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Consequences of Categorization: National Registration, Surveillance and Social
Control in Wartime Canada, 1939-1946

by

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Abstract

This dissertation takes up the question of how socially constructed bureaucratic classifications can become central elements in governing individual action, shaping everyday life and mediating the performances of individual identity. Drawing on the work of Foucault, Butler, Bowker and Star, this work demonstrates the link between classification, governing rationalities, technologies, performative acts and identity formation. In particular, it approaches the role of technologies through a conceptualization of classifications as the means through which the content of governing rationalities can be taken up and expressed through implemented technologies. It argues that this can be done in such a way as to mediate, or tighten, classifications and their related performances onto individuals and populations. By adopting the concept of performativity and sedimentation, this work demonstrates how the repeated governed acts, or forced performances, related to conscription in Canada during the Second World War ultimately resulted in the formation of a particular identity for NRMA or Zombie soldiers within popular culture and within this population of mobilized men. This dissertation will focus on two key branches of investigation – first on the technologies themselves, encompassing the historical moments of their generation, their adoption of particular classifications informed by set governing rationalities and their relative effectiveness in tightening the classifications of the National Registration system onto targeted individuals and populations. Second this dissertation demonstrates the impact that the forced performances of acts related to the category of “conscripted

soldier” had on the men who were called into service. The goal of this work is not only to review this historical period in Canadian history, but also to draw this knowledge into contemporary debates about national ID cards, immigration and status cards, citizenship papers, and population management.

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Introduction

In 1943, in an office at the National Registration Bureau at 227 Laurier Avenue West in Ottawa,¹ over 300 employees worked within the country's National Registration offices under the authority of the Department of Labour, having been charged to track, trace and direct men and women from across the country into their proper social place within government, industry and the armed forces. Specifically, their job was to separate those who were classified by the registration system as being "necessary" in their community, from those who were "available" for service, and then to reallocate the latter to more significant work within the war effort. Data going into these decisions had been gathered over two years earlier in a massive statewide registration of the population of Canada known as the National Register. All persons finding themselves within the borders of the Dominion were to have been interviewed, their answers carefully documented on pre-configured registration forms and then consolidated within a National Register in Ottawa. Registered individuals were also issued personal ID cards by National Registration staff, to be carried at all times as proof of compliance with registration procedures as well as to prove their identity to other government officials and agencies. As the men and women of Canada's Second World War National Registration program worked to assess registration forms and file accounting and tracing cards in their appropriate slots and cabinets, letters from their offices at the Department of Labour fanned out across the country.

¹ Secret Circular 46 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt.3 NWS Delinquents

For those just coming of age, letters informed them of the need to be assessed by a medical doctor, while for others who had already been assessed, letters held orders to report for military training. Elsewhere, letters were reaching Canadians of Chinese and Indian heritage informing them that their services were unwanted in the Canadian Armed Forces and telling them instead to direct themselves to the Red Cross. Letters were being delivered to Doukhobors and Mennonites as well, informing them of their need to contribute their labour in work camps established for conscientious objectors, while in remote parts of the country registration letters waited in infrequently used post boxes to be picked up by First Nations peoples working seasonal trap lines. Letters were also reaching Japanese Canadians in British Columbia demanding that they report for evacuation after having been photographed and fingerprinted by the RCMP. Women were receiving letters as well, telling them to take on new roles in previously male-dominated industries or to take to the fields to take a more active role in industrial production as farmhands.

Behind every letter was a clerk, and on every clerk's desk was a list, and at the top of every list was a classification – established by a registrar working with the Department of Labour, and associated with a specific social role, laid out and enforced through federal legislation. When these letters arrived, people had to decide whether to conform with the condition of their governmentally ascribed category or not. They had to come to terms with the social role that was being pressed upon them and, in turn, deal with the social consequences of their actions. By taking part in the National Registration they all had become visible to the

government in new ways, opening their lives to being reviewed, assessed, counted, identified and managed as they had never been before. They were now a part of the largest surveillance system implemented by the government of Canada up until that time.

In its history, Canada has had at least four different National Registration programs, each having been developed and implemented to differing degrees. Canada's first National Registration program was short lived, having been put in place over the final months of the First World War. The second was implemented in 1940, following the unanticipated defeat of France and remained in force until the end of the Second World War. The third was developed in the 1950s, the cards and forms printed and at the ready for the expected outbreak of a world war in Asia; and in the years following the violence of the September 11th 2001 attacks in the United States, a new National Registration program was established and developed by the Canadian government. Though each case is distinctive in the technologies employed, their common goal was principally one of governance – the programs being specifically designed to develop a new visibility of populations and exert a greater capacity to enact government policy.

Though Stevenson has written an excellent book on National Selective Service and mobilization during the Second World War which touches on National Registration (see Stevenson 2001), its focus on the politics and infighting involved in the implementation of this program is significantly different from the purpose of this work. Stevenson's (2001: 172-3) analysis concluded that National Selective Service was ineffective in supporting a "comprehensive armed

forces mobilization strategy,” leading him to echo the comments of the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons in 1944, that this program was “Canada’s greatest wartime muddle.” Regardless of the program’s capacity to meet the expectations of the leader of the opposition party of the time, National Registration remains one of the first massive, surveillance based, government programs to target *all* peoples living within the borders of Canada. Though it is true that it was considered by some to be a “muddle,” to pass this program off as a simple failure ignores both the massive amount of time, resources and effort that was put into managing the lives of people across the country, and in addition discounts the personal experiences of those who were significantly impacted by the system’s classification and enforcement mechanisms. Importantly, National Registration did do *something*, and how and what it did, as well as the resistance it prompted, is important to the study of governance, classification and identity. In particular, this work develops a detailed analysis of the ideas behind National Registration, the specific ways they were implemented and refined in Canada, and the use of classification technology to shape the lives of those living amidst these government systems. It is not concerned with the capacity of this system to meet an arbitrary standard of “success” but instead aims to address the very real on-the-ground implementation of that program, how it touched people and changed their lives – in short, the focus is on government classification and its consequences.

This dissertation focuses on first, the National Registration technologies themselves encompassing the historical moment of their generation, the governing rationalities of its policy, the technological innovations which enabled it to be

used as a tool of governance, and its subsequent impact on individuals and specified populations; and second, the role that this technology played in developing and formalizing specific sets of social orders – who was necessary/expendable, who participated in decision making, as well as the historical proliferation of governance focused surveillance-based systems. In particular, this work demonstrates how National Registration in Canada acted as a technology of governance, explicitly shaping the lives of those it touched through ascribed social categories.

The purpose of this work is to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between classification and governance. In Foucault's own work the role of classification is quite predominant as it relates to the governance of populations. In particular, Foucault asserts that governing rationalities find expression through the defining and application of particular categories. As such, his analysis into governance stresses the importance of recognizing governing rationalities and developing an understanding of the specific social orderings, relationships and truths that these rationalities hold. Also within Foucault's work, is a stressing of the role of specific governing technologies – which act in accordance with governing rationalities. As Foucault notes, it is through a relationship of rationalities and technologies that the lives of individuals are mediated, or “governed.” In this way, Foucault's work at its core asserts a relation where governance is the result of rationalities *plus* technologies. It is at this point, however, that Foucault faces significant critique. In particular, critique is leveled which makes the claim that the observed performances of individuals subjected to

the governing systems which Foucault studied did not directly relate to the rationalities that he discovered. In his defense, Foucault (2008: 2; 1996: 81-82) notes that the “on the ground,” or “lived,” experiences of people were not the focus of his research; however, regardless of Foucault’s self application of a limited scope to his work, a significant disjunction still exists between the understanding of governing systems that a Foucaudian approach develops and the observable social impact that these systems have on targeted populations.

Into this space this work has inserted the concept of “categorical tightness,” a term developed by Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997) as a means of understanding how categories work to mediate social relations within particular social spaces. In particular, this dissertation adopts the concept of categorical tightness as a measure to understand the relative impact of different governing technologies that were employed to mediate the performances of targeted individuals and populations. That is, this measure is adopted to note the degree to which governance finds expression within populations and social spaces, by means of comparing the content, or definitions, of governmentality applied categories – themselves having been produced as a result of the system’s governing rationalities – with the observed performances of the system’s targeted populations. In short, specific governing rationalities provide the content and definitions of categories, while governing technologies assert these categories along with their content onto target populations, while target populations’ behavior is in this way governed. As a result, the technologies implemented by the system can be measured in regards to the “tightness” of its imposed categories

– or, in other words, their capacity to render the observed performances of populations to match the defined categories of the system’s governing rationalities. In this way, a bridge between the understandings of governing rationalities and the understanding of the observed “on the ground,” or “lived,” history of populations targeted by governing systems can be made. Additionally, this approach also provides a means to measure the relative effectiveness of different imposed technologies in asserting into the performances of individuals the content of applied governing rationalities. In developing this approach, this research also points to the role of governing technologies in shaping the development of identity, as the repeated governed, or forced, performances of individuals results in the sedimentation of these performances into individuals’ understandings of self and their social understandings of identity.

In short, this dissertation draws on five key points in its investigation of the impact that National Registration had on the peoples of Canada. First, from the work of Foucault, it is asserted that the categories taken up by this system were defined through, and were the result of, specific governing rationalities. Second, also drawn from Foucault’s work, that in order for these rationalities and their subsequent categories to find expression, that specific governing technologies would have to be developed and implemented. Third, that the relationship between rationalities and technologies can in fact lead to the governance of targeted populations. Fourth, that this governance can be understood by measuring the tightness of applied categories through the observation of the performances of the targeted populations and comparing them

to the defined content of applied categories. Also, that by this means the relative effectiveness of applied governing technologies can be compared. And finally, fifth, that the governance of the performances of individuals can have lasting effects in regards to identity, as repeated forced performative acts sediment, like any other performances, into the individual's understanding of self, and the cultural understandings of categorized individuals (see Figure I-1).

Figure I-1. Premises of Categorical Tightness

- | |
|---|
| 1. Governing Rationalities Work to Define Categories
2. Governing Technologies Implemented

3. Mediation of Performances (Governance)

4. Measure (Governing Rationalities vs. Observed Performances)
∴ Categorical Tightness

5. Identity (Sedimentation of Forced Performative Acts) |
|---|

The remainder of the introduction takes up these five points in order to provide a foundation for this investigation into the consequences of categorization that individuals living in Canada faced as a result of the implementation of the National Registration and mobilization program during the Second World War.

Governance and Governmentality

This section takes the first, second and third points noted above, establishing the role of rationalities and technologies in the establishment of governance within targeted populations. In addition, this section demonstrates how the term of governance has come to be applied within sociological research, working to

provide a means to understand how particular social systems come to mediate or govern individual action.

Within the literature of social science the concept of “governance” is hotly debated, its definitions “numerous, diverse and fragmented,” and as of yet, lacks “any consistent tradition” (Sand 2004: 44). An analysis of the governance literature shows, however, that there is significant overlap in how the concept is often used. As work of Burris, Kempa and Shearing (2012: 10) notes, “much of what is meant by governance has to do with manipulating the elements of governance to achieve effective and efficient management – i.e. governance that works,” arguing furthermore, that governance also “implies goals to which systems are being directed,” and so governance then is a process “inextricably tied to normative questions of what the governor is seeking to accomplish” (Ibid: 10). In addressing this somewhat loose definition, the necessary conceptualizations of value laden terms like “effective,” and “efficient,” as well as the imposition of “goals” and the social position of a “governor,” stresses the degree to which governance exists within the realm of power and politics, incorporating issues of social control, coercion and identity. As a means of critically approaching this political and mediating nature of governance, the later work of Michel Foucault develops the useful concept of “governmentality,” linking the specific tools and practices of government to a particular orientation and organization of thought, or a “mentality” of government.

Foucault’s question in regards to governance is one of how large scale political modes of thought could come to be inscribed upon individual action. The

study of government, for him, addresses “the conduct of conduct,” incorporating all forms of activity “aiming to shape, guide or effect the conduct of some person or persons” – including relations “between the self and self” (Gordon 1991: 2).

Within his work, Foucault sought to develop an understanding of governmentality by identifying common and overlapping ways of thinking present across an array of primary texts concerning the functioning of governing bodies (Gordon 1991: 1, 8). By focusing on these texts, Foucault’s concern was to outline the organizing conceptualizations, or what he refers to as “rationalities,” which worked to define what governance is, what objects were to be governed, why they were to be governed, to what end they should be governed, what nature and obligations were to be attributed to the governed, and how governance was ultimately to be carried out (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 86). In short, his research investigates how governing rationalities exist as “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government” which could then, make specific forms of activity both thinkable and actionable for its practitioners as well as “those upon whom it was practiced” (Gordon 1991: 3). Also important to his study of governance was the question of how these rationalities came to enable the exercise of political power, or govern, social action. Foucault linked the socially constructed rationalities of government to the development and realization of specific mechanisms, strategies, techniques and procedures - conceptualizing them collectively as “technologies of government.” These technologies then, are the means through which governance is exercised upon and through populations.

Foucault's analysis of government importantly avoided the all encompassing notions of control often attributed within classic sociological texts to conceptualized actors such as "the state" or "the church." Instead it focuses alternatively on historical investigations of the smaller and more minor texts of programmers, designers and administrators (Valverde 2007: 160). In this way, the state and its institutions were not understood to exist as a singular monolithic entity, but instead conceptualized "as 'coagulations' of practice," arising "from an assemblage of forces" and involving a multitude of players (Foucault STP 1978 cited in Valverde 2007: 162; Rose and Miller 1992: 181; Gordon 1991: 4). Under this approach, government is understood as developing as a regulated and systematized mode of power, bound to a specific rationality which defines a problem, a course of action and a specific set of technologies to be applied as a means to achieve its objective.

Foucault's lectures in the late 1970s and 1980s trace a genealogy of the modern conception of governance, tying its origin to that of "state reason" and as having been a part of a shift in the late sixteenth century from the Machiavellian problem of authority maintaining sovereign control over territory and establishing the loyalty of subjects, as was put forward in *The Prince* ([1532]1961), to one concerned with attaining prosperity through the proper management of a knowable population (Foucault 1991: 96; Gordon 1991: 8-9). Key to the explanation of these early rationalities of governance was political writings on the science of police.

Coming out of the German tradition, “police science” sought to assert a high degree of cultural regulation on citizens in order to develop individual lives in such a way as to foster the material and political strength and prosperity of the state (Foucault 1988b: 82). Police science worked to establish these goals through total knowledge and regulation of the functioning of nearly everything – from the dimensions of horse cloths to what should be eaten and drunk during a wedding feast – that existed within the bounds of the state (Haggerty 2001: 41). Key to this was the development of highly ordered urban spaces, within which not only were a whole range of activities prohibited, but governing institutions also “positively encourage[ed] and even demand[ed] particular modes of conduct from the citizenry” (Valverde 2003: 235). In light of this history, Gordon (1991: 11) offers an analogy of this understanding of governance as “a state mechanism which was arraigned like a clock,” having been “consciously and purposefully built up,” as to make the best “use of the various species and strengths and qualities of men as its springs and wheels.” The new science of police also provided new epistemological resources to govern institutions, providing “endless lists and classifications” (Gordon 1991: 10), as well as establishing a vital link which aligned the politics of proper governance with the collection of information, the development of regimes of truth, and the enhancement of authority (Rose 1991: 676; Gordon 1991: 8). To properly govern, “therefore, whether to govern a household, a ship, or a population, it was necessary to know that which was to be governed, and govern in light of that knowledge” (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 87).

The unity of knowledge and government which typified state reason and police science soon fell apart under its inevitable incapacity to establish its required environment of total knowledge. This breakdown, coupled with the rise of discourses focused on liberty, enabled a form of liberal rationality to assert itself within the developing art of governance (Gordon 1991: 16). The liberal rationalities which arose existed initially as a critique developed to push back against the excessive management of the governance experienced under the police science of state reason, and singled out particular domains of societies as being outside the capacity of state to properly “know“ and organize (Gordon 1991: 15). Specifically, liberalism sought to address concerns about governing too much, and drew on the increasingly popular intellectual position that elements of society, such as the market place, had their own internal natural laws. For the state and its peoples to properly flourish, then, required freeing up of civil society to develop its own order and prosperity through participation in government. Now, the art of government was to be “understood and administered using a whole range of strategies and tactics to secure the well-being of each and all” (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 87).

In contrast to police power, which exercised governance through regulations targeting specific individuals or activities, liberal governing institutions now established as one of their central problems the politics of “populations” (Foucault 1991: 100). Under this rationality groups of individuals came to be conceptualized as a new discrete entity, a “population,” which has its own characteristics, natural laws and properties, distinct from a simple collection

of individual wills or a summary of enacted legal decrees. In light of this, “populations had to be understood by means of specific knowledges and to be governed through techniques that [we]re attuned to these emergent understandings” (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 84). In this way, systems of governance changed how they sought to govern, incorporating individualizing acts at the level of the subject into rationalities of governance at the level of the population – working to both “totalize” and “individualize” practices of governance. Valverde (2006: 172) offers the example that “while a theft is treated by the system of sovereign criminal law as an act to be punished, assemblages of [governance] (*le dispositif de sécurité*) inserted the phenomenon of theft – turned into an aggregate – into a series of probable events, and set out to govern the general problem of future thefts as it affects not individuals, or the sovereign, but rather ‘the population.’” As Haggerty (2001: 42) notes liberalism’s distinctiveness then “lies in its attempt to resolve the dilemma of how to govern autonomous domains – without compromising their autonomy – through a unique combination of knowledge, expertise, and the active participation of subjects in their own government.” Proper governance then, needed to address not only a focus on aspects of security to ensure the strength of the state, but also work for the good of the society to nurture those domains which were to exist outside of the state’s purview. Under this rubric, the state’s exclusive claim to governance came to an end, and others were drawn in to govern the spaces opened up by the state’s retreat. In stressing the limits of the political, liberal governmentalities a role was established for “a whole array of nonpolitical actors and forms of

authority – medics, religious organizations, philanthropists, and social reformers – in governing the habits of the people” (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 91).

Classification and Governance

In this section the role of rationalities in developing the content of classifications and how classification relates to governance, is taken up in greater detail. In particular, this section notes the role that classifications play in allowing individuals to understand the world that they live in, as well as how these classifications are themselves social products that can be made up as the result of governing rationalities.

Rose and Miller (1992: 185) note the huge investment of labour, time and resources exerted by governments in order “to transform events and phenomena into information.” Citizenship data, education levels, births, deaths, vaccinations, health problems, marital and employment statuses as well as an array of other data, are all regularly documented, placed in figures and tables, and assessed by a host of government officials. Though Foucault’s conceptualization of governance always addressed the importance of knowledge as it relates to power, the work of Douglas (1986), Latour (1987), Yates (1989) as well as Rose and Miller (1991) further establish the act of transforming actions and events into information as providing *the* basis for its centralized form. Crucially, each of the authors argue in their own way how events and processes need to be converted into equivalent forms, capable of mobility and accumulation, if power is to be exercised over any

distance. As part of this, a kind of standardization needs to be exerted, both in the formalization of the inward collection of information by governing centers, as well as in the formatting of the outward transmission of readily applicable instructions (Yates, Orlikowski and Rennecker 1997: 2; Bowker and Star 2000: 231-233; Douglas 1986: 55). In the case of National Registration and conscription, for example, it was the development of a common means of defining, identifying, and counting individuals which enabled information to be shared between institutions, the establishment of a shared language about who should be called into service in the Armed Forces, and ultimately led to the development of a universalized governing protocol for Registrars.

In the performance of these kinds of acts, however, real people are required every day to face the near infinite complexity of the natural world and make it fit the governing systems they are called on to apply. Not only is each plant, animal or person unique, they are also all in a state of constant change over time – seasonal changes to match the colour of the snow in the case of rabbits, metamorphosis from caterpillars into butterflies, or simply change due to the natural processes of aging – from object to object, from day to day, no two encounters can ever truly be the same. This incredibly complex, and ever-changing, field of application in which governing systems need to work, presents a significant problem in addressing the totalizing and individualizing nature of governing rationalities, specifically in their establishment of the required general applicability of the technologies of governing systems. If each case that a governor or government official encounters is unique, then how can there ever be

sufficient knowledge or policy developed to manage the vast numbers of people, places and events that their particular system is called on to govern?

In fitting this complexity to the rationalities and technologies of systems of governance, a process of abstraction is required. This involves sorting a selection of the billions of discrete, discriminateable objects of the natural world into groups, and reconceptualizing them as equivalents through the application of a defined classification (Rosch 1975: 177). In this way, classifications exist as a representation of a consciously segmented, or grouped, portion of the social world (Erickson and Kruschke 1998: 107), as a socially constructed universal whose particulars are made to reside together, or in other words, a “summary representation of some sets of things in terms of conditions that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for determining membership” (Hjørland 2009: 1520-21 cited in Fox 2011: 329). As a result, classifications are not natural or simple representations of the world, and as such need to be conceptualized as being formulated “not only by means of the (objective) property of objects, but also in response to the special purpose of the classification” (Mazzocchi 2011: 400; also see Olson 1999: 69). In this way there “are countless legitimate, objectivity grounded ways of classifying objects in the world,” each holding to their own specific and governing ontological positions (Dupré 1993: 18). To use Hjørland’s (2009) term, classifications then, are also necessarily “domain-centric,” in that each classification scheme produces its own, not always externally compatible, definition of its subjects, and holds to its own constructed internal logic. Classifications then, are cultural products which need to be learned

in order for individuals to understand why and how they are to be properly applied (Rosch and Mervis 1975: 574; Rosch 1975a; Rosch 1975b; Mervis 1984 in Lacoff). As Rosch (1975: 177) argues, “one of the most basic functions of organisms may be th[is] ‘cutting up’ of the environment into classifications,” as it provides the necessary means through “which nonidentical stimuli can be treated as equivalent” and the overwhelming complexity of the real can be made manageable and navigable. In this way, classifications exist as the “scaffolding in the conduct of modern life” (Bowker and Starr 2000: 47), and play the key role of turning a subjective, “qualitative world into information and rendering it amenable to control” (Rose 1991: 577).

To incorporate the role of classification into Valverde’s (2006: 172) explanation of governance through the analogy of the thief – the glossed over system of sovereign criminal law, requires his or her specific act (or theft) to be fit into the governing system’s means of collecting knowledge, rendered equivalent through the application of the defined aggregate categories of “theft” and “thief,” the proper rationality and technologies exercised based on the applied categories, and finally the generalized governing requirements asserted upon the specific individuals allocated to the subject positions of police officers, judge, jury and jailers as well as the newly classified “thief” themselves. In this way, individual behavior is governed as a result of the ability that classifications provide within technologies of governance to move from the level of the individual to the aggregate and back again. As Foucault (1982: 792) notes, classifications work as “systems of differentiation” which “permits one to act upon the actions of others:

differentiations determined by the law or by traditions of status and privilege; economic differences in the appropriation of riches and goods, shifts in the processes of production, linguistic or cultural differences, differences in know-how and competence, and so forth” – “every relationship of power puts into operation differentiations which are at the same time its conditions and its results.”

This selective reduction of complexity of the natural world, though necessary for systems of governance, is not without significant consequence to the production of knowledge. The political judgments implicit in the choice of what criteria are to be used to determine category membership and what rationalities are to be applied to interpret how categorized objects are to relate to one another, ensures that classifications “can be neither ideologically nor theoretically innocent” (Alonso and Starr 1987: 3 cited in Rose 1991: 675). In this way, rationalities and technologies of governance are shaped by how their selected categories and classification methods work to “cut-up” the world, revealing as much about the “assumptions, prejudices, dreams, and aspirations of the classifiers as they do about the objects of which they speak” (Haggerty 2001: 46). For this reason when talking about classifications and what they portray “it should be emphasized that we are talking about a perceived world and not a metaphysical world without a knower” (Rosch 1978: 29), that is, each category valorizes some point of view while silencing another, presenting one form of operationalizing the world over all others, and works to mediate how subjects construct their perceived social worlds (Bowker and Star 2000: 5; Foucault 1982: 792; Barsalou 1983;

Lakoff 1987: 45). In so doing, classifications assert their own particular “objectivity,” or normalized way of “seeing,” “reading” and “knowing” the world that is tied strictly to their constituting rationality, supporting technologies and incorporated subject positioning relationships, or goals. As Rosch (1975: 177) describes it, classifications provide “the culture through which humans ‘see nature.’”

This “objectivity-through-classification” has been shown to be fundamental in standardizing the understanding of both subjects and objects within governing systems (Porter 1986; Olson 2007). Since the application and use of categories is a learned social process, it requires the subject to develop a sensitivity to the observation of the culturally significant facets that are stressed within the given classification system – such as what occupation an individual has or if he is the owner of a business, in the case of the conscription selection process of Canada’s World War Two National Registration system (Rosch and Mervis 1975: 574; Lakoff 1987: 42, 51; Gibson and Gibson 1955; Wittgenstein 1953). In this way, a selective and learned “visibility” is tied to a classification’s own asserted “objectivity.” This in turn, advances the recognition of certain objects or aspects of objects while diminishing the visibility and cultural importance of others. This learning of a constructed “objective” visibility has been shown to be established through “the culture and language into which the individual is born” (Rosch 1975: 177), as is perhaps best shown in the study of the adoption of categories by children. Although effective and consistent processes of categorization have been demonstrated by subjects as young as two (see Mervis

1984 in Lacoﬀ 1987: 45), the adoption of “adult” categories, however, has been determined to require the internalization of specific cultural knowledge regarding employed categorical systems and are taken up later in life. Leach (1964: 34) notes how “the child, in due course, is taught to impose upon [her or]his environment a kind of discriminating grid,” eﬀectively mediating the act of observation along the lines of applied systems of categorization. As it will be shown, how individuals were “seen” and assessed for conscription within the National Registration system was limited to how the data collected as part of the registration process, as standardized understandings of employment, skills and training formed the basis of the decision if the individual was necessary for their community or should be called up into service. During the war this can be seen in the identity category that developed due to the categorical diﬀerentiation of volunteer and conscript soldiers – as the latter were identiﬁed through speciﬁed patches and badges and a cultural understanding of these individuals was developed, identifying them as foreign, cowards and of the French race, regardless if this was true in each individual case.

This link between categories, perception and knowledge is not trivial in its implications to the understanding of the role of classiﬁcations within governing social environments. The work of Bowker and Star (2000) investigates how the “objectivity” of systems of classiﬁcation become ﬁtted together with reality through the implementation of particular classiﬁcation technologies. Speciﬁcally, the authors note that the application and continued use of classiﬁcation systems produces a cumulative eﬀect, in which the “process by which information

artifacts and social worlds are fitted to each other and come together.” Referred to by Star, Bowker, and Neumann (1997) as “convergence,” the interaction of technologies and classifications is conceptualized as being mutually constitutive, ultimately resulting in the effect “of changing the world so that the system’s depiction of reality becomes true” (Bowker and Star 2000: 49, 84). Importantly, as a classification converges more fully within a social space it also becomes naturalized and rendered transparent. In this way “categories come to seem entirely natural, rather than negotiated,” and contribute to a particular understanding of “objectivity” that asserts that “this is just how the world is” (Star, Bowker and Neumann 1997). As Haggerty (2001: 46) notes “the fact that we live within the classificatory schemes of our own society makes it difficult for us to acknowledge their conventional status.”

In approaching the theorization of categorization, the above statements suggest a very imposing and formative role that governing systems can have within societies. Although the perhaps overly deterministic tone found in much of the governance literature suggests an ease in the imposition of all encompassing, or even totalitarian, styles of governance (see Giddens 1987 for example), what is often missing from these studies, however is a conceptualization of the role individuals play within the “translation of rationalities of government into concrete programs directed at a field of intervention,” as well as the governing capacity of these systems in relation to targeted populations (Carter 1995: 581-585). This relationship, between individual’s performances and applied categories, is perhaps the most important insight which can be gathered as a result

of forwarding the analysis of classification within the study of systems of governance.

Classification and “living Reality”

This section takes up a particular critique leveled at the work of Michel Foucault, asserting that its understanding of the role of governing systems is overly deterministic in nature and as such not born out in the histories of governed peoples. Specifically, this critique cites a lack of concrete evidence regarding the role of governing rationalities in shaping the observed behaviours of targeted populations. Although Foucault responds to this critique by arguing that it is beyond the scope of his own research, this section investigates this claim and critique further, looking to establish a means of incorporating both traditional understandings of governance and the observable “lived experiences” of targeted populations.

Within his work on governance Foucault distinguished his own research on the “art of government” by separating the specific practices of governors from the reason of governing. As Foucault (2008: 2) explains “I have not studied and do not want to study the development of real governmental practice by determining the particular situation it deals with, the problems raised, the tactics chosen, the instruments employed, forged, or remodeled, and so forth,” – “I want to study the art of governing, that is to say, the reasoned way of governing best.”

The Foucauldian approach to the investigation of governance has, however faced significant criticism due to its nearly singular focus upon discourse and political rationalities. In response to these criticisms Foucault himself explained:

you say to me: nothing happens as it is laid down in these ‘programs’... Bentham’s Panopticon isn’t a very good description of ‘real life’ in nineteenth-century prisons. To this I would reply: if I had wanted to describe ‘real life’ in the prisons, I wouldn’t indeed have gone to Bentham...[governing systems] are fragments of reality which induce particular effects in the real as the distinction between true and false implicit in the ways men ‘direct’, ‘govern’ and ‘conduct’ themselves and others. To grasp these effects as historical events – with what this implies for the question of truth (which is the question of philosophy itself) – this is more or less my theme. You see that this has nothing to do with the project – an admirable one in itself – of grasping a ‘whole society’ in its ‘living reality’ (1991b: 81-82).

This choice within Foucault’s work, to focus on ideas and practices as the primary object of analysis and to downplay observed histories, or “living reality,” has developed a lingering problem within the governance literature. In particular, research which chooses to focus exclusively on the constitution of rationalities and discourses has been critiqued for “taking these abstract concepts as more real than the practices that constitute them,” and in-so-doing, problematically asserts governing programs as direct representations of lived experiences (Valverde 2007: 160). More broadly, this criticism has been articulated as an opposition to the representation of society as a “network of omnipresent relations of subjective power” (Gordon 1991: 4), in which “discourses themselves create realities and identities” within culture (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 89). Though Foucault (1971; 1977 also see Gordon 1991:4) specifically and repeatedly warned about this conflation of the rationalities of governance and everyday life, the

reification of its discursive emphasis and its “epochalist” reading of culture (Valverde 2007: 160), is none-the-less felt through the over-representation of governance research which concerns itself with nothing beyond the “question of truth.” As Gordon (1980: 246) points out, this position often contributes to the assertion of two “illusions” – “an illusion of ‘realisation’ whereby it is supposed that programmes elaborated in certain discourses are integrally transposed to the domain of actual practices and techniques,” and an “illusion of ‘affectivity’ whereby certain technical methods of social domination are taken as being actually implemented and enforced upon the social body as a whole.”

Importantly, there is a degree of complexity in the application of specific governing systems which needs to be accurately accounted for, as “programs c[an] not simply be implemented” and “technologies have their own characteristics and requirements” (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde 2006: 86). In this way, governance research needs to consciously adopt a sensitivity to the distinctive contributions and characteristics of each of its constituting elements, while remaining mindful of the fact that the clean cut exemplars of social interaction laid out in the scripts and standards of government systems can easily cloud the complex influences of the social environments under study.

In light of this need for a sensitivity to the complexity of the social environment within research, the study of how classifications are developed and work within governing systems offers a distinctive space for analysis. Not only is the application of categories “where the rubber hits the road in terms of enfolding the social, political, and organizational agendas,” it is also formative of the

subject's social environment that makes up their "living reality" (Bowker and Star 2000: 102).

As mentioned above, the rationalities and technologies of governance require classification. Governing action necessitates that its subjects are rendered equivalent and knowable in order to be acted upon, and as such, each categorized object needs to be tied to sets of strict definitions and orienting relationships. In performing the act of governance, applied technologies assert what change in performative action is required of its classified subjects. In this way, classification meets culture by using specific technologies to insert a mediating, constituting and productive governing force into its subjects' social environment. In understanding this point, it is crucial to note Foucault's (1977: 194; 1978: 136) conceptualization of power as being a productive social force (also see Gordon 1980: 237). As Foucault notes "we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms" (1977: 194). Power, instead is "bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them" (Foucault 1978: 136). To govern, in this sense, "is to structure the possible field of action of others" (Foucault 1982: 221). This understanding, based on Nietzsche's assumption regarding the conceptualization of practices of rule in terms of struggle and the adoption of conflict as the default position, establishes power as bringing sets of behaviors into being, and not simply negating action (see Valverde 2007: 165). This position allows Foucault (1982: 789) to assert that power is always actions on others actions, in that "it is a total structure of actions

brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.” Perhaps most importantly, “it presupposes rather than annuls [individuals’] capacity as agents,” as the individual must be governed in order to be fitted to the category (Gordon 1991: 5).

In this light, governance exists as a mode of productive power, working as a social force to assert the particular goals of the governing system by bringing into being the required performative actions of its subjects, by means of the technological assertion of set and systematically defined classifications within a specified social environment. This expression of power works to (re)produce the system’s depiction of reality into the subjects’ “living reality,” and as such, develops the individual to fit how they are represented categorically within the applied governing rationality. In this way, classification provides a means to bridge the gap between “the question of truth” and “living reality.” This “definition/required-action” relationship of classification provides the basis for an empirical comparison between the definitions asserted within the technologies of governing systems and the on-the-ground performative acts of individuals. In short, the expression of classifications by governing systems connects the rationalities and technologies of governance to the “living reality” of these system’s subjects, and in so doing, renders measurable the relative capacity of systems of governance to govern the lives of individuals. By asserting the degree

to which a particular governing technology's definition and subsequent required action matches the lived experiences of classified subjects, the relative effectiveness of governing systems and specific implemented technologies to mediate individual performances, or the "categorical tightness" of systematically imposed categories, can be investigated.

Categorical Tightness and Performance

This section takes up where the last section left off, noting the disjunction between traditional understandings of governance and the observed experiences of populations which were the subject of governance. In bridging this gap, this work turns to research regarding classification, and adopts an understanding of governance which defines certain categories and enforces them onto individuals and populations. In regards to the points upon which this research is based, this section addresses the final point regarding the relationship between governance and identity, adopting the position that repeated performances work to sediment particular understandings of self as result in a constructed sense of identity – regardless of the intent or reason for the performance.

Within the performative literature the understanding of the "environmental" mediation of performance is often conceptualized as "performative failure"² (Butler 2010; Green 2007: 33). Under the performative

² Butler's (2010: 152) later use of the term "misfired" in explaining this relation is somewhat better. The analogy of a misfire would appear to be a better conceptualization of this relationship, however, it is still problematic in its stressing of the intentionality of the actor as the basis for investigations into the governance of performance.

model, subjectivity as well as identity are conceptualized as being the reiterated, re-established and sedimented result of a process of repeated “ritualized” acts of performance (Butler 2010: 152; Butler 1999: 120). The subject, then, is in no way fixed, but emerges as the result of a relationship between culturally developed classifications and the individual’s performance of its associated cultural acts. Social categories, such as “femininity” or “masculinity,” for example, provide an organizing structure, or blueprint, for the individual to choose particular performative acts that serve as their expression of the “gender” with which they have chosen to identify (Butler 1999: 7-12; Goffman 1959: 4, 35, 51). In this way, the “subject is not presumed, but is itself cultivated by the norm which summons the subject to recognize itself according to the norm” (Butler 2000: 25). This relationship, not only makes a “subject possible,” but also provides “the means by which the subject comes to recognize itself” (Butler 2000: 25). In regards to failure, Butler (2010: 152) notes how in describing the process by which certain kinds of identity categories “are made or brought into being,” performativity also assumes the capacity for “failure and undoing, as a necessary part of that operation” (Butler 2010: 152). Performative failure, in reference to individual acts, refers to this “inability of the individual to fully realize the concept and lay claim to ontological status” (Green 2007: 33).

The development and reliance on a conceptualization of the “failure” of this type of performative relationship, particularly in the tradition of Foucault, however, is somewhat problematic. First, the conceptualization of “failure” suggests a binary relationship in which a performance, or a specific act of agency,

is understood as being successful or not. Given Foucault's assumption regarding the incapacity of power to be held – power being “the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society,” and not a position, an instruction, a structure or “a certain strength we are endowed with” (Foucault 1978: 93; also see 1983: 217) – it would suggest that the capacity to control *all* aspects necessary to enable a “successful” performance would never be possible. In particular, the incapacity of the actor to control the interpretation or elicited action of the others who experience the specific performance, stresses this point. Foucault (1962: viii) notes that because of this lack of control, “paternity is put in question” – although you can control what it is that you do, you cannot control what you do *does*. This understanding of performative “failure” also establishes a problematic situation in which each performance would need to be conceptualized as both a success in action (you can control what you do) and a failure in its social impact (you cannot control what you do does). Furthermore, the adoption of this concept establishes the content of agency as a central measure of analysis, requiring investigation to address the arduous task of determining intentionality, and forcing researchers to not only know the specific intent of the actor but also to additionally address troublesome questions such as: “if an act which ‘succeeds’ by unintended means is still to be considered an example of performative failure?” Finally, Foucault’s (1977: 194) understanding of power as necessarily a productive social force further confuses a concept of “failure,” in that *something* is always the product of the performative act. Someone attempting to be funny and “failing,” for example, does not result in nothing, but results in “not-funny” –

which has an equal social impact in regards to processes of reiteration, re-establishment and sedimentation that provide the basis for a performative understanding of formation of identity and cultural classifications.³ In light of this, the concept of a "failed" performance simply does not sufficiently express the complexity of the classification-environment-actor relationship, or provide a proper space to examine the mediating impact that constructed techno-social spaces have on individual acts.

Regardless of the difficulty of "performative failure" as a concept, authors like Butler (2010) are none-the-less hinting at an important aspect of performativity in which the capacity of the individual to shape their own performance comes into conflict with the mediating pressures of specific techno-social spaces. In building on Queer theory's reliance on performative failure, Green (2007: 32) instead develops the concept of the "performative interval" as a means to measure the influence of classification on performative action and identity. Specifically, Green (2007: 32) defines this concept as "a unit of analysis in the interaction order wherein an actor 'acts toward,' or is 'called forth' into a symbolic formation – such as a particular role," the role of "conscripted soldier" in relation to National Registration for example. The interval then, is measured by noting "the distance between doing and identity" (e.g., doing "conscripted soldier" which represents practice) and identity (e.g., man) "an interior semblance of self" (Green 2007: 32). Green's measure develops a crucial understanding of

³ Additionally, a failed performance would not necessarily serve to deconstruct excised social categories – as the production caused by a "failed" act may not directly coincide with a deconstruction of its assumed opposite – as Foucault (1982: 779) notes "it is senseless to refer to reason as the contrary entity to non-reason."

the relationship between social roles, performative acts and identity, as having a non-binary, or continuum basis. In this way, the influence of roles can be conceptualized as mediating individual performances toward, or away from, the individual's understanding of their identity. The sources of Green's "symbolic formations," or "roles," as well as their relation to governing systems remains, however, are crucially underdeveloped within the model. Without asserting the origin or defining make up of the social categories, or roles, that are being measured, the "performative interval" lacks a means to define its "unit of analysis" – that is, without a firm definition of the "interior semblance of self" there is no means to measure its distance from "the doing of identity."

Conversely, Foucault's (1982: 792) work stresses the importance of the discursive construction of set categories, noting also the importance of addressing the effectiveness of technologies of governance and classification in the establishment of power relations. In doing so, Foucault describes the relative impact of these power relations as "the degree of rationalization." Specifically, he asserts how "the bringing into play of power relations as action in a field of possibilities may be more or less elaborate in relation to the effectiveness of the instruments and the certainty of the results (greater or lesser technological refinements employed in the exercise of power) or again in proportion to the possible cost (be it the economic cost of the means brought into operation or the cost in terms of reaction constituted by the resistance which is encountered)" – asserting variance in the governing capacity of categories across different techno-social spaces (Foucault 1982: 792). Here Foucault's understanding of power as

mediating the field of possibilities for action effectively draws in the role of governing systems and social categories; however, his interest in doing so is not to speak to how this relates to the particular performances of specific individuals.

As a means of incorporating both Green's development of a continuum-based measure and Foucault's understanding of governance, categories and power relations, the language of the classification literature, in particular the conceptualization of categories as possessing a degree of "tightness" or "looseness," offers effective language to address the problem of conceptualizing how governance systems meet performance. In particular, Categorical Tightness denotes the degree to which governance finds expression within the performances of targeted populations. In particular, this expression is measured by means of comparing the content or definitions of the categories developed within the governing system's rationalities, with the observed performances of the system's targeted populations. Within this case study, the socio-legal duties associated with being conscripted into the Armed Forces, which were defined as part of the classifications of the National Registration System, were measured against the observed performances of those called into service.

When discussing the impact of the organizing capacity of categories within the learned institutionalized research process of university libraries, Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997) state that "too tight a convergence becomes over-determination," that is, an "overly tight coupling between a social world and its information artifacts can be seen as a powerful routine that closes off other possibilities." In particular, the authors are noting the governing influence of the

specific classification technologies which make up the techno-social environment of the library, and how, within these types of spaces the cumulation of rationalities and technologies can develop the capacity to exert a mediating force on individuals' actions. In this sense, the authors are developing an argument similar to that of Foucault for the governing nature of categories and the capacity of governing systems to structure the possible fields of action for their subjects. However, in their work Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997) also assert the concept of "categorical tightness" as a means to incorporate a capacity to address the effectiveness of these systems to tie performative action to the established categories of governing systems. Where governance speaks to the structuring of individual action, categorical tightness provides a means to conceptualize a degree of measure, or continuum, for investigating the mediating capacity of the imposed structuring of individual performance (Star, Bowker and Neumann 1997; also see Bowker and Star 2000: 187, 315). As with Green's (2007) measure, categorical tightness addresses the "distance" between the practices of performance and the individual. However, where Green turns to the "inner semblance of self" as his comparative measure, categorical tightness draws on the observable performances of individuals within specific techno-social spaces and compares them to the *content* of applied categories drawn from the system's governing rationalities. In this way, categorical tightness represents a measure of the distance between the ascribed definitions of categories asserted by governing systems and the observable mediation of the individual's performative acts.

In their conceptualization of “categorical tightness” Bowker and Star (2000: 315) note “a category (or system of categories) may be loosely or tightly coupled with a person” – that is, although individuals encounter a myriad of categories and classification systems, not all effectively subjectify them or mediate their performances to the same degree. At the “tight” end of the spectrum, for example, would be a relationship such as can be found in the fully constructed techno-social space of a computer generated environment. Within these spaces all relations are delineated by pre-programmed computer code – classification is necessarily consistent, necessarily mutually exclusive, necessarily complete and necessarily binary – and as such, the field of action for subjects is fully governed, capable of enduring over time, and continually feeding into future potentialities for performative action – as “certain kinds of effects can possibly follow if and only if certain kinds of felicitous conditions are met” (Butler 2010: 152). Importantly, agency remains in the choices between structured performance options presented to the subject,⁴ but as Lessig (1999: 6) notes, within these spaces “code is law,” and one must choose performative acts based only on the pre-coded conditions of that space and endure the historical implications of performances made within its unforgetting environment. In a moment of anger, for example, you can’t choose to knock over a virtual chessboard,⁵ or choose an unrepresented response for a mandatory field on a digital form. Respectively, one must accept an opponent’s move into checkmate, and accept the selection of only

⁴ Within these constructed social environments on the extreme tight end of the spectrum performance is tied to applied classifications and the space for agency can be reduced to its limit – subjects can perform the structured act or choose not to act. This limit denotes Foucault’s (1982: 789) differentiation between governance and violence.

⁵ Unless that is of course a pre-programmed option within that space.

one of the “male” or “female” boxes within the form’s gender field. These performative acts, though highly governed, importantly still sediment, shaping not only the individuals’ identity, but also their subjectivity and their potential for future acts. In this way, the categories of gender and age can also be seen as being “tightly coupled with a person as categories” (Bowker and Star 2000: 315); however, it is also crucial to note that the tightness of these categories can only be understood in relation to the definitions of their particular classification systems, being necessarily tied to the particular rationalities, technologies and techno-social environments that make them up and police them. As Foucault (1987: 782) notes “subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the mechanisms of exploitation and domination.”

Though constructed digital spaces exemplify the far tight end of the spectrum, another example of a tight category would be that of “prisoner” within techno-social spaces such as prisons or jails. Though not as structuring in relation to the possibility for action as purely digital spaces, prisons none-the-less push for the exclusive performance of acts related to their own governing systems’ categories, drawing on the set cultural infrastructures of implemented governing technologies and rationalities. As Timmermans and Epstein’s (2010: 79) work regarding standardization notes, every category “needs to be plugged into a physical and structural infrastructure that allows it to function,” though “this does not mean a completely controlled environment, but rather the transfer of sufficient conditions for standards to thrive” (also see Akrich 1992; Latour 1988; O’Connell 1993). Tight classifications within these types of environments have also been

shown to express momentum and authority (Kula 1986), demand intercompatibility (Timmermans and Burg 1997), and resist change (Storz 2007).

On the loose end of the spectrum of categorical tightness, there are technological environments in which the subject plays a much larger role in the formulation and expression of categorized performances, as there often exists a multiplicity of classifications and classification systems to draw on, and contribute to, within these types of spaces. As such, “loosely coupled categories may be those that are transient, such as the color one is wearing on a given day or one’s position waiting in line” (Bowker and Star 2000: 315). Somewhere in the middle there would be examples such as “hair color, which may shift slowly over a lifetime or change in an afternoon” (Bowker and Star 2000: 315). Again, categorical tightness relates to a variance in the measurable mediation of performance as they relate to specific categorical definitions within governing systems. In this particular study, the government’s conscription, or “mobilization,” technologies are investigated in order to understand their capacity to tighten the categories of the National Registration System onto populations – mediating the performances of those it classified.

In relation to tight classifications, one can see how a performative act could be considered to have “failed,” in that the structured and defined practice of performance does not match the actor’s intended outcome, however, something did happen, and as such, it is crucial to incorporate this fact into an understanding of how the governed act still plays a part in the processes of reiteration, re-establishment, and sedimentation that contribute to the development of identity

and the social content of cultural categories. In this way, categorical tightness develops an understanding of a kind of "forced performativity," denoting the continuing and compounding impact that repeated governed performances have on the formation of individual identity regardless of the individual's intention or desires, and incorporates a degree of mediation in the dialogic contribution that the subject is able to exert upon the (de)construction of cultural categories (Hacking 2006: 26-27, 29). As will be shown in chapter 4, individuals who were conscripted into the Armed Forces were forced to take up the performances of soldiers, and more specifically NRMA, or "Zombie" soldiers. Though the identity performances associated with being a Zombie were undesirable and carried a strong social stigma, these forced performances, regardless of the individual's intentions, still sedimented and shaped the individual's sense of who they were.

Where Foucault's focus on the question of truth develops a blanket understanding of subjects as "governed" or not, tightness adds an important *degree* to which subjects are governed, empirically drawing back in the complexity of "lived experience" that Foucault (1982: 792) noted to be of importance in the understanding of power relations. In this way, a more comprehensive understanding can be developed in regards to how specific systems and technologies of governance meet culture, as categorical tightness expresses the complex interrelation between self-determination and external governance.

The question again, is one of classification and its consequences.

Chapter Outlines

This dissertation draws on historical archival data to explicate the role of the particular technologies and social organization involved within Canada's WWII National Registration program in order to understand their ability to develop population data into governing social categories. In particular, this work argues that Canada's National Registration and mobilization system exerted a significant social impact upon classified populations, and traces the impact of this system from the governing rationalities under which the system was developed, to the specific technologies established to implement policy, through to the mediation of the performative acts which constructed individual understandings of identity. This work investigates the problem of how a governing system is capable of taking a simple bureaucratic classification and making it a fixed, governing element of national culture and identity – arguing that it is through specific types of technologies and organizational systems that ascribed categories come to govern individual action, and that this relationship existed within Canada's WWII National Registration mobilization system.

The first chapter of this dissertation adopts Foucault's understanding of governing rationalities and argues that the predominant discourses of subjecthood and citizenship were fundamental in shaping the development of the social categories and technologies used within the National Registration system. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates how these rationalities were taken up and incorporated into the technologies and policies of the system, demonstrating the

social moment of the creation of the National Registration program and its development into a tool for conscription, or “mobilization.”

The second chapter demonstrates how classifying technologies were developed by the Department of National War Services and the Department of Labour to assert ascribed classifications and their required social acts onto individuals and populations. Over the course of the war three different techno-social approaches were taken to call men into service, allowing for a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the different means employed. This chapter demonstrates how the different processes implemented were developed as a means of asserting and maintain the system’s categories, as well as how individuals were called into service in the Armed Forces. This chapter argues that the effectiveness of the 1942-43 mobilization system in calling up men was the result of the adoption of the tools of manpower accounting and the establishment of a centralized management structure.

The third chapter demonstrates how enforcement technologies within the mobilization system were developed over the course of the war. More specifically, it argues that certain technological innovations worked to increase the enforcement capability of the National Registration and mobilization system to assert its categories upon individuals and populations. Furthermore, this chapter develops the concept of categorical tightness, arguing that these technologies worked to “tighten” – or increase the mediating capacity of – ascribed social categories onto individuals, thus increased the governing nature of the system’s categories. Though much work within surveillance studies asserts the governing

capacity of surveillance technologies, this chapter delves into *how* and *what* specific technologies work to increase this capacity. In particular, this chapter reviews the number of individuals identified and the number of individuals who were pressed further in order to have them conform to their ascribed categories, as a means of demonstrating the link between implemented technologies and categorical tightness. The evidence of this chapter points to (1) the capacity of these technologies to develop path dependency within the system, and (2) the development of technologies that allow classifications to be uniformly shared across collaborating government organizations, as the technological innovations which most effectively increased the tightness of the systems ascribed categories.

The fourth chapter argues that the classifications applied as part of the National Registration system were significant and they impacted the lives of each individual who was forcefully conscripted into the Armed Forces. It specifically addresses what actions these individuals were required to take, what types of people were impacted by mobilization technology, and the result that mobilization had in regards to mobilized men taking up of the term “Zombie” as a means self identity, description and expression.

The concluding chapter demonstrates how the argument that the technologies of surveillance can work to “tighten” classifications onto populations, govern behavior, and force the performance of particular acts, is supported by the history of National Registration and Mobilization in Canada. The conclusion argues that the role of the introduction of legislated identification technologies, the capacity to render individuals visible and actionable by the

system, the ability to influence the politics of the classification process, the ability to assert path dependency within the system, and the ability to impose a singular classification across state organizations, were the key factors influencing the capacity of the mobilization system, to take data collected as part of the National Registration and develop it as a means to assert governing classifications within populations.

Chapter 1

Classification, Governing Rationalities and National Registration in Wartime Canada

It is true that under the laws today, many of us have lost our liberty. A man can be forced from one job to another, from one city to another, if it is believed that this will help the nation. He can be forced to stay at his present job whether he likes it or not. Or he can be forced to stay on the farm. All of this is autocratic legislation, which probably wouldn't live thirty minutes in a peacetime parliament. But what we have lost in liberty temporarily - we have gained in honor. Today no country of comparative population is so envied for her war record both at home and in the field. – Harold Digman NSS Official in Library Magazine “Fight, Work or Jail” RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-14.

During the Second World War surveillance was everywhere and “[m]ankind barely noticed when the concept of massively organized information quietly emerged to become a means of social control, a weapon of war, and a roadmap for destruction” (Black 2001:7). In Canada, the emergence of centralized information infrastructures in the 1940s was obscured by the war effort. As the government sought to more efficiently manage and control the population, technologies designed to ensure oversight, efficiency and compliance became embedded into almost all areas of social life. For the Canadian government, the most critical issue during the war period was the management of military human resources and industrial production; it was through the desire to manage these areas that massive registration and identification systems became effective tools for state-wide administration and governance. The first of these, now largely normalized, all-inclusive state-scale systems, was implemented in Canada under the title of the National Registration program. Not only was the Canadian National Registration designed for the en-mass registration of labour power across

the country, but the program was also the first in Canada to act on an all-inclusive scale to attempt to tie regulatory practices to individuals through the reliance on identification, tabulation and a constantly updating register of the population.

The modern day reimplementation of National Registration and issuance of National ID Cards has been debated in Canada in recent years – particularly following the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York, though also more recently at the Provincial level (Lyon, 2004: 1; Marleau 2003: 6). Among other things, politicians, advocacy groups and policy makers have speculated about the social impact that National ID cards *may* have on citizenship rights, privacy, population management, and anti-terrorism. What is absent from contemporary debate, however, is information and evidence concerning the social impact of National Registration and ID cards within the Canadian historical experience.

This case study demonstrates the governing influence of the implemented technologies of Canada's World War Two National Registration program. In particular, this work draws on the work of Foucault and others in its understanding of the governance of populations as being the result of an interplay of governing rationalities and governing technologies. In its focus on the role of specific technologies in the governance of individuals and populations, however, it applies a measure which notes the degree to which governance finds expression, by means of comparing the content or the definitions of the categories developed within the system's governing rationalities with the observed performances of the system's targeted populations. In this way, the technologies implemented by the system can be measured in regards to the "tightness" of its imposed categories –

or their capacity to render the observed performances of populations to match the defined categories of the system's governing rationalities.

Although the acts of registering within a National Registration program or the carrying of a National Identity Card issued by the state may not jump to mind as stereotypical examples of technologies of surveillance or social control, this system none-the-less was designed to enable the governance of the Canadian population by means of collecting detailed personal information about them and enabling discriminating decision making regarding their compliance to the system's own developed rules. In this case, the applied rules of the National Registration system dealt with matters of conscription into positions in the Armed Forces and within industry, while compliance with these rules, for some, led to the forced performance of dangerous industrial jobs such as coal mining, or the forced performance of military combat on the front lines in the Pacific and European theaters. As a result of National Registration's conscription technologies, over 150,000 individuals who did not freely choose to join the Armed Forces were pressed into service in the Army, forcing 9,667 individuals to be deployed to the European front, 2,463 to fight in operational units, and leaving 232 wounded, 13 taken prisoner and 69 killed (Byers 1996: 202). In this way, the National Registration program was incredibly significant in shaping the lives of people living throughout the country, while its implementation had very real, and lasting, consequences for all those who were selected for conscription. Although the concept of "total war" has become normalized in our cultural understanding of the history of the Second World War, it is important to note the tangible

authoritarian and totalitarian nature of these policies and practices, as well as the role that surveillance based systems, such as National Registration, played in exercising a centralized form of control which worked to govern the everyday lives of the peoples of Canada.

In this chapter the establishment and implementation of Canada's National Registration program is charted, establishing the central role that the governing rationalities of "subjecthood," and "citizenship" played in the development of the categories that the system used in order to govern the performances of targeted individuals and populations. In particular, this chapter explains on what basis individuals were sorted and selected for conscription by National Registration, by tracing the categories of National Registration to their formative rationalities. In addition, it also establishes the categories that were used to govern the Canadian population, working to enable the capacity to measure the effectiveness of implemented technologies in mediating performances or targeted individuals – a matter which will be taken up in detail in the chapters that follow.

In the "total war" local expression of the inter-state conflict of the Second World War, relationships between specific individuals living within the Dominion, industrial production and the state, became increasingly important to the development of governing rationalities and the implementation of government policies (Chickering, Stig and Greiner 2005). Developing out of the legal and political rationalities of civic nationalism and British Imperialism, and their respective socio-legal categories of citizenship and subjecthood, the categories of the National Registration system asserted the importance of two different

relationships to the state which existed in Canada – “subjecthood,” being tied to symbolic identification, or *who the individual was* in relation to the social order of British Imperialism and their presumed loyalty to the Crown; and “citizenship,” relating to the cultural participation of the individual in question, their “utility” to their community, or *what it is that they did* in relation to Canadian polity and the capitalist expression of industrial war production in Canada. As Farney and Kordan (2005: 75) note, although these two rationalities outline “divergent views about political identity” in Canada – one stressing ethnicity while the other civic participation – they none-the-less both “provided a framework for many of the policy decisions that were made during th[e] period of national challenge and trial” that made up the war years.

Before the Second World War, these rationalities were expressed legally in the limited authority granted to the Canadian state. As a Dominion, Canada’s parliament was granted sovereignty over matters that were considered to be internal, while the British parliament retained control over matters that were considered external or international in nature. When it came to immigration and immigration policy, this split resulted in the Imperial and international legal status of British subjects being held externally, while the legal status of citizenship depicted one’s internal status to the Canadian state.

Culturally, rationalities of Canada’s imperial subjecthood traces its roots back to British law and culture, stressing relationships between types of individuals and the British Crown, along with ideals related to the adherence to loyalty, the conception of a British common descent, a British cultural

commonality and a strong sense of a divine “natural” social order that asserted itself through the conceptualizations of the British commonwealth and the rise of social Darwinism. In comparison, rationalities of citizenship consisted of types of individuals’ relationships to Canada as a distinct nation, which found expression in the adoption of a legal differentiation of Canadian Citizens from other British subjects under Canadian law. Importantly, this distinction existed as “something more,” a distinction within British subjecthood which asserts the importance of belonging and participation in the community of Canada as crucial elements of Canadian citizenship, and furthermore, adopted an understanding of social polity in which non-British peoples could take an equal role and were expected to contribute to the betterment of Canada as a nation. This chapter asserts the role of both of these governing rationalities within the formation and adoption of the categories used within Canada’s World War Two National Registration System, noting the importance of questions related to who the individual was in relation to subjecthood, naturalization and the natural social order of British Imperialism, and what the individual did in relation to their utility to Canadian polity or “total war” capitalist industrial production.

*Subjecthood, Imperialism and Ethnic Nationalism*¹

The rationality of subjecthood would come to play a formative role in the development of the categories and the understandings of the categories that would be adopted into Canada's Second World War National Registration system.

Although it may seem that concepts of imperialism and British commonwealth are far removed from Canada's current self-expression as a multicultural society (see Bannerji 2000), issues of British Subjecthood and Canada's Imperial role in making the world prosper under the British Crown was a strong factor in the development of legislation, policy and social life throughout Canada's early history. During the war years, this rationality found expression in developing an understanding of loyalty, allegiance, duty to the crown and a strict hierarchical social structure based on ethnic ties. In regards to conscription, subjecthood provided the legal basis for men to be called into service, due to their duty and allegiance to the British Crown – though its administration, the decision to adopt conscription and its application were deemed to be internal matters falling under the sovereignty of the Canadian parliament. This section charts the social relations that the rationality of subjecthood exerted in pre-war and wartime Canada as a means of understanding the historical context and social content of the ascribed categories of the National Registration system, arguing that this rationality was

¹ As Cole (1980: 1-2) notes, the application of the concept of imperialists and nationalists in relation to Canada is quite complex as “the only phenomenon in Anglophone Canada that can qualify as nationalism is precisely that Britannic or Anglo-Saxon ideology which identified Canadians with their Anglophone partners within the Empire or elsewhere... its nationalists are, quite confusingly called imperialists, but its adherents had far more in common with German, pan-slav, Italian (or French Canadian) nationalism than with anything that should be termed Canadian nationalism.” For ease in explanation this section will employ the term of “Imperialism” though the term of “ethnic nationalism” could also be applied.

fundamental in shaping how applied categories were understood and worked to inform the individual performances of categorized populations in relation to conscription.

As Farney and Kordan (2005: 79) note, “the imperialist movement in Canada had the support of a significant portion of the population, its strength being derived in part from the imperialists’ adroit use of national history, especially their characterization of the United Empire Loyalists and French Canadians as the ideal types of imperial subjects in Canada,” as both had “remained loyal to the Crown during the American wars of 1776 and 1812” and represented the loyalty, deference and sacrifice that was expected of Imperial subjects (also see Cole 1971: 172). In regards to National Registration in Canada, the rationality of subjecthood asserted the importance of *who the individual was* within the established social hierarchy of British Imperialism and the commonwealth, and as such, incorporated information relating to race, class, gender and age, as well as the individual’s presumed loyalty to the British Crown – a matter based almost exclusively upon whether or not the individual held the status of “British subject” under the law. In this way, the legal status of individuals living in Canada, particularly during the war, drew on this relation of subjecthood under the British Crown (Farney and Kordan 2005).

The concept of British subjecthood found its basis in a divine sense of social order, in which individuals were born within a given society and under a specific sovereign. Subjects under the commonwealth model were appointed by

God through birth to a set social position and were called to perform the social duty of their station. As the Church of England's homily on order² explained;

ALMIGHTY God hath created and appointed all things, in heaven, earth, and waters, in a most excellent and perfect order... In earth he hath assigned and appointed kings and princes, with other governors under them, in good and necessary order... Every degree of people, in their vocation, calling, and office, hath appointed to them their duty and order. Some are in high degree, some in low; some kings and princes, some inferiors and subjects; priests and laymen, masters and servants, fathers and children, husbands and wives, rich and poor; and every one have need of other. So that in all things is to be lauded and praised the goodly order of God: without the which no house, no city, no commonwealth can continue and endure; for, where there is no right order, there reigneth all abuse, carnal liberty, enormity, sin, and Babylonical confusion (cited in Aughterson 1998: 93).

As part of this rationality of the British commonwealth, the order/duty relationship meant that the crown extended protection downward to its subjects, while their subjects in turn extended loyalty and deference upward to the authority of the Crown – both knowing their place and playing out their given societal role, and both knowing that adherence to God's order would bring peace and prosperity to all. This hierarchical relationship from God – to sovereign – to subjects, spoke to the set order in which all peoples inside and outside of the British Commonwealth were “naturally” structured.

As British culture extended into Empire, this sense of a natural social order was incorporated into imperialist rationalities, which in addition to having subjects answer the calling of their station, called on the British people as a whole

² The Books of Homilies are collections of official and authorized sermons issued by the Church of England under the reigns of Edward VI and Elisabeth I, and were to be regularly preached to the general public. The homilies were specifically designed to ensure that men "learn their duty towards God, their prince, and their neighbour" and to ensure that "erroneous and poisoned doctrines, tending to superstition and idolatry, are to be repelled" (Church of England 1854). This particular homily is titled the "An Exhortation Concerning Good Order and Obedience to Rulers and Magistrates."

to extend the divine natural order of God into the unordered spaces of “abuse, carnal liberty, enormity, sin and Babylonical confusion” mentioned above. In this way, the British as a people and an empire, were to take up the white man’s burden of bringing God’s order to the world, to take their place at the top of a world-wide social hierarchy, and spread their art of order and government to the disordered peoples of the world. As Hobson ([1902] 2005: 118,122) noted of British Imperialism in the early 1900s:

when British authority has been forcibly fastened upon large populations of alien race and colour, with habits of life and thought which do not blend with ours...We are obliged in practice to make a choice between good order and justice administered autocratically in accordance with British standards, on the one hand, and delicate, costly, doubtful, and disorderly experiments in self-government on British lines upon the other, and we have practically everywhere decided to adopt the former alternative.

In this way, the rationalities of British Imperialist order did not present the dominating actions of the English people as being self serving but as natural and for the benefit of all, as the sociologist Deherme noted of Imperial expansion in 1908:

the most important result of colonization is to increase world productivity. It is at the same time a great social force for progress. The earth belongs to humanity. It belongs to those who know best how to develop it, increase its wealth and in the process augment it, beatify it and elevate humanity. Colonization is the propagation of the highest form of civilization yet conceived and realized, the perpetuation of the most talented race, the progressive organization of humanity (cited in Conklin 1997: 56).

Under this rationality, Imperialism brought the prosperity and peace of God’s order to all (Cole 1971: 175, 178). With the popular rise of scientific thought, and biology in particular, this sense of Imperial social order came to incorporate a race-patriotism within British culture based on the “scientific” assumptions of

race struggle found in the works of social Darwinism of the period. As Hobson ([1902] 2005:155) notes, Imperialism of the early 20th century asserted that “in the history of man, as throughout nature, stronger races have continually trampled down, enslaved, and exterminated other races,” noting that the arguments of biology explained how this behavior was “rooted in nature, including human nature,” and as such

that it must go on... It has been the prime condition and mode of progress in the past, therefore it is desirable it should go on. It must go on, it ought to go on... This genuine and confident conviction about ‘social efficiency’ must be taken as the chief moral support of Imperialism. Human progress requires the maintenance of the race struggle, in which the weakest races shall go under, while the ‘socially efficient’ races survive and flourish: we are the ‘socially efficient’ race. So runs the imperialist argument.

This belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and a *survival of the fittest* component within 20th Century Imperialism was, at the time of Hobson’s writing, considered by many to have been proven through the coupling of the world domination that the English had experienced over the past century, and a skewed interpretation of Darwinian principles of environmental biology (Hofstadter 1944: 172; Cole 1971: 172-173). As a result of this cultural position, British culture and political practices were considered not only models to be followed, but *the* proper means to order the world. Being a valued British Subject within this order, then, required strict “Anglo-conformity,” involving the individual’s assimilation into British culture, the acceptance of British institutions and practices as well as the taking of one’s “proper” place within the hierarchy of British society (Palmer 1976: 494). The French Canadians, for example, had been noted as loyal subjects but predominant sentiment existed that expressed that “the sooner we take in hand

our French Canadian fellow subjects and make them British in sentiment and teach them the English language, the less trouble we shall have to prevent” (McCarthy speech July 12th 1889, cited in Willison 1903: 53). In this way, the British Empire, and Canada as one of its Dominions, was understood to be part of a divine Imperialist mission to champion “liberty, peace, righteousness and commercial freedom to all lands,” and as such, represented “the greatest instrument for the case of God and man that there is on earth” (Grant 1890: 29 also see Burger 1970: 223-224).

Within the socio-legal culture of the Canadian Dominion, this natural order found expression in asserting distinctive legal statuses upon individuals who were not considered to be subjects under the natural order or British Imperialism. Under British legislation that was enforced in Canada, an individual’s status in relation to the Crown was defined as either; (1) a “Natural-Born British Subject,” having been born within the Empire, or whose father or husband was a British Subject; (2) a “Naturalized British Subject,” who had applied to become a subject, who needed to be of good character, have adequate knowledge of the English language and have lived in the Empire or have been in service to the Crown for a period of five years; or (3) an “Alien,” which identified the individual as not being a British subject, required them to carry identifying documentation, and restricted their capacity to own property or participate in polity (see Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1. Classifications of British Subjects under *the Naturalization Act 1914*

Naturalization Act 1914 (Ch.17)
<p>Natural-Born British Subject (Part I, sec. 1 (a,b,c); Part III, sec.10 and 14(1))</p> <p><i>Natural Born British Subjects were defined under the Naturalization Act 1914 as: “(a) <u>Any person born within His Majesty’s dominions and allegiance; and (b) Any person born out of His Majesty’s dominions, whose father was a British subject at the time of that person’s birth and either was born within His Majesty’s allegiance or was a person to whom a certificate of naturalization had been granted; and (c) Any person born on board a British ship” (Part I sec.1). In addition, subject-hood was also granted or lost through marriage, as “<u>the wife of a British subject shall be deemed to be a British subject, and the wife of an alien shall be deemed to be an alien,</u>” however, “where a man ceases during the continuance of his marriage to be a British subject it shall be lawful for his wife to make a declaration that she desires to retain British nationality, and thereupon she shall be deemed to remain a British subject” (Part III sec.10). The Act also notes that any British Subject obtaining a certificate of naturalization from another state may “make a declaration of Alienage” and cease to be a British Subject (part III sec.14(1).</u></i></p>
<p>Naturalized British Subject (Part II, sec. 4, Part III, sec.19(a), 27(1))</p> <p><i>Naturalization was a means of Aliens obtaining similar rights to Natural Born British Subjects. As part of their application Aliens would have to prove “ (a) that he has either resided in His Majesty’s dominions <u>for a period of not less than five years in the manner required by this section, or been in the service of the Crown for not less than five years within the last eight years before the application; and (b) that he is of good character and has an adequate knowledge of the English language; and (c) that he intends if his application is granted either to reside in His Majesty’s dominions or to enter or continue in the service of the Crown” as well as make an oath to “reside in the United Kingdom for not less than one year immediately preceding the application” (Part II sec.4(1)(2)). Having satisfied these requirements Naturalized British Subjects would be issued a certificate of naturalization (Part II sec.5) and “<u>be entitled to all political and other rights powers and privileges, and be subject to all obligations, duties and liabilities, to which a natural-born British subject is entitled or subject, and, as from the date of his naturalization, have to all intents and purposes the status of a natural-born British subject” (Part II sec.3(1)). In addition, the applicant could choose to “include in the certificate the name of any child of the alien born before the date of the certificate and being a minor, and that child shall thereupon, if not already a British subject, become a British subject” (Part II sec. 5(1)). Unlike Natural Born British Subjects, however, the government reserved the right to “revoke the certificate” of subject-hood in cases of misrepresentation or fraud (part II sec. 7(1)). Naturalized British Subjects could also forfeit their subjecthood through a declaration of Alineage (Part III Sec.14(2). Under the 1914 Act, naturalization certificates were issued based on the category of naturalization. Each certificate bore a letter (A, B, D, C or E) referred to as “the Series,” and a number. Certificates issued in French also include the letter F after the number. Series A: Certificates granted to Aliens, Series B: Certificates granted to Aliens where names of minor children [we]re included; Series C: Certificates granted to Minors; Series D: Certificates granted to persons whose nationality as British Subjects is in doubt; Series E: Certificates granted to persons naturalized under prior Acts; Series F and G: Repatriations.</u></u></i></p>
<p>Alien (Part III, sec 17, 5(3), 19(1)(a))</p> <p><i>Aliens were granted limited rights under British and Canadian law. The Nationalization Act 1914 specifically notes that the law “shall not operate so as to — (1)<u>Confer any right on an alien to hold real property situate out of the United Kingdom; or (2)Qualify an alien for any office or for any municipal, parliamentary, or other franchise; or (3)Qualify an alien to be the owner of a British ship; or (4)Entitle an alien to any right or privilege as a British subject, except such rights and privileges in respect of property as are hereby expressly given to him ; or (5)Affect any estate or interest in real or personal property to which any person has or may become entitled, either mediately or immediately, in possession or expectancy, in pursuance of any disposition made before the twelfth day of May eighteen hundred and seventy, or in pursuance of any devolution by law on the death of any person dying before that day” (Part III sec.17). Aliens, for the most part, could however apply to become British Subjects through a process of “Naturalization,” however, the act also singled out “any person under disability” as being disqualified from naturalization (Part II sec.5(3)). Aliens were also required to be registered and carry forms of identification (Part III s.19(1)(a).</u></i></p>

NB – *Naturalization Act 1914* ch.17 emphasis added.

As part of the divine ordering of sovereignty and nature under arguments of Imperialism, those born outside of the empire were set beneath the authority of a different sovereign, held a distinctive legal classification, and as such, existed independently from the protection/loyalty relationship that existed between the British Crown and its subjects. Importantly, God did not make a mistake in deciding under which sovereign, or to what people an individual was born, and so legally and culturally the diminished status of individuals classified as holding an “Alien” or having been born to an “inferior race” status living within Canada was justified.³ Under British law Aliens could become “naturalized,” that is, gain status similar to that of Natural Born Subjects in regards to political participation and property rights, however, subjects could not abandon the hierarchy of the natural order that was established by God, and simply choose to replace their sovereign. Under British Naturalization legislation the legal processes of immigration and naturalization worked not to eliminate but to add a second social position under the newly adopted sovereign, and with it a second requirement of loyalty and deference. Additionally, all European countries retained the right to determine for themselves whether to release emigrated peoples from their duty of subjecthood and many did not.⁴ British law had also specifically found in 1608

³ A number of Canadian laws were passed which differentiated peoples of Alien status or of “inferior race,” in particular peoples from China, Japan, Eastern Europe and of Jewish and African heritage were treated differently under the law. As such, discriminatory understandings of peoples born by God to countries outside of the Empire or to differentiated races were adopted and naturalized as part of the rationalities of imperialism and subjecthood (see Ch # for greater detail as well as sec. # of the *Naturalization Act*).

⁴ German law, for example, took this stance as Article 25 of the German state nationality legislation (*The Delbrück law*) of July 22nd 1913 and asserted that when a German was naturalized to another country their status as German subjects and citizens was maintained,

that in cases of conflict between sovereigns, the primary allegiance of a given subject would remain under the sovereign to which the individual was born, thus the status of those who had become naturalized was not that of Naturally Born British Subjects and could be revoked in a time of war – a matter that will be taken up later in this chapter (*Calvin's Case* Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608); also see Price 1997; Kettner 1978: 18-19).

These relationships of subjecthood, Imperialism and Commonwealth, can be seen in the wartime posters of the Second World War period. The soldiers depicted in the *British Commonwealth – Together* (1941) war poster, for example, march in the social order of British Imperialism (see Figure 1-2) – the English Navy officer leading, while the people of the colonies which had a large portion of white British settlers, namely Australian and Canadian, came next, followed by New Zealand, South Africa and finally, the coloured peoples of East Africa and India, with their place being at the bottom of the social hierarchy of British Imperialism.⁵

asserting a relationship of dual allegiance beneath the German and naturalized sovereign (Carruthers 1978: 60-61).

⁵ see Clendinning (2006: 80) for the Crown acknowledgement of this ordering of British peoples.

Figure 1-2. World War Two War Posters Depicting Imperialist Relationships



NB – As noted “Left to right they are soldiers from India, East Africa, South Africa, New Zealand, a Canadian airman, an Australian soldier and a Royal Navy sailor,” the original poster is titled “The British Commonwealth of Nations – Together” (1941) catalogue number: Art.IWM PST 8457, Imperial War Museum: London (<http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/17043>). The second poster is “To Victory” Canadian World War II Poster (1942). The poster also appeared in French under the title of “Allons-y” (1942), Acc. No. 1983-30-243, Library and Archives Canada: Ottawa.

In the case of the Canadian war poster entitled *To Victory* (1942), the image shows a beaver representing the Dominion standing next to the crowned English lion of Great Britain. Although they stand together, the social position of Canada within the commonwealth being lower than that of England is depicted in the smaller stature of the beaver as well as in its wooden sword. In this way, the poster expresses the relationship between Canada and England, presenting the Dominion as a loyal and deferent “side kick,” working to fight alongside the strength of the mother country in the defense of the empire.

As will be shown later in this chapter, the influence of Imperialist understandings of subjecthood can be seen in the stressing of registration questions and classification related to *who the individual was* in relation to the

Crown and the Imperialist natural order as it was experienced within Canadian society in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In this way, the categories of National Registration stressed questions directly related to subjecthood and familial lineage, but also addressed questions of race, gender, age, and Naturalization status. Importantly, the rationalities of subjecthood worked to express within the individual's categorization their position within the social order and their presumed loyalty to the Crown.

Citizenship and Civic Nationalism

In Canada the rationality of citizenship and civic nationalism developed out of a desire to differentiate Canadians from other British Subjects in order to exert control over who could legally immigrate and reside in Canada. Although based on an exclusionary history, the conceptualization of Canadian Citizenship and the sense of "Canadians" as a distinct people, developed within this socio-legal space, eventually enabling its rationalities to assert a Lockean, or "social contract," sense of equality and rights being based on participation in, and utility to, the prosperity of Canadian society. This sense of Canadian citizenship grew in importance through the mass immigration of the years of the Laurier Government, and found legal expression within Canadian naturalization laws in the late 1800s. In this way, the rationality of citizenship found expression in pre-war and wartime Canada in the realization of the goals and the prosperity of the state, and crucially in how particular individuals' participation in seeing to the achievement of these

goals. This section charts the development of the rationality of citizenship within pre-war Canada, arguing that its definitions and understandings of social relations informed the adopted categories of the National Registration system during the Second World War and shaped the government's expectations in regards to the performances of classified individuals.

In Canada the rationality of citizenship developed out of a complex history of Canadian immigration policy and the conceptualization of belonging. On the one hand, the government of Canada needed to entice immigration in order to settle the lands of the prairies and ensure inexpensive labour for major projects such as the TransCanada railway. To do so, a new sense of belonging other than British subjecthood was needed in order to incorporate Non-British peoples within Canadian polity. While on the other hand, the desire to strictly limit the immigration of "undesirable" peoples, such as those of Chinese and Indian heritage, needed to address the complexity that British holdings in Asia made those born in India, Hong Kong and other territories, British Subjects equal to those born in Canada under the law. As a result, Canadian immigration policy needed to assert a legal means to discriminate against these populations if the government wished to bar them from entry. By adopting a differentiated "Canadian" legal status that existed outside of British subjecthood, citizenship could be asserted in relation to the geographical, legal and political entity of the Canadian state, and remained separate from the divine natural order which linked the British Crown to all subjects equally under the laws of British Imperialism. As a result of the legal classification and distinction of "Canadian Citizens" from

other British Subjects that was developed under the legislation of the 1881 *Immigration Act*, differential immigration policies and procedures could be developed along these lines. Often noted is the exemption that Canadian Citizens gained from inspection by immigration authorities when re-entering the Dominion, and the use of citizenship laws to control the influx of immigrants from the Orient who held the status of British Subjects due to the territorial possessions of the British Empire. Citizenship, however, also presented an important obtainable legal status which enabled the entry of most new immigrants into Canadian polity – as subjects required links to the Crown, while citizenship did not. This section demonstrates the rationality of citizenship in pre-war and wartime Canada as it relates to the development and adoption of categories as part of the National Registration system. Specifically, the rationality of citizenship asserts the importance of cultural participation in Canada as a Nation, as the key point in understanding belonging, and stresses the importance of *what an individual did* and their *utility* in relation to the attainment of the state's goals (Breton 1988: 87).

In the period prior to the war years, the rationalities of citizenship had been developed more strongly by the administration of the Laurier government (1896–1911) in order to address the discord in polity that had been developing in Canada as a result of the Canadian government's previous strict adherence to the rationality of subjecthood and British Imperialism as the means of understanding belonging within the Dominion. As Levitt (1981: 4-5) notes:

glorifying the Anglo-Saxon race made good sense because it increased pride in British heritage and made it possible to envisage a greater

Canadian role in world politics as a 'linchpin' connecting the British and the Americans. But such an outlook threatened national unity by disparaging the French Canadians... [if] French Canadian nationalism was indeed anchored in the 'blood,' then no amount of persuasion would induce its proponents to shift their attitudes. Moreover, harping on racial differences would raise the inevitable question of why a Canada should exist at all, if the most numerous ethnic group in Canada belonged to [a different] race (cited in Breton 1988:92).

During the time of the Laurier government, the intent of official policy was to address the disjunction French Canadians and other non-Anglo-Saxons felt in relation to polity. Additionally, the government sought "to facilitate successful settlement as much as possible," in order to fulfill the colonization of the prairies. As a result of both of these pressures, the cultivation of new civic identity was needed that would allow non-Anglo-Saxon peoples, as well as new settlers, to take part in the building of Canadian society (Farney and Kordan 2005: 82). In its adoption of a Lockean model of the social contract, the rationality of citizenship asserted that since a polity's founding experience is contractual, that is, it consists of a rational decision made by the individual to participate, "newcomers join the polity on the same basis as the native born, and that an individual's decision to accede to that contract is the same whenever it takes place in time" (Ibid: 81). Furthermore, under the rationality of citizenship, "citizens are encouraged to participate actively in government" and contribute to the pursuit of the goals of the Nation (ibid: 81).

As a result, the policies of the Laurier government incorporated a sense of a continued participation in Canada as a central part of its immigration and Alien legislation. Under the government's policy, agricultural immigrants were identified as a priority given the state's goal to settle the prairie lands of Western

Canada, but importantly the financial rewards advertized to draw immigrants to Canada were only to be applied to those who settled and sought to stay (Timlin 1960: 518). In addition, the *Aliens Labour Law* of 1897 was specifically adopted to deny employment to short term travelers who were attempting to gain work on government subsidized projects such as the railways, the government's aim being to "preserve these employment opportunities for those potential settlers who needed funds for their successful establishment on the land" (Ibid: 519). As His Excellency Earl Dufferin noted in a speech to a group of Russian immigrants settled in Manitoba on August, 1877;

there is no right or function which we exercise as free citizens in which we do not desire you to participate, and with this civil freedom we equally gladly offer you absolute religious liberty. The forms of worship which you have brought with you, you will be able to practice in the most unrestricted manner, and we confidently trust that those blessings which have waited upon your virtuous exertions in your Russian homes will continue to attend you here; for we hear that you are a sober-minded and God-fearing community, and as such you are doubly welcome amongst us. In the name then of Canada and her people, in the name of Queen Victoria and her Empire, I again stretch out to you the hand of brotherhood and good fellowship, for you are as welcome to our affection as you are to our lands, our liberties and our freedom. Beneath the flag whose folds now wave above us, you will find protection, peace, civil and religious liberty, constitutional freedom and equal laws (cited in Howell 1884: vi).

Again the government stressed the importance of participation within the community of Canada as well as liberty, freedom and equality for all under the country's laws. Between 1896 and 1913 over 3 million individuals immigrated to Canada, of whom 40% were not of British origin.

To characterize Canadian Immigration policy in the pre-war period as being completely inclusive and equal would, however, not be accurate, and the

socio-legal development of citizenship in Canada owes as much to its exclusionary policies as its inclusionary ones. In the late 19th and early 20st centuries the government of Canada sought to limit certain populations from immigration into the country, mainly targeting the Chinese, Japanese and Indians seeking to come to British Columbia from Asia. Laws were implemented which imposed a taxation on certain kinds of peoples, and required a fixed 100:1 ratio of tonnage of imported goods to the number of immigrants on board vessels landing in Canada.

These laws were, however, legally challenged by British law makers due to their questionable adherence to the central British Imperial policy of “non-distinction” – a policy which asserted and should have ensured that those born in India, Hong Kong, or any of the other British held territories, were to hold the same status as any other subjects of the British Crown under the laws implemented throughout the Empire. Starting in the late 1800s Canada, along with Australia, pushed back politically against this concept of non-distinction, asserting their right to discriminate against individuals seeking to immigrate, regardless of their status as British subjects. In both countries, laws were passed asserting a distinctive legal category of “citizen,” which distinguished some British subjects to also be citizens of particular Dominions (see Figure 1-3).

Figure 1-3. Citizenship Under the *Canadian Nationals Act* and the *Immigration Act*

Immigration Act 1910 (Ch.27)	Canadian Nationals Act 1921 (Ch. 4)
<p>Canadian Citizen (Paragraph 2 (b))</p> <p><i>Under the Immigration Act 1910 the classification of Canadian Citizen was limited to "(i) a person born in Canada who has not become an alien" (sec.2(b)(i)). Unlike other classifications citizenship was not passed through marriage or lineage, as "for the purpose of this Act a woman who has not been landed in Canada shall not be held to have acquired Canadian citizenship by virtue of her husband being a Canadian citizen; neither shall a child who has not been landed in Canada be held to have acquired Canadian citizenship through its father or mother being a Canadian citizen" (sec.2(b)(i)).</i></p> <p><i>"(ii) a British subject who has Canadian domicile;" (sec.2(b)(ii)) and "(iii) a person naturalized under the laws of Canada who has not subsequently become an alien or lost Canadian domicile: Provided that for the purpose of this Act a woman who has not been landed in Canada shall not be held to have acquired Canadian citizenship by virtue of her husband being a Canadian citizen; neither shall a child who has not been landed in Canada be held to have acquired Canadian citizenship through its father or mother being a Canadian citizen. (sec.2(b)(iii)).</i></p> <p>Canadian Domicile (Paragraph 2 (e),(i))</p> <p><i>The Immigration Act also granted entry rights to those retaining a Domicile within Canada. Specifically, "(e) "domicile" means the place in which a person has his home, or in which he resides, or to which he returns as his place of permanent abode, and does not mean the place where he resides for a mere special or temporary purpose; (i) Canadian domicile can only be acquired, for the purposes of this Act, by a person having his domicile for at least five years in Canada after having been landed therein within the meaning of this Act." (sec.2(e)(i)).</i></p> <p>"Unsuited Races" (Sec.38 (c))</p> <p><i>Section 38 specifically stated that "the Governor in Council may, by proclamation or order whenever he deems it necessary or expedient" - "(c) prohibit for a stated period, or permanently, the landing in Canada, or the landing at any specified port of entry in Canada, of immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any specified class, occupation or character." (Sec.38 (c)).</i></p>	<p>Canadian National (Sec. 1(a)(b)(c))</p> <p><i>The Canadian Nationals Act defined a Canadian National as "(a) Any British subject who is a Canadian citizen within the meaning of the Immigration Act;" (sec. 1(a)). Though also applied this classification through marriage and patrilineage, extending the classification to "(b) The wife of any such citizen; (c) Any person born out of Canada, whose father was a Canadian National at the time of that person's birth, or with regard to persons born before the third day of May, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one, any person whose father at the time of such birth, possessed all the qualifications of a Canadian National, as defined in this Act. " (sec. 1(b)(c)) - making the category not exclusive to aliens.</i></p>

NB -An Act Respecting Immigration 1910 Ch. 27 Ed. VII 9-10

(http://eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_07184/2?r=0&s=1)

Now, Canadian legislation developed its own distinct peoples, under the category of citizens, making Canadian citizenship a subdivision of British Subjecthood.⁶

This classification was again opposed in England, leading to a conference in England in 1914 to settle the legal definition and classification of British Subjects throughout the Empire. Although the resulting *British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act* was established to uphold the principle of non-distinction, and was to ensure that all those born within the empire held an equal status as subjects under the Crown, the legislation also importantly conceded to the Dominions the sovereignty to determine the local manifestation of subjecthood status (sec. 21(1)).⁷ In this way, British statutory recognition was officially extended to the practice of distinguishing between British Subjects which had been already been taking place in the Dominions. Later in 1918, British law granted the Dominion governments complete control over immigration with the single provision that, once admitted, all British Subjects would enjoy equal rights. In 1921 the Crown dropped even this provision, fully conceding that internal citizenship was a matter that fell fully under the Dominion's internal sovereignty (Hansen 1999: 32). Ultimately, this capacity to develop sovereignty over immigration policy and distinguish between British Subjects opened a space for the socio-legal

⁶ This relationship switched under the 1946 Canadian Citizenship Act, which asserted that "a Canadian Citizen is a British Subject." In so doing, Canada disrupted the divine relationship between the subject and the Crown, as individuals only attained subject status through Canadian law and not as part of a divine right. The removal of Canadian Citizens from a subdivision of British Subjects to a term which differentiated Canadians from all other British Subjects, resulted in a significant amount of legal controversy in England and ultimately led to Canadian Citizenship being recognized outside of Canada's borders.

⁷ The *British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act* notes that "nothing in this Act shall take away or abridge any power vested in, or exercisable by, the Legislature or Government of any British Possession, or affect the operation of any law at present in force which has been passed in the exercise of such a power, or prevent any Legislature or Governments from treating differently different classes of British subjects" (sec.21(1)).

development of an understanding of Canadian citizens that existed independently from the British Crown and Empire.

Along with these changes in law, social change brought in with the tremendous influx of Non-Anglo-Saxon people in the pre-war period bolstered the role of the rationality of citizenship within Canadian culture. First, linguistic assimilation that had previously been forced upon all peoples had resulted in the decline of the English language as a symbol of culture and of group membership, and English outside of Québec was increasingly seen as a tool for communication and a shared element of Canadian culture (Breton 1988: 216). This assimilation also played a similar role in diminishing the role of specific religious and ethnic practices in distinguishing individuals of Anglo-Saxon descent. Finally, individuals who were second and third generation immigrants no longer accepted the title of “immigrant” and instead moved to assert their full status as Canadian citizens under the law. As Breton (1988:91-92) notes, these people “saw themselves as citizens ‘*a part entière*’, even though they were not members of the Anglo-collectivity” and that these circumstances forced “the collectivity to a new conception of itself – that of a collectivity that fully incorporates as citizens people of different ethnic origins.” This distinction of citizenship also asserted the capacity for belonging outside of subjecthood – as it was explained of German immigrants, “although the hearts of Germans in Canada may have been in Germany, their hands were *for* Canada” (Grams 2001: 45 emphasis added).

As Canada entered the Second World War, the cultural understanding of a distinctive Canadian citizen had developed further. As Vipond (1982: 82) notes

“by the time WWI ended, a different kind of Canadian National feeling was increasingly shouldering aside the old, traditional imperialist, British-oriented type nationalism.” Now, being a Canadian meant participation in the endeavors of the nation, and in the case of World War II, participation in these goals painted one’s status as a “true Canadian” (Epp 1974: 401). As Neufeldt (2009: 212) notes “those who engaged in the prescribed types of service or sacrifice fit within the civic nationalism ideal, and those who did not were potential enemies of the state and undermined the national war effort” (Neufeldt 2009: 212). During the war years, participation “deemed critical for loyal citizens included military enlistment, direct financial contributions, particularly through purchasing war bonds, agricultural and economic production for the national war effort, and – as the War persisted – support for the war relief effort” (Neufeldt 2009: 212). This rationality of citizenship which stressed wartime civic participation also found expression in the government posters of war-time Canada (see Figure 1-4).

Figure 1-4. War Posters Depicting Relationships of Citizenship



NB – “Attack on all Fronts” war propaganda campaign - Second World War. This Hubert Rogers poster showed three determined Canadians—a soldier, a factory worker and a farm worker—committed to action in their own areas. 1943 ; “Moo-Che-we-in-Es” by E. Henderson, 1914-1918 Howell Litho. Ltd., Hamilton. Glenbow Museum Image no: Poster-14.

The first poster, “Attack on all Fronts” denotes the different expressions of participation which the state required as part of the total-war effort. It depicts a soldier fighting on the front lines, the industry labourer working to build munitions and other industrial products, and farmers who were needed to grow food to support home consumption and soldiers deployed overseas. The poster also presents a woman as taking part in the fighting of the war by stepping into necessary labour positions. The second poster depicts Moo-Che-we-in-Es, a member of the Cree Nation from the Onion Lake Reserve, declaring his participation in the Patriotic Fund (Morton 2004:118). The poster notes that while his “skin is dark” his “heart is white,” asserting his support and capacity to

participate in Canada's Anglo-Saxon polity regardless of his racial background. As his letter to the government that is printed on the poster notes: "I feel like I want to help [the government of Canada's war effort] some way, and the best I can do it is to send a little money, for I can't go myself as I am nearly blind" (Moo-Che-we-in-Es cited in Morton 2004:118). This image of the noble and participating "Indian" was used to press the government's message that all peoples within Canada were working to further the ends of the Canadian nation, and was publicized in order to press all to contribute fully to the goals of the nation (Sheffield 2005: 78-79; Morton 2004:118).

As the war progressed and the government of Canada looked to increase manpower within the military and within necessary industries in late 1939 through conscription, the rationality of citizenship, particularly in its stressing of an individual's participation within, and utility to, the goals of the state, became asserted within the National Registration program. In particular, the rationality of citizenship stressed *what the individual did* in relation to the goals of the nation, and developed a rationalized sense of individual "utility" which took into consideration employment, education, health, farming skills and job training.

The Design of Canada's WWII National Registration Program

When Canada's World War Two National Registration program was being designed, the rationalities of subjecthood and citizenship shaped how types of peoples in Canada were understood as being "necessary in their community" or

“available” to be conscripted into the Armed Forces or into industrial production (Department of Labour 1949: 9, 5, 47). How these classifications were developed quickly became crucial to the lives of all registered people living in Canada, as the social content and requirements of ascribed government categories would determine the social performances that a classified individual would legally be required to perform. In this regard, the development and application of National Registration regulations, policy and technologies was crucial in shaping what factors would be rendered visible and actionable by the system, and upon which elements the discrimination and classification of individuals would be determined. In this section the role of subjecthood and citizenship are demonstrated in how the categories, policies and technologies of National Registration were developed. In particular, this section demonstrates how the questions that were asked as part of the initial registration were shaped by the rationalities of subjecthood and citizenship and how registration officials were taught to properly interpret the answers of those registering.

Canada’s second National Registration program was not internally discussed until after significant losses were experienced by France in 1939. From the commencement of the war up until the 10th of May 1940, “no special drive was being put into the war effort because those in charge in Great Britain were proceeding on the basis that it was more or less a stalemate and would continue in that way for years,” and as such, “there was no urgency in preparing for defence or counter offensive” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National

Registration). After Germany's successful move into Belgium and the Netherlands, and the speed of these governments' collapse, having happened in only a matter of days, the German capacity for military expansion was taken more seriously. Germany's entry into France "brought about the first realization of what [the Allied countries] were up against and that the days of leisure were over," and it was then decided "that rapid and fast action was required to cover over the mistakes made by th[eir previous] leisurely policy" (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). In addition, the speed of German expansion raised fears over the existence of German agents working to bring down attacked countries from within, leading Allied countries to be concerned about their vulnerability to issues of internal security as well (Prokop 2008; Neufeldt 2009: 222; *Hamilton Spectator* 1940 "Part of Registration Plan Completed in Record Time" August 17th 1940; *Chronicle* 1940 "Fifth Columnists" October 31st 1940).

As a result, the government of Canada prepared for the eventuality that conscription would have to be implemented in order to draw sufficient men into the Armed Forces to counter German advancements through military force. The Government had, however, learned its lesson after the political and logistical difficulty it had experienced implementing conscription in the final months of the First World War. Then, National Registration had been openly tied to conscription and forced participation in what was considered to be a wholly European war. In addition, knowledge during the First World War that National Registration would be used to conscript men, led to high rates of non-compliance

in populations that felt they would bear the brunt of forced military service. In Québec city, popular opposition to registration and conscription was brought to the forefront on March 28th 1918 with the detainment of a young man for not carrying his proper registration identity documents. This move led to direct action by thousands of protesters against government offices, which resulted in the destruction of National Registration documents, administrative records and the burning down of a registration office over the course of a few days. What was later termed the “Easter Riots,” lasted from March 28 to April 1, 1918, and ultimately resulted in the application of martial law, the deployment of soldiers throughout the province to protect other government offices and facilities, and over 150 civilian and military casualties (Auger 2008: 503, 510). After the First World war had ended, the government conceded to popular public pressure against registration and conscription, and ordered the burning of all remaining records pertaining to the WWI National Registration program (see Library and Archives Canada 2010).

In light of this history, the implementation of Canada’s Second National Registration program was taken on with a greater sensitivity to public sentiment. As such, the government specifically sought to distance National Registration from conscription within the public mind, adopting instead the term “mobilization,” while it was argued by Burns (1956: 116-117) and Granatstein (1976: 100) that “the broader powers of NRMA were nothing more than ‘window dressing’ to hide the true purpose of authorizing conscription” (Byers 1996: 178). In this way, Canada’s World War Two National Registration program was

publically framed as “taking stock,” or conducting a statistical measure of the country’s labour power, while the program’s key function of conscription was to remained out of the government’s public discussions (see Figure 1-5).

Figure 1-5. National Registration Advertisement Poster 1940

NATIONAL STOCK TAKING NEEDS NATIONAL REGISTRATION

CANADA CALLS upon all her citizens, regardless of nationality, male and female, over 16 years of age, to register on August 19th, 20th, or 21st. Registration offices will be open from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m.

The object of this registration is to ascertain the human resources of the nation so that they may be mobilized to enable Canada to make her maximum effort in the defence of this country and towards the successful prosecution of the war.

Here are the questions you will be asked to answer. The card for women will be similar but subject to certain necessary variations. Study the questions carefully now so that you may be ready to give full and complete answers to the registration officer.

REGISTRATION DATES:- AUGUST 19th, 20th and 21st

DATE OF REGISTRATION		ELECTORAL DISTRICT		POLLING DIVISION		CARD No.	
Month	Year	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
1890							
1. Surname (Print in block letters)		Given Names		2. Permanent Postal Address (If away from usual residence when filling in card give name of usual residence)		3. Class of occupation: (a) Are you an employer of labour other than domestic? If so, state business. (b) Are you working on own account, but not employing labour? If so, state business. (c) Are you an employee? (1) working at usual occupation. (2) working at other than usual occupation. (3) unemployed. (4) Not working because pensioner, dependent, retired, independent means. (5) Other.	
3. Age last birthday		Date of birth		4. Conjugal condition: Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced		13. Occupation or Craft: (a) Present occupation? (b) What is your regular occupation? (c) What other work can you do well? (d) If an employee, who is your present employer? Name, Address, Nature of business where employed? (state precisely). (e) If experienced in a skilled industrial occupation or profession, describe specifically the types or types of work in which you are specially equipped by training or experience.	
4. Of what dependents (if any) are you the sole support: (a) Father, (b) Mother, (c) Wife, (d) Number of children under 16 years, (e) Number of other dependents, (f) Do you contribute partial support to any one		6. Country of birth of (a) Yourself, (b) Your father, (c) Your mother		7. Nationality or country of allegiance:—British subject (a) by birth? (b) by naturalization? (c) Foreign citizen? (d) If naturalized, in what year? (e) In what place? (f) If not British subject, to what country do you owe allegiance? (g) If an immigrant, in what year did you enter Canada?		14. Unemployment: (a) How many weeks did you work in the past 12 months? (b) If out of work now, state number of weeks since last employed in any occupation other than work performed in return for direct relief. (c) Are you totally incapacitated for employment?	
8. Racial origin		8. Language or languages: (a) Do you speak English? (b) French? (c) What other language can you speak, read and write?		10. Education: (a) Primary only, (b) Primary and Secondary, (c) Vocational Training (Business College, Technical High School), (d) College or University Degree.		15. (a1) Were you brought up on a farm? (a2) Until what age? (a3) Have you worked on a farm? (b) How long? (b3) In what province or country? (c1) Can you handle horses? (c2) Drive a tractor? (c3) Use farm machinery? (c4) Can you milk? (c5) Are you able to do other farm work?	
11. Is your general health (a) good? (b) fair? (c) bad? If blind, deaf, dumb, crippled or otherwise physically disabled, state nature of disability.		If permanently disabled, are you in receipt of a pension? In respect of War Service? Workmen's Compensation? Old Age or Blind? Other? (Specify).		17. In there any particular occupation in which you would like to be specially trained?		18. Defense Services: (1) Have you previously served in any Naval, Military or Air Forces? If so, state (a) Forces of what country? (b) Approximate dates between which services performed (c) Title? (d) Rank held. (e) If retired or discharged, give reasons therefor. (f) If retired or discharged, have you been rejected for military service in the present war? (g) Have you been rejected for military service in the present war? (a) Why? (b) Where?	

This is Your Opportunity to Help in The National Effort. To keep the cost of this registration at a minimum the Government is asking the co-operation of all public-minded citizens in the work of registration. You can help by getting in touch with your local registration officials and offering your services.

WHERE TO REGISTER

Registration offices are being set up by electoral districts in the same manner as in the last Dominion election.

Registrants are required to register in the regular polling subdivisions of their own constituencies. But should a registrant be in some other province or district out of the regular polling subdivision on Registration Days, he or she may register at any registration office convenient, upon satisfactory explanation to the local deputy registrar.

Penalty for Non-Registration — Failure to register will make any male or female, married or single, over the age of 16 years, liable to a fine not exceeding Two hundred dollars, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding Three months, or to both such fine and imprisonment, and moreover to a further penalty not exceeding Ten dollars for each day, after the day upon which he should have registered, during which he shall continue to be unregistered.



Your Registration Certificate

To every person answering the questionnaire fully and satisfactorily a certificate of registration will be issued by the local deputy registrar. This is a small card which must be carried on the person at all times.

Published under the authority of **HON. JAMES G. GARDINER**
Minister of National War Services

NB- *The Globe and Mail* “National Stock Taking Needs National Registration” August 8th 1940. This exact image and message also appeared in many other newspapers including the *Bassano Recorder*, August 1, 1940; *Recorder*, August 2, 1940, *Irma Times*, August 16, 1940; *Blairmore Enterprise*, August 2, 1940; as well as others.

During the Second World War, National Registration was to again act as a tool of conscription for the Armed Forces in Canada, though the idea was also put forward that this action would not be taken right away. National Registration would be conducted first, and later “when the power of compulsion to render civilian service [wa]s rendered,” the military officials and Department of Labour would indicate to National Registration officials the number of men and women that they required “and it would then be the job of [National Registration officials] to call out such persons to render such services” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Furthermore, the government worked to publically play up the belief that “Germany’s rapid success was due to cooperation by fifth columnists in the countries attacked and overrun,” in order to gain support for National Registration – leading them to adopt media messaging that asserted that it was in fact the Canadian public who had “demanded a National Registration so that the Government would know who was in Canada, where they were, what they were doing and what they were capable of doing” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).⁸

In June of 1940, it was decided to establish the Department of National War Services and include within its mandate a new National Registration System. A committee on National Registration was formed on June 21st under Dr. Coats of

⁸ Such calls did exist, however, news media from Ontario and the prairie provinces point to Veterans’ organizations seeking to have the government assert a policy of internment for all Aliens living in Canada as being the primary source (*Blairmore Enterprise* 1940 “Canadian Legion Asks Suppression of ‘Fifth Columns’” May 24th 1940; *Redcliff Review* 1940 “Protests Bring Results” May 2nd 1940).

the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and included personnel drawn from “all departments of government chiefly concerned with the war effort for the purpose of discovering this question of National Registration, how it would be conducted, how the information secured there would be compiled and to what use the information would be put when compiled” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Specifically included on the committee were officials from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, the military departments, the Department of Labour, the Department of Munitions and Supply, and officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

The committee agreed that National Registration would be organized like a census, though a National Registration would present three distinct challenges. The primary one was that “in a census you secure information and that is the end of your contact with the individual,” while “a National Registration is a continuing process” requiring the maintaining of up-to-date “records of change of address, change of marital status and death” etc. (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Second, the committee noted that a National Registration program would need to include a technological means for individuals to be identified, and to allow individuals to identify themselves. Specifically, National Registration policy called for the issuance of identity cards, this policy having been adopted given the need to check individuals for compliance as well as the possibility of the need to exert “some control of movement of the

population in Canada” if the time came “when a person w[ould] not be allowed to leave one National War Services District for another without securing consent of the National War Services Board of the District” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). The question also arose about whether or not a form of the certificate should be issued which carried “a photograph of the registrant, for identification purposes,” or if the “finger prints of the registrant” should also be included on the card or kept within the government’s records (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).⁹ In addition, the use of special paper and a unique identifying number were also discussed, however, it was ultimately “decided that while these ideas might reduce the possibility of forgery,” they “would not provide a sufficient safeguard against it to warrant” the additional amount of time that these measures would require for registration and fabrication, in addition to the tremendous increase in cost that these inclusions would demand (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

⁹ The matter was looked into again in 1941 and it was suggested that photographs could be important if the strict control of movement was needed to be enforced by the Armed Forces (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

Figure 1-6. Special Registration Card Specimen 1940

No. S 15584

DOMINION OF CANADA
NATIONAL REGISTRATION REGULATIONS 1940
SPECIAL REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE

Name

Address

.....
(signature of registrant)

.....
(place of issue) (date)

.....
(signature of deputy registrar)
(OVER)



NB- Special Registration Certificate 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol 1

The committee did, however, decide to tie the individual's identification certificate to his or her registration data by including in the design of the identity cards "the constituency number and the polling subdivision number in which the registered" person resided (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

The third challenge of National Registration involved the need to develop an effective means to assess and sort registered individuals into the desired governing categories. Key to this was the development of the questions which were to be asked of each registrant, the answers to which would then make up the data set through which the government's system could discriminate between categories of individuals and populations. In this way, the questions needed to make visible those who could be conscripted and those who were deemed to be

“necessary for their community” in order for them to be popularly classified and ensure maximum efficiency for the Canadian war effort (Department of Labour 1949: 9, 5, 47). In this way, conscription was to be highly selective, as it was noted:

if the unemployed and unessential manpower of the country could be transferred directly into the Defense Forces, leaving essential industries and utilities undisturbed to merely change from peace to war production, only part of the community would be disrupted... This means that for maximum efficiency all the best designing, construction and manufacturing technicians and tradesmen would be reserved, while the cream of operative and maintenance manpower (less a small percentage reserved for testing and proving) would be at the front (Committee of the Cabinet of Internal Security 1939 Report of the Subcommittee on Reserved Occupations December 1939 RG 2 vol. 6 file: M-5 Labour Supply Investigation).

As such, various questions were put on the National Registration questionnaire by representatives of the various departments from within the government in order to provide “the information which they desired to get for the use of their respective departments” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

Ultimately, two sets of questions were adopted, nineteen for men and twenty for women, ranging from questions concerning one’s Nationality and country of allegiance, to if the individual had any experience milking cows (see Figure 1-7).

Figure 1-7. National Registration Questionnaire Questions for Men and Women 1940

Shared Questions	Lines Devoted in the Instructions
1. Surname, Given Names	8
2. Permanent Postal Address (If away from usual residence when filling in card give name of usual residence)	6
3. Age last birthday, Date of Birth	10
4. Conjugal Condition: Single, Married, Widowed, Divorced	6
5. Of what dependents (if any) are you the sole support: (a) Father (b)Mother (c)Wife (d) Number of Children under the age of 16 (e) Number of other dependants (f) Do you contribute to partial support of any one	9
6. Country of birth of (a) Yourself (Place) (b) your father (Place) (c) your mother (Place)	6
7. Nationality or country of allegiance: British subject (a) by birth (b) by naturalization (c) Foreign citizen (d) if naturalized, in what year (e) in what place (f) if not British Subject, to what country do you owe allegiance (g) if an immigrant, in what year did you come to Canada	27
8. Racial Origin	21
9. Language or languages: (a) Do you speak English (b) French (c) what other languages do you speak, read and write	9
10. Education: (a) Primary only (b) Primary and Secondary (c) Vocational Training (Business College, Technical High School) (d) College or University degree	8
11. Is your general health: (a) good (b) fair (c) bad	5
12. If blind, deaf, dumb, crippled or otherwise physically disabled, state nature of disability; If permanently disabled are you in receipt of a pension; In respect to War Service; Workmen's Compensation; Old Age or Blind; Other (specify)	3
13. Class occupation: (a) Are you an employer of labour other than domestic; if so, state business (b) Are you working on own account, but not employing labour; If so state business (c) Are you an employee (1) working at usual occupation (2) working at other than usual occupation (3) unemployed (4) Not working because pensioner, dependent, retired, independent means (specify)	18
14. Occupation or Craft: (a) Present occupation – years of experience (b) What is your regular occupation – years of experience (c) what other work can you do well - years of experience (d) If an employee, who is your present employer; name, address, Nature of business where employed (state precisely), (e) If experienced in a skilled industrial occupation or profession, describe specifically the type or types of work which you are specifically equipped by training or experience	47
15. Unemployment: (a) How many weeks did you work in the past 12 months (b) If out of work now, state number of weeks since last employed in any occupation other than work performed in return for direct relief (c) Are you totally incapacitated for employment	8
17. / 19. Is there any particular occupation in which you would like to be	7

specialty trained	
Questions for Men Only	
16. Were you brought up on a farm: (a) General farming (b) Truck farming (c) Fruit farming (d) Poultry farming (e) Dairy farming (f) Business establishments	4
18. Defence Services: (1) Have you previously served in any Naval, Military or Air Forces; If so, state (a) Forces of what country (b) Approximate dates between which services performed (c) Unit (d) Rank held (2) If retired or discharged, give reasons therefore (3) Have you been rejected for military service in the present war (a) Why (b) Where	9
Questions for Women Only	
1. Surname, Given Names: (a) If married, state maiden name	0 ^A
16.State length of experience (in years) if any in: (a) General farming (b) Truck farming (c) Fruit farming (d) Poultry farming (e) Dairy farming (f) Business establishments	0 ^A
17. Can you: (a) handle horses (b) drive motor trucks (c) Drive an automobile (d) Drive a tractor (e) Use farm machinery (f) Milk cows (g) Do plain cooking	0 ^A
18. Indicate here any qualifications or practical experience which you possess, not already described	0 ^A
20. Do your circumstances permit you to serve in the present national crisis, by changing your present occupation to some other for which you are qualified (a) Where you can return home daily (b) Away from the house	0 ^A

NB – A – The instructions noted that the questions “of the Women’s Card are self explanatory and do not need special instructions.” Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 93C0006; also see Department of National War Services (1940) “Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars.” July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2.

After the committee had drafted the questions of the Questionnaire, it was sent to Council and approved “except that Question 17 [on the male card, question 19 on the female card] was added which was a question asking the registrants if there was any special training they would like to receive in connection with industry etc.” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Although the question regarding the ability to milk cows "cause[d] for many a puckered brow and a broad grin" at the registration tables even in 1940, these questions none-the-less worked to make specific data visible that was of interest to participating government Departments and allowed for ascribed classifications to be applied

along these lines (*Gleichen Call* 1940 "Much Activity Shown During Registration" August 21st 1940).

As part of the committee's design of the National Registration questions, detailed instructions were also drafted to explain to the registration officials who were charged with actually registering people on the ground, how exactly these questions were to be asked and how individuals' responses were to be interpreted and properly recorded. In total, five of the questions asked as part of the National Registration of 1940 sought to categorize individuals based on *who they were* in relation to the rationality of subjecthood – as questions six, seven and eight, inquired as to the individual's place of birth, as well as their parents place of birth; the country to which they owed allegiance; their racial origin; and finally, what languages they spoke. Thirteen of the National Registration questions were directed toward *what the individual did*, or their utility in regards to the goals of the state. These questions related mostly to the individual's occupation, education, and training, as well as their capacity to perform certain kinds of farm work. Questions thirteen (m), fourteen (m), fifteen (m), seventeen (m) / nineteen (f) and the specialized female questions from sixteen (f) through twenty (f), specifically addressed the individual's current employment status, what skills they had in relation to industrial and agricultural production, as well as if they could be called on to receive training in a specific area that was necessary to the government's pursuit of the war effort.

In the *Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars* (1940) that was provided to Registrars and their staff

before the registration took place, it was noted that: “the completion of a registration card is quite simple,” however, this manual provided significantly more detail in the explanation of the proper filling out of questions 7, 8, 13 and 14 than each of the other questions. In particular, these questions addressed the central questions related to subjecthood – that is, “nationality” and “racial origin” – as well as the key questions related to citizenship – addressing “class of occupation” and one’s “occupation or craft” (Department of National War Services (1940) “Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars” July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2).

National Registration’s key question that related to subjecthood was question 7, which addressed the registrants’ nationality. Unlike other questions which received an average of just over seven lines of explanations (see Figure 1-7), the instructions regarding nationality were incredibly detailed. As the instructions noted:

Question 7, Nationality – It is important to obtain accurate information upon the question of nationality or citizenship. Ordinarily there will be no difficulty in answering this question, but cases may occur in which the registrant, by reason of honest doubt or lack of knowledge on this subject, will be unable to determine the appropriate answer. In such cases the Deputy filling in the card should ask the man in authority for his interpretation. The following answers should be given under the heading *British subject*. For all British subjects (a) by birth or marriage the answer will be ‘yes’, all other questions under this heading being left blank. (b) Enter ‘yes’ for all British subjects by naturalization. (c) *Foreign citizens*. If the person is not a British subject and owes allegiance to a foreign country the answer to this question will be ‘yes.’ (d) *Naturalized*. For naturalized citizens enter the year of naturalization. In the case of persons who were naturalized as children with their parents, if they do not know the exact year, an approximate year will suffice. (e) *What Place*. Enter the name of the place in Canada where the person was naturalized. (f) *Country of Allegiance*. Enter the country to which foreign citizens living in Canada owe allegiance. Do not accept unknown as an answer. Some cases will be

met where the registrant was born a British subject and subsequently renounced his British citizenship in order to become a citizen of some other country. In some cases the first part of the question 'British Subject' is to be interpreted as asking whether the registrant is or is not now a British Subject, and the registrant would indicate the country to which he now owes allegiance. (g) *Year of Immigration*. If the person was born outside of Canada, enter the year of entry into Canada. Note: It is important to remember that a person born out of Canada, whose father was a British Subject at the time of that persons birth, does not need to be naturalized to acquire Canadian citizenship, unless such person has become a citizen of a foreign country (Department of National War Services (1940) "Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars" July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, emphasis in the original).

As such, the instructions stressed if subjecthood had been attained by birth or naturalization, as well as under which sovereign the individual held allegiance.

In addition to these extensive instructions of how to enter the individual's answers onto the form, the instruction manual for Registrars also dedicated a further page and a half of text to explain what the categories of British Subjecthood and Canadian Nationality meant in relation to National Registration. In determining if an individual was in fact a British Subject, Registrars were to apply a "general rule" which was explained as follows:

Who are British Subjects – General Rule. Speaking in the most general terms, a person may become a British Subject by birth, by naturalization, or, in the case of women, by marriage, but British nationality once acquired may be lost, by naturalization in some other country, by the cancellation of a naturalization certificate, or, in the case of women, by marriage, the general rule being that a wife has the same nationality as her husband. The statutory provisions on the subject of nationality are extremely complicated, and a simple statement of them is impossible. All that can be done is to state first the circumstances in which British nationality is acquired and then those in which it is lost (Department of National War Services (1940) "Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars" July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, emphasis in the original).

The statement went on to explain the eight means through which subjecthood would be attained including: birth within the Dominion or on a British ship; birth to a father who is a British subject; having been granted a certificate of naturalization under the statutes of Canada; being the listed child of an individual granted a naturalization certificate; birth to an individual naturalized before January 1st 1918 or being the minor child of a person naturalized before January 1st 1915; being a woman married to a British Subject; being a woman married to an Alien that became naturalized before January 15th 1932; being an Alien woman married to an Alien that became naturalized after January 15th 1932 and within six months had made a declaration that she also wanted to be naturalized as well and was accepted. This was followed by the six means whereby subjecthood could be lost, noting: naturalization by another country; having his or her naturalization certificate cancelled; being a woman married to a man who is not a British Subject; being a woman married to a man before January 15th 1932 who then ceased to be a British Subject; being a woman married to a man who is an Alien – unless they are from France, the United States of America, Argentina, Cuba, Guatemala or Uruguay; being a woman married to a man after January 15th 1932 who then ceases to be a British Subject and also decided not to make a declaration that she desired to retain her status as a British Subject within the allowed time period (Department of National War Services (1940) “Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars” July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2). With all of this detail it was understood that registration officials would later be able to identify those who owed allegiance to

the British Crown as British Subjects, and thus who could be legally called into service.

Significantly above average attention was also given to the question of “Racial Origin” within the instructions provided to Registrars. Specifically, Registrars were instructed to note in detail the race of the individual registrant, drawing for the most part on patrilineal ties, but for some groups *any* familial connection to a particular ethnic or geographical heritage was to result in a set racial category being applied. As the instructions noted:

Question 8, Racial Origin – it is important to remember that a person’s racial origin and nationality are very often different; for instance, the American nationality comprises many different racial origins, such as English, Scottish, French, Italian, German, Polish etc. The name of the country from which a person has come to Canada gives no indication of that person’s racial origin. A person may have come to Canada from Poland but may be German, Russian, Ukrainian, etc., by racial origin. *‘Canadian’, ‘American’* – It is imperative to remember that the word ‘Canadian’ does not denote a racial origin, but a nationality, and the same applies in the word ‘American’. As a general rule a person’s racial origin is traced through the father, e.g., if a person’s father is English and mother French, the racial origin shall be entered as English; while if a person’s father is French and the mother English, the racial origin shall be entered as French, and similarly for other combinations. *Canadian Aborigines* – For the Canadian Aborigines the entry shall be Indian or Eskimo as the case may be. For a person of mixed White and Indian blood, the entry shall be ‘Half-breed’. *Coloured Stock* – For persons belonging to stock involving a different colour, i.e., the black, yellow and brown races, the entry shall be Negro, Japanese, Chinese, Hindu, Malayan, etc., respectfully, thus indicating the branch within the distinct ethnic stock to which such person belong. *Mixed Blood* – The Children begotten of marriages between white and black or white and Chinese etc., shall be considered as Negro, Chinese, etc., as the case may be (Department of National War Services (1940) “Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars” July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, emphasis in the original).

These instructions approach race in the context of the natural social order and hierarchy of British Imperialism, however, the designing committee writing the instructions also took into consideration the Canadian context in emphasizing the difference of the races of English and French peoples, as well as giving attention to those who held First Nations heritage,¹⁰ and then finally explaining how to register those who were classified as “coloured stock.” In this way, National Registration incorporated the individual’s answers to these questions and allowed for the individual’s place within the natural order of the commonwealth to be taken into account when categorizing them.

Within the instructions issued to Registrars, two more questions were addressed in much greater detail than the rest, noting the importance of question 13, which related to the individual’s “class of occupation,” and question 14, which noted their “occupation or craft.” The first of these two questions related to the individual’s “class of occupation,” and addressed if the individual owned their means of production, employed other men, or sold their labour time. As the instructions noted:

Question 13, Class of Occupation – (a) If an employer of labour other than domestic enter ‘yes’ and state the nature of the business; for example, boot and shoe manufacturer, general store keeper, general contractor, beauty parlor, milliner, barrister, architect, etc.(b) if a person is in a business on own account but does not employ labour, enter ‘yes’ and give the nature of the business; for example carpenter, painter, boot and shoe repairer, hairdresser, dressmaker, civil engineer, doctor, etc. (c) Opposite (1) of this heading enter the usual occupation, such as blacksmith, men’s

¹⁰ The Race and Nationality questions do not specifically address the differential status of First Nations peoples categorized as “Indians” under the Indian Act. As a result, there was significant confusion in if National Registration could be legally applied to these people, since they held a distinctive relation to the Crown. Racism also played a part in individual Registrar’s choices as some First Nations peoples were forcefully registered while others were actively disallowed to participate.

tailor, cleaner and presser, etc.; under (2) state whether working at other than usual occupations; (3) if unemployed answer 'yes'. (d) Under this sub-heading enter all persons who are not working because they are receiving a pension, are dependants, are retired, or have independent means, etc., and specify which. This question refers only to those who are unemployed at the date of the registration by reason of receiving a pension, retired, etc., but it does not include young people who have never worked (Department of National War Services (1940) "Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars" July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, emphasis in the original).

In this way, this question would differentiate those who ran businesses and employed others from those who were unemployed or sold their labour time, making this distinction a part of how people were governed under the National Registration classifications. The Second question related to the type of work that the individual was involved in, noting training, job experience and the individual's capacity to participate within the government's specified war industries. As was stated in the instructions:

Question 14, Occupation or Craft – Fill in the question under this heading for every person who has or has had an occupation and for all persons who have had special training or experience in certain types of work. (a) By present occupation is meant the occupation the person is following at the date of the registration, or, if unemployed, the occupation in which last employed. It must be understood that the answers under (a) and (b) need not be different, as in the great majority of cases the present occupation will be the same as the regular occupation. Specify clearly the occupation followed by the person, for instance it is not sufficient to say 'draftsman', but the person will have to specify his occupation as 'Map Draftsman', 'mechanical draftsman' etc. Or, if a 'driller' specify whether an automatic drill operator, drill press operator, an optical goods driller, etc. The word 'clerk' is not sufficient; designate the person as a salesman, typist, stenographer, accountant, bookkeeper, etc. Do not enter a stenographer as secretary. Distinguish a traveling salesman from a salesman in a store. (c) Under this sub-heading state in detail any other kind of work, in addition to present occupation that the person can do well. For instance, a person may be a house painter, yet that person may have had years of experience as a carpenter or a molder, etc. or again the person may be a stenographer, yet may also have had experience as a nurse, or teacher, etc. Opposite (a), (b) and (c) enter the years of

experience. (d) Under the sub-heading give the name and address of present employer and describe the nature of the business, for instance, it is not sufficient to say manufacturer, or a store keeper or contractor. For example, if the person works in a mine, state whether it is a coal mine, a copper mine, a mica mine, etc.; or if the person works in a factory or a mill, state whether it is a sawmill, an iron foundry; and if an iron foundry, whether they make stoves, ploughs, etc. Again if the employed on transportation, state whether it is a steam or a street railway, or busline, etc., or if working in a store or trading establishment, whether it deals in drugs, groceries, hardware, etc., and whether it is a retail or a wholesale establishment. If working in a refinery, it should be specified 'petroleum refinery', 'sugar refinery', 'copper refinery', etc. (e) This section of the question is designed to bring out information as to our special qualifications such as the registrant might possess, if he has specialized in certain lines or has received special training and experience. The particular purpose in asking this question is to enable the Government, in as far as practicable, to direct people towards the kind of work for which they are best fitted by training and experience. For example, if the person has received special training in motor mechanics this person's experience should be minutely defined. Again, if the person has a special training in precision machines of any kind it should be minutely and precisely defined. In other words, give as complete detail as possible as to the training and experience the person has had in various types of work (Department of National War Services (1940) "Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars" July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, emphasis in the original).

Of specific interest in this question was the individual's capacity to perform the specified tasks associated with industries of war production, while the inclusion of these data allowed for the later categorization of individuals in regards to the rationalities of citizenship – stressing the individual's utility or capacity to participate in the fulfillment of state goals.

The temporary National Registration committee working under Dr. Coat had also called for the data to be compiled by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and that its first task, after the data collection of the registration had been completed, was "to get a general statistical picture of the human resources of

Canada, i.e. the number of males and females of different ages, classified into provinces, according to occupations, condition of health etc.” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). This information was given priority since it would be used in “deciding Board matters of government policy with respect to the utilization of manpower” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). The next priority was specifically stated to be the identification of individuals identified as “Doukhobors¹¹ and Japanese,” since this material was urgently required for consideration by a separate committee convened to deal with “the Japanese problem¹² on the Pacific Coast” and officials concerned with Doukhobor direct action against the war effort (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

¹¹ Doukhobors, or "Spirit-Wrestlers," refers to a ethnic group of Russian dissent that adopted a kind of "Spiritual Christianity" as their way of life. Due to their beliefs of non-violence and opposition to political interference in their community a large population immigrated to Canada at the end of the 1800s (*The Wetaskiwin Times* 1932 "The Doukhobors" May 26th 1932). Along with Mennonites, Doukhobors were granted specific legal privileges by the government of Canada when they had emigrated which established that they would not be called for military service (see Order-in-Council PC 2747 December 6th 1898). When registration was being debated before the Second World War, Doukhobor religious leaders petitioned the government concerning their differential rights under Canadian law and were criticized for protesting Canada's entry into the war. When the registration occurred in 1940 many also demanded the right to affix a document prepared by their leadership to their National Registration forms as a means of assuring that their religious status would be properly documented (*Gleichen Call* 1940 "Doukhobors Cause Confusion When Registering" August 28th 1940; *Chronicle* 1940 Will Respect Privileges August 15th 1940). As such, this legal distinction and their vocal stance against the war led the government to prioritize their identification under National Registration.

¹² It is important to note that Canada and Japan were not yet at war in August 1940 and would not be until December of 1941. The Japanese problem that was being discussed had to do with the number of Japanese men that should legally be allowed to immigrate to Canada.

The Initial Registration 1940

This section charts how the policies, technologies and classifications of National Registration found expression within the initial Registration of 1940. In particular, it notes how these technologies worked to press the classifications of National Registration outward, from internal government meetings, into formalized documents, and then into mainstream culture and the everyday lives of people living in wartime Canada. In particular, the technology of the Questionnaire Card was used to record individuals' answers to the questions of National Registration, and subsequently as a means of maintaining a permanent record of these data. The Initial Registration also introduced the technology of identity cards so that registrants could demonstrate that they had performed the required task of registration and later to identify themselves to government officials. In addition, this technology worked to provide the National Registration system a means of linking held records and ascribed classifications to particular registered individuals. Although the physical act of registering took on a mundane and bureaucratic appearance, the act of registration itself was incredibly significant in that it expresses an observed performative conformity to the system's first ascribed categorization of the population – the requiring those who were classified as sixteen or older to perform the act of registration – while it also made the data of all those who did register visible and actionable to government officials in a way that had not existed prior to the act of registration. Crucially, this visibility/actionability relationship would not have existed if the individual

had chosen not to participate in the registration, making the act of registration *the* key step which allowed government officials to track, sort and classify individuals. Furthermore, by taking this action and providing their personal information it gave the system the capacity to assess individuals' compliance and implement forms of targeted governing technologies.

Registration was initially conducted over a period of three days, on August 19th, 20th and 21st in 1940, and required the opening of numerous registration locations in addition to the enlistment of the aid of thousands of local volunteers and various large employers (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos. T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration; Canadian Manufacturers Association Circular 965 1940; Chief Registrar of Canada (1940) National Registration Regulations, 1940 RG 3 vol 978 file: 11-11-12 vol.2: Department of National War Services (1940) *Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars* July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, sec.13; *Hamilton Spectator* 1940 Thousands of Men and Women Needed To Aid in Registration 1940/07/18). National Registration was legislated under the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (NRMA) of 1940, while orders in council P.C. 3086 July 9th 1941 and P.C. 3156 July 12th 1941 specifically placed registration activities under the oversight of the Department of National War Services (DNWS).

The registration process itself took on a structure similar to that of voting in a federal election, in that individuals were called on to report to their local polling station to provide their personal information to a registration official. It

had been decided by the Temporary National Registration Committee that “the actual registration should be done on an electoral division basis, as nearly as possible to the way in which a Dominion Election is conducted, and through the instrumentality of the Chief Electoral Officer” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). In this way, National Registration was organized to align with voter registration districts, and would adopt the “electoral district” and “polling division” as a means to subdivide the population. Under the policy of National Registration “the Chief Electoral officer became the Chief Registrar for his Division and was placed in charge of a staff to conduct the registration itself. As a result of a suggestion by Member of Parliament, J.H. Harris, the staffing of registration divisions was “done as nearly as possible on a voluntary basis ... that the members of the House of Commons [were] asked to assume responsibility for the building up of the necessary volunteer organizations in their respective constituencies” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). All members of the House of Commons were called to meet in the summer of 1940, “and the plan of proceeding was given to them,” and “was rigidly adhered to throughout” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Additionally, as a means of checking to determine if the individual was registering in the proper polling division, and as a means of tracking the progress and compliance of registration, Registrars were issued an

up-to-date list of local registered voters. As it was noted in the Registrars instructions:

the printed copy of the list of electors which will be supplied to the deputy registrars, by the Registrar, will serve many purposes. It will enable the deputy registrars to readily ascertain if the registrant resides in the polling division for which they have been appointed. This list will also be helpful in determining what proportion of electors have registered from day to day. If, for any part of the polling division, persons do not present themselves as rapidly as they should, the deputies should endeavor to communicate with the delinquents before the close of the registration, urging them to register promptly (Department of National War Services (1940) "Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars" July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2: sec. 30).

In this way, Registrars were to ensure that everyone in their polling division had registered, and that data was accurately collected and recorded onto the National Registration Questionnaire cards.

The government employed the use of various media, including posters, newspaper advertisements, and radio announcements to alert the general public to register between 8 am and 10 pm on the three given registration days (Department of National War Services (1940) Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, sec.9, 10). As it had been explained in earlier planning meetings, "in advance of the taking of the registration, a campaign of publicity should be instituted through suitable radio broadcasts, advertisements in the press, announcements by the clergy, instructions by schoolteachers, etc.," which made clear the general public's requirement to register, while it had also been decided that "circular letters should be dispatched to leading employers of labour, public

organizations of various kinds, and others, asking for their cooperation” (Temporary Committee on National Registration 1940 letter re: National Registration June 25th 1940 RG 27 vol. 993 file: 2-102 pt.1). In addition to providing information regarding how to register, the government’s media messages also included the stern statement that those who failed to register would be in violation of the law and would face prosecution (Toronto Telegram 1940a; Toronto Daily Star 1940a; Toronto Daily Star 1940b; Toronto Daily Star 1940c). These measures furthermore noted that the legislation placed the burden of proof for registration on the individual, explaining that anyone to “whom a registration certificate has not been issued shall be deemed to be unregistered, and the burden of proving registration shall lie with the person who alleges it” (P.C. 3156; *National Registration Regulations*, 1940 sec. 20(2)). In many instances media reported on both the benefit to the country that National Registration represented as well as the legal penalties that backed up the legislation. A newspaper in the town of Wainwright, Alberta, for example, reported that:

from the time registration started at 8 am Monday Wainwright citizens along with all others across Canada, flowed in a steady stream to registration booths to record all pertinent facts about themselves, their occupations and their technical abilities...Women, too, are to be asked many questions designed to find out how their efforts can best be utilized in the war. The questions are designed to ascertain if they have any specialized industrial training which may be useful to the war effort, if it, should it become necessary, they can take over farm work and release men to the fighting forces and key industries. All this rests on the correct answers to the questions which, during these days, are being asked at thousands of registration booths all over Canada...To make certain that no individual shirks his or her responsibilities in the matter, penalties have been provided for those who fail in any way to carry out the provisions of the act...Remember, too, that there is no age limit – all persons above the age of 16 must register or run the risk of a heavy penalty. By the time this appears in print, it is expected that the majority of our citizens will have

filled in the necessary forms and received in return the precious registration certificate. However, if you haven't already done so, it is not too late - DO IT NOW" (Wainwright Star (1940) "Registration Closes 10 P.M. Wednesday; Do It Now!" August 21st 1940, emphasis in original).

For each individual registrant, Deputy Registrars or their staff filled in colour coded "Questionnaire Cards" (white or pink, for male and female registrants respectively), that measured 25.4 cm (10 inches) by 30.5 cm (12 inches), and presented the aforementioned 19 questions to men and 20 questions to women (see Figure 1-8).

Figure 1-8. National Registration Questionnaire Card for Men 1940

DOMINION OF CANADA—NATIONAL REGISTRATION

CARD FOR MEN

WRITE CLEARLY

DATE OF REGISTRATION

Month	Day	Year	1940	ELECTORAL DISTRICT No. <input style="width: 50px;" type="text"/>	POLLING DIVISION No. <input style="width: 50px;" type="text"/>	CARD No. <input style="width: 50px;" type="text"/>
-------	-----	------	------	--	--	--

Name

1. Surname..... Given Names.....
(Print in black letters)

2. Permanent Postal Address (if away from usual residence when filling in card give name of usual residence)
Street and Number..... Rural Route and Post Office..... Town or City..... Province.....

3. Age last birthday..... Date of birth..... Year..... Month..... Day.....

4. Conjugal conditions: Single..... Married..... Widowed..... Divorced.....

5. Of what dependents (if any) are you the sole support:—
(a) Father..... (b) Mother..... (c) Wife..... (d) Number of children under 16 years..... (e) Number of other dependents..... (f) Do you contribute partial support to any one.....

6. Country of birth of
(a) Yourself..... Place.....
(b) Your father..... Place.....
(c) Your mother..... Place.....

7. Nationality or country of allegiance:—British subject (a) by birth?.....
(b) by naturalization?..... (c) Foreign citizen?..... (d) If naturalized, in what year?..... (e) In what place?..... (f) If not British subject, to what country do you owe allegiance?.....
(g) If an immigrant, in what year did you enter Canada?.....

8. Racial origin.....

9. Language or languages: (a) Do you speak English?..... (b) French?.....
(c) What other language can you speak, read and write?.....

10. Education: (a) Primary only..... (b) Primary and Secondary..... (c) Vocational Training (Business College, Technical High School).....
(d) College or University Degree?.....

11. Is your general health (a) good?..... (b) fair?..... (c) bad?..... 12. If blind, deaf, dumb, crippled or otherwise physically disabled, state nature of disability.....
If permanently disabled, are you in receipt of a pension?..... In respect of War Service?..... Workmen's Compensation?..... Old Age or Blind?.....
Other? (Specify).....

13. Class of occupation: (a) Are you an employer of labour other than domestic?.....
If so, state business..... (b) Are you working on own account, but not employing labour?..... If so, state business.....
(c) Are you an employee? (1) working at usual occupation..... (2) working at other than usual occupation..... (3) unemployed..... (d) Not working because pensioner, dependent, retired, independent means.....
(Specify)

14. Occupation or Craft:—
(a) Present occupation?..... (a).....
(b) What is your regular occupation?..... (b).....
(c) What other work can you do well?..... (c).....
(d) If an employee, who is your present employer? Name.....
Address..... Nature of business where employed? (state precisely).....
(e) If experienced in a skilled industrial occupation or profession, describe specifically the type or types of work in which you are specially equipped by training or experience.....

15. Unemployment: (a) How many weeks did you work in the past 12 months?.....
(b) If out of work now, state number of weeks since last employed in any occupation other than work performed in return for direct relief..... (c) Are you totally incapacitated for employment?.....

16. (a1) Were you brought up on a farm?..... (a2) Until what age?..... (b1) Have you worked on a farm?..... (b2) How long..... (b3) In what province or country.....
(c1) Can you handle horses?..... (c2) Drive a tractor?..... (c3) Use farm machinery?.....
(c4) Can you milk?..... (c5) Are you able to do other farm work?.....

17. Is there any particular occupation in which you would like to be specially trained?.....

18. Defence Services: (1) Have you previously served in any Naval, Military or Air Forces?.....
If so, state: (a) Forces of what country.....
(b) Approximate dates between which services performed.....
(c) Unit..... (d) Rank held..... (2) If retired or discharged, give reasons therefor.....
(3) Have you been rejected for military service in the present war?.....
(a) Why?..... (b) Where?.....

I affirm that I have verified the above answers and that they are true.

Signature of Deputy Registrar

Signature of Registrant

The Registrar was to be the one to fill out the form so as to ensure the accuracy of collected data, and was to adhere to a set procedure – as the *National Registration Regulations* of 1940 noted:

every person required by these regulations to register during the registration period shall attend at one of the places appointed for registration and truthfully declare to the deputy registrar his answers to the questions upon the appropriate registration card. The deputy registrar shall carefully and legibly write or cause to be written such answers upon the said registration card; the registrant shall sign the registration card thereby affirming the truth of the answers there recorded and the deputy registrar shall complete and sign the report on the said registration card. Where to the knowledge of the deputy registrar, a person is ill or incapacitated and cannot attend the registration booth in person, the deputy registrar may have a duly appointed voluntary assistant deputy registrar attend on such ill or incapacitated persons to complete the registration card in the usual manner (sec. 9).

Once completed, Questionnaire Cards were signed by the registration official who filled in the form and by the registrant themselves, the card was then given a sequential number, and the registered individual was issued a National Registration identity card.

Known as a “certificate of registration,” the identity card was to act as a means of identification and proof of registration for the individual, as well as a means of linking identified individuals to their held files and respective classifications within the National Registration system (Department of National War Services (1940) “Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars” July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2; see Figure 1-9).¹³

¹³ Special identity cards were also issued to merchant seamen, aliens, immigrant workers, First Nations peoples legally defined as “Indians,” foreign dignitaries and those within the Armed Forces.

Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Also of importance for identification was the individual's signature on the certificate, as it was noted that if police authorities were "in doubt as to the validity of a registration certificate, either the signature or the certificate can be compared with the signature on the original card, or the person can be required to write his name on a piece of paper and this can be immediately sent to [National Registration Officials] for comparison" (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

Anyone attaining the age of 16 after the registration date, residing within Canada for a period of over six weeks, or that was absent from Canada during the registration was required to register at a local post office and was issued a temporary fourteen-day certificate while an official card was produced by Head Office (Post Office Department 1944 Duties of Postmasters Under National Registration April 15th 1944 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol.3).

Social Sorting of Registered Peoples

This section charts how the rationalities of subjecthood and citizenship found expression in the collection and analysis of National Registration data.

Importantly, these data were used by Registration officials in order to develop knowledge about individuals and populations, and enabled a selective visibility of individual traits and types upon which the system's classifications would be

applied. In particular, this section demonstrates how the technology of Questionnaire Cards was used to identify and sort out individuals for conscription, for industrial work, for farm work or for increased suspicion or exclusion because of their specific ethnic heritage. In addition to the expression of rationalities of subjecthood in sorting out non-British, or alien, populations, rationalities of citizenship found expression in a detailed statistical analysis of National Registration data that was performed by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics— which stressed an individual’s utility to the goals of the state. Additionally citizenship found expression in the criteria Registration officials used in the production of lists which detailed exactly who was working, had experience, or had been trained in the government’s pre-selected necessary “special” occupations. Though each of these acts of social sorting drew on the same dataset, the different rationalities shaped what information was drawn out and used in the later classifying of registered individuals.

The initial sorting of the registered population began at the registration table itself, as local registration officials were instructed that:

as the registration proceeds the Deputy Registrars will keep the completed cards for men separated from the completed cards for women. When the registration is complete the Deputy Registrars will make duplicate copies of the completed registration cards of all single men and widowers without children, between the ages of 19 and 45 years. These duplicate copies will be kept separate for transmission to the Registrar. They must be enclosed in a separate envelope supplied for that purpose, which will be clearly marked with the name of the electoral district and the name of the polling division where such registrations have been effected (Department of National War Services (1940) Instructions for the use of Deputy Registrars and Voluntary Assistant Deputy Registrars July 15th 1940 RG 3 vol. 978 file: 11-11-12 vol. 2, sec. 27; also see Order-in-Council P.C. 3156: s.17(1)).

After Deputy Registrars and their staffs duplicated the cards of all single men and widowers without children, between ages 19 and 45 years, the Questionnaire cards were checked and sorted into age groups. Local registration officials were then instructed to enclose the duplicate cards in a separate envelope in order for them to be sent to those in charge of their local Administrative District (P.C. 3156; *National Registration Regulations*, 1940). The duplicate copies of the Questionnaire Cards, once collected by the local Administrative District, then became the “basic record for the military call-ups” and were touted as the “most essential feature of the registration” (Department of Labour 1949: 9).

Once copied, the original Questionnaire Cards were transferred to the Chief Registrar for Canada in Ottawa, and once there, were sorted by sex, by Provincial Administrative District, by electoral district, and by polling district, they were finally arranged alphabetically by last name, to conform to the Russell Soundex System of filing due to the increased speed and reliability of this format, and once this work was finished, formed a complete card index dubbed the “Central Registry” (ibid: 22; *Alphabetic vs. Numerical Filing* 1943; Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). As records were being received, mobilization staff did note some failures to follow their procedures in the filling out and copying of cards, and action was taken to rectify discovered errors.¹⁴ The Central Registry was originally housed in the offices of the

¹⁴ “In the case of men who registered in an Electoral District other than that in which his permanent postal address was located some officials assert that the duplicate card went to the Registrar of the Division in which the man registered, others state that the duplicate went to the Registrar of the Division in which the man’s home address was located. Apparently the

Dominion Bureau of Statistics, however, by September 30th of 1940 “hundreds of tens of registration cards had accumulated at the Bureau” and National Registration staff, materials and their necessary machinery were moved to new offices designed for the sole purpose of housing the National Registration data (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

The cards of aliens were sorted out as well, as a ban on the enlistment of aliens into the Armed Forces in Canada had already been put in place before the beginning of the Second World War. The decision to take this action had been asserted by the *Interdepartmental Committee on the Recruiting of Aliens* in 1939, their reasoning being three fold. First, there was worry about “embarrassment to Canada-United States relations” as the United States’ desire to remain neutral in the war could be disrupted by the conscription of American citizens living within Canada. Second, by allowing aliens to enlist or be conscripted into the Armed Forces in Canada, many from other countries would seek to join the war effort in this way, and the resulting “influx of aliens into Canada [which] would be undesirable” (Report of Interdepartmental Committee Recruiting of Aliens in Canada 1939: 6, 9). The third point was much more central, drawing on rationality of citizenship it was argued that “if these men are called upon to

procedures varied and it appears that much of the trouble which Registrars have encountered stemmed from the fact that they received duplicate cards for men who were not actually residents of their Divisions although they had registered there” (Department of Labour 1943 National Registration Activities in Relation to Mobilization June 14th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Head office noted, however, “that when the cards came in it was found that some constituencies had made copies” while in others “no copies had been made” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Staff at the Bureau of Statistics were called on at that time to ensure that all Divisional Registrars complied with the policy of duplication.

perform the duties of citizens and bear arms for Canada, it will be impossible to resist the argument that they are entitled to the franchise” – noting how participation in furthering the goals of the state would entitle participation within Canadian polity (Department of External Affairs 1940 cited in Roy 1978: 342). Historically, several individuals of Japanese heritage who had immigrated to Canada had used this very argument to gain full voting rights and status within Canadian society following their military service in the First World War (Roy 1978: 343). Although the committee found no law that could support the exclusion of individuals classified as British Subjects, regardless of their heritage, the very first circular issued to National Registration Registrars instructed them not to call up British Subjects in Canada of Oriental origin (Report of Interdepartmental Committee Recruiting of Aliens in Canada 1939: 9; NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 25 1943).

Policy did change in 1943, however, and required Registrars to re-sort all alien “registration cards on hand into 3 groups” (NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 25 1943). The first was to consist of “Enemy Aliens,” being non-British subjects who were nationals, subjects or citizens of Germany, Japan, Italy, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria; the second, of “Allied Aliens,” those who were classified as non-British subjects, but were nationals or citizens of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, The United States of America or Yugoslavia; and third, “Neutral Aliens,” non-British Subjects who owed allegiance to undeclared countries (NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 25 1943). After having sorted the registration cards according to these new

regulations, Registrars were instructed that: “(a) ENEMY ALIENS, as aforesaid, shall not be ordered out under the regulations for military training because such aliens are not acceptable to the authorities the Department of National Defence (Army) at the present time,” while “(b) ALLIED ALIENS, as aforesaid, will be ordered out for military training under the regulations upon terms to be set out in a subsequent circular memorandum, but for the present, Registrars shall refrain from ordering out such aliens under the regulations,” and finally, “(c) NEUTRAL ALIENS, as aforesaid, shall be ordered out for military training forthwith in the usual way under the regulations subject to instructions hereinafter set forth” (NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 25 1943). Although Registrars could conscript aliens, and aliens were allowed to volunteer to serve on the Canadian Armed Forces after 1943, significant distinctions in classification still remained. Registrars were specifically reminded in 1943 that Secret Circular Memorandum No. 1 still applied, and that “Registrars were instructed not to call out British subjects in Canada of Chinese origin,” that individuals naturalized after the first day of September 1929 who previously held allegiance to an Enemy sovereign were still to be excluded, and that Registrars were not to conscript men who were classified as Enemy Aliens “unless such men are in possession of a ‘Certificate of Exemption’ issued by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,” since such men were not to be accepted “at Basic Training Centers or District Depots without such certificates” (NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 25 1943).

The task of filing all of the cards in the proper order was completed in July of 1941 and allowed National Registration officials to boast that “if we are given

the name of any person in Canada, we can immediately go to the card of the individual and get all information desired about them” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Much work was also put into maintaining the accuracy of National Registration data, as the number of changes of Address Notices for persons liable for military training for the month of October 1941 alone was 12,625,¹⁵ while it was reported in 1943 that an average of approximately 60,000 changes of address were required to be made each month, of which nearly one third (approximately 20,000) related to men of military age (Department of War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 378 Nov. 7 1941 Archives of Canada. RG 27 Vol. 993, file: 2-102 pt.1; Department of Labour 1943 National Registration Activities in Relation to Mobilization June 14th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). In addition, “literally hundreds of thousands of certificates” had been lost by late June of 1941 and were in need of being replaced (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

Before tabulation began at the Bureau of Statistics, Dr. Coats called on the Temporary National Registration Committee members to “tell him specifically what they wanted as a result of the registration” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002

¹⁵ Rounded figures of changes of addresses made by NR officials October 1941; Division “A” London, Ontario 900; “B” Toronto, Ontario 2,850; “C” Kingston, Ontario 750; “D” Port Arthur, Ontario 300; “E” Montréal, Quebec 1,650; “F” Quebec, Quebec 300; “G” Halifax, Nova Scotia 300; “H” Saint John, New Brunswick 300; “I” Charlottetown, P.E.I. 25; “J” Winnipeg, Manitoba 1,200; “K” Vancouver, B.C. 900; “M” Regina, Saskatchewan 1,950; and “N” Edmonton, Alberta 1,200 (Department of War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 378 Nov. 7 1941 Archives of Canada. RG 27 Vol. 993, file: 2-102 pt.1).

file: 1941 National Registration). Ultimately five priorities were asserted by the committee and Dominion Statisticians were tasked with “(1) the selection of single males of military age; (2) the listing of some 1,250 specialized occupations; (3) the listing of persons with training in agriculture; (4) the selection of certain classes of aliens” and finally, “(5) the compilation of a general conspectus of the ages, birthplaces, nationality, education, etc, of the Canadian adult population” (Department of National War Services Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1941: 1, 4). In regards to specialized occupations, the position of committee members had shifted from a desire for the data to provide a general statistical picture of Canadian manpower, to the preparation of set lists of “the actual names and addresses of the people engaged in these preferred occupations” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

Specifically, National Registration data’s first task was to be used to develop “a complete list of all persons engaged or capable of being engaged in certain preferred occupations,” and as a result the committee prepared a list of 1,250 preferred, or “specialized,” occupations, broken down into some 12,000 sub-occupations (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration).

As was noted:

the selection of ‘specialized’ occupations consisted of some 1,200 of these main occupational classes. Included were all occupations in fishing, logging, mining, manufacturing, electric light and power production, building and construction, as well as certain of those in transportation and communication, trade, professional and personal service, and clerical occupations (Department of National War Services and Dominion Bureau

of Statistics 1941 Specialized Occupations National Registration 1940
1941 RG 2 vol. 6 Files: M-5 Labour Supply Investigation).

To achieve each of their allotted tasks, the statisticians adopted the high technology of their time, employing the use of punch cards, sorting and tabulating machines (Temporary Committee on National Registration 1940 Letter re: National Registration June 25th 1940 RG 27 vol. 993 file: 2-102 pt.1). These "punch-card records ma[de] it possible to arrange or select card documents at great speed and with little chance of error," in addition to enabling significant data processing and the printing off of held data (IBM 1962: 5). In transferring collected data to punch cards, the limitations of space within the card's 9 row, 80 column format meant that conscious decisions needed to be made regarding how data would be categorized based on what kinds of criteria government officials wanted registered individuals to later be tabulated and sorted. Classified data then needed to be coded and physically punched into the 0-9 row numbers that made up each column (see Figure 1-10).

When the punch card was read by a sorting or tabulating machine, a brush would pass over each column and note which number had been punched out. In this way, data was required to be coded into ten (1- 9 plus 0) or less categories if they were to fit on one column of the punch card, making the choice of what categories to adopt in this process significant in determining what data would be made visible and actionable by these technologies and their outputs.

Under the punch card system employed by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics "nationality" data was classified under one of seven categories – noting

if the individual was a (1) British Subject by Birth or (2) by Naturalization, (3) if the individual was a Canadian citizen by birth but not a British Subject (Canadian Born Alien), (4) if the individual was a British born Alien (non-Canadian citizen), (5) if the individual was an Enemy Alien, (6) or a non-enemy or “Other Alien”, or (7) if the individual was considered to be “stateless” under international law.

These punch cards also incorporated the individual’s birthplace, distinguishing between those born in (1) Canada, (2) within another part of the British Empire, (3) the United States, (4) Germany and Austria, (5) Italy and Albania, (6) USSR/Russia, (7) the Baltic States, (8) Other European Countries or (9) simply “other countries.” Two columns were dedicated to the classification of an individual’s racial origin, depicting the 18 categories of (1) English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, Manx, (2) French, (3) Austrian (n.o.s.), (4) Belgian, (5) Czech & Slovak, (6) Dutch, (7) Finnish, (8) German, (9) Hungarian, (10) Italian, (11) Jewish, (12) Polish, (13) Romanian, (14) Russian, (15) Scandinavian, (16) Ukrainian, (17) Asiatic, and (18) Other. The knowledge of languages was also allocated two columns and was broken down into four classifications regarding the “official languages” of English and French, (1) Speaking English Only, (2) Speaking French Only, (3) Speaking English and French, (4) Cannot Speak English nor French; and nine classifications of “Other Languages,” (1) German or Austrian, (2) Italian, (3) Magyar,¹⁶ (4) Polish, (5) Scandinavian, (6) Russian, (7) Ukrainian, (8) Yiddish, and (9) “Various.”

The decision to develop the categories used in tabulation in this way notes a greater adherence to the rationality of citizenship and the stressing of individual

¹⁶ Magyar is a term here referring to the Hungarian language.

utility, as opposed to the categories of the rationality of British Subjecthood. In particular, the National Registration questions which had stressed British Subjecthood, nationality and allegiance in the instructions provided to Registrars, discussed earlier in this chapter, adopted instead three categories which specifically asserted relationships inherent of Canadian citizenship – that is being “British Born Aliens,” “Canadian Born Aliens,” and the “stateless” classifications. Furthermore, the eighteen chosen categories of “racial origin” are also of interest in that only two (English and French) were explained in the instructions, while the racial distinctions of Indians, Half-Breeds, Negros, Japanese and others were not considered to be of importance in the development of Dominion Bureau of Statistics lists of qualified labour within their “specialized occupations” of wartime production. This is not to say that these racial distinctions were not important in the application of National Registration categories (see below), but they were chosen not to be stressed or made visible within this analysis of necessary occupations.

Education was allocated one column on the punch card, and noted the completion of primary, secondary, university and post graduate degrees, but special attention was given to technical training in Bookkeeping, stenography and typing. The health of the individuals was incorporated into two columns, dedicating one column to the categorization of general health as “good,” “fair” and “bad,” though the second column was highly detailed in noting nine particular disabilities of (1) Blindness, (2) Deaf-Mute, (3) Lost one eye, (4) Lost one hand or One Arm, (5) Lost two Hands or Two Arms, (6) Lost one Leg, (7) Lost Two

Legs, (8) Cannot Use Hands nor Legs, (9) Other Disabilities, and (10) Deafness. Again, the utility of individuals was stressed in this application of categories, as the identification of particular disabilities were recorded in great detail in order to understand what level of work these individuals could be directed to if needed. The card's remaining 15 columns were dedicated to the recording of occupation and employment data. Cards listed four occupations: one's "present occupation," noting in which occupation the individual was employed at the time of registration in 1940; one's "regular occupation," which noted if the individual was trained in a second occupation but was not employed in it at that time; one's "special occupation," this section being used to note if an individual was trained in a second occupation, that was classified as necessary to the war effort; and finally one's principal occupation, which combined some of the more detailed occupations to make a list of 200 principal occupations. Other than the principal occupation, each was allocated four columns for the identification and classification of the types of work, while one additional column recorded the number of years of experience the individual had in that occupation. In this way, the four columns dedicated to the classification of occupations allowed for incredibly fine understandings of Canadian labour power, as these columns would allow for up to 10,000 different categories to be applied.

Also incorporated into the employment sections in the punch card was a category defined internally as "status," which denoted one's position within the capitalist mode of production, noting if the individual was (1) an Employer, (2) self employed, or worked on their Own Account, (3) Wage-Earner at Work, (4)

Unemployed, (5) Home Maker, (6) Retried, (7) Students, (8) had Never Worked, or (9) an Inmate of an Institution (see Figure 1-10).

Figure 1-10. Punch Card Columns used in the Tabulation of Specialized Occupations 1940-1941

1. Principal Number (3 columns)		2. Name and Address Information	
3. Electoral District (3 columns)		4. Polling Division (3 columns)	
5. Card Number (3 columns)		6. Age (2 columns)	
7. Conjugal Condition	1. Single 2. Married on or after July 15 th 1940 3. Married 4. Married and Separated 5. Widowed 6. Divorced 0. Not Stated	8. Birthplace	1. Canada 2. British Empire 3. United States 4. Germany and Austria 5. Italy and Albania 6. USSR (Russia) 7. Balkan States 8. Other European Countries 9. Other Countries 0. Not Stated
9. Nationality	1. British Born 2. British Naturalized 3. Canadian born Alien 4. British born Alien 5. Enemy Alien 6. Other Alien 7. Stateless 0. Not Stated	10. Racial Origin	01. English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, Manx 02. French 03. Austrian (n.o.s.) 04. Belgian 05. Czech & Slovak 06. Dutch 07. Finnish 08. German 09. Hungarian 10. Italian 20. Jewish 30. Polish 40. Romanian 50. Russian 60. Scandinavian 70. Ukrainian 80. Asiatic 90. Other 00. Not Stated
11. Official Language	1. Speaking English Only 2. Speaking French Only 3. Speaking English and French 4. Cannot Speak English nor French 0. Not Stated	12. Other Language	1. German or Austrian 2. Italian 3. Magyar 4. Polish 5. Scandinavian 6. Russian 7. Ukrainian 8. Yiddish 9. Various 0. Not Stated
13. Education	1. Primary 2. Secondary 3. Business College 4. Stenography and Typing 5. Technical High School 6. Bookkeeping 7. Bachelor Degree (BA BSc BSA etc) 8. Post Graduate Degree (MA MSA etc.) 9. Not Stated	14. Health	1. Good 2. Fair 3. Bad 4. Not Stated
15. Disability	1. Blind 2. Deaf-Mute 3. Lost One Eye 4. Lost One Hand or One Arm 5. Lost Two Hands or Two Arms 6. Lost One Leg 7. Lost Two Legs 8. Cannot Use Hands nor Legs 9. Other Disabilities' 0. Deaf	16. Status	1. Employer 2. Own Account 3. Wage-Earner at Work 4. Unemployed 5. Home Maker 6. Retried 7. Student 8. Never Worked 9. Inmate of Institution
17. Present Occupation "all persons engaged in a specialized occupation at the time of the National Registration of August 1940. In addition, persons who happened to be idle or unemployed at that date were enumerated as of the occupation followed when last employed."		18. Years of Experience	0. Under 1 Year 1. 1 Year 2. 2 Years 3. 3 Years 4. 4 Years 5. 5 Years 6. 6 Years 7. 7 Years and Over 8. Completed Training, No Experience 9. Years not Stated - If Blank, Hobby or Partial Training, No Experience.
19. Regular Occupation "This classification consisted mainly of persons whose regular or usual, occupations were specialized, but were different from those on which they were engaged at the date of Registration. In these cases if the present and regular occupations were both specialized, the registrants would be included on each list."		21. Special Occupation "These occupations were selected on a broad basis to determine the persons who by training or experience might be fitted for employment in industries or services essential to Canada's War effort."	
20 & 22. Years of Experience		(see above)	

Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration; see Figure 1-11).

Figure 1-11. Punch Card Printout of Listed Individuals by Occupation 1940-1941

INDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL IN 1940		ELECTORAL DISTRICT		ROLLING VOTING CARD NUMBER		AGE		CONJUGAL CONDITION		BIRTHPLACE		NATIONALITY		RACIAL ORIGIN		OFFICIAL LANGUAGE		OTHER LANGUAGES		EDUCATION		HEALTH		DISABILITY		STATUS		EXPERIENCE IN YEARS	
Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description	Code	Description
20	COMEAU N PORT ELGIN N B	17	1	5	72	44	3	1	10	3	30	13	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
17	HENDERSON A H SUSSEX N B	12	1	2	25	48	3	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
12	PARKER HARRY F 41 SHIRLEY AV MONCTON N B	14	6	8	32	40	3	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
14	KELLY W 128 PRINCE EDWARD ST JOHN N B	20	1	32	13	47	3	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
20	MURRAY L RRI MONCTON N B																												
20	BELLIVEAU ALPHONSE 25 MAPLE MONCTON N B	18	1	74	15	57	3	1	10	3	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	CUMING W E 64 GARDEN ST JOHN N B	12	4	41	10	58	3	1	10	1	30	12	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
12	BATSON CHARLES M WELCHPOOL N B																												
21	DUPLISEA H L HOYT STATION N B	18	2	02	8	2	1	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	WILSON FREDERICK 51 MAGAZINE ST JOHN N B	18	4	5	24	58	3	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	RARTLETT WILLIAM E 9 GILBERTS LANE ST JOHN	20	5	1	34	65	3	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
20	BALSER G W R R 1 MEMRAMCOOK N B	17	1	8	18	6	3	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
17	LINDSAY S YOUNGS COVE RD N B																												
11	WOOD CARVERS																												
18	MILLETT ROSS A L 236 CHARLOTTE ST JOHN NB	18	9	7	15	16	1	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	HOFFORD C L JR BEACON AV E ST JOHN N B																												
18	DEICHMANN L K MOSS GLEN N B	18	3	4	11	39	3	8	2	60	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
11	FINISHERS AND POLISHERS																												
12	LUNN JAMES H MARKDALE ONT	12	4	14	32	19	1	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	GALLANT D B 240 KING ST ST JOHN W N B	18	1	24	11	38	3	1	10	3	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
17	LUXFORD W H PETER SUSSEX N B	17	3	6	19	41	3	1	10	1	30	12	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
13	GIONET R ST JOHN ST BATHURST N B	13	2	2	19	4	50	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
23	MCMILLAN N 2628 E 42 VANCOUVER B C	18	7	7	19	59	1	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	MONTFORD W C 142 PRINCESS ST JOHN N B	18	9	9	3	52	4	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
18	KNAPMAN A D 118 QUEEN ST ST JOHN N B																												
18	CANNON F H 21 SYDNEY ST JOHN N B	18	6	6	18	6	4	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
11	PATTERN MAKERS WOOD N O R																												
16	DICKSON E WELLS DALHOUSIE N B	16	1	04	83	21	1	1	10	1	30	11	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	

NB - Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1941 Punch Card Printout of Specialized Occupations 1941 RG 27 vol. 993 file: National Registration pt.2

Although lists were shared with all departments, they were utilized primarily by the Department of Labour and the Department of Munitions and Supply in their management of conscription and industry in order to control the impact of conscripted soldiers being taken out of work positions and being sent to the front (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Upon request the government's National Registration data was also made available to identify and locate men, this service being extended to Departments and Bureaus of Provincial and Federal Governments, foreign Governments, and selected Non-Governmental Agencies (Department of Labour 1949: 22).¹⁷

The Dominion Bureau of Statistics report on the general statistics regarding the peoples of Canada reported the primary results of tabulations from National Registration in the early days of 1941. The report noted that a total of 7,862,920 individuals were registered, and of those who registered, 3,979,680 identified as male and 3,883,240 as female. In regards to education, 4,641,730 were noted as having achieved a primary education and 1,961,180 secondary,

¹⁷ Specifically, internal documents report access to National Registration files by the Red Cross, Railway companies, welfare organizations and life insurance companies (Archives Canada RG 28, Vol.162, File 3-18-10), however, the National Registration's offices had already started to receive requests from the general public to locate individuals by the early 1940s. In some cases names and addresses were released without warrant or specific government authority (Department of National War Services 1941 Letter to Captain G.R. Benoit, September 10 1941. Archives of Canada. RG 27 vol. 993, file: 2-102 pt.1). On September 6th 1941 the *Montreal Daily Star* Reported: "if you want to know where anybody's whereabouts in Canada chances are that the National War Services Department, through use of National Registration cards, can tell you. For instance N. McLean of Winnipeg, wrote to a Toronto paper regarding the whereabouts of Roderick MacLeod who left Stornoway, Scotland in 1923 and was in Winnipeg in 1924. Here's what National War Services found out for him: There are 30 Roderick MacLeods in Canada over the age of 16; 26 were born in Scotland, seven came to Canada in 1923, and two came from Stornoway. By provinces the Roderick MacLeod register is Nova Scotia, one; New Brunswick, one; Manitoba, four; Alberta, five; Ontario, seven; British Columbia, 12. Now it's up to MacLean to learn where his Roderick MacLeod is by writing the seven MacLeods that came to Canada in 1923 and whose addresses were supplied to him."

436,700 individuals reported business or college degrees – of which 52,000 were specifically noted as having stenography and typing training – 212,540 were noted as having attained a technical high school education, 34,030 were trained in book keeping knowledge, while 131,320 were reported to have completed bachelor or postgraduate degrees.

In regards to health, 4,514,670 were reported to be in good health, 2,781,610 in fair health, 539,340 in bad health, while over 27,300 had neglected to answer this question. In addition, the report singled out specific ailments, noting 6,960 blind men, 30,190 men without one eye, 28,930 deaf men, 16,260 with the loss of an arm or a leg, while the conscious decision was made not to tabulate the health data for women. Unemployment data was also tabulated showing that 306,520 individuals were unemployed, 222,400 of which were men, and 60,000 of which had reported not having worked a week in the previous 12 months. Tabulated farming data reported that of the total 3,979,680 men who answered the questions, 2,028,270, or 50.9 % reported not having grown up on a farm, while 1,593,190 reported that they could handle horses and 1,955,990 reported their ability to milk a cow. Tabulated female data noted that 1,157,210 or almost 29.8 % were capable of milking a cow while only 53,590, or 1.4 %, were comfortable driving a tractor (The Ottawa Journal 1941 National Registration Shows 7,862,920 Tabulated April 4th 1941 RG 3 vol. 978 file 11-11-12; Department of National War Services and Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1941 National Registration, August, 1940: Preliminary Statistical Tabulations - Folio D 768.15 P7 CWM 1941 Canadian War Museum).

These statistics then provided the “basis of government policy in deciding the number of men Canada had available for the Armed Forces, the number available for industry and thus the relationship between the Armed Forces and Industry in Canada’s War effort” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos.T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). When this secondary work was done, the priority shifted to the generation of a complete list of those working or capable of working in agriculture.

National Registration and Classification / Conclusion

After the statistical analysis and the lists of men qualified to work in necessary industries had been printed and distributed, the government’s attention turned to the conscription, or mobilization of men into the Armed Forces. On September 11th 1940 Order-in-Council PC 4671 was passed, designating the ages of men to be conscripted into the Armed Forces. Requisitions for 382,021 men were then submitted to National Registration offices across the country to call men into service. As a result of the collection of detailed personal information as part of the Initial Registration in August of 1940, registered individuals were identified, assessed and sorted into set categories based on the rationalities of subjecthood – which asserted relations of *who the individual was* within the natural order of British Imperialism – and citizenship – which asserted relationships of *what the*

individual did, or their utility and participation in furthering the state's goals regarding manpower in the Armed Forces and wartime industrial production.

In this way, the National Registration system developed its own categories which sorted and delineated populations living within Canada, and ascribed onto these individuals prescribed ways of being in relation to the British Crown and the state's goals. This classification process effectively separated the country's registered population into twelve distinct categories, each of which having been allocated its own specified set of governmentally ascribed duties or required social performances, which were then to be exercised over the targeted populations (see Figure 1-12).

Figure 1-12. The Ascribed Governmental Categories of Mobilization 1940-1946

Category	Determining Factors	Ascribed Duties
Unavailable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Those out of the country - Deceased - Incarcerated - Members of the Home Defence Army ("R", NRMA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report any changes in address, marital, employment, or current NRMA status.
Too Young	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age 16 – 18½ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Register when attaining the age of 16, report any changes in address, marital, employment or armed forces status.
Not Yet Sent - Order Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age 18½ - 45 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report any changes in address, marital, employment or armed forces status.
Order-Medical Examination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age 18½ – 45 - Recipient of an Order Medical 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need to report for medical assessment within 30 days.
Order-Military Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age 18½ - 45 - Completed medical exam - Recipient of an Order Military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need to report for 4 months of military training.
Necessary due to Specialized Occupation/ Postponement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age 18½ - 45 - Completed medical exam - Successful postponement hearing - Holder of Certificate of Postponement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need to maintain employment and report to Mobilization Board any change in employment status, and any calls for reassessment.
Postponement Under Review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Age 18½ - 45 - Completed medical exam 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report to Military Mobilization Board for assessment.
Aliens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foreign national, naturalized citizen or Canadian individual with patrilineal linkages to specified "enemy" and "friendly" countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Report any changes in address, marital status and employment. - For Enemy Aliens, curfews, property confiscation and

		internment.
Statutory Exceptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Clergy^A - Police - Fire Fighters - Students - Judges - Wardens and Officers of penitentiaries, prisons, lunatic asylums and mental hospitals 	- Report any changes in address, marital, employment, armed forces or “current” status.
Armed Forces	- Enrolled in the Armed Forces	- Maintain active “A” or General Service status
Not in Good Standing	- Those violating mobilization legislation or regulations	- To report and re-attain good standing; to be tried within the criminal justice system
Sorted Out	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Too old (ages 45+) - Women 	- Report any changes in address, marital, employment, armed forces or “current” status.

NB- A - Clergy were defined by the Deputy Minister of Justice as being part of a religious denomination under section 3(2)(d) of the 1942 Mobilization Regulations. Registrars were to consult the appropriate representative Army Chaplain (Protestant or Catholic) to ascertain the particulars of men claiming religious occupation” (Department of Labour 1943 Interpretive Letter #6 Dec. 2nd 1943 RG 27 vol. 37 file: 1). Table data based on information presented in Department of Labour 1949; Department of Labour 1943 Interpretive Letter #6 Dec. 2nd 1943 RG 27 vol. 37 file: 1; Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular Memorandum 67 Dec. 2 1943 RG 27 vol. 37 file: 1; National War Services 1940 National Selective Services (Recruits) 1940 F229-36, Box 11, B273360 file: War General “N-V”.

Men over the age of 45 in 1940, as well as women, were completely sorted out of the military mobilization component of the National Registration program, while males aged 18½ - 45 faced the categories that demanded the most significant acts of conformity, including military training, deployment, and in some cases, the forced performance of military combat.

Within these categories the rationalities of subjecthood and citizenship found expression in how the National Registration system’s categories were shaped and how these categories were defined. In regards to mobilization, the rationality of subjecthood asserted the right of the British Crown to call British Subjects into service, in addition to asserting the subsequent duty of British subjects to serve. This rationality also informed what kind of performances would be required of aliens, as these individuals legally held allegiances to different

sovereigns, and as such, could not be called on to loyally serve, nor could they any longer claim the legal protection of the British Crown. National Registration specifically took into account the sovereign under which these individuals held allegiance, whether they were presently subjects or had been historically, as cases of dual allegiance through naturalization reverted to the sovereign under which the individual was born. Subjecthood also asserted the importance of the natural social hierarchy of races in the interpretation of registrants' "racial origin," expressly noting distinctive patrilineal relations in defining the English, French and western European races, though reverting to the "single drop of blood" criteria for those deemed to be of "coloured stock" or of mixed heritage.

In regards to the rationalities of citizenship, the categories of mobilization expressed a highly rationalized understanding of an individual's utility to the war effort, either through industrial production, through service in the Armed Forces or other potential needs of the home front. In particular, the classification of individuals through a stressing of occupational skills, training and experience, denotes this relationship strongly, as those deemed to be necessary for specialized industries would be protected, or "postponed," from being conscripted into military service. The statistical analysis of Canada's labour power specifically included the skill sets of women and the clear definition of how certain individuals were handicapped, denoting how fully these technologies rationalized an individual's utility to the state and incorporated it into its mobilization classifications. In addition to this, mobilization officials drew heavily on rationalities of citizenship, which tied participation in the state with the rights of

polity, as specific policy was designed to exclude Oriental peoples from mobilization categories for reasons that government officials did not want these peoples to be considered as citizens or be able to claim the right to vote or retain the status of full Canadian citizenship. In this way, mobilization classifications inject specific social roles and duties into individuals and populations which were structured by who the National Registration data said they were in relation to the rationalities of subjecthood, and what they did in relation to the rationalities of citizenship.

It is important to note, however, that the move from internal, governmentally legislated categories to the observed conformity of individuals' performances was not a simple one, and did require the complex development and application of specific technologies designed to govern individual actions. In order to investigate this relationship between governance, technologies and classification, the remainder of this work takes up the concept of categorical tightness – which demonstrates the degree to which governance finds expression within particular populations by comparing the content or definition of the categories developed within the system's governing rationalities with the observed performances of the system's targeted populations – as its means of analysis. In this particular case study, the observed performances of those classified to be mobilized onto the Armed Forces will be compared to the socio-legal duty of their ascribed categories.

Over the next three chapters this work demonstrates in detail the various technologies that were designed and adopted in order to make up the National

Registration and mobilization system, as a means of understanding how exactly this system worked to tighten the ascribed categories of the National Registration system onto individuals and populations. In short, this work argues that Canada's World War Two National Registration system was able to take developed bureaucratic classifications, and make them fixed, governing elements, of national culture, individual identity and individual action. In this way, this research takes up the question of how these acts of governance were achieved, through what technological means, and how this application of mobilization categories impacted classified individuals and populations living in Canada during the Second World War.

The following chapter takes up this question in relation to how individuals were conscripted into the Armed Forces, while chapter three explores this question as it relates to the development of the system's enforcement capabilities which worked to identify non-conforming individuals and bring them back into compliance with their ascribed categories. In each of these cases, however, the governing rationalities of subjecthood and citizenship provide the basis of, and means through which, applied categories were defined and understood, and as such established a basis of measure for empirical research into the capacity of imposed technologies to tighten categories onto populations.

Chapter 2

Mobilization I: Calling Men into the Armed Forces

Now therefore know ye that pursuant to The National Resource Mobilization Act, 1940 and the War Measures Act, and pursuant to and in accordance with the National War Services Regulations, 1940, promulgated under the provisions of the said Acts, we do hereby call out the aforesaid classes of men to submit themselves for medical examination and to undergo military training. – Proclamation Calling Up For Military Training, September 11, 1940. The Canada Gazette

In Canada much attention has been given to the question of conscription during the Second World War. These accounts, often emphasize the divide in political support between English and French Canadians that culminated in the conscription crisis of 1944. For the most part, they frame this history as sets of political arguments and maneuvers between delineated social groups and political parties. Although these politics are significant, and will be addressed in later chapters, what this framing of the discussion misses is the significance of the government's development and implementation of a new and vast surveillance system whose technologies were specifically designed to shape the behaviors of classified individuals across the country. Also lost is a proper acknowledgement of the significance of the role that these technologies played in shaping the lives of Canadians over the course of the war. To address these points, this chapter charts the government's creation of governing categories as a part of the mobilization component of the National Registration program, arguing that the implementation of particular surveillance technologies resulted in an observable change in the performances of classified individuals, as categories tightened

around them the actions these individuals took in accordance with constructed definitions of imposed social categories.

As was addressed in the introduction, governance exists as an interplay between sets of governing rationalities and implemented technologies, while categorical tightness refers to the degree of mediation of individuals' performances in relation to categories defined as part of a governing system's rationalities. This chapter assesses the relative tightness, or the degree to which the observed performances of men called-up into service came into conformity with the classifications of the mobilization system's governing rationalities, in order to demonstrate the relationship between specific technologies of governance and the capacity of governing systems to communicate and assert sets of required actions onto individuals and populations. More specifically, this chapter argues that two elements of the technologies and social organization of the mobilization system rendered it more effective in governing the observed performances of its target populations, or in other words; these technological innovations worked to tighten the system's ascribed categories. First, the adoption of technologies that worked to standardize how applied classifications were used, understood and allowed the social contexts of the used classifications to be transmitted between individuals and institutions; and second, technologies that worked to enable a form of "reactive path dependency" – that is, technologies which ordered and shaped how data was dealt with within the system, developing a sequential chain of events through which the data progressed, and in which each event within the sequence was implemented as a reaction to the previous event (Mahoney 2000:

509). In short, this chapter addresses the question of what technologies worked to increase the governing capacity of the mobilization system and how exactly the discriminating and forceful decisions about individuals made within this system were pressed outward onto populations throughout the country – addressing not only the capacity of this system to impact the life trajectories of individuals, but perhaps more importantly, developing an understanding of how these technologies did so, and what it was that made this system so effective in shaping the lives of over 150,000 men.

Referred to, within the government of the time, as “mobilization,” a term specifically chosen in order to avoid the touchy politics associated with conscription, the design and implementation of Canada’s registration and mobilization program sought to address the government’s problem of how to take men who had not volunteered or chosen to join the war effort and somehow press them into service. This coercive act, though glossed over in most historical accounts, was responsible for far reaching decisions concerning who was sent to fight, how they were “called-up” and what social acts these men were expected to perform as part of their compulsory mobilization. In order to perform these tasks, the Department of National War Services developed a detailed system of surveillance and social control which adopted the data and technologies of the National Registration program and ultimately worked to coordinate the actions of the Department of Defence, the Department of Labour, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, the Postal Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, local police forces across the country and the Criminal Justice System.

At first glance, registration and ID cards may not seem to suggest the tightness of imposed categories in quite the same way as the more obvious expressions of the heavy handed enforcement technologies such as the raids conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the developed fear regarding incarceration – matters which will be taken up in the following chapter. However, it is important to address the fact that these technologies, like any other technologies of surveillance, worked to establish a system to deal with a multitude of individuals that was “committed to compiling information about them for the purpose of discriminating decision-making, and using that decision-making apparatus to enforce compliance with certain rules” (Rule 1973: 98). In this way, the link between implemented technologies and the tightness, or mediating capacity, of governmentally ascribed categories can be seen in the capability of the mobilization system’s technological innovations to “call-up” individuals into service in the Armed Forces. It is also important to note, regardless of the degree of normality that the concept of WWII conscription now holds culturally, that this system’s classifications carried real, serious, and lasting social consequences for those it touched – having ultimately pressed over 150,000 individuals who did not choose to join the Armed Forces, into service in the Army, forcing 9,667 individuals to be deployed to the European front, 2,463 to fight in operational units, and leaving 232 wounded, 13 taken prisoner and 69 killed (Byers 1996: 202). As a result, the classifications used within the mobilization system and the effectiveness of implemented technologies to tighten the categories that were employed, becomes a crucial part of understanding the social role that

conscription played in governing the lives of those living in Canada during the Second World War.

Though every individual over sixteen living within the country who had complied with the initial registration in 1940 had already been identified and assessed through the analyses performed under the Dominion Bureau of Statistics,¹ the challenge to be overcome by government officials after the registration had been completed, was how to select specific individuals for mobilization, ensure that every classified individual was aware of the classification they fell under and lived up to the required duties they now had in relation to mobilization policy. To address this need, the conscription, or mobilization, component of the National Registration program was developed to perform four central tasks: first, to continue and refine the social sorting function of maintaining the separation between those who were deemed necessary to support industry and government from those who were available to be directed into the Armed Forces, as had been asserted by the initial work done by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics; second, to identify and locate the individuals classified; third, to inform these individuals of their ascribed category and corresponding duties; and fourth, to ensure that they complied with government mobilization policy (Ibid; Department of National War Services, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1941 National Registration Regulations. National Archives of Canada. RG-3, Vol. 978, file: 11-11-12 vol.2: 1).

In keeping with some of the main insights of surveillance studies, this chapter asserts that the capacity of governing systems to mediate the

¹ For more detail regarding this sorting process see Chapter 1.

performances of individuals is highly dependent upon the technologies that are employed. In this case, the relative effectiveness of the various technologies used to call men into service is demonstrated by means of comparing the number of men that the system was able to call into service. As such, tracing the uses of technologies and information within the mobilization system's "calling-up" of men is critically important in developing an understanding of the effectiveness of particular technologies in tightening the categories of the mobilization system onto individuals. This material also speaks to how these "call-up" technologies related to the system's enforcement mechanisms and the associated politics that developed in light of the system's imposition of categories – topics which will be taken up in detail in chapter 4.

During the Second World War mobilization technology passed through three distinct organizational periods, allowing for a comparative analysis of the degree of tightness expressed through their applied technologies. The first period, dating between the initial registration of 1940 and March 1942, relied upon local control over the selection process, enabling the discretion of local registrars in the selection of men and the input from local business interests to formulate decisions regarding how individuals would be classified and who would be called into service.

The second period, spanning from March 1942 to August 1943, saw the management of mobilization placed under the Department of Labour and experienced a complete reorganization in order to address concerns regarding perceived unfairness in the selection process and a lack of oversight of

mobilization in general. During this period, the Department of Labour implemented a statistically based management strategy which incorporated the tools of manpower accounting to perform and maintain its classification of individuals. As it will be shown, this period was the most effective in calling men into service, enlisting over 84,500 men.

The final period, dating between August 1943 and August 1946, returned the selection process to local control as a result of political opposition to the perceived “automated,” or path dependant, nature of the mobilization process experienced in the previous period, though Registrars chose to keep much of the classification technology brought about in 1942. With these changes the effectiveness of the mobilization system was decreased, dropping the monthly average of men called by 4,175.

Analysis of these three historical periods demonstrate how Canada’s mobilization system was structured and how implemented technologies significantly impacted the capacity of this system to govern the actions of those who were classified as “available.” Additionally, it speaks to the capacity of specific technologies to tighten imposed categories onto individuals and populations, leading to an observed compliance with imposed categories. In this way, this work not only speaks to the specific history of mobilization during the Second World War but presents evidence of the governing capacity of National Registration programs and state run personal identification technologies, as well as the potentiality of these applied surveillance technologies within modern contexts.

THE INITIAL MOBILIZATION SYSTEM (AUGUST 1940 – MARCH 1942)

Because of the significant changes that were made to the mobilization system between the three historical periods under study, this section is devoted to demonstrating the link between the social organization and technologies deployed between 1940 and 1942 and their effectiveness in tightening the system's classifications onto targeted individuals. In particular, this section notes the capacity of these technologies to maintain how the system's categories were read and used across different geographical locations and inform the performances of individuals. Specifically, this section demonstrates how information was recorded and moved within the mobilization system, how decisions were made internally and the results in terms of how many individuals were called-up, I note the effectiveness of official orders issued by the Federal Government, and the dependence on the discretion of local authorities as the key technologies of the 1940-42 period. Although this material is of historical interest in its own right, the details of how the mobilization system worked builds the groundwork for a comparative analysis between the technologies and social organization within this and later historical periods. The following sections delineate the innovations made to social organization and technologies that were brought in as part of the two later historical periods, 1942-43, 1943-46, as well as their respective results regarding the number of men called-up.

Mobilization was legislated under the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (NRMA) in the summer of 1940. The act empowered the Governor-in-

Council to call up men from across the country for compulsory military training – noting that the Governor-in-Council may make “such orders and regulations, requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community” (*National Resources and Mobilization Act* 1940 ch.13 s.2). Though the *Act* enabled individuals to be called up into the military, public opposition to conscription forced a compromise in which soldiers called in this way would carry a distinctive “R,” “Home Defence,” or “NRMA” classification and could only be deployed to protect Canada and its territorial waters (*The Star* June 18th 1940 *To Register All At Once For Defence Plan*).²

Under the legislation, the Governor-in-Council could call up a designated class of men, distinguished by age group and marital status through a proclamation made by his office (*National Resources and Mobilization Act* 1940 ch.13 s.2). The first such proclamation, P.C. 4671, was made on September 11th 1940 and designated unmarried³ men, aged 21 to 24 without children, requiring them to report for a 30 day training period with the Army. Subsequent designations extended the training period to 4 months in January of 1941, while in April of that same year men were kept on for permanent duty in Canada (Stacey

² For a further explanation of the “R” Classification see Chapter 4

³ “Unmarried” men referred to men unmarried, as well as those who had been divorced, judicially separated or widowed and were without children on July 15th 1940 (Department of Labour 1944 *The Military Call Up* RG 27 vol. 3009 file: Mobilization Procedures).

1970: 399). Under further designations, by 1944 all men aged 18 and 6 months to 31 and all unmarried men aged 26 to 41 had been called in this way (Department of Labour 1944 The Military Call Up RG 27 vol. 3008 file: Mobilization Procedures; see figure 2-1).

Figure 2-1. Proclamations Pertaining to Mobilization 1940-1944

No	Date	Proclamation	Called	Newly Designated Men	Cumulative Total of Designated Men
1	Sep. 11 th 1940	P.C. 4671	All unmarried men who were 21, 22, 23 and 24 on the 1 st of July 1940	382,021	382,021 ^A
2	Feb. 20 th 1941	P.C. 1281	All unmarried men who were between 21 and 45 on the 1 st of July 1940	211,188	170,833
3	June 27 th 1941	P.C. 4644	All unmarried men who were 21, 22, 23 and 24 on the 1 st of July 1940	211,188	382,021
4	Mar. 21 st 1942	P.C. 2192	Every unmarried man born between 1912 and 1921 (age 21-30)	302,565	684,586
5	June 16 th 1942	P.C. 5110	Every unmarried man born between 1907 and 1921 (age 21-35)	141,891	826,477
6	July 7 th 1942	P.C. 5841	Every unmarried man born between 1902 and 1922 (age 20-40)	195,153	1,021,630
7	Sept. 30 th 1942	P.C. 8919	Every unmarried man born between 1902 and 1923 (age 20-40)	109,574	1,131,204
8	Dec. 15 th 1942	P.C. 11326	Any man regardless of marital status born between 1917 and 1923 (aged 19-28)	39,680	1,170,884
9	Feb. 1 st 1943	P.C. 809	Any man regardless of marital status born between 1917 and 1924 (aged 19-28)	120,680	1,291,260
10	Apr. 7 th 1943	P.C. 3131	Any man born between 1917 and 1924 (aged 19-28) and unmarried men (aged 26-41)	No Change	1,291,260
11	Aug. 9 th 1943	P.C. 5708	Any man born between 1913 and 1925 (aged 18 and 6 months-30) and unmarried men (aged 26-41) ^B	236,346	1,527,606
12	June 16 th 1944	P.C. 4238	Any man born between 1913 and 1926 (aged 18 and 6 months-31) and unmarried men (aged 26-41)	111,283	1,638,889

NB – A - the first proclamation only required a 30 day training period. This was lengthened to 4 months for the second and all subsequent proclamations. B - On October 25th 1943 Registrars were informed that the Army would not accept individuals older than 38 with the exception of volunteers for special duties.

Department of Labour 1944 Proclamations Pertaining to Mobilization RG 27 vol. 3001 Duplicate Regulations 1944 Proclamation; Appendix "N" Changes in Regulations Concerning Men Called up Under National Resources Mobilization Act 194-1944 in Stacey 1970: 586.

Though calling up individuals for military training was made legal through these proclamations, the act of organizing the training of men fell to the Defence Department, and the work of mobilizing these men, of classifying them, choosing them, informing them, and ensuring that they did in fact go to the Military Training centers, was the duty of the Department of National War Services and its staff of Registrars. Policy developed regarding the mobilization of men explained that “when the Defence Department require[d] men for a compulsory military training, that Department requisitions the [Department of National War Services] for the number of men required and General La Fleche, through his [Divisional] offices, calls out these men and delivers them to the military authorities at the camp door” (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum Jos. T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

To achieve this feat, the country was separated into 13 regional Provincial Administrative Divisions, distinguished bureaucratically by letter and associated key city.⁴ These Divisions were then administrated by Mobilization Boards⁵ working initially under the management of the Department of War Services and

⁴ “A” London, Ontario; “B” Toronto, Ontario; “C” Kingston, Ontario; “D” Port Arthur, Ontario; “E” Montréal, Quebec; “F” Quebec, Quebec; “G” Halifax, Nova Scotia; “H” Saint John, New Brunswick; “I” Charlottetown, P.E.I.; “J” Winnipeg, Manitoba; “K” Vancouver, B.C.; “M” Regina, Saskatchewan; and “N” Edmonton, Alberta. For a complete listing of electoral districts by division see Department of National War Services 1940 National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) F229-36, Box 11, B273360, file: War-General “N-V”.

⁵ The Boards, referred to in this text commonly as “Mobilization Boards” for the purpose of clarity, remained virtually consistent over the entire mobilization period, however they were also known from 1940-1942 as “National War Service Boards” and from 1943-1946 as “National Selective Service Boards.”

later under the Department of Labour. The Boards consisted of three community members, and were chaired by a Judge of the Superior Court, they also included at least two other predominant members of the district (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 8(2) F229-36, Box 11, B273360 file: War-General “N-V”). Additionally, each Board was allocated a Divisional Registrar, along with a support staff of clerks, typists and stenographers (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 8(5) and (6)). In this way, Mobilization Divisions were comprised of two parts: “the administrative branch and the judicial branch” (Department of Labour 1943 Address of Major-General H.J. Riley, D.S.O. , Associate Director of National Selective Service, to Meeting of Registrars, June 15th 1943, at 2pm RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). While the latter was designed to oversee mobilization call-ups, their actual allotted duties were almost exclusively directed towards the review and judgement of requests for “postponement” – legal passes issued to supersede mobilization requirements. The local Registrars and their staff made up the administrative component of Mobilization Divisions and were charged with the duty to “see that the machinery of selection works efficiently and speedily” as well as to “bring all men in the designated classes into the process of selection and, if and when an application for postponement [wa]s made, to bring before the Board all relevant information” (Department of Labour 1943 Address of Major-General H.J. Riley, D.S.O. , Associate Director of National Selective Service, to Meeting of Registrars, June 15th 1943, at 2pm RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).

After the Department of National War Services had been requisitioned for men by the Department of Defence, quotas were sent to Divisional Registrars from Mobilization's Head Office in Ottawa requiring them to call-up a set number of men. The instruction within NRMA legislation established:

after a proclamation has been issued, the Minister upon being informed by the Department of National Defence that a given number of men are required for military training, may instruct any Divisional Registrar to call out any number of men from his division and instruct the Divisional Registrar to call out the men from his division and instruct the Divisional Registrar to call out the men for any period of military training, to be carried out or performed at any stated place or places and at any stated time. The Minister shall inform each Divisional Registrar concerned of the number of French-speaking men who are required to report to an indicated place and at an indicated time for military training (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits) sec. 9(5)*).

At the provincial Administrative Division offices Registrars were to select men based on data collected within the National Registration. As part of the initial registration, the Questionnaire Cards of all men aged 16 to 45 had already been duplicated, organized and delivered to the Registrar of their closest mobilization Administrative Division office and Divisional Registrars were to:

immediately on taking office, from the duplicate registration cards received by him from the other Registrars for the Electoral Districts within the administrative division of such Divisional Registrar, prepare the following lists of men who on the first day of July, 1940, had attained the age of 21 years and who were on the 15th day of July, 1940, unmarried or widowers without child or children (for the purposes hereof men married on the 15th day of July, 1940, are to be treated as married men as of that date) viz. (a) A list of those of the above men of the age classes of 21 to 24 inclusive engaged in agriculture, fishing, trapping, lumbering and other occupations of a seasonal character; (b) A list of those of the above the age classes of 21 to 24 inclusive who are students of colleges and universities; (c) A list of those of the above men of the age classes of 21 to 24 inclusive who are members of the Non-Permanent Active Militia, Canadian Officers' Training Corps, Royal Canadian Naval reserve units or who have served in any Canadian Naval, Military or Air Force unit; (d) A list


of all others of the above men of the age classes of 21 to 24 inclusive. The list in this sub-paragraph (d) provided for is hereinafter referred to as 'the immediate call list' (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 9(2)).

These lists were to include "the name, address, date of birth and occupation of each man ... for which provision has been made in the preceding subsection," and as soon as the lists were prepared, one copy was forwarded "to the Minister, one copy to the Board of the Administrative Division of such Divisional Registrar and one copy to the representative of the Department of National Defence" (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 9(3)-(4)). The duplicate Questionnaire Cards themselves were filed locally and form the Division's Central Registry. This register held the individual's master file and retained a complete record of all registration and mobilization data regarding the classification of the individual. Additionally, an index card was completed which contained alternative spellings of the individual's name and was incorporated as part of the Central Registry to ensure that an individuals' file could be found quickly.

Also as part of the initial registration, the National War Service Boards were furnished with lists of the names and addresses of all single men aged 19 to 45 in Canada, as well as the names of all married men of the same age in 1941 by NR Head Office, having been generated by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics based on the initial 1940 Registration data. This work was done "so that the National War Service Board in each District w[ould] thus have a complete list of all men of military age in Canada, as against the day when they may have to be a mobilization of all human resources in Canada" (Department of National War

Services 1941 Memorandum Jos. T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration). Additionally, Divisional Registrars “had the responsibility of selecting from [the] pool of designated men in his Division the men who were to be called for military training” (Department of Labour 1949: 37; see Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-2. National Registration Mobilization System 1940-1942



NB- Based on information presented in Department of Labour 1949: 37, and Department of National War Services Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1941: 1, 4.

Once selected, classified for mobilization and allocated a unique serial number containing a letter to denote the individual’s mobilization Administrative Division and a number related to the sequential order that the individual was mobilized,⁶ (Department of National War Services 1940 Circular Memorandum

⁶ The Divisional Registrar “will insert the registration number, and for the purpose of identification, will place the letter ‘[of the Division]’ immediately before the number. He should be advised to number the items in numerical sequence starting from No. 1, as the use of the identifying letter [of the Division] will obviate any confusion with other registered letters”

No.V September 9th 1940 RG 27 vol. 1488 file: 2-173 pt.1), Registrars were to “notify each man so selected, by registered post” informing them to submit themselves “for medical examination within three clear days to any one of the nearest duly appointed examining physicians in the Administrative Division in which the selected men resides and, if the[y were] found fit for military training, the Divisional Registrar [was to] notify such men, in prescribed form, by registered post, to report within three clear days for military training to an indicated military training center” (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 9(7)).

The Order-Medical Examination

Once the mobilization system had designated that an individual was to be called-up, they needed a means to press that category outward and have it inform the performances of that specific individual. In particular, the ascribed classification needed to retain the social context, or content and meaning that it held internally within the mobilization system, as it was translated outside to the particular classified individual it named, to the doctor who would examine the individual, and to the institutions of the police and criminal justice system which could be called on to enforce the individual’s classification. As a means of achieving this, the mobilization system developed the Order-Medical Examination Form (NWS 3) and the Order-Military Training. These forms were a new form of bureaucratic

technology issued through the mail and asserted an official “order” for action from the Department of National War Services, drawing on the authority of the Federal Government and threatening punitive action under the law in cases of non-compliance. Importantly these orders needed to carry the content and requirements to the new social space of the categorized individual. Specifically, they instructed the individual to report to their local doctor to receive a full medical exam (see Figure 2-3).

Figure 2-3 Order-Medical Examination Form 1941 (NWS 3)

(Notice—Medical Examination)

<p>DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES (National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940) From: The Divisional Registrar, Administrative Division "B" Toronto, Ont. (Date issued:)</p>	Sept. █/41	<p style="text-align: center;">NOTICE OF CALL Serial Number</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Re B 39259</p>
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BY PROCLAMATION OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

You have been called out to undergo military training and, in accordance with the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits), are hereby notified to present yourself for medical examination, within three clear days, to any one of the nearest duly appointed examining physicians in this Administrative Division.

TO ████████████████████
████████████████████
ARDBEG, Ont.

training. If you are found fit, you will be notified to report for military training at a time and place which will be indicated to you. This Department will pay the examining physician. If necessary, a warrant for transportation will be forwarded with the notice to report for training.

NB- Department of National War Services 1941 Order-Medical Examination Form NWS 3 1941 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-7-1.

On the reverse of the Order-Medical Examination was specific instructions as to the individual’s new classification and expected duties, asserting that:

upon receiving the enclosed ‘Notice-Medical Examination’ you will proceed, within three clear days, to any duly licensed doctor in your village, town or city, or at the nearest point to you. Show the doctor your ‘Notice-Medical Examination’ and be sure to sign the ‘Medical Examination and Certificate’ Form used by the doctor who will examine you. You are reminded that you must proceed to the doctor at your own expense and that the Department will not pay any transportation in connection with your medical examination, but the Department will pay the examining physician for examining you. Any questions which you

may wish to take up should be taken up in a letter addressed to your Divisional Registrar. His address appears in the upper left hand portion of the 'Notice-Medical Examination' (Department of National War Services 1941 Order-Medical Examination Form NWS 3 1941 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-7-1).

Men issued an Order-Medical Examination were to be given a full review when they arrived at the doctor's office – the physicians making specific notation as required on the Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) and adhering to the instructions and requirements set out in the *Physical Standards and Instructions for Medical Examination of Recruits* (1940) booklet issued by the Department of National War Services.

The Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) identified the individual by name and address as well as by the serial number allocated by Divisional Registrars. These forms were issued to physicians across the country and instructed physicians to “examine the men and complete this form and certificate,” detailing if the individual had a medical history of specific diseases and their suggested medical fitness⁷ (Department of National War Services 1941 Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1). Doctors were paid \$1.00 per examination and were to strictly

⁷ The examination form consisted of three sections; the first included the individual's name and address as well as data as to if they had ever suffered from a set of specified diseases – including Rheumatism, Tuberculosis, Bronchitis or Asthma, Heart Disease, Kidney or Bladder Disease, stomach or intestinal trouble, rupture, varicose veins, trouble with feet, nasal trouble, ear trouble, eye disease, fits, nervous or mental disease, Syphilis, Gonorrhoea, or if they had ever worn glasses or had been disabled (Department of National War Services 1941 Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1). The second section included the individual's height, complexion, eye colour, development (on a scale of good, fair or poor), hair colour, chest measurements, vision with or without glasses, hearing, mouth and teeth conditions, and if they suffered from any disability. Finally, the third section addressed the individual's medical classification on a seven point scale A, BI, BII, CI, CII, D and E – with A, indicating that the individual was fit for mobilization, and E indicating a lasting disability. The D category represented a significant but healable injury and was to include an expected timeline for recovery.

follow the guidelines provided (Canadian Medical Association 1940 Letter: August 31st 1940 RG 27 vol. 1486 file: 2-160-2). When the exam was completed the physician was to immediately convey the examination form to the Divisional Registrar within their geographical area.

When a Medical Examination and Certificate from the inspecting physician was received, the Divisional Registrar of the Administrative Division in which the man examined resided was to immediately “stamp hereupon the date the form has been received by him and w[as to] prepare or have prepared, four exact and typewritten copies of this original, showing upon the four copies the date the original was received from the examining physician” (Department of National War Services 1941 Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1). Each of these copies were to “be certified as a true and correct copy by the Divisional Registrar or by a person duly appointed by him for this purpose” and the Divisional Registrar was to “retain the first typewritten copy,” to “attach a copy to the original form and certificate received from the examining physician and w[as to] immediately forward both original form and certificate and the copy to the Department of National War Services, Ottawa” (Department of National War Services 1941 Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1). The third copy was forwarded “to the representative of the Department of National Defence” while “the last copy, if the man ha[d] been found fit for military training and [wa]s being notified to report to a military training center” was sent “to the Officer Commanding the military training center to which the

man has been instructed to report,” or if the individual was not selected it was “retained by the Divisional Registrar” (Department of National War Services 1941 Medical Examination and Certificate Form (NWS 1AR) 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1; also see Department of National War Services 1941 Notice of Medical Examinations, National War Services Regulations Material September 19th 1941 RG 27 vol. 995 file: 2-104-1-4 NWS References to Records Branch DND (Army)).

After “the man had been medically examined and the registrar was of the opinion that he was fit for military training, and if no postponement was requested and granted, his duty was to serve the man with an ‘Order-Military Training’” (*National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 9(7)). These Orders-Military were also sent by post and explained to the mobilized men their duty to report to a specific military camp within a set time period.

The Selection Process (August 1940 – March 1942)

Although the preceding discussion has dealt briefly with how men were selected to be called up, the discretion of local Division offices in making these decisions distinguishes the 1940-1942 historical period from the later 1942-1943 period. In this section I detail the integration of local businesses into the selection of men as a means of incorporating them into the process of classification, and how his action drew on the governing rationality of utility within the capitalist mode of production.

The *NRMA (Recruits) 1940* legislation noted three points regarding the selection of individuals to be called-up. First, that “the Divisional Registrar shall select in his Administrative Division from the men called out the number required for the training period aforesaid” – establishing the central role of the Registrar in the selection process (Department of National War Services 1940 *National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)* sec. 9(6) F229-36, Box 11, B273360, file: War-General “N-V”). Second, that “so far as is practicable, he shall select the number from the younger men of the age class or classes,” asserting that those that were youngest, at this time 21, were to be called first before moving on to those aged 22 and so forth (Department of National War Services 1940 *National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)* sec.9(6) F229-36, Box 11, B273360, file: War-General “N-V”; also see Department of Labour 1942 Minutes Evening G RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 : G-22). Third, that Registrars were to endeavour “to call out men proportionately from all parts of the Division” (Department of National War Services 1940 *National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)* sec.9(6) F229-36, Box 11, B273360, file: War-General “N-V”).

These regulations gave considerable leeway to Divisional Registrars in selecting men. In Halifax, for example, the registrar described his process, of calling men out proportionately noting how he had “divided [the district’s] men by constituencies according to occupation,” then used 1931 census data to incorporate into his selections an equal distribution across populations – “take Antigonish-Guysborough,” he explained, “which has the smallest population, as the figure 1, Halifax city and county would be 4 and for every man called from

Antigonish-Guysborough I would call four from Halifax” (Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrar Minutes – Evening Session G Thursday April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : G 10- G12).

This equal distribution was not, however, applied to different occupations, as Head Office developed policy to give special attention to those employed within war industries who had been singled out by the National Bureau of Statistics report in 1940. Section 15 (1) of the *NRMA (Recruits) 1940 Act* specifically established that:

the Divisional Registrar shall furnish such information to any manufacturer, financial institution, public service corporation or other employer including the Dominion Government, the Provincial Governments and the Municipal Corporations (hereafter called the ‘employer’) making the request. Within two weeks of the receipt of the copy of such estimate, but not thereafter, an employer may formulate a plan to enable employees liable to military training to be called out during the said twelve months period in a manner which will least inconvenience the carrying on of the business or undertaking of the employer (Department of National War Services 1940 National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) sec.15(1) F229-36, Box 11, B273360, file: War-General “N-V”).

Mobilization officials were to contact the employers within these industries and request from them, the “prepare[ation of] a semi-yearly plan” regarding their labour needs.

The submission of this plan was done in exchange for granting employers “two privileges” (Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrar Minutes – Evening Session G Thursday April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-16).

The first being that the employer could choose the “serial order in which [their] employees w[ere to] be called out to military training,” as it was understood that,

in addition to developing compliance with the program, employers were the “best qualified to determine who are good ones and who are dead wood” (Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrar Minutes – Evening Session G Thursday April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-16). Secondly, employers were granted the privilege of fixing themselves “the quota of men [they could] release monthly” (Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrar Minutes – Evening Session G Thursday April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-16). As it was explained, “you know your own situation and are familiar with all the circumstances” (Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrar Minutes – Evening Session G Thursday April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-16).

Those men put forward on the semi-year plan were to be automatically granted a six month postponement – temporarily alleviating them of their duty for military training and service – covering the time until the employer’s next semi-yearly plan would need to be submitted to registrars. Under this scheme, the “particulars [we]re given – name, address, date of birth, education, experience prior to present employment, present occupation, since with the company, salary, electoral district and polling division,” and “according to the understanding between the executive and [the mobilization management] board, the men are classified into four categories by the company itself” (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 :M-19). Participating companies were also to pledge that they would work whenever possible to replace young men with older men or women in order to free up additional callable men

(Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-19).

Employers were to keep in contact with Registrars regarding the employment status of men that were part of their semi-yearly plan, and were “to send immediately, in quadruplicate to the name and address, together with the serial number of every man, or group of men, shown or listed on the plan, whose service ha[d] terminated, or [wa]s no more on the payroll of the company”

(Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 :M-16). This policy was developed specifically to immediately call up any man on strike and developed the authority and enforcement capacity of mobilization for political purposes (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-18).

In these cases “the postponement of such men, or group of men, that had been granted in virtue of this plan w[ere to] be automatically annulled and revoked” (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 :M-16). As Head Office explained, “there were two reasons for the enactment of this decision” – the first was to stop “one industry from rob[bing] another of its employees,” (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-18), a problem which had been noted within industry (Boas 1945); while the other reason provided, and the “reason why we mentioned groups of men [within the regulations] – ‘every man or group of men’ – was to prevent strikes” (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-18). It was felt by mobilization officials that “in

war industries it is necessary to take full capacity and we must therefore prevent strikes, so that when a group of men leave their company” their service would be considered to be “terminated, and if a group of men leave their employment their postponement is automatically revoked” (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – M April 24th 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file:3 : M-18). Striking men within distinguished industries run by cooperating employers were thus to be automatically mobilized into the Armed Forces and this matter was made clear to the employers within these industries.

In this way, employers of key industries became incorporated into the mobilization process, identifying to Registrars specific men who were singled out to be selected, and maintaining accurate records concerning their employed status. Furthermore, mobilization adopted the authority and insight of local elites from the business community and integrated them into the social sorting and classification processes of mobilization.

Men Called 1940-1942

In adopting of the technologies of the Orders-Medical and Orders-Military, as well as relying on significant local discretion, Registrars existing could to make decisions regarding the calling up of men based on held data. During the twelve month period dating from when the calling up began in March of 1941, to the end of the first historical period in March of 1942, over the course of the full twelve months 44,208 men were enlisted as a result of these technologies, providing a monthly average of 3,684.

THE MOBILIZATION SYSTEM (MARCH 1942 – AUGUST 1943)

If the first period was designed based on the maintenance of local authority, the second historical period was organized around the idea of centralized management, oversight and control. This section is devoted to technological and social innovations that existed between March 1942 and August 1943. Two major changes distinguish this historical period from its predecessor. First, a significant shift in organization occurred – from one based on regional control under the District's Boards and Registrars, to one which adopted a centralized management model in which decisions regarding calling-up men was firmly held by officials working at the Department of Labour's Head Office in Ottawa. As part of this new centralized system, Head Office also needed a means to render visible and actionable what was happening at the regional Division level and as a result, implemented a standardized set of manpower auditing technologies designed to yield highly detailed statistical information. As part of this process, registration also implemented two card based record catalogues, that had been designed to increase the capacity of mobilization officials to assess the internal progression of an individual's data toward the decision to mobilize them or not, and in this way more effectively structured the movement of individuals' mobilization data along the system's predetermined paths.

The Department of Labour Takeover and Statistical Oversight 1942

The move to centralize the management of mobilization occurred as a result of political pressure resulting from criticism that the selection process of the 1940-1942 period was unjust due to its reliance upon the discretion of local registrars in the calling up of men. As a result, decision making regarding the classification of men across the country fell under the authority of the relatively small number of individuals that constituted the staff of mobilization's Head Office in Ottawa.

This shift not only centralized information processing to officials in Ottawa, but it also worked at Division offices, altering their work from one which required them to negotiate the complex legal and social requirements of mobilization, to one in which they were to follow strictly delineated call-up practices. In this way, centralization worked to assert a form of reactive path dependency for the data of individuals with the system, in which a set path of progression of an individual's data was strictly defined and each event along that path was the result of previous events and worked to establish a particular action to be taken in the current moment.

Due to shortages in manpower experienced in the industrial sector in early 1942, the Mackenzie King Government decided to change the procedural workings of mobilization by shifting administrative control to a centralized location under the authority of the Department of Labour (Stacey 1970: 406; Department of Labour 1943 National Registration in Relation to Mobilization June 14th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). The reasoning behind the move was to incorporate both previously independent aspects of manpower management –

industry and military – by linking the registration/mobilization system into the Department of Labour’s National Selective Service (NSS) program, thus developing a more efficient association between manpower assessment, industry and military mobilization (Department of Labour 1949: 12-13). A much less public reason for this centralization was to address claims that decisions made by Division Registrars were often seen to be arbitrary and unfair,⁸ and the government hoped to implement a less subjective selection process through the adoption of one like the draft lotteries of the United States (see House of Commons March 24th 1942 Hansard: 1711; Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrars – Minutes Evening Session – G April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 : G-13, G-15).

The move was legislated by Order-in-Council P.C. 2253 and took effect March 21st 1942, reallocating both the duties of the Chief Registrar and the duties of the comptroller of NSS Manpower to Henry Hereford at the Department of Labour (Department of Labour 1943 National Registration Activities in Relation to Mobilization June 14th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). In addition to this, legislation laid out in Order-in-Council P.C. 6045 and P.C. 8800 granted the Minister of Labour greater control over the process of mobilization, including the ability to develop and administer the newly drafted *National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations* (Order-in-Council P.C. 10924) starting December 1st

⁸ The Prime Minister commented “it has also been decided to select the men to be called up for service by drawing lots over the whole field of those who are subject to the proclamation. As soon as the necessary administrative arrangements have been worked out for this plan of selection by lot, a detailed announcement will be made by the Minister of National War Services” (House of Commons Hansard March 24th 1942: 1711).

1942 (Order-in-Council P.C. 6045; Order-in-Council P.C. 8800; Department of Labour 1949: 13).

Under the new policy registrars were no longer to apply their own discretion, but instead of using a lottery system, the Department of Labour decided to simply call-up “every man in a designated class, fit for military service, who is subject to the regulations,” and “deal with every man in the designated class as rapidly as possible” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). The result sought by Head Office was that “all men fit for service in the designated class, who are not given postponement and have not volunteered for service in the armed forces are [to be] selected” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). As Head Office officials in Ottawa noted, their role in mobilization had significantly changed, where

prior to last December, apart from the provision of duplicate registration cards and supplying the Divisional Registrars with changes of address of men subject to call, there was only a slight relationship between National Registration and Mobilization activities. Since December work relating to Mobilization has been the major activity of the Registration staff and I think it may be said that the Chief Registrar and his staff have to the best of their ability endeavored to cooperate with, and to assist the Mobilization Section in every possible way. The close contact which has developed has been of mutual benefit, as through it National Registration has been able to secure a considerable volume of information vital to the registration records (Department of Labour 1943 National Registration Activities in Relation to Mobilization June 14th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Furthermore, Head Office now retained strict control over staffing decisions, allocations, and even required attendance and sick day data from Division offices. New duties also led to a rise in the number of those employed within the mobilization system, from “less than 1,000 to nearly 2,000 in a few months” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held at 238 Sparks Street, June 14th 1943 at 2pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47; Department of Labour 1943 Address given by H.F. Caloren on Monday, June 14th-17th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

As its first objective, National Registration Division in Ottawa was ordered to review all regionally held information regarding registration, enlistment, mobilization and men being investigated for delinquency, as a part of a nationwide audit (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Circular Memorandum 24 January 5th 1943 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. 2 NWS Delinquents). Registrars were to send all of their registration and mobilization data including a “strictly alphabetical list, in quadruplicate, double spaced, setting out particulars” of the men under investigation for not complying with issued mobilization orders (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Circular Memorandum 24 January 5th 1943 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. 2 NWS Delinquents).

To make the 1942 audit easier, the bulky Questionnaire Cards and accompanying communication files were replaced with an individually numbered card system, which in turn allowed for more detailed and accurate reports regarding classifications and mobilization compliance. For each registered individual the new tracking system incorporated two separate cards: the

“Accounting Card,” also known as “Statistical Card,”⁹ and the “Control Card” (Department of Labour 1949: 121). At Divisional offices across the country “the Statistical Cards would be maintained in numeric sequence, as a whole, whereas the Control Cards would be divided into sections according to the stage in procedure that the man had reached” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held at 238 Sparks Street, June 14th 1943 at 2pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). In this way, “a reference to the Statistical Card would immediately indicate in what section of the Control Card setup the card would be found” and the allocated mobilization status of the individual immediately known (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held at 238 Sparks Street, June 14th 1943 at 2pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). After the audit was complete, Statistical and Control cards became permanently integrated into the mobilization system.

The Accounting / Statistical Card

The Accounting Card was one of the key technologies of the 1942-1943 period. Not only did the Accounting Card work to provide a uniform structure for the internal record keeping of the Division offices, it also enabled the flow of information by greatly reducing the time and effort required to compile statistics. In this way, this technology was fundamental in the mobilization system’s capacity to transmit information, which allowed centralized management and

⁹ Accounting Cards were also referred to internally as Statistical Cards within the Department of Labour (see Department of Labour 1944 letter re: Figures on Statistical form No.49 May 12th 1944 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-9-5).

oversight, but also more effectively rendered visible the mobilization data of registered individuals to all those working within the system, developing a more effective capacity to discriminate between registered individuals.

Accounting Cards contained a condensed account of an individual's registration information and were designed to enable the quick analysis of mobilization file data. The bulk of the card was devoted to the individual's mobilization status, noting data regarding medical classification, postponement, military training and a section regarding delinquency. Additionally, the card noted the individual's allocated Serial Call number, Regimental Number NRMA and Regimental Number after enlistment. The personal information on the card was, however, limited to the individual's name, original address (obtained during the National Registration of 1940), their latest address, birthplace, subjecthood, racial origin and regular occupation (see Figure 2-4).

Figure 2-4. Accounting Card / Statistical Card, NSS (M) 37 (front and back).

ACCOUNTING CARD

Administrative Division **C** Card

Name		E.D.	P.D.	Date of Birth
Original Address		Birthplace	Serial Call Number	
Latest Address		Non-British Subject Country of Allegiance	Regimental Number N.R.M.A.	
		Racial Origin	Regimental Number after Enlistment	
		Regular Occupation	Unit or Corps	
			Date of Enlistment	

Notice—Medical Examination		Reason Not Reporting		Postponement	
1. Date Sent	2. Date sent	1st	2nd	Board	Disposal
Medical Category					
	First Examining Physician	Second Examining Physician	Medical Revision Board	Enlisted	
A-1				Army	Granted until
A-2				Navy	Refused
B-1				Air Force	Pending
B-2				2. Deceased	Time of Application Before 30 day Training
C-1				3. Stat. Exemp.	
C-2				4. C.O.T.C.	Before recall for duration
D				5. Student	Before call for duration
E				6. Ill	
				7. Merchant Marine	
				8. In Jail	
				9. Other	
				10. Notice Returned— Being Traced	
				11. Notice not Returned— Possible Delinquent	
				10. Othe.	

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MILITARY TRAINING

		REASON FOR NOT REPORTING				
	30 Day	M.F.M. 1st sent	Recalled for Duration	Called for Duration	30 Day	Recall Call for Duration
Date to report						
Camp. No. or Name						
Reported						
Reg. Mtd.						
C-1						
C-2						
D						
E						
Remarks:						

Delinquents	
1. Handed to Police	R.C.M.P. (date)
2. Located and completed with regulations	Prov. (date)
3. Located and prosecuted	Other (date)
4. Convicted (give sentence)	
Non-British Subjects	
1. Enlisted for service with armed forces of	
2. Filed "first papers" and suitable for Can. Army	
3. Filed certificate of exemption schedule B	
Miscellaneous	
1. Volunteered as Fire Fighter (date)	
2A. Called for Service with R.C.M.P. (date)	
2B. Reason for not reporting	

File transferred to Administrative Division on
File transferred from Administrative Division on

NB- National Archives of Canada. RG 27, Vol.973, file: #1 Sample Forms.

Accounting Cards additionally acted to establish centralized oversight of the actions of Registrars at the local level by rendering processes of tabulation, summarization and review more accurate and expedient. As a part of this effort, newly appointed Statistical Sections were established in each Division office and used the Accounting/Statistical Cards to maintain and regularly submit up-to-date statistical data to Head Office (Department of Labour 1949: 122; Department of Labour 1944 NSS letter re: Figures on Statistical form No.49 May 12th 1944 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-9-5).¹⁰ The primary function of this card system was to “have an actual manpower accounting undertaken which would show the exact classification of every man” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

The equipment for handling the Statistical Cards included trays “ 18 [inches] in length capable of holding about 1,500 cards” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). These trays were arranged on tables so that clerks could “sit opposite each other in that one row of trays on one side of the table would be handled by one clerk and another row on

¹⁰ The Statistical Section was “originally intended as a manpower audit and not as a permanent establishment for the maintenance of current statistics,” and “ the statistical cards or the manpower accounting cards, as they were called at the time, were to be completed for each file, but no thought was given to maintaining the cards up to date, and it was not until approximately 250,000 files had been covered that it was decided to turn this accounting into a set of current and up-to-date statistics” (Department of Labour 1944 letter re: Figures on Statistical form No.49 May 12th 1944 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-9-5). On April 30th 1944 it was still reported that over 10,000 cards remained to be updated (Department of Labour 1944 letter re: Figures on Statistical form No.49 May 12th 1944 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-9-5).

the opposite side of the table by another clerk” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). The clerks “would have cards allocated to them according to the letters in the alphabet and the documents received in the section would be passed from one clerk to another, each extracting the information pertaining to her particular cards” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). The “completed Statistical Cards then [were to] pass on to the clerks who [we]re to enter them in the Tabulation Sheets” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). In this way, Tabulation Sheets maintained a complete record of all actions relating to the mobilization of men conducted by the Division.

The Tabulation Sheets incorporated an up-to-date means of tracing data that was new or changing, and additionally included the technology of a column of “plus,” in order to note the new classification of the individual whose data was being processed was being moved to, and a “minus” column to note where the individual was classified before the change (Department of Labour 1943 Monthly Tabulation Sheet RG 27 vol. 001 file: 2-90-47). In this way, the capacity to trace an individual’s movement through the system was incorporated into the collection of statistical data.

As part of this statistical review, tabulation sheets distinguished fifty separate categories within the mobilization system and enabled their review and comparison. These categories included the number enlisted in the Armed Forces, those on Postponement, those within the 30-day window of an order, specified

Medical Classifications, possible delinquency, men not yet sent orders (including Aliens, Neutral, United States, Allied, Enemy, Chinese, Japanese and those holding specified ages and marital status), as well as “miscellaneous” classifications such as “in jail,” statutory exemptions, students, fire fighters, disabilities, conscientious objectors, outside of Canada and “far distant” (Form NSS (M) 49 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146 see figure 2-5).

Figure 2-5. Nested Categories Within the Monthly Summary ‘Plus’ and ‘Minus’ Entries, Derived from Monthly Tabulation Sheets (Form NSS(M) 49).

Category		Tabulation Chart Line	
Home Defence Army		1	
Active	Army	2	
	Navy	3	
	Air Force	4	
Postponements		5	
Postponements Pending		6	
30 Day Men not Previously Re-Called		7	
Medical Category	A1	8	
	A2	9	
	B1	10	
	B2	11	
	C1	12	
	C2	13	
	D	14	
E		15	
Notice Returned – Tracing		16	
Notices Not Returned – Possible Delinquent		17	
Unexpired Time Limit		18	
Men Not Yet Sent Medical Notice	Aliens	Neutral	19
		United States	20
		Allied	21
		Enemy	22
	Chinese		23
	Japanese		24
	Age Groups Prior to 1902		25
	Single Men 1924		26
	Married Men 1905-11		27
	Married Men 1912-16		28
	Married Men 1917-23		29
	Others		30
	Miscellaneous	NPAM	31
NFM 12 and Other Rejection Forms		32	
NFM 7 and Other Notices of		33	

	Discharge	
	Navy Discharges	34
	Air Force Discharges	35
	Ill	36
	Deceased	37
	In Jail	38
	Merchant Marine	39
	Statutory Exemptions	40
	COTC	41
	Student	42
	Fire Fighters	43
	Disabilities	44
	Conscientious Objectors	45
	Far Distant	46
	Outside Canada	47
	Others (Specified)	48
	Transfers from Other Divisions	49
	New Registration Cards Received From National Registration Office Ottawa	50

NB – Department of Labour 1943 Monthly Summary Plus and Minus Entered Derived from Monthly Tabulation Sheet 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47.

This ease of tabulation that the card technology offered also enabled a switch from quarterly to monthly statistical reports, quickening the response time and providing more detail to Head Office than had existed before (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

The Control Card

The Control Card was another key technology implemented in the 1942-1943 period. The main innovation enabled by Control Cards was the capacity to sort the data of all registered individuals into their allocated categories within the mobilization process. Unlike the Accounting Cards which were maintained in

sequential order, Control Cards allowed for specific data to be isolated and the cards re-sorted, enabling these Cards to work as a functioning database. Not only did this technology render visible the data of non-compliant individuals in new ways that allowed Registrars to quickly know how many people were in each category or when a particular individual's window for compliance with an issued order had expired, the technology of Control Cards also established a strict sequential progression of an individual's data through the mobilization system, allowing for the development of a form of reactive path dependency for individuals' data in which each step in the progression was reliant upon the last but also informed how the individual's data was to be addressed at the current moment (Mahoney, James 2000 "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology" *Theory and Society* 29:507-548: 509; 526).

The Control Card was the primary means of determining an individual's classification and mobilization status within the system and was brought to replace the Master Sheets of the previous period (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars 14-19 June, 1943 Session 14-19 June 1943 pm RG 27 vol 991 file 2-90-47; see Figure 2-6). Although several Divisions had already adopted makeshift variations of the Control Card by 1942, as a means of addressing the bottlenecking which resulted from the use of single documents such as the Master Sheet by different clerks across the entire department, the process was standardized and expanded to all Divisions as part of the Department of Labour's reorganization in 1942 (Department of Labour 1942 Conference of all Registrars – Minutes Evening Session G April 23rd 1942 RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 :

G10-G11; Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).¹¹ On the card “was shown only the essential data pertaining to changes in the man’s status with respect to the military call-up, as well as his last known address” (Department of Labour 1949: 122; see Figure 2-6).

Figure 2-6. Control Card, NSS M 4/ NSS (M) 53

The image shows a sample Control Card form with the following fields and labels:

NAME	SURNAME	SERIAL No.
PERIOD OF MIL. TRAINING:	CALL _____	MONTH _____
ADDRESS _____	POSTPONED UNTIL	
MED. CAT.	BY BOARD	
DATE OF REQUEST	BY DIV. REG.	
WAR INDUSTRY	BY CLER. ERROR	
COM'L "	BY MIL. DOCTOR	
SEASONAL OCCUPATION	DATE OF POSTPONEMENT	
ENTERED BY _____		
N.S.S.—M.4		

#10751727

NB- National Archives of Canada. RG 27, Vol.973, file: #1 Sample Forms

In addition to retaining an up-to-date record of an individual’s personal information, the real advantage the Control Cards provided was “that the cards themselves [wer]e divided into sections and placed in specific trays in accordance with the stage the man ha[d] reached, and a number of employees c[ould] work on these cards at the same time” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47; also see Control

¹¹ These systems were first implemented successfully in Montreal and were later implemented and standardized across the entire country (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Card System in Divisional Offices 1943). Control Cards were to be kept in thirteen separate trays, and maintained within these trays in numerical order. In this way, the Control Card system incorporated a hierarchical classification model (see Mayr and Brock 2002), in that the entries were arranged in a hierarchical series of nested classes, in which similar or related classes at one hierarchical level were subdivided into more exclusive classes at the next lower level.

As seen in figure 2-7, the highest order of classification divided the trays into two groupings, separating the cards of those who were currently a part of the mobilization system (Grouping 1) from those who were outside of its scope (Grouping 2). Grouping 1 consisted of three subsections containing (A) the “cards of men to whom an Order-Medical Examination had not been sent;” (B) the “cards of men to whom and Order-Medical Examination has been sent;” and (C) the “cards of men who have taken their medical” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

The (C) cards, consisting of those who had already received their medical exam, were further sub-classified into (1) men assigned to medical categories “A” and “B”; and (2) those assigned to medical categories “C” and “D”.

The cards of men in categories “A” and “B” were further separated into three groups; (a) containing the “cards of men for whom no application for postponement had been received” – this group constituting “those available for ordering out for military training;” (b) the “cards of men who ha[d] made application for postponement but whose application has not been disposed of by the Board;” and (c) the “cards of men who ha[d] been postponed” (Department of

Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

The Control Card system further subdivided those for whom no application for postponement had been made into two categories; (a) containing “the cards of men whom Order-Military Training has been issued” – which were “to be checked against the Nominal Roll¹² returned by the district depot or training center and the names of those men who ha[d] failed to report [we]re to be transferred to the tracing department for necessary action;” while (b) included the “cards of men who ha[d] reported for military training and ha[d] been rejected by the district depot or training center” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

The latter category, consisting of rejected individuals, was further separated into (i) “the cards of men rejected as categories ‘B’ and ‘C’,” which were “to be kept separately in special trays so that they [could] be recalled should the Army specifically state that they ha[d] lowered their standards and they will definitely accept for training all men in either or both of these categories;” and (ii) “the cards of men rejected as category ‘D’” which were “kept in a special tray in accordance with the period of unfitness so that they may be recalled for military training at the expiry of such period”; (iii) the “cards of men rejected as category ‘E’ [we]re to be placed in the man’s file – his case being closed;” and (iv) “the cards of men who have been taken on strength are to be placed on the man’s file,

¹² Nominal Rolls were a list of names of men used to list match with other lists and record inconsistencies in held data see below.

his case being closed” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

The cards of those on postponement were also further subdivided into three groups consisting of (i) the “cards of men who have been postponed until further notice;” (ii) the “cards of men who have been granted the ordinary temporary postponement ... divided in accordance with the expiry date of the postponement;” and (iii) the “cards of men who have been granted postponement as conscientious objectors” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47; see figure 2-7).

Figure 2-7. Control Card Sorting Trays

Grouping 1				Control Card Trays	
A) Order Medical Examination has <u>not</u> been sent				1.A	
B) Order-Medical has been sent				1.B	
C) Men who have taken their medical	1. Medical Categories “A” and “B”	a) No application for postponement received	a) Order Military issued	1.C.1.a.a	
			b) Men rejected for training	i) Categories “B” and “C”	1.C.1.a.b.i
				ii) Category “D”	1.C.1.a.b.ii
		b) Application made but not decided upon	1.C.1.b		
	c) Those on Postponement	i) until further notice	1.C.1.c.i		
		ii) for set period	1.C.1.c.ii		
		iii) as Conscientious Objectors	1.C.1.c.iii		
2. Medical Categories “C” and “D”*			1.C.2		
Grouping 2					
1. Cards of Students without medical examinations				2.1	
2. High ranking men in the Reserve Army				2.2	
3. Other Classifications – Aliens, Outside the country etc.				2.3	

NB – Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47. * This tray was further separated in 1943 in order to accommodate data from the Order-Medical Re-Examination program see chapter three.

The Second Grouping of trays were to include (1) “the cards of students for whom no medical examination [wa]s on hand because they are COTC or other training

unit” – which were “to be reviewed regularly so as to ascertain that they continue to fall within the student classification;” (2) “the cards of men in the Reserve Army of the rank of those to whom no Order-Medical Examination should be sent under the regulations, so that they will be available should the Army desire to have them ordered out;” and finally (3) the cards of those in “every other classification of men which may arise from time to time and upon whom the Registrar may wish to have control, such as, amongst others, card groupings for aliens, for men who have been granted permission to leave Canada etc.”

(Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). As a means of ensuring the accuracy of the Control Card system, the cards of men whose cases were closed – who had died, who had enlisted, who had been rejected as category “E”, who had been discharged from the service, or who had been referred to the Alternative Service Officer – were removed from the system and placed within the individual’s Central Registry file (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).


The trays themselves were to be constructed of “Binder’s Board” or light wood, designed to fit the 6 inch by 4 inch cards and “no more than 15 inches in depth so that they could be placed back to back across the width of a 34 inch table” (Department of Labour 1943 Registrars Conference Meeting 16-6-43 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). This design was adopted in order to place “three or four at each table, so as to leave enough space in the center for two operators to work opposite each other with a set of trays on each side (Department of Labour

1943 Registrars Conference Meeting 16-6-43 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Tables of trays were also to “be arranged in accordance with the flow of the cards, that is to say the trays containing cards of men to whom ‘Orders Medical’ have not been issued should be at one end of the room and each other table placed in succession in accordance with the stage of operation reached, down towards the other end of the room to the last trays containing the cards of men rejected at the reception centers, as in medical categories other than the category ‘E’”

(Department of Labour 1943 Registrars Conference Meeting 16-6-43 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). In this way, Control Cards were to follow a set flow from the issuance of an Order-Medical Examination to the individual enrolment in the Army (see Figure 2-8).

Figure 2-8. Control Card Flow Chart 1943



Ottawa, June 8, 1943.

National Selective Service,
Mobilization Section.

This separation into separate trays denoting the individual's classification enabled an efficient means of distinguishing their mobilization status, but also preformed an important oversight and statistical function by being capable of "giv[ing] at any time complete information as to the number of men in each category" (Department of Labour 1949: 122). Specifically, Control Cards enabled the Control Department to perform an additional process of verification for cases of postponement, and rendered visible those "A" and "B" category men not on postponement and who remained available to be called up (Department of Labour 1944 letter re: Figures on Statistical form No.49 May 12th 1944 RG 27 vol. 3056 file: 21-9-5).

Control Cards also worked in accordance with Statistical Cards, as "the Statistical Cards would be maintained in numeric sequence as a whole" and "the Control Cards w[ere] divided into sections according to the stage in procedure that the man had reached" (Department of Labour 1943 The Meeting of Divisional Registrars, 238 Sparks St. at 2pm, June 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). Through this arrangement "a reference to the Statistical Card would immediately indicate in what section of the Control Card set-up the card would be found" (Department of Labour 1943 The Meeting of Divisional Registrars, 238 Sparks St. at 2pm, June 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). As Head Office reported to Divisional Registrars:

it will be obvious that the Statistical Section and the Control Card Section must work in close proximity so that both can handle the documents for their respective purposes, these two sections will supplement each other to a considerable extent. The Control Card will be filed in many different

groups according to the present stage at which the card has arrived, whereas, the statistical cards will be in alphabetical order. No statistical Card will be allowed to pass out of the hands of the Statistical Section and if they are in alphabetical order this will act as a cross index. It will then only be necessary to look at a statistical Card to find out in what group of the Control Cards an individual's Control Card may be found (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146; Also see Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting in Room 403, Motor Building, Thursday June 17th 1943, 9am RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Each individual was, in this way, allocated a classification and their relative position within the system was monitored for compliance with governmental policy by both Divisional employees and by Head Office – the system rendering visible both registered individuals and the work being conducted by mobilization staff.

In addition to speeding up processing times, this system also enabled better oversight of classified individuals as it allowed staff to focus on a smaller, more manageable number of segregated cards. In the case of those sent Orders-Medical or Military, their “cards [we]re to be reviewed regularly so that the names of those men for whom no medical is received after a set time may be turned over to the tracing department” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Additionally, the cards in the postponement section were divided “in accordance with the expiry date of the postponement” so that registrars would readily know those whose postponements were to expire, and finally the cards of conscientious objectors were easily “made available to the Alternative Service Offer upon

request” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

When this card based system was implemented “the result was so favorable and the improvement so great” that those who managed mobilization at the Department of Labour were reportedly “extremely well pleased” (Department of Labour 1943 Letter to MacNamera from Shaw July 19th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3003 file: Equipment 1943-1944). In this way the data of individuals being called into service was organized in a new way, and now flowed through the various stages of the mobilization process following a distinctive chain of progression. At each stage the classification on the card informed employees as to what action they were to take and also informed them as to what the next step in the chain would be and to what new bin the Control Card was to be delivered.

Establishment of Statistical and Control Cards

The conversion to this new statistics-based card system was, however, a complex task and required additional staff to be brought from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.¹³ First, Statistical Cards needed to be generated covering the entire history of mobilization. To achieve this, data from Accounting/Statistical Cards from March 1942 forward was entered onto “ledger sheets which ha[d] been

¹³ Conducting the review and bringing the Statistical System up-to-date was tasked to “the full manpower of accounting staff,” however, once this was accomplished “the supervisors on loan from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics w[ere] withdrawn, and only as many of the manpower accounting staff as [we]re necessary to carry on the monthly statistics w[ere to] be retained” and transferred permanently to the Registrar’s day staff (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).

drawn up in such a manner as to classify the men accounted for in the class which represent[ed] their disposition up to that time,” effectively sorting men into “classes for enlistments, Home Defence Army, postponement, low categories, C.O.T.C., deceased, notices-returned, tracing and so on” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). The second step involved bringing the Statistical Card System up-to-date and maintaining its accuracy through the addition of any new data. These data were also to be simultaneously entered on the cards and Tabulation Sheets and to act henceforth as “the medium for keeping the statistics up to date” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).

In “J” Division in Winnipeg, for example, eighteen typists and eighteen clerks on average worked the nightshift, completing between four and five thousand files per shift (Department of Labour 1943 Method of Changing Over from Alphabetical to Numerical System of Filing Used in Winnipeg 1943 RG 27 vol. 3008 file: Winnipeg). The task of compiling this District’s approximately 105,000 cards was completed in six weeks, requiring 2,688 man hours – suggesting a total manpower requirement of approximately 26,704 man hours to complete the cards for all available males aged 16+ across the country.¹⁴

Maintaining accurate records through this period was also a tremendous job. In each case of a change of address between Districts, for example, policy was to fill out a form letter, “typewritten in quadruplicate” with “the disposition of the various copies being as follows”: the original and one copy “will be

¹⁴ 2,688 hours for 105,000 cards results in 0.0256 hours per card, x 1,043,163 cards of men classified as available by National Registration = 26,704.94 hours

forwarded with the file and one dispatching Registrar as a receipt for the file, another copy will be placed in the file cover by the dispatching registrar and will be his record until the receipted copy is returned to him, one copy will be forwarded to the Assistant Chief Registrar in Ottawa in order that he may change his address"; finally, " a fifth copy will be sent to the D.O.C.'s representative he so desires" (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of the Meeting Held in Room 403, Motor Building, 9am June 15th 1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). Duplicate cards were also produced by Head Office in Ottawa for boys as they approached the age of 19, "that is, those born after August in 1921, and in the years 1922, '23 and '24" and "instructions were issued that these were to be allocated to the Divisional Registrars on the basis of where registration took place" (Department of Labour 1943 National Registration Activities in Relation to Mobilization June 14th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Furthermore, the original Questionnaire Cards were also to be supplemented with "information of any kind" that was considered pertinent by the Mobilization Registrar or by various organizations and Departments which he was in contact with (Department of Labour 1949: 26).

The Selection Process

As part of the response to allegations of favoritism and inequality in the selection process, the design of the newly implemented mobilization technologies were to address the discretionary control of local Boards and Registrars. Specifically, the

new system worked to eliminate internal discretion at the Division level by applying a standardized measure to determine an individual's "availability" based on their age, marital status and employment. Now, the key decision of who would be called resided with Head Office, who then passed that information down to the Division Registrars. Critically, this section notes how the elimination of discretion at the local level and the role of centralized management increased the tightness of governing classifications.

When the 1942 audit data was received by Head Office in Ottawa informing them of the mobilization status of all registered men within the country, "separate files were set up for the questionnaire cards of enlisted persons with either the service number or the rank and date of enlistment entered on each individual card," developing in essence two separate centralized card catalogs distinguishing those who had already been mobilized from those who had not (Department of Labour 1949: 26). The card catalog of non-mobilized individuals was sorted along the same classificatory lines as were the regionally held Control Cards, while the determination of who was to be issued mobilization orders was based on data drawn from statistical analyses of labour power and registration data conducted by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Department of National War Services, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1941 National Registration, August, 1940: Preliminary Statistical Tabulations. Ottawa: King's Printer. National Archives of Canada. RG 27, Vol.3003, file: Statistics and Reports; Department of Labour 1949: 26).

As the Department of Labour (1949: 25) reported; in this period “work related to mobilization became the major activity at” National Registration’s Head Office in Ottawa, their new duties regarding the selection of men consisting of:

- (1) Issuing for the use of Mobilization Registrars, duplicates of questionnaire cards of men who became subject to call for military training,
- (2) Advising Mobilization Registrars of changes of address and of marital status and deaths of men subject to call-up,
- (3) Receiving from the forces and forwarding to the appropriate Mobilization Registrars, notices of enlistments, discharges, and casualties,
- (4) Checking with the registration questionnaires, enlistment material and correspondence which had been forwarded to Mobilization Registrars but for which no duplicate questionnaire could be located in the mobilization office for the men concerned,
- (5) Checking with the registration records and with those of the Forces, lists of men, who upon notice to do so, had not reported for their medical examination or military training.

By September of 1943, 2,839,191 Duplicate Cards were supplied to Divisional offices with the expectation of calling up these men (Department of Labour 1943 Summary of Mobilization Statistics 1943 RG 27 vol.3006 file: Collection of Statistics 1943-44).

Those designated for mobilization by the new centralized selection process were reported to regional mobilization offices by sending a copy of the individual’s Questionnaire Card along with a list that showed the address, electoral district, polling division and the name of each man for whom a duplicate card was being sent (Department of Labour 1943 Form Letter Index: Form Letter “M” RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). One copy of this list (Form NWS 25, later Form NSS(M)27), or “Nominal Roll”, was to be checked against the duplicate Questionnaire Cards received, and then signed off on by the Division Registrar, as having been reviewed and found to be accurate. This copy was then returned to

the Chief Registrar at the National Registration Bureau in Ottawa and checked over as a means of establishing accurate oversight of the mobilization process, and with it asserted regional accountability (Department of Labour 1949: 26; Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting in Room 403, Motor Building 9am June 15th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47; Department of Labour 1943 Form Letter Index: Form Letter “M” RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Local registrars were, however, still charged with the calling up of men through the issuing of Orders- Medical and Orders-Military. At the point when the copies of Questionnaire cards arrived at the local office along with the copies of the Nominal Roll, Registrars were to “immediately institute files for all men for whom cards ha[d] been received, allocating numbers by means of the next open number for medical examination notices and recording these numbers on the file cover and other documents” – including the “cross index for the Central Registry” as “well as the Control and Statistics Card” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting in Room 403, Motor Building 9am June 15th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Specifically, registrars were instructed “upon receipt of [the Questionnaire] cards” to “(a) check [the] list and forward receipted copy thereof to Assistant Chief Registrar in Ottawa; (b) Utilize next available serial number and number both above list and National Registration Cards in numerical sequence; (c) Prepare - (i) docket or file cover (type of serial number only); (ii) Statistical Card, (iii) Control Card; (d) file docket or file cover with National Registration Card in Central Registry; (e) file Statistical Cards in Statistical Department; (f) file Control Card in Control Department” (Department of Labour

1943 Action Necessary on Receipt of Duplicate Registration Cards from Ottawa
1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).

Figure 2-9. Registrar Action

a) Check the Nominal Roll and return it to Head Office	
b) Allocate to the individual a serial number	
c) Prepare for the individual	i) A file and Index Card for the Central Registry
	ii) A Statistical Card
	iii) A Control Card
d) File Cover	
e) File the Statistical Card in the Statistical Department	
f) File the Control Card in the Control Department	

NB- Department of Labour 1943 Action Necessary on Receipt of Duplicate Registration Cards from Ottawa 1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146.


As opposed to the previous historical period which relied on the discretion of the Division Registrars, the new policy adopted a reactive path dependant process. Now mobilization staff were to strictly follow a nine step process as follows: (1) when a registration card arrived from Ottawa a new Statistical Card was to be produced; (2) upon sending an Order Medical, Registrars were to supply the Statistical Section with the Master Sheet of all orders as well as any incidental orders sent out by the Investigation Department – “those incidents would all probably be for men who already have a serial number, to ensure this all duplicates of [Orders-Medical] sent out which are not entered on current master sheets must be handed to the Statistical Section must balance the number of Notices-Medical recorded against the number registered to see none have been missed” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).¹⁵ (3) Medical examination forms were also to be routed through the Statistical Section, and tabulation conducted in order to list check orders against

¹⁵ This procedure was also in place regarding medical re-examination orders

those sent out or recorded on the master list. (4) Statistical Sections were to receive copies of Nominal Rolls from training camps in the form of NWS 25 carrying data regarding who “reported,” was “rejected” and “the reason for not reporting” – these data were then to be recorded and checked “elsewhere for confirmation” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). (5) In cases of Postponement, the Statistical Sections were to record onto Control Cards as well as maintain Statistical records of (a) when applications for Postponement were received; (b) the result of an application as reported on the pink copy of the Postponement Form; (c) all terminations of Postponements due to expiry, enlistment, death etc; (d) any renewed Postponements; and (e) the grounds on which a Postponement was requested or granted. (6) All notices, or orders (OME and OMT), “returned should be given to the statistical section first where they would be recorded, passed to Control Card Section and then sent to the legal and tracing section” (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). Furthermore, “as notices-returned are followed up and traced the results must be listed daily and passed to the Statistical Section” making a “clear description made of each as, for example ‘sent notice medical’ – ‘sent notice-military’ – ‘Enlisted army’ – etc.” (7) Notices not returned were to be statistically viewed in the same manner. (8) In regard to voluntary enlistment independent of mobilization, “all pro formae as of enlistment should be routed immediately on receipt to the Statistical Section” so that the individual’s classification could be updated (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). In this way, pro-formae had

been developed as a means of “bringing to the attention of Divisional Registrars the names of all single men and childless widowers who were at any time subject to call under the regulations since the beginning of our operations and who may have enlisted in the Armed Forces” (Department of National War Services 1942 Circular Memorandum 480 March 19 1942 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents). (9) Miscellaneous documents related to those not reporting for mobilization – such as lists of university students, M.F.M 12’s, birth certificates etc. – were also to be forwarded and reviewed by the Statistical Section and then incorporated into the Central Registry (see Figure 2-10).

Figure 2-10. NR/NSS Mobilization System 1942-1943



NB - Department of Labour 1949: 25-27.

The second copies of the Nominal Rolls from Head Office were issued to Armed Forces personnel charged with processing mobilized populations at the military training camps. After having been checked against the ID cards of those

who reported, Nominal Rolls were sent to the Registrars at Division offices, who then checked the list against their Control Cards, and in turn, reported to the Chief Registrar in Ottawa, those who were found to be delinquent (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Officials in Ottawa finally checked the returned Nominal Rolls and non-compliant lists against the original Questionnaire Cards before passing these data onto policing organizations for investigation (Department of Labour 1949: 27).

The Statistical Section

When the mobilization system was redesigned in 1942 its emphasis on centralized decision making and statistical oversight required a significant shift in how information was processed and flowed through offices at the local Division level. Specifically, the need for current and accurate statistics by Head Office in order to allow for discriminating decision making, required the development of a team of employees devoted solely to the production and maintenance of accurate statistics. This in turn, asserted the need for the office of the Statistical Section to be capable of recording and processing all information that passed through the local Division. This section charts how the organization of the local Divisions needed to change in order to accommodate the centralized management of the 1942-1943 period and the production of vital statistics.

Head Office's emphasis on statistical oversight also saw to a reorganization of the flow of information within local Division mobilization offices. All received information and forms were now to pass through the Statistical Section first, as it was to act as the initial point of contact for *all* mobilization data. This "new procedure involve[d] a flow of documents to the Statistical Section" enabling mobilization officials the new ability "to post its records day by day as events occur[ed]" and "ma[de] manpower accounting the basis of the Statistical reports which [wer]e sent to Ottawa" (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

After Orders-Medical and Military were issued, a record would be made on the Master Sheet and submitted back to the Statistical Section so that these data could be added to the Statistical Cards. Medical Examination and Certificate Forms were also submitted in this way, as well as copies of form NWS 25 which contained the result of an issued Order-Military Training. The same went for all data regarding returned orders, possible delinquents, confirmations of voluntary enlistment (*pro formae*) and all documents supporting claims regarding postponements (Department of Labour 1943 Mobilization Statistics RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Registrars were instructed that for any action an entry should be immediately made on a Statistical Card, and "by this means the Statistical Card w[ould] always present an up-to-date picture of the man's case" (Department of Labour 1943 The Meeting of Divisional Registrars, 238 Sparks St. at 2pm June 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). Furthermore, entries on Statistical Cards were followed by an entry "on the tabulation sheet and the document of original

entry w[as] then [to] be passed on to the Control Section for similar action respecting the card” (Department of Labour 1943 The Meeting of Divisional Registrars, 238 Sparks St. at 2pm June 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146). In this way the Statistical Section also worked to maintain up-to-date Tabulation and Summary Statistics.


The Staffing and Organization of Divisional Offices

The staffing of Division offices of this time speaks to the significant amount of manpower and resources that were required to develop the mobilization system’s form of governance. Throughout the war, the mobilization system was highly rationalized in its organization, adopting a hierarchical structure, which consisted mostly of clerks working to enable the efficient flow of information and augment the capacity of this system to make discriminating decisions. Over the course of the war the mobilization system required a significant number of staff and resources. In 1943-1944 Division offices reported back to the Department of Labour the number of employees they had on staff and how work within their Divisions was organized.

Each Division retained a handful of specialized staff including the Registrars themselves, their assistant or chief clerk, a receptionist, doctors working as medical advisors, and judges and lawyers performing tasks as legal advisors. The bulk of those employed within the Divisional offices, however, were clerically trained, and working as clerks, typists or stenographers. Division E

in Montréal, for example, employed over 280 primary staff, consisting of over 169 Clerks, 80 typists and 22 stenographers, separated into 10 different sections (Department of Labour 1944 Division E Montréal June 1944 RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division E Employee Flowchart; see Figure 2-11).

Figure 2-11. Division “E” Montréal – Divisional Registration Employee Flowchart 1944



NB – Department of Labour 1944 Division E Montréal June 1944 RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division E Employee Flowchart.

Within the Montréal Division, the section allocated the largest number of staff was that of the Central Registry, employing 63 individuals or 21.91 % of the total workforce. This section in turn had the largest number of its clerks tasked with filing out documents within individual’s Central Registry files, working to

maintain these files current. In total 68 individuals, or 24.03 %, of the Division's staff were directed to the tasks of running the Statistical and Control Card Sections, employing 41 and 27 individuals respectively. Again, most were tasked with the filing and tabulation duties required to keep their data up-to-date within their respective sections. Though each Division retained a division of labour that addressed mobilization's key areas – Board Matters, the Central Registry, Statistical Section, Control Section, Enforcement, Correspondences, Medical Review, Mobilization Study and Office Services – variations existed in the Divisional allocation of staff to these various sections (see Figure 2-12).

Figure 2-12. Divisional Offices Staffing 1943-1944

	Division				
	"E" Montreal	"B" Toronto	"O" Halifax	"H" St John ^A	"C" Kingston
Board Matters	5 (1.77 %)	13 (10.74 %)	5 (14.71 %)	2 (3.51 %)	4 (5.71 %)
Central Registry	62 (21.91 %)	20 (16.53 %)	2 (5.88 %)	15 (26.32 %)	9 (12.86 %)
Statistical/Accounting Section	41 (14.49 %)	8 (6.61 %)	2 (5.88 %)	12 (21.05 %)	15 (21.43 %)
Control Section	27 (9.54 %)	5 (4.13 %) ^B	-	5 (8.77 %)	10 (14.29 %)
Enforcement	22 (7.77 %)	15 (12.40 %)	7 (20.59 %)	1 (1.75 %)	11 (15.71 %)
Correspondences	11 (3.89 %)	9 (7.44 %)	-	3 (5.26 %)	2 (2.86 %)
Medical Review	14 (4.95 %)	2 (1.64 %)	2 (5.88 %)	6 (10.53 %)	2 (2.86 %)
Mobilization Study	47 (16.61 %)	13 (10.74 %)	2 (5.88 %)	2 (3.51 %)	1 (1.43 %)
Office Services	39 (13.78 %)	15 (12.40 %)	5 (14.71 %)	2 (3.51 %)	-
Other	15 (5.30 %)	21 (17.36 %)	9 (26.47 %)	9 (15.79 %)	16 (22.86 %)
Totals:	283 (100 %)	121 (100 %)	34 (100 %)	57 (100 %)	70 (100 %)

NB – A - It was noted in St John that in 1943 the Divisional Office had, in addition to its 38 primary staff, 36 additional support staff which involved Calling up of Quotas, Subsistence Warrants, Transportation (2 Girls); Posting of Master Sheets (4 Girls); Medical Re-Examination (4 Girls); Notices-Military, Quotas and Check-ups (10 Girls) and Statistical Reports (16 Clerks) (Department of Labour 1943 Administrative Division "H" St. John NS Registrar's Staff RG 27 Vol. 3006 File: National Registration Offices 1943). B - In Toronto Registrars employed the use of Master Sheets as their main tool to distinguish mobilization categories. Department of Labour 1944 Division E Montréal June 1944 RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division E Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1943 Administrative Division "H" St. John NS Registrar's Staff RG 27 Vol. 3006 File: National Registration Offices 1943; Department of Labour 1944 Division E Montréal June 1944 RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division E Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 Division B Toronto March RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division B Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1943 Kingston C Division March RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division C

Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 St John H Division June RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division H Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 Halifax O Division June RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division O Employee Flowchart.

In Toronto and Montréal, for example, a greater percentage of staff were directed to the analysis of industry within their regional districts.

These staff organization charts also make note of the fact that the Divisions did take on additional staff when it was needed. In St. John it was noted that a support staff of 20 girls and 16 clerks were retained by the Divisional Office to supplement the primary staff and perform tasks related to the Calling up of Quotas, Subsistence Warrants, Transportation (2 Girls); the Posting of Master Sheets (4 Girls); the issuance and oversight of Medical Re-Examination (4 Girls); the oversight of Orders-Military, Quotas and Check-ups (10 Girls) and the generation of the Division's Statistical Reports (16 clerks) (Department of Labour 1943 Administrative Division "H" St. John NS Registrar's Staff RG 27 Vol. 3006 File: National Registration Offices 1943). In the organizational charts of the other reporting Divisions it was noted that they employed "casual clerks" as well as "other clerks" working as additional support staff within the sections of Office Services (Montréal), Delinquents, Central Registry, and Control Card (Kingston), Central Registry (St. John), Statistics, Industrial and Mobilization Survey, Medical Review, and Central Registry (Halifax) (Department of Labour 1943 Administrative Division "H" St. John NS Registrar's Staff RG 27 Vol. 3006 File: National Registration Offices 1943; Department of Labour 1944 Division E Montréal June 1944 RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division E Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 Division B Toronto March RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division B Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1943 Kingston C

Division March RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division C Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 St John H Division June RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division H Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 Halifax O Division June RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division O Employee Flowchart). Also significant extra staff were taken on to establish the Accounting and Control Cards.¹⁶

The financial cost of Division offices was also significant. In H Division in St. John, salaries for staff were noted as ranging from those receiving the largest salaries – the Divisional Registrar (\$3,600), the Medical Advisor (\$2,400), the Division's Assistant Registrar (\$1,800), and principal clerks (\$1,200) – to the office boys who received the smallest salaries of \$420. For the most part, employees were paid \$720, this wage being given to Gr.1 Clerks, all levels of Stenographers, and Gr.1 or 2 typists. The distinction of being an "A" staff member (ie. Clerk Gr.1A) meant that the individual was allocated additional duties and would be paid \$900 (Department of Labour 1943 Administrative Division "H" St. John NS Registrar's Staff RG 27 Vol. 3006 File: National Registration Offices 1943). Reports from the Toronto and Montréal establish that their specialized employees earned slightly more than in St. John.¹⁷

At the national level, the annual cost of the registration system was estimated at 3 million dollars in 1943 – 1.5 million for salaries, \$200,000 for cost-

¹⁶ See endnote 1.

¹⁷ The Assistant Registrar in Toronto making \$2,520, a Gr.3 Clerk \$1,500, the Medical Advisor \$4,200, the Switchboard \$1,000, the Enforcement Officer \$2,400; while in Montréal it was almost identical to Toronto, reporting that the Registrar there earned \$4,500, the Head Clerk \$2,520, the Medical Advisor \$4,200, Assistant Medical Advisor \$3,600, the enforcement legal advisor \$3,000, a principal clerk \$1,920, Gr. 4 Clerks \$1,920, Gr.3 Clerk \$1,500 and office boys \$600 (Department of Labour 1944 Division E Montréal June 1944 RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division E Employee Flowchart; Department of Labour 1944 Division B Toronto March RG 27 Vol. 3017 File: Division B Employee Flowchart).

of-living increases and for unemployment insurance, \$143,000 for fees and allowances, \$75,000 for travel expenses for travel expenses, \$300,000 for transportation of mobilized men, \$100,000 for meals and lodging, \$420,000 for medical examinations, \$125,000 for supplies, printing and stationary, \$35,000 for advertizing and publicity, \$35,000 for telephone and telegraph, and \$45,000 in miscellaneous spending (Department of Labour 1943 Letter re: Expenditures Nov. 30th 1943 RG 27 vil. 3003 file: Accounts).

Men Called 1942-1943

The reorganization to a highly centralized mode of social organization and the incorporation of the manpower accounting technologies of the Control Card, the Accounting Card along with sets of standardized detailed statistics, enabled the calling up of men based upon held data. From March 1942, to 1943 when the management of mobilization was effectively decentralized, Orders-in-Council made 1,145,585 men available to be called up. In regards to enlistment, the 1942-43 period saw the greatest amount, numbering 84,658, which resulted in the highest monthly average of 4,456 – this number representing over 20 % above the later 1943-1946 period. As this data shows, the technologies and social organization of the 1942-1943 period were the most effective in tightening the classifications of the mobilization system onto targeted individuals and populations.

THE MOBILIZATION SYSTEM (AUGUST 1943 – AUGUST 1946)

This section is devoted to the changes to the mobilization system that were established in August of 1943 in response to the lack of local input experienced between 1942 and 1943. Specifically, the technologies implemented in this period can be understood as a blending of the new technological innovations of the Control and Accounting Cards that were brought in, in the 1942-43 period, and the decentralized social organization of the earlier 1940-1942 period. In this way, this historical period denotes the degree to which these technologies, and the social organization which relied on the discretionary authority of the Boards and Registrars, had impacted the capacity of the mobilization system to call-up men into service in the Armed Forces.

In August 1943, political turmoil regarding how human resources and manpower should be allocated to industry and the Armed Forces, that had come about as a result of the centralization of the mobilization selection process and the control wielded by the Department of Labour and its apparent overemphasis on industrial production over training soldiers, resulted in yet another revision of mobilization practices. Officially, this move was taken “for the purpose of broadening, strengthening and decentralizing the administration” of mobilization, and it dismantled the Department of Labour’s centralized management and oversight of Division selection and mobilization procedures (Department of Labour 1949: 34). After August 1943, the administration of the mobilization selection process reverted to an approximation of its previous 1940-1942 system, based on the regional Provincial Administrative District maintaining discretionary

control over the selection of men. However, the technologies brought in to assert mobilization categories since 1940 – including the Orders-Medical and Military, the card based Accounting and Control sections and the statistical tabulation technologies – largely remained in place unchanged until the end of the war (Order-in-Council P.C. 6387). The Department of Defence still provided a requisition for the total number of men required, allotting them by district according to their training capacity, but mobilization's Head Office did “not determine from where they c[a]me,” these allotments “[we]re sent on to the registrar as a matter of convenience” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

The men who were to be called were now “determined by the application of mobilization regulations” by Divisional Registrars, however, the legislation did assert that “every man in a designated class fit for military service, who is subject to the regulations [was to be] selected for the Army (active) unless he receives postponement on any of the grounds set out in the regulations such as essential industry, farming, National interest, compassionate grounds or conscientious objector” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). As was explained by the Department of Labour in its administrative report in 1943, “the same result is sought; that is, all men fit for service in the designated classes, who were not

given postponement and have not volunteered for service in the armed forces are [to be] selected” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). During this period, Accounting Cards acted as the main tool used by local registration officials to determine “whether a man, at a specific date, should be called up or not on the basis of his nationality, occupation, age, marital status or other factors” (Department of Labour 1949: 121).

The selection of men was, however, not completely discretionary, as special directions were still in place regarding the mobilization of aliens, non-Canadian citizens and workers within specific industries.¹⁸ PC 4092, 6632 and 7261, for example, specifically protected any individual working as a coal miner or in the industry of hardening steel from mobilization, and similar legislation existed in relation to farmers and those in the timber industry.¹⁹

In September of 1943, Registrars were also given the task of mobilizing conscientious objectors into military positions for the first time (PC 7251 11th Sept. 1943). Although these individuals were mobilized, their separate classification as conscientious objectors was to ensure that they were to be limited to activities related to “non-combatant duty only” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of

¹⁸ New National Selective Service legislation also continued the role of industry in mobilization, as section 10(10) made “provision for any employer to submit, at any time, a plan for the postponement of military training of any group of employees and also empowers a Board to instruct any employer to submit such a plan, if such action is advisable” (Department of Labour 1943 Address of Mr. Willard Scott, Supervisor, Deferment and Mobilization Survey Division to a Meeting of Registrars, June 18th 1943 at 9 am RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).

¹⁹ These individuals were to be automatically granted postponements.

Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). Men were also mobilized for special duty under Part II of the NSS regulations to work with the RCMP, though this action was limited to a strict monthly quota and was largely restricted to the provinces of Québec and Nova Scotia (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

As part of the reversion to de-centralized management, the issuance of National Registration Questionnaire Cards and Nominal Rolls from Head Office ceased, and Registrars were to consult their regionally held Central Registries to select individuals for mobilization and to employ Control Cards and Accounting Cards to assess and track registered individuals within the mobilization process. New to this period was also a shift from the previous reliance on civilian doctors to perform the initial medical classification through the Medical Examination Certificate Form to military review boards.²⁰

The final proclamation regarding the mobilization of men was issued on June 6th 1944 and was to include all men born between 1913 and 1926 (aged 18 and 6 months to 31 years old) and unmarried men born between 1903 and 1918 (aged 26 to 41) (Department of Labour 1944 Circular 1028 June 6th 1944 RG 27 vol 3001 Duplicate Regulations 1944 Proclamations). By the end of the war over 28,975 men had been mobilized within this third historical period (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch –

²⁰ This action was referred to as the “Medical Re-registration” and its role in asserting categories is discussed later in this work. See Chapter 3.

Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943
RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

Men Called 1943-1946

With the shift to a decentralized mode of social organization, the local Division Boards and Registrars were again given the authority to make decisions regarding the calling-up of men. Within this period Orders-in-Council only made an additional 111,283 men available to be called into service. Within this time period, 28,975 men were enlisted as part of the mobilization system, representing a monthly average of 1,207, accounting for the calling up of the fewest number of men of the three historical periods.

CONCLUSION

This chapter portrayed the central features of the social organization and technologies of the mobilization system that were put in place in Canada during the Second World War, as they pertained to the conscription of men into the Armed Forces. In particular, the material presented here demonstrates the link between specific types of social organization and technologies, and the degree of categorical tightness, or the degree to which the performances of targeted populations can be governed to match the classifications as defined by the system's governing rationalities. As such, this analysis makes comparable the relative capacity of the mobilization system as it existed in the years of 1940-

1942, 1942-1943 and 1943-1946, to call men up into military service. In regards to the categorical tightness asserted within the mobilization system's three historical periods, these data demonstrate notable differences between the number of men who were processed for service under the each of the different periods under study. Within the first period dating from 1940-1942 44,208 individuals were mobilized into the Army, while 84,658 were called-up in the second 1924-1943 period, and 28,975 in the third 1943-1946 period (see Figure 2-13).

Figure 2-13. Number of Men Called into Service 1940-1946

	March 1941 – March 1942	March 1942 - August 1943	August 1943 -August 1946	Totals
Designated Manpower (Available)	382,021	1,145,585	111,283	1,638,889
Total Number Enlistments	44,208	84,658	28,975	157,841
Average Number Enlisted Per Month	3,684	4,980	805	2,870

NB – Tabulated from data presented in Stacey (1970: 599) Appendix T and Department of Labour 1941-1947 RG 24 vol 2915 file HQS 9011.

With the shift to a centralized and more path dependant system, in which registrars were called on to follow a highly scripted protocol in mobilizing individuals, the average number of men enlisted per month jumped from 3,684 to 4,980. When discretion was returned to Registrars in August of 1943, the average number of men processed per month dropped to 850, noting a difference between the 1942-43 period of 4,175.

In considering these data, two themes emerge as technological and social components working to tighten the classifications of the mobilization system onto individuals. First, the adoption and application of technologies which enabled the

social content of the system's internal categories to be moved to new geographical and institutional spaces, most notably the Orders-Medical and Orders-Military instituted in 1941; and second, those technologies which worked to develop an automated, or kind of reactive path dependence, in the means in which an individual's data was addressed, perhaps best exemplified in the Control Card catalogue developed in the 1942-1943 period.

In addressing the first point, the categories of the mobilization system needed to be effectively translated to a variety of social spaces in order for classified individuals to take up the required performances of their ascribed categories. Within the mobilization system, the Orders-Medical and Military were the primary technologies adopted to perform this task. Specifically, these technologies carried with them detailed instructions as to the performances that were expected of individuals and were used by doctors and police as a means of identifying how particular individuals were expected to perform and were to be treated.

The technology of the Nominal Rolls also worked in this way, enabling the classifications made at Head Office to be effectively relayed to local Division offices, allowing them to initiate mobilization procedures and also receive actionable information back from military training facilities. In all, the Nominal Rolls of the 1942-1943 period passed through Head Office, Mobilization Division offices, local military training camps, back to Head Office again and finally, if warranted, to policing organizations, and at each stage the categories these lists expressed worked to inform those processing the information as to the

performances that were required of the persons in question and the actions that the individuals receiving these lists were to take. Furthermore, this relationship between categorical tightness and the use of standardized documents to translate system categories into new social spaces, can be seen in the *Pro Formae* used to identify individuals who were enlisted at military camps and relay those data to mobilization officials. Before the 1942-1943 period, a lack of standards in this type of reporting was specifically noted as disrupting the mobilization system's capacity to call-up men, leading to wasted resources and manpower in attempts made to mobilize individuals who had already enlisted.

As such, the history of these technologies effectively demonstrates the central role of standardized classification technologies in developing a necessary continuity and stability within governing systems – noting how this standardization works, not only to enable system officials and other cooperating organizations to work together effectively, but also in pressing categories that were developed internally within the system outward into the social environments of its target populations.

The second theme that emerges from this history is the development of a kind of automated, or coded, response to an individual's data within the system. The Control Card catalogue, for example, established a protocol and technology in which at each step, each card, in each filing cabinet or tray, not only spoke to a particular progression to be followed but asserted that a singular classification was to be expressed. Additionally, each step within the card's progression carried with it rules and requirements to be taken up by various actors across the

mobilization system. As such, these technologies worked to assert the tightness of applied categories through the adoption and adherence to a formalized series of steps, or events, set in linear progression along a pre-determined path. In developing an understanding of this relationship, the language of reactive path dependency is highly useful. As noted above reactive path dependence denotes the establishment of a set progression in which each step on path is largely a reaction to the preceding step, suggesting that “each event in the sequence is both a reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events” (Mahoney 2000:526).

By adopting a highly reactive path dependence, through the technologies brought in within the 1942-1943 historical period, the formalized use of individual discretion by Division officials and their capacity to negotiate the specific nature of each individual’s case was severely limited. Under this model, the positioning of an individual’s data within the system’s many trays and files dictated what action was to be taken and asserted individual accountability for the clerks charged with their management. In this way, mobilization after 1942 was no longer a relationship to be negotiated by mobilization staff, but a series of steps to be followed and a process to which specific individuals could now be made accountable. As in the case of Timmerman’s (1999) study of cardiac patients, this singular classification, or in his case “singular identity,” scripted all interactions within the system along the pre-set progression of events – as system design directed employees to see individuals only through their classifications and in relation to the predetermined progression of internal stages. Although

Timmerman does not adopt the language of reactive path dependency, or separate the path of individuals and their data through the system, the observed relationship of scripted, temporally ordered and causally connected events to performance remains. Additionally, accountability for the functioning of mobilization became much less diffused across the system, as post 1942 policy and the development of more detailed statistics exposed mobilization officials to a more individualized, segmented and manageable section of held data.

Furthermore, this technology enabled the system's effectiveness to be internally audited, again developing the system's capacity to enforce adherence to its established path dependency. Although the influence of 1942-43 policy and technology was incredibly effective in its classification and management of individuals, it is important to note that it also developed the most political resistance from its staff due to its lack of incorporating a means for Divisional authorities to assert influence or negotiate as part of the selection process.

Although the technologies described in this chapter were effective in establishing and relaying mobilization classifications, the movement from classification to the governance of individual acts, for some, did require the application of additional enforcement technologies, particularly where individuals sought to avoid the ascribed duties of mobilization. The following chapter addresses this question of how the mobilization system moved from its held classifications to the enforcement of particular categories upon non-compliant individuals and populations.

Chapter 3
Mobilization II: Enforcement Technologies

Fight, Work – or Jail ... Every man must take his part – or the consequences.
– Harold Digman NSS Official in *Library Magazine* “*Fight, Work or Jail*” RG 27
vol.1479 file: 2-117-14.

Though much work within surveillance studies asserts the governing capacity of surveillance technologies, little attention is given to how governing rationalities are translated into individual action, or endeavor to explain the relationship of particular technologies in enabling the governance of individuals or populations. This chapter addresses these questions through an examination of the number of individuals who were pressed to conform to the ascribed categories of Canada’s World War II mobilization program and the specific enforcement technologies that were developed to assert conformity over individual performances. In so doing, this chapter demonstrates the link between implemented technologies and the tightness, or mediating capacity, of governmentally ascribed categories.

Although many men chose to conform with orders issued from government officials telling them to register, to report to a doctor’s office, or to a military training center, the individuals facing this system could have freely enlisted in the Armed Forces at any time after the start of the war. This, coupled with the fact that these individuals did not choose to do so until after receiving their mobilization orders from government officials, establishes how these performances were coerced social acts, stemming from the external governing pressure of applied registration and mobilization technologies.

As with any system developed to control individual action, the mobilization section of National Registration and National Selective Service was faced with the arduous task of bringing a set of rigid and clear-cut governing rationalities into being across an array of social environments, a vast geographical space, and a multiplicity of differing personal biographies. Its function was to govern the performances of individuals in relation to a set of specified classifications and ensure compliance with their associated legislation and regulations. In the case of mobilized men, categories of “registrant,” “OME recipient,” “OMT recipient” and “NRMA soldier,” among others, dictated the performances of both the classified individuals and mobilization staff (see Chapter 2). In short, it was the mandate of the mobilization program to ensure that every man “take his part – or the consequences” (*Library Magazine* 1944 “Fight, Work – or Jail” August 15th 1944 RG 27 vol. 1479 file: 2-117: 14).

Crucially, the mobilization program was not completely successful in its task of governing all performative acts related to mobilization in the country. Very early on, for example, it was recognized that not all adults living in Canada had registered, as registration numbers did not meet the government’s population estimates that had been established through census data, leading Registration officials to voice their concern regarding the likely existence of un-registered, and thus, non-compliant, individuals. Though the registration program publically maintained a hard line within news media which assured everyone that “enforcement officers [we]re hunting down the slackers, gamblers, touts, bookmakers, tricksters, pool-hall artists, the spurious conscientious objectors, and

the general run of the mill loafer,” mobilization officials at Head Office in Ottawa and in the Division offices across Canada were facing the very real question of how exactly to tighten mobilization categories in order to ensure that each and every man did indeed take his part (*Library Magazine* 1944 “Fight, Work – or Jail” August 15th 1944 RG 27 vol. 1479 file: 2-117:14).

Over the course of the war, government officials were also made aware of gaps and flaws in their system, as well as conscious attempts by individuals to avoid the ascribed duties of their categories, and as a result moved to address these lapses in control. What may have been considered a loose social classification in 1940, asserting little governing pressure in the development of performative acts, was tightened through the application of new technologies, ultimately mediating the day-to-day performative acts of well over 900,000 individuals – in some cases even going as far as to result in the forced performative act of military combat.

The technologies examined in this chapter are separated into different sections, each depicting a different component of the mobilization system, specifically addressing: the Initial Registration of 1940 and the associated legislation used to assert it; the adopted regulations and practices used to identify and trace cases of “delinquency,” or non-conformity; the issuance of specialized identity documents and certificates to more easily indicate the mobilization status of individuals; the creation of a Re-Registration process which targeted those who avoided the initial registration; the implementation of a series of raids on private establishments conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; the

requirement of employers to check the identity documents of their employees as part of the “Employer Check-up;” and the requirement of men classified as “not medically fit” by their local doctor to be retested by certified military personnel as part of the Medical Re-Examination. In addition, the tightness of the system’s imposed categories was also augmented by support from the Criminal Justice System in prosecuting offenders, and was furthermore bolstered by social pressure which developed during the war as a result of the social stigma associated with being a forcefully mobilized NRMA soldier (see chapter 4), and the identification of non-compliant individuals through unsolicited letters sent in by the general public. Specifically, the tightness expressed by this system can be seen in the capacity of its technological innovations to assess individuals’ status in relation to mobilization, to identify individuals for whom no record previously existed, and the capacity to press individuals into service in the Armed Forces. Through an examination of the specific technological elements implemented as part of the mobilization system in order to identify and eliminate cases of non-conformity, as well as an investigation of the degree to which these technologies were capable of mediating the social performances of targeted populations, this chapter demonstrates how it was technologies that worked to establish a visibility of targeted populations, that drew on the authority of the law and fear of punitive action, that established a singular classification which could be shared across state organizations, and that developed path dependency, effectively tightening the mobilization system’s social categories onto individuals and populations.

Initial Registration and the Use of Law 1940-1942

This section charts how the authority and punitive capacity of law was coupled with media messaging in order to tighten ascribed mobilization categories onto individuals and populations. When National Registration and mobilization were first implemented in 1940, the regulations of the *National Resources Mobilization Act* were widely publicized within various media. As part of this effort, the government's media messaging repeatedly asserted that it was a crime not to take part in the Initial Registration of 1940 and that those who failed to do so would be found and prosecuted. Additionally, posters for enlistment, victory bonds and other government messages fostered a positive perception of duty and shared sacrifice that were associated with the government's war effort. In regards to the technologies of the Initial Registration and classification, over 96% of the estimated adult population complied with the requirements of registration, noting a strong relationship between categorical tightness and the authority of government policy when coupled with public advertizing and the potential of legal penalties.

National Registration in Canada during the Second World War was conducted in 1940 under the management of the Department of National War Services and the legislation of the *National Mobilization Act*. The initial Registration occurred in government and public buildings across the country on August 19th, 20th and 21st 1940, and involved a large number of trained registration staff, assistance from corporations which employed large numbers of

people, and the aid of over 200 local volunteers (Department of National War Services 1941 Memorandum to Jos. T. Thorson June 21st 1941 RG 27 vol. 3002 file: 1941 National Registration; Canadian Manufacturers Association Circular 965 1940). The process of registration itself involved a set of 19 standard questions for men and 20 questions for women, which collected information regarding their name, address, age, date of birth, country of birth, their father and their mother's name and country of origin, their nationality and immigration status, languages spoken, education, basic health, class of occupation, employment status, experience and training in agriculture and finally one's current registration status in the Armed Forces. These data were then entered on pre-printed National Registration Questionnaire Card forms, and became integrated into the selection and management mobilization system (see chapter 1 and chapter 2).

With the exception of the requirements of income tax, up until this point, involvement in the war effort had been largely voluntary, and in this way National Registration marked the first instance in which all adults across the country were called on to comply with government policy regarding direct participation in the Second World War. The need to register had been announced publically through various media sources including print, radio and posters set up in government offices across the country. Instructions directed all men and women over the age of 16 to present themselves and legally register, or face legal penalties. As a National Registration poster printed in *The Globe and Mail* noted:

Canada calls upon all her citizens, regardless of nationality, male and female, over 16 years of age, to register on August 19th, 20th, or 21st.

Registration offices will be open from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. The object of this registration is to ascertain the human resources of the nation so that they may be mobilized to enable Canada to make her maximum effort in the defence of this country and towards the successful prosecution of the war...Failure to register will make any male or female, married or single, over the age of 16 years, liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, of both such fine and imprisonment, and moreover to a further penalty not exceeding ten dollars for each day, after the day upon which he should have registered, during which he shall continue to be unregistered (Department of National War Services 1940 "National Registration Poster" in *The Globe and Mail* 1940 "National Stock Taking Needs National Registration" 12 08 1940).

Given the simple nature of these governing technologies, the National Registration system, in combination with the social pressures of the wartime period was incredibly effective in getting people to participate in the act of registration. Collecting vital data on over 9,250,000 individuals and allowing for government officials to fulfill the publically stated mandate of National Registration of taking stock of the manpower within the country and asserting which individuals were considered “necessary” to their community and which were deemed to be “available” to be called into mandatory service – effectively sorting these populations into readable and actionable categories (Department of Labour 1949: 9, 5, 47). Ultimately, these classifications determined who would be legally required to perform certain acts, to either mobilize into the Armed Forces, into industry, or to continue to perform their current jobs within their communities. Although fairly simple in its application, this use of media, the validity of law and the threat of punitive legal action was highly effective in governing the performative act of registration, allowing for the incorporation of the personal information of these individuals into the registration and mobilization

system, and accounting for over 96% of the estimated adult population and 94.88% of all individuals identified by mobilization technology throughout the course of the war.

With the exclusion of those individuals who were identified to registration officials later as a part of subsequently implemented technological innovations, all mobilization technology was crucially reliant upon the data collected as part of the initial registration of 1940 to enforce the system's categories and performative requirements upon individuals and populations. Quite simply, without the names and addresses of registered individuals Registrars would have been unable to issue or deliver the government orders for medical assessment and military training that were the basis of the mobilization system, or even know where to direct the system's enforcement capacity. Unlike those who did not register, the data of registered individuals would remain on their filed cards, and non-compliance would produce evidence of delinquency as part of the system's internal record. As such, this initial act of registration, taken by individuals living within Canada, was fundamental to the enforcement capacity of governing technologies implemented later, as registration not only made the actions and inactions of these individuals visible to the mobilization system, but it also enabled the systematic auditing of mobilization data to identify acts of non-compliance with governing policy, further developing the capacity for the actions of individual actors to be reviewed, accessed, and enforced.

Furthermore, this relationship was expressed in the fear related to the loss or mismanagement of the original National Registration Questionnaire Cards – as

the Associate Deputy Minister of the Department of National War Services

expressed:

it goes without saying that should the master card be lost or removed, it would be extremely difficult to trace any individual ... there remains for your attention the vital necessity of guarding the master cards which constitute the only means of tracing an individual who might be thought to have escaped his duties under National War Services Regulations (Department of Labour 1942 Memorandum to Justice Davis re: National Registration Staff – RCMP Investigation, February 16th 1942. Archives of Canada. RG 27 vol. 993, file: 2-102 pt.1).

Once the process of calling up men had begun, officials sought to use undelivered Orders-Medical and Military to identify any cases of delinquency and use the rule of law, in combination with the criminal justice system, to ensure compliance with applied categories. In discovered cases of non-compliance, registrars were to work closely with local and provincial postmasters and police, as well as with the federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), to enforce mobilization policy (Department of National War Services 1941 Meeting of Chairmen and Divisional Registrars of the Administrative Divisions Held at the New Supreme Court Building in Ottawa, on Monday and Tuesday, Feb. 17th and 18th RG 27 vol. 3026 files: Meeting of Chairman 1940-41).

To accomplish this, the mobilization legislation of the *National Resources and Mobilization Act 1940 (Recruits)* 1940, and later *National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations* (Order in Council P.C. 10924 December 1st 1942), had been specifically designed to contain “adequate enforcement provisions” for “both deterrent and punitive purposes,” while nine different sections of this legislation established new criminal acts regarding registration and conformity to applied mobilization categories (*National Resources and Mobilization Act 1940*

(*Recruits*) 1940; Department of Labour 1943 Memorandum re: NSS Mobilization Regulations – Section 28(3) May 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-11).

Specifically, now criminalized was the act of not answering questions posted by mobilization officials truthfully (*Recruits 1940* sec. 28(1) and (2); NSS 1943 sec. 25,30 and 35), non-compliance with Orders-Medical and Military (*Recruits 1940* sec.29, 30;NSS 1943 sec. 26 and 27), willful injury (NSS 1943 sec. 36), attempts to bribe officials (*Recruits 1940* sec.35) and impeding the operations of mobilization regulations through action, written or oral public speech that advised others to refuse or submit to comply with their ascribed social duties (*Recruits 1940* sec. 34(a) and (b);NSS 1943 sec. 31 and 33). Also included was a catch all-section to criminalize anything mobilization officials felt required the force of law, to be used in cases where there were “no other penalties provided” (NSS 1943 Sec. 32; see Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1. Table of Offences under the Mobilization Regulations (*National Resources and Mobilization Act 1940 (Recruits)* and *National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations*)

1940-42	1942-46	Offence	Penalty
Sec.28,36	Sec. 25	Not answering truthfully certain questions put by the Department.	A fine not exceeding one hundred dollars
Sec.29	Sec. 26	Non compliance with Order-Medical Examination	Imprisonment not exceeding twelve months with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars and not exceeding two hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.30	Sec. 27	Non compliance with Order-Military Training	Imprisonment not exceeding twelve months with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars and not exceeding two hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.31	Sec. 29	Second offences	Imprisonment not exceeding two years with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars and not exceeding five

			hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.32	Sec. 30	False statements or representations, acts or omissions for evasion of military training or to gain postponement	Imprisonment not exceeding two years with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding two hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.34	Sec. 31	Impeding the operation of Mobilization Regulations	Imprisonment not exceeding two years with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding two hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.33	Sec. 32	General penalty clause for offences where no other penalties provided	Imprisonment not exceeding twelve months with or without hard labour or a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars and not exceeding two hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.34	Sec. 33	Council or advice as to resisting enforcement of Mobilization Regulations	Imprisonment not exceeding two years with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
Sec.35	Sec. 34	Corrupt offer to or acceptance by person administering Mobilization Regulations	Imprisonment for a term not less than six months and not exceeding five years with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than one hundred dollars and not exceeding five thousand dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine, and in default of payment of such fine a further term not exceeding six months
	Sec. 35	Willful inaccuracy by physicians	Imprisonment not exceeding twelve months with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding two hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
	Sec. 36(1)	Malingering or willful injury to oneself	Imprisonment not exceeding twelve months with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
	Sec. 36(2)	Willful injury to a person other than oneself	Imprisonment not exceeding twelve months with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
	Sec. 37	Impersonation	Imprisonment not exceeding

			twelve months with or without hard labour, or a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars or to both such imprisonment and fine
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NB – *National Resources and Mobilization Act 1940 (Recruits)*; Department of Labour 1943 Memorandum of Proposed Amendments to the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations Increasing Penalties of Fine and Imprisonment for Offences Committed There Under August 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-11.

Tracing Delinquency August 1940 – March 1942

This section charts the implementation of mobilization technologies and policy directed at identifying those who were not acting in compliance with their ascribed government categories during the 1940-42 period. Although mobilization officials internally noted the extreme difficulty in actually applying sanctions upon those who did not register, particularly since they had no data with which to identify non-conforming individuals or which could be used to inform any enforcement mechanism, and as a result, had no idea who these unregistered people were, exactly how many there were, or where they could be found, the government's hard line that all non-conforming individuals would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law was the position that mobilization officials publically maintained. Mobilization policy specifically called on the system's staff to identify *all* those who were not conforming with their ascribed classifications, however, individuals' decisions either to register and provide their data to the mobilization system, or not to do so, worked to make visible only those who had chosen to register. In this way, the tracing of delinquency and the enforcement of mobilization categories was limited to those who had registered *and then* chosen

not to comply with an issued Order-Medical or Military.¹ This limitation in system visibility denotes the crucial importance of the system holding data on the individual, in enabling the capacity of a governing system to develop categorical tightness – stressing “contingent events” (Mahoney 2000: 527), moments in which a specific choice or action enables the setting into motion of a reactive chains of events, as key components in understanding the capacity of governing systems to assert categorical tightness. In this case, it was the contingent event of the act of participation within the initial registration that crucially established the individual’s visibility to the system and enabled its capacity to make the individual’s performance of compliant or non-compliant acts known and linked to the system’s reactive chains of enforcement and prosecution. Without participation in the process of registration, the individual’s later performative acts in relation to mobilization categories were not perceptible, and as such, could not trigger any of the system’s enforcement mechanisms. This section also demonstrates how some of the technological elements of the 1940-1942 period made the enforcement of mobilization categories more difficult, noting in particular how early attempts were hindered by a lack of effective information sharing between government institutions.

When it was determined that an individual was suspected of non-compliance with mobilization regulations, either by an order being returned to the registration office unopened or the time given to comply with an issued order had

¹ Orders-Medical and Military referred to Orders issued by mobilization officials which called a particular person into service, instructing them to either report for a medical examination or to report to a military training facility to begin their service in the Army (for greater detail on how men were called see chapter 2).

expired, Registrars were to follow a set protocol designed to investigate and gather any evidence of delinquency. Initially, registrars were to contact postmasters as a means of ascertaining if (1) the local postman knew whether or not the individual under investigation had moved to a new address and simply had not received their mobilization orders; (2) the postman knew if the suspected individual had already voluntarily joined the Armed Forces; or (3) it was known by the postman or anyone else he knew in the community that the individual under investigation had in fact knowingly refused to accept the delivery of the Order-Medical or Military Training or was otherwise suspected of “not being in good standing” of their own volition (see St. Vincent DePaul Penitentiary 1942 letter re: Prisoners admitted without registration cards May 8th 1942 RG 27 vol.999 file: 2-117 pt.1 NWS Delinquents; Department of National War Services 1941 Refusal to Accept Delivery of Registered Letters Posted and Divisional Registrars in Accordance with the Provisions of *National War Services Regulations 1940 (Recruits) – (Consolidation)* May 29th 1941 RG 27 vol. 1488 file: 2-173 pt.1). As part of this investigation Registrars were also instructed to, where possible, contact other knowledgeable community members, including the individual’s employer, known family members or local clergy (Department of Labour 1945 Administrative Instructions No. 117 Delinquent Farmers May 9th 1945 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-12).

If after this initial investigation the Registrar felt that the individual was willfully not complying with ascribed mobilization duties, a second order (medical or military) was to be sent, along with a form letter, informing the

delinquent individual that “this is your final notice, unless you comply with same and present yourself [to location] as ordered within three clear days you are liable to prosecution and penalties” (Department of Labour 1943 Form Letter Index: Form Letter “A” RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47, emphasis in original). Official policy after the delivery of this “final” notice, dictated that the Registrar was to press the individual further by involving policing institutions and, if necessary, the criminal justice system. In these cases, individuals who failed to comply with their Order-Medical Examination or Order-Military Training, *and* had not responded to their second and final notice orders, were to have their “full particulars” sent to policing organizations immediately (Department of National War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 246 June 3rd 1941 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents; Department of National War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 219 May 5th 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file:2-117-1; Department of National War Services 1942 Circular Memorandum 480 March 19th 1942 RG 27 vol.999 file pt. NWS Delinquents).

Once such a request had been received by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), or other contacted police agency, police were to assign an officer to investigate the matter further. If the delinquent individual was found, the investigating officer was to serve them with yet another Order-Medical or Military. After having done so, the officer was then to post a copy of their police report to mobilization’s Head Office in Ottawa, outlining the actions they had taken and specifically affirm that the order had in fact been personally issued to the individual by hand. These reports were to be placed in a newly opened

delinquency file for the individual under investigation and placed in the filing room at Head Office. Subsequently, a printed acknowledgement was to be sent back to the police agency to inform them that their correspondence and report had been received. The open file was then “marked for attention,” and was to be addressed again in “about thirty days after the diary date which appear[ed] on the left hand bottom corner of the police report” (Department of National War Services 1942 Memorandum to Miss McCarthy and Miss Viau. September 24th 1942 GR 27 vol 999 file: 2-117 pt. 2 NWS Delinquent). Thirty days after the diary date, if mobilization staff had not already been informed of the case’s result, they were to inquire to the police as to the status or resolution of the case.

In addition to adding the police report to the individual’s Central Registry file, officials at Head Office in Ottawa were also to send a letter to the local Divisional Registrar informing them that the individual in question had now been knowingly served with the order, and as such, had the usual three days to comply (Department of National War Services 1942 Memorandum to Miss McCarthy and Miss Viau. September 24th 1942 RG 27 vol 999 file: 2-117 pt. 2 NWS Delinquent). After this letter was issued, Head Office staff was to wait twenty-one days before conducting a follow up check with the local Registrar.

In the case that the delinquent individual had failed to report within the stipulated period, the process would start again, the Registrar would write to the Post Office, and if warranted, contact the police, and the police would open an investigation and file a new report with Head Office. The only difference in these second cases were that police would now have documented evidence that the first

order had in fact been delivered and received by the non-compliant individual, and the police at that time would have legal grounds to apprehend the individual on charges of non-compliance.

Once a delinquent was taken into custody mobilization policy established that they were also to be given one final chance to comply – as it was reported:

the general policy with regard to men who failed to report for medical examination, for further medical examination or for military training was that following their apprehension the Registrar exhorted or persuaded them to report voluntarily as instructed on their mobilization order. If the men reported immediately, as suggested, they then became in good standing but if they refused to report, they were immediately brought to court for prosecution (Department of Labour 1949: 96).

It was further noted that: “while a man may refuse to obey the regulations, he may later change his mind” and “it is not considered sound practice to lay a charge against a man when he still has an opportunity of remedying the default” (National Selective Service – Mobilization Section 1943 Minutes of a Meeting in Room 403, Motor Building, on Saturday, 19th Day of June, 1943, at 9.00 am RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

In cases where delinquent individuals chose to comply, registrars at Head Office were to “mark the file accordingly,” applying the special “Reported to Training Center” stamp (Department of National War Services 1942 Memorandum to Miss McCarthy and Miss Viau. September 24th 1942 GR 27 vol 999 file: 2-117 pt. 2 NWS Delinquent; Department of National War Services 1942 Memorandum of Procedure for guidance of stenographer in Dealing with

prosecutions. October 10 1942, RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt.2 NWS
Delinquents).

This investigation process was, however, considered to be highly inefficient by both the Registrars and the police involved, as it often required “a large number” of letters and a significant amount of time and effort to be expended in order to obtain the necessary data. As a Registrar reported –

as it stands no less than four letters, and sometimes more than six, are required to obtain, in many instances, only a few words of necessary information, the Divisional Registrar must send a communication to the Director of Postal Services, the Director of Postal Services to the local Postmaster concerned, the local Postmaster Concerned to the Director of Postal Services, Director of Postal Services to the Divisional Registrar, and the Divisional Registrar to the RCMP (Department of National War Services 1942 letter re: Postmasters November 18th 1942 RG 27 vol.999 file:2-117 pt.2 Delinquents).

In addition to the time consuming nature of this process, Postmasters often resisted requests from Registrars to divulge individuals’ information on the basis that what they were asking was highly personal and private, and as such, it was “against the regulations of [the] Post Office Department” to release to any third party (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Memorandum February 3rd 1943 RG vol.3055 file: 21-3-4). In these cases, Registrars were instructed to include a full citation of section 25 of the *National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations* along with their requests to post office officials, asserting that it was against the law to not answer questions from Registrars and that failure to respond within eight days would make any uncooperative person “guilty of an offence under this section” (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Memorandum February 3rd 1943 RG vol.3055 file: 21-3-4).

Additionally, the involvement of police in the issuance of mobilization orders placed a significant burden upon officers called to enforce this legislation, leading them to argue that the process was far too labour intensive to be effective, and that time spent on these matters had started to impeded their capacity to perform their other required duties. In a 1942 Memoranda letter put forth by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police office in Winnipeg, it was noted that the mobilization workload of the force in addressing problems of this nature had increased fivefold over the past year – from just 17 cases related to the delivery of Orders-Medical and Military in J District in all of 1941, to 319 in 1942, to over 1,182 over the course of only the first seven and a half months of 1943 (see Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2. RCMP National Selective Service Enquiries in Winnipeg – Periods 1941-1942 From January 1st to August 15th 1943 Computed Enquiries from January 1st to December 31st 1943

Enquiry Type	1941	1942	January 1 st - August 15 th 1943	1943 Computed	Increase over 1942
Notice Call (OMT) and Notice Medical (OME)	17	319	1,185	1,896	1,577 (494%)
Prosecutions	110	131	153	245	114 (87%)
Enquiries re Home Conditions	18	559	1,182	1,891	1,332 (238%)
Totals:	145	1,009	2,520	4,032	3,023 (400%)

NB - RCMP Memorandum re: National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, August 18th 1943. Archives of Canada. RG 27 vol. 1494 file: 2-270-4.

In these cases, the RCMP also noted the general difficulty and inefficiency in the enforced mobilization call up process, informing mobilization officials that:

the system adopted at present is for Notices Medical [Order-Medical Examination] and Orders of Call [Order-Military Training] to be sent to this Force for personal service upon the individuals named therein. If Notice Medical is served, the person to whom it is addressed is then

located - sometimes after considerable difficulty, entailing correspondence between various points - and the Notice served upon him. If he takes his Medical Examination, a Notice of Call may then be received and the same procedure is gone through, if, in the meantime, the designated man has moved again to another address. In some instances the individual concerned may deliberately disappear so as to avoid service of Call being made upon him. If he is located, Service of Notice of Call is then made and if he does not report for training, the same procedure in respect to locating him is resorted to for a third time with consequent expenditure of public funds, gasoline and the time of the member concerned with the work in hand. If the man has not reported for military training, it will be obvious that to discover his whereabouts becomes a difficult task (RCMP Memorandum re: National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, August 18th 1943. Archives of Canada. RG 27 vol. 1494 file: 2-270-4).

Prosecutions for this time period show that by the end of 1941 only 332 men had been charged for not complying with mobilization legislation. Nearly all (320 or 96.39%) of those charged, originated from mobilization's "E" Division in Montréal, Québec (Department of National War Services 1941 letter re: Order of the House Questions May 1941 RG 27 vol.999 file 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents). Although numbers of men prosecuted were almost exclusively in Québec, the numbers of those identified as having not complied with mobilization orders were more equally being distributed across the country – the largest number outside of Québec being "M" Division in Regina with 505, "J" Division in Winnipeg with 500 and then "E" Division with 444 (see Figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3. Number of Men Called, Delinquent and Prosecuted 1940 – May 1941

Questions	Mobilization Divisions													Totals
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	M	N	
How many men in each division were called for military service pursuant to the National War Service Regulations?	19,895	24,453	13,978	2,802	48,488	28,639	7,827	3,715	899	7,375	19,571	13,770	17,403	208,802
How many such men in each division reported to camp?	7,913	14,039	7,615	1,607	22,333	10,790	3,583	3,548	821	6,878	6,525	7,389	7,307	100,348
How many such men in each division failed to respond when ordered to present themselves for medical examination?	315	1,335	136	148	2,199	577	478	152	-	1,128	2,237	570	842	10,117
How many such men failed to present themselves at the military camp for training when ordered to do so?	34	88	13	19	444	754	67	167	54	500	32	505	131	2,808
Have there been any convictions for failure under either category?	-	-	1	2	320	-	-	-	-	2	7	-	-	332
How many prosecutions for failure to respond when ordered to present themselves for medical examination?	-	-	1	-	311	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	314
How many prosecutions for failure to present themselves at the military camp for training when ordered to do so?	-	-	-	2	9	-	-	-	-	1	6	-	-	18

NB – Department of National War Services 1941 Answers to Mr. Franser May 4th 1941RG 27 vol 999 file 2-117 pt NWS Delinquents 1941.

By the end of 1942 the policing of the National Registration and mobilization legislation had resulted in a total of 5,544 convictions (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1942-46 Annual Reports of Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences. Kings Printer. Ottawa). Of these, 37 were the result of violations of 1942 National Selective Service legislation. Data from 1941 denotes that the bulk of the mobilization cases, 314 out of 332, or 94.58%, were the result of men not conforming with an order to report for medical examination, while 18 out of 332, or 5.42%, related to individuals who had complied with their Order-Medical but had chosen not report for their ascribed military training.

The Classification of "True Delinquents" 1940-1942

When the technology of mobilization was implemented in 1941, government officials sought to develop a means of discriminating between those who were intentionally non-compliant, from those who had not technically complied but had instead volunteered for one of the branches of the Armed Forces when they had received their Order-Medical or Military. This more selective prosecution of delinquency was considered to be necessary to combat the hostility that was being developed against the mobilization system as a result of publicized prosecution cases that had been initiated against men who had chosen to volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces. As internal documents note, government officials informed mobilization staff that the system looked particularly bad and was at risk of losing further public support in cases where the man in question had already died in

combat when police officers arrived to investigate why he had not reported for his ordered medical examination or required military training. This section charts the development of mobilization technologies designed to differentiate those who were considered to be “true delinquents,” those who knowingly ignored the social requirements of their ascribed categories, from those who had not complied with issued orders for valid reasons. This section also denotes the degree to which mobilization technologies of this period were effective in mediating the social performances of classified individuals, noting that less than 7% of issued Order-Medical and Military ultimately resulted in delinquency, and that of these, only 17.66% were found to be the result of deliberate acts of evasion – again demonstrating the high degree of categorical tightness that government programs with the backing of law were able to express without the implementation of further coercive technologies.

In mobilization’s early years it faced a significant problem in identifying who they considered “true” delinquents. On the surface, mobilization data depicted large numbers of men who were seemingly non-compliant and unaccounted for within the mobilization system. An audit initiated by an order from The House of Commons in 1941, for example, reported that 10,117 Order-Medical Examinations and 2,808 Order-Military Training had been returned to Registrar’s offices unopened by May of that year (Department of National War Services 1941 letter re: Order of the House Questions May 1941 RG 27 vol.999 file 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents). Mobilization officials, however, stressed in their report back to the house that “it [wa]s not to be presumed that all these men are

willing delinquents” and that “experience ha[d] shown that when the truth [wa]s known, deliberate delinquents form but a mere minimum of the number involved” (Department of National War Services 1941 letter re: Order of the House Questions May 1941 RG 27 vol.999 file 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents).

As a result of the 1941 audit, the Department of National War Services decided to drop the blanket application of the term “delinquent” when describing those who failed to report, since “to apply ‘delinquent’ to a good number of men who heretofore have been included in this classification is really unwarranted and unfair” (Department of National War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 284 July 25 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1). For this reason five separate classifications were adopted to distinguish the status of those not in good standing; (a) Unreported – being traced; (b) Possible Delinquents – being traced; (c) Unreported – being traced; (d) Possible delinquents; and (e) Delinquents – which referred only to those “who, on the strength of police reports or other definite information, are known to be trying to evade their responsibilities under National War Services” (Department of National War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 284 July 25 1941 RG 27 vol. 1478 file: 2-117-1).² For each of these categories Registrars were to maintain complete lists.

Lists were to carry the individual’s “surname, Christian names, serial call number, date of birth, last known address, date notice sent by Divisional Register,

² On July 25th 1942 the number of lists was changed to reflect four stages in the mobilization process. List “I” indicated those who had failed to comply with a “Notice-Medical Examination”; list “II” indicated those who failed to report for “Alternative service work” at either (a) specified ASW Camp or (b) Green Timbers, BC; LIST 3 and list “IV” which indicate those who failed to comply with a “Notice-Medical Re-examination” (Department of National War Services 1942 Circular Memorandum 635 July 25th 1942 RG 27 vol.999 file: 2-117 pt.2 NWS Delinquents).

and note if the case had been handed over to the RCMP, provincial police or any other police force” (Department of National War Services 1942 Circular Memorandum 635 July 25th 1942 RG 27 vol.999 file: 2-117 pt.2 NWS Delinquents). One further list was added in July of 1942 to distinguish those who had previously been under investigation and were found to be in good standing. This list was compiled under the heading of “Disposal” and was also to note the result of the conducted investigation by asserting that the individual was found to be “enlisted, dead etc.” (Department of National War Services 1942 Circular Memorandum 635 July 25th 1942 RG 27 vol.999 file: 2-117 pt.2 NWS Delinquents).

A further review of delinquency data conducted in Saskatchewan’s mobilization offices in 1942 noted non-compliance, or delinquency, in 6.73% of all their issued mobilization orders (Department of Labour Services Intelligence Section Regina 1942 Memorandum to RCMP January 14th 1942 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents). Of this approximate 7%, further investigation determined that only 17.66% were in fact the result of deliberate acts of evasion – establishing cases of true delinquency as approximately 1.2% of the total called-up population. The bulk (73.7%) of the seemingly delinquent cases were found to be as a result of the individual in question failing to change their address, while 7.73% had failed to pick up their mail from their post office box, and 0.74% were the result of clerical errors made by mobilization staff (Department of Labour Services Intelligence Section Regina 1942 Memorandum to RCMP January 14th 1942 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. NWS Delinquents). Additional analysis

showed that of those who failed to change their address, 21.77% had in fact complied with the law and had sent in the necessary notice of change of address. In these cases their reported delinquency was the result of delays inherent in the labour intensive job of maintaining up-to-date Registration records (Department of National War Services 1941 Circular Memorandum 378 Nov. 7 1941 Archives of Canada. RG 27 Vol. 993, file: 2-102 pt.1).

Identity Cards, Documents and Certificates 1942-46

Although identity cards were issued as part of the registration process, they were not adopted by government officials as a means of assessing an individual's compliance to mobilization categories until 1942. This section demonstrates the increase of categorical tightness that was experienced after the mobilization system incorporated the use of identity cards, identifying documents and government issued certificates into the delivery of goods and services. Specifically, this section denotes how the implementation of a standardized set of identification documents greatly simplified the checking of the status of registered individuals to determine if they were in fact acting in accordance with their ascribed category and required social duty. In addition, these technologies made it possible for the first time for individuals without full access to the mobilization system's internal records to conduct effective checks of a particular individual's mobilization status. These data demonstrate not only the importance of identification technologies in developing a means to identify and assess

individuals within a governing system, but also the importance of increasing the number of points of contact with the system by tying these technologies to the delivery of goods and services.

As a result of the increased policing of regulations and the need to assess the registration documents and mobilization status of individuals, it was discovered that new technologies were needed to more quickly and efficiently distinguish those in good standing from delinquents. Shortly after December 1st 1942, “administrative action was taken for the issuance of certificates to men in designated classes to indicate compliance with mobilization regulations” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). Specifically, rejection certificates, certificates of exemption, “Postponement Order Certificates, Medical Unfitness Certificates and Other certificates indicating compliance with the Mobilization Regulations” were developed and were to be issued in “all appropriate cases” (Department of Labour 1943 Procedure Adopted Since December 1st 1942 to Enforce National Selective Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons June 23rd 1943 RG 27 Vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

Mobilization Officials also sought to integrate the use and requirement of the National Registration identity cards issued as part of the initial Registration and incorporated them into interactions with other governmental agencies and services. Starting in 1942 “the privilege of endorsing registration certificates, together with the right of demanding production of such certificates for that purpose, was extended to agencies other than the Department of Labour” – including the Department of National War Services, the Indian Affairs Branch, Provincial Liquor Control Boards and Commissions, and the Unemployment Insurance Agency (Department of Labour 1949: 20; Department of Labour 1943 Letter to Chief Registrar April 21 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 30).

Plans were also developed to require National Registration Certificates in order to receive nearly any government service, particularly rationing or drivers licenses, however, difficulties arose in the practicality of enforcing this requirement, most notably due to the reliance of remote and rural populations on the use of the postal system to receive many of these services³ (Department of Labour 1943 letter to the Deputy Minister of Highways March 5th 1943 RG 27

³ A “test check made in this office a few days ago indicated that less than 1% of those applying were unable to produce their National Registration Certificates. Over 30% of those presenting applications were agents, either in the person of members of the family, messengers, or garage operators applying on behalf of the owner. There has always been a large percentage of applications presented by other than owners but in the present emergency it appears to be the practice of employers of large staffs to designate one member to make application for all those requiring permits and licenses are annually applied for by mail. It would not, of course, be practical not proper to require persons forwarding the applications by mail or by messenger to risk the loss of such certificates by having them accompany the applications. While we have every desire to co-operate with your office in its efforts to check up on adult registration, we feel, for the reasons outlined herein, that it will not be possible for us to act on your suggestion in this regard” (Motor Vehicles Branch Department of Highways 1943 letter to chief Registrar for Canada March 22 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 30). In Halifax, “approximately 75% of our motor vehicle registrations and drivers licenses are issued by mail from the central bureau in Halifax. The remaining 25% are issued over the counter person to person” (Motor Vehicle Branch Halifax 1943 letter to the Chief Registrar for Canada March 17 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 30).

vol. 3033 file: 30; Department of Labour 1943 Letter to the Director of the General Section Wartime Process and Trade Board January 11 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file 36; General Section Wartime Process and Trade Board 1942 Secret letter re Respirators August 20 1942 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 36; RCMP 1943 letter to Chief Registrar re Co-operation between R.C.M.Police and provincial authorities in prosecuting multiple cases involving infractions of both our Regulations and provincial liquor laws or regulations April 21 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 30; Motor Vehicles Branch Department of Highways 1943 letter to chief Registrar for Canada March 22 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 30). National Registration Certificates were, however, successfully integrated into the purchasing of liquor permits and the distribution of benefits under Unemployment Insurance (Department of Labour 1943 letter to the Deputy Minister of Highways March 5th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 30; Department of Labour 1943 Contribution Circular August 1943 RG 27 vol. 3033 file: 33).

Between 1942 and 1946 the number of assessments done as part of the delivery of unemployment services was 9,236,018. On average this number represented 2,309,000 individuals checked annually (Statistics Canada 1947 *The Canada Year Book*). A similar number of these assessments can be attributed to the sale of liquor, as over 4,593,493 liquor permits were purchased in the province of Ontario alone between 1942 and 1946 (LCBO Annual Reports 1942-1946). These purchases represent an average of 1,148,373 resident permits⁴ per year or

⁴ Permits also existed for non-residents or “visitors” to the province and special permits also existed for businesses, hospitals and other establishments (see Thompson and Genosko 2007). These permits were not included in these tabulations.

39.04% of the estimated Ontario adult population – similar numbers were also reported in Québec.

In both of these instances, the integration of identity cards into the delivery of services associated with unemployment and liquor distribution was found to influence both the carrying of identity cards and compliance with mobilization regulations (Liquor Control Board of Ontario Circular 3276, January 1943; *Globe and Mail* 1943 “Beer Tells Value of Registration 06/26/43; *Globe and Mail* 1942 “Need Registration Card to Cast Ballot Today” 01/01/42; Department of Labour 1949: 20; RCMP 1945 Division File #45E.1066/2-117 May 22nd 1945 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-10).

The issuance of these certificates was reported to have been completed by June 1943 and maintained up-to-date by “all the thirteen offices of the mobilization registrars” until the end of the war (Department of Labour 1943 Procedure Adopted Since December 1st 1942 to Enforce National Selective Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons June 23rd 1943 RG 27 Vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

Also new as part of this policy was the collecting of national ID cards by mobilization officials when an individual was accepted into the Armed Forces, and the retention of these cards until the individual was discharged. This simple

innovation was seen as “one of the most important provisions” of the post-1942 mobilization system as it enabled identification documents to play a much more effective role in the identification and assessment of specific individuals and sorting out of non-compliant populations (Department of Labour 1949: 13).

The Re-Registration 1942

In the winter of 1942, mobilization officials chose to implement a selective re-registration of men within the “callable” age categories as a means of identifying unregistered and non-conforming individuals. This section demonstrates the development and implementation of the technology of the mobilization system’s Re-Registration, noting its effectiveness in tightening mobilization categories onto individuals and populations. The decision to make this move was based on three points. First, that it was suspected that there was still a number of men that remained unregistered; second, that high rates of compliance had been noted during the initial registration of 1940 when the government had asserted the legal necessity of registration through media; and third, the extreme difficulty of identifying and locating by any other means those who had not registered. As part of the Re-Registration the government was to again assert the illegality of non-registration. This time, however, their print and radio media were also to stress to a much greater degree the message that the government had previously been lenient with seeking convictions for not complying with registration legislation, but they *now* would be cracking down on *all* delinquent cases. Although the legal penalties for non-compliance stayed the same, media messages asserted the

coming increase in enforcement. In regards to the tightness of applied categories, the technology of Re-Registration was noted as having been an effective tool in getting men to register, identifying a significant number of new individuals who had not participated in the Initial Registration of 1940, as well as identifying a number of individuals who participated in both registrations out of a fear of being prosecuted.

In the process of auditing Questionnaire Cards and mobilization records in 1942, registration officials at the Department of Labour recognized that a large number of men of the prescribed age-classes “had not yet been located nor reached in order to be served with an ‘Order-Medical Examination’ form” (Department of Labour 1949: 101). Therefore, it was decided at Head Office that “before proceeding with the compulsory mobilization of men married before July 15, 1940,” mobilization officials were “to make every effort to complete enforcement against those men who had failed to register in National Registration 1940, or advise appropriate authorities as to subsequent changes in address and other facts” (Department of Labour 1943 Procedure Adopted Since December 1st 1942 to Enforce National Selective Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons June 23rd 1943 RG 27 Vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). Specifically, changes in address, errors in the preparation and duplication of

Questionnaire Cards and orders, as well as deception, were noted as the main reasons the audit had shown for the system's inability to identify and assert governmentally ascribed mobilization categories on individuals. Furthermore, officials charged with policing mobilization regulations noted that they simply did not have the means to identify or locate individuals who had not registered, this in addition to the fact that those "failing" to receive their calls for medical examination "had not yet committed an offence" and were thus not liable for prosecution under the 1940-42 legislation (Department of Labour 1949: 109). In light of this, the decision was made to initiate a re-registration of specified populations in 1942, and mobilization regulations were therefore "amended to require the re-registration of men of the then designated age classes who had not been served with notice or Order-Medical Examination" (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

The Re-Registration was legislated under Order-in-Council P.C. 11240 on December 11th, 1942. The order amended a new section to the *National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations* and ordered the compulsory re-registration of all single men born between 1902 and 1922 (aged 19 – 40) who had not already been the recipient of an Order-Medical Examination. Additionally, the legislation now also placed the legal onus on the individuals themselves to prove that they had registered, received their Order-Medical or Military form and had reported as

required (Order-in-Council P.C. 740; Order-in-Council P.C. 10924; Order-in-Council P.C. 1836).

Like the initial registration in 1940, government officials used various media to report to the public who was legally required to register. Instructions directed 19-40 year old men to report to the office of their Divisional Registrar, or their local post office, and fill out the re-registration's "Schedule C" form. Again, similar to the initial Registration of 1940, media reports stressed that those who did not register would be subject to fines, incarceration and immediate activation in the Armed Forces if they were apprehended by any policing organization after the registration date had passed (NSS Circular 94; Order-in-Council P.C. 11240; *Hamilton Spectator* 1943; *Globe and Mail* 1943 "All Single Men Called Must Register" Jan 5th 1943). In addition, media reports also carried the government's claim that those failing to register would cease being overlooked and be vigorously prosecuted, and that those seeking to avoid their duties "are all eventually found" (*Globe and Mail* 1943 "Mounties Seek Draft Evaders Near Montreal" Jan 29 1943). The government's public assertion of these two points was, however, somewhat misleading, as the incapacity to enforce mobilization legislation upon non-registered populations had been cited internally as one of the main reasons for attempting the re-registration in the first place. None-the-less, government messaging asserted the punitive aspects of non-compliance – as the Minister of Labour described publically, "the [Re-]registration gives an opportunity to single men in age classes under the military call-up to put themselves in good standing and to clear up any technical violations of

regulations of which they may have been guilty up to this time” (Hamilton Spectator 1943 “Progress Made in Registration of Single Males” Jan 23rd 1943).

The Schedule C itself was a fairly simple document, designed primarily for the collection of the names and addresses required for the mobilization system to perform its function of identifying, locating and calling up men. The forms were to be filled out in duplicate and while one was to be submitted to the regional Divisional Registrar, the other was to be retained by the official that had overseen the filling out of the form as a means of keeping a record of registrants’ compliance with re-registration regulations (NSS Circular 94; see Figure 3-4).

Figure 3-4. Schedule C

<p>DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR MINISTÈRE DU TRAVAIL NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE SERVICE SÉLECTIF NATIONAL MOBILIZATION SECTION DIVISION DE LA MOBILISATION</p>	<p>NOTICE TO REGISTRAR AVIS AU REGISTRAIRE</p>	<p>“SCHEDULE C” NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE MOBILIZATION REGULATIONS “ANNEXE C” RÈGLEMENTS SUR LE SERVICE SÉLECTIF NATIONAL (MOBILISATION)</p>
<p>N^o 571821</p>		<p>DATE _____ PLACE _____ PROVINCE _____</p>
<p>NAME _____ SURNAME _____ NOM _____ PRÉNOM _____</p>		
<p>PRESENT ADDRESS _____ ADRESSE ACTUELLE No., NUMÉRO STREET, RUE CITY, VILLE TOWN, VILLAGE PROVINCE</p>		
<p>DATE OF BIRTH _____ DATE OF MARRIAGE _____ DATE DE NAISSANCE DAY, JOUR MONTH, MOIS YEAR, ANNÉE DATE DE MARIAGE DAY, JOUR MONTH, MOIS YEAR, ANNÉE</p>		
<p>DATE OF DIVORCE _____ DATE OF JUDICIAL SEPARATION _____ DATE DE DIVORCE DAY, JOUR MONTH, MOIS YEAR, ANNÉE DATE DE SÉPARATION JUDICIAIRE DAY, JOUR MONTH, MOIS YEAR, ANNÉE</p>		
<p>PARTICULARS FROM MY NATIONAL REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE ARE: EXTRAITS DE MON CERTIFICAT D'INSCRIPTION NATIONALE:</p>		
<p>ADDRESS _____ ADRESSE No., NUMÉRO STREET, RUE CITY, VILLE TOWN, VILLAGE PROVINCE</p>		
<p>POLLING DIVISION ARRONDISSEMENT DE VOTATION No. _____</p>		<p>ELECTORAL DISTRICT DISTRICT ÉLECTORAL No. _____</p>
<p>SIGNATURE _____ (SIGNATURE OF ABOVE MENTIONED PERSON—SIGNATURE DU SUSNOMMÉ)</p>		
<p><i>I certify that on the above date, pursuant to the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, the above person duly executed the above form in duplicate and I delivered or mailed one copy thereof to the Office of the Registrar concerned and filed one copy thereof in my office.</i></p> <p><i>Je déclare que, à la date précitée et conformément aux règlements sur le Service sélectif national (mobilisation), le susnommé a dûment rempli en double exemplaire la présente formule et que, après avoir communiqué directement ou par la poste un de ces exemplaires au bureau du registraire en question, j'ai déposé l'autre dans mes dossiers.</i></p>		
<p>SIGNATURE _____ (REGISTRAR, POSTMASTER OR PERSON AUTHORIZED) (REGISTRAIRE, MAÎTRE DE POSTE OU PERSONNE AUTORISÉE)</p>		
<p>ORIGINAL FOR REGISTRAR OF DIVISION WHERE MAN RESIDES. ORIGINAL À ÊTRE EXPÉDIÉ AU REGISTRAIRE DE LA DIVISION OÙ L'HOMME EST DOMICILIÉ.</p>		

NB – Department of Labour 1942 Schedule C RG 27 vol 3019 file Operations of Military Mobilization

As part of the registration process, registrants were issued temporary Schedule C ID forms, and being found not to be in possession of one of these forms or a National Registration ID card carried the same penalty as failing to register, with the additional stipulation that these individuals could be immediately and forcefully drafted into the Armed Forces (Order in Council P.C. 11240; *Reserve Army Special Regulations*, 1941; Department of Labour 1949: 102). Once completed, the Re-Registration forms were sent to Divisional Registrars and were checked against Accounting and Control Cards to determine if the individual was listed as a resident of the district, and if up-to-date data existed for that individual. Also “registrars were told that it was their primary duty to mobilize those men” before others, and that an Order-Medical Examination (NSS (M) 14) was to be immediately issued by registered post to all individuals newly identified through the technology of the Re-Registration (Department of Labour 1943 Procedural Adopted Since December 1st, to Enforce National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons. June 23rd 1943. RG 27 vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943; Department of Labour 1949: 104). A daily Nominal Role of all those who filled out Schedule Cs was also recorded and sent to the National Registration Bureau in Ottawa to maintain the accuracy of their central registry.

These Schedule C Nominal Roll lists, along with the updated Questionnaire Card data, were then used to provide the new up-to-date

information to policing organizations who had been charged with finding individuals who had not complied with previously issued Orders-Medical or Military (Department of Labour 1943 National Selective Service Circular 900). After the transfer of Re-Registration data was implemented, this arrangement was touted by mobilization officials as having “resulted in considerable saving of time, manpower and expense connected with tracking and locating missing and delinquent men,” and that this action had “solved partially” the “problem of tracing men” (National Selective Service Circular Memoranda 94 cited in Department of Labour 1949: 109; Globe and Mail 1943 “Many Register Before Needed” Feb. 22nd 1943; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

In regard to the identification of non-compliant individuals, the Re-Registration was deemed by mobilization officials to have been a great success as it allowed for the generation of new lists of recruitable men, enabled the capacity to “list match,” the checking of these lists against lists of individuals seeking government services, and developed an increased ability to arrest those whom were found to be non-compliant with their ascribed classification. By March 1943 over 144,900 individuals had re-registered across the country, the largest numbers having been reported in the prairie provinces, Ontario and Québec (see figure 3-5).

Figure 3-5. Cumulative Totals of Re-Registration by Region 1943

Region	Jan.21, 1943	Jan.28, 1943	Mar.2, 1943	Mar.15, 1943	Newly Identified* as of Mar.16, 1943
Maritime Provinces	208	3,639	10,029	11,470	7,387
Quebec	1,331	5,948	28,927	37,248	23,987
Ontario	1,621	12,256	37,577	39,940	25,721
Prairie Provinces	831	14,118	39,819	43,749	28,174
British Columbia	789	3,950	11,145	12,566	8,092
Totals:	4,780	39,911	127,497	144,973	93,363

N.B. * Based on the 64.4% average of newly identified individuals as reported by registration officials. Numbers presented above correspond to the particular dates denoted and are cumulative. Department of Labour 1949: 107,⁵ Department of Labour 1943 Summary of Mobilization Statistics June 1943 RG 27 vol. 3007 file Statistics 1940-1944.

Although the Re-Registration process yielded what was reported as a significant number of new individuals for the Armed Forces, further analysis into these numbers showed that as many as 43.95% percent of these “new” individuals in the Toronto District (B) had re-registered unnecessarily - either having already been registered or falling outside of the necessary age criteria (Department of Labour 1949: 108). Registration officials noted that the risk of legal action against those who failed to register had worked, as “apparently men in doubt about their category ... registered rather than risk an infraction of Mobilization Regulations” (*Globe and Mail* 1943 “Many Register Before Needed” Feb. 22nd 1943; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

⁵ The official reports from the Department of Labour in 1943 note a discrepancy in their 1949 report. In the 1949 report the March 15th 1943 number for those re-registered was recorded as 139,517 (see page 107).

A review of these redundant re-registrations found an average rate of 35.6% across reporting districts (Department of Labour 1949: 108). This number considered, the Re-Registration would still have identified over 94,000 individuals for the first time and re-asserted the classifications of the remaining 52,012 who had re-registered unnecessarily – making it second only to the initial registration in the identification and documentation of new individuals.

Although Re-Registration was legislated to be completed by March 15th 1943 (Order-in-Council P.C. 1836; Department of Labour 1943 Procedural Adopted Since December 1st, to Enforce National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons. June 23rd 1943. RG 27 vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943), the program's success at identifying new individuals extended the issuing of Schedule C forms until January 1944, when Registrars were finally instructed to discontinue the program (Order-in-Council P.C. 740; Order-in-Council P.C.1836; NSS Circular Memoranda N 814).

Raids Conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 1942-1943

This section charts the role that the technology of police raids played in tightening the ascribed social categories of mobilization onto targeted populations. In 1942, mobilization officials, in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) responded to government calls for greater policing powers to be directed

toward the prosecution of those who were delinquent under the mobilization legislation. As a result, mobilization officials and the RCMP planned and conducted a series of raids against what they considered would be places that non-conforming individuals would congregate – such as pool halls, bowling alleys and dance halls. Ultimately, nearly 600 individuals were charged for violations under either the legislation of National Registration or mobilization's *National Resources Mobilization Act*. These raids were also considered internally to have been a success, as they were understood as being one of the very few means of actually identifying those who had not registered in either the Initial Registration in 1940 or the Re-Registration of 1942. Additionally, the raids were found to have had a secondary enforcement benefit, as they had prompted a number of men who were delinquent, but had not been caught as part of the raids, to report to mobilization offices to find out under which category they fell and how they could ensure that they were in compliance with the relevant legislation. In regards to categorical tightness, these data regarding the RCMP police raids assert three insights: first, the importance of identifying data being held within the system, that is, having a record of those who were delinquents upon which further enforcement action could be asserted; second, having legally required identifying documents which allowed for a means of easily checking an individual's status, without which the large scale assessment of populations required by the raids would not have been possible; and third, the role of asserting the potential of criminal prosecutions in developing individual compliance with ascribed categories.

In addition to their work tracing and delivering Orders-Medical and Military to non-compliant individuals in collaboration with mobilization officials at local Divisions, the RCMP, working closely with Registrars, planned and executed a series of raids targeting “pool rooms, beverage rooms, taverns, bowling alleys and other public places harboring alleged delinquents” in communities across the country (Department of Labour 1943 Circular Memoranda re: Increased Enforcement Activity by Police – Checking as to Non-Compliance with National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt.3 N.W.S Delinquents; Department of Labour 1943 Sixth Report National Selective Service Operations 1943 RG 27 vol. 37 file: 1 Seventh Report). Drawing on the new legal authority granted to police officials to demand proof of an individual’s registration, and the 1942 issuance of identity documents demonstrating one’s mobilization status, officers were now in a position to efficiently check large groups of individuals to determine their given classification and degree of compliance with mobilization legislation (*Hamilton Spectator* 1942 “Police Round Up 40 Quebec Defaulters” 1942/11/20; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). In their internal documents concerning the raids, RCMP instructions specifically noted that the purpose of this action was “the arrest and trial of individuals who [we]re defaulters under the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations” who, up to this point, had not been able to be located by investigating officers (RCMP

1943 Letter re: Enforcement of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations August 1943 RG 27 vol. 1494 file: 2-270-4).

Starting in 1942, these “special drives,” were designed to target individuals “who make their living from the gullible minority,” such as “poolroom sharks, street bookies etc,” since it was understood that they would have “no intention of reporting for duty” if called, nor have any “intention of obtaining honest employment” to contribute to the war effort (RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol.3055 file: 21-3-2). The locations for these raids were also selected to maximize the potential of isolating these populations.

The raids were to involve three separate stages. First, officers were to lock down the building, congregating those in the raided establishment within a central location and separate the men and women. Second, officers were to check the identity documents of all of the men who were present, not only assuring that each individual had their necessary documentation, but also inquiring “into the reasons for which certain persons of military age” had “secured deferment for military service,” as a means of detecting any potential cases of fraud (RCMP 1943 Letter re: Enforcement of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations August 1943 RG 27 vol. 1494 file: 2-270-4). Third, those without sufficient evidence of their identity or reasoning for their deferred mobilization status were to be taken to police headquarters for additional questioning, and their data sent to Division offices to be checked against locally held Control Cards (Department of Labour 1943 Circular Memoranda re: Increased Enforcement

Activity by Police – Checking as to Non-Compliance with National Selective

Service Mobilization Regulations RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt.3 N.W.S

Delinquents). As a reporter observing a raid in Montréal explained:

sullen girls were herded to one side of the dance hall while the men were lined up on the other...startled merry-makers found it hard to figure out what had happened when the police and soldiers boiled into the St. Denis dance hall, the pool room downstairs and the bowling alley in the basement. Girls, separated from their escorts chattered angrily to polite but firm policemen who kept them on their own side of the room. A few of the young men scurried for back entrances or tried to slip past guards posted at the main doors, but they were rounded up and asked to show their papers. Registration cards were not regarded as sufficient proof of low [medical] categories [categories B2 and below], and medical rejections discharge papers and other documents were requested (Hamilton Spectator 1943 “Draft Evaders Rounded Up in Large Montréal Raids” 1943/10/29).

The raids required a significant amount of manpower in order to be executed, employing 999 RCMP officers, 292 staff from local police agencies, and 222 specifically selected Army personnel (see Figure 3-6).

Figure 3-6. Personnel Used in RCMP Raids From Their Inception to November 30th 1943.

RCMP Division	Number of Institutions Raided	RCMP Personnel Used	Local Police Personnel Used	Army Personnel Used	Total Staff Used
“A” Ottawa	163	139	82	23	244
“C” Québec	135	306	7	137	450
“D” Manitoba	3	16	6	6	28
“E” British Columbia	23	96	32	24	152
“F” Saskatchewan	876	238	61	13	312
“H” Nova Scotia	10	8	0	0	8
“J” New Brunswick	28	45	20	0	65
“K” Alberta	101	83	27	8	118
“L” Prince Edward Island	32	5	3	0	8
“O” Ontario	288	61	54	11	126
Totals:	1,659	999	298	222	1,519

NB – RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-2.

Of the Army staff taken on by the RCMP to conduct these raids, 75 were specifically requisitioned because they were francophones from Québec, these men having been “carefully chosen” for their “local knowledge of the districts where it is alleged a surplus of manpower exists” (Military District #5 Quebec letter 1943 re: Recruits for RCMP Enforcement – NRMA 17th July 1943RG 27 vol. 7006 file: July 17 1943). It was also specifically noted that these volunteers were required to have military backgrounds, with a “full understanding of the conditions of service which they w[ould] be called upon to perform,” as “such type of work [wa]s considered distasteful by many” (Military District #5 Quebec letter 1943 re: Recruits for RCMP Enforcement – NRMA 17th July 1943RG 27 vol. 7006 file: July 17 1943).

This additional taking on of volunteers with local knowledge was considered of special concern in Québec, since the problem of locating non-compliant individuals in that province was “aggravated by the fact that the Québec Provincial Police g[a]ve little or no assistance” to mobilization staff and it was believed, that generally, there was a greater sentiment against mobilization in that province (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Memorandum 3rd February 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-4). A similar situation also existed later in the war in Ontario, as provincial police were specifically instructed not to take part in mobilization investigations or “any duties involving arrest of draft dodgers,” since it had been determined by the provincial government that “from the jurisdictional standpoint, the responsibility of enforcing the regulations rested with the

Dominion” (*Globe and Mail* 1942 “Provincial Constables Won’t Nab Defaulters” 1942/10/08). This decision did not, however, include the municipal police forces within the province, as Ontario was still to make all of its “law-enforcement machinery and personnel” available “other than the Provincial Police” (*Globe and Mail* 1942 “Provincial Constables Won’t Nab Defaulters” 1942/10/08).

As part of the Special Drives program, RCMP officers and mobilization staff raided a total of 1,659 different establishments, conducted investigations on 39,973 individuals, detained 2,701 suspected delinquents, and ultimately charged 537 individuals for non-compliance (see Figure 3-7). In addition to finding men not in good standing with the mobilization system, these raids also identified 105 deserters who had left their positions in the Armed Forces, and 662 who were not gainfully employed, though considered capable of being put to work within necessary industries.

Figure 3-7. Statistical Return of RCMP Raids Since its Inception to November 1943

RCMP Division	Number of Institutions Raided	Persons Checked	Detained	Charged			Deserters Located	Not Gainfully Employed
				NSS MR	NR R	Other		
"A" Ottawa	163	3,416	219	24	19	0	4	0
"C" Québec	135	9,525	1,217	245	6	0	77	5
"D" Manitoba	3	237	21	0	0	0	2	137
"E" British Columbia	23	1,984	386	13	100	2	11	25
"F" Saskatchewan	876	12,962	103	3	9	4	5	257
"H" Nova Scotia	10	666	0	0	0	0	0	0
"J" New Brunswick	28	878	107	0	1	0	0	0
"K" Alberta	101	6,395	220	9	6	12	3	8
"L" Prince Edward Island	32	169	2	0	0	0	0	0
"O" Ontario	288	3,741	426	50	23	11	3	230
Totals:	1,659	39,973	2,701	344	164	29	105	662

NB – RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-2.

The bulk of the institutions raided and individual checks were made in the RCMP's "F" Division in Saskatchewan (52.8 % and 32.4 %, respectively). However, the vast majority of detentions (45.0 %), charges (46.7 %), and identified deserters (73.3%), were the result of raids in RCMP "C" division in the province of Québec (RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-2). Although the raids did discover non-compliant individuals in each district of the county, these data also demonstrate a level of complete compliance with ascribed classifications in 93.24 % of the assessed individuals within the targeted populations – these individuals not only being in good standing, but also carrying the proper identity documents and proof of their status. With the exclusion of Québec this number rises even further to

over 96 %, while across the country only 1.27 % of those investigated were actually found to be in violation of registration or mobilization policy. The RCMP furthermore reported that, of those charged under the National Registration legislation, “almost all of the 164 persons” were charged as a result of having “failed to change their address,” leading officials to note “that a percentage of these would eventually have become delinquent under the Mobilization Regulations had they not been found and charged” (RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-2).

In addition to aiding in the difficult task of locating delinquent individuals, the RCMP furthermore touted the psychological effect that raids had on “men who were contemplating, or had been avoiding their duties,” noting that since the raids had begun, Division offices “had to place extra staff on duty to look after the large number of men making enquiries as to when they were to report for duty and giving changes of address” (RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-2; also see *Globe and Mail* 1943 “Police Continue Raids to Find Draft Dodgers” 1943/09/11).

By the end of 1944 the RCMP reported that a total of 3,775 establishments were raided across the country, the documents and mobilization status of 63,506 individuals were checked for compliance, resulting in 373 being charged with a breach of mobilization regulations, 271 were charged in regards to violations under the National Registration legislation, and an additional 145 were identified as deserters (Stacey 1970: 414). Upon completion of these special drives, the RCMP reported to the Department of Labour that they had been “more than

worthwhile,” since reporting officers felt that it was “doubtful if [they] could have reached the[se delinquents] in any other way” (RCMP 1943 RCMP Letter Ref. No. C 11-95-11-2 December 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-2).

Tracing Delinquency 1943-1946 – Commercial Reporting Agencies / RCMP Investigations

In 1943, policy regarding the tracing of delinquency within mobilization offices was changed significantly, rendering the process of identifying non-conforming individuals and the activation of enforcement mechanisms much more efficient and effective. This section charts the adoption and implementation of the new policies and technologies designed to identify and locate delinquents that were adopted and implemented by mobilization staff. For the first time, the mobilization system incorporated the aid of “commercial reporting agencies,” private companies which were involved in tracking individuals’ finances and credit for the banking industry, in locating delinquent individuals across the country. Also new as part of the 1943 shift in policy, was the adoption of the technology of a tracing card which enabled the implementation of a strict reactive path dependent flow for the data of delinquent men, as well as allowing data regarding mobilization classifications to be effectively passed between cooperating institutions. This new technology also greatly increasing the efficiency in which the data of delinquents could be passed onto the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and commercial reporting agencies for investigation and enforcement. As a result, these innovations worked to increase

the tightness of ascribed categories by significantly increasing the numbers of individuals searching for delinquent men, but also in their ability to enable mobilization categories to enter into, and draw information from, the surveillance apparatus involved in the issuance and tracking of credit used by the banks and commercial reporting agencies across Canada and the United States. These innovations increased the mobilization system's enforcement capacity significantly, identifying well over 90,000 delinquent men and worked to ensure that these individuals complied with the duty of their ascribed category.

In May of 1943 the Minister of Labour approached his staff about what could be done to increase the effectiveness of mobilization and obtain more men for the Army (Department of Labour 1943 Notes re: How Can We Obtain More Men for the Army May 1st 1943 RG 27 vol. 3008 file: 1943 Mobilization Procedures). At the top of this list was the call for more "vigorous" enforcement of mobilization legislation, and as a result, new policy was developed to identify non-conforming individuals and press them into service (Department of Labour 1943 Notes re: How Can We Obtain More Men for the Army May 1st 1943 RG 27 vol. 3008 file: 1943 Mobilization Procedures).

As part of its response, the Department of Labour brought into force a new policy involving a uniform means of tracing non-conforming individuals on June 29th 1943 (NSS Secret Circular 38). New policy asserted that in cases where a delivered Order-Medical or Military was not returned or classified as undelivered, and the time allotted for the individual to report had expired, it was to "be assumed that the Order ha[d] been properly delivered but that the man ha[d] not

complied therewith” – the case being immediately turned over to “the Divisional Office of the RCMP as soon as it c[ame] to notice” (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular Memorandum No.38 June 29th 1943 RG 27 Vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). In cases where an Order was returned or undelivered, the Registrar was to open an investigation consisting of four distinct stages; including a preliminary investigation conducted by the Registrar themselves, a review of all held registration data at National Registration Bureau in Ottawa, the involvement of private commercial investigation agencies, and finally an investigation conducted by the RCMP (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

As under the previous 1940-42 period, the Registrar’s first step was to check held data to determine if the individual in question had been enlisted, rejected, discharged or had died. Having done those initial checks, the Registrar was then to resend the order. At that time, however, the order was also to be accompanied by an “Acknowledgement of Receipt Card,” also known as “A. and R. Cards,” announcing to both the individual who was to receive the order, and to the local post office, that the individual was currently considered not to be in good standing in relation to their mobilization classification. When “A. and R.” Cards were mailed, the postman making the delivery was also required to complete the attached AR form, filling in as many details as possible regarding the personal information and whereabouts of the delinquent man. Completed AR forms were then to be sent back to the local Division office and integrated into the individual’s file within the locally held Central Registry (Department of Labour

1943 Memorandum for Submission to Registrars Meeting June 14th to 19th, 1943, Concerning Tracing of Men Whose Mobilization Orders are Returned Undelivered RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47; NSS letter September 2 1943 RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-9 pt.1).

If the local post office was unsuccessful in providing any information that could locate the individual, then Registrars were to move on to the second step in their investigation and contact the Ration Administration War Time Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) – the agency charged with the oversight and distribution of rationing documents – to retain any information they had on hand regarding the individual’s whereabouts. It was argued that “the number appearing on the man’s ration cards would be of great assistance in tracing him,” not only because of the benefits of participating in the ration system would ensure a high rate of participation, but also in the ability to get a current location for the individual, particularly in cases “when he moved from one district to another” (Department of Labour 1943 The Meeting of Divisional Registrars, 238 Sparks St. at 2pm June 18th 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Postal employees charged with the issuance of the ration books were also to record an “AR” next to the individual’s name on their rationing master list, denoting the individual’s “delinquent” mobilization status, and the need to alert mobilization officials immediately if anyone collected an “AR” marked ration book (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). Inquiries were also to be made by Registrars at this stage to “local municipal authorities, parents, employers etc,” based on the data held on the individual’s

National Registration Questionnaire Card (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

Once these avenues had been exhausted without success, Registrars were then to move on to the third stage of the tracing process and submit a 3” by 5” Tracing Card (Form NSS(M)102, see Figure 3-8) “giving the surname, given name, serial number, latest known address, electoral district, birth date and remarks” of the individual under investigation to the Assistant Chief Registrar at Head Office in Ottawa as to alert them of the individual’s delinquent status (Department of Labour 1943 Memorandum for Submission to Registrars Meeting June 14th to 19th , 1943, Concerning Tracing of Men Whose Mobilization Orders are Returned Undelivered RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Figure 3-8. NSS Tracing Card NSS(M)102

		TRACING CARD							
DIVISIONAL REGISTRAR	Date	E.D.	P.D.	Serial No.					
	Given Names				Surname				
	Address at Registration								
	Latest Address								
	Birth date	S M	Date	Notice Returned Became Delinquent	OME	FOME	OMT		
Remarks:									
CHIEF REGISTRAR	Enlisted Enrolled	Yes	No	Navy	Army	Air Force	Service No.	Date	Enlisted Enrolled
	Rejected Discharged	Yes	No	Date	Reason	Merchant Marine			
	Further Addresses								
	Remarks:								

In filling out the Tracing Cards, Registrars were to ensure that the “top half of the attached form NSS(M)102” was to be fully completed, in duplicate, and that “the thin paper copy thereof [was to] be sent daily to the Chief Registrar, National Registration Bureau, 227 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa” (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). If, after having checked the data they had on file in Ottawa, the individual was found, the Chief Registrar was then to return “his copy of the report with the bottom half completed” and a new Orders with the correct mailing information was to be sent out (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

The second copies of the Tracing Card were “referred to the Hooper-Holmes Bureau,” a private investigating agency which had been authorized under Order-in-Council P.C. 2278 in 1943, to conduct “confidential investigation[s] and report” on the whereabouts of delinquent men (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular Memorandum No.38 June 29th 1943 RG 27 Vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).⁶ Commercial reporting agencies were paid a fixed rate of \$2.50 per

⁶ In March of 1943 the Department of Labour decided to engage the Hooper-Holmes Bureau to “locate men of military age to whom the register ha[d] been unable to deliver the first call-up notice” (Department of Labour 1943 Letter to Registrar of Division “B” March 19 1943, RG 24 Vol.3055 file: 21-3-4). It had been decided to allow the Bureau 500 cases, selected at random, as a test of their efficiency in investigation. These investigations, conducted under the management of Rod A. Corrigan at the Hooper-Holms Bureau, led to the Bureau’s first report on their trial cases in April of 1943 though it was reported that the Hooper-Holms Bureau had received significant resistance from the National Defence Department over the verification of enlisted men based on the private nature of this personal information a matter mobilization officials sought to rectify. By June 12th 1943 the Bureau had completed 315 of its cases, finding 105 men to have been enlisted in the Army, 14 in the Navy or Merchant Marine, 35 in the Air Force, 39 to be non-compliant with regulations and at the address provided by the Department of Labour, 113 to have changed their address and 9 of whom had been deceased (Hooper-Holms Bureau 1943 Letter to McLaren, June 12 1943, RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-4). Given the success of the Bureau the decision was made at the Department of Labour to support the passing of PC 2278 and to incorporate the Bureau into the NR/NSS mobilization tracking system.

successfully⁷ resolved case, were given 30 days to complete their investigations, and worked under the authority of the Department of Labour's NSS Mobilization Section (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Mobilization Regulations Secret Circular Memorandum no. 68 December 21 1943, RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-9 pt.1). If the commercial reporting agency found the individual in question, they were to contact the local Registrar, returning the Tracing Card filled in with the newly discovered personal information. The Registrar was then to issue an Order, and pay the commercial agency once there was evidence that the Order had in fact been received (Department of Labour 1944 NSS Administrative Instructions No. 1944 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

If the thirty days committed to the commercial investigating agency passed without any word from them regarding the delinquent man, Division Registrars were then to collect whatever registration and mobilization data they had available to them and forward it "to local, or Provincial Police, if such arrangements [we]re in effect, or the RCMP for investigation and report" (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular Memorandum No.38 June 29th 1943 RG 27 Vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). These letters to Police were standardized using form letter "I" and included the Tracing Card data, as well as the dates that the returned or undelivered orders were issued to the individual under investigation, if these Orders were successfully delivered, and the complete particulars from the individual's Registration card, including their parent's

⁷ Administrative instructions noted "the ultimate test of correct location by a commercial reporting organization is whether or not a mobilization order can be served personally or by registered post on the man in question, or it is deemed that such an order should not be issued" (Department of Labour 1944 NSS Administrative Instructions No. 1944 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

address, place of birth, occupation and employer (Department of Labour 1943 Form Letter Index: Form Letter "I" RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). If the police found the man, he was to be served with the Order or taken into custody.

Registrars were also to retain their own copy of the Tracing Card in a distinct filing cabinet and to arrange the cards in "numerical sequence according to call-up number with subdivisions for OME [Order-Medical Examination], OFME [Order-Further Medical Examination] and OMT [Order-Military Training]" (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). Additionally, Registrars were called on to ensure that an entry was made on each Tracing Card which indicated "the name of the reporting commercial organization and the date the case was referred to them" (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). In this way, the Tracing Cards acted to maintain a detailed record of all delinquency investigations that were currently in progress. As a circular to Registrars noted: "Registrars shall direct that section of their staff in charge of tracing missing men to keep copies of NSS(M)102 up-to-date, insofar as the action taken toward the location of the man is concerned" (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). Furthermore, the card database was to be kept up-to-date by ensuring that as soon as the individual was "located, the copy of NSS(M)102" was to "be placed in his file and removed from the filing cabinet containing forms NSS(M)102," while in cases "where a man bec[ame] unlocatable a second time, the form NSS(M)102 [was to] be removed from the individual file of the man and

replaced in the cabinet containing the forms NSS(M)102, it being marked this time for special attention” (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). Registrars were additionally instructed to have this section of their staff “review forms (M)102 periodically to ensure that every effort [wa]s being made to locate the man” (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

If at any stage of the investigation the man was found, the Division Registrar was to contact all parties involved in the investigation to inform them that the investigation had been successfully resolved. Within Division offices, the individual’s NSS(M)102 form was also to be moved out of the Tracing Card database and placed into his file within the Division’s Central Registry in all resolved cases (Department of Labour 1944 NSS Administrative Instructions No. 1944 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). If any evidence regarding the delinquency of a particular individual was found through any stage of the mobilization system’s integrated investigation, it was to be passed onto a “Prosecuting Council,” who was then directed to take legal action against the individual in question (Department of National War Services 1944 letter re: Prosecutions Under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations April 5th 1944 RG 27 vol.1513 file: 60.9-1 pt.1 NSS Enforcement Orders).⁸

⁸ Reports had surfaced in 1944 of the inefficiency involved in this process as internal processes resulted in cases where up to “two months ha[d] elapsed between [the] investigation which disclosed all the evidence of an offence and the actual instructions to assist some prosecuting council” (Department of National War Services 1944 letter re: Prosecutions Under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations April 5th 1944 RG 27 vol.1513 file: 60.9-1 pt.1 NSS Enforcement Orders). Due to this delay “a new, and often expensive, investigation ha[d] to be conducted to locate the delinquent member, who ha[d] been placed on his guard by previous

In August of 1943 the number of commercial reporting agencies granted contracts to investigate delinquent men was quickly expanded beyond the Hooper Holmes Bureau to include the 27 affiliated members of the Associate Credit Bureau of Canada (NSS Secret Circular 38A). As it was noted in PC 4111, “the authority [was] granted to the minister of labour permitting the use of said Hooper Holms Bureau and/or other similar organizations in connection with the location of individuals whom Registrars cannot locate for enforcement of compliance with the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations” (Order in Council P.C. 4111 RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). These credit bureaus were chosen to be incorporated into the mobilization system in part because of their presence throughout the country, but primarily due to the detailed records they had already accumulated on those living in Canada and the experience these organizations had in tracking down individuals in cases of financial default. As the president of the Associated Credit Bureaus of Canada explained in his letter to the government:

our Association comprises 58 individual Credit Bureaus spread across Canada from Halifax to Victoria. Each Credit Bureau was organized and is maintained by business and professional men in the districts which they serve. In addition to this, they are affiliated with the Associated Credit Bureaus of America comprising over 1,200 some Bureaus in the United States, or affiliated with similar organizations in other parts of the world. Each Bureau maintains file record of all matters pertaining to character and credit record of practically each individual in the area served. In addition thereto, each Bureau maintains a staff for ascertaining any additional information required. We believe that no other corporation furnishing characters and credit reports presume to represent that has on records the information, either nature or volume, which we have in our files. These Bureaus are of vital importance during war time to individuals and corporations due to the transient nature of our population in such

investigations” (Department of National War Services 1944 letter re: Prosecutions Under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations April 5th 1944 RG 27 vol.1513 file: 60.9-1 pt.1 NSS Enforcement Orders).

times (Associated Credit Bureaus of Canada to Paul Martin June 12 1943, Archives Canada RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-9 pt.1).

Registrars were reminded that their work with these private investigation agencies was to remain secret, that “reports [we]re not to be published in any way” and that “neither the identity of the commercial reporting inspectors, nor their informants, [were to] be divulged for any reason” – even as evidence in criminal trials, as “at no time [we]re these reports to be made court exhibits” (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular Memorandum No.38 June 29th 1943 RG 27 Vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).

As a result of this new system of tracking non-conforming individuals, mobilization officials reported in their quarterly return in September of 1943 that they were tracking a total of 161,385 delinquent men, 56,562 (35.05 %) of which were the result of returned or undelivered orders, while the remaining 104,823 (64.95 %) had received their orders and were known to be non-compliant (Department of Labour 1943 NSS letter September 2 1943 RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-9 pt.1).⁹

Later that month additional pressure was placed on mobilization officials, presenting them with the task of “locate[ing] and dispose[ing] of these cases by December 15th 1943” (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 57 RG 27 vol.14079). As such, the “primary investigation” procedure that had previously been carried out by local Division offices involving

⁹ Orders-Medical examination: Returned Undelivered 44,592, Not Complied with 71,089, total 115,681; Orders-Medical Re-Examination: Returned Undelivered 5,509, Not Complied with 9,589, total 15,098; Orders-Military Training: Returned Undelivered 6,461, Not Complied with 24,145, total 30,606 (Department of Labour 1943 NSS letter September 2 1943 RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-9 pt.1).

Canada Post were halted, and cases of suspected delinquents were to be sent immediately to one of the commercial reporting agencies (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). New policy also eliminated the 30 day window for commercial investigations to be completed. Now commercial investigations were extended indefinitely, though Registrars were called on to pass Tracing Card data to the second commercial agency after the original 30 days had expired. Furthermore, Registrars were to report all cases to the RCMP at the same time as the commercial investigation agencies (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2).¹⁰ As a result of this shift, the number of new RCMP investigations spiked from a monthly average of approximately 3,000 over the previous 3 months to 12,224 in October of 1943 alone (RCMP 1943-1946, "RCMP Statistical Returns" RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5). Head Office also demanded weekly reports regarding the numbers of all cases referred to commercial investigators and the RCMP, along with the number of those cases that were successfully completed (Department of Labour 1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9 pt.2). In concluding their September 1943 circular 57, the Department asserted that "the urgency of this matter cannot be over emphasized and that Registrars are directed to take all possible steps so that all cases of non-compliance or non-delivery in their offices are given immediate and preferred attention" (Department of Labour

¹⁰ And finally to the RCMP after 60 days if the case had not yet been resolved (Department of Labour 1943 NSS Secret Circular Memorandum 57 RG 27 vol.14079).

1943 Secret Circular 57 September 10th 1943 RG 27 vol. 14079 file: 2-117-9
pt.2).

Between the months of September and December of 1943, Registrars had submitted over 143,600 cases to be investigated by commercial reporting organizations and the RCMP (Department of Labour NSS(M) 29.1.44 1944. RG 27 Vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5). Of these, 25,569 were resolved by the investigations of commercial agencies, while RCMP investigations resolved an additional 20,692 cases. By January of 1944, over 97,000 cases remained unresolved and “still under investigation” within the mobilization system (see Figure 3-9).


Figure 3-9. Number of Men Traced by Various Agencies September-December 1943

Administrative Divisions	Commercial Agencies Investigations ^A	RCMP (Police) Investigations	Total Investigations	Number of Unresolved Cases (men not located as of Dec 31 st 1943)
“A” London, Ontario	1,833	1,133	2,966	2,754
“B” Toronto, Ontario	6,083	1,357	7,440	21,290
“C” Kingston, Ontario	1,125	957	2,082	1,332
“D” Port Arthur, Ontario	10	491	501	678
“E” Montréal, Québec	11,333	6,915	18,248	35,729
“F” Québec, Québec	1,435	5,434	6,869	14,884
“G” Halifax, Nova Scotia	227	141	368	1,709
“H” Saint John, New Brunswick	407	3,058	3,465	1,321
“I” Charlottetown, P.E.I.	0	19	19	46
“J” Winnipeg, Manitoba	372	12	384	1,861
“K” Vancouver, B.C.	1,498	507	2,005	6,667
“M” Regina, Saskatchewan	394	782	1,176	5,730
“N” Edmonton, Alberta	852	86	938	3,155
Total Canada:	25,569	20,692	46,461	97,156

NB – Department of Labour 1944 NSS(M) 29.1.44 1944. RG 27 Vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5 September 13th 1943 – January 15th 1944. A – The commercial agency investigations were conducted by the private companies of the Hooper Holmes Bureau and the Associated Credit Bureau of Canada.

Although the numbers noted above show that a vast number of cases remained “still under investigation” – expressing a “success rate” of under 50% as of December of 1943 – RCMP statistical returns show that by VE day (May 7th 1945) the number of unresolved cases had been cut to just over 16,200 (RCMP 1943-1946, “RCMP Statistical Returns“ RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5; see Figure 3-10).

Figure 3-10. RCMP Mobilization Investigations March 1943 – July 1946



NB- Tabulated from RCMP 1943-1946 “RCMP Statistical Returns“ RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5.

Prosecutions even continued after the resolution of the war, with the services of commercial agencies being retained until August 10th 1945, while the RCMP continued their investigations well into 1946 (RCMP 1943-1946 “RCMP Statistical Returns“ RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5; Department of Labour 1945 letter to the Associated Credit Bureau of Canada August 10th 1945, RG 27

vol.3055 file 21-3-4). In their final report on the matter of mobilization in June of 1946, the RCMP reported that only 828 of their cases remained open and unresolved (RCMP 1943-1946 "RCMP Statistical Returns" RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5). Ultimately this system of dealing with delinquents identified and located at least 346,317 of the over 362,517 individuals that were sought, pressing them to comply with the requirements of their ascribed social categories (RCMP 1943-1946 "RCMP Statistical Returns" RG 27 vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5; Department of Labour 1944 NSS(M) 29.1.44 1944. RG 27 Vol. 3055 file: 21-3-5 September 13th 1943).

The "Employer Check-up" 1943-1945

In this section the technologies of the Employer Check-up are charted as a means of further explicating the relationship between categorical tightness and the mediation of individual performance. Starting in 1943 all employers were legally required to investigate the mobilization status of each of their staff. The design of the Employer Check-up again used the tying of the delivery of goods and services to the enforcement of conformity to mobilization categories. In this case, the capacity to legally sell one's labour time was linked to the performance of acts in compliance with the regulations of the mobilization system by requiring all employers to check the identity documents of all of their employees and any new applicants. In cases where the employer suspected an individual of delinquency, they were to notify mobilization officials by submitting a specialized form which was designed to enable mobilization officials to identify and locate the individual

in question. In this way, the mobilization system sought to use the technologies of identification documents and the law to incorporate all employers across the country into the enforcement arm of the mobilization system. The Employer Check-up was considered to be a success by mobilization officials, as it worked to identify 10,040 new individuals and worked to reinforce the classifications of over 49,500 others.

Due to the internal audits of mobilization records conducted by the Department of Labour in 1942, it was determined by mobilization officials that “by the end of 1943, a good many men in Canada were not in good standing in respect to the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations” (Department of Labour 1949: 113, 122). In a Meeting of Registrars earlier that year in Ottawa it had been established “that it would be an absolute impossibility to search out all individuals who were listed as delinquents, but that the most feasible way to locate a reasonable number of these men would be through special reports by employers and NSS officers,” and by making “it mandatory that all men employed or seeking employment [to] give proof that they have not contravened the mobilization regulations” (Department of Labour 1943 Memorandum Matters Discussed within General Riley this Afternoon 22nd Jan 1943 RG 27 vol. 2915 file: 9-4011-9-5).

In order to identify these men, locate them and reassert categorical conformity, action was taken by mobilization officials based on the premise that these men were somehow paying for the necessities of life and were therefore “presumably employed” (Department of Labour 1949: 113). It was argued that

since legally one was required to be in good standing with the mobilization regulations in order to be in possession of employment, then a review of all individuals employed would identify those not complying with the relevant legislation. Although the initial *National Resources Mobilization Act* in 1940 had criminalized the hiring of unregistered individuals, and the Department of Labour had conducted internal reviews of all men seeking permits for employment¹¹ since the middle of April 1942, and the Department of Labour had repeatedly asked employers through press releases to “check over their payrolls and satisfy themselves that their employees had complied with [mobilization] regulations” since November of 1942, it was decided that a legally mandated full review of the credentials of all employed individuals within Canada was needed (Canadian Manufacturers’ Association 1940 Circular No. 960 August 12th 1940 F229-36, Box 11, B273360, file: War General “N-V” ; The Globe August 8th 1940 Registry Onus on Employers; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943; Department of Labour 1942 Press Release November 23rd 1942 RG 24 vol. 2915 file: 5-4011-9-5).

Dubbed the “Employer Check-up,” regulations laid out in Order-in-Council P.C. 9919 of December 31st 1943 asserted that:

¹¹ Permits were required to enter new employment under National Selective Service Civilian Regulations employing over 300 staff in 1943 for this task above (Department of Labour 1943 Address of Mr. T. R. Ealsh, Chief of Enforcement and Instructions Division, NSS and Unemployment Insurance to Meeting of Registrars June 18th 1943 at 10:30 am RG 27 vol. 1485 file: 2-146).

every employer who has in his employ any male employees, is required to carry out an examination of documents possessed by such employees, to ensure that the employees have not failed to comply with National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations.

Additionally, the Order-in-Council added Section 24A to the National Selective Service mobilization regulations and established the official identity certificates and documents that would be accepted as proof that an individual was in compliance with their mobilization classification. Specifically, the individual would have to present either a) a certificate of discharge from active service in the Armed Forces, b) a certificate showing that they had volunteered to serve in the Armed Forces and were rejected, c) a certificate showing that they had been mobilized and had reported for military training but were rejected, d) a certificate showing that they were classified as exempt from service, e) a certificate of Postponement, or f) any other governmentally prescribed certificate or document (P.C. 9919 December 31st 1943). As a means of familiarizing the “personnel of Registrars and of employment offices with the documents indicating good standing, copies of a special booklet” entitled *Documents Which Indicate Good Standing Under The National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations* (1944 RG 27 vol II NSS Mobilization Records) containing “facsimiles of the documents showing good standing” were sent to Registrars, employers and to employment offices (Department of Labour 1949: 118).

On January 28th 1944, a ministerial order activated the new legislation, and an “Employer Guide” which detailed instructions concerning the procedures and the review process of the Employer Check-up were posted to employers across the country (Department of Labour 1949: 143). As a means of informing the general

public of the Employer Check-up, announcements were also made through various media, explaining what the program required of both employees and employers (*Recorder* 1943 “A Word of Caution to Men of Military Age and to Their Employers” October 29, 1943; *Crossfield Chronicle* 1943 “A Word of Caution to Men of Military Age and to Their Employers” November 5, 1943).

The *Employers’ Guide For Examination of Standing of Male Employees Under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations* was distributed on January 28th 1944, and laid out in detail the legal duties of employers, as well as the process of conducting the assessment of their employees. As the guide explained:

“not later than May 1st, 1944 every employer must (a) either personally, or through some responsible official or employee working for him, interview all male employees, in order to learn whether such employees are in good standing in regards to National Selective Service Mobilization regulations; and (b) report immediately to the Registrar of the nearest Mobilization Division, on any male employee who fails to furnish proof to the employer that he has complied with the regulations” (Department of Labour 1944 Employers’ Guide F 229 box 11 B273360 file: War-General “N-V”).

Suspected non-compliant individuals were to be identified through a particular form, the “Schedule 9” (NSS (M) 99; see Figure 3-11), which detailed both the individual’s personal information, and his position within the industry. Like the Schedule C of the Re-Registration, the Schedule 9 focused on collecting data that would enable the identification of the suspected individual and also provide a means of inserting their personal information into mobilization technologies and locating them, in cases of future investigations or legal action.

Figure 3-11. Schedule 9, Form NSS (M) 99

DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR
NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE MOBILIZATION REGULATIONS

SCHEDULE 9 To the Registrar,
 Mobilization Section at: Date.....

.....
 (Place) (Province)

Report on employee who has failed to produce satisfactory evidence that he is in good standing under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, when requested to do so.

(Please leave this blank.)
 Med. Cat.
 No.

Details from Employee's National Registration Certificate

1. Name.....

2. Address.....
(Street and No. or Rural Route) (Place) (Province)

3. Electoral District No..... Polling Division No.....

4. Present Address.....
(Street and No. or Rural Route) (Place) (Province)

5. Present Marital Status (mark with an "X"):
 Single Married Widower Divorced Judicially Separated

6. If ever married:
 Date of Marriage..... Date of becoming a Widower, or being Divorced or Judicially Separated..... No. of Children Living.....

7. Date of Birth: Month..... Day..... Year.....

8. Signature of Employee:
(Certifying to above statements).....

9. Or Name of Employee:
(Entered for him on refusal to sign).....

10. Certification: The undersigned employer certifies:
 (a) That the above employee failed or refused to furnish proof of good standing under National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, after being given reasonable opportunity to do so;
 (b) That the statements and answers given in this form are either known to be correct, or have been provided by the employee;
 (c) That the employee refused to sign (this is to be crossed out if employee signs above);
 (d) That a copy of this form, completed similarly, has been given to the employee:

Employer's Name.....
 Signature of, or for, Employer.....

Position with Employer.....
 Address of Employer or Location of Branch.....

To Employer: The original copy of this Form should be mailed immediately after completion to the Registrar of the Mobilization Section for the Division in which the employer or branch completing the Form is located.
 N.S.S. (M.) 99

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NB – Department of Labour 1944 Schedule 9 Form in *Employers' Guide* F 229 box 11 B273360 file: War-General "N-V"

The *Employers' Guide* explained to employers that they were to adopt the following procedure when filling out a Schedule 9:

(a) in Section 1, 2 and 3, copy the details from the employee's Registration Certificate (this refers to the National Registration of August, 1940). Information from the Registration Certificate should be copied exactly; (b) in Section 4 the employee's present address is to be entered; (c) the employee should sign in Section 8, should he refuse, the employer should then enter the employee's name in Section 9; (d) in section 10, in the case of a business firm, the firm or company name, the branch of the firm, address and the official position of the signing officer, are important. Where the employer is a Government, the branch and its location should be clearly entered (Department of Labour 1944 *Employers' Guide* F 229 box 11 B273360 file: War-General "N-V").

Employers were also instructed that the Schedule 9 should be completed by the employer "in triplicate," the original copy to be "sent immediately after the completion to the Registrar for the Division in which the employer, or branch completing the form is located," while "the employee should be given one copy and the employer should retain the third copy" (Department of Labour 1944 *Employers' Guide* F 229 box 11 B273360 file: War-General "N-V").

An analysis of all Schedule 9s submitted before the end of the program in 1945, depicts a rate of compliance of investigated individuals to their governmental mobilization categories of just over 79% (see Figure 3-12). Most Districts reported that under 6% of their investigated cases were found to be "not in good standing," with the exception of Toronto (48.06%), Vancouver (34.63%), Montréal (16.46%) and Québec (15.43%), all reporting significantly higher rates of delinquency. Statewide this amounted to an average of discovered cases of non-compliance of just over 20%, leading to the identification of over 10,000 individuals. Of those found to be not in good standing, 258, or 0.52% of all those

identified through the Employer Check-up, were found to be absentees or deserters - having failed to report for military training or had left the Armed Forces without leave. These individuals were to be directly delivered to Armed Forces training camps by police personnel.

Figure 3-12. Schedule 9 Forms Submitted by Employers Jan 28th 1944 – Aug. 31st 1945

Administrative District	Estimated Working Adult Male Population (1941)	Submitted Schedule 9s ^A	Found in Good Standing ^B	Not Found in Good Standing ^C	Found as Absentee or Deserters ^D
Ontario	1,140,105	12,934	8,374	4,545	15
“A” London, Ontario		2,546	2,308	237	1
“B” Toronto, Ontario		8,739	4,529	4,200	10
“C” Kingston, Ontario		974	925	45	4
“D” Port Arthur, Ontario		675	612	63	0
Québec	928,464	29,271	24,318	4,717	176
“E” Montréal, Québec		19,375	16,103	3,190	82
“F” Quebec, Québec		9,896	8,215	1,527	94
“G” Halifax, Nova Scotia	153,941	2,761	2,655	58	48
“H” Saint John, New Brunswick	119,341	759	753	4	2
“I” Charlottetown, P.E.I.	26,088	73	65	8	0
“J” Winnipeg, Manitoba	215,705	619	611	7	1
“K” Vancouver, B.C.	258,723	1,490	972	516	2
“M” Regina, Saskatchewan	273,122	717	618	90	9
“N” Edmonton, Alberta	247,622	924	884	35	5
Totals :	3,363,111	49,548	39,250	10,040	258

N.B. A – If an individual was interviewed by their employer and were not able to supply evidence that they were in compliance with National Registration or their mobilization requirements a Schedule 9 form would be filled out. All Schedule 9s were then sent to Division offices and the individuals noted therein were investigated against held records. B – Those for who the Division Registrars found evidence of the individual listed in the Schedule 9 was properly registered and was found to be compliant with their mobilization requirements were classified as “Being Found in Good Standing.” C – Those for whom no evidence of Registration or had found to report for their medical examination were classified as being “Not Found in Good Standing.” D – Those for whom the Registrars found evidence that they had been called for military service but had not reported or who had left the Army without leave were classified as “Found as Absentee or Deserters.” E – As percentage of the estimated population reported in the 1941 census. Data tabulated from information presented in Department of Labour 1949: 118 and McInnis (1999) *Historical Statistics of Canada* Table D512-521.

Given the success of the Employer Check-up, a Ministerial Order was issued on August 15th 1944, which extended the duties of employers in checking the identity documents of new employees past the program's originally scheduled end date of May 1st 1944. The new regulations also legally integrated the review of identity documents into the hiring phase itself, as employers were now required to assess registration and mobilization documents, and file a Schedule 9 within seven days of receiving an application for employment from an individual without valid identification papers (Department of Labour 1949: 116).

This procedure of making employers liable for the proper registration and documentation of all of their employees, and employees requiring identity documents to legally exchange their labour/time within the country, continued until June 26th 1945, when the need for manpower mobilization had come to an end. Employers were informed of the program's end in a letter sent out by the Department of Labour on August 7th 1945, while Mobilization Boards and Registrars were informed of this fact ten days later (Ministry of Labour Circular Memorandum 1132, 1945; Department of Labour 1949: 117).

The Medical Re-Examination 1943

This section demonstrates the development and implementation of the Medical Re-Examination technology and its capacity to assert categorical tightness. In 1943, the Medical Re-Examination was developed in order to assert more effective control over the processes of medical classification. This was to be

achieved by taking the task of medical examinations out of the hands of the local doctors who up until that time had been selected by the individual being examined, and instead placing these examinations under the direct supervision of Army staff. In this way, the tightness of mobilization categories was increased by ensuring that the personal relationships between particular individuals and their doctors could not work to disrupt the application of a consistent medical classification. In this way, over 52,500 men were reclassified from categories which were not to be called, to ones which could be conscripted into the Army.

The first regulations relating to the medical re-assessment of individuals were included in the legislation of the *National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) (Consolidation 1941)*, in which it was asserted that if “there was doubt as to the man’s fitness or unfitness for military training, the man could be ordered to report for another medical examination” (Department of Labour 1949: 71). Unlike the first exam, which was to be conducted by a civilian doctor of the individual’s choosing, this legislation asserted that the second examination was to be done “by an examining physician designated by the Registrar” – this process being specifically designated to address any suspected inconsistencies in classification that may have occurred (Department of Labour 1949: 71). Although the civilian doctors performing medical examinations across the country had been given detailed instructions (see ch.2 p.#), Military Training Centers, who conducted their own assessments on all incoming mobilized and volunteer men, noted discrepancies in how medical classifications were being applied (*Hamilton Spectator* 1942 “Speed Up Check on Men Called” 1942/11/21).

By 1942, Mobilization staff at local Division offices had adopted the policy of reviewing doctor's medical examination reports (NWS 1AR) in all cases of low or unfit medical classifications, having their own "medical advisor look over the report and tr[y] to find the cause" for the individual being placed in an unfit medical category (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes Evening G RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 : J-14). In cases where discrepancies were found, and the reason for medical unfitness was "not sufficient according to the regulations," the Division medical advisor was to mark the individual as "fit," and in some cases the individual "may be marked A" (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes Evening G RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 : J-14). These re-classifications were not generally considered necessary as the result of expected fraud or corruption, but mainly because of significantly different interpretations of the applied medical classifications (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes Evening G RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 : J-14). As it was noted by a Division Registrar, "we have had doctors who, acting in good faith, have obviously not categorized men correctly – not because of dishonesty but because they have not been careful in their reading of the brochure and regulations" (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes Evening G RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3 : J-14).

As of September 7th 1943, Order in Council PC 6990 authorized Registrars "to change the procedure for compliance with an Order-Medical Examination" (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943). Under the

previous regulations, men issued an Order-Medical could report to a physician of their choice in order to receive their medical assessment. New regulations, however, sought greater control and oversight over this process through the application of more rigid enforcement and standardization in testing – requiring mobilized men instead to report “in the first instance for medical examination, to either an Army Medical Board at a reception center,” to “a designated physician belonging to a panel of physicians,” or in extreme cases where the individual was living in a remote area that would require more than a forty-eight hour return journey, to the “nearest duty approved civilian physician” (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943; Department of Labour 1949: 68; also see “New Procedure in Examinations to Help Doctors”). Medical examinations that were part of mobilization were now only to be conducted by doctors selected by Registrars, for the most part, at military facilities, and done in accordance with strict adherence to the new standards put forth in the *Physical Standards Instructions for the Medical Examination of Recruits* of September 7th 1943 (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943; Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of the Meeting in the Office of Mr. MacNamera June 2nd 1943 RG 27 vol. 3008 file: Winnipeg).

The reason provided for the change was to eliminate the duplication of services for medical exams, since under the previous policy the individual would receive an exam from both a civilian doctor and then a military doctor – the argument being, that “if the Revision Board conducted a complete examination” in the first instance, “there would be no need for a further medical examination in the view of the National Defence officials” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held in Board Room, Confederation Building June 16th at 9am 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 File: 2-90-47). Furthermore, this change effectively removed the need for the lengthy medical classification appeals process undertaken by local Division offices in cases where an individual’s medical classification was challenged (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held in Board Room, Confederation Building June 16th at 9am 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 File: 2-90-47).¹²

As part of this shift in medical examination policy, the need to address previously classified individuals to determine if they were indeed within the proper medical category was stressed. At National Defence it was explained “that some of the early discharges which were made for various reasons would not hold” any longer, and as such, these cases “should be reviewed with a view to calling the[se] men up” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held in Board Room, Confederation Building June 16th at 9am 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 File: 2-90-47). As a result, mobilization officials brought into force a program of

¹² On December 16th 1942, the authority to conduct medical re-examinations was strictly limited, under Circular Memoranda 755, to Army Medical Boards and their staff, shifting the responsibility for medical classification from mobilization officials at the Department of Labour to Armed Forces personnel working under the Department of Defence (Department of Labour 1949: 72).

Medical Re-Examination, reporting that the “medical status of men was to be scrutinized,” and that this process would focus on an “intensive screening of men on deferment” (Hamilton Spectator 1945 “More Stringent Attitude Being Adopted by Boards” 1945/01/19). Specifically, General LaFleche explained that

after a study of the [NWS AR1] reports of these examining doctors, it had been the practice to call some of the men placed in lower categories back for re-examination by a board of physicians. In some cases these boards find men who were originally placed in low categories are fit for service. With a large number of these boards functioning it is probable practically all men rejected on their original examination will be re-examined (Hamilton Spectator 1942 “Speed Up Check on Men Called” 1942/11/21).

Additionally, it was noted that the Medical Re-Examination would address any discrepancies that were found to exist between how different civilian doctors had interpreted how to classify men, and work specifically to re-examine those who had received deferments from mobilization for medical reasons and “who ha[d] not appeared before the Army Medical Board previously” (Hamilton Spectator 1944 “Every Person on Deferment to go Before Medical Board” 1944/05/09). As such, the purpose of the Medical Re-Registration “was to re-examine and confirm the categories of all deferred men” working to definitively “categorize every man on deferment or in a lower category, and bring the Division’s file up to date” (Hamilton Spectator 1944 “Several Hundred Men Re-Examined by Army Doctors” 1944/08/10; Hamilton Spectator 1944 “Every Person on Deferment to go Before Medical Board” 1944/05/09).

Panels of physicians taking part in the Medical Re-Examination were established in larger cities as a means of reducing the impact that the time requirements of having these men re-examined would have on industrial

production in the country – as local panels removed the need for the men to travel the often extensive distance to the centralized military training centers within their Divisions.

The new process of medical examination was also more intensive, adopting the PULHEMS System, which established different scores for physique, upper body and upper limbs, locomotion or lower limbs, hearing, eyesight, mentality, and emotional stability. Testing under this system required four or five separate screenings of the individual before a final decision could be reached, including a “health questionnaire, followed by personal selection where the man [wa]s questioned on his occupation, and education” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held in Board Room, Confederation Building June 16th at 9am 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 File: 2-90-47). These screens were then followed by a psychiatric test in which “Social Service workers [we]re employed to check on a man's past history,” and in instances “where there [we]re borderline cases, th[e] men we]re take[n] into the Army and rechecked at frequent intervals” (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held in Board Room, Confederation Building June 16th at 9am 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 File: 2-90-47). Upon completion of the Re-Examination, those who were found to be unfit for service were re-issued rejection certificates (forms NFM12 or 141) or rejection buttons, which acted as proof of their compliance in regards to mobilization and evidence of their medical classification, while Nominal Rolls carrying the individual’s name and information were to be sent to local Division offices (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting Held in Board Room,

Confederation Building June 16th at 9am 1943 RG 27 vol. 991 File: 2-90-47).

Medical Re-Examination was to operate in this way “until the file on every man [wa]s confirmed” (Hamilton Spectator 1944 “Every Person on Deferment to go Before Medical Board” 1944/05/09).

The procedure of the Medical Re-Examination also required Division Registrars to call a set number of men to be re-examined per day. This was achieved in much the same way as the original Order-Medical, though documentation distinguished these new orders as being Orders-Further Medical Examination or OFME. The identification of men to be issued these Orders-Medical for re-examination was conducted based on data the Division Registrars had on hand. At the Division offices, the Control Cards of those who had previously been classified as unfit for medical reasons were adopted as a means of identifying those who were to receive a new Order and were additionally used to track individual compliance with these new orders.

As part of its initial design, the Control Card system had already identified and segregated those individuals classified as “unfit” and on deferment for medical reasons, placing their cards within trays marked as 1.C.2 (see Chapter 2). The Control Cards within the 1.C.2 trays, were first to be reviewed, then subdivided into two groups. The first consisting of (a) the “cards of men to whom an Order-Medical Re-Examination ha[d] been issued,” and the second, (b) the “cards of men who ha[d] been examined by the Medical Revision Board,” having already participated in the Re-Examination, and having already had their new medical classification applied (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of

Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Control Cards in the (1.C.2.a) trays were then to be used to call up men, as well as identify those who did not comply with their Order-Medical Re-Examination, as these cards were to be checked regularly “against the nominal roll returned by the Medical Revision Board” indicating the names of men who had complied with their Order-Medical Re-Examination (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). In cases of “men who fail[ed] to present themselves for Medical Re-Examination,” Registrars were to ensure that these individuals were to be immediately “referred to the tracing and prosecution department for investigation” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

The cards of men who, after their re-examination, had been re-classified into Medical Categories of “A” or “B,” were to be integrated into the normal flow of the Control Card system, their cards being moved into trays (1.A) and (1.B) respectively, and entered into the process of being called into service (see Chapter 2). The cards of men who had been re-examined and were still found to be unfit to be mobilized, however, were to be classified as (1.C.2.b) and further subdivided and filed into one of three groups.

The first group of Control Cards were placed in trays marked (1.C.2.b.ii) and were to include “the cards of men in category ‘C’” – the words “category ‘C’ by Med.Rev.Bd [Medical Review Board]” specifically marked on the cards themselves, and kept in these trays “for ordering out for military training, should

the Army lower its standards to the point of accepting men in category ‘C’” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Control Cards in the second group were sorted into trays (1.C.2.b.iii), and were to contain “the cards of men in category ‘D,’” – men who were currently considered medically unfit for duty, but were also expected to recover from the specific injury that kept them from being mobilized. Like the Control Cards of men on postponement, these cards were also “to be divided in accordance with the expiry date of the period of unfitness so that they [could] be ordered out for military training or for further medical examination, as the case may be, at the expiry of such period of unfitness” (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47; see Figure 3-13).

Figure 3-13. Re-Registration Control Card Trays 1943-1946

Unfit Medical Categories	a) Medical Re-Examinations Issued		1.C.2.a
	b) Men Re-Examined, Found Unfit	ii) Men in category “C”	1.C.2.b.ii
		iii) Men in Category “D”	1.C.2.b.iii

NB - Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47.

Those having been re-examined and placed in category “E” by the Medical Revision Board were relegated to the fourth group, and were to have their Control Cards moved from the 1.C.2.b trays to their file folder within the Division’s Central Registry – “the case being closed” and the individual not being subject to further Orders related to mobilization (Department of Labour 1943 Conference of Registrars Session 14-19 June, 1943 pm RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

As part of the Medical Re-Examination program, Registrars re-issued “approximately one hundred and fifty thousand” Orders-Medical, finding about 35%, or 52,500, of these men to be in an “acceptable category for military training” under the new assessment policy, allowing for them to be mobilized into the Armed Forces (Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943).

Letters to Registrars Concerning Delinquents

Throughout the war, letters were sent to mobilization staff which denounced particular individuals as having failed to conform with their required social duties. This section charts the role these letters played in tightening the ascribed categories of the mobilization system. Although mobilization officials did receive a number of these types of letters during the war years, a conscious decision was made early on not to solicit the aid of the general public in this way. None-the-less, a significant number of letters were still received which sought to bring to the attention of mobilization staff individuals who were thought to be delinquent. From the records which remain, the letters that resulted in police investigations often came as a result of the influx of new or non-Anglo Saxon labour into the letter writer’s locality. Furthermore, these letters, almost exclusively, drew on rationalities of utility associated with civic nationalism and those of duty under British subjecthood when denouncing particular men as delinquents or calling for

them to be mobilized.¹³ In this way, the tightness of mobilization categories was influenced significantly by the degree to which delinquent individuals fit, or failed to fit, into the local cultural readings of these rationalities.

Although it was never adopted as a formal part of enforcement policy or sought out publically through media, Registrars and other government officials were informed of alleged cases of non-compliance through correspondence from the general public (RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-14). These unsolicited letters often told of neighbours, relatives or community members, who were professed to be flaunting the fact that they had not registered, who were thought to be boasting about beating the system, or were simply seen by the letter writers as not sufficiently fulfilling their social duty to the country in regards to the principle of equality of service and sacrifice. A woman from Falher, Alberta, for example, personally compiled a detailed list of 50 individuals within her community she deemed to be “slackers” in 1944, writing:

“this letter is to bring to your knowledge a few facts existing out here in Falher district and surroundings ... It is regarding the numerous men and boys of age for war service that have been either exempted [or] rejected for service, that very likely that th[ere] cannot be so many unfit, and quite a few are hiding under the pretence of being farmers, and really should not be exempted, as there is either the father or younger that could do the farming even without the help of the boys who, according to our knowledge, should be doing their bit for the country ... So to bring these facts to your knowledge, as we are positive you do not know, we are sending the names of these yellows who are either evading the war through Political pull or otherwise ... The following list of names ... would give you an idea where to look for them as we are sure [we] are not the only town which should be investigated seriously. In every town there is the same complaint, people evading the colours, while others have been dragged into service when

¹³ The rationality of civic nationalism noted the individual’s participation in, or utility to, the advancement of the interests of the country, which during the war years related to industrial production and political involvement. British subjecthood stressed loyalty, deference and sacrifice to the crown, which at the time of the Second World War related to service in the Armed Forces and strict adherence to any law or state policy (see chapter 1 for greater detail).

they should have been exempted to purs[u]e the town[‘s] most important industries for the war. Lists of persons who have evaded the call to the colours... [Name 1 and 2] ... when they were called, those two were staying in town but ... lately they move[ed] their house, from the town to the farm, so they could prove they were farmer[s] ... [Name 3] ... this boy is a native from Quebec ... presumably he never registered in 1940, so this is the reason he has [been] forgotten ... [name 4] ... should be in the army as he has no farm and is not needed ... [Name 6] ... is doing nothing except delivering a few quarts of milk in town, and [drives a] taxi without a license ... why is he still at large when others were forced to go ... [Name 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11] ... those boys have been exempted after being called, three of them have been declared medically unfit, they .. are pleased to laugh over this fact ... although not very bright, they are certainly bright enough to be fighting with the others ... This is certainly enough to show you the necessity of a strict investigation of [why] the above are exempted, I do not see why our own people have been taken... I remain one for fair play” (Department of National War Services 1944 Letter to the Minister of War Defence October 7th 1944 RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-14).

Other less direct letters from the general public included questions, touching on how the laws and regulations related to mobilization and postponement. As one man wrote, “would you please advise if special grants are given to men of this class when they are employed on essential war jobs, thereby enabling them to work on non-essential jobs also. Even though he is my son, it does not seem fair to all the other fellows who are in uniform” (Department of Exemptions 1944 Letter to the Department of Exemptions October 18th 1944 RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-14).

In some of these cases, letters from the general public led to Police investigations being conducted after these letters were received – as in the case of Kapuskasing, Ontario, in 1942. There, the bringing in of over 160 men from Québec and New Brunswick to bush lumber camps for the Spruce Falls Power and Paper Company over the winter months of 1942, led to “numerous complaints from the local citizens” being made to local and provincial police, asserting that

“the majority of the 130 men from Quebec were ‘draft evaders,’” and, as such, were in need of formal investigation (RCMP 1942 Suspected Draft Evaders – Kapuskasing, Ont. Dec 7 1942 RG 27 vol. 999 file: 2-117 pt. 2 NWS Delinquents). Based on the pressure applied by the general public through the writing of these letters to police organizations, the RCMP opened an investigation, compiling a complete list of all the 165 men brought in, including their names, age, marital status, previous address and previous employer, from data held at local National Selective Service offices at Kapuskasing. Although the time of year and remoteness of the lumber camps restricted the investigating officer’s ability to “question any of them” or “look over their National Registration Certificates,” the full list of men was forwarded to enable list matching with held registration records.¹⁴

These letters denouncing the non-compliance of particular individuals received by Registrars over the course of the war almost exclusively drew from discourses of subjecthood and citizenship, noting duty to the crown and the necessity of each individual to contribute fully to the Canadian war effort. Additionally, there were significant calls for mobilization officials to uphold fairness and equality in the imposition of the sacrifice involved in forced industrial or military service (see letters in RG 27 vol.1479 file: 2-117-14). Of these types of personal letters in the RG 27 vol. 1479 file: 2-117-14 series, police involvement can be noted in some cases, though few show further action being taken by any mobilization official, or provide evidence to suggest a formalized

¹⁴ “Draft Dodgers Plead Guilty” Globe and Mail, 1944/04/05 – some men were arrested in 1944, but no real connection.

process of dealing with these letters, or comment on how many delinquent individuals were identified or pressed into service in this way.

At a meeting of registrars in 1943 the question of formally involving the general public in identifying those who did not conform was raised. Registrars specifically discussed “whether publicity should be given through the press giving the names of delinquents,” as a means of identifying these individuals (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting in Room 403, Motor Building, Thursday June 17th 1943, 9am RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47). Although “it was pointed out that the Americans take this action,” at the time it was considered “inadvisable to do so,” and was not taken up formally as part of the mobilization enforcement practices (Department of Labour 1943 Minutes of a Meeting in Room 403, Motor Building, Thursday June 17th 1943, 9am RG 27 vol. 991 file: 2-90-47).

Criminal Justice System and Prosecutions

This section charts the numbers of individuals that were charged and convicted under the legislation of mobilization. It notes how effective the prosecutions brought by mobilization officials and the police were during the war years, as well as the various sentences that were handed out as a result of convictions. In regards to tightness, the punitive capacity of the Criminal Justice System was often touted by mobilization officials in order to foster compliance, but the law also allowed for convicted men to be forcefully brought to Army training camps to report for

mobilization. This tactic was reported by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and mobilization officials as being highly effective in tightening the categories of mobilization onto particular delinquent individuals.

As part of its enforcement technologies, the mobilization system drew on the authority and punitive capacity of the Criminal Justice System. As noted above, the policies of National Registration and National Selective Service were incorporated into Canadian law, and as such, enabled mobilization officials to identify individuals for prosecution. Although the mobilization system adopted the policy of having an individual stand trial or serve a prison term as being a last resort, and those found to be delinquent in regards to their ascribed classification were to be given the option to comply before being legally prosecuted, a total of 21,142 individuals – 19,655 men and 1,487 women – were convicted under the National Registration and National Selective Service legislation between 1940 and 1946 (see Figure 3-14).

Figure 3-14. Convictions Under the National Registration and National Selective Service Acts 1940-1946.

National Registration Act						
Date	Total Convictions	Men	Women	Option of Fine	Committed without Option	Deferred
1940	456	393	63	337	73	46
1941	3,304	2,894	410	2,261	296	747
1942	2,203	1,906	297	1,268	177	758
1943	1,886	1,684	202	1,208	248	430
1944	2,704	2,494	210	1,947	276	481
1945	1,656	1,530	126	1,171	229	256
1946	1,595	1,459	136	1,295	108	192
Totals:	13,804	12,360	1,444	9,487	1,407	2,910
National Selective Service Act						
Date	Total Convictions	Men	Women	Option of Fine	Committed without Option	Deferred
1942	37	37	0	33	1	3
1943	1,327	1,320	7	852	398	77
1944	4,333	4,319	14	3,029	1,192	122
1945	1,425	1,409	16	869	450	106
1946	216	210	6	190	15	7
Totals:	7,338	7,295	43	4,973	2,056	315

NB – Dominion Bureau of Statistics Judicial Branch 1941-1947 Annual Reports of Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences. Dominion Bureau of Statistics: Ottawa.

The bulk of these convictions, 7,037, or 33.28 %, occurred in 1944, relating to the period when the majority of mobilization's enforcement technologies were already in place.

In an analysis of prosecutions related to non-conformity with mobilization legislation that was conducted after the completion of the war, it was determined that the majority of cases came as the result of either an individual failing to report after having been issued an Order-Medical or Military (46.38%), or for having failed to notify Registrars of a change of address (43.37%) (Figure 3-15).

Figure 3-15. Prosecutions Under Mobilization Legislation 1940 – August 15th 1946

Nature of Charges		Disposition of Charges	
Failure to Notify Change of Address	4,996	Withdrawals and Dismissals	2,074
Failure to Report for Military Service	3,346	Convictions	9,285
Failure to Report for Medical Exam (OME, OFME)	1,996	Disposition of Convictions	
Failure to Re-Register	780	Suspended Sentence	395
Impeding the Operations of NR Regulations	108	Handed Over to Military	238
Making False Statements	42	Fines	383
Failure to Answer Truthfully a Question	19	Imprisonment	2,203
General Contravention of NR Regulations	29	Fines and Imprisonment	111
Miscellaneous	203	Option of Fine or Imprisonment	5,955
Total:	11,519	Total:	9,285

NB – *Conviction data above refers to convictions between the beginning of the military call-up to August 15th, 1946. Data tabulated from Department of Labour 1949: 97 and Department of Labour NSS mobilization Regulations Delinquency Cases.

The prosecutions for failing to notify of a change in address and failure to report after having been issued an order, together accounted for 89.75% of mobilization related prosecutions, showing that the vast majority of prosecutions were made against individuals who had chosen to conform with their registration requirements and whose data were visible to the internal practices of the mobilization system. Furthermore, these data also note that only 780 men, representing 6.77% of mobilization prosecutions, were prosecuted for having failed to comply with the legal requirement to register – again demonstrating the difficulty experienced by mobilization officials in identifying those that did not participate in one of the formal registration processes. Also of note in these data is the number of withdrawals (1,946), which shows that when faced with the threat of prosecution under the Criminal Justice System 16.89% of the individuals chose

instead to conform with their ascribed mobilization requirements. Dismissals represented 1.11% of all prosecutions, accounting for only 128 individual cases. Together, these data suggest a rate of enforcing compliance through either convincing individuals to comply or legally convicting them in 97.50% of cases identified for prosecution.

In 1946, mobilization officials were still tracing 3,590 individuals who had faced prosecution and noted the effectiveness of post-prosecution procedures in enforcing the required performances of applied mobilization categories. These data noted that of the 3,590 individuals, 2,953 had been ordered by a judge to be forcefully escorted to military training camps by police (see Figure 3-16).

Figure 3-16. Final Disposition of Delinquent Subjects 1946

Disposition of Men	Number of Men
Escorted to Camp and Rejected	2,295 (63.93%)
Escorted to Camp and TOS	649 (18.08%)
Escorted to Camp and Not Reported as Yet	9 (0.25%)
Postponed by Board	161 (4.48%)
Mobilization Orders Issued	170 (4.74%)
Serving Jail Term - Mobilization Offences	3 (0.08%)
Serving Jail Term - Other than Mobilization	5 (0.14%)
Cases Remanded: No Disposition Yet	15 (0.42%)
US Army Discharge	1 (0.03%)
Files Transferred to Other Division	150 (4.18%)
Enlisted in Royal Canadian Air Force	0 (0.00%)
Outside of Canada	1(0.03%)
Released – Enemy Alien (3-2-H)	1(0.03%)
Not Subject to Call – Protected	5 (0.14%)
Not Subject to Call – Attained 38 Years of Age	1(0.03%)
Available to be Called-up	83 (2.31%)
Pending Receipt of Information as to Final Disposition	41 (1.14%)
Total:	3,590 (100%)
Paid Fines	2,011 (56.02%)
Served or Serving Jail Term	1,351 (37.63%)
Paid Fine and Served Jail Term	3 (0.08%)

NB - Department of Labour 1946 National Selective Service Mobilization Section Report of Prosecutions (up to August 1946) RG 27 vol.3055 file: 21-3-10

Under the laws of National Registration and National Selective Service, judges could order any individual convicted of an offence related to mobilization to be escorted by police to the location described in the order. Since the original legislation in 1940, mobilization laws had been further amended in 1942 to specifically include non-compliance of “Re-Registration,” and non-compliance of “change of address and particulars,” as offences in which “the convicted person could be escorted in police custody to an appropriate place for military training” (Department of Labour 1943 Procedure Adopted Since December 1st 1942 to Enforce National Selective Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons June 23rd 1943 RG 27 Vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943). Although the numbers above note a low percentage of those being brought forcefully to military training camps ultimately becoming NRMA soldiers (only 2.31%), these individuals were none-the-less forced to perform the acts involved in reporting for service as well as those involved in the required military assessment practices. The RCMP reported in 1943 that “these more stringent enforcement measures [we]re of great assistance in enforcing mobilization regulations” as they could now directly deliver non-conforming individuals to what was considered to be their rightful place (Department of Labour 1943 Procedure Adopted Since December 1st 1942 to Enforce National Selective Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such

Orders or Other Reasons June 23rd 1943 RG 27 Vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943).

Conclusion

A final audit of mobilization data prepared for the Department of Labour, conducted by a team of chartered accountants from the Montréal firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company, found that in June of 1945, of all men liable for service under mobilization legislation only 20,591, or 1.38 % were unaccounted for, while over 57.83 % had been successfully directed into the Armed Forces or necessary positions within industry (see Figure 3-17).

Figure 3-17. Classification of Manpower within the Age Classes Liable for NRMA Service 1945

Classification of Men	Number	Per Cent
Armed Forces	769,764	42.37 %
Men Applying for and on Postponement	280,926	15.46 %
Medically Unfit for Military Service	607,782	33.45 %
Not Yet Sent Order- Military Training	4,849	0.27 %
Not Yet Sent Order-Medical Examination	695	0.04 %
Sent Order – Time not yet Expired	19,401	1.07 %
Not yet 18 ½ years of age but born in 1926	19,146	1.05 %
Not Available ^A	32,880	1.81 %
Statutory Exceptions ^B	25,004	1.38 %
Over Age (45+)	35,794	1.97 %
Not Accounted For	20,591	1.13 %
Total:	1,816,868	100 %

NB – A - Outside Canada, Unacceptable to the Army, Deceased, In Jail, Members of the Reserve Army, etc. B - Clergy, Police, Firefighters, Enemy Aliens etc. From a report dated June 8th 1945 prepared as part of an audit of manpower and mobilization data conducted by the chartered accountant firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company, Montréal. Cited in Appendix “O” in Stacey 1970:587.

As such, the development and implementation of Canada's Second World War mobilization system demonstrates the effectiveness of registration and enforcement technologies in tightening governing categories onto particular individuals and populations across the country. During the war, implemented mobilization technologies were used to assess the status of individuals in over 20,000,000 instances, and identified over 2,000,000 more individuals than had been previously documented through the government technologies of the census or voting records (see Figure 3-18).

Figure 3-18. Technologies of Governance and Categorical Tightness 1940-1946

Technologies of Governance	Individuals Assessed	As Percentage of Adult Population ^A	Newly Identified Individuals ^B	Individuals Pressed into Service	Found to be Deserters from the Armed Forces
Initial Registration 1940	7,862,920	96.01%	1,944,713	1,859,811	0
Post 1940 Registration of those Attaining 16	1,292,212	15.77 %	1,292,212		
Endorsement of Identity Cards	13,829,511+	168.86+ %	-	-	-
Re-Registration	146,100	1.78 %	94,088 ^C	52,012 ^D	0
RCMP Raids	63,506	0.78 %	-	644	145
Integrated Commercial/RCMP Investigations	203,367	2.48 %	0	153,196	0
Employer Checkup	49,548	0.60 %	-	10,040	258
Medical Re-Examination	150,000	1.83 %	0	52,500	0
Criminal Justice System / Prosecutions	21,142	0.26 %	780	2,953	-
Total:	23,618,306	274.53 %	3,237,705	335,519	363

NB – A - Adult Population was derived from census estimates for those living within Canada, 15 years and older drawn from Dominion Bureau of Statistics (1953) *Population Estimates (Age and Sex), 1921-1952*. Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Reference Paper No. 40. The remaining adult population was calculated by subtracting the number of adults whom had previously been identified by voter registration lists from the estimated adult population. Estimates population of adults (15+) in Canada in 1940 is 8,190,000, Number of Individuals on voter registration lists 6,588,888. B - When compared to previously held Federal voter's registration lists. C - In an analysis of the re-registration it was discovered that between 27.3% and 43.9% of individuals who re-registered had already registered previously. This number is based on the average new registration percentage of 64.4% and the reported 146,100 filed schedule Cs (Department of Labour 1949: 108). D - Although the number of individuals eventually directed to service due to these innovations was in all likelihood much higher, since those discovered were given the option to comply and return to good standing, these numbers represent those who were found to be in

violation of their service duties and forcefully sent directly to the armed forces See endnote 3-1 at the end of this chapter for chart data sources.

In each of these cases, individuals would have experienced the tightness of their mobilization category, mediating their social performances. In some cases tightness was experienced through an assessment of one's identity documents, while in others it was experienced through the forced performance of military combat, including the very real possibility of being killed. Of the men forced into the category of NRMA soldier as a result of being called up by the mobilization system, 9,667 reached the front, 2,463 fought in operational units, 232 were wounded, 13 taken prisoner and 69 were killed (Byers 1996: 202).

In regards to individuals who were assessed for non-conformity, three technologies stand out as having affected the largest number of people – first, the endorsement of identity documents; second, the Initial Registration of 1940; and, third, the integrated investigations of the commercial reporting agencies and the RCMP.

The establishment of identity documents, and the tying of these documents to the delivery of services through the technology of endorsement, effectively enabled the quick and simple assessment of the mobilization status of men and women for the first time. This capacity, coupled with the expanded number of institutions adopting this procedure into their regular practices resulted in by far the greatest number of individuals having their mobilization status assessed. If this program had been extended to the issuance of drivers licences, ration documents and medical services, as had been originally planned, the number of assessed individuals would have been even higher, in all likelihood touching

nearly all people residing in Canada at that time. The sheer volume of individuals who had their classifications assessed through this technology points to the effectiveness of the linking of services to the assessment of categorical compliance, establishing this identification/endorsement technology as a key indicator of the potential tightness of an ascribed category.

The technologies of the initial registration also enabled mobilization officials to access the data of a significant number of individuals. In all, this number represented 96.01% of the adult population as estimated by previous census data. As noted above, the effectiveness of this technology relied heavily on the publication of messages in various media which informed individuals of their requirement to register, as well as the legal penalty for failing to do so.

This relationship between classification, media, the law and individual performance, was also demonstrated in the effectiveness of the Re-Registration as well as in the case of the RCMP raids. In both instances these technologies were shown to have motivated previously non-compliant individuals to report to Registration Offices of their own free will to determine their own status, to carry their identity documents on an every day basis, as well as to inquire about how to act in accordance with their ascribed category. As such, these data re-assert how the threat of prosecution under the law, coupled with the use of media messaging, possesses the capacity to develop the tightness of externally applied categories.

In regards to individuals who were previously undocumented and were newly identified through the application of mobilization technologies, the Initial Registration of 1940 was again the most effective, identifying over 1,900,000

more individuals than had previously existed within government census or voting list records, and ultimately representing 95.34% of all those who would be newly identified through mobilization technology by the end of the war. In addition to the Initial Registration, the Re-Registration identified the next largest number of new individuals at 94,088 or 4.61 % of all of those newly identified, or identified to the system and their data recorded for the first time. Again, these technologies point to the role of media messaging and the rule of law in the tightness of governmentally ascribed categories, while the Re-Registration in particular asserts this relationship, since mobilization officials expressly used the media and threats of punitive action through the Criminal Justice System as its means of tightening applied categories.

Also of note is how few individuals were newly identified outside of the formal Registration processes in 1940 and 1942. This data points to the relationship between categorical tightness and the classifying system already being in possession of a record of the individual, or the individual already being “visible” to applied technologies. In this way, the tightness of categories can be understood as being tied to the establishment and maintenance of “reactive path-dependency” – a relationship between “temporally ordered and causally connected events,” in which “each step in the chain is dependent on prior steps” and “each event in the sequence is both a reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events” (Mahoney, James 2000 “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” *Theory and Society* 29:507-548: 509; 526). In particular, this relationship is demonstrated in the technologies of the endorsement of

identity documents, the Medical Re-Examination, the social pressure associated with the “NRMA” classification, and the commercial reporting agencies / RCMP investigations – each were dependant on the breakpoint moment of the individual’s initial choice to register and their act of contributing their personal data to the system. Furthermore, these technologies then functioned by means of developing and asserting a scripted path on which the individual’s data were to progress. This relationship can be seen most clearly in the capacity of these technologies to press individuals into service. The most effective example being the integrated commercial reporting agencies and RCMP investigations, which were crucially reliant upon a set data progression involving Control Cards and Tracing Cards that directed mobilization information across institutions. A further example can be seen in the Medical Re-Examination, which again incorporated the ordered progression of data within the Control Card data flow. Each of these technologies relied heavily on past mobilization technologies to identify and provide necessary data on non-complaint individuals and then worked to assert a more formalized process in which the data of these individuals was progressed.

In relation to pressing individuals into adopting mobilization categories, the most effective technology was the integrated commercial reporting agencies and RCMP Investigations, accounting for 153,196 individuals. Here again the authority of the law, the threat of prosecution and the expression of reactive path-dependency, as noted above, each added to the tightness of applied categories. Furthermore, this data also demonstrates how the capacity for system classifications to be shared with other individuals and associated agencies, was

crucial in the enforcement of ascribed categories. In the case of NRMA soldiers, it was the capacity to discriminate between NRMA and GS soldiers, achieved through technologies of identifying badges, that made these men's classification readily visible and actionable, while in the case of commercial reporting agencies and RCMP investigations the technology of the Tracing Card was key in transmitting the classification of individuals across agencies and geographical space.

Finally, the insertion of an assessment of mobilization status into the process of legally selling labour time, as part of the Employer Check-up, also provided an effective means of pressing individuals into service. Specifically, 10,040 men were pressed into service in this way, establishing the insertion of classification technologies within the social relations of production as an effective means of tightening applied categories. This, coupled with the linking of assessment to unemployment and liquor purchases also points to a connection between categorical tightness and the delivery of necessary services.

The efforts of the mobilization personnel and the use of implemented technologies to fulfill the mandate of ensuring that "every man take his place – or the consequences," was fundamental in tying the governing rationalities of citizenship and subjecthood to the performances of individual actors during the Second World War. Although the above data shows the effectiveness and capacity of these technologies to tighten classifications onto individuals and populations, the application of these categories was not without resistance, and as such, this history also shows significant complexity in how the imposition of these

governing categories was experienced differently by different individuals and populations. Over the course of the war, mobilization technologies developed a complex politics of identity, performances and classification, a matter which will be taken up in greater detail in the following chapter.

Endnote 3-1 Sources for Table Data

Table information is tabulated from information presented in Department of Labour 1949: 90, 84; Department of National War Services, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1941a; Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1940-1947; Department of National War Services 1941 Answer to Mr. Franser May 4th RG 27 vol 999 file 2-117 pt NWS Delinquents; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Concerning Mobilization Section of National Selective Service RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943; Department of Labour 1943 Procedure Adopted Since December 1st, 1942, To Enforce National Selective Mobilization Regulations In Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons June 23rd 1943 RG 27 vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943; Stacey (1970:599, 414); Department of Labour 1943 Summary of Mobilization Statistics June 1943 RG 27 vol. 3007 file Statistics 1940-1944; Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1942-46 Annual Reports of Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences; Department of Labour 1943 First Administrative Report to Research and Statistical Branch – Department of Labour Mobilization Section of National Selective Service 1943 RG 27 vol. 969 file: NSS 1943; NSS Secret Memorandum 57; Department of Labour 1943 Summary of Mobilization Statistics June 1943 RG 27 vol. 3007 file Statistics 1940-1944; Russell (1999: 52–53, 57); Hitsman (1953: 146); Byers (1996: 182, 189, 193)

Chapter 4 The Impact of Classification

The volunteer regards himself as above, and apart from the NRMA soldier. Nothing the latter does or can do by way of physical courage or superior intellect can alter this fact. It might be likened to the scorn of the white man (even the 'poor white') for the educated negro. He may be educated but he is still a 'nigger.' - Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin's Report on the Mobilization of the 13th Infantry Brigade on an Active Basis 2nd May 1944

While the previous two chapters have addressed how the classifications of National Registration were applied onto individuals and populations, as well as the technologies implemented to identify and enforce the system's categories, this chapter demonstrates the impact that mobilization had in forcing individuals to take up and engage in the set performative acts associated with being NRMA soldiers. In reading this chapter it is important to consider that although the conscription of men during the Second World War has become largely normalized within Canadian culture, this act, when drawn out of its historical context, is one that is deeply authoritarian and totalitarian in nature – as it was government policy and the threat of punitive legal action that pulled people from their daily lives and forced them, to perform the social role of soldiers and even fight, and in some cases, kill or be killed in military combat. This coercive and intrusive nature of mobilization is perhaps most clearly shown in the fact that these individuals could have chosen to volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces at any time, but instead these men were mobilized, having been selected by the government after internal analyses had determined that they were not “necessary” to their community, and as a result were forced into the position of NRMA

soldiers. Even news media of the time noted the seriousness of this action, characterizing it as a loss of liberty, “not in accordance with...[the] government of a free people,” and policy “which probably wouldn’t live thirty seconds in a peacetime parliament” (Minister of Labour Mitchell 1946 Speech to the House of Commons RG 27 vol.3029 file: Department of Labour; *Library Magazine* 1944 “Fight, Work – or Jail” August 15th 1944 RG 27 vol 1479 file 2-117 1944).

This chapter draws the arguments of this dissertation to a conclusion, having demonstrated how certain rationalities shaped the categories that were developed as part of the National Registration system, as well as how specific technologies were implemented to tighten these constructed categories and their required performances onto individuals. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates the impact that the forceful application of the classifications of the National Registration system had on mobilized individuals. The fact that this system developed the capacity to govern the performances of these individuals at all, is significant in its own right, however, this chapter also demonstrates how the classification of these men led to the forced performances of systematically ascribed acts, that is, those actions that were made legally required by individuals carrying certain classifications, which identified these men to themselves and others as NRMA soldiers. Ultimately, this chapter argues that these performances led NRMA men to adopt a governed understanding of themselves and led to the forceful incorporation of mobilization categories into their constructed sense of identity. In this way, the consequences of classification can be understood as having played out in regards to mobilized men in three parts; first, in the content

of the performances required of NRMA soldiers during the war; next, in who was impacted by mobilization technologies, having been classified as “available,” mobilized into positions as NRMA soldiers, and then not choosing to become General Service soldiers; and finally in how the forced performances of being an NRMA soldier, the end to which each of the technologies of the National Registration and mobilization were designed to lead, culminated in the development and sedimentation of a distinctive “Zombie” identity within the NRMA classified individuals as well as within Canadian popular culture.

Forced Performance of NRMA Soldiers

Under the *National Resources Mobilization Act* particular performances were required of called up NRMA soldiers. In the first section of this chapter the content of these forced performances are demonstrated, noting how required performances changed after the demands placed on the Canadian government for overseas soldiers became greater, as well as how the application of the popular term “Zombie” to describe the forced performances required of mobilized individuals worked to both describe and influence the identity performances of these individuals.

After the defeat of the French military in 1939 the need to take more drastic action with the calling up of men was accepted by the Canadian government. In March of that year the leaders of the two predominant political parties, the Liberal and Conservative parties, both came to the decision that the Canadian government should take actions which would be in “full support” of England through

industrial production, but that the government of Canada would withhold any conscripted troops from being sent overseas. The decision not to force any potential conscripts to take part in the anticipated conflict in Europe was first put forward by the Conservative leader on March 27th 1939 as a means of improving the party's political support in the predominantly French province of Québec, where public opinion was known to be opposed to the idea of conscription for a European war. The position, however, was also taken up by the Prime Minister and expressed in the House of Commons only three days later on March 30th (Stacey 1970: 387-398). When the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (NRMA) was passed on June 21st 1940, the legislation specifically stated that any compulsory service would not include the capacity of being deployed overseas.

Men started being called up for compulsory service in the Armed Forces in September of 1940, and as part of their mobilization they were required to participate in thirty days of training at Military camps set up across the country. These initial 30 day training camps were designed to present the Army in a positive light, and were no doubt at least in part developed to soften political opposition against conscription and act as a means for recruiting attendees to volunteer to serve in the Army. As was noted in September of 1940, "every arrangement [wa]s being take[n] to ensure that when the youths return after a month to their home they'll say they've 'just had the best time of their lives'" (*Globe and Mail* 1940 "Home Comforts, Including 'Father' Await Draftees, No Spuds to Peel" 1940/09/28). In addition, a camp list of activities posted by a spokesman for the Defence Department noted Army training instructions which

requested that the individual be ready for “physical training, squad drill lecture, arms drill, shooting, and sports (football, skiing, skating, baseball – bring your running shoes if you have them – also skates if winter time)” for “supper, singsongs, recreation rooms (bring your mouth organ or violin along), lights out, warm blankets, heated huts, pay parade, good-bye, should auld acquaintance be forgot” (*Globe and Mail* 1940 “Army Believes Men Will Like Camp Training” 1940/09/04). It was further noted, that during the 30 day period, mobilized individuals would not be required to do any “fatigue duties, such as washing dishes, cleaning floors, or peeling potatoes,” and that this form of light training had been adopted since “it would be absurd to drill unaccustomed men to the point where their health or morale suffered” (*ibid*).

In January 1941 the policy regarding the training of mobilized men changed significantly, extending the 30 days of training to a period of four months. In April of that same year, only four months later, policy was changed yet again and mobilized men were no longer released to return home after training. Instead, all mobilized men were deployed to units after having received their basic training, were based across the country and were forced to take up the performances of full time NRMA soldiers under the Army’s authority and discipline. The experience of training also changed to reflect the fact that these men were now being mobilized into combat ready units. Gone was the summer camp atmosphere, as mobilized individuals faced much more detailed and grueling training experiences. When mobilized men first arrived at basic training centers, after April 1941, they were to perform a two month “period of intensive physical

training which include[d] the handling of a Bren gun” (*Hamilton Review* 1944 "Training Recruits" 1944/10/06). The two month period focused on physical training, but also included detailed training in the areas of anti-tank rifle instruction, and the firing of live rounds in realistic combat drills (*Hamilton Review* 1944 "Training Recruits" 1944/10/06). Also taught was the use of hand grenades, “intense training in gas defence,” and defences against aircraft attack. At the conclusion of the two months, “the basic training center recruits [we]re sent to a training center . . .there they [we]re dispersed to various units and it [wa]s possible that some w[ould] be assigned to duties or units which would not involve further training in offensive action, but the great majority [would] undergo further training” (*Hamilton Review* 1944 "Training Recruits" 1944/10/06).

As part of the war effort NRMA soldiers were also deployed into combat positions starting in September of 1942. Legislation initially had limited the development of these troops to the protection of Canada and its territorial waters, however, later Orders-in-Council expanded where they could be deployed. Their first deployment was to three anti-aircraft batteries in Alaska in 1942, while later in September other NRMA soldiers were deployed to Newfoundland and Labrador to bolster infantry forces stationed there. NRMA soldiers also saw combat in June of 1943 as part of the American commanded forces attacking Kiska in the Aleutian Islands. Under pressure to produce more troops for the European front, the order was given in August of 1943 to enable the deployment of NRMA men anywhere in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, British Guiana, Alaska, and the United States (Granatstein and Hitsman 1977:

298). Finally in 1944, an Order-in-Council given on November 22nd gave the authority to send NRMA soldiers to Europe, and as a result 16,000 of these soldiers were selected for deployment.

As a result, the forced performances associated with being forcefully mobilized and becoming an NRMA soldier became more significant over the course of the war. What started as a mere recruiting tool, developed into a full conscription program which selected men who had no desire to participate in the fighting of the war through arms, mobilized them into training camps and required them to perform detailed training and physical fitness regimes, and finally deployed them to perform the role of soldiers, which in some cases resulted in the forced performances of military combat.

Within popular parlance, the lack of control over their performances led to soldiers classified as Home Defence, or NRMA, being given the moniker of “draftees,” and “conscripts,” however, the term “Zombies” quickly caught on culturally and in short order became how these men were referred to within popular parlance. The term *Zombie* itself was derived from a translation of the Kimbundu term *nzūbe* meaning “ghost” or “spirit of a dead person” (Bishop 2006: 197). When brought from Africa to Haiti the term became tied to the mystical practices of the Vodoun, which established Zombies as being linked to an entrancing practice which harboured “the magic required to strike people down to a death-like state and revive them later from the grave to become virtually mindless servants” and “the most subordinate slaves” (Bishop 2006: 197). The term *Zombie* had apparently been lifted from the popular horror movies of the

Magic Island (1929), *White Zombie* (1932) and *Revolt of the Zombie* (1936) of the 1930s, and was applied to NRMA soldiers by “some too-clever person” (Bishop 2006: 197; Stacy 1970: 462). The term developed a context in Canada during the war which “implied that the conscripts had no will of their own,” and instead, their actions were animated by the government’s law and politics (Russell 1999: 52). Not only was this concept of Zombie effective in reflecting the state of these men, it also “tended to worsen it” (Stacy 1970: 462).

This lack of control over individual performance was also cited within media as the source of the problems associated with NRMA men, as Zombies existed not quite as soldiers and not quite as civilians but as the victims of government policy – the argument being that “if there are Zombies, it is because they have been made so by the Canadian Government” (*Globe and Mail* 1944 "Zombies are Blamed for Faults of Others" 1944/07/24). As was noted in the *Globe and Mail* in 1944:

Zombies are not cowards or men lacking in ordinary courage, but are normal individuals that the government, in playing a cat-and-mouse game under the Mobilization Act, has manoeuvred into the humiliating position where they are now rapidly losing their self respect and the esteem of the public, and where they will undoubtedly become a sulky or mutinous mob which the Government or the Military authorities cannot handle. If all men are treated alike in a National Emergency under compulsory service laws for both soldiers and civilians and no preferential treatment is permitted on grounds of race or religion, groups of men such as our 70,000 Zombies and other unjustly exempted individuals would cease to exist and all causes of friction, criticism, unreasonable bullying and ragging would be abolished automatically (*Globe and Mail* 1944“Zombie, Neither Soldier Nor Civilian, Victim of Government Policy" 1944/07/21).

The term Zombie also carried with it a strong negative connotation, asserting a prejudicial understanding of these men which drew on the discourses

of subjecthood and citizenship, presenting these individuals as not volunteering to become full General Service (GS) soldiers “out of pure selfishness and lack of manhood,” and a refusal to accept “the principle of equality of service and sacrifice,” (*Globe and Mail* 1944 “‘I am Zombie’ Letters Flood House” 1944/11/22; also see Allen 1961: 393-94; Byers 1996: 200). In regards to the rationality of citizenship, Zombies were seen as remaining “idle when there [wa]s a labour shortage throughout the country,” and were therefore actively choosing to render “no service to the Country in this hour of crisis” (*Toronto Telegram* 1944 “Critics’ Blistering Barbs Seen Forcing Showdown On Fate of Zombie Army” July 6 1944 ; *Globe and Mail* 1944 “Report of Row Brings ‘Zombie’ Issue to Fore” 1944/07/10). As a result, Zombies were culturally understood and presented in media as being “foreign,” or “not real Canadians,” as being of a Central European dissent or carrying an affiliation with the French-Canadian race (Russell 1999: 52; *Globe and Mail* 1944 “Camp Clashes Insignificant, Says Ralston” 1944/07/11). As was noted in an internal Army Report:

the great majority are of non-British origin — German, Italian, and Slavic nationalities of origin probably predominating. Moreover most of them come from farms. They are of deplorably low education, know almost nothing of Canadian or British History and in fact are typical European peasants, with a passionate attachment for the land. A good many of them speak their native tongues much more fluently than they speak English and amongst them the ancient racial grudges and prejudices of Europe still persist. Here again the process of converting these men into free citizens of a free country willing to volunteer and die for their country will be a matter of education, and I think it will be slow, At present there is negligible national pride or patriotism among them. They are not like Cromwell's ‘Good soldier’ who ‘knows what he fights for and loves what he knows.’ They do not know what they are fighting, for and they love nothing but themselves and their land. This fact must be recognized ... I think it is accurate to say that, quite apart from the lack of patriotism or the will to fight, there is a widespread feeling among these men that the

present manpower policy is both weak and unfair (Macklin 1944 Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin's Report on the Mobilization of the 13th Infantry Brigade on an Active Basis 2nd May 1944 cited in Stacey1970: Appendix "S" 596).

Although reports like the one above, which denote Zombies as being foreign, and non-British, are quite common, data regarding who was selected for mobilization as a result of National Registration technologies paints a very different picture of who were in fact consigned to the Zombie classification.

Those Impacted by Mobilization

During the Second World War in Canada the impact of the mobilization system was not felt equally across all populations. As a result of the mobilization selection process, the social pressures associated with enlistment and the pressure for individuals to volunteer once called. Those who remained carried particular classifications which were over and underrepresented when compared to the general Canadian population.

Data concerning the men that were mobilized into the Armed Forces was maintained by Registrars and were used to track the individual's age, the province in which they were mobilized, their place of birth, what languages they spoke, their religion, what occupation they held and under which internal classification of "industry group" that occupation fell. These records were maintained as a means of ensuring that internal policy regarding the calling up of men was being followed, and that the mobilization of men was not disrupting the state goals of industrial and agricultural production. As internal documents had noted before the war, the goal was to identify those who were "necessary in their community" as

well as those who were “available” to be conscripted as to have mobilization minimally impact domestic production – as if the “unemployed and unessential manpower of the country could be transferred directly into the Defence Forces, leaving essential industries and utilities undisturbed to merely change from peace to war production, only part of the community would be disrupted” (Department of Labour 1949: 9, 5, 47; Committee of the Cabinet of Internal Security 1939 Report of the Subcommittee on Reserved Occupations December 1939 RG 2 vol. 6 file: M-5 Labour Supply Investigation). In light of this, not all people faced the same chances of being mobilized, and an analysis of NRMA data note statistically significant differences between the population of men that were selected to be called into service and the general population living within Canada.¹ The most obvious distinction between the mobilized and general population are of course gender and age, as women and men over the age of 45 were not to be called,

¹ In this chapter the Z test is used to ask the question of if there is a statistically significant difference in the appearance of certain classifications of people within the NRMA population when compared to the Canadian general public. This statistical tool tests the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference and asserts that if there is sufficient evidence to throw out the null hypothesis, then the difference is statistically significant. The test is based on a test of if there is a less than a 5% chance of the null hypothesis being true and the result instead being variance as a result of sampling. It is represented by the following equation: $z = (p - P) / s$, where $s = \sqrt{P(1-P)/n}$. In these equations “P” represents the proportion of the overall population of Canada falls under holds the tested classification, “p” represents the proportion of the population of NRMA soldiers falling under the particular classification being tested, and “n” represents the number of all individuals within the NRMA population. This equation yields the difference between “P” and “p”, that is the difference between the proportion of individuals falling under the tested classification within the general Canadian population and within the NRMA population, measured in units of the standard deviations. In a two tailed test the null hypothesis is rejected if the value of the test statistic falls within either the tail at the high end or low end of the sampling distribution – the test being named after the two “tails” at the ends of a normal or bell shaped curve. In this case, if the test statistic falls under the 2.5% high or low tails of the curve by receiving a z score larger than 1.96, then the null hypothesis can be rejected and the difference is understood as being statistically significant.

however, significant distinctions also existed across nearly all of the mobilization system's measured categories.

Statistical data collected as part of the National Registration mobilization system specifically distinguished individuals based on their "occupational category" classifying individuals as either "Owners and Managers," "Professional Occupations," "Clerical Staff and Sales Workers," "Operatives" referring to people employed within manufacturing industries, "Farmers and Farm Workers," or "Labourers" (Department of Defence 1940 Records of the Department of National Defence 1940 RG 24 file: HQ 1161-1-5). Of these, mobilization policy had denoted the importance of not calling people who ran businesses, and this found expression in the under representation (only 1.54%) of "Owners and Managers" within the NRMA soldier population. Also under represented were the occupation categories of "Farmers and Farm Workers" and "Professional Occupations," both of which being protected under the government's mobilization policy (see Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. NRMA Soldiers by Occupational Category

Occupational Category	NRMA	%	Canada	%	st. dev.	z	p value
Owners and Managers	2,436	1.541	212,460	6.317	0.000612	-78.0522	0.000***
Professional Occupations	3,570	2.259	150,379	4.471	0.00052	-42.5642	0.000***
Clerical and Sales Workers	14,705	9.304	308,342	9.168	0.000726	1.864083	0.0628
Operatives (Manufacturing Industry)	76,047	48.114	1,375,879	40.911	0.001237	58.24374	0.000***
Farmers and Farm Workers	38,734	24.507	1,061,896	31.575	0.001169	-60.4564	0.000***
Labourers	21,950	13.887	254,155	7.557	0.000665	95.21762	0.000***
Not Stated	614	0.388	0	0.000			
Totals:	158,056	100	3,363,111	100			

NB- This statistical analysis was conducted based on figures presented in Byers (2000: 114) and McInnis (1999) *Historical Statistics Canada* Table D86-106.

Data regarding the occupational categories of “Operatives” and “Labours” were over represented within the NRMA population, accounting for 48.11 % and 13.89 % of all conscripted soldiers respectively, and established a notable working class element to mobilization. The numbers of “Clerical and Sales Workers” were not found to be significantly different when compared to the general population, though this was the only occupational category not to be statistically significant.

Individuals’ data were then broken down by Registrars into specified “Industrial Groupings,” and sorted into the main categories of “Agriculture,” “Extractive Industries,” “Manufacturing,” “Transportation,” “Construction,” “Retail and Wholesale Trade,” “Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate,” “Electrical and Gas Utilities,” and “Service Industries” (Department of National Defence 1940 Records of the Department of National Defence RG 24 vol. 6570 file: HQ 1161-1-5). In mobilizing men, registrars drew primarily from Agriculture, Extractive Industries, Manufacturing, Construction and Service Industries, accounting for 24.24 %, 22.26 %, 11.75 %, 7.38 % and 7.02 % of the total NRMA population respectively. Together these five classes made up for over 72.65 % of all NRMA soldiers (see Figure 4-2).

Figure 4-2. NRMA Soldiers by Industrial Group

Industry Groups	NRMA	%	Canada	%	st. dev.	z	p value
Agriculture	38,318	24.243	1,062,928	31.605	0.001169	-62.9536	0.000***
Extractive Industries	9,451	5.980	236,302	7.026	0.000643	-16.2822	0.000***
Forestry	3,953	2.501	93,313	2.775	0.000413	-6.62243	0.000***
Fishing and Trapping	1,958	1.239	50,533	1.503	0.000306	-8.61974	0.000***
Mining	3,540	2.240	92,456	2.749	0.000411	-12.3859	0.000***
Manufacturing	35,184	22.260	735,097	21.858	0.00104	3.874956	0.000***
Food/Beverage/Tobacco	4,079	2.581	87,979	2.616	0.000401	-0.8785	0.3788
Leather and Rubber	1,556	0.984	32,392	0.963	0.000246	0.867257	0.3844
Textiles/ Clothong	2,086	1.320	76,294	2.269	0.000375	-25.3323	0.000***
Wood/Paper/Publishing	4,531	2.867	160,327	4.767	0.000536	-35.461	0.000***
Metal/Machinery/Transportation	15,265	9.658	309,763	9.211	0.000727	6.150372	0.000***
Chemical/Petroleum/Minerals	833	0.527	51,670	1.536	0.000309	-32.6257	0.000***
Other	6,834	4.324	16,672	0.496	0.000177	216.6902	0.000***
Transportation	18,575	11.752	246,835	7.339	0.000656	67.27098	0.000***
Railways	5,327	3.370	123,514	3.673	0.000473	-6.38944	0.000***
Other	13,248	8.382	123,321	3.667	0.000473	99.73518	0.000***
Construction Industry	11,663	7.379	218,732	6.504	0.00062	14.10964	0.000***
Detail and Wholesale Trade	6,928	4.383	384,046	11.419	0.0008	-87.9524	0.000***
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	731	0.462	61,311	1.823	0.000337	-40.4312	0.000***
Electrical and Gas Utilities	107	0.068	21,134	0.628	0.000199	-28.2092	0.000***
Service Industries	11,111	7.030	355,657	10.575	0.000774	-45.8356	0.000***
Education	1,824	1.154	35,872	1.067	0.000258	3.382113	0.000***
Health and Welfare	284	0.180	27,998	0.833	0.000229	-28.5641	0.000***
Food and Lodging	2,023	1.280	58,312	1.734	0.000328	-13.8261	0.000***
Personal and Recreational	3,999	2.530	59,955	1.783	0.000333	22.45524	0.000***
Government	896	0.567	111,634	3.319	0.000451	-61.0847	0.000***
Other	2,085	1.319	61,886	1.840	0.000338	-15.4114	0.000***
Not Stated	25,988	16.442	41,069	1.221	0.000276	550.977	0.000***
Totals:	158,056	100	3,363,111	100			

NB- "Not stated" refers to 19,511 recruits who listed only that they were "labourers" or "workers," and an additional 5,110 clerks and office workers. This statistical analysis was conducted based on figures presented in Byers (2000: 113) and McInnis (1999) *Historical Statistics of Canada* Table D86-106.

Nearly all the differences measured between the NRMA population and the national averages the occupations were found to be significant, with the exception of "Food/ Beverage/ Tobacco" and "Leather and Rubber." The largest over-representation came from those involved in Transportation Occupations who were

not employed with the railways, noting a discrepancy of over 4% when compared to the national average. Also of note, was the near 4% over representation of those working in manufacturing that were not part of the National Registration and mobilization system's six tracked subcategories of "Food/ Beverage/ Tobacco," "Leather and Rubber," "Textiles/ Clothing," "Wood/ Paper/ Publishing," "Metal/ Machinery/ Transportation," "Chemical/ Petroleum/ Minerals."

In the under represented occupations the largest discrepancy was in agriculture, noting a 7% difference. This result is expected as agriculture was a protected industry and the decision not to call these men was a key part of mobilization policy. This policy of protection could also be said to have played a role in the low numbers of men drawn from "Electrical and Gas Utilities" (0.07%), and those classified as working in "Health and Welfare" (0.17%) as these occupations were considered to be necessary services by the government. The next largest under representation was in "Retail and Wholesale Trade" industries, noting a difference of 7%, followed by the "Service Industry" (3.55%), "Government" employees (2.75%), and finally "Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate" at 1.36%. Of all the categories which were not specifically protected by government policy, the category that drew the fewest men was "Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate," supplying only 731 men, and representing only 0.46% of the total NRMA population.

The country in which the mobilized individual was born was also tracked by mobilization officials, being subdivided into the categories of "Canadian", "British Born," "European," "American," and "Asian." Although these data note

the birth of some NRMA mobilized men outside of the British Empire, they would all have had to have been Naturalized British Subjects under the law to have been legally called into service. Of these groups, Canadian born individuals were over represented, noting a difference in the NRMA population of over 17% when compared with the general population (see Figure 4-3).

Figure 4-3. NRMA Soldiers by Place of Birth

Place of Birth	NRMA	%	Canada	%	σ	z	p value
Total Canadian Born	145,439	92.02	5,874,110	74.71	0.001093	158.3222	0.000***
Total British Born (non-Canadian)	3,041	1.92	975,690	12.41	0.000829	-126.436	0.000***
Newfoundland	112						
England/Wales	1649						
Scotland	870						
Ireland	344						
Australia	17						
Tasmania	1						
New Zealand	1						
Union of South Africa	5						
British Africa	4						
British Guiana	3						
India	8						
Other British Colonies	27						
Total European Born	7,183	4.54	622,270	7.91	0.000679	-49.6206	0.000***
Poland	2091						
Russia	949						
Italy	653						
Czecho-Slovakia	593						
Hungary	578						
Germany	394						
Roumania	326						
Norway	273						
Sweden	221						
Austria	196						
Denmark	185						
Finland	163						
Holland	119						
Belgium	111						
Greece	81						
Lithuania	81						
France	40						
Switzerland	35						
Syria	30						
Bulgaria	15						
Latvia	14						
Turkey	12						
Estonia	10						
Iceland	6						
Albania	3						
Servia	2						
Luxembourg	2						
Total American Born	1,919	1.21	299,830	3.81	0.000482	-53.9539	0.000***
USA	1899						
Mexico	2						
Brazil	3						
Cuba	2						
Equador	1						
Hati	3						
Argentina	4						
Other South American	5						
Total Asian Born	20	0.01	40,860	0.52	0.000181	-28.0342	0.000***
China	9						
Siberia	3						
Japan	2						
Other Asian	6						
Other							
Non-British African	2						
Not Stated	452						
Totals	158,056	100.00	7,862,920	100.00			

NB- This statistical analysis was conducted based on figures presented in Byers (2000: 109) and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (1941) *Classification of Occupations, Eighth Census, 1941*.


The next largest group within the NRMA population had been born in Europe, making up 4.5 % of the NRMA population, though this group was under represented when compared to the general population of Canada. Of these, the most NRMA soldiers, 2,091, were born in Poland, followed by Russia (949) and then Italy (653). Those mobilized individuals born within the Americas almost exclusively came from the United States (98.9 %), though individuals were also recorded as having been born in Mexico (2), Brazil (3), Cuba (2), Equator (1), Haiti (3) and Argentina (4).

Those classified as being British Born had originally immigrated to Canada from Newfoundland (112), England/Wales (1649), Scotland (870), Ireland (344), Australia (17), Tasmania (1), New Zealand (1), Union of South Africa (5), British Africa (4), British Guiana (3), India (8), and Other British Colonies (27). British Born were the most significantly under represented group in the NRMA ranks, their numbers being nearly 11% less than in the general Canadian public. The number of men from Asia that were mobilized was quite small, only numbering 20, as Registrars had been specifically instructed on multiple occasions not to call these men or allow them to be mobilized. As such, those born in Asia were under represented in the NRMA category, though the data notes that 9 men were conscripted who were born in China, 3 from Siberia, 2 from Japan, and 6 who were born in other Asian countries.

In regards to age, the mobilization system drew heavily from younger age categories in the mobilization of men. Orders-in-Council between 1941 and the end of the war had identified men aged 19-45 to be called into service by

mobilization officials, however, specific policy noted that young men that were 19 were to be called up first and, once this age group had all been called, Registrars were to move on to those who were 20 years old, and so on (see chapter two). This policy did indeed find expression in the population of those who were mobilized under this system, as the data regarding the men that made up the NRMA population shows that the vast majority (78.73 %), were born between 1916 and 1925 – making these men between the ages of 20 and 29 in 1945 (see Figure 4-4).

Figure 4-4. NRMA Soldiers by Age in 1945



NB- Tabulated from figures presented in Byers (2000: 106)

In this way, the NRMA population carried with it a very predominant component of young men, as those older than 30 made up less than 19% of their ranks.

Data regarding which Province or Territory NRMA soldiers were called from was also tracked by mobilization officials. Of note is the high representation of individuals from Québec and Ontario, making up 35.05% and 28.57% of the total NRMA population respectively. In regards to over representation, the province of Québec had the highest discrepancy, being over represented by over 6%, while New Brunswick was also over represented, accounting for a difference of 0.56%. In contrast, Ontario was significantly under-represented noting a difference of 4.34%, followed by Nova Scotia with 1.07%. The Northwest Territories and Yukon were also underrepresented, providing not a single man to the NRMA population (see Figure 4-5).

Figure 4-5. NRMA Soldiers by Province and Territory

Province	NRMA	%	Canada	%	st. dev.	z	p value
PEI	919	0.581	95,047	0.826	0.000228	-10.7431	0.000***
Nova Scotia	6,255	3.957	577,962	5.023	0.000549	-19.3923	0.000***
New Brunswick	7,165	4.533	457,401	3.975	0.000491	11.35676	0.000***
Québec	55,402	35.052	3,331,882	28.956	0.001141	53.43393	0.000***
Ontario	45,158	28.571	3,787,655	32.917	0.001182	-36.7704	0.000***
Manitoba	9,508	6.016	729,744	6.342	0.000613	-5.32345	0.000***
Saskatchewan	12,259	7.756	895,992	7.787	0.000674	-0.45425	0.6528
Alberta	10,475	6.627	796,169	6.919	0.000638	-4.57133	0.000***
British Columbia	10,903	6.898	817,861	7.108	0.000646	-3.24193	0.0012
Territories (NWT YUK)	0	0.000	16,942	0.147	9.64E-05	-15.2663	0.000***
Newfoundland	3	0.002	0	0.000			
USA	9	0.006	0	0.000			
Totals	158,056	100	11,506,655	100			

NB- This statistical analysis was conducted based on figures presented in Byers (2000: 108) and Statistics Canada (1999) *Historical Statistics of Canada* Table A2-14.

In addition to those who were called from each of the provinces, mobilization statistics also note that a total of 12 individuals did not have residence in Canada and had in fact still been called up and conscripted into service as NRMA soldiers

within the Canadian Army. Of these men, 3 were residents of Newfoundland, while 9 were citizens of the United States.

Of the predominant religions in Canada during the Second World War, Protestants were significantly under represented in the population of NRMA soldiers, while Roman Catholics were significantly over represented within this group. Specifically, Protestants represented 34% of all NRMA men, and as a whole were under represented when compared to the general population by over 14 %. In contrast, Roman Catholics accounted for 57.78% of all NRMA men and were over represented by 16% within this population (see Figure 4-6).

Figure 4-6. NRMA Soldiers by Religion

Religion	NRMA	%	Canada	%	st. dev.	z	p value
Total Protestant	55,129	34.879	5,713,533	49.654	0.001258	-117.481	0.000*
United Church	20,268	12.823	2,208,658	19.195	0.000991	-64.3168	0.000*
Methodist	813	0.514					
Congragational	6	0.004					
Anglican	13,991	8.852	1,754,368	15.247	0.000904	-70.7223	0.000*
Lutheran	7,428	4.700	401,836	3.492	0.000462	26.14712	0.000*
Presbyterian	7,070	4.473	830,597	7.218	0.000651	-42.174	0.000*
Baptist	5,381	3.404	484,465	4.210	0.000505	-15.9523	0.000*
Salvation Army	172	0.109	33,609	0.292	0.000136	-13.5007	0.000*
Roman Catholic	91,320	57.777	4,806,431	41.771	0.001241	129.0281	0.000*
Jewish	3,479	2.201	168,585	1.465	0.000302	24.35338	0.000*
Total Other	6,709	4.245	800,947	6.961	0.00064	-42.4306	0.000*
Other protestant	0	0.000	231,688	2.014	0.000353	-56.9901	0.000*
Greek/Ukrainian	0	0.000	325,793	2.831	0.000417	-67.8639	0.000*
Other	6,709	4.245	243,466	2.116	0.000362	58.80917	0.000*
Not Stated	922	0.583	17,159	0.149	9.71E-05	44.73661	0.000*
No Religion	497	0.314		0.000			
Totals	158,056	100	11,506,655	100			

NB- This statistical analysis was conducted based on figures presented in Byers (2000: 112) and Statistics Canada (1999) *Historical Statistics of Canada* Table A164-184.

Those of the Jewish faith were also tracked by mobilization officials, accounting for 3,479 NRMA men, or 2.2% of the total population. People of the Jewish faith were also over represented in the ranks of NRMA soldiers by 0.74%.

The final data collected on mobilized men referred to what languages they spoke. As was noted in chapter one, National Registration data separated languages into the two categories of “official languages” and “other languages.” Data regarding official languages noted an under representation of English only speakers within the NRMA population, noting a discrepancy of over 30%, while French speakers and bilingual speakers (English and French) were both over represented by 4% and 7% respectively. Unofficial language data notes that over 6,400 German speakers were mobilized under the NRMA regulations, making them the largest number of “other language” speakers and over represented by nearly 2%. German speakers were followed by Polish, Italian and Russian speakers which were all over represented providing 3,766, 3,033 and 1,038 men respectively. The other languages reported also included Spanish, Chinese and Japanese accounting for 50, 38 and 2 NRMA men respectively.

Given these descriptive data, it can be understood that the public understanding of NRMA “Zombie” soldiers as being foreign, non-British, French and farmers was not an accurate representation of these men. Though many were drawn from the agriculture industrial group, nearly as many had previously been employed in manufacturing, and nearly half of all of the men serving as NRMA soldiers had been classified as operatives, having been involved in the manufacturing industry. This, coupled with the under-representation of “owners

and managers” and of “professional occupations” suggests a stronger association with working class, or blue collar labour than with strictly European peasant populations. Secondly, over 90% of the NRMA population were Canadian born, making NRMA soldiers overwhelmingly Canadian citizens and British subjects.

The NRMA Classification, Visibility and Social Pressure

This section demonstrates how the classification of NRMA soldiers impacted the development of the individual and social identities of those who were forced to take up these performances. As daily military rationalities were followed, and the military action worked to render the NRMA classification more visible by means of the application of specific identifying technologies, the impact of repeated performances effectively sedimented to form a Zombie identity within popular culture and within the NRMA classified soldiers themselves.

In making this decision to apply a differential status to those who were mobilized, the result was that the Army was composed of two categories of soldier: conscripts, known as “Home Defence” or NRMA soldiers which could only be deployed for the defense of “Canada and the territorial waters thereof”; and volunteers, known as “General Service,” “GS,” or “active” soldiers, who could be deployed anywhere the government saw fit (*National Resources Mobilization Act* 1940). Due to the government’s need for troops to fight at the European front, and the legally limited nature of NRMA classified soldiers in filling the demand for fighting men to be sent to the Europe, it was quickly


recognized by ranking officers that only GS soldiers could be used in the process of defeating the enemy in the field. Policy was soon developed to pressure those classified as NRMA to give up their “Home Defence” status and volunteer, to “go active,” and become General Service soldiers. To achieve this end, social pressure was exerted on those who had been forcefully mobilized to have them change their status.

In 1942 mobilization officials commented on the fact that the issuance of a new batch of Orders-Medical would result in many of those men choosing to volunteer for one of the three branches of the Armed Forces instead of passing through the entire mobilization process and becoming an NRMA classified soldier. As a Registrar noted, it was “expected” that “when designated, these classes w[ould] go through the process of mobilization” and would “provide the usual proportion of enrolment and volunteers” (Department of Labour 1943 Procedural Adopted Since December 1st, to Enforce National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations in Cases of Non-Compliance with Mobilization Orders Arising Because of Non-Delivery of Such Orders or Other Reasons. June 23rd 1943. RG 27 vol. 3007 file: Report to the House of Commons Dec. 1943). As these officials knew, mobilization carried with it a negative social stigma, and as such, worked to pressure those men called to volunteer instead of remaining NRMA classified soldiers. In 1943 it was asserted that “80 per cent of military volunteers only offered their services after they received their Orders Medical or Orders Military in the mail,” and from the evidence of how many men chose to volunteer when their designated class was called up, the Chief Registrar reported

that “there is no doubt that National War Services Regulations have been the best single recruiting agency of them all” (Department of Labour 1942 Minutes – H RG 27 vol. 986 file: 3; House of Commons Debates, 18 May 1943: 2779).

In November of 1941, training centers officially adopted policy to assert social pressure on individuals carrying the Home Defence classification as part of their recruiting plan, working to “coerce draftees to go active” and become General Service soldiers (Department of National Defence 1941 Letter: Adjutant-General to District Officers Commanding 4th November 1941 RG 24 vol. 6571 file: HQ 1161-1-5 vol.4 cited in Byers 1996: 188; *Globe and Mail* 1944 “Report of Row Brings ‘Zombie’ Issue to Fore” 1944/07/10). Key to this action was the capacity to apply differential treatment based on the individual’s classification as either an NRMA or GS soldier (*Globe and Mail* 1945 “‘Scandalous,’ Remarks General; Had Always Asked Men Go Active” 1945/02/17). As a means of differentiation, after December of 1941 NRMA soldiers were denied the right to wear the “Canada” patch on the shoulders of their uniform, and after December of 1942, General Service soldiers were issued special “GS” badges that marked their categorical distinction from those choosing to remain as NRMA soldiers (*Globe and Mail* 1944 “Report of Row Brings ‘Zombie’ Issue to Fore” 1944/07/10; Stacey 1970: 429; see Figure 4-7).

Figure 4-7. General Service or “Active” Classification Badge 1946



NB – The reverse side of the badge also included the individual’s badge number and the statement, “penalty for misuse 500 dollars or six months in prison” (Veterans Affairs Canada 2001 War Service Badges – General Service 2011-10-04 <http://www.verteans.gc.ca>).

As the legislation noted, these badges were to be awarded to all “members of the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada who have declared their willingness, or who have engaged, to serve in any of the said forces on active service beyond Canada and Overseas, during the present war, and who have been honourably caused to serve on active service” (Order in Council P.C. 1022 Friday March 29th 1940). The act of rendering these classifications visible, significantly changed how soldiers were treated by their superiors and how they interacted with one another. As it was reported;

at Camp Salute...there was at first no hostility between R-men and A-men, or even anything that could be called coolness. Since most R, or reserve men went A, or active, within a week to two anyway there was, in most cases no occasion for it. But later the climate of their ninety man hut came to be as carefully and expertly managed as though it were controlled by a thermostat. The visible differences between the R-men and the A-men began to achieve some importance...An active soldier wore the cap badge of the corps to which he would soon be posted... A reserve soldier wore a non-committal maple leaf. An active soldier had badges saying Canada on

his shoulders and the ribbon of the Canadian Volunteer Service Medal on his chest. A reserve soldier had nothing on his shoulders and nothing on his chest (Allen 1964: 234).

Through the technology of service badges, NRMA and GS soldiers' classifications became visible and actionable to military officers and other soldiers. In addition, this capacity to distinguish between the two groups allowed for classified individuals to be required to perform different tasks based on their mobilization classification. Not only were NRMA men visibly distinguished from General Service men, allegations started being made regarding "offers of alcohol and cash payments" to go active, NRMA men being denied medical treatment, and even suffering physical violence and humiliation at the hands of fellow soldiers for not volunteering to convert (Russell 1999: 54; *Globe and Mail* 1944 "Report of Row Brings 'Zombie' Issue to Fore" 1944/07/10; Byers 1996:196-199).² As was noted by a war correspondent:

inevitably and quickly the existence of two such armies side by side led to frictions and differences of the ugliest kind. In their training camps it was the habit – and in many cases the deliberate policy – to mix the R Men and the A Men in fairly close ratios and hope that by moral pressure and sometimes by actual physical violence the A Men would help persuade the R Men to 'go active' too. Between the two groups there were small distinctions in such things as cap badges and service ribbons and quite often larger ones in their treatment by their officers and non-

² Macklin, who wrote a highly detailed report on the recruiting experiment put forward in the 13th Infantry Brigade in 1944, did however, take issue with this type of claim, noting that: "it will undoubtedly be said that coercion has been used by the officers of 13 Brigade including myself. This is not so. We have used every form of persuasion that could be thought of — interviews, discussions, sermons, films, speeches. We have appealed to their pride, to their manhood, to their patriotism and even to their self-interest. But we have NOT used threats or intimidation nor subjected these men to extra fatigues or menial duties... As I personally told them the only discrimination has been that represented by the General Service badge on the arm of the volunteer, and all that badge implies" (Macklin 1944 Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin's Report on the Mobilization of the 13th Infantry Brigade on an Active Basis 2nd May 1944 cited in Stacey 1970: Appendix "S" 597, emphasis in original).

commissioned officers (Allen 1961:393-94 Allen, Ralph 1961 *Ordeal by Fire: Canada, 1910-1945*. Doubleday Canada: Toronto)

Additionally, in early 1944 Armed Forces personnel were instructed to adopt “a ‘gloves-off’ recruiting effort, to persuade the remaining HD [Home Defence] men to convert to GS” (Burns 1956: 123). As a result, officers were instructed to “interview every HD soldier to determine the reasons each gave for refusing to ‘convert,’” and junior officers were specifically brought on to surveil NRMA soldiers in order to identify men who were considered “hard core” conscripts – those “who were not only expected never to volunteer themselves, but who also might prevent others from doing so” (Russell 1999: 54). Once identified these men were to be “progressively transferred out of the military camp, to a separate tent camp, jeeringly referred to as ‘Zombierville’”(Russell 1999: 54). As an internal Army report noted:

Commanding Officers were unanimous in the opinion that it would be sound to remove from each unit 40 or 50 men known to be dissuading others from enlisting... These were selected men believed by their officers to be a bad influence on others, and not expected by anyone to enlist (Macklin 1944 Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin’s Report on the Mobilization of the 13th Infantry Brigade on an Active Basis 2nd May 1944 cited in Stacey 1970: Appendix “S” 593-594).

Over the course of the war major incidents of violence between Home Defence and General Service men were reported in BC, Alberta and Ontario, while several newspapers also reported differential treatment in regards to allocated leave time, increased fatigue duties such as cleaning or food preparation, and inferior housing conditions (*Globe and Mail* 1944 “Camp Clashes Insignificant, Says Ralston” 1944/07/11; *Globe and Mail* 1944 “Report of Row

Brings 'Zombie' Issue to Fore" 1944/07/10; *Globe and Mail* 1944 "Paper Reports Bayonets Flash In Alberta Active-Zombie Row" 1944/07/20).

As the war progressed the rift between GS and NRMA widened and the NRMA classification came to represent an important social marker in the Armed Forces that carried with it prejudicial understandings of those men's character and identity. It was noted in an internal Military report regarding the effectiveness of attempts made to convert NRMA soldiers to GS soldiers and the development friction between these two groups, that:


it is not too much to say that the volunteer soldier in many cases literally despises the NRMA soldier...The volunteer feels himself a man quite apart from the NRMA man. He regards himself as a free man who had the courage to make a decision. He seldom takes the trouble to analyze the manifold reasons put forward by those who won't enlist. He lumps them all together as no more than feeble excuses masking cowardice, selfishness and bad citizenship. In many cases no doubt he is right. In others he may be wrong, but the fact remains that the antipathy between these two classes of soldiers starts right in the barrack room. The rift is there all the time... The volunteer is conscious of his position. He is proud of it. He is anxious to work. He salutes his officers and speaks to them with self confidence. The NRMA soldier slouches at his work. He tends to become sullen. He nurses his fancied grudge against 'the Army.' He hates 'the Army.' He has little self respect and therefore little respect for his officers... NRMA soldiers [are] discontented and unhappy; a solid mass of men who had resisted successfully every appeal to their manhood and citizenship, despised by their former comrades, and finally rejected even by their officers as hopeless material out of which to make a fighting force. These men take pride in only one thing: they have beaten 'the army'; they have beaten 'the government'" (Macklin 1944 Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin's Report on the Mobilization of the 13th Infantry Brigade on an Active Basis 2nd May 1944 cited in Stacey 1970: Appendix "S" 595).

The social pressure of the Zombie stigma associated with being a Home Defence soldier impacted these men outside of training facilities and camps as well. As it was reported, "nice girls do not dance or dine with them; GS personnel

object to being associated with them under any circumstances, and they are now regarded by the public as a group of cowards” (*Globe and Mail* 1944 “Zombie, Neither Soldier Nor Civilian, Victim of Government Policy” 1944/07/21). At a farm labour facility in Ottawa, the appointment of an NRMA soldier in 1944 had even led to a work stoppage, as “the girls took exception to the appointment of a draftee in charge of their group, on the grounds that many had relatives overseas and were unwilling to work under a ‘Zombie’” (*Globe and Mail* 1944 “Girls Refuse to Work Under ‘Zombie’ CSM” 1944/08/22).

This social pressure resulted in many men choosing to conform to the Armed Forces’ desire for their full conscription, and “volunteered” to “go active” and became General Service personnel. In a report from the Department of Labour in March of 1944, it was noted that between November 7th 1942 and the end of January 1943 over 2,000 men converted to General Service, representing 7.8 % of the mobilized “enlisted” men in this period (see Figure 4-8).

Figure 4-8. Converted Home Defence, NRMA Recruits 1942-1943



NB- The numbers of NRMA soldiers going active and becoming GS was tabulated from Stacy (1970: 399).

By the end of the war a total of 64,297 (58,434 Army, 747 Navy, and 5,082 Air Force) were reported to have volunteered “either on receiving their call up orders or after a period of service” (Stacey 1970: 399).

In response to their visible classifications, differential treatment, and distinctive forced performances as NRMA soldiers, the term *Zombie* began to be taken up by these men as an element of their identity and a means through which they engaged in political action.

This form of political action, with the adoption of the *Zombie* identity, came to a head on Friday November 24th 1944 when self proclaimed *Zombies*

took to the streets in response to hearing the news that approximately 16,000 of their ranks would be forcefully deployed to combat overseas. Protest began in Vernon, British Columbia on Friday November 24th 1944, and the Military later reported that around 200 men from the military camp near the town of Vernon had left camp and “paraded in a relatively ordinary manner, and then returned to camp after military police told them to do so” (Russel 1999: 59). Media reports of this act cited the number of protesting men to be around 1,000, while internal documents place the number of protesting NRMA soldiers between 300 and 1,000 (Ibid: 58-59). Within publicized reports of this event, it was noted that protesters had fully adopted the Zombie title, including it in their slogans and descriptions of self expression, as it was reported “the most notorious label ‘Zombie,’ was obviously intended to be an insult, while the November demonstrators at the time took it up as almost a badge” (Russel 1999: 52). As part of these protests, banners were carried with the text “Zombies Strike Back” (*Hamilton Spectator* 1944 “Wave of Anti-Conscription Parades Hits West Coast” 1944/11/27). Action taken in Vernon quickly spread as more NRMA soldiers took to the streets to demonstrate against their forced deployment. Over the coming weeks similar demonstrations were reported in military camps near the towns of Prince George, Courtnay, Chilliwack, Nanaimo, Port Alberni and Terrace. News media reporting from these events noted that “demonstrations were protesting what they termed a ‘phony conscription’ and were expressing their disapproval of a form of compulsion which they considered discriminatory” (*Hamilton Spectator* 1944 “Wave of Anti-Conscription Parades Hits West Coast” 1944/11/27). In particular,

protests in Terrace pointed to the working class makeup of NRMA soldiers, leading to calls to “let them conscript wealth too,” and to “give guys like Henry Ford a \$1.50 a day and our rations and see what he would say” (Russel 1999: 59). In other parts of the country taunted NRMA soldiers started to respond to their treatment, taking up a new song entitled “Its Better to be a Zombie than a General Service Man,” which chastised those who had volunteered, and adopted the term of Zombie as one which portrayed the smart men of the Army (*Globe and Mail* 1944 “Paper Reports Bayonets Flash in Alberta Active – Zombie Row” 1944/07/20).

Finally, in 1944 a letter of protest was sent to all members of Parliament from a self described “Zombie,” expressing many elements of the stereotyped understandings of NRMA soldiers. The writer, or writers, claimed to be of foreign born parents, being opposed to the forced performance of service, but in describing their political position the writer(s) drew on the rationality of citizenship, arguing that the discontent associated with Zombies came as a result of experienced social inequality. As the letter noted:

assure me, that all Canadians, who have honestly tried to abide by the laws of this country, will have equal rights, equal opportunities for education in every field and enterprise. Assure me this with deeds not promises. This done – there will be no need or coercion nor compulsion to further disunity, no need to sell ‘citizenship’, no need for further useless ‘drives’. It has been well said ‘that you cannot drive men of spirit, but you can lead them. [signed] ‘The Zombies’ (*Globe and Mail* 1944 ‘I am Zombie’ *Letters Flood House Members* 1944/11/22; *Globe and Mail* 1944 “Dear Sir: I am ‘Zombie’ - That Despised and Scorned” 1944/11/18).

In this way, the mobilization technologies which brought these men into service and differentiated them from GS soldiers in appearance, treatment and action, led

to the sedimentation of performances attributed to the *Zombie* classification. In particular, these data demonstrate the importance of visible means of classification in distinguishing individuals, enabling differential treatment, and the increased capacity to make a specific classification a central element of identity.

Conclusion

Unlike the previous chapters of this dissertation which focused on the numbers of individuals that certain technologies were able to classify and assert mobilization categories onto, this chapter addresses what the impact of these classifications were. From the time mobilized individuals arrived at military camps they were faced with taking up a strict set of performances based on military discipline and regulations. Although the content of these performances shifted quickly from the summer camp-like atmosphere of the first training session, to one that mirrored the basic training practices of volunteer soldiers, each represented the taking up of a forced performance that these individuals were largely required to take on. In addition, this chapter notes how National Registration technologies were not felt across all populations, as the mobilization exerted pressure on populations consisting mainly of young men of working class backgrounds that had been called into service.

Although the simple forcing of individuals to perform the acts of being a soldier in war time was significant in its own right, this case study also demonstrates the role that mobilization technologies played in developing a

specific and distinguishable identity for NRMA mobilized men. In particular, these data show the impact that these governing technologies had become more significant over time, as repeated forced performative acts became sedimented into individual and cultural understandings of identity. In this way, the role of ascribed classifications within governing systems can be understood as achieving something more than simply mediating individual performances in the present moment, but also under certain conditions can lead to the taking up of new understandings of self and the development of new social identities – as it did for NRMA soldiers who knew themselves and were known as Zombies.

In establishing this final link in regards to identity, this case study into the impact of the classifications of Canada's Second World War National Registration and Mobilization system is nearly complete. As it has been demonstrated, the rationalities of subjecthood and citizenship that were taken up in chapter one and were shown to have been integrated into the categories of the National Registration and mobilization system. This was followed by two chapters which addressed the development and implementation of specific technologies designed to have classified individuals perform the system's ascribed social duties, and finally, this final chapter addressed the forced performance of being an NRMA soldier and demonstrated how it mediated the development of these individuals' personal sense of self and cultural identity. The concluding chapter of this dissertation takes up this entire process in greater detail, drawing out the lessons which can be learned from this history and what

this case study can contribute to the current understanding of the relationship between technology, classification, and governance.

Conclusion

I am happy that we have reached the day when we are able to dispense finally with these Registration and Mobilization Regulations, and I am sure that the honorable members will agree with that statement. These measures were vitally necessary for war purposes. They helped Canada over many of our manpower difficulties, but they represented one of the features of wartime administration which a democratic public tolerate and even expect, but which the same public very properly feel is not in accord with the peacetime machinery necessary in the Government of a free people. – Statement by Hon. Humphrey Mitchell, M.P., Minister of Labour, to the House of Commons on the end of National Registration, August 15th 1946

Canada's second National Registration program officially ended on August 14th 1946 through the authority of Order-in-Council P.C. 3449. Having been in place for just under six years, National Registration had collected the personal information of over 9,250,000 individuals living in Canada, had been used to call over 158,000 individuals into service in the Armed Forces, and had been adopted as a technology to round up over 200,000 individuals who had not been acting in compliance with their governmentally ascribed mobilization categories by the end of the War. As a result of National Registration and mobilization technologies, many individuals had received letters calling on them to report for a medical examination, and many others had received letters to report for military training. Over the course of the war, an estimated 3 million dollars had been spent annually on the National Registration program accounting for 18 million dollars. Although significant calls had been made during, and after, the war to increase the effectiveness of this program (see Stevenson 2001: 172), its technologies undoubtedly provided the government with a greater amount of detailed personal information regarding the population living within Canada than it had ever

collected before, and the program had significantly impacted the lives of each of the 158,056 NRMA soldiers mobilized into the Army.

This case study has covered considerable ground in demonstrating the design and functioning of Canada's World War Two National Registration Program, focusing on the technologies it developed as well as how the categories that it adopted, and worked to enforce, were significant in mediating the identity performances of its classified individuals and populations. In chapter one the rationalities of citizenship and subjecthood were discussed and the process by which they were developed into the categories of the National Registration and mobilization program was demonstrated. As was shown, these rationalities shaped the categories of registration and became the foundation upon which the technologies used to call men into service and the technologies that were later developed to enforce the system's categories onto specific individuals and populations, was based. These points, regarding how individuals were called and how classifications were enforced, having been taken up in chapters two and three respectively, also worked to develop an understanding of the degree to which applied technologies were able to tighten the government's ascribed classifications onto individuals. This was achieved by examining the expectations for action that these categories carried, and comparing them to the observed performances of classified individuals. The final chapter worked to tie the categories of the National Registration and mobilization system to the experiences of individuals, as it focused on the impact that classification had on the lives of soldiers mobilized as a result of the *National Resource Mobilization Act* (NRMA)

legislation and how NRMA classifications became an important element of identity and self expression. As a result, this concluding chapter returns to the question of governance, and addresses what can be learned from how the National Registration system was capable of taking as socially constructed categories of bureaucratic classification, and make them a clearly defined, governing elements, of national culture, identity and individual action.

National Registration and Categorical Tightness

The history of National Registration and mobilization during the Second World War presented in this dissertation is incredibly rich, and much can be read into each development made to increase the system's capacity in the calling up of men into the Armed Forces, or in enforcing mobilization categories onto non-compliant individuals. The extreme detail into which this work has gone, however, was presented in order to develop a systematic understanding of the relationships between specific technologies and their capacity to govern individuals and populations. In pursuing this goal, this dissertation has approached the investigation of governance in a somewhat unconventional manner. Although the assertions put forward by Foucault and others regarding the role of rationalities and technologies as being the source of governance are accepted, this dissertation works to incorporate data regarding observed performances of those who were the subjects of governing technologies as well.


To do so, this research adopted the concept of categorical tightness, a term developed by Star, Bowker and Neumann (1997), that within this text has been used as a measure to understand the relative effectiveness of applied technologies in mediating, or governing, behavior. Specifically, categorical tightness here refers to a relationship between governing systems and individuals, denoting the degree to which implemented technologies are able to mediate the observable performances of the target populations and make these performances match the content of the governing system's applied classifications. As Foucault has noted, the governing rationalities of systems find expression in the categories and content of these categories. As such, this type of governance can be understood as finding expression through the application of systematically defined categories, the content and definitions of which being the result of specific governing rationalities. This understanding of categorical tightness was used in order to investigate the relative capacity of the various technologies that were implied as part of the National Registration and mobilization program, to govern the system's targeted populations and individuals. This section investigates the insights into the capacity of the specific technologies employed by the National Registration and mobilization system to tighten the system's ascribed categories onto the peoples living within Canada during the Second World War. In particular, this case study notes how the capacity to tighten mobilization categories was reliant upon two technological capabilities; first, the system's capacity to "newly identify," that is to identify individuals for the first time and effectively incorporate their data into the system; and second, the system's

capacity to “assess” individuals to determine if they were in fact acting in conformity with their ascribed classifications.

Newly Identified Individuals

As noted previously, the National Registration system’s reliance upon held data was crucial in its capacity to mediate the performance of each of its actors. As was shown in chapters two and three, when asked to enforce the law on those who did not register, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reported that they did not know who to investigate or arrest, since they did not have the data to identify or assess the compliance of any of the unregistered individuals. As a result, the findings of this study in regards to the gathering of personal information are noteworthy, as the effectiveness of National Registration technologies in identifying individuals and providing this kind of necessary data to government systems was greater than that of other government programs of its time (see Figure C-1).

Figure C-1. Identified Individuals Under Canadian Government Systems




In regards to other programs of the Canadian government which collected personal information, National Registration represented a significant increase in the number of individuals upon which the government held data. In comparison with the Voter Registration lists of 1940, and the real held data from the country's previous Census in 1936, the technologies of National Registration identified to government records for the first time almost an additional 17% of the estimated adult population, accounting for over 1,944,713 new individuals on which the government previously held no data. In addition, by the end of the war, the National Registration system had collected and maintained data on over 9,250,000 individuals. In regards to what differentiated National Registration technologies from that of the 1936 census, registration was designed to collect data on *all* individuals, and furthermore, the government adopted an aggressive media messaging campaign as part of the National Registration program which

publicised the punitive elements of the *National Registration Mobilization Act* (NRMA) legislation.

As a result, over 9,158,000 individuals chose to comply with government calls for registration without any further pressure being applied. These data show that the general public's compliance with a legislated, legally mandatory, and highly publicised governmental program was high (above 101% of the estimated adult population in 1947), though this result was in all likelihood bolstered by the predominance of discourses of patriotism and duty which were propagated during the war years. In addition to the Initial Registration, the second registration in 1942, or the "Re-Registration" as it was called, as well as the work of the Criminal Justice System, both newly identified a significant number of individuals (see Figure C-2).

Figure C-2. Individuals Newly Identified Under the Technologies of National Registration



The Re-Registration which occurred later in 1942 was publicised as a means for those who failed to register as part of the initial registration in 1940, to comply with National Registration legislation and return to good standing under the law. As part of this effort, the government's media messaging took a strong

stance in asserting the fact that the government had previously chosen to be lenient with those who had not complied, but that *now* “legal penalties will be enforced.” This punitive focus to the advertizing of Re-Registration increased the degree of compliance with government policy – increasing the number of those registered to over 97% of the estimated adult population and drawing in an additional 94,088 newly identified individuals. Although internal documents denote the degree to which registration officials were unable to follow up on these threats due to a lack of visibility of the non-conforming populations, the role of media messaging technologies which incorporated the strong public threat of the Criminal Justice System for those failing to take part in the Re-Registration was significant, as it even pushed over 49,600 individuals who had already registered and to whom the new requirements to register did not even apply, into showing up and filling in the necessary paperwork to be sure to avoid criminal prosecution.


This research also shows the effectiveness of National Registration technology in identifying individuals when compared with the efforts of policing organizations. During the war, the RCMP’s series of conducted raids on pool halls, bowling alleys, and dance halls, coupled with the general investigation actions of everyday policing, were able to newly identify a small fraction of the population – only 780 individuals. Though in real terms the apprehension and new identification of those 780 individuals whom the National Registration system did not previously hold data on is significant, and what resulted was the tightening of the mobilization categories and the mediation of these individuals’ performances, this number does not compare to the 362,517 that the police and

commercial investigation organizations were able to find, apprehend and re-enforce the categories of mobilization onto, when the system already held the personal information of the individual in question and as a result knew to look for them.

Assessment of Individuals

In its second point, the assessment of individuals for non-conformity, this work demonstrates how the National Registration system’s capacity was bolstered through the technologies of “endorsement,” the investigations of police and commercial agencies, the Medical Re-Examination, and the RCMP Raids (see Figure C-3).

Figure C-3. Number of Assessments Done Under the Technologies of National Registration



Endorsement, which included the double checking of an individual's status before the delivery of specified goods and services could be made, or the assessment of an individual's identity documents before allowing them to legally sell their labour time.

In particular, endorsement was applied in the sale of liquor and the right to endorse National Registration identity documents was also granted to unemployment offices, the Dependence Allowance Boards, Indian Affairs and other government agencies. In order to make these purchases, or interact with these government agencies individuals needed to show their National Registration ID card and other certificates that detailed their mobilization status. The documents would then be stamped as "endorsed," allowing for legal sales to be made or other services to be rendered. In the case of employment, all employers were legally required to check the documents of each of their employees to ensure that they were in compliance with mobilization regulations as part of the Employer Check-up of 1943. In all, this checking of employees should have accounted for the assessment of the papers of the some 3,363,111 men employed within Canada. In addition, employers who were suspicious of the documents their workers presented, or in cases where the employee could not present their documents at all, a specialized "Schedule 9" form was to be filled out noting that individual's personal information, and once completed was to be forwarded to registration officials in Ottawa and the individual in question was to be investigated. During the war years, National Registration offices received a total

of 49,548 Schedule 9s, and found 10,040 non-compliant individuals as a result of these technologies and subsequent investigations.

What was lacking from most endorsement technology, in exclusion of the Employer Checkup, however, was a method of reporting assessment information regarding who was identified as being non-compliant back to mobilization officials. These technologies instead exerted pressure by means of the denial of services to individuals, namely the purchasing of liquor and the denial of employment or government benefits. This action was surprisingly effective in the assessment of individuals across the country, as the “blanketing” approach that endorsement took up did allow for the assessment of mobilization status to happen more often, and with greater certainty. The technology of endorsement was also noted as an effective way of ensuring that individuals carried their identity documents on their person, a problem that had been reported by policing organizations in the war’s early years. It can also be hypothesised that if this exclusionary technology had been successfully applied to the delivery of necessary services such as rationing, as had also been part of the government’s initial plan, the impact and frequency that individuals encountered endorsement technology would have resulted in even greater significance.


In addition to endorsement, this study notes the important role that the deployment of standardized identification documents which allowed classified data to be shared across institutions, played in enabling the assessment of applied mobilization categories. In particular, the integration of the private commercial agencies of the Hooper Holmes Bureau and the Associated Credit Bureaus of

Canada, and the addition of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to mobilization investigation procedures in 1943. The investigations of these organizations were supplemented with the development of the technology of the Tracing Card – the document having been specifically designed to enable the sharing of classifications across these institutions. Combined, these technologies led to the assessment of the mobilization statuses of over 203,000 individuals suspected to be not complying with their legally mandated classification requirements. Where previously registrars were to conduct their own investigations and contact police only after a significant amount of time and follow up letters had not been successful in finding the individual, the Tracing Card technology formalized the data that would be passed on, while its associated policy formalized the steps that would be taken within National Registration offices, as well as how and when the police and private commercial organizations would be contacted. As part of this technology National Registration data also became compatible and fitted to the previously segregated financial records of the private commercial reporting agencies. These agencies, having had experience assessing individuals' credit as well as tracking down delinquent debtors in service to several of the large banking institutions in Canada and the United States, opened up new data to the National Registration system, enabling an additional 25,569 non-compliant individuals to be tracked down based on these previously held financial data alone.

In contrast to the “blanket” approach of endorsement, the actions taken by police in association with the Tracing Card technology were much more effective

in pressing individuals into service, noting that over 75% of the individuals assessed in this way by police were found to be non-complaint and were forced back into conformity with their ascribed category. In this regard, the integration of commercial agencies and RCMP investigations into the procedures of mobilization was the most effective technology adopted in pressing men into service (see Figure C-4).

Figure C-4. Number of Men Pressed Into Service Under the Technologies of National Registration



The next most effective technology of the mobilization system in pressing individuals into service was the Medical Re-Examination of 1943. In particular, the Medical Re-Examination worked to reassess the medical statuses of those who had previously been classified as “B” or below and considered to be not physically fit by their local family doctor. The purpose of the Re-Examination was to take steps to remove the personal relations and individual discretion that

individual family doctors had previously experienced with the men they were called on to classify. Under the Re-Registration, a team of Army doctors were called on to apply highly standardized measures in such a way as to ensure uniformity across the entire population of men that were re-examined. In this way, the technology of Re-Examination again points to the success of taking up set, reactive path dependant, procedures when asserting governing categories. That is, the Re-Examination brought with it a new highly regimented and sequential means of assessing the medical status of men called into service – in which each step was informed by the last, expressed a singular classification in the current step which informed those within the system to act toward the individual being re-examined in a systematically predetermined way, and which then passed the individual on to the next step in the chain. Although the previous method of family doctors assessing individuals locally were to take up the government's medical standards, the new Re-Registration technology had been specifically designed to remove all individual discretion and take on an almost automated, or coded, appearance. As a result of the Re-Examination 52,500 of individuals were reclassified and made available to be called into service by mobilization officials.

The effectiveness of the Re-Examination was followed by the Re-Registration of 1942 – which sought to get those who did not participate in the Initial Registration of 1940 to register by holding a second registration that targeted men within the age categories affected by mobilization legislation. As noted above and in chapter three, the Re-Registration relied on government media

messaging and the assertion that criminal prosecution would be levelled against those who were not acting in compliance with their requirement to register.

The social pressure put on by the Armed Forces to have NRMA mobilized soldiers convert to General Service (GS), in order for the government to be legally able to send these men overseas to fight, was also significant in pressing a significant number of individuals into service. In particular, these data point to the crucial role of a means of visibly identifying individuals of different classifications in enabling the application of systematically directed differential treatment. In this case the General Service Badge, as well as the cap badge; and the “Canada” shoulder patches, each worked to make GS soldiers distinctive from NRMA soldiers. As a result, the classification of NRMA, which was at first a simple bureaucratic distinction applied internally, became a key element that shaped how these individuals were treated and made the forced performance of being an NRMA soldier a central feature of their everyday lives. In light of the negative stigma and social pressure associated with this performance, 64,174 individuals instead decided to take up the performative acts associated with being a deployed GS soldier, and fight on the front lines in Europe.

Governance and Categorical Tightness

In reviewing these insights regarding the techno-social factors implemented as part of mobilization in Canada during the Second World War, four central themes emerged as key components that affected the translation of the National

Registration and mobilization program's classifications onto individuals and populations. First, that of visibility, or the ability to collect data on individuals and to organize them in such a way as to render these data actionable. Second, the role of legislation, in combination with wide scale mass media publication of government announcements explaining the law, and the association of punitive action for non-compliance. Third, the establishment of a singular classification for a specific individual, as a means of achieving systematically direct action toward that individual, as well as the capacity to share this classification across organizations and organizational actors. Fourth, the capacity to develop a form of reactive path dependency, by asserting a means through which held individual data is progressed along set chains of events, having each stage in the management of data being informed by the last stage, as well as having the individual's singular classification organize the action to be taken in the current stage, and having the action taken at the current stage inform the next stage along the established path.

In the case of visibility, this work reasserts the necessary dependence of governing practices on the collection and storage of identifying personal information. The clearest example of this linkage within the WWII registration and mobilization data was the inability of policing organizations to enforce regulations on non-registered populations in the early years – simply because they lacked a means of identifying and locating these individuals. Unlike those who had chosen to register, the data of those who did not register was not entered into the National Registration and mobilization system, and as such, was not visible to

any of the reviews, audits, investigations or other technologies associated with the enforcement of mobilization policy. The numbers of individuals newly identified by policing organizations also indicates the extremely limited degree to which policing practices aided in the identification of those seeking to avoid detection through non-participation with registration requirements. It was only where identification technologies became incorporated into employment and the delivery of government services through the technology of endorsement, that the identification of new individuals outside of the Initial Registration and Re-Registration became effective components of the mobilization system. These results also demonstrate the degree to which governing technologies were reliant upon the initially collected registration data, as investigation technologies were overwhelmingly designed to track registered but known to be non-compliant individuals – as the actions of these individuals were made visible and actionable within the technologies of the National Registration system.

The second point, legislation, was also crucial to the capacity of National Registration to tighten mobilization categories onto populations. As has been noted above, the threat of criminal prosecution was an effective element of registration technologies that convinced many individuals to comply with National Registration and mobilization policy. It is also important to note, however, that the authority of the National Registration system itself found its basis in law, as the legislation of the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (NRMA), as well as the subsequently passed Orders-In-Council which made men available to be called, were the means through which the day-to-day operations of

registration and mobilization gained their authority. In addition, by making participation within registration and mobilization a legal matter, the system could call on police across the country to enforce the system's regulations and applied categories. After 1943, this relationship was rendered more explicit, as well as more effective, when the investigative process of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the private commercial agencies became integrated into National Registration and mobilization procedures as part of the technologies and policies associated with the Tracing Card.

The establishment of a singular, or dominant, classification was also a predominant part of the National Registration System. In most social interactions an array of classifications are expressed within an individual's performances, and those participating or observing the interaction are called on to negotiate what it is that these performances mean, how they are to be understood, and how they are going to respond to them. The changes that were implemented as part of the Department of Labour takeover of National Registration in 1942, adopting technologies in order to shift to a form of centralized management. In addition, new technologies also asserted a type of reactive path dependence in how mobilization officials processed data – effectively removing the type of social negotiation mentioned above from the daily work of registration officials. In contrast to spaces that are unregulated in this way, the actions of the system's social actors are highly mediated by technologies which organize their interactions with data to the extent that they come to mirror automated readings and responses of coded environments (see Lessig 2000), and as such, become

reliant upon the reading of the singular and dominating category through which the system's policies dictate that decisions are to be made. This research also notes how the technological development of a means to transfer this type of organizing and orienting classification, along with its set reading and expected response, was crucial in allowing for both centralized control over individuals across time and space but also the capacity for the system's categories to be pushed into new and varied social spaces. In this way, shared and stable classifications also enabled the effective coordination of action across different institutions and organizations.

The fourth point works closely with the third, as technologies which worked to assert a singular classification and set ways of reading individuals and data were made more effective in mediating individual performance by means of linking together the reading of applied classifications and the action taken by system officials together to form detailed path dependant chains of events. Within the theorization of reactive path dependency, each "reactive sequences are chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events," and as such, "in a reactive sequence, each event in the sequence is both a reaction to antecedent events and a cause of subsequent events" (Mahoney 2000: 526). In particular, singular classifications instructed particular ways of reading and interpreting individual performances, however, in tying these classifications to system designed chains of events, performances become increasingly mediated by how implemented classifications were designed to be read at that particular stage of the chain, and how the remainder of that chain had been organized.

This relationship is most clearly seen in the Control Card Catalogue, where the design and policy of the catalogue led to sets of linear paths through the mobilization process, along which individuals' data was processed then passed on. This also finds expression today in the decision trees used to mediate the performances of individuals working at call centers (Kyper, Douglas and Blake 2012), and more strongly in the purely coded environments of online spaces in which each action is recognized, added to one's profile, historically and is then used to inform one's place in a game or how one is advertized to through targeted marketing schemes (Vachey 2011; Rich and Miah 2009; Webber 1985). In this way, reactive path dependence mirrors automated or coded interactions in that an individual's read category determines the types of actions that are possible in certain spaces.

In regards to tightening categories, this case study stresses the importance of early events and what are referred to as "breakpoint" moments – moments in which a single decision to participate initiates, or enables, the implementation of reactive path dependant chain of events. In regards to National Registration the choice to initially register one's data was a breakpoint moment, as this action then enabled the future application of path dependant chains involving mobilization. In contrast, this relationship could not be developed for those of whom the system held no data, as they could not be incorporated into these developed chains.

The End of National Registration?

Although in the press the technologies of National Registration and its subsequent identity cards had been described as “totalitarian” and a “limit to liberty,” they were accepted due to the wartime conditions. Directly following the end of the war the government argued that National Registration technologies had become a necessity of modern life, even in the post war period. In 1945, the Department of Labour expressly asserted within media that National Registration had *not* been abandoned, and pointed to the many uses to which the technology had been applied as the reason to keep the program running. As the Minister of Labour noted: “the fact is...that in addition to its use for military call up, the National Registration is used for tracing people for the dependants’ allowance board, for tracing the relatives of those discharged from the armed services, and for tracing people in various other ways. Also, it is tied in with certain other dominion and provincial regulations, which make its continuance for the present quite necessary” (Mitchell 1945 cited in *Irma Times* June 8th 1945). In the House of Commons the minister argues that registration technologies were still being used to “(a) so that the registration records from which much information is still being supplied may be kept as up to date as possible; (b) the certificates are still being used for identification purposes by the national employment service and other governmental agencies; (c) to assist the authorities in clearing up unfinished cases and investigations of desertions from the armed forces, defaults and delinquencies under national resources mobilization regulations, the defence of Canada

regulations and other wartime controls” (Canada Parliament House of Commons Hansard July 22nd 1946: 3730).

Furthermore, private business had taken up the technology of the identity cards to check an individual’s identity and signature when cashing cheques, “police welcomes the new and more positive means of identification” (*Evening Citizen* 1946 “Will Decide if Registration to be Continued” April 15th 1946); allowed for the checking of Family Allowance cheques (*Ottawa Citizen* 1945 “Registration Cards” August 18th 1945); and a “constant stream of requests from creditors and others who would find the records highly valuable for commercial purposes” had been turned down by the Chief Registrar (*Ottawa Journal* 1943 “Registration Cards May Have Permanent Post-War Utility” October 20th 1943). The legislation was also critiqued as it had been used as a catchall adopted by some police as the “lack of the card allows officious policemen to hound otherwise innocent citizens to the police courts” ... “these facts may satisfy the snooping tendencies of certain beaurocrats, but they have no value to the nation, or in determining Government employment policy.” As of March 31st 1946 there were still 232 individuals employed at the National Registration Branch of the Department of Labour, accounting for a monthly cost of approximately \$30,000 and an annual budget of \$324,625 (Hansard April 17th 1946; *Evening Citizen* 1946 “Will Decide if Registration to be Continued” April 15th 1946). In February of 1946 a Nationwide Gallup Poll was conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public opinion which showed that the majority of Canadians were in favor of retaining the National Registration. Nationally 61% answered that the nation

“should have registration,” while 33% stated that the government “should discontinue it” (*Evening Citizen* 1946 National Registration Favored by Canadians February 27th 1946). The largest differential between reported provinces was Ontario which voted 68% in approval and Québec where only 48% felt that the Registration should be maintained. These numbers are somewhat surprising given the numbers of negative media reports, op-eds and extreme opposition to the program by opposition parliamentary members, due to its apparent misuse of government funds and manpower as well as the un-British nature of technologies of “regimentation and documentation” (Stevenson 2001: 172; *Ottawa Citizen* 1945 “Registration Cards” August 18th 1945; *Globe and Mail* 1945 The Dictator Habit September 4th 1945).

Due to the unpopularity of the government’s conscription policy, National Registration was ultimately abandoned in August of 1946, leading the Minister of Labour to change his stance from one supporting National Registration, to one lauding its demise (*Globe and Mail* 1946 “What Can the Purpose Be?” 1946/08/31; Statement by Hon. Humphrey Mitchell, M.P., Minister of Labour, to the House of Commons, August 15th 1946 (RG 27 vol.3029 file: Department of Labour).

Although the program had officially ended, and its staff of over 300 mostly reassigned, the technologies of enforcement designed to identify and locate those who had not complied with their Orders-Medical or Orders-Military remained intact and functional until the end of June in 1946. As a result, over

18,700 additional individuals were prosecuted for their non-conformity with registration and mobilization policy after the war had been concluded.

The data of the National Registration itself lived on as well, as when the program ended in August of 1946 arrangements had already been made to place the full Central Registry of Original Questionnaire Cards under the authority of the Public Records Committee in Ottawa. The cards themselves were reported publically as having been scheduled to be microfilmed and then destroyed in September of 1946 (see “Being Microfilmed: National Registration Card Record Will Take up Small Space” in *Irma Times*, September 27, 1946; *Gleichen Call*, September 18, 1946; *Recorder*, September 19, 1946; *Crossfield Chronicle*, October 4, 1946; *The Blairmore Graphic*, September 20, 1946; *Didsbury Pioneer*, October 9, 1946). However, the Department of Labour reported in 1949 that the Original Questionnaire Cards had been moved and stored on the third floor of the Supreme Court Building in October of 1946, while “information from such records [wa]s only divulged when urgently required by Government Officials and other recognized authorities” (Department of Labour 1949: 23). The microfilmed data ultimately were transferred to Statistics Canada, and the data now is only made available outside of the Government to the direct descendants of registered individuals (see Library and Archives Canada 2010).

The possibility was also investigated to segregate the names and addresses of those individuals of age for conscription within the Government’s records of the DBS Registry of Births and Deaths as well as those receiving government assistance through the Family Allowance program, though no evidence was found

showing that this action passed further than the planning stage (Cabinet Committee on Emergency Measures 1951 Top Secret Memorandum for the Cabinet: Appendix May 2nd 1951 RG 2 vol. 173 file: National Registration).

Even with the government's public talk of "lest we forget" and "never again" following the Second World War, by 1949, only 2 years later after National Registration had been disbanded, the potential conflict in Asia and fear over a possible war which would again require the management of the country's labour power and the conscription of men into military and into industry, led to the organization, planning and preparation of legislation for a new National Registration (Department of Labour 1949 Department of Labour War Book (1949) RG 20 vol. 1970 file: 20-240-9- Department of Labour War Book; Department of Labour 1950 Memorandum of Plans for National Registration 1950 RG 20 vol. 1970 box: 26 file: 20-240-6; Department of Labour 1952 Draft of National Registration Regulations March 1952 RG 27 vol. 3020 file: pt.1). By 1950 the details of this program had be put into place and by 1952 the procedures and legislation had been fully drafted, and by 1953 the government had already printed the necessary questionnaire cards and ID cards that would be required to conduct Canada's third National Registration Program and secretly kept these documents at the ready.

In more modern times, National Registration and the issuance of identity cards have again entered into political debate. In 1999 the government called on the company Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) to submit an estimate to parliament regarding a nationwide ID Card system based on the Social

Insurance Number (SIN) program which was already in place (Human Resources Development Canada (1999) “A Commitment to Improvement: The Government of Canada’s Social Insurance Number Policy” *Response to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts* December 31st 1999). After the attacks on the United States on the 11th of September 2001 the call for National Registration was again taken up by a greater number of voices, culminating in late 2002, when the government sought to open the debate on the matter. As a result, Minister Coderre called on the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration to formally study the implementation of a National Identity Card program in 2003. In his address to the Committee, Corderre argued that “in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, identity has taken on a new predominance in countries around the world. Canada has been no different. Canadians have come to see the ability to establish identity as an important element of personal and collective security” (The Honourable Denis Coderre, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (2003) “*Why Discuss a National Identity Card?*” notes for an address by the Minister before the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, February 6th 2003). In this case, National Registration was to address the key problems of providing “more secure and reliable proof of identity;” to “help combat identity theft and ID fraud;” to “facilitate travel by Canadians abroad, notably in the United States; and” to “prevent racial profiling” (Marleau 2003: 6). Since this time, the concept of National Registration has fallen out of favour federally in Canada, however, by

2012 the provinces of British Columbia and Ontario had both taken significant exploratory steps in pursuing their own programs.

In moving forward and facing the next National Registration and identity card program in Canada the obvious question of *how* this technology will achieve its proposed functions will need to be addressed. If this system is to protect against terrorism – how exactly will it do so? If it is to protect against identity theft or other forms of fraud – again, how will this be achieved? Or if it is claimed that it will provide a more secure and reliable proof of identity – how will this be done? The findings of this case study make the question of *if* there should be a National Registration Card System in Canada, a deeply important one. In this regard, this study presents some troubling insights. First and foremost, the history of National Registration is filled with secrecy and obfuscation, as the government had learned after the failure of the system implemented during the First World War, that being open about the coercive and governing practices that these technologies would seek to employ had led to political opposition and non-participation from the very populations that the system was designed to identify and control. The learning of this lesson and the development of sufficient “window dressing” during the Second World War to avoid the public’s understanding that National Registration was, and always had been, designed to enact conscription, is frighteningly telling. Future programs will also present governments with the same, very real, problem of how to avoid the non-participation of the populations that the technology would be designed to control, providing them with the uneasy decision of choosing between the effectiveness of

these new systems, and the engagement in honest public debate considering how these technologies would function and would be used, that is a requirement in an open and democratic society. Second, that these technologies are known to hold the capacity to govern, or even force, the performance of particular acts by targeted individuals and populations. In particular, this case study shows how the rationalities of citizenship and subjecthood were integrated into the technologies of National Registration and allowed for the state to structure the identity performances of classified individuals and social groups. As a result, those identified as Chinese and Indian were specifically excluded from mobilization as a means to control the capacity of these groups to be able to press for equal rights within the country as had successfully been done after the First World War. The system also applied classifications registering class, race, gender, and employment that impacted who would be selected to be mobilized, and led to a systematic inequality directed towards peoples along these identified criteria. Third, the high number of errors that were present within the National Registration system was significant, leading in some cases to wrongful prosecutions and other complications. In addition, the secretive design of these technologies did not allow for individuals to check the accuracy of collected data and were thus subject to what had been recorded on their Questionnaire Card on their behalf. Fourth, that these technologies which were designed to govern behaviour, also could be tied to the delivery of necessary services. In regards to the historical case of World War Two, the tying of compliance to registration and mobilization categories was made in regards to employment and to the sale of

liquor. If this type of link was made to the delivery of necessary services, such as health care – as is currently proposed in BC and in Ontario – then the potential of these technologies to govern behaviour would be quite significant. Finally, that registration represents a “breakpoint moment,” one in which the data provided cannot be taken back, and the potential future applications for these data would be unknown. If nothing else, this case study demonstrates the importance and necessity of held data in developing a capacity to govern individuals and populations.

In demonstrating the classifications and consequences of National Registration in Canada during the Second World War, this case study demonstrates not only that the design of imposed governing technologies was significant in determining how effective the system was in identifying individuals and mediating behaviour, but it also notes how these technologies worked to shape the lives and cultural identity of each individual that the National Registration program touched. In moving forward and investigating other governing technologies, this work asserts the fundamental importance of giving proper credit to the role that classifications play in mediating the performances of targeted populations and suggests that future research look to classification as a means of incorporating data regarding individuals’ “lived experiences” in order to better understand the consequences of applied governance systems.

“Laughter in the face of serious categories is indispensable.”
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