices in the pursuit of peace. Second, Israelis needed to be humanized to an uncompromising Palestinian audience bent on their animalistic destruction. Third, Israel was so desirous of peace that it was willing to forgo revenge.

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<sup>19</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., pp. 136-137.

<sup>20</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 137.

<sup>21</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 137.

Rabin's statement is an obvious example of speaking truthfully according to this first discursive rule. Equally obvious subscriptions to this analytic dominate the post-1993 literature on Palestinian-Israeli relations. In fact, this rule may be the most influential, almost determinant, analytic structuring the discourse. Articulations in accordance with this rule are made by Bar-Ilan,<sup>22</sup> Feith,<sup>23</sup> Smootha,<sup>24</sup> Sternhell,<sup>25</sup> Lewis,<sup>26</sup> Little,<sup>27</sup> Rubin<sup>28</sup> and Ross<sup>29</sup>.

A scant two months after the signing of the DOPOISGA Bar-Ilan was already prophesizing on the implications for Israel of a Palestinian state.<sup>30</sup> He offered the following as a realistic scenario:

At some point, radical elements in Jordan, encouraged and incited by their newly independent neighbors [the Palestinians], will overthrow the Hashemite monarchy and extend the Palestinian state from the Iraqi border to the

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<sup>22</sup> David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat," *Commentary* 96, no. 5 (1993): pp. 27-31.

<sup>23</sup> Douglas J. Feith, "Land for No Peace," *Commentary* 97, no. 6 (1994): pp.32-36.

<sup>24</sup> Sammy Smootha, "The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555, no. Israel in Transition (1998): pp. 26-45.

<sup>25</sup> Zeev Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).

<sup>26</sup> Anthony Lewis, "Introduction," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin (New York: The New Press, 2002), pp. 1-9.

<sup>27</sup> Douglas Little, *American Orientalism : the United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

<sup>28</sup> Barry Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over," *Middle East Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (1996): p. 3- 12.; Barry Rubin, "From War to Peace" in *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993* eds. Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma'oz (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 3-9.; Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<sup>29</sup> Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace : the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004).

<sup>30</sup> I will return to Bar-Ilan's subscription to the third rule of formation.

outskirts of Tel Aviv. ... Dwarfed Israel, back to its 'natural size,' as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt likes to refer to the Jewish state within the 1949 armistice lines, will become an irresistible temptation again, just as it was in 1967. Except that today's Arab armies are far more efficient and sophisticated, and they do not have a friendly-to-Israel, Shah-dominated Iran threatening their backs. Just the opposite: the ayatollahs will support any move they make, as long as it is against Israel.<sup>31</sup>

Clearly, Bar-Ilan represents Israel as assailed by Arabs rejectionists. First, the Arab states and Iran reject Israel because it is Israel and not because of its practices and policies in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and south Lebanon – of which nothing is said in the entire text. It cannot be otherwise or the establishment of the Palestinian state would assuage their rejectionism as the conflict will have been resolved. For Bar-Ilan, Arab opposition to Israel is congenital rather than political. Second, Arab irrationality explains past and future Arab violence, and for Bar-Ilan it is *Arab* violence. Arab violence results because Arabs are a congenitally covetousness people prey to irrational, as opposed to strategic or political, violence (and “temptation”) and bent on Israel’s destruction.

Where Bar-Ilan’s text focuses almost exclusively on the rejectionism of Arabs, Feith’s 1994 text “Land for No Peace” reproduces more equally the Israel-conciliatory/Arab-rejectionist analytic. Feith, as did Yaniv, Peretz and Quandt in the pre-1993 period, represents Israel as conciliatory by repeatedly invoking “the historic and unprecedented nature of Israel’s *concessions* in the [DOP].”<sup>32</sup> He also invokes the image and idea of a defensive Israel.

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<sup>31</sup> Bar-Ilan, “Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat,” p. 31.

<sup>32</sup> Feith, “Land for No Peace,” p. 32. My emphasis added.

If contrary to all benevolent hopes, it transpires that those neighbors are not so willing [to sustain peace with a Jewish state], Israelis will have to tap into their Zionist heritage to find enough conviction and fortitude to defend themselves, for however long may be necessary, against hostility and violence, against *intifadas* and wars, if they are to preserve their state.<sup>33</sup>

Feith only conceives of a future in which Israelis might have to defend, protect and preserve themselves. No thought is given to the idea that Israel might wage another aggressive war of choice. In fact, no suggestion is even made that Israel has ever conducted an aggressive war, a war of choice or an aggressive war of choice. Israel defends, it retaliates, it responds; it never initiates. This is logical given Feith's concomitant representation of Arabs and Palestinians as "aggressive neighbors"<sup>34</sup> who have pursued policies of "unremitting hostility and violence."<sup>35</sup>

Says Feith:

Much is made of the fact that the Arab parties are for the first time willing to negotiate peace with Israel openly. That is something; but does it establish that the Arab intent is peaceable? After all, every ambitious and aggressive dictator for the last 100 years engaged in highly publicized peace talks: Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Slobodan Milosevic all participated in peace negotiations and used them to pursue belligerent designs.<sup>36</sup>

The Arabs have deviated from their rejectionist line. However, this deviation may be ephemeral. There is good reason to believe that the Arabs are being deceitful and positioning themselves to exploit Israel's conciliatory nature to realize their aggressive goals. And why is there good reason for this belief? Because Arab

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<sup>33</sup> Feith, "Land for No Peace," p. 36.

<sup>34</sup> Feith, "Land for No Peace," p.36.

<sup>35</sup> Feith, "Land for No Peace," p. 36.

<sup>36</sup> Feith, "Land for No Peace," p. 36.

leaders such as Arafat are malicious, bloodthirsty warmongers as were Hitler and Stalin. Of course, the association made by Feith identifies Arafat as congenitally warlike and aggressive for the sake of aggression.

Smoocha's text, like that of Bar-Ilan, emphasizes the Arab rejectionism of this first rule of formation. According to Smoocha, Arab rejectionism has been the defining characteristic of the Jewish experience in Palestine: "[f]rom its inception in 1881, the new Jewish society in the Land of Israel/Palestine was born, grew up, and has lived in a hostile Arab environment and has learned to survive under dire conditions."<sup>37</sup> Smoocha does not anticipate this changing in the future. "Peace will make the state's [Israel's] environment non-hostile, but not friendly and supportive. The new surrounding will remain restive, unstable and unsafe."<sup>38</sup> Try as Israel might, it can only do so much to order the regional dynamics because it is still surrounded by intransigent Arabs. Even after a peace agreement, "Israel will go on suffering from the insecurity of being a small non-Muslim state in the region and feeling distrustful because of its collective memory of Arab rejectionism and the Holocaust."<sup>39</sup> If the Arabs are not rejecting Israel for its policies, they will reject it for its religious identity.

Much like Bar-Ilan and Feith before him Smoocha foresees future Arab hostility towards Israel, even in the presence of a peace agreement or agreements. The only possible explanation for such hostility is that rejectionism is innate to

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<sup>37</sup> Smoocha, "The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society," p. 27.

<sup>38</sup> Smoocha, "The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society," p. 30.

<sup>39</sup> Smoocha, "The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society," p. 31.

Arabs. Why else would Israel remain insecure and the target of potential Arab violence in the context of a peace settlement? The persisting Arab mistrust of Israel<sup>40</sup> of which Smooha speaks must be irrational and emotive rather than political because political issues will have been addressed by the presumed settlement.

Sternhell's 1998 text *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State* is a prime example of my suggestion that this first rule of formation is determinant in producing truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Unlike Bar-Ilan, Feith and Smooha, Sternhell violates an analytic governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Like Bar-Ilan, Feith and Smooha, however, Sternhell also represents Arabs as intransigent rejectionists.

Most notably Sternhell violates the second systematic silence regarding the place of territorial maximization in Zionist ideology. First, he explodes the false dichotomy between Israel's Right and Left of which I spoke earlier. "The historical struggle between the labor movement and the revisionist Right was a struggle over the methods of implementing national objectives, not over the objectives themselves."<sup>41</sup> Next, he speaks explicitly of Zionism's national objectives and institutions of territorial conquest saying: "the nationalist ideology

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<sup>40</sup> Smooha, "The Implications of the Transition to Peace for Israeli Society," p. 31.

<sup>41</sup> Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, p.6.

of the Jewish labor movement was to conquer as much land as possible”<sup>42</sup> and “[t]he aim of ... the Histadrut [General Federation of Jewish Workers in Palestine] was the conquest of the land.”<sup>43</sup> Sternhell even goes so far as to argue that early Israeli policy, while laden with socialist rhetoric, subordinated the values of socialism to national prerogatives.<sup>44</sup>

Sternhell’s text speaks of a facet of Zionist thought that the discourse silences. In this sense it is critical.<sup>45</sup> Still, he writes according to the first rule of formation that requires that Arabs be represented as intransigent rejectionists. Sternhell acknowledges that “the implementation of Zionism could be only at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs.”<sup>46</sup> A page later Sternhell states that:

[t]he opposition to the partition proposals of 1937, the Palestinian guerilla war that began immediately after the UN decision of 29 November 1947 to partition the country, the invasion of the Arab armies at the end of the British mandate on 15 May 1948, and the Arab threat of extermination in May 1967 form *a single chain of Arab acts of refusal* to accept the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine.<sup>47</sup>

This is an obvious contradiction. The Jewish Agency, and more specifically its executive members such as Ben-Gurion, Weizmann and Moshe Shertok, intended

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<sup>42</sup> Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, p.6.

<sup>43</sup> Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, p.21.

<sup>44</sup> Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>45</sup> Interestingly, Sternhell’s title *The Founding Myths of Israel; Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State* is very similar to Flapan’s *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, another critical text.

<sup>46</sup> Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, pp.43-44.

<sup>47</sup> Sternhell, *The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State*, p. 45. My emphasis added.

to conquer Palestine at the expense of Palestinians, yet it is the Palestinians and Arabs who are intransigent. What exactly were they to accept? To what should they have acquiesced? This obvious contradiction – as well as the evident research lacunae or omissions that characterize the second statement – is a result of the robustness of this first rule of formation. The fact that Sternhell is aware that Zionist goals would be realized at the expense of Palestinians and yet still makes the refusal statement demonstrates that the first rule of formation must be determinant in producing knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Even while he pursues an argument that could lead to a different conclusion, Sternhell’s work ends up abiding by this first rule of formation.

Lewis’ introduction<sup>48</sup> to Carey and Shainin’s *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* is similar in nature to the Sternhell text in that while an ostensibly critical text, it represents Israel and the Arabs/Palestinians according to the dictates of this first rule of formation. Lewis makes three notable statements in this regard. First, he states that “[f]rom the day of its birth as a state in 1948 Israel had to struggle for acceptance. The Arab world refused to recognize the state or even, for a long time, to call it by its name.”<sup>49</sup> Second, he notes that “[a] solution along the lines of Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal [of early 2002] would entail

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<sup>48</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, pp. 1-15.

<sup>49</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p.1.



risks for Israel, of course”<sup>50</sup>. And third, he speaks repeatedly of Israel’s post-2001 retaliatory campaign.

How do each of these statements conform to the first rule of formation?

The first statement clearly opposes an intransigent Arab world bent on denial of Israel to an open and flexible Israel that was just awaiting recognition. Furthering the images of an Israel willing to be accommodating if just given the opportunity and an Arab world categorically opposed to Israel are Lewis’ silences regarding Zionist rejections of Arab peace overtures in 1949 and Zionist denial of Palestinian nationhood into the contemporary period. Of course, this ahistoricism, these silences are in keeping with the second and third analytics of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The second statement suggests that Israel would expose itself to danger or peril if it were to accept an Arab peace proposal. Informing this statement is the idea that Arabs are so inherently opposed to Israel that even a peace agreement might not provide Israel with security. Israel would still be exposed to possible injury because it is surrounded by Arabs, and they are prey to irrational violence.

The third collection of Lewis statements, including references to Israeli retaliation,<sup>51</sup> Israeli responses,<sup>52</sup> “Sharon’s retaliatory campaign”<sup>53</sup> and “Sharon’s

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<sup>50</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 8. Abdullah proposed a normalization of Arab-Israeli relations in return for full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem.

<sup>51</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 3.

policy of massive retaliation”<sup>54</sup> all mobilize the language of retaliation. Lewis only speaks of Israel as returning an injury and repaying acts of violence with similar acts of violence. These statements, too, are made in accordance with this first rule of discursive formation – Israel is compelled to react because it is confronted in its conciliatory position with the violent provocations of others; the provocateurs initiate violence because as Palestinians they are unequivocal in their rejection of Israel.

The language of retaliation could be addressed in relation to the second rule of formation, namely to represent Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship or posit as symmetrical this relationship. Obviously, victims retaliate, not aggressors. However, the language is also notable in regards to this first rule of formation. Israel is the victim because it is confronted by intransigent and violent Arabs. This is another example of the mutually supportive nature of the analytics governing the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Little’s 2002 *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* offers some of the most glaring examples of the operation of this first rule of formation. Like Bar-Ilan’s text, Little’s statements pertain predominantly to Arab intransigence. Notable statements include: “Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy all floated some variant of the peace-for-land formula

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<sup>53</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Lewis, “Introduction” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent*. eds. Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin, p. 4.

only to be greeted with Arab intransigence;”<sup>55</sup> “[i]n the early days, it was the Arabs who constituted the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East;”<sup>56</sup> and “[a]s the war clouds loomed [in early 1967], Washington blamed the Arabs, whose intransigence made compromise impossible.”<sup>57</sup> While other statements in the Little text are attributed to other authors, such as the statement that Arabs are by nature inclined to fight windmills which is attributed to the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt in 1956<sup>58</sup>, the three cited above carry no references. They require no external authorization because they are in keeping with the first rule of formation; they are discursively truthful.

Rubin’s work is probably the most slavishly obedient to this first rule of formation, moreover it has been a sustained obedience. In 1994 for example Rubin made the following three statements: 1) “[t]he difficulty of making peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict was a function of the issue’s definition. The problem’s defining root was that the Arab states and the Palestinians national movement refused to accept Israel’s acceptance and believed that it could be destroyed;”<sup>59</sup> 2) “Israel was already ready for peace with the Arab states;”<sup>60</sup> and 3) “[t]he Palestinians suffered most from the status quo but they were also the party most

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<sup>55</sup> Little, *American Orientalism : the United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, p.7.

<sup>56</sup> Little, *American Orientalism : the United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, p. 268.

<sup>57</sup> Little, *American Orientalism : the United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, p. 280.

<sup>58</sup> Little, *American Orientalism : the United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, p.28.

<sup>59</sup> Rubin, “From War to Peace” in *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993* eds. Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma’oz, p.4.

<sup>60</sup> Rubin, “From War to Peace” in *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993* eds. Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma’oz, p.5.

locked into an intransigent stance.”<sup>61</sup> The first and third statements obviously represent Arabs and Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists while the second statement represents Israel as historically predisposed to compromise in the interests of peace.

In his 1996 text Rubin made similar statements. On Arab intransigence and rejectionism he states variously: “the deadlock persisting for decades resulted neither from tough bargaining nor misunderstanding but from a complete rejection of compromise by the Arab side;”<sup>62</sup>

[t]he great majority of Arab states and also the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rejected a wide range of peace plans – Israel’s 1967 offer to trade captured territories for peace, King Husayn’s 1972 United Arab Kingdom concept, the 1977 Camp David accords, the 1982 Reagan plan, Jordan’s 1985 proposal, and many others – that might have been adopted and adapted toward this end;<sup>63</sup>

and “[s]uffering the greatest in the conflict, they [the Palestinians] were also the party that most perpetuated it, explicitly preferring deadlock to a solution requiring any real compromise.”<sup>64</sup> Rubin also wrote according to the second half of this bifurcated analytic. States Rubin: “Israel was always ready for peace with the Arab states, from its endorsement of the 1948 partition plan to the secret post-1967 war initiative offering to trade captured land for peace.”<sup>65</sup> The representation of Israel as peace-seeking is obvious.

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<sup>61</sup> Rubin, “From War to Peace” in *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993* eds. Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma’oz, p.8.

<sup>62</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” p. 3.

<sup>63</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” p. 4.

<sup>64</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” p. 6.

<sup>65</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” p. 8.

One additional statement by Rubin deserves noting. According to Rubin, “[w]ith Arafat finally ready to meet Israel’s minimal conditions, the Oslo accords came fast and relatively easily.”<sup>66</sup> This statement is notable for more than its subscription to the first rule of formation. The explanations Rubin provides for Arafat’s abandonment of his intransigence are structural – the demise of the Soviet Union and the resolution of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Fundamentally, a change of policy was forced on Arafat. Arafat did not, according to Rubin, undergo a conversion.

I point this out because in 1996 Rubin was certainly not as zealous as other regional commentators were in rehabilitating Arafat after the start of the Oslo Process in 1993. However, by the time Rubin published his 2003 biography of Arafat entitled *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography*<sup>67</sup> the author was demonizing the Palestinian leader. This type of demonization is the hyper-individualization of this first rule of formation. Arafat is made the icon of Arab/Palestinian intransigence and rejectionism; a rejectionism that once defined a people defines the person who represents the people. Ross similarly demonizes Arafat with similar discursive results.

Rubin’s biography is peppered with references to “Arafat’s intransigence,”<sup>68</sup> “Arafat’s long refusal,”<sup>69</sup> and Arafat’s uncompromising nature.<sup>70</sup> Ruben makes two particularly illustrative statements. First,

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<sup>66</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” p. 9.

<sup>67</sup> Barry M Rubin, and Judith Colp Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<sup>68</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 141.

<sup>69</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 151.

[e]ven if all of the details of the specific issues could have been solved, the real cause of the failure was that Arafat preferred to continue the conflict for years – even if this meant occupation and many more casualties – rather than make the necessary tough decisions and concessions to resolve it.<sup>71</sup>

And second,

[t]hus, the peace process did not fail because Rabin was assassinated, or Netanyahu was intransigent, or Barak was insufficiently charming at Camp David, or Israel did not offer a percentage point of two more territory initially, or Clinton did not postpone the Camp David meeting for two weeks. The problems lay deeper, first and fundamentally, with Arafat.<sup>72</sup>

Both statements clearly illustrate how Arafat is made the embodiment of Palestinian rejectionism. Arafat and Arafat alone, not Israel as the other party to the negotiations or the U.S. as the honest broker for the negotiations, is responsible for the collapse of the Oslo Process. Of course, this also means that the rejectionism he personifies is responsible for the collapse of the Oslo Process.

Rubin's biography is not exclusively a treatise on Palestinian intransigence. As was the case with his 1996 text, he wrote his biography according to both halves of this bifurcated analytic. For example, he represented Israel as conciliatory over the entire course of the Oslo Process. In the early stages of the process Rubin notes that “[d]espite temporary closures and postponements in response to terrorist attacks, they [Rabin and Peres] repeatedly made concessions in order to renew the talks and to ensure they moved forward toward

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<sup>70</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 205.

<sup>71</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 213.

<sup>72</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 215.

a compromise deal.”<sup>73</sup> At the end of the Oslo Process, at the Camp David negotiations Rubin asserts that Barak offered “major concessions”<sup>74</sup> and on the specific issue of Jerusalem made a “significant sacrifice.”<sup>75</sup> Rubin consistently represents Israel as willing to make concessions and surrender positions in order to realize peace with the Palestinians.

Like Rubin, Ross produced his truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations in accordance with this first rule of discursive formation representing Israel as conciliatory and Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists. Ross speaks of the Israeli ethos which “reflects the deep-seated desire for peace in Israel”<sup>76</sup> and describes the Barak government as “an Israeli government that might be willing to take unprecedented steps toward the Palestinians.”<sup>77</sup> Concomitantly, Ross’ scorn for Arafat is limitless. Ross repeatedly blames the collapse of the Camp David negotiations of 2000 and the Oslo Process more generally on Arafat: “[t]he President [Clinton] had made his best effort, and now so had Barak. Arafat has said no to everything;”<sup>78</sup> “Arafat either let the intifada begin or, as some argue, actually gave orders for it;”<sup>79</sup> “Yasir Arafat had definitively demonstrated that he could not end the conflict. We had made every conceivable effort to do what we

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<sup>73</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 158.

<sup>74</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 191.

<sup>75</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: a Political Biography*, p. 197.

<sup>76</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 28.

<sup>77</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 637.

<sup>78</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 693.

<sup>79</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 757.

now had to accept was impossible with Yasir Arafat;”<sup>80</sup> “[o]nly one leader was unable or unwilling to confront history and mythology: Yasir Arafat;”<sup>81</sup> and “[t]o be sure, I would not be writing about the failings of Oslo if it had not been for Yasir Arafat.”<sup>82</sup> Importantly, Ross is silent on the substantive reasons behind Arafat’s position at Camp David. He does not explain how the negotiations failed to meet Palestinian bottom lines regarding, *inter alia*, territory, resources, Jerusalem and refugees. Also like Rubin, Ross represents Arafat as the personification of Arab rejectionism and posits with him responsibility for the end of the Oslo Process.

### *Persistence of Practice*

The discursive rule of formation requiring representations of Israel as conciliatory and of Arabs as intransigent rejectionists has persisted in the post-1993 period. So too has the practical realization of this rule. In the form of practical agreements and proposals Israel has been represented as conciliatory and peace-seeking and Arabs and Palestinians have been represented as (potential) rejectionists.

Rokach makes the statement that “[t]he persistence of the myth of Israel’s security shows that there is considerable public belief in the so-called Arab

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<sup>80</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 757.

<sup>81</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 758.

<sup>82</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 767.



commitment to eliminate the Jewish state.”<sup>83</sup> The persistence of this insecurity in Israel is certainly evident in the 1997 Beilin-Eitan Agreement. This agreement states that: “[t]he Jordan Valley will be a special security zone, and Israeli army forces will be posted along the Jordan. The residents of the area will be permitted to remain where they are ...; another version insists upon an Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.”<sup>84</sup> As was noted in some of the pre-1993 texts, specifically those of Plascov and Heller, according to the Beilin-Eitan Agreement the Palestinians would have to take steps to assuage Israeli security concerns. The security components of the agreement establish that:

1. The Palestinian entity will be demilitarized and it will have no army.
2. The Jordan River will be the security border of Israel. Secure crossing conditions will be regulated by IDF forces in proportion to need and to the changing conditions within the Palestinian entity, affecting the estimated need for the IDF on the borders.
3. The Palestinian entity will establish a strong police force to meet the needs of internal security.
4. No foreign army may be stationed within the boundaries of the Palestinian entity.
5. The Security forces of Israel and the Palestinian entity will work to deter and foil acts of terrorism aimed against Jews and Arabs.
6. The Palestinian entity will not sign any military agreement or any other agreement that includes a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Israel, the security of its citizens, or the integrity of their property. It will not sign any agreement regarding boycott or any other illegal steps against the Israeli economy nor any

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<sup>83</sup> Livia Rokach, and Moshe Sharett, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism: a Study Based on Moshe Sharett's Personal Diary and Other Documents*, 3rd ed., AAUG Information Paper Series, no. 23 (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1986), p.1.

<sup>84</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians’,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p. 161.

agreement involving negative propaganda against the State of Israel or against the Jewish people.<sup>85</sup>

These prescriptions are quite obviously the product of an abiding suspicion of Arab and Palestinian intentions toward Israel. These pro-active prohibitions preempt potential intransigence. The Palestinian entity is demilitarized so as to be unable to threaten Israel. The Jordan River is Israel's eastern border so as to increase Israel's strategic depth against possible threats. Israel's Oslo-created security guarantor in the Palestinian entity keeps Palestinians from endangering Israel. Other states, presumably Arab, are precluded from using the Palestinian entity as a conduit through which to threaten Israel. There is to be security cooperation with Israel's guarantor. And political and economic pressure and injury to Israel, Israelis and Israeli property is precluded. Either the Palestinian entity, Palestinians or Arabs are conceived of in this agreement as threats to Israel. Given that the agreement lays out the guidelines for a permanent settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this conception must be based on the presumption that Arab/Palestinian rejection of Israel is congenital.

Only Palestinian policy is circumscribed by the Beilin-Eitan Agreement. Israeli policy is completely unencumbered. This is natural given the discursive truth that Israel is peace-seeking and the Arabs and Palestinians are prone to violence. This was an intra-Israeli agreement so the production of an agreement in accordance with this rule of formation is hardly surprising. However, it was not only Israeli-Israeli dialogue that produced such possible agreements. The Camp

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<sup>85</sup> "Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, 'National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians'," p. 161.

David negotiations of July 2000, the Clinton proposals of December 2000 and the Taba negotiations of January 2001 were all rooted in the idea that Arabs/Palestinians would continue to reject Israel, even after a permanent settlement, and that they would try to realize this rejection violently.

At Camp David in the summer of 2000 Israeli negotiators repeatedly contended that, even in the context of an agreement with the Palestinians, Israel would still face a threat from the East. Consequently, they argued that Israel needed to maintain a strong military presence in the West Bank. According to Hanieh, the Israelis first demanded “bases, patrols, and, finally, early-warning stations in the Jordan Valley along the Jordanian border.”<sup>86</sup> Later in the negotiations,

... the Israelis reiterated their demands relating to security along the Jordanian border, once again on the basis of the ‘threat from the East’ theme. They wanted mobile patrols in the Jordan Valley, the establishment of three early-warning stations in the West Bank, the establishment of five Israeli ‘supplies bases’ in the Jordan Valley to be used by the Israeli army in emergencies, and inspection of all goods imported to the Palestinian state, which would be demilitarized.<sup>87</sup>

Hanieh asserts that Israel’s East-inspired insecurity was a subterfuge used to justify a continuing Israeli presence in the West Bank.<sup>88</sup> If this is the case, then this is in keeping with the Zionist practice of territorial maximization. Ostensibly, however, the Israeli demands at Camp David were very similar to the contours of a permanent settlement outlined by the Beilin-Eitan Agreement. More

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<sup>86</sup> Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 2 (2001): p. 82.

<sup>87</sup> Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” pp. 93-94.

<sup>88</sup> Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” p. 82.

importantly, they read as inspired by the same concerns regarding congenital, permanent Arab hostility to Israel. Representations of rejectionist Arabs/Palestinians were not restricted to Israeli negotiating positions. In fact, ideas of Arabs/Palestinians as violent intransigents bent on Israel's destruction also informed the "Clinton Parameters".

The Camp David Summit ended 24 July without an agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis. On 28 September Ariel Sharon entered the Al-Aqsa compound in Occupied East Jerusalem. The following day Israeli forces wounded 220 Palestinians and killed seven. This was the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. In an attempt to arrest the ongoing acts of Palestinian resistance and Israeli violence, and to secure himself a historic legacy, President Clinton forwarded what have been dubbed the "Clinton Parameters" or "Clinton Ideas" on 23 December 2000.

Clinton delivered his "parameters" orally to the Palestinian and Israeli negotiating terms in the White House. The following four points, all under the heading of "Security", deserve quoting at length from the Clinton text.<sup>89</sup> First, according to Clinton

[t]he key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by the agreement of both sides... At the end of this period [a thirty-six month Israeli withdrawal period], a small Israeli presence in fixed locations would remain in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another thirty-six months. This period could be

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<sup>89</sup> No official version of the Clinton Parameters was released. The citations that follow are taken from the appendix of Ross' *The Missing Peace*. Also see: "Doc. D1 President Bill Clinton, Proposals for a Final Settlement," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (2001): pp. 171-173. Substantively, the texts are in agreement.

reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel.<sup>90</sup>

Second, said Clinton, “[o]n early-warning stations, I believe that Israel should maintain three facilities on the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence; the stations would be subject to review after three years, with any change in status to be mutually agreed.”<sup>91</sup> Third,

[o]n the emergency deployments, I understand you still have to work to do on developing maps of relevant areas and routes. In defining what would constitute an ‘emergency’, I suggest you think about formulations that refer to ‘an imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel’s national security and that requires Israel to declare a national state of emergency’.<sup>92</sup>

And fourth,

I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a ‘demilitarized state,’ while the Palestinian side had proposed ‘a state of limited arms’. As a possible compromise formula I suggest you think in terms of a ‘non-militarized state’. This would be consistent with the fact that, as well as a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrence purposes.<sup>93</sup>

Ultimately, these parameters would have meant that 1) an international force would have replaced the Israeli army in the West Bank for an indefinite period or until Israel decided the force was no longer necessary; 2) Israel would have a permanent military presence in the West Bank, or until Israel decided the

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<sup>90</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 802.

<sup>91</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 802.

<sup>92</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 802.

<sup>93</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 802.

presence was no longer necessary; 3) Israel would have a “right” to emergency deployment through and across the West Bank; and 4) the Palestinian state would have no army, but merely the Oslo-inspired, Israeli-security-providing, police force.

The Clinton Parameters are, quite obviously, rooted in a concern for Israeli security in the face of unremitting Arab hostility. An international force is envisioned as a buffer between Israel and the Arab states to the East. Israeli forces, too, are to be positioned to provide early warning of endangerment, presumably, from states such as Syria. The Jordan River is to be Israel’s eastern border against external threats. And the Palestinian state is provided with forces sufficient to control the Palestinian population but insufficient to threaten Israel. All the elements indicate that Israel is the state exposed to potential violence and that this potential violence will emanate from uncompromising Arab states to Israel’s east.

From 21 to 27 January 2001 Palestinian and Israeli negotiators met in Taba, Egypt. Palestinians and Israelis were the only two parties to participate in these discussions; the U.S. did not participate. The closest document to an authoritative text of the negotiations is the *Moratinos Nonpaper on the Taba Negotiations*.<sup>94</sup> As the introduction of the nonpaper states: “[a]lthough the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues

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<sup>94</sup> “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001),” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 3 (2002): pp. 79-89.

at Taba.”<sup>95</sup> It is evident that the positions articulated in this nonpaper were built extensively on the first rule of formation informed Clinton Parameters.

The Clinton Parameters called for a six year period for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank to be replaced with an international force. This was the Israeli negotiating position at Taba.<sup>96</sup> The Clinton Parameters called for an Israeli military presence in the West Bank in the form of three early warning stations. This was the Israeli negotiating position at Taba.<sup>97</sup> The Clinton Parameters suggested a non-militarized Palestinian state. This was the position adopted by the Israeli negotiators.<sup>98</sup> Most interestingly, the Clinton Parameters suggested that the parties agree to the modalities of Israeli emergency deployments through the West Bank. During the Taba negotiations

[t]he Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on Palestinian territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response allowing for a maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit for their dismantling. In addition, the Palestinian side considered that these two emergency locations be run by international presence and not by the Israelis. Informally, the Israeli side expressed willingness to explore ways that a multinational presence could provide a vehicle for addressing the parties’ respective concerns.

The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of Israeli armed forces on Palestinian territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001),” p. 81.

<sup>96</sup> “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001),” p. 88.

<sup>97</sup> “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001),” p. 87.

<sup>98</sup> “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001),” p. 87.

<sup>99</sup> “The Taba Negotiations (January 2001),” p. 88.

In the case of emergency deployments or emergency locations as they are parenthetically referred to in the nonpaper, the Palestinian delegation subscribed to the first rule of formation's representation of Arabs as intransigent rejectionists of Israel – the delegation agreed to emergency locations in the West Bank, differing only on the nationality manning the locations; the delegation agreed to emergency deployments through the West Bank, differing only on the nationality of those being deployed. Fundamentally, the Palestinian delegation's acceptance of a surrogate security force in or moving through the West Bank marks subscription to the idea that Israel is assailed by external threats emanating from surrounding Arab states against which it requires protection.

This subsection demonstrated that the first rule of formation, that Israel be represented as conciliatory and peace-seeking and Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists, has continued to govern the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations through the post-1993 period. This analytic was institutionalized, in the form of Israeli insecurity, in the Oslo Agreements; a strong Palestinian police/security force was established to function as a guarantor of Israeli security. Truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations continued to be produced in accordance with this rule by authors such as Bar-Ilan, Smooha, Sternhell, Rubin and Ross. Finally, I described the manner in which the representations of Israel as conciliatory and threatened and Arabs as congenitally violent rejectionists persisted and were institutionalized in the Beilin-Eitan Agreement, negotiating positions at Camp David, the Clinton Parameters and negotiating positions at the Taba talks.



### *Rule 2 – Israel as Victim; Symmetrical Relationship*

According to the second rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations, Israel must be represented as the victim of the conflict or the Palestinian-Israeli relationship must be posited as symmetrical, an equality between the two parties must be assumed. Recall that in both cases Palestinians are not represented as victims of the conflict. This analytic, too, has persisted into the present period. The Oslo Agreements institutionalized this rule, the rule continues to govern the production of truthful knowledge of Palestinian-Israeli relations and its political realization persists into the contemporary period.

#### *Institutionalization of Discursive Rule*

It is useful as a point of departure to briefly recall here the work of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in its text *Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East* and Haass' *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes*. Both texts posit an equality between Palestinians and Israelis, psychologize the conflict and conclude that confidence-building measures need to be implemented so as to reconcile the perceptual gaps between the parties and to assuage their respective fears. In the case of Haass such measures are intended to "ripen" the conflict for resolution.

This reasoning, in fact the second rule of formation, is a logical extension of the first rule of formation. The progression is straightforward: Palestinians have been or are intransigent rejectionists unaccepting of Israel's equally valid claims

to Palestine; Israel has been the victim of this intransigence; and Palestinians must demonstrate that they have abandoned their intransigence by building trust and credibility with Israel. The manner in which literature produced in accordance with the second rule of formation mobilizes ideas of the first is readily apparent in the discourse. For example, Pruitt, Bercovitch and Zartman explain that the PLO was motivated to settle the conflict in 1992-1993 because “the PLO seemed to be going downhill politically, having lost its Soviet backers and its major financial contributors.”<sup>100</sup> Pruitt himself is more explicit stating that “PLO had been politically and economically weakened by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and by Arab retaliation for the PLO’s support of Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, curtailing its capacity to continue an effective campaign against Israel.”<sup>101</sup> In assuming that intransigence was no longer affordable, both statements assume its existence in the first place, thereby conforming to the first analytic.

The Oslo Process itself was a long (5 years) confidence building measure premised on a psychologized interpretation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was a test of Palestinian intentions to ensure that their abandonment of rejectionism was not ephemeral. This is immediately evident in Arafat’s 9 September letter to Rabin. After recognizing Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, renouncing terrorism, and committing the PLO to disciplining violators of the DOPOISGA the letter states that

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<sup>100</sup> Dean G. Pruitt, Jacob Bercovitch, and I. William Zartman, “A Brief History of the Oslo Talks,” *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): p. 178.

<sup>101</sup> Dean G. Pruitt, “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks,” *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): p. 243.

the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.<sup>102</sup>

As an opening gesture intended to convince Israel of the PLO's intentions Arafat promised to revise the Palestinian Covenant. According to Lustick, "[the entire process was an] intrinsically ambiguous framework for incubating trust and reconciliation."<sup>103</sup>

The DOPOISGA, the Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho Committee and the Oslo II Agreement further institutionalized this second analytic. Two elements of the DOPOISGA bear noting as regards this institutionalization. First, the reader will recall that the preamble states that Israel and the PLO "recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights."<sup>104</sup> The preamble establishes an equality between the two parties; by defining the rights as mutual they are made to share the same status and belong to each party respectively and reciprocally. Second, Article V of the DOPOISGA divides the negotiating process into two stages: an interim stage and a permanent-status stage. This article explains that: "[t]he five-year transitional period will begin upon the [Israeli] withdrawal from the Gaza Strip

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<sup>102</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 128.

<sup>103</sup> Ian S. Lustick, "Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Process Between Political Partnership and Legality," *Cornell International Law Journal* 30, no. 3 (1997): p. 742.

<sup>104</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 117.

and Jericho area.”<sup>105</sup> It continues: “[p]ermanent statue [*sic*] negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.”<sup>106</sup> According to Aruri:

the entire concept of splitting the negotiations into interim and final status stages – is based on the flawed assumption that the real barriers to conflict resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian case are psychological: Palestinians must demonstrate their willingness to live in peace with Israelis in order to enjoy the rights conferred upon them by international law and the dictates of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>107</sup>

The DOPOISGA posited an equality between Israel and Palestinians and this, in turn, initiated a process that institutionalized the psychologized reading of the conflict. Both parties have competing claims and because the rights of both parties are equal and reciprocal, the irreconcilability of the relationship must be the product of attitudinal or cognitive dissonance between the two parties.

The DOPOISGA also called for the establishment of several joint Palestinian-Israeli committees to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. A month later the Gaza-Jericho Committee was established. This committee met three times over the course of October 1993 releasing communiqués after each meeting.<sup>108</sup> The content of the communiqués demonstrates that the committee

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<sup>105</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 118.

<sup>106</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 118.

<sup>107</sup> Naseer H. Aruri, “Early Empowerment: The Burden Not the Responsibility,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (1995): pp.38-39.

<sup>108</sup> “Doc. A4 Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho Committee, Joint Communiques,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 2 (1994): pp. 129-130.

built on the posited symmetry between Israel and the Palestinians and the consequent psychologizing of the relationship by institutionalizing specific confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the overall process. The first communiqué states that during the meeting the “two sides emphasized the importance of confidence building.”<sup>109</sup> The second communiqué institutionalized confidence-building measures by establishing within the framework of the Joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes established by Annex II.3e of the DOPOISGA a subgroup to deal with confidence-building measures.<sup>110</sup> The third communiqué explains that the “confidence-building measures subcommittee, in its meetings yesterday and today, discussed mutual measures in order to build confidence between the two peoples.”<sup>111</sup> A prisoner release was to be the first such measure.

The Oslo II Agreement further institutionalized the psychologized reading of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Article XVI of this agreement dealt with confidence-building measures. Reads the article:

[w]ith a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples,

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<sup>109</sup> “Doc. A4 Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho Committee, Joint Communiques,” p. 129.

<sup>110</sup> “Doc. A4 Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho Committee, Joint Communiques,” pp. 129-130.

<sup>111</sup> “Doc. A4 Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho Committee, Joint Communiques,” p. 130.

both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures.<sup>112</sup>

The agreement details as such measures prisoner releases, protection of Palestinians “who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities” and immunity for Palestinians returning to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>113</sup> Quite evidently, CBMs are intended to address the issue of trust between Palestinians and Israelis by reconciling their attitudinal and emotional states.

### *Rule Governed Knowledge Production*

I demonstrated in the pre-1993 period that this second discursive rule of formation governed the production of truthful knowledge about the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Authors writing in accordance with this analytic posited a symmetry between the two parties, explored the psychology of the relationship and offered means of narrowing or eliminating the cognitive and perceptual gaps between them. This same analytic continues to govern knowledge production in the post-1993 period. Texts governed by this rule assume that the conflict was psychological and proceed to explain how the distrust and lack of confidence between the two parties was overcome.

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<sup>112</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

<sup>113</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

Reprising Haass' ideas, the texts in the 1997 special issue of *International Negotiation* "have in common that they address the elements of the situation that made it ripe for the Oslo breakthrough."<sup>114</sup> The authors explain how a ripe environment for conflict resolution or a relationship of trust and confidence that facilitated negotiations was established. Pruitt, for example, in his "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks"<sup>115</sup>, explores psychological issues in his explanation of the start of the Oslo Process. Growing working trust – "a conviction on both sides that the other side is serious about the negotiations and ready to make concessions in the interests of settlement"<sup>116</sup> – and perceptions regarding spokespeople and common ground produced an agreement to "start an incremental process of confidence building."<sup>117</sup> Similarly Bercovitch, while acknowledging that changes at the global and the regional level might explain the occurrence of the Oslo negotiations, attributes the success of the negotiations to the psychological environment. The Norwegian hosts and facilitators "inspired the 'Oslo spirit' of confidence, credibility and genuine commitment to peacemaking."<sup>118</sup> Bercovitch,

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<sup>114</sup> Dean G. Pruitt, "Lessons Learned From the Middle East Peace Process: Introduction," *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): p. 175. Obviously, these texts reproduce the peace-making breakthrough reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process. Reads the introduction: "[t]he period from 1991 to 1996 witnessed an extraordinary breakthrough in the seemingly intractable Middle East conflict. The most important event in this period was the 1993 secret talks in and around Oslo, which produced a declaration of principles that led to the establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority and mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization." p. 175.

<sup>115</sup> Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Process," pp. 237-250.

<sup>116</sup> Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Process," p. 248.

<sup>117</sup> Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Process," p. 249.

<sup>118</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, "Conflict Management and the Oslo Experience: Assessing the Success of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking," *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997): p. 230.

in fact, attributes determinancy to the psychological conditions created by the hosts: “Norway’s role enabled the parties to get to know each other, modify some of their perceptions, and, above all, build up trust and credibility.”<sup>119</sup> According to both authors, the conflict was made ripe for resolution through a change in perceptions and attitudes.

Kelman’s 1999 article entitled “Building A Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations”<sup>120</sup> encapsulates all the elements of the second rule of formation. Written after the Oslo Process was to have already been completed and during the until then nadir of Palestinian-Israeli relations during the prime ministership of Netanyahu, the text assumes a symmetry between the parties, psychologizes the relationship and recommends restoration of trust as a means to what the author calls a principled solution. First, Kelman advises that the Palestinians must acknowledge “that the Jewish people have authentic links to the land – that they are not just European colonial settlers engaged in an imperialist project, but a people that has returned to its ancestral homeland.”<sup>121</sup> Kelman concludes that sustainable peace “requires each side to acknowledge that the other belongs in the lands and has rights there.”<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Bercovitch, “Conflict Management and the Oslo Experience: Assessing the Success of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking,” p. 232.

<sup>120</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations,” *Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 5, no. 2 (1999): pp. 101-115.

<sup>121</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 114.

<sup>122</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 114.



Obviously, the author assumes that Palestinians have denied or rejected Jewish claims to Palestine and that the claims of both parties are equally valid.

Second, Kelman interprets the Oslo Process according to psychological criteria. He speaks of reassuring the parties, the concerns of the parties and states that “the partnership developed during those years [while Rabin, and subsequently Peres, was Prime Minister] into a relationship characterized by significant elements of working trust and responsiveness on the leadership level.”<sup>123</sup> Kelman attributes the deterioration of Palestinian-Israeli relations to an undermining of this trust, assigning responsibility primarily to Netanyahu. Kelman concludes that “[t]o revive the peace process now, the parties need to re-establish the working trust and the political partnership, that have broken down.”<sup>124</sup> This recommendation follows logically from his psychological interpretation of the relationship and the Oslo Process: if the process was successful during periods of trust and unsuccessful during periods of distrust, trust must be restored.<sup>125</sup>

The Kelman text also highlights another discursive manifestation of the second analytic: the language of partnership. The deployment of this language is particularly evident in Lustick’s “Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace

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<sup>123</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 115.

<sup>124</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 109.

<sup>125</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 110.

Process Between Political Partnership and Legality.”<sup>126</sup> Lustick argues that the initiation of the Oslo Process created a

partnership ... between a group of moderate and dovish political parties in Israel controlling the government and diplomatic apparatus of the state in 1993 and the Arafatist wing of the PLO in combination with a larger percentage of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza, though not within the Palestinian diaspora.<sup>127</sup>

This was a “cross-polity partnership”<sup>128</sup> the core of which was the Labor Party-Arafat axis.”<sup>129</sup>

The language of partnership, as well as the idea that as a result of the Oslo Process the PLO and Israel were partners, serves two discursive functions. First, it dehistoricizes the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. According to Guyatt, “[b]y claiming that the Palestinians were their ‘partners’ in the peace process, Israel attempted to efface its own history of belligerent occupation and colonisation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”<sup>130</sup> Dehistoricizing the relationship is a prerequisite for positing a symmetry between the two parties and psychologizing the conflict. Mobilizing the language of partnership casts the Palestinian-Israeli relationship as one between equals plagued by psychological incongruities, thereby re-enforcing the second analytic.

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<sup>126</sup> Lustick, “Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace Process Between Political Partnership and Legality,” pp. 741-758.

<sup>127</sup> Lustick, “Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace Process Between Political Partnership and Legality,” p. 745.

<sup>128</sup> Lustick, “Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace Process Between Political Partnership and Legality,” p. 747.

<sup>129</sup> Lustick, “Ending Protracted Conflicts: The Oslo Peace Process Between Political Partnership and Legality,” p. 745.

<sup>130</sup> Nicholas Guyatt, *The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Zed Books, 1998), p. 67.

Second, the language of partnership has the discursive effect of reproducing the first rule of formation. This is no surprise given the mutually reinforcing nature of these analytics. A partner is defined as “one who has a share or part with another or others”<sup>131</sup> – in the present case that being shared is Palestine. Recall that Rabin’s letter to Arafat stated simply that “the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”<sup>132</sup> When the language of partnership is combined with the tone of Rabin’s letter it becomes readily apparent that it is Israel that has decided to share Palestine with the Palestinians. This, in turn, reproduces the representation of Israel as magnanimous and conciliatory.

The discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations interprets the start of the Oslo Process as a peacemaking breakthrough. According to the second rule of the discourse, this breakthrough was made possible by the overcoming of psychological obstacles such as a lack of trust and confidence. Furthermore, this overcoming of psychological obstacles had to be perpetuated in and through the Oslo Process itself. This is evident, for example, in the institutionalization of confidence-building measures in the Oslo II Agreement.

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<sup>131</sup> OED Online/Oxford University Press, “Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English language,” Web page, [accessed 12 November 2004]. Available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com).

<sup>132</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 129.

## *Persistence of Practice*

The second discursive rule has not lost its authority as Palestinian-Israeli relations have become more violent since the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada* in 2000. The *Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report*, also known as the *Mitchell Report*,<sup>133</sup> of 2001 is evidence of the persistence of this practice into the contemporary period. In fact, the *Mitchell Report* is an example of meticulous adherence to this rule of formation.

First, the report dehistoricizes the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. It does so by mobilizing the language of partnership. When recommending how to resume negotiations the committee suggests that “each party again be willing to regard the other as a partner.”<sup>134</sup> Now, as Guyatt contends, mobilizing this language obscures the history of Israel’s continuing occupation. While the committee does acknowledge the Israeli occupation, it does not speak of the structural violence of the occupation and its engagement with Israel’s practice of colonizing the West Bank and Gaza Strip is limited to cataloguing the practice’s psychological effects.

This follows logically given that the report posits as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. This is evident both in the construction of the report as well as the report’s substance. The report is characterized by parallel

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<sup>133</sup> The *Mitchell Report* was announced at the conclusion of the 17 October 2000 Sharm El-Sheikh Summit. The committee was to investigate the cause of the then almost three weeks of violence following Ariel Sharon’s 28 September 2000 visit to the Al-Aqsa grounds, end the violence, prevent its recurrence and reinvigorate negotiations.

<sup>134</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, “Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report,” Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

construction such that the Israeli perspective is presented and then the Palestinian perspective is presented in near equal proportion. In the spirit of symmetry the committee's findings are balanced. For example, the committee concludes that there is "no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain demonstrations and control the violence once it began [after 28 September]; or that the GOI [Government of Israel] made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians."<sup>135</sup> The substantive matter conveyed by this construction is further evidence of posited symmetry. The report's introduction states that "[t]wo proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live side-by-side in peace."<sup>136</sup> The competing claims are posited as mutual and equal.

Another example of the manner in which the *Mitchell Report* articulates this sense of symmetry is in its repeated mobilization of the phrase "cycle of violence." The report's almost exclusive use (there are isolated references to Palestinian acts of terrorism) of the term "violence", as opposed to war, resistance or colonialism for example, represents the conflagration as depoliticized. The conflagration is represented, not as a political struggle for power involving an organized military on one side and civilians on the other, but as a mutually

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<sup>135</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

<sup>136</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

injurious application of physical force. Furthermore, the report's use of the term "cycle" connotes a natural recurrence with no beginning and no end. Deploying such a term represents the conflagration as one without an initiating or instigating event, almost spontaneous given the report's findings, and for which each party bears equal responsibility. The phrase "cycle of violence" conveys the idea that there is a congruity or correspondence in the character and quality of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship and furthermore that there is an equal distribution of responsibility between the parties.

Third, the report psychologizes the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. This is plainly evident at the outset. The introduction reads: "[f]ear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is that the culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its place there is a growing sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort to violence."<sup>137</sup> Exclusively psychological factors and emotional responses are considered. Nothing is said of material factors such as the expropriation of property and demolition of houses that attend settlement construction. While the Israeli occupation is referenced in the report, it is only referenced to the extent that it causes Palestinians to suffer humiliation and frustration – again, exclusively psychological factors. Nothing is said of the unemployment, lack of adequate healthcare and education and homelessness imposed by the occupation.

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<sup>137</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

The *Mitchell Report* most obviously psychologizes the relationship in its recommendations. Three recommendations will suffice as examples: 1) “[t]he PA [Palestinian Authority] and the GOI should work together to establish a meaningful ‘cooling off period’ and implement additional confidence building measures;”<sup>138</sup> “[t]he restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end;”<sup>139</sup> and “[w]e call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda.”<sup>140</sup> The report’s recommendations urge the parties to compose and calm themselves in order to re-establish an equanimous condition that will, in turn, change their mental attitudes and dispositions.

This section described the persistence of the second rule of formation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations through the Oslo Process and into the contemporary period. The analytic that requires that Israel be represented as the victim of the conflict or that the relationship be posited as symmetrical was institutionalized in the DOPOISGA and the Oslo II Agreement, governed the production of truthful knowledge in the post-1993 period by authors such as

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<sup>138</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, “Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report,” Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

<sup>139</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, “Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report,” Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

<sup>140</sup> Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, “Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report,” Web page, [accessed 1 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm>.

Pruitt, Bercovitch and Kelman and continued to be realized politically in such texts as the *Mitchell Report*.

### ***Rule 3 – A Sovereign Palestinian State in Mandate Palestine***

The third rule of formation follows directly from the previous two rules of formation (which are, of course, supported by, and dependent on the three discursive silences). According to the second rule of formation Israel is the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. According to the first rule of formation Israel is conciliatory, or would have been conciliatory if given the opportunity. Together, these analytics produce the following truth: Israel, by nature, has always been poised to be conciliatory and once the Arabs/Palestinians stopped victimizing Israel, Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

The third rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period is to assume that Zionism as articulated through the Jewish Agency or later Israel would have permitted, or would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. More specifically, the third rule requires an author to assume that: 1) Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine; 2) this state would be provisional on Arabs/Palestinians realizing certain occurrences and conditions; 3) Arabs/Palestinians are responsible for realizing these occurrences and conditions; and 4) these occurrences and conditions would have to assuage Israeli security concerns.



As the third rule of formation is not borne out by historical evidence, it is better to change the manner in which I describe it, as compared to the previous two. I still develop my description in three stages. However, in the first stage I evidence the functioning of this rule. I reference the works of Rubin, Bar-Ilan, Heller, Kelman and Shlaim to demonstrate that this rule has governed the production of truthful statements in the post-1993 period. In the second stage, as in the pre-1993 period, I show that there is no historical grounding for this discursive rule. Based on omissions from the Oslo Agreements and Israeli policies since the start of the Oslo Process I explain that this is not a logical assumption. Third, I demonstrate that the Israeli policy of denying a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine persists into the contemporary period.

#### *Rule Governed Knowledge Production*

The functioning of this matrix of analytics generally and the third rule of formation specifically is readily identifiable in Rubin's 1996 "The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over."<sup>141</sup> For example, Rubin asserts that "[t]he key factor prolonging the conflict over so long a period was that while Israelis wanted a peace that brought recognition from their neighbors, Arabs (including the Palestinians) in principle rejected Israel's existence."<sup>142</sup> Arab/Palestinian rejectionism perpetuated the conflict – rule #1. Rubin then proceeds to make two assumptions in the same statement. Says Rubin: "[a]fter all, the current solution pursued in the peace process negotiations – the existence of both an Israeli Jewish and a Palestinian

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<sup>141</sup> Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over," pp. 3-12.

<sup>142</sup> Rubin, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over," p. 3.

Arab state – was the United Nations’s original proposal for 1948; and this solution was accepted by Israel in 1947 but rejected by the Arab side.”<sup>143</sup> The first assumption, which Flapan disproves, is that the Jewish Agency/Israel accepted the idea of a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine in 1948. The second assumption is that Israel accepted the idea of a Palestinian state with the start of the Oslo Process. Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine – rule #3. Ironically, Rubin states that “It would take almost half a century to arrive back at a situation approximating the one offered at this starting point [1948].”<sup>144</sup> The irony lies in the fact that the same approximate situation to which Rubin refers is one in which Israel still rejects the idea of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

Rubin’s more recent 2003 *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography*,<sup>145</sup> coauthored with Rubin, contains more explicit statements abiding by the third rule of formation in the post-1993 period. For example, Rubin and Rubin assert that “Arafat’s job was to end Palestinian terrorism against Israel, govern the territories he received, cease hostile propaganda, and build the institutions that would make possible a stable Palestinian state.”<sup>146</sup> They also state that “[t]he birth of a state called Palestine was supposed to come at the process’s end – and even then only after he made a full peace treaty with Israel – and not at the start.”<sup>147</sup> These statements hardly require elaboration. Both clearly indicate an assumption on the

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<sup>143</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over,” pp. 3–4.

<sup>144</sup> Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict is Over,” p. 4.

<sup>145</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography*.

<sup>146</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography*, p. 140.

<sup>147</sup> Rubin and Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography*, p. 146.

part of the authors that Israel would accept a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

Bar-Ilan's 1993 "Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat"<sup>148</sup> is also written in accordance with the third rule of formation. As is evident from his title, Bar-Ilan argues that a Palestinian state is not in keeping with Israeli national interests. This argument is premised on the assumption that with the start of the Oslo Process a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine has become unavoidable. Bar-Ilan asserts that "the Declaration of Principles makes it clear that the creation of a PLO state in all of the West Bank and Gaza, with minor border adjustments, is inevitable."<sup>149</sup> Of the incipient Palestinian entity, Bar-Ilan says "[t]his, clearly, is a state in the making."<sup>150</sup> In both cases the author does not contemplate that Israel would inhibit or prohibit the making of such a state. In fact, he states that "all that is required for the emergence of a Palestinian state is the withdrawal of Israeli troops."<sup>151</sup> And he assumes that this is only a matter of time. Finally, Bar-Ilan asserts that "[t]he question, then, is not whether the government's plan will lead to a Palestinian state – which Labor no less than Likud has always considered a mortal danger to Israel – but whether Israel and a Palestinian state can coexist in peace."<sup>152</sup> By positing a Palestinian state as foreordained, Bar-Ilan implicitly assumes that Israel will permit the establishment of such a state; he abides by the third discursive rule.

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<sup>148</sup> Bar-Ilan, "Why a Palestinian State Is Still A Mortal Threat," pp. 27-31.

<sup>149</sup> Bar-Ilan, "Why a Palestinian State Is Still A Mortal Threat," p. 28.

<sup>150</sup> Bar-Ilan, "Why a Palestinian State Is Still A Mortal Threat," p. 29.

<sup>151</sup> Bar-Ilan, "Why a Palestinian State Is Still A Mortal Threat," p. 29.

<sup>152</sup> Bar-Ilan, "Why a Palestinian State Is Still A Mortal Threat," p. 29.

I identified Heller's 1983 *A Palestinian State: Implications for Israel* as a text produced in accordance with the third rule of formation in the pre-1993 period. The same author produced truthful knowledge in the post-1993 period by abiding by the same analytic. Heller's "The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View"<sup>153</sup> was written in early 1994. Heller opens his article with the statement that: "[t]hese arrangements [the final status issues] will inevitably include the demarcation of separate national polities for the Jews and Arabs of Palestine."<sup>154</sup> This statement is notable for its concomitant clarity and opaqueness. It mobilizes the language of inevitability as Bar-Ilan did; the idea that the outcome of the arrangements is unavoidable is clear. The statement is opaque regarding what the inevitable outcome will be however. The phrase "separate national polities" is not synonymous with "state". In fact, the statement reads, as do significant portions of the text, as though the author went to great linguistic lengths to speak of something other than a Palestinian state. These efforts are belied by his statement that

[a]ll these [final status issues] are intrinsically subsumed by the issue of a Palestinian state, and though the substantive outcome of negotiations is neither foreordained nor even rigidly constrained, that both sides are committed to discuss these issues means that a Palestinian state is essentially what they will be negotiating.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Mark A. Heller, "The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View," *Current History* 93, no. 580 (1994): pp. 56-61.

<sup>154</sup> Heller, "The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View," p. 56.

<sup>155</sup> Heller, "The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View," p. 60.

What Heller speaks of only opaquely earlier in his piece is made clearer by this statement, namely a Palestinian state. Of course, in the same statement he also now denies that this state is unavoidable or predestined.

The tensions, or contradictions, of the Heller text aside, it must be recognized that Heller assumes that Israel will permit the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel will be more or less inclined to accept a certain kind of Palestinian state<sup>156</sup>, according to Heller, but it is not assumed to be ideationally opposed to such a state. In other words, the author understands that with the start of the Oslo Process Israel began negotiating what kind of Palestinian state would be established in mandate Palestine, not whether a Palestinian state would be established. Heller produced his text in accordance with the third rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Kelman's 1999 "Building A Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations"<sup>157</sup> is another example of truthful knowledge premised on the assumption that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. This text is characterized by both tentativeness and conviction. For example, the author states that "some of the DOP's features created a clear opening for a Palestinian state ... [b]ut it did not *guarantee* an independent Palestinian state."<sup>158</sup> And similarly that "[t]here was no commitment on Israel's part that the final outcome would take the form of an

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<sup>156</sup> Heller, "The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View," p. 60.

<sup>157</sup> Kelman, "Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," pp. 101-115.

<sup>158</sup> Kelman, "Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," p. 102.

independent Palestinian state, but the recognition of the PLO and some of the terms of the DOP clearly pointed in that direction.”<sup>159</sup> Kelman’s tentativeness is evident in that while stating that a Palestinian state was not assured he did identify it as a possibility. The author’s conviction surrounding the realization of this possibility is made more evident when Kelman asserts that “[t]he very fact that a Palestinian state is now being talked about by elements on the Israeli right underlines the inevitability and growing legitimacy of a two-state solution based on territorial compromise.”<sup>160</sup> Like Bar-Ilan and Heller before him Kelman mobilizes the language of inevitability suggesting that nothing could preclude this eventuality.

Now, Kelman seemingly contradicts his own assertion regarding the inevitability of a Palestinian state when discussing then Prime Minister Netanyahu’s policies. Kelman surmises that in negotiations Netanyahu was offering Palestinians “a limited autonomy in Gaza and several West Bank enclaves, excluded from Jerusalem, and heavily dependent on Israel.”<sup>161</sup> He continues:

[e]ven if this entity were to be called a state, it would lack the geographical contiguity, the control over its population and resources, and all of the attributes of sovereignty, viability, and security that an independent state requires. Moreover, such a state would not solve the central problem of the Palestinian people, which is their lack of citizenship – a fundamental human right in the modern world. It would

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<sup>159</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 103.

<sup>160</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 108.

<sup>161</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 108.

in effect be a set of Bantustans offering only the pretense of citizenship, without the capacity to protect the population or meet its needs.<sup>162</sup>

According to Kelman, Netanyahu was offering the Palestinians a state in name only.

Kelman's statements only appear contradictory. In fact, his statement of conviction regarding the inevitability of a Palestinian state actually follows his review of Netanyahu's policies and is, in turn, followed by the statement: "[o]ne must be clear about the nature of the Palestinian state that will emerge from the final negotiations and its precise relationship to Israel."<sup>163</sup> Both of his statements are clearly declarative – a Palestinian state will emerge.

How can Kelman's declarations be reconciled with the policies and outcomes he ascribes to Netanyahu? Phrased differently, how can Kelman still declare a Palestinian state inevitable when he recognizes that Netanyahu's policies are foreclosing on this eventuality? Kelman can do so because he individualizes the policies to Netanyahu and his government. In fact, Netanyahu is represented as an aberration as regards negotiations with the Palestinians.

According to Kelman:

[t]he approach to the peace process of the current Israeli government is qualitatively different from that of the previous government. Netanyahu has not made the strategic decision to end the conflict with a historic compromise based on mutual recognition. He has not accepted the Oslo agreement's implication that Israeli will yield territory and

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<sup>162</sup> Kelman, "Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," p. 108.

<sup>163</sup> Kelman, "Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," p. 108.

control to an independent Palestinian state at the end of successful negotiations.<sup>164</sup>

Kelman subscribes to the false dichotomy between Labor and Likud which sees the Labor Party under Rabin and Peres defecting from the Zionist consensus (recall that Jamal assesses the Beilin-Eitan Agreement as a document demonstrating “the comprehensiveness of the Israeli national narrative”<sup>165</sup>) on the impossibility of a Palestinian state in Palestine and Likud as obscurantist aberrations on the march to peace; it is Netanyahu specifically or the Likud Party more generally that will not permit a Palestinian state. Kelman does not generalize Netanyahu’s policies to long-established and persistent Jewish Agency and Israeli practices. Kelman can reconcile his declarations with what he sees in Netanyahu’s policies because he assumes that the Labor Party will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. While Kelman’s assumption is more specific involving the Israeli political party that would permit a Palestinian state in Palestine, it is still the assumption of the third rule of formation.

Shlaim’s subscription to this analytic is more implicit than that of the other authors identified in this corpus. He does not state explicitly that a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine will follow from the Oslo Process, thereby accepting that Israel would permit the establishment of such as state, though his language and the sense of his texts suggest that this will be the case. Shlaim’s

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<sup>164</sup> Kelman, “Building a Sustainable Peace: The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 106.

<sup>165</sup> Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” p.47.



1994 “The Oslo Accord”<sup>166</sup> is representative of the breakthrough reading of the DOPOISGA. In this text he states that “[t]he shape of the permanent settlement is not specified in the DOP but is left to negotiations between the two parties during the second stage.”<sup>167</sup> Following almost immediately on this statement he observes that “Rabin was strongly opposed to an independent Palestinian state but he favored an eventual Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.”<sup>168</sup> In other words, Rabin was a proponent of the Jordanian option. These statements would seem to indicate that Shlaim does not assume that Israel under Rabin’s leadership would permit a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. However, Shlaim also declares that “[t]he historic reconciliation was based on a historic compromise: acceptance of the principle of the partition of Palestine.”<sup>169</sup> In this discourse partition means a Jewish and a Palestinian state in Palestine; it does not mean a single binational state in Palestine, it does not mean Israel and autonomy for Palestinians, it means two states. In mobilizing the language of partition, and in the next paragraph referencing UN partition in 1947, Shlaim implies that the DOPOISGA is based on the idea of a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

Shlaim’s 2000 text entitled *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*<sup>170</sup> is characterized by this same implicit subscription to the third rule of formation. Shlaim makes several statements and observations that seemingly deny this

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<sup>166</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): pp. 24-40.

<sup>167</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” p. 34.

<sup>168</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” pp. 34.

<sup>169</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” pp. 26.

<sup>170</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

subscription. For example, Shlaim notes that “[t]hey [Israeli negotiators in committees formed as a result of the DOPOISGA] wanted to repackage rather than end Israel’s military occupation.”<sup>171</sup> He also observes that “Rabin envisaged a gradual disengagement from those parts of the occupied territories that were not strictly necessary for either Israeli security or Israeli colonization, ending with the formation of a demilitarized entity.”<sup>172</sup> Such statements, particularly his acknowledgement that Rabin in initiating the Oslo Process did not envision a Palestinian state as the outcome, would indicate that Shlaim did not expect Israel to permit the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, they should prompt him to foreclose on this potentiality.

However, other of Shlaim’s statements demonstrate that the author could foresee a Palestinian state. Shlaim states that “the Declaration of Principles promised to set in motion a process for ending Israeli rule over the two million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.”<sup>173</sup> He mobilizes, verbatim from his 1994 article, the language of partition and the attendant idea of two states in mandate Palestine.<sup>174</sup> Elsewhere in the text he also explains that “it [the DOPOISGA] recognized the PLO, it conceded that the Palestinian people had a legitimate right to self-government, and it began the process of partitioning western Palestine.”<sup>175</sup> He states that “the Oslo accords, which though not committing Israel to the idea of an independent Palestinian state, pointed in that

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<sup>171</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.524.

<sup>172</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 546.

<sup>173</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 517.

<sup>174</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 519.

<sup>175</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 567.

direction.”<sup>176</sup> The phrase “pointing in the direction of a Palestinian state” is nearly identical to one of Kelman’s previously cited statements, and Kelman produced knowledge in accordance with this third analytic.

Furthermore, Shlaim states that “[t]he logic of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was founded on incremental momentum toward a Palestinian state. This was not stated openly. But the basic premise underlying the Declaration of Principles was that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had to be effected gradually.”<sup>177</sup> He also contends that the Oslo Process did not fail. Rather, argues Shlaim, the process was undermined by the policies of Netanyahu’s Likud Party and its coalition partners.<sup>178</sup> Now, admittedly the suggestion that a Palestinian state would be an incremental outgrowth of the Oslo Process is not as forceful as assertions deploying the language of inevitability. However, his contention that the process deteriorated as a result of actions ascribed specifically to the person of Prime Minister Netanyahu is in keeping with the argument of Kelman – if it had not been for Netanyahu the Oslo Process would have culminated in the establishment of a Palestinian state in Palestine.

Shlaim himself cites evidence that should preclude him from entertaining the idea of a sovereign Palestinian state – that such a state is not specified as the outcome of negotiations; that Israeli negotiators merely wanted to reorganize the occupation, not end it; that Rabin did not envision a Palestinian state; and that Netanyahu’s negotiating and settlement policies differed little from those of Rabin

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<sup>176</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 575.

<sup>177</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, pp. 599-600.

<sup>178</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 603.

and Peres. Yet, Shlaim still asserts that the logic of the process involved a Palestinian state. This is, quite simply, not the case. In fact, his own evidence indicates quite clearly that this was never the case.

Shlaim does not so much assume that Israel will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine as he *believes* that it will. In the face of countervailing evidence, Shlaim has faith that Israel would permit the establishment of such a state. Like the authors before him writing in accordance with the third rule of formation, Shlaim is confident that Israel will permit the establishment of Palestine.

In the foreword to *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* Segev states categorically that “[i]t [Israel] always said it would never agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Now it does.”<sup>179</sup> If we accept that by “Palestinian state” Segev means a sovereign state in mandate Palestine Segev’s first statement is accurate; his second, groundless. In writing the foreword for a collection of dissenting essays, Segev paradoxically conformed to the third discursive rule of formation. To not put too fine a point on it: there is no grounding for the assumption that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine in the post-1993 period. There is nothing in any of the Oslo Agreements to support the assumption. Furthermore, Israeli policy since the start of the Oslo Process clearly indicates that such a state would not emerge from the negotiations.

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<sup>179</sup> Tom Segev, “Foreword” *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin eds. (New York: The New Press, 2002), p. xii.

*Institutionalization of Discursive Rule*

The DOPOISGA specifically and the Oslo Agreements more generally nowhere state that the negotiations will culminate in the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. In fact, a close reading of the agreements demonstrates that the Palestinian Council, the only quasi-state institution other than the Palestinian police established by the Oslo Process, was increasingly marginalized to the point of obscurity by the agreements. In other words, as the Oslo Process came to be constituted by more agreements the assumption that the process would culminate in the establishment of a Palestinian state, groundless as it was at the outset, became even more so.

Recall again the aim of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations as stated in Article I of the DOPOISGA:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the “Council”) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 117.

This article is important for what it says and what it does not say. The article references the Palestinian Council as well as Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The article is silent on UN General Assembly Resolution 181.

The Palestinian Council was authorized by the DOPOISGA and constituted, in the sense that powers and responsibilities (significantly more of the latter than the former) were transferred to it, by the Oslo II Agreement. As the only quasi-state institution belonging to Palestinians other than the mandated police force, the Council is a relatively prominent aspect of the DOPOISGA and Oslo II. The establishment of the Council is, in fact, the only stated aim of the Oslo negotiations. From this place of relative prominence in the early agreements, references to the Council dwindle with each successive agreement to the point that it is mentioned only in one instance in the Wye River Memorandum.

References to the Council in later agreements are replaced with the language of the “Palestinian side”. This language was introduced in the 27 August 1995 Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities and comes to prominence in the Hebron Protocol and Wye River Memorandum. For example, where the DOPOISGA states that “the Council will establish a strong police force”<sup>181</sup> and “[t]he Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it”<sup>182</sup> the Wye River Memorandum is characterized by statements such as: “[t]he Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence against both

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<sup>181</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 119.

<sup>182</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 119.

sides.”<sup>183</sup> The institutionalized Council is displaced in the agreements by the more nebulous “Palestinian side”; an established, elected body was marginalized in favor of a more abstract and obscure position.

As the agreements in the Oslo Process mounted, the only quasi-state institution the Palestinians had as a result of the process was marginalized. As the Oslo Process continued, the meager trappings of statehood the Palestinians had obtained were literally written out of the agreements. Not only is “Palestinian state” not mentioned in any of the Oslo Agreements, but moreover the only non-coercive state-like apparatus that could have served as a stepping stone to Palestinian statehood was marginalized. It is this marginalization that should have given authors abiding by the third rule of formation cause for thought – as the process continued Palestinians were moving further away from statehood, not closer to it. The evolutionary determinism inherent in the American liberal argument following from the original Camp David Accord was turned on its head.

Second, Article I of the DOPOISGA puts at the center of the Oslo Process Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Equally, if not more, important, the article is silent on UN General Assembly Resolution 181. In fact, Resolution 181 was intentionally *not* referenced; it was excluded. Recall again, that Resolutions 242 and 338 make no reference to Palestinians. Moreover, they certainly make no reference to a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Recall also, that UN Resolution 181 was the partition resolution that called for the establishment

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<sup>183</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “The Wye River Memorandum,” Web page, [accessed 10 May 2000]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

of a Jewish and an Arab state in mandate Palestine. The drafters of the DOPOISGA could have, if they had been so inclined, been explicit that a Palestinian state would emerge from the negotiations by referencing Resolution 181. This resolution was excluded because to be in accordance with it would have required the establishment of a Palestinian state. Something significantly less than a state can follow from the Oslo negotiations and the parties can still be in accordance with resolutions 242 and 338.

The Oslo Process institutionalized Israel's denial of a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. In establishing the Palestinian Council and a strong police force responsible exclusively for controlling the Palestinian population the DOPOISGA institutionalized Palestinian autonomy. This is evident in the title of the original agreement: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. It is an agreement on interim self-government. This fact is obscured by the Oslo Peace Process discourse. As you will note from previous citations attributed to Bar-Ilan, Kelman and Shlaim, authors in this discourse reduce the title to "Declaration of Principles" or the abbreviated acronym "DOP". They make no reference to the fact that the principles pertain to "Self-Government Arrangements". Furthermore, such non-references also obscure the fact that the process was to be temporally limited. These two points are particularly interesting given Begin's statement after signing the Camp David Accords, previously cited, that Israel would have postponed making a claim to sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip for an interim period of five years during which time the Palestinians would enjoy autonomy. At the end of this five



year period of autonomy, said Begin, the Palestinians could accept Israel's claim or have their autonomy continued indefinitely.<sup>184</sup>

By abbreviating the agreement's title the authors make more plausible the assumption of the third rule of formation. Referring to the "Declaration of Principles" rather than the "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" silences the obvious reference to the elements that openly contradict or invalidate the assumption regarding eventual Palestinian statehood. Moreover, it also occults the fact that Palestinian autonomy was not envisioned by Israel as a stepping stone to statehood, but rather an interminable condition. I have deployed the acronym DOPOISGA throughout as a means of focusing attention on these silenced elements and not abiding by this third rule of formation.

Lustick argues that the DOPOISGA was intended as a loose political framework, rather than a legal codex, that would provide the parties with latitude enough to pursue reconciliation.<sup>185</sup> According to this interpretation, a declaration regarding Palestinian statehood would have made the agreement too rigid to be workable. Barnett contends that Rabin's practices and policies were aimed at creating "a cultural space in Israeli politics in which a withdrawal from the territories became desirable and legitimate."<sup>186</sup> It stands to reason in this case that Israeli society had not been properly prepared to accept a clear indication that a

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<sup>184</sup> William B Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.; Berkeley: Brookings Institution; University of California Press, 1993), p. 326.

<sup>185</sup> Ian S. Lustick, "The Oslo Agreement As an Obstacle to Peace," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, no. 1 (1997): pp. 61-66.

<sup>186</sup> Michael Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 1 (1999): p. 5.

sovereign Palestinian state would emerge at the end of the Oslo Process. First, Israeli society would be accustomed to the idea of territorial compromise and later a cultural space would be opened that would allow for a declaration regarding statehood.

Such arguments are not borne out by the historical evidence however. More generally, the third rule of formation is not borne out by the historical evidence. Israeli policy since the start of the Oslo Process clearly indicates that a Palestinian state was not the envisioned endpoint of the negotiations, at least from the Israeli perspective (and given extant power relations, this is the only perspective that mattered). The exclusion of Resolution 181 from Article I of the DOPOISGA or any statement pertaining to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine as an intended aim of the negotiations are not explained by the political expediency of latitude and room to maneuver or a need to create cultural space. Quite simply, the Oslo Agreements contain no references to a Palestinian state because Israel never intended for such a state to be realized.

### *Persistence of Practice*

As in the pre-1993 period, there was Zionist consensus regarding the impossibility of a Palestinian state in mandate Palestine in the post-1993 period. This is obscured by authors subscribing to the false dichotomy between the Labor and Likud parties. Barnett subscribed to this false dichotomy saying that “[t]he contrast between Rabin and former Prime Minister Shamir could not be more

stark.”<sup>187</sup> Kelman subscribed to the same erroneous dichotomy and identified Netanyahu as an aberration whose policies differed significantly from those of Rabin and Peres before him. In both cases Rabin is conceived of as a dissenter from the established Zionist consensus. In the case of Kelman, Netanyahu represented a return to this consensus.

Recall that Begin accepted an autonomy arrangement for the “Arabs of the territories” in the Camp David Agreement. Recall further that according to Kelman, Netanyahu offered the Palestinians “limited autonomy in Gaza and several West Bank enclaves, excluded from Jerusalem, and heavily dependent on Israel.”<sup>188</sup> Rabin’s 1992 election platform, Israel’s negotiating position in Oslo, Rabin’s defense of the DOPOISGA and Rabin’s vision of the permanent settlement with the Palestinians all indicate that Rabin was no dissenter from the Zionist consensus. He was, and remained, opposed to a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Ideationally, Rabin was *sympatico* with Begin, Shamir and Netanyahu.

“During the election campaign [of 1992] Rabin promised that if elected he would try to reach agreement on Palestinian autonomy within six to nine months.”<sup>189</sup> According to Dajani, Rabin’s Labor Party platform “categorically rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state ‘west of the Jordan River’.”<sup>190</sup> In

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<sup>187</sup> Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” p. 20.

<sup>188</sup> Kelman, “The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations,” p. 108.

<sup>189</sup> Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” pp. 28.

<sup>190</sup> Dajani, “The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis,” p. 21.

fact, Rabin's Labor Party still preferred the Jordanian option in 1992. Rabin promised to pursue an *autonomy* agreement with the Palestinians. He did not promise to pursue an agreement whereby Palestinians would obtain statehood. His preferred option was what Khalidi called "a Bantustan 'federal' formula under a Hashemite dressing."<sup>191</sup>

This election pledge was clearly articulated, and realized, by Uri Savir.

Recall the Israeli negotiator's statement in Oslo:

We will not yield on security for Israelis. We will not make you responsible for it. Why should you be? We have been fighting for a century. We're just now beginning to build mutual trust. We will not recognize your national rights because that means assenting to a state. We must distinguish between these talks on autonomy and subsequent negotiations on a permanent settlement.<sup>192</sup>

Clearly, Israel had no intention of allowing the Oslo Process to midwife into existence a Palestinian state. Rabin maintained this position when defending the DOPOISGA in the Knesset in 1993. Said Rabin: "I am an advocate of the Allon Plan ... I have not deviated from my personal commitment to the principles of the Allon Plan;"<sup>193</sup> "[w]e are prepared to be party to establishing a reality whereby the internal Palestinian security will be in the Palestinians' hands;"<sup>194</sup> and "[t]here

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<sup>191</sup> Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs* 56, no. 4 (1978): p. 701.

<sup>192</sup> Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998), pp.46-47.

<sup>193</sup> Dajani, "The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis," p. 21.

<sup>194</sup> Dajani, "The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis," p. 21.

is no commitment to the nature of the permanent solution.”<sup>195</sup> To be an advocate of the Allon Plan<sup>196</sup> is to support Palestinian autonomy and to oppose Palestinian statehood. To allow Palestinians to police themselves is similarly to support autonomy, not statehood.

In an interesting twist, interesting because the author still assumes after making the following statements that Israel will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine, Bar-Ilan provides further evidence of Israel’s enduring opposition to a Palestinian state in the post-DOPOISGA period. According to Bar-Ilan, “Peres and Rabin keep assuring Israelis that the new Palestinian entity will not be a sovereign state. Like former Secretary of State James Baker, Israeli ministers like to call the territories’ ultimate status ‘something more than autonomy and less than a state’.”<sup>197</sup> Rabin stated openly and repeatedly that a Palestinian state would not issue forth from the Oslo Process.

Such statements were made in the immediate post-September 1993 period. Two years later and a month prior to his assassination Rabin had not changed his position; he remained an adherent to the Allon Plan and its abrogation of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine until his death. According to Shlaim:

[i]n the course of his [5 October 1995] speech, Rabin outlined his thinking for the permanent settlement: military presence but no annexation of the Jordan Valley, retention

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<sup>195</sup> Dajani, “The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis,” p. 21.

<sup>196</sup> The Allon Plan is explained comprehensively in chapter seven.

<sup>197</sup> Bar-Ilan, “Why a Palestinian State Is Still A Mortal Threat,” p. 28.

of the large blocks of settlements near the 1967 border, preservation of a unified Jerusalem with respect for the rights of the other religions, and a Palestinian entity that would be less than a state and whose territory would be demilitarized.<sup>198</sup>

A less than state - clearly Rabin endorsed the same type of autonomy scheme as did his Likud predecessors and follower. A demilitarized less than state, the West Bank portion of which would be surrounded by the Israeli military to its west in Israel and to its east (between the less than state and Jordan) in the Jordan Valley - Rabin also expected this entity to realize conditions intended to assuage Israeli security concerns. Rabin morphed onto the Palestinian entity the provisions authors abiding by the third rule of formation expected would have to be met for Israel to accept the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. Again evidencing a facet of Zionist thought unaffected by the initiation of the Oslo Process, Rabin would not permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine; no matter how qualified the state, no matter what conditions were met or concerns assuaged.

The 1997 “National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians”, the document that Jamal said demonstrates “the comprehensiveness of the Israeli national narrative”<sup>199</sup>, further evidences the persistence of Israel’s denial of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine – substantively it is nearly identical to Rabin’s 1995 vision of a permanent settlement – and the erroneous nature of the third analytic. Recall that

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<sup>198</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 528.

<sup>199</sup> Jamal, “The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,” p.47.

the agreement rejects an Israeli return to the 1967 borders and states categorically that Israel's settlements will come under Israeli sovereignty. Of particular note to the present discussion the agreement states that "[t]he Jordan Valley will be a special security zone, and Israeli army forces will be posted along the Jordan."<sup>200</sup>

Furthermore, under the heading "Security Components" the agreement makes the following points:

1. The Palestinian entity will be demilitarized and it will have no army.
2. The Jordan River will be the security border of Israel. Secure crossing conditions will be regulated by IDF forces in proportion to need and to the changing conditions within the Palestinian entity, affecting the estimated need for the IDF on the borders.
3. The Palestinian entity will establish a strong police force to meet the needs of internal security.
4. No foreign army may be stationed within the boundaries of the Palestinian entity.
5. The security forces of Israel and the Palestinian entity will work to deter and foil acts of terrorism aimed against Jews and Arabs.
6. The Palestinian entity will not sign any military agreement or any other agreement that includes a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Israel, the security of its citizens, or the integrity of their property.<sup>201</sup>

The section entitled "Status of the Palestinian Entity and Limits on Its Sovereignty" states that "[i]f the Palestinian entity subjects itself to the limits presented in this document, its self-determination will be recognized. According

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<sup>200</sup> "Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, 'National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,'" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 3 (1997): p. 161.

<sup>201</sup> "Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, 'National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians,'" p. 161.

to an alternate opinion it will be regarded as an enlarged autonomy, and according to another opinion, as a state.”<sup>202</sup>

Now, some might suggest that the fact an Israeli national agreement broached the issue of a Palestinian state represents a fundamental shift in the Israeli national narrative. This is not the case however. According to the Beilin-Eitan Agreement the envisioned Palestinian entity would be surrounded by the Israeli army to the north, south, east and west, demilitarized, have its borders controlled by the Israeli army and enjoy limited sovereignty. As described, this is not a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. It is, even according to the forthcoming opinion articulated in the agreement, a state in name only. The National Agreement is merely a restating of the unchanged national narrative.

In addition to restating the unchanged Israeli national narrative regarding a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine, the Beilin-Eitan Agreement also, more so than Rabin’s election platform or speeches, exposes the error of producing truthful knowledge in accordance with the third rule of formation. In the pre-1993 period authors such as Plascov and Heller suggested that a Palestinian state would need to be demilitarized (point #1 in the agreement), offer Israel security guarantees (points #2 and 5) and accept restrictions on military relations with other states (points #4 and 6). The authors were right to assume that the Palestinians would have to realize conditions assuaging Israeli security concerns. They were wrong, however to assume that in exchange Israel would

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<sup>202</sup> “Doc. B2 Labor and Likud Knesset Members, ‘National Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement With the Palestinians’,” p. 161.



permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in Palestine. Israel would permit only autonomy.

Israel's denial of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine persists into the present period. At first blush the third rule of formation, the assumption that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine, seems to be proven right by the Clinton proposals of late 2000 and Sharon's Herzliya speech in 2003. Phrased differently, these texts appear as deviations from the Zionist consensus and an abandonment of the Zionist practice of denying a Palestinian state in Palestine. This is chiefly because both texts move beyond the Beilin-Eitan Agreement in their explicit acceptance of a Palestinian state. Ultimately, however, both texts conform to the Zionist policy of denying a sovereign Palestinian state.

After the end of the Camp David negotiations of 2000, President Clinton delivered proposals for continuing negotiations to Palestinian and Israeli representatives on 23 December, the result of which he said would be a sovereign and viable state for the Palestinian people. The proposals were grouped under the headings "Territory", "Security", "Jerusalem", "Refugees" and "End of Conflict". The section on security deserves quoting at length.

Security should be provided by 'international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent.' 'My best judgment is that the Israeli withdrawal should be completed over 36 months and that the international force be gradually introduced over the same period. A small Israeli presence may remain in 6 locations under the authority of the international force for another 36 months.' This presence can be reduced if regional developments reduce threat to Israel.

- 3 Israeli EW [Early Warning] facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. These facilities may be subject to renewal after 10 years, and any change in their status should be mutually agreed.
- Emergency deployment: The sides should develop map of locations and routes. A possible definition of emergency: ‘imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel’s national security of a military nature that requires the declaration of a state of emergency.’ ...
- Militarization: ‘I understand that the Israeli position is that the Palestinian state should be demilitarized, and that the Palestinians talk of a state with limited arms. I suggest a ‘non-militarized State’ and an international force for border security and deterrence.’<sup>203</sup>

According to Clinton’s ideas the Palestinian state would not control its own borders, be surrounded militarily by Israel indefinitely (mutual consent and mutual agreement provide Israel with a veto to any change to the status quo) and be non-militarized. Furthermore, Israel would have the right to move through the state militarily. Despite Clinton’s assurances, this would not constitute a sovereign or viable Palestinian state.

In 2003 at the Herzliya Conference Prime Minister Sharon delivered a speech outlining his views of a Palestinian state. Said Sharon:

This Palestinian state will be completely demilitarized. It will be allowed to maintain lightly armed police and interior forces to ensure civil order. Israel will continue to control all entries and exits to the Palestinian state, will command its airspace, and not allow it to form alliances with Israel’s enemies.<sup>204</sup>

Ideationally, this is, of course, nothing but a restating of the Beilin-Eitan Agreement, which itself was a restating of Rabin’s policy. Practically, Sharon

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<sup>203</sup> “Doc. D1 President Bill Clinton, Proposals for a Final Settlement,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (2001): p. 172.

<sup>204</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories* 13, no. 1 (2003): p.3.

realizes this vision through his settlement policies and the construction of Israel's "security fence".<sup>205</sup>

While Clinton and Sharon invoked the idea of a Palestinian state, they did not deviate from the Jewish Agency/Israeli practice of denying a Palestinian state. The states they adumbrated would not be sovereign. In the pre-1993 period no leader of the Jewish Agency or Israeli Prime Minister ever conceived of the possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. In the post-1993 period Sharon speaks of a state, but one that is so qualified, so conditional, so provisional as to be empty. His state is still 'something less than a state'. Sharon, like Rabin before him and all Israeli Prime Ministers before him, denies Palestinians a sovereign state in mandate Palestine. As Halper says: "[n]o one who followed Israel's relentless expansion of its occupation on the ground would have detected the slightest hint that Israel had ever even contemplated a viable Palestinian state."<sup>206</sup>

This section described the persistence of the third rule of formation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations through the Oslo Process. This analytic requires that authors assume that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine provided certain conditions were met by Palestinians. Reading the DOPOISGA and speeches of Israeli leaders, negotiating positions and the Beilin-Eitan Agreement I also explained that there is no grounding for this assumption. Finally, I also demonstrated that the Israeli

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<sup>205</sup> The issue of Israel's "security fence" will be examined in chapter eight.

<sup>206</sup> Jeff Halper, "The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control," in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin eds. (New York: The New Press, 2000), p.36.

policy of denying a sovereign Palestinian state persists into the contemporary period. This policy was institutionalized in the Clinton proposals and dictates Sharon's vision of a permanent settlement.

### *Conclusion*

In chapter four I identified three rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period. In this chapter I examined the same three analytics in the post-1993 period. This examination evidenced my claim that these rules have, indeed, persisted into the present and continue to govern the production of truthful knowledge bearing on Palestinian-Israeli relations. Furthermore, I also demonstrated that these rules were institutionalized in the Oslo Process and that the Zionist policies associated with these rules – denial of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine for example – have also persisted into the present period.

In the next chapter I move from an archaeological examination of analytics of truth to a genealogical analysis of persistent practices.

## Chapter Seven – Persistent Israeli Practices

In the preceding four chapters I conducted an archaeological study of the analytics governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. In this chapter I conduct a genealogical analysis of non-discursive practices defining Palestinian-Israeli relations. More specifically, I compare diachronically three Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians in the periods 1967-1993 and 1993-2002. The practices I compare are: Israel's settlement enterprise, Israeli attempts to produce "acceptable" interlocutors and Israel's proffering of initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

These non-discursive practices are the effects of the analytics of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. For example, if Israel is not a conquest movement (silence #2) that has denied Palestinian nationhood and this nation's right to self-determination (silence #3), but rather a state that will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine provided it begins with autonomous status (rule #3) then settlement (practice #1) is benign and an enterprise that will not foreclose on the prospects of a Palestinian state. Similarly, if the truth is that Israel has not denied Palestinian nationhood and deemed Palestinians irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine (silence #3), and that Israel has historically been conciliatory only to be greeted with intransigent rejectionism (rule #1), then it can determine its interlocutors (practice #2). Finally, if Israel is by nature conciliatory (rule #1) and will permit

the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state (rule #3), then it can offer, will be inclined to offer, initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation (practice #3).

My thesis is that persistence of silences and rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians (re-)produced the conditions for violence between Palestinians and Israel. The genealogical analysis I conduct in this chapter substantiates my claim that Israeli practices persisted despite the Oslo Process “breakthrough.”

Recall very briefly three tenets of genealogy: 1) interpretations are not natural; 2) changing interpretations are imposed upon persistent practices; and 3) imposed interpretations serve political interests. Genealogy disaggregates practices from their meanings conceptualizing the relation between the two not as inherent but rather contingent with the former antedating the latter; understands practices as persistent and meanings and interpretations as fluid, ephemeral ascriptions and the products of shifting relations of domination and subordination; and recognizes interpretation as a political act committed within specific configurations of power relations that serves to re-enforce or challenge the configurations. In chapter two I outlined the political interests served by the dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process; I showed how the PLO, Israel and the U.S. benefited from interpretations of the Oslo Process as a peace process. In this chapter I study persistent practices.

My diachronic comparison develops in two stages. First, I outline practices or procedures executed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since their

occupation by Israel in June 1967 until 13 September 1993. Specifically, I concentrate on three practices that have defined Israeli occupation of the territories – the building of settlements and the transfer of population into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, attempts to create alternative power centres (alternative to the PLO) so as to produce interlocutors more acceptable to Israel, and initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the Israeli occupation. Second, I examine the execution of these three practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1993 and 2002 – following the initiation of the Oslo Process. This comparison demonstrates that despite the start of the Oslo Process, Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories have persisted.

### *Pre-1993 Non-Discursive Practices*

In this section I examine the three practices as executed by Israel in the period 1967-1993 starting with settlement. Israel started its illegal settlement enterprise in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem immediately after their occupation in 1967.<sup>1</sup> Since then, both Labour- and Likud-led governments pursued policies of establishing infrastructure and institutions in, and transferring the Israel's Jewish population, to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

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<sup>1</sup> In September 1967 Kfar Etzion became the first Israeli settlement established in the Occupied Territories.

## *Settlement*

Early Labour governments established settlements according to the Allon Plan. This meant that settlements were built in the Jordan Valley and the southern West Bank. By the time Likud won its first election in 1977, Labour had built almost thirty settlements in the West Bank and transferred some 4,500 Israelis.<sup>2</sup> An additional 50,000 Israelis had been transferred to settlements in or around East Jerusalem.

After 1977, Likud started building settlements in the mountain strip which borders the Jordan Valley to the east. This was in accordance with Israel's official "hundred thousand plan"<sup>3</sup> and unofficial Drobless and Sharon approaches.<sup>4</sup> For the first time settlements were established in or around Palestinian populations centers such as Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron.<sup>5</sup> From 1977 to 1992, settlements were built in the Western Hills which border the

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<sup>2</sup> Yehezkel Lein, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank* (Jerusalem: B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 2002), p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> This plan was published by Israel's Ministry of Agriculture (Ariel Sharon was Minister of Agriculture) and the World Zionist Organization in 1983. This was the government's 'master plan' for settlements. It envisioned increasing the Jewish population transferred to the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) to 100,000 by 1986. See Lein, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, pp. 8-11.

<sup>4</sup> The Drobless plan was produced by the head of the World Zionist's Organization Settlement Division – Matitiyahu Drobless. It sought to increase the number of Jews living in the West Bank. According to this plan Israel's civilian population was to be transferred to the West Bank's central mountain range. The Sharon Plan is named after the then Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon. This plan was very similar to the Drobless plan. Sharon's plan called for the annexation of more West Bank territory than the Drobless plan. Only an isolated number of Palestinian population centers would not be annexed by Israel. See Lein, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, pp. 9-11.

<sup>5</sup> Lein, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 14.



West Bank's mountain strip to its west and the Green Line (the defacto border between Israel and Jordan following the War of 1948) to its east as well as in the Gaza Strip.

The Foundation for Middle East Peace establishes the total number of settlers in Gaza and the West Bank at 109,784 with an additional 141,000 settlers living around East Jerusalem as of 1992.<sup>6</sup> B'Tselem, the Israeli information center for human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, produced a report on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 2002. A copy of the table tracking settlements and settlers in the West Bank is reproduced below in Table Five.

Table 5. Israeli Settlement 1976-1993

Year	Number of Settlements	Population (in thousands)
1976	20	3.2
1977	31	4.4
1978	39	7.4
1979	43	10
1980	53	12.5
1981	68	16.2
1982	73	21
1983	76	22.8
1984	102	35.3
1985	105	44.2
1986	110	51.1
1987	110	57.9
1988	110	63.6
1989	115	69.8
1990	118	78.6
1991	119	90.3
1992	120	100.5
1993	120	110.9

Adapted from *Land Grab – Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p.18.

<sup>6</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: A Guide* SR, no. 9 (2002): p. 6.

Table Five reveals that Israel's settler population in the West Bank doubled four times over a 17 year span (1976-1978, 1978-1981, 1981-1984, and 1984-1990). Concomitant with this increase in transferred populations was a 6 fold increase in the number of settlements established.

This table counts only settlements. It does not track the increase in housing starts within settlements – what Israeli officials define as the “natural growth” of the settlements. Building units within settlements does not increase the number of settlements, but it does allow for the transfer of greater numbers of civilians. A 2000 Peace Now report tracks this statistic for the 4 years preceding the start of the Oslo Process (these numbers include the West Bank – excluding East Jerusalem – and Gaza Strip). Nineteen eighty-nine saw 1,470 housing starts in Israeli settlements; 1990, 1,870 starts; 1991, 7,750 starts; 1992, 6,210; and 1993, 980 housing starts. By the end of 1993 there were 32,750 housing units in Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>7</sup> Between their occupation in 1967 and the initiation of the Oslo process in 1993, Israel relentlessly built settlements in, and transferred parts of its own civilian population to, East Jerusalem, the West bank and Gaza Strip. During this period, Israel expanded and deepened its presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

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<sup>7</sup> Peace Now, “Report on Settlements,” Web page, 4 December 2000 [accessed 7 October 2002]. Available at <http://www.peacenow.org.il/english.asp> (Report is no longer available on the Peace Now web site.).

### *Producing “Acceptable” Interlocutors*

The second practice I study is Israel’s attempts to incubate alternative power centers in the Palestinian polity (alternative to the PLO) and thereby produce “acceptable” interlocutors. The PLO was established in 1964. Arafat was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO in 1969. Since the conclusion of the June 1967 war, and particularly the 1968 battle of Karamah, the PLO has represented Palestinian nationalism. As such, it was an organization anathema to Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PLO was first recognized by Israel with Rabin’s letter to Arafat in September 1993.

As a result of its territorial conquests in 1967, Israel had to devise mechanisms of governing the Palestinian populations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These mechanisms included the notables system, Israeli-run municipal elections, the village leagues, and support for militant Islamists. The first three mechanisms were intended to produce a Palestinian cadre within the territories which would accept Israeli diktats under the guise of “dialogue” and thereby facilitate the Israeli occupation. The last mechanism was intended to fracture the Palestinian polity as a prelude to the ascendance of “moderate” Palestinians who Israel could accept as interlocutors. While the mechanisms differed technically, they were all undergirded by a common practice. This practice was one of creating alternative power centres. Alternative, of course, to the PLO.

The notables system was Israel’s preferred mechanism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1974. This was a classic method of colonial administration. Traditional Palestinian notables from cities such as Hebron or

Ramallah or Jericho functioned as intermediaries between Israel's military administration and the indigenous population. It was publicly known that these individuals had good relations with Israeli authorities. As a result, Palestinians availed themselves of the services of these notables in order to obtain favours. For example, a notable might be asked to intervene in order to secure the issuing of a building permit. This was not a unidirectional relationship however. In return for the favours received by the notables and passed on to the supplicants the notables exercised their political and social influence in the interests of the Israeli authorities. The notables would play a "moderating" role in meetings, discussions and communal activities.

The notables system was a relationship of reciprocity based on vastly asymmetrical power relations. The notables made requests of the Israeli authorities. The Israeli authorities, on the other hand, made demands and issued directives. The requests could be ignored by one partner, the demands and directives could not be ignored by the other partner. This was not a dialogical relationship if dialogue is understood as an equal exchange between interlocutors. Instead, it was a monologue of instructions punctuated by petitions. It was a monologue, however, that Israel could direct at agents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who were not representatives of the PLO. Furthermore, these agents served as local power centres responsible for the administration of a system of rewards and punishments which excluded the PLO.

Once the notables mechanism had lost its efficacy for the Israeli authorities, it was undermined and subsequently dismantled. In its stead the Israeli

military administration offered Palestinians elections in 1976. Chomsky describes these as “relatively free elections ... for municipalities in the West Bank.”<sup>8</sup> What interference there was was committed by Israel. For example, the Israeli authorities expelled two nationalist candidates to ensure the election of more acceptable opponents.<sup>9</sup> Despite these machinations the elections did not produce the desired outcomes for Israel – those elected proved to be “unacceptable.” As Llewellyn remarks in his BBC retrospective: “[c]ivic elections in the occupied territories in the mid-1970s brought Israel an embarrassing roster of insubordinate pro-PLO mayors and councils.”<sup>10</sup>

The 1976 elections were another attempt by the Israeli authorities to establish local power centres. These centres, it was hoped, would undermine the standing of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in the long run render the Organization politically irrelevant, by producing representatives willing to cooperate with the Israeli authorities. In fact, the opposite happened. The PLO did not take a position on the Israeli orchestrated elections. Despite this, while on tour in 1977 Secretary of State Vance was given a letter from the elected mayors of West Bank towns that stated that “the Palestinian people had chosen as its sole representative, irrespective of the place ... the PLO under the leadership of Mr.

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<sup>8</sup> Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed. (Montréal : Black Rose Books, 1984), p.54.

<sup>9</sup> Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed., p. 55.

<sup>10</sup> Tim Llewellyn, “Israel and the Intifada,” *BBC Online Edition*, 23 April 1998, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/israel\\_at\\_50/history/82302.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/israel_at_50/history/82302.stm) (10 July 2002).

Arafat.”<sup>11</sup> The elections did produce local power centres but these power centres failed to marginalize the PLO. Indeed, the elections located in these power centres representatives who recognized the PLO as their representative.

For Israel, the municipal elections mechanism was an utter failure. So much so in fact, that within 6 years all but one of the elected mayors of major towns had been dismissed by the Israeli authorities. This failure did not mean, however, that the underlying practice was being abandoned.

Starting in 1981, then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon set up mechanisms called Village Leagues in the villages of the Occupied Territories. The leagues were headed by an Israeli appointee – Mustafa Dudin – and received substantial amounts of financial support from the military administration. The leagues were one prong of a two-pronged approach that was coordinated by the military administration. The military administration attacked indigenously developed social institutions such as unions, universities and municipal councils.<sup>12</sup> The Village Leagues, in turn, were proffered as alternatives to these under-funded and harassed institutions. This policy was intended to undermine established institutions in the Occupied Territories and create a dependency on institutions manipulated by the Israeli authorities.

The Village Leagues are yet another example of an Israeli attempt to produce a cadre of pliable negotiators among the Palestinian population. The difference between the leagues and the previous mechanisms was that the former

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<sup>11</sup> Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed., p.55.

<sup>12</sup> Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed., p. 60.

was completely disconnected from Palestinian civil society. The notables and elected mayors had some standing in Palestinian society and as such were nominally legitimate representatives; Dudin and the leagues were foisted on the populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and assigned “the role of representative of the Palestinians in the occupied territories for dealings with Israel.”<sup>13</sup> This difference, however, was only a matter of degree involving the presence and role played by the Israeli puppeteer. The leagues most blatantly revealed the machinations of this puppeteer. The former Chief of Israeli Intelligence offered the most honest and unaffected description of the leagues: “the Village Leagues established a network of quislings to serve the purpose of the [Israeli] government.”<sup>14</sup>

The Village Leagues were also the most explicit attempt to date to create power centres alternative to the PLO. Chomsky states that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip recognized in the establishment of the leagues an Israeli attempt to undermine the PLO’s authority.<sup>15</sup> An even more straightforward articulation of the intended end of the leagues is offered by a report on the main events and issues during the tenth session of the Israeli Knesset. This report is unequivocal: “[s]imultaneously with the effort to liquidate the PLO, village

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<sup>13</sup> Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed., p. 58.

<sup>14</sup> Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed., p. 59.

<sup>15</sup> Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the United States and the Palestinians*, 1st Canadian ed., p.57.

leagues were set up ... with the hope that an alternative Palestinian leadership would emerge.”<sup>16</sup>

The transparent nature of the leagues doomed this mechanism to failure. According to Palumbo, “the Village Leagues had almost no support among the population of the West Bank.”<sup>17</sup> As with previous attempts, however, it did not spell the end of Israeli attempts to undermine PLO authority. Rather than appoint “acceptable” interlocutors to facilitate the occupation, the Israeli authorities shifted to a policy of exploiting existing intra-Palestinian cleavages. It was hoped that by playing one Palestinian group off against another that the nationalist PLO could be marginalized and that “appropriate” and “moderate” Palestinians would emerge. The Israeli authorities supported radical Islamists as an alternative to the secular, nationalistic PLO. The most significant beneficiary of this support was an offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood – the Islamic Resistance Movement also known as HAMAS.

The Village Leagues persisted until the outbreak of the first *intifada* in December 1987. It was through this mechanism that the Israeli authorities supported militant Islamists in the early 1980s. Initially the Israeli support was limited to the registration of, and operational freedom for, the Islamic Association founded by Sheihk Yassin. The Israeli registration of this association allowed it to launch a newspaper and establish charitable organizations and fundraising

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<sup>16</sup> The State of Israel – Knesset, “The Main Events and Issues During the Tenth Knesset,” Web page, [accessed 7 October 2002]. Available at [http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng\\_hist10.htm](http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist10.htm).

<sup>17</sup> Michael Palumbo, *Imperial Israel: The History of the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza* (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p. 163.



programs. The operational freedom granted by the Israeli authorities allowed the association to function as a benevolent religious foundation building mosques, schools and hospitals. Once the registration and operational freedom had allowed the association to become established, the Israeli authorities used the Village Leagues as conduits for financing the association's activities.<sup>18</sup> " Hamas used the money [provided by Israel] to operate a network of schools, medical clinics, social service agencies, religious institutions and provide direct services to the poverty stricken Palestinian population."<sup>19</sup>

Israeli support of HAMAS was not the product of a benevolent decision. It was the most political of decisions. As Abu-Amr explains: "[t]he Israeli reasoning was to grant permission for religious and Islamic movements to expand the areas of their activities and their support within the ranks of the Arab citizens, hoping to undermine the influence of, and support for, the Palestinian nationalist forces, especially those loyal to the PLO."<sup>20</sup> He continues by quoting the *New York Times* correspondent in Jerusalem David Shipler:

Politically speaking, Islamic fundamentalists were sometimes regarded as useful to Israel because they had their conflicts with the secular supporters of the PLO. Violence between the groups erupted occasionally on West Bank university campuses, and the Israeli military governor of the Gaza Strip , Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, once

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<sup>18</sup> Ray Hanania, "How Sharon and the Likud Bloc helped lay the foundation for Hamas and benefit from its terrorism," Web page, 5 June 2002 [accessed 7 October 2002]. Available at <http://www.mediamonitors.net/hanania46.html>.

<sup>19</sup> Hanania, "How Sharon and the Likud Bloc helped lay the foundation for Hamas and benefit from its terrorism," Web page.

<sup>20</sup> Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. xvi

told me how he had financed the Islamic movement as a counterweight to the PLO.<sup>21</sup>

This particular mechanism was never intended to produce a cadre of cooperative Palestinians. Instead, its function was to further fracture Palestinian society and entrench alternatives to the PLO. It was hoped that Israel could identify in these alternatives a group willing to be co-opted and then anointed as Palestinian representatives. Ultimately, the anointed would facilitate the Israeli occupation.

Supporting HAMAS conforms to established Israeli practice. Like the notables system, elections, and village leagues which preceded it, Israeli support for the organization that started to deploy suicide bombings in 1994 was an attempt to manufacture power centres alternative to the PLO. As bombs continue to explode on buses and Sharon denounces HAMAS as one of Israel's greatest existential threats, it is important to recall words spoken in 1990 by Israeli Knesset member Avraham Poraz to then Prime Minister Shamir: "The Likud has got Hamas on its hands because it refused to talk to the PLO."<sup>22</sup>

### *Proffering Initiatives Ostensibly Aimed at Ending the Occupation*

The third practice I study is Israel's proffering of initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There have been numerous plans proffered as means of ending Israel's occupation. Examples include the Brookings Institute Peace Plan of 1975, the Sadat Plan of 1978, the Fahd Plan of 1981, as well as the Reagan and Fez Peace Plans of 1982. The

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<sup>21</sup> Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, p.35.

<sup>22</sup> Hanania, "How Sharon and the Likud Bloc helped lay the foundation for Hamas and benefit from its terrorism," Web page.

authors of the plans differ – a policy think tank based in Washington, an Egyptian head of state, a Saudi head of state, a U.S. president and the Arab Summit. The similarity between these initiatives is that they were all rejected by the Israeli government of the day. Israel is the military power in the Occupied Territories as well as the Middle East’s regional hegemon. Any plan not approved by Israel is a non-starter. As a result, this section will only survey Israeli initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation. Specifically, I will outline the Allon Plan, Begin’s Autonomy Plan and Shamir’s Four Point Plan.

After 1967 Israel had to reconcile the acquisition of land it coveted with the conquering of a people that posed demographic “problems.”<sup>23</sup> The first answer to this dilemma was prepared by Yigal Allon, head of Israel’s Ministerial Committee on Settlements, as early as the end of 1967. The Allon Plan was never formally approved by an Israeli government. It did, however, guide Israeli settlement practice for a decade. Over the same period, it also governed, and this is the more important aspect, ideas surrounding Israel’s dispossession of the West Bank<sup>24</sup>.

Settlements were the Israeli state’s first step in creating facts on the ground in the West Bank. It was intended that these facts, in turn, would serve to legitimize the formal annexation of the territory. “Allon proposed the annexation

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<sup>23</sup> The problem for Israel after 1967 was how it could keep the territory of the West Bank without converting Israel into a binational state. To paraphrase Prime Minister Eshkol’s remark to Golda Meir: the 1967 war had given Israel a dowry which pleased it but a bride which did not. See Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed. (New York : W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 255.

<sup>24</sup> The Allon Plan did not discuss the fate of the newly conquered Gaza Strip. The fact that the plan did not call for any settlement in the Strip indicates that Israel had no designs of retaining the territory.

of Judea to Israel and the granting of a semi-autonomous status to Samaria, the northern half of the West Bank.”<sup>25</sup> More specifically, the Allon Plan recommended the incorporation of the following into the state of Israel: “a strip of land ten to fifteen kilometres wide along the Jordan River; most of the Judean desert along the Dead Sea; and a substantial area around Greater Jerusalem, including the Latrum salient.”<sup>26</sup> In order to facilitate the annexation of territory proposed by Allon, Israel started a strategic construction campaign building settlements in the Jordan Valley and the Etzion Bloc east of Jerusalem.

Settlements were not, however, established in areas of Palestinian concentration such as Nablus or Jenin. This was because the plan sought to include as few Palestinians as possible in the claimed areas;<sup>27</sup> the plan recommended “that, as far as possible, the annexation of areas densely populated by Palestinians should be avoided.”<sup>28</sup> Ultimately, the plan called for the following: two disconnected enclaves in the West Bank – a completely isolated southern enclave including Hebron and Bethlehem and a northern enclave containing Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm connected to Jordan through Jericho; these areas were to become autonomous regions governed by local leaders or become part of a Jordanian-Palestinian state; and were to be linked economically to Israel.

The Allon Plan was designed to end Israel’s occupation of Palestinians through the annexation of as much land as possible containing as few people as

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<sup>25</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.256.

<sup>26</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.256.

<sup>27</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p.256.

<sup>28</sup> Lein, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 7.

possible. As an Israeli initiative, it addressed Israel's territorial issues. It also gave the appearance of offering concessions and being forthcoming in the pursuit of a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. However, the spaces that were to escape annexation were not conceived of territorially or as concessions by Israel. Instead, the initiative amounted to a strategic allocation of demographics.

The Allon Plan was abandoned with the ascendancy of the Likud Party in 1977. As was the idea underpinning the Allon Plan that territory would be transferred in an autonomy or federation scheme. The Likud Party emphasized the idea of Greater Israel. Three tenets of the party's ideology were: 1) all of the territory conquered by Israel in 1967 would be retained by Israel, 2) Jordanian claims of sovereignty to the West Bank were invalid, and 3) Palestinians had no right to self-determination.<sup>29</sup> These ideological commitments formed the basis of Begin's 1977 autonomy plan for the occupied territories.

This plan envisioned replacing Israel's military administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Palestinian administrative autonomy.<sup>30</sup> This autonomy was to be expressed through an elected administrative council with responsibilities for affairs such as education, transportation, health, labour, finance, and construction and housing. Palestinians would vote for this council and would constitute its membership. In addition, Begin's plan allowed Palestinians to choose between Israeli and Jordanian citizenship. Finally, Begin's Plan allowed Israeli Jews to purchase land in the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinians who chose Israeli citizenship to purchase land in Israel.

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<sup>29</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 352.

<sup>30</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, p. 364.

The crux of Begin's plan was maintenance of Israeli sovereignty over all the conquered territory. In his 1977 speech to the Knesset Begin declared "Israel insists on its rights and demand for its sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip"<sup>31</sup>; and "[w]e have a right and a demand for sovereignty over these areas of Eretz Yisrael [Greater Israel]."<sup>32</sup> Begin's plan ensured this continued sovereignty by retaining security and public order as an exclusive purview of the Israeli authorities. In the same Knesset speech Begin announced that "[w]e do not even dream of the possibility – if we are given the chance to withdraw our military forces from Judea, Samaria and Gaza – of abandoning those areas."<sup>33</sup> He continued: "let it be known that whoever desires an agreement with us should please accept that the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] will be deployed in Judea, Samaria and Gaza."<sup>34</sup> According to Begin, Israel would continue to exercise sovereignty over the territories and the instrument of this control would be the Israeli army.

Bickerton characterizes Begin's Plan as granting "autonomy for the people [Palestinians], not for the land."<sup>35</sup> As such, it can be understood as similar to the Allon Plan. Allon sought control of the *majority* of the land in conjunction with a

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<sup>31</sup> Walter Laqueur, and Barry M Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Rev. and updated ed., Pelican Books (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 606-607.

<sup>32</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Rev. and updated ed., 607.

<sup>33</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Rev. and updated ed., 607.

<sup>34</sup> Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader: a Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, Rev. and updated ed., p. 607.

<sup>35</sup> Ian J Bickerton, and Carla L Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 197.

transfer of authority over a *majority* of the Palestinian population (either to local leaders or Jordan). Begin, on the other hand, sought control of *all* the land while transferring authority over *all* Palestinians (to the administrative council). Both Israeli initiatives endeavoured to resolve expanding the geography of Israel with a downloading of responsibility for governing the indigenous population of the same geography.

In 1983, Likud's Central Committee elected Shamir to replace Begin. Shamir subscribed to the same idea of Greater Israel as Begin. Consequently, Shamir's Four Point Plan differed little in substance or end from Begin's autonomy scheme. Shamir proposed his Four Point Plan in 1988. This, after the *intifada* had broken out on 13 December 1987, King Hussein had renounced Jordanian claims to the West Bank on 31 July 1988, the PLO had declared an independent Palestinian state on 15 November 1988<sup>36</sup> and Arafat had repeated the PLO's acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounced terrorism on 14 December 1988.<sup>37</sup> Of Shamir's four points, only the fourth is of import. Shamir's Plan rejected the notion that Israel would negotiate with the PLO and instead sought "appropriate" Palestinian representatives: "[i]n order to bring about a process of political negotiations and in order to locate legitimate representatives of the Palestinian population, the prime minister proposes that free elections be held among the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza – elections that will be free of

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<sup>36</sup> See Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 241-242.

<sup>37</sup> See Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 243-244.

the intimidation and terror of the PLO.”<sup>38</sup> Not only was Israel to supervise elections intended to determine its negotiating partner, Shamir also “stated unequivocally that the result [of negotiations] would be, at best, autonomy.”<sup>39</sup> In his own words: “[t]he aim of the elections is to bring about the establishment of a delegation that will participate in negotiations on an interim settlement, in which a self-governing administration will be set up.”<sup>40</sup> This “self-governing administration” should not be confused with a state. It was something significantly less. On this point, the Begin and Shamir Plans are identical. Both amounted to nothing more than a program for limited home rule for Palestinians in the territories, not national self-determination.

In the period from 1967 to 1993 Israeli initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip shared four commonalities: 1) denial of Palestinians’ right to national self-determination through autonomy schemes, 2) annexation of large tracts of land by the Israeli state in the form of settlements, 3) a transfer of responsibility for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 4) continued Israeli sovereignty over large portions or all of the territories. Overall, Israel’s initiatives sought to reconcile Israel’s territorial expansion with demographic concerns.

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<sup>38</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 245.

<sup>39</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 232.

<sup>40</sup> Bickerton and Klausner, *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 245.



## *Post-1993 Non-Discursive Practices*

### *Settlement*

The pre-1993 section on settlements closed with the observation that Israel had expanded and deepened its presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by building settlements and transferring parts of its civilian population to these settlements. Now if the Oslo Process was a peacemaking breakthrough that would eventually, or inevitably, result in the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state as the dominant interpretation claims, then it stands to reason that this expansion and deepening would stop and be rolled back with the initiation of the Process. This has not been the case. In fact, its opposite has been true.

The Oslo Process did not prohibit the building of settlements. Rather, settlements (and settlers) were one of the five issues deferred to the final status negotiations. It was the Israeli position that settlements could continue to be built during the Oslo Process. Said Beilin of the settlement Har Homa in 1997: “one cannot say Har Homa is against Oslo ... you cannot refer to a specific sentence in the Oslo accords or anywhere else which says Israel cannot build Har Homa.”<sup>41</sup> The DOPOISGA does state, however, that the “two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.”<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, Oslo II states that “[n]either side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

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<sup>41</sup> Graham Usher, “Making Peace: An Interview with Yossi Beilin,” in *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process* ed. Graham Usher (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p. 147.

<sup>42</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), p. 118.

pending the outcome of the final status negotiations.<sup>43</sup> Preserving the integrity of this unit resulted in the following between the initiation of the Oslo process and 2000:

- official establishment of 3 new settlements<sup>44</sup> and the establishment of more than 80 “outposts”<sup>45</sup> in the West Bank
- 52.96% increase in the settler population<sup>46</sup>
- 52.49% increase in the number of housing units<sup>47</sup>

Similar figures are presented below in a continuation of the previously cited B’Tselem table tracking settlements and settlers in the West Bank. Please note that Table Six includes estimates for 2001.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” Web page, [accessed 5 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html>.

<sup>44</sup> Peace Now, “Report on Settlements,” Web page, 4 December 2000 [accessed 7 October 2002]. Available at <http://www.peacenow.org.il/english.asp> (Report is no longer available on the Peace Now web site.).

<sup>45</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories 12, no. 5 (2002): p. 7.

<sup>46</sup> Peace Now, “Report on Settlements,” Web page. The majority of this increase has taken place in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem). At the end 1993, the settlements of the West Bank had a population of 100,500. Seven years later the population was 191,600. This represents an increase of ninety percent. See Lein, *Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 13.

<sup>47</sup> This figure is from Peace Now “Report on Settlements,” Web page. B’Tselem’s report includes the building of housing units until 09/02 and arrives at a rate of increase of 54%. The difference is primarily attributable to the policies of Ehud Barak’s government under which the construction of almost 4,800 new housing units started in 2000.

<sup>48</sup> It should also be noted that the number of settlers included in this report differs from the number cited below. The number below was taken from the Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories* 12, no. 5 (2002). This latter number was used in all subsequent

Table 6. Israeli Settlement 1993-2001

Year	Number of Settlements	Population (in thousands)
1993	120	110.9
1994	120	122.7
1995	120	127.9
1996	121	141.5
1997	122	154.4
1998	123	166.1
1999	123	177.5
2000	123	191.6
2001	123	198

Adapted from *Land Grab – Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p.18.

At the end of 1993 there were 120 Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Over the following seven years Israel built three new settlements, all in the West Bank. The outposts represent embryonic settlements or extensions of existing settlements. These are communities that have not followed the bureaucratic procedure involved in establishing a settlement. Outposts are almost never evacuated or dismantled, and are retroactively given settlement status by the Israeli Ministry of Housing.

In 1993, the population of Israel’s settlements was 115,000; Israel’s population was 5.3 million.<sup>49</sup> By 2000, the settler population had risen to 199,000 while Israel’s population had increased to just over 6.2 million. These statistics reveal: 1) that the growth rate in the settlements over the seven years was 73%, and 2) that the growth rate in Israel was 17%.

The official Israeli position is that the increase in the settler population is the result of the “natural” demographic growth. A comparison of the two growth

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discussion because the B’Tselem number is only an estimate as of 31 September 2001.

<sup>49</sup> All numbers taken from Peace Now “Report on Settlements,” Web page.

rates does not bear this argument out. In fact, such a comparison suggests that settler growth is “unnatural”; that the transfer of Israeli civilians to the West Bank and Gaza Strip proceeds at a much faster rate than the increase in the general Israeli population. It can be surmised that over the 7 years of the Oslo process Israel has disproportionately inflated its settler population.

So, Israel built only 3 settlements between 1993 and 2000 but its settler population in the Occupied Territories increased by 73%. Where did these 84,000 people go? Rather than establish numerous new settlements, Israel transferred this population into existing settlements. Recall that in the 4 years preceding the Oslo agreement Israel started construction on a total of 18,280 settlement housing units. This resulted in a total number of settler housing units of 32,750. From 1994 to 2000, Israel started construction on an additional 15,920 housing units (1994 saw the start of 1,320 housing units; 1995, 2,520 units; 1996, 1,670 units; 1997, 1,900 units; 1998, 4,210 units; 1999, 2,510 units; and 2000, 1,790 units). Over the first 6 years of the Oslo Process, Israel increased the number of settler housing units by almost 49%. All of this increase was built on land appropriated by the state of Israel from Palestinians. An Israeli practice which took 26 years to build 32,750 units took only an additional 6 years of “peace process” to increase that number again by almost half.

What can be taken from the preceding? First, since 1967 Israel has perpetuated and intensified a practice of building settlements and housing units and transferring its civilian population to the Occupied Territories. Second, the initiation of the Oslo Process did not interrupt this practice. Rather than decrease

its settler presence in the wake of the Oslo agreements, Israel expanded and deepened this presence. As the B'Tselem report astutely observes: “The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians did not lead to the evacuation of even one settlement, and the settlements even grew substantially in area and population during this period.”<sup>50</sup> The “breakthrough” that was the start of the Oslo Process did not precipitate a change in Israeli practice on the ground.

### *Producing “Acceptable” Interlocutors*

Much like the persistence of the Israeli practice of settlement in the post-1993 period, Israel’s practice of trying to produce “appropriate” Palestinian interlocutors has also persisted in the post-1993 period. Israel’s pre-1993 practice in the West Bank and Gaza Strip sought to marginalize the PLO politically through the creation of alternative power centres. Having recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1993, one would assume that the Israeli government would have suspended this practice. This has not been the case. In fact, with some modification the practice has persisted through the Oslo Process.

First, some explanation of the modification to the machinations of the practice. Israel’s practice was designed to produce “acceptable” Palestinian representatives. In the pre-Oslo period, in order for a group or organization to be considered “acceptable” it could not have any connections to the PLO. This changed in 1993. With the signing of the DOPOISGA, Israel recognized the PLO

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<sup>50</sup> Lein, *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank*, p. 4.

as an “acceptable” interlocutor. Israel continued to undermine the PLO, not in order to exclude it, but *because* it had been included; *because* it had been recognized as the interlocutor. In other words, Israel continued to weaken the PLO not because Israel refused to negotiate with the Organization, but because it had taken the decision to negotiate with it. An undermined PLO meant weaker Palestinian bargaining positions, which also meant a more “appropriate” interlocutor.

The Oslo Process made the PLO, through the PNA (Palestinian National Authority), the guarantor of Israeli security. With Israel’s redeployments from places such as Gaza and Jericho came a transfer of responsibility for policing the Palestinian populations. No longer was policing of Palestinians the job of the occupying Israeli army. It became the *raison d’etre* of the PNA. This rationale has long been present in Israeli strategic considerations. Even before the initiation of the Oslo Process Rabin was quoted as saying that Palestinian self-rule would demand that Arafat and the PLO apprehend and punish Palestinian opponents of peace and that Arafat would be better at this than the IDF because those he arrested would have no appeals to the Israeli Supreme Court and his forces would be unencumbered by the Israeli Association of Civil Rights.<sup>51</sup> The same rationale is evident in Rabin’s 21 September 1993 speech to the Knesset. Here he explained that with the Oslo Process the PLO had assumed responsibility for punishing *Palestinian* violators of the agreement (failure to do so would result in

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<sup>51</sup> Graham Usher, “The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 2 (1996): p.28. Also cited in: Dore Gold, “Where Is the Peace Process Going?,” *Commentary* 100, no. 2 (1995): 38-42.

Israel's punishment of the violators).<sup>52</sup> Recall, too, that the DOPOISGA and Oslo II institutionalized this guarantor function in the form of a strong Palestinian police force.

As guarantor of Israeli security, the standing of the PNA is weakened by every military action undertaken by militant Islamists or other Palestinian groups opposed to the Oslo Process (read Israel's continuing occupation) and/or the PNA's regime. A bombing in Tel Aviv or Ramat Gan or Jerusalem is interpreted, regardless of the political affiliation of the perpetrator, as PNA failure to effectively police the Palestinian population. This makes groups such as HAMAS effective agents in any campaign to undermine the PNA.

In 1996 the state of Israel intentionally antagonized HAMAS as a means of undermining the PNA. On 5 January Shimon Peres authorized the assassination of HAMAS' Yahya Ayyash, "the Engineer". Shortly thereafter Gaza's HAMAS spokesman guaranteed revenge attacks.<sup>53</sup> Israel acknowledged the inevitability of the counter attacks by declaring a five-day closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 6 January. Why did the Israeli Prime Minister execute Ayyash knowing that HAMAS would avenge his death, particularly after HAMAS had observed a unilateral cease-fire since September of the previous year?

The assassination can be understood as an action meant for Israeli domestic consumption. Peres was facing elections against Netanyahu at the end of

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<sup>52</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 153.

<sup>53</sup> Graham Usher, "Israel Interferes in the Palestinian Elections," *Middle East International*, no. 517 (19 January 1996): p. 3.

May 1996. Peres was identified as “the most dovish prime minister in Israel’s history”<sup>54</sup> by the Israeli electorate and the extra-judicial killing may have been an attempt to demonstrate that as head of state he too could be tough on Palestinians. It may have been an attempt to attract the votes of the Israeli centre/right-wing by “uniting peace-making qualities with a commitment to security.”<sup>55</sup>

This is not the only understanding however. HAMAS inevitably retaliates for attacks on its members. These attacks, in turn, would undermine Peres’ temporarily obtained security image. In fact, this is exactly what happened. In early March HAMAS launched a spate of bombings. These 5 attacks in 9 days and the general sense of insecurity they created within the Israeli electorate precipitated the election of Netanyahu. Moreover, had Peres wanted to augment his reputation as a security minded Prime Minister he could have initiated “Operation Grapes of Wrath” 3 months earlier. “Operation Grapes of Wrath” was launched against Lebanon on 11 April 1996. During this operation Israel carried out 600 air raids and fired some 25,000 shells into Lebanese territory.<sup>56</sup> All under the pretext that Israel’s northern communities were being endangered by rocket attacks emanating from southern Lebanon. Spraying along Israel’s self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon was incessant however, and this pretext could have been deployed by Peres at any time to launch a military campaign.

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<sup>54</sup> Haim Baram, “The Referendum Hoax,” *Middle East International*, no. 523 (12 April 1996): p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Baram, “The Referendum Hoax,” p. 5.

<sup>56</sup> Human Rights Watch, “Israel/Lebanon ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’,” Web page, [accessed 12 October 2002]. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/1997/isrleb/>.



So why did Peres authorize the assassination of Ayyash when 1) HAMAS had put a hold on military operations against Israel until provoked, 2) HAMAS had repeatedly demonstrated that actions against its members would inevitably result in retribution and 3) he had “Operation Grapes of Wrath” as an alternative means of improving his domestic image? The Ayyash killing was a continuation of Israel’s persistent practice. It was a means of undermining the PLO/PNA.

Three causally-related reasons support this understanding of the Ayyash killing. First, HAMAS’ cease-fire was the product of an agreement between the militant group and the PLO. This agreement had been arranged so as not to jeopardize the Palestinian elections of 20 January or Israel’s ongoing redeployment in the West Bank. The assassination and the inevitable retaliation, stalled as it may have been,<sup>57</sup> nullified this agreement. The killing shattered the HAMAS-PLO reconciliation and (re)fractured the Palestinian polity. Instead of coordinating and speaking with one voice, now different Palestinian factions were competing and utilizing different means to secure different ends. The conquered were (re)divided, HAMAS resumed military activity and the PLO/PNA was shown to be incapable of fulfilling its Oslo mandate of securing Israelis.

Second, the breaking of HAMAS-PLO cooperation enabled Israel to delay redeployments and the negotiating process. Because the PLO/PNA was unable to fulfill its mandate, all progress on the Oslo Process – whether Israel’s partial redeployment in April of 1996 or the commencement of final status talks in May

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<sup>57</sup> Usher, “Israel interferes in the Palestinian elections,” p.3.

– became dependent on a generic end to violence.<sup>58</sup> Phrased differently, Israel made the continuation of the Oslo process hostage to an Israeli-provoked HAMAS.

In order for the process to resume, the PNA had to discipline HAMAS. Disciplining the militants was a double-edged sword however. Punishing HAMAS carried with it the threat of a further bifurcated Palestinian polity. Which, in turn, would further reveal the PNA's inability to fulfill its mandate. On the other hand, failure to punish HAMAS would translate into a PNA inability to press Israel in negotiations. Again, because the PNA would not be recognized as an effective security partner. Once HAMAS retaliated, the PNA was weakened regardless of its actions or inactions.

Third, an already weakened PNA was further undermined in the face of Palestinians when Israel sent military raiding parties into the West Bank in early March 1996. After Peres declared that "Israel is at war with Hamas"<sup>59</sup>, HAMAS activists were arrested by Israeli military units in territory due to be transferred to the PNA. This action demonstrated to Palestinian civil society that the PNA had achieved little since 1993. Three years of negotiations and still Israeli forces could penetrate and exercise authority anywhere in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The repercussions of Israel's assassination of Ayyash revealed that the PNA could not provide Israelis with security. Concomitantly it demonstrated that the Authority was incapable of protecting Palestinian civilians. In the end, the

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<sup>58</sup> Graham Usher, "Israel Burns the Palestinian Haystack," *Middle East International*, no. 521 (15 March 1996): p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> Peretz Kidron, "Tough Guys," *Middle East International*, no. 521 (15 March 1996): p. 7.

assassination did not help Peres in his election. Instead, it only served to undermine the PNA both within Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These effects, taken together, provided Israel with a stronger negotiating position.

The Ayyash killing is just one example of Israel's ongoing practice of undermining the PLO. Israel's assault on Palestinian infrastructure (destruction of the Gaza airport, roads throughout the West Bank, Arafat's Ramallah compound) since the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada* indicates a continuing commitment to attenuate the Authority. This commitment should not be understood in the context of a collapsing Oslo Process however. Israel's plans for crippling the PNA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were laid as early as 1996.

Operation "Field of Thorns" was "developed and tested through simulations and rehearsals in 1996."<sup>60</sup> This plan intended to topple Arafat.

Operationally it included the following:

- Massive reinforcement of IDF troops at points of friction.
- Use of other forces to secure settlements, key roads and terrain points.
- Use of helicopter gunships and snipers to provide mobility and suppressive fire.
- Use of extensive small arms, artillery, and tank fire to suppress sniping, rock throwing and demonstrations.
- Bombing, artillery strikes, and helicopter strikes on high value Palestinian targets and punish Palestinian elements for attacks.

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<sup>60</sup> Shraga Eilam, "Peace' with Violence or Transfer," Web page, December 2000 [accessed 10 October 2002]. Available at [http://www.lawsociety.org/Intifada2000/articles/Violence\\_or\\_transfer.htm](http://www.lawsociety.org/Intifada2000/articles/Violence_or_transfer.htm) (Report is no longer available online.). See also Anthony Cordesman, *Peace and War: Israel Versus the Palestinians. A Second Intifada?* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000).

- Search and seizure interventions and raids into Palestinian areas in the Gaza and West Bank to break up organized resistance and capture or kill key leaders.
- Selective destruction of high value Palestinian facilities and clearing of strong points and fields of fire near Palestinian urban areas.
- Mobilization and deployment of armored and other land forces in the face of a massive Palestinian rising.

- Use of armor and artillery to isolate major Palestinian population areas, and to seal off Palestinian areas, including many areas of Zone A.
- Introduction of a simultaneous economic blockade with selective cuts offs of financial transactions, labor movements, and food/fuel shipments.
- Use of Israeli control of water, power, communications, and road access to limit the size and endurance of Palestinian action.
- Regulation and control of media access and conduct a major information campaign to influence local and world opinion.
- Use of military forces trained in urban warfare to penetrate into cities if necessary - most probably in cases where there are Jewish enclaves like Hebron.

→ Carrying out “temporary” withdrawal of Israeli settlers from exposed and low value isolated settlements like Hebron.

→ Arrest PA officials and imposition of a new military administration.

→ Forced evacuations of Palestinians from “sensitive areas”.<sup>61</sup>

“Field of Thorns” was updated in early 2000. The update did not change the intention of the plan. What was developed as a policing security operation that

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<sup>61</sup> Cordesman, *Peace and War: Israel Versus the Palestinians. A Second Intifada?*, p.4.

would enfeeble the PNA became a full-scale military reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that renders the PNA politically and administratively superfluous.<sup>62</sup>

Since late 2000 the IDF has executed all of the measures of Operation “Field of Thorns” save for those indicated by an arrow (→). Says Reinhart quoting Rogers, Israel’s moves, particularly Operation Defensive Shield, to “destroy the Palestinian [National] Authority ... cannot be viewed as spontaneous ‘acts of retaliation.’ They should be seen as part of a calculated plan, long in the making.”<sup>63</sup> This being the case, all Israel needed to realize the end of completely dispensing with the PNA as a politically relevant actor were ripe conditions.<sup>64</sup>

One of the most significant contributors to these propitious conditions is “blood justifications.” Israel justifies its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as defensive, preventative and retaliatory. According to the Israeli narrative, HAMAS attacks Israeli civilians and as a result the IDF incurs deeper into the West Bank and Gaza, razes houses, destroys olive groves and imposes interminable 24 hour curfews. What is not mentioned in this narrative, however, is the Israeli provocation that results in HAMAS attacks. Case in point. On 23 June 2002 Israel assassinated the leader of HAMAS’s military wing – Salah Shihada (along with killing another 11 people and wounding an additional 140). This immediately after three tentative moves were taken which held the potential

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<sup>62</sup> Eilam, “Peace with Violence or Transfer,” pp.1-2.

<sup>63</sup> Tanya Reinhart, “Israel: The Generals' Grand Design,” Web page, 17 April 2002 [accessed 17 July 2005]. Available at <http://www.opendemocracy.org/debates/article-2-46-231.jsp>.

<sup>64</sup> Reinhart, “Israel: The Generals' Grand Design,” Web page.

of suspending or ending the al-Aqsa *intifada*. Had these moves proven successful, Israel would have been denied its pretext for reoccupying the West Bank. In order to foreclose on the possibility of these tentative moves bearing fruit Israel executed Shihada. Usher speculates, and I think correctly, that the assassination was “a deliberate intention to draw a Palestinian response against Israeli civilians.”<sup>65</sup> Such a provoked response would scuttle these tentative moves: HAMAS is attacked, a bomb is detonated killing innocent Israelis, and the Israeli army tightens its siege of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the process the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is more extended, more entrenched and more prolonged.

Prior to 1993 Israeli practice was to incubate alternative Palestinian power centres as a means of undermining the PLO. In 1993 Israel recognized the PLO as an “acceptable” interlocutor. Through out the entirety of the Oslo Process, Israel continued the practice of trying to undermine the PLO – not as an intractable foe, but as a relatively disempowered negotiator. Operation “Field of Thorns” and its recent operationalization by the Israeli government indicate that even this change in machinations surrounding the persistent practice has been revisited. State sanctioned assassinations and sieges of the PNA headquarters in Ramallah demonstrate that Israel has again changed its definition of “acceptable” interlocutor. The PLO headed by Arafat was exercised, not only from the Oslo Process, but from Israel’s pantheon of “acceptable” Palestinian representatives.

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<sup>65</sup> Graham Usher, “Assault on Gaza,” *Middle East International*, no. 680 (26 July 2002): p. 13.

It is in this context that calls for PNA reform should be understood. In the summer of 2002 reform of the PNA came to dominate discussions surrounding the renewal of peace negotiations. This shift has been spearheaded by Israel's patron, the United States. On 24 June 2002 Bush issued a call for new a Palestinian leadership: "I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts."<sup>66</sup> He continued by saying that "[a]nd when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state."<sup>67</sup> The recently released *National Security Strategy* parrots the same message. This document states that "[t]he United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government."<sup>68</sup> It continues by making American support for a Palestinian state contingent on Palestinians embracing democracy.<sup>69</sup> Reform as a prerequisite for American support has also been expressed by other members of the Bush administration. On 2 May, Secretary of State Powell stated that "[w]ith respect to Arafat, its not a question of

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<sup>66</sup> President of the United States of America George W. Bush, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinians Leadership," Web page, [accessed 11 October 2004]. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html>.

<sup>67</sup> Bush, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinians Leadership," Web page.

<sup>68</sup> National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), p.9 Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssintro.html>.

<sup>69</sup> National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, p.9.

rehabilitating him. He knows what is expected of him.”<sup>70</sup> Three days later, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice said: “[t]he Palestinian leadership that is there now, the Authority, is not the kind of leadership that can lead to the kind of Palestinian state that we need. It has got to reform.”<sup>71</sup>

The patron and client are singing of reform from the same hymn book . The hymn, however, was selected by the client. As early as December 2001, Sharon declared Arafat irrelevant.<sup>72</sup> He then waited for supportive American declarations, such as the *National Security Strategy*, before continuing on with his campaign to oust Arafat and reform the PNA. Following Powell’s statement, on 5 May Sharon suggested to the Anti-Defamation League that “Israel would be unwilling to open negotiations at all unless there was a new Palestinian leadership, a reformed PA.”<sup>73</sup> Two days later Sharon explained that “a ‘precondition’ to any political settlement would be a restructuring of the PA.”<sup>74</sup> On 14 May Sharon continued this mantra by stating that the PA had to “undergo basic structural reforms in all areas – security, economic, legal and social.”<sup>75</sup> Reform is a euphemism for a Palestinian leadership sans Arafat. As a member of

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<sup>70</sup> Michele K. Esposito, “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 February - 15 May 2002,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 4 (2002): p. 151

<sup>71</sup> Esposito, “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 February - 15 May 2002,” p. 151.

<sup>72</sup> Michele K. Esposito, “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 November 2001 - 15 February 2002,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 3 (2002): p. 120.

<sup>73</sup> Esposito, “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 February - 15 May 2002,” p. 151

<sup>74</sup> Esposito, “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 February - 15 May 2002,” p. 151

<sup>75</sup> Esposito, “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 February - 15 May 2002,” p. 152.



Sharon's entourage explained following the Prime Minister's explanation of his precondition: "reform is a gentle way of pushing Arafat aside."<sup>76</sup>

The most obvious manifestation of this reform mechanism were the two sieges, and almost complete destruction, of the PNA headquarters in Ramallah in the spring and fall 2002. This, however, was accompanied/preceded by more covert attempts to reform the PNA. The *Journal of Palestine Studies* reports that in early May 2002 Sharon, in an attempt "to cultivate alternatives to Arafat sent his son Omri to meet secretly with Arafat advisor Muhammad Rashid." The same publication also reports that in late April 2002 Israel's Defence Minister offered the head of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza, Muhammad Dahlan, control over the Gaza Strip in conjunction with an Israeli withdrawal. Presumably both were enticements for the men to abandon the PNA president. Both instances demonstrate that for Israel "reform" means regime change in Ramallah.

It must be recognized that demands for PNA reform are not new. Nor have they been articulated by exclusively American or Israeli voices. In fact, since the conversion of the PLO into the PNA the earliest and most consistent calls for reform have been made by Palestinians. The most prominent and stinging critic of the PNA has been Edward Said. A cursory glance at Said's *Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process or The End of*

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<sup>76</sup> Esposito, "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy 16 February - 15 May 2002," p.151. This accords perfectly with a statement made by Ben Eliezer, Leader of Israel's Labour Party and Defence Minister in the Sharon cabinet. In a cabinet meeting convened in early September 2002 Eliezer reportedly promised "that, should Arafat ask to leave the [Ramallah] compound, he [Eliezer] would personally provide him with a 'one-way ticket'." Peretz Kidron, "Getting Rid of Arafat," *Middle East International*, no. 684 (27 September 2002): p. 11.

*the Peace Process: Oslo and After* (a book banned in PNA controlled areas) reveals innumerable criticisms of the PNA and Arafat's governing. A few citations will suffice to make my point. As early as 1994 Said was identifying Arafat as a petty dictator beyond reforming.<sup>77</sup> A year later he explained that Arafat governs unilaterally;<sup>78</sup> surrounds himself with a network of hangers-on, sycophants, commission agents, spies and informants;<sup>79</sup> and does what he pleases, spends as he likes, disposes how he feels his interests might be served.<sup>80</sup> In the same piece Said discussed Arafat's economic corruption:

All petroleum and petroleum products used by Palestinians come exclusively from the Israeli petroleum authority. Local Palestinians pay an excise tax, the net amount of which is held in Arafat's name in an Israel bank account. Only he can get to it, and only he can spend it. At a donor's meeting in Paris ... an I.M.F. observer told me that the group voted \$18.5 million to the Palestinian people; \$18 million was paid directly to Arafat; \$500,000 was put in the public treasury. How it shall be disbursed is at Arafat's discretion.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Edward W. Said, "Two Peoples in One Land," in *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* ed. Edward W. Said (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 122.

<sup>78</sup> Edward W. Said, "The Middle East 'Peace Process': Misleading Images and Brutal Actualities," in *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 157.

<sup>79</sup> Said, "The Middle East 'Peace Process': Misleading Images and Brutal Actualities," in *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* ed. Edward W. Said, pp. 157-158.

<sup>80</sup> Said, "The Middle East 'Peace Process': Misleading Images and Brutal Actualities," in *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 158.

<sup>81</sup> Said, "The Middle East 'Peace Process': Misleading Images and Brutal Actualities," in *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process* ed. Edward W. Said, pp.158-159.

Also in 1995 Said accused the PNA of incompetence and autocracy<sup>82</sup> and likened the Organization to “a kind of mafia.”<sup>83</sup> In early 1996 Said adumbrated Arafat and the PNA’s electoral manipulations<sup>84</sup> and declared that 1) Arafat has contempt for democratic procedure,<sup>85</sup> 2) Arafat runs things as a personal fiefdom,<sup>86</sup> and 3) Arafat and his men govern as they please.<sup>87</sup> In July of the same year Said again denounced the PNA regime and demanded change stating that:

no one [among Palestinians] has any illusions at all that his [Arafat’s] rule is anything but corrupt, that his police and prisons ... are cruel, torture is rife, due process is suspended most of the time, and if you need to get anything done you have to have a connection with someone in the Authority.<sup>88</sup>

Palestinian demands for reform, whether Said’s or those coming from human rights organizations such as LAW (Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment), or members of the Palestinian Legislative Council such as Hanan Ashrawi, have been expressed and ignored since the outset of the Oslo Process, by Arafat, his PNA, Israel and the United States. Israel, and

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<sup>82</sup> Edward W. Said, “Where Do We Go From Here?,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), p. 22.

<sup>83</sup> Said, “Where Do We Go From Here?,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 22.

<sup>84</sup> Edward W. Said, “Elections, Institutions, Democracy,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 33.

<sup>85</sup> Said, “Elections, Institutions, Democracy,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 34.

<sup>86</sup> Said, “Elections, Institutions, Democracy,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said, p.35.

<sup>87</sup> Said, “Elections, Institutions, Democracy,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 37.

<sup>88</sup> Edward W. Said, “Mandela, Netanyahu, Arafat,” in *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* ed. Edward W. Said, p. 65.

by extension the United States, only discovered PNA reform as an issue when Arafat lost his standing as an “acceptable” interlocutor for Israel following the Camp David negotiations of 2000 and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. Reform is only the most recent in a long line of mechanisms deployed by Israel to weaken Palestinian representation and produce interlocutors acceptable to the state of Israel. As in the pre-1993 period, Israel in the post-1993 period is still seeking to unilaterally determine who will receive its monologue.

### *Proffering Initiatives Ostensibly Aimed at Ending the Occupation*

As with Israel’s practices of settlement and determining its interlocutor, Israel’s practice of offering plans ostensibly intended to end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip persisted in the post-1993 period. Furthermore, as was the case in the pre-1993 period these plans sought to reconcile Israel’s territorial expansion with its demographic concerns. The initiatives were designed to allow Israel to exercise sovereignty over land while assigning responsibility for the people of the land to other quasi-state authorities. This practice of divorcing Palestinians from their land has persisted in the post-Oslo period. This section will track the persistence of this practice by first briefly reviewing the agreements which constitute the Oslo Process and then examining Israeli initiatives launched since late 2000; where Feith compared the DOPOISGA to the Camp David Accord to highlight “the historic and unprecedented nature of Israel’s concessions”<sup>89</sup> in 1993, I compare the Oslo Agreements to Israeli initiatives such

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<sup>89</sup> Douglas J. Feith, “Land for No Peace,” *Commentary* 97, no. 6 (1994): p. 32.

as the Begin Plan to demonstrate that the latter are recycled versions of the former that institutionalized the persistent practice.

Recall that the DOPOISGA states as its aim “establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority ... in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”<sup>90</sup> for a “transitional period not exceeding five years”<sup>91</sup> which would begin with an Israeli redeployment of forces out of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. The DOPOISGA also notes that Israel will retain responsibility for security and settlements. Vestiges of the Allon, Shamir and Begin Plans are all present here. Recall that the Allon Plan envisioned the transfer of Jericho and Gaza to another authority because they were areas of high Palestinian population. Recall further that the Shamir Plan sought to establish an “interim settlement” and a “self-governing administration”. Finally, remember that Begin’s Plan had security as the exclusive purview of the Israeli authorities and that his vision had the Israeli army remaining in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the army would redeploy not withdrawal. All three plans saw continued Israeli sovereignty over settlements and the appropriated land upon which they were built.

The Cairo Agreement started the partitioning of the West Bank. This agreement transferred administrative control of Jericho and parts of Gaza to the PNA. It also re-enforced the understandings that settlements and military installations would remain under Israeli sovereignty and that Israel was responsible for security. As a continuation of the DOPOISGA, the Cairo

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<sup>90</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 117.

<sup>91</sup> Institute for Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: a Documentary Record*, Rev. 2nd ed., p. 117.

Agreement was the first operationalization of the combined Allon, Begin and Shamir Plans.

The Early Empowerment Agreement of August 1994 is a verbatim restatement of the Begin Plan. This agreement transfers powers, responsibilities and authority for education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism , direct taxation, and Value Added Tax on local production from the Israeli military government to the PNA; reaffirms that responsibility for settlements and security remains with the Israeli military government; and allows the Palestinian Council to promulgate “secondary legislation” provided it is not opposed by Israel. This is Begin’s replacement of Israel’s military administration with Palestinian administrative autonomy. The Palestinian Council is the equivalent of Shamir’s “administrative council”, Israel has retained sovereignty over the land and the Israeli army has generally remained in place. Harkening back to Bickerton’s characterization, this agreement did not involve the transfer of sovereignty over any land to the PNA just the transfer of autonomy over, and responsibility for, the populations.

The Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities is still another revisiting of Begin’s initiative. This agreement consigns the authorities, powers and responsibilities for labor, commerce and industry, gas and petroleum, insurance, postal services, local government and agriculture from the Israeli military government to the PNA. Again, this is another initiative that allows Israel to exercise sovereignty over land while assigning responsibility for the people of the land to a quasi-state authority.

The Oslo II Agreement continued the partitioning of the West Bank, but in a more detailed manner. It redeployed the Israeli military and assigned different disciplinarians and administrators to Areas A, B, and C. Area A was under Palestinian administrative and security control. Area B was under Palestinian administrative and Israeli security control. And Area C was under Israeli administrative and security control. Vestiges of the Allon Plan and a modified Begin Plan are both present here. The transfer of territory accords perfectly with the Allon Plan – the land transferred to the PNA contained concentrations of Palestinians, the land retained by Israel included the Jordan Valley and large tracts of the southern West Bank. Palestinians policing Palestinians, but being ultimately responsible to Israel in Areas A and B is the autonomy envisioned by the Begin Plan. The modification of the Begin Plan involved the fact that some land was transferred with the Palestinian populations. However, the non-contiguous nature of the transferred spaces effectively denies Palestinians sovereignty; again realizing Palestinian autonomy. The Begin plan called for the retention of all the West Bank along with the exercise of Israeli sovereignty. Oslo II, through a more efficient and judicious arrangement of space, retained Israeli sovereignty over all the land (without actually having to occupy the spaces) while relinquishing authority over some of the population.

The Hebron Protocol continued the partitioning of the West Bank. This agreement transfers responsibility for the town of Hebron, except for the Israeli enclave in the heart of the city, to Palestinian administrative control. This transfer was realized through another redeployment of Israeli forces. This, again, is an

extension of the Allon Plan – Hebron, a predominantly Palestinian town, was transferred to the Palestinian administration without costing Israel control over most of the territory in the West Bank.

The Wye River Memorandum transferred a total of 13% of Area C to Areas A and B (1% to Area A and 12% to Area B, 3% of the latter being designated a nature preserve). Likewise, the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum transferred different percentages of land between different areas. The transfers were phased according to a timeline for Israeli redeployments. In total, another 8% of the West Bank was schedule to be transferred to Area A with another 10% going from Area C to Area B. Again, both sets of transfers were in accordance with the territorial and demographic considerations of the Allon Plan.

The agreements constituting the Oslo Process have all the markings of previous Israeli initiatives. In fact, it is disingenuous to simply recognize that there are parallels between previous initiatives and the signed Oslo Agreements. It is more accurate to say that the agreements are merely updated versions of 20 year old plans. This practice of recycling initiatives has persisted since the start of the *Al-Aqsa intifada* in 2000.

Since 28 September 2000 Israel has re-conquered all of the West Bank and portions of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli army is present in every Palestinian city and has surrounded every Palestinian town in the West Bank. Furthermore, it has imposed what Israel calls “internal closure”<sup>92</sup> on the West Bank. This means that Palestinians are not permitted freedom of movement between locations. Even

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<sup>92</sup> The Declaration of Human Rights defines this practice as collective punishment.



within Areas A, the Israeli army exercises complete control and regulates all movement. Israel did not re-occupy the Gaza Strip; the Gaza Strip as well as movement between the Strip and Israel has been heavily regulated since the space was literally fenced in by Prime Minister Peres in 1996.

In early August 2002 Israel proffered an initiative ostensibly intended to ease the re-occupation. Israel proffered a “Gaza-Bethlehem First” initiative. Like the DSOPOISGA and Gaza and Jericho First Agreement (the Cairo Agreement) before it, this 2002 initiative planned Israeli redeployments from Palestinian population centres.<sup>93</sup> Taking an even longer duree perspective, in accordance with the Allon Plan this initiative perpetuated Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and southern West Bank while relinquishing authority over isolated pockets of Palestinians. Like the Begin Plan’s part in the DOPOISGA and Cairo Agreements, this initiative did not involve any military withdrawal, merely redeployment. This is evident from Prime Minister Sharon’s statement to reporters defending the initiative: “All in all, a few jeeps and armoured personnel carriers changed their positions in the Bethlehem area and there has been no

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<sup>93</sup> For information on Gaza-Bethlehem First 2002 see: “‘Gaza first’ plan founders,” BBC News World Edition, 8 August 2002, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2180637.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2180637.stm) (8 September 2002); Aluf Benn, “Israel, PA agree to implement ‘Gaza, Bethlehem First’,” *Ha’aretz* 19 August 2002, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=198944&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y> (19 August 2002); Bradley Burston, “Background/‘Gaza First’: Labor’s Declaration of war on PM?,” *Ha’aretz* 20 August 2002, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=199247&contrassID=1&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y> (19 August 2002); Tony Karon, “New Hope for Mideast Truce?,” *Time Online Edition* 7 August 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,334914,00.html> (19 August 2002).

change in the deployment of the forces in Gaza.”<sup>94</sup> Israel continues to retain sovereignty over the land on which the Palestinian population lives.

An extension of Gaza and Bethlehem First was discussed in the fall of 2002. This would have involved IDF redeployment from Hebron.<sup>95</sup> Again, this was a revisiting of the Hebron Protocol which itself was a revisiting of the Allon Plan. Responsibility for the administration of another Palestinian population was to be transferred while Israel was to retain sovereignty over the land.

Israel’s practices regarding the ending of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have persisted despite the start of the Oslo Process. In fact, if there has been any change in this practice it has been that each successive initiative has retained more land under Israeli sovereignty. Israel’s practice of tabling proposals that guarantee Israeli control of land while transferring responsibility for the population of the land to a quasi-state authority has continued unabated in the post-1993 period.

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<sup>94</sup> Aluf Benn and Yossi Verter, “Sharon Downplays Gaza-First program,” *Ha’aretz* 18 July 2005, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=200152&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0> (18 July 2005).

<sup>95</sup> For information on IDF redeployment from Hebron see: Amos Harel, “Ben-Eliezer to discuss with IDF a possible pullout from Hebron,” *Ha’aretz* 18 October 2002, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=220519&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y> (18 October 2002); Amos Harel and Arnon Regular, “IDF to reduce its presence in Palestinian sections of Hebron,” *Ha’aretz* 18 October 2002, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=221209&contrassID=1&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y> (18 October 2002).

## *Conclusion*

In this chapter I conducted a genealogical analysis of three Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians. I compared diachronically three Israeli practices: 1) Israel's settlement enterprise, 2) Israeli endeavours to produce "acceptable" interlocutors and 3) Israeli initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the periods 1967-1993 and 1993-2002. This diachronic comparison demonstrated that these Israeli practices, initiated before 1993, persisted through the duration of the Oslo Process. In other words, seven years of the Oslo Process did not arrest Israel's practices of building settlements and transferring its civilian population into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, undermining the PNA to produce a more pliable negotiator and offering cognate initiatives (the initiatives are analogous in nature, character and function) ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

My thesis is that the persistence of analytics governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians (re-) produced the conditions for violence between Palestinians and Israel. Over the course of chapters three through six I demonstrated that the analytics of truth of this discourse did indeed persist despite the initiation of the Oslo Process. In fact, these analytics were institutionalized in the Oslo Agreements. In this chapter I evidenced my second claim – Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians also persisted despite the start of the Oslo Process in 1993. In the last chapter I explain the manner in which the persistence of these analytics and practices (re-)produced the conditions for violence.

## Chapter Eight – Conclusion

When I began this project frantic attempts were being made to rescue the Oslo Process from the Al-Aqsa *intifada* which, by then, had raged for five months and claimed 400 Palestinian and Israeli lives. As of July 2005 the Al-Aqsa *intifada* had entered its 59<sup>th</sup> month and the casualty figures are more than 4,657 Palestinians and Israelis dead and more than 35,000 Palestinians and Israelis injured; the overwhelming majority in both cases being Palestinian. This is the worst violence between Palestinians and Israel since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967.<sup>1</sup>

The first Palestinian *intifada* was an effect of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Discursive silence regarding the fate of Palestinians transferred by Israel through Plan Dalet in 1948, and consequent political inaction regarding their condition, coupled with Israel's practice of settlement in accordance with the Allon and Drobless Plans and cultivating alternatives to the PLO in the form of Village Leagues produced a resistance in Palestinian civil society against the Israeli occupation. The first *intifada* was relatively non-militarized; forms of resistance included *inter alia* boycotts of Israeli goods, civil disobedience and stone throwing. This *intifada* ended with the start of the Oslo Process.

Throughout the Oslo Process Palestinians continued to be discursively denied, *inter alia*, their nationhood and their right to national self-determination.

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<sup>1</sup> Graham Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 2 (2003): p. 31.

Recall here that the agreements constituting the Oslo Process never identified Palestinians as a nation, but rather as a rarefied “people”. Further, throughout the Oslo Process Palestinians continued to see their lands and property expropriated for settlement and bypass road construction which have, in part, established what Halper calls a “matrix of control”. Moreover, the constant production of statements made in accordance with the third rule of formation – that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine provided this state met certain criteria – raised Palestinian expectations that became more remote the longer the Oslo Process continued. Says Roy of the Palestinian condition:

[d]uring the seven years [of the Oslo Process] ... the hopes of Oslo were transformed into unrelieved bleakness, not only at the economic level but also at the level of society, where numbed expectations and mocked possibility left anger and bitterness and an undeniable anomie. The “al-Aqsa intifada” that erupted at the end of September 2000 is the product of Oslo’s failure: it is the seven years of the “peace process” that created the context for the uprising.<sup>2</sup>

In September 2000 the Al-Aqsa *intifada* started and continues as I write. Admittedly, the first and second *intifada* are not identical. In the Palestinian case, society is much more militarized than in the past<sup>3</sup> and so is the resistance to the Israeli occupation.<sup>4</sup> More important to note, however, is that both events are marked by direct violence between Palestinians and Israel. In fact, one unnamed

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<sup>2</sup> Sara Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (2001): p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Usher, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On,” p. 25.

member of the Palestinian National Security Council characterized the Al-Aqsa *intifada* as “an unofficially declared military war.”<sup>5</sup>

This “unofficial war” is paradoxical for the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. The 1993 DOPOISGA specifically and the Oslo Process generally was/are interpreted and represented as a peace-making breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. According to this reading, authored by politicians, the media and academics, the Oslo Process was supposed to usher in a new period of peaceful resolution of competing Palestinian-Israeli claims and grievances through negotiation, reconciliation and compromise. Seven years of peacemaking were not supposed to grind to a violent halt in 2000.

In this my last chapter I restate my argument and its development over the course of the preceding seven chapters. I also outline the implications of my analysis. More specifically, I evaluate recent initiatives aimed at ending Palestinian-Israeli violence and suggest a discursive change intended to encourage peaceful Palestinian-Israeli relations.

### *Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations*

I argue that the Oslo Process was an articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and furthermore, that the al-Aqsa *intifada* is an effect of this discourse. More specifically, I argue that the Oslo Process institutionalized and perpetuated discursive rules and non-discursive practices that defined Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period. The continuation of these rules

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<sup>5</sup> Usher, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On,” p. 27.

and practices through (the period of) the Oslo Process produced direct violence between Palestinians and Israelis in 2000 in a manner similar, though not identical, to the first *intifada*.

### *Chapters One and Two*

In the first chapter I rationalized my study of the Oslo Process. In other words, I answered the question: why study the Oslo Process? I argued that it is important to study the Oslo Process because 1) the process was heralded as an important breakthrough in which tremendous amounts of political and economic currency were invested; and 2) the process did not produce peace between Palestinians and Israelis, but rather more brutal and costly violence. It was also in the opening chapter that I outlined the paradoxical nature of the Al-Aqsa *intifada*. Rather than ending in historic reconciliation, the Oslo Process ended in violence.

Finally, in the first chapter I outlined the analytical utility of archaeological and genealogical method. As the reader will recall I adumbrated four reasons for using these methods. First, they underscored the fact that language is not transparent or neutral. It is politicized. Second, archaeology enabled me to conduct an ontology of the unthought.<sup>6</sup> Rejecting the author principle, archaeology prompted an identification and description of the extra-textual rules – analytics – that govern truth production according to a particular

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<sup>6</sup> Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 326.

discourse. Recall here that I conceptualized truth as “an ensemble of rules”<sup>7</sup> by which one must speak in order to make a truthful statement. Third, a genealogical understanding enabled me to see that: 1) practices are persistent, 2) interpretations and meanings are ephemeral and ascribed to practices, and 3) the ascription of interpretations and meanings to practices is a political act. And fourth, together archaeology and genealogy allowed me to conceive of a relationship between truth and power. Power is not purely negative and prohibitive. It is positive and productive. Power produces truth – rule governed knowledge. Power is implicit in the truth production process and the “effects of power are attached to the true.”<sup>8</sup> A discourse is a network of analytics to which the effects of power are attached.

Having laid the analytical and organizational foundation of my project, I began to apply my framework in chapter two. Here I evidenced three claims regarding the texts surrounding the Oslo Process. First, I established that the dominant reading of the DOPOISGA and the Oslo Process interprets and represents the process as a peacemaking breakthrough in Palestinian-Israeli relations. I identified, *inter alia*, Shlaim, Rubin and Ashrawi as contributors to this dominant reading. Throughout the course of my project I challenged the interpretation of this reading. Second, I demonstrated that there exists a critical corpus of texts that reject the dominant reading of the Oslo Process, arguing instead that the process continued the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and

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<sup>7</sup> Michel Foucault, and Colin Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 132.

<sup>8</sup> Foucault and Gordon, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, p. 132.



Gaza Strip in a more efficient and effective manner. Said, Roy and Finkelstein were identified as key contributors to this critical corpus.

My project shares the continuity tenet of this critical corpus – I too reject the idea that the DOPOISGA was a political caesura. Further, my project also examined some of the same non-discursive practices studied by the critical corpus, settlements for example. However, my project is distinguished from this critical corpus on two points. On one point, my object of study was not the Oslo Process *per se*, but rather the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. I posited the 1993 start of the Oslo Process as a point of potential (non-)discursive discontinuity and conducted an archaeological excavation of the rules and a genealogical analysis of the practices of this discourse before and after this potential rupture. I examined how Palestinian-Israeli relations are talked about. On another point, I connected non-discursive practices to discursive analytics. Practices are parts of discourses and must be understood in their relationship to discursive rules.

Third, in chapter two I also explained the political function of the dominant reading of the Oslo Process. I showed how each of the primary parties to the process – the PLO, Israel and the U.S. – benefited from an interpretation and representation of the Oslo Process as a peace process. Most importantly, interpreting and representing the Oslo Process as a peace process saved the PLO from political oblivion. For Israel, the start of the “Oslo Peace Process” delivered a weak negotiating partner that could end the first *intifada* as well as economic benefits to Israel’s business elite. Finally, the dominant interpretation of the Oslo

Process served the interests of a Middle East *Pax Americana*. The “Peace Process” was, *inter alia*, advantageous to American client states in the region and further undermined what little existed of Arab unity.

### *Chapter Three*

I conducted my archaeological and genealogical analysis of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations primarily in chapters three through seven. The first four chapters in this grouping are archaeological excavations of the discursive analytics and the final chapter is my genealogical study of non-discursive practices. Chapters three and four studied three systematic silences and three rules of formation in texts from the pre-1993 period. Chapters five and six studied the same silences and rules from texts in the post-1993 period. Chapter five is the couplet to chapter three and chapter six is the couplet to chapter four. Collectively these five chapters evidence my assertion that the Oslo Process effected no discursive or non-discursive change in Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Table 7. Analytics and Practices

Silence 1	exclude discussion of transfer
Silence 2	exclude discussion of Zionism's territorial desideratum
Silence 3	exclude discussion of denial of Palestinian nationhood and this nation's right to self-determination
Rule of Formation 1	represent Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists and Israel as conciliatory and peace-seeking
Rule of Formation 2	represent Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship or posit the relationship as symmetrical
Rule of Formation 3	assume that Zionism/Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine
Practice 1	settlement
Practice 2	producing interlocutors "acceptable" to Israel
Practice 3	proffering initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

In 1994 Shlaim declared that “[with the initiation of the Oslo Process] [t]he rules of the game in the entire Middle East have radically changed.”<sup>9</sup> I began to challenge this claim in chapter three by identifying three silences of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The three silences involve: 1) the Zionist idea and practice of transfer, 2) Zionism’s territorial desideratum and 3) Zionism’s denial of Palestinian nationhood and the right of this nation to self-determination. I focused on the research of Walid Khalidi and Masalha and compared it to statements of Kimche and Bickerton and Klausner to evidence discursive silencing of the Zionist idea and practice of transfer in the pre-1993

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<sup>9</sup> Avi Shlaim, “The Oslo Accord,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): p. 27.

period. I also evidence discursive silencing of Zionism's territorial desideratum through a study of Plan Dalet and statements from Oren and Walzer. By building extensively on the research of Finkelstein I demonstrated that while first Zionism as a movement, and later Israel, sought to maximize the amount of territory it controlled through wars of choice (including most notably the Wars of 1948 and 1967) the pre-1993 discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations is silent on the fact that "[f]rom beginning to end, Zionism was a conquest movement."<sup>10</sup> Finally, in chapter three I identified and described as a discursive silence Zionism's/Israel's denial of Palestinian nationhood and right to national self-determination. Citing statements and practices of leading Zionists such as Zangwill and Weizmann, and more contemporarily such as Begin and Shamir, as well as texts such as UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and UN Security Council Resolution 242 I evidenced the negation of Palestinians and their national rights. Furthermore, I showed that this effacement of Palestinians was reproduced textually by Peters. The discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period silences this denial assuming Zionism's selective recognition of Palestinians (as inhabitants with no political rights) to be something more than it was.

#### *Chapter Four*

Chapter four continued my challenge of Shlaim's claim that the Oslo Process changed the rules of the game in the Middle East. I shifted my archaeological focus from the analytics prohibiting statements to those requiring

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<sup>10</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York, London: Verso, 2003), p. 108.

certain statements. I identified and described three rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. To speak truthfully of Palestinian-Israeli relations an author must: 1) represent Israel as conciliatory and peace-seeking and Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists, 2) posit as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship or represent Israel as the victim in the conflict (in both cases Palestinians are *not* represented as victims) and 3) assume that Zionism, as realized by the Jewish Agency or Israel, would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine.

Regarding the first rule of formation I demonstrated that in the pre-1993 period authors such as Aronson, Peretz, Walzer and Quandt represented Israel as a pacific compromiser, who only begrudgingly resorted to violence in self-defence, beset by hostile, violent, uncompromising Arabs/Palestinians. Authors abiding by this rule often mobilize Zionism's "painful acceptance" and Arab/Palestinian "rejection" of the 1947 UN Partition Plan as evidence of this conciliatory-rejectionist dichotomy. Building on the work of Flapan and Pappé I showed that the Arab states actively tried to avoid war in 1948, Palestinians were ready to accept the existence of Israel in 1949 provided Israel permit the repatriation of Palestinian refugees and that Israel pursued war against the Palestinians and Arab states in 1948 and colluded with King Abdallah of Transjordan to destroy the Palestinian political leadership (recall here Abdallah's Greater Syria Scheme) and expand the state. Finkelstein's assessment neatly encapsulated Arab/Palestinian opposition to the Zionist project:

Arab opposition and resistance to the Zionist movement  
was rooted pre-eminently in the latter's intent to create a

state that would, at best marginalize – and more than likely expel – them. The ‘security’ threat posed by the Arabs thus resulted from Zionism’s ideological-political agenda.<sup>11</sup>

Among others, authors such as Galtung, Kelman and Haass produced statements in accordance with the second rule of formation in the pre-1993 period. Authors abiding by this analytic assume a symmetry between the parties, for example Palestinian and Israeli claims, rights and interests are given equal weight, thereby dehistoricizing the parties’ relationship. This dehistoricizing, in turn, results in a psychologizing of the relationship – the barriers to reconciliation are not rooted in historical grievances, but rather are emotional and/or attitudinal. One effect of this rule of formation is for authors to recommend trust- and confidence-building measures as means of overcoming these psychological issues.

To assume that Zionism, as articulated by the Jewish Agency and later Israel, would have permitted or would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine is the third rule of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the pre-1993 period. In chapter four I described the manner in which authors such as Walid Khalidi, Plascov, Heller and Weiler assume that under certain conditions (i.e. recognition of Israel, demilitarization) Israel would have or will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Further, I argued that there is no historical grounding for this assumption. In the entire pre-1993 period Zionism categorically rejected the idea and possibility of such a Palestinian state and tried

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<sup>11</sup> Norman G Finkelstein, *Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: Verso, 2003), p. 85.

to thwart it by encouraging Abdallah's Greater Syria Scheme, institutionalizing Palestinian autonomy in the Camp David Accords and encouraging a Palestinian confederation with Jordan – the so-called “Jordanian option”.

### *Chapter Five*

In chapter five I again described the three silences governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations, this time in the post-1993 period. This chapter, as well as chapter six, evidences my argument that the Oslo Process is an articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Together they reveal the discursive continuity of the analytics as well as the institutionalization and reproduction of these analytics in the Oslo Process itself.

The DOPOISGA specifically and the Oslo Process more generally speak of “refugees”. The entire process, however, is silent on the historical emergence of these refugees. None of the agreements constituting the process acknowledge the forcible removal of refugees. The Oslo Process was produced in accordance with, and further reproduces the systematic silence surrounding the idea and practice of transfer. Furthermore, authors such as Little and Reuveny, and more notably given their discursive standing, Shlaim and Morris produce statements in accordance with, as well as reproduce, this silence. Morris specifically silences the idea and practice of transfer, even while he speaks of it, by inverting the relationship between Arab/Palestinian opposition to the Zionist project and the exclusivist nature of the project; the Zionist idea and practice of transfer, grounded in a desire for a largely homogenous Jewish state, prompted

Arab/Palestinian opposition, Zionism did not realize transfer in response to baseless Arab/Palestinian opposition. For Morris transfer was not responsible for the creation of refugees. Instead, transfer was a response to Jewish insecurity borne of Arab/Palestinian opposition.

In chapter five I also showed that the practice of transfer continues to be advocated by members of the Israeli political mainstream and practiced most notably in the case of the West Bank village of Yanun. Contrary to the suggestions of Halper and Segev that transfer is an emergent idea and practice in the Israeli polity I demonstrated that transfer is a persistent idea and practice.

The second silence involving Zionist/Israeli territorial desideratum also continued to govern the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period and was institutionalized in the Oslo Process. The Oslo Process is ahistorical as to how Israel came to occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The process is silent on how Israel's 1967 war of choice resulted in the pre-Oslo Process status quo. Statements made by, *inter alia*, Walzer and Ross represent Israel's military presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the result of a defensive war; not of a successful conquest movement. Their texts reproduce, and are produced in accordance with, the analytic requiring silence regarding Israel's plans for, as well as actual, territorial aggrandizement. Through reference to Halper's work on Israel's "matrix of control" I demonstrated that Israel has continued its practice of territorial maximization. The mechanisms of realizing aggrandizement have shifted from tanks and airplanes to houses and roads, but the practice persists.



Finally, in chapter five I studied the discursive silence involving the denial of Palestinian nationhood and this nation's right to national self-determination. Like the other two analytics examined in this chapter, this silence too is institutionalized in the Oslo Process and the idea and practice persist discursively and non-discursively into the present. Authors such as Kelman and Shlaim saw in the start of the Oslo Process, more specifically the letters exchanged between Arafat and Rabin, a departure from this established Israeli practice; Israel recognized Palestinians. However, as the reader will recall Israeli negotiator Uri Savir was adamant during the DOPOISGA negotiations that Israel would not recognize Palestinian *national* rights. In his letter Rabin recognized Palestinians, but in a selective manner consistent with long-established Israeli practice. Furthermore, this selective recognition of Palestinians deemed them irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine. As Robinson said, the Oslo Process was an internal Israeli debate about what Israel would surrender to Palestinians rather than negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians;<sup>12</sup> Palestinians merely assented to or rejected what Israel decided to offer.

Rubin and Dershowitz are notable for their reproduction of this analytic and for the production of statements in accordance with this analytic. Dershowitz, like one of his sources from the pre-1993 period – Peters, denies a distinct Palestinian nation and instead recognizes Palestinians selectively as part of the larger Arab nation.

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<sup>12</sup> Glenn E. Robinson, "Israel and the Palestinians: The Bitter Fruits of Hegemonic Peace," *Current History* 100, no. 642 (2001): pp.17-18.

This third discursive silence is institutionalized in the Oslo Process in Secretary of State Christopher's "Letter of Assurance" and Ross' "Note for the Record" appended to the Hebron Protocol. The "Letter of Assurance" explains that the scope and extent of Israeli redeployments from Hebron is an exclusively Israeli process, not subject to negotiation with the Palestinian Authority. According to the "Note for the Record" Israeli redeployments are the exclusive purview of Israel. They need not be negotiated. In both cases, these Oslo Process texts rendered Palestinians irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine. The redeployments would be determined unilaterally by Israel with the Palestinian Authority accepting these *fait accomplis*.

The persistence of the Zionist/Israeli practice of denying Palestinian nationhood and the Palestinian right to national self-determination is evident in the 1997 Beilin-Eitan Agreement. This agreement, which Jamal says demonstrates the "comprehensiveness of the Israeli national narrative,"<sup>13</sup> denies Palestinian attachment to the land of Palestine. It also dispenses with the idea that there existed at the time a negotiating partnership in the context of the Oslo Process. It dismisses Palestinians as a party to the final dispensation of Palestine. Palestinians are merely the recipients of Israeli *diktats*.

### *Chapter Six*

In chapter six I examined the three rules of formation governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period. This chapter

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<sup>13</sup> Amal Jamal, "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (2000): p. 47.

furthering my argument that the Oslo Process is an articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. It reveals that the rules of formation I identified and described in the pre-1993 period persist despite the start of the Oslo Process and moreover, that these analytics were institutionalized in the Oslo Process.

The first rule of formation is to represent Israel as conciliatory and peace-seeking and Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists. The Oslo Process institutionalized this analytic in the form of a strong Palestinian police/security force that was to serve as the guarantor of Israeli security by combating recalcitrant Palestinian elements (eg. Hamas). Authors such as Sternhell, Rubin and Ross, among others, continued in the post-1993 period to reproduce this analytic and to represent the Palestinian-Israeli relationship in this manner. Israel is celebrated for its “unprecedented concessions” and Palestinians, specifically Arafat, are cast as historically and contemporarily uncompromising and unwilling or unable to make the sacrifices necessary for peace.

The continued practical realization of this analytic is evident in the Beilin-Eitan Agreement. According to this document Palestinians must take a number of steps, such as accept Israeli army forces in the West Bank, to assuage Israeli security concerns. Obviously, Israeli insecurity is the result of Palestinian intransigence. This idea of Israeli insecurity borne of Arab/Palestinian intransigence also featured prominently in the Camp David negotiations of 2000, the Clinton Parameters of late 2000 and the Taba negotiations of early 2001. In each case the governing idea was that Israel would continue to face Arab/Palestinian threats to its security, even after a permanent settlement to the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict, because of Arab/Palestinian intransigence.

Consequently, Israel demanded, either directly or through Clinton, security guarantees, including but not limited to a nonmilitarized Palestinian state and Israeli early warning stations in the West Bank.

The second rule of formation is to posit as symmetrical the Palestinian-Israeli relationship or represent Israel as the victim in this relationship. This rule, too, was institutionalized in the Oslo Process, continued to govern the production of statements bearing on Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period and continues to be practically realized in the contemporary period. As I outlined in chapter four, the positing of a symmetry between the two parties removes the relationship from history and psychologizes it. A psychologized interpretation of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship produces as means of conflict resolution trust- and confidence-building measures. This logical chain is obvious in the Oslo Process, in the sense that the process itself was a confidence-building measure premised on a psychologized reading of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Arafat's letter to Rabin, the DOPOISGA, the Gaza-Jericho Committee and the Oslo II Agreement further evidenced this positing of a symmetry between the parties leading to trust- and confidence-building measures. Recall here that

the entire concept of splitting the negotiations into interim and final status stages [in the DOPOISGA] – is based on the flawed assumption that the real barriers to conflict resolution in the Israeli-Palestinian case are psychological: Palestinians must demonstrate their willingness to live in peace with Israelis.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Naseer H. Aruri, "Early Empowerment: The Burden Not the Responsibility," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (1995): pp.38-39.

And recall further that the Gaza-Jericho Committee institutionalized confidence-building measures in the form of the Joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee.

Authors such as Pruitt, Bercovitch and Kelman continued to produce statements in accordance with this rule in the post-1993 period. Kelman, in particular, posited a symmetry between the parties and dehistoricized the relationship asserting that each must acknowledge that the other has rights in Palestine. He then psychologized the conflict contending that a Palestinian-Israeli partnership developed and flourished post-1993 due to high levels of trust and responsiveness and deteriorated when this trust was undermined. And finally, he recommended that trust be restored in order to reinvigorate the process.

The “Mitchell Report” of 2001 is an example of the continued practical realization of this analytic. The report dehistoricized the Palestinian-Israeli relationship by mobilizing the language of partnership which obscures the history of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It then posited the relationship as symmetrical by making mutual and equal Palestinian and Israeli claims to the territory and mobilizing the depoliticized phrase “cycle of violence” which connotes a congruity in the nature of the parties’ violence as well as an equal responsibility between the parties for the violence. Adhering meticulously to this analytic the “Mitchell Report” concluded with recommendations intended to incubate trust and confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.

The third rule of formation is to assume that Israel would permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine. More

specifically, according to the third rule of formation an author must assume that: 1) Israel would allow a sovereign Palestinian state to be established in mandate Palestine; 2) this is a state conditional on Arabs/Palestinians realizing certain conditions; and 3) the realization of these conditions must mollify Israel's security concerns. I demonstrated in chapter six that this rule, like the previous two, continued to govern the production of statements bearing on Palestinian-Israeli relations in the post-1993 period. I also showed that there is no historical precedent for this rule and that Israeli policy continues to deny a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine in the contemporary period.

In the post-1993 period authors such as Rubin, Heller, Kelman, Shlaim and Segev all reproduced this third analytic and produced statements in accordance with it. These authors assumed that Israel would have permitted the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine at the end of the Oslo Process; this did not occur because Arafat failed to provide Israelis with security or because Netanyahu undermined the process. As you will recall, I argued that there exists no historical grounding for this analytic and assumption; that, in fact, the texts of the Oslo Process nowhere indicate that a sovereign Palestinian state will follow from the (successful) conclusion of the process. Article I of the DOPOISGA, which states the aim of the negotiations, makes no mention of a sovereign Palestinian state and subsequent Oslo Agreements marginalized the Palestinian Council, the only non-coercive state-like institution that could have helped to usher in a Palestinian state. Also notable is the exclusion from the Oslo Agreements of reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 181.

Inclusion of this resolution, particularly in Article I declaring the aim of the negotiations, would have necessitated the establishment of an Arab state in mandate Palestine alongside Israel. Its intentional exclusion goes to the point that a sovereign Palestinian state should not have been assumed as an outcome of the Oslo Process.

The Oslo Process institutionalized Palestinian autonomy. This fact is occulted by the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations through the mobilization of an abbreviated title for the DOPOISGA, namely the “Declaration of Principles” and its acronym, the “DOP”. Through the deployment of this label the discourse silences obvious references to “Self-Government Arrangements” that contradict the assumption of the third rule of formation, and thereby re-enforces the analytic.

I also demonstrated in chapter six that the Israeli practice of denying a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine persists in the contemporary period. Rabin, one of the signatories to the DOPOISGA, never stopped being an advocate of the Allon Plan and the “Jordanian option” until the moment of his death. The Beilin-Eitan Agreement envisioned a Palestinian state in name only, and even then only according to one interpretation of the document. The Clinton Parameters of 2000, if realized, would not have produced a sovereign Palestinian state and the more recent outline proffered by Sharon in 2003 of a Palestinian state would also have been a state in name only. In each case, the “state” would have been demilitarized, perforated by Israeli early warning stations and surrounded by the Israeli military controlling all entry and exit points. As Halper stated in 2000: “[n]o one who followed Israel’s relentless expansion of its

occupation on the ground would have detected the slightest hint that Israel had ever even contemplated a viable Palestinian state.”<sup>15</sup> Israel has never contemplated it.

The discursive analytics I identified and described in chapters three through six constitute a mutually supportive and re-enforcing matrix. For example, one analytic will eliminate potential contradictions of a second analytic while strengthening a third analytic. For an author to produce a statement in accordance with the third rule of formation he must also abide by the first and second silences; to assume that Israel would have permitted, or will permit the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in mandate Palestine an author must remain silent on Zionist attempts to empty Palestine of the indigenous people and Zionism’s territorial maximization. The same author makes the assumption because Israel is represented as conciliatory and peace-seeking – the first rule of formation.

### *Chapter Seven*

In addition to being mutually supportive, these discursive analytics are also connected to non-discursive practices. Phrased differently, the analytics governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations produce a truth to which the effects of power are attached and that is realized in practice. For example, if Israel is a conciliatory state (first rule), and it can only be conciliatory if its

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<sup>15</sup> Jeff Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” in *The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent* Roane Carey and Jonathan Shainin eds. (New York: The New Press, 2000), p.36.



policies of transfer and territorial maximization are quieted (first and second silences), that is willing to permit the establishment of a Palestinian state (third rule), then settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is a benign, or at worst counterproductive, practice that is not terminal for the prospects of the Palestinian state.

I examined three non-discursive Israeli practices vis-à-vis Palestinians in chapter seven. I compared diachronically, positing the 1993 start of the Oslo Process as a point of potential non-discursive discontinuity, Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli attempts to produce “acceptable” interlocutors among the Palestinian populations of the OPT and Israel’s proffering of initiatives ostensibly aimed at ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This comparison demonstrated that: 1) settlement accelerated the longer the Oslo Process continued and reached its apogee under the leadership of Prime Minister Barak; 2) Rabin’s letter and the DOPOISGA consecrated the PLO, in the form of the PA, as an interlocutor “acceptable” to Israel which, like the Village Leagues before it, fell out of favor with Israel and was marginalized politically through “Operation Field of Thorns” and American and Israeli demands for “reforms”; and 3) the Oslo Agreements are recycled versions of pre-1993 Israeli initiatives (for example, vestiges of the Allon, Shamir and Begin Plans are present in the DOPOISGA and Cairo Agreement and the Early Empowerment Agreement is a verbatim restatement of Begin’s 1977 Plan) that sought to reconcile Israel’s territorial maximization with demographic concerns. In chapter seven I evidenced my claim that Israeli non-discursive practices vis-à-

vis Palestinians, like the six discursive analytics, persisted despite the Oslo Process “breakthrough”.

### *Implications*

What are the implications of my project? There are two significant implications. First, my analysis indicates that recent peace initiatives such as the Quartet’s “Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” of 2003 – the “Roadmap”, the Geneva Accord of 2003 and Sharon’s “Disengagement Plan” announced in 2003, which includes Israel’s unilateral redeployment around Gaza and construction of the “security fence”, will not end Palestinian-Israeli violence. These initiatives are articulations of the unchanged discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations and, at the same time, reproduce persistent analytics and practices. They should not be reasonably expected to produce peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Second, peace between Palestinians and Israel will only be possible with discursive change. While it is important, in the interests of Palestinian-Israeli peace, to end practices such as Israeli settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is imperative that the analytics according to which the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations is produced be changed.

### *Recent Initiatives – The Roadmap*

Even a nominally attentive read of the Roadmap, Geneva Accord and Sharon’s Disengagement Plan reveals the persistence and further

institutionalization of the analytics and practices I have identified and described. The opening paragraph of the Roadmap references Bush's 24 June 2002 speech (I touched on this speech in chapter seven) so it should come as no surprise that the Quartet's document repeatedly demands reform of the Palestinian Authority. The demands include electoral and legal reform and this reform is institutionalized in the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.<sup>16</sup> This is the Quartet, with considerable Israeli input throughout the entirety of the drafting process, determining that the Palestinian Authority must be overhauled if it is to serve as an "acceptable" interlocutor for Israel. This is the perpetuation and institutionalization of the second non-discursive practice (Israel producing "acceptable" interlocutors).

The Roadmap is also produced in accordance with, and institutionalizes, the second and third rules of discursive formation. In the case of the second rule of formation, the document psychologizes the Palestinian-Israeli relationship instructing Israel to take no actions that undermine trust between the parties and calling for the resumption of the type of security cooperation associated with the confidence-building measures of the Gaza-Jericho Committee. In the case of the third rule of formation, the Roadmap instructs the "reformed" Palestinian leadership to issue an "unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to

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<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Web page, 30 April 2003 [accessed 4 August 2005]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.

end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis everywhere.”<sup>17</sup> Israel is instructed to issue an “unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel.”<sup>18</sup> As the third analytic dictates, provided Palestinians realize certain occurrences Israel is willing to permit the establishment of a Palestinian “state” (with provisional borders according to the document).

#### *Recent Initiatives – The Geneva Accord*

The Geneva Accord was “a private Israeli-Palestinian ‘civil society’ peace initiative”<sup>19</sup> announced in October 2003. It was drafted by, among others, Yasir ‘Abid Rabbuh (Palestinian cabinet minister), Yossi Beilin (former Deputy Foreign Minister), Amram Mitzna (Labor leader who lost the 2003 election to Sharon), and David Kimche (chief proponent of the “order theory” explaining the 1948 Palestinian exodus). The agreement had no official standing, being that it was drafted by Palestinian and Israeli political figures operating in their private capacities, and while it was endorsed by Presidents Carter, Chirac, Clinton,

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<sup>17</sup> U.S. Department of State, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Web page, 30 April 2003 [accessed 4 August 2005]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of State, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Web page, 30 April 2003 [accessed 4 August 2005]. Available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>.

<sup>19</sup> “The Geneva Accord,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 2 (2004): p. 81.

Gorbachev and Mandela and Prime Minister Blair it was rejected, absolutely, by Sharon.<sup>20</sup>

The Geneva Accord, too, is produced in accordance with, and perpetuates the persistent analytics and practices of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The most notable of the Geneva Accord's seventeen articles involve the defensive characteristics of the Palestinian state, early warning stations and refugees. The agreement states that "Palestine shall be a nonmilitarized state, with a strong police force"<sup>21</sup> and that "Israel may maintain two EWS [early warning stations] in the northern, and central West Bank."<sup>22</sup> It hardly bares mentioning that no limitations are imposed on Israeli military forces and that there are no Palestinian early warning stations in Israel. These are restatements of the Clinton parameters of 2000. Recall that Clinton proposed three Israeli EWS in the West Bank as well as the idea of nonmilitarized Palestine.

These statements abide by, and reproduce, the second and third rules of formation as well as the second discursive silence. Israel is posited as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Israel requires EWS and a nonmilitarized Palestine lest its security be further imperiled through withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An ostensibly sovereign Palestinian state could be established in mandate Palestine provided it meets several conditions, most importantly those dealing with security arrangements. And, nothing is said of the fact that Israel's insecurity, which must be assuaged by Palestinians actions and

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<sup>20</sup> "The Geneva Accord," p. 81.

<sup>21</sup> "The Geneva Accord," p. 85.

<sup>22</sup> "The Geneva Accord," p. 88.

guarantees, is the result of its wars of choice. The Geneva Accord is mute on the manner in which Zionism's territorial desideratum has afflicted Israel with the insatiable insecurity of the usurper.

Notable as regards refugees the Geneva Accord states that: “[t]he parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them;”<sup>23</sup> and “[t]he parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this agreement.”<sup>24</sup> The first statement is discursively standard in that the refugees are represented as a problem, for which responsibility is disclaimed, in need of solution rather than an intended consequence of Jewish Agency and later Israeli policy.

The second statement (re-)produces a discursive silence and perpetuates a persistent Jewish Agency/Israeli practice. In chapter five I drew attention to the DOPOISGA's exclusion of Resolution 194 in connection with the discursive silence surrounding the idea of transfer. At first blush, this exclusion is rectified by the Geneva Accord. This is not the case, however. Resolution 194 calls for the return of all refugees to their homes in Israel after the War of 1948. The Geneva Accord, on the other hand, would only permit a small number of refugees a return to what is now Israel, and not at their discretion but at Israel's. The options for

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<sup>23</sup> “The Geneva Accord,” p.95.

<sup>24</sup> “The Geneva Accord,” p. 96.

what the Geneva Accords call the refugee's "Permanent Place of Residence" are Palestine, areas transferred to Palestine by Israel in a land swap, third countries, Israel or present host countries.<sup>25</sup> According to the agreement, the number of refugees Israel would "accept" is at its "sovereign discretion."<sup>26</sup> This is so significant a modification to the original intent of Resolution 194 as to make the Accord's reference to the resolution purely political and functionally inoperative.

In chapters three and five I described the discursive silence regarding Zionist denial of Palestinian nationhood and right to national self-determination. The Geneva Accord perpetuates this Zionist idea and practice even while speaking of refugees. According to David Kimche Israeli drafters refused to include the word "return" in the Accord. Says Kimche of the Geneva negotiations:

Towards the end of the session [in the morning at the Movenpick hotel], the Palestinians asked to include the word "return" in the subtitle of the article on refugees. We said, "If you include the word return, we are going to pack our bags and go home. We're not going to accept anything that has to do with return."<sup>27</sup>

By excluding the term "return" from the Accord the Israeli negotiators silenced the idea that the refugees would be "going back" to Palestine. This exclusion reproduces the Zionist idea/practice of denying Palestinians attachment to the land of Palestine in much the same discursive manner as the texts of Peters and Dershowitz.

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<sup>25</sup> "The Geneva Accord," p.96.

<sup>26</sup> "The Geneva Accord," p.96.

<sup>27</sup> Gilead Light, "The Lesser Price to Pay: An Interview with an Israeli member of the Geneva initiative delegation," Web page, 4 December 2004 [accessed 24 July 2005]. Available at <http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=922>.

Finally, the second statement concerning Palestinian refugees also perpetuates the Zionist practice of only accepting the partition of Palestine if it is attended by transfer of the indigenous population. The reader will recall that in chapter three I identified the connection between the transfer of Palestinians and partition of Palestine. Masalha aptly summarized this connection: for Zionists “partition was unacceptable without transfer.”<sup>28</sup> Flapan offered a similar statement saying that for Ben-Gurion specifically, and Zionists more generally, “peace was a corollary of transfer.”<sup>29</sup>

The second statement on refugees from the Geneva Accord makes this connection. Article 7 to which the statement refers is the end of claims clause. It states: “[t]his agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.”<sup>30</sup> The second statement on refugees effectively says that peace will follow as a practical consequence from the Palestinians’ acceptance of their transfer. Phrased differently, the final partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Palestinian state will only occur when Palestinians acquiesce to their transfer. Transfer has always been a Zionist precondition for partition and it continues to be in the Geneva Accord.

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<sup>28</sup> Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 68.

<sup>29</sup> Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p. 104.

<sup>30</sup> “The Geneva Accord,” p. 97.



### *Recent Initiatives – Sharon’s Disengagement Plan*

Finally, Sharon’s Disengagement Plan is produced in accordance with and institutionalizes the persistent analytics and practices of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The Disengagement Plan has two prongs: 1) Israeli military redeployment to the perimeter of the Gaza Strip, rather than in it, and 2) construction of the “security fence”. The first prong also involves the evacuation of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. Together these two actions perpetuate persistent Zionist/Israeli practices, *inter alia*, transfer and territorial maximization.

It must be recognized that Sharon’s much heralded “unilateral disengagement from Gaza” does not represent a policy departure for the state of Israel. Israel has, in fact, wanted to get out of Gaza since it occupied the strip. Israel offered the Gaza Strip to Egypt in 1967 at the conclusion of the war as part of an armistice, seeing in the territory no religious or strategic significance and an obvious demographic liability (the overwhelming majority of the population of the Gaza Strip is refugees or descendents of refugees from the War of 1948). Israel’s abhorrence and fear of the Gaza Strip, particularly after the start of the first *intifada*, was stated quite clearly in 1992 by then Prime Minister Rabin when he expressed the wish that the Gaza Strip “would fall into the sea.”<sup>31</sup> Rabin quickly added “that since that won’t happen, a solution must be found for the

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<sup>31</sup> United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 194 (III) (1948) Palestine - Progress Report on the United Nations Mediator,” Web page, [accessed 29 October 2004]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/c758572b78d1cd0085256bcf0077e51a?OpenDocument>.

problem.”<sup>32</sup> In 1994, Israel built a 64-kilometer encirclement fence around the Gaza Strip. In 1995, the solution to the Israeli problem with the Gaza Strip was crafted in the form of the Oslo II Agreement. The reader will recall here from chapter two that the Oslo II Agreement transferred responsibility for Gaza, except for the settlements and bypass roads in the territory, to the Palestinian Authority. It appeared that Israel was finally rid of the Gaza Strip, until the start of the Al-Aqsa *intifada* and the Israeli military incursions into the strip. As a result of these actions, Israel again tried to divest itself of the Gaza Strip in 2002 by proffering the Gaza-Bethlehem First initiative. The Gaza Strip dimension of Sharon’s Disengagement Plan is the current solution to Israel’s problem with Gaza’s demographics.

The Gaza Strip dimension of the Disengagement Plan perpetuates three persistent Israeli practices: 1) rendering Palestinians irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine; 2) transfer; and 3) territorial maximization. First, the Disengagement Plan renders Palestinians irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine. This is evident in the fact that the plan is a *unilateral* action. Palestinians are excluded from the political machinations surrounding Israel’s redeployment. Sharon acknowledged as much in his speech announcing the plan saying that “[t]he unilateral steps which Israel will take in the framework of the ‘Disengagement Plan’ will be fully coordinated with the United

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<sup>32</sup> United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 194 (III) (1948) Palestine - Progress Report on the United Nations Mediator,” Web page, [accessed 29 October 2004]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/c758572b78d1cd0085256bcf0077e51a?OpenDocument>.

States.”<sup>33</sup> Later Sharon also tellingly said that “[t]he ‘Disengagement Plan’ will include the redeployment of IDF forces along new security lines and a change in the deployment of settlements, which will reduce as much as possible the number of Israelis located in the heart of the Palestinian population. *We* will draw provisional security lines and the IDF will be deployed along them.”<sup>34</sup>

Conspicuous by its absence from both statements is any mention of the Palestinian Authority. The redeployment is not being coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, but with the U.S. The lines of the redeployment are not being drawn in consultation with the Palestinian National Authority.

Redeployment is an exclusively Israeli action, the consequences of which will be imposed on Palestinians.

Second, Israel’s redeployment around the Gaza Strip is an attempt to transfer responsibility for the Palestinian population of the territory to the Palestinian National Authority. According to the “Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights”:

Israel has announced that it will withdraw unilaterally from Gaza. Israel intends to portray this as the end of the military occupation of Gaza, with the result that it will no longer be subject to the Fourth Geneva Convention in respect to Gaza. In reality, however, Israel does not plan to relinquish its grasp on the Gaza Strip. It plans to retain ultimate control over Gaza by controlling its borders, territorial sea and airspace. Consequently, it will in law remain an

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<sup>33</sup> “Doc. C1. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech Outlining a Unilateral ‘Disengagement Plan,’” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 3 (2004): pp.165-166.

<sup>34</sup> “Doc. C1. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech Outlining a Unilateral ‘Disengagement Plan,’” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 3 (2004): p. 166.

Occupying Power still subject to obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention.<sup>35</sup>

By evacuating the Gaza Strip, and claiming to end its occupation of the territory, Israel is trying to divest itself of responsibility for Gazan Palestinians and impose this responsibility, unilaterally, on the remnants of the Palestinian National Authority.

In the Gaza Strip dimension of the Disengagement Plan we see the transfer of responsibility for Palestinians from Israel to another party. Where historically Zionism had hoped that this party would be Jordan in accordance with the “Jordanian option”, now it is what little remains of the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip. The practice of transfer is the same – Israel divests itself of a non-Jewish population while controlling the territory of this population; the recipient responsible for the transferred population has changed.

Finally, Israel’s redeployment around the Gaza Strip perpetuates the practice of territorial maximization. Now, how does a military redeployment to the perimeter of the Gaza Strip maximize Israeli territory? First, as the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights noted, redeployment does not mean that Israel is relinquishing control of the Gaza Strip. Second, and more importantly, redeployment from the morass that is the Gaza Strip will pay

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<sup>35</sup> John Dugard, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, “E/CN.4/2005/29 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.” Web page, 7 Decemeber 2004 [accessed 4 August 2005]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/9c172354fe3c565785256f8e006f3988?OpenDocument>.

territorial dividends for Israel in the West Bank. Sharon is redeploying from the Gaza Strip to remain in the West Bank.

According to the Foundation for Middle East Peace:

“[m]ost of the plans for separation or unilateral withdrawal now under discussion, including the one supported by the Sharon government, are first and foremost the product of an Israeli desire *not* to separate – to remain in the territories in both the security and settlement dimensions – from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”<sup>36</sup>

This assertion, and the persistence of the Israeli practice of territorial maximization, is borne out by Sharon’s own comments on the Disengagement Plan and Bush’s guarantees to Sharon in April 2004. In the same speech in which he outlined Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip Sharon also stated that:

“[a]t the same time [as redeployment around the Gaza Strip and relocation of Israeli settlements], in the framework of the ‘Disengagement Plan,’ Israel will strengthen its control over those same areas in the Land of Israel which will constitute an inseparable part of the State of Israel in any future agreement.”<sup>37</sup>

“Those same areas in the Land of Israel” are located in the West Bank. The envisioned territorial dividends were realized by Sharon in April 2004 when correspondence from Bush to Sharon assured Israel that it would retain its large settlements in the West Bank in any final status agreement. Said Bush:

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the

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<sup>36</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories* 12, no. 3 (2002): p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> “Doc. C1. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech Outlining a Unilateral ‘Disengagement Plan,’” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 3 (2004): p. 166.

ground, including already existing major Israeli populations [sic] centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.<sup>38</sup>

“Already existing major Israeli population centers” are settlements in the West Bank such as Ariel and Efrat, and according to Bush they will not have to be surrendered by Israel in any final status negotiations with the Palestinians. Redeployment around the Gaza Strip further consolidates Israeli control over the West Bank and this, of course, is the perpetuation of the Israeli practice of territorial maximization.

The second prong of the Disengagement Plan is construction of Israel’s “security fence”.<sup>39</sup> Like the Gaza Strip dimension of the plan, this “fence” is neither an ideational or policy departure for Zionism and Israel. As the reader will

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<sup>38</sup> “Doc. B. U.S. President George W. Bush, Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the Disengagement Plan,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 4 (2004): pp. 89-90.

<sup>39</sup> B’Tselem describes the “security fence” as follows: “The main component of the barrier is an electronic fence that will give warning of every attempt to cross it. Along the east side of the fence is a ‘service road’ bordered by a barbed-wire fence. East of the service road is a ‘trench or other means intended to prevent motor vehicles from crashing into and through the fence.’ The plan calls for three paths to the west of the fence: ‘a trace road, intended to reveal the footprints of a person who crossed the fence, a patrol road, and an armored vehicles road.’ Another barbed-wire fence will be constructed along this path. The average width of the barrier complex is sixty meters. Due to topographic constraints, a narrower barrier will be erected in some areas and will not include all of the elements that support the electronic fence. However, as the state indicated to the High Court of Justice, ‘in certain cases, the barrier will reach a width of one hundred meters due to the topographic conditions’.” Yehezkel Lein, *Behind the Barrier: Human Rights Violations As a Result of Israel's Separation Barrier* (Jerusalem: B’Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 2003), p. 8.

recall from chapter three, Jabotinsky argued in favor of an “Iron Wall”: “[w]e must either suspend out settlement efforts or continue them without paying attention to the mood of the natives. Settlement can thus develop under the protection of a force that is not dependent on the local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to break down.”<sup>40</sup> According to Shlaim, “Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s strategy of the iron wall was designed to force the Palestinians to despair of the prospect of driving the Jews out of Palestine and to compel them to negotiate with the Jewish state from a position of weakness.”<sup>41</sup> It would be a mistake, however, to understand the idea of an “Iron Wall” or “security fence” as an exclusively Revisionist Zionist or Likud one. In this sense, Makovsky is right in identifying Rabin as the intellectual father of the “fence”.<sup>42</sup> In 1994 Rabin built the already mentioned Gaza encirclement fence; in 1995 Rabin established the Shahal Commission (after inter-ministerial committee headed by Moshe Shahal, his police commissioner) to determine the optimal means of building a security barrier in the West Bank;<sup>43</sup> in 1996 “Peres approved the construction of a two-kilometre-wide ‘buffer zone’ to run along the 350-kilometre West Bank-Israel

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<sup>40</sup> Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 13.

<sup>41</sup> Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, 1st ed., p. 606.

<sup>42</sup> David Makovsky, “A Defensible Fence: How to build a West Bank barrier that encourages peace.” Web page, August 2004 [accessed 28 July 2005]. Available at <http://www.ajiac.org.au/review/2004/298/essay298.htm>. For similar ideas see also: David Makovsky, “The Right Fence for Israel,” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (2004): pp. 50-64.

<sup>43</sup> Makovsky, “A Defensible Fence: How to build a West Bank barrier that encourages peace.” Web page, August 2004 [accessed 28 July 2005]. Available at <http://www.ajiac.org.au/review/2004/298/essay298.htm>.

Green Line;”<sup>44</sup> and in 2000 Barak “ordered Deputy Defence Minister Ephraim Sneh to prepare a team to draw a partition line between Israel and the West Bank, paralleling Rabin’s Shahal Commission.”<sup>45</sup> Like the idea and practice of transfer and the practice of settlement, the “security fence” is a longstanding Zionist idea shared by Israel’s mainstream political parties. Sharon<sup>46</sup> co-opted “a popular idea reared by the Israeli Center-Left”<sup>47</sup> and broadened its appeal to the Israeli public by moving it eastward,<sup>48</sup> absorbing more West Bank territory (including Israeli settlers and settlements and Palestinian villages and land) into Israel.

A number of discursive analytics and non-discursive practices come into play in the construction of the “security fence”. I will focus briefly on three. First, the idea/practice of territorial maximization and persistence of the Israeli practice of settlement are readily apparent. The “fence” is largely built in the West Bank, on land appropriated from Palestinians. According to the UN’s Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights:

[a] further purpose of the Wall is to expand Israel’s territory. Rich agricultural land and water resources along the Green Line have been incorporated into Israel. In recent months, Israel has manifested its territorial ambitions in the Jerusalem area. The Wall is currently being built around an

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<sup>44</sup> Graham Usher, *Dispatches From Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Process* (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p. 99.

<sup>45</sup> Makovsky, “A Defensible Fence: How to build a West Bank barrier that encourages peace.” Web page, August 2004 [accessed 28 July 2005]. Available at <http://www.ajiac.org.au/review/2004/298/essay298.htm>.

<sup>46</sup> Sharon, it must be noted, has long been a builder of walls. He built the Bar-Lev Line (a 60-foot high wall of sand) in the occupied Sinai and built walls around South Africa bantustans for the apartheid regime.

<sup>47</sup> Peter Lagerquist, “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel’s “Separation Wall”,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 2 (2004): p. 6.

<sup>48</sup> Lagerquist, “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel’s “Separation Wall”,” p. 7.



expanded East Jerusalem to incorporate some 247,000 settlers in 12 settlements and some 249,000 Palestinians within the boundaries of the Wall.<sup>49</sup>

Regarding the persistent practice of settlement, Lagerquist states that: “[i]f most parties along Israel’s political spectrum can identify with the map now drawn by the fence it is because it closely follows one that for over thirty years has served as a referent for Israeli debates about the West Bank – that of the Allon Plan.”<sup>50</sup>

Second, the idea/practice of transfer informs, and is institutionalized in, the “fence”. Lagerquist asserts that transfer looms at the conclusion of the “fence”.<sup>51</sup> According to him, Palestinians have good reason to fear that the “fence” will realize “a demographic housecleaning in the West Bank.”<sup>52</sup> The UN’s Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights comes to the same, if more geographically restricted, conclusion.

[Another] purpose of the Wall is to compel Palestinian residents living between the Wall and the Green Line and adjacent to the Wall, but separated from their land by the Wall, to leave their homes and start a new life elsewhere in the West Bank, by making life intolerable for them. Restrictions on freedom of movement in the ‘Closed Zone’ between the Wall and the Green Line and the separation of

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<sup>49</sup> Dugard, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, “E/CN.4/2005/29 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.” Web page, 7 Decemeber 2004 [accessed 4 August 2005]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/9c172354fe3c565785256f8e006f3988?OpenDocument>.

<sup>50</sup> Lagerquist, “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel's “Separation Wall”,” p. 10.

<sup>51</sup> Lagerquist, “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel's “Separation Wall”,” p. 5.

<sup>52</sup> Lagerquist, “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel's “Separation Wall”,” p. 21.

farmers from their land will be principally responsible for forcing Palestinians to move.<sup>53</sup>

Whether Palestinians are forced from land adjacent to the “fence” or forced from the West Bank entirely, through construction of the “security fence” Israel is forcibly removing Palestinians from territory it covets. The “fence” is yet another instance of Israel attempting to reconcile its territorial ambitions with demographic concerns.

Third, the idea/practice of deeming Palestinians irrelevant to the final dispensation of mandate Palestine is present in the construction of the “fence”. This is most obvious in the fact that the route of the “fence” is determined by the Israeli Ministry of Defence. Admittedly, there is ongoing discussion between Israel and the U.S. as to the exact location and route of the “fence”. This is hardly surprising; recall that in announcing the Disengagement Plan Sharon explained that Israel’s unilateral steps would be coordinated with the U.S.<sup>54</sup> This Israeli-American coordination is acknowledged by Ross:

With the Israelis, the United States would coordinate on the route of the security barrier to ensure that it makes infiltration into Israel difficult, minimizes the numbers of Palestinians Israel would absorb, imposes the fewest possible hardships on Palestinian villages affected by the

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<sup>53</sup> Dugard, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, “E/CN.4/2005/29 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.” Web page, 7 Decemeber 2004 [accessed 4 August 2005]. Available at <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/9c172354fe3c565785256f8e006f3988?OpenDocument>.

<sup>54</sup> “Doc. C1. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Speech Outlining a Unilateral “Disengagement Plan”,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 3 (2004): pp. 166-167.

barrier, and preserves the possibility of an eventual two-state solution in time.<sup>55</sup>

Ross' empty concern for the hardships of Palestinians aside, his statement clearly indicates that Palestinians are excluded from discussions involving the "fence". The "security fence" is "the most far-reaching reordering of the Palestinian landscape undertaken since 1967"<sup>56</sup> and Palestinians are irrelevant to this reordering; Israeli policy exclusively will dictate it.

According to the Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Israel is refining its ideas with the United States rather negotiating with the Palestinian Authority, which the two parties have turned into a moribund shadow of its former self."<sup>57</sup> This, of course, is in keeping with established idea and practice. As was the case in the procurement of the Balfour Declaration and negotiations surrounding the 1947 Partition Resolution, Israel is coordinating the dispensation of Palestine with the hegemon of the day and ignoring the natives *in situ*.

The Roadmap, Geneva Accord and Disengagement Plan, like their predecessors in the Oslo Process, are articulations of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. They are produced in accordance with, reproduce and institutionalize the analytics and practices of the discourse. They should not be expected to succeed in producing Palestinian-Israeli peace where similar textual products of the same discourse failed. Despite their varying levels of international

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<sup>55</sup> Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 778.

<sup>56</sup> Lagerquist, "Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel's "Separation Wall", p. 5.

<sup>57</sup> Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Report on Israeli Settlement Activity in the Occupied Territories* 13, no. 4 (2003): p. 4.

acclaim (particularly for the Geneva Accord) and political investment (in the Roadmap) these initiatives will no more produce peaceful Palestinian-Israeli relations than did the DOPOISGA or the Hebron Protocol.

### *Discursive Change*

In *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*

Ross asserts that the key to Palestinian-Israeli peace is to debunk mythologies.

Says Ross: "I tell this story in much detail for a very basic reason: peacemaking can never succeed in an environment dominated by mythologies and untruths."<sup>58</sup>

On the same page he declares as his mission: "[m]y purpose is to debunk mythologies. My purpose is to engage in truth-telling."<sup>59</sup> For Ross, the cause of Palestinian-Israeli peace is harmed by falsity.

It is not myth or untruth or falsity that is the problem, but rather the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The Oslo Process did not produce peace between Palestinians and Israel because it was an articulation of the unchanged discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The Roadmap, Geneva Accord and Disengagement Plan will not produce peace between Palestinians and Israelis for the same reason. Palestinian-Israeli peace requires discursive change.

To change the truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations to which the effects of power are attached, to produce texts and agreements that will encourage peaceful Palestinian-Israeli relations, it is necessary to change the rules that govern the

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<sup>58</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 773.

<sup>59</sup> Ross, *The Missing Peace: the Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, 1st ed., p. 773.

production of that truth. In other words, in order to see power produce and be exercised in accordance with texts and agreements that encourage peaceful relations it is necessary to change how Palestinian-Israeli relations are spoken of. I conclude with a discursive change intended to encourage Palestinian-Israeli peace.

In chapter five I speculated that the first discursive silence involving the idea and practice of transfer might be determinant. Similarly, in chapter six I suggested that the first rule of formation requiring that Israel be represented as conciliatory and peace-seeking and Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists might be the most influential analytic governing the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Given that the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations is a matrix of mutually supportive and re-enforcing analytics, the most far-reaching and effective discursive change will come from a violation of one silence or rule that in turn challenges others. Violating the first silence achieves this kind of change; challenging the first rule of formation remains an isolated exercise. Speaking of Zionism's/Israel's idea and practice of transfer weakens the first rule of formation by making it exceedingly more difficult for authors to represent Israel as conciliatory and peace-seeking and Arabs/Palestinians as intransigent rejectionists. Furthermore, such a violation also challenges the second rule of formation by problematizing representations of Israel as the victim in the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Challenging the first rule of formation would not necessarily produce such a causal chain.

To affect discursive change it is most necessary to violate the silence surrounding the Zionist/Israeli idea and practice of transfer. Palestinian refugees must no longer be spoken of as a problem and the product of the vicissitudes of war. Instead, Palestinian refugees must be spoken of as the intended consequence of Zionist thought and Israeli policy. Statements must be made that Zionism and Israel sought to empty Palestine of Palestinians thereby radically changing the demographic composition of the territory in order to realize a Jewish majority. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the Palestinian refugees were willing to accept the existence of Israel as early as the Lausanne Conference of 1949, provided Israel permitted their repatriation and that Israel has, at every opportunity, denied them this right. It is not sufficient, in fact it is detrimental to the cause of peace, to invent imaginative formulas that acknowledge the suffering of refugees and make them the responsibility of the international community. Responsibility for the creation and perpetuation of the Palestinian refugees must be assigned to Israel. The refugees must be spoken of as human beings with rights that are non-negotiable, that cannot be bartered and traded; it must be said that no matter Israel's demographic concerns and its "Jewish character" that the refugees are entitled to return to their homes and lands and/or receive compensation. Statements must be made bearing on the contemporary practice of transfer involving Palestinian villages such as Yanun as well as the growing appeal the idea and practice has in the Jewish Israeli electorate.

The Oslo Process was a truthful articulation of the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. This discourse with its analytics and practices

produced the first Palestinian *intifada* in 1987. With no discursive or non-discursive change it is hardly a surprise that the Oslo Process did not produce peace between Palestinians and Israel. One should not have reasonably expected the same silences, the same rules, the same practices, the same truth and the same effects of power to produce a different outcome. Persistent and persisting analytics and practices had the same effect in 2000 as they did in 1987.

Peace will not follow from the current truth of Palestinian-Israeli relations. Peace is only possible with discursive change; with a different truth.

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