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Royalism, Rhetoric and Polemic in the Historical Thought and Writing of Peter Heylyn

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled Royalism and the Polemic of the Past: The Historical Thought of Peter Heylyn submitted by Christopher Allen Sinal in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

This thesis explores the historical method employed by Peter Heylyn—biographer of Archbishop Laud, controversialist member of Anthony Milton's Durham House Group and royalist historian. As D.R. Woolf has demonstrated, the Civil War period saw the infusion of ideology into narrative historical writing and the breakdown of late-Tudor and early-Stuart conservatism, leading to historical narratives that lacked a commonly rooted underpinning. The thesis illustrates how Heylyn's history writing cognitively evovled into such heated polemic from the ideological consensus that existed only a few years earlier. This is accomplished through examinations of Heylyn's commitment to royal and ecclesiastical duty, or deontology, and his use of different forms of rhetoric to advocate for the Laudian and royalist policies. The thesis concludes with an examination of how this analysis of a single Laudian and royalist's historical thought might be expanded into a larger analysis of English history writing during the Civil War.

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Introduction

"There is little doubt," wrote George Vernon in his 1682 biography of the royalist

Peter Heylyn, that "the very name of Dr. Heylyn will raise the Blood, and exasperate the

Passions of some quarrelsome and unquiet spirits, who like Ghosts and Goblins fight with

those that are dead, as well as affright others that are living."[1] Vernon's assessment was

certainly accurate: today, Heylyn is largely remembered as the literary nemesis of those

who opposed Archbishop William Laud and the ecclesiastical reforms he championed.

Some modern scholars, such as Anthony Milton, place him in a position of significant

influence within Laud's inner circle. In fact, Milton labels Heylyn "the chief ideologue of

the Laudian movement".[2] However, Heylyn was more than a controversialist; he was a

noteworthy author of historical works that spanned the genres of antiquarian and

narrative history, as well as ecclesiastical and civil history. On these points alone, an

examination of the historical thought of this author—active in the years from 1620 to

1660 during one of the most contentious periods in English historical writing—is needed.

Indeed, during the English Civil War, a time of rich ideological ferment and exchange,

the nature of historical writing itself remains mysterious. That historians such as Heylyn

engaged openly in controversy through the medium of narrative history is noteworthy

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[1] George Vernon, *The Life of the Learned and Reverend Dr. Peter Heylyn* (1682), Epistle Dedicatory 2. A note on citation: throughout the thesis primary quotations will maintain original spelling and grammar, save for the substitution of the letters "u" for "v" and, in some instances, "s" for "t".

[2] Anthony Milton, "The Creation of Laudianism: A New Approach," in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust and Peter Lake, eds, *Politics, Religion and Popularity in Early Stuart Britain: Essays in Honour of Conrad Russell* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 165. Milton's characterization of Heylyn as wielding such a high level of influence is somewhat dependant on the reader's acceptance of Milton's model of Laudianism as a construction of the "minor and often rather obscure authors" that existed in the fluid realm of discourse. Within this context, Heylyn's prominence stems—among other things—from his hyperactive role as a Laudian controversialist.

given the state of history writing only a few years earlier. The task of exploring the roots

of the Civil War historical mind is a massive one, and would requires extensive analysis

of numerous historians. Areas that require study include: issues of identity construction

and group affiliation; the appropriateness of terms such as such as "Parliamentarian" and

"Royalist"; how the historical writing and ideas of various authors influenced and were

influenced by one another; and whether or not certain rhetorical and historical

constructions emerged in the discourse of Civil War and Interregnum historical writing.[3]

This effort to trace Interregnum-era royalist historical writing is best completed through

studies of the authors themselves, many of whom lack modern biographies and

historiographic analyses. However, given the magnitude of this effort, the present work

seeks to initiate the discussion by exploring the historical thought of one historian active

during the breakdown of the early Stuart narrative consensus. As Woolf rightly notes, "in

some ways, the best map of the historical mindset of an era can be drawn from close

inspection not of its peaks but its plains."[4] Of the works discussed above, nearly all are

limited in their study of Civil War historians to the heavily studied: Hobbes, Dugdale,

Clarendon, Milton, and others. It is for this reason in addition to those above that this

study focuses on one of the lesser-studied historians of the period, Peter Heylyn. How did

Heylyn's idea of history—his concept of truth and attitudes towards the past—interact

with his outspoken, often political and sometimes vitriolic writing? To understand this

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[3] I suggest here that just as Laudianism had an "unstable quality," according to Anthony Milton, that evolved and changed within the writings of the period, perhaps so to did the idea of history shared by narrative historians during the Civil War and Interregnum. See Anthony Milton, "The Creation of Laudianism",162-184.

[4] D.R. Woolf, "Narrative Historical Writing in Restoration England: A Preliminary Study," in *The Restoration Mind*, edited by W. Gerald Marshall (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1997), 211.

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question more fully, we must first examine the terrain that has already been well covered in English historiography.

This survey of modern investigations of British historical thought begins with F. Smith Fussner's noteworthy 1962 work, *The Historical Revolution,* in which the author made the case that the titular revolution in historiographical thought and methodology occurred in England between 1580 and 1640. Through analysis of authors such as Ralegh, Camden, Bacon, and Selden, Fussner maintained that the change in late Tudor historical writing was part of the greater transition from traditional to modern industrial society accompanied by a "new secular idea of progress".[5] This transition, in Fussner's view, led to ideological conflicts where historians like Bacon used newly accessible records to question established epistemological theses, such as the commonly held trope that the world was in a steady state of decay, and chose to work instead within the nascent model of progress. For Fussner, this new paradigm led to historical attacks on both secular and ecclesiastical authority; while Bacon divided history into civil and sacred/ ecclesiastical branches, Fussner rightly held that contemporary history could not be separated from divinity, given the latter's reliance on historical foundations. While the 1580s saw the beginning of the author's "historical revolution", it reached its peak during the Civil War, an event that acted as an impetus for change. However, the Restoration saw the stabilization of English historical writing given that there was "no longer any need for a thorough reform of the theory and practice of historiography. Continuity," writes

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[5] F. Smith Fussner, *The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought, 1580-1640* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 299.

Fussner, "was for more significant than change."[6] Unfortunately, Fussner's work is rife

with problems endemic in Whig history -- notably its teleology rooted in an idea of

methodological progress towards late nineteenth-century historiography. Indeed, the

Whig contention that the historical authors of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England

were the beneficiaries of the lifting of a historiographic Burckhardtian "common veil"[7] is

a claim that was met with some scepticism after it was first introduced.[8]

Arthur B. Ferguson has further illuminated the landscape of early modern English

historical writing. His *Clio Unbound* (1979) attempts to trace the sixteenth century

"tyranny of *res gestae*", or the dominating historical mode of chronicling the "things

done" through texts.[9] Ferguson explores the Tudor conception of "histories" as simple

accounts of events, with the "spine of history" being political narrative, leaving other

writings involving the past to fall under the broad rubric of "antiquities". It is here,

through an analysis of "how the story of social and cultural history in Renaissance

England [became] the story of antiquarian research,"[10] that the author finds the genesis of

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[6] Fussner, *The Historical Revolution*, 300. J.G.A. Pocock's *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Reissue with a Retrospect* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) is also rooted in the idea of an early modern English revolution in historical writing (see specifically pages 259-261 of the *Reissue*.)

[7] Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S.G.C. Middlemore (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 98. Burckhardt's "common veil" stands as an excellent archetype of the teleology of progress. The phrase is taken from the following: "In the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness – that which was turned within as that which was turned without – lay dreaming or half awake beneath a common veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion and childish prepossession, through which the world and history were seen clad in strange hues... In Italy this veil first melted into air; an *objective* treatment and consideration of the state and of all the things of this world became possible."

[8] For discussion of the "historical revolution" thesis, see Joseph H. Preston, "Was there an Historical Revolution?" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38 no. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1977): 353-364, specifically the reference to Butterfield's *The Whig Interpretation of History*.

[9] Arthur B. Ferguson, *Clio Unbound: Perception of the Social and Cultural Past in Renaissance England* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), 3.

[10] Ferguson, *Clio Unbound*, 13.

a kind of social history as conceived of in the modern sense, although contemporaries did not recognize it as such; the "ability to visualize societies and cultures as having a history in themselves, apart from that of the individuals whose deeds were recorded in conventional narrative."[11] Ferguson's study traces the tension between the idea of an ordained, unchanging past manifest in a natural order of things and the manifest social changes endemic in Tudor England through the work of numerous English writers of history—both "historians" proper and antiquaries—such as Hooker, Spelman, Selden, Daniel, Camden, and Bacon. Ferguson's work represents a valuable insight into the historical mind of Renaissance England, although its search for the development of modern historical thought, as manifested in the recognition of the importance of the social and cultural past as a concept in historical writing, replicates the teleological flaw of Fussner's earlier work.[12]

In his *Neoclassical History and English Culture,* Philip Hicks addresses the preoccupation of scholars of early modern English historiography with searching for the evolution of modern historical thought in the past. Hicks examines the theme of neoclassical thought in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writing in an effort to "offer a counterweight to correct scholarly studies that tend instead to privilege twentieth century responses to the texts."[13] Hicks's line of enquiry stems from the effort of continental historians such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini to emulate the classical

[11] Ferguson, *Clio Unbound,* 79.

[12] These concerns are raised in G. R. Elton's review of *Clio Unbound* in *History and Theory* 20, no. 1 (1981): 92-100, in which Elton writes that "Ferguson's constant awareness of twentieth-century expectations...gives the book an astonishingly anachronistic air." (p. 94)

[13] Philip Hicks, *Neoclassical History and English Culture: From Clarendon to Hume* (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 5.

models of Thucydides and Herodotus, and the perceived failure of English historians to achieve such a level of historical writing until the works of Hume. The failure of English historians adequately to harness the neoclassical idiom was, argues Hicks, of central concern in the English conception of history, and has only been missed thus far in historical analysis because of the desire to map the evolution of modern historical methods onto the past. Englishmen, writes Hicks, spoke often about appreciating classical histories, but were just as likely to buy "document-laden, partisan histories", even going so far as rejecting Hume and Clarendon because they disagreed with the authors. This partisan history, apparent during the Civil War and only exasperated by the clerical nature of seventeenth-century England—where the closeness of political and civil history "meant that ostensibly civil or secular historians wrote in the clericalist manner"— combined with the party politics of the early eighteenth century to prevent neoclassical history from developing in England. [14]

The partisan history that arises in Hicks' work was first fully discussed within Daniel Woolf's extensive writing on the late Tudor and early Stuart historical mind. Like others, he is concerned with exploring the differentiation within Stuart thinking between the historian and the antiquary, and what was understood when contemporaries used the terms. More importantly, Woolf delves into the early Stuart understanding of the past itself, constructing the conceptions and beliefs that underpinned antiquarian and narrative historical writing. By the end of Elizabeth's reign, he argues, a "rigid orthodoxy" had formed in contemporary writing of the past, the underlying tenets of which—a

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[14] Hicks, *Neoclassical History,* 210, 213.

fundamentally conservative ideology of "obedience, duty and deference to social and political hierarchy"—were rarely questioned.[15] This underlying conservatism continued until the events of the Civil War shifted historical discourse away from rhetorical restatement and towards an environment of "controversy, dispute and debate," where the past was used to not only explain events but also to cast blame upon one's adversaries.

It is with the breakdown of the traditional, conservative underpinnings of English history, and the resulting infusion of ideology into narrative historical writing coincidental with England's political and religious tribulations that this thesis is chiefly concerned. As the exploration of the landscape of the English historical mind has traveled through the questionably "revolutionary" origins of modern historical thought and the formation of social and cultural awareness, the ideological conflicts of the mid-sixteenth century have been noted, but typically only on the periphery of the research: most analyses of early modern English historical thought draw their later terminus at the Civil War. In fact, no scholarship has directly explored the fragmentation of English historical writing, nor have studies been done to explore the internal dynamics of the seemingly obvious infusion of ideology into historical discourse. This is not to suggest that there have been no discussions of history-writing during the Civil War; a number of studies exist that deal with the subject. However, most are written from the perspective of the Restoration, or with the aim of illustrating contemporary attitudes to the conflict. We will examine some of these works below.

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[15] D.R. Woolf, *The Idea of History in Early Stuart England* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 33.

Royce MacGillivray's *Restoration Historians and the English Civil War* deals

with three discrete periods of history writing: from the Civil War to 1660, from 1660 to

1688, and from 1688 to 1702. Additionally, the author places histories into clearly

defined "Royalist, Parliamentarian, or Whig" camps. Given that only one third of the

work is dedicated to historical writing during the period of Woolf's collapse of

ideological consensus, the opportunity for thorough analysis of the period's historians is

limited. While the issue of ideology is addressed, it is done through a brief discussion of

contemporary understandings of "truth" and the belief that to support what one believed

to be correct was the morally right thing to do. MacGillivray's primary focus is rather on

the perceived causes of the Civil War, and how they changed over time. Peter Heylyn and

Thomas Fuller are the recipients of brief studies, while others are collected under a

general survey. From his survey of historians writing largely since the Restoration,

MacGillivray concludes that there were no prevailing interpretations of the war in

historical narrative, nor were there any "orthodox" ideas as might be found in early Stuart

England. Also, the period lacked any generally accepted images of what constituted

"Puritanism" (the author does not, however, explore whether a similar conclusion could

be arrived at with regards to "Royalism").[16] In the end, the lack of consensus and

prevalence of ideological disputes is taken as a reflection of the fractious nature of the

period and, as a result, it is not explored in any depth.

Of the other notable scholarly efforts that explore history-writing during the Civil

War, R.C. Richardson's work also discusses the fact that royalists and Parliamentarians

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[16] Royce MacGillivray, *Restoration Historians and the English Civil War* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 15-45, 226, 229. For an exploration of the existential qualities of "Royalism" and those who espoused it, see Jerome De Groot's *Royalist Identities* (New York: MacMillan, 2004).

both found and nurtured their respective historians, who based their accounts on a selective sampling of the available literature. However, the focus of his analysis is the narrative of the Civil War from the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries, with the majority of the effort spent on writers after the Restoration.[17] Woolf's own work on Restoration historical writing draws our attention to the significant questioning of impartiality that followed the destruction of Elizabethan and early Stuart political and religious consensus, and the fact that "post-Civil War historiography was driven, seemingly endlessly, by the engine of ideological conflict."[18] Nonetheless, the causes and course of this breakdown are left unexplored. In fact, to date, no detailed analysis has been undertaken to address the causes and course of the fracturing of the early Stuart ideological consensus. Simply put, many of the polemical sources of historical writing that underpin current Civil War scholarship remain unstudied from a historiographical perspective. If nothing else, this work serves as a preliminary effort in illuminating this dark area in the map of the seventeenth century English idea of history.

In the following chapters, I will explore the historical thought of Peter Heylyn, and also seek to begin a larger discussion on the ideological breakdown of the early Stuart consensus in narrative history. This will be accomplished through analyzing the component parts that together gave form to Heylyn's historical method; rather than a study of Heylyn's historiographical forebears and inspirations for his historical method, I will instead focus on how Heylyn came to form the ideas and opinions that drove him and

[17] R.C. Richardson, *The Debate on the English Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[18] D.R. Woolf, "Narrative Historical Writing," 211. Woolf notes that his study is a call for further research into Restoration writing; "I should add the further caveat," he writes, "that the gaps in our knowledge of Restoration historiography are at present time caverns rather than cracks."

how he argued them in print. Chapter one will explore Heylyn's own biography, including his education and his relationship with various personalities during the years leading up to the Civil War. Special attention will be paid to the theological debates between the "Laudians" and their adversaries, and Heylyn's role as vociferous advocate on behalf of Laud and the crown.

Chapter two will focus on the major themes of Heylyn's historical writing. While he is often seen as little more than a controversialist (save perhaps for his works of geographical history at the beginning and again at the mid-point of his career) Heylyn's views were not created *ex nihilo* to serve the argument at hand. Rather his writings reveal core beliefs that were brought to bear on opponents. These will include what it meant to be a "royalist", and whether Heylyn could accurately be thought of as holding them; his attitudes towards the monarchy and theories of government, as well as where and how these intersected with his theological beliefs. Finally, this chapter will discuss how these themes developed and were reflected by Heylyn's participation in the Laudian movement. I will show how these beliefs coalesced into a system of deontology, or moral duty, consisting of the same ideology of obedience, duty and deference to social and political hierarchy that underlie both Elizabethan historical writing and Royalism.

The third and final chapter will explore the tools employed by Heylyn in his histories and battles with contemporary writers. Specifically, it will focus on the place of "truth" in seventeenth-century history, and how Heylyn's deontological beliefs were molded and formed into arguments that were delivered as historical truth. I will investigate how Heylyn was able to differentiate between "partiality" and "partisanship"

in writing histories, and how he engaged in writing history that was openly polemical, while maintaining a position of advocating truth rather than opinion. Finally, I will conclude by examining how this analysis of a single Laudian and royalist's historical thought might be expanded into a larger analysis of English history writing during the Civil War; this may help us one day answer the question of how the fractious historical debates of the mid-seventeenth century evolved from the ideological consensus that existed only a few years earlier. Let us begin, then, by exploring in more detail the focus of this study: Peter Heylyn, and how he may help answer our larger historiographical questions.

Chapter One
A Life of Raising the Blood and Exasperating the Passions

Throughout his life, Heylyn published as a historian-controversialist. He was heavily engaged in the ecclesiastical debates leading up to the Civil War. As Vernon tells us,

> Many books were written by him [Heylyn], when the King and Church were in their low and calamitous condition; some of which were historical, relating to matters of fact; some political, relating to the power of the Princess and various form of Government; and lastly others theological; and those either didactical, tending to the settling and informing of mens understandings; or practical, that conducted to the amending of their manners; or polemical, that vindicated the Truths of God and Unity of his Church against the Errors, Schisms and persecutions of its enemies, whether papists, socinians, or disciplinarians.[19]

It is from this collection of works that Heylyn has proved most relevant to the modern historiographic scholarship on the Civil War. Recently, academic debates have taken place regarding the acrimonious engagements between groups in the seventeenth century's conflicts. These scholarly discussions surround historical motivations by actors, as well as the dichotomies used to describe them—be they Anglican and Puritan, Laudians and Calvinists, Royalists and Parliamentarians; some wonder whether such

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[19] Vernon, *The Life*, 155.

categories are even constructive.[20] Indeed A. W. Harrison is correct when he writes,

"English political history can never be understood if the historic division of the Church

over doctrine and worship is forgotten."[21] It is important to note the context of these

discussions, as they form the basis for the modern relevance of Heylyn, and it will

arguably be these exchanges that would most benefit from a detailed analysis of

Heylyn's individual historical writings and his idea of history. Heylyn spent much of his

early years working closely with Laud and his associates within the Durham House

Group, vocally advocating Laudian policies. During the Interregnum, he continued to

write extensively in support of the royalist cause through the medium of historical

narrative. Given his active involvements in the ideological conflicts of the Civil War, and

the fact that his publishing predates the breakdown of the early Stuart historical

consensus, Heylyn provides an excellent starting point for a larger examination of

royalist historical thought specifically, and Civil War and Interregnum thought generally.

Recent debates within Civil War historiography have been framed within a

traditional historiographical view, what David Hoyle calls the "old orthodoxy", that held

that the key to understanding the contemporary religious context and the war's cause was

the growth of a "rising militant Puritanism".[22] In recent decades, however, this image of

the religious and political environment on the eve of the Civil War has come into serious

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[20] For an introduction to this debate, see the exchange between Peter White and Nicholas Tyacke in *Past and Present*: Peter White, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered." *Past and Present* no. 101 (Nov., 1983): 34-54; Nicholas Tyacke, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered." *Past and Present* no. 115 (May, 1987): 201-216; Peter White, "The Rise of Arminianism Reconsidered: A Rejoinder." *Past and Present* no. 115 (May, 1987): 217-229); see also White's *Predestination, Policy and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

[21] A.W. Harrison, *Arminianism* (London: Kemp Hall Press, 1937), 139.

[22] David Hoyle, "A Commons Investigation of Arminianism and Popery in Cambridge on the Eve of the Civil War" *The Historical Journal* 29 no. 2 (Jun., 1986): 419.

question. As Hoyle has written, "new villains of English history have emerged, and Archbishop Laud is now held personally responsible for both the collapse of the Church and the fall of the Stuart monarchy."[23] Patrick Collinson's *Birthpangs of Protestant England*, attributed the rising militancy of Puritanism to a "confrontation of... startlingly different moral economies", resulting from an Elizabethan Church that was occupied by an "advanced, evangelical Calvinist Puritanism".[24] The rise of Archbishop Laud and the doctrinal mandates impressing Arminianism and Laudianism across the country (and later, infamously into Scotland) redefined "Puritanism" as a force to be opposed, with Laud acting as an *"agent provocateur"*. It was this action that, along with other political and social factors during the Caroline period that gave rise to the Civil War. In this continuing debate, a *de facto* starting point exists before engaging in any discussion of the religious climate leading up to the English Civil War: that is the problem of defining terms such as "Puritan", "Arminian", "Calvinist" and "Laudian". "There is little point," writes Collinson, "in constructing elaborate statements defining what, in ontological terms, Puritanism was and what it was not, when it was not a thing definable in itself but only one half of a stressful relationship."[25]

Of those authors who have engaged in the debates over the nature of Civil War-era group identities, some, such as Peter Lake and Nicholas Tyacke, have argued that an English Arminianism existed in the form of a Laudian movement, which ascended within

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[23] Hoyle, *A Commons Investigation* , 419.

[24] Patrick Collinson, *The Birthpangs of Protestant England* (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 140-1, 143.

[25] Collinson, *Birthpangs,* 143.

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the English Church in such a manner that they grew to overpower a Catholic orthodoxy.[26]

This is built further upon by the work of Anthony Milton, who paints a picture of a small, dedicated group of divines—led by Laud—who launched a concerted effort of dissent against the established Calvinist Church. Briefly, Milton's thesis focuses on the genesis of what we can call "Laudian thought" within the "Durham House Group", a "court-centered group of divines, closely bound by personal links, who manifestly considered themselves to be an embattled minority, involved in a struggle for survival with a Calvinist establishment who were dangerously indulgent towards puritan activities and doctrines."[27] This form of Laudianism, however, could not genuinely be considered a cohesive theology such as Arminianism but was rather the result of a "faction tightly bound by common ideas and patronage finding its voice for the first time."[28] This group, although originally alienated from the religious and doctrinal establishment, rose to power through a blend of court influence and clerical patronage, stemming from Bishop Richard Neile of Durham. After the death of Neile, the Durham House group began to separate as their court influence increased individually, including Laud rising to assume leadership of the Anglican Church.[29] For his part Heylyn sought to gain influence within the nascent Laudian circles by actively seeking out puritan conspiracies.[30]

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[26] See Peter Lake, "The Laudians and the Argument from Authority," in *Court, Country and Culture: Essays on Early Modern British History in Honor of Peter Zagorin*, edited by Bonnelyn Young Kunze and Dwight D. Brautigam (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1992); also Tyacke's *Anti-Calvinists: The Rise of English Arminianism, c. 1590-1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

[27] Milton, "Creation of Laudianism", 162-3.

[28] Milton, "Creation of Laudianism", 177.

[29] Tyacke, *Anti-Calvinists,* 123.

[30] Milton, "Creation of Laudianism", 169.

For Milton, Heylyn is a key figure in the Laudian movement, with his notoriety

stemming in part from the manner in which he carried out his attacks: "Heylyn's

originality," writes Milton, "stemmed partly from his ingenious deployment of historical

materials and earlier documents in support of his arguments, and also from his readiness

in the heat of debate to go beyond acceptable boundaries" including reading "a whole

falsified history of Sunday-worship in England."[31] It was these attacks that would help to

solidify the Laudians' position within the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Upon attaining

positions of influence throughout the English Church, Milton's cabal of Laudians

proceeded to implement a "series of divisive ecclesiastical policies" through a process of

change and development that can be called "Laudianism"; in this manner, the

eponymous group can be seen as less a theological mindset than a movement, although

its course would inevitably take it to a similar end as Tyacke and Lake.[32] With Heylyn

holding a place of such prominence within Milton's writings, a study of the development

of Heylyn's historical method and thought could shed new light on the writings that form

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[31] Milton, "Creation of Laudianism," 172. Although it should be questioned to what degree Heylyn's history can be said to be "falsified". One suspects that such a statement stems from a misunderstanding of the manner in which contemporaries recorded history, and to the overall idea of recording and transmitting the past in the period after the breakdown of Woolf's early Stuart "idea of history."

[32] Milton, "Creation of Laudianism," 162-3. This thesis forms the spine of Milton's *Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), in which Milton defines a "Laudian" as "all those clerics who were closely associated with Laud and who were unequivocal in their support for his ecclesiastical policies in the 1630's." (9)

the core source material of these ongoing debates surrounding Civil War ecclesiology.[33]

With that, let us turn to the man himself, and Heylyn's growth from an environment

arguably predisposed to "puritan" education to Milton's defender of Laudianism.

Born 29 November 1599 in Burford, Oxfordshire, Peter Heylyn was the second

son of Henry Heylyn and thus a relative of Rowland Heylyn, who would serve as one of

the feoffees for impropriations, a puritan conglomerate for the purchasing of church

livings in order to fill the posts with godly ministers. The young Heylyn began his

education at the Burford grammar school where, by the age of 10 and perhaps

foreshadowing his later writings, he had composed the *History of the Destruction of Troy*

as well as "several Exercises both in Prose and Verse… with other exercises

Historical."[34] However, if Heylyn's writings were indicative of future interests, the same

could not be said for his teachers. After the death of Burford's schoolmaster William

North, Heylyn was transferred to Mr. Davis, who was permitted to retain his living after

the civil war, suggesting that he was no disinclined to the activities of Parliament.

Additionally, after Heylyn traveled to Oxford in 1613, one Walter Newbery, whom

Heylyn's son-in-law John Barnard notes was "a zealous Puritan in those days,"[35] tutored

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[33] Charles Prior's recent work on the Jacobean church further demonstrates how ecclesiastical history could benefit from historiographic analysis. Prior's efforts to "define the Jacobean church" illustrate the preeminent use of History in conformist writing, given the importance of the belief that the Anglican Church was an outgrowth and continuation of the apostolic church. Moreover, Prior finds that Reformers looked to history for examples of the pure Church, and to trace its decline. (4-5). It should also be noted that Prior finds Milton's reliance on Heylyn when analyzing the nature of Laudianism a flaw, given that Prior calls Heylyn "arguably the most atypical of Caroline divines, whose recollections of the period were colored either by nostalgia or by harsh indictments of moderate churchmen." (13) See Charles W. A. Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church: The Politics of Religious Controversy, 1603-1625* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2005).

[34] John Barnard, *Theologo-Historicus, or the True Life of the Most Reverend Divine and Excellent Historian, Peter Heylyn, D.D.* (1683), 81-82.

[35] Barnard, *Theologo-Historicus,* 84.

the future Laudian controversialist. Heylyn later was elected a Demy of the House at Magdalen College, later becoming Impositor of the Hall, a post that he held for such a prolonged period and with such intensity that his fellow students referred to him as "the Perpetual Dictator".[36] Heylyn was awarded a BA in 1617, was elected a fellow at Magdalen the following year, and received his MA in 1620.

It was while at Oxford that Heylyn began the scholarship which would launch his historical writing career; for it was as a geographer and in the shadow of the great antiquarian writer Camden that Heylyn first came to the attention of others. Heylyn gained recognition for his lectures on geography, and it was as he neared the completion of his degree that he was "perswaded by several Friends, to publish those geographical lectures which he read in the long vacation, that others might taste the sweetness and pleasure of those studies, besides his own fellow collegians:"[37] The collection of Heylyn's geographic work was first printed as *Microcosmos: a Little Description of Great World* on November 7, 1621, and went on to seven subsequent editions before 1639. While Heylyn gained the future Charles I, then Prince of Wales, as a patron with the work, the second edition proved controversial with Charles's father, James I, due to Heylyn's reference to France in his survey of the country as "the more famous kingdom" in comparison to England. The affair was short-lived and rectified by Heylyn in later editions by simply changing the offending sentiment to the past tense. Later efforts by Heylyn to endure himself to royal authority met with better results. After meeting his future patron William Laud in 1629, the year in which he proceeded BD, Heylyn was

[36] Vernon, *The Life*, 10.

[37] Barnard, *Theologo-Historicus*, 86-87.

appointed chaplain-in-ordinary to the now King Charles I in 1630. It was with Charles's

interest in the Order of the Garter in mind that Heylyn penned the *History of Saint*

George, which concerned both the origins of the legendary figure and the Order; Laud

presented the work to the king in February of 1631. Heylyn took further steps to endure

himself to the king, including authoring anonymously 1632's *Augustus, or an Essay on*

Those Meanes Whereby the Commonwealth of Rome was Reduced unto a Monarchy, a

work Woolf describes as "a soothing reassurance from his chaplain to Charles I that the

king's strategy was tried and true".[38]

Contemporaneous with Heylyn's efforts to secure court patronage through Laud

and Charles I was the author's career advancement as an ecclesiastical figure. Ironically,

religion and either its study or practice were not necessarily of immediate interest in

young Heylyn's life; he was originally reluctant to take holy orders and become

ordained.[39] When Heylyn did eventually engage in theological debates—notably his

1627 personal dispute with Oxford regius professor of divinity John Prideaux—he was

said to utilize theological methods involving the study of "fathers, Councils,

Ecclesiastical Histories, and school men, the way which King James commended to all

younger students for confirming them in the doctrine and discipline of the Church of

England, that is most agreeable to the doctrine of the primitive church."[40] Heylyn penned

a sermon calling the government to action—ironically, given his relation to Rowland—

against the problems of feoffees for impropriations, a copy of which he sent to Laud. In

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[38] Woolf, *Idea of History*, 186.

[39] Anthony Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic in Seventeeth-Century England: The Career and Writings of Peter Heylyn* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), 10-11.

[40] Barnard, *Theologo-Historicus*, 94.

1631, the same year he published his *History of Saint George*, Heylyn was presented to a

prebendal stall at Westminster (since Elizabeth's reign, a collegiate church), whereupon

he participated in a lengthy antagonism with the abbey's dean, John Williams, in which

Heylyn reported on the dean's activities to Charles' secretary of state, Sir John Coke.[41]

He composed 36 articles against the Bishop, and he eventually played a role in

Williams' later imprisonment. Additionally, in 1633, Heylyn re-engaged his Oxford

nemesis, Prideaux, in a battle over Laudian attitudes towards sabbatarianism; this

eventually proved the inspiration for Heylyn's 1636 *History of the Sabbath*.

It was perhaps due to Heylyn's aptitude for enthusiastic advocacy of Laudian

policies that he was asked by the king to address William Prynne's writings against the

Laudian Church. Heylyn quickly became one of the chief advocates for governmental

policies—what Anthony Milton calls Laud's "hit man against the regime's opponents."[42]

Heylyn's writings, especially after 1630, were almost always published at the behest of

others, whether the King or simply "men of all orders and dignitaries in the Church, and

of all degrees in the universities,"[43] most probably Laud and other leaders of the Durham

House movement that constituted the ideological base of Laudianism. Though his

writings were undoubtedly polemical, they remained throughout primarily historical and

political works, and were only secondarily theological texts. At some point after 3 Nov.

1640, Heylyn was called before parliament to answer a complaint levied by Prynne

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[41] Anthony Milton, "Canon Fire: Peter Heylyn at Westminster" in *Westminster Abbey Reformed, 1540-1640*, ed. Charles Stephen Knighton and Richard Mortimer (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 209-211.

[42] Anthony Milton, "Peter Heylyn" *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2.

[43] Vernon, *The Life*, 155.

stemming from the latter's earlier prosecution. Returning home, Heylyn published *The Historie of the Episcopacie* in 1642 and shortly thereafter found his residence raided by parliamentary troops. Heylyn fled to Oxford, where he was asked by the King to record the weekly observances, published as the news book *Mercurius Anglicus*.

Throughout the 1650s Heylyn continued to write both for the royalist cause, and for his own benefit. Heylyn reissued his *Microcosmos* as an expanded folio volume in 1652—the same year as his *A Help to English History*—with the new title *Cosmographie,* the work for which Heylyn is perhaps best known. Two works on the life of Charles I followed the regicide: 1656's *Observations on the Historie of the Reign of King Charles* and 1658's *A Short View of the Life and Reign of King Charles*. The last years of the 1650s saw most of Heylyn's controversialist ire directed at royalist historians. These attacks notably included a prolonged exchange with Thomas Fuller; commenting on Fuller's purported neutrality in his historical works, Heylyn wrote,

> All things pass on smoothly for the Presbyterians, whom he chiefly acts for…
> No professed Puritan, no cunning Nonconformist or open Separatist comes
> upon the stage whom he follows not with plaudits and some fair commends…
> [Whereas] the Fathers of the Church and conformable children of it are sent
> off commonly in silence and sometimes with censure.[44]

Heylyn survived to see the Restoration, but only by two years: he died on 8 May 1662, and was buried in Westminster Abbey. In his later years his vision increasingly failed, until by 1660 he was only able to discern shapes and was forced to dictate his

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[44] Cited in Richardson, *The Debate on the English Revolution*. 9.

works. Still, two of his most influential publications emerge from this later period in his life. *Ecclesia Restaurata*, printed in 1661, stands as Heylyn's history of the English Reformation, while 1668's *Cyprianus Anglicus* is of the first biographies of Archbishop Laud.

It is Heylyn's attacks—and the vitriol and vigour with which he attacked his own opponents and those of both Laud and Charles—that have most drawn the attention of scholars, when they have been inclined to notice. In Heylyn's later years, as his eyesight began to fail and his attacks became all the more furious, but were now directed mainly against fellow royalists, some have suggested that these targets were considerably safer to engage than puritan opponents, at least prior to the Restoration. Further, MacGillivray suggests that Heylyn believed that "deviation from the truth by however little in a fellow believer is worse than its outright rejection by an enemy."[45] However, this latter proposition raises pressing questions. MacGillivary's notion would seem to imply that there was a truth, likely intended to be interpreted in the doctrinal sense, that a royalist (or, at the very least, those who traveled in the same ideological circles as Heylyn) would hold and could deviate from. Yet Jerome De Groot's work has illustrated the complexities involved in defining Royalism beyond a "dogmatic loyalist collective"; De Groot himself can only go so far as to define the group as "a "loose affiliation of those who supported the King and who condemned his enemies," and, indeed, contemporaries of Heylyn, De Groot suggests, did not have an easier time identifying themselves with any specific

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[45] MacGillivray, *Restoration Historians,* 30.

ideological tenets.[46] This, as we have seen, is a conclusion similar to that arrived at by Anthony Milton, for whom Laudianism was rather a constantly evolving collection of thoughts and writings than it was an ideological movement grounded in any singular document. The simple answer of what drove Heylyn to attack those he disagreed with, especially in his later years, now takes on a new dimension, for it begs the question of what the truth was or, rather, what Heylyn believed it to be. What ideals did he hold to that would have driven him to engage so passionately with those whose writing opposed his? It is that very question—the nature of the core beliefs held by Peter Heylyn—to which we now turn.

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[46] De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, 1-2.

Chapter Two
Heylyn's Deontology: the golden chain, the absolute prerogative, and the Laudian church

Peter Heylyn's biographer, George Vernon, did not just write about the controversialist's ability to "raise the Blood, and exasperate the Passions".[47] Vernon took special note of Heylyn's skill as a polemicist and historian: or, rather, a polemicist who made careful use of history in his defenses of both the royalist and Laudian causes. Had Heylyn, wrote Vernon,

> but employed one half of those things against the King and Church of England, which he had writ for them, he would have been accounted by very many persons… the greatest Scholar, the greatest Protestant, the most faithful Historian, or in their own phrase, the most precious man that ever yet breath'd in this Nation. But he had the good luck to be a scholar and better luck to employ his Learning like an honest man and a good Christian, in the defense of a Righteous and pious King; of an Apostolical and true Church; And this drew upon him all the odium and malice that two opposite factions, Papist and Seciary could heap upon him.[48]

Vernon draws our attention to an important aspect of Heylyn's thinking specifically, and of contemporary thinking generally: early and mid-seventeenth century debates often turned on matters ecclesiastical and political. The issues concerning royal sovereignty—the "Righteous and pious King"—and the nature of the Anglican

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[47] Vernon, *The Life*, Epistle Dedicatory 2.

[48] Vernon, *The Life*, 117.

"Apostolical and true Church" did not exist in separate spheres; rather, the justifications

for positions on each, and the defenses for said positions, were often drawn from the

same wells of history, tradition, and biblical instruction. As Heylyn engaged in rhetorical

conflicts in support of both monarchy and Laudianism, an important question to consider

is did he self-identify as a royalist? Is this identification what drove his polemical wit?

This question is more difficult than perhaps it first seems, as the practice of defining

identity—whether royalist, Laudian, Parliamentarian, or Puritan, to name but a few

possibilities—was not a simple task in the seventeenth-century, nor is it for today's

historian. So difficult is it to define precisely what constituted the royalist identity that

scholars such as Jerome De Groot are left with little recourse but to deploy vague

definitions—such as "royalist" constituting a "loose affiliation of those who supported

the King and who condemned his enemies." De Groot hesitates to venture beyond this

definition, fearing that the debate that exists in deeper issues will quickly result in the

forest of collective identity being lost for the trees of individual issues like ship money.[49]

De Groot acknowledges that this definition is far from adequate, and does a great service

in noting that the conception of royalists as members of a "dogmatic loyalist collective"

is a but a product of historians' tendency to characterize Civil War-era actors along

polarizing axes. [50]

Discerning what is denoted by the term "royalist" will help in our examination of

the undercurrents in Heylyn's historical thought, and De Groot provides a valuable

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[49] De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, 2.

[50] De Groot, *Royalist Identities*, 1-2. De Groot's characterizes this tendency as the "contemporary need to think of dialectic and individualized historical phenomena rather than the actual normative complexities of early modern political science and discourse."

starting point: as we shall see, many of Heylyn's writings were clearly intended to

support the king or, more accurately, the institution of the monarchy. Heylyn's beginnings

as an antiquary perhaps predisposed him towards a conservative outlook; Graham Parry

attributes a "conservative character" to the antiquarian thought process, given its reliance

on the physical remnants of past groups. He suggests that "it is hardly surprising that the

majority of them [antiquarians] were strongly supportive of the Church of England"

given their ability to use evidence to demonstrate the "extreme antiquity" of national

institutions, such as the Church of England. They also, writes Parry, took an interest in

"the constitution of the early Church, its discipline, and its ceremonies." However, this

should not suggest that antiquaries were all royalists: on the one hand were the likes of

Dugdale, and on the other were the likes of John Selden and Sir Simonds d'Ewes. Parry

notes that those antiquaries that had "a strong interest in the history of the law" tended to

support Parliament, with the exception of Dugdale.[51] Clearly, any conception of

conservatism developed must be more than just supporting the King or monarchy.

Indeed, the late G.E. Aylmer once noted the danger of relying on such a simple

definition, one that risks being seen as stemming from simple conservatism; he wrote of

the academic reluctance "to admit that instinctive, emotional conservatism can be held to

constitute a system of ideas at all, as opposed to a welter of prejudices and vested

interests."[52] Aylmer also drew our attention to fact that royalists were far from a

monolithic block, with various instances of people ideologically committed to the idea of

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[51] Graham Parry, *The Trophies of Time: English Antiquarians of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 17-18.

[52] G.E. Aylmer, "Collective Mentalities in mid-Seventeenth-Century England: II. Royalist Attitudes," *The Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*. V, Vol. 37 (1987), 1.

"Anglican Royalism" yet who did not take up arms for the King, mainly out of concern for losing property. In developing a set of positive criteria that could be used in differentiating royalists from both their opponents and one another, Aylmer constructs a taxonomy that amounts to "more of an axis or spectrum than a strict antithesis or dichotomy." The categories that Aylmer deploys include religious beliefs, political rank and station, whether an individual was a soldier or a civilian, social rank, and on it continues.[53] The use of so varied a system to contain Aylmer's conception of Royalism, however, risks making the term so broad and all encompassing as to be largely useless for the purpose of categorization.

Instead, to understand the nature of Heylyn's royalism I suggest one start with the nature of *deontology*, or the science of duty and obligation, a political way of thinking that was shared among numerous groups in Stuart England, including royalists.[54] The sense of duty stretched far beyond a man's duty to his superiors or one another, and rather pervaded all aspects of social, political and ecclesiastical relationships. Where Aylmer suggested that the general precepts of Royalism lay in divine authority, the mortal sin of rebellion, and the apostolic nature of bishops,[55] the more specific commonality is in the attitude of royalists towards the nature and role of duty in these areas. Deontological concerns were at the root of political debates and, as we shall see below, at the heart of Heylyn's writings on the subject. It should not surprise the reader that duty played such an important role; John Morrill has shown us how the arguments of political duty and

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[53] Aylmer, "Collective Mentalities", 25.

[54] Andrew Sharp , ed., *Political Ideas of the English Civil Wars, 1641-1649* (New York: Longman Group, 1983), 13.

[55] Aylmer, "Collective Mentalities", 4-8.

responsibility were deployed in both the political and religious rhetoric, with attacks on

"evil councilors" having far greater rhetorical traction and success in the religious sphere

than the political. Observing that religious rhetoric spilled into all other spheres of

government critique in the early days of the Long Parliament, and that it often was not

claimed that Charles I was a papist, but rather that he had ceased to govern responsibly

and act according to his duties *due to* the religious influences upon him, Morrill goes so

far as to write that "the English Civil War was not the first European revolution: it was

the last of the Wars of Religion.[56] Theological belief and religious duty were inextricably

linked in seventeenth-century English life, and it would be incorrect to separate it from

the political quite so readily as Morrill has; questions of duty formed the root of the

disagreements in both areas—it was the point on which the axes turned. [57] It is the

question of duty, of deontology, that ought to guide our examination of Heylyn's royalist

beliefs. It is Heylyn's sense of moral duty, and the ecclesiastical and political beliefs that

underlie it, that harkened back to the "rigid orthodoxy" of early Stuart historical writing,

and that truly defined him as both conservative and a royalist.

Before exploring Heylyn's political writings, I will begin in the ecclesiastical

sphere, where Heylyn's membership in a small group of divines operating out of Durham

House and led by Archbishop Laud would result in his authoring some of the most

polemic works of religious history to be seen in the Civil War; while Justin Champion in

recent times would use Heylyn as an example of "the High Church defense of an

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[56] John Morrill, "The Religious Context of the English Civil War," *The Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*. V, Vol. 34 (1984): 162-4, 171, 178.

[57] On theological belief and religious duty, see J.A.I. Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 1660-1730* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6-7.

independent clerical authority *in extremis*,"[58] Heylyn's contemporary enemies would perhaps have labeled such a position distinctly Arminian and Heylyn "the spawn of a Papist."[59] The nature of the contemporary Arminian-Puritan debate, and its life in modern historiography, forms the starting point of our exploration of Heylyn's religious writing.

Only in the last three decades has it become increasingly clear that the conflicts of the Caroline regime could be attributed to differences of religion rather than simply political arguments between parliament and the royal court. Before manifesting in the violence of the Civil War, these conflicts existed in debates surrounding the nature of the Anglican Church, predominantly carried out by invested divines in pamphlets, sermons, and even the floor of Parliament.[60] Hugh Trevor-Roper wrote of three distinct (and overlapping) movements in the period leading from ecclesiastical consensus to the preeminence of "the politics of conviction": the Erasmianism that gave rise to the English Reformation; Genevan-imported Calvinism; and "historicist" Protestantism brought by the Marian exiles. Where Erasmianism was an ideal "for settled times", the upheaval of the Reformation required the protection of the monarch and recognition of her undisputed supremacy over the Church. This was drawn from German Protestants and made manifest in Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*. After the crisis of Mary and the Armada had passed, the spirit of Erasmianism grew again out of the two seminarian universities: Oxford and

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[58] Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken*, 21.

[59] Francis Rous, cited in A.W. Harrison, *Arminianism*, 139. The full passage reads, "I desire we may consider the increase of Arminianism, an error that makes the grace of God lackey after the will of man. I desire we may look into the belly and bowels of this Trojan horse, to see if there be not men in it ready to open the gates to Romish tyranny, for an Arminian is the spawn of a Papist, and if the warmth of favour come upon him, you shall see him turn into one of these frogs that rise out of the bottomless pit."

[60] Aylmer, "Collective Mentalities," 14.

Cambridge, culminating in the work of Richard Hooker. Hooker's work was on the

surface a defense of Calvinism, but its opposition to the idea of "Papacy as Antichrist"

put it at odds with John Foxe and his thesis that "the Church was justified not by reason

or tradition but by prophecy."[61] From this point, Trevor-Roper wrote, things progressed

relatively quickly at Cambridge, but more slowly at Oxford where John Prideaux— the

Regius Professor of divinity with whom Heylyn shared more than one exchange over

doctrinal difference—was a devout Calvinist and extremely respected within the

University.[62] Writing about his experiences at Oxford in the early seventeenth century,

Heylyn observed,

> By the power and practices of these men, the disposition of those times,
>
> and the long continuance of the Earl of *Leicester* (the principal Patron of
>
> that Faction) in the place of *Chancellor*, the face of that University was so
>
> much altered, that there was little to be seen in it of the Church of
>
> *England*, according to the Principles and Positions upon which it was at
>
> first Reformed.[63]

It was within this environment that Laud and his "court-centered group of

divines" began to make their influence felt, advocating divisive ecclesiastical policies that

together contained a view of how the Church ought to be ordered and governed, from

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[61] Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), 42-45.

[62] Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans*, 65.

[63] Peter Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus: or, the history of the life and death, of the most revered and renowned prelate William, by divine providence, Lord Archbishop of Cantertbury* (1671), 51.

positions of increasing political, ecclesiastical, and rhetorical influence.[64] What, then, were these policies? What did the Laudians believe?

While modern historians may identify a group of individuals who shared the values of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Laud wrote nothing comparable to the *Summa* or any of Luther's works.[65] Instead, it has fallen to historians such as Lake to construct "minimum and maximum" positions of Laudian belief through the examination of pamphlets, sermons, histories, and other printed sources.[66] Additionally if the basis of Laudianism was, as some claim, "an attempt... to redefine the line between the sacred and the profane" it represents, as Lake illustrates, "an attempt which cannot be reduced either to a series of numbered points about predestination nor assemblage of conventional conformist commonplaces about the need for order, obedience and uniformity."[67]

Lake has argued that the Laudians believed that the "beauty of holiness", that is to say both the architectural and liturgical aesthetic and beauty within the Church as an early Stuart edifice and an institution, was the crux of true Christian theology.[68] Their readings and theology stemmed from Old Testament exegesis and typological references to the tabernacle and temple of the Jews. This emphasis on the structure of the church itself as the house of God involved a concomitant interest in all aspects of life within the church,

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[64] Trevor-Roper, *Catholics, Anglicans and Puritan*, 77; Milton, "Creation of Laudianism", 162-3.

[65] Milton, "The Creation of Laudianism," 163. Much of what follows is drawn from the work of Milton and Peter Lake, who have both sought to address the difficulty in discussing religious controversy in early Stuart England posed by the lack of a contemporary Laudian statement of position.

[66] Kenneth Fincham, ed., *The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 163.

[67] Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church*, 164.

[68] Lake, "The Laudians and the Argument from Authority," 151.

including the liturgical and ceremonial. "Laudian divines," writes Lake, "placed ceremony, and in particular bodily expressions of reverence and worship, at the very centre of their vision of what a church should be like and what the outward profession of Christianity was."[69] This belief in the importance of worship—reinforced through ritual—was central to the Laudians, to the point where it would be difficult to overestimate the necessity of the social performance and conformity for personal salvation.[70] Prayer was a vital component of these public displays of worship within the church, so much so that one Richard Tedder proclaimed that "prayer is the end to which God's house is erected, *domus mea, domus orationis est.* Though there be many other religious duties to be exercised in God's house yet there is none other mentioned but prayer."[71] All of this culminated in the Laudian belief that worship, prayer, and public preaching were but a means to bring the community together in order to celebrate the sacraments of the Church. The sacraments, for the Laudians, were a central part of the veneration and respect for God, and for the attainment of personal salvation.[72] That many of the sacraments were not explicitly drawn from scripture—what could be called a fundamental tenet of Protestant theology—was irrelevant, for the Laudian Church possessed a doctrine of "immemorial custom whereby church traditions to which no known historic origins could be assigned were taken to be apostolic."[73] Of course, the Laudian belief in the utility of Church customs from the distant past made for easy

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[69] Lake, "The Laudians and the Argument from Authority," 153.

[70] Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church,* 167.

[71] Cited in Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church,* 168.

[72] Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church,* 170.

[73] Lake, "Laudians and the Argument from Authority," 159.

charges of "popery" by those wished to inveigh against the Laudian position. It was another aspect of Laudian thought, however, that would emerge as one of the defining features of 1630's Stuart Church policy and would, as a result, become a choice subject for Heylyn's early polemical writing—the conversion of moveable communion tables into permanent altars.[74]

The altar's position as the primary vehicle through which the sacrament of communion was performed made it, to Heylyn, "more sacred than any material thing besides to the church belonging."[75] In order to reflect this sacredness, and the importance of the altar within the Church building itself altars under Laud were to be railed-in. This, argues Christopher Hill, was part of the greater policy aimed at elevating the status of the English clergy and keep the laity "an humble distance before God."[76] Julian Davies argues that the Laudian altar policy that exists in historiography was not directed by Laud, but was instead a collection of decentralized innovations—especially those of Bishop Matthew Wren—some, but not all of which proved controversial.[77] Interestingly, Davies notes that Heylyn castigated Fuller for not differentiating between the policies of Laud and those of Wren thus, according to Davies, illustrating that Laud's policies were

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[74] Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church*, 171.

[75] Cited in Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church*, 174.

[76] Christopher Hill, *A Nation of Change and Novelty: Radical Politics, Religion and Literature in Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 68-9. It should not be surprising that one of the primary components of Laudianism was, for Hill, the entrenchment of class distinction.

[77] Julian Davies, *The Caroline Captivity of the Church: Charles I and the Remoulding of Anglicanism 1625-1641* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 205-250. With Davies' concerns regarding the nature of historiographical Laudianism in mind, Milton's model of Laudianism as a movement existing in the dialogue between polemicists becomes even more attractive.

not the ones at issue during the altar controversy.[78] Heylyn's writing, however, was supportive of ecclesiastical compulsion in adhering to the altar policy, including his 1636 *Coale from the Altar,* which concludes:

> By this Authoritie the *Altars* were first taken downe in King *Edwards* reigne… his Majestie now being, might appoynt the *Table* to bee set up, where formerly the *Altar* stood, (had it been otherwise determined in the *Rubrick,* as indeed it is not) to avoyd prophanenesse.

> [I will add that] his sacred Majestie hath hereupon already declared his pleasure, in the Case of Saint *Gregories* Church neere Saint *Pauls* in *London,* and thereby given encouragement to the *Metropolitans, Bishops,* and other *Ordinaries,* to require the like in all the Churches committed to them.[79]

Writing later, Heylyn also noted that while some ordinaries allowed their ministers to "proceed as best pleased themselves" the ordinaries still believed that "they had well complied with all expectations."[80] Given Heylyn's support of the altar policy generally and not for specific details advocated by Laud, as Davies might suggest, it is reasonable to agree with Fincham when he writes that while "Laud took a more moderate line on this latter issue than some of his subordinates, especially Wren, though this amounted to a

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[78] *The Caroline Captivity,* 250.

[79] Peter Heylyn, *A Coale from the Altar* (1636), 62-63.

[80] Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus,* 313.

difference over methods not ends."[81]

Those ends represented an underlying theme of Laudian thought that went far beyond the moving of the communion table; "the Laudians," writes Peter Lake, "were redrawing the division between the sacred and the profane in tight spatial and temporal terms."[82]

Laud and those that followed him sought to ensure public worship and standardize the nature of the English church. Often policies were used to combat what were perceived as instances of Puritan "scripturalism", such as the debates over the Sabbath; efforts to ensure strict adherence to sabbatarian practice on the part of Calvinist theologians throughout the country led to virulent attacks by associates of Laud, including Heylyn's 1636 *A Coale from the Altar*, which as Milton notes was remarkable in that "even in a period notorious for the venomous style of its polemic, Heylyn's exchanges… exhibit remarkable reserves of vitriol."[83] 1636 also saw the publication of *The History of the Sabbath*, where historical arguments were used to bolster scriptural exegesis that argued there was no basis for such strict adherence to Sunday worship.[84] Additionally, the Laudians believed that by raising the Lord's day above others, the Puritan's actions

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[81] Kenneth Fincham, "The Restoration of the Altars in the 1630's," *The Historical Journal* vol. 44, no. 4 (Dec. 2001), 940.

[82] Peter Lake, "The Laudian Style: Order, Uniformity and the Pursuit of the Beauty of Holiness in the 1630's" in *The Early Stuart Church, 1603-1642,* Edited by Kenneth Fincham, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 178.

[83] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic*, 60.

[84] Lake, "The Laudian Style," 160-1.

belittled the other holy days of the Christian year.[85] Indeed, such tactics reflected a larger

Laudian tendency to support their claims using scripture where appropriate and relevant,

and historical evidence where not.[86] The use of history as a basis for fact was preeminent

in conformist writing. Charles Prior notes that the arguments often deployed by those

opposed to the reformist and "puritan" disposition required the belief that the Anglican

Church was an outgrowth and continuation of the apostolic church. Alternatively, those

opposed to Laudian thought looked to history for examples of the pure Church and to

trace its decline.[87] Heylyn wrote two books in explicit support of the altar policy, a

defense of the Book of Sports, and a defense of the Personal Rule; all were historical

examinations that served to draw an uninterrupted line of practice from Scriptural source

material to the present day. Additionally, Heylyn engaged in defenses of clericalism

through the *History of the Sabbath, the Stumbling Block of Disobedience,* and the *History*

of the Episcopacy (which contains a defense of the *de jure divino* episcopal hierarchy

from the twelve apostles). In addition, he penned support of the Henrician reforms in

numerous works of history, including *Ecclesia Restaurata, Ecclesia Vindicata,* and

Historia Quinquarticularis.[88]

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[85] Fincham, *The Early Stuart Church,* 172. On the Sabbath and the Laudian movement, see Kenneth L. Parker, *The English Sabbath: A Study of Doctrine and Discipline from the Reformation to the Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), specifically chapters 5 and 7. Note that Parker takes special issue with Heylyn's polemic and its use by modern historians as a factual narrative of events. See below, p. 87-88. For an excellent example of the type of modern scholarship that Parker would take issue with, see David Katz, *Sabbath and Sectarianism in Seventeenth-Century England.* New York: E.J. Brill, 1988, which quotes Heylyn as a historical source with little mention of polemical controversy.

[86] Lake, "The Laudian Style," 166-7.

[87] Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church,* 3-5.

[88] Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken,* 65-9.

In spite of his writing supporting various Laudian theological positions, Heylyn was not trying to fill the void left by the absence of a set of stated Laudian principles: rather, the majority of his works were reactionary—responding to the writing of others. While Heylyn possessed clear objectives in authoring his works, Anthony Milton suggests that Heylyn's goals were less concerned with overarching ideology, and more with besting literary, theological or political opponents; Heylyn was, suggests Milton, "generating ideas to fit what he took the policies to be, formulating the arguments and evidence to support the position with which he had been presented."[89] Where Burton used examples to illustrate encroaching popery, Heylyn instead outright defended the Catholic Church, attempting to demonstrate the "wrongness" of his opponent through polemic. This, Milton suggests, Heylyn believed would be looked upon favorably at court. [90] There is evidence to indicate that Heylyn's advancement was linked to his prolific attacks against the opponents of the Archbishop of Canterbury. However, Milton places too much weight on this aspect of Heylyn's thought; the fact that Heylyn's histories drew selectively from available evidence was not unique, and ought to be expected from an author so reliant on traditional rhetorical techniques, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter. While Milton is right to suggest that Heylyn's ecclesiastical writing was more reflective of the needs of a nascent Laudian movement than any deep-rooted theological beliefs held by the author, he misses deeper streams in Heylyn's thought. Rather, the issues discussed in his writing, ranging from the altar policy to Sabbatarianism were reflective of a reactionary strategy against Laud's opponents yet still

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[89] Milton, "The Creation of Laudianism," 171.

[90] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic*, 82, 88-90.

reflected a clear sense of moral duty to ecclesiastical authority. The core tenet of Heylyn's belief system was not any particular collection of Laudian (or, for that matter, royalist) positions, but was rather the deontological sense of duty he held to the established order. Indeed, the combative tone of Heylyn's histories reached their peak only as the polemical atmosphere within England also reached its zenith into the mid-seventeenth century, with the regicide of Charles I and the institution of a godly republic; White notes that most of Heylyn's controversial church histories and the Puritan "conspiracy theory" that undergirded them only matured in *Aerius Redivivus (History of the Presbyterians)*.[91]

Clerical authority formed the basis of Heylyn's defense of Laudian policies, culminating in his *Help to English History*. This work, while appearing uncontroversial on its face as a simple collection of lists of monarchs and bishops, in fact contained lists that tethered the succession of nobility to that of—among others—those same bishops. As it was the puritan style at the time to attack the place of bishops, Heylyn's work implicitly suggested that doing so is also to call into question the authority of the king. This, in conjunction with the possibility that Heylyn visited imprisoned bishops during the Civil War in order to provide them with historical advice to advance their defense, also illustrates Heylyn's belief in the continued import of clerical authority.[92] Burgess notes that the (rhetorical) conflicts of the 1620s were policy-oriented, and did not reflect any disagreement over things like the duty of subjects to be obedient, resistance theory or the nature of the royal prerogative—in short, many of the fundamental aspects of deontology.

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[91] White, *Predestination, Policy and Polemic*, 6.

[92] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic*, 117-118.

However, the rise of clericalism in the period from 1625-40, and with it Laudianism, as well as the increasing reliance on absolute prerogative to defend particular practices, spelled disaster.[93] As the environment within England became increasingly hostile to both the church and those charged with its operation, and with it the deontological centre of Heylyn's belief system, his attacks on behalf of both Laud and the court grew in intensity. Some, such as Joseph Mede and John Cosin—Laudian sympathizers both—worried that Heylyn and others might have been too aggressive and extreme, threatening more moderate support of Laud and his church policies.[94] Christopher Dow, writing in support of the Laudian policy vis-à-vis the Sabbath, did not cite Heylyn's earlier published *Brief and Moderate Answer*. While this is indicative to Parker of "inconsistencies [in] the Laudian position" and a "conflict in ideology,"[95] it is also entirely possible that Dow, whose methods were considerably less polemical than Heylyn's, was also worried of the latter's aggressive tendencies. Nonetheless, Heylyn continued to enjoy a position as the only author to publish with the support of the authorities. Given the importance within Heylyn's thinking and writing of authority and one's duty to obey it, let us now examine these concepts more closely.

Heylyn's emphasis on the importance of church authority and hierarchy stemmed in part from his belief in the divine authority of the institution of the monarchy. Heylyn, responding to writings of Henry Parker, wrote that all forms of rebellion against royal

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[93] Glenn Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 170-1, 182-3.

[94] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic,* 64. In particular, Mede was concered that Heylyn's defence of the Laudian altar policy used justifications that treaded on "dangerous grounds."

[95] Parker, *The English Sabbath,* 212-213.

authority were inherently forbidden, and that such magisterial authority was divinely

ordained. "There is a golden chain in politics," he wrote,

> ... and every link there of hath some relation and dependence upon that
>
> before, so far forth as *inferior Magistrates* do command the People,
>
> according to that power and those instruments which is communicated to
>
> them by the *Supreme Prince*, the *Subject* is obliged to submit unto them,
>
> without any manner of *Resistance*.[96]

God ordained and delegated power to the ruler and, as a result, Heylyn held that

the magistrate's actions were irrelevant in viewing the public's actions—any insurrection

was explicitly an attempt to overthrow divine order.[97] This "golden chain" was by no

means unique to Heylyn's writing; rather it was a commonplace found in literature

ranging from Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* to Pope's *Essay on Man, the vast chain

of being* in the eighteenth century; "this metaphor," wrote Tillyard, "served to express the

unimaginable plenitude of God's creation, its unfaltering order, and its ultimate

identity."[98] The idea found its origins in Platonic philosophy, was later developed and

expanded upon by Aristotle, and became entrenched in the medieval mind as a

commonplace through the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, for whom the law of nature

[96] Peter Heylyn, *The Rebells Catechism* (1643), 16.

[97] R.E.A. Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty," *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church* 55 (1986), 183.

[98] E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1958), 23.

was the fundamental grounding for all civil society.[99] The picture of a chain of being, stretching from God to Man, finds voice through a passage by Sir John Fortescue, who wrote:

> God created as many different kinds of things as he did creatures, so that there is no creature which does not differ in some respect from all other creatures and by which it is in some respect superior or inferior to all the rest. So that from the highest angel down to the lowest of his kind there is absolutely not found an angel that has not a superior and inferior; nor from man down to the meanest worm is there any creature which is not in some respect superior to one creature and inferior to another. So that there is nothing which the bond of order does not embrace.[100]

As an accepted fact of life in early modern Europe, the chain of being often appeared in theological discourse, especially sermons, where many quoted Bible versus that established a simplistic order theory.[101] Of note is the 1542 *Homily of Obedience*, which explicitly stated the connection between the chain of being and questions of royal authority:

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[99] J.P. Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640* (New York: Longman, 1986), 14. Arthur Lovejoy, whose seminal work on the great chain must be mentioned, writes that the result of Aristotle's expansion "was the conception of a plan and structure of the world which, through the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many philosophers, most men of science, and, indeed, most educated men, were to accept without question." See Lovejoy's *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 59.

[100] Cited in Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture*, 24.

[101] Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution*, 132-3.

Almighty God hath created and appointed all things in heaven, earth, and

waters, in a most excellent and perfect order. In heaven he hath appointed

distinct orders and states of archangels and angels. In earth he hath

assigned kings, princes, with other governors under them, all in good and

necessary order. . . . The sun, moon, stars, rainbow, thunder, lightning,

clouds and all birds of the air do keep their order. The earth, trees, seeds,

plants, herbs, corn, grass, and all manner of beasts keep them in their

order. . . . All kinds of fishes in the sea, rivers and waters, with all

fountains, springs, yea the seas themselves, keep their comely course and

order.

And man himself also hath all his parts, both within and without, as soul

heart, mind, memory, understanding, reason, speech, with all and singular

corporal members of his body, in a profitable, necessary and pleasant

order.[102]

Heylyn's belief in the chain of being manifested in the structure and order of his

view of history, nature, and royal authority. In understanding that a chain of being

underlay all human actions, Heylyn kept company with other contemporary writers,

including Spenser, Sidney, and Hooker, who described and discussed the chain in the

sixth chapter of book one of his *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*.[103]

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[102] Cited in Conrad Russell, "Divine Rights in the Early Seventeenth Century," in *Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-Century England*, ed. John Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 106.

[103] Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty," 27.

Given the all-encompassing nature of the great chain of being, it should come as no surprise that it formed the corner-stone of many theories establishing the rights by which the sovereign maintained his authority over his subjects. The "ancient constitution" of the English tradition on which the Elizabethan monarchy (which was so thoroughly explored by Pocock among others) was built established that the ruler held power by divine right, only to be held in check by the "constitution" of public consciousness, legal records and written history that could be consistently traced back as far in time as possible; it was, by definition, "immemorial custom." [104] The common law moderated power through tradition and the consent by omission of action—that is to say, rebellion— of the public. However, that the common law existed to moderate power should not be taken to mean that it could restrain power through primarily juridical means; royal powers were derived from God, and any legal power that limited them derived from the "lawes of the land", which of course were made with the King's consent and by his authority. "Besides," Heylyn tells us,

> the law of Monarchie is founded on the law of nature, not on positive
>
> Lawes: and positive lawes I trow are of no such efficacie, as to annihilate
>
> any thing of which hath its being and originall, in the law of nature. Hence
>
> is it, that all soveraigne Princes in themselves are above the lawes, as
>
> Princes are considered in *abstracto*, and extent of power... though in
>
> *concreto* a just Prince will not breake those lawes, which he hath promised
>
> to observe.[105]

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[104] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution*, 30-55, specifically 37.

[105] Peter Heylyn, *A Brief and Moderate Answer* (1637), 33.

Thus, Heylyn would agree with Glenn Burgess' assertion that Elizabethan and early Stuart royal authority "was dependant on the simultaneous acceptance of the divine right of Kings and avoidance of royal absolutism."[106] The governing consensus between crown and the governed in Jacobean England was based on the agreement upon a "duplex notion of kingship" where the Sovereign held both a legal prerogative and discussed in the language of the common law, as well as an absolute prerogative that existed in natural law.[107] Heylyn observed this as a distinction of royal power *"in abstracto"* and *"in concreto"*, and while that kings were above laws, but this was only in theory; in practice, they were bound through their "promise to observe".[108] It is here noteworthy that in January 1642, during the height of civil hostilities, Heylyn delivered a sermon to Charles I concerning John 10:27, "My sheep hear My voice, and I know them, and they follow Me." Heylyn's message to the King was one of tolerance and forgiveness towards enemies, encouraging Charles to care for those beneath him as the Great Chain required.[109]

That kings were bound to serve laws shouldn't be confused with certain resistance theories that stemmed from the belief that early English societies arose from mutual consent or birth, and that power arose without human intervention. This chain of thought led to many theories of resistance wherein power resided with the community, and was then transferred to the King, therefore implying its potential revocation and limits upon

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[106] Glenn Burgess, "The Divine Right of Kings Reconsidered." *The English Historical Review* 107, no. 425 (Oct. 1992): 845.

[107] Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution*, 144.

[108] Burgess, "The Divine Right of Kings Reconsidered," 847.

[109] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic,* 121.

its exercise. Rather, Heylyn's understanding of royal power seems to echo the standard

absolutist retort that while the royal title may be derived from the people, the authority

itself was derived from God.[110] It should be noted that Heylyn's conception of the balance

of royal authority also echoed that of James I, who often compared his divine right to that

of a father within a family. Carrying out an exegesis of I Sam. 8: 18, James believed that

a government could hold power by election and divine right; however central to this was

the belief that God was the only true source of legitimacy.[111] Thus, while Sommerville

may be in error when he writes that contemporary conventions generally held that "if

kings held sovereign power, derived directly from God, it followed that all the rights and

privileges of subjects depended on the royal will, and also that Parliament was wholly

subordinate to the monarch", this was certainly a view to which Heylyn was amenable.

Furthermore, this was a view advanced in more detail by Heylyn in his *Stumbling Block

of Disobedience* when he denied Parliament any part of royal sovereignty.[112]

Still, as seen above, Heylyn was not an advocate of an unfettered moral

commitment to authority, such as that later advocated by Hobbes; most supporters of the

monarchy viewed Hobbes's model as one that would "render monarchy odious to

mankind." One is reminded once again that Heylyn saw absolutism and limitation as

compatible.[113] Heylyn's conception of English government generally was not a simplistic

model; rather it was developed in number of works, and drew on various sources. It was

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[110] Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology*, 20-1.

[111] Russell, "Divine Rights," 103-4.

[112] Peter Heylyn, *The stumbling-block of disobedience and rebellion* (1658), 267.

[113] James Daly, "The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century England" *The Historical Journal* 21, no. 2 (Jun. 1978), 238-41.

thus historically-derived. Heylyn's first foray into models of government is found in his

work penned to advise Charles I, *Augustus.* While not a specific description of the state in

England, it serves as a useful allusion. Commonwealths, writes Heylyn, have been

divided into three "species": the king, the nobles and the people; these are in turn

subdivided into the good and the "evill"; thus far Heylyn echoes the classic Aristotelian

three types of government and their three perversions. Those governed by a King were

the *monarchy* and its corrupt form, the *tyranny*; the nobles governed the *aristocracy* and

the *oligarchy*; while the people the *republic* and *democracy*. There was a tendency, a

"secret inclination", Heylyn suggested, for each of these to transform into the other.[114]

There are echoes here of Thomas Smith who, writing in the mid-sixteenth century,

believed that of the three classic Aristotelian forms of government—monarchy,

aristocracy, and democracy—no government was of just one type. Instead, there were

mixtures of elements of all three theoretical ideals.[115] Additionally, one can see the

influence of Jean Bodin, with whom Heylyn was clearly familiar given the latter's

reference to Bodin as "as great a *Politick* as any of his time in the Realm of *France.*"[116] It

is reasonable to conclude that Heylyn was familiar with Bodin's full descriptions of

monarchies found in the *Six bookes of a common-weale,* published in the 1606 translation

by Richard Knolles:

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[114] Peter Heylyn, *Augustus. Or, an essay on those meanes whereby the commonwealth of Rome was reduced unto a monarchy* (1632), 2.

[115] Daly, 228.

[116] Heylyn, *The stumbling-block,* 249.

Wherefore a lawfull or royall Monarchie is that where the subiects obey

the lawes of a Monarque, and the Monarque the lawes of nature, the

subiects inioying their naturall libertie, and proprietie of their goods. The

lordly Monarchie is that where the prince is become lord of the goods and

persons of his subiects, by law of armes and lawfull warre; gouerning them

as the master of a familie doth his slaues. The tyrannicall Monarchie, is

where the prince contemning the lawes of nature and nations, imperiously

abuseth the persons of his free borne subiects, and their goods as his

owne.[117]

This view of monarchy, while alluded to in *Augustus,* became explicit in Heylyn's

Full Relation of his travels through France, where his descriptions of the French

government is similar—if not identical—to that found in *Augustus*.[118] Heylyn's view that

contemporary England was subject to the mixing of monarchical systems can be seen in

his description of the country found in *Cosmographie*:

The Nobility of this Countrie is not of so much unlimited Power, as they are

to the prejudice of the State) in other Countries; the name of *Dukes, Earls,*

and *Marquesses* being meerly titular; whereas in other places they have some,

absolute, some, mixt government; so that upon any little distaste, they will

stand on their own gnard [sic: guard], and slight the Power of their Soveraign.

And on the other side, the Commonalty enjoy a multitude of Privileges above

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[117] Jean Bodin, *The six bookes of a common-weale* (1606), 2000.

[118] Robert Mayhew, "British Geography's Republic of Letters: Mapping an Imagined Community, 1600-1800," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 65, no. 2 (2004), 56.

all other Nations, being most free from Taxes, and burdenous Impositions, but what they take upon themselves by their own consent.[119]

Heylyn's mention of the consent of the governed harkens back to the "duplex notion of kingship" discussed previously. He saw the manner in which the King governed and exercised power, and the authority with which he did so, as anything but simplistic. Nor were these trivial concerns; in fact, they formed the basis for one of the greatest debates that underlie the Civil War itself—a theory of resistance. Indeed, resistance theory played a big role a major role in the rhetoric of the mid-seventeenth century, as one side of the Civil War had to come to terms with their actions within the framework of the common law. They were forced to develop a theory during the Interregnum that could justify the removal of Charles I (and in practice his execution) while maintaining other structures of authority that would permit a government to function.[120] Heylyn's 1643 *Rebells Catechisme* provides us with a fully developed picture of governmental authority. It expands on themes found in his earlier *Brief and Moderate Answer*, and fully dismisses any distinction between the Kings person and his power. Heylyn divides the act of rebellion against the monarch into three parts: the *rebellion of the Heart*; the *Rebellion of the Tongue*, and the *Rebellion of the Hand*, which was in turn subdivided between books and pamphlets, and the actual physical act of revolt. This schema was not to be taken as incremental—each stood to offend the monarchy in its own right. When the rebellion of the heart manifested itself in words Heylyn wrote,

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[119] Peter Heylyn, *Cosmographie in four bookes : containing the chorographie and historie of the whole vvorld, and all the principall kingdomes, provinces, seas and isles thereof* (1652), 264.

[120] Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution*, 95.

borrowing heavily from Aristotle "he that speaks against the Magistrate offends against the Common-wealth."[121] Under the pretense of answering a question of why the rebellions of the heart and tongue are not punished equally with that of the hand by Parliament, Heylyn writes that such failures "betray their disaffection in it to His Majesty, whose Person they endeavour to destroy that they may keep his power still amongst themselves."[122]

Where other theories forbade resistance, they did not contain any concomitant belief in the root of the King's ability to make laws. "There was a world of difference," writes Burgess, "between claiming that the King possessed the *right* to give laws without consent, and claiming that he did not possess such a right, but nevertheless could not be resisted should he act upon the delusion of possessing it."[123] In fact, Morrill has noted that under Charles I, there was little or no direct criticism of the monarchy itself, no demand for a change in the system, and no criticism of the "long-term development of the early modern state". Instead, the common critique was that the King was using "approved powers in inappropriate circumstances".[124] Yet, while Heylyn believed in the royal "promise to observe" those laws passed by them, he did not agree that the violation by the sovereign of parliamentary laws could justify rebellion. As Russell notes, one could fail to obey the edicts of sovereign authority and yet *not rebel* if the king's orders differed from the will of God.[125] As the great chain of being held that royal authority stemmed

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[121] Heylyn, *The Rebells Catechism*, 3.

[122] Heylyn, *The Rebells Catechism*, 4.

[123] Burgess, "The Divine Right of Kings," 843.

[124] Morrill, "The Religious Context of the English Civil War," 160.

[125] Russell, "Divine Rights", 112.

from the divine order itself "even *defensive Arms,*" writes Heylyn, "are absolutely unlawful in the Subject against his Sovereign: in regard that no *defensive War* can be undertaken, but it carrieth a *resistance* in it to those *higher powers,* to which *every soul* is to be *subject.*"[126] For Heylyn, there was always a choice beyond rebellion.

Heylyn's views on the great chain and royal authority clearly placed him squarely at odds with those opposed to the monarchy. At a time when England was, the late Conrad Russell suggested, composed of, a "patchwork quilt of competing divine rights", Heylyn's writings existed in the area where the relationship between these divine rights resolved, and, therefore, where conflict arose.[127] Heylyn also intersected with the ancient constitution and royal authority in his early writings on the history of England. Pocock writes that Elizabethan and early Stuart Englishmen were generally reluctant to derive royal authority from the Norman Conquest, given that the introduction of foreign laws would have irreparably disrupted the continuity of the people's common law. Additionally, notes Pocock, if conquest theory "was no more than an appeal to force, to God's judgment as expressed in success, then it conferred as good a right on Cromwell as on Charles."[128] Heylyn first discussed the arrival of William the Conqueror's in *Microcosmos*, where he wrote (in a chronicle of events, under the heading "1066"),

> 16 *Harald* Sonne to Earle *Godwin*, was chosen King in the nonage of
>
> *Edgar Adling*, Grandchild to *Edmond Ironide*, the true heire of the
>
> kingdome. In his raigne *William* Duke of *Normandie* pretending a

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[126] Heylyn, *The Rebells Catechism,* 8. Original itallics.

[127] Russell, "Divine Rights", 105-6.

[128] Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution*, 149-150.

donation of *Edward* the *Confessour*; invaded *England*, slew *Harald*, and

with him, 66654 of his English Souldiers; possessed himselfe of the

kingdome: vsing such pollicy in his new conquest, that he utterly

disheartned the English from hopes of better fortune.[129]

This description was notably expanded in Heylyn's *Cosmographie*, published in

the midst of the Interregnum, to explicitly discuss the juridical effects of the Conquest:

1067. 1 *William,* surnamed the *Conqueror,* after the vanquishment and

death of *Harald,* acknowledged and Crowned King, altered the antient

Lawes of *England,* and established those of *Normandy* in place thereof;

governing the people absolutely by the power of the Sword, and giving a

great part of their Lands to his former Followers, and such as were

ingaged in the Action with him, from whom most of our antient *Families*

doe derive themselves; those Lands to be holden in *Knights-service,* which

drew along with it the *Wardship* of the Heir in *Minority,* as a charge laid

upon the Land.[130]

This latter expansion was published following Heylyn's discussion of the role of

the Conquest at some length in the aforementioned *Stumbling Block of Disobedience.* In

it, he departed from those contemporaries who looked upon the Conquest with

apprehension, and instead drew royal power directly from William's invasion of Britain.

In illustrating his belief that governmental power rested properly and legally in the King

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[129] Peter Heylyn, *Microcosmos, or A little description of the great world* (1621), 485-6.

[130] Heylyn, *Cosmographie,* 284.

alone, Heylyn wrote of William's administrative control over the country, "when the Norman Conqueror first came in, as he wonne the Kingdom by the sword, so did he govern it by his power: His sword was then the scepter, and his will the Law."[131] Further to the point, Heylyn observed, "there was no need on his part, of an Act of Parliament; much less of calling all the Estates together, to know of them after what form, and by what Laws they would be governed." Heylyn's views were by most contemporary standards extreme; in fact, Heylyn was one of the few royalist writers to embrace a conquest theory of government, and his political works and their theories were not reprinted until after the 1680's.[132] Heylyn's views on the role of the Conquest did not flourish in the environment of Commonwealth-era Britain, even among his fellow conservatives. For many, Heylyn's views could be viewed as dangerous, particularly given the fact that, as R.E.A. Meza writes, they "presented a totally new interpretation of medieval English history which raised the embarrassing possibility that if God had ordained William's conquest and rule of 1066, it might also be possible that he had done so for Oliver Cromwell."[133] Meza suggests that Heylyn came to this belief through his close association with Spelman's works, which Heylyn may have discovered through Laud. [134] Meza's idea is supported by the lack of any reference to the juridical impact of the invasion in *Microcosmos,* and the changes made in *Cosmographie..*

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[131] Heylyn, *The stumbling-block,* 267.

[132] Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty," 181.

[133] Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty," 200.

[134] Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty", 181, 190-2.

Heylyn believed in a strong monarchy, voluntarily controlled only by the reins of

the unwritten common law and established by the authority of the Conquest. With this in

mind, it may come as a surprise that Heylyn was far from an unapologetic supporter of

the King, especially when the latter engaged in actions with which Heylyn himself

disagreed. Writing on the origins of the conflicts that raged around him, Heylyn noted

strong reservations about James I, worrying that his actions had been unduly manipulated

by those that surrounded him, as well as that he paid too little attention to the affairs of

state. "One might say," wrote Heylyn,

> (I fear too truly) that by putting off the Majesty belonging to a King of
>
> *England,* that so he might more liberally enjoy himselfe; neglecting the
>
> affaires of State, and cares of Government, to hunt after pleasures; deserting
>
> the imperiall City, to sport himselfe at *Roiston, Newmarket,* and such obscure
>
> places (which were to him as the Isle of *Capre* was to *Tiberius Caesar*) and
>
> finally by letting loose the Golden reines of Discipline, held by his
>
> Predecessors with so strict a hand; he opened the first gap unto those
>
> confusions, of which we have since found the miserable and wofull
>
> consequences.[135]

Additionally, Heylyn's attitude towards England's King Edward in the former's

Ecclesia Restaurata and his suggestion that the monarch's death may have been

beneficial to the Church certainly doesn't suggest a love of king at any cost, especially

considering his earlier comments with regard to James. [136] Instead, while Heylyn saw no

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[135] Peter Heylyn, *Observations on the Historie of the Reign of King Charles* (1656), 13-14.

[136] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic,* 202-3.

separation between the office of royal power and he who held it in life, he seems to have not been so clear when viewing royal actions in hindsight. For Heylyn, while power was being exercised by a reigning sovereign authority deontology demanded allegiance at all costs. Few acts support this more clearly than Heylyn's *Ecclesia Vindicata*, published in 1655 with a dedicatory epistle to Cromwell himself. The cynical reader may dismiss such an action by Heylyn as little more than a sycophantic attempt to ingratiate himself with power. However, the period was rife with philosophical debates about the nature of usurpers, and the fact that they ought to be obeyed even after they have taken power. It is entirely plausible, suggests Milton, that Heylyn was instead drawn to Cromwell's monarchical tendencies as the latter solidified his power during the Interregnum.[137]

Rather than proposing that Heylyn's royalist system of deontology was focused primarily on the monarchy, it is best to view it as a system of values that encompassed both the sovereign and the Laudian church. Heylyn did not view them as separate, even though the proposition was not unknown—in the 1590s there were those who advocated a divine right of episcopacy that was separate from the monarch's, although they were in the minority. Given Heylyn's close theological relationship with Laud, the former undoubtedly knew that the latter, writes Jeffery Collins, "deeply abhorred the division of religious and secular matters". Laud held that the king was the one governor over the ecclesiastical and state apparatus; Laud's conception of royal authority was Erastian, with the king an absolute monarch to the point that "even when the King committed

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[137] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic*, 163-4.

theological error, churchmen were prohibited from disobeying him. [138] Additionally,

Heylyn stated in the *Stumbling Block* that his purpose in writing on royal sovereignty was

"to preserve the dignity of the supreme power."[139] Meza notes that Heylyn went to great

lengths to illustrate that the three estates within England consisted of the Lords Temporal,

Lords Spiritual and Commons, as opposed to the system of King, lords, and commons

advocated by Parliament.[140] Note that for Heylyn, wherever ecclesiastical authority came

from, the church and its bishops were obliged to obey the king.

While Heylyn looked upon the Laudian church as an institution coequal with the

crown, his deontological energies—that of the divine right, of the near-Hobbesian

prohibitions on revolution, and the fact that sovereign authority stemmed from the

Conquest—were most often levied against opponents of the Church. As a Laudian—in

fact arguably the chief polemicist for the movement—this would seem natural. However,

the effect on Heylyn's writing was to cast his entire view of moral duty and obligation

into one viewed though the prism of the Laudian church, with the result that when the

king had perished and the system was viewed through written histories, the church was

most important, as seen in Heylyn's remembrances of James, Charles and Edward.

Certainly Milton notes that Heylyn's writing on the death of Charles was not an attempt

to create a martyr; it is simply the commemoration of a ruler. Given the import of the

King as the primary subject of Heylyn's right writings on duty, however, his treatment of

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[138] Jeffrey R. Collins, "The Restoration Bishops and the Royal Supremacy," *Church History* 68, no. 3 (Sep. 1999): 551-554.

[139] Peter Heylyn, *The stumbling-block of disobedience and rebellion* (1658), 1.

[140] Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty", 189.

Laud differed significantly, effectively creating a hagiography of the archbishop in

Heylyn's *A briefe relation of the death and sufferings of the Most Reverend and renowned*

prelate, the L. Archbishop of Canterbury.[141] While deontology was the motivator for

Heylyn's writing, and provided the underlying themes for what flowed form his pen,

religion was the prism through which all his polemical conflicts and the resulting theories

were viewed. For Heylyn, as Justin Champion has noted, the central premise of his

history writing was "that religious worship was a necessary component in human

society,"[142] and changes to the *status quo* or departures from the Laudian model spelled

disaster; "No one thing," wrote Heylyn, "more hath caused so frequent, and so generall

Rebellions in the States of *Christendome*, than alterations of this Nature; I cannot

therefore commend it, as a pious *Resolution*, in a *late mighty Monarch.* Better some few

corruptions should be suffered in a Church, than that a change."[143] Having seen how

Heylyn manifested a particular brand of Woolf's Elizabethan and early Stuart

historiographic orthodoxy, let us now examine how Heylyn's deontological beliefs and

his efforts to rhetorically support them at any cost could operate within the medium of

history writing--one that valued, among other things, truth.

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[141] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic,* 170-1. Also see below, pages 76-79.

[142] Champion, *The Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken,* 66.

[143] Heylyn, *Augustus, 128.*

Chapter Three
Rhetoric, Truth and Heylyn's Historical Method

Truth was fundamental to early modern history writing; while the meaning and definition of "history" was subject to change, its root lay in stories or as "an inventory of factual knowledge".[144] History as such was then used to provide lessons to readers by illuminating the moral and theological truths within the past. It should be noted, however, that there was not a broad desire to establish, as Woolf notes, "the precise truth of the past for its own sake, through a cumulative process of research, selection, interpretation, and argument."[145] In studying the breakdown of the seventeenth-century's ideological consensus in history writing an important consideration—perhaps even the crux of the matter—is the changing nature of the idea of "truth" and how authors used it in their work.[146] Having examined the issues and beliefs that underlay Heylyn's polemical Laudian writing, we must now more deeply investigate how it was that Heylyn communicated those views. While we now understand what beliefs Heylyn held to be true, what was the nature of "truth" for Heylyn? Further, how did Heylyn engage other writers, debate matters of policy, and spew forth polemic vitriol, all while nominally staying true to the very historical consensus—Woolf's old orthodoxy—that he was, in fact, destroying? These issues cut to the heart of the breakdown of the early Stuart idea of history. We begin our exploration with the question of historical truth.

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[144] Woolf, *The Idea of History*, 15.

[145] Woolf, *The Idea of History*, 12.

[146] Woolf, *The Idea of History*, 15.

A work's moral truth did not give an author license to construct the past from his own mind, provided he remained beholden to nebulous and ethereal conceptions of a Greater Truth. Rather it was, rhetorically speaking, perfectly reasonable to "minimize or gloss over any weakness in [a case], thus making it appear as plausible and attractive as possible" in the advancement of underlying moral truths.[147] Authors recognized that truth was reflected in the course of historical events—the facts of the case—and sought to use those facts as colours and shades with which to paint their historical portraits for the edification of readers. Indeed, this continued a long tradition in Western historical writing; Augustine, writing in the early fifth century held that the veracity of facts could be established from the narrative chronology surrounding them. The fundamental utility of history, as required by Augustinian dictum, was not the direct representation of the past using these facts, however, but was instead of a certain past that was relevant for the present.[148]

The preference for eye-witness accounts in seventeenth-century history writing also had a noble pedigree: Isidore of Seville provided a seventh-century definition of a "fact" as that which an observer had seen, such that "the eye-witnessing of events was the guarantee *not only* of the accuracy of the historical information *but also* of its presentation."[149] Not all witnesses were equal, however: accounts where the author also

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[147] Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133-5.

[148] Hans-Werner Goetz, "The Concept of Time in the 11th and 12th Centuries" in *Medieval Concepts of the Past: Ritual, Memory, Historiography, ed.* Gerd Althoff, Johannes Fried and Patrick J. Geary (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 164-5.

[149] Jeanette M.A. Beer, *Narrative Conventions of Truth in the Middle Age. (*Genéve: Librairie Droz, 1981), 23.

witnessed the events were traditionally preferable, and anything other than a first-person account was considered suspect.[150] Furthermore, information gathered from first-hand witnesses could be validated provided that the relationship with the author was fully explicated within the text; if the name was not mentioned, the title—carrying with it authority—was. Terms such as "a reliable witness" and "faithful men" tended to be attached to positions of authority like monks, abbots, priests or bishops.[151] It was from these precepts of medieval historical writing that the Tudor and Stuart humanist narrative historical tradition developed. It was a system rooted in the use of history to project moral truth, based in historical fact. Even after the singular truths of the early seventeenth century began to shatter under the pressure of civil war, echoes were still present in Peter Heylyn's writing; for example, his declaration in 1636's *History of the Sabbath* that his documentary evidence was drawn from the writings of the "holy fathers of the Church", and "the most renowned divines of the latter times", men working in "gods publike service, and the conducting of Gods people in the wayes of truth". By implication, these sources are eminently trustworthy, and it is with that in mind that Heylyn can then be seen to be serious in beseeching "God, the God of truth, yea the truth it selfe, to give us a right understanding, and a good will to doe thereafter."[152]

The Civil War brought new challenges to the use of eyewitness accounts, and to the conception of truth more generally. The preface to John Rushworth's 1659 *Historical Collections* contains a caution that future readers will "hereafter… hear that every man

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[150] Beer, *Narrative Conventions*, 25-6

[151] Elisabeth Van Houts, *Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe, 900-1200* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 23-24.

[152] Peter Heylyn, *The History of the Sabbath* (1636), 6.

almost in this generation durst fight for what either was or pretended to be Truth."[153]

Thomas Fuller recognized that, "the most informative histories to posterity and such as

are most highly prized by the judicious are such as were written by eye-witnesses thereof,

as Thucydides the reporter of the Peloponnesian War."[154] However, commenting on the

perils of authoring contemporary history, Fuller wrote:

> I must tread tenderly because I go not, as before, on men's graves, but am
>
> ready to touch the quick of some yet alive. I know how dangerous it is to
>
> follow truth to near to the heels; yet better it is that the teeth of a historian
>
> be struck out of his head for writing the truth than that they remain still
>
> and rot in his jaws by feeding too much on the sweetness of flattery.[155]

Such were the concerns of using eyewitness testimony for the construction of

history: while the world awaited the light of truth, that same truth was imparted by men,

who were in turn subject to pressures and biases. These concerns were not unique to the

Civil War period, a fact demonstrated by Heylyn nearly forty years before Rushworth.

Heylyn's conception of valid sources shows an awareness of the difficulties that could

develop in the relationship between witnesses, facts and truth. He writes that,

> It is requisite that the relations should be absolutely true, neither swarving
>
> to one side through malice, nor leaning to the other through affection; so
>
> that two things are requisite in an Historiographer, a generous & resolute

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[153] Cited in R.C. Richardson, *The Debate on the English Revolution*, 15.

[154] Thomas Fuller, *The church-history of Britain from the birth of Jesus Christ until the year M.DC.XLVIII*, Book X, (1655), Preface.

[155] Fuller, *The church-history of Britain*, Book V, 232. Joseph H. Preston notes that Fuller was borrowing here from Sir Walter Ralegh's *The Hstory of the World*. See Preston's "English Ecclesiastical Historians and the Problem of Bias, 1559-1742," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 32, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1971), n.25.

spirit: 2. An upright and sincere conversation; that so hee may neither be daunted by a tyrannicall Prince, nor transported with partiality; that he might dare to deliver all the truth withut feare, and yet not dare to relate any thing which is false through favour.[156]

Despite Heylyn's warning against false and induced testimony, Royce McGillivray is quite right to suggest that impartiality in the modern sense was not expected in seventeenth-century history writing. While people respected the idea of "truth", and would shy from inventing evidence or misrepresenting events, they did not worry about taking sides in an argument; indeed, to support what one believed to be "right" was the only morally appropriate course of action.[157] Seventeenth-century historians regularly vouched for both the truth of their accounts and also their selection of sources, while inveighing the actions and omissions of their adversaries.[158]

While Heylyn sought through his writing to seek to "free one onely captivated truth," and, in his 1630 *Historie of St. George* to, "make it evident in this, *quam magna veritas*, how great the truth is, and how mightily it will prevaile,"[159] he was well aware that history was a partisan activity. As early as 1636 Heylyn took issue with other authors using "as a matter of fact" the past to justify their own policies towards the Sabbath,[160] and Joseph Preston's analysis of bias in ecclesiastical writing observes that by the Interregnum, Heylyn's introductions regularly included accusations that his adversaries'

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[156] Heylyn, *Microcosmos*, 15.

[157] MacGillivray, *Restoration Historians*, 7.

[158] Preston, "English Ecclesiastical Historians," 218.

[159] Peter Heylyn, *The Historie of St. George* (1630), 14.

[160] Heylyn, *The History of the Sabbath*, 2.

inability to support their claims through evidence demonstrated the error of their ways.[161]

Further, Preston's work shows that Heylyn's writing often suggested that one could

deliver truth, yet still be biased, leading to the suggestion that one can differentiate

between "partiality" and "partisanship".[162] If one is to understand the fundamental

changes that occurred within the mind of the Civil War era narrative historian—the

breakdown of ideological consensus---one must understand the nature of truth and,

specifically, how authors were able to reconcile the partisan nature of witness accounts,

their inextricable link to historical "facts", and the latter's connection to truth. Using

Preston's framework, how did an author differentiate between "partiality" and

"partisanship"? How did authors engage in writing history that was openly polemical,

while maintaining a position of advocating truth rather than opinion?

Heylyn is a case study in these questions. His position as one of the more active

polemicists of his age allows us to see inside the mind of a writer who engaged in

fractious contemporary debates using history as his weapon and yet who considered

himself a purveyor of historical truth. How Heylyn reconciled these contradictions stems

from his method of argumentation—both how he wrote and his argument's relationship

with truth was intimately tied to his use of the Neo-Ciceronian style of rhetoric. However,

before beginning an exploration of Heylyn's rhetorical thought, it would be beneficial

briefly to examine the fundamental role rhetoric played in sixteenth and seventeenth

century humanist education.

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[161] Preston, "English Ecclesiastical Historians," 208-9.

[162] Preston, "English Ecclesiastical Historians," 218.

While Burckhardt referred to rhetoric pejoratively as "the Greek tongue" that

outlived the death of Greek culture,[163] it was central to the sixteenth- and early

seventeenth-century literary sphere. The role played by rhetoric in Tudor and Stuart

England remains evident today within a vast collection of arts and social sciences

disciplines, including linguistics, literary criticism, sociology, communications, and

public relations; for Heylyn and his predecessors, however, these were institutionalized

under the broad rubric of the rhetorical arts. Indeed, as John Bender and David Wellbery

have noted, "The cultural hegemony of rhetoric as a practice of discourse, as a doctrine of

codifying that practice, and as a vehicle of cultural memory, [was] grounded in the social

structures of the premodern world."[164] To study the function that rhetoric filled in minds

of the historians of the Civil War-era is to explore the fundamental underpinnings of their

mode of though; for, according to Nan Johnson, "the particular disposition of rhetorical

theory during one period in history reflects the intellectual and philosophical climate of

that particular era; consequently, historical studies in rhetoric are also studies in the

history of ideas."[165] Rhetorical education, along with grammar, poetry, history and moral

philosophy, constituted the "liberal sciences" that formed the spine of the sixteenth-

century humanist education system—a system known as the *trivium* that sought to revive

the Roman idea of the *studia humanitatis* through emphasis on Latin literacy, along with

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[163] Thomas O. Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist Rhetoric* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 90.

[164] John Bender and David E. Wellbery, "Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric," in *The Ends of Rhetoric*, John Bender and David E. Wellbery, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 6-7.

[165] John F. Tinkler, "The Rhetorical Method of Francis Bacon's History of the Reign of King Henry VII," *History and Theory* 26, no. 1 (Feb., 1987), 50.

it, the *ars grammatica* and the *ars rhetorica*.[166] Classical rhetoric served as the template

for student declamations and compositions, such that "through their teachers' instruction,

students came to regard genre not only as an aid to invention but also as a heuristic device

to help them understand authorial intention."[167] Heylyn was undoubtedly introduced to

rhetoric early in his education; this is suggested by his biographer John Barnard, who

observed that by ten Heylyn had composed "several Exercises both in Prose and Verse,

particularly a Tragy-Comedy upon the Wars and Destruction of Troy, with other exercises

Historical, which foreshewed what an excellency he would after attain unto all kind of

generous Learning."[168]

Heylyn's juvenile exercises in the realm of history are hardly surprising, given

that rhetoric provided the student with not just a tool for the composition of speeches, but

also a mode of thought that proved especially useful in the composition of history.

Rhetoric, writes Hanna H. Gray, provided a "common-sense" means of deriving what was

probably true; it was thus well suited to a field where differing interpretations and

possibilities existed, where scientific demonstrations were not possible, and where things

"could be judged only in terms of probable truth.[169] The notion of "probable truth" was,

as we shall see, in part an outgrowth of Aristotelian and Ciceronian rhetoric, and could be

found in various historical writings, such as those of Edward Herbert, first Baron Herbert

of Cherbury. Herbert believed that one must use one's judgment in order to evaluate the

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[166] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 21-3, 28.

[167] Elizabeth Skerpan, *The Rhetoric of Politics in the English Revolution, 1642-1660* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1992), 13.

[168] Barnard, *Theologo-Historicus*, 48.

[169] Hanna H. Gray, "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 24, no. 4 (Oct. – Dec. 1963), 505-6, 511-2.

authority of a historical writer and recognize the different roles of the author. His lack of

faith in the certainty of history stemmed from the fact that, for Herbert, one did not need

certainty; one needed only to determine general trends in order to avoid the unobtainable

idea of a perfect history and instead construct the "probable history."[170] The uncertainty

of truth in classical rhetoric was an issue largely addressed in the late-sixteenth century

continental ascendancy of the Ramist school of thought, which offered rhetoricians a

means of discovering singular, rather than probable, truths.[171] By exploring both sides of

this rhetorical coin—Ramist and classical, we will be in a better position to understand

Heylyn's complex relationship with both of these schools of thought, and how they

allowed him to engage in such polemical writing while still adhering to the convention of

historical truth.

Such an exploration is particularly necessary given that contemporary authors

rarely gave explicit voice to their rhetorical method; in fact, Christian church writers

would traditionally either not acknowledge their rhetorical debt, or actively speak against

it.[172] This behavior was not limited to the Church, with the general thought being that "as

soon as the audience notices how *well* something is said, it assumes a position of critical

detachment. The delight in language for its own sake thus produces a playful, distanced

appreciation at odds with the commitment and unselfconscious absorption of strong

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[170] Woolf, *The Idea of History*, 136.

[171] Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 295-305.

[172] Debora K. Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 111.

emotion."[173] This often turned the denunciation of rhetoric into a topos or commonplace

reflecting poor writing and obfuscation, and it is one deployed by classical rhetoricians,

early Church fathers, and Heylyn himself, all of which were clearly employing that which

they disavowed.[174]

The first element in Heylyn's use of rhetoric lies, as with his contemporaries, in

classical tradition of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, whose philosophies were founded upon

"a belief in the perfectibility of man, the existence of truth, and the possibility of its

acquisition by the individual."[175] This discernment of truth was possible thanks to the

intimate connection Aristotle forged between rhetoric and dialectic. The Aristotelian

tradition of dialectic moved from a question through probable arguments to a probable

conclusion; it was a logical structure rooted in dialogue between persons, concerned with

the deliberation of things where two alternatives were possible for, writes Albert

Duhamel, "he who divines well in regard to the truth will divine well in regard to

probabilities."[176] Cicero held a similar position, with differences in terms of dialectic and

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[173] Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric*, 115.

[174] See Cicero, "Pro Archia Poeta," in *Cicero, The Speeches*, edited and translated by N.H. Watts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 41: "I am sure that my statement of the case, brief and straightforward as I, true to my practice, have made it, has appealed to every one of you." Also, see St. Gregory Nazianzen, "Oration XVI: On His Father's Silence," in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, second series, edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Printing Company), 247: "The first wisdom is to despise that wisdom which consists of language and figures of speech, and spurious and unnecessary embellishments." As originally cited in Shuger, 111. For Heylyn's denunciation of rhetoric, see his *A briefe relation of the remarkeable occurences in the northerne parts.* (1642): "But I have too long plaid the *Scholiast* on so clear a Text, and wronged by an impertinent glosse the Writers most perspicuous and full expressions; which whosoever reades must needes understand, and whosoever understands the *danger*, must abhorre the actors, and not the *Actors* only, but the *Authors* too"; also, see Heylyn, *Microcosmos*, 15: "Although to number up the especiall delight and profit gathered from the reading of histories, be but as it were to light a Candle before the Sunne, and speake of such things as require no Rhetoricke to adorne them, yet I hope I shall no waies doe amisse in laying before you some of the chiefe."

[175] P Albert Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10, no. 3 (Jun. 1949), 355.

[176] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 61; Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric," 350-1.

invention.[177] Cicero's rhetorical style, more so than Aristotle, took root in medieval and early modern scholastic circles. After Petrarch, Cicero's oration *Pro Archia* was "a sacred text," wherein the orator was idealized for his ability to use his eloquence to enlighten others.[178] Cicero's method consisted of developing oration in five parts—invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—with the Aristotelian logical dialectic playing a key role in the process of invention. Cicero, like Aristotle, held that there were numerous truths to be known in answer to a problem, rather than one specific truth. By going through and examining each through the rhetorical process, one could reduce the number of *possible* truths to a few reasonable *probabilities*—although any singular truth could not be known with "rational certainty". That said, the reasonably deduced "truth" one arrived at through Cicero's method was nonetheless expected to be argued for and advanced passionately.[179] This was accomplished through the use of *elocutio* (eloquence); *ratio* (reason), thought Cicero, was not a sufficient force to motivate action, and was also insufficient in a large number of cases to induce belief in others.[180]

The Ciceronian orator was expected to adhere as closely as possible to the truths he advanced. That said, they also had to contend with the existence of opponents advocating other reasoned positions; this reality meant that orators were permitted, even expected, to emphasize certain elements over others in order to make a case. In doing so *elocutio* could be used to emphasize true elements under-girding a narrative, and thereby

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[177] Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric," 352.

[178] Gray, "Renaissance Humanism," 503-4.

[179] Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist*, 89.

[180] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 94-5.

emphasize the larger moral truths within. According to Cicero, one of the "greatest

virtues of a rhetorical narrative lay in "its capacity to present the facts in a manner

accommodata or calculated at once to delight and to persuade."[181] As the sixteenth

century drew to a close, serious questions arose out of the humanist schools concerning

scholasticism, empiricism, and the nature of truth as an observable phenomenon; within

this debate came a questioning of the role of rhetoric as, in Walter Ong's words, a "logic

of the probable".[182] The reform of the liberal arts was embodied in Pierre de la Ramée or

Petrus Ramus (born 1515, died 1572); a student of the Collège de France in Paris, Ramus

received an MA for a markedly anti-Aristotelian thesis which criticized Aristotle's system

of thought "not because it was too mechanistic a thing, but precisely because [Ramus]

envisioned a more solid structure of his own." [183] Indeed, a primary concern of Ramus

was constructing a method where the answers derived could be relied upon with a level of

certainty that was equal to scientific logic, and not simply "probable".[184]

Ramus's "career of unremitting polemical violence"[185] against the scholastic

system of education departed most radically from Ciceronian and Aristotelian thought in

its methodology of logic. Ramus emphasized logic and diminished the importance of

rhetoric, with the former consisting of invention and disposition of thought, and style and

delivery relegated to the discrete and isolated realm of the latter. Ramus's *inventio* relied

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[181] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 103-4.

[182] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 101.

[183] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 47. It should be noted that the putative title of Ramus's thesis, *Quaecemque ab Aristotle dicta essent, commentitia esse*, is the subject of considerable analysis in Ong's work; however, Ramus's intent in criticizing Aristotelian rhetoric is clear.

[184] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 176.

[185] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 59.

on traditional commonplaces and disposition, the second of which involved a system of deducing truth through the use of dichotomies. Ramus considered rhetoric—the system of communicating the discoveries of logic to others—a separate field; while Ramus called his system of invention and disposition "dialectic", it was not rooted in disputation like Aristotle or Cicero's.[186] "The tropes and figures of elocution," wrote Ramus, "together with the graces of action, form the entirety of Rhetoric as a true art distinct from Dialectic."[187] In our examination of Peter Heylyn's historical thought, two aspects of the Ramist method concern us; these are the previously mentioned use of dichotomies in Ramist dialectic, and the existence in Ramist logic of overarching and self-obvious truths.

Ramus's dialectical process was grounded in his desire to remake the liberal arts out of the existing scholastic system. He did this by applying three rhetorical "laws" to the humanist arts: truth, justice and wisdom. Truth, or *lex veritatis*, sought "affirmations in which the predicate was true of every case of the subject."[188] These particular truths were arrived at through a five-part process that fell under the collective rubric of "invention" and "disposition": *Invention, Syllogism, Induction, Beginnings of Method, and Ascent to God.* Invention involved analyzing the subject and predicate of a statement under consideration, and finding the missing connection between them—the syllogism; in this, the initial stages of Ramist dialectic do not differ from Aristotle or Cicero's. The

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[186] Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist*, 137.

[187] Pierre de la Ramée, *Dialectique,* edited by Michel Dassonville (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964), 152. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 59. Having invention and arrangement as a part of logic was nothing particularly new, as Aristotle had talked about it in his *Topics*; having them as solely constituting rhetoric, however, was a new development.

[188] Wilbur Samuel Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 150-2.

syllogisms were then placed into an argument that could be either true or false, but not both.[189] It was in this inductive process that Ramus's logic departed from Aristotle's, and in a manner relevant to Peter Heylyn's thought, for it allowed for the syllogisms of Ramist invention to serve as examples for particular truths, something that Aristotelian logic would not allow. In the *Method,* these arguments (and the supporting evidence) were then organized in order from the most general conclusions to the most detailed so that "by this methode," wrote Ramus, "we proceade from the antecedent more absolutely known to prove the consequent, which is not so manifestly knowen."[190] This process of Ramist dialectic—the ordering of syllogistically derived evidence from general to specific—manifested as a "method of dichotomies", to the point that Ramist thought took on a "severely geometrical pattern" of bifurcations, writes Howell.[191] It is this distinctive pattern of divisions that is most readily apparent sign of the Ramist logical method, and it is one that is clearly apparent in Heylyn's early historical writing.

Heylyn's first explicit description of his historical method is found in his Oxford lectures on historical geography, published in 1621 as *Microcosmos.* Beyond the obvious bifurcation of history and geography, which Heylyn described as "two *Gemini*", the work provides detailed schemata for both spheres. Heylyn divided history, which was "a quintessence extract" of *Commentaries, annals, diaries,* and *chronologies,* into the "History of the Greater World" and the "History of the Lesser World". The former was

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[189] Petrus Ramus, *The Logike of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus Martyr.* Edited by Catherine M. Dunne, translated by Roland MacIlmaine. (Northridge: San Fernando Valley State College, 1969), 10, 46-52; See also Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue,* 182-6, 210.

[190] Ramus, *The Logike, 54.*

[191] Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England,* 156-62.

subsequently divided into *universal history*, which Heylyn called the "cosmography" and

which consisted of natural history, and of *particular history*, wherein was found the study

of heaven, astronomy, and geography. The realm of the "Lesser World" consisted of a

series of classifications taken, as Woolf notes, directly from Johannes Freigius' *Historiae*

synopsis.[192] The discussion is represented in the work by a diagram clearly demonstrating

a Ramist progression of division from general to more specific categories.[193]

Heylyn's use of the Ramist system of organization in his early work makes sense

considering that the latter's frequent use of tables lay largely in their pedagogical

appeal;[194] this is especially apt given *Microcosmos's* origin within the Oxford classroom.

However, such organization is conspicuously absent from Heylyn's later works,

especially when he returned to the use of diagrams to visualize his schema; Heylyn still

periodically made use of charts, as in 1641's *A Help to English History* and 1643's *The*

Rebell's Catechism. In both cases, the relevant displays lack any clear indications of

Ramist roots—the former is organized chronologically in the form of a list, while the

latter offers glimpses of Ramist division in its description of types of rebellion, but

quickly gives way to more complicated, overlapping categories.[195] Whatever role

Ramus's methodology played in Heylyn's thought processes, its influence clearly

diminished as time progressed.

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[192] Woolf, *Idea of History*, 182, 308 n.40.

[193] Heylyn, *Microcosmos*, 18-19.

[194] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 199.

[195] Robert Hall, *A Help to English History.* (1641); Heylyn, *The Rebells Catechism*, 3-8; also see above, page 46.

Ramist thought played a more active and lasting role in the underlying use of truth in Heylyn's view of the past. As Skerpan has noted, Ramist rhetoric was not really rhetoric at all, but was rather a "method for unfolding 'truth' to the audience—a method that is intuitive rather than persuasive."[196] Truth, as conceived within Ramism, was manifestly obvious; while Ramist logic—invention, syllogism, induction, method, and ascent to God—could fan the sparks of divine reason, it was not essential to discerning the essential truths. Indeed, Ramist thinking held that when logic and dialectic were poorly implemented, truth could be obfuscated, for

> when with delectation or some other motion thy chief purpose is to deceave the auditor, thou shall put some thing away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, divisions and transitions: & set in there places thinges appartaining nothing to do with the matter... And surely this more imperfect forme of methode... is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order.[197]

While improper use of the method could hide the truth, correct use would only enhance it. Either way, singular truths existed independent of the logic that served to illuminate or obfuscate it.[198] This concept of truth was in part a function of the fifth and last element of Ramus's logical method, the *Ascent to God*. By requiring the acknowledgement of God and His ultimate responsibility for all aspects of Creation, Ramus made it fundamental in his understanding of truth that engaging in the discourse

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[196] Skerpan, *The Rhetoric of Politics*, 17; Also, see Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist*, 137-44.

[197] Ramus, *The Logike, 58*.

[198] Skerpan, *The Rhetoric of Politics*, 21; Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist*, 138.

of logic involved, according to Ong, one being "in contact with all the multitude of things in God's mind."[199] By deducing an illuminated truth one was closer to the intentions and machinations of the Almighty. In this, Ramus is not necessarily remarkable: as discussed above, God was the root of truth in early modern Britain and a powerful motivator for understanding the past and its use as a pedagogical tool in the present. However, Ramus' insistence on the divine underpinning for truth, and his logic's reliance on such singular truths as being self-evident, were clearly conducive to Heylyn's belief in undeniable historical tenets discussed in the previous chapter: the commonly held idea of a great chain of being, the associated belief in the absolute prerogative, and his adherence to the truth of the policies espoused by the Laudian church.

While the Ramist idea of singular truths is much closer to Heylyn's use of the term than Aristotle's multiple probabilities, Ramus is nonetheless seemingly otherwise absent from much of Heylyn's work. Perhaps we should not be too alarmed by this given Heylyn's Oxford education. After its inception in France, the Ramist innovations in humanist rhetoric slowly worked their way across the channel, never finding quite the reception in England that they enjoyed on the Continent: indeed, Ong observes that there was "practically no serious and mature scholarship oriented by Ramism in the British Isles."[200] Ramus teachings were not wholly absent from Britain, as interest in him appears to have flourished at St. Andrews and Cambridge. However, Heylyn's alma mater was more tepid in its response to Ramism. Students such as Magdalen College's John Barebone, who was seen as a zealous Ramist when he went for his MA in 1574, were

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[199] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 182-6.

[200] Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 303.

expected to demonstrate knowledge of Aristotelian theses and teaching before graduating. While not a rejection of Ramus as such, Howell has cogently argued that these and other incidents demonstrated neutrality at Oxford towards Ramus, and belied a general preference for Aristotle's teachings.[201]

While Ramist truth forms an important part of Heylyn's historical writing, it is only one element of a larger picture. In developing a method for constructing history, the choice facing Heylyn at Oxford was not a stark one between Ramus and Aristotle. Rather, the key to Heylyn's ability to differentiate between "partiality" and "partisanship"—the ability to remain a purveyor of truth while being such an ardent polemicist—lay in a third choice of rhetoric that drew from both the classical and Ramist schools. Some scholars in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries saw merit in Ramus' critiques of scholastic rhetoric and logic, and endeavored to reform rhetoric through compromise between classical and Ramist thought. They accomplished this by synthesizing Ramus's organizational acumen and achievements, and by eliminating redundancy in Aristotelian and Roman rhetoric, while maintaining other elements of the Aristotelian dialectic, notably its style of presentation. These individuals have been referred to as both "neo-Ciceronian" and "neo-Ramist".[202] While they employed aspects of Aristotle's method, their use of classical rhetoric often did not draw from this source; in fact, a Latin translation of Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric* did not circulate widely in England until 1619,

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[201] Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England*, 189, 192. Howell offers the experience of Hooker, who came from Corpus Christi, Oxford and was a critic of Ramus, as evidence that the Oxford college did not ignore Ramus entirely, and certainly paid him academic attention.

[202] Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England,* 282, 318; for a discussion of "neo-Ramists", see Skerpan, *The Rhetoric of Politics*, 18. I will continue to use "neo-Ciceronian" throughout the text.

and before that its publication was limited primarily to the Italian peninsula.[203] Instead,

writers relied on the rhetoric of Cicero and Quintilian, whose works were largely built on

the shoulders of that earlier Greek philosopher. However unlike Aristotle, whose rhetoric

involved discerning probabilities and the use of emotion to come to proofs, the Roman

rhetoricians were primarily concerned with using figures and tropes as persuasive

devices.[204]

Of these widely known ancient Roman rhetoricians widely read in early Stuart

England, humanists generally recommended Cicero. Indeed, Heylyn cites Cicero's *De

Oratore* within his first work, writing with regard to the value of history, "it is the rule of

direction, by whose square we ought to rectifie our obliquities, and in this sense the

Orator [Cicero] calleth it *Magistra vita*."[205] Of the Ciceronian texts used pedagogically as

rhetorical guides, perhaps the most widely-read was the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, a work

widely attributed to the Orator in Heylyn's period, even though Raphael Regius had

"positively divorced the work from Cicero's name" as early as 1491.[206] Still, in spite of

the questions surrounding its authorship the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*'s utility—stemming

from its pragmatic approach to rhetoric—helped to ensure its popularity in English and

continental rhetoric from Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetoric*[207] to Machiavelli's *The

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[203] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 35.

[204] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 36-7.

[205] Heylyn, *Microcosmvs*, 15.

[206] Unknown [Cicero]. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), ix; Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 32-3.

[207] Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England,* 98, 103.

Prince.[208] The *ad Herennium* provides us with a rhetorical model that fits Heylyn's neo-Ciceronian rhetoric, which relied on the Ramist idea of certain truths to support the golden chain of politics and the policies of Laudianism in a period of fractiousness and multiple, competing clams to historical truth. The competitive nature of Civil War-era contemporary historiography, however, required that Heylyn employ a means of delivery suited to the task. Nowhere is this clearer than in his use of the three genres of Aristotelian oratory espoused in the *ad Herennium.* Understanding these genres is critical to constructing the nature of Heylyn's polemic and its relationship with historical truth; indeed, a study of this relationship—the tension between partiality and partisanship—is a study in the genres of neo-Ciceronian genres of oratory.

Aristotle divided rhetoric into three genres, each of which entailed slightly different methods and, most importantly, varying stylistic features. The genres, or *orations,* consisted of the *deliberative, forensic* and *display,* with each intended to serve a different temporal period: the future, past, and present respectively. Additionally, each category existed to serve different purposes, as defined by their listener and the resulting objective. For a description, it is worthwhile quoting Aristotle at length:

> Now the listener must be either a spectator or a judge and, if a judge, one either of the past or of the future. The judge, then, about a future is the assembly member, the judge about the past is the juror, and the assessor of capacity is the spectator, so that there must be three types of rhetorical speech: *deliberative, forensic* and *display...*

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[208] Virginia Cox, "Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium: Deliberative Rhetoric in the Prince," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 28, no. 4 (Winter. 1997), 1109-1141. On *utile* in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* see Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist,* 122.

Each of the types has a different *objective*, and, as there are three types

there are three objectives. The objective of the deliberative orator is

advantage or *harm*, as to exhort is to urge as being more advantageous, to

deter to dissuade as being more harmful, and other aspects, such as justice

or nobility, are ancillary. That of the forensic speaker is *justice* and

injustice, though he too will bring in other aspects as ancillaries. The

objective of display oratory is *nobility* and *baseness*, to which speakers

also relate the other aspects.[209]

Aristotle's three genres were carried into early seventeenth-century English

education via Cicero, who praised their usefulness early in his writing but later found

them insufficient, and by the *ad Herennium*, where the genres form the spine of its

oratorical method.[210] Interestingly, the three genres' role as a utilitarian tool for

constructing persuasive arguments threatened to undermine the Christian concept of

universal values and morality—something that could have seriously limited their use in

early modern Europe. However, the Ciceronian (or neo-Ciceronian) model placed the

value of *honestas* as the end of deliberative rhetoric over *utilitas*. While Cicero and the *ad*

Herennium certainly used the genres to appeal to the audience's logos, ethos and pathos

through reason, moral force, emotions respectively,[211] the ability to accommodate moral

truths as the heart of rhetorical arguments and the reason for their success rather than

utility made the scheme more palatable for both ecclesiastical authors, and also those

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[209] Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric* trans. H.C. Lawson-Tancred (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1991), 80-81. For Aristotle's description of the three genres and their use, see Part 1 (pp. 79-135)

[210] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 41; Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England,* 73.

[211] Sloane, *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist*, 94.

whose dialectic was based in Ramism.[212] Regardless of genre, the *ad Herennium*'s

method required that the orator be adept at employing five devices in order to persuade an

audience, some of which will be familiar from the Ramist method: *inventio, dispositio,*

elocutio, memoria, and *pronuntiatio.* Additionally, all addresses were organized into six

elements: *exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio,* and the *conclusio.* The

differences between the genres came from the manner in which these sections were

structured, as well as the contents and objectives of each.

The deliberative genre existed for use when the questions under consideration

were choices between two or more courses of action. Rooted in the political discourse of

the amphitheatre and the forum, deliberative oratory utilized arguments that sought to

balance *utilitas* and *honestas*—in this context, security and honour—in achieving

advantage in matters of policy. Questions such as "if the Senate should deliberate whether

to exempt Scipio from the law so as to permit him to become consul while under age"

were to be framed in such a manner as to promote the advantage of the assembly, state,

nation, or other decision-making audience.[213] Ironically, this genre's role as a tool in the

political sphere made it of little use to Heylyn. The mechanics of deliberative rhetoric

assumed a debate that turned on the wisdom of policy, and absent the personal questions

of motivation and virtue found in the other genres. In effect, to use the deliberative genre

was to limit unnecessarily ones self to a debate on the merits of an argument, rather than

all aspects of the case, including the mechanics of the argument and its authors. It

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[212] On the Christian use of the three genres, see Cox, "Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium," 1115;
On the neo-Ciceronian synthesis of genres and the Ramist dialectic see Skerpan, *The Rhetoric of Politics,*
18 and 26.

[213] *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* III. II. 2-3

afforded the participants a level of respect that, while present in the others, was not so explicit. Additionally, the deliberative genre was—as Aristotle elucidated—intended for the study of the future, and had limited application to the study of history. Where Francis Bacon employed the genre in his histories, such as in his study of Henry VII, he limited its use to (invented) character speeches that concerned political issues.[214] Not surprisingly, the deliberative genre could instead be found in political works such as *The Prince*, where, writes Cox, the rhetorical tools of expediency and advantage allowed Machiavelli to inject them "into a species of writing normally dominated by considerations of moral excellence."[215] While this was of great use to Machiavelli in constructing a treatise on effective governance in the future, this was something Heylyn rarely engaged in, preferring to work in the medium of historical narrative or, closer to the present, ecclesiastical treatises.

In contrast to the deliberative genre's limited application to political debates, the demonstrative genre—or "epideictic", as it was known in the *Ad Herennium*—existed for praise and censure of both individuals and events. History's role, noted Heylyn, was to "stirreth men to virtue, and deterreth them from vice, by shewing the glorious memory of the one, and stinking repetition of the other, but especially it keepeth many men of place and calling in a continuall feare of ill doing, knowing that their villanies shall there be laid open to the view of the vulgar."[216] Clearly, Heylyn held early on that history's primary role was demonstrative, and he was not alone; his conception of history-writing

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[214] Tinkler, "The Rhetorical Method of Francis Bacon," 42.

[215] Cox, "Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium," 1112.

[216] Heylyn, *Microcosmvs*, 15.

reflected the sixteenth and seventeenth century's use of the past to commemorate events

and edify readers through moral lessons. This was a demonstrative role, although

elements of other genres could certainly be included if needed. [217] Heylyn often used

elements of the judicial genre in his writing, sometimes to the point that the works are

best described as being native to that category. Given his frequent mixing of genres, the

best examples of Heylyn's demonstrative writing are, not surprisingly, his memorials of

Archbishop Laud following the latter's execution, including the 1644 *A briefe relation of*

the death and sufferings of the Most Reverend and renowned prelate, the L. Archbishop of

Canterbury.

The *ad Herennium* outlines the content of the demonstrative genre's *exordium*,

including the dictate that "if we speak in praise, we shall say that we are doing so from a

sense of duty, because ties of friendship exist."[218] Heylyn does this his introduction to the

Briefe Relation, writing that Laud's life was "adorned and beautified" with "splendour of

those rare endowments both of Grace and Nature" and that Laud possessed "eminent

vertues", including piety to God, fidelity to Charles, "a publique soule towards Church

and State," as well as devoted friendship. Heylyn concludes his introduction with a

statement drawn straight from the *ad Herennium's* instructions—that the author's work

was done out of a sense of friendship and duty, and "'tis the last publique Office I shall do

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[217] Tinkler, "The Rhetorical Method of Francis Bacon," 35.

[218] *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* III. vi. 11.

him."[219] Of note here is that the virtues presented were also those used by Laud's

opponent William Prynne as reasons for the Archbishop's prosecution. This tactic of

substitution and inversion stretched back to Quintilian, who argued that one could replace

(or substitute) one thing or concept for another (*res pro re*), instead of just one *word* for

another in definitions; this extended to the concept of virtues and vices, where Quentin

Skinner refers to it as "paradiastolic redescription"— or the excusing of vice by

redescribing it as a virtue. [220] In his *narratio* Heylyn borrows from the judicial genre,

attacking and vitiating the arguments and motives of those prosecuting Laud in an effort

to "secure goodwill by bringing them into hatred, unpopularity, or contempt."[221]

The *divisio, confirmatio,* and *confutatio* combined in recounting those under

consideration, while "observing their precise sequence and chronology" and placing them

within the context of the "external circumstances" and "physical advantages" that the

events or people displayed or benefited from.[222] This Heylyn did by chronicling the

tumult Laud was subjected to in the time leading to his execution, while placing these

events within the narrative frame of the virtues enumerated in the introduction: piety,

duty and personal devotion. Describing Laud's incarceration, Heylyn wrote that, "God

had given him such a measure both of strength and patience, that these afflictions, though

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[219] Peter Heylyn, *A briefe relation of the death and sufferings of the Most Reverend and renowned prelate, the L. Archbishop of Canterbury with a more perfect copy of his speech, and other passages on the scaffold, than hath beene hitherto imprinted* (1644), 1-2. It should be noted that where Robert Wilcher sees this statement as displaying Heylyn's "personal touch", suggesting a close relationship with Laud and genuine anger at his opponents, he has perhaps misinterpreted the conventions of Heylyn's rhetoric, see Wilcher's *The Writing of Royalism, 1628-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 233. For a similar literal interpretation of Laud's final moments, see Jerome De Groot's *Royalist Identities*, 151.

[220] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 144, 170.

[221] *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* I. v. 8.

[222] *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* III. vii. 13-14.

most great and irksome, did make no more impressions on him, then an Arrow on a rocke

of *Adamant,*" and that "certainly it was no wonder that it should be so, he being

conscious to himselfe of no other *crimes*, which drew that fatall storme upon him, then a

religious *zeale to the honour of God, the happinesse of the King, and the preservation of*

the Church in her peace and patrimony, as he professeth at his death before all the

people."[223] Laud's virtues culminated in his speech before his execution, wherein Heylyn

noted "his great care was to cleare His Majestie, and the *Church* of *England* from any

inclination unto *Popery.* "[224] Finally Heylyn engaged in a *conclusio* consisting of a brief

summary of Laud's virtues and their relevance to history:

> If at the least he may be properly said to dye, the great example of whose
>
> vertue shall continue alwaies, not only in the mindes of men, but in the
>
> Annals of succeeding Ages, with Renowne and Fame. But how he lived,
>
> what excellent parts he was composed of, and how industriously he
>
> imployed those parts, for the advancement of Gods honour, his
>
> Soveraignes Power and Safety, and the Churches Peace, will be a worke
>
> becomming a more able pen; unto whose care and diligence I commend
>
> the same.[225]

As discussed above, narrative history was seen as within the purview of the

deliberative rhetorician. Heylyn's historical writing, however, was rarely written solely

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[223] Heylyn, *A briefe relation*, 6-7.

[224] Heylyn, *A briefe relation*, 15.

[225] Heylyn, *A briefe relation*, 27; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, III. vii. 15, "Our conclusions will be brief, in the form of a Summary at the end of the discourse; in the discourse itself we shall by means of commonplaces frequently insert brief amplifications."

for the edification of the princely reader. Rather, his works were often policy documents

and responses, tracts on royal authority and narratives laying out the theological

foundation of Laudian ecclesiastical policy. As part of the constant to-and-fro reflected in

the fracturing of the early Stuart historical mind, many of Heylyn's writings contained at

their heart a case made to the reader, often against either real or expected opposition.[226]

As such, the majority of Heylyn's works fell within the judicial, or "forensic" genre, the

primary concern of which was justice and the court of law. Given the use of judicial

rhetoric to make convincing evidential arguments on past events, the forensic genre's

suitably spread far beyond the courtroom, from the parish church to the historian's text.

In 1553, Thomas Wilson noted the appropriateness of using rhetorical principles in

preaching, particularly the judicial genre when speaking from the pulpit.[227] Bacon, while

predominantly employing the demonstrative genre, nonetheless turned to the judicial

when describing the laws passed by Henry and their utility in his *History of Henry VII*.[228]

Just as for the other genres, the *ad Herennium* outlined the proper method of

pursuing a judicial argument. So often did Heylyn employ this method, and so frequently

did he reuse biblical and historic evidence while supporting his deeply held truths, that

Royce MacGillivray notes, while not acknowledging the methodological reason of the

repetition, that "Heylyn's interpretation of the political and religious issues of the war as

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[226] Anthony Milton's description of Laudianism as an ideology that "was partly a creation of... polemicists", when combined with the nature of Heylyn's writing discussed above is what has led Milton to describe Heylyn as the "chief ideologue" of the Laudian movement. According to Milton, Heylyn not only exploited the polarized ecclesiastical environment of the 1630's, but also helped foment it by assisting in the creation of contemporary religious policies. See Milton's "The Creation of Laudianism: A New Approach," 165, 180.

[227] Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England,* 107.

[228] Tinkler, "The Rhetorical Method of Francis Bacon," 42-3.

expressed in his historical writing does not differ significantly from one work to another and may be expounded by selecting the evidence from among them."[229] Since Aristotle, it was fundamentally important during the opening of an argument to establish one's moral credentials—the Aristotelian concept of presenting a good image or conception of one's self—by establishing "the *probitie* of his owne *person*."[230] As was seen above, this was often done by demonstrating why one was qualified to carry out the study, and was traditionally accompanied by a grudging reluctance and protestations of not "being up to the task." This is also seen in Heylyn's 1642 *The Historie of the Episcopacie*, where he wrote that, seeing no one step forward to defend the Laudian Church from the malicious attacks of its opponents, he "was then encouraged in my resolution of offering my poore endevours to the *publike* service" in spite of his "*obscuritie* and *meane condition*".[231]

The establishing of one's *bona fides* was often accompanied by discussion of "the person of our adversaries", a tool Heylyn also used in his *Briefe Relation* of the death of Laud. Heylyn provides an excellent example of this in his introduction to *Antidotum Lincolniense,* the 1637 work, addressed to "the grave, learned, and religious Clergie of the Diocesse of Lincoln", wherein Heylyn combated a work previously published by a "Minister in Lincoln-shire" opposing the moving of altar tables. On his selection and use of evidence, he writes "In all and every part of the whole discourse, as I have laid downe nothing without good authority; so have I faithfully reported those authorities which are there laid down." He then goes on to inveigh the minister of Lincoln diocese who, Heylyn

[229] MacGillivray, *Restoration Historians*, 32.

[230] From Hobbes's translation of Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric*, cited in Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 129-30.

[231] Peter Heylyn, *The Historie of the Episcopacie* (1642), Preface.

suggests, does otherwise "as one that cannot but have learned by this minister that all fals dealing in that kinde, however it may sarve for a present shift, yet in the end, he brings both shame to them that use it, and disadvantage to the cause."[232] *Lincolniense* is noteworthy in Heylyn's explicit framing of the work in the judicial genre, concluding his introduction with,

> You are now made the Judges in the present controversie, and therefore it
> concernes you in an high degree, to deale uprightly in the cause, without
> the least respect of persons: and having heard both parties speake, to
> weigh their Arguments, and then give sentence as you finde it. Or in the
> language of Minutius; Quantum potestis singula ponderare, ea verò quae
> recta sunt, eligere, suscipere, probare. And that you may so doe, and then
> judge accordingly, the God of truth conduct you in the wayes of truth, and
> leade you in the pathes of righteousnesse, for his owne names sake.[233]

In this, and nearly all of Heylyn's other polemical works of the Civil War period, what follows is a narrative collection of arguments, organized chronologically and thematically, with Heylyn's stance seemingly supported through the provision of the kinds of valid evidence discussed above: church fathers, learned divines and other "reliable" sources. When using these sources, opponents would often draw from the same well. This led to the use of another telltale element of judicial rhetoric—arguing over definition. By using the same language as an adversary but differing as to what it meant, one could argue that an action had been poorly judged because the action had a different

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[232] Peter Heylyn, *Antidotum Lincolniense* (1637), Preface.

[233] Heylyn, *Antidotum Lincolniense*, Preface.

"moral complexion" than the terms describing it would otherwise suggest.[234] Instances

such as Heylyn's exploration of what is meant by the terms "rebel" in *The Rebells*

Catechism[235]—a question at the very heart of the document—as well as the *Historie of*

the Episcopacie's investigation of the etymology of the word "Episcopal" and its

contemporary meaning in the early Church[236] further demonstrate Heylyn's awareness of

and use of the rhetorical tools provided by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium.*

Given the particularly acerbic nature of Heylyn's writing—the strength with

which he wielded rhetoric, particularly his manipulation of the judicial genre to vitiate his

opponents—a final note is warranted; Skinner observes that the classical rhetoricians

looked upon the judicial genre as one that, being primarily worried about prosecution and

defense, was unique in allowing participants to mount plausible cases on either side. As

Quintilian wrote, judicial arguments were the sort of cases "in which two wise men may

with just cause take up one or another point of view, since it is generally agreed that it is

possible for reason to lead even the wise to fight among themselves."[237] There is irony in

Heylyn's use of the judicial genre. We have seen that Heylyn's historical writing was, like

that of his contemporaries, founded on the principle of moral duty and truth—truth that

existed in facts observed and propagated by reliable sources. Drawing from his Oxford

education, Heylyn relied on Ramist ideas for certainty in his particular interpretations of

those facts, rather than the mere "probability" offered by Aristotle. As the historical

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[234] Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 141-2; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, I. xii. 21.

[235] See Heylyn *The Rebells Catechism, 9.*

[236] Heylyn, *The Historie of the Episcopacie*, 56-8.

[237] As cited in Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, 97.

consensus of early seventeenth-century royalist conservatism began to crumble in the political and religious debates leading to the Civil War, Heylyn maintained many of the beliefs associated with that orthodoxy. However, in an increasingly polemical and competitive environment Heylyn deployed the tools of neo-Ciceronian rhetoric—specifically the three genres of oratory—to advance moral lessons of the past. Where Heylyn differed from many of his contemporaries was in his use of the judicial genre rather than the demonstrative. This increased over time—Heylyn's initial conception of history reflected a demonstrative root, as in *Microcosmos*, but his later histories spent less time praising or blaming past action for edification, and instead sought to advance Laudian and royalist arguments.

Heylyn's reputation as a polemicist and controversialist—labels that are clearly apt—disguises the fact that his very use of judicial rhetoric implicitly suggested that a dialogue was taking place: an argument between reasoned sides. Returning to our earlier questions, this was how Heylyn was able to differentiate between "partiality" and "partisanship", and how he engaged in writing history that was openly polemical, while maintaining a position of advocating truth rather than opinion: Ramist dialectic allowed his to be certain of the truth of his writing—truth rooted in divine knowledge and supported by historical and biblical facts—and his use of neo-Ciceronian genres allowed him to engage in the most polemical of debates while adhering to the styles and forms of traditional historical narrative. Heylyn's polemic was a function of his argumentative style and his rhetorical method. While this can be said of most polemicists, Heylyn is noteworthy for the skill with which he wielded rhetoric. Where Anthony Milton sees

Heylyn's originality in his use of historical materials to support theological arguments, one should perhaps look instead for the controversialists' skills in what Milton calls "his readiness in the heat of the debate to go beyond accepted boundaries."[238] Heylyn was particularly adept at the use of the *ad Herennium's* juridical techniques, and employed them to great effect. Indeed, Heylyn is most combative and his language most acrimonious, at precisely those points where he must undercut the foundations of his opposition's arguments to deny them even the semblance of legitimacy that the judicial genre would afford them.

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[238] Milton's "The Creation of Laudianism," 172.

Conclusion

I have been concerned with two overlapping questions throughout this study: how was it that Peter Heylyn could maintain that his writing — apt as it was for raising the blood and exasperating the passions — still espoused concepts of truth and practices of narrative that constituted contemporary historical writing; and, given that his writing was contemporaneous with a collapse in an established, conservative consensus in ideas of the past, what can Heylyn's writing teach us about the infusion of ideology into historical discourse, and the fragmentation of English historical writing generally?

We have seen that Heylyn espoused the breakdown of the fundamentally conservative ideology of obedience and duty that marked late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart history writing. Throughout his career Heylyn moved from simply restating the past towards, as Woolf suggests was endemic in Civil War-era histories, injecting "controversy, dispute and debate" into his narratives.[239] This is not to say that Heylyn did not possess a conservative ideology; as we have seen, this was far from the case. Rather than consider Heylyn a royalist based on this conservatism, I have heeded the advice of G.E. Aylmer and sought a more active definition, stemming from John Morrill's examinations of political and ecclesiastical deontology; although Anthony Milton suggests that Heylyn lacked consistency and did not hold set views,[240] we have seen that Heylyn possessed a rich and developed sense of moral duty and obligation. These deontological beliefs manifested in stalwart defenses of both ecclesiastical and royal

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[239] Woolf, *Idea of History*, xii.

[240] Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic*, 5, 224.

authority: the former through writings in support of various Laudian positions including the altar policy and anti-Sabbatarianism; and the latter via Heylyn's belief in near-absolute royal authority stemming from both the Great Chain of Being and the Norman Conquest of 1066. While Morrill placed a divide between theological belief and political duty there was no such split for Heylyn, for whom deontology was a system of values that encompassed both the sovereign and the Laudian church. Heylyn believed in strong, centralized authority in both the church and state; when the leaders of either failed to espouse those traits and attributes that he admired, Heylyn noting their failings after death as evidenced by his later writings on Kings Edward, James I and Charles I.[241] It was this unerring belief in duty and obligation that drove Heylyn to write so passionately; ironically, his belief in obedience and duty is what caused Heylyn to engage in the very "controversy, dispute and debate" that undid the historiographical consensus of pervious generations.

The question of Heylyn's methods led us to an examination of contemporary ideas of truth itself, and shed new light on the polemicist who modern authors have often treated cynically when speaking of his historiographical method. Kenneth Parker's self-described "reappraisal" of English Sabbatarianism is largely focused on what Parker sees as the widespread use of Heylyn's work as *de facto* historical evidence; indeed, Parker accuses Heylyn of having "dealt with tradition by falsifying it."[242] Parker is not alone; as we have seen, Charles Prior holds that Heylyn's "recollections of the period were colored

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[241] This allowed Heylyn to comment on the holders of royal authority without treading into the territory of recognizing the contemporary idea of "the king's two bodies", where the individual and the office were to be treated separately; Heylyn viewed this theory as a "strange and impossible division." See Meza, "Heylyn's Theory of Royal Sovereignty," 184.

[242] Parker, *The English Sabbath,* 197.

either by nostalgia or by harsh indictments of moderate churchmen." [243] Even Anthony Milton, whose recent work concedes that Heylyn was not being deliberately untruthful in his histories, earlier noted his "readiness in the heat of debate to go beyond acceptable boundaries," which included calling Heylyn's *History of the Sabbath* "falsified history."[244] To suggest that Heylyn falsified the past, however, is to suggest two things: that he deviated from an accepted truth, or that he otherwise obfuscated the past in ways not permitted in contemporary rhetoric--that his omissions or alleged falsifications ought to be considered noteworthy. Instead, we have seen that Heylyn wrote from a solid position vis-à-vis a contemporary notion of "truth." Heylyn's noting of his sources, and vouching for their accuracy, were not done to combat suspicions of deceit, but rather were demanded by rhetorical conventions. For Heylyn and his contemporaries, truth was to be deduced through rhetorical principles--whether the probable and sometimes uncertain truth of classical rhetoric or the singular truths of Ramism. Heylyn's use of the neo-Ciceronian school in his writing, a hybrid between classical and Ramist rhetoric, allowed him to deploy whatever evidence in his writing was needed to make convincing arguments in support of ecclesiastical or royal authority. While Heylyn noted other historical writers were acting as *partisans*, to use Preston's terms, Heylyn acted only with *partiality*, acting within existing rhetorical conventions to make arguments.

It is this last point that presents us with the clearest insight into the character and thinking of Peter Heylyn, and it is one that is at odds with the traditional interpretation of his career as historian only by virtue of his writing as a polemicist. Heylyn's use of the

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[243] Prior, *Defining the Jacobean Church,* 13; also see above, n. 33.

[244] Milton, "Creation of Laudianism," 172; also see above, n. 31.

judicial genre of rhetoric rather than the demonstrative--as was conventionally used by history writers--speaks to his ultimate desire to make cases and advance arguments rather than to use the past to elucidate or teach. This dependence on the conventions of rhetoric had a side effect: Heylyn rarely, if ever, engaged in *ad hominem* attacks against opponents. Where Milton attributes this to Heylyn's lack of social connection and financial resources, both of which would be necessary to engage in personal attacks against sometimes influential opponents, it is also possible that Heylyn's fondness for judicial rhetoric nurtured a desire to maintain the precepts of history writing. It was the conventions and limitations of rhetoric that allowed Heylyn to believe himself a historian and yet engage in polemic with a clear conscience.

There remains a significant lacuna in research of the process by which the historical consensus of early-Stuart England broke down; to say that historical writing became infused with ideology does not answer the question of how, cognitively, this occurred. More generally, there is a need to explore the general themes in the construction of the past that ran through the historical writing of the Civil War and Interregnum, and how those themes both reflected and refashioned the religious and political environment of the period ranging from the initial breakdown of historical consensus in 1640 up until 1670. Our foray into the thought of Peter Heylyn has taught us that one way of approaching the question of *how* ideology was infused into historical writing is through the tool used to deliver that message: rhetoric. Heylyn's shift from traditional to judicial rhetoric moved his pre-existing--and not altogether remarkable--conservative ideology into the realm of fierce polemic, all while maintaining a perception of historical truth that

connected him with past history writers. Heylyn's history writing was intended to prove certain debatable truths; in his *History of the Episcopacie* Heylyn, wishing to avoid the argumentative format of his other works, introduced it by noting that he proceeded "not in the way of Argument, or of Polemicall discourse… but in the way of an historical narration, as in point of fact; in which the Affirmative being made good by sufficient evidence, *it will bee very difficult, if not impossible, to prove the negative.*" [245] Was Heylyn's movement from the demonstrative to the judicial genre unique, or was it a natural way to proceed from early Elizabethan historical precepts to the controversial disputes of the Civil War while still holding true to "truth"

One hopes that this examination of Peter Heylyn will serve as a starting point for future work on the Civil War historical mind. What is called for is a further examination of little-studied historians, including Arthur Wilson, William Sanderson and others, who have been forgotten in the modern discourse, but who were men of note among contemporary historical actors. An examination of the sense of obligation and duty held by these men as well as the rhetorical tools used to advance their beliefs will provide us with the means to understand the infusion of ideology into English narrative historical writing more fully, which in turn will begin to bridge the scholarly gap between the early-Stuart understanding of historiography and that of those historians contemporary with the Restoration. More importantly, it will provide much-needed context for the religious and political debates that preoccupy modern scholarship on the English Civil War.

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[245] Peter Heylyn, *The Historie of the Episcopacie* (1642), Preface (my emphasis); Milton, *Laudian and Royalist Polemic*, 119.

This proposed line of future inquiry will give new insights into old sources, offering a fuller picture of the seventeenth century English historiographical environment and will, in turn, afford a basis for new scholarly questions and investigations.

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