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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

The Concept of Will in International Relations

by

Howard Cooper

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

Fall 1986

ISBN 0-315-32436-8

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED Master of Arts

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED 1986

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Concept of Will in International Relations submitted by Howard Cooper in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Supervisor

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Dedication

To my Parents

Abstract

The Concept of Will In International Relations is a study of a concept in international relations theory which has not received rigorous examination, though allusion to it is considerable, especially in theory, which assesses or alludes to power as a psychological relation between states. This thesis has done at least three things: (1) developed a theory of influence, examining how will functions in the context of influence as well as to propose a definition of the concept; (2) analyzed relevant theoretical literature that would offer some insight into the subject; and (3) tested the concept in the context of the Vietnam conflict during Johnson's Presidency.

The theory itself centers on the role of perception in influence, and specifically, on how the state's perceptual image of its opponent's will (disposition) to act bears upon its own will to act. In application to the Vietnam conflict, the combatants' perceptions of their opponent's will to act proved to be simply one of a number of pertinent sources influencing the individual state's will to act. Other salient sources included the linkage made between the goal and a threat to the state's core values and to those of the respective leaders; public opinion; and the leaders' understanding of the dynamics of conflict.

It was evident that the theory could not account for the complexity of sources which might have a bearing upon the state's will to act within the given context.

Nevertheless, the theory was beneficial in enabling the researcher to better understand the role of will in the process of influence.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to all those who, directly and indirectly, contributed to my research and writing. I am deeply grateful to my loving parents and sisters, whose encouragement, patience, and understanding facillatated the completion of this project. I thank my committee members for their reading of the draft. Special gratitude is extended to my supervisor, Professor Juris A. Lejnieks, whose advice, assistance and keen criticisms of earlier drafts of this thesis were absolutely essential to the completion of this study.

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I. The Concept of Will and Power

David Baldwin finds fault with the prevalent usage of power, which equates a state's store of physical capabilities with its level of power. The essence of the problem, according to the author, lies in the assumption that power resources are fungible. Particularly objectionable to Baldwin is the explanation offered by many power analysts with regard to the frequent failure of seemingly stronger states to translate their power resources into successful foreign policy outcomes. He labels this frequent failure of power predictions as "the paradox of unrealized power."[1]

Without alluding to sources, Baldwin suggests that many power analysts have identified the presence of an essential conversion process separating alledged "potential power" (or power "resources") and successful foreign policy outcomes or "actual power." The "paradox of unrealized power" may be explained in terms of "malfunctioning conversion processes."[2] Baldwin alledges that many commentators cite will as a principal factor in this conversion process. In the absence of will; potential power resources cannot be converted into actual power. The American defeat in Vietnam, for instance, is said to have resulted from a lack of will to utilize available armanments.[3]

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[1]David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies," 31 World Politics (No. 1, 1978), p. 163.
[2]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 163.
[3]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 164.

It is clear that Baldwin disdains this usage of will. To employ will in this manner encourages "sloppy power analysis."[4] In effect, Baldwin's chief criticism is that commentators, no matter how inept, can always explain away their failed power predictions by attributing to the prima facie stronger state a lack of will to influence the second state.[5] In this vein, Baldwin writes:

> Emphasis on skill and will in conversion processes makes it all too easy for the power analyst to avoid facing up to his mistakes.[6]

It is noticeable that Baldwin's analysis contains a series of uncorroborated assumptions. The author seems to be proposing, first, that a customary explanation of the notion of will can be discerned. Second, he assumes that there exists a traditional understanding, and indeed, presence of a conversion process as he understands it. Related to the preceeding point is the author's supposition that the factor of will can occupy a pivotal position in the mobilization of physical resources. These assumptions are not evidenced. In the absence of proper substantiation, there is ample reason to question the validity of these fundamental assumptions.

An associated problem is the author's failure to define key terms. The notion of will, whose alledged explanatory usage Baldwin so severely criticizes, is not defined. In light of what has been previously mentioned, will surfaces as an intrinsic element in whether or not resources are

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[4] Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 169.
[5] Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 169.
[6] Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 170.

mobilized. However, this is the assumed function of will, not its meaning. Any definition must be offerred by the reader, based upon his analysis of Baldwin's article.

It would appear to be the case that Baldwin's goal is to exclude the power fungibility analysts' usage of the concept of will. In effect, the author is requesting that will, heretofore understood as the indispensable conversion process element motoring the successful use of physical capabilities, be relegated to the status of a capability. By doing this, Baldwin attempts to divest from the analysis of power the proposition that will a priori occupies a pivotal place in the state's utilization of its physical resources.

Baldwin notes that in the estimate of state capabilities, the probability of successful conversion should be included.[7] In isolation, capabilities are "relatively low in fungibility."[8] Their relevance is properly evaluated within the given policy-contingency framework;[9] it is essential that scope and domain be included in the analysis of capabilities.'[10] Will, as a capability, can therefore only have utility within a given context. Baldwin's own scheme, however, re-introduces an analogous conversion process which to the one he criticizes. Intrinsic to this conversion process is the notion of "commitment," a term which Baldwin appears to substitute

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[7]Author's italicization. Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 170.
[8]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 166.
[9]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 165.
[10]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 163.

freely in the place of will.'' In what follows, Baldwin's analysis will be shown to be tautological as he cannot jettison the factor of will.

At the outset of his analysis, Baldwin writes that the term, "power" will be treated in a broad generic sense, that is, interchangeable with such terms as "influence" and "control."'[2] It is manifest in Baldwin's theory that it is the usage of power as influence which is favored. As influence, power is a relational concept. For Baldwin, power inheres in the relationship between A's capabilities and B's value system.'[3] In effect, A's ability to influence B, to have power, is contingent upon the degree to which B values a particular goal. Put differently, the degree to which B values an objective will impact upon his degree of commitment not to be influenced; and therefore, A's power. Citing Knorr, Baldwin states:

> If B's perceptions, values and skills are such as to make it impossible for A to influence him, then putative power should never have been attributed to A in the first place.'[4]

Baldwin's failure to define key concepts extends to those terms comprising his conversion process. The notions of values and perceptions are not defined; however, the author's allusion to or direct usage of these terms enables the analyst to surmise how Baldwin would define them. His illustration of a couple who are strongly committed to a

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''I am indebted to Dr. J.A. Lejnieks for this comment.
'[2]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 462.
'[3]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 171.
'[4]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 171.

non-violent resolution of conflict within the framework of marriage is the closest the author comes to defining the notion of values.'[15] The suggestion is also made that individuals' reactions to situations differ given their particular set of values. The notion of perception is also alluded to. Within the context of sanctions, Baldwin suggests that a perception is an interpretation.'[16] Mirroring his comment on values, Baldwin notes that perceptions are variable given particular individuals.

Outside of the elements that comprise Baldwin's conversion process, the author corroborates the point that will is indispensable to the usage of power resources. In his critique of Kindleberger, Baldwin writes that "power cannot be divorced from goals or purposes."'[17] A state may possess the potential power resources to influence another state. However, the usage of capabilities is dependent upon the state's intentions, and its desire to exercize its capabilities.'[18] In Baldwin's analysis, the values at stake within the given context determine the state's investment of will (commitment). It is at this point that the conversion process, which Baldwin so severely criticized, creeps back into his own analysis. The utility of the state's power resources is heavily contingent upon the level of commitment which the state, based upon it value system, ascribes to its objective. Regarding this relationship between commitment

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[15]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 178.
[16]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 184.
[17]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 173.
[18]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 173.

and the utility of physical resources, Baldwin writes:

> In the absence of information or assumptions about the degree of commitment to maintaining a given policy framework, one can say "nothing" about the relative importance of the power resources... ''

It would appear that Baldwin has travelled full circle. Ostensibly, his intention was to exclude the notion of will, as used by power fungibility analysts, from his analysis in order to forego the criticism meted out against their "exaggerated" usage of the concept. Nevertheless, Baldwin himself has arrived at the conclusion that will, which he terms, "commitment," is indispensable to the utility of power resources.

Baldwin does not outrightly define the notion of will. Based, however, upon his usage of will and commitment, one may surmise how the author would outline the term's definition. In itself, will surfaces as a disposition. Whose disposition is being spoken of is a difficult question. Will is often thought of as the general disposition of a particular society, or nation-state. Baldwin, however, does not confirm that this is his interpretation. Baldwin speaks simply of the state's commitment. This does not overrule the possibility that it is the disposition of the state's leaders which is being addressed. In Baldwin's analysis, will cannot be extricated from action; it is the will (the disposition) to act which is common parlance in Baldwin's article. Consequently, will is properly regarded in the venue of action, the given context. The source of will,

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''Author's italicization. Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 179.

according to the author, inheres in the second state's values within the given context.

An examination of K.J. Holsti's treatment of power assists the analyst in coming to grips with the problems presented in Baldwin's analysis. In writing about power, Holsti discusses the notion of resources (capabilities). In the process of influencing (an aspect of power) another state's behaviour, less tangible resources, that is resources other than physical capabilities, come into play. For example, as influence is set within the context of interstate relationships, elements of psychology, such as the perception of determination (will), assume a high significance in the process of influencing the behaviour of states.[20]

In Holsti's analysis, the nature of the notion of capability within the act of influence is multifarious. To illustrate this, Holsti examples a bank robber who demands money from a bank clerk. My intention is to analyze scenarios, based on Holsti's illustration, which I will put forward or take from Holsti's text. In so doing, my goal is to better understand how will functions in the context of influence. In the course of this investigation, Baldwin's findings will be assessed in order to discover whether they are in need of ammendment.

(A) In Holsti's first scenario, the robber is unarmed and demands money from the bank clerk. The clerk's refusal

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[20]K.J. Holsti. International Politics. (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983, pp. 145-146.

to give over the money seems to be based on her perception that the robber does not have a gun. The absence of the weapon implies that the threat and the threatener lack credibility. Inhering in the clerk's response is the linkage made between the weapon's absence and the clerk's estimation of the robber's lack of will to fulfill his threat. In this case, then, it is the capability which implies the will to act.[21]

This example points to the central position of perception in the process of influence. In this case, it is the clerk's definition of the robber's weakness that resulted in the robber's failure. In short, the clerk has perceived that the threat is invalid due to her assessment of the thief's weapon and what it implies. It appears to be the clerk's perception which is the source of her will to refuse to hand over the cash. Influence, then, in this context can be related to the relationship between A's properties and B's value system.

(B) Holsti now proposes that the robber is armed and threatens to shoot if the clerk does not give up the money. This time, the clerk complies. In this case, Holsti notes that less tangible resources other than the simple possession of the gun may be involved. The robber's influence is closely linked to his ability to convey determination and threat.[22] The effectiveness of the robber's conveyance of will is dependent upon the clerk's

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[21]I am indebted to Dr. J.A. Lejnieks for this comment.
[22]Holsti, (fn.20), p. 145.

perception thereof. In this case, the clerk's action is prompted by her perception that the robber has the will to use his gun. Whether that will is imagined or real is immaterial. The clerk's action is brought about by her belief-- her interpretation of the robber's behaviour--as well as by the sort of individual the clerk is, which is largely a function of her own particular value system.[2]

It is evident that the clerk had sufficient grounds on which to base her belief: the pointed weapon and the verbal threat. The clerk, believing that the threat was credible, made a value judgement that her life was worth more than the loss of the money. However, the clerk's estimation of value was preceeded by her perception of the threat. It is the perception of a credible threat; that is, the belief that the robber has the will to utilize his weapon, which antedates the value judgement. Therefore, the robber's influence has hinged upon the clerk's perception of danger.

(C) A variation upon the previous scenario, and one not used by Holsti, would be that the robber displays a weapon, however does not offer any verbal threat. In this case, the clerk might refuse to give over the money. The clerk appears to have made the judgement that the threat posed by the robber's weapon is not credible. In effect, the clerk has assumed that the robber does not possess the necessary will to utilize his weapon. The clerk's definition of her adversary's will to act may be correct or incorrect. Yet, it

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[2] I am indebted to Dr. J.A. Lejnieks for this comment.

is the clerk's perception that is the critical element in effecting her refusal; her perception establishes a fact which otherwise may be untrue; for the robber's will to act is independent of the clerk's perception and his response may be to shoot.

A second way to regard the clerk's response is to suggest that in association with her perception of the robber's absence of will was the attendent belief that a superior show of will would disarm the bandit. In other words, her will may have caused the robber to lose his nerve and retreat. The inference is that will is bilateral; it does not flow in one direction.

(D) In this scenario, the robber is armed, and has issued a verbal threat. The weapon is concealed. The clerk agrees to give over the money.

Despite the weapon's concealment, the clerk has interpreted the situation as being dangerous. Included in the definition of the situation is the assumption that the robber's implicit threat to use the gun is not a bluff. The robber has conveyed the impression, which may or may not be true, that he possesses the will to utilize the resource.

The actual existence of the gun is not the important factor in the robber's success. What is more essential is the psychological relation between the two parties. The robber's influence is primarily a function of the clerk's perception of danger. To be more specific, the robber has been able to transmit the impression that he possesses the

necessary psychological disposition (will) to utilize his resource. The perceived certainty of the weapon's existence is furthered by the robber's conveyance of this attitude. The clerk's perception of this attitude contributes to the robber's influence.

This situation highlights the importance of focusing on actor's perceptions and interpretations of the other party's will in the particular context. Influence often involves a subtle psychological relation between states. It can involve a state's attempt to impose a particular image of reality in the international system, which effects the the second state's behaviour. The perceived display of will is fundamental to the achievement of power in this influential relationship. This process is best exemplified in the context of deterrence in international relations.

(E) In this scenario, the robber is armed and is concealing his weapon. He issues a verbal threat. The clerk refuses to hand over the money. This time, from the clerk's vantage point, the existence of the weapon is doubtful. This perception is sensed. Strengthening this perception is the clerk's assessment of the thief's disposition. In this case, the existence of the weapon does not conform with the clerk's definition of the robber's will.

Once again, this situation focuses on the centrality of perception in establishing influence. In the absence of tangible resources, influence can be nevertheless established. The suggestion is that influence is heavily

dependent on the belief that less tangible resources are present. The conveyance of the will to act and the perception thereof, can contribute to successful influence. In this case, as in all previously mentioned scenarios, the clerk's perception of the robber's will is the fundamental element in whether or not the thief will immediately achieve his objective.

(F) In this scenario, both parties possess a resource: the robber has a gun, the clerk an alarm buzzer. The clerk refuses to hand over the money.

The clerk's refusal is predicated on her belief that she can defend herself. Prior to the clerk's refusal, she must have sized up her antagonist and arrived at the conclusion that by utilizing her resource, the thief could be vanquished. Included in that estimate must have been a calculus of the robber's will to use his weapon following the alarm going off. It is the perception of the robber's will that has influenced the clerk's decision. Her own willingness to use her weapon was a product of her interpretation of the robber's will. If, on the other hand, the clerk was to perceive that the robber's threat to shoot would be credible following the alarm's buzzing, and the clerk still refused to hand over the money, one might be forced to conclude that she was suicidal. If the clerk, believing that the threat was credible following the alarm's buzzing, had given up the money, it would be reasonable to conclude that the clerk valued her life over the money's

loss. In this case, it would have been the clerk's value estimation that would have followed her perception of the danger.

A. Conclusions and Summary

In this chapter, I have endeavored to understand better the notion of will. To this end, I have attempted to assess Baldwin's findings in light of Holsti's examples and variations which can be made thereupon. Will, which he coextensively terms, commitment, is intrinsic to the functioning of physical capabilities. For Baldwin, the source of commitment, within the given context, is located within B's value system.

In Baldwin's article, the state is treated as an actor, embodying the characteristics of an individual. In exampling ideas, the author shifts his discussion from the state to the individual. The inference is that ultimately the analyst must focus on the individual decision maker as the appropriate level of analysis in international relations.

Throughout the delineation of the scenarios, it has been shown that the situation is far more complex than Baldwin would have the reader believe. It is clear that the presence of will is indispensable to the mobilization of resources. However, a state's willingness to utilize its resources may be the product of its perception of another state's will, within a given context. Hence, the manner in which a state interprets the actions of another state may have a significant bearing on influence within the particular context.

Will is not simply the disposition of the state to act. Will has utility, in addition, by virtue of the

psychological relation between states. Namely, influence can be predicated on a state's perception of another state's strength of will or weakness thereof.

Baldwin's allegation that B's value system determines the function of will within relationships is simplistic. In a number of the scenarios, it was shown that a proper analysis must take into account the degree to which both participants value their goal. Furthermore, as influence is set within the context of a relationship between states, a proper analysis should also include an assessment of both parties's perceptions of the other state's will to act.

Baldwin seems to overestimate the importance of B's values. Its puzzling how Baldwin comes to the conclusion that B's values establish the level of commitment within the given context. He himself has admitted that contexts are dynamic. This dynamism avers that A will respond to B's action in light of his own priorities and interpretation of B's will. The functioning of will is highly dynamic and a valuable analysis must consequently be balanced between both actors involved in a particular situation.

Any definition of will to be gleaned from the scenarios, must take its lead from the idea of power regarded as an influential relationship between states. Within a relationship of influence, elements of psychology can be highlighted. Foremost among these elements is perception. Central to the success of threat-making is the opponent's perception that the threat made is credible.

Credibility, in large part, is a function of the percepetion that the state has the requisite will to fulfill its threat. Mirroring the definition interpreted from Baldwin's article, will surfaces as a disposition. To be more specific, will is the disposition to act.

The scenarios, however, modify the definition of will gleaned from Baldwin's article. Within the context of the scenarios, influence may be effected on the basis of the belief that another state possesses the necessary disposition to act upon its proposed threat. In other words this perception may be formed on the basis of an image that the will to act is possessed. Such a perception may confer a reality on a proposition which may otherwise be erroneous. For example, a bank teller perceiving that a robber, whose weapon is concealed, possesses the will to act, may resultingly give over the money because she believes that a weapon does exist, though, in reality, it does not.

In light of the potential psychological relation between parties, the definition of will, given the context, may have to be modified to read: the perceived disposition to act as oppossed to the disposition to act. However, while it appears incumbent upon the political theorist to include in his definition of will a consideration of image, it should be acknowledged that in view of the dynamic nature of contexts, the state's perceived disposition to act will necessarily devolve upon the second state's own disposition to act or not to act. In short, the inherent dynamism of

contexts suggests that a suitable definition of will must include the union of both nuances previously alluded to: as a perceived disposition to act and as an actual disposition to act.

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K.J. Holsti. International Politics. (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983.

II. The Concept of Will in Realist Literature

It was noted in the previous chapter that Baldwin had alledged that power analysts tended to explain their failed power predictions by making reference to what Baldwin termed "malfunctioning conversion processes," separating supposed "potential power" (or power "resources") and successful foreign policy outcomes or "actual power." Baldwin labelled this frequent failure of power predictions as "the paradox of unrealized power."[24] Subsequently, Baldwin alledged that power analysts tended to cite the absence of will as a principal factor in malfunctioning conversion processes. My intention is to evaluate Baldwin's allegations by conducting an examination of the work of key power theorists. I will proceed by examining the work of commentators, which Baldwin cited in the defense of his propositions. Works by Knorr, Keohane and Nye, Dahl, and Cline were mentioned. Finishing this, I will investigate literature by major authors who deal with the notion of power, including Morgenthau, Strausz-Hupe and Wolfers, among others. The authors's works examined merit investigation as they constitute the foundations of Realist theory. My objective throughout will be to detail how will is conceived and utilized by prominent authors in order to assess the soundness of Baldwin's statements.

In Klaus Knorr's writings, allusion to the notion of will is both explicit and tacit. The effectiveness of

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[24]David A. Baldwin, (fn 1), p. 163.

military capabilities is based, in part, on the psychological relationship existing between states. The behaviour of the adversary may be affected by his perception that the state not only possesses superior military capabilities, but, more importantly, is apt to use them.[25] Knorr expands upon the previous point when he comments that the opponent's behaviour can be influenced by his expectation that if the state's vital interests are crossed, it possesses the necessary disposition, the will, to resort to military force.[26] Knorr emphasizes that the credibility of the state's threat is, in part, a function of the opponent's image of the state's will to act. However, the author remarks that by its very nature the credibility of the image and the reputation of resolve is open to doubt and uncertainty; therefore, the opponent may endeavor to probe the reactions of the state in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether or not he is a paper tiger.[27]

In the context of the specific situation, Knorr enumerates at least two nuances of the notion of will. The first nuance concerns itself with the idea of the national will to support particular objectives. Knorr recounts that the state's ability to mobilize its resources is heavily dependent upon what he terms, "the political foundations of

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[25]Klaus Knorr. Miltary Power and Potential. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1970, p. 3.
[26]Klaus Knorr. Power and Wealth. New York: Basic, 1973, p. 15; and Klaus Knorr. The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations. New York: Basic, 1975, p. 9.
[27]Knorr, The Power of Nations, (fn.26), p. 13.

military power."[28] By this Knorr means that there must exist a national disposition, a national will, to support the use of force.[29] However, the national will is contingent upon the populace's estimation that the value of the goal supersedes the level of the personal sacrifice called for.[30] Within the context of a conflict, the national will, among all parties, is rooted in an estimate of cost/gain.[31] The inference is not only that the national will is situationally-specific; it is, in adddition, variable within the particular context, given the inherent dynamism of situations, and the consequent public re-evaluations of the objective's value in light of the incurred costs.[32] Hence, B's will and ability to resist, based upon the values at stake in the conflict, will devolve upon A's willingness or unwillingness to pay the costs associated with the continuation of the conflict.[33]

A number of nuances of the notion of will arise. First, will surfaces as a disposition rooted in the general population, supporting the use of capabilities to achieve state ends. Second, that disposition is subject to fluctuation, based upon the estimation of the value of the goal in comparison to the associated costs. The inference is

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[28]Knorr, (fn.25), p. 27.
[29]Knorr, (fn.25), pp. 137-138; and Klaus Knorr. The War Potential of Nations . Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956, pp. 43, 72.
[30]Knorr, (fn.25), p. 138; and Knorr, The War Potential, (fn.29), p. 72.
[31]Knorr, (fn.27), pp. 10-11.
[32]Knorr, The War Potential, (fn.29), p. 72.
[33]Knorr, (fn.27), p. 20

that the will to act is strengthened when the policy objective is interpreted as being valuable.

Robert Dahl does not explicitly allude to the notion of will. His interpretation of power, however, emphasizes the notion of power as a "chain of causation,"[31] appropriately assessed within the given contextual relation between states.[32] As influence, power involves the ability of actors to effect the actions or the predispositions of others.[33] Influencing state behaviour, Dahl notes, can involve a psychological relation between states, which includes the ability to shape the perception of another state that threats are credible; thereby, affecting the state's choice of response.[34] In doing so, A attempts to effect B's actions by making him believe that alternate forms of behaviour, other than that favored by A, are not open.[35] In effect, A attempts to convince B that his threats are credible, which, in turn, impacts upon what Dahl calls B's "predispositions."[36] A principal aspect in establishing this credibility is the ability to influence B's perception that his opponent possesses the will (the disposition) to fulfill his threats. Dahl instances the above when he presents the example of a union agent who threatens to beat up an

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[31]Robert A. Dahl. Modern Political Analysis. (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1976, p. 39.
[32]Dahl, (fn.31), pp. 26-27; and Dahl, "The Concept of Power," 2 Behavioural Science. (1957), p. 203.
[33]Dahl, (fn.34), p. 34.
[34]Dahl, (fn.34), pp. 43-50.
[35]Dahl, (fn.35), p. 44.
[36]Dahl, (fn.35), p. 44.

employee and his family, if he fails to go on strike.[40] In this case, the worker accedes to the threat because he believes that the union agent has both the means and the will to make his threat credible. This example illustrates the proposition that indispensable to the establishment of credible threats is the perception that the state has the will to execute its threats.

In Ray S. Cline's text, World Power Assessment, the author presents a formula for measuring national power: Pp=(c+e+m)x (s+w), where Pp= perceived power; c= critical mass; e=economic capability; m= military capability; s= strategic purpose; and w= the will to pursue strategy.[41] The author allocates weights to each of these elements based on his assessment of differing nation-states.

The degree of national will is conceived to be a factor making a "critical difference" in the relative power of nations.[42] As a term, will is defined as a quality enabling a nation to mobilize its resources and capabilities.[43] Cline arrives at a value for will by attaching percentage weights to suppossed constituent values composing the term. Under a series of headings, these elements, with their corresponding percentage weights, are listed as follows: (1) Level of national integration: (a) cultural integration (25%), (b) territorial integration (8%); (2) Strength of national

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[40]Dahl, (fn.35), p. 49.
[41]Ray S. Cline. World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1977, p. 34.
[42]Cline, (fn.41), p. 175.
[43]Cline, (fn.41), p. 145.

leadership: (a) governmental policy capability (17%); (b)level of social discipline (17%); and (3) Relevance of Strategy to national interest (33%).[44] The maximum rating on national will is 1.0, though many nations rate well below the norm of 0.5.[45]

Cline's goal is to quantify national will. However, the author himself questions the validity of such an exercize. Not only does Cline term such a procedure as an "uncertain task,"[46] he also writes that "it (will) is not a fixed quality of unchanging value; in fact it is ephemeral, fluctuating."[47] In effect, Cline is suggesting that the strength of will is contextually-related. However, consideration of context is passed over as Cline's goal is to provide a listing of states's level of will, which is not open to doubt. Cline's version of national will as a quantifiable unit, equates with his overall theory of power. That model, in turn, meshes with Baldwin's conclusion, however overstated, that Cline's view of power is "monolithic, homogenous, unidimensional and highly fungible."[48]

Baldwin correctly noted [illegible]les Kindleberger differentiates between "strength" and "power" along lines similar to the distinction between actual and potential power.[49] Strength is treated as a capability, while power is

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[44]Cline, (fn.41), p. 151.
[45]Cline, (fn.41), p. 151.
[46]Cline, (fn.41), p. 145.
[47]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 173.
[48]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 173.

conceived of as strength capable of being used efficiently.[48] A transformation process is present between the components of strength and power. Kindleberger suggests that will may be an essential part of this process of conversion. Will is referenced as the general (national) disposition of the populace. The author notes that the populace's willingness to sanction the usage of resources is contingent upon the estimation that the goal's value merits the sacrifices called for. Hence, "willing the means is easy provided that the country is sufficiently unified in willing the ends."[49] In Kindleberger's analysis, then, will arises as a disposition to act which is dependent upon an estimation of cost versus gain within the particular context.

Keohane and Nye similarly distinguish between power resources and power as the actor's actual influence over outcomes.[51] The mere possession of power resources is not necessarily related to actual power. How vulnerable a state is has a large influence upon the role of power in interdependence. By vulnerability, the authors mean the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.[52] Supplementing the extent of costs in the measure of vulnerability is the state's

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[48]Charles P. Kindleberger. Power And Money. New York: Basic, 1970, p. 56.
[49]Kindleberger, (fn.49), p. 68.
[51]Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little Brown and Co., p. 11.
[52]Keohane and Nye, (fn.51), p. 13.

"political willingness to bear them."[52] The failure of the American's foreign policy in Vietnam, for example, can be explained by the North Vietnameses's williness to pay a higher cost to reach their objective.[53]

Keohane and Nye's text uses will in a number of ways. By political will the authors mean that the state, or its representatives, possess the necessary disposition to utilize capabilities. The use of means is dependent upon the value of the ends. In short, the willingness to use means is related to the particular context. Second, in the absence of the possession of superior capabilities, a state can enjoy influence by virtue of its willingness (its predisposition) to bear higher costs, to suffer. Finally, the authors aver that influence can result as a consequence of the perception of will.

For Hans Morgenthau, power ultimately resides in a state's capabilities, the most important being the state's military resources.[54] It is the capabilities that enable the state to establish its control over mens "minds and actions."[55] Morgenthau suggests, furthermore, that capabilities are the ultimate source of an actor's ability to impose his will over another actor. Will, within this context, is synonymous with the objectives of the actor.

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[52]Keohane and Nye, (fn.51), pp. 14-15.
[53]Keohane and Nye, (fn.51), p. 18.
[54]Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations. (5th ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 29.
[55]Morgenthau, (fn.55), p. 28.

Similarly, Morgenthau equates the individual leader's will with his particular goals. Likewise, the leader's ability to impose his will over another individual is ultimately based on his possession of capabilities. This is illustrated in the following example:

> he (the Secretary of State) has no power over the President; for he has none of the means at his disposal with which to impose his will upon that of the President.''

Will is not constricted to this formulation. Morgenthau proposes that influence can be related to a psychological process in which actors shape their behaviour in accordance with another party's wishes. They do so due to their expectation that the opponent possesses the will to act. The threat of force, for example, can alter the will (the disposition) of another party to act contrary to the objectives of his adversary.'' In this context, Morgenthau draws a distinction between potential (political) and actual (military) power. Potential power embodies a threat or a potentiality to use capabilities, principally armed strength. Whereas:

> the actual exercize of physical violence substitutes for the psychological relation between two minds, which is the essence of political power and action.''

Consequently, the threat of violence can shape mens minds and actions" due to the perception that threats are credible. Credibility, in turn, is a function of the

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''Morgenthau, (fn.55), p. 29.
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''Morgenthau, (fn.55), p. 29.

interpretation that the state has the requisite will to fulfill its threat.

Morgenthau forwards a third nuance of the concept of will. He castigates leaders for shaping their foreign policy due to a misdirected interpretation of the national will. The definition of the public disposition to support policy is alledged to dissipate the leadership's disposition to act.[60] The employment of will in this manner closely approximates that found in the previous paragraph in that it embodies a psychological relation between parties. However, in this instance, Morgenthau suggests that a national disposition exists, though it might be only as a perceived image.

Robert Strausz-Hupe waffles with the idea that power is improperly equated with a state's store of physical capabilities. On the one hand, he suggests that the utility of resources resides in the minds of actors; that is, "where they think power lies and what it will be used for."[61] On the other hand, the author argues that those who can "bend men to their will" can do so in light of their possession of capabilities which affords them the "power to coerce."[62] The meaning of will in this context equates with the state's objectives.

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[60]Hans J. Morgenthau. In Defense of The National Interest. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, p. 237.
[61]Robert Strausz-Hupe. Power And Community. New York: Praeger, 1956, p. 12.
[62]Strauż-Hupe, (fn.61), p. 14.

Elsewhere the author writes of will as a disposition to act. This disposition is related to the particular context.'' Power resources in the absence of will are ineffective. Strausz-Hupe writes:

> Weapons are instruments of power; they do not confer power upon their possessor. It is not true that power "comes out of the mouth of a gun." It is the will to match power with power--the "will to resist"--that confers political meaning upon all instruments of power, including nuclear weapons.''

Here, the author appears to be proposing that the utility of weapons depends upon the necessary disposition to use them.

A third nuance of will, alluded to by Strausz-Hupe, revolves around the idea that power can be grounded on the perception of will. Strausz-Hupe points out that deterrence, for example, is rooted in the perception that the state possesses the will to make its threats credible.'' The upshot of the perception that the state does not possess the will to fulfill its threats will result in acts which are contrary to its objectives. Power, then, can be stationed within the image that other states possess the disposition to act.

Karl Deutsch suggests that there exists a division between power as a potentiality and as an actuality. A state's aggregate power resources is conceived to be the basis of potential power. Actualized power is the conversion

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''Strausz-Hupe, (fn.61), p. 12.
''Robert Strausz-Hupe. "The Nuclear Revolution and Its Impact on International Relations," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (eds.). Stategy and Values: Selected Writings of Robert Strausz-Hupe . Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1974, pp. 41-42.
''Strausz-Hupe, (fn.64), p. 35.

of resources into successful foreign policy outcomes.[64] The level of skill in utilizing resources appears to be the single conversion process element referenced.[65] Elsewhere, Deutsch argues that power in no way approaches the fungibility of money. In this context, the author notes that power resources are subject to a state's commitment to use them.[66] Commitment to policies may be important in order to convey to other actors that one has the will to defend one's interests if threatened.[67] Will is conceived by Deutsch as the disposition to act, which must be proved in the absence of a psychological relation in which states perceive that their opponents possess the will to validate threats. Deutsch states:

> governments that must continually prove their will and capacity to fight probably do not have quite enough prestige for the policies they are engaged in.[68]

Prestige is related to the establishment of influence on the basis of the perception that an opponent's threat to use force is credible.[69] A failure in conveying the perception that threats are credible necessitates a demonstration of capabilities.[70] A show of capabilities, Deutsch intimates, does not mean their actual use. Rather, they present the perception that the state possesses the will to use them.

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[64]Karl W. Deutsch. The Analysis of International Relations. (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978, p. 27.
[65]Deutsch, (fn.66), pp. 27-28.
[66]Deutsch, (fn.66), pp. 47-48.
[67]Deutsch, (fn.66), p. 48.
[68]Deutsch, (fn.66), p. 48.
[69]Deutsch, (fn.66), p. 47.
[70]Deutsch, (fn.66), p. 47.

For Arnold Wolfers, power, in the end result, is a function of military capabilities. While power can be conceived as a psychological relation between states;[72] that is, the ability to move other actors by threatening deprivation, power is ultimately stationed in the available resources to effect one's ends.[74] However, the accumulation and usage of power is sensitive to the "value that nations attach to the goals they seek to attain."[73] In this context, will means the disposition to act.

Though the term, "will" is not used, the suggestion is that a positive correlation exists between the degree to which the state values its objectives and the level of will which it manifests in trying to accomplish its goals. Wolfers notes that values and the resulting level of will (commitment) to achieve a particular goal, is subject to the degree that both actors value their objective within a given context.[74] A state must muster sufficient resources to overcome "the power of resistance put up by those who desire to preserve things which they possess and cherish."[75] In effect, successful influence is contingent ultimately on the mobilization of resources in order to break the resistance

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[72]Arnold Wolfers, "Power and Influence: The Means of Foreign Policy," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.). Discord And Collaboration. Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1962, p. 103.
[73]Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in James N. Rosenau (ed.). International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research And Theory. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 147; and Wolfers, (fn.73), pp. 106-107.
[74]Wolfers, (fn.74), p. 148.
[74]Wolfers, (fn.73), p. 106.
[75]Wolfers, (fn.74), p. 149.

of another party. The ability to mobilize resources is dependent, in turn, upon the degree to which the actor values his objective.'[8]

On the face of it, Inis Claude's definition of power is denoted to include only military capabilities.'[9] However, Claude later in his discussion of deterrence, qualifies this statement. He writes that within a context, such as deterrence, which emphasizes the perception of power, what inhibits aggression "is not power per se but the state's evident willingness to use power."[10] The implication is that within the setting of contexts, such as deterrence, which stress the psychological relation between states, that the perception of the image of will is of greater importance than the actual possession of armaments. Will, as a disposition to act, is thought to be an essential conversion element outside of this psychological relation. Will is conceived to be an essential element contributing to the credibility of threats.

E. H. Carr's work is firmly set within the confines of realist analysis. For Carr, international politics is always power politics.'[11] The state's foreign policy is ultimately defined by its level of military strength.'[12] All other forms

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[8]This point is inferred and is not located in the author's articles.
[9]Inis L. Claude, Jr.. Power and International Relations. New York: Random House, 1968, p. 6.
[10]Author's italicizations. Claude, (fn.79), pp. 125-6.
[11]E.H. Carr. "Forms of Power," in Harold and Margaret Sprout (eds.). Foundations of National Power. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1951, p. 50.
[12]Carr , (fn.81), p. 44.

of power, cited by the author, namely economic and the power over public opinion, have utility only in association with military capabilities and war. Within Carr's analysis, consideration of scope and domain is absent. Furthermore, any consideration of will is excluded from his analysis either as a disposition to act, related to the particular context, or within the vantage point of a psychological relation between states.

The Sprouts's conception of power differentiates between power as a potentiality and as an actuality. Potential power resides in a state's store of physical capabilities. The utility of resources, however, is subject to such elements as skill, strategy and what the authors' terms as "baffling human intangibles."[1] One of these intangibles relates to the psychological disposition of the society to support policies. In this vein, the authors propose the significance of the following question: "What is their (the populace's) moral stamina, their ability to stand firm and pull together in adversity."[2] The authors do not directly use the term will, however, they imply that the usage of capabilities is dependent upon the national disposition (the will) to utilize resources in order to fulfill objectives.

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[1]Harold and Margaret Sprout. "Why Some States Are Strong and Others Are Weak," in Harold and Margaret Sprout, (eds.). Foundations of National Power. (2nd ed.). New York: D. van Nostrand, 1951, p. 110.
[2]Sprout, (fn.83), p. 110.

A. Conclusions and Summary

Within realist analysis, the concept of will tends to be alluded to. In-depth investigation of the concept is not undertaken despite most commentators tacit or explicit conclusion that the concept of will is an important element in the functioning of power. In opposition to Baldwin's assertion, none of the authors surveyed explained away their failed power predictions by directly pointing to an absence of state will in carrying out objectives. Apart from Cline, commentators did not appear to have formulated power predictions as to which states would be more powerful in specific conflicts or in conflicts in general.

However, upon examination of much of the literature, one would surmise that had a majority of the theorists surveyed formulated power predictions, they would, owing to the logic of their own theories, have to explain failure in the manner in which Baldwin so severely criticized. As a disposition to act, the concept of will figures prominently, if not essentially, in the analyses of Cline, Deutsch, Kindleberger, Keohane and Nye, the Sprouts and Strausz-Hupe. Baldwin correctly identifies the central position of will in the translation of means to ends in the theories of many of the analysts cited above. Reference to the concept of will by power analysts is overwhelmingly done in this manner.

However, the concept of will is also discussed in a number of other ways. Claude, Knorr, Morgenthau and Strausz-Hupe note that inhering in the concept of power is a

psychological relationship existent between states. These authors write that state behaviour may be influenced by the estimation, the perception, that the opposition possesses the will with which to vitalize his capabilities. Reference to will as an imaged disposition to act is typically done within discussions of deterrence.

A third way in which the concept of will is defined is as the state's objectives.

Without elucidating as to what constitutes a state's values, both Strausz-Hupe and Wolfers argue that a linkage exists between the state's will, its disposition to act, and the state's values. Strausz-Hupe appears to employ the notion of values in the same manner that Baldwin does. A state's success in reaching a particular objective will depend on its opponent's values, which will influence its disposition to be or not to be influenced.

When realist analysts speak of or allude to the concept of will, they do not discuss whose will to act is relevant in decision-making. For the most part, the authors' single level of analysis is the state. In the works of Kindleberger, Knorr, Morgenthau and the Sprouts, reference is made to the national will as being an important element in the success of policy. In Morgenthau's work, the national will is significant only insofar as the leader believes it to be. In effect, the leader's will to act may be conditioned by his interpretation, his perception, of the national will to support his policy. Morgenthau seems to be

suggesting that the individual leader is ultimately the appropriate level of analysis in international relations, whereas other theorists, including Baldwin, focus on the abstraction of the state as actor.

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III. The Concept of Will And Deterrence

In this chapter, the concept of will will be examined within the subject area of deterrence. Deterrence theory will be looked at as it highlights the importance of perceptions in the establishment of influence, and therefore, may yield some important findings regarding the concept of will. Works by important theorists, including Brodie, Jervis, Kahn and Schelling, among others, will be assessed. Examination of these authors' works is merited as they represent the principal foundations of deterrence theory. In looking at these works, my objective will be similar to that in the preceeding chapter: to discover how will is conceptualized by different authors and, second, to determine whether will has various meanings within deterrence literature.

Robert Jervis rarely uses the term, "will." Terms and phrases, such as "resolve," "commitment," and "standing firm," are substituted in its place. Set out in Jervis's work are a number of ways in which the notion of will is discussed. For example, the author details the centrality of perceptions in the success and/or failure of deterrence. In attempting to deter one's opponent from behaving in ways contrary to one's wishes, it is essential to convey the message, the perception, that the expected value of the action is outweighed by the anticipated costs.[1] Basic to understanding this perception is the state's ability to

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[1] Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 7 International Security (Winter, 1982-83), p. 4.

signal to its opposite number that its threats are credible. The crux of this credibility resides in the opponent's estimate that his adversary possesses the will, the "determination," with which to fulfill his threat.[1] Whether the state actually has the disposition to fulfill its threat is not essential to the short-term and perhaps long range credibility of the threat itself. Deterrence is maintained so long as the adversary possesses the image that his antagonist has the requisite disposition with which to execute his threat. Within Jervis's depiction of deterrence, the suggestion is made that power exists, in large part, within the psychological relation existent between states. Essential to that relation's maintenance is the perception of will. In this vein, will surfaces as the imaged disposition of a state to act.

Jervis's work, dealing with deterrence and the notions of perception and image in international relations, contains two depictions of will. On the one hand, will is an imaged perception. It is held to be highly resistant to change. On the other hand, the arguement is made that perceptions of will are context-bound; that is, an estimate of will is not automatically transferable from one situation to the next over long periods of time. In short, perceptions of will are subject to the particular dynamics of the given situation.

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[1] Robert Jervis. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970, p. 21.

Regarding the first proposition, it has been argued that the credibility of commitment within a given context is related to the pre-establishment of patterns of behaviour;[84] images of state behaviour, it is alledged, are highly resistant to change.[85] Hence, an acquired reputation for hostile behaviour will tend to "increase the chance that the state, currently under consideration, will be seen as very dangerous."[86] In this vein, Jervis writes that the processing of incoming information is generally assimilated to pre-existing images, even if that information is ambiguous or discrepent from the pre-held image of the enemy.[87] The reputation for standing firm, predicated upon iterative behaviour, is thought to be the corner-stone of deterrence. Jervis argues that as the perception of will tends to be resistant to change, those who have attained a reputation for standing firm are most likely to inhibit would-be aggressors from undertaking contrary actions.[88] In effect, the ability to signal the willingness to act over a long duration; that is, the ability to establish a long-standing image of will is believed to be a principal base [redacted] successful deterrence.

Exhibiting a reputation for weakness has been argued to have the analogous effects as those found in the

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[84]Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 31 World Politics (No. 2, 1979), p. 298.
[85]Robert Jervis. Perception and Misperception in International Politics . Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976, p. 68.
[86]Jervis, (fn.85), p. 22.
[87]Jervis, (fn.85), p. 24; and Jervis, (fn.88), pp. 68, 357.
[88]Jervis, (fn.87), p. 309.

establishment of a reputation for standing firm. A state may believe that its projected image of resolve may suffer if it fails to respond decisively in each situation. Stated differently, it may be thought that losses, and the presentation of weakness of will in what are believed to be critical situations, will lead to expectations of weakness in the future. In effect, retreating in one situation is conceived to produce a slippery-slope, a "domino effect."[12] Consequently, involvement in low-level conflict may be undertaken in order to attempt to project an unequivocable image of will so as to influence the long-term expectations and actions of states. To this end: "Issues of little intrinsic value become highly significant as indices of resolve."[13] Jervis notes that it is an open question as to whether outcomes are interdependent and, in turn, whether the alledged costs of retreat are not exaggerated.[14]

In any case, if statesmen understand process in the international system in terms of a slippery-slope, this interpretation will fuel their disposition--their will--to act forcefully in most situations. In effect, it may be thought that displaying weakness in one situation will encourage the opponent to further challenge the status quo. The state, therefore, may act due to its feeling that its image for standing firm will be jeopardized and its general credibility tested. An inference that may be tendered, then,

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[12] Jervis, (fn.87), p. 298.
[13] Jervis, (fn.88), p. 58; and Jervis, (fn.86), p. 226.
[14] Jervis, (fn.87), p. 319.

is that related to being powerful may be an insecurity that requires the state to project an image to itself and to others that it is able and willing to fulfill its threats. It should be noted that the state's perception that failing to respond to conflicts will have a dynamo-like effect is an unsubstatiated assumption as are the beliefs that other actors perceive situations in the same light; and that a reputation for firmness actually influences the future behaviour and expectations of actors.''[85]

A second line of argumentation holds that deterrence is properly assessed within the given contextual relationship between states. Jervis writes that success in particular conflicts is often a function of the degree to which the state values its objectives. In other words, the degree to which the state values its goals will influence the level of will instilled within the particular context.''[86] Supplementing the preceeding point is the idea that the degree of will invested by the state in a given conflict will be related to the state's estimation of the goal's value in comparison with the perceived costs to be incurred in attaining it.''[87] However, the level of will invested by the state in the given context will not only depend upon the degree to which it values its objective. Jervis adds that the state's will to act will also be influenced by its estimation of it opponent's will to act within the

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''Jervis, (fn.87), pp. 293, 306; and Jervis, (fn.85), p. 9.
''Jervis, (fn.85), pp. 8-9; and Jervis, (fn.86), p. 318.
''Jervis, (fn.85), p. 8; and Jervis, (fn.88), p. 51.

situation.'' For instance, Jervis suggests that the North Vietnamese concluded that the United States could be beaten in a protracted conflict as it would not be willing to pay the price necessary to deter the North.'' In effect, the credibility of threats is related to the opponent's perception of the other state's will to act in a particular context.

Jervis proposes that a proper assessment of the concept of will within deterrence theory should embody a consideration of the particular context as well as images of resolve, outside of the particular situation. The will to act is often variant, both in its possession and its estimation, within specific contexts. However, apart from the particular situation, Jervis comments that successful deterrence requires that the threatener himself is believed to be to be credible.''° The reputation for being willing to pay high costs to achieve one's goals is deemed to be a salient consideration in the success of deterrence, though the author notes that there is no clear understanding of the influence of reputation on states' expectations and future behaviour.

Thomas Schelling's work emphasizes the point that success in the fields of bargaining and deterrence is grounded, in large part, upon the psychological relationship existing between states. Basic to the development of this

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''Jervis, (fn.87), p. 306.
''Jervis, (fn.87), p. 306.
''°Jervis, (fn.85), p. 8.

psychological relationship is the state's ability to shape the expectations, or perceptions, of its adversary. In doing so, Schelling stresses that the state must be able to clearly and persuasively communicate its intent.'[9] Credible threats, for example, are tied to the expectation that the state possesses the requisite will to utilize its capabilities. In this context, two nuances of the notion of will surface. First, will refers to the opposition's expectation that the state possesses the requisite disposition to act upon its projected threats. In deterrence, Schelling argues, that which lends util[illegible] power is not situated in the state's capabilitie[illegible]ing credibility to the state's physical means is the b[illegible]f, the perception that one has the will to use them. Its the expectation of their usage that makes the state "deadly."'[10]

Schelling remarks that owing to the central position of image in deterrence, a great deal of uncertainty exists as to if and at what point the state will actually fulfill its threat. Schelling suggests that deterrence and bargaining is strongly reminiscent of the Game of "Chicken." The Game of Chicken involves a contest of resolve. The author regards deterrent threats in somewhat the same way in that their credibility is often uncertain, requiring states to test the degree of resolve of their opponents. Drawing upon the conclusion of Bertrand Russell, Schelling concludes that the

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'[9]Thomas C. Schelling. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966, p. 35.

[10]Schelling, (fn.101), p. 37.

nuclear threat between East and West is characterized by an uncertainty as to the opponent's threshold.'[103] Schelling writes that many situations in international relations are marked by uncertainty and that states are continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve and attempts to discover whether their opponent's genuinely possess the will to act.'[104] Schelling remarks that states endeavor to offset this discovery process by attempting to shape the perceptions of adversaries that a number of visible "trip-wires" have been lain, which, if set off, will lead to a chain reaction down the line. In short, movement is at one's own peril.'[105] Ascertaining whether the adversary possesses the will to act implies that, in the final analysis, he must have the necessary disposition to act if the occasion arises.

The second nuance of the concept of will, then, arising from Schelling's work, concerns itself with the idea that at some point the state will have to show that it actually has the will, the disposition, to fulfill its threats. The true test of credibility, then, is manifested in the actual display of resolve, as images of resolve imbue uncertainty and are given to frequent challenges as to their credibility.

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[103]Thomas C. Schelling, "Uncertainty, Brinkmanship, And The Game of "Chicken," in Kathleen Archibald (ed.). Strategic Interaction and Conflict. Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1966, p. 75.

[104]Schelling, (fn.101), p. 93.

[105]Schelling, (fn.103), p. 75.

Schelling discusses at length how actors can increase the credibility of their threats. The author tends to examine this question within the perspective of power as a psychological relation between states. The credibility of deterrent threats is heavily related to the shaping of the opponent's expectation that the state possesses the will to fulfill its threats. Schelling comments that an effective manner in which to increase the credibility of one's will to act is to link it with one's essential values. Essential values are deemed to include such principles as one's reputation, and honor.'[96] By tying the success or failure of one's objective to principles, the particular commitment becomes very difficult for the state to disentangle itself from.'[97] Linking one's commitment to values can increase the credibility of will within the situation as options to retreat are destroyed and the commitment to stand firm becomes subject to irrevocableness.'[98] Schelling concludes that maximum credibility is related to the state's ability to convey the perception that its commitment will not be watered down--that the state has no choice but to carry out its threat.'[99]

Linking one's core values with issues is thought to have an additional function. Standing firm over a series of issues may be commissioned due to the belief that shows of

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[96]Thomas C. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960, p. 29.
[97]Schelling, (fn.98), pp. 65-66.
[98]Schelling, (fn.101), p. 45.
[99]Schelling, (fn.106), p. 40.

weakness in particular issues will establish in the opponent's mind the expectation that weakness of will will be repeated in the future.'''° Schelling ascribes to the proposition that standing firm in particular situations is important because "threats are interdependent;" to not react strongly in some conflicts would give the enemy the perception that in other conflicts the state would not react firmly.'''

One inference that can be drawn is quite puzzling. On the one hand, standing firm is believed to establish a long-term image that the state possesses the will to defend its interests. The development of such a reputation is conceived to be fundamental to successful and long-term deterrence. Yet, if this is the case, why, as the author reports, do states constantly challenge their opposition's willingness to stand firm? Perhaps, standing firm in one or a series of situations does not have the iterative effect upon states that the author claims. Rather, it might be reasonable to assess each situation in isolation or in context: therein regarding how actors perceive each other, and their individual willingness to be committed to action based upon the degree to which they value their objectives.

The problem may be solved by focusing on individuals rather than speaking of states.'''² The decision to stand firm in a series of issues, and indeed to test the strength

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'''°Schelling, (fn.101), p. 118.
'''Schelling, (fn.101), p. 83.
'''²I am indebted to Dr. J. A. Lejnieks for this idea.

of other states's commitments, may not necessarily result from the failure of the state's reputation. Rather, decisions and actions are taken by individuals whose particular personalities and leadership styles bear on their decision-making. Conflicts involve a relationship between particular individuals; commitments are subject to their individualistic judgements. Irrespective of the fact that a particular leader has a reputation for standing firm in conflicts, another state's decision makers may be strongly motivated to achieve a particular goal, which will pit their state in conflict with the former. Second, although the individual leader believes that his self-image and that of his state's will to act is strong, other state leaders may have contrary perceptions. Finally, as the state's reputation for standing firm may well be associated with that of the particular decision maker, changes in leadership may occassion probing actions by opponents in order to test the new leader's disposition to act.

Franklin Weinstein's discussion of the concept of commitment mirrors the manner in which other authors have utilized the notion of will. Two currents of thought dealing with the concept of commitment are identified. First, a state's commitment can be situational. Within a given context, the state's commitment is dynamic and is related to an evaluation as to whether the national interest is being served.'''[3] The nature of this commitment tends to be

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'''[3]Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations," 13 Journal of Conflict Resolution

shortlived, as it is characterized by Rebus sic Stantibus, that is, that circumstances that contradict the obligations are terminable upon the occurrence of changing circumstances that contradict the state's "vital national interests."[''] The inference is that the will to act in the given situation is subject to constant reevaluations of the value of the goal.

The second way in which the concept of commitment has been regarded, and the one, according to Weinstein, which predominates in American strategic and governmental thinking, views commitments non-situationally. In other words, commitments in particular situations are assessed in terms of principles, and the establishment of long-term expectations of behaviour. In this vein, referring to the work of Schelling and Kahn, commitments are viewed as being interdependent.[''] The state is engaged in psychological warefare in which it endeavors to shape the long-term expectations of the adversary that it (the state) is unwilling to back down from its commitments.[''] The will to act in the given situation is not grounded on the intrinsic value of the situation, but on the desire to present an image that the state's disposition to fulfill its objectives is credible. Some advocates of the Vietnam Conflict, for instance, favored, according to the author, involvement in order to maintain the credibility of the United State's

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[''](cont'd) (No.1, 1969), p. 40.
[''']Weinstein, (fn.114), pp. 42-43.
[''']Weinstein, (fn.114), p. 46.
[''']Weinstein, (fn.114), p. 46.

other commitments by showing that the state's "will" was firm.''' In deterrence, then, will surfaces not only as the disposition to act. But also the state is deterred by its expectation, rooted in past precedent, that its opponent possesses the disposition to act.

An associated method of establishing the credibility of one's commitments is to tie the outcome of situations with the state's core principles. Doing so in the particular situation may be commissioned in order to develop long-term expectations. Conversely, to link the success of one's goals with such values as the loss of one's honor and reputation, and then to back down in the given context, may be at the expense of one's long-term image. Such thought, then, holds that the long-range national interest will derive greater benefit by maintaining principle.''' Ascription to core principles appears to increase the will to act in two ways: (1) in lieu of success, one's national self-conception will suffer; and (2) that one's allies and enemies' conception of the state's willingness to defend its interests will erode.

Bernard Brodie's work recurringly emphasizes the idea that the foundation of successful deterrence is stationed in the psychological relation existent between states. At the root of this psychological relation is the ability of the state to shape the expectations of the opponent that it (the state) possesses the will to make its threat credible. At this point it should be mentioned that the author freely

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'''Weinstein, (fn.114), p. 52.
'''Weinstein, (fn.114), p. 44.

substitutes the terms, "resolve" and "will." The credibility of threats is not only grounded upon the perception that the state possesses the will and the capability to validate its threat.'[119] In addition, Brodie suggests that the credibility of a threat is related, at least in part, to an estimation that the threatener is himself credible. The author relates, for example, that Khrushchev did not believe, based upon his assessment of Kennedy's previous behaviour, that the President would object to the placement of missiles in Cuba.'[120] A number of inferences may be set foreward: (1) the disposition to act is dynamic given the particular personalities of decision-makers;'[121] (2) the will to act is variable given the value of the objective in the particular context; and (3) related to the previous point, a state's antecedent behaviour is not necessarily a reliable index of its future conduct. Consequently, due to the establishment of and reliance upon past images of will, a state's appraisal of its antagonist's will may be misperceived as considerations of such factors as the opponent's valuing of the particular objective may be overlooked.

Typically, Brodie writes, the perception is rarely absolute that another state possesses the will to fulfill its threats. The author presents basic deterrence; that is,

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'[119]Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," 11 World Politics (January, 1959), p. 188; and Bernard Brodie. War And Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1973, p. 404.
'[120]Bernard Brodie. Escalation and the Nuclear Option. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966, pp. 48-49.
'[121]Brodie, (fn.120), p. 116.

the deterrence of nuclear attack within the home territories of the United states, and the threat to retaliate if attacked, as an instance in which the credibility of the threat is not in question.'[122] The reason that the credibility of the threat is high in this case is that it is related to the state's greatest core value, its self-preservation.'[123] Writing in 1946, Brodie noted that the credibility of deterrence would be undermined if the adversary believed that he would go unpunished if he were to violate the core values of the state.'[124] Two inferences surface: (1)that a state's willingness not to act may be influenced by the perception that its adversary's threat is linked with its core values; and (2) the threatener's will to act is increased when his position is linked with his core values.

Brodie suggests that a more typical situation in international relations is characterized by uncertainty as to the degree to which the state is committed to its objective.'[125] States may endeavor to discover the resolve of the opponent on a given issue by undertaking probing actions.'[126] By the phrase, 'probing the resolve of the opponent,' the author seems to refer to the process of discovering the degree to which the opponent values its objective. States may undertake actions due to their

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[122]Brodie, "The Anatomy," (fn.119), pp. 175-76.
[123]Brodie, (fn.122), p. 185.
[124]Bernard Brodie. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946, p. 142.
[125]Brodie, (fn.122), p. 179.
[126]Brodie, (fn.124), pp. 114-115, 125.

misperception of the degree to which their adversary values his objective. '[17] In this vein, Brodie identifies the Chinese reaction to McArthur's expansion of the Korean War as an example illustrating two points: (1) that states may fail to realize that their actions may be perceived by other actors to constitute a threat to their core values, for instance, to their self-preservation; and (2) as has been previously mentioned, there is a positive relationship between threats to the state's principal values and the level of will invested in a particular context. The author suggests that a principal source of misperception may be the development of the expectation, the image, that the opposition is given to backing down.'[18] Such an expectation, as has been previously stated, may be at odds with the degree of value ascribed to a particular outcome and, coextensively, with the level of will invested in the given context.

The notion of core values may be extended to include such interrelated principles as reputation, face and prestige. Brodie notes that when outcomes become linked with these principles, commitments become stronger and increasingly irrevocable. Backing down from such commitments, Brodie writes, will not only influence the given situation, but, in addition, will have long-term repercussions upon other states' image of one's resolve.'[19]

'[17]Brodie, (fn.124), p. 134.
'[18]Brodie, (fn.120), p. 115.
'[19]Brodie, (fn.120), p. 120.

Understanding that a strong correlation exists between will and core principles, Brodie comments that states should provide their opponents with accessible outlets of backing down without having to sacrifice their principles.'[130] He examples Kennedy's determination not to humiliate Khruschev during the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case in point.

Robert Osgood discusses the idea that stability within the balance of terror places a high premium upon the estimation that threats are credible. Central to the maintenance of stability is the state's assessment that its adversary's intentions are credible. Osgood interchanges the term, "intentions" with "will."[131] The calculation of will • as the intention to act upon one's threat, is given to uncertainty as it is ultimately based on perception. Will, largely grounded upon the psychological relation between states, is subject to false estimations, resulting in potentially disastrous consequences.[132]

Elsewhere, Osgood notes that the perception of will can have a strong influence on the course of conflicts. Citing the Vietnam conflict as a case study, the author proposes that the success of the North was, to a significant degree, anchored in the perception that the United States was unwilling to pay the price needed to achieve its goal: the scale of bombing needed to exert influence upon Hanoi's will

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[130]Brodie, War and Politics., (fn.119), p. 426.
[131]Robert E. Osgood, "Stabalizing the Military Environment," in Dale J. Hekhuis, et. al. (eds.). International Stability: Military, Economic and Political Dimensions. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964, p. 86.
[132]Osgood, (fn. 131), p. 87.

would have been unacceptable to American and world opinion.'[131] Hanoi perceived, and it became obvious as the war continued, that the national will of the American public to support the war, given the mounting human and financial costs, was waning.'[132] Furthermore, Osgood notes that the value of the goal influenced the balance of will--the asymmetry of motivation.'[133] Greater resolution, on the part of Hanoi, was produced by the higher value it placed on reaching its objective. Hanoi could outlast the United States because, as has been previously alluded to, it was willing to bear a higher proportion of costs in order to achieve its goal of unification.

The concept of will is utilized in a variety of ways in Osgood's texts: (1)the perceived intention to fulfill threats; (2)the national disposition to support policies; (3)the necessary disposition to utilize capabilities; (4)the disposition to act based on a calculation of cost/gain. In short, the will to act based on an assessment of the value of objectives; and (5) the disposition to act based upon principles, such as reputation.'[134]

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's text, The War Trap, rarely explicitly uses the term, "will." Nevertheless, allusion to

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[131]Robert E. Osgood. Limited War Revisited. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1979, p. 45.
[132]Osgood, (fn.133), p. 42.
[133]Osgood, (fn.133), p. 44.
[134]Osgood, (fn.133), p. 47. By 1968, the author reports, the justification for the war had become simply the state's reputation for defending its allies under hardship.
It may be an open question whether principles are dissimilar from values.

the concept is made in a number of propositions. The author argues that the individual leader--the "critical gatekeeper" --is the appropriate level of analysis when examining decision-making during war.'[37] However, individual leaders differ not only in their choice of policy options, but "may also differ in their willingness to take risks or in their response to uncertainty."[38] In short, the leader's own particular willingness to take risks may play a significant role in decision-making during war. Elsewhere, the author mentions that wars are subject to the national estimation that the conflict is important enough to make sacrifices for.'[39] Stated differently, the author infers that the success of the war effort is subject to the national disposition (the will) to support it. That disposition, in turn, is dependent upon the general belief that the conflict's value outweighs its costs.

Alexander George regards the concept of will, first, within the conception of deterrence as a psychological relation between states. The credibility of one's threats hinges, in large part, upon the deterring power's ability to convey to the opponent that "it has the <u>will and resolution</u> to defend the interests in question."[40] Shaping the

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[37]Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. <u>The War Trap</u> New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1981, p. 27.
[38]Bueno de Mesquita, (fn.137), p.33.
[39]Bueno de Mesquita, (fn.137), p. 44.
[40]Authors' italicization. Alexander George and Gordon A. Craig. <u>Force And Statecraft</u>. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983, pp. 172, 183. It should be mentioned that the authors use the terms, will and resolution in tandem; neither do they draw a distinction between the two, nor is one visible to the observer.

adversary's expectations that the state possesses the reputation for having the disposition to fulfill its threats, is in itself often insufficient in deterring opponents. In the final analysis, however, the deterring power must possess the capabilities, or persuade the opponent that it has them, with which to deal with the would-be aggressors.'[41] However, in another work, George comments that the usage of means may be done in order to demonstrate the resolve of the state to defend itself. In effect, the use of capabilities may be undertaken in order to signal the expectation that the state will defend its future interests.'[42] Nevertheless, George comments that the specific situation is the most suitable venue in which to examine the concept of will. In wars of attrition, for example, success is often a function of the willingness to bear higher costs, to outlast an opponent, as oppossed to the raw possession of superior physical capabilities.'[43] Yet, if the deterrent power is able to convey the perception that its threat is allied with inalienable values and interests at stake, in association with the actual exhibition of an asymmetry of motivation, it may influence the opponent's behaviour.'[44] In George's texts, the notion of will is identified, explicitly or tacitly, in a number of ways: (1) as the perceived disposition to act, based upon

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[41]George, et. al., (fn.140), p. 172.
[42]Alexander L. George, et. al., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, p. 9.
[43]George, et. al., (fn.142), pp. 19-20.
[44]George, et. al., (fn.142), p. 26.

the estimation of the state's past behaviour; (2) as the motivation to act within the particular context, based upon the valuing of a goal; (3) associated with the preceeding point is the willingness to pay costs in light of the value of the end; (4) the inference is made that the usage of physical capabilities requires the disposition to utilize them; and (5) the estimate of motivation based, to some degree, upon the communication of intent.

In Herman Kahn's work, the terms, "will" and "resolve" are used interchangeably. Deterrence hinges, in large part, upon the state's estimation that its opponent's threat of retaliation is credible. Kahn writes that the credibility of the state's retaliatory threat does not inhere in the possession of capabilities as it is a given that both superpowers possess the necessary weaponry to validate their threatened second strikes. Rather, influencing the opponent's behaviour depends not only upon the state's possession of the will, the disposition, to utilize its capabilities, but on the adversary's perception that that will exists.'[46] However, while a facade of resolve may induce the enemy to behave in certain ways if he was to deduce that the threat of retaliation was incredible, he might, on the other hand, conclude that by simply raising the stakes in critical issues, the other side would be forced to conceed. The suggestion is that state behaviour may be significantly affected by the state's imaged

[46]Herman Kahn. On Thermonuclear War. (2nd ed.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961, p. 32.

perception of the opposition's willingness to fulfill its threat.

Kahn notes that the credibility of deterrent threats, as they are often predicated upon assumptions as to the possession of will, are typically subject to ambiguity.[145] States may endeavor to assess the conveyed image of their opponent's will by probing his reaction to provocations.[146] However, the objectives in undertaking probing actions may be far greater than simply testing the image of the adversary's resolve. The underlying goal of what Kahn terms, "Type II Deterrence" (Controlled Reprisal and Limited General War), envisages through a series of tit-for-tat attacks, not the destruction of the other side's military capabilities, but, more importantly, the destruction of his general resolve.[147] The inference is that loses in key issues and contexts will have a far-reaching influence upon the nation's will to stand firm in future crises.

However, Kahn comments that in backing down, states very often signal to their opposition that behaviour in the particular case should not be generalized.[148] In extricating itself from the given context, the state may attempt to leave the impression with would-be violators of the status quo that it has both the resolve and the capability to insure that it will not readily yield in future contexts.[149]

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[145]Kahn, (fn.145), pp. 18-19.
[146]Kahn, (fn.145), p. 34; and Herman Kahn. Thinking About The Unthinkable. New York: Horizon, 1962, p. 115.
[147]Kahn, (fn.145), pp. 116-117.
[148]Kahn, (fn.147), pp. 132-133.
[149]Kahn, (fn.147), p. 205.

In effect, the author intimates that a state's contextual show of resolve will be influenced by the belief that its projected image of resolve will be jeopardized.

Kahn remarks that the state's contextual demonstration of resolve will be strongly influenced by the values at stake within the particular situation. The author stresses, for example, that the usage of nuclear weapons would be related to the estimation that in lieu of their firing, the preservation of the state would be in question.[151] The judgement of the values at stake in the given context as well as the willingness to act will be subject to the particular personal dynamics of the decision-maker.[152]

Raymond Aron does not tend to explicitly use the term, "will." Nevertheless, he does point to a number of themes which are closely reminiscent of those in which other analysts have employed the concept of will. For example, Aron emphasizes that a good part of deterrence is based upon the state's ability to convey messages of intent that will be clearly grasped.[153] The establishment of the perception that one's commitment to deterrent policies is credible has been thought to be related to the development of a psychological relation between states. Aron writes that potential aggressors, who are thinking of upsetting the status quo, should attempt to take into account what is

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[151]Kahn, (fn.145), p. 28; Kahn, (fn.147), p. 158.
[152]Kahn, (fn.147), p. 20.
[153]Raymond Aron. The Great Debate. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965, p. 60.

likely to be going on in the mind of the chosen victim.'[155] Reading the opponent's mind, the author suggests, will include an assessment of the opposition's resolve.'[156] The deterrent power will endeavor to communicate its resolve by linking the particular situation with his core principles, such as his honor and reputation in order to influence the behaviour of the adversary.'[157] In this context, the expectation of resolve approximates how other authors have discussed one aspect of the notion of will.

Elsewhere, Aron shifts his attention to strategy within the particular context. He writes that "in all conflicts one must distinguish between the trial of force and the test of will...."[158] Therein, Aron elucidates upon what he means by the term, "will." In doing so, the author identifies two separate nuances of the term, both of which strongly influence upon what Aron refers to as "the actual military aspect of the operation."[159] First, Aron comments that the national attitude (the national will) of the civilian population is one of the principal stakes in conflicts, as well as one of the main contributing factors in the success or failure of the state's policy.'[160] Second, Aron suggests that the state's failure or success to reach a particular

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[155] Aron, [illegible]53), p. 201.
[156] Aron, [illegible], pp. 201-202.
[157] Aron, [illegible]153), pp. 201-202.
[158] Raymond Aron, "The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought," in Alastair Buchan (ed.). Problems of Modern Strategy. London: Chatto and Windus, 1970, p. 26.
[159] Aron, (fn.157), p. 6.
[160] Aron, (fn.157), p. 26.

objective is also related to the personal will of the decision-maker, whom Aron refers to as "the counter-insurgents," to commit the necessary capabilities required to achieve success.'[1] The author notes the strong relationship between these two nuances. Specifically, the leader's will to act is often affected by his estimation of the public's willingness to support his policies.'[2]

The communication of threats, warnings, and bluffs are made to influence the opponent's expectations and, in turn, his behaviour, according to Fred Ikle.'[3] The credibility of the threatener is ultimately based upon his adversary's perception that the threatener possesses the sufficient capability and motivation to inflict the damage after he has been challenged.'[4] In the perceived absence of the motivation--the will--threats are hollow and can be exploited.'[5] The inference is that the image of the possession of the willingness to act can function as a deterrent.

In international bargaining, the credibility of one's commitments is often referenced by decision-makers in terms of past precedent. Not only is the expectation of will or weakness conditioned by the state's customary behaviour.'[6] One must, understanding th[illegible]sm of the expectation of

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'[1]Aron, (fn.157), p. 26.
'[2]Aron, (fn.157), p. 26.
'[3]Fred Charles Ikle. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, p. 62.
'[4]Ikle, (fn.162), p. 64.
'[5]Ikle, (fn.162), p. 64.
'[6]Ikle, (fn.162), p. 83.

behaviour, continue to obtain favorable outcomes so as to preserve or improve one's future credibility.'[166] In doing so, one might indicate that positions are being maintained in order to safeguard core principles, such as one's honor and reputation.'[167] Doing so, might increase the credibility of the perception, albeit legitimate or false, that the threatener possesses the disposition to act upon his threat.

Henry Kissinger comments on the importance of perception in the success or failure of deterrence: "deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor."'[168] Will surfaces in this context not only as the necessary disposition to utilize one's capabilities. In addition, the effectiveness of deterrence is dependent upon the perception that the opponent's willingness to use his resources is credible. It should be acknowledged, however, that Kissinger accords the same weight to the variable of physical capabilities as he does to the possession of will. If the possession of "any" of these elements (will, capabilities and the perception thereof) is zero, deterrence fails.'[169]

The establishment of the perception of the willingness to validate threats is furthered by ascribing the success of one's position to core values. Creating, what Kissinger

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'[166]Ikle, (fn.162), p. 77.
'[167]Ikle, (fn.162), p. 84.
'[168]Henry A. Kissinger. The Necessity of Choice. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961, p. 12.
'[169]Kissinger, (fn.168), p. 12.

calls, "psychological asymmentries" is done by communicating the perception that the state is willing to run greater risks than its opposition in order to achieve its particular objective.''' The establishment of the image that one is willing to bear a high cost in order to achieve goals is believed to have an iterative effect upon the behaviour of future aggressors contemplating challenging the status quo.'''

'''Kissinger, (fn.168), pp. 46-55.
'''Kissinger, (fn.168), p. 48.

A. Conclusions and Summary

A number of variations of the concept of will have surfaced within this chapter. On the one hand, theorists maintain that successful deterrence emphasizes the idea of power as a psychological relation between states. Effective deterrence embodies three elements: (1) the state's capabilities; (2) its willingness to use them; and (3) the opponent's perception of the state's willingness to utilize them. Many theorists have discussed the third point in reference to the individual decision-maker's willingness to act. Leader's may operate on the assumption that failure to act decisively in conflict situations will ramify upon their own image of self as well as upon the adversary's long-term perception of the individual's and the state's willingness to act. Situations are interpreted to be interdependent as they are casually linked by their effects on the opponent's actions, which are derived from his perceptual image of the state's willingness to act.

A number of authors, including Schelling, George and Kissinger, have taken issue with the proposition that deterrence rests, principally, in the psychological relation existing between states. They contend that ultimately the state cannot rely on its projected image of will to sustain the credibility of its threats. At some point the image will be tested. And, the state will have to show that there is bite behind the bark. In other words, successful deterrence, in the final analysis, only requires two components: (1) the

possession of capabilities and (b) the will to use them.

Deterrence theorists tend to focus on the state as a single level of analysis; however, allude to the individual decision-maker in exampling ideas, especially during crisis situations. When the individual is regarded, for example in Brodie's analysis, his previous behaviour is thought to influence the opponent's expectation of his future behaviour and, coextensively, the adversary's willingness to act. Bueno de Mesquita remarks that the individual's willingness to take risks is related to his particular personality.

Whether speaking of the state or of the individual, theorists tend to argue that the will to act is variable given the degree to which the state values the particular objective. Valuing an objective, many theorists contend, relates to the values at stake in the given context. When the concept of core values is referred to, for example by Brodie and Kahn, its meaning does not appear to extend beyond the notion of self-preservation. It would appear to be the case, furthermore, that authors freely substitute the term, "core values" with the term, "core principles." The latter is said to include such principles as reputation, credibility, honor and face. Ascription of positions to core principles is thought to increase their irrevocability. In addition, commentators, including Schelling and Weinstein, remark that linking the state's position with its core principles is intended to influence opponents' perceptual image of the state's disposition to act both within the

immediate situation and within future conflictual contexts. Jervis suggests that the influence of success in low-level conflicts on opponents' long-term perception of the state's willingness to act may well be exaggerated.

Perceptual images of will are given to uncertainty. Hence, the individual decision-maker's will to act can arise on the basis of faulty assumptions as to the perceptions and behaviour of the opponent. A leader, for example, may illegitimately assume that the reaction of his opposite number should equate with his own. Such an assumption may be predicated on the misperception of the opponent's valuing of an objective, or, indeed, the values and perceptions of the adversary may not be taken into account at all. Second, and related to the previous point, the leader may fail to realize that by standing firm, his opponent may react similarly, especially as backing down may defined to be only at the expense of his core values.

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IV. The Concept of Will and the Vietnam Conflict

Finally, the concept of will has to be examined within the context of the Vietnam conflict. To delimit the subject, I will confine my investigation to Johnson's Presidency. Vietnam is being used as a case study due to David Baldwin's reference to it as a prototypical example in which academics employ the concept of will as a stand-by device to explain away their failed power predictions. In Baldwin's judgement, the emphasis on an actor's willingness to use his physical capabilities "encourages sloppy power analysis."[172] It is my contention that Baldwin's conclusion, with respect to Vietnam specifically, is suspect given a fuller delineation of the concept of will. Specifically, an assessment of the psychological images of the adversary as well as the self-images of the individual combatants will be conducted as these factors have been shown to be highly salient in the functioning of the concept of will.

In investigating the sources of the combatants' willingness to act in Vietnam, a number of interrelated key topics have to be addressed: (1)the perception of the conflict of as a threat to the state's core values; (2) the perception of the adversary; (3) the role of the individual decision maker's personality; and (4) the role of public support in the success of the leaderships' policies. To proceed, these issues are examined in relation to the American will to act, and subsequently, to North Vietnam's.

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[172]David A. Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 169.

By "American" and "North Vietnamese," I am referring primarily to official thinking, and secondarily, in the case of the United States, to American public opinion.

A principal senior governmental explanation for the American entry and commitment in Vietnam was that its status was thought to be linked with a series of interrelated American core values. In part, the stakes at risk in South Vietnam were related, by American decision makers, to a threat to such principles as the general credibility of American commitments and to the state's prestige, reputation and honor. Lyndon Johnson's depiction of American involvement in Vietnam as a "question of honor" in defending the independence of an ally is typical of government statements equating the loss of Vietnam with a threat to the core values of the United States.[1] This theme was present in official thinking throughout Johnson's Presidency. It numbered as one of a series of significant ideas which sustained the administration's will to act in Vietnam.

Contributing to the administration's will to fight in Vietnam as well as to the unlikelihood of compromise was the administration's conviction that their involvement ensued from the nation's ideological principles. Baritz, for example, cogently argued that an important theme underlying both the Vietnam involvement and the general history of American foreign policy, could be termed,

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[1] Lyndon Baines Johnson, "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia," 52 Department of State Bulletin (April 26, 1965), p. 607.

missionary/evangelical.''[4] By this the author means that the United States has often operated from the solipsistic assumption that other nation-states have wanted to model themselves on the United States and that it was the duty of the [redacted] to help them do so.''[5] Parenthetically, Baritz [redacted] that Americans typically fight wars on the basis of [redacted]tract principles.''[6] Johnson, for instance, stated that the American willingness to sacrifice would be related to "keeping the faith for freedom."''[7] Rusk similarly related the American involvement to ideological principles when the authors defined the American role in the context of providing for the rights of the South Vietnamese to determine their own future.''[8] The American self-image as the guarantor of South Vietnam's "freedom" contributed to both the administration's willingness to pursue its commitment and to the irrevocable nature of that commitment.

As a third reference to the state's core values, the administration equated the defense of the status of South Vietnam with the national interest of the United States.''[9] Specifically, it was alledged that United State's security was bound up with the protection of South Vietnam's

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''[4]Loren Baritz, Backfire, New York: William Morrow, 1985, p. 42.
''[5]Baritz, (fn.174), pp. 24-25.
''[6]Baritz, (fn.174), p. 38.
''[7]Lyndon Baines Johnson, "The Struggle to Be Free," 56 Department of State Bulletin (June 5, 1967), p 340, 344.
''[8]Dean Rusk, and Maxwell D. Taylor, "The United States Commitment in Viet-Nam: Fundamental Issues," 54 Department of State Bulletin (March 7, 1966), p. 353.
''[9]Lyndon Baines Johnson. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of The Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p. 53.

independence.'[**] This perspective, which elevated the status of South Vietnam, concurrently raised the stakes which would be associated with its loss. Concomitantly, the administration's willingness to act was increased by its definition of the presumed danger to the state's security in the event of the loss of South Vietnam.

The administration, then, endeavored to link its Vietnam policy with a threat to the state's core values. The notion of core values, in the administration's thinking, encompassed a variety of ideas, including a threat to the state's national security, which is generally thought to be the quintessence of the concept of core values. By attributing the American commitment in Vietnam to the state's core values, the administration was arguing, in effect, that its Vietnam policy was taken in what it believed to be, the American national interest.

Although the administration might have contended that a series of core values were threatened in Vietnam, the success of its Vietnam policy was ultimately built on public support. In turn, public approval was based on the estimation that the state's core values were at stake in the conflict. As the war continued, the public increasingly began to re-evaluate whether the state's core values, specifically whether the nation's security was actually at risk. In effect, the public's definition as to what constituted core values, in the context of Vietnam,

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[**]Rusk, et. al., (fn.178), p. 350.

increasingly became centered on the issue of national security. Accompanying public questioning as to whether the national security was in jeopardy in Vietnam was the erosion of support for the administration's policy. The public's, or a large segment thereof, estimation of that which constituted relevant core values for fighting in Vietnam ultimately differed from the administration's definition of what were the germane core values at risk in Vietnam.

The administration's willingness to act in Vietnam was enhanced by its understanding of process in the international system as well as by its perception of Communism. Contributing to the administration's conclusion that the retention of South Vietnam's "freedom" was vital to American security were the overlapping theoretical bases of the domino theory and the theory of containment. As intellectual roots, these theories were wholly incorporated into the administration's statements justifying the American participation in Vietnam. However, these theories were not merely ideas that were alluded to. Rather, it is evident that they were part and parcel of the decision makers' perceptions of the conflict, and indeed, of the administration's general weltanschauung. Moreover, their acceptance was intrinsic to the executive's will to act.

The administration did not regard the conflict as an indigenous struggle, which was, at base, a social conflict to overthrow a particular social system.'[1] Instead, the

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[1]Jeffrey Race, "How They Won," 10 Asian Survey (August, 1970), p. 649.

administration regarded the conflict in Vietnam as a probing action, which was rooted in the Cold War struggle between East and West.[182] Vietnam was construed to be an initial Communist probe, which would summarily be followed by the downfall of Southeast Asia or worse.[183] As a probe, which was thought to have such far-reaching consequences, the stakes at risk in Vietnam were heightened. In Hilsman's terms, the stakes were psychological, strategic, political and economic.[184]

Having established that the administration defined the Vietnamese struggle in terms of a probing action, the question remains as to what the executive believed was being-tested in Vietnam. Repeatedly emphasized by the President and his advisors, was that the war was a test of the American, the national will to rebuff the encroachments of the ideological adversary, Communism.[185] However, as a test of the American will to act, the Vietnam conflict, taken in isolation, was not of great importance. Rather, Vietham's significance inhered in the belief that American behaviour there would effect the adversary's long-term expectation of the American will to act. The development of this perception would, hopefully, deter future adversarial probing. The

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[182]Eugene V. Rostow, "A Certain Restlessness About Viet-Nam," 58 Department of State Bulletin (March 25, 1968), pp. 406-407.
[183]Roger Hilsman, "Orchestrating The Instrumentalities: The Case of Southeast Asia," in Foreign Policy In The Sixties: The Issues and the Instrumentalities. Roger Hilsman, et. al. (eds.). Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins, 1965, p. 192.
[184]Hilsman, (fn.183), p. 192.
[185]Baritz, (fn.174), p. 68.

flip-side of this proposition boded odious consequences: "If the Communists find out that We will not pursue our commitment to the end, I don't know where they will stay their hand."[176] And, in the words of George Ball and Dean Rusk: "If we yield... We would be expected similarly to yield on other matters as well."[177] The administration's involvement in Vietnam was heavily influenced by a mindset, which was colored by the shadow of Munich and appeasement; in short, by a train of thought that accepted "straight-line projections into the future based on precedent."[178]

In large measure, the theoretical rationale for maintaining the status of South Vietnam was stationed in the idea of power as a psychological relation between states. The administration believed that failure in Vietnam would have long-term effects upon the adversary's expectation of the American will to act and coextensively, upon his perception that the United States could be counted on to defend issues which it linked with its core values. Letting South Vietnam fall, it was argued, would lead to a slippery slope of belief that American commitments were not credible: "If you abandon one commitment how do you expect us to persuade anybody else that our word is to be relied on?"[179] In addition, as upholding the status of South Vietnam was

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[176]Dean Rusk in Johnson, (fn.179), p. 147.
[177]Henry F. Graff. The Tuesday Cainet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 70.
[178]Leslie H. Gelb, and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington, D.C.: Brooking, 1979, p. 99.
[179]Graff, (fn.187), p. 83.

deemed to be a question of principle,'[1] and its loss would challenge the administration's belief that the United States was honorable and responsible.'[2] Given the administration's analysis of the consequences of failure, the likelihood was greatly reduced that the United States would yield.

Para and parcel of the administration's wholesale acceptance of the domino theory was the related assumption that Communism was a monolith whose adherents formed a homogenous grouping. Vietnamese nationalism was perceived to be legi[redacted]f its orientation was anti-Communist and invalid [redacted] espoused tenets of Communism.'[3] The Viet Cong were not only alledged to be unsupported in South Vietnam, but were labelled with such invectives as terrorists, assassins, subversives and insurrectionists.'[4] The nature of the conflict was not regarded as an indigenous struggle for power, but rather as part of the larger East-West conflict. Within this perspective, administration officials perceived Hanoi's goals in two ways; (1) that they paralleled those of China, and (2) that Hanoi's actions were dictated chiefly by Communist China; Hanoi itself was

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[1]U. Alexis Johnson, "The Issue and Goal In Viet-Nam," 54 Department of State Bulletin (April 4, 1966), p. 530.
[2]This idea echoes throughout the statements issued by administration officials. Two examples include: (1) George Ball, "The Issue in Viet-Nam," 54 Department of State Bulletin (February 14, 1966); and (2) Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia," 56 Department of State Bulletin (April 3, 1967).
[3]William P. Bundy, "The Path to Viet-Nam: A Lesson In Involvement." 57 Department of State Bulletin (September 4, 1967), p. 276.
[4]See Roger Hilsman's introduction in Vo Nguyen Giap. People's Army People's War. New York: Praeger, 1962.

thought to be simply a satellite of China. These perceptions are manifest in administration statements, for example: "Ho and Mao are a team;"[1] and "the Chinese will fight to the last Vietnamese."[2] The upshot of this view, as has been alluded to, was the executive's denial that Hanoi's goals had any legitimacy. For, in the words of Eugene Rostow: "the national liberation war was simply an integral part of the catechisms of both Peking and Hanoi."[3]

The perceptual image that Hanoi and Peking were partnered influenced Johnson's conduct of the war. Specifically, it acted as a deterrent in that Johnson's will to act was bounded by the belief that provocative actions might trigger a Chinese troop movement or a greater confrontation with China and the Soviet Union.[4] Kearns notes, for example, that Johnson's step-by-step escalation policy derived, in part, from the desire to monitor what the reactions of China and Russia would be.[5] Military officials have contended that Johnson's definition of the situation constrained his military options and led to the unsuccessfulness of his goals in Vietnam.[6] Though the previous statement is contentious, the fact is that Johnson's will to act, [illegible] Haiphong, was influenced primarily [illegible]

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[1]Rostow, (fn.182), p. 409.
[2]George Ball in Graff, (fn.187), p. 72.
[3]Rostow, (fn.182), p. 409.
[4]Larry Berman. Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982, p. 141.
[5]Doris Kearns. Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New York: Harper and Row, 1976, p. 264.
[6]Berman, (fn.197), p. 143.

of Hanoi's relationship wi[illegible]a.

As a third source of [illegible]merican willingness to act in Vietnam, Johnson's partic[illegible] personality has been deemed, by a number of commenta[illegible], to have had an important influence upon the cour[illegible] of the American commitment in Vietnam. Particularly salient is how Johnson coupled the success of the American commitment in Vietnam with both his own self-image and with the success of his Presidency. Admittedly, a number of authors have referred to both Johnson's early insecurity in foreign policy decision making and to his heavy reliance upon his advisors' advice.[100] George Herring, for example, characterizes Johnson's policy in Vietnam as following in his predecessors' footsteps, however attempting to do so in a more efficient manner.[101] Johnson himself believed that his policies were continuous with those of the Kennedy administration;[102] he was reputed to be in agreement with his advisors, most of whom were members of Kennedy's cabinet, on the presumed ramifications of the loss of Vietnam.[103]

However, it would be illegitimate to to designate Johnson either as an unconscious follower of previous policies, or as, in Bill Moyer's words, "the prisoner of any

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[100]For example: Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), p. 324; and George C. Herring. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. New York: John Wiley, 1979, p. 128.
[101]Herring, (fn.200), p. 116.
[102]Baritz, (fn.174), p. 145.
[103]John G. Stoessinger. Crusaders And Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy. New York: W. W. Norton, 1979, p. 178.

man."[199] For Johnson the consequences of failure in Vietnam were highly personal. Johnson's will to act was sharply increased by his estimation of his personal stakes in the event of defeat in Vietnam. Johnson believed, first, that at risk would be his self-image. In Johnson's own terms, his political opposition and the public at large would perceive

> That I had let a democracy fall into the hands of the communists. That I was a coward. An unmanly man. A man without a spine.[200]

From Johnson's perspective, the black consequences of defeat would be visited not only upon his personal reputation, but upon that of the nation. Johnson's personal willingness to persist in his course in Vietnam was furthered by the irrefrangible linkage, which he made between the fate of his Presidency and the success of his Vietnam policy. Johnson's will, therefore, was not simply a product of his wish not to appear as the first American President to lose a war.[201] Rather, Vietnam subsumed Johnson's domestic goals and increasingly Johnson ascribed the value of his Presidency to a successful outcome in Vietnam. It stands to reason, therefore, that as the war continued and began to appear stalemated, Johnson would feel trapped.[202] Failure in Vietnam, Johnson believed, would occassion a divisive national debate, which would, in Johnson's words: "shatter my Presidency, kill my

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[199]Graff, (fn.187), p. 50.
[200]Baritz, (fn.174), p. 147.
[201]Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), p. 328.
[202]Kearns, (fn.198), p. 252.

administration, and damage our democracy."[208] More importantly, an admission of failure could not be made, as Johnson had staked his personal prestige, his self-integrity, on the success of his policy in Vietnam.[209] Johnson's steadfastness (his willingness) in following his policy in Vietnam, then, was closely allied with the linkage which he drew between the outcome of his Vietnam policy and his definition of self. In effect, Johnson's will to act was strengthened by his estimation of the personal costs which would be associated with defeat.

Another important aspect of Johnson's style, one which had a profound impact upon the administration's conduct of the war as well as upon its estimation of Hanoi, was the belief that both parties to the conflict had dissimilar but negotiable interests.[210] The foundation of this belief was built on the premise that the adversary was a 'rational' decision maker who could be convinced to settle on the administration's terms. By inflicting enough punishment upon North Vietnam, the administration believed that it could persuade Hanoi to agree to American terms. Hanoi would settle when it re-evaluated its policy goals in light of the costs to be incurred in their achievement. It was simply a

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[208]Johnson related his feelings to Kearns in 1970 as to what he perceived, in the early weeks of 1965, would be the repercussions of failure in Vietnam. Kearns, (fn.198), pp. 251-252.

[209]Kearns, (fn.198), p. 257.

[210]Kearns, (fn.198), p. 265. It would be incorrect to confine this theme solely to Johnson. Instead, it would be more apt to extend its presence to the mindset of the cabinet in general.

matter of discovering how much force was required to reach Hanoi's threshold. However, the American definition as to what would constitute rational North Vietnamese behaviour failed to grasp Hanoi's view of the conflict, especially as it related to the depth of Hanoi's commitment to achieving the core value of reunification. Gareth Porter writes, for example, that for Hanoi, the principle of unification, and concomitantly the status of the South Vietnamese were non-negotiable core values.[211] The Americans, similarly, misjudged the willingness of the Vietnamese to sacrifice in order to achieve their goals. Rational Vietnamese behaviour, from Johnson's perspective, would have been to compromise in order to preclude the harsh costs of the war. Stoessinger appropriately terms this sort of thinking as the "superimposition of misperceptions on Asian realities," as Johnson was unable to understand an adversary who was unwilling to bargain.[212]

Operating on the assumption that Hanoi would negotiate, Johnson believed that he possessed the necessary capabilities with which to convince Hanoi to settle. In order to persuade Hanoi that it should bargain, North Vietnam's perception--that it could attain its objectives--would have to be altered. The United States could do this, Johnson believed, by raising the costs that Hanoi would have to pay to such a level that it would desist

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[211]Gareth Porter. A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement. Bloomingon: Indiana Univ. Press, 1975, p. 29.
[212]Stoessinger, (fn.203), p. 198.

from its "infiltration" of the South. As the principal instrument of behaviour modification, the use of massive force was directed not only at Hanoi's ability to wage war, but, more importantly, at its will to continue the struggle.[213] Inhering in the administration's perspective, at least initially, was the belief in the assuredness of victory, given the wide gulf between the two sides (physical) capabilities--the thought that America, with all its might, could lose was unthinkable.[214] The use of force would eventually yield the wanted result: "We had to apply the maximum deterrent till he sobers up and unloads his pistol."[215] It was unknown, however, how much force was needed to persuade Hanoi that the costs of continuing were prohibitive.

As the war progressed, however, the American view of the role of force began to alter. The change in perspective was brought about, according to Gelb and Betts, by the realization of most American leaders that, by the fall of 1965, the struggle in Vietnam had become a "test of wills" in which each side perceived that it could not win a quick victory.[216] At the outset, it was believed that the use of force could convince Hanoi that the costs of the war necessitated a settlement--on American terms. This reasoning, Richard Betts comments, fuelled Johnson's bombing and ground operations policies, characterized by gradual

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[213]See, for example, U. A. Johnson, (fn.190), p. 534.
[214]Baritz, (fn.174), pp. 44-45.
[215]Lyndon Johnson in Graff, (fn.187), p. 64.
[216]Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), pp. 331-332.

escalation, during the period between 1965 and 1967.[211] stalemated, the use of force was increasingly directed at influencing Hanoi's perception that the United States possessed the long-term will to continue the struggle. The need to do this stemmed from the administration's belief that it had an image problem: the adversary's imaged perception of the United States' long-term will to act. The executive thought that this image could be rectified, a viewpoint, which turned out to be a misperception. The problem, and its perceived solution, were well-stated by Bundy in Johnson's, The Vantage Point:

> There is one grave weakness in our posture in Viet-Nam which is within our power to fix and that is the widespread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience and determination to take the necessary action and stay the course.[212]

The corollary of this statement was exemplified in the administration's wish to eschew actions, which were thought to signal an image of being weak-willed. Johnson, for example, perceived that bombing halts would be interpreted by Hanoi as a sign of weakness of will.[213]

Another aspect of Johnson's personal style, which had an important influence upon the conduct of the war as well as upon the whole of Johnson's Presidency, related to his treatment of public opinion. Johnson's decision-making style emphasized the formulation of policy by a narrow coterie of

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[211]Richard K. Betts, "Misadventure Revisited," in Peter Braestrup (ed.). Vietnam As History: Ten Years After The Paris Peace Accords. Washington, D.C.: Univ. Press of America, 1984, pp. 5-7.
[212]Emphasis is mine. Johnson, (fn.179), p. 127.
[213]Johnson, (fn.179), p. 377.

advisors, who shared common assumptions about the United States' commitment in Vietnam. Johnson's own fear of the consequences of public debate was reinforced by his concept of the President's role in foreign policy decision making. Public disclosure was unnecessary as Johnson thought that the Congress and the general public should rightly defer to the executive on matters of foreign policy.[220]

As the war continued, and the administration concluded that the conflict was likely to be protracted, the problem arose as to how to maintain the public's willingness to support the war. In McNamara's judgement, public support for the war would be related to the administration's ability to convince the public that the "formula for success has been found and that the end of the war is merely a matter of time."[221] In effect, it was recognized that the public's perceptual image of the war's course would affect its willingness to support the government's policy. It was believed that the public's will would be greatly influenced by its perception of the costs of the war. To positively affect the general will, the administration laid stress upon two points: first, McNamara emphasized the importance of "making the costs to the American people acceptably limited;"[222] and second, the government's official position repeatedly emphasized that progress was being made slowly but steadily;[223] in short, "a policy of controlled

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[220]Kearns, (fn.198), pp. 283-284.
[221]Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), p. 337.
[222]McNamara's emphasis. Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), p. 337.
[223]See, for example, Rostow, (fn.182), p. 414.

optimism."[224]

Johnson understood that the viability of his Vietnam policy rested on public support. Gelb suggests that Johnson's use of force in Vietnam was tempered by his consideration as to what would be the effects of his decisions upon American public opinion.[225] Gelb comments, for example, that decisions about strategy were partly based on what was thought to be the best way to maintain public support. [226] It could be argued, then, that Johnson's consideration of public opinion acted as a deterrent upon his willingness to act in Vietnam.

Johnson's style of concealment as well as his administration's attempt to convey to the public the image that the end of the war was close at hand ultimately laid the foundation for the failue of his Vietnam policy as well as for his own resignation. The success of the administation's goals, in the final analysis, was founded upon the national will to support the government's policy. By 1968, the national will had signicantly eroded. Peter Braestrup cites a national Gallup Poll, suggesting a close relationship between public support for Johnson's Vietnam policy and for Johnson as President (see Table 1). [227]

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[224]Leslie H. Gelb, "The Essential Domino: American Politics And Vietnam," 50 Foreign Affairs (April, 1972), p. 465.
[225]Gelb, (fn.224).
[226]Gelb, (fn.224), p. 464.
[227]Peter Braestrup (ed.). Vietnam As History: Ten Years After The Paris Peace Accords. Washington, D.C.: Univ. Press of America, 1984; Appendix, citing John B. Mueller, "War, Presidents, and Public Opinion," Journal of Defense Research Series B, (Fall 1975), n.p..

Public support, in both cases, diminished gradually.

Table 1 Popular Support For Vietnam War And For Johnson

Year Ending	Approval of War	Approval of Johnson
1965	65%	65%
1966	45%	52%
1967	45%	45%
mid 1968	35%	35%

Aside from the mounting human and financial costs of the war, Kearns recounts that by 1968, the national will had considerably declined primarily due to the general perception that Johnson had regularly deceived the public. The Tet Offensive (June, 1968) was highly effective in countering, for a large segment of the American public, the executive's claims that the war was being won. The public no longer thought that Johnson was a credible leader;[228] and this estimation, in turn, affected the public's willingness to support Johnson and his Vietnam policy.

Hanoi's goals were composed of long-term and short-term objectives. The overarching goal was the quest for national

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[228]Kearns, (fn.198), p. 337.

independence and unification.[229] However, Hanoi understood that the realization of this goal would be far-off as the nature of the conflict was protracted. In the short term, [redacted]irected it efforts to achieving two goals: (1) to [redacted]the co[redacted]the South Vietnamese government, and (2) to create th[redacted]s whereby the United States would become exhausted and decide to withdraw. As a principal means in accomplishing the first goal, the Viet Cong endeavored to discredit the South Vietnamese government by demonstrating to the peasantry that it (the Viet Cong) was more representative and sensitive to the people's needs.[230] Alongside tactics of benevolence, the Viet Cong used widespread terror to divide the peasantry from the South Vietnamese government. Gaining the peasantry's allegience was fundamental to the success of the war, whose character was, at base, civil. The indigenous nature of the conflict militated against a negotiated settlement, as both Hanoi and Saigon were ultimately uninterested in a compromise.[231]

In the context of Vietnam's political culture, furthermore, compromise was anathema, according to Frances FitzGerald. The nature of Vietnamese society was hierarchical: the character of power relations was symbolized by the structure of the family wherein the father represented the locus of authority.[232] The state model of

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[229]Porter, (fn.211), p. 29.
[230]See, for example, Jeffrey Race, (fn.181).
[231]Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), p. 339.
[232]Frances FitzGerald. Fire In The Lake. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972, p. 15.

authority replicated that found in the family structure. The ruler, sitting atop the socio-political structure, was looked upon to example the "Tao," the correct way of life.[233] It was a tenent of the society that there was a single correct answer to every question.[234] It follows, therefore, that pluralism, multiple sovereigns, and the division of the state, were signs of chaos and crisis. During such times, the populace would look for a man who expressed, in his life, how the government and the society ought to behave (the Tao)-a leader who demonstrated that he possessed the "Mandate of Heaven."[235] The struggle, therefore, in the long term, could not embody compromise. Given the two competing factions vying for the allegience of the South Vietnamese people, it follows that it was Ho and his confederates' goal to demonstrate that the Saigon regime did not represent the society's best interests.[236]

Ho's own will to act was fuelled by the threat which the conflict posed to his core values. He had dedicated his life to achieving Vietnam's independence and unification.[237] In his biography of Ho, William Warbey notes that the inability to achieve reunification would have meant the failure of Ho's lifelong dreams.[238] Certainly, the willingness of the North Vietnamese populace to bear

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[233]FitzGerald, (fn.232), p. 28.
[234]FitzGerald, (fn.232), p. 17.
[235]FitzGerald, (fn.232), pp. 26-27.
[236]Porter, (fn.211), p. 28.
[237]See, for example, Jean Lacouture. Ho Chi Minh. Peter Wiles (trans.). London: Penguin, 1968.
[238]William Warbey. Ho Chi Minh. London: Merlin, 1972, p. 216.

enormous costs was related, in large part, to the affiliation which existed between it and Ho. He was considered, according to Jean Lacouture, to be the "father of the people;" Ho and the populace were bound by reciprocal bonds of obligation, devotedness, loyalty, discipline and filial piety.[3'']

From Hanoi's perspective, the American objective was to transform South Vietnam into an American colony and military base.[3''] The American involvement was depicted as an "undeclared war" and as a "special war" in that the United States, Hanoi believed, regarded South Vietnam as a test case in establishing the principle that the concept of the national liberation war was invalid and would be therefore combatted.[3'']

Both parties to the conflict realized that securing the South Vietnamese public's will was crucial to their success. Each side concentrated with differing programs, levels of intensity, and with a distinct asymmetry of success--in Hanoi's favor--on securing broad public support. In waging its war effort, it should be noted that Hanoi did not draw any verbal distinction between attacking the enemy militarily and destroying his political base, indigenous and external.[3''] In doing the latter, within South Vietnam, Ho

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[3'']Lacouture, (fn.237), pp. 163-166.
[3'']Ho Chi Minh. On Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-66. Bernard B. Fall (ed.). New York: Praeger, 1967, p. 363.
[3'']Vo Nguyen Giap, "The South Vietnamese People Will Win," in Russell Stetler (ed.). The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, p. 193.
[3'']Vo Nguyen Giap. Banner of People's War, The Party's

and his cadres successfully expended much of their energy towards convincing the populace that the Party represented the "correct political line."[242] The goal of politicizing the peasantry was to increase the affiliation between the individual and the state, and pointedly, to "make the Vietnam People's Army truly a child of the people."[243] Establishing bonds between the Party and the peasantry, included inculcating the belief, the perceptual image, that a common foe was existent. This perception, in turn, increased the individual's estimation of his stake in the conflict, and heightened his willingness to fight on behalf of the Party and the Viet Cong.

Hanoi realized that success would ultimately be grounded upon the willingness of its constituency to support the war effort. A recurring theme in the writings of key NLF/DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) figures, stressed the willingness of the populace to back Hanoi and to defeat the Americans. It should be noted, however, that the writings and the speeches of the Vietnamese leadership served as a principal means of raising the morale of the troops and the society at large. General Nguyen Chi Thanh, for example, noted that "ideological mobilization" was essential to the acquisition by the troops of "a staunch revolutionary stand and a firm determination to fight and

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[242](cont'd) Military Line. George Boudarel (Intro.). New York: Praeger, 1970, pp. 56-57.
[243]Giap, (fn.242), p. 25.
[244]Vo Nguyen Giap. People's War People's Army. New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 52-53.

defeat the Americans."[215] Maintaining a positive psychological spirit was fundamental to the success of the war effort, especially as the North Vietnamese populace and military were asked to bear ever-increasing costs as the war continued.

A fundamental assumption, which underpinned the American conduct of the war, was the idea that the massive use of force could weaken the will of the DRV/NLF in order to deter continuing "aggression" in the South.[216] As primary sources of misperception, the administration overestimated the utility of force and undervalued the strength of will of North Vietnam's leadership and populace. Porter, for example, argues that the Americans were unwilling to undertake serious compromise due to their perception that, within a short space of time, the will of the DRV/NLF could be broken and victory, on American terms, could be achieved.[217]

Hanoi repeatedly emphasized that the outcome of the conflict would not be decided on the basis of which side possessed superior physical capabilities.[218] Decision in the conflict, instead, would ultimately be based upon the

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[215]Nguyen Chi Thanh, "General Nguyen Chi Thanh On The South's Ideological Task," in Patrick J. McGarvey (ed.). Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964-1968. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Publication 81, 1969, pp. 61-62.
[216]U.A. Johnson, (fn.190), p. 534.
[217]Porter, (fn.211), pp. 54-55.
[218]Truong Son, "Truong Son on the 1965-66 Dry Season," in Patrick J. McGarvey (ed.). Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964-1968. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Publication 81, 1969, p. 81.

possession of a single intangible capability--the long-term willingness to pay the costs associated with victory. American bombing was regarded as a form of compellence. Instead of diminishing North Vietnam's will, widespread bombing, according to Giap, only increased the public's solidarity behind the policies of Hanoi:

> The U.S. agressors have attempted to shake our people's fighting will through the massive use of bombs and shells. However, our people's determination to win is now higher and firmer than ever before.[210]

The propaganda of key leaders was critical to maintaining the population's morale; it was especially important in endeavoring to eliminate "erroneous thoughts," such as the "overestimation of the enemy and underestimating ourselves."[211]

Hanoi believed that it was the United States leadership's perception that the war could be won through the large-scale use of force. Maintaining the populace's morale was part and parcel of Hanoi's strategy to avoid any move that would be construed as a sign of weakness of will.[212] Conversely, by displaying a continued strength of will, Hanoi believed that it could alter Washington's perception that a military victory could be achieved; negotiation of a compromise settlement would be possible only when the United States believed that victory was no

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[210]Emphasis is mine. Vo Nguyen Giap, "The War of Escalation," in Russell Stetler (ed.). The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, p. 310.
[211]Thanh, (fn.245), pp. 63-64.
[212]Porter, (fn.211), p. 30.

longer imminent.[252]

The style of warfare which was put into practice by Hanoi was directed at undermining the opponent's willingness to prosecute the war. This would be achieved by forcing the adversary to re-evaluate whether the value of the goal merited the costs. The idea of protracted war stresses the transformation of the enemy's will to act by inflicting upon his populace unbearable costs. Supplementing this perception is the development of the viewpoint that the conflict is a blind alley without any forseeable exit. The notion of the protracted war is also intended to convey the perception that the Vietnamese willingness to sacrifice is infinite and indefinite.[253]

An explication of the concept of protracted war was outlined by Ho when he stated:

> If we must fight, we will fight. You will kill ten of our men, but we will kill one of yours. And in the end it is you who will tire.[254]

Inhering in the notion of the protracted war is the idea that the adversary's citizens willingness to support the war is heavily contingent upon the level of incurred costs as well as upon the perception that a favorable resolution to the conflict is in sight. Giap's assertion--the longer the struggle, the weaker the enemy becomes; and conversely, the longer the struggle, the stronger we become[255] --is built

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[252]Porter, (fn.211), p. 31.
[253]Minh, (fn.240), p. 384.
[254]Jeffrey Race, "The Unlearned Lessons of Vietnam," 66 China Quarterly (December, 1976), p. 170.
[255]Vo Nguyen Giap. Big Victory Great Task. New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 90.

upon the idea that the war will be fought in a manner which is advantageous to Hanoi, specifically a low-level guerilla war, which will slowly wear down and exhaust the opponent[256] The objective was twofold: to wear down the opponent's will to act both militarily and politically.[257] A principal means of influencing the opponent politically, and, by correlation, militarily, was to attempt to diminish his constituencies' willingness to support the administration in its handling of the war. In so doing, Hanoi essayed to foster a rift between the public--what Gelb and Betts termed, the "key stress point"[258]--and the administration.

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[256]Giap, (fn.244), pp. 29-30.
[257]In the Vietnam conflict, military action was frequently undertaken by Hanoi with the view that it would have a political impact in the United States. In short, one component often devolved upon the other.
[258]Gelb and Betts, (fn.188), p. 332.

A. Conclusions and Summary

David Baldwin had alledged that it was inappropriate for analysts to point to a lack of will in explaining the American failure in Vietnam. Will, in this context, refers to the state's disposition to utilize its capabilities. Neither does Baldwin assess whether there is any merit to this interpretation of the American loss in Vietnam, nor does the author investigate what were the sources of the respective combatant's will to act in Vietnam.

In this chapter, I studied the concept of will in the context of the Vietnam conflict. In that context, I have examined the concept of will, taken as a psychological disposition to act. Regarded from the American perspective, the will to act resulted only partially from the perceptual image of the opponent in the actual conflict. As important were factors such as the personality of the leader and his perception of his personal stakes in the conflict; the ascription of principles and core values with the outcome of the conflict; key assumptions held about the nature of the international system, specifically, the belief that the conflict was masterminded by confrontational states outside of Vietnam; and the dynamics of conflict. The administration's understanding of the dynamics of conflict bear a strong relation to key assumptions which are part and parcel of the theory of deterrence, specifically, that the state's disposition to act in specific contexts establishes perceptual images of its will to act in future conflicts.

Baldwin had also argued that the state's success in influencing the behaviour of another state partially depended upon the latter's values. Ostensibly, the state's values would bear upon its willingness not to be influenced. Baldwin neither defined what he meant by the term, "values," nor did he draw a distinction between the notions of values and core values.

In contrast to Baldwin, I have contended that a consideration of both parties perception of their core values at risk in the conflict constitutes an important source of their respective wills to act. Most commentators on Vietnam who allude to the notion of core values, however, do not precisely set out what the term means. Here, I have understood a core value to be an abstract principle, which strengthens the state's commitment to its policy. I have noted that as the war continued a sizeable segment of the American public increasingly questioned whether American core values, especially whether the nation's security, was at risk in Vietnam. The discrepency, in the public's mind over this relation, acted as an important source of the populace's gradual disaffection with Johnson's Vietnam policy.

It has also been shown that the administration's own will to act was based on a series of misperceptions regarding its ability to alter the opponent's will to act. The administration both misunderstood and invalidated Hanoi's own stakes in the conflict. Specifically, the

administration misperceived the strength of will, especially the will of the North Vietnamese populace and leadership to sacrifice in order to achieve their goals. Third, the administration overestimated the utility of force in being able to alter the willingness of Hanoi to fight.

The nature of the indigenous conflict did not provide for compromise. The conflict represented a threat to the core values of independence and reunification, which had been the lifelong aspirations of the North Vietnamese leadership. Furthermore, in the context of the Vietnamese culture, compromise was inappropriate. Ho and his advisors were successful because they possessed an understanding of the opponent's weak points. Specifically, it was understood that it was to Hanoi's advantage to draw out the length of the war as long as possible. This understanding resulted from the correct assumption that the opponent's will to act was heavily dependent upon public support. Hanoi essayed to diminish American public support for the war, and coextensively for the administration, by inflicting large-scale costs upon the American public as well as by showing that the war's course, as posed by the administration, was discrepent from reality.

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V. Final Conclusions

To conclude, David Baldwin's understanding of the concept of will has to be reassessed in light of the conclusions drawn out in this study. In so doing, I will specifically comment upon the author's complaint regarding the alledged tendency of power analysts to explain away their failed power predictions by pointing to an absence of state will in converting its potential power resources into actual power. Second, Baldwin's proposition that influence is properly appraised within a given context wherein power (influence) is related to the relationship between state A's capabilities and state B's values, perceptions and propensities has to be reviewed.

Fungibility analysts, according to Baldwin, set the concept of will within the context of the mobilization of resources. This sort of explanation, according to Baldwin, "makes it all too easy for the power analyst to avoid facing up to his mistakes."[111] Despite Baldwin's view to the contrary, it may be argued with some merit that the American failure in Vietnam did result from the administration's unwillingness to muster all available armaments, including nuclear weapons.

It is evident that Baldwin's goal is to diminish the role of will by relegating it to the status of one of a myriad of potentially significant state capabilities. Yet, intrinsic to the conversion process which Baldwin introduces

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[111] David A. Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 170.

is the notion of commitment, a term which the author appears to freely substitute in the place of will. Baldwin's analysis, however, does not really offer any conclusions as to why states do commit themselves to policies, aside from an illustration alluding to the idea of core values.[116]

The ability of the state to influence a second state is said to inhere in a conversion process embodying the former's capabilities and the latter's value system, perceptions and propensities.[117] Presumably, these elements bear on the state's own degree of commitment not to be influenced. However, as has been shown in the case of the Vietnam conflict, these factors contribute to both parties willingness to act within the given context, not simply to one actor's. In other words, as sources of the will to act, the anayst should evaluate the core values, perceptions and propensities of both states to a particular conflict.

However, it should be noted that in Baldwin's article, conversion process elements are deemed to be relevant only insofar as to whether influence will be achieved as oppossed to whether the will to influence or not to be effected will be increased. The conclusions, drawn from this study suggests that an analysis of influence in particular conflicts cannot be properly conducted in the absence of a consideration of the states' willingness to act.

Certainly, Baldwin's inclusion of the factor of perception suggests that it cannot be separated from the

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[116]Baldwin, (fn.1), pp. 178-79.
[117]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 171.

state's will to act. A threat's effectiveness is dependent, in part, upon B's perception of it.[262] It was found, however, that the success of the threat included B's perceptual image that the threatener was himself credible, which included the belief that he possessed the required will with which to fulfill his threat. The perception of another actor's will to act becomes a salient factor in Baldwin's conversion process, and coextensively, in the successfulness of the influence attempt.

Deterrence theorists, including Jervis and Schelling, among others, have concluded that the validity of perceptual images of will are given to uncertainty. An individual decision-maker's will to act can arise on the basis of faulty assumptions as to the perceptions and behaviour of the opponent. A leader may also misperceive, or fail to take into account, the degree to which the adversary values his objective, and correlatively, his willingness to sacrifice in order to achieve his goals. Furthermore, the leader may incorrectly assume that the reaction of his opposite number should equate with his own. These misperceptions were manifest in Johnson's Vietnam policy.

A final problem in Baldwin's critique of the conversion process deals with levels of analysis. While Baldwin lists the elements which he believes are pertinent in the process of influence, he does not detail whose values, perceptions and propensities should be assessed in the given context. In

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[262]Baldwin, (fn.1), p. 171.

the case of Vietnam, for example, the individual leaders' will to act, especially Johnson's, was subject to a variety of governmental and societal, typically heterogenous influences. The former included the cabinet, the bureaucracy, and the military, while the latter took in public opinion and the media. Also relevant were the particular personality traits of the Johnson, especially as he related the value of the goal to his own self-integrity, and to that of the state. It was also pointed out that individuals will to act may have been influenced by ideology; their understanding of the dynamics of conflict; and by their perceptual images of their opponent's willingness to act. What is apparent is that the will to act in a particular conflict is not only derived from a series of sources, but is changeable given re-evaluations of the goal's value in light of the costs required to achieve it.

Baldwin's own attempt to exclude the concept of will as a central element in the functioning of influence was unsuccessful. This study illustrated that inhering in the process of influence is a psychological dimension, which includes the state's perceptual image of another state's will to act. Though it was found in successive chapters that the foundations of the state's will to act was much more complex than simply the psychological relation existent between states, it is the conclusion of this thesis that power analysis, as Baldwin's article has so aptly shown, cannot be divorced from the inclusion and examination of

states' will to act.

This thesis proceeded by defining the concept of will as an imaged disposition to act. This definition was framed within the concept of power regarded as a psychological relation between states. However, this thesis concludes, taking its lead from deterrence theory, that this definition of will is too narrow. Ultimately, the state's bluff will be called and it will have to show whether its projected image of will is credible. In effect, images are given to testing. In the final analysis, the state will be asked to display its possession or absence of an actual willingness to act.

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