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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FRIENDSHIP: AN IDEAL TYPICAL MODEL

by

DON C. STARRITT

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF Doctor of Philosophy

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1988

ISBN 0-315-42967-4

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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NAME OF AUTHOR DON C. STARRITT

TITLE OF THESIS FRIENDSHIP: AN IDEAL TYPICAL MODEL

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED Doctor of Philosophy

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED 1988

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled FRIENDSHIP: AN IDEAL TYPICAL MODEL submitted by DON C. STARRITT in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Date 18 March 1988

ABSTRACT

This thesis purports to deal with three aspects of dyadic friendship in modern society. First, the meanings of friendship are examined through a selective propositional inventory of agreements and disagreements in the research literature. The objective is to "lay the groundwork" for a subsequent definition of dyadic friendship that effectively integrates the findings of a number of classical and contemporary scholars. The resultant definition takes into account the parameters of the study of dyadic friendship, its structure, and its social psychology.

The second aspect of dyadic friendship that is pursued concerns the need for and possibility of an explanatory model of friendship relationships in social science. In this context, the method of ideal type construction is used to produce an ideal typical model of dyadic friendship. This model generates a total of sixteen different kinds of friendship that derive from four basic or "pure" types. The pure types include: altruistic, egoitstic, exploitative I, and exploitative II friendships. Two pairs of analytical constructs, identified as intrinsic and extrinsic friendship value orientations, define the pure types.

The third and final aspect of dyadic friendship examined in the thesis concerns the usefulness and applicability of the ideal typical model of friendship. In this context, the constructed model is applied to select circumstances emergent in the stages of the human life

cycle. The analysis reveals that altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative friendships are possible at almost every stage of the life cycle. It also reveals that the adult stage of the life cycle is problematic for the development of altruistic friendships and that the greatest potential for this friendship type is perhaps during the "pre" and "post" adult stages of adolescence and retirement. The results confirm the importance and significance of ideal type construction in this area of inquiry.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to acknowledge the support given by the following individuals: Professor Wayne W. McVey Jr., Professor J. Young, Professor H. Northcott, Professor P. Saram, and Professor D. Rehorick. To the many other individuals who have contributed their time, energy, and talent to this project--thank you. In addition, a very special thank you to Penny A. Cairns.

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I. SECTION I. BACKGROUND: SOME MEANINGS OF FRIENDSHIP IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

Clues to the meanings of friendship may be seen to emerge from remarks made by a number of early social philosophers. Aristotle (1962), for example, discusses the degree and extent to which similarities and differences are required in "natural friendships." He maintained that both similarities and differences were a part of friendship relationships but placed more emphasis on the former. Complementarity in this sense was seen as "tolerable" but also somewhat subversive to the "ideal" of perfect friendship.

Aristotle's concerns with respect to the roles played by similarity, complementarity, and difference in "close" relationships have surfaced in both classical and modern sociological theory. Durkheim (1964), for example, has suggested that both similarities and differences are required in "modern" friendships and that the effects of increasing division of labor and specialization in society may have some direct effects on the friendship choices individuals make. The implication is that as society becomes more specialized, individuals may come to appreciate the "solidarity" produced by having friends with specialized and different interests and, that no single "friend" could possibly hope to share all one's individual interests. R. Winch (1958), has also attempted to deal with Aristotle's concerns though in the context of mate selection and not friendship per se.

Aristotle (1962), provides another set of clues to the meanings of friendship in antiquity which are also of particular significance in modern social theory. These concern the possibility of generating classification systems that effectively describe and discriminate between and amongst specific occurrences of particular social phenomena. Aristotle attempts such a classification of friendship and alludes to "motives" as determinants of friendship types and choices but fails to adequately describe how this process comes about. R. Williams (1959), E. Wolf (1966) and Y. Cohen (1961) have subsequently dealt with this issue of the classification of friendship's types and have made great strides in understanding the dynamics of the problem.

Cicero (1967), has also provided a number of clues to the meaning(s) of friendship and friendship relationships. Cicero primarily concerns himself with an analysis of "true" and "false" friendship and describes in great detail the "qualities" that must be attributed to friendships of each type. Though Cicero's approach is "value laden" and his idealization of "true" friendship complete, he nevertheless identifies a number of friendship's social and structural properties which have been later substantiated by social scientists. Each of these properties will be discussed at some length in later sections but for the moment suffice it to say that much of what modern social science acknowledges about the "qualities" of friendship finds its "roots" in Cicero's analysis of true and false friendship. Some of the

"values" issues that Cicero raises are:

1. The importance and significance of friendship in everyday life.
2. The place of virtue, honor, and honesty in friendship.
3. The question of friendship for advantage or advantage in friendship.
4. The question of the effects of status differentials in friendship.
5. The question of whether or not one "should" monitor the demands one makes of one's friends.
6. The question as to whether or not friendship and love are one and the same.
7. The question of friendship as only a personal and private relationship.

Montaigne (1935), has also made significant contributions to the meaning(s) that friendship holds "sociologically." Like Cicero, Montaigne tends to idealize friendship and to "place it upon a pedestal" apart from most other forms of human social relationships. Once again, it is only friendships of the true and perfect kind that are held in any esteem whatsoever. Nevertheless, Montaigne is effective in describing some of the "intrinsic" qualities and properties of friendship that have been later explored by Parsons (1951) and Wolf (1966). Montaigne's emphasis on friendship as an "end in itself" (1935:84), in part forms the basis for an ideal typical model of friendship to be

developed in a later section.

It is evident that some aspects of the works of Aristotle (1962), Cicero (1967), and Montaigne (1935) are of some continuing significance to modern social science. They are significant because they provide clues to the meaning(s) of friendship which bears directly on the ability of scientists to conceptualize, explain, test, and subsequently establish the meaning boundaries and key variances of the concept of friendship itself. Thus, the ultimate goal in this section will be to formulate a preliminary working definition of the meaning of friendship that adequately identifies its key variances in social context.

The approach and the method in this regard will be to review the current state of theory and relevant empirical research on the meanings of friendship in sociology and in conjunction with this develop a limited but representative propositional inventory of what friendship is or is not considered to mean or represent in the opinions of selected authors and researchers. Then, having compiled an inventory of both agreements and disagreements from the literature, it will be possible to advance a tentative working definition of the meanings of friendship and therefore a specification of its conceptual boundaries or limits.

A. An Inventory of Agreements on the Meaning(s) of Friendship

Proposition One: Friendship Remains Relatively Unstudied

Despite the confusion in the literature over the meanings of friendship and friendship relationships there are a number of statements about friendship that are either agreed upon by a number of scholars or simply remain unchallenged to this point in time. First and foremost among these statements is the proposition that friendship for the most part remains unstudied and consequentially aloof from the logical tools of the social scientist. Sadler, for example, notes:

> In most cultures friendship is highly valued, it is particularly esteemed in America. Surprisingly enough there has been little study of it. Scientific scrutiny of friendship is virtually non-existent and philosophy has rarely given it careful consideration. (1970:177)

Similarly, Duck, in a more recent statement echoes these arguments in saying:

> ...the basis of friendship and acquaintanceship remains elusive and the poets, novelists and scientists have not yet given up the quest for a satisfactory theory. (1977:1)

Thus, the elusive nature of friendship is well documented in the literature. Sadler sums up the potential dangers of giving the meaning(s) of friendship superficial scientific treatment when he states that:

> It is important that we acknowledge both the problems and ambiguities that pertain to this phenomenon in our society, but perhaps even more important is the attempt to reach a clear and

> reliable understanding of what the nature of friendship really is. If we fail to understand what friendship means, we may be in danger of accepting substitutes. (1970:177)

Here, Sadler warns that if we fail to understand what friendship really is or means, we may be in danger of accepting substitutes. That is, without an adequate understanding of what the boundaries of friendship are we may mistakenly accept quasi-friends for "real" friends or mere acquaintances for "real" friends and so on. The dangers here are implicit and refer to the potential harm done or caused by mistakenly classifying a relationship as one of friendship when in fact it may not be.

In any event, there would appear to be enough evidence here to state preliminarily that the meaning of friendship remains relatively unstudied and/or expressed in sociology and social science generally. This is the first point of agreement in the selective propositional inventory.

Proposition Two: Friendship has not Been Conceptualized Adequately.

If we accept for the moment that the social scientific scrutiny of friendship is in its infancy, subsequently it should be no surprise to find that many authors agree that friendship has not been conceptualized adequately. Becker and Useem, note in this regard that:

> There is no general consensus as to the meaning of the term friendship. To some it signifies an ease of companionship, an exchange of confidence without fear of misunderstanding, censure or exposure. To others it means an individual on whom one can depend

in times of crisis. (1942:21)

and that:

> Research is needed to clarify the concept of friendship as defined both by the participants and the culture. (1942:21)

Similarly, Paine (1969), Sadler (1970), and Albert and Brigante (1967) support these concerns when they suggest that:

> ...there are no short cuts in the comparative sociology of friendship...we have to think hard about what we mean by the word friendship. (Paine, 1969:505)

and that:

> ...we often mistake casual acquaintances for friends...There is greater confusion about the meaning of friendship today. (Sadler, 1970:177)

and finally:

> Conceptualization of the major dimensions and problems in this area might lead to a better understanding of the healthier aspects of human interrelationships along with further understanding of the interaction between social and personality variables. (Albert and Brigante, 1967:33)

In each of these statements it is clear not only that friendship has been inadequately conceptualized in the research literature but also that there would again appear to be a complete lack of consensus over the boundaries and meanings of the term. It is extremely important as these arguments would suggest that researchers not only "think hard" about what they mean by the concept but that they make a concerted effort to clarify its boundaries. Allan (1979) admits further, that we have made very little progress in sociology with respect to an adequate and workable concept

and definition of friendship. He notes, for example, of the concept that:

> ...it is one whose definition is by no means precise. The range of connotations, not all of which occur in concert, can be brought into play at different times and on different occasions. (1979:35)

And, in referring to an unpublished sociological review of friendship by Edgell, Allan attacks empirical sociological treatments of friendship in saying:

> In none of the studies referred to so far have the meanings of friendship been adequately conceptualized by the investigators. It is a case of making excuses or measuring the extent of a social phenomenon without giving prior thought to what is being measured. (1970:35)

Then, having made this point, Allan further attacks Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), R. Williams (1959), Babchuk and Bates (1963), Babchuk (1965), Z. Blau (1961), and Booth and Hess (1961) as examples in the sociological literature that place too great an emphasis on "real friendship" as the only form worthy of investigation. In his words:

> ... while a lot of what has been written generalizes about friendships of all forms, the data it is based on usually pertains to a restricted set of very close friends. (1979:37)

This suggests a need to discriminate between and among different kinds and degrees of friendship and the possible benefit of an ideal typical model that might serve to accomplish the former. Nevertheless, Allan's comments and criticisms in conjunction with the other views presented here suggest that there are indeed some serious problems in conceptualizing, measuring, and defining friendship in the

sociological literature. There is substantial evidence to state for the purposes of this inventory that most researchers agree that friendship itself has not been conceptualized adequately. There is also some evidence to suggest as a result of this that many empirical treatments of the subject lack validity and reliability and that scholars should interpret their generalizations with a degree of caution.

Proposition Three: Friendship is Primarily a Dyadic Phenomenon

Another point of agreement in the literature is the idea that friendship is primarily a dyadic phenomenon. Becker and Useem, for example, demonstrate that friendship pairs may be classified under what they call "comprehensive dyads", (1942:20) and that these dyads:

> ...are those pairs in which a relatively large portion of the personalities of both are included in the relationship. (1942:21)

Simmel also implies that intimate friendship is primarily dyadic in its form when he suggests that:

> The larger the group is, the more easily does it form an objective unit up and above its members, and the less intimate does it become: the two characteristics are intrinsically connected. (1950:127)

Thus, since group size is intrinsically connected to intimacy according to Simmel, it would seem reasonable to suggest that a truly intimate friendship relationship may only develop in dyads, or a two-person group. In addition,

G. Watson (1966), supports this contention further when he notes:

> ...that the possibility of friendship forming in a dyadic relation appears to be higher than the chance of similar associations developing within a larger group. One reason for the dyad's importance is that it affords more opportunities for communication of an intimate and personal nature. (1966:85)

and that:

> ...dyadic interaction appears to be more condusive to the formation of friendship than group interaction. (1966:85)

Each of these points of view indicates that intimate friendships are formed most easily in the context of the "sociation" (Simmel, 1950) known as the dyad. This is not to suggest that friendships between or among larger groupings are impossible, but is rather to state that friendship is perhaps more properly addressed sociologically as a two-person phenomenon. Many other scholars and researchers have taken this position (Paine, 1969; Rake, 1970; Secord and Backman, 1968; Mills, 1958; and Slater, 1963).

Simmel makes a number of comments that are relevant to the dyad as a special social form and are therefore relevant to a discussion of friendship as a dyadic phenomenon. He notes:

> ...the simplest sociological formation, methodologically speaking, remains that which operates between two elements. It contains the scheme, germ, and material of innumerable more complex forms. Its sociological significance, however, by no means rests on its extensions and multiplications only. It itself is a sociation. (1950:123)

In Simmel's opinion, the dyad is a viable social form in its

own right. He also notes some unique properties of the dyad which differentiate it from other types of social groupings. He suggests, for example, that the dyad is mortal, that is, the group dies should one member disappear or die and that this is not necessarily characteristic of other social groups that replace their members. He further emphasizes the uniqueness of the dyad as a very special sociological unit when he writes that:

> Ideally, any large group can be immortal. This fact gives each of its members, no matter what may be his personal reaction to death, a very specific sociological feeling. A dyad, however, depends on each of its two elements alone - in its death, though not in its life: for its life, it needs both, but for its death only one. This fact is bound to influence the inner attitude of the individual toward the dyad, even though not always consciously nor in the same way. It makes the dyad into a group that feels itself both endangered and irreplaceable, and thus into the real locus not only of authentic sociological tragedy, but also of sentimentalism and elegiac problems. (1950:124)

Here, Simmel has identified not only some of the structural problems associated with the dyad itself but some of the difficulties that are a part of dyadic friendship as well. That is, what Simmel is talking about here, namely the degree of dependence each member of the dyad has on the other member for group survival coupled with the endangered and irreplaceable feeling associated with such a bond, would lead one to believe that dyadic friendship has some unique problems. Friendship in fact, given these dyadic properties, may be interpreted as a polar concept in that it is both enduring but tenuous, and a vital but insignificant human endeavor.

Since the dyad itself is both endangered and irreplaceable at the same time, the friendship dyad would seem especially so. That is, it is endangered in the sense that it may be replaced by one, the other, or both at any time even though the relationship may be irreplaceable in some ultimate sense. In Simmel's terms, this is a "tragedy" on the one hand and a natural outcome of increased differentiation in friendship relationships on the other. It is tragic in the sense that to the degree the friendship was highly valued by the individuals involved and to the degree that its loss was unanticipated--and further to the extent that each "friend" invested, entrusted, and imparted a degree of self to the other--the remaining partner must feel a deep sense of loss, as not only has the dyad ceased to be but so has a part of himself.

This scenario is in part a function of the mortality of the dyad but it is also a function of the uncertainty of friendship for the individuals involved, and given this it would seem that for each to invest in the other in friendship would cause them to seek to maintain this tenuous association with a maximum effort. As with most action complexes, however, there is likely a threshold beyond which efforts to maintain a relationship may be futile. This threshold, if it exists, may be affected by increased differentiation such that if A's friendship with B is dependent through the effects of increased differentiation primarily on X and Y, and should X and Y cease to exist for

either A or B or both, then it would seem to follow that A's and B's friendship would deteriorate unless some other raison d'etre were formed, say Z. The disappearance of X and Y as a reason to be for A's and B's friendship may be a threshold that may or may not be negotiated successfully by the individuals involved.

To the degree then, that friendships have become more differentiated today, one might expect a greater turnover of friendships than ever before. For example, if A shares X or Y in common with B, and, X and Y then subsequently disappear, then A and B may cease to be friends in that they seek to obtain X and Y from individuals C or D. On the other hand, A and B may remain "friends" sharing Z, but seek to fulfill their X and Y needs elsewhere, at least providing that these needs remain fixed and do not change.

It would seem further that the enduring and vital properties of the dyad in general are especially felt or experienced in friendship. That is, to the extent that friendship is perceived as a need by the individuals in question and this need is mutually and reciprocally sought and subsequently met in the dyad - then the friendship formed must necessarily be enduring, vital, and irreplaceable because of this consensual and mutual definition. At the same time, however, need fulfillment in the friendship dyad may be differentiated on the basis of the degree of instrumentality/specificity and/or expressivity/diffuseness. The instrumental/specific basis

for the friendship may be quite obvious to the participants and therefore there may be little ambiguity as to their presence or absence in the relationship. Expressive/diffuse needs, however, are problematic and difficult to assess in that the individuals may or may not be consciously aware of their presence or absence and even if they are aware they may not recognize them as significant to their relationship.

It might be suggested in this regard, that it is only when the dyad is threatened by forces internal or external to the unit that the individuals introspect enough to begin to consciously evaluate the diffuse elements of their association and the weight that these elements may or may not carry to the quality and longevity of the relationship. So, whether either individual is consciously aware of it or not, tension in a dyadic friendship is probably a vital element of a friendship relationship in the sense that each partner may choose or be forced to evaluate that friendship from the standpoint of its potential mortality and the consequences thereof.

This in turn may further indicate that the dynamics of friendship in the dyad are not necessarily fixed to any specific needs either instrumental/specific or expressive/diffuse, but are fluid and constantly changing in a relationship provided that these needs do not violate either individual's evaluative limits. Therefore, it may be good in a sense to test the limits of one's dyadic friendships occasionally at least for the purposes of growth

and continuance and/or dissolution.

Regardless, the polar properties of the dyad itself that one may infer from Simmel, tenuous/enduring, vital/insignificant, may very well apply to many specific forms and types of friendship relationships. It is also clear that if one should attempt to construct a model of friendship careful consideration must be given to the properties and structure of the dyad as a social form that contributes to what is possible in a dyadic friendship. Precisely what the effects of the dyad are on friendship remains to be seen, however, there is enough evidence here to suggest: (1) that dyadic structure does place some interesting caveats on what is possible in friendship and (2) for the purposes of this inventory friendship must be seen as primarily a dyadic phenomenon.

Proposition Four: Friendship is a Basic Human Need

Another point of agreement in the literature with respect to friendship and its meaning would appear to be the notion that friendship is a basic human need. Both Cicero (1967) and Cooley (1929) for example, see friendship as an intrinsic and inalienable aspect of human nature. Cicero notes:

> ...all I can do is urge you to put friendship above all other human concerns, for there is nothing so suited to man's nature, nothing that can mean so much to him, whether in good times or in bad. (1969:53)

and Cooley implies that in friendship:

> ...one is never more human, and as a rule never happier, than when he is sacrificing his narrow and merely private interests to the higher call of the congenial group. (1929:38)

Therefore, it may be suggested that friendship is both cause and consequence of human nature; that is, it is human nature to be friends, and to be friends is human nature. The two are inextricably linked in these statements. It is part of human nature to both be friends with others and to seek them out.

Similarly, Simmel and Tonnies support the need for friendship when they note:

> The intimate character of certain relations seems to me to derive from the individual's inclination to consider that which distinguishes him from others, that which is individual in a qualitative sense, as the core, value, and chief matter of his existence (Simmel, 1950:126).

and that friendship is one of:

> ...the three main pillars of Gemeinschaft. (Tonnies, 1957:42)

the other "pillars" being kinship and neighborhood. Thus in these authors' opinions, intimate friendships are needed because they represent the core of individual existence as well as community relations. For Simmel, friendship helps us to distinguish ourselves from others and for Tonnies it is part of the glue or cement that hold community relations together.

> The associations of Gemeinschaft are most perfectly interpreted as friendship, Gemeinschaft of spirit and mind. (Tonnies, 1957:192)

To the degree that Gemeinschaft primary relations have been supplanted or superceded in an evolutionary sense by Gesellschaft type secondary relationships in modern society, one might build an argument that friendship is not a basic human need in today's society but is rather a product of the past--outmoded and outdated. If on the other hand Gemeinschaft friendships have not been eliminated in a Gesellschaft society, they must surely have changed somewhat from the cognitive spiritual encounter that Tonnies suggests as characteristic of Gemeinschaft to other forms more clearly associated with Gesellschaft/society relations. One might speculate further in this regard, and suggest that Gesellschaft friendships, as more secular commodities in Tonnies' estimation, have altered our expectations of friendship to the point where pseudo-Gemeinschaft and indeed pseudo-friendship are expected and accepted aspects of modern life. That is, in Gesellschaft, friendship might be seen to become a commodity or a means to other "rational ends," and less and less a cognitive and spiritual end in itself.

Whether or not friendship changes or alters in its form or its guise in the manner suggested, the fact remains that it is needed and required both in the Gemeinschaft community and the Gesellschaft society--though for different reasons.

That friendship is a basic human need is probably most explicit in the works of Paine (1969) and Schofield (1970). Paine, for example, makes the following assumption in his

analysis of friendship:

> ...certain human needs of an affective nature are universal and in our own society are taken care of by friendship, either alone or in conjunction with other institutions. (1969:506)

and Schofield notes in the context of friendship that:

> ...man has a need for close personal relationships with at least a few other individuals. (1970:212)

Both of these statements relative to man's need for friendship and the corollary friendship as man's need are well supported.

There is yet another approach that may be useful in demonstrating that friendship is a basic human need. This approach comes from many studies that focus on the consequences of the absence of friendship and the subsequent effects of a lack of friendship on the individual's experience of well being and/or alienation.

According to Rake (1970) for example, it has often been demonstrated that there is a definite connection between the experience of friendship and mental health. Rangell (1963) notes specifically in this regard:

> ...that the lack of friendship is a major barrier confronting people in therapy. (1963:5)

Similarly, Lepp (1966) in a rather compelling argument suggests:

> ...friendship is the only form of interhuman communication capable of dissolving modern man's alienation from his fellow man. (1966:21) (and)...that encounter with another, by virtue of his otherness, is, as a matter of fact, the central event in the lives of most men. (1966:18) (Parentheses Author's)

Albert and Brigante (1962) also emphasize the need for and

power of friendship in noting that:

> We need interested others...to live plausible, meaningful, and tolerable lives. (1962:33)

And that:

> ...friendships can complement, extend and sometimes compensate for earlier (negative) family experiences. (1962:33)

Finally, Armstrong (1969) underscores the importance of friendship as a quasi-therapeutic agent when he suggests:

> ...~~that~~ intimate friendships are potentially therapeutic...and that friendship itself or the dynamics inherent within the relationship, renders a strong, behind the scenes form of stabilizing effect on a person's mental health. (1969:140)

To the degree that friendship can function to lessen human suffering in the form of mental illness, alienation, and/or self-estrangement it would stand to reason that it deserves the status of a basic human need from the standpoint of its potential benefit to humanity. That is, friendship is a basic human need because it is a necessary and valued property of social life and friendship is the core and prototype of a meaningful social existence.

Before addressing the next point of agreement in the literature with respect to the meaning of friendship, a comment on why such an important aspect of life has been neglected by contemporary social scientists would seem in order. That friendship, or the reasons why people become friends in our culture, has been treated superficially or as unproblematic is not surprising but is rather, symptomatic. It is symptomatic of a value system that takes much of its content for granted. That is, while friendship may generally

be conceived of by "the man in the street" as a worthwhile social endeavor, it does not as R. Williams (1970) has pointed out rank high with respect to the dominant value orientations of our culture. In a time, for example, when many if not most aspects of everyday life are measured on an accounting board of cost and reward, friendships, while rewarding in several ways may cost heavily in terms of time.

If one believes, for instance, in a degree of reciprocity in friendship, one should "be available" to one's friends whenever they need you and vice versa. However, this ideal blanket availability has its limitations even between the most devout of friends. These limitations may derive from many sources but most obvious are the limits imposed by the demands of the world of work, broadly conceived. Therefore, even if one has internalized a deep commitment to one's friend, that friendship must fall flat or short of one's expectations when challenged by a more dominant value.

One might speculate further in this regard that friendships may only last or endure so long as they remain unchallenged, unthreatened, or unthwarted by more dominant cultural or societal values. If, for example, we center on a "supra-socialized" being who has internalized the work ethic as Weber (1958) describes it and who fervently reaches out for the cultural success goal as Merton (1961) discusses, there would appear to be no question where the priority lies in this individual's value system. The question would seem

to be, to what degree is this individual capable of an intimate friendship if only in the sense that he or she has no time for one.

On the other hand, should this individual be disappointed in the pursuit of the "success goal," he or she may be forced to reassess his or her values, ambitions, and priorities and he or she may find that friendship can aid in this process. The point is, that friendship as a value seems to always lurk in the shadows of the more dominant values of our culture but at various times it may be or become the most significant and important anchor of our identities to the extent that it may outweigh all others. If friendship can become a dominant value orientation for individuals in our society the question is when and under what conditions. The suggestion will be that the human life cycle systematically and structurally presents us with both opportunities and constraints for the development of intimate friendships and this point will be dealt with at length in a later section.

Proposition Five: The Quality of Friendship is Critical

In addition to the status of friendship as a basic human need there is also considerable consensus in the literature that friendships should be evaluated qualitatively, or, that the "true" character of friendship is revealed or given by its qualities. Though this statement is somewhat amorphous, perhaps even tautological, there are

some significant points to be made with respect to the quality of friendship relationships.

Cicero, (1967) for example, makes a number of statements in his essay that deal with evaluative and qualitative elements of the phenomenon of friendship. He notes to begin with:

> ...that friendship can exist only between good men. (1967:53)

and that it is virtuous by definition:

> ...friendship is just this and nothing else: complete sympathy in all matters of importance, plus goodwill and affection, and I am inclined to think that with the exception of wisdom, the gods have given nothing finer to men than this...Those who say that virtue is man's highest good, are of course very inspiring; but it is to this very virtue that friendship owes its beginning and its identity. Without virtue friendship cannot exist at all. (1967:54-55)

and finally, that it is both universally essential to us as human beings and in the final analysis a matter of mutual honor. Specifically:

> ...friendship...brings with it many advantages. Wherever you turn it is at your side; there is no place not open to it; it is never in the way. In short, not even water and fire, as the saying goes are as universally essential to us as friendship. (1967:55-56)

Cicero's first law of friendship summarizes these statements:

> ...that we ask of our friends what is honorable and do what is honorable for the sake of our friends. (1967:66)

It is very obvious from this series of statements that Cicero has a very idealized conception of what "true" friendship is or must represent in society. Nevertheless, it

is interesting to note that idealistic or not, goodness, virtue, and honor, tend to persist in both classical and modern descriptive treatments of the subject. In fact, as Allan (1979) has pointed out, most studies of friendship assume that there is only one kind of friendship worth studying, namely, the friendship of the true or perfect kind that Cicero describes so aptly. From the standpoint of this research, however, while it is important to acknowledge the possibility of the existence of friendships of a "true" and "perfect" kind, there are many other forms of friendship which may fall short of these idealized limits. The suggestion will be that friendship is after all a matter of degree and not in fact an all or none hypothesis.

Despite any misgivings one might have with respect to the descriptive characteristics of Cicero's notions of friendship he does emphasize what needs to be emphasized in any attempt to interpret the meanings of friendship--that it is beyond any doubt an evaluative and qualitative experience.

Having noted what he thinks friendship is, Cicero then deals with what it is not in his opinion. It is in these remarks that one begins to understand and appreciate the essential qualitative and intrinsic properties of the friendship relationship. Cicero admits:

> I have done a lot of thinking about friendship, and over and over again in the course of my reflections it has seemed to me that the most important question arising in connection with it is this: do men desire friendship because of their own feebleness and inadequacy, with the idea that by exchanging mutual

> services they may be able to give and to receive things that would be beyond their individual and separate powers? Or is this only a result of friendship and there should be some reason for it, something deeper and finer, and lying closer to man's very nature? ...Advantages, you see, are garnered in many cases even by men who are the objects of simulated friendship who are esteemed only for the sake of convenience. But in friendship there can be no element of show or pretense; everything in it is honest and spontaneous. (1967:58)

One begins to see that friendship occupys a pivotal position in Cicero's conception of "sociation". He is suggesting and implying much in this statement--first, that friendship does not arise out of individual inadequacies; second, that it is something much deeper and finer; and third, that it does not involve "show" or pretense but is honest and spontaneous. He further adds that:

> ...we do not exercise kindness and generosity in order that we may put in a claim for gratitude; we do not make our feelings of affection into a business proposition. (1967:60)

and that:

> ...friendship does not follow up on advantage, but advantage in friendship. (1967:69)

Cicero's conceptions of friendship have, whether one would like to think so or not, at least one serious flaw. They cannot account and interestingly do not even try to account for friendships that may arise from qualitatively less "noble" reasons. Indeed these "other" forms would not even rank as "friendship" in Cicero's view. For example, Cicero makes the following comment on friendships for profit:

> But the vast majority of mankind recognize nothing

> as good in the human sphere unless it be profitable. In the matter of friends, as if they were so many domestic animals, they lavish their affections chiefly on those from whom they expect to derive the highest profit. As a result they know nothing about friendship in its finest and natural guise-the friendship that is desirable for its own sake--and they set before themselves no image of the true nature and significance of friendship. For a man loves himself not in order to exact from himself some pay for his affection, but simply because every man is by his very nature dear to himself. Unless this same principle is transferred to friendship, a man will never find a true friend, for the true friend is, so to speak a second self. (1967:80)

Nevertheless, there are those individuals in our society who call themselves friends, and may or may not be so by Cicero's criteria. Thus, any attempt to explain friendship relationships in their totality and complexity can not and must not rely on a single idealized image no matter how compelling it might be. It will be suggested that the idealized "perfect" friendship that Cicero describes is but one possibility and that "lesser" forms are perhaps the rule instead of the exception to the rule. Regardless, it is very evident that friendship for Cicero is an intrinsic, an end in itself. This position is also supported by Wirth (1938).

Before turning to some more contemporary views on the quality of friendship, Cicero provides the following rule of friendship relative to the demands we place on ourselves and our friends.

> ...we must not let an excess of affectionate concern--something very common--to interfere with things that may mean a great deal to our friends...anyone who tries to keep us from doing what we must and should in such cases, simply because he cannot bear the thought of loosing us, is

> weak, and self-indulgent, and for that very reason no true friend...we must watch carefully what we demand of our friends and what we allow them to demand from us. (1967:78)

The non-interference that Cicero points to in this passage still has some very practical significance and relevance to today's friendships.

More recent studies which emphasize the importance of the quality of the relationship called friendship include Montaigne (1935), Cohen (1961), Allan (1979), Davis (1950), and Pitt-Rivers (1961). Allan points out for instance that:

> ...real friendships are qualitatively different from most friendships. (1979:67)

and Cohen observes in a similar vein that:

> ...it is the quality of friendship that is the challenging and fascinating aspect of the area of human behavior. (1961:351)

Montaigne and Davis carry this point of view further and in fact side with Cicero by pointing out that we should view friendship as a primary and intense relationship characterized by diffuse as opposed to specific properties and qualities. Davis notes for example that:

> If friendship is formed for a purpose--say, to make a sale--we do not regard it as a genuine friendship. (1950:296)

and that friendship as a primary relationship :

> ...is not regarded by the participants as a means to an end but as a good in its own right. This means that the relationship is non-contractual, non-economic, non-political, and non-specialized. Instead it is personal, spontaneous, sentimental, and inclusive. (1961:294)

Montaigne makes a strong statement with respect to the importance of focusing on friendship as an end in itself

when he suggests:

> ...all those amities that are created and nourished by pleasure or profit, public or private needs, are so much the less noble and beautiful, and so much the less friendships, as they introduce some other cause and design and fruit into friendship than itself. (1935:84)

Allan (1979), echoes these sentiments as well when he writes that friendship:

> ...is not a relationship formed for instrumental reasons... it should be undertaken for its own sake rather than for some ulterior motive or as a means to some other end...Its raison d' etre is not to gain political or economic advantage nor to secure oneself against possible misfortune. Indeed little is more likely to destroy a friendship than one perceiving that another is using their relationship solely in order to obtain some extraneous benefit for himself. (1979:43).

Finally, Pitt-Rivers (1961), adds emphasis to the significance of the qualitative dimension of friendship when he notes that:

> As with currency, the value attached to friendship stands in inverse ratio to the quantity distributed. The friend of everybody has no friend. (1961:182)

With the exception of this last statement that simply implies that quantities of friends are no guarantee of their quality--the goal in this section has been to show that many classical and contemporary scholars agree that the quality of friendship is a critical variable and one that needs to be better understood. While friendships vary in their quality, the variables that combine to comprise a quality friendship have not been established or identified. However, this may be accomplished in a preliminary way through the development of some ideal type constructs--to be dealt with

in a later chapter. Regardless, that the quality of friendship both varies and requires specific kinds of conceptual analysis in order to classify the variance would appear to be non-debatable.

Proposition Six: Friendship is Different from Kinship

The next significant point of agreement in the literature relative to the meaning(s) of friendship is that friendship is different from kinship and must be studied apart from it and in its own right. The arguments have developed as follows. Montaigne (1935) was perhaps one of the first scholars to recognize and comment upon this issue. He notes for example that the marital bond:

> ...is forced and constrained, and depends on something other than our will... whereas in friendship there is no traffic or business except with itself. (1935:186)

Simmel (1950) stimulates some similar thoughts in this regard when he suggests that the intimacies that couples share in marriage are trivial or inconsequential or simply irrelevant to:

> What perhaps is the most important part of their personalities and these small trivial elements lead them to consider their objective and stimulating thoughts as outside the marital unit and thus gradually eliminate the interesting. (1950:127)

If as Simmel suggests marriage "trivialities" may, over time, eliminate the interesting--the question is to what degree would this be the case in friendship. One might hypothesize that this could not and would not happen to the same extent in friendship simply because friends do not have

the formal role obligations that marriage partners do by virtue of the contractual nature of their marriage. That is, friends who do not mutually exchange meaningful aspects of their personalities with one another might not be expected to remain friends. On the other hand a married couple who habitually do not mutually disclose or exchange these elements may remain married and may not necessarily be friends as a result.

The key to this distinction between friendship and kinship (marriage) is simple. Friendship has no formal or institutionalized requirements in our culture nor does it necessarily imply any definable/discernable, formal or reciprocal role obligations--though there are many informal ones. Marriage, though it does not rule out friendship between spouses in the classical sense, is both a highly institutionalized and a highly formal social arrangement with many reciprocal obligations built into its very structure. Therefore, marriage can exist and even persist without affect, mutual meaningful exchange, or true intimacy but friendship as an achieved end in itself cannot exist or persist in this empty shell sense because of an informal structure that demands intimacy for its survival as a social form. In marriage one can "lean on" institutionalized expectations and role definitions but in friendship one must continually and mutually negotiate expectations and definitions.

Additional evidence in support of the statement that friendship and kinship should not be confused with one another is given by Allan (1979), Nagale (1958), and Schmalenbach (1961). Allan notes for instance that:

> ...the criteria of friendship are of a different order than those of kinship, in that the former involves an evaluation of a continuing social relationship while the latter depends largely on factors external to the character of ongoing interaction. (1979:30)

and:

> ...that ties of friendship and kinship are often seen as mutually exclusive in Western culture also appear to be related to the notion that friends are achieved rather than ascribed. (1979:40)

Nagale (1958) supports these views as well when he suggests that: ...kin and friends occupy different spheres of activity (1958:232), and Schmalenbach (1961) states categorically that:

> ...friendship and kinship have an entirely different basis, the former being an example of community and the latter of communion. (1961:331)

Regardless, there would appear to be once again sufficient evidence in this section to propose that **kinship and friendship are different entities in a conceptual, structural, and empirical/practical sense.** That friendship stands on its own as an analytically distinct social form at least with respect to kinship and marriage in our culture is clear.

Proposition Seven: Friendship is Different from Acquaintanceship and/or Attraction

There would also appear to be considerable agreement in the literature to suggest that friendship is not only analytically distinct from kinship but that it can as well be meaningfully separated from acquaintanceship and/or attraction. There are at least two arguments in the literature that demonstrate this point. The first stems from the (established) position that friendship is a primary relationship and as such, according to Cooley (1929) and Davis (1950), the individuals involved must develop a shared "we feeling." Acquaintances, then, or those individuals of either sex that are merely attracted to one another in a cognitive or cathectic sense do not necessarily develop the kind or degree of mutual identification that Cooley and Davis suggest as characteristic of a primary relation. Thus, the same criteria which define friendship as a primary relationship also exclude acquaintanceship and/or attraction from this relational category.

The second argument that effectively separates friendship from acquaintanceship and/or attraction derives from the position expressed by Duck (1973), Allan (1979), Naegale (1958), and Kurth (1970). Duck, for example suggests:

> ...that an individual passes through stages before they accept a person as a potential friend. (1973:90)

and that:

> It appears that the criteria for friendship colour and change with the development of friendship. (1973:99)

These statements point to the possibility that friendship is a processual and sequential experience that does not happen all at once and is, in fact, governed by some developmental criteria. It might be suggested in this regard that attraction and acquaintanceship may represent earlier stages in the friendship process. That is, they might be conceived of as early stages or thresholds of friendship development that must be positively and effectively negotiated for friendship to occur. Simply expressed, if a friendship potential is to evolve, the individuals in question must be "attracted" to one another in order that they might become acquainted which must in turn occur before a mutual definition of friendship is possible. Friendship, then, is only one possible outcome of attraction and acquaintanceship, enmity being the other most obvious possibility. Nevertheless, whether or not attraction or acquaintanceship play such a role in the development of friendship, they are not conceptually or functionally equivalent to the friendship relationship and must be considered as separate phenomena.

Kurth (1970) obviously considers friendship to be "beyond" simple acquaintanceship or the "friendly relation" as she calls it when she suggests:

> To form a friendship, we must move beyond the formal role relationship and the friendly relation. (1970:169).

In her opinion, we must distinguish between friendship as complete psychological intimacy and the friendly relation which she feels that many people settle for because of the problems associated with complete intimacy. She notes further that:

> Friendly relations occur more frequently today and are more frequent than friendship. (1970:169)

Thus in Kurth's opinion acquaintanceship or the friendly relation is not only less intimate psychologically than friendship but may be a preferred relationship to friendship for those threatened by the demands of intimacy associated with it.

Similarly, Allan (1979) and Naegale (1958) challenge the boundaries of friendship and acquaintanceship with their treatment of the category of "just a friend." Allan notes:

> Nagale's group of high school students created the concept 'just a friend' to cover this ambiguity. (between friendship and acquaintanceship) (1979:42)(Parentheses Author's)

The concept "just a friend" suggested here indicates that the individual in question is perceived in a sense as perhaps more than an acquaintance but somehow less than a friend. Thus it identifies a zone of significance between mere acquaintanceship and "true" friendship. As a result one must consider friendship as removed or different from acquaintanceship at least by a matter of degree. To the extent then that these arguments are somewhat valid, friendship must be considered as qualitatively and quantitatively different from acquaintanceship and/or

attraction.

Before proceeding to the next point in the selective inventory of agreements about friendship's meanings, some further comment on the notion of "just a friend" would seem in order. Aside from pointing to a difference in degree between acquaintanceship and friendship the concept of "just a friend" indicates further that the idea of friendship is complex and has many more meanings, gradations, and degrees of meaning than can be accounted for in contemporary sociological research.

The question is or would seem to be, what does it mean to be "just a friend?" While it appears according to Allan and Naegale that this concept covers the analytical and experiential territory somewhere between the poles of friendship and acquaintanceship, we have no way of knowing how far one must progress or regress in such a relationship before the mutual definitions change. Furthermore, we have no means to assess the direction of change that the individual may experience. That is, under what circumstances does "just a friend" become a friend as opposed to a mere acquaintance? There is also the question of whether or not this category "survives" beyond school years broadly conceived. Answers to these questions are problematic but one might suggest that the best approach would be to develop some analytic criteria that meaningfully separates kinds and degrees of friendship as opposed to simply relying on better traditional indicators like frequency of and/or opportunity

for interaction.

On another level one must agree that "just a friend" is at least very different in an experiential sense than "a friend"--for the modifier, just, indicates or lends a "something less than" connotation to the friendship experience. One might feel slighted for example if they were invited to a Lunar convention and introduced as "just a person." One would hope that a "just a friend" did not want to be "a friend" to the speaker who introduced them in such a fashion. There are some gradations of meaning here with respect to friendship that are significant and unless they are incorporated into systematic explanatory schema, research designs will continue to be ineffective and incomplete--to say nothing of their validity and generalizability.

Proposition Eight: Friendship is Likely to be Free of Status Distinctions

Another point of view in the literature that is agreed upon by several scholars is that friendship should be free of status distinctions. Following a discussion of reciprocity in friendship, Allan (1979) notes:

> Closely tied to the idea of reciprocity is the notion that friendship is a relationship between equals. In Edgells terms (n.d.), it is a symmetrical relationship with the parties to it (not being differentiated in a hierarchical manner. Within the context of the friendship no side has more authority or greater status than the other...This is one reason why friends tend to occupy the same status in the wider society as one another, a theme developed by Lazarsfeld and Merton... (1979:44)

Cicero also warns of the dangers of status differentials in friendship when he suggests:

> ...that those who are superiors in a relation of friendship must avoid all invidious distinctions and similarly that those who are the inferior must in a sense rise above themselves. (1967:77)

The point of view expressed here is both uncomfortably accurate and extremely revealing with respect to our understanding of friendship's meaning. It is accurate in at least two senses; first, it has been empirically verified that status differentials effect friendship (Lasarsfeld and Merton, 1954) and, perhaps more importantly, second, these differentials may help us explain other related aspects of our social existence. For example, if we assume that status differentials negatively influence friendship formation then it might explain why some men have seldom considered their wives as friends and furthermore why cross-sex friendships are seldom as viable as same sex friendships. Such a statement may also allow us to extrapolate upon trends toward greater occupational equality between men and women to the point where one might hypothesize that greater status homophily between the sexes may lead to a greater prevalence of husband/wife and/or cross-sex friendships. There are of course many other variables to be considered before one advances such a notion but status differentials may provide some answers in these areas or at least, they may stimulate better questions.

One of the appeals of utilizing status differentials to explain why some kinds of friendships may be more likely to

persist over time or simply exist in the first place is the priority it places on friendship as an end in itself. That is, it might stand to reason that it is only between individuals, who treat and perceive each other as equals and who expect to gain nothing through their association but friendship, that friendship is viable and meaningful. On the other hand, those who perceive that they stand separated by variables like age, sex, marital status, occupation, income, or education may also enter into friendship. However, because of the perceived status differentials there is a greater chance that other ends in place of friendship may take priority. In other words, to the degree that status differentials between two individuals are great, the more one might expect the hypothesized friendship to degenerate into dominance and submission. For example, in a two career family where the status gradient between husband and wife is great one might expect each to consider the other less an equal and therefore less a friend. Subsequently, one might also expect the potential for friendship between husband and wife in this example to be greater where the occupational status gradient is less.

Regardless, it takes little imagination to see the implications of gross status differentials between potential friends and even less imagination in the "sociological" sense to see how these differentials might be exploited in the guise of friendship. Friendship is likely to be free of status distinctions.

Proposition Nine: Friendship is Both Role and Relation

That friendship is both a social role and a relational phenomenon is also reasonably well established in the research literature. Naegale (1958), for example, notes:

> In our society we think of friendship as a role and a relation. We have a pattern of expectations concerning the obligations and privileges which mark another as friend. We probably further distinguish kinds of friendship by attending to the spheres of activity or stages in the life cycle in which they were first formed. (1958:236)

The key points in this statement that identify friendship's status as both role and relation are; (1) that friendship is a role because of the existence of some socially and culturally conditioned patterned expectations on the part of the individuals involved, and (2) that friendship is a relation because it is an activity that depends in part on the nexus of interaction within which it was first formed. Thus, friendship is both role and relation because it is composed of a series of expectations and activities.

The difficulty with Naegale's statement, however, is that he would appear to overgeneralize when he suggests that we have "a" pattern of expectations in friendship. It may be more accurate to say that we have many patterns of expectations in our friendships and subsequently that plural expectations must lead to plural experiences of friendship in both quality and quantity. Therefore, that we must distinguish between kinds and/or types of friendship in our society is, once again, essential. It is not only important that we identify the context within which we have "made our

friends"--school, army, work, family etc.--but it is also important that we examine and identify the bases upon which these friends were made. The suggestion is, that if the "bases" change, our experience and expectations of friendship will also be altered and therefore we may in fact see that we have had, after all, not many friends but many kinds of friendships.

To return to the main argument, Ramsoy (1968) states that friendship is a relational phenomenon:

> In theoretical terms, friendship is definitely a relational phenomenon: it is impossible to assign meaning to statements such as 'he is a friend' without implying to whom he is related in this way. (1968:12)

and Allan (1979) supports this further when he suggests:

> The term friend is only applied to people who have a personal relationship that is qualitatively of a particular sort. It is the actual relationship itself that is the most important factor in deciding whether someone can or cannot be labeled a 'friend.' Thus as well as locating people in the social structure it also implies something about the relationship between those so labeled. (1979:34)

Friendship, then, is thus a social label and a qualitatively significant action complex. It would appear to be both role and relation.

Proposition Ten: Friendship is a Mortal Phenomenon

Before turning to some final points of agreement with respect to factors that we may assume to effect friendship formation, intensity, and duration, it is important to emphasize that dyadic friendship in contrast to other relationships is a mortal social phenomenon. As previously

mentioned, Simmel (1950) follows such a line of reasoning in suggesting that this fact is the "real locus of authentic sociological tragedy."(1950:124) Allan (1979) supports this point as well when he notes that:

> In general long lasting friendships are comparatively rare. (1979:65)

and that:

> Most friendships die completely once face to face interaction lapses. (1979:66)

yet Allan is quick to point out further that:

> The first feature to note about real or true friendship is that they frequently continue even though face to face interaction is rare. (1979

Despite the fact then, that there appears to be some "confusion" over the longevity of real or true friendships, as compared to what might be called more casual friendships, both Allan and Simmel agree that they are in fact mortal--at least in a general sense. The primary significance of their mortality is that they resist attempts at systematic study because of their spontaneous and transitory nature.

It is further evident that friendship formation, intensity, and duration are complex issues effected by a host of variables. There are in fact at least twenty different agreed upon variables yet to be identified in the context of the research literature. These include:

1. Temporal Proximity
2. Spatial Proximity
3. Frequency of Interaction
4. Physical Contact

5. Cultural Values
6. Intelligence
7. Communication
8. Cognitive, Effective, Evaluative Standards
9. Commitment
10. Self Concept Support
11. **Opportunity for Interaction**
12. **Constraints on Interaction**
13. **Age**
14. **Sex**
15. **Social Class**
16. **Marital Status**
17. **Basic Values Agreement**
18. **Unconscious Factors**
19. **Personality Factors**
20. **Formal Role Obligations**

Each of these variables have been at least minimally demonstrated to play a role either with respect to friendship formation, intensity, or duration. Approximately half of these same variables (those indicated in bold face) are utilized widely in the research literature--they will be discussed at some length.

Proposition Eleven: Friendship Requires Opportunity for Interaction

Opportunity for interaction has often been considered to be a critical factor in friendship. The suggestion has

been that without sufficient opportunity for face to face meaningful interaction the primariness we associate with friendship does not have a chance to develop and thus the potential friendship does not develop. Davis (1950) makes this point when he notes:

> In order for intimacy to arise it is necessary that people have rather close contact, and nothing provides such contact better than face to face association. (1950:291)

So, in Davis' opinion, intimacy is the result of close contact which can only be achieved by face to face association and therefore the opportunity one has or makes for close contact will in part determine not only the degree of intimacy possible in one's friendships but problably their number as well. Allan (1979) reinforces this view with his reference to the fact that "most friendships" do in fact die in the absence of face to face interaction. Therefore both the life and the death of one's friendship relationships rely in part on opportunities for interaction that are intimate, face to face, and meaningful. This would further tend to support the notion that close contact and face to face association are important universal boundary conditions to the development of primary ties with a friend. Simple physical proximity, however, is a necessary but insufficient condition for friendship when one considers Davis' (1950) remarks that:

> Physical proximity ...provides an opportunity for the development of primary groups, but whether or not that opportunity will be utilized depends on the situation as defined in the culture. (1950:292)

Opportunity for interaction then, may be provided for by the simple notion of physical proximity, but it is very clear from Davis' statement that if intimate friendships are to develop or persist over time other criteria in the form of situational and cultural prescriptions and proscriptions must be considered. Regardless, opportunity for interaction remains a necessary, if insufficient, condition for friendship in this context. It remains, further, an integral part of the overt and tacit assumptions made about friendship by Paine (1969), Naegele (1958), Booth and Hess (1974), Babchuk and Bates (1961), and Armstrong (1969) to mention a few.

Proposition Twelve: Friendship Responds to Interaction Constraints

Equally as important as the idea of opportunity for interaction for friendship formation, duration, and intensity is the notion of constraints upon interaction. As suggested in Davis' previous statement, constraints in the form of situational or social and cultural prescriptions or proscriptions may or may not set the stage for the development of a friendship relationship. Parsons, for example, implies that friendship relationships vary in their structure and their function according to a number of situational factors (Parsons, 1951:174). The situational factors would appear to derive from both egos' and alters' definition of the situation as instrumental or expressive,

and the cultural factors from the achievement or ascriptive base of the cultural subsystem. In other words what Parsons is suggesting is that constraints on friendship are both situationally and culturally determined. He notes with respect to diffuse affective attachments like friendship in our society that they:

> ...are exceedingly prominent in the cross-sex relationships of the "dating" period with the attendant romantic love complex, but tend to be absorbed into the kinship unit by marriage. Intrasex friendship as diffuse attachment is much less prominent, probably because it can too readily divert from the achievement complex. Among men it tends rather to be attached as a diffuse "penumbra" to occupational relationships in the form of an obligation in a mild way to treat one's occupational associate as a friend also...The very fact that affectionate bodily contact is almost completely taboo among men in American society is probably indicative of the situation since it strongly limits affective attachment. (1951:189)

In this statement, Parsons suggests that friendship is constrained both by any individual definition of the situation that takes away from the achievement complex and by a cultural taboo of affectionate bodily contact among American men. Interestingly, women have not been directed by this cultural taboo to the same degree in our society, nor have they been socialized for the work role to the same extent as men. While some suggest that these factors may combine to allow closer friendships among women than among men (Armstrong, 1969; Jourard, 1964), the increased participation of women in the work force witnessed over the past 20 years may adversely effect women's friendships.

Lepp (1966) develops the position that we may have many constraints on the development of our friendships further when he notes:

> ...friendship is not born between two persons unless both are in a state of availability. When people lack time or emotional energy for friendship, their absence of availability is said to be exterior. When people are egocentric, when they have no thought for the needs of others but rather seek from them only egoistical satisfaction and confirmation, their unavailability is of an interior, subjective kind. (1966:110)

In this statement, Lepp shows that we suffer both external and internal constraints on our friendship relationships and that our availability to and for friendship is therefore conditioned by these constraints.

The point of view that is emerging here is that friendship will occur and persist only to the degree that we are; (1) available to it both internally and externally, and (2) only if it is culturally sanctioned in the latter sense and does not divert or subvert our commitments to the world of work and/or the larger social system. To the degree that friendship does interfere with other social duties and obligations, it may be perceived as a threat because as Pitt-Rivers (1971) suggests:

> ...to enter into friendship with someone means putting oneself in a state of obligation. (1971:138)

and to the degree that friendship obligations are ascriptive and take precedence over the work role then they must be seen to constitute a threat to the achievement base of the social system. This may well explain why friendships on the job are often informally discouraged and only formally

tolerated. Constraints, then, on friendship are individually, socially, and culturally conditioned but are acknowledged as such in only a small minority of contemporary research formulations.

Proposition Thirteen: Friendship is Effected by Social Background

The variables of age, sex, social class, and marital status have also been shown to be associated with friendship formation, duration, and intensity. Z. Blau (1961) notes the significance of these variables as does Rosow (1970). Rosow notes further, for instance:

> ....status similarities generally provide a strong basis for solidarity because they join persons of like social position who have the same relation to the larger society and who share a common set of life experiences, problems, perspectives, values, and interests. (1970:63)

Thus persons of similar status or who have "status and value homophily" as Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) discuss stand a better chance of forming, having, or keeping friends than those of different, divergent, or dissimilar status. In a similar vein, Becker and Useem (1942) have suggested that:

> Friendship groups exist on all levels except for the very young. Thus rise and duration are influenced by age, sex, personality, cultural opportunities, and intelligence. (1942:21)

and that:

> Cultural taboos are factors in limiting the number of heterosexual friendships during adolesence and in adulthood. Although there have been a number of studies of friendship on the pre-adult level, and several in the college age group, by and large adult friendships have been neglected. (1942:21)

These preceding statements show that friendship, aside from being neglected and overlooked in the adult population according to Becker and Useem, does form, rise, and continue between individuals who are by degree more similar than dissimilar in status, interests, and social background characteristics. It is interesting to note that Becker and Useem also emphasize the importance of cultural taboos in the process as well and that Parsons (1951) saw fit to adopt this point of view in his later work.

Proposition Fourteen: Friendship is Effected by Basic Values

In conjunction with these statements on status similarity, agreement on basic values is yet another element that many believe to have some direct effect on friendship formation, duration, and intensity. This is not to say, however, that all "friends" agree upon or possess similar values. Rake (1970) notes for example of Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1954) study:

> ...that it is possible for a friendship to emerge between those holding disparate values. This occurs when the personal attachment forms before the partner's are aware of divergent values. On the strength of their initial affinity they are able to tolerate much more disagreement. Therefore the kind and degree of value conflict must be examined within the distinctly different contexts of firm, established friendships and tenuous early ones. (1970:167)

Nevertheless, it has often been pointed out that respondents in Lazarsfeld and Merton's study tended to a great extent to select only those others for friends with whom they shared the greatest degree of value similarity as measured.

On the other hand, that friendships may form before the individuals are aware of any "significant" values differences between them suggests, again, that many kinds or forms of friendship are possible in a heterogeneous society, and that some of these forms may be aberrant and/or destructive to the individuals involved.

Proposition Fifteen: Friendship is Effected by Personality Variables

The rise, strength, and duration of friendship relations have also been shown to be effected by what are assumed to be unconscious/personality centered variables. Rake (1970), for instance, comments on Lepp's (1966) study of friendship and notes:

> The initiation of friendship involves both conscious and unconscious factors. The first which he identifies is the need for some kind of common ground...a further necessary constituent seems to be a certain personal and, as Lepp says, mysterious affinity which originates to a large extent in the unconscious...both poles are necessary for the friendship encounter. (1970:170)

Duck (1973) reinforces the importance of unconscious motives as well, when he remarks:

> ...while some people [redacted] set out to choose and deliberately make par[redacted] others into friends, a more unreasoned, unc[redacted]ous and universal process is felt to be the main one. (1973:38)

Rangell (1963) also makes this point in a discussion of unconscious personality characteristics like "narcissism" which may impair friendships. Whatever this mysterious unconscious affinity is or the degree to which it plays a

role in friendship has not as yet been specifically or empirically determined.

Proposition Sixteen: Friendship is Effected by Role Obligations

Finally, formal role obligations have also been shown to have a pronounced effect on the formation, duration, and intensity of friendships. Kurth (1970), for example, asserts that:

> To form a friendship, we must move beyond the formal role relationship and the friendly relation. (1970:169)

So, formal role relations are in a sense barriers to friendship formation in Kurth's opinion and further, that friendships once formed may reciprocally be barriers to certain kinds of formal role obligations. Cicero (1967:78) has implied and warned for instance that one must carefully watch or monitor the demands that one makes on his/her friends so as not to interfere with the formal duties and responsibilities that are important to him or her. This, again, would seem an especially important consideration for friends who "work" together. Slater (1963) and Parsons (1951) have, of course, made this point abundently clear although in slightly different contexts.

The remaining points of agreement with respect to factors effecting friendship formation, duration, and intensity including: intelligence, communication, cognitive/cathectic/evaluative standards, commitment, and

self concept support are less widely shared elements of the research literature. Suffice it to say, that these variables may contribute "something" to our understanding of friendship in society but they are collectively somewhat less significant than those examined to this point in the analysis.

Summarizing, then, the arguments in the literature with respect to this selective inventory of agreements on the meanings of friendship it is evident that:

1. Friendship, for the most part remains unstudied and aloof from the logical tools of the social scientist.
2. Friendship has not been conceptualized adequately.
3. Friendship is primarily a dyadic phenomenon.
4. Friendship is a basic human need.
5. The quality of friendship is a critical variable.
6. Friendship is different from kinship and must be studied apart from it and in its own right.
7. Friendship is different from acquaintanceship and/or attraction.
8. Friendship is likely to be free of status distinctions.
9. Friendship is both a social role and a relational category.
10. Friendship is a mortal phenomenon.

and that friendship formation, duration and intensity are effected by:

1. Opportunities for interaction.
2. Constraints on interaction.
3. Age, sex, social class, marital status.
4. Agreement on basic values.
5. Unconscious personality variables.
6. Formal role obligations.

and perhaps also by:

1. Intelligence.
2. Communication.
3. Cognitive, cathectic, evaluative standards.
4. Commitment.
5. Self concept support.

Before attempting to advance a working definition of friendship, however, it is necessary to examine some disagreements in the literature over the meanings of the concept. This is the goal of the second chapter.

II. SECTION I.

A. An Inventory of Disagreements on the Meaning(s) of Friendship

There would appear to be approximately nine substantial points of disagreement or debate in the research literature with reference to the meaning(s) attributed to friendship or friendship relationships. Disagreements vary in their intensity from minor and semantic skirmishes to major and opposite points of view. For the purposes of this thesis and of the systematic development of an adequate working definition of friendship an inventory of the entire range of disagreements is considered essential. It is essential primarily because it is logically impossible to state what friendship is or really means unless one can also know or demonstrate what friendship is not and/or does not mean. The goal in this chapter will be to identify and evaluate the variance in some points of disagreement in such a way so as to facilitate the emergence of a definition of friendship that is as valid in the negative sense as it is in the positive.

Proposition Seventeen: Friendship Consists of Tension and Conflict.

Proceeding, then, from what might be considered minor disagreements to major conflicts of interpretation most scholars confirm and suggest for example that friendship

often consists of obligations, demands, tension, conflict, and even hostility. This identifies many of the characteristics that if taken in the extreme are closer to enmity than one would associate with friendship and as a result many other scholars do not share this point of view.

Nevertheless, perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the position that friendship consists of at least some degree of discord comes from Simmel's (1955) discussion of the necessity of conflict in intimate relationships. Simmel notes, for example:

> ...that very intimate groups...should contain no occasions for conflict is quite out of the question. (1955:46)

and suggests to the contrary that

> ...this behavior often characterizes attitudes which though affectionate, moral, and loyal, nevertheless lacks the ultimate, unconditional emotional devotion. (1955:46)

So according to Simmel conflict is in part a positive and strengthening element of an intimate relationship, as opposed to being only a divisive force. In fact there is some suggestion here that relationships devoid of conflict are, in some sense, lacking in degree of emotional commitment. Simmel goes on to say :

> Conscious of this lack, the individual is all the more anxious to keep the relation free from any shadow and to compensate his partner for that lack through the utmost of friendliness, self-control, and consideration. (1955:47)

In this statement Simmel is clearly suggesting that there is a difference that "makes a difference" between friendliness and "true" friendship. He implies that those of us who are

for some reason incapable of an intense emotional commitment either to one's wife/husband or "friend" or both, know this to be true at some level of awareness and in fact compensate for their lack of feeling by being overly friendly or by simply avoiding conflict situations.

Conversely, according to Simmel, another perspective emerges from the following circumstances:

> ...where on the other hand we are certain of the irrevocability and unreservedness of our feeling, such peace at any price is not necessary. We know that no crisis can penetrate to the foundation of the relationship - we can always find the other again on this foundation...Thus, although conflict among intimates can have more tragic effects than among less intimate persons...precisely the most firmly grounded relation may take a chance on discord, whereas good and moral but less deeply rooted relationships follow a much more harmonious and conflictless course. (1955:47)

Thus, Simmel feels that conflict, though sometimes tragic, can be a source of solidarity and cohesion in an intimate relationship provided that the individuals involved are certain of their feelings. In marriage, this point of view makes intuitive sense in that a secure marital relationship can afford or may even demand a certain level or degree of discord at times to remain vital and alive, but what of friendship?

It would seem that many of the principles that apply to Simmel's remarks on intimate marital relations would also be operative in a secure intimate friendship. One might hypothesize for instance that if Simmel's notions of conflict are correct that: (1) the best of intimate friendships generate and maintain a certain level of

discord, and (2) to the degree that the relationship is intimate both partners would value differences of opinion. Conversely it might also be suggested that: (3) lesser or "lower case" friends probably generate and maintain lesser levels of discord, and (4) less intimate friends probably do their best to avoid differences of opinion and the individuals involved may perhaps settle for more stereotyped social exchanges. Whether or not these hypotheses are supported empirically is secondary, however, to the point that at least from Simmel's perspective conflict and friendship are not mutually exclusive because conflict though a negative phenomenon in general terms must nevertheless also be seen as a source of intimacy. Therefore to have an intimate relationship is to have conflict and to the degree that friendship is an intimate relationship, then friendship is conflict.

That friendship consists of mutual demands and/or obligations is also quite well represented in the views of several scholars. As previously mentioned, for example, Cicero (1967) notes:

> ...we must watch carefully what we demand of our friends and what we allow them to demand of us. (1967:78)

Similarly, R. Paine (1969) suggests:

> ...that friendship makes mutual demands of intimacy and confidence... (1969:507)

and J. Pitt-Rivers (1971) agrees, in saying universally that:

> ... to enter into friendship means putting oneself

> in a state of obligation. (1971:138)

The point of view being expressed here is simply that not only is conflict inherent in any truly intimate relation but that the friendship relationship can and often does make heavy demands on our personal and emotional resources. C. Gratton (1970), for instance, in commenting on an obscure article by A. Greeley (1970), identifies the risks of friendship when she notes:

> ...friendship can only occur when we offer ourselves to the other, and to offer oneself to someone else is the most risky of all human endeavors. (1970:242)

She goes on to say, that for Greeley:

> ...self-revelation is both the indispensable core of personality expansion and the essential gift-giving of friendship, and it is to the extent that we are able to enter into friendly relationships, that we become fuller, richer, warmer, more humane human beings. Yet such self-revelation is a big risk , for the other may reject our offer of self in friendship in various devestating fashions. Thus, many who have risked themselves up to a point, turn away from the relationship, and settle for coexistence, quitting just before friendship actually begins. But once the turning point is reached, the friends become friends forever, confident they have passed the point of no return. (1970:242)

These quotations raise a number of issues relative to the risks in friendship. Foremost among these is in "the friendship game" (discussed above) and that by implication different individuals have varying abilities or potentials to risk themselves in a friendship relationship.

On the surface the risks in friendship would appear to make intuitive sense for it would seem to follow that the more one risks in friendship the more one may stand to gain in that relationship. Yet, if this reasoning is correct it

must also be true that the less one risks, the less one potentially gains. The problem with this reasoning however, is that expectations may not always be in alignment with outcomes, nor may individuals always be aware of what they risk. For example, if one risks a great deal in friendship and wins in his or her own eyes or if he or she risks little and similarly wins, this suggests they are both winners--though surely the former more so than the latter. On the other hand, if one risks a great deal and loses or if one risks only a little and loses they are surely both losers - but who has lost more? One might suspect that the former has lost more.

Perhaps all that can be communicated here is that friendship by its very nature involves some risk or some cost to self and that one may both win or lose in many different ways in the friendship game - yet what of a draw? Is it possible to have a stalemate in friendship ultimately? These questions and others like them remain unanswered and justifiably so at present. Until it is possible to specify with a greater degree of certainty what friendship is or means, answers to these questions will be difficult. However, it is somewhat evident from this discussion that friendship may well be a luxury that few can really afford in today's society.

To this point in the chapter the concern has been to show that there is considerable agreement among various scholars with respect to the proposition that friendship

often consists of obligations, demands, some tension or conflict, and even hostility. On the other hand, some researchers disagree and substantially reject this point of view. Babchuk's (1965) classic definition of "primary friend" for example makes no direct reference to the "tension" often associated with primary relations. He notes in his study that:

> A primary friend was a person with whom one was predisposed to enter into a wide range of activities...and with whom there would be a predominance of positive affect. (1965:483)

Rather, Babchuk simply covers his remarks using the qualifier of a "predominance" of positive affect. The point is, that a predominance of positive affect does not rule out the presence of some conflict. Nevertheless, there is no mention of mutual demands, tension or hostility in Babchuk's landmark study of friendship.

More overt objections to friendship as consisting of some tension and obligation come from Allan (1979). Allan suggests, rather consistently in this work that friendship, because it is voluntary, is based primarily on enjoyment. Specifically, Allan notes:

> ...because in our culture friendship is entered into voluntarily it is reasonable for those individuals involved to assume that the other(s) are party to the interaction because they enjoy it. (1979:41-42)

This may well be "reasonable" to assume as Allan suggests, if everyone were to carry the same experiences and preconceptions into any friendships that they might enter into. However, if one assumes both variability in friendship

experience in kind and in intensity and also variation in the preconceptions and therefore expectations that individuals may have about friendship, this statement is at least somewhat suspect. For example, if enjoyment is a criteria of and for friendship one might expect:

1. individuals not to continue or enter into friendships that are or may be tension or anxiety producing and subsequently that
2. individuals would dissolve their friendships when they ceased to be enjoyable.

Both of these statements would probably hold true in the classical sense of friendship. However, if friendships can exist at lower levels than complete, true, or ideal friendship then these statements may be inaccurate. For example, consider the following scenario: (1) Y befriends X but does so only to advance his or her career, (2) Y, in successfully keeping this information from X , lies and cheats to maintain the polite fiction, (3) X's needs are honestly met in the relationship, and (4) despite Y's definition of the situation the friendship appears "socially" viable. While this relationship between Y and X could never be said to be a friendship in any "true" or pure sense, it may exist with all or most of the social properties that one might expect of true friendship at least as far as "others" external to the dyad are concerned. Thus, though exploitative of one member of the dyad, in this example there is in a sense a functional if coerced

friendship existing between Y and X at least as far as the observer is concerned.

Many other scenarios are possible here, where one, either, or both individuals involved might exploit the other to their own ends, that is, ends other than friendship per se. They may not represent "true" friendships in the classical sense nor may they add up to everyman's definition of what friendship should be, yet the degree to which friendships exist in some of these forms suggests that enjoyment may have very little to do with some kinds of friendships.

On the other hand, one would hope that any fraudulent, exploitative friendships that may exist in our society could be identified as such by the individuals involved and eliminated forthright. However, there is a more complex issue here that bears on the previous example. Say further, that in the course of Y's false friendship with X, Y changes his or her mind and accepts X as a "true" friend. So in effect a false and exploitative friendship is transformed into a "real" one. It would seem to follow here that Y must retain some anxiety about his or her original motives and therefore the friendship unit may dissolve, now not because of dishonesty, but perhaps because of Y's guilt. If further, X were to discover Y's original motives (career advancement) at this junction in their friendship both would be anxious and disturbed about the state of their relationship.

These examples are, in sequence, representative of what many describe as the tragedy of friendship. That is, while it may begin for less than honorable motives, it may also end for more than honorable motives - but that it both begins and ends is certain.

In summary, while some authors disagree with the proposition that friendship often involves obligations, demands, some tension and conflict, and hostility, the evidence would appear to strongly favor acceptance of the proposition in the affirmative. Thus for inventory and definitional purposes, friendship will be considered to consist of these elements - the disagreements being relatively weak and minor.

Proposition Eighteen: Friendship is Achieved and Expressive

Another minor point of disagreement would appear to exist in the literature over the proposition that friendship is, by degree, a voluntary, achieved, expressive, and affectively charged phenomenon. R. Paine (1969) for example challenges the expressive dimension of this statement by posing the question:

> For is not all friendship ultimately instrumental? (1969:506)

The question is formulated in the wake of a criticism of Parsons' (1951) discussion of the instrumental or expressive emphasis in friendship and Paine further notes that:

> The suggestion that this (instrumentality or expressivity in friendship) is an either or matter is unconvincing. (1969:506)

Paine's suggestion that friendship is ultimately an instrumental phenomenon is misleading in the sense that a friendship that is truly other-oriented cannot be purely instrumental. However, it is difficult to argue with his latter statement that most friendships will contain elements of both instrumentality and expressivity. Yet, what Paine does not seem to realize or emphasize enough is that some friendships may be more or less instrumental or expressive than others in their character and distinguishing these relative degrees of emphasis is where the real conceptual/theoretical problems of friendship lie. Until we can develop a model of friendship that can accommodate extreme and intermediate forms we are likely to make little progress in dealing effectively either theoretically or empirically with the concept of friendship.

Thus, while Paine raises some issues about the instrumental or expressive states of friendship as a social category his remarks do little to seriously challenge the expressive emphasis in friendship documented by Parsons (1951).

Having identified this minor disagreement over friendship's expressive/instrumental properties, most scholars would appear to agree on the remaining elements of the proposition under discussion. Of friendship's voluntary and achieved nature, for example, Allan (1979) remarks:

> Friend relationships are defined as voluntary. To put this another way they are achieved rather than ascribed. Where there is a personal relationship with another based on criteria other than free

> choice, or when a person's choice is consequential to a greater or lesser extent on factors for which he perceives he is not responsible then the relationship is unlikely to be considered one of friendship. (1979:40)

In this statement Allan clearly supports a voluntary and achieved conception of friendship and would appear to be on "fairly solid ground" in making these comments. However, while one might not disagree with this statement, what he may have overlooked is that, while we may accept the voluntary nature of friendship and the fact that it is not a given, it is often difficult to determine to what degree the choice is "conditioned" or is freely made and furthermore who decides this issue.

Allan, using an interactionist perspective, would correctly suggest that it is the individuals' perceptions of each other that are important. Yet, others may also be seen to influence these perceptions by attributing elements other than free choice to their association and thereby influencing these perceptions. While the individuals involved may choose to believe or not believe this input from the outside, an evaluation is being imposed from outside the unit. Therefore, in a sense any friendship unit is composed of much more than the two individuals and their perceptions of each other. It may, for example, invoke a series of networks which may or may not function to permit a "free choice" of and in friendship. On the other hand if the friendship unit or dyad is considered in isolation as a "type" then these considerations probably do not apply.

In summary, Allan is quite correct in suggesting that friendship is primarily a voluntary and an achieved phenomenon but some caution in assessing the degree to which free choice is used as a basis for these properties is necessary.

The final element of the proposition, friendship's affective nature, is widely discussed in many different contexts in the research literature. K. Davis (1950) sees it as "sentimental and inclusive;" Parsons (1951) as diffuse affective attachment; N. Babchuk (1965) as positive affect; and S. Keller (1968) as mutual trust, affection, and respect. R. Williams (1959) sees "type one" friendship as:

> ...characterized by a relatively high degree of affective involvement, diffuseness, collectivity orientation, and norms of affectivity rather than neutrality. (1959:7)

Each of the above scholars emphasizes the priority of the affective dimension in the friendship relationship but perhaps one of the strongest statements about affectivity as an element in friendship is given by R. Paine (1969) when he suggests:

> ...some assumptions seem unavoidable and perhaps justifiable at the outset, and one of mine is that certain human needs of an affective nature are universal and in our own society are taken care of by friendship, either alone or in conjunction with other institutions.(1969:506)

Here, affectivity is given the priority of a basic human need and friendship is seen to have the ability to fulfill this need either alone or in conjunction or connection with other institutions. Given these remarks there is little

doubt that affectivity must now be included as an essential and integral part of a definition of friendship.

For the purposes of the inventory, the proposition that friendship is, by degree, a voluntary, achieved, expressive, and affectively charged phenomenon will be accepted despite some minor disagreement over its expressive or instrumental status.

Proposition Nineteen: Friendship Requires Similarity in Psychological and Social Backgrounds

Turning to the next point of disagreement over friendship's meaning(s), the suggestion that friendships are most likely to form between individuals with similar psychological and social backgrounds is a source of some further concern. While it has already been established in the inventory of agreements that most scholars agree that friendship formation is governed in part by a basic similarity in social and psychological orientation, the situation is complex and requires some further attention. It is interesting to note for example that, although evidence in support of the proposition under consideration far outweighs information to the contrary, there are significant anomalies in the literature. Before addressing these anomalies, however, it is necessary to reevaluate the affirmative case.

First, then, with respect to social similarity as a basis for friendship formation, it has already been pointed

out that Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) found their respondents tended to select others with similar values as friends. Similarly, R. Williams (1959, 1970) and Rosow (1970) have, in addition, pointed to the significance of status and value similarity in interpersonal relations like friendship in suggesting that:

> ...the weight of the value system is on the side of 'horizontal' rather than 'vertical' emphasis: peer relations, not superordinate-subordinate relations, equality, rather than hierarchy. (Williams, 1970:502)

and that:

> Status similarities provide a strong basis for solidarity because they join persons of like social position who have the same relation to the larger society and who share a common set of experiences, problems, perspectives, values, and interests. (Rosow, 1970:63)

Thus, horizontal as opposed to vertical relations in friendship coupled with the potential solidarity produced by various status parallels provide two strong indications that social "similarity" is the foundation for friendship relationships.

Following up on the potential solidarity produced by status similarities in Rosow's (1970) opinion, it is reminiscent of Tonnies' (1957) statement suggesting that friendship is strongly represented in Gesellschaft. Since this is the case, and since Gemeinschaft means solidarity as well, friendship must necessarily imply the same. Therefore, to the degree that status similarities produce solidarity, they, using these perspectives, must produce or simply contribute to the formation of friendship as well. Simmel

(1950) and Paine (1969) also support the significance of similarity in friendship formation in emphasizing "standards of equivalence" and/or "mutuality" in friendship. Simmel notes for example that friendship involves:

> ...a high degree of reciprocal (or mutual) knowledge of one another. (1950:324)(Parentheses Author's)

and Paine remarks in a similar way:

> That friendship is based upon equivalency--though perhaps mutuality is the better word--should not be lost from sight. (1969:511)

Thus, two potential friends become "friends" because of a high degree of reciprocal knowledge of one another on the one hand and because they treat each other as equals or perhaps "mutuals." Their similarity, then, seemingly derives from this, their mutuality of orientation toward one another.

That psychological similarity of background is also a factor in friendship formation is also well established in several contexts and requires some further elaboration before addressing the disagreements with respect to the proposition. The potential psychological similarity of friends has been preliminarily explored by: Duck, 1970,1973; Secord and Backman, 1968; and Beier et al., 1961. Duck (1970) for example relies heavily on Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs and concludes by indicating several ways that "similarity of construing process" can be applied to explain friendship formation. His views further derive as follows:

(1)The commonality corollary states that to the

> extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another, his processes are psychologically similar to those of the other person'...Thus...similarity of construct systems amounts to similarity of personality. (2)The other corollary which helps here is the sociability corollary. This states that 'to the extent that one person construes the construction processes of another he may play a role in social processes involving the other person.' (3)It is therefore derivable from within the structure of personal construct theory that similarity of construing processes will facilitate the formation of friendships.' (1973:24)

Therefore, in Duck's opinion friendship formation can easily be explained as a corollary of personal construct theory. His emphasis on psychological similarity as the key element in friendship is further elaborated when he suggests:

> The present proposal will espouse the view that friendships result from the failure to present negatively evaluated data and the marriage of this criterion with the disclosure of psychological similarity. (1970:31)

Thus, psychological similarity in the form of construing processes combined with the disclosure of this fact and the failure to present "negatively evaluated" data somehow combine to facilitate friendship formation.

Beier, et al., (1961) also support the importance of psychological similarity in friendship formation. Their findings suggest for example that:

> 1. Subjects will project more of their own characteristics on their friends.
> 2. Subjects will project more socially approved characteristics on their friends.
> 3. Subjects project more socially disapproved characteristics on disliked persons. (1961:8)

It would seem to follow, then, that the assertion that friends tend to be substantially similar in psychological

characteristics has been both theoretically and empirically verified at least in preliminary way.

Secord and Backman (1968) have contributed to this position as well, but add further complexity to the issue in stating:

> Two conditions that promote attraction between members of a dyad are perceived similarity of alter to self and interpersonal congruency, a state existing when perceived self and self as ego (are) perceived by alter (as) congruent. (1968:115) (Parentheses Author's)

As a result, psychological similarity, whether it be a function of construing processes, self disclosure, the absence of negatively evaluated data, approval, or perceived interpersonal congruency, is well documented as a factor in friendship formation. Precisely how these variables combine or rank, however, in terms of the facility they add to a potential friendship has not yet been determined.

Turning, then, to the discussion of disagreements over the proposition that friendships are most likely to form between individuals with similar social and psychological backgrounds, "difference" has also been used as an explanation for friendship formation. In other words, not only has social and psychological similarity been suggested as a basis for friendship but difference as well has been offered as an explanation for the solidarity produced in the friendship dyad.

It has already been pointed out for example that Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) see that similarity of values is only necessary in a basic sense and that friendships made

before value differences were noted may be as valid and sincere as those friendships formed with complete value homophily. Thus it may be said that value differences in themselves are not necessarily stumbling blocks to friendship formation. Similarly, R. Winch's once popular views on "complementary needs" in mate selection might be seen to apply somewhat to friendship in stressing the importance of differences in need fulfillment complementing each other in the relationship. Banta and Heatherington (1963), however, have, among others, negated the suggestion of complementary needs in friendship by stating that:

> In friendship pairings there is again evidence for similarity of needs and none for complementarity. (1963:403)

Durkheim (1964) adds further to the debate in emphasizing the importance of both similarity and difference to friendship formation when he notes:

> Friendship, says Aristotle, causes much discussion. According to some people, it consists in a certain resemblance, and we like those who resemble us: whence the proverbs 'birds of a feather flock together' and other such phrases. Others on the contrary, say that all who are alike are opposed to one another. (1964:55)

and maintains further that, according to Aristotle:

> These opposing doctrines prove that both (similarity and difference) are necessary to natural friendship. Difference, as likeness, can be a cause of mutual attraction. However, certain differences do not produce this effect. We do not find any pleasure in those completely different from us...only certain kinds of differences attract each other. They are those, which, instead of opposing and excluding, complement each other. As Bain says, there is a type of difference which repels, another which attracts, one which leads to rivalry, another which leads to friendship. If one of two people has what the other

> has not, but desires, in that fact lies the point of departure for positive attraction....the division of labour determines the relations of friendship. (1964:54-56)

In this quotation Durkheim, in conjunction with Aristotle, and Bain, raises a number of issues relative to the role(s) of similarity and difference in friendship formation. While Durkheim would appear to maintain that both similarity and difference are necessary to "natural" friendship--what is natural may only be a small part of what is actual or possible. That is, in focusing on natural friendship, Durkheim has ignored other possibilities. If, for example, one were to rewrite his statement to read: while similarity and difference may be necessary to "natural" friendships, since there are many kinds of friendship that might be called natural--but not necessarily good or bad--most friendships will contain both elements. This would have effectively removed the emphasis upon one kind of friendship in Durkheim's analysis and defined a field of variation within which not only kinds of friendship might be identified but degrees of similarity and difference as well.

R.C. Bailey, et al., (1975) present a final point of disagreement with respect to similarity as a basis for friendship. They have suggested for instance that:

> ...self-concept support is a more reliable feature of friendship than is perceived similarity, or even similarity between friend's self-concepts. (1975:237)

Thus, self-concept support may in fact be a more critical

factor in friendship formation than similarity is, at least interpreted in a general sense.

In summary, though some scholars have correctly pointed to some flaws in viewing friendship formation as resulting strictly from the variables associated with social and psychological similarity, the evidence they provide is sketchy and inconclusive. Therefore, for the purposes of the inventory the preposition that friendships are most likely to form between individuals with similar social and psychological backgrounds will be accepted.

Proposition Twenty: Friendship and Love are One and the Same

The next point of disagreement in the Literature to be considered in this inventory concerns the proposition that friendship and love are one and the same, or interchangeable in some ultimate sense. While definitive answers to the almost infinite questions posed by this proposition are beyond the scope of this research it is important to note the directions taken by some select scholars with respect to both the potential correspondence and/or dissociation of friendship and love.

Evidence in favor of the proposition that friendship and love are one and the same comes from a wide variety of classic and contemporary treatments of the subject. Cicero (1967) for example points to the classic polarities of self and/or other love in friendship through Laelius' comments on the death of his friend Scipo Africanus:

> ...I am particularly comforted by the fact that I am free of that error which in most men is the usual cause of anguish at the passing of friends. I do not feel that Scipo has suffered any misfortune. I am the one who has suffered misfortune if any has occured. But to be crushed by grief at one's own misfortunes is the act not of a man who loves his friend, but one who loves himself. (1967:49)

and:

> I am afraid that to mourn at what has happened to him would come more naturally to one who hated him than to one who loved him. (1967:49)

In this statement Cicero's views on friendship and love are most explicit. Cicero, in acknowledging only friendships of the true and perfect kind, as in Laelius' friendship with Scipo Africanus, has a polar view of love and friendship. That is, if one has a true and perfect other love then and only then does one have a friendship. If, however, one is "consumed with grief" as Cicero implies then one might be said to hate rather than love and thus no true friendship would have existed in the first place. Therefore, in Cicero's opinion, perfect friendship is love and love is perfect friendship. Anything less in this respect by implication is enmity and hatred or hatred and enmity. It is a polar concept, and an all or none suggestion but nevertheless serves to equate friendship and love as one and the same.

In a more contemporary view Brain (1976) makes no attempt to distinguish between friendship and love and in fact uses the concepts interchangably. He notes:

> ...In contemporary Western society the boundaries of friendship...and loving are disintegrating, if they

ever really existed. (1976:15)

Similarly, Sadler (1970:178) suggests that friendship is really a form of love and implies that analytical distinctions may not be very useful or meaningful. There is, in addition, the fact, as Schofield (1970) states that:

> The word "friend" derives from an Anglo-Saxon verb meaning to love. (1970:213)

Thus, each of these statements would lead us to believe that friendship and love should be equated. Further, Jourard (1971:15) and E. Fromm (1955:38) imply through their views on self disclosure and the productive relatedness of man to his fellow man respectively, that love and friendship are common processes involving similar properties with similar or at least convergent outcomes.

On the other hand, many scholars have taken the opposite point of view with respect to the proposition in suggesting that there are significant differences between friendship and love. Montaigne (1935) for instance states that love is:

> ...more active, fiercer, fervent...volitile, fickle, and wavering... (whereas)...Friendship, on the other hand, is enjoyed in proportion as it is desired; it is bred, nourished, and increased only by enjoyment. (1935:186) (Parentheses Author's)

Ramsoy (1968) supports this as well but adds the dimension of degree of intimacy. He notes:

> Friendship is intimate, but less so than love...(1968:12)

Thus, according to Montaigne and Ramsoy, friendship can and must be differentiated from love on the basis of enjoyment

and degree of intimacy.

Perhaps the best "sociological" argument for differentiating between friendship and love comes from Simmel (1950). While Simmel begins by treating friendship and love under the same heading, that is, as involving the same principle or as he suggests:

> ...a high degree of reciprocal knowledge of one another not based on circumstances or fixed amounts as in interest groups, or acquaintances. (1950:324)

They are nevertheless different entities. He categorically states for instance that friendship and love involve totally different configurations. He notes specifically that friendship:

> ...aims at an absolute psychological intimacy. (1950:325)

or:

> ...an entering of the whole undivided ego into the relationship....(1950:325)

and that this:

> ...may be more plausible in friendship than in love for the reason that friendship lacks the specific concentration upon one element which love draws from its sensuousness. (1950:325)

Therefore, because friendship might be said to lack the "vehemence" of love as Simmel suggests:

> It may be more apt than love to connect a whole person with another person in its entirety; it may melt reserves more easily than love does--if not as stormily, yet on a larger scale and in a more enduring sequence. Yet such complete intimacy becomes probably more and more difficult as differentiation among men increases. Modern man, possibly, has too much to hide to sustain a friendship in the ancient sense. (1950:326)

In summary, though the evidence is quite divided with respect to the proposition that friendship and love are one and the same, one might tend to follow Simmel's suggestion that they are somewhat different from each other and therefore reject the proposition. That is, while many have stated that friendship and love are one and the same the reason for the sameness is built, almost without exception, on an idealized conception of perfect friendship of one kind. This is admirable in a sense but very irresponsible in another. It is irresponsible in the senses that: (1) if one assumes for example, as Fro[illegible] (1956) does, that different kinds of love exist and, (2) that as will be shown, different and specific kinds of friendship exist and, (3) that there is variability in the degree of intimacy within and between these kinds of love and friendship then, (4) some kinds of friendship must necessarily be less intimate than some kinds of love and vice versa and, (5) some kinds of friendship must be more intimate than some kinds of love and vice versa. Therefore variability in kinds of friendship and kinds of love plus the variability in the degree of intimacy suggested by Simmel, and the more appropriateness of friendship for achieving intimacy, make it improbable that friendship and love should be considered one and the same.

Proposition Twenty-One: Friendship is a Cultural Value

Continuing to the next point of disagreement, it may be generally assumed that friendship is not a dominant cultural value in our society, at least in terms of ~~R.~~ Williams' (1970) analysis of values and value orientations. However, some interesting inconsistencies appear in a closer examination of Williams' formulations. For example Williams defines values experienced by individuals as having the following qualities:

> (1) They have a conceptual element--they are more than pure sensations, emotions, reflexes, or so-called needs. Values are abstractions drawn from the flux of the individual's immediate experience. (2) They are affectively charged: they represent actual or potential emotional mobilization. (3) Values are not the concrete goals of action, but rather the criteria by which goals are chosen. (4) Values are important not "trivial" or of slight concern. (1970:440)

Then, having defined values in this fashion Williams provides four criteria through which the dominant/subordinate status of a value might be established:

> 1. Extensiveness of the value in the total activity of the system. What proportion of the population and of its activities manifest this value?
> 2. Duration of the value. Has it been persistently important over a considerable period of time?
> 3. Intensity with which the value is sought or maintained, as shown by: effort, crucial choices, verbal affirmation, and by reaction to threats to the value--for example promptness, certainty, and severity of sanctions.
> 4. Prestige of the value carriers--that is of persons, objects, or organizations considered to be barers of the value. (1970:448)

Assuming that friendship meets the basic value criteria according to Williams, which may or may not be the case, one, in principle, should be able to determine friendship's

dominant or subordinate status as a cultural value using this second set of criteria. Responding in this way, it would seem a more difficult task than one might expect and that friendship is both a dominant and a subordinate value in terms of these criteria. For example, it would be difficult to argue in terms of "extensiveness" that friendship is a value that is manifest by only a small proportion of the population. That is, most everyone has, or would admit to having, a "friend," whether it be a pet or at least one other person. On the other hand the question arises as to just how extensive is friendship relative to the entire activity of the social system? One might argue, for instance that in this later sense friendship may play a relatively small role. Thus, in terms of William's first criteria of "extensiveness," friendship is conceivably both a widely held value but also one that is easily overshadowed by the demands of modern institutional life. Friendship, then, is neither conclusively dominant nor subordinate in this first sense.

With respect to an estimate of the hypothetical intensity of friendship as a value a similar problem exists. Specifically, though many would support the value of friendship as extremely intense and meaningful, it may also be described as loosely solde[illegible]stly modified, or broken by circumstance. Therefore, its intensity is variable, it is not a given nor is it necessarily easily discernable. There is also the point that, if it comes to a choice between an

obligation to a friend and an obligation to work, one must often accept the priority, thus the intensity of the latter over the former. Friendship is both a dominant and subordinate value in this sense as well.

Duration and prestige, as criteria, may also be long or short and/or low or high respectively, but it is becoming evident that the confusion over friendship's dominant or subordinate value status cannot be solved using William's descriptive categories. This suggests at least three possibilities:

1. Friendship is not a dominant value in our society. (or)
2. Williams' conceptualization of values is inadequate or at least not exhaustive or complete. (and/or)
3. Friendship is an extremely complex value, a quasi-value, a special case, and/or an exception to the rule.

In the light of the evidence examined one could simply accept the first possibility noted above and carry the discussion no further. However, if Williams' scheme is incomplete, which he, himself, admits it may be, then friendship may well be one of the "numerous exceptions" which might help to refine his typology. He notes further in his discussion of value orientations that:

> The simplified picture that results will, of course, be inaccurate in every detail--it will be a series of ideal types, subject to numerous exceptions. Nevertheless these abstracted patterns will serve as working models against which variations and contradictions can be more easily seen. (1970:453)

It may be that friendship is one of these contradictions that at present lies outside the scope of Williams' ideal types, as a special case.

In summary, for the purposes of this inventory of disagreements, though friendship is not a dominant cultural value in our society, according to Williams, it may not always be a subordinate value, and the possibility exists that it may be a special case, unique in its status. The need, for, and utility of, a typology of friendship is, however, once again validated, this time through Williams' study of values.

Proposition Twenty-Two: Friendship is Personal

Another point of disagreement in the literature concerns two propositions that in some respects are the opposites of one another; both will be discussed. The first proposition is that friendship is a personal and private relationship, the second being that friendship is a shared phenomenon.

First, in support of the proposition that friendship is a personal and private relationship many scholars including; Cicero (1967), Cooley (1929), Montaigne (1935), Simmel (1950), Paine (1969), Keller (1968), and Allan (1979) have made statements relative to this point. Cicero (1967) for example emphasizes the private and exclusive properties of friendship in noting:

> We can best comprehend the power of friendship by considering the fact that nature has established

> social contact between countless numbers of men; yet friendship is so concentrated and restricted a thing that all the true affection in the world is shared by no more than a handful of individuals. (1967:50)

Similarly Montaigne (1935) centers on the private and completely exclusive nature of friendship when he states:

> ...friendship...is indivisible each one gives himself so wholly to his friend that there remains to him nothing to divide with another....(1935:191)

and Keller (1968) also suggests that:

> ...friendship, is generally a private and personal affair. (1968:25)

By far the most problematic argument given to support the private and personal nature of friendship is provided by Allan (1979). He suggests:

> The first point to make about friendship is that it is taken as a personal relationship connected in three senses: (1) that it is a relationship between individuals; (2) that it is a private relationship; and (3) that it involves the person as the person he really is. (1979:38)

While this is a concise statement that clearly points to the personal and private nature of friendship, that it involves "people as they really are," is a highly debatable notion. Though this is a "nice" sentiment one might wonder both what "they are really," and how accurate an assumption this "really is." That Allan is aware of some of the difficulties associated with his three part statement is, however, evident as his argument progresses.

Referring to point (2) above, that friendship is a private relationship, Allan correctly suggests that:

> ...friendship should not be based on criteria external to the relationship but referring to the quality of the relationship. (1979:38)

This statement implies that in principle, the quality of a friendship may not be based nor accurately assessed in terms of factors external to the relationship itself which, from a Weberian standpoint is justifiable. However, in practice, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that external factors are often very significant in contributing to the individual actor's definitions of the situation, namely, the status and quality of their association as friends.

Despite Allan's (1979:38) argument that, friendship according to McCall (1970) scores low on "formality" and that it is not governed by "formal" role positions, or that friendships do not develop between people solely because of the "role positions" they fill in organizations or institutions, Allan is not in a position to state that these external influences are insignificant or inconsequential to the members of the friendship dyad. Nevertheless, one would have to agree with Allan's notation from Paine (1969:513) that:

> ...friends are not considered to be mutually substitutable persons. (1979:38)

Similarly, with respect to friendship as a personal relationship one might be compelled to agree with Allan, and Simmel that:

> Friendship is a personal relationship in the sense of it being a private one, of concern only to those who are friends. (Allan, 1979:39)

On the other hand, as has already been suggested, perhaps the status of one's friendships becomes an issue in those friendships precisely because of others' (outside)

definitions. For instance, say that you and I are friends, this is our concern and thus we mutually define ourselves and each other as such. Say further, that person X known to me in the context of a formal role relation, encourages me to denounce our friendship to our mutual benefit in X's opinion. Then, if I believe X and act in accordance with his or her definition of our friendship as harmful, and if you, responding to my negative cues and not X's, reassess my status as your friend, then we are now not friends as we privately define it because of the influence of person X on me. Thus, in a sense, friendship is not only a personal and private relationship but is as well an interpersonal relation with boundaries that may extend beyond the individuals themselves. To use an analogy, friendship is an island inhabited by few but visited by many.

Allan goes on to say that:

> ...friendship in English culture is not institutionalized. (1979:39)

While this may be quite true of North American culture as well as "English culture", what few realize is that just because it may be uninstitutionalized does not mean that it is a completely privitized and individualized phenomenon. To the contrary, friendship is, informally, a highly regularized even routinized phenomenon with a discernable set of responsibilities and reciprocities attached to it. For example, that there are informal expectations in and about friendship in our culture is given in phrases as: "In need a friend, all one needs is a friend, lets be friends,

and choose your friends wisely etc. ." Thus, the interpersonal, as opposed to strictly personal, structure of friendship as existing beyond the dyad itself emerges as a significant property of the friendship concept. Perhaps one of the best cultural indicators of this property of friendship as an informal and quasi-institutionalized concept comes from an excerpt from the lyrics of a song by Elton John:

> Making friends, for the world to see
> Let the people know you've got what you need
> With a friend at hand you will see the light
> When your friends are there, everythings alright.
> (1970: "Friends")

In these few lines, friendship is portrayed as a cultural goal of some significance and as a social category with expectations encumbent upon it. In this context, it is both an end in itself and a means to other ends; it is specific to the individuals involved yet it is also a social and cultural value. It is personal but it is also interpersonal. It is both private and public. It has meaning for the actors involved but it also has meaning to the observer even if the meaning attached to it is of a different sort in the latter case.

Though some scholars prefer to view friendship as strictly a personal and private phenomenon there is some disagreement to the effect that its boundaries should perhaps not be so restricted. Pahl (1971), for instance, was one of the first to emphasize the necessity for a public versus private distinction in friendship's boundaries. Bates

(1964) also invokes this distinction though with respect to "privacy" and not friendship per se.

Bates (1964) makes a number of insightful statements in his article that relate primarily to the "phenomenological construct of privacy" (1964:29) but his method and some of his ideas relate to this discussion of friendship. Reflecting on his formulations of privacy, it would seem that on the surface privacy and friendship are antithetical notions. In a very general sense, privacy means a witholding of "something" to oneself and friendship, on the other hand, involves a giving or sharing of something with another. In another sense, though, a dyadic friendship according to Simmel (1950) is a very private phenomenon. It is shared, but exclusively with the other and not any other. Thus, in this second sense one might say that privacy and friendship are closely related.

This similarity or isomorphism between privacy and friendship might be further extended after an examination of some of the functions Bates attributes to privacy:

> 1. It provides a kind of slippage between social pressure and individual response...
> 2. It protects the self; protects it from disclosure of mistakes made, motives, feelings, and actions which would be humiliating or damaging to have known...
> 3. After bruising contact with the world, privacy may be required within which self-esteem can be restored. (1964:433)

One could easily substitute friendship, instead of privacy, as the subject of these functions that Bates describes. That is, it is not inconceivable that friendship as well could;

(1) provide slippage between social pressure and individual response, or (2) function to protect the self, or (3) help reestablish self-esteem after troubled events. If friendship were to function in any or all of these ways, it would then be difficult to argue from Bates' perspective, that friendship and privacy are antithetical, at least to the extent that they share functional attributes.

Bates also notes in several places that privacy is both privately and publically structured, and that its "subjective" structure has the following components:

> 1. It is differentiated into many content areas...
> 2. It is structured by the answer to the question of who one wishes to exclude from having this knowledge...
> 3. It is a structured portion of a person's total phenomenological field. (1964:430)(Paraphrase)

and that at the societal level:

> 1. Privacy is recognized and channeled by the culture. (Privacy of voting etc.)...
> 2. Privacy of bodily functions, sexual activities...
> 3. Right to withold deeply felt ideas, beliefs, and emotions...
> 4. Privacy of lovers. (1964:431)(Paraphrase)

Following Bates' paradigm, on the "subjective" and "societal" or, the private and public structure of privacy, another parallel with friendship is evident. That is: (1) that friendship is both privately and publically structured may be seen as a given, (2) that it answers the question of who one includes as opposed to excludes would also appear to follow, and (3) that friendship is part of one's experiential field would also be difficult to debate or refute. At the societal level, it is conceivable that

friendship, like privacy, is also channeled by the culture but includes the right to give and express one's ideas instead of simply the right to withold them.

Regardless of whether or not Bates' analysis of privacy is completely isomorphic with these views of friendship, the point is that friendship, like privacy, is a relatively untouched phenomenon of experience which with further study:

> ...might yield cultural and psychological taxonomies, ways of classifying privacy (and friendship) which could serve as the basis for more analytical kinds of inquiry. (1964:433)(Parentheses Author's).

The proposition then, that friendship is a personal and private relationship must be rejected because though it contains personal and private elements it is also governed to a degree by public expectations and cultural edicts.

Proposition Twenty-Three: Friendship is Shared

In support of the second related proposition that friendship is a shared phenomenon it is important to point out at the beginning that there is a significant difference between "sharing" as an activity or a process in a relationship, and having or possessing a shared friendship. For example, it is evident that according to Cicero (1967), K. Davis (1950), Cooley (1929), and Duck (1973) among others, that friendship involves an exclusive sharing process of almost everything from a "we feeling" and "mutual identification" through "ideals" to "personal constructs." On the other hand, however, true or perfect friendships

according to Montaigne (1935) cannot be shared nor can more than one true friendship exist at any point in time for an individual. Further, in Montaigne's estimation, it is only the more common friendships that can be shared. He notes:

> Common friendships are capable of being shared: we may love one for his handsome exterior, another for his easygoing manners, another again for his liberality; this one for his fatherly and that one for his brotherly ways and so forth; but this friendship (perfect friendship) which possesses the soul and dominates it with absolute power, cannot possibly be split in two. If two at the same time entreated your assistance to which of them would you hasten? If they required of you opposite services, how would you arrange it? If one of them imparted to you a secret that it would be useful for the other to know, how would you solve the difficulty? The unique and paramount friendship dissolves all other obligations. (1935:191)(Parentheses Author's)

Thus, it would appear that while friendship involves a sharing of interests, values, and ideals between individuals, there is some disagreement over the degree to which true friendships can be shared among friends, if indeed they can be shared at all in this way. Montaigne's point is, that because true friendship is indivisible, it can not be diffused among the many but rather is known only to the few.

This line of reasoning is problematic for, as has been suggested, many kinds of friendship may exist other than true or perfect friendship with social consequences as real and as immediate for the individuals involved as is implied by the true form that obsesses Montaigne. It is important to note Simmel's (1950) comments on the proliferation of the "modern" differentiated friendship in this connection, and

that simply because true or perfect friendships may be less probable today does not rule out their spirit, though in modified form. There appears to be, nevertheless, more than enough confusion in the literature over the shared status of friendship to reject the proposition that friendship, as presently conceived, is a shared phenomenon. This is not to say, however, that "friends" do not share X or Y or Z as a part of their mutual and idiosyncratic definitions of their friendship but is to say, rather, that we presently do not possess the conceptual apparatus to meaningfully distinguish friendship types let alone the degree to which they may be shared outside of the dyad.

Proposition Twenty-Four: Intimate Friendships Arise from more Ordinary Friendships

Yet another point of disagreement with respect to friendship's meaning(s) concerns the proposition that real intimate friendships may arise from more ordinary friendships. The strongest support for this suggestion comes from Cooley (1929), Allan (1979), and Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954). Cooley, for example provides the first real indication that what one might call secondary association today, can result in a process that may lead to primariness, intimacy, and therefore friendship. He notes:

> In our society, being little bound by place, people easily form clubs, fraternal societies and the like, based on congeniality, which may give rise to real intimacy. (1929:26)

and Allan (1979) confirms this potential with reference to

his summary of friendship research when he states:

> Real friendships can be seen as an extension of more ordinary friendships. (1979:67)

Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), as discussed earlier, also allow for this possibility given the minimal criteria of basic values agreement as all that is really necessary for friendship formation. Thus, it would seem, that a secondary or (ordinary) type relationship might easily be transformed into an intimate primary or (real) friendship under the appropriate conditions.

To the contrary, however, many have suggested that the transformation of an ordinary friendship into a real friendship is a qualitative jump that is simply not possible under most circumstances. Allan (1979), for example, reports a contradictory finding in his research summary when he suggests:

> ...real friendships are qualitatively different from most friendships. (1979:67)

This is in direct contradiction to his contention that real friendships may be seen as extensions of more ordinary ones. That is, in one case real friends must be seen as qualitatively different from more ordinary ones and in another case Allan suggests that the latter may arise from the former. Though these two statements are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they certainly appear to be inconsistent and contradictory. Kurth (1970) and Schofield (1970) also imply that the degree of intimacy and interdependency we associate with real friendship does not necessarily follow

from more ordinary friendships, and Montaigne's (1935:191) statement from the previous section would categorically preclude this possibility.

In summary, though the evidence is divided with reference to the proposition that real friendships may arise from more ordinary friendships, one might be inclined to accept the proposition since it includes the qualifier "may." That is, there are probably circumstances where "real" friendships do develop out of what has been called more "ordinary" friendships but both the corollary and the negation may exist as well.

Proposition Twenty-Five: Friendship Involves an Equivalence of Exchange

The next point of disagreement to be dealt with involves the proposition that friendship is a reciprocal bond involving an equivalence of exchange. The first element of this proposition that friendship is a reciprocal bond is well established in the literature and is relatively unproblematic. Duck (1973, 1977), for example, has suggested that:

> Reciprocity of liking is one kind of explanation of attraction. (1973:44)

and that in very simple terms:

> ...we like those who like us, or who like the same things that we do (one of which is ourselves). (1973:44)

and further:

> Self-disclosure is defined by Jourard (1971) as a

> mutual unfolding of people to one another...highly dependent on favorable outcomes such as liking and reciprocity. (1977:166)

and finally that according to Allan (1979):

> ...friendship is a reciprocal relationship in that, in general a friend is only regarded as a friend to the extent to which he considers you a friend. In other words, friendship must be reciprocal in terms of both sides labeling of the other. (1979:44)

Thus, it is very clear in this series of statements that not only friendship but rudimentary liking, attraction, and self-disclosure demand reciprocity in their operation.

Disagreements with respect to the proposition center on the latter element, that friendship involves an equivalence of exchange and here the issue becomes very clouded. It becomes clouded in the sense that if one closely follows the exchange views of Homans (1961), P. Blau (1964), and Thibaut and Kelly (1959), friendship must, in the final analysis, be reduced to the economics of cost and reward or the psychology of deprivation and gratification. This puts a mercenary twist on friendship which may be warranted in some cases but not in others.

Perhaps Allan (1979) addresses the complexities of friendship exchange best when he notes:

> Friends can quite legitimately make use of one another in instrumental ways without threatening the relationship, provided that it is clear that they are being used because they are friends and not friends because they are useful. Thus a friend would expect to be used if he could help in some way but would feel less charitable if he discovered the other only treated him as a friend so that help could be obtained from him. One way in which the image of the relationship as one not being based on instrumental or exploitative interests is by an effective or putative equivalence of exchange.

(1979:43)

What Allan is suggesting here is exchange, but not in the usual meaning of the term. As he further notes:

> The idea is best captured by Naegale (1958:244), for in friendship the reciprocity must remain implicit and this is achieved when it is an informal, almost casual reciprocity.
>
> A major means by which reciprocity is maintained in friendship is by the person who last benefited seeking to redress the balance. It works out as a case of 'debtor' seeking to repay more avidly than the 'creditor' seeks to claim, for in this way the former can show that the relationship is not one of exploitation but one of friendship. (1979:44)

Thus, in friendship, the assessment of cost and reward is skewed in favor of an "overpayment" that is not expected to be "refundable." This is definitely not pure exchange theory but is rather what Paine (1969) is suggesting when he states that:

> ...friendship is based upon equivalency--though perhaps mutuality is the better word. (1969:511)

Therefore, as a final entry to the selective inventory of disagreements, the proposition that friendship is a reciprocal bond involving an equivalence of exchange will be rejected. Accepted, however, is the idea that friendship is a reciprocal bond and that it involves a kind of "mutuality skewed" exchange process that bears little resemblance to exchange theory.

The following propositions have been either accepted or rejected as a result of the selective inventory of disagreements attempted in this chapter:

Accepted

1. Friendship often consists of obligations, demands, some tension /conflict and even hostility.
2. Friendship is, by degree, a voluntary, achieved, expressive, and affectively charged phenomenon.
3. Friendships are most likely to form between individuals with similar social and psychological backgrounds.
4. Friendship is not a dominant cultural value in our society.
5. Real intimate friendships may arise from more ordinary friendships.

Rejected

1. Friendship and love are one and the same.
2. Friendship is a personal and private relationship.
3. Friendship is a reciprocal bond involving an equivalence of exchange.(Proviso)

B. Friendship Defined

To conclude this chapter and section, the task is to advance a working definition of friendship on the basis of the inventory of agreements on friendship's meaning(s) coupled with the subsequent inventory of resolved disagreements. In order to accomplish this, a three part definition is proposed; the first dealing with the study of friendship itself, the second with friendship's structure, and finally the third referring to friendship's social

psychology.

First, for the purposes of this thesis the study of friendship will be defined as in its infancy, its subject matter having been poorly or inadequately conceptualized, it has received little systematic theoretical or empirical scientific attention. Second, though friendship is not a dominant value or value orientation in our society it does have a definable, informal and unique structure. Specifically, it is primarily dyadic; it is different from kinship, acquaintanceship, and/or attraction; it may be seen as both a social role and a relational category; and as a mortal as opposed to an immortal social group. Third, friendship will be defined as a basic human need that may take many forms. It is effected in its formation, duration, intensity, quality, and quantity by a host of variables--some of the more important ones being: (1) opportunities for interaction, (2) constraints on interaction, (3) age, sex, social class, and marital status, (4) degree of basic values agreement, (5) unconscious personality variables, and (6) formal role obligations. It is further defined as being: (1) voluntary, achieved, expressive, and affective in its nature, though it also consists of (2) obligations, demands, some tension/conflict and even hostility. It may be both "real" or more "ordinary" in its character, and real intimate friendships may derive from the latter. It generally occurs between individuals with similar social and psychological backgrounds and should

be free of status distinctions. This completes the working definition of friendship to this point in the thesis.

Throughout the first two chapters in this section on the meaning(s) of friendship in social context, friendship has been portrayed as a confused and often misunderstood concept in the research literature. The selective inventories of agreements and disagreements have, nevertheless, added some order to the "chaos," order, in the sense that for the first time it has been possible to construct, in a limited way, a working definition of friendship which is consistent with a wider body of theoretical and empirical works on the subject than has as yet been accomplished in sociology. This is not to suggest that the definition offered is completely valid or all inclusive or that the task of defining friendship and its meaning(s) is complete. In fact, most of the analysis in these first two chapters raise as many or more questions than it potentially answers. What it does represent, however, is a beginning to the systematic and scientific treatment of a subject that has long been ignored by social scientists. It is also a beginning in the sense that, definition in hand, one can begin to explore and test the boundaries of and variance in the concept in greater detail and with greater precision--theoretically, empirically, and pragmatically.

The direction to be taken in this regard for the remainder of the thesis is theoretical and pragmatic--to

explore in some detail the variance in friendship's many but as yet specifically undefined forms. The task in chapter three is to construct an ideal typical model. Then, in chapter four, having developed a rudimentary theoretical model its practicality and applicability will be assessed through an application to some aspects of the human life cycle. Such an exercise will not only clarify the boundaries of friendship and its meaning(s) but will also pave the way and provide the necessary theoretical groundwork for future meaningful empirical studies of the subject.

III. SECTION II. A FRIENDSHIP MODEL

A. The Need for and Possibility of a Model of Friendship and Friendship Relationships

While the arguments presented in the first section of this thesis strongly support both the "need for" an explanatory model of friendship and its "possibility," it is important to review some of the basic positions in these respects before attempting to generate the model. First, with reference to the need for such a model, Williams (1959) and Allan (1979) comment on the dangers of accepting a commonsense view of friendship. Williams notes:

> ...with very few exceptions, studies of friendship have relied solely upon the immediate, commonsense designations of a relationship as "friendship" by one or both of the persons involved...this procedure gives us a highly variable and ambiguous criterion for identifying friendship; even the most casual observation shows that what a person will describe as "friendship" ranges from highly superficial and fragile relationships to enduring relationships of intense commitment, great intimacy, and strong mutual solidarity. (1959:4)

and subsequently that:

> There is an urgent need to go beyond the commonsense, self reporting of respondents in order to designate the relationship as friendship. (1959:10)

Similarly, Allan comments on the lack of rigor in commonsense approaches to friendship when he suggests:

> At an everyday level the meaning (of friendship) may be taken as obvious, but for research purposes the obvious must be treated as problematic...The point to be made here is that in common usage terms like friend (and mate, pal, chum, etc.) are only vague means of analyses; they serve as resources as well as restraints. People use them as labels and devices

> for conveying meaning in particular situations, not as rigorous and precise analytical tools. (1979:37).

Thus, according to Williams and Allan, not only is there an urgent need to go beyond the commonsense approach to friendship and its study but in addition, the vagueness of the term is given by the many forms it may take. The systematic investigation and classification of these forms is, then, clearly a prerequisite to a refinement of our understanding of the concept and idea of friendship.

On the other hand, as Allan (1979) correctly points out:

> ...many writers assume that (the state of) being friends is invariable, and therefore an unproblematic state of affairs. (1979:36-37) (Parentheses Author's)

He then proceeds to attack Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), R. Williams (1959), Babchuk and Bates (1963), Babchuk (1965), Z. Blau (1961), and Booth and Hess (1961) as being examples in the literature that exhibit this unidimensional emphasis on one kind of friendship. In his words their emphasis reflects:

> ...the tendency to treat 'real' friendships as the form of friendship. (and)...all illustrate the emphasis there is in the literature on extreme forms of friendship. (1979:37)(Parentheses Author's)

What this means in Allan's view is that though much of what has been written generalizes about friendships of all forms:

> ...the data it is based on usually pertain to a restricted set of very close friends. (1979:37).

Therefore, much of the data that has been collected with respect to friendship is misleading because it has relied

too heavily on a narrow and restricted view of friendship. Specifically, as Allan points out:

> ...if a relationship is not characterized by strong emotional attachment, feelings of empathy, mutual sympathy and understanding, it is immediately classified as something other than full friendship and removed from consideration.

This kind of simplistic analysis is a detriment to the systematic development of a workable model or theory of friendship because it is arbitrary and incomplete. It subsequently makes meaningful empirical generalizations impossible because it ignores everything but what has been called "full" friendship.

The absence of and therefore need for an adequate conceptual model of friendship is most obvious when one attempts to interpret findings such as the ones reported by Banta and Heatherington (1963) where a sex difference in male and female fiancees' friendship choices was reported. They note:

> Engaged males like the same type of women both as friend and fiancee, but there is little similarity between the male friend and the fiancee of engaged females. (1963:404)

While this may be an accurate, stimulating, and thought provoking finding relative to dissimilarity of needs in cross-sex friendships it lies flat without a framework to "hang it on." It would seem very premature to examine cross-sex friendship choices without at least a clear statement and specification of what friendship is. This is, however, not to criticize Banta and Heatherington too heavily for others have proceeded with the commonsense

self-report method, or have prestructured their friendship categories before hand (e.g. Sutcliffe and Crabbe, 1963). Whether one allows respondents to report their friendships as they perceive them, or whether prestructured categories are defined by a panel of judges, the results obtained are not generalizable and are for the most part inconsequential without an explanatory framework to coordinate them. As Ramsoy (1968:12) has pointed out, the empirical meaning of friendship is "vague."

With respect to theory, J. Van Vlissingen (1970) makes one of the best statements on what a model or theory of friendship must do when he notes:

> A theory of friendship must clarify the matter (for the partners), must justify the institution (for society), and must integrate it within the rest of the culture. (1970:226)

This is a mammoth task and one might seriously question whether or not this is possible given the "infancy" of the study of friendship at this point in time. Nevertheless, these objectives must ultimately be pursued. Having demonstrated the need for an explanatory model of friendship and friendship relationships, the next task is to discuss its possibility.

Just how possible or feasible is a model of friendship and friendship relationships given the present state of theory and empirical research in the areas? The answer to this question is provided in part by some few classic and contemporary attempts to develop explanatory models of friendship. Williams (1959) and Wolf (1966) support, for

example, what might be called a Parsonian model of friendship. That is, they each see friendship as existing in two major forms or types; an expressive form and a more or less instrumental form. The expressive type of friendship according to Williams is:

> Type I, characterized by a relatively high degree of affective involvement, diffuseness, collectivity orientation, and norms of affectivity rather than neutrality. (1959:7)

and the instrumental type is:

> . . . type II, characterized by low rankings on these variables. Type I may be thought of as "real friendship," type II, as "casual acquaintance." (1959:7)

Wolf (1966:10) similarly distinguishes two types of friendship but substitutes the term "emotional" for the expressive type. In either case, what is being offered here is a simple bifurcation of the concept of friendship. That is, one is either a true friend in an emotional and unconditional sense, or one is not a true friend but rather an acquaintance or an associate of some particular significance, relevance, or purpose. This is a simple model but neglects, by virtue of its simplicity, the territory between the extremes of true friendship and acquaintanceship. When, for example, and under what conditions does acquaintanceship become true friendship or vice versa? This bifurcated model cannot handle questions of this sort, nor does it explain why we should view friendship as an either/or phenomenon. It is, on the other hand, a beginning in the sense that true friendship and casual

acquaintanceship have been identified as the "extremum" or extreme boundaries of a friendship model. It is a useful but incomplete explanatory framework.

More complete explanatory models of friendship have been offered by Aristotle (1962) and Cohen (1961). Aristotle, for example, in his classic work, Nichomachean Ethics, cites three types or kinds of friendship: "perfect friendship," "useful and pleasant friendship," and "friendship of advantage." The first two of Aristotle's types, perfect friendship and useful and pleasant friendship, might be said to be similar to or at least accounted for in Williams' and Wolf's distinctions between instrumental and expressive friendships. However, Aristotle's suggestion of a third type of friendship, the friendship of advantage, brings another dimension into the picture which widens the horizon of what may be possible in friendship. That is, with the addition of the category of friendship of advantage one must consider not only the degree of expressivity or instrumentality inherent in a hypothetical friendship but also the motives of the individuals involved. What this means in terms of model building is that casual acquaintanceship may no longer be seen to be the boundary or limit to the lower end of the friendship continuum but rather that the false friendship of advantage may now represent this lower limit. Regardless, Aristotle adds an element of "richness" to his model of friendship through his allusion to motives as determinants

of the quality of friendship relationships. Unfortunately, however, he does not develop his position in the detail that would be required to "test" his thesis and as a result his model is incomplete as well.

Perhaps one of the most complete models or typologies offered to date with reference to friendship and its many forms is provided by Y. Cohen (1961). Cohen identifies four types of friendship in his model; "inalienable," "close," "casual," and "expedient." He differentiates among the four types first by separating inalienable friendship from the other three, for, in his words:

> ...it is only this friendship (inalienable) that cannot, ideally be withdrawn, and it is the one friendship that is entered into ritually or ceremonially. (1961:354) (Parentheses Author's)

The other three types, as Paine (1969) has pointed out, tend to:

> ...shade off into each other along a continuum which appears to be one of decreasing intimacy and increasing materialism as one moves from "close" to "casual" and to "expedient" friendships. (1969:144)

The advantage that Cohen's model has over many of the others is not simply that it has more friendship types and is therefore more exhaustive of the possibilities, although this is an element, but is rather his suggestion of friendship as a continuum. That is, Cohen correctly observes that friendship is not and can not be an either/or phenomenon but that the forms it takes range along a continuum of higher to lower friendship potential. Cohen has, however, been severely criticised for this suggestion.

Paine (1969), for instance, notes:

> Cohen, in common with others (Eisenstadt, 1961; Berliner, 1962), has an underlying purpose "to view an element of culture along a continuum of maximization-minimization, this continuum paralleling the one presented in the model of social structure. In general his twofold classification of social structure and friendship is probably helpful. However, the procedure whereby each social structure is coupled with one kind of friendship, is regretably artificial and the analyses must not be left standing there. In our own society, for example, probably all four friendships have their places and functions, and it is this kind of situation that raises the really important questions. (1969:145)

Thus, in Paine's opinion, though Cohen's types are "probably helpful" they are at the same time artificial, incomplete, and not unique.

While Paine's criticism of the lack of completeness of Cohen's types and their specification is probably valid, his attack on their artificiality is unwarranted. Paine might well be reminded in this regard that typologies are by definition artificial constructs not necessarily intended to conform to each and every empirical reality. Their focus is, rather, to allow us to better explain and hopefully later predict the prevalence and intensity of various elements of social experience like friendship. A criticism of "artificiality" is not necessarily "bad" or negative at this stage in the development of friendship theory nor is Cohen's typology somehow less valuable because he relies, unwittingly or not, on other's formulations. He does present what appears to be a novel combination of previous work. On the other hand, as Paine suggests, Cohen's model does leave

many questions unanswered; foremost among these being the conditions that give rise to each of his types.

In summary, several classic and contemporary scholars have attempted to develop models of friendship some of which have been briefly outlined. For the most part these efforts have been insightful, but inconclusive. Nevertheless, it is clear from the arguments presented in these preliminary works that a workable explanatory model of friendship is possible at this point in time.

B. Ideal Type Construction

Since the primary goal in this section will be to derive and defend an ideal typical model of friendship and friendship relationships, a brief comment on the nature and function of the ideal type would seem in order.

Like many fundamental units of social thought, the precise origins of the ideal type or what might be called ideal type thinking are obscure and almost impossible to identify with any particular historical epoch, school of thought or individual personality. However, many believe, as P. A. Sorokin suggests, that the origins of ideal typical phenomena can be traced back to the time of Confucius and his notion of five fundamental social relationships, which bear a distinct similarity to F. Tonnies' more modern ideal typical conceptualization of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Tonnies, 1957:vii). Sorokin states that ideal types may also be identified with Plato's Republic and Laws, Cicero's

analysis of true and false friendship, St. Augustine's theory of the Church and the City of God, and Ibn Kaldun's History of Berbers (Tonnies, 1957:viii). It is not difficult, then, to identify a vast diversity of social thinkers who were perhaps initially responsible, either individually or collectively, for original ideal type thinking. It is also interesting to note, in these comments, that the study of friendship is clearly associated with the origins of the ideal type itself.

Conceptually, there is, however, little agreement in the literature as to the precise nature and function of ideal types and/or ideal typical constructs. For some scholars, they are simple conceptual/methodological tools yet for others they attain the status of systematic theories. McKinney and Tiriakyan (1970), in a discussion of ideal types and constructed types, state:

> Considerable ambiguity remains with respect to the proper functioning of types in the chain of inquiry. Whatever else a constructed type may be, it is clearly a conceptual tool. (1970:246)

However, Tiriakyan in an earlier work also supports the theoretical status of the ideal type in a discussion of the typological method. He notes:

> That the more explicitly stated the typology (or ideal type) including the relationships between types, the more the typology functions as a theoretical model...useful in its explanation of the virtual tendencies of a system in the light of which actual discrepancies may be investigated. (1968:179) (Parentheses Author's)

Thus, an ideal type is potentially both a methodological and a theoretical entity at the same time.

The conceptual problem of the ideal type and how it may be distinguished from other type concepts should perhaps first be examined from E. A. Tiriakyan's (1968) remarks on the typological method in general. He notes:

> Typological classification, as a subdivision of taxonomy, has characterized a considerable part of the culture of the social sciences; paradoxically, the notion of types and this method of classification have also been the object of severe methodological and ideological opposition. Few subjects in taxonomy are understood in more different ways or are more misunderstood than the nature and use of types. (1968:178)

It would appear from this general statement of the diversity and confusion that seems to characterize the nature and use of type constructs in social science that misconceptions and obscurities must of necessity carry over from this state of generalized confusion to the specific instance of the ideal type as a constituent element of the typological procedure.

Perhaps the most cogent schema presented to date with respect to the conceptual differentiation of the myriad of type concepts found in the literature is that of C. G. Hempel (1965) in his essay on "Typological Methods in the Natural and Social Sciences." In a rather lengthy discussion, Hempel distinguishes between type concepts on the basis of three categories: classificatory types, extreme types, and ideal types. He suggests that classificatory and extreme or polar types have little explanatory power and, by and large, function as low grade generalizing entities. Ideal types, however, as he points out:

> ...are not used for the kinds of generalizations characteristic of extreme or ordering types, but are

> invoked as a specific device for the explanation of social and historical phenomena. (1965:161)

It is in this sense of an ideal type as a specific device for the explanation of friendship relationships that the "ideal typical model" of friendship will be developed. The term "model" is used simply to represent the specific patterns of friendship that may be seen to emerge from the ideal type as defined. Before proceeding with this definition, however, some additional background on ideal typical formulations is considered necessary.

Though Hempel's (1965) position on the features of the various type concepts, especially the ideal type, is consistent with the position of this dissertation, there are perhaps some alternatives worthy of attention. If, for example, instead of differentiating classificatory, extreme, and ideal types on the basis of their potential for generalization and explanation per se, one were to conceive of the types as located in a nexus of abstraction that proceeds from concrete through abstract to formal levels of scientific discourse, respectively, then differentiation becomes relatively clear. That is, the concrete level might be defined as those aspects of human experience that we internalize as observers of natural phenomena. Classificatory types may then be seen as the symbolic expression of this concrete level of discourse. We simply classify the subjects and objects of our experience with like subjects and objects in order to make sense out of this experience.

The abstract level might be seen as qualitatively different from the concrete level in that we perhaps no longer have direct empirical access to the phenomena we experience but we nevertheless polarize our thinking and attribute meaning in the process. Extreme or polar types in this schema appear to symbolically represent an abstract level of scientific discourse because they define an undetermined range of phenomena which can only be described in general and indiscrete terms.

The formal level of discourse might be conceived as dealing with those phenomena of experience which are fully representational as in the example of pure mathematics. At this level of scientific discourse, the operations involve a constructed system of concepts with a highly specified and integrated set of logical internal relations. Correspondingly, the ideal type might be developed as a fully representational system capable of formal specification. Thus, at least the possibility of differentiating type concepts need not only be viewed in terms of vague estimates of generalizability and explanatory potential, but may also be seen as differentiated on the basis of the degree of symbolic representation required or present in each case. This fundamental trifurcation of classificatory, extreme, and ideal types into concrete, abstract, and formal levels of scientific discourse adds some coherence to their properties, the phenomena with which they deal, and potentially clarifies their roles in the

research process. The proposed ideal typical model of friendship, following this chain of reasoning, must therefore have some very specific and formal properties that clearly explain the dynamics of dyadic friendship at a level that is unattainable by simple classificatory or extreme types.

Regardless of the basis for the differentiation of type concepts, the ideal type is nearly always seen as a special case whereby the normal classificatory and ordering criteria seemingly seldom apply. Nevertheless, as Parsons points out in discussing the ideal type:

> The scientific legitimacy, indeed the indispensibility of such concepts is not to be questioned. (1937:33)

or further as J.I Rex notes:

> What makes theory and hard empirical data live sociologically are the ideal types of social structure. Anyone who fails to concern himself with the construction of these will fail to do sociology and will be ill-equipped to help us in our task of demystifying the modern social and political world. (1974:65)

It is significant to note in the above quotations that while the ideal type has obviously been a legitimate and accepted element of social thought for many decades few, if any, have been able to successfully integrate it into their work. The reasons for this difficulty may, once again, be a result of the fact that as Martindale suggests:

> There is no consensus as to whether ideal types are conceptual forms, methodological devices or theories. (1959:57)

and therefore they are often considered as functioning or

not functioning at one, two, or three levels of analysis respectively. This lack of consistency in the treatment of ideal types at various levels of analysis in the literature is evidenced in Martindale's observation that:

> Ideal types tend to be viewed by Max Weber, R. M. MacIver, and R. K. Merton as valuable methodological tools, whereas by T. Parsons, J.C. McKinney, and J. W. N. Watkins, as systematic theories. (1959:58)

The significance of the above quotations is that they are indicative of a vast body of knowledge which portends to represent the scientific treatment of the nature and function of ideal typical phenomena in recent social science theory and empirical research. Clearly, there is little agreement in the works alluded to. Such agreement, if present, might tend to favor one particular theoretical, methodological, or conceptual orientation over another. In order to help explain this confusion over the precise status of the ideal type, the works of Max Weber may provide insight. P. A. Sorokin notes the following of Max Weber's concept of the ideal type:

> It is possibly the most serious attempt to clarify the concept of the ideal social type as a specific method in an investigation of social problems. (1928:720)

and J.C. McKinney supports him in suggesting:

> Max Weber made the greatest contribution to the delineation of the procedure of the ideal type, and also the use of it in both historical and social scientific analysis. (1966:1-2)

These two quotations, if taken somewhat out of context, would seemingly suggest that Max Weber's specification of the nature and function of the ideal type in social theory

is complete and without fault or inconsistency. However, though Weber's (1949) thoughts are compelling, the following statement from his own work shows that his conception of the ideal type is far from being completely integrated in any systematic sense:

> Whatever the content of the ideal type, be it an ethical, a legal, an aesthetic, or a religious norm, or a technical, an economic, or cultural maxim or any other type of valuation in the most rational form possible, it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts and to understand and explain them causally. (1949:43)

Weber's remarks appear to lack consistency and integration in this statement for he seems to claim that ideal types have one and only one function in an empirical investigation, namely the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish similarities and differences. The difficulty arises when he, in the same sentence, imputes two other distinct and separate functions to ideal types, specifically understanding and causal explanation. Comparative analysis, understanding, and causal explanation cannot be reduced to a single unit idea, for if one were to accept the function of ideal types as useful devices for comparison their status would be that of a heuristic methodological tool. However, in attributing to them the further functions of understanding and causal explanation, they must also be accepted as systematic theories or, in the least theoretical models. Weber appears to confuse the three

ideas and consequently the three different levels of abstraction and it would therefore seem that Parsons is quite correct in submitting that Weber had a fear of abstraction and that the reason that Weber did not develop a theoretical system out of his methodology was because he failed to overcome the empiricist monistic fallacy (1937:635).

Weber's supposed difficulties with levels of generalization and abstraction are perhaps also evident in his statement on the formation of ideal types. Weber notes:

> An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct, which in its conceptual purity cannot be found anywhere in reality. It is utopia. (1949:90)

Therefore, an ideal type is, for Weber, an analytical construct, which in pure form cannot be found in reality, a tautology when one considers that an analytical construct is by definition abstracted from reality. For Weber to state unequivocally that a pure ideal type cannot be found in reality would seem today somewhat premature. For instance, just because an analytical construct (A) is abstracted from its content (C) for purposes (X) or (Y), it does not necessarily follow that (A) is less real than (C) given (X) or (Y); it follows only that (A) and (C) reflect the same reality (R) removed from each other by degree only given (X) or (Y) as stated. In short, an analytical construct--an

ideal type, and an empirical expression of some component of that construct do not necessarily warrant a division of reality on the basis of observable existence but, rather, may mirror different aspects of a single reality interpreted in symbolic fashion. Given this, the only difference between an analytical construct and a proposed empirical reality may be the rigor one applies to the symbolic representation of either. The amount of abstraction required to accomplish these tasks is seemingly not recognized in Weber's thought, thus prohibiting the clear specification of an ideal type theory. As Shils notes in the introduction to Weber's Methodology of the Social Sciences:

> Weber's methodological writings raise important questions regarding the structure of a theoretical system...he brings the problem before us in a most interesting way, but leaves it unsolved. (1949:VII-VIII)

It is evident that questions regarding the precise nature, structure, and function of ideal types in social science were not by any means solved at the time of Weber's writing. In fact, today, it would appear that scholars still struggle with the same issues that Weber addresses in his methodological works. What would appear to be continually challenged is the ability of scientists to utilize theoretical systems of thought in an objective fashion. This remains as contentious an issue today as it was in Weber's time. The fact that Weber leaves questions of this nature unsolved is clearly indicative of the continued significance they have on both the direction and goals of scientific

inquiry in sociology.

It may be suggested that, if sociology is to mature and emerge as a vital and rational discipline in Weber's sense, the disparity between theoretical systems and human values can and must be eliminated. Social scientists can not afford the luxury of specialized empirical training at the expense of theoretical understanding, nor can the theoretician afford to intellectualize away the substance and input of observables. There is a critical need in today's scientific community for generalists whose specialty is the integration of synthetic and actual experience. The hope of a maturing science would seem to rest in part on the strength of its transformations, from the synthetic to the actual and vice versa. A design which purports to deal with variables of human substance must integrate human values with the products of human experience or fail in the process.

The ideal typical model of friendship, yet to be specified in this section, is an example of an ideal type that in contrast to Weber's beliefs can be found in "reality." Its strengths are in its transformations from the synthetic properties of the constructs of which it is composed to real and actual empirical references in the human life cycle. It will also be observed that these life cycle events feed back into the constructs themselves in a continuous loop, thus creating an open systems environment. Interpreted in this way, the ideal type of friendship must be seen as a theoretical system. As C. G. Hempel notes:

> Ideal types can serve their purpose only if they are introduced as interpreted theoretical systems, ie. by (a) specifying a list of characteristics with which the theory is to deal, (b) formulating a set of hypotheses in terms of those characteristics, (c) giving those characteristics an empirical interpretation, which assigns to the theory a specific domain of application, and as a long range objective, incorporating the theoretical system into a more comprehensive theory. The method of the ideal type then becomes indistinguishable from the methods used by other scientific disciplines in the formulation and application of explanatory concepts and theories. (1965:171)

Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, ideal types will be viewed as interpreted theoretical systems that exist in a framework of abstraction that extends from the concrete through the abstract to the formal levels of scientific discourse and are capable of both synthetic and actual transformations of information. They operate at the concrete level as classificatory devices, at the abstract level as heuristic conceptual tools, and at the formal level as interpreted theoretical systems. This definition of ideal types effectively integrates the often confused and conflicting body of research that emphasizes one aspect of the operation of ideal types at the expense of others. They clearly have been shown to function in all of the above ways in the discipline and this definitional framework allows the competing points of view to mutually co-exist.

C. Deriving an Ideal Typical Model of Friendship

The ideal typical model of friendship and friendship relationships to be derived and defended in this section originates in a sense with Montaigne's (1935) remarks on the nature of friendships:

> ..all those amities that are created and nourished by pleasure or profit, public or private needs, are so much the less noble, and so much the less friendships, as they introduce some other cause and design and fruit into friendship than itself. (1935:184)

While, on the surface, this statement might appear to simply provide yet another description of what "real" or ideal friendships are not or should not be, it actually seems to contain the scheme and the germ of an ideal type of friendship and friendship relationships. For instance, if one attends closely: first, to the significance that Montaigne places on "amities" as an (intrinsic) end in itself, and second, to his suggestion that friendships formed for (extrinsic) means to other ends in the forms of "public or private" gains; then Montaigne has done much more than simply describe the nature or character of friendships. He has, perhaps unwittingly, provided us with a preliminary way to meaningfully define and differentiate between and among the various forms of dyadic friendship that we as individuals may encounter in social experience. He has made this possible by advancing the criteria of friendship existing as both an intrinsic end in itself and as an extrinsic means to other ends which, together, define the conceptual limits, boundaries, or the possibility space of a

rudimentary friendship model. That is, he has identified the extremum of an ideal typical model of friendship within which various types and subtypes might be seen to operate. However, before the substance of the model can be further articulated, some inferences and assumptions are required, and as R. Paine (1969), and Albert and Brigante (1962) have pointed out:

> ...assumptions seem unavoidable and perhaps justifiable at the outset... (Paine, 1969:506)

and that:

> It is clear than in the discussion of friendship, one must make some of the same broad assumptions that one does in discussing any human behavior. (Albert and Brigante, 1962:35)

Given the preliminary statement by Montaigne and given that there is a need for some assumptions in attempting to explain the phenomenon of friendship, then, if one assumes:

1. that friendship is a dyadic association between individuals who may or may not personally and independently accept or reject friendship as an intrinsic end in itself or as an extrinsic means to other ends (and)
2. that individuals will develop either intrinsic or extrinsic friendship value orientations as by products of socialization and social experience (and)
3. that individuals may or may not differ in their acceptance or rejection of intrinsic or extrinsic value orientations (and)

4. that the friendship dyad will "improve" or "deteriorate" in its character to the degree that each individual's friendship value orientation either approaches friendship as an end in itself or avoids friendship as a means to other ends in the case of the former or avoids friendship as an end in itself or approaches friendship as a means to other ends in the case of the latter

a basis for an ideal typical model is evident. For example, if one accepts these four assumptions suggested by Montaigne's statement about friendship it is subsequently possible to determine the significance of each individual's friendship value orientation to the character or quality of the dyadic bond formed. Specifically, the dyadic bond must improve in its quality or character when the individuals involved:

A.1 Approach or accept friendship as an end in itself, or,

A.2 Avoid or reject friendship as a means to other ends.

Similarly, the quality or character of the dyadic bond must deteriorate or decay to the degree that the individuals involved:

B.1 Approach or accept friendship as a means to other ends, or,

B.2 Avoid or reject friendship as an end in itself.

It is suggested that these two pairs of constructs represent four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive friendship value orientations that individuals may carry with them into all of their potential daydic friendship associations. (Figure 1.)

Assuming then, that each individual may possess one or another of these four friendship value orientations prior to the formation of any friendship dyad, it is further evident that not all of the permutations or possible alternatives are accounted for. That is, while it is quite simple to determine the effect on the dyad should A or B (above) occur, "healthy" and "unhealthy" respectively, the problem is to determine the degree of health and or sickness of the friendship dyads potentially formed by the permutations and combinations of the friendship value orientations in A and B. (Figure 2.) The basic permutation, however, defines a healthy friendship as occurring when both individuals in the dyad either accept friendship as an end in itself or reject friendship as a means to other ends. Correspondingly, an unhealthy friendship is defined as occurring when both individuals in the dyad either reject friendship as an end in itself or accept friendship as a means to other ends. In order to further define the model, some additional assumptions are required:

1. That "true" or completely altruistic friendship is only possible when both individuals approach or accept friendship as an end in itself or when both

individuals may be said to possess an intrinsic friendship value orientation (IFSVO)

2. That the dyad formed by combined intrinsic friendship value orientations is the strongest, most viable, and most enduring primary type of friendship.

3. That "false" friendship has two primary forms or types, one egoistic and one exploitative, both being less strong, less viable, and less enduring than primary altruistic friendship, and within this category the latter being less strong etc. than the former.

4. That primary "false" egoistic friendship occurs if and only if both individuals accept friendship as a means to other ends or when both individuals may be said to possess an extrinsic friendship value orientation (EFSVO).

5. That the dyad formed by combined extrinsic friendship value orientations is viable and enduring only to the degree that it benefits the ego's of its members. It is not true friendship but it is not exploitative of one individual at the expense of the other. It is mutual.

6. That exploitative friendship occurs when either individual approaches or accepts friendship as a means to an end, or avoids or rejects friendship as an end in itself in such a way so as to create a

polar conflict where an intrinsic friendship value orientation is brought into contact or correspondence with an extrinsic friendship value orientation. The conflicting friendship value orientations result in the exploitation of one individual by the other.

7. The dyads formed by opposing friendship value orientations are the least strong, least viable, and least enduring of all friendships. (Figure 3.)

These seven assumptions, whether completely valid or not, are heuristic. They provide, at this stage in the model derivation, a means to distinguish between and among four primary types of friendship; altruistic, egoistic, exploitative I, and exploitative II--the second exploitative category being the mirror image of the first. More specifically, they allow us to begin to evaluate, in an ordinal sense, the quality of our friendships on the basis of the friendship value orientations brought forward by the individual actors involved in the dyad. They permit one, in a sense, to "grade" the quality of friendships formed from most true through to least true and assign them to one of four defined categories that represent a correspondence or dissociation of specific friendship value orientations. In addition, these seven assumptions permit one to say that: (1)not all friendships are alike, (2)not all friendships are formed and maintained for the same reasons, and (3)not all friendships are necessarily "healthy" for the individual

"friends."

The model is, however, as yet incomplete. That is, not only must one be able to differentiate altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative friendships but one must also be able to distinguish between degrees of each of these primary types. Altruism, for example, may be seen to occur several times in the model, the primary type being labeled (W.1)(Figure 4.). Specifically, in addition to the primary type, two secondary types (W2.), (W3.) and one tertiary type (W4.) have been identified. The assumptions behind the secondary and tertiary types are as follows: that while a "true" or primary altruistic friendship cannot exist unless both individuals accept friendship as an end in itself, a secondary (somewhat less of an altruistic state) can exist as long as one individual accepts friendship as an end in itself and the other individual rejects friendship as a means to other ends. Here, in effect, one individual's friendship value orientation is positive toward friendship as an end in itself while the other's orientation is not negative. In other words, the later individual's friendship value orientation is, though not intrinsic, not extrinsic either. There is some "uncertainty" here, on the second individual's part, but not enough to define the relationship as something other than altruistic. This defines cells (W2.) and (W3.) as secondary altruistic friendship.

Tertiary altruism is the least viable category of altruistic friendship in the model. It occurs only when both

individuals reject friendship as a means to other ends in terms of their friendship value orientations. It is important to note here, that rejection of friendship as a means to other ends is conceptually and analytically different from the acceptance of friendship as an end in itself, otherwise there would be no difference between the primary and tertiary forms. The assumption that makes this distinction work is that since both individuals reject friendship as a means to other ends they are more likely to accept it as an end in itself than as a means to other ends.

Similarly, though primary egoistic friendship (Z1.) (Figure 5.) cannot exist unless both individuals approach or accept friendship as strictly a means to other ends, secondary egoistic friendship (Z2.), (Z3.) and tertiary egoistic friendship (Z4.) are also possible under certain conditions. Secondary egoism will occur for example when one individual is seen to accept friendship as a means to other ends and the other rejects friendship as an end in itself. In this case, one individual approaches friendship as a means to an end which serves his or her egoistic purposes and the other, while not doing the same, does at least not have the opposite orientation. That is, there is a greater possibility that the "other" will put up with if not contribute to the first individual's egoism than adopt the opposite orientation.

Tertiary egoistic friendship (Z4.) is the weakest, least viable, form of egoism in that both individuals reject

friendship as an end in itself but do not, as a result, necessarily accept it as a means to other ends.

Exploitative friendship (Figure 6.), unlike altruistic and egoistic friendship, has two primary (X1.), (Y1); four secondary (X2.), (X3.), (Y2.), (Y3.); and two tertiary forms (X4.), (Y4.). In this case the possibilities are doubled simply because it is necessary to distinguish individual A and individual B in terms of their respective friendship value orientations. That is, exploitative Type I keys on the orientations of individual A, while exploitative Type II keys on the orientations of individual B. They are each the mirror image of the other.

The primary exploitative forms of friendship occur when one individual, A, accepts friendship as a means to other ends and the other, B, accepts friendship as an end in itself (Y1.), or, when individual B accepts friendship as a means to other ends and individual A accepts friendship as an end in itself (X1.). Both of these scenarios are examples of primary exploitative friendship, Type I and Type II respectively. They represent the strongest occurrences of an exploitative friendship relationship because each individual is opposite to the other in terms of their friendship value orientations and therefore by definition someone is bound to be "hurt" by the association.

The less severe of these exploitative forms are the secondary exploitative cases (X2.), (X3.), (Y2.), (Y3.). In these cases, both the means and the ends are accepted and

rejected by the respective individuals resulting in an exploitative polarity but not as severe a polarity as in the primary forms.

The least severe exploitative form of friendship is represented in cells (X4.) and (Y4.), where both ends and means are reflected by the individuals involved. There is a polarity of friendship value orientation here as well but there is also the greatest amount of uncertainty in these cells and therefore they are the least severe of the exploitative forms.

This completes a preliminary formal statement of the model (Figure 7.), however it is necessary to briefly summarize and restate the parameters of its development. The basis for distinguishing four primary types of friendship; altruistic, egoistic, exploitative I, and exploitative II; is a friendship value orientation which individuals develop as a byproduct of socialization and social experience. The individuals in question either accept or reject friendship as an end in itself (intrinsic valuation) and/or accept or reject friendship as a means to other ends (extrinsic valuation).

The acceptance by both individuals of friendship as an end in itself (intrinsic friendship value orientation or IFSVO), or the acceptance on the part of one individual of friendship as an end in itself (Intrinsic Friendship Value Orientation) and rejection on the part of the other of friendship as a means to other ends (extrinsic friendship

value orientation or EFSVO), or the mutual rejection of friendship as a means to other ends (extrinsic friendship value orientation) constitute degrees of the "highest" form of friendship, labeled altruistic. (Figure 4.) Further, because there is a greater degree of commitment involved in the acceptance of intrinsic friendship value orientations than in the rejection of extrinsic friendship value orientations, the highest form of friendship within the altruistic category is identified and referred to as primary altruistic friendship (PAF). It involves the mutual acceptance, then, of friendship as an end in itself, or, occurs as a result of combined intrinsic friendship value orientations. The next highest form of altruistic friendship combines an intrinsic friendship value orientation with the rejection of an extrinsic friendship value orientation, where one and only one of the individuals may be seen to accept friendship as an end in itself while the other rejects friendship as a means to other ends and/or vice versa. These categories are identified and referred to as secondary altruistic friendship, (secondary altruistic friendship), and mediate between the primary altruistic friendship and the lowest form of altruistic friendship called tertiary altruistic friendship, (TAF). (Figure 8.)

The category of TAF occurs in the model when both individuals in question reject friendship as a means to other ends, or, where both reject extrinsic friendship value orientations. It, as a category, is least altruistic of the

four types because of the absence of intrinsic friendship value orientations, yet it is not egoistic or exploitative because both individuals reject extrinsic friendship value orientations.

Similarly, egoistic friendship is seen to have primary, secondary, and tertiary forms, (Figure 9.). Primary egoistic friendship (PEF) occurs when both individuals accept friendship as a means to other ends or may be said to have combined extrinsic friendship value orientations. This form is most egoistic because both individuals approach their friendship as a product of other ends. It is an accident of association in a sense, but does not necessarily harm either individual. Secondary egoistic friendship (SEF) occurs when one of the two individuals accepts friendship as a means to other ends (extrinsic friendship value orientation) and the other rejects friendship as an end in itself (rejection of intrinsic friendship value orientation). Here, one individual in a sense uses their friendship (extrinsic friendship value orientation) but the other complies willingly so both ego's are saved and neither individual is necessarily exploited.

The least egoistic form of friendship, tertiary egoistic friendship (TEF), arises when both individuals reject friendship as an end in itself (combined rejection of intrinsic friendship value orientations). This is a rather undefined state, however it accounts for those friendships that seem to persist for no apparent reason intrinsically or

extrinsically.

Exploitative friendship (Figure 10.) has eight forms; two primary, four secondary, and two tertiary. Primary exploitative friendship (PExF) is seen to occur when one individual accepts friendship as an end in itself (intrinsic friendship value orientaion) and the other accepts it as a means to other ends (extrinsic friendship value orientation). This is the most severe form of exploitation in friendship, the clear cut battle between intrinsic and extrinsic friendship value orientations. To use an analogy, one individual offers his/her hand in friendship, the other accepts it but steals his/her watch.

Secondary exploitative friendship (SExF) is less severe than (primary exploitative friendship) in that one individual either: (1) accepts friendship as and end in itself (intrinsic friendship value orientation) while the other rejects friendship as an end in itself (rejection of intrinsic friendship value orientation), or (2) one individual accepts friendship as a means to other ends (extrinsic friendship value orientation) while the other rejects friendship as a means to other ends (rejection of extrinsic friendship value orientation). In each case of (1) and (2) above, the individuals are at odds in their friendship value orientations such that one accepts what the other rejects, it exploits both but less so than in primary exploitative friendship where each accepts the opposite orientation.

Tertiary exploitative friendship (TExF) is the least severe form of exploitative friendship. It may be seen to occur when both individuals reject opposite friendship value orientations. That is, one individual rejects friendship as a means to other ends (rejection of extrinsic friendship value orientation) while the other rejects friendship as an end in itself (rejection of intrinsic friendship value orientation). Exploitation is evident because neither individual accepts the other's friendship value orientation. Tertiary exploitative friendship is somewhat of an amorphous category, however it probably accounts for cases of exploitative friendship where the degree of exploitation is so small as to be considered negligible.

Thus, an ideal typical model of friendship has been introduced which, based upon the criteria of acceptance and/or rejection of intrinsic or extrinsic friendship value orientations, has defined sixteen mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories of friendship and friendship relationships. The basic friendship types, their primary, secondary and tertiary forms, and their total frequency of occurrence are summarized in Figure 11.

The basic types are arranged from most like Montaigne's ideal of "true" friendship to least. Within the primary, secondary, and tertiary basic types there are a series of continua from the most strong to the least strong occurrence of the subtype. Between the basic types, continua of viability are formed from most viable to least viable. Thus,

though altruistic friendship as a general and basic type closely approximates Montaigne's ideal, primary altruistic friendship is in fact the specific personification of this ideal. It is both the strongest subtype within the basic category of altruism and the most viable subtype among the other subtypes. Similarly, at the opposite extreme, tertiary exploitative friendship, in either of its two types, is the weakest subtype within the basic categories of exploitative friendship and is also the least viable subtype among the other subtypes. All of the remaining subtypes fall to a greater or lesser degree between the extremes created and defined by these continuua. This completes the formal specification of the model of friendship.

D. Defending an Ideal Typical Model of Friendship

There are perhaps two initial ways in which a model such as the one presented in this section can or should be defended: (1) in terms of support for the assumptions required in its derivation and, (2) with respect to the degree of explanatory power that it yields. Both of these avenues of defense will be explored at some length.

First, then, with reference to point (1) above, it is clear at this point in the thesis that the main assumption of the model, that friendship must take and be interpreted as having many forms, is well justified in the literature. Rather than repeat the substance of the breadth of the arguments that support this assumption and this approach,

suffice it to say that as Stouffer and Jackson (1962) and J.M. Reisman (1979) have pointed out:

> ...there is variability from individual to individual in the intimacy of friendships. (Stouffer and Jackson, 1962:482)

and that there are many different kinds of friendship that:

> ...may be of very different degree of intimacy and closeness. (Reisman, 1979:1)

Thus, as has already been pointed out in many contexts, one is on fairly solid ground in assuming at the outset that friendships of many kinds exist and furthermore that there is variability in the degree of intimacy and closeness in their expression from individual to individual. The main assumption of the model is therefore both substantiated and defensible.

Seemingly, somewhat of a more contentious assumption in terms of the model's derivation may appear to be the use of "intrinsic ends" versus "extrinsic means" as boundary conditions for kinds and levels of friendship. Upon close inspection, however, these ideas may be seen to be more or less explicit in the works of several sociologists and social anthropologists who have been concerned with friendship's forms. Allan (1979) for example, identifies the priority of these criteria in suggesting that "true" friendship:

> ...should be undertaken for its own sake (which is interpreted as an end in itself) rather than for some ulterior motive or as a means to some other end. (1979:43) (Parentheses Author's)

Similarly, Parsons (1951) points to the value of these

criteria as well in emphasizing the "expressive/diffuse" properties of friendship as opposed to "instrumental/specific" ones. Paine (1969) and Wolf (1966) have also entertained the importance of making a distinction between ends and means with respect to friendship's potential types and forms. Thus, though the inspiration for these elements of the model emerge from Montaigne (1935), they find specific support and expression in the works of many contemporary sociologists. The use of means and ends as boundary conditions in the derivation of friendship types is therefore substantiated.

Support for the assumptions in the model consistent with the suggestion that individuals acquire friendship value orientations (intrinsic friendship value orientations) and (extrinsic friendship value orientations) as by products of socialization and social experience and subsequently carry these orientations in the form of socially and culturally conditioned expectations into their potential friendship associations comes from a variety of sources. Foremost among these sources, is Williams' (1970) treatment of values and value orientations in American society. In this work, Williams clearly shows that while friendship is not in his opinion a dominant cultural value, he alludes to the possibility that friendship may be a quasi-value or a "value orientation" that may help us to order, integrate, and otherwise make sense out of our values. In a sense what he is suggesting or perhaps more accurately what one might

impute to his remarks derives as follows: (1) since friendship may be a value orientation and, (2) since friendship takes many forms, (3) many kinds of friendship may therefore mean many kinds of friendship value orientations. Thus, Williams' discussion of values and value orientations paves the way for differentiating between friendship types on the basis of the friendship value orientations held by individual members of a friendship dyad.

Perhaps the greatest support, however, for the usage of friendship value orientations as differentia specifica in the derivation of the model relates to the need to understand the motives behind the formation of friendships of different kinds or forms. Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954:25), for example, have made exactly this point in a critique of empirical studies of friendship. They suggest that a more comprehensive model of friendship must be developed in sociology that focuses on the processes (motives) that give rise to friendships, instead of simply relying on empirical accounts of observed friendship patterns. In other words, there is not only a need to observe, describe, and record patterns of friendship in our society, but there is an even greater need to understand why we make the kinds of friends that we do. The former is important, but the latter is a priority.

The question is, then, what do the friendship value orientations advanced in the model have in common with

motives? Paine (1969) provides the necessary link between motives and friendship types when he notes:

> Pitt-Rivers said some time ago now, 'the criterion which distinguishes true from false' friendship flees...into the realms of motive.' (1969:507)

and, the model, in conjunction with Williams (1970), simply extends this position to suggest that friendship value orientations have motivational properties which predispose individuals to gravitate toward altruistic, egoistic, or exploitative friendship types. Therefore the friendship value orientations derived in the model reflect the motives involved in the kinds of friendship choices an individual makes.

More support for the existence of friendship value orientations and their usage in the model comes from Albert and Brigante (1962:38). They cite "mutual value orientations" as one of the key structural elements that leads to the greatest degree of friendship potential between two individuals located in a social system. Specifically, Albert and Brigante would suggest that the greater the similarity of mutual value orientations between two individuals the greater would be their friendship potential. This generalization is almost completely consistent with the assumptions made about friendship value orientations. It is different, however, in two respects: (1) it deals only with value orientations in a general sense and (2) while it structurally accounts for potential friendship formations on the basis of mutuality of value orientations and the degree

of "free or forced" choice involved (1969:39), it posits only one kind of friendship and cannot accommodate multiple forms. Therefore, though Albert and Brigante's structural model of friendship supports the use of value orientations with respect to friendship potential its focus on one kind of friendship renders it sterile.

Support for the existence assumptions made in the derivation of the model with reference to the basic types of altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative friendship plus the relations among the subtypes within and between each basic category is found in Aristotle's (1962) discussion. In this work, Aristotle defines three types of friendship, perfect friendship, friendship based on pleasure, and friendship based upon utility. (1962:218-219) These types correspond precisely with the altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative forms attributed to Montaigne's (1935) discussion. Thus the existence and continuing relevance of this tri-fold division would appear to have a long tradition in European social thought. The difficulty has been that until now social science has seemingly lacked the conceptual apparatus to effectively describe and discriminate among these types. This, however, is accomplished in at least a preliminary way in the model.

More contemporary support for each of the basic types comes from several scholars. Blum (1980), for example, supports the existence of altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative friendship as basic types when he suggests:

> ...friendship (or, anyway, most genuine friendship) involves substantial concern for the good of the friend for his own sake, and or a disposition to act to foster that good, simply because the other is one's friend. In this sense friendship is an altruistic phenomenon, and a locus of the altruistic emotions. This altruistic aspect is essential to friendship; a relationship based solely on mutual advantage (even if it involved mutual liking) would not in this sense be a friendship. (1980:43)

In this statement, Blum not ony supports the existence of altruistic friendship as an end in itself but also supports the differentiation of altruistic friendship from egoistic and exploitative forms in the model in that these last two types represent less than altruistic forms. In addition, this view of altruistic friendship as the most productive and most intimate form of friendship is consistent with the assumptions made in the model's derivation and with E. Fromm's (1955:38) and Lowenthal and Haven's (1968:20) statements on the nature and benefits of productive, intimate relationships.

Further evidence in support of the derivation of egoistic friendship as a basic type begins with T. Burn's (1953:654) implication that many friendships are friendships in name only and that often they are "disguised hostility" and are maintained only by what he calls "the polite fiction." Mutual benefit would, in Burns' analysis, appear to be the operational criteria for these less than noble kinds of friendship that have been labeled egoistic. Blum (1980) also supports the existence of an egoistic friendship type with his suggestion that though a selfish or egoistic

person may not have friends in the fullest sense, they, nevertheless:

> ...can have friends...or at least share interests and activities and can wish another well. (1980:48)

Yet the egoist, according to Lepp (1966), though he or she may have friends as Blum suggests, has "interior" constraints on his or her availability for "true" friendship. Specifically Lepp has suggested:

> When people are egocentric, when they have no thought for the needs of others but rather seek from them only egoistical satisfaction their unavailability (for true friendship) is of an interior subjective kind. (1966:170) (Parentheses Author's)

Thus, according to Burns, Blum, and Lepp, the idea of a basic egoistic friendship type, based upon the advantage gained by ego in the "hypothetical" friendship, is supported and is defensible.

Support for the final basic or pure type of friendship generated in the model, exploitative friendship, where one individual is seen to exploit the other purely for his or her own gain, comes from many sources as well. Chief among these sources are those that deal with the issues of pseudo intimacy or as some have called it, pseudo- Gemeinschaft. Ramsoy (1968) summarizes the character of the exploitative friendship type in noting:

> The suggestion has been made that a highly differentiated society with a high degree of mobility and emphasis on specific performance cannot also support enduring and important intimate relationships beyond those of the nuclear family. This may be the structural source of pseudo-Gemeinschaft, that is, appeals, usually commercial that use a presumption of closeness to

> transfer modes of behavior from a friendship setting to strangers, with the consequent growth of values of superficial friendship, and popularity. (1968:12,13)

Thus, in Ramsoy's opinion, pseudo or exploitative friendship is not only possible in our society but is structurally encouraged by our value system. Generalizing across all of the basic friendship types discussed, perhaps Blum (1980) says it best when he suggests:

> ...there are very different levels of friendship, levels which are understood in moral terms, in terms of how fully one cares for the other. (1980:73)

This completes a defense of the basic assumptions required in the derivation of the model. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that it is accurate and defensible to assume:

1. that friendship varies in its forms and in its degree of intimacy (and)
2. that intrinsic ends and extrinsic means are useful and adequate boundary conditions for a friendship model (and)
3. that individuals develop friendship value orientations as by products of socialization and social experience (and finally)
4. that friendship takes three basic forms; altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative.

Moving, then, from a defense of the assumptions required in the derivation of the model to the second defensive strategy which deals specifically with the explanatory power the model generates, several points are

emergent. First, the model may be seen to explain why one should take heed of Cicero's (1967:78) "rule of friendship." That is, it explains why as Cicero warns we should "carefully watch" both the demands we make on our friends and the demands we allow them to make upon us. The critical point is that from the standpoint of the model, if either the demands we make or have imposed upon us in our friendships become too heavily weighted in terms of extrinsic services, our friendships may deteriorate into egoistic or simply exploitative forms. In other words we come to sacrifice the intrinsic convenience of friendship in its altruistic form for the friendship for convenience which may be egoistic or exploitative. Therefore, the self monitoring requirement implicit in Cicero's rule of friendship is supported by this type of friendship model.

In addition, the model may also be seen to explain why, as Cooley (1929:23) points out, a primary group is not all "harmony and love" and why various degrees of tension and hostility are very much a part of some kinds of friendships. Specifically, in this regard, the model points out that when individual's friendship value orientations are at odds with each other to the degree that their motives and thus their expectations may be interpreted as conflicting, then, should this friendship persist, it must necessarily carry a higher level of tension than a friendship where there is a mutuality of friendship value orientations. Thus, exploitative friendships in their primary, secondary, and

tertiary forms support and reflect Cooley's remarks, and by definition, these friendships carry with them the highest degree of tension and hostility of all of the friendship types. This is not to say, however, that altruistic and egoistic forms do not contain some tension and hostility, but is rather to suggest that potential for conflict is greatest among the exploitative friendship types. The model explains the significance and relevance of tension and hostility to these specific kinds of friendship relationships.

Simmel (1950:127), it will be remembered, has suggested that intimate content in a relationship does not necessarily make that relationship intimate. This fact is supported by the model as well in that; the degree of intimacy in friendship is not measured or defined by a simple enumeration of intimacies, shared or not shared, but rather by the friendship value orientations that individuals bring forward into their association. Therefore, knowledge, or awareness of a particular value orientation, precludes the possibility that the behavior in question will not be in accordance with the motives of the individual. In short, "that I act like your friend" does not mean that "I am your friend" unless my motives are intrinsic and, in a sense, pure.

The basic categories of friendship described in the model also help to clarify the confusion in the literature over the self or other oriented nature of friendship. It is

both. Friendship is most other oriented in its altruistic forms and least other oriented in its exploitative forms. Correspondingly, it is most self oriented in its egoistic and exploitative forms and least self oriented in its altruistic forms. Thus, the question of the self and/or other oriented nature of friendship is not an either/or matter but is rather, a question of degree.

Though many scholars have noted and spoken of the connection between friendship and mental health, (Rake, 1970; Rangell, 1963; Lepp, 1966), the model also explains why not all forms of friendship are or will be healthy for both of the individuals involved. Those friendships formed, for example, where A exploits B to some other particular end can hold little reward or consensual validation compared to those that approach a Gemeinschaft of spirit and mind in the state of primary altruistic friendship. There is probably a continuum here, as well, from most healthy in a mental health sense to least healthy with respect to the friendship forms and one might speculate that the altruistic forms have the greatest potential for mental health.

The model also explains the nature of the "risks" we make and take in our friendship relationships (Greeley, 1970). In general, the model would suggest that the risks we take in friendship are governed by the value orientations we bring, once again, to a potential friendship. Thus we risk more by way of depth and feeling in a relationship with an intrinsic friendship value orientation than we do with an

extrinsic friendship value orientation, and therefore an altruistic friendship is by definition more risky than any of the other forms. Commitment and attachment in friendship as Goffman (1961) discusses can also be explained this way.

Given the benefit seemingly afforded by an altruistic friendship type, one might wonder why an individual would "settle for" anything less in their friendship relationships. The friendship model, of course, specifies that many individuals will, on the basis of their value orientations, develop either egoistic or exploitative friendships if these value orientations are not intrinsically motivated. Both E. Fromm (1959) and W. Schofield (1970) support and add clarity to this position in noting:

> ...the ultimate choice for man, inasmuch as he is driven to transcend himself, is to create or destroy, to love or to hate...love and hate are not two instincts which exist independently. They are both answers to the same need for transcendence, and the will to destroy must rise when the will to create cannot be satisfied. (Fromm, 1955:42)

and that:

> ...when the channels for forming, maintaining, and using the friendship relationship are closed or constricted, the deprived individual will look for approximations. (Schofield, 1970:212)

Thus, in these authors' opinions, the reason why individuals may settle for less than altruistic friendships is that they lack the resources to develop them in the first place. These resources are explained by the model as capacities and propensities that accompany friendship value orientations.

Another point worthy of note with respect to these statements by Fromm and Schofield is that both suggest or imply than when channels for realizing productive friendships (altruistic) are closed, individuals will "destructively" seek out approximations. In other words as far as the model is concerned extrinsic friendship value orientations might be interpreted to be substituted for intrinsic friendship value orientations in the absence of the later and therefore these approximations are synonymous with egoistic and exploitative friendship types. This simply suggests that egoistic and exploitative friendship types, while no less natural in their occurrence than altruistic types, primarily occur or develop out of destructive as opposed to productive orientations and therefore in a sense represent the dark sides of friendships in our society. This darkness has both structural and interpersonal consequences but its severity can only be understood or judged in terms of the "light" afforded by the altruistic forms. The model makes this kind of comparison possible.

In summary, it is evident that the ideal typical model of friendship and friendship relationships described in this section is not only defensible in terms of the assumptions required in its derivation but that it also adds a great deal to our abilities to explain the phenomenon of friendship. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that the ideal typical model, as an analytical tool, helps one to explain:

1. why we must watch the demands we place on ourselves and others in friendship,
2. why tension and hostility are elements of some friendship relationships,
3. why intimate content in a friendship does not necessarily mean it is an intimate friendship,
4. why friendship is both self and other oriented,
5. why not all forms of friendship are "healthy."
6. why there is "risk" in friendship,
7. why friendships vary in commitment and attachment,
8. and why individuals may settle for less than perfect friendships.

The model, however, though it may help us to explain these and other questions associated with the nature of friendships, it is an ideal typical model and not a systematic theory of friendships. The constructed model has explanatory and heuristic capabilities. However, a theory would have predictive power as well. The predictive abilities of the ideal typical model are yet to be observed.

Before moving on to the next section of the thesis and a consideration of the application of the friendship model to selected aspects of the human life cycle, there is one final point of view that clearly grounds the dynamics of the model in the nexus of sociological theory. This connection is provided by Max Weber.

Weber (1961) mentions "friendship" several times in his discussion of the concept of social relationship. The

definitional criteria that Weber uses both conform to and support the assumptions made in the friendship model. Weber notes:

> 1. Thus as a defining criterion it is essential that there should be a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the others. Its content may be of the most varied nature; conflict, hostility, sexual attraction, friendship, loyalty, or economic exchange...The definition, furthermore does not specify whether the relation of the actors is "solidary" or the opposite.
>
> 2. The meaning relevant in this context is always a case of the meaning imputed to the parties in a given concrete case, on the average or in a theoretically formulated pure type--it is never normatively correct or a metaphysically true meaning...the social relationship consists exclusively in the fact that there has existed, exists, or will exist a probability of action in some definite way appropriate to this meaning.
>
> 3. The subjective meaning need not necessarily be the same for all the parties who are mutually oriented in a given social relationship; there need not in this sense be "reciprocity." "Friendship," "love," "loyalty," "fidelity to contracts," "patriotism" on the one side, may well be faced with an entirely different attitude on the other. In such cases the parties associate different meanings with their actions and the social relationship is in so far objectively asymmetrical from the point of view of the two parties. It may nevertheless be a case of mutual orientation in so far as, even though partly or wholly erroneously, one party presumes a particular attitude toward him on the part of the other and orients his action to this expectation...a relationship is objectively symmetrical only as, according to the typical expectations of the parties, the meaning for one party is the same as that for the other...A social relationship in which the attitudes are completely and fully corresponding is in reality, a limiting case. But the absence of reciprocity will, for terminological purposes, be held to exclude the existence of a social relationship only if it actually results in the absence of a mutual orientation of the action of the parties. Here as elsewhere all sorts of transitional cases are the rule rather than the exception.
>
> 4. ...that a "friendship" or a state exists or has

> existed means this and only this: that we the observers, judge that there is or has been a probability that on the basis of certain kinds of known subjective attitude of certain individuals there will result in the average a certain specific type of action...
>
> 5. The subjective meaning of a social relationship may change, thus...a relationship, once based on solidarity, may develop into a conflict of interests.
>
> 6. The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned, expect to be adhered to by their partners, on the average and approximately...
>
> 7. The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behavior, whether toward each other or toward third persons. (1961:176-177)

The above seven defining features of a social relationship[1] are to a great extent isomorphic with many explicit and tacit elements of the friendship model. To begin with, Weber's first statement applies to the friendship model in that it postulates a certain basic minimum of "mutual orientation," whether it be solidary or not, in order that a social relationship might exist between social actors. The model similarly postulates a minumum of mutual orientation in the forms of value orientations which, as Weber suggests, may also be solidary or not, but nevertheless function to condition the process and the outcomes of the social relationship called friendship.

Weber's suggestions (in points 2, 3, and 4), that the "meaning relevant" and the "subjective meaning" respectively of a relationship like friendship are observer applied

labels in the case of the former, as well as a process of mutual definition with respect to the latter, are also built into the model. Specifically, friendship is first conceived of as having a subjective meaning for each of the individuals involved, to which only they as individuals have access. This subjective meaning is not, as Weber points out, necessarily the same for all of the parties who are mutually oriented in a given social relationship. It is private, interior, and personal as a friendship value orientation. On the other hand, since as Weber implies friendship is also an observer applied label as in "A and B are friends," third party assessments have consequences as well. These assessments are built into the classificatory structure of the model in terms of the four basic pure types of friendship discussed and allow one to deal with what appears to be instances of "good" friends or "bad" friends. At the same time, however, one might suspect that all "friends" subjectively define their friendships as good. Nevertheless, both of these dimensions of meaning that Weber identifies are accounted for in the model and the different forms of friendship identified do consist of "a probability of action" in some definite ways appropriate to these meanings.

Further to point (3), in Weber's analysis, he discusses action orientations in social relationships which are not always symmetrical and are subsequently often asymmetrical. As far as the model is concerned it is a small conceptual jump to translate Weber's remarks on symmetry and asymmetry

in social relationships into a statement that reflects symmetry and asymmetry in friendship value orientations. That is, the combined acceptance and or rejection of friendship as an end in itself or a means to other ends constitutes symmetry in friendship value orientations on the part of the individuals involved which results in primary, secondary, and tertiary forms of altruistic and egoistic friendship relationships. Similarly, the asymmetry that Weber discusses refers directly to and corresponds exactly with the exploitative types of friendship in the model. That is, exploitative friendship relationships always and only result from an asymmetry in friendship value orientations. Therefore, since symmetry and asymmetry are defining features of both the friendship model and a social relationship in Weber's analysis, the model must therefore define or typify a social relationship. In other words, Weber has analytically demonstrated that while symmetrical and asymmetrical polarities of action orientation or friendship value orientations in a social relationship like friendship are quite natural and to be expected, the nature of these polarities does determine or condition the behavior of the actors involved. Thus similarities and differences in friendship value orientation must result in different kinds of behaviors which can and must be classified according to their correspondence to or degree of divergence from the limiting case.

The suggestion that Weber makes in point (5) is, as well, accounted for in the model. Specifically, though the subjective meaning of a friendship for example may change and become in fact a conflict of interests, one must be able in principle to account for those that do not change in this regard and as well for those that publically persist despite such a change. The permutations of the model handle these possibilities nicely.

Weber's points (6 and 7), that complete his definition of a social relationship, imply that friendships as social forms have constant and variable properties and that the meaning the relationship holds for its members involves a process of mutual negotiation. The ideal typical model of friendship presented in this section defines the constants and a field of variation within which these negotiations take place. The end result is a useful, defensible, and theoretically sound model of friendship and friendship relationships. The issue of the model's utility will be explored further in the next section.

IV. SECTION III. FRIENDSHIP AND THE LIFE CYCLE

In the final analysis the strength and the utility of an ideal typical model of friendship and friendship relationships lies in its ability to meaningfully explain and integrate findings relevant to the subject in many areas of investigation. That is, the model must be shown to be generalizable and applicable in many contexts before its utility can be said to be established in any real sense. One of the most challenging areas within which the utility of the model might be tested is that provided by some elements of the human life cycle. However, before attempting such a "test" it is necessary to outline some of the basic connections that have been established in the literature between friendship and the life cycle.

Almost without exception, studies of friendship and the life cycle have not been concerned with the possibility that friendship takes or may take many forms. As a result, kinds of friendship are often described in the literature as dependent only on the particular stages of the life cycle during which these friendships were formed. K.D. Naegale takes this position when he suggests that we:

> ...distinguish kinds of friendship by attending to the spheres of activity or stages in the life cycle in which they were first formed. These are old school friends, and friends from army days, friends bound together through a consuming like interest or occupation, and friends who are just friends. (1958:236)

Thus according to Naegale, kinds of friendships are to be discerned and differentiated from each other on the basis of

our individual developmental histories in the life cycle. While few would debate that the life cycle, interpreted in this way, helps to differentiate between friendships formed at different stages, it does not allow us to make qualitative/evaluative distinctions among the friendships formed at these stages. That is, it does not allow one to deal with the possibility that "army friends" were better, closer, or perhaps just different kinds of friends than "old school friends." Thus, it is important that we distinguish the stages of the life cycle during which we have made our friends but it is also important that we determine the kinds of friends we have made at these stages and why. The friendship model makes these kinds of evaluative distinctions possible.

In another vein, many scholars have studied the importance of the connection between the life cycle and friendship. Schulman (1975), for example, notes that the life cycle effects individual's friendship choices both before and after marriage in suggesting that prior to marriage:

> ...greater involvement with becoming established in a career, seeking companionship, and the search for a mate, leads them to associate with age mates who share these concerns. (1975:820)

and that after marriage:

> ...fewer friendships are formed. (1975:820)

He concludes by stating:

> ...the nature of close relationships does vary with the life cycle and that at each stage people tend to establish and maintain networks of relationships

> geared to the needs and concerns of their particular stage of life. (1975:820)

Therefore in Shulman's opinion the life cycle dictates a pattern of needs and concerns around which individuals form their intimate relationships.

Correspondingly, friendship has also been shown to have some effects on an individual's ability to effectively negotiate later stages of the life cycle. Z. Blau (1961), Lowenthal and Haven (1968), and Rosow (1970) for example note:

> The data...strongly indicate that extensive associations with friends becomes an important mechanism of adjustment in old age following either widowhood or retirement. (Blau, 1961:429-430)

and that:

> The presence of an intimate relationship serves as a buffer both against gradual social losses in role and interaction and against the more traumatic losses accompanying widowhood and retirement. (Lowenthal and Haven, 1968:20)

and finally, Rosow emphasizes these points in suggesting that there is a need for the further study of:

> ...the potential functions of friendship in compensating for the specific losses of status (income, widowhood) and instrumental roles (retirement). (1970:67-68)

Thus it would seem, on the one hand, that friendship acts as a buffer or mechanism of adjustment against the role and status loss that accompanys retirement and widowhood. On the other hand, stages in the life cycle determine opportunities for and constraints upon friendship in the first place. In other words, though friendship may effect one's experience of the life cycle, it would appear to be

equally true that the stages of the life cycle also effect friendship. This latter point is further supported either implicitly or explicitly by Allan (1979), Simmel (1950), K. Davis (1950), and Parsons (1951). If this is indeed a "two way street" of mutual influence, as the interaction would suggest, then two questions need to be addressed as far as the application of the model is concerned. First, if friendship in the "singular" effects the individual's experience of the stages of the life cycle, how might the multiple forms of friendship developed in the ideal typical model further explain this effect; and secondly, if the life cycle stages themselves structurally provide both opportunities and constraints for friendship, again in the "singular," then how might the model aid in interpreting this effect?

Responding then to the first question, it follows that multiple forms or kinds of friendship such as those suggested in the model will have multiple and differential effects on the individual's experience of the life cycle stages. For example, if the model is applied and limited to the supposed benefits provided by friendship as a positive mechanism of adjustment to the life cycle stages of retirement and widowhood, some interesting anomalies appear. Specifically, while some kinds of friendship (altruistic) may indeed aid the individual in negotiating the role and status loss of this period, it is extremely doubtful that egoistic or exploitative friendships would aid very much at

all, in this process. Rather, an egoistic or an exploitative friendship must in fact hinder the adjustment potential of the individual by introducing motives that preclude by definition the healthy and successful negotiation of these stages. This scenario re-emphasizes the very great danger there is in viewing friendship as existing only as a positive and beneficial social relationship of one kind or form. That it can also be destructive in its forms and its content must also be considered.

Turning then to the issue of the life cycle creating both opportunities and constraints for friendship formation, it follows from the model:

1. that if one assumes that multiple forms of friendship are possible at almost any stage in the life cycle given the individual's friendship value orientations (and)
2. that the life cycle itself creates both opportunities and constraints for friendship formation in the first place (then)
3. the life cycle must present differential opportunities and constraints for the expression of friendship's multiple forms.

In other words, some stages of the life cycle may, given this reasoning, be more or less prone to one kind of friendship relationship (altruistic, egoistic, or exploitative) as opposed to another. The question is then at what stages of the life cycle do opportunities and

constraints function to influence individuals to perhaps run greater risks of developing intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic friendship value orientations and thus one kind of friendship as opposed to another. This question is approached in two ways: first, in terms of opportunities and constraints for friendships of any kind in the life cycle, and second, with respect to the primary friendship types defined by the model itself.

Generally, it may be argued that friendships of any kind vary in their frequency of occurrence at different stages of the life cycle according to both opportunities and constraints provided by the boundaries of the life cycle itself. That is, for every stage of development in the life cycle, there would appear to be both constraints on friendship in the forms of institutionalized norms and opportunities for friendship created by these same norms. For example, while an individual employed full-time in any capacity may have more opportunities for friendship, he or she may also find the constraints of employment limiting to potential friendship associations. Similarly, though marriage as an institution may provide more opportunities for (combined) friendship formation it may also constrain each partner from forming friends outside of the unit. It would stand to reason then, that as an individual progresses through the developmental stages of occupational entry, marriage, and perhaps family formation, that there are both more opportunities for friendship, at least in terms of an

available pool of eligibles, and yet at the same time there are as well more formal and institutionalized requirements that place priority demands on one's time and energy. Thus, the negotiation of these stages of the life cycle may dictate a high degree of constraint on potential friendships as well.

It is unfortunate, as D. Levinson points out that:

> The literature of biology, psychology, and the social sciences does not contain a systematic conception of the life cycle and its components. (1978:5)

Nevertheless, a number of heuristic and useful developmental perspectives of the life cycle have been advanced over the past few decades, most notably by Freud (1958), Jung (1922), Erikson (1950), Peck (1968), Buhler (1968), Gould (1975), Inkeles (1969), Kolberg (1964), and Atchley (1975). Perhaps the most useful perspective for the purposes of this discussion comes from R.C. Atchley's views of the "life course" which defines the life cycle as consisting of seven developmental stages from infancy, childhood, and adolescence, through young adulthood, middle age, and later maturity, to old age. In each stage he further identifies the central issues and concerns dictated by occupational, family, and economic cycles. With the exception of his views on infancy, where the infant is "at home" and completely dependent on others for his or her needs and well being, Atchley's stages lend themselves well to a discussion of friendship.

If for example: (1) one conceives of the life cycle, in parallel to Atchley, as consisting of seven developmental stages existing between birth and death including childhood (pre-school, primary school), adolescence (secondary, post secondary school), early adulthood (occupational entry, marriage, family), middle adulthood (maximum career involvement), late adulthood (empty nest), old age (retirement), and old age (widowhood); and (2) one develops continua of opportunities and constraints on friendship formation at each of these stages defined as high, medium, and low; where (3) opportunity for friendship formation is defined only in terms of the relative size of the available pool of eligibles at a particular stage, and constraint is defined only in terms of the sheer number of role requirements that may be encumbent upon the individual at that same stage; it is possible to roughly outline the general "friendship potential" given by each successive stage of the life cycle. While this conceptualization provides a very imprecise "guesstimate" of the influence of the life cycle on potential friendships it does allow one to map the contours of the problem. (Figure 12.)

Given this conceptualization the highest opportunities for friendship formation strictly in terms of numbers of eligibles probably occur during the adolescent and adult stages of the life cycle simply because it is during these stages that one may be exposed to the greatest number of contacts. Similarly, childhood, retirement, and widowhood

would seem to provide less opportunity for friendship in this sense. On the other hand, constraints upon friendship formation, strictly in terms of role requirements, are probably lowest during adolesence, retirement, and widowhood, but highest during adulthood.

In summary, combining these views on opportunity and constraint and friendship potential at each stage of the life cycle it follows that:

1. childhood might be defined as having a low friendship potential because it would appear to be characterized by relatively low opportunity and relatively high constraint;
2. adolescence might be defined as having a high friendship potential as it is characterized by relatively high opportunity and relatively low constraint;
3. adulthood might be defined as having a low friendship potential because though opportunity remains high constraints are high as well;
4. retirement might be defined as having a medium friendship potential because constraints are less than in adulthood but on the other hand opportunities are also less; and
5. widowhood might be defined as having a medium to low friendship potential because even though constraints are low opportunities are probably at their lowest.

If this speculation were at least somewhat accurate then one might suggest that friendship potential in the life cycle is greatest during what might be called the pre- and post-adult stages in our society. In the pre-adult stage for example, (adult being defined primarily by full-time participation in the work force) adolescents who are still enrolled in secondary and post secondary educational institutions are in a sense denied "full" adult status as "students" which is both a plus and a minus with respect to the life cycle. That is, they are not "adult" which may mean they resent this "in-between period" of financial dependence but on the other hand they may develop a substantial espirit de corps because they are not expected to be "adult" either, in that they are somewhat less encumbered with the formal requirements often associated with full adult status. Thus, in a sense, they may be more "free" and less constrained to pursue friendship relationships. Simply put, less regularized formal responsibilities may create the time to develop friendships of any kind provided, of course, that opportunity is present.

The post-adult stages of retirement and widowhood are more difficult to assess in this way in several respects. However, a case might be made that since retirement and widowhood involve role and status changes respectively, this may lessen the formal constraints on the individual and thus allow him or her to pursue friendships that may have not been possible before. Yet at the same time because

opportunities are lessened due to the loss of the work role and the status of husband or wife, friendships may become more problematic and difficult. In a very general sense what this conceptualization shows is that the life cycle can potentially have some very real effects on the formation of any kind of friendship relationship simply by virtue of the opportunities and constraints that it affords to friendship.

Returning then to the basic question in terms of the application of the friendship model namely, the degree to which certain stages of the life cycle might be more susceptible to one specific kind of friendship as opposed to another, several suggestions may be advanced prior to examining each stage independently in this regard. First, it is suggested that with the exception of the very young all four primary types of friendship and their subtypes are possible at almost every stage of the life cycle. Second, the pre- and post-adult stages probably hold the most promise for the development of altruistic friendships as not only are opportunities potentially higher and constraints potentially lower during these stages but there is also a greater chance that the individuals involved will develop intrinsic friendship value orientations because there may be less potential extrinsic motives possible at these same stages. Third, adult friendships may run the highest risk of taking egoistic and/or exploitative forms because extrinsic motives seem to impinge more directly upon adulthood concerns than upon any other stage of the human life cycle.

Each of these suggestions derives from the parameters of the friendship model though they have yet to be discussed, grounded, and shown as relevant in each specific stage of the life cycle and this is the task to follow.

A. Childhood

Although childhood friendships may be frequent, intense, and memorable for many reasons they would appear to be constrained in their formation and expression by a host of variables that generate from a plurality of developmental perspectives concerning biological, psychological, and social thresholds that must be attained before a child's thoughts and actions may be considered to be self directed, voluntary, and socially aware. Indeed, the question of a child's capacity to "make friends" of any kind is a matter of debate given the number of perspectives on development given by Freud (1958), Durkheim (1961, 1965), Piaget (1965), and Kolberg (1964) for example. Nevertheless, that children do make and have "friends" by their own or by other's definitions is a social fact and it is the quality of these friendships that is at issue from the standpoint of the model. Generally, the lower opportunities in terms of exposure to a field of eligibles and the high constraints in terms of parental supervision and concern may combine to limit the potential of childhood friendships, the specific forms that they may take are perhaps limited more by the issue of "capacity."

Specifically, the suggestion is that following Piaget (1965), young children's friendships are and must be considered to be primarily of the egoistic forms or types largely because children for the most part lack the "other consciousness" to in effect be altruistic or truly manipulative in an exploitative sense. This quality of consciousness is restrictive of altruistic friendship in particular because the ability to form this type of association is dependent on the ability to respond to altruism or altruistic behavior on the part of others and beyond certain limits children may not have this ability. Thus children take themselves and their immediate perceived needs most seriously and the social world exists for the most part only to meet and fulfill these needs. This is not to say that children cannot and do not have close friends, but is rather to suggest that the motivations and the value orientations of children are centered more around the immediacy of gratifications than they are in the often deferred investments of altruism and altruistic friendships. Children's lack of ability to develop intrinsic friendship value orientations is not inherent in them as children, but is due to cognitive and experiential thresholds which have not yet been attained or reached, which is simply another way of saying that the capacity to make and maintain friendships is both learned and relearned and is not a prewired predetermined propensity.

As with most aspects of human behavior there are exceptions to the rule, however, the key to understanding children's friendships from the standpoint of the model can in part be further understood in the sense that there would appear to be less uncertainty over the value orientations that children carry into their friendships than is perhaps the case in other stages of the life cycle. That is, there is a certain innocence and blatant honesty in the predictability of the egoistic friendship choices made by some children and this is in a peculiar sense comforting. On the other hand what is, perhaps less comforting is the possibility that egoistic choices may continue to be made at later stages of the life cycle where it may be seen as maladaptive and in fact harmful to individuals who have the misfortune to come into contact with an adult with an exploitative friendship value orientation.

B. Adolescence

Adolescence, with generally higher opportunities and lower constraints on friendship formation, presents perhaps the greatest hopes for and challenges to the friendship bond. Adolescence is a time of great uncertainties in an individual and a social sense. Individually it is a period of personality testing (Buhler, 1968) and socially it is a period of more or less stressful experiments with rules, roles, and relationships (Erikson, 1950). Friendship is an important facet of these experiments. As a result of the

stress and uncertainty of this period of development, adolescents have in a sense perhaps less to loose and more to gain in a friendship relationship largely because they have not yet been introduced to, or in some cases imprisoned by, the certitudes and the role requirements of the adult world. The uncertainties here define adolescent friendship choices as problematic in some respects but they also represent an adaptive challenge.

The challenges of adaptation that adolescents face in their friendships may be seen to emerge primarily from two areas:

1. from the impact of peer evaluations of their friendship choices and of their behavior within those units (and)
2. from self evaluations or lack thereof of their associational needs and commitments.

The first point derives from the atmosphere of public scrutiny that informally sets boundaries and controls on the behaviors of friends and which also forms the basis of the age status system and of the status grading that further determines boundaries of eligibility. In these respects one would expect the close scrutiny and potential censure of others to produce a discipline toward altruism in adolescent friendships and it is highly probable that this will in fact occur at least some of the time. The source of altruism is, however, in this case imposed by the collective conscience, as Durkheim (1964) might have suggested, and therefore is in

a sense not freely chosen. Thus, adolescent friendships that follow this pattern are only altruistic by default and not by design and are therefore not altruistic in the sense dictated by the friendship model.

It is in the second sense of self evaluation and perceived needs that the uncertainty of altruistic friendships becomes more clearly evident. That is, since adolescence is a developmental period where issues of identity and identity roles are seldom resolved completely, the bases upon which friendships are negotiated are likely to be in a state of flux as well, and where uncertainty exists in these areas egoistic and exploitative friendships are not only rendered more possible but more probable as well. This would be especially true for those individuals influenced to a lesser degree by the collective conscience.

In summary, although adolescent friendships are somewhat subject to taking egoistic and exploitative forms because of the tentative nature of this period of development (that gives rise to a greater variety of posssible value orientations occurring in combination), they must also be seen to have great altruistic potential. This potential may realize itself largely because of the tentative and uncertain social properties of this time of life which while constraining in some senses are also freedom producing in other senses. Adolescents are in this society seemingly "freer" from the social and structural constraints that by definition inhibit the emergence of

altruistic friendships than perhaps any other age group in the life cycle with the possible exception of those individuals in the retirement and widowhood stages. Thus, the uncertainties and therefore the risks and freedoms of this period may make for some of the strongest and most viable friendships of a lifetime but whether or not they are altruistic, egoistic, or exploitative in their nature is for the most part dependent on the friendship value orientations they possess.

C. Early Adulthood

Probably the most significant issues in early adulthood friendships that tend to constrain and interfere with their development into altruistic forms stem from the kind and quality of institutional commitments made by individuals to careers and family life. conceived. For those young adults who have chosen to marry early, say in their late teens or early twenties, a series of dilemmas present themselves with respect to friendship. Among these dilemmas there are possibly two that bear direct relevance to this discussion:

1. the possibility and probability of defining each other as friends as well as lovers and marriage partners (and)
2. the issue of which premarital friendships to maintain and which to drop.

With respect to the first dilemma, though it is fashionable today for husbands and wives to publically pay

lip service to the quality of their "spousal" friendships and it is also fashionable in some circles to drop hints of the emancipation and redivision of the division of labor in the performance of nuptial duties, the status change that comes with the marriage ceremony functionally eliminates the possibility of close friendship let alone altruistic friendship for the couple. "You are my wife/husband therefore by definition you are both my lover and my friend." It is taken for granted and that is the folly of friendship in marriage.

What is implied here is that marriage still represents a highly structured set of expectations which, whether recognized by the couple or not, may often interfere with the kind and quality of self disclosure necessary to an altruistic friendship which is contingent only on itself for its continuance and its maintenance. What may often happen in early adulthood marriages is that after the idealization of the spouse has worn off and the more routinized aspects of daily living set in, the basis upon which the nuptial friendhip is negotiated changes as well. That is, over a period of time it may become exploitative with one spouse doing more or less of "their share" and the other simply accepting it as "normal" or perhaps transitory and not really worth making a "fuss about." The difficulty here may be that the focal point has changed to where one is a friend now for what they do or do not do instead of for what they contribute to the "spousal" friendship itself.

There is another sense in which spouses may not be able to consider each other as true (altruistic) friends and this may arise again from the instrumentalities incumbent upon them in their new status as husband and wife. Marriage results in a new and reorganized family unit for the bride and the groom. This new family is also a new economic unit, with assets and liabilities prior to the marriage, and since the survival of this unit is dependent on the cooperation of each spouse in this area, conflicts will inevitably arise. The danger here from the standpoint of friendship is that these conflicts, if they are both frequent and intense enough, may alienate and insulate the friendship from further development and growth. In short, the friendship at best may be put "on hold" and at worst may deteriorate into an egoistic symbiosis with each weighing each other's contribution to the marriage with an eye to a deficit.

Thus, with respect to the first dilemma, though one cannot rule out the possibility of altruistic friendship between husband and wife in early adulthood, its probability is low due to the institutionalization of the love relationship, routinization in the division of labor and communication, and imbalances in the scales of economic contribution to the survival of the unit. These factors collectively inhibit the development of intrinsic friendship value orientations on the parts of husband and wife because they superimpose duties and obligations that relate more to the social contract of their association than to the quality

of the association itself. The result may be that though husband and wife may reciprocally define each other as friends, that friendship is likely to be exploitative or egoistic in its nature.

Another dilemma which newly married couples often face is which friendships to keep. Each spouse in this is likely to have a variety of both short and long term "friendship" associations as part of their developmental histories. The obvious problem is first one of definition. That is, prior to the marriage, and according to the model, each individual will have defined their friendships according to their own unique value orientations. The difficulty arises that "your friends become my friends" by rule of marriage. Though this may seldom be the actual case it tends to call up and to emphasize any value divergences that the couple may have as reflected in their independent choices of friends. Further, the problem is that, prior to marriage, individuals may not have even questioned the choices or, more specifically, the value orientations that formed the basis of their friendship choices.

The value divergence thus evident at the point of marriage may bring about one of the first self conscious realizations that friendships of many kinds exist and that perhaps not all of them have been made for the most noble of reasons. Just how the couple deals with this issue is not clear in the literature, though traditionally the influence of the patriarchy (Richmond-Abbott, 1983) has been

predominant. From the standpoint of the model, this dilemma is of major significance because should one or both spouses discover that their husband's and/or wife's friendship choices have been or are purely and contrastingly egoistic or exploitative not only has a battleground been set over friendship choices but perhaps more importantly as far as the couple is concerned the perceived basic value differences may threaten the stability of the early adult marriage or eventuate a series of difficult adjustments.

Clearly, the expectations and demands of marriage as an institution have profound effects on early adult friendships. Most of these effects have been shown to be negative from the standpoint of the possibility of developing altruistic friendships at this stage of the life cycle. There are, however, perhaps four choices or alternatives that young adults may have to some of the traditional barriers to altruistic friendship implied by the institution of marriage. The first of these alternatives concerns what might be referred to as the decision to remain single at least during the young adult stage of the life cycle. While this option may or may not be taken as a result of a conscious decision on the part of the individual in question the very fact that it exists and persists today as a viable and in many ways attractive life style (Stein, 1975, 1983) presents some interesting and different possibilities as far as friendship is concerned.

Unencumbered by the real, imagined, or perceived limits of the marital bond it would seem that these young adults have greater opportunities and less constraints by way of formal role requirements operating on them and are therefore freer to both define their friendships in their own terms, with less interference, and to engage in a wider variety of both same and opposite sex friendship relationships. To the degree and extent to which young adults collectively choose singlehood as a viable lifestyle the probabilities of developing altruistic friendships are indeed higher than for those caught early in the matrimonial web. The problem here, however, from the standpoint of the model is that though there may be more opportunities and less constraints operating on the single person's friendship choices in general, at least compared to those who are married, the quality of these choices is still in question. That is, since neither friendship nor singlehood are as yet institutionalized properties of our society, considerable ambiguity exists concerning appropriate behaviors in these two areas. In other words, a certain amount of normlessness (Durkheim, 1951) exists with respect to single adult friendships both of the same sex and cross-sex varieties. What this means is that to a great extent, individuals are free to indulge themselves in their friendship relationships. Thus, young adults may be free in a sense to pursue altruistic friendships but at the same time they are increasingly vulnerable to egoistic and exploitative

friendship forms (1) since there are fewer checks and balances to their value orientations and (2) since there are few institutionalized norms governing their behaviors as single "friends."

Though young single adults would appear to have a great potential for making and maintaining more altruistic type friendships than those who decide to marry early, they must also be seen to run a high risk of developing egoistic and exploitative asssociations not this time because of the presence of institutional requirements but rather because of their absence. There is, however, another sense in which young single adult friendships hold great promise for the future and have some distinct advantages over friendships in early marriage. This promise and advantage occurs in the area of continuity.

Very often in early marriage the exclusive nature of the love relationship (Parsons, 1951), (Slater, 1963), (Goode, 1964) between husband and wife interrupts the continuity of friendship associations made on either part, whether they are altruistic, egoistic, or exploitative in nature, at least for a small period of time and often for much longer. Though this interruption is an institutionalized aspect of the honeymoon period that friends both expect and understand by varying degrees, depending somewhat on their marital status relative to the couple and their degree of commitment to the individuals involved, many of these friendships do not survive the

marriage. The implication here is that the couple will make new friends as a couple after the honeymoon period. This, coupled with the possibility that friendships made prior to the marriage, especially cross-sex ones though occasionally same sex friends as well, are perceived by one or both spouses as potentially threatening thus suggesting that many friendships with great promise are lost to the individual conceivably forever. This may not be a tragedy at all if these friendships were in actual fact egoistic or exploitative in nature but if they were altruistic or as importantly had the capacity to become altruistic then a significant continuity is broken and the loss is great both to society and the individuals in question. The promise and the advantage of singlehood should be obvious at this point. If single, the young adult need not witness a potentially terminal break in the continuity of his/her friendship relationships at least as far as it is due to marriage and therefore being single provides for the dimensions of development and continuity in friendship which may not be possible for those who choose marriage.

Another alternative that seemingly could enhance the development of altruistic friendships in young adulthood as a life cycle stage is the decision to remain childless (Veevers, 1980). While this decision may be thrust upon individuals yielding no choice whatsoever due to difficulties with [illegible]y or conception or both, it is with those that consciously choose childlessness as the

objective condition of their family life orientation that some interesting possibilities occur with respect to friendship. Traditionally conceived, childless marriages of this type may be viewed as a "waste" and childless couples are to be pitied for their lack of foresight and what must be the consuming selfishness that has condemned them to a life devoid of children's company, surely a generativity crisis (Erikson, 1950) that must be resolved by age forty for the couple. Yet, from the perspective of the young married couple who legitimately would choose to be each other's best friend in an altruistic sense, childlessness has some distinct advantages. Perhaps the most important of these advantages are subsumed under the categories of time and opportunity to be intimate in a psychological sense. Though it may be argued that couples with children perhaps spend as much time in each other's company in the course of daily life as couples without children what is at issue is the quality of that time spent. Familists have long touted the virtues of the nuclear family in terms of the quality of this time and feminists have sought to expose it for the enslavement that they feel it represents, but aside from these interests the issue of the quality of time spent remains significant to the development and enhancement of a friendship. It is suggested in part that childless couples have a distinct advantage in potentially developing altruistic friendships because they are once again freed from the instrumentalities of child rearing duties and

responsibilities and, perhaps more importantly, because they have learned to look to each other as more than the sum total of the roles that are or must be performed. This may make the quality of the time that they spend together much less subject to the demands of the family life cycle and more open to change and exploration within the unit itself. In short, the unit is sustained because of its intrinsic worth and not because of imposed criteria of "normalcy."

On the other hand, couples who choose to remain childless during the young adult years are also extremely vulnerable to egoistic and exploitative friendships, once again the quality of time spent together being the critical issue. That is, without the responsibilities of children the couple may not take advantage of the opportunities for psychological intimacy afforded them but instead may assume the posture of a marriage of convenience as far as their friendship is concerned. They may, for example, use the lack of children as an excuse to mutually and egoistically pursue and/or exploit their individual careers or hobbies to the exclusion of their spouse or they may independently or reciprocally use each other to obtain other goals extrinsic to the marriage and their friendship relationship. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that altruistic friendships will not simply develop because individuals assume an alternative or a minority life style in this stage of the life cycle, though this may help to eliminate some role conflict. What is required is that the young married couple

learn to look at their friendship as an end in itself with an independent existence from the roles that they play and not as a necessary result of those roles. Though childlessness as a category of family life may offer a couple more freedom to explore each other's values and to be intimate it does not automatically make for a "good" "spousal" friendship though its possibility may be higher than for those who have traditionally opted for children in marriage.

Yet another alternative to some of the traditional barriers to altruistic friendship in young adult marriages can be approached through a consideration of divorce and remarriage. Since in our society we may be considered amongst the most marrying and remarrying peoples in the world, serial monogamy as a form of marriage is both increasingly common in its occurrence and increasingly significant to the friendship potentials of young adults whether they are married or not. Though comparatively high divorce and remarriage rates are in one sense indicative of the frequency and intensity of value and role conflicts that occur between spouses in our society they also indicate that spousal friendships are increasingly tenuous and transitory and therefore based according to the model on value orientations inconsistent with the survival of the unit. What this means according to the model is not only is serial monogamy the most often practiced form of marriage in our society but perhaps serial friendship in the forms of egoism

and exploitativism are also to be expected characteristics of the cycles of divorce and remarriage as far as the couple's friendship relationships are concerned.

Thus, interpreted in this way couples whose marriages survive must by definition have incorporated some degree of altruism into their relationship and correspondingly avoided or eliminated egoistic or exploitative tendencies in the evolution of their friendship. It must be assumed that failed marriages have had little success in this regard. Nevertheless, since marriage failures in the forms of divorce and separation, legal or otherwise, are significantly high today (Ambert, 1980) it is also important to consider the advantages to friendship that may occur as a result of these phenomena.

Given the previous argument it might appear that there are few advantages to "spousal" friendships in young adulthood marriages that have run the cycle of divorce and remarriage. Although ultimately this may be the case, the possibility also exists that one or both spouses may as a result of the status change reevaluate their value orientations with reference to their expectations in and of friendship and marriage with their new marital partner and in effect increase the probabilities of establishing an altruistic friendship in the marriage. Of course this would assume that a period of self evaluation, introspection, and self criticism were to follow the divorce in each person's case and there is more than a little evidence here to

suggest that this does not often occur. The evidence against such self evaluation after divorce comes partly from the divorce rates of individuals in remarriage which are generally higher than for individuals in a first marriage (Ambert, 1980), and from the traditional common law view of divorce itself where blame must be assigned and a plaintiff identified. Thus in the first instance it is evident that divorce rates of remarried couples are higher than for first marriages that few individuals introspect enough about the quality of friendship in their first marriage to overcome the probabilities of a second marriage failure. This is perhaps also emphasized in the second instance in that it is possible for a couple to experience divorce in the British Common Law tradition and for one of them to emerge legally if not actually blameless. The difficulty here from the standpoint of the second marriage and the quality of the friendship established is that the guilty party may perceive themselves as blameless and therefore has no need to reevaluate his/her value orientations in friendship and marriage. Regardless the possibility does exist that divorce and remarriage may actually increase and enhance the potential for the development of altruistic friendships in remarriage and that in a sense, divorce instead of being a threat to social solidarity, friendship, and the institution of marriage actually reinforces and supports these elements at least to the degree and extent that it is treated by the individuals involved as a learning experience.

The last alternative to traditional obstacles to the development of altruistic friendship in young adulthood emerges from a discussion of the changing nature of sex role definitions in modern society (Whitehurst and Booth, 1980). One of the greatest strides made in the emancipation of the sexes in recent years with respect to the potential for altruistic friendship in young adulthood has been in the area of perceptions of status equality. It is no longer popular for men and women to consider themselves bound to superior and subordinate positions in the division of labor simply by virtue of their sex and though there are exceptions as in the feminization of poverty, at no previous point in history in North America have perceived status differences between men and women and their effects been more open to public ridicule and institutional debate. These circumstances have provided opportunities for altruistc friendships not before possible.

Specifically, what may be happening is that since status differentials (Richmond-Abbott, 1983), between men and women are increasingly being defined both by men and women as arbitrary the sexes are just now beginning to be able to approach each other as something other than products to be consumed and exchanged in the marketplace of interpersonal relationships where profit takers and bankruptcies have defined the boundaries of interaction up until now. This beginning makes altruistic friendships much more probable than in the past because now the criteria for

lasting and meaningful friendship associations are separable in the public consciousness from status motivated value orientations. In other words, cross-sex friendships of the altruistic forms are more possible because men and women may be more likely to approach each other as equals and are therefore less likely to introduce or introject other motives into the friendship association that serve only to enhance their status or increase their hold over the other. Altrusim as a form of friendship in no sense means possession and since possesssion is the key to increasing one's status, altruistic friendship and status differentials are totally at odds with one another and completely incompatible. Therefore equality between the sexes is very likely to be a necessary if insufficient condition for the development of altruistic friendships throughout the life cycle and not simply with reference to young adulthood. However, young adults may have the flexibility to adjust their expectations of friendship to be in keeping with changing sex role definitions to a greater extent than other age groups if only because there is less time lag in their socialization experience of these changes and because their history in this regard "nouveau." Young adults who have the flexibility to meet changing sex role expectations and who also have the ability to recognize and avoid rigid, stereotypical, and prejudicial views of sex appropriate behavior will be much better prepared to understand the challenges of sexual equality and will subsequently be more

likely to have altruistic friendships in their lifetimes.

D. Middle Adulthood

Many of the problems and concerns relative to the forms that friendship may take during the middle years in the human life cycle are simply extensions of those experienced in young adulthood in that the issues of family life and career orientations remain of paramount importance. However, due to the timing of certain life cycle events the focus of adjustments made during the middle years is altered significantly and therefore the challenges to friendship are also significantly changed and the friendship model lends insight into these changes.

Generally, it has been argued that adult friendships are subject to high opportunity and relatively high constraint in terms of the potential of friendships of any kind forming during this stage of life. The middle years provide ample proof of this "truism" and the friendship model illustrates how this comes about in terms of the kinds of friendship choices both possible and probable in conjunction with certain significant timing events. To begin with, it should be noted at the outset that the middle years can be generally characterized as a period of great vulnerability for both individuals and couples in that egoistic and exploitative friendship choices can easily be made though at the same time opportunities for altruistic choices do exist they may be difficult to realize for many

reasons.

For couples in their middle years, the challenges to friendship may be seen to be initiated by the timing events of the "chiming of the career-clock" or the issue of career plateaus and what Erikson (1950) has called the "generativity crisis" of middle age. Taken together these timing events may be seen to have profound effects on the kinds of friendships that are possible in middle age. Since both of these timing events concern to some degree a self evaluation of the contribution one has made to society and to one's family during the course of one's working life and since not everyone will be able to survive that evaluative experience in a positive way, many couples will find the quality of their friendships tested. This test may take many forms but it would not be unreasonable to expect that the added stress potentially placed on a couple as a result of a negative experience in these respects may alienate their affections and erode the value orientations upon which their friendship is built. Thus the possibility that each will exploit the other to in effect resurrect their respective egos is great and the chances are equally high that their friendship will deteriorate into one or another of many egoistic or exploitative types, the exact form being dependent on the direction and extent to which the friendship value orientations have been altered by the experience.

For single individuals in their middle years the effects of the combination of these timing events on potential friendships formed are at once both more and less intense. They may be more intense in leading to exploitative friendships because they lack the traditional institutional supports of marriage and family, which are normally important components of this evaluative process in their own right, or because the salvation of their egos requires them to define their friendships as a means to furthering their threatened careers. This response unconditionally defines their friendship as exploitative. Further, should they choose to associate only with others who have this orientation, the friendships formed would similarly be confirmed as egoistic. These timing events may be less intense in their potential effects on the friendship choices of singles, however, in the sense that they may evaluate their contributions to society and to their work life more in their own terms and are therefore perhaps less likely to perceive or internalize the stress of these events and are subsequently less likely to make friendship choices based on their negative impact.

Two additional mid-life timing events combine to make the middle years difficult from the standpoint of friendships especially for couples in families where children have been present for many years. These events though referred to by many names include the phenomenon of the empty nest where the family structure is changed after

the "launching" of the children and the shrinking of the extended family due to the death of the grandparental generation. Though both of these events can be anticipated as natural properties of the family life cycle, few recognize their significance to a couple's marital and friendship relationships until it is actually upon them. There would seem to be a kind of equivocation that couples engage in that perhaps functions to take the "sting" out of some life cycle events that are perceived as less than welcome even though they are inevitable. These events are perhaps looked at in this way. As far as the effects that these events can potentially have on a couple's friendship, it is important to first emphasize the suddenness with which social roles may be ripped away from the couple with reference to the deaths of their parents and also the social distance which may now exist between the couple and their children due in part to the changes in residence which often accompany the launching stage. These factors of role loss and social distance, if not physical and geographical distance, from children now young adults themselves, can leave many middle aged couples in a rather confused and normless state though this is not necessarily the case if these events were actively anticipated.

Nevertheless, the couple that finds themselves in these circumstances indeed has some large adjustments to make and one of these adjustments may be the redefinition of each other as friends or more importantly the redefinition of

each other as "what kinds of friends." Implied here is the idea that perhaps many couples loose sight of their friendship and its quality simply due in part to the duties and responsibilities of child rearing to the launching stage. For example, it may be perceived as more important to witness a child's graduation than to miss the ceremony and attempt to settle some old business concerning the couple's retirement plans, and perhaps in one sense it is more important to do the former. The point is, however, that should the social sacrifices habitually be made by the couple in favor of the perceived needs of the children the couple may find themselves in their middle years not only with an empty shell marriage and the feeling of occupying roleless roles, but also with an egoistic friendship. That is, they have earned this egoistic friendship by mutually surrendering their needs as husband and wife to their duties as father and mother and have therefore abdicated any hope of developing an altruistic friendship in their marital relationship at least through the launching stage. Further, their friendship could also easily become exploitative should either of the spouses recognize the error of their choices and seek solace outside of the unit all the while maintaining the polite fiction when in the other spouse's company.

Hopefully these circumstances apply only to a small number of couples in their middle years but what this scenario makes clear is that altruistic friendship may be a

luxury that few couples at this stage of development could really afford. This is, however, not to imply that altruistic friendship in middle adulthood is an impossibility for their are many possible variations in life style available to individuals during this time of life both inside and outside of the nexus of marriage and the family and these life style choices will in part determine the kinds of timing events that are likely to be perceived by the individuals in question as significant and subsequently the kinds and qualities of friendship choices made.

E. Late Adulthood

As previously mentioned the friendship choices of late adulthood are difficult to assess in terms of specific life cycle events that one might reasonably expect to occur at this point in development. The major reason for this difficulty is that social gerontologists have not yet had sufficient time, funding, or opportunity to adequately study, describe or conceptualize the variety of social influences that characterize this period (Rosow, 1970). Thus there are fewer agreed upon benchmarks by way of specific timing events from which to generalize from in terms of the friendship model and its implications in the late adult years. Nevertheless, it is clear that late adulthood is a critical time in the life cycle because it marks both the end of the adult years and a transition to post-adult status in our society.

It is also evident that far from representing the beginning of the downhill slide into senescence that the late adult years are indeed very active and very productive and in fact as many have pointed out the late adult years may be more productive in a work/achievement sense than the early or middle adult years (Birren, 1964; Harris and Cole, 1980). The activity levels of this period tend therefore to define its general friendship potential in terms of high opportunity and relatively high constraint though perhaps the constraints in terms of sheer numbers of role requirements in late adulthood are somewhat lower than in the other two categories of adulthood due to fewer responsibilities to adult children and the potential job security reached at this stage of life. Thus in terms of general friendship potential late adulthood may not be substantially different from young and middle adulthood looking simply at the criteria of opportunities and constraints and in many cases the previous discussions of kinds of friendship choices in adulthood, generally, would apply similarly to late adulthood. However, part of what makes this period of life special in terms of the challenges it presents to the kinds of friendship choices made emerges from a consideration of two issues, the impending loss of adult status and impending retirement.

Taken together these two issues suggest that the late adult years though generally productive may not be so simply because of differential successes or failures in the world

of work as motivators but perhaps also because of a perceived desperate need at this point to hang on to the adult status and therefore avoid later concerns over mortality by channeling the majority of one's energies into what might be called legitimate adult productive activity. In other words productivity surges in late adulthood may in part be motivated by a desperation to retain adult status at all costs and in a sense to cheat the passage of time because the alternative of acceptance is perceived as too threatening to the self concept. Should the perceived threat of the loss of adult status lead individuals to this kind of desperate activity the friendship choices that they are likely to make will be constrained and limited to the egoistic and exploitative forms. The "spousal" friendship would be egoistic for example should both individuals perceive and support each other in this compulsive activity and it would be extremely exploitative should either spouse not share this orientation and an altruistic friendship would not be possible at all under this influence.

For single people in their late adult years this influence would similarly result in egoistic and exploitative friendships for within their field of eligibles there would be those who both recognized and "fueled the flames" of this desperation for their advantage and those who in the absence of awareness simply support it as a reasonable response. This potentially cheats both individuals out of a healthy adjustment to the impending

loss of adult status and functionally prevents them from developing altruistic orientations in their friendship.

Another stress placed on the friendship potential of women, in particular, in their late adult years concerns those women who have opted for a more traditionally defined division of labor in their family lives and perhaps find themselves remote from husbands consumed by work and their emptied roles of mothers and companions to now departed children. Technically while this period of time could be and often is conceived by some women as one of great freedom and opportunity to develop new friendship ties and activities outside of the marital home for many it may be perceived as a time of great loneliness, emptiness, and depression. Therefore what to many women is perceived as freedom and opportunity is to others perceived as a threat to themselves and their duties to their families. This threat combined with the emptiness of the experience might be expected to produce a great vulnerability in the friendship choices of women caught in these circumstances. The suggestion is that these women may be easily victimized, manipulated, and exploited in their friendship choices both by family members and by "outsiders" who may themselves have vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

There is yet another sense in which the late adult years may create difficulty in the kinds and qualities of friendship choices made and relates to a generativity issue that is often referred to as "mentorship." To those

acquainted with the academic world, mentorship is a familiar if somewhat uncomfortable concept in that it both supports and undermines the principles of scholarly achievement and it must also be seen as a "mixed blessing" in terms of the kinds of friendship choices that it implies. For example, if it is indeed true that individuals in their late adult years perceive the "generativity need" to pass on the substance of their acquired experience in some form to worthy and significant apprentices whether they be family members or work associates broadly defined, the resultant mentorship creates several possibilities as far as the friendship model is concerned. Firstly it may result in a friendship of mutual egoism or pure egoistic friendship for both mentor and apprentice may seek to satisfy their perceived needs, the mentor's generativity need and the apprentice's need for sponsorship and knowledge, with "pygmalion like" disregard for the other's requirements because of consuming self interests. In this case though mentor and apprentice may each gain or loose in an instrumental sense from their association their friendship is ego intensive and expressively weak. Secondly, the possibility exists that either the mentor or the apprentice will exploit the other's definition of their friendship for gains inconsistent with the definition of the situation whether they be personal and idiosyncratic in the form of sexual appetites or affiliative needs, or strictly social in the form of status acquisitions. In either case the mentor or the apprentice is

the unwitting victim of an exploitative friendship where though some purposes may be served they are accomplished through deception and subterfuge and deceit must lead to enmity and ill will. Thirdly, there also exists the possibility that mentor and apprentice will evolve an altruistic friendship from a more or less limited exchange of services dependent, however, on the degree and extent to which the relationship grows to rely less upon that simple exchange and more upon a mutual and valued definition of discovery that results from a value orientation not predicated on extrinsic rewards. Such a response would be rare in the mentor apprentice circumstance and even more rare in late adulthood generally because of the kinds of life cycle concerns discussed here that tend to interfere with the discovery and the disclosure necessary to an altruistic friendship (Jourard, 1971).

In summary, late adulthood defined as a stage of the life cycle that occurs between the middle years and retirement broadly defined, though difficult in some respects to assess nevertheless influences the friendship choices of individuals. The friendship model helps to conceptualize these life cycle influences and subsequent friendship choices and demonstrates the kinds of challenges that individuals may face at this point in their lives with reference to friendship. [redacted] clear from this discussion:

1. that men and women in their late adult years are still very vulnerable to exploitative and egoistic

friendship forms both in the family and the work contexts and

2. that men and women in more traditionally defined marriages run high risks for these types of friendships and finally
3. that issues of generativity and mentorship make altruistic friendship choices extremely difficult and improbable though ulitmately not impossible at this stage in the life cycle.

F. Retirement

Retirement continues to be a timing event of great significance in our society, in that it involves role and status changes that, whether anticipated or not, can have dramatic effects on individuals' conceptions of themselves and/or others and therefore on their friendship choices. The loss of the work role is of paramount importance to friendship choices because it functionally shrinks the individual's sphere of social contacts and as a result reduces opportunities for friendship formation and maintenance. The status change that is of major significance here is from working adult to retired person which means first that one is in transition from the employed to the unemployed or retired from work status and second that one is also in a sense in transition from the adult status into a non status category where one is neither child nor adult.

This category characterizes the movement of individuals into post-adult status simply because since they are no longer "working" they are no longer "doing" what adults "do" in one sense and are therefore by one chain of reasoning not adults any longer. Subsequently this transition to post-adult status, whether or not it is actually experienced or accepted by individuals as part of the redefinition of themselves at retirement, may be applied by others to them and thus have wide ranging effects on interpersonal relationships.

On the other hand the retirement period is, like later adolescence, a time of great uncertainties about the future and as in the adolescent period this uncertainty can also be a source of freedom to try out new roles and relationships without some of the interferences of the adult years. That is, while a perceived absence of rules in the form of a work schedule to organize one's life around may be a normless and alienating experience for many retirees, it must also be seen to some extent as freedom producing and that freedom translates into optimism for the general friendship potential of retirees.

Thus, there would appear to be a bifurcation in the friendship potential of individuals after retirement, one that is reminiscent of the debate between proponents of "disengagement theory" (Cumming and Henry, 1961) and those who support the "activity perspective" (Havighurst, Neugarten, and Henry, 1968) as vehicles to the successful

adjustment to the aging process. In one instance it would appear that role and status changes so threaten retirees that they must disengage and retreat from their friends and associates into the comparative safety of the dyad or on the other hand they must actively strive to recreate in their new found freedom supportive and meaningful relationships. Though the "choice" between these responses is in a sense clear, it is not as yet evident which, if either of these responses, is more or less adaptive to the successful negotiation of this stage of the life cycle. The friendship model, however, adds some further insight into this dilemma.

If retirement is perceived by some individuals as threatening or destructive and, if that negative valuation were to carry over into their friendships then, their friendships could come to be negotiated around little else than this, their retirement fate. Those individuals who perhaps experience retirement in this way, as a threat to their self concepts, are ill prepared for a friendship of any kind let alone an altruistic one. As a result, their friendship value orientations may become mutually and extrinsically twisted to the point where their friendship relationships are reduced to some peculiar form of retirement therapy and therefore classified according to the model as an egoistic friendship type. It is egoistic because their friendship is consumed by the threat of retirement as an external event beyond their control which holds little hope for their relationship or the successful negotiation of

this stage of life.)

Exploitative friendships may also occur at retirement should individuals dramatically differ in their response to the event itself. That is, should one individual perceive retirement as a threatening and isolating experience while the other sees it as an opportunity for growth and mutual rediscovery the stage is set for a values conflict of no small proportion. The outcome, should this relationship survive, would likely be a compromise benign in the least, stifling in the other extreme, and satisfying to neither party but exploitative of both. This circumstance is unfortunate and one would hope that it is avoidable for most individuals and couples in their retirement years, however, it does point out that friendship value orientations can be altered by significant timing events like retirement and that less than completely rewarding friendship types may result from these factors.

As indicated earlier the retirement period must also be seen as generally possessing lower opportunities for friendship than the adult years but also less constraints as well and it is in this area of less constraint that retirement holds the greatest promise for the development of altruistic friendships. In simple terms, altruistic friendships between individuals are more probable in the retirement period when individuals perceive themselves to be free to be less confident, less self assured, less self possessed, and less structured in their orientations toward

duty and responsibility than they were required to be in their adult years. This perception of the freedoms offered by retirement is an active growth process that means that individuals with this perception are less likely to be bound to friendship associations motivated by extrinsic values and correspondingly are more likely to seek and make friends with others that not only share this perception but also who are not motivated by extrinsic concerns. The friendships formed under these circumstances are positive, active, growth oriented and altruistic by degree and by definition.

The arguments presented in this section on retirement show that many types of friendships are possible at this stage of the life cycle, the egoistic and exploitative forms tending to come about in part in negative reaction to the disengagement of the individual from society and society from the individual and the altruistic forms from a more positive activity perspective. This would tend to suggest that those individuals who disengage at retirement do not do so to their mutual benefit as far as the quality of their friendships go and furthermore that if a positive adjustment to retirement is rendered more possible through the development of altruistic friendship associations then it is most likely to occur for those individuals who take a more active stance to this stage of life than for those who disengage.

G. Widowhood

Widowhood, like the retirement stage of the life cycle, is difficult to assess in terms of its general friendship potential. While constraints are lower in terms of formal role requirements, increasing perhaps the time available for friends and friendship, opportunities to take advantage of this less structured time are probably at their lowest ebb in the life cycle generally. The reasons for this lower opportunity are many but mortality, chronic health problems, residential mobility, and fixed lower incomes are important contributing factors to the elderly widow's or widower's capacity to make and maintain friends of any kind or quality. Nevertheless, while friendship potential may be lower in widowhood due to less opportunities, it is also clear that friends are important mechanisms of adjustment to the role and status losses that accompany this stage of the life cycle (Lowenthal and Haven, 1968). The question would appear to be then, do all types of friendships possible at this stage of the life cycle facilitate the adjustment process?

The answer to the aboye question from the standpoint of the friendship model is a resounding negative. It is negative because it is entirely possible and probable that both widows and widowers are subject to making egoistic and exploitative friendship choices that may in fact hinder and in some cases completely prevent both their abilities to develop altruistic friendships and their adjustment to

widowhood as a life cycle event. Egoistic friendship choices for example may result in part from the pressures of status homophily and the tendency for individuals in similar status categories to seek each others company. Under these circumstances it is possible that the friendship formed could be for the purposes of avoiding the reality of the loss of one's spouse where each attempts to keep the memories of married life in the present tense and therefore consciously relegate the pain and cruelty of the event to a surrealistic state. While some might suggest that this response may simply be a coping mechanism of short duration brought about by the death of one's spouse, to the degree that it persists and indeed becomes the basis of a dyadic friendship, that friendship must be of an egoistic form or type. It is egoistic because the widow or widower is not in fact looking for the compassion and sympathy of someone who has shared the painful experience and from whom mutual growth and adjustment is possible but instead each is pursuing a private escape from the situation and this escape is the basis of their friendship.

Egoistic friendships may also develop at this stage of the life cycle in response to the "void" left by the death of a spouse where individuals, men may be especially susceptible to this form, so distraught by the loss they have experienced may reach out almost at random for "friendship" to fill both their time and their waking consciousness. The purposes here being strictly egocentric

it is unlikely that the friendship formed would be altruistic in any sense or in fact be of any aid to the adjustment process.

Exploitative friendship forms may also occur at this stage of the life cycle in response to matters of inheritance and finance. Specifically, the circumstance may arise that kin, pseudo kin, "friends," and lovers may come to feel that they have a claim not only on a widow's or a widower's "friendship" but also on their property and their holdings in a monetary sense. Thus, the value orientations of potential friends at this stage of the life cycle may be called into question and to the degree that the widow or widower is compromised by the promise of financial gain in his or her friendship choices the bonds formed will be exploitative by definition.

It is clear from the discussion to this point that widowhood as a stage in the life cycle is not exempt from the possibility of egoistic and exploitative friendship forms, and is, because it represents a lengthy period of adjustment that perhaps many never really put to rest even in remarriage, a difficult time for the development of altruistic friendship bonds. However, for those individuals not consumed by their grief or preyed upon by profit seekers and who are able to internalize their new status without deep emotional scars altruistic friendships may be more likely to form. Yet this capacity is completely dependent on the friendship value orientations that are held by potential

friends which are themselves dependent on their experience of and in life cycle events.

The objectives in this final chapter have been to examine and explore the parameters of the friendship model in the context of the human life cycle. This process has clearly demonstrated first; that there is a definite two way reciprocal relationship between friendship forms and the life cycle stages in that these stages both effect and are effected by the kinds of friendship choices made by individuals and second; that some kinds of friendships are more likely to occur at some stages of the life cycle than at other stages and third; that the ideal typical model of friendship developed in this dissertation provides an effective means to differentiate between and among the kinds and qualities of friendship choices made throughout the life cycle and subsequently adds depth, meaning, and understanding to our knowledge of the aging process generally. In addition, the model also specifically functions to add definitional and conceptual clarity to an empirical body of knowledge on friendship which has to this point eluded and resisted systematic analysis, classification, and/or codification. There are many more avenues to pursue before a systematic theory of friendship is rendered possible, but the friendship model might be said to provide us with an "area code" if not a "street address" in this regard.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The three major objectives of this dissertation have been met. First, it has been shown through inventories of agreement and disagreement that the meaning boundaries of friendship and its key variances are extensive, somewhat conflicting, and often difficult to isolate. Nevertheless, it has been possible to identify and reconcile, at least to some degree, approximately twenty five propositions that directly concern the meanings of dyadic friendship as selectively revealed in the research literature. Further, this discussion has also provided for the emergence of a definition of dyadic friendship that is perhaps consistent with a wider range of empirical and theoretical evidence than has perhaps been available to this point in time. This is not to imply that the definition of dyadic friendship advanced in this context is a complete and comprehensive one, but is, rather, to point out that many treatments of the subject in the past have been much more incomplete and much less comprehensive.

The analysis of the propositions has shown that while there is substantial agreement in the literature on the meanings of dyadic friendship with respect to its structural properties and its general significance as a relational category, there are also substantial disagreements. The disagreements are perhaps most revealing. That is, they tend to be concerned with "value charged" aspects of what individuals expect both in and of their friendship

relationships. It is not surprising in this regard that research is divided on the applicability of social exchange theory to the explanation of friendship relationships. Many have suggested, for example, that reciprocity is the key to "good" friendships while others have objected and suggested to the contrary that reciprocity only encourages efforts to "balance the account" and that this is therefore a sterile, a "bad" friendship unless it goes beyond social exchange.

The research problem here is considerable, largely because of the value charged nature of these phenomena. What is continually at issue in many of the propositions is the ability of the social scientist to resist the temptation to bridge the conflicting arguments by in effect becoming either by accident or on purpose a "moral entrepreneur." The social scientist can not afford to make this kind of error either overtly or covertly. To do so would be to compromise "value freedom" and accept proselytism as accepted scientific practice. Instead, extra effort must be exercised to weigh the evidence as objectively and dispassionately as possible, and, if judgements are inevitable they must be identified as such. With respect to the social exchange argument, the question is not whether a "good" or "bad" friendship is defined by reciprocity but rather to what extent can friendship and its variations be analytically described or explained by this particular perspective. Only the careful consideration of the available evidence can decide this and/or other related issues.

The three part definition of friendship advanced at the conclusion of section one, dealing with the study of friendship, its structure, and its social psychology, represents a synthesis of the inventories of agreement and disagreement. This inventory reveals that the study of friendship has received little scientific attention. This point should effectively warn social scientists that any attempt to operationally define dyadic friendship at the present time is likely to be at best, simplistic, and at worst, inadequate or inappropriate. The simplistic and often inappropriate measures of friendship have resulted in part from the absence of a solid theoretical base from which a sociological study of friendship can proceed. Subsequently, empirical studies, though often sound methodologically, lack substantial conceptual frameworks, let alone systematic theories, to interpret the data and to aid in the formulation of testable hypotheses. Thus, a warning is inherent in the first part of the definition to proceed with caution and prudence in these early stages of the scientific treatment of friendship and friendship relationships.

In the second part of the definition some of the major structural properties of friendship are identified. Perhaps the most significant contribution here is that the structural properties of friendship may be seen as unique. That is, they are specific to the dyad and not necessarily a part of other kinds of friendship relationships involving networks of more members, families, small groups, or

institutions. This may appear as a moot point but one is constantly reminded in examining the literature that dyadic friendship is a very special case, a case about which not all is known or agreed upon with respect to its structural properties.

One obvious question that arises is how can scientists attempt to study friendship networks in larger groupings when the structure of the smallest group possible is still to some extent an open question? Perhaps one can only assume that larger friendship networks are special cases as well, bound by their own unique structural considerations. The point needs to be made, however, that until the structural aspects of the dyad are clearly articulated, structural comparisons with larger networks are likely to be difficult.

The third part of the definition of friendship concerns elements of friendship's social psychology. In this case dyadic friendship is defined and expressed as a basic human need of great significance to both individuals and society. It is seen to occur between individuals who share similar social and psychological backgrounds and to be affected by a number of variables--both individual and social in their origins.

This is the most dynamic and complex aspect of the definition of friendship advanced in this thesis. Its dynamics derive from the complex relations among its component elements, which are both discrete and continuous in terms of their importance and their effects. The

individual is seen to perceive in the other certain specific social and individual characteristics with which they can identify and upon which social interaction depends for its existence and continuance. To the degree that the other similarly perceives these elements a dyadic friendship may, by this definition, be said to exist. There are of course many constraints that may or may not allow this mutual definitional process to occur, let alone the conceptual difficulties in determining the particular form this potential friendship takes and the individual and social meaning(s) attributed to it. It is at this point, in response to questions of this sort concerning the precise form(s) that dyadic friendship may take that the second major objective of the dissertation is pursued namely, the development of an ideal typical model of dyadic friendship.

The need for the development of an ideal typical model of dyadic friendship is first established by reference to a number of classical and modern attempts to specify the character and expression of friendship's multiple forms. These attempts were determined to be insightful but inconclusive. That is; though many scholars over the years have attempted to draw meaningful distinctions between the kinds and qualities of friendships formed in the dyad, few have progressed beyond rudimentary classificatory schemes. Although many of these schemes have been of some conceptual and heuristic value, they have nevertheless failed to explain why and under what circumstances some types of

friendship are more likely to occur than others. In short, none of these works were specific enough in their boundary conditions or in the definition of the relations between types of friendship to be effective. Therefore, it was determined necessary to look to ideal type construction and its methodology as a way of developing a more comprehensive model of friendship that had the requisite specificity and explanatory power to deal with the multiple forms of friendship.

Unfortunately, however, there is less than complete agreement in the literature as to the "proper" functioning of ideal types themselves in the chain of inquiry. Nevertheless it is possible to view ideal types as "interpreted theoretical systems" and as such to use both their conceptual properties and explanatory power in the development of an ideal typical model of friendship (Hempel, 1965). The development of such a model represents the second major objective of this dissertation.

The ideal typical model of friendship derived in context originates with two pairs of analytical constructs that represent four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive friendship value orientations. The individual may be seen to possess one or another of these value orientations and to carry them into all of their potential dyadic friendships at any point in time.

The basic value orientations are both formed and defined by:

1. the acceptance by the individual of friendship as an intrinsic end in itself,
2. the acceptance by the individual of friendship as a means to other ends,
3. the rejection by the individual of friendship as an intrinsic end in itself, and
4. the rejection by the individual of friendship as a means to other ends.

These four possible friendship value orientations have further specific and defined effects, in combination, on the quality of any specific dyadic friendship formed. In permutation, there are sixteen possible friendship types created, of which, four have been defined as primary, eight as secondary, and four as tertiary in terms of their substance and effects.

The primary friendship types, or pure types, consist of:

1. Primary Altruistic Friendship: formed by the combined acceptance by the individuals of intrinsic value orientations in the dyad.
2. Primary Egoistic Friendship: formed by the combined acceptance by the individuals of extrinsic friendship value orientations in the dyad.
3. Primary Exploitative Friendship Type I: is formed by opposing and alternate acceptance or rejection by the individuals of friendship as an end in itself or

as a means to other ends such that individual (A) is exploited.

4. Primary Exploitative Friendship Type II: is formed by opposing and alternate acceptance or rejection by the individuals of friendship as an end in itself or as a means to other ends such that individual (B) is exploited.

Each of these primary friendship types contribute some depth of understanding to the quality of friendship formed in everyday life. Collectively they may permit one, in a sense, to "grade" the quality of one's friendships in an ordinal sense from most "true" to least "true" and assign them to one of four defined primary types. In the event that one's friendships are not isomorphic with the primary types there is a field of variation defined by secondary and tertiary types that in principle will account for gradations in friendship value orientations and subsequently permit classification of individual cases.

Thus, the ideal type of friendship as specified clearly suggests that not all friendship relationships are the same nor are they necessarily formed and/or maintained for the same reasons. This explains in part why social scientists have found friendship to be a difficult subject of investigation for, in assuming, that "everyone knows what a friendship is" and therefore all that one needs to do is "ask," the concept of friendship is done a disservice. Friendship meanings are not immediately obvious in either an

empirical or a theoretical sense. Instead, it is suggested that scientists take their lead from ideal types of friendship viewed as theoretical systems, which if accurately designed and interpreted will eventually result in testable hypotheses.

One of the most problematic aspects of ideal type construction, as it is presently conceived, concerns the assumptions made about human behavior that are seemingly unavoidable from the outset. It is required, subsequently, to defend and justify these assumptions both in terms of support in the literature and with respect to the explanatory power the ideal type possesses as a result of these assumptions. The results of this process have been to show first, that it is defensible and accurate to assume:

1. that friendship varies in its forms and in its degree of intimacy,
2. that intrinsic ends and means are useful and adequate boundary conditions for the ideal type,
3. that individuals develop friendship value orientations, and
4. that friendship takes four basic forms including altruistic, egoistic, and expoitative types I, and II.

and second that, the ideal typical model explains why:

1. we must watch the demands we place on ourselves and others in friendship,
2. tension and hostility are elements of some

friendship relationships,

3. intimate content in a friendship does not necessarily mean it is an intimate friendship,
4. friendship is both self and other oriented,
5. not all forms of friendship are "healthy,"
6. there is risk in friendship,
7. friendships vary in commitment and attachment, and
8. individuals may settle for less than perfect friendships.

Therefore, support for both the assumptions made at the outset and the explanatory power yielded by the ideal typical model itself are established in several contexts. It is a coherent system that is linked to many components of classical and contemporary sociological theory.

The third and final objective of the dissertation has been to demonstrate the strength and utility of the ideal typical model of friendship by applying it to some aspects of the human life cycle. It is evident in this context that the life cycle differentially creates both opportunities and constraints for friendship formation by stage of that life cycle as defined. Further, it follows from the ideal typical model of friendship:

1. that if one assumes that multiple forms of friendship are possible at almost any stage of the life cycle (and)
2. that the life cycle itself creates both opportunities and constraints for friendship

formation in the first place (then)

3. the life cycle must present differential opportunities and constraints for the expression of friendship's multiple forms as specified namely, altruistic, egoistic, and exploitative friendships.

Continua of both opportunities and constraints for friendship formation at each stage of the life cycle are developed and defined so as to be able to provide a rough outline of the general friendship potential of each successive stage. Using rankings of high to low opportunity (defined in terms of the available pool of eligibles) and high to low constraint (defined as the number of role requirements) it is possible to outline the friendship potential of each life cycle stage. This information indicates that:

1. childhood has a low friendship potential,
2. adolescence has a high friendship potential,
3. adulthood has a low friendship potential,
4. retirement has a medium friendship potential, (and)
5. widowhood has a medium to low friendship potential.

The suggestion is, subsequent to this ranking system of general friendship potential, that with the exception of the very young, all four primary types of friendship and their subtypes are possible at almost every stage of the life cycle. It is also evident that the "pre" and "post" adult stages of the life cycle probably hold the most promise for the development of altruistic friendships. This is likely to

be the case since not only are opportunities potentially higher and constraints potentially lower, but there is also a greater chance that the individuals involved will develop intrinsic value orientations because of less potential extrinsic motives operative at these stages. Adult friendships would appear to run the highest risk of taking egoistic and exploitative forms because extrinsic motives seem to impinge more directly upon adulthood concerns than upon any other stage of the life cycle. Each of these generalizations derive from the parameters of the model of friendship when it is place in the nexus of the life cycle in a broad sense.

More specifically, it has been shown in each stage of the life cycle that:

1. childhood friendships are likely to be primarily egoistic largely because they lack the "other consciousness" to be either altruistic or truly manipulative in an exploitative sense,
2. adolescent friendships though somewhat subject to taking egoistic and exploitative forms have perhaps the greatest altruistic potential in the life cycle. This is because they are free from a number of role requirements and are also free to experiment with their value orientations,
3. early adult friendships are likely to be exploitative or egoistic in their nature due to the kind and quality of institutional commitments made

by individuals to careers and family life. However, the possibility of the development of altruistic friendships in the young adult stage of the life cycle increases somewhat if the individual remains single, or the couple chooses childlessness, or if an individual divorces and remarries, or if the individual or the couple may be seen to have flexible gender role expectations.

4. middle adult friendships are subject to many of the same risks as those described as characteristic of young adulthood. Nevertheless, they may be generally characterized as vulnerable to taking egoistic or exploitative forms due in part to significant mid-life timing events. Role loss, with respect to the death of the grand-parental generation and the launching of children, plus the subsequent feeling of occupying "roleless roles" may distance and erode the couple's friendship value orientations. Thus the possibility that each will exploit the other to resurrect their respective egos is great and the chances are high that their friendship will deteriorate into one or another of egoistc or exploitative friendship types.

5. late adulthood friendships are likely to be egoistic or exploitative as well. Here, the challenges to the realization of altruistic friendship concern, the impending loss of "adult status," impending

retirement, and mentorship issues. Each of these events may be seen to produce desperation and a strain toward egoistic and exploitative friendship types. It is evident that men and women in more traditionally defined marriages tend to run higher risks for these types of friendships and that the issues of "generativity" and mentorship make altruistic friendship choices extremely difficult at this stage of the life cycle.

6. friendship choices made by the individual in the "retirement" period are likely to result, in part, from activity in and/or disengagement from society. Those who disengage will tend to make egoistic or exploitative friendship choices; while those who maintain an activity perspective may be less constrained by the dilemmas of retirement and are therefore potentially more open to altruistic orientations.

7. friendship choices in widowhood are likely to be egoistic; due to the pressures of status homophily and the void left by the death of one's spouse, exploitative; in response to matters of inheritance and finances and altruistic; due to the degree and extent to which individuals are not consumed by grief, preyed upon by profit seekers and, who are able to internalize their new states without deep emotional scars.

In conclusion, the direct contributions of this research have been: (1) to provide a working definition of the meanings of friendship that is consistent with a wider body of works on the subject than perhaps has been possible to this point in time, (2) to develop and test the necessity, feasibility, and utility of an ideal typical model of friendship and dyadic friendship relationships and to demonstrate the operation of the ideal type as a theoretical system and, (3) to apply the ideal typical model of friendship to specific stages of the human life cycle.

It has been suggested that the model, when applied to specific life cycle stages, shows friendships of different forms both affect and are influenced by the stages of the life cycle itself. It also shows that it is possible to discriminate between and among life cycle stages in terms of their potential for variants of altruistic, egoistic, and/or exploitative friendship types. This usage describes some of the events at each stage which may lead individuals to adjust their friendship value orientations and therefore to change the types of friendships that they form.

Perhaps the most dramatic discoveries in this regard relate to the varied opportunity and constraint structures in each life stage which modify the value orientations themselves. The result is to clearly show that adult friendships are extremely problematic in our society in terms of their capacity to be or to become altruistic and, that altruistic friendships are not likely to occur in

adulthood at all but rather in the "pre" and "post" adult stages of adolescence and retirement. Correspondingly, however, adulthood whether it is defined as early, middle, or late runs perhaps higher risks for the development of egoistic and exploitative forms than any other stage of the life cycle.

Perhaps the greatest indirect contribution of this research is the priority it places on understanding significant social relationships in our society. That is, it not only provides clues for the social scientist to meaningfully conceptualize, operationalize and test hypotheses about the prevalence and intensity of friendship relationships, but it also provides a means for "lay" individuals to examine and reflect upon the quality and the quantity of their own friendships. The ideal typical model, then, is perhaps more than an ideal type in that it may have some indirect therapeutic benefits attached to it and these benefits may indeed extend and be felt well beyond the boundaries of the dyad and at almost every stage of the life cycle experience.

This is not to suggest, however, that researchers should accept this ideal typical model of dyadic friendship as complete in any sense and subsequently abandon attempts for a systematic theory of friendship for there are far too many questions left unanswered. It is beyond the scope of this research; for example, to assign probabilities to the specific occurrences of primary, secondary, and tertiary

friendship types in the life cycle, though, ultimately this may be possible. In addition, it may well be that a completely different approach, a more comprehensive one, that includes as part of its boundary conditions larger friendship groupings is required. Such an approach would seemingly extend beyond the dyad to include variables of increasing group size, functional complexity, and the influence of interaction networks. The addition of these types of considerations would conceivably add generalizability to the knowledge base of friendship and also potentially provide for the emergence of systematic theory in the area.

Speculatively, there are yet other ways to both conceptualize and potentially test the meaning(s) of dyadic friendship and its significance as a social form. If, for example, the friendship model was to allow for the co-presence of friendship types at any discrete point in time, some additional possibilities emerge. These possibilities concern the degree and extent to which the social actor may consciously and intentionally manipulate the definition of his or her friendship to conform to perceived situational variables. This scenario bridges the issues of friendship value orientations and defines a new and different research problem. The problem is to determine "intentionality." It may therefore be necessary to expand the boundaries of the friendship model to account for these kinds of variables.

Ultimately, a test of friendship's nature and significance in the life cycle might be better accomplished by focusing on one particular developmental stage. This focus would, in principle, allow for a much more detailed test of the interpreted theoretical system. It would potentially provide both data to "flesh out" the experience of friendship's multiple forms in the life cycle along with empirical generalizations to challenge, link to, or modify existing theory. It will be difficult to operationalize friendship's multiple forms, but it is necessary that social scientists move in this direction.

In conclusion, it should also be noted that refinements must continue to be made in the understanding of the "proper" place of ideal types in the chain of inquiry. Disagreements between and among theoreticians and methodologists continue to make the nature and use of ideal types scientifically suspect. In this work, they have largely been conceived of and treated as "interpreted theoretical systems," although they have also been alluded to as functioning as conceptual and heuristic methodological tools. Evidence is conflicting, but it is nevertheless clear that ideal types of friendship do have considerable explanatory power and predictive ability as well, though perhaps they are weakest in this latter sense. Whether or not ideal types are accorded the status of systematic theories is secondary, however, to their operation as interpreted theoretical systems. Researchers must continue

to focus on the systems properties of ideal typical models.

VI. FIGURES

Figure 1.

Summary of Requisite Initial Assumptions for a Rudimentary Dyadic Friendship Classificatory Scheme.



Where:

A = Acceptance

R = Rejection

⟶ = Individual Processes

⟺ = Potential Correspondence or Dissociation of Friendship Value Orientations in the Dyad

Figure 2.

The Relative Health of Some Combined Friendship Value Orientations in the Dyad.

Individual A. \ Individual B.	Acceptance of Friendship as an End in Itself	Rejection of Friendship as an End in Itself	Acceptance of Friendship as a Means to Other Ends	Rejection of Friendship as a Means to Other Ends
Acceptance of Friendship as an End in Itself	Healthy Friendship Formed By Definition 1	2	3	4
Rejection of Friendship as an End, In Itself	5	Unhealthy Friendship Formed By Definition 6	7	8
Acceptance of Friendship as a Means to Other Ends	9	10	Unhealthy Friendship Formed By Definition 11	12
Rejection of Friendship as a Means to Other Ends	13	14	15	Healthy Friendship Formed By Definition 16

Where: Only Cells 1, 6, 11, and 16 can be identified as "Healthy" or "Unhealthy" in terms of the assumptions made to this point in the model specification. This leaves twelve cells yet to be defined in permutation and combination.

Figure 3.

The Derivation of the Primary Types of Friendship by Friendship Value Orientations in the Dyad.

Individual B.

Individual A.	IFSVO	EFSVO
IFSVO	Primary Altruistic Friendship 1	2
	5	6
EFSVO	Primary Exploitative Friendship 9	10
	13	14

Primary Exploitative Friendship 3	4
7	8
Primary Egoistic Friendship 11	12
15	16

Where:

IFSVO = Intrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

EFSVO = Extrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

Cell # 1 = Combined IFSVO(s) or Primary Altruistic Friendship

Cell # 11 = Combined EFSVO(s) or Primary Egoistic Friendship

Cells # 3, # 9 = Opposing IFSVO(s) and EFSVO(s) or Primary Exploitative Friendship

Remaining Cells are as yet undefined

Figure 4.

The Derivation of Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Altruistic Friendships by Friendship Value Orientations in the Dyad.



Where:

IFSVO = Intrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

-EFSVO = Not Extrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

W1 = Combined IFSVO(s) define Friendships formed as Primary Altruistic

W2 W3 = One IFSVO plus one -EFSVO defines Friendships formed as Secondary Altruistic

W4 = Combined -EFSVO(s) defines Friendship formed as Tertiary Altruistic

Figure 5.

The Derivation of Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Egoistic Friendships by Friendship Value Orientations in the Dyad.



Where:

EFSVO = Extrinsic-Friendship Value Orientation

-IFSVO = Not Intrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

Z1. = Combined EFSVO(s) define Friendship formed as Primary Egoistic

Z2., Z3.. = One EFSVO plus one -IFSVO defines the Friendships formed as Secondary Egoistic

Z4. = Combined -IFSVO(s) define the Friendship formed as Tertiary Egoistic

Figure 6. Friendships by Friendship Value Orientations in the Exploitative The Derivation of Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Dyad.

Individual B.

Individual A.	IFSVO	-IFSVO	EFSVO	-EFSVO
IFSVO		Secondary Exploitative Friendship X3.	Primary Exploitative Friendship X1.	
-IFSVO	Secondary Exploitative Friendship X2.			Tertiary Exploitative Friendship X4.
EFSVO	Primary Exploitative Friendship Y1.			Secondary Exploitative Friendship Y3.
-EFSVO		Tertiary Exploitative Friendship Y4.	Secondary Exploitative Friendship Y2.	

Where:

IFSVO = Intrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

EFSVO = Extrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

-IFSVO = Not Intrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

-EFSVO = Not Extrinsic Friendship Value Orientation

X1, Y1 = Opposite and Opposing Friendship Value Orientations Define Friendships formed as Primary Exploitative

X2, X3, Y2, Y3 = Opposite but not necessarily Opposing Friendship Value Orientations define Friendships formed as Secondary Exploitative

X4, Y4 = Opposing but not necessarily opposite Friendship Value Orientations define Friendships formed as Tertiary Exploitative

Figure 7.

Summary of the Derivation of All Friendship Types By Friendship Value Orientations in the Dyad.

Individual B.

Individual A.	IFSVO	-IFSVO	EFSVO	-EFSVO
IFSVO	Primary Altruistic Friendship W1.	Secondary Exploitative Friendship X3.	Primary Exploitative Friendship X1.	Secondary Altruistic Friendship W2.
-IFSVO	Secondary Exploitative Friendship X2.	Tertiary Egoistic Friendship Z4.	Secondary Egoistic Friendship Z3.	Tertiary Exploitative Friendship X4.
EFSVO	Primary Exploitative Friendship Y1.	Secondary Egoistic Friendship Z2.	Primary Egoistic Friendship Z1.	Secondary Exploitative Friendship Y3.
-EFSVO	Secondary Altruistic Friendship W3.	Tertiary Exploitative Friendship Y4.	Secondary Exploitative Friendship Y2.	Tertiary Altruistic Friendship W4.

Where:

W1, W2, W3, W4 = (Figure 4)

X1, X2, X3, X4 = (Figure 6)

Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4 = (Figure 6)

Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4 = (Figure 5)

Figure 8.

Continuum of Altruistic Friendship Types from Highest to Lowest.



Figure 9.

Continuum of Egoistic Friendship Types from Highest to Lowest.



Figure 10.

Continuum of Exploitative Friendship Types from Highest to Lowest.



Figure 11.

Relations Among Basic Friendship Types, Subtypes, and their Frequency of Occurrence in the Model.



Where:

A = Most Like Montaigne's Ideal
B = Least Like Montaigne's Ideal
C = Most Strong to Least Strong Occurence of the Subtype
D = Least Viable to Most Viable Occurence of the Subtype
E = Most Viable to Least Viable Occurence of the Subtype

Figure 12.

Continuua of Opportunities (A) and Constraints (B) on Friendship Formation by Stages of the Life Cycle.



Where:

Opportunities = Estimate of Relative Size of Pool of Eligibles

Contraints = Estimate of Number of Role Requirements

X----X = Approximate Range of Effect

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