

University of Alberta

Self-Modifying Experiences in Literary Reading: A Model for Reader Response

by

Olívia da Costa Fialho

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Comparative Literature

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Spring 2012
Edmonton, Alberta

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Abstract

This thesis introduces an approach to literary reading that takes into account experiential reading. To this purpose, it describes the different modalities of consciousness involved in the process. More specifically, it investigates how literature becomes a means for the dehabitation of readers' understandings of themselves in the world. Its main objectives are to (a) gain access to readers' mode of engagement during the type of reading experience that is self-modifying; (b) focus on the moments in which changes in sense of self occur; and (c) investigate the relation between textual properties and the experience of self-modification. To reach these goals, the study proposes a new method based on lexical repetition and theme modification that allows the examination of readers' first-person accounts of their experience of a short story by Katherine Mansfield. An adaptation of previously described procedures (Kuiken, Schopflocher and Wild, Kuiken and Miall, "Numerically Aided Phenomenology"), this method is here called "Lexical Basis for Numerically Aided Phenomenology" (LEX-NAP). It is demonstrably effective in the present study as it allows for dynamic descriptions of the phenomenon, including a description of readers' embodied repositionings as the reading unfolds. Interdisciplinary in nature, this thesis resorts to insights from literary studies, phenomenology, psychology, neuroscience, and stylistics. The results obtained are various: first, a typology of self-modifying reading experiences is offered, which helps establish a model for readers' responses. Second, the study redefines the notion of literariness from empirical data, indicating how specific verbal, emotional and cognitive elements may account for the distinctiveness of the literary experience. Third, it clarifies the relation between textual properties and the experience of self-modification. The

findings have implications for literary studies, linguistics, stylistics, and, ultimately, for literary education, where they may inform the design of alternative teaching methods with focus on experiential reading of a transformative nature.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Drs. David Miall and Don Kuiken for their supervision and for the advice provided throughout the making of this dissertation. I would also like to acknowledge the insights derived from exchanges with the other members of our research group, Cathelain Aaftink, Daniel Mantei, Paul Campbell, and Paul Sopčák.

My gratitude is extended to the members of the supervisory and examining committees, Drs. Margaret Mackey, Marisa Bortolussi, Michael Toolan, and Stephen R. Reimer for their insightful comments and for making this a better work. Drs. Albert Braz, Brian Boyd, Irene Sywenky, Sonia Zyngier, and Sylvia Chard have also assisted me in different ways and moments.

A word of thanks also goes to Barb Heagle, Hiroko Ono-Paul, and Sheila Troppmann for all their administrative support at the Office of Interdisciplinary Studies, especially to Janey Kennedy.

This work would not have been possible without the contribution of the participants of this study, whom I thank, and the students who, knowingly or unknowingly, have inspired and informed this research, especially Caeleigh Moffat and Danielle Siemens.

Words will never be enough to express my gratitude to my parents, my brother, my uncle, and my husband for their encouragement and unconditional support.

I gratefully acknowledge the Program of Comparative Literature for its financial support, along with the University of Alberta and the Government of Alberta for their funding through the FS Chia Doctoral Scholarship, the Mary Shore Graduate Scholarship, the J. Gordin Kaplan Graduate Student Award, and the Andrew Stewart Memorial Graduate Prize.

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Chapter 1. Introduction: Literary Reading in Context

Wording a title for this thesis has been rather daunting. Several key terms presented themselves: *self, feelings, self-modification, literary, reading, experience*. Analogous to Luigi Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author*,¹ six nouns were here in search of just one title. As complex as the unfinished characters in search of their sense of self, each of these words requires a definition that is beyond the reach of this thesis as each brings along with it a history of uses across various disciplines. For example, the self has been studied extensively by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and literary theorists, each viewing it from a different perspective: as a principle of identity, a narrative construction, an experiential dimension, as a temporally-bound entity, and so on. A cursory review of these concepts would never cover the complexity and depth each of them involves.

I am also aware that placing these terms together under one title may bring about further complications. As it stands now, the title raises at least two fundamental questions. The first concerns the nature of literary reading. In the present chapter, I propose that (a) due to their intertwining, reading can be seen as a life experience; (b) it can be personally engaging and implicate the self; (c) the sense of self necessarily involves the interplay between feelings and cognition; and (d) literary reading may modify the way readers experience their sense of self. However, these processes do not only or necessarily occur when reading a literary text; so, they might not be essential to the phenomenon of literary reading. Moreover, when they occur, little has been said of

1. In the original, *Sei Personaggi in Cerca d'Autore* (1921).

how they do occur or how they interact (see, for instance, Miall and Kuiken, “A Feeling for Fiction”; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”; Kuiken et al., “Locating”).

I anticipate that a brief elaboration of the wording of the title may make explicit the assumptions that underlie the theory of reading that provides the basis for this thesis and introduce some of the issues that will be developed here. In qualifying reading experiences as *self-modifying*, one of the initial assumptions is that literary reading has varied forms (e.g., story-driven, leisure escape, see Hunt and Vipond; Miall and Kuiken, “Aspects of Literary Response”; Nell; Rosenblatt, *Reader*; among others; expressive enactment, see Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”). In addition, opting for the use of the term *experiences* in the plural implies that I both assume distinct modes of literary reading as well as different kinds of self-modifying reading experiences. In other words, *self-modifying reading* is not expected to be a unified term. This thesis is open to the possibility that a variety of self-modifying experiences might unfold.

A second assumption is that the particular kind of experience I address here, namely *self-modifying*, is worded with the *-ing* suffix to make it evident that this phenomenon is not static. Self-modifying literary reading implies transformation and change and necessarily involves temporality (see Chapter 5). I assume that a phenomenological approach to literature, consciousness, and emotion will enable the development of an orientation that takes into account the relation between reading and life.

In focusing my selection on one kind of literary reading, I am also aware that a second issue needs attention: the aims of literary education. Despite not being central to

this thesis, one of the major questions here is the role of these reading processes in former and current educational practices. My argument is that this role has been too limited. If these processes are important aspects of reading, the way they are dealt with in the classroom setting must be considered. The complicating factor is that there still is no consensus (and perhaps may never be) about the aims of literary education, and little knowledge of how literary reading is processed, as social and cultural factors are involved. Therefore, considering alternative approaches to literary education that make self-modification (or experiential reading with transformative qualities) pivotal should take into account both internal and contextual factors. Before so doing, I hold the position that a better understanding of self-modification as the basis for these alternative educational practices should be developed first. Only then can we begin to narrow the current gaps between the way literature is taught and the practices of ordinary readers outside the educational environment. In so doing, we may be helping to reestablish the social function and relevance of literature in the classroom setting and to avoid marginalization of the discipline in school curricula (e.g., in Brazil, Pisa 2000, 2003, 2009; IDEB 2008, 2009, see Section 1.2 below).

As theories of literary reading, of education, and of each of the words referred to in the title vary, instead of presenting one unified basis for this thesis, I have opted for putting together a kaleidoscopic perspective in the hope that this interdisciplinary outlook can be extended to various settings (see Chapter 7). In this sense, I expect that each theoretical contribution, albeit not exhaustively detailed, will contribute to a gestalt. In selecting and bringing parts together—philosophical, psychological, neurobiological, linguistic, and literary (see Chapter 7)—I point at the complexity of the issues and hope

to shed new light on the phenomena under study. This thesis holds that only a better understanding of literary reading will enable the development of a theory of reading that takes into account the reader, the text, and life, so as to inform educational practices.

1.1. Living and Reading

This study is about how actual readers respond to literary texts. But what may be called the “actual” or “ordinary” reader (see above) is not a homogeneous entity. Large national surveys conducted over the past fifty years in various high-income countries, especially in North America, Europe and Oceania, have classified readers in different ways. For example, “heavy readers” in the 2004 NEA study conducted with U.S. adults are those who have read eight or more books in the previous year, whereas in the U.K.’s study *Reading the Situation* (2000), they are classified as those who spend more than eleven hours a week reading books. Surveys such as these have provided fairly stable conclusions about reading behaviors and shown that there is a variety of readers. For example, they point out that about half the population in those continents read books as a leisure activity, that the single most powerful predictor of reading is level of education, and that about 10 to 15% are avid readers, i.e., heavy consumers of books, magazines, newspapers, and other media (Ross, McKechnie, and Rothbauer 134-141). The book reading patterns follow a Bradford distribution in the United States² (Leigh 32; Link; Ross, McKechnie, and Rothbauer 136), where “heavy” or “avid” readers are more likely to be educated women of eighteen to thirty-four years of age (Gallup Organization 14),

2. 70% of the books were read by 20% of the population

and, in the United States and in Canada, they are likely to live in the western regions (Ross, McKechnie, and Rothbauer 134).

Case studies and readers' self-reports have also revealed much about the reading experience (e.g., Coady and Johannessen; Osen; Rosenthal). Some repeated themes that emerge from these self-reports indicate that it (a) is effortless, and associated with flow (Csikszentimihalyi); (b) implicates emotional response--especially comforting childhood memories with strong sensory dimensions; and (c) involves delight in language (Ross, McKechnie, and Rothbauer 148-9). An outstanding theme is how engaging and personal reading can be. One participant in Toyne and Usherwood's study thus summarizes the experience:

I go completely into [the reading], and become one of the characters and I have to stop myself from talking like that character [*especially if it's something like Jane Austen*]... *when I read fiction ... I just get completely absorbed and I'm there and I'm involved and I'm feeling all of the emotions and everything else.* (32, my italics)

This statement indicates the mode of engagement that seems typical of their literary experience: an enactive form of identification. While commenting on David Lodge's novel *Out of the Shelter*, Joseph Gold eloquently describes a comparable experience:

I lived through World War II in London, England ... Mostly I have kept the experience to myself ... I think that I buried a lot of it inside me somewhere ... Lodge's novel ... was just such an experience for me ... I was strongly moved by it, but more, I was grateful for it. The expression,

the novel, sometimes gives a shape, a form, to experience that we recognize as our own. The novel is then a gift, a creating of the reader's reality, existence, history. The pieces of my past, my life, that were lying around in a puzzling mess—unexpressed, unformed, vaguely felt—were gathered together and given recognizable and storable shape. This is a priceless gift—a gift to the reader of part of the reader's life. Now I can say, if you want to know some of how it felt to be me as a twelve-year-old in England in 1944 and 1945, read *Out of the Shelter*. (quoted by Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, "Forms" 178)

For Gold, Lodge's novel represents a means whereby his sense of self is modified.³ This same kind of experience is described in the words of ordinary readers. In accounts of the relevance of the experience, it is frequent to find the awakening metaphor, such as in the following:

Books help me clarify my feelings; change my way of thinking about things; help me think through problems in my own life; help me make a decision; and give me the strength and courage to make major changes in my own life; they ... give me hope to rebuild my life. (Ross, McKechnie, and Rothbauer 163)

This statement in a way explains how reading can be woven into the texture of readers' lives. Granted that the experiences of reading vary widely, these accounts illustrate how individuals often refer to the impact of reading on their self-development to

3. In Gold's description, both modification and awareness occur. See his lines: "I was strongly moved by it, but more, I was grateful for it. The expression, *the novel*, sometimes gives a shape, a form, to experience that we recognize as our own." The presence of awareness is indicated by the word "recognize" and of modification, by the expressions "I was strongly moved" and "the novel ... gives a shape, a form, to experience."

explain why they engage in fiction (Fialho, “A Influência do Professor”; Miall and Kuiken, “A Feeling for Fiction”; Radway, *Reading the Romance*; Toyne and Usherwood). The experience seems to be emotionally relevant and responsible for changes in how the reader sees the world. In fact, this function of literary reading is further explored by such programs as Changing Lives Through Literature⁴ and Literature for Life.⁵ We will see here how literary reading may have transformative powers as it deepens our understanding of the position of the self in the world.

Reading has so far enjoyed a secured function in human life and has, very probably, an assured future (Pattison; Petrucci) in non-institutionalized contexts (see also NEA’s *Reading on the Rise 2009* and Oprah’s Book Club). A different picture can be observed, however, in American educational contexts since the early nineteenth century, when literature became a subject of university study. At that time, literary culture continued to flourish in the general community. Informal literary education of impressive proportions, such as literary debating societies, college debating clubs, public lectures, student literary publications, among others, co-habited and merged with new colleges (Graff, *Professing* 44-5). Literature turned into an object of study at the same time that it continued to be enjoyed outside the academy by the community in general and was seen as an essential instrument of socialization. Literary education did not depend solely on the school requirements. Since then, the gap between the life of literature outside and inside the institutional walls has become increasingly wide.

4. Changing Lives Through Literature is an alternative sentencing program based on the belief that literature has the power to transform lives by enabling criminal offenders to gain insight into their lives and reassess their behaviour. For further information, see <http://ctl.umassd.edu/home-flash.cfm>; see also Trounstein and Waxler.

5. Literature for Life is a charity aimed at empowering at-risk teenage mothers through literature. It runs book groups for teenage mothers and their children and use novels as an opportunity to debate and discuss issues of relevance to these participants, who have the opportunity to publish and perform their poetry. For further information, see <http://literatureforlife.org/>.

1.2. Institutional Crisis

It was not until the early nineteenth century that the idea that literature had to be taught in formal classes arose in America. One of the problems that marks the introduction of literature as a discipline, at least in the USA and in countries like Brazil, has been the dichotomy between reading as a school requirement and reading for pleasure; the idea arose that “literature had to be taught in formal classes *instead of* being enjoyed as part of the normal experience of the community” (Graff, *Professing* 19; my italics; Carvalho). Even though the flourishing extracurricular literary culture described above went on, early proponents of literary education organized the curriculum in such a way that what was done in class was dissociated from the life of literature outside the classroom. In the educational setting, it was taught in an instrumental and mechanical way. Latin and Greek texts provided illustrations of grammar, rhetoric, elocution, and civic and religious ideals (as informed by neoclassical theories), a place where memorization, recitation of grammatical and etymological particularities (as informed by a romantic view of language) and hermeneutical theorizing took place. Outside the classroom, literature was appreciated as an essential instrument of socialization. This paradox that characterized literary education in the preprofessional era (1828-1876) (Graff, *Professing* 19-20) was enhanced by the static nature of the curriculum. In the classroom, the single textbook practices informed courses and promoted the uniformity of experiences, and a “deadly routine” (*idem* 28) as opposed to the life of literature outside the institution was imposed.

With regard to the teaching of English itself, the dichotomy between literary education and personal meaningfulness was later translated by the dichotomy between

the scientific and the emotional, and materialized itself in the different approaches to teaching. A pattern emerged: on the one side, textbook learning, forced recitations, and philology; on the other, “misty impressionism” (Graff, *Professing* 41). In the old college, rhetoric courses provided a certain middle ground (*ibid.*) as there was an attempt to reconcile the assumed role of poetry to please, amuse, speak to the imaginations and the passions with instruction (for example, see Hugh Blair’s rhetorical handbook *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Letters*). Nevertheless, translated into the classroom, this rhetorical approach also fell into the same “dreary grind as classical grammar and textbook literary history” (Graff, *Professing* 42). The opponents of the new philology and advocates of revitalized elocution argued that what was needed was “not more talk *about* literature, but the *literature itself*” (1870 Cornell President White, qtd. in Graff, *Professing* 47, my italics). This statement was based on the belief that reading literature aloud was the sole and sufficient form of authentic literary experience, and that mere talk *about* literature could easily become an obstacle to appreciation (Corson). Literary education, then, started to be seen as an impediment to the fruition of an authentic experience.

As a result, literary courses did not aim at developing literary instincts among the students who attended them and the students’ “enthusiasm [was] about dead ... they [were] ashamed of ... [their] own ideas, ... [have] learned how to write ‘themes’ and ‘papers’ ... [knew] what the instructor [wanted] and [wrote] accordingly” (Graff, *Professing* 103). A substantial faction undertaking the debate recommended various kinds of “criticism” as a way of overcoming the polarity between experience and appreciation. This early movement did not achieve significant influence until later as no

method was yet widely available for the kind of aesthetic interpretation that was needed (*idem* 96) and departments backed an interpretive, “scientific” approach to literary texts.

At the turn of the twentieth century, criticism began to emerge as the promise of an alternative to the gap between “pure science” and “pure impressionism.” One example was the program formulated by the newly appointed chairman of the English department at Indiana University, Martin Wright Sampson, in 1895. His proposal already reflected much of what was later called New Criticism, the idea that students should be placed “face to face with the work itself” (qtd. in Graff, *Professing* 123), approaching it systematically, finding out its meanings and their significance, with the exclusion of the study of biography or literary history or grammar, etymology or anything except the work itself. As Graff observes, the growth of criticism not only did not resolve the gap: it created new ones. Scholar and critic appeared as antithetical terms, and the gap between fact and value, investigation and appreciation, science and art was widened (122), creating an impasse still present in today’s educational setting (see Slingerland).⁶

After over a century, the sun has begun to set for reading and interpreting literary texts as an academic discipline. In many of today’s institutions it is being replaced by other disciplines such as Composition, Cultural Studies, Creative Writing, Language Acquisition and other disciplines which may use literature to illustrate styles, innovation, deviation, etc. This situation has been noted by other scholars, who resort to different metaphors to announce the terminal status of literary studies (Miall, *Literary Reading*).

The following titles are quite illustrative: *Literature Lost* (John Ellis), *The Rise and Fall*

6. Slingerland (2) attributes the current crisis in literary studies (with the decline in enrollments and funding levels from external agencies and the “increasingly insular” work of the humanists), partially, to their focus on the application of theory and the mind-body dualism and argues for the reconciliation between science and the humanities.

of English (Robert Scholes), *La Littérature en Péril* (Tzvetan Todorov). The works of Daniel Pennac, *Comme un Roman*, and Georges Snyders, *Des Élèves Heureux: Réflexion sur la Joie à l'École à Partir de Quelques Texts Littéraires*, can also be added to this list. What such studies share is their belief that the education system has failed to promote successful and positive experiences of reading. One might similarly add reports such as those of Stephen Greenblatt, then President of the MLA, who states that “most Americans do not begin to recognize the absolute centrality of literature and language in their lives” (8). Similarly, in a review article for *College English*, Rouse claims that

the humanities have become isolated from life outside the university, and ... [that] ordinary citizens ... have in fact very little interest in whatever it is these professors are talking about. And in recent times the advent of theory, with its pretentious obscurities, has further alienated the humanities from the rest of society. (459)

Rita Felski also points out the misalignment between acts of reading inside and outside the classroom, which she calls an “unbridgeable chasm” (qtd. in Graff, “Presidential Forum” 7). Surveys have been conducted, adding evidence to these claims and signalling a crisis in reading (Pisa 2000, 2003, 2009; *Reading at Risk* 2004).

This general sense of crisis in literary studies is strikingly at odds, however, with the most recent findings of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in the U.S.A. *Reading on the Rise* (2009) reports a substantial recent increase in adult reading activity, marking the first major rise in literary reading in 26 years. Although the steady decline in reading that NEA (2004) has reported in previous years has been to some extent reversed, the reasons for the current upsurge have yet to be explained. While these results look

rather optimistic, and although the decline cannot be attributed to only one factor, the apparent deficiencies of literary education still must be investigated and associated with another problem observed in educational institutions: a decline in the number of bachelor degrees in English, reported in 2004 by Fitts and Lalicker, who write on the “precipitous decline in literature majors in the United States” (427) and in 2009 by the National Centre for Education Studies or NCES (see *Profession* 2009). This decline becomes significant when examined together with the NEA’s reported trends. A similar shift has been reported by Chace, who indicates a drop in the number of Humanities majors from 30 percent to 16 percent from 1970/71 to 2003/04 and a decrease in English majors from 7.6 percent to 3.6 percent over the same time period. In Canada, the University of Alberta’s statistical records show less drastic but still comparable declines: within the last six years, the number of English majors has dropped from 8.31 to 6.95 percent in the Arts Undergraduate population. The discord between the NEA’s report and the findings of Chace and the NCES might be one more indication of a disconnection between the status of reading inside and outside the institution.

To make the scenario even bleaker, Rouse’s prediction that literature as an academic study will disappear (465) has, indeed, already become a reality in some places: in Brazil, for instance, it is no longer part of the curriculum of public elementary education and literary texts are but an appendix to language learning. Recent findings of the Latin American Laboratory for Evaluation of Educational Quality, linked to the United Nations (2004 to 2008), revealed that, in Brazil, out of 100,752 third graders and 95,288 6th graders in 3,000 schools, 71.39% of the third graders were rated as presenting reading levels below what is considered adequate to this grade. With the 6th graders, that

percentage was lower but remained, nevertheless, at a worrying 50.07%. This picture is similar to most Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba (*O Globo Online*; see also ABTE; IDEB; *Pisa* 2000, 2003, 2009). There is evidence enough indicating that the decline of literary studies might be a global problem. The crisis seems to be not only in education but also due to or reflected in economic policies. Deficiencies in reading *per se* are not the only factors.

Indeed, since its institutionalization as an academic discipline, not much has been achieved in terms of welcoming the literary experience that is familiar to private or even social moments of reading into the classroom. Regardless of the pedagogical strategies employed—be it close reading, applied literary theory, or stylistic analysis—the teaching of literature has tended to lead students to a detached and clinical approach that may put them off further reading. These different approaches have been coexisting, but the nature of the curriculum or what is done in the classroom remains unchanged. The open-ended multiplicity of readings that may occur in the outside world remains unrepresented or not even recognized or addressed inside the classroom. While specifying that books must be read in a certain way—with the sole purpose of interpretation—theorists keep stipulating what constitutes a “proper” form of reading.

The problem of how much of literature teaching has restricted the plurality of readings to a single “right way” has been addressed by other critics (Long). Radway (“On the Sociability,” qtd. in Long 30) has pointed out how theorists hold a form of cultural control, not just in education, but also in the “refinement, policing, and evaluation of particular ways of reading and writing.” A similar point had been made even more strongly some time ago by de Certeau, who sees “literal” meaning as the index and the

result of a social power exerted by an elite. He compares the social hierarchization practiced in schools (and also in the press and television) that “isolates the text controlled by the teacher” from the “activity of readers” to that of the Church which has formerly “instituted a social division between its intellectual clerks and the “faithful”, [with the former determining] what parts of [texts] should be read” (172). De Certeau resorts to dramatic imagery to explain this approach: the relation between theorist-teachers and students is put in terms of the “Great Wall of China that circumscribes a ‘proper’ in the text,” (171, sic) and readers are comparable to “nomads poaching their way across fields they did not write” (174). The autonomy of the ordinary reader that yields plural readings is disregarded, and the academy remains in the possession of the final words about a text.

1.3. Self-Modifying Potentials of Literary Reading

What we need is to work towards a pedagogy of literature that “liberates rather than deadens” (Graff, “Presidential Forum” 7). To this purpose, the linear conceptual model common to much academic thinking and practice should be reassessed. Radway (“On the Sociability,” qtd. in Long 21), who describes this model well, establishes “a spatial starting point and a temporal moment of origin” centred on the writer and what he or she has written in the text. Here, I reread this role in terms of the theorist-teacher. The reader is then conceptualized “as coming after, as subsequent to, and therefore usually as subordinate to the author [and critic] as well.” Understanding reading as a transfer of information from this point of origin to another point of reception “may unwittingly function to structure our understanding of the social process (of reading) as necessarily

hierarchical...as the registering of the impact of one subject upon a less powerful or at least less active other.” In my view, a reassessment of this model begins with giving more serious consideration to a more fruitful conceptual model that was proposed by Louise Rosenblatt in 1938: that of the transactional relation between reader and text. In assuming the transactional model, the next step is to give more voice to readers and inquire about what happens as they read and what literature can do for them so as to counterbalance the long-term primacy of investigations of the text. A reader-text transactional model enables us to explore how texts might invite readers to “deterritorialize” themselves and become “writers-founders of their own places” (de Certeau 173-4). It is here that we move from the need to empower the reader to the need to study the readers themselves. My main point is that a model should be derived from in-depth studies of how student-readers read. Here I contribute to de Certeau’s call for analyses of “the very operation of reading, its modalities and its typology” (170). I would like to propose that a proliferation of studies of this kind is needed. Only then will it be possible to design teacher-training programs and sensitize literary educators to the subtle and elusive ways that readers take up culture and forge new meanings and new possibilities for their lives.

While conducting an in-depth study of how student-readers read, my aim is to focus especially on the transactional experience between reader and text, allowing for the possibility that different types of transactional experiences might unfold. Assuming that forms of reading might have a fluid character challenges the static nature of the concept initially proposed by Rosenblatt (*Literature*). I intend to explore the complexities of what student-readers’ actual reading entails and better understand the subtle ways by means of which they engage texts, how they become involved with characters, connect with them

on levels that may not be apparent to them, and how, by means of such a process, forge new meanings and new possibilities for their lives. This study also makes room for the unexpected, especially as regards the articulation of kinds of responses not previously anticipated. In this way, this thesis follows investigations in Cognitive Poetics that consider philosophical, physiological and psychological theories of mind in order to study reading processes. However, the empirical investigation of what individuals actually do with texts remains a venture that is only seldom undertaken. This thesis contributes to filling in this gap, thereby contributing to a better understanding of the nature of the encounter that engages readers with texts. Interdisciplinary in nature, it draws from and opens out toward several fields but fitting fully and comprehensively into none.

As pointed out in Section 1.2, the meaningfulness that literature can have in readers' lives seems to have been barred by the walls of the institution. Perhaps, due to this fact, little is known about the processes involved in the self-modifying reading experiences ordinary readers mention. It is true that British Romantic poets, for instance, pointed out the need to combine deep feeling and philosophical contemplation (see Coleridge 59). Later, Russian Formalist Šklovskij proposed that the purpose of art was to prolong contemplation by making the habitual strange. To the Formalists, the ultimate function of art was to enable the world to be seen afresh (Šklovskij 12). Similarly, during the seventies, reader response theoreticians also suggested that literary reading implicated the self (Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*; Fish, "Literature in the Reader"; Iser, *The Implied Reader*; Jauss). Although there has been some interest in the way reading implies and

modifies the self, little systematic or empirical study has focused on how such a process occurs (see Holland; Radway, *Reading the Romance*).

Therefore, in this thesis, I will attempt to investigate the mechanisms through which literature exerts its transformative powers, causing the world to be seen afresh, not only in a self-implicating but in a self-modifying way. It is likely that response to texts varies as much as there are readers, but here one type of reading experience is especially considered and assessed. The issues here investigated derive from hypotheses generated from empirical studies of reading about how self-modifying reading experiences might unfold. These are detailed in the next sections.

1.3.1. Linguistic Cues in Narrative

Dehabituation (or defamiliarization) and foregrounding (Šklovskij; Mukařovský; Iser, *The Act of Reading*; van Peer; Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; Miall, *Literary Reading; Language and Literature* 2007) are the driving forces in which narrative is considered in this thesis. I intend to look not only into the moments of response to foregrounded features but also at what follows them, that is, how readers respond as they have their perceptions dehabituated. I assume that if foregrounding in a literary text dehabituates certain aspects of readers’ perception of reality, they are then confronted with the problem of how to incorporate these disturbances into their models of reality. Miall and Kuiken (“Foregrounding”) have shed light on these aspects when proposing a basis for understanding the constructive work required of the reader in response to foregrounded structures. They demonstrate how a central part of the constructive work required by readers is initiated at the moment they react affectively to stylistically

remarkable elements (394-5). Such constructive work required by the reader is understood through what they have called *dehabituation* (Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; Miall, *Literary Reading*) and *reconceptualization*⁷ (Harker; Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding,” “Shifting Perspectives,” “A Feeling for Fiction”) and which, guided by the feelings evoked in the reader, may lead to re-considerations of the text that herald transformations in readers’ interpretative frameworks (Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding” 225). Elsewhere, I have suggested one of the ways for having access to reconceptualization strategies and for discriminating them qualitatively. I have empirically demonstrated how an appreciation of the formal elements of a text presented a recurring reconceptualization strategy employed by the readers interviewed to develop new perspectives on the text and the sense of who they are. I have suggested how this specific kind of affective feeling might play an important role in self-modifying processes (“Foregrounding”).

What the empirical studies conducted so far have suggested is that (a) individuals from different cultures, times, and critical perspectives appear to be sensitive to foregrounding in literary texts (Fialho, “Foregrounding”; Miall and Kuiken, “What is Literariness?”; Steen; van Peer); 2) their attempts to reconceptualize meaning often

7. Foregrounding is seen as a fundamental device of all literature (*Language and Literature* 2007). Dehabituation (or defamiliarization) can be understood as the psychological process readers undergo in their immediate response to foregrounded features, in which perception is slowed down and their models of reality, dehabituated, or made strange (Miall *Literary Reading* 18). Reconceptualization (or refamiliarization) is the reconstructive process readers undergo after their responses have been dehabituated by foregrounded features. In Miall and Kuiken’s (“Foregrounding” 394) words, “the reader may review the textual context in order to discern, delimit, or develop the novel meanings suggested by the foregrounded passage” (a process that Harker has described as the reader’s “reattentional” activity”). Differently from Harker, who does not consider the contribution of feeling, Miall and Kuiken’s (“Foregrounding”, “Shifting Perspectives”, “A Feeling for Fiction”) proposal is that reconceptualization is modulated by the feelings evoked in response to those features. It has been empirically demonstrated that the focalization of aesthetic feelings in response to foregrounding cause longer reading time, and suggested that as readers turn to feelings in order to locate alternative source meanings, perspectives are changed (see also Fialho, “Foregrounding” 106).

differ; 3) feeling provides a route to experiences or memories that suggest a new interpretive context following the moment of defamiliarization (Miall and Kuiken, “What is literariness?” 7). These possibilities, especially the role of feelings in literary response, require much closer examination. The present study will focus on this *defamiliarization-reconceptualization* cycle (Miall, “Affect and narrative”; Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding,” “Shifting perspectives”; Fialho, “Caminhos,” “Foregrounding”), about which little is known. This study differs from other empirical research conducted which has concentrated on local effects of foregrounding (for instance, van Peer). The present research is original in that it focuses on processes of *reconceptualization*.

1.3.2. Affective Responses

This thesis will both resort to theories of the emotional effects of art and literature and contribute to them. It is true that attention to emotion has been present since human beings realized that they could influence others through discourse. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle was already aware of the emotional effects drama produced on the audience. Plato also attributed to “good poets” the capacity to affect readers, and regarded emotions as “the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight” (qtd. in Burke 20). The transformative effects of literature were considered dangerous because of their power to influence readers, which led Plato to ban poets from his *Republic*. Although the Greeks acknowledged the effects of literature and rhetoric, their focus was mainly on how effects in reception, such as catharsis, depended on the manipulation of verbal art.

In the eighteenth century, Romantic aesthetics, articulated in a radical restructuring of the relation between consciousness and its objects emphasized

inspiration, imagination, and the “inspired creator.” Despite the centrality of the author, the location of authority was placed in the self and the concern for the role of feelings in the arts was kept alive especially through the British Romantic poets, such as Coleridge (59-60) and Wordsworth, who defined good poetry as the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” (1800 Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*).

In the twentieth century, the dominance of Formalist approaches to art and literature limited the efforts to understand the role of emotion in literary reading. As New Criticism became mainstream, critics looked for an organic unity in the text, focusing on the text as an object of investigation rather than on readers. The theory of irrelevance of authorial intention that then prevailed shifted the focus from authors to their works.

Poststructuralists, like Barthes, announced both the “death of the author” and the “birth of the reader.” However, T.S. Eliot’s theory of impersonality and his desire that literature detach itself from the subjective realm of the author’s personal thoughts and feelings led directly to the New Critical distaste for considering feelings in readers. This is illustrated by one of the key tenets of New Criticism: the affective fallacy described by Wimsatt and Beardsley. The idea that “high art” had to be processed intellectually and not emotionally was at the core of modernist aesthetics (for instance, Brecht and his alienation techniques). Post-Modernists carried on such tradition through a variety of decentering techniques aiming at raising awareness of the intellectual involvement on the part of the reader.

Investigations of feeling and emotion among reader reception and response theorists in the sixties and the seventies renewed appreciation for the centrality of the role of the reader, now seen as an active participant in the creation of a text’s meaning. In an

earlier proposal, Rosenblatt (*Literature*) was already shifting the emphasis of textual analysis away from the New Critical focus on the text alone and viewed the reader and the text as partners in the production of meaning. Although a rather solitary voice at the time, she argued that the reader is actively engaged in both nonliterary and literary transactions with the text. With her distinction between the two forms of reading, *efferent* and *aesthetic*, the latter emphasizing living through the transactional experience, she drew attention to the affective elements of reading. Reader reception and response critics then shifted the emphasis away from the text as a sole determiner of meaning to the significance of the reader as an essential participant in the reading process, one who is informed by the experiences he/she brings to the moment of reading: present historical circumstances, world knowledge, gender, race, class, age, education, personal experiences, feelings. As she puts it, “a poem is what the reader lives through under the guidance of the text and experiences as relevant to the text” (*Reader* 127). This consideration of the reader as an active participant in the interaction reader-text is what differentiates Rosenblatt and reader response critics from other critical approaches that also considered aesthetic responses (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Coleridge and Matthew Arnold).

Reader reception and response criticism, however, does not provide us with a unified body of theory or methodology, and, despite sharing an emphasis on the role of the reader, each critic espouses a different approach to textual analysis and different models of readers, e.g., Eco’s “model reader”; Fish’s “informed reader” (“Literature in the Reader”); Iser’s “implied reader” (*The Implied Reader*); Riffaterre’s “super reader.” These approaches brought readers to the limelight, but their models tend to be those of

specialized and not of ordinary readers. Fortunately, some efforts towards valuing the ordinary reader were being made, for example, by de Beaugrande and Rabinowitz, which this thesis tends to follow. However, the main stream in literary studies continued to be carried out within a purely theoretical framework. The way ordinary readers respond to literature has begun to be clarified by empirical studies.

The proposal for an empirical study of actual readers and the detailed mechanisms by which literature is self-implicating and self-modifying necessarily brings discussions of the notion of literariness. In this thesis, it will not be seen exclusively as a set of formal textual properties (Jakobson) or as only relying on a set of conventions (e.g., Culler, *Structuralist Poetics, The Pursuit of Signs*; Fish, *Text*). It will be seen as involving readers' reconceptualizing strategies (cf. Section 1.3.1) and, therefore, will contribute to the dehabitation theory of literature (Miall and Kuiken, "What is Literariness?" 121-2; Miall, *Literary Reading*). It is an underlying assumption here that responses to literary texts combine verbal, emotional and cognitive elements that may account for the distinctiveness of the literary experience. In this sense, then, the concept of literariness will be revisited and shaped by evidence-based observations. The results will contribute to the debate on the function of literature, now seen from the perspective of the actual reader and not the critic.

1.3.3. Interdisciplinary Nature

To carry out this study, cross-fertilization is needed. In order to better understand self-modifying reading experiences, I will resort to insights and findings from other areas. For the theoretical foundations on emotion I will draw most evidently from

Phenomenology, Psychology and Neuroscience. Studies on emotion are actually a patchwork of theories and much of my work on self-modification in literary response and the role of feelings in this experience will entail selecting patches that cohere. This will not consist of a study in which theory will be applied, but in which theories will be articulated and adapted in a way that will help me understand the phenomenon I am interested in investigating. For example, here evidence-based theory will help see how feelings entail perception, knowledge, awareness, self-referentiality, and the body (Damasio, *Feeling*; Prinz; Robinson). This thesis will clarify how the role of feelings in processes involving the defamiliarization, confrontation, and reconceptualization of models of reality is also attuned with recent findings of the significance of feelings in consciousness (Damasio, *Feeling*; R. Ellis). It will discuss how enactive theories of consciousness and emotion, like the one developed by R. Ellis, allow for but also present difficulties for the development of an enactive theory of art, especially one that considers its transformative aspects. Posing questions of this kind will stand as a potential contribution of the present thesis to other disciplinary perspectives.

The growing interest in the psychology of art (e.g., Cupchik, Oatley, and Vorderer; Kneepkens and Zwaan; Oatley, “A Taxonomy,” *Brief*; Tan) will also inform my investigation into the emotional aspects of literary response. Those who conduct empirical investigation in this area, and who rely either on cognitive, noncognitive, or hybrid theoretical understanding of emotions, seem to agree on two claims: that literary reading involves a wide range of feelings (e.g., aesthetic, evaluative, narrative, cf. Miall and Kuiken, “A Feeling for Fiction”; Artefact and Fiction emotions, cf. Kneepkens and Zwaan) and that modification processes are involved. Although Oatley’s (“A

Taxonomy”) theory of identification based on *mimesis as simulation* does not cover all reading experiences, it provides insight on the kind of phenomenon I am interested in investigating, namely how emotions prompt readers to go “beyond the schema given” (Miall, “Beyond” 55). As Oatley suggests, feelings *may* play a mimetic role. While empathizing with characters, readers take on their goals, feel their emotions, and draw upon the same social skills that enable them to understand others (“A Taxonomy” 66). Kneepkens and Zwaan argue that modification occurs in the roles feelings play during literary reading, elaborate upon the ways the different feelings in literary response might interact, and provide empirical evidence for such claims. For instance, they show how readers become less and less involved in technical aspects and contextual information (A-emotions or Artefact emotions) and more involved in character and event descriptions in the story world (experiencing F-emotions, or Fiction emotions) as a story progresses (134). Their contribution, however, resides much more in the kind of questioning their discussion generates, materialized in a number of empirically testable predictions (*idem* 136).

The fundamental part of my discussions on feelings in literary reception will be drawn from the work developed by Miall and Kuiken (Miall, “Empowering,” *Literary Reading*; Miall and Kuiken, “Shifting Perspectives,” “A Feeling for Fiction”), who have been providing empirical evidence for some of the hypotheses presented by Kneepkens and Zwaan. Miall and Kuiken (“A Feeling for Fiction”) propose a taxonomy for the different feelings involved in literary reading, including *evaluative feelings*, such as the overall enjoyment, pleasure, or satisfaction of reading a text, and with the primary role to sustain or to impede reading (223); *aesthetic feelings* prompted by the formal, stylistic

components of a text, such as being struck by an apt metaphor, intrigued by an ironic description, captured by the rhythm of a verse, and characterizing the defamiliarizing moment experienced by the reader in response to foregrounding (*idem* 224); *narrative feelings* towards settings, events, or characters in the fictional world, which are discussed as “fiction emotions” by Kneepkens and Zwaan; and *self-modifying feelings* that “restructure readers’ understanding of the textual narrative and, simultaneously, readers’ sense of self” (Miall and Kuiken, “A Feeling for Fiction” 223). They draw upon feelings from the other domains – *evaluative, aesthetic, narrative* – and represent a distinctive process within which an existing feeling is reconceptualized. The authors propose that, within this feeling domain, it is possible to locate what is distinctive to literary response (223). This thesis elaborates on this notion.

Since Miall and Kuiken (“A Feeling for Fiction”) do not focus specifically on self-modifying reading nor on how, as Oatley suggests, “through fiction our emotions may be transformed by having them deepened or understood better, and they may be extended towards people of kinds for whom we might previously have felt nothing” (Oatley, “Emotions” 43), this thesis aims at clarifying these processes, by describing the structure of the experience of self-modification and the sense in which, for instance, narrative feelings can become self-modifying.

Although there are theoretical ideas available based on previous empirical work indicating that modes of “participatory responses” (Gerrig) towards a text, such as identification, facilitate the exploration of readers’ feelings, memories, and provoke an engagement with reading that is personally relevant (Bortolussi and Dixon; Larsen and

Seilman; Seilman and Larsen; Oatley, “A Taxonomy”; Tan), this thesis goes deeper into the kind(s) of responses that characterize self-modifying experiences.

The specific objectives here are

1. To gain access to readers’ mode of engagement during the type of reading experience that is self-modifying;
2. To focus on the moments in which changes in sense of self occur—in particular, on the different processes involved;
3. To investigate the relation between textual properties and the experience of self-modification;
4. To propose a method that can allow for the observation of these processes.

1.4. Description of Chapters

This thesis presents a hybrid approach to literary reading in which insights from phenomenology, stylistics, and the latest neuroscientific findings meet. In order to make explicit the view of emotion that informs this study, Chapter 2 discusses how the process of reading unfolds, explaining that it occurs as readers respond affectively to stylistic features (considered striking or evocative), and to characters (by rejecting, sympathizing or identifying with them, and/or by imagining what it would be like to be in their shoes). I argue that the process of reading can be detected as readers position themselves in and through language use. Chapter 2 also argues for a rationale to study how the reading process can be detected in language and makes the case that the intentional qualities (cf. Husserl, *Logical Investigations, Crisis*; Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*) of reading experiences can be viewed as *modalities of consciousness*. This chapter makes

explicit my own approach to literary reading as a modality of consciousness and provides its theoretical foundation. This chapter is structured in such a way as to make evident how I understand reading experiences to unfold. In the first section, I discuss the implications of the terms “modes” and “modality” and argue for a hybrid approach. Next, I look into foregrounding and perception and the nature of the most immediate and pre-reflective encounter between reader and text, going against the characterization of appraisal theories of emotion and supporting an enactive perspective. In the third section, I discuss how the body plays an indispensable role in this enactive form of pre-reflective engagement with the world of the text, emphasizing an embodied perspective, pervasive to all forms of intentionality. In Section 2.4, I discuss how the notion of *positionality* becomes crucial for stating and revealing how the body is in the world. I argue that the way readers position themselves vis-à-vis the text can be detected by the way they use language, which is perhaps conscious (the content of what they say) and partially unconscious (*how* they report their experiences). My point is that their readerly style of discourse might be revealing of the positionality of their bodies in relation to texts. In the last section (2.5), I discuss the nature of reader’s reflective encounter with texts, which can be more interpretive, more experiential, or characterized by a balance between both. This chapter holds that reading experiences are complex because they involve all of these modalities of consciousness, at both the level of pre-cognition and cognition.

The research paradigm and the methodological orientation of the present work are presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 justifies the use of numerically aided phenomenology (NAP) as a tool for the analysis and description of aesthetic moments of reading. It discusses NAP both as a phenomenological method of inquiry and a

classificatory procedure. In revising previous research on self-modifying reading, it discusses the strengths and limitations of the method that led to the need to provide more lexically-based evidence for numerically aided phenomenology (LEX-NAP), which may yield dynamic descriptions of aesthetic phenomena, including a description of readers embodied repositionings as the reading unfolds. In Chapter 4, the study conducted is described as well as the materials used, the profile of participants, and the strategies for data collection.

Chapters 5 and 6 present the two different kinds of analysis carried out in this dissertation and the results obtained. More specifically, Chapter 5 offers systematic guidance through the analytical procedures carried out. It presents the framework that informs the analysis of readers' experiential accounts as well as the textual determinants of the reading experience. In doing so, it offers a typology of reading experiences based on cluster analytical procedures that meet NAP requirements. In Chapter 6, a close reading of the prototypical examples of each experiential type obtained in Chapter 5 is discussed at length. It analyses the discourse of each of the types and shows how different linguistic markers and different moments characterize shifts in the sense of self. In this sense, Chapter 6 suggests further evidence for the results obtained in Chapter 5.

The concluding chapter of this thesis elaborates on how the cross-fertilization carried out in this thesis can contribute to the different areas it has drawn on. It points out the implications of the main findings of the study for literary studies, linguistics and stylistics, and, ultimately, for literary education.

Chapter 2. The Reader in the Text: Modalities of Consciousness

Besides the need for cross-fertilization (as discussed below and in Chapters 1 and 7), another main difficulty of a project such as the one carried out here, as with any scientific study of literature, is that it does not rely only on facts. According to Miall, “to adopt a scientific approach to the study of literary reading will often involve employing experimental methods that more typically characterize research in cognition; but the methods [should be] borrowed, adapted, or designed for the purpose” (“Science” 11). Some attempts have been made along these lines (Gerrig; Green; Green and Brock; Nell; Mar and Oatley; Oatley, “Why fiction”). As Mar and Oatley noted, “the evidence is [still] spotty for some ... of the arguments [offered] ... but ... amenable to empirical study” (187). In arguing for the need to systematize literary experiencing, I am aware that cognitive processes must come together with descriptions of emotion and the self, an enterprise that inevitably requires a multi-disciplinary outlook.

Indeed, processes that involve literary reading have partially been explained by neuroscience at the basic level of word recognition (Dehaene; Pulvermuller; for a review, see Foroni and Semin⁸), at the sentence level (Kuperberg;⁹ for a review of ERP studies, see Miall, “Neurophysiological”) and at the level of processing of figurative language, like “novel” metaphors (Arzouan, Goldstein, and Faust) and irony (Regel, Gunter, and Friederici). These categories of research seem relevant for understanding literary reading

8. They also demonstrate that action verbs referring to emotional expressions are embodied, giving rise to motor resonance and that such resonance contributes to affective judgments.

9. See Kuperberg for a review of ERP research examining sentence level (and even discourse level) context effects, like those provoked by semantic and syntactic anomalies (e.g., “He spread the warm bread with *socks*”; “The broker persuaded *to* sell the stock was sent to jail.”) and that resemble the effects of foregrounding.

even if the materials used do not derive directly from literary texts. At the level of neural processing, analyses of the workings of emotion in narrative and story comprehension have been growing (Auracher; Wallentin et al.; for a review, see Mar and Skov and Lauring).

To carry out this study, I found myself at the crossroads where phenomenology, linguistic approaches to discourse, and the latest studies in neuroscience may meet. The implication for the present study from a phenomenological perspective (see Husserl, *Logical Investigations* qtd. in Giorgi, *Descriptive* 213) is that, through intentional acts, readers and texts co-constitute themselves in a transactional experience (see also Rosenblatt, *Reader*). Intentional acts have a temporal structure and inherent transitivity (every experience is always an experience *of*) which can only be captured indirectly and hypothetically in a re-constructed form on the part of the second order observer. Moreover, subject and object are not seen as separate entities; so, there is no *ego cogitans* or brain-in-a-vat.¹⁰ Instead, phenomenology views the mind as public, involving intentional acts and intended objects, intentional quality and intentional matter (cf. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*). Therefore, every experience is intentional and in the process of reading, readers modify texts and are modified by them. In this sense, “intending” means the conscious relationship we hold with an object (Gallagher and Zahavi 7; Sokolowski 2-3). By arguing for a relation between mind (reader’s intention) and the text, the theory of intentionality suggests that the mind acts and manifests itself not just inside its own confines but out in the world (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of*

10. The notion of the “brain-in-a-vat” has been described vividly by Gallagher and Zahavi: “the image is of a brain floating around in a vat of chemicals, kept alive by artificial nourishment, and kept informed by various electrodes that carry information about the world.” (129) Roald Dahl has an ironic fictionalization of the brain-in-a-vat in the short story “William and Mary” (1960).

Perception; Sokolowski). Thus, the fundamental argument here is that consciousness¹¹ and experiences actualize presences and reveal how we relate to the world, a view that raises some questions, as follows: What kind of conscious relationship(s) can readers hold with texts? How can we characterize it/them? And what would be the most precise terminology to define it/them?

Besides contributing to a renewed understanding of human awareness and consciousness, phenomenology sees intentionality as constituted by highly differentiated structures. Husserl (*Crisis*) argues that there are different kinds of intending, each related to different kinds of objects. We are intentionally directed at a given object differently whether we see it directly or, for example, whether we look at its pictorial re-presentation (Gallagher and Zahavi 111). In fact, Husserl developed a concept of intentionality that accounts for “real” and “unreal” objects (*Logical Investigations II* 127) and for presences and absences. One example of absence within intentionality is the notion of perspectival incompleteness as a ubiquitous aspect of structures of perception. Another intentional structure manifests itself by means of the vagueness in which things are given to us, in need of further articulation, as if there were more to say, like the meaning of a text that one cannot yet decipher.

The notion of intentionality was also considered by Iser (*The Act of Reading*), who argues that meaning results from the reader's interplay with the text. To achieve it, the text offers the reader forms, but it is the gaps, absences or indeterminacies the text offers that require a participatory involvement of the actual reader, who, while filling them in, co-creates the text. Two issues are then implied: first, as readers modify texts,

11. Consciousness is seen as the articulation of the things we experience. From Latin *articulatio(n)-*, from the verb *articulare*, meaning 'divide into joints, utter distinctly' (*Oxford Dictionary*: Oxford UP, 2011).

they are also modified by them. In this sense, co-constitution implies modification. Second, as they fill in gaps, they create discourse. And it is here that we need to draw insight from linguistics. Both these issues will be expanded in the next section.

2.1. Modes or Modality?

As discussed above, phenomenology holds that every intentional experience is an experience of a specific type, which Husserl called the “intentional quality” and the “intentional matter,” the component that specifies which object is intended and how the object is apprehended (Husserl, *Logical Investigations II* 119-120). Consequently, besides intending different properties of an object (e.g., a book is a paperback or a book is a best-seller), the mode of intentionality itself might also vary (e.g., instead of *perceiving* a book, I can *imagine* it, *judge* it, *remember* it, etc.). These variations constitute, for Husserl, experiential differences, or modes of consciousness.

Therefore, when readers are in an experience of reading, texts are, for them, in different modes of givenness (i.e., as *imagined*, *perceived*, *anticipated*, etc.). Moreover, what an experience is like and what it is of are not independent properties. According to phenomenology, every appearance is an appearance of something to someone. Thus, there is a layering of the intentional content and its phenomenal character. As a consequence, experience, intentionality, and meaning are connected.

In this thesis, I am interested in investigating the modes of engagement between readers and texts (or the intentional qualities of this experience) rather than only that with which readers engage (the intentional matter). I make use of Husserl’s concepts of intentionality and co-constitution (see discussion of the noetic-noematic structure of

experience below) to illuminate how literary reading is given in experience. Indeed, this topic has been carefully considered by other phenomenologists, i.e., Ingarden (*The Literary Work of Art, Ontology*) and Iser (*The Act of Reading*), for whom reading is *imagination*. Iser thus describes how literary reading unfolds and meanings emerge:

What is missing from the apparently trivial scenes, the gaps arising out of the [text]—this is what stimulates the reader into filling the blanks with projections. He is drawn into the events and made to supply what is meant from what is not said. What *is* said only appears to take on significance as a reference to what is not said; it is the implications and not the statements that give shape and weight to the meaning. But as the unsaid comes to life in the reader's imagination, so the said "expands" to take on greater significance than might have been supposed: even trivial scenes can seem surprisingly profound ... Whenever the reader bridges the gaps, communication begins. The gaps function as a kind of pivot on which the whole text-reader relationship revolves ... the blanks leave open the connections between perspectives in the text and so spur the reader into coordinating these perspectives ... the various types of negation invoke familiar or determinate elements only to cancel them out. What is canceled, however, remains in view, and thus brings about modifications in the reader's attitude toward what is familiar or determinate—in other words, he is guided to adopt a position in relation to the text (168-9).

This means that, in imagination, readers adopt different positions while filling in gaps, which are realized in language and may be empirically grasped by the choice of words

they use to talk about the experience of reading. Therefore, in describing what literary reading entails, it is necessary not only to look at what is being intentionally represented but also at how the reader builds into the text through language. This is why, in analyzing readers' responses, I will not only be attentive to the different forms of intentionality but will also consider how they materialize in discourse. Because the analyses I carry out observe how language may reveal the different modes of readers' intentionality as they comment on their experiences of a text, I will assume that *imagination* is realized in terms of different modes of consciousness as expressed through modality in discourse (see Chapter 4).

As in this thesis attention is paid to how readers talk about their experiences of reading, attention is also paid to whether they emphasize the noetic or the noematic poles of their experiences. To illustrate this point, I offer an elaboration of the noetic-noematic structure of experiences as proposed by Husserl (Giorgi, *Descriptive* 105). For example, one of the participants of the study here conducted (P25) expressed his feelings for the protagonist repeatedly throughout his experiential account, but in different ways. Here are extracts of his response to Commentaries 3 and 6, respectively:

it's a bit sad [for Miss Brill]. Why would you want to be an actress when you could be a real person? (P25, Commentary 3)

I felt really sad for [Miss Brill] ... *I feel quite bad for* this little old lady (P25, Commentary 6)

In response to Commentary 3, the reader made an effort to justify his feelings for the protagonist, which lies on the noematic pole of experience. As he repeatedly expressed his feelings for the protagonist in Commentary 6, he placed himself as agent of the

utterance, focusing on the noetic pole. The kind of transformation observed from Commentary 3 to Commentary 6 is expressed by two different constituents:

<I feel for the protagonist (noematic)> (Moment 1)

becomes

<I feel for the protagonist (noetic)> (Moment 2, see Figure 5.2)

This kind of transformation from focusing on the noematic to focusing on the noetic pole of experience differentiated the responses of one of the resulting experiential types in this study (Cluster 2, see Table 5.2), of which P25 is a member. This kind of analysis allows me to suggest that, although experiences hold a dual structure and that both the noetic and the noematic poles are inseparable (an experience is always an experience *of*), the different ways to engage a text in imagination are modes of intentionality, in which differences are very subtle but which are enough to allow us to say that there are different modes of being in the world of the text. As the questions pursued in this thesis concern what the experience of reading is like, how the world of the text is given in experience, that is, how it manifests itself in discourse, and what it is an experience of, I hold that the *howness* of experiences can be grasped by the manner in which readers position themselves in discourse. In this way, I provide a theoretical foundation for an approach that seeks to explore *variations in the imaginal mode of consciousness involved in literary reading as expressed in terms of modality in discourse*.

In sum, and in accordance with Iser, texts provide gaps of indeterminacy. In filling in these gaps to arrive at an understanding, the reader necessarily imagines what the world would be like. In this sense, we can say that imagining characterizes reading. However, when the reader materializes imagination in language, he builds discourse. In

so doing, he creates another text, which can then be submitted to linguistic analysis. In this sense, an understanding of how modality works in discourse may reveal much of the reader himself.

I draw the term “modality” from Halliday, who following Firth, considers language as a mode of action in social interaction (see Butler). Halliday (*Language*, 222-3) describes modality as an interpersonal function of language that reveals the way in which we orient, shape and measure our utterances in discourse. In his words, “modality is a form of participation by the speaker in the speech event. Through modality, the speaker associates with the thesis an indication of its status and validity in his own judgment; he intrudes, and takes up a position” (“Functional diversity”, 335).

In line with Halliday, Simpson (*Language* 47; *Stylistics* 123) explains that modality allows us to attach expressions of belief, attitude and obligation to what we say and write and is thus an all pervasive feature of most discourses. As used in logic, semantics and grammar, it is concerned with speakers’ attitudes and perspectives, or with their stance towards the propositions they express (Wales 302; McCarthy and Carter 102); it is the “description of unrealized states and possible conditions ... of everyday situations and discourse” (Carter and Nash 255). Modality is realized in terms of degrees of possibility and certainty and expresses meanings of obligation, necessity, volition, prediction, knowledge and belief, etc. Wales illustrates the concept as follows: “sentences like *You may be right* and *She must have arrived by now* express degrees of (un)certainty and knowledge; *You may go now* and *You must leave at once* express permission and obligation” (302).

Modality is commonly expressed by modal verbs, including the broadest sense of modal meanings, i.e., volition and prediction (*will, shall*), ability and potentiality (*can, be able to*), among others. At the discourse level, other devices are also available for expressing modal functions, such as adverbs (*possibly, perhaps*), clauses (*I'm certain that ...*) and mood (*declarative, interrogative*) (Wales 302). Lexical modals, such as the various forms of words such as *possible, probable, likely, certain*, and so on, along with certain discourse markers (*sort of, like, etc*) can also perform the functions of modality (Wales 302; McCarthy and Carter 103). These lexical items are context-dependent. Repetition can also be an index of modality and, as Carter and Nash explain (255), the same modal verb may express more than one kind of modality, depending on the context: “thus, ‘*Why isn't he here?—He must be in bed*’ expresses a conjecture, whereas ‘*Give Johnny his supper now—he must be in bed by nine*’ expresses obligation.” In observing linguistic realizations of modality, it is necessary to take into account a broad range of devices and contextual factors because, as Halliday makes clear, the system involves “the interrelation of different components in the grammar” (“Functional diversity” 325) and runs prosodically through whole clauses and contexts (*idem* 331; see Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).

Modality has been widely studied in the areas of stylistics, text linguistics and literary semantics, among others, due to the wide interest of scholars in discourse and interpersonal relations between implied author or narrator and reader, and in point of view in fiction (Wales 302). This is why, in this thesis, I propose that modes of consciousness as expressed by means of language can be studied in terms of modality. Similarly to what happens with first person fictional narratives and with representation of

characters' thought processes in free direct and indirect thought (Wales 303), when readers talk about texts, marked modality may reveal their thought processes and point of view. Therefore, in this thesis, modality in its broadest terms is observed as a way into how the different modes of participatory responses of readers towards texts are structured. In other words, a range of meaning potential is offered by the textual gaps and readers are invited to fill in these gaps that are available to them. The interest here is to observe what they select among these possibilities and how they realize such potential linguistically. Moreover, since a functional approach to language implies that the structures built by speakers reflect the functions or the purposes for which they use language, it is my interest to observe whether the different ways they structure discourse can reveal different modes of engaging texts. This is what has led me to coin the hybrid term "modalities of consciousness." Instead of opting for "modes" or "modality," the phrase "modalities of consciousness" combines both concepts: modes of consciousness, as described from a phenomenological perspective, and modality in discourse, as proposed by Halliday ("Functional diversity," *Language*).

2.2. Perception and Foregrounding

In observing literary reading as modalities of consciousness as I do here, I am aware that the observation is restricted to how self-modifying experiences emerge. Beneath the surface of what is observable, a whole area remains obscure. I hope that the discussion initiated here may help bring out part of what remains in obscurity.

As literary reading might involve emotional experiences (Oatley "Why Fiction," Miall, *Literary Reading*) and unfolds as readers respond affectively to stylistic features

that they consider striking or evocative (*Language and Literature* 2007; Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; van Peer), foregrounding must be considered. In its original, the Czech term means “bringing to presence,” (see below) so here I refer to foregrounding in terms of the process of being made actual. Readers also respond affectively to characters. In imagining what it would be like to be in the characters’ shoes, they might sympathize or identify with characters positively or negatively, and share or reject their views of the world (Green; Hakemulder; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”; Oatley, “A Taxonomy,” “Why Fiction”).

Therefore, as readers open a book, step into the textual world of characters, and encounter passages that are foregrounded due to stylistic features, their initial responses occur immediately, in an embodied way, and *below the threshold of consciousness*. The nature of this most immediate, basic, and still pre-reflective encounter between readers and texts has been explained in various ways, some of which are here discussed.

The theory of foregrounding has so far explained part of what happens as readers encounter texts and what makes literary experiences “literary.” In an analogy with a fundamental characteristic of human perception, distinguishing between “foregrounding” and “backgrounding,” the theory refers to one of the aesthetic functions of visual art (see “figure/ground” in Ostrower 55; Short), and has been applied to understanding literariness (Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; van Peer). In human perception in general, the basic figure-ground phenomenon is actually necessary for there to be any perception at all. Whatever is prominent in our experience and engages our attention appears as foregrounded while the background remains more or less indeterminate, even

though it affects the appearance of what is determinate. This gives us the sense of a holistic perception and that both figure and ground are co-present.¹²

In addition to background/foreground, the idea that art has a special function of slowing down our perception and defamiliarizing or dehabituating what is known (see Chapter 1), enabling us to see the world anew, was initially proposed by Victor Šklovskij. The term “defamiliarization” is the English translation of the Russian “*ostranenie*” (or making strange), used by Šklovskij to characterize the experience of art: “And art exists so that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. ... [It] is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important” (12). For Šklovskij, defamiliarization is not a mere perceptual process devoid of emotion, since he argues that some features actually emphasize the emotional effect of a given expression (9). Although a Russian Formalist, Šklovskij’s characterization of the aesthetic process of perception renders his view an experiential perspective. His ideas were later taken up by the Prague scholar Jan Mukařovský, who proposed that poetic language should not be defined in terms of its properties, but rather

12. Perception has been systematically studied by Gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists (in their account of perceptual horizons). They have both pointed out that in our perception of objects there are no neutral traits. This point has been explained by Dreyfus: “the same hazy layer which I would see as dust if I thought I was confronting a wax apple might appear as moisture if I thought I was seeing one that was fresh. The significance of the details and indeed their very look is determined by my perception of the whole.” (238) In exploring the two forms of awareness involved in human perception, Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception* 4) has pointed out that indeterminacy plays a crucial role in human perception. What remains in the background is indeterminate so that something can be perceived in the foreground. The different kinds of perceptual indeterminacy have also been investigated by Husserl. He terms these two different kinds “outer horizon” and “inner horizon” (which is not as indeterminate as the outer horizon). His point is that when we perceive an object we are aware that it has more aspects than we are at the moment considering. Once we have experienced these further aspects, they will be experienced as copresent. Here is how Dreyfus illustrates his argument: “We perceive a house, for example, as more than a façade—as having some sort of back—some inner horizon. We respond to this whole object first and then, as we get to know the object better, fill in the details as to inside and back.” (241) A general characterization of the gestalt is that the interpretation of a part depends on the whole in which it is embedded (*idem* 243).

in terms of its aesthetic effect. He proposed that, in poetic language, foregrounding is highly structured, systematic, and hierarchical. Different from everyday language with its focus on communication, literary language concentrates on the disruption of such communication, enabling literature to present new meanings with an intricacy and complexity that ordinary language does not allow. This is what Mukařovský would call a communicative effect. To him, foregrounding does not merely “disrupt communication” or merely draws attention to language itself. In Mukařovský’s words, “Foregrounding is ... the deautomatization of an act; the more an act is automatized, the less it is consciously executed; the more it is foregrounded, the more completely conscious does it become. Objectively speaking, automatization schematizes an event; foregrounding means the violation of the scheme (19). In its original, the Czech term “*aktualisace*”¹³ also emphasizes the experiential dimension of the aesthetic process, as it would be most appropriately understood as “bringing to presence.” Mukařovský referred to foregrounding not only as a linguistic device, but rather as a kind of perceptual process that is distinctive to the literary domain. I would argue that the theory of foregrounding is not only about the form of literature, but, as conceived by the Russian Formalists and Czech Structuralists, it is also about its experiential domain. In fact, elsewhere (Fialho, “Foregrounding”) I have proposed the following working terms: *foregrounding* presents a linguistic perspective whereas *defamiliarization* (or *dehabituation*), which is the effect produced by *foregrounding* is seen from a psychological perspective. In this sense, I argued that foregrounding should be better understood as a linguistic-psychological-

13. The term “foregrounding” has been introduced in the Western literary studies by Garvin as a translation of the Czech term “*aktualisace*”. In Portuguese, the term has been translated by Manuel Ruas as “*atualização*”, which is much closer to the original Czech term than the English translation.

aesthetical process (Fialho, “Foregrounding” 106-7). In this view, foregrounding can be observed as participating in modalities of consciousness.

By now, many scholars have contributed to the theory with empirical support, thus developing it (Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; van Peer; see also *Language and Literature* 2007). Studies based on ERP data have also contributed to this understanding. They demonstrate, for example, how emotional processes are activated prior to consciousness (Aurell; Bachmann; Damasio, *Feeling*; see R. Ellis for a review).¹⁴ Nevertheless, much still lies ahead in terms of learning more about the experiential dimension of foregrounding theory. Even though it does not account for what might occur below the threshold of readers’ awareness, one of the empirical findings – that foregrounding passages are initially experienced as affective (Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”)—gives us some clues to what happens both at the surface level of consciousness as well as what remains beneath it. In a way, the theory reveals not only how readers relate to texts but also how they interact with the world in broader terms.

More evidence for the primacy of affect over cognition comes from studies in the area of developmental psychology that indicate that there are certain inbuilt emotional states in human beings which do not appear to require cognition – for example, the inborn ability of newborn infants to mimic the mother’s smiling face and other expressions (Field et al.; Meltzoff and Moore, “Imitation of Facial,” “Imitation in Newborn Infants,” “Infants’ Understanding”; see also Robinson 37-38 and Watson). These recent findings shed new light on the well-known Zajonc-Lazarus debate (Zajonc, “Feeling,” “Primacy”;

14. As Antonio Damasio words it, “we are probably late for consciousness by about five hundred milliseconds.” (127; qtd. in Miall “Neurophysiological”) In this work, Miall mentions other neurophysiological references supporting the primacy of affect over cognition.

Lazarus, “Thoughts,” “Primacy”). The evidence found so far on the primacy of affect over cognition tilts the balance towards Zajonc’s arguments.

In fact, our emotions actually shape our perceptions of the world and how we engage with it. The implication of these findings for literary reading is that even though cognitive components such as imagery or memory are clearly part of literary responses, they are controlled and shaped by readers’ feelings, an argument that Miall has been pursuing for some time in his discussions of literariness (“Beyond,” *Literary Reading*, “Neurophysiological”).

The findings about the emotional brain have further implications for literary reading. They enable us to question the appropriateness of cognitive theories of emotion, which conceptualize emotion as dependent on prior cognitive appraisals (e.g. Lazarus, *Emotion*; Lyons; Ortony).¹⁵ Therefore, given the essential role of emotions in human experiences, any theory of reading must necessarily account for their role and for what happens under the surface of consciousness. To this purpose, and in order to provide a full description of a theory of emotion that can be applied to an aesthetic and experiential reading, it is necessary to discuss the most appropriate terminology to refer to the phenomenon of interest here, which is not straightforward or simple (cf. Chapter 1).

15. Robinson also mentions and discusses the philosophers Robert M. Gordon, Gabriele Taylor, Robert C. Solomon, and Peter Goldie, and the psychologists Phoebe Ellsworth. There are a number of other philosophers who defend judgment theories that she does not explicitly discuss, but she mentions that notable among more recent additions to the literature are Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, *The Subtlety of Emotions* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 2000); Peter Goldie, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000); and the neo-Stoic Martha Nussbaum’s *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001).

2.2.1. Non-Cognitive Appraisal

An experiential view of reading with focus on the literariness of features such as foregrounding will necessarily provide an alternative look into the appraisal theory of emotion described so far. My view is that an experiential reading can emerge as readers engage with textual linguistic features early in the process. Appraisal theories to date, however, support cognitive construals, hence leading to an interpretive view (such as cognitive metaphor theory, Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*). I do not deny that interpretation can be part of the process, but the emotional experiences of the text in readers' initial contact with it should be taken into account, as this thesis will demonstrate. In line here are questions such as: does the text evoke feelings? If so, of what kinds? How are they expressed? In relation to what passages?

As pointed out in Chapter 1, finding the precise wording to define the theory of emotion that supports this thesis is like treading on thin ice. Indeed, the terminology has to be precise lest it becomes deceptively tricky. To begin the discussion, let us consider one of the most helpful criticisms of the "cognitive" or "judgment" theories of emotion as well as an insightful account of the relationship between the emotions and the arts. In Robinson's study, a good case is made for conceptualizing our engagement with the world as a process. She describes it as occurring at two levels: the first, immediate, and pre-reflective, and the second, reflective, with emotions playing an essential and important guide to how we perceive and engage with the world through language. In this sense, her view is consistent with my approach to literary reading as a process. However, in this section, I will argue that characterizing emotion as "non-cognitive appraisal" may be seen as both paradoxical and inconsistent.

The term “appraisal” has been widely used and discussed in various areas, such as psychology, philosophy, and linguistics. It seems to me that the debate around it has been so wide that etymology does not help to clarify its meaning any longer. For instance, in the introduction to their 2000 edited volume *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*, Geoff Thompson and Susan Hunston discuss the term appraisal as used to refer to the language of expressing opinion, or “evaluation.” According to the editors, some of the well-established terms used in referring to language which expresses opinion are “connotation,” “affect” and “attitude,” even though “appraisal” and “stance” are also used for the same purpose (2). In their view, these terms overlap and their definition is still too “confusing” (*idem* 3). The result is that “appraisal” remains hard to define. This problem has led James Robert Martin to propose a tripartite appraisal system consisting of “affect,” “judgment,” and “appreciation.” This means that, for Martin (145-6), “appraisal” refers to the semantic resources used to express emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, fear), but also to make judgments (e.g., ethical, deceptive, brave) and to construe the aesthetic quality of semiotic processes and natural phenomena (e.g., remarkable, desirable, harmonious). It is true that feelings pervade all three systems, but the theory of appraisal construes affect in terms of linguistic realizations and does not focus on a detailed account of what goes on in the brain,¹⁶ which is what Robinson devotes her work to. Appraisal is, then, viewed by Martin (147) in terms of materialization or “institutionalization” of feelings or as “a semantic resource for construing emotions” (148), assumed to be realized “more [with] the head than heart” (152), more cognitively than affectively.

16. In fact, Martin argues that he is not prepared to invoke a Cartesian mind/body opposition perspective (152).

It follows that, from a linguistic perspective, the phrase “non-cognitive appraisal” is, then, redundant. Adding the adjective “non-cognitive” or “affective” to modify the noun “appraisal,” as in Robinson’s case, does not help because this noun connotes the notion of cognitive processing. In other words, including any “non-cognitive” modifier does not do away with the status of cognition implied in the term “appraisal.” Despite the fact that Robinson tries to avoid such a paradox, these considerations are relevant to stress our need to use the most appropriate language to describe the processes of how we might engage with texts.

If the status of cognition is implied by the use of the word “appraisal,” it seems paradoxical that the term should be used to name a model that is presented in opposition to cognitive theories of emotions. Semantic here equals cognitive. Robinson’s wording, then, seems to go against her own criticism of cognitive theories. The lack of systematization in the language used actually reflects a broader problem in emotion theory. What are cognition and emotion, and what are the appropriate forms to express them linguistically? Despite calls for judgment, Robinson’s proposal is that a fast, unconscious, non-cognitive appraisal occurs first (41) and causes physiological changes that promote attention to the object in question (*idem* 42). Her emphasis is on how such appraisals need to be made very quickly, for survival value (*idem* 43). But this depends on what we mean by cognitive: she will confine the term to processes occurring in the neo-cortex (i.e., amenable to consciousness) (*idem* 45). Hence what she terms “affective appraisals” (*idem* 45), these involve physiological, facial, or other somatic changes, that alert us to some aspect of the world of importance to us (*idem* 46). The problem is in part a terminological one. What is cognition, and how far down does it go? The view that

informs this thesis is that of an embodied approach rather than a purely cognitive one or one that considers cognitive processes in detriment of emotional ones and vice-versa. Feelings modulate, coordinate our immediate responses in relation to the current enactive mood. They elicit a stance towards significant moments (see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3).

Here I argue that the term “non-cognitive appraisal” may seem to be paradoxical not only in linguistic terms but also due to its nature. Even though Robinson (25) argues that emotions should not be equated merely with judgment, she still agrees that they should be conceptualized in terms of evaluations. In her words, “it seems as *if some kind of appraisal or evaluation is necessary for emotion and that we distinguish one emotion from another by reference to the different kinds of appraisal they require*” (*idem* 26, her italics). For example, she views “anger” as requiring “some kind of assessment roughly to the effect that someone has wronged me or mine” (*ibid.*). She adds, “whatever the evaluations in an emotion are, they are evaluations in terms of what we want, what we care about, what our interests are ... for emotions seem to be ways in which an organism appraises the environment as satisfying or failing to satisfy its wants and interests” (*ibid.*). Despite the fact that she holds that emotions are evaluations of a different nature than the ones defended by cognitive theorists, serving to focus attention on those things in the environment that matter to our survival (*idem* 41-3), she still characterizes our immediate encounter with the world in terms of appraisal. It seems incongruent that, at the same time that Robinson subscribes to the theory of the primacy of emotion over cognition (Zajonc, “Feeling,” “Primacy”), she supports her argument that emotion and cognition should be understood as two different modes of appraisal by referring to Lazarus’s theory (*Emotion*). Besides that, she holds the view that there can be emotion

without judgment: “[during a walk in the woods], I can be afraid *without* judging that there is a snake before me” (Robinson 55, my italics). If “affective appraisal” is understood as inherent, then there can be no “appraisal.” Appraisal involves judgment and cognition, so what occurs at a non-cognitive level cannot actually be an appraisal. This conclusion leads to the question of what then happens at the initial moment of affective experiences.

The second paradox has to do with the way Robinson contrasts emotion and cognition, in terms of two different kinds of “information-processing devices” (43), or two different ways of knowing the world that use different routes in the brain. Drawing from LeDoux's findings of two different pathways for processing the same sound, she speculates that emotions are processed through a “low road” (LeDoux 161), which is fast, automatic, and important, from an evolutionary perspective, so that we instantly evaluate what in the environment is conducive to our well-being or not and respond very fast to what we perceive. On the other hand, “higher” cognitive appraisals are processed through a “high road” (LeDoux 161), and more slowly, deliberately, and “dispassionately,” given that truth and accuracy are more important than a prompt response (Robinson 42-3).¹⁷

Here is where she cites LeDoux to illustrate her point:

Imagine walking in the woods. A crackling sound occurs. It goes straight to the amygdala through the thalamic pathway. The sound also goes from the thalamus to the cortex, which recognizes the sound to be a dry twig that snapped under the weight of your boot, or that of a rattlesnake shaking

17. According to LeDoux there are two different pathways for processing the same sound: a “quick and dirty” processing system, operated through the thalamo-amygdala route (the ‘fear circuit’) and another “slower, more discriminating” one, operating through the cortex and, therefore, cognitive (Robinson 49-50; see LeDoux 161-5).

its tail. *But by the time the cortex has figured this out, the amygdala is already starting to defend against the snake.* The information received from the thalamus is *unfiltered* and biased toward evoking responses. The cortex's job is to prevent the inappropriate response rather than to produce the appropriate one. Alternatively, suppose there is a slender curved shape on the path. The curvature and slenderness reach the amygdala from the thalamus, whereas only the cortex distinguishes a coiled up snake from a curved stick. If it is a snake, the amygdala is ahead of the game. From the point of view of survival, it is better to respond to potentially dangerous events as if they were in fact the real thing than to fail to respond. The cost of treating a stick as a snake is less, in the long run, than the cost of treating a snake as a stick. (LeDoux 163–5, qtd. in Robinson 49-50, my italics)

To put it in a nutshell, Robinson's understanding is that emotional responses are initiated "rapidly," "crudely," and independently of cognition, which she defines as "more complex stimulus transformations" (51). Apart from proposing that emotion and cognition should be thought of as separate processes, which I see as a problem, she also qualifies these two different, although interacting processes as "mental" (*idem* 51). In conceptualizing emotion and cognition in terms of mental or information-processing devices, Robinson's "affective appraisal" theory remains too close to a cognitive perspective that she herself criticizes for supporting a Cartesian mind-body dualism, or a mental representation way of thinking about the mind in relation to the world. Once again, her rationale undermines the very criticism of cognitive theories (and therefore

Cartesian) that she makes.

The third paradox is that her theory seems to lie too close to “reactivist” and, therefore, cognitive theories of emotion, those that construe emotions and feelings as reactions to perceptual inputs combined with the interoception of internal states (R. Ellis 10; Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza*).¹⁸ To her, emotions are “*provoked* by the environment ... when ... humans interact with [it], viewed in terms of its *effect* upon their wants, interests, and goals” (Robinson 18-19). Her understanding of emotion supposedly as “responses” to environmental conditions and events makes itself even more evident in her description of the progression of emotion as a process, entailing “(1) an initial *affective* appraisal of the situation that focuses attention on its significance to the organism and *causes* (2) physiological responses of various sorts” (*idem* 59). Construing emotions as “responses” to environmental conditions and physiological responses as *caused by* emotions only emphasize a “reactivist” formulation of her theory. She understands bodily physiological responses as mere side effects of the processing of inputs (emotion), a view that leads to the epiphenomenalism of the body.

I hold that, even though Robinson¹⁹ takes us a step further in understanding the pre-reflective level that might characterize readers’ engagement with texts, her definition of an “affective” and “non-cognitive” appraisal needs to be reviewed. So far, I have been arguing that the nature of this immediate, pre-reflective engagement with the world cannot be characterized in terms of appraisal.

Moreover, it seems that the view of emotion and cognition as two different kinds

18. Damasio (*Looking for Spinoza*) characterizes interoception as a form of perceptual input originating from the viscera of the body (see R. Ellis 2).

19. Other researchers have made a similar distinction between emotion and cognition as two different kinds of appraisal, such as Solomon (*The Passions*, “Emotions and Choice”) and Oatley (*Best Laid Schemes*).

of information-processing devices, using two different brain pathways, should be better understood. This pre-reflective level cannot be understood in light of a reactivist view that sees emotions as side effects of cognitive processes. It could be possible, for example, to consider the existence of two different brain routes without being committed to one as a side effect. All of these arguments are inconsistent with what we already know about the physiology of emotions. I would suggest that the enactive characterization of perception might offer an alternative to better conceptualize and understand the nature of this initial and pre-reflective moment, one that can be applied fruitfully to aesthetic experience. I will argue that the enactive view is not only consistent with my approach to literary reading, but clarifies the sense in which literary reading can be seen as a mode of consciousness, involving a form of pre-reflection that is not evaluative, but, by being affective, allows reader and text to co-constitute themselves, modifying one another. I will suggest that what is misleading is the terminology and the way it has been defined so far, which leads us to the second proposition below.

2.2.2. Enactive Affordances

The preference for an enactive view to illuminate the theory of affect that informs this thesis is justifiable for a number of reasons. First, it has been supported by a growing number of physiological findings about the emotional brain, in opposition to the predictions of “reactivist theories” of emotion, including those that view emotion as cognitive or affective appraisal. A note of caution is needed here, though, as LeDoux’s theory of fear has not been so far challenged empirically. Second, the theory has applicability to the approach to literary reading developed in this thesis for dissolving the

Cartesian mental representation view of consciousness, which is dualistic and disembodied, and which has been rejected empirically (see Section 2.3). It also enables drawing relations with the phenomenological way of thinking about the mind-body relationship (see Section 2.3). Third, it enables a framework for understanding emotion as a mode of knowing the world that is compatible with the present approach to literary reading.

The enactive theory is one that construes the nature of the immediate, pre-reflective mode of interaction with the world in terms of *action affordances* rather than in terms of affective appraisal. This view has been supported empirically by neuroscientific findings about the emotional brain and its scientific basis has been discussed extensively by R. Ellis. Here, I will mention just two of the important findings that help support the theory, based on electroencephalography (EEG) and brain imaging studies, which initiated the discovery of the working of mirror neurons (Gallese and Goldman; for a review, see Rizzolatti, Fogassi, and Gallese). It is true that these cells were first discovered in the brains of macaque monkeys, but evidence has been found for comparable areas in the human cortex (Iacoboni; Nishitani and Hari; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, and Gallese). According to this finding, many of the same neural systems are activated when we observe another person performing an action as when we perform the action ourselves; what is mirrored is the other person's intention to achieve a goal rather than the literal physical movement.²⁰ While imagining, action commands in the brain continue

20. It is well documented, for example, that perceiving a smile or a frown activates the corresponding facial muscles (e.g., Dimberg and Petterson; Dimberg, Thunberg, and Elmehed). In fact, different theorists have proposed that the human mirror system may account for the foundations of imitation (Arbib et al.; Iacoboni), language (Rizzolatti and Arbib; Rizzolatti and Craighero), and theory of mind (see Mar and Oatley for a review).

being sent, but are inhibited later in the cortex. Mirror neurons in humans also respond to reading about an experience (hence the relevance of imagination, see Speer et al.), and drive language comprehension (e.g., Fischer and Zwaan; Gallese and Lakoff). This means that we understand others (including characters in fiction) “by initiating the corresponding goal-oriented action commands in ourselves and then inhibiting them, in order to imagine the corresponding action in others. ... [W]e empathize by imagining ourselves doing what the other is doing” (R. Ellis 10; Newton, “Sensorimotor,” *Foundations*). Such mirroring in motor movements is assumed to guide people’s understanding of others (cf. Gallese; Rizzolatti and Craighero), as well as their understanding of their own and others’ emotional states (Niedenthal). It is also assumed to influence emotional experience and to shape judgments (e.g., Ekman, Levenson and Friesen; Winkielman, Niedenthal and Oberman). Thus, the finding of the mirror neurons not only casts light on the enactive theory, but also helps conceptualize the pre-reflective moment of engagement between readers and texts adding that we [readers] understand others [the text, characters] by means of this kind of *action imagery*, in which action commands continue being sent, being inhibited later in the cortex; and not in terms of appraisal.

A related finding that might help support the nature of this immediate encounter between readers and text is the primacy of the *efferent* over the *afferent* enervation in conscious processing, based on ERP data, and initially proposed theoretically by Dennett (80). By efferent, R. Ellis means the “nervous impulses that travel *away* from the central nervous system’s most primary action-initiating centers” whereas afferent signals refer to

“those signals that travel from the peripheral parts of the nervous system *inward* to the more central areas” (2).

After the presentation of a stimulus to the retina, which, in the case of text can be understood as the marks on the page, an unexpected long delay (100-200ms) has been found from occipital processing (where visual input is processed) to perceptual consciousness (in the parietal lobe). This gap is too long for neuronal transportation from one lobe to the other, so much processing occurs before sensory cortex activity can result in consciousness (Aurell; Bachmann; Runeson). As R. Ellis explains, emotional and *action-initiating processes* are triggered as early as 18-20 ms, and involve “a very primitive reaction to the object’s *action affordances* and emotional meanings, prior to any occipital processing” (12-13). In sum, according to the enactive view, “emotional interests ... pre-select for conscious attention images relevant to those interests” (R. Ellis 14). For example, meaningful items in the environment would attract more attention than meaningless ones because the organism is “pre-tuned to be on the lookout” for meaningful early clues that an object is worth paying attention to (R. Ellis 71). “Meaningfulness” depends on the organism’s emotional needs. One of the implications of these findings is the questioning of our possession of free will (or, at least, reassessing the issue) and whether our sense of choosing or appraising a course of action is a mere construction of our consciousness (see Libet and Wegner, qtd. in Miall “Neurophysiological”). From an enactive perspective, I would suggest, then, that our actions and even consciousness are shaped by the intentionality of our feelings. To this point, by intentionality I refer to an immediate and pre-reflective mode of engagement between readers and texts, in which emotions modulate, coordinate, shape and guide a

given text's *action affordances*, prior to occipital processing.²¹ Given the empirical evidence here presented and further explored by R. Ellis, it seems to me that this is a more appropriate characterization of the nature of this immediate and pre-reflective level than characterizing it in terms of appraisals, a view which remains more conceptual than empirical.

In this sense, “enactive” can, then, be understood as a synonym for “embodied” (e.g., Gallagher and Marcel) accounts of the relationship between readers and texts.²² My argument is that this embodied view as expounded by the enactive approach dissolves the Cartesian mental representation way to view consciousness, typical of reactivist theories, including cognitive and affective appraisal theories of emotions that view both cognition and emotion as mental states and emotions as caused by physiological changes in the body (e.g., Robinson). According to the enactive perspective, consciousness is part of the organism's attempts to use its environment in the service of *purposeful organismic action* (R. Ellis 16). It views processes such as consciousness, perceptual consciousness, feeling, and representation as part of a self-organizing system that *acts upon rather than only reacts* to its environment, and one that appropriates, organizes, and replaces its own micro-constituents in complex ways to maintain its needed level and patterns of complexity and energy expenditure (R. Ellis 1, 14). This notion of a “self-organizing

21. As Miall (“Neurophysiology”) points out, it would be illuminating to turn to studies of evoked response potentials to various features of language, such as the ones measured by electroencephalography, to investigate whether and how (emotional) action affordances work differently in the various dimensions of literary response—e.g., in the response to foregrounding (the author reports that its initial phase appears to occur within less than half a second, too fast for it to register bodily change in consciousness), defamiliarization, recontextualization, absorption, and empathy (the author argues that they seem likely to engage the body at longer intervals, e.g. over the course of a narrative episode or a verse in poetry). The N400 shift seems to be relevant in response to foregrounding (see Kuperberg for a review).

22. This notion of “embodied” moves away from the sense in which it has been used in theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson) in which it is followed a Cartesian orientation to understanding the relation between mind and body, an orientation R. Ellis, for example, tries to avoid.

system” is key to understanding “action” (in the sense of “unified action initiated by a self-organizing entity”) as opposed to “reaction” (as a mechanical reaction to an external event). The enactive perspective brings implications for our understanding of how we relate to and understand the world: “by *anticipating* how we could act upon it relative to organismic purposes,” (R. Ellis 2) and not by appraising.

Emotions are, then, understood as aspects of the organism’s ongoing self-organizational activity, which drive the processing of information rather than being merely responses to it, having to do with aims that are active rather than reactive (R. Ellis 6, 20). To support the notion that both emotions—conscious and unconscious²³—and feelings have intentionality,²⁴ R. Ellis uses the terms “feeling” and “emotion” interchangeably²⁵ as a terminological convention for

a process through which an organism *monitors*, in a coherent, unified way, how well it is doing in achieving and maintaining the various motivated patterns in its overall state, and forms a sense of what needs to be done *vis a vis* the environment in order to achieve or maintain the particular self-organizational balance that is motivated (28, my italics).

In short, like the affective appraisal theory expounded by theorists like Robinson, the enactive perspective also construes emotions as a way to understand the environment.

23. Although R. Ellis admits that powerful emotions normally have a strong tendency to break into conscious awareness and assumes that this distinction between conscious and unconscious emotion might sometimes be a distinction of degrees (30).

24. In this respect, R. Ellis’ view is different from Damasio’s, which differentiates feelings from emotions on the grounds that feelings include the interoceptive “awareness” of emotions and seems to imply that “emotions prior to being elevated to ‘feeling’ status would not involve intentionality,” a view that as R. Ellis argues, Damasio himself would like to avoid (R. Ellis 8).

25. In fact, R. Ellis uses the term “feeling” as a convention for “conscious or preconscious registering of the affective quality of an emotion—where “preconscious” refers to [non-conscious aspects or] to processes able quickly to become conscious.” (17)

However, the nature of this particular form of understanding that characterizes the pre-reflective level is of a different nature. From an enactive perspective, I would argue that this level can be understood in terms of a lingering sense of what kind of action needs to be taken to preserve the self-organizing system, even though this sense might be based on the minimal cues as to the action affordances of an event and is still inaccessible to awareness, at this stage. Given the timing of brain events discussed earlier, an enactive approach, for instance, construes fear differently from how an affective appraisal theory would: “we can assume that the fact that height affords falling is registered more quickly than the cortex can process enough perceptual data to consciously identify the perceptual details of what we are looking at—a chasm for example” (R. Ellis 28-29). Viewing emotion as precognitively intentional, then, provides a bridge to phenomenology and to understanding what Merleau-Ponty (*The Visible* 214) has referred to as the “sensible,” or our “immediate” mode of engagement with the world, this sense of knowing a phenomenon, of approaching an idea that has a transcendent meaning, the sense of knowing something prior to any reflection.

As stated above, attempting to better understand the intentionality of emotion is not a simple enterprise. On the self-organizational view, the precognitive emotion “knows” that it is about something, but the aboutness is always inaccessible to awareness, one more argument that there cannot be evaluation. Here, I suggest a reexamination of the example given by LeDoux and used by Robinson to understand the event of the crackling sound heard during a walk in the woods. Differently from an affective appraisal theory, an enactive perspective would not see emotion as playing a “mental function” or the initial response to fear as “generated by an ‘emotional appraisal’ in the amygdala that

happens very fast and prior to cognitive intervention” (Robinson 51-2). Instead, it would understand the crackling sound as the minimal clue needed to elicit the possible action affordances of the event (“scary” walk in the woods) and take this lingering sense of knowing as an opportunity to prepare for the kind of action needed to be taken to preserve the organism. In other words, the organism would use the opportunity of the crackling sound in the context of a walk in the woods to express a certain emotion that was already important for its self-organizing purposes in this context—in this case, fear.

In order to further clarify this subtle difference, I offer another example, now in relation to the feeling of “anger.” From an affective appraisal theory perspective, “anger” is viewed as requiring “some kind of assessment roughly to the effect that someone has wronged me or mine” (Robinson 26). However, here is how an enactive approach explicates the intentionality of the same emotion:

The motorist who cuts in front of me is not simply or even primarily the intentional object of that momentary feeling of anger; on the contrary, he is used by me to express emotions that were already important for my total self-organizational purposes, and may frequently involve larger than life issues than the trivial but powerfully triggering event of being cut off in traffic (R. Ellis 17).

Thus, according to the enactive approach, the felt quality of an emotion does not pinpoint what the real disturbance is in the first casual or superficial glance and its hidden nuances are further explored, at a later and cognitive moment (see Section 2.5). To understand the real intentionality of an emotion or feeling requires exploring the way these total life events contribute to the affect.

In viewing the pre-reflective moment of engagement with the world in terms of action affordances, the enactive theory has implications for understanding the reader and the text within an aesthetic experience. It presents the reader in a more active role than simply reacting to the text. In fact, in saying that the reader enacts the text means that the reader uses the text for his/her own emotional purposes, even though this reader may not be fully aware of these purposes. The enactive perspective shares the same emphasis on the connection between emotion and our interests, wants, wishes, values, and goals, a view that has found agreement among judgment theorists, affective appraisal theorists as well as phenomenologists. However, in construing the affective dimensions of experiences differently, in terms of action tendencies, it explains this connection more adequately than these other theories and finds support not only conceptually but also empirically. Therefore, “enactive affordances” is here viewed as a form of emotional predisposition to know and act upon the world. For a deeper understanding of this level of engagement, the primary role of the body needs to be discussed more at length.

2.3. The Body in the World

If we support the notion of enactive affordances as presented above, it necessarily follows that the body plays an indispensable role in our pre-reflective mode of engagement with the world. For example, it is well documented that perceiving a smile or a frown activates the corresponding facial muscles (e.g., Dimberg and Petterson; Dimberg, Thunberg, and Elmehed). In fact, some empirical evidence is available indicating that the body contributes significantly to language understanding and,

therefore, to literary reading and is actively engaged during this activity. For example, we know that the motor cortex is activated while reading about action with a body part (e.g., Hauk and Pulvermuller).

Empirical evidence of readers' awareness of how their bodies are involved during literary reading seems to support these findings (Kuijpers and Miall). Using the same short story here investigated, "Miss Brill," as well as Chopin's "The Story of an Hour," the researchers found correlation between frequency of sentence choice and foregrounded elements in "Miss Brill" and found that readers who scored higher in absorption were more likely to report bodily feelings in response to this story. In response to "The Story of an Hour," mentions of body parts in responses correlated with both foregrounding and frequency of sentence choice. Regarding absorption, the results found in response to "Miss Brill" were partially confirmed in response to "The Story of an Hour." In response to "Miss Brill," the chest and the stomach were the two body parts that were most frequently chosen by the participants, so it seems that this story facilitated certain "gut-feelings." (Prinz) These findings challenge Holland's suggestion that we suspend disbelief when reading a literary text, no longer perceiving our bodies or the environment around us ("The Willing"). Kuijpers and Miall show that, on the contrary, in their study, readers actually experienced more bodily feelings when absorbed in reading and suggest this shows that readers shifted their awareness from their body and the actual world around them to the story world. Indeed, readers experienced more bodily feelings as they became more involved in the story and enacted characters' feelings as their own. Despite this informative study, much still lies ahead before we can better understand the role of the body in literary reading. As Kuijpers and Miall themselves suggest, this issue should

be further explored in studies testing readers' responses without explicitly raising their awareness of how their bodily feelings are implicated during reading, which can, in itself add a degree of bias to the study.

Some findings from cognitive neuroscience illuminate the issue. For example, Saygin and colleagues, in their fMRI study, provide evidence that linguistic semantics of motion modulates neural responses as early as visual areas that subservise motion processing. Without raising participants' awareness of the role of their bodies in processing of motion, static sentences, and fictive motion sentences, they found that the visual area MT+ was activated significantly more for motion sentences than the other sentence types and more for fictive motion sentences than the static sentences. These findings suggest that semantic processing of visual features depicted in linguistic stimuli may involve a rough neural simulation of seeing those visual stimuli (2486). This way, they provide further evidence to support the view of language comprehension as an embodied process rather than an amodal representation, with the activation of early sensory and motor areas that are specifically related to the represented semantics. They also add to the hypothesis that processing figurative language involves embodied representations (2486-7), without us being aware of how our bodies are implicated.²⁶ Connell and Lynott add to an embodied view of language by showing that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation and that modality switching costs emerge in concept creation.

26. Saygin and colleagues also show that the response in MT+ by fictive motion compared with static sentences was relatively right lateralized, consistent with this hemisphere's known involvement in discourse level and figurative language processing, even though neuroimaging data on this topic has not been entirely consistent (Saygin et al. 2487; see also Jung-Beeman).

It is true that we still know little about readers' bodily responses beyond the sentence level. Most importantly, we still need to understand the role of literariness in light of the findings discussed above. For example, whether literary reading experiences evoke distinctive bodily feelings still remains unanswered. This section, then, discusses the limitations of science in dealing with this topic and argues for the need to resort to a hybrid approach, one that places itself between empiricism and phenomenology so as to describe more accurately what is at play in readers' embodied engagement with texts.

2.3.1. The Enactive View of the Self

In Section 2.2 I compared two theoretical models of emotion, where I showed how both the affective appraisal and the enactive theories share the view that physiological changes are essential during pre-reflection and can continue during reflection. However, I also pointed out how these two theories differ in the way they see the function of these physiological changes and of the body, more broadly speaking, in our engagement with the world. The affective appraisal theory views physiological changes as *caused by* emotional appraisals and as reinforced through feedback systems (cf. Section 2.2.1). Action *results from* this process. The function of physiological changes is then to help the organism prepare for appropriate action. As Robinson explains, "The [affective] appraisal immediately gets the person physiologically prepared for possible emergency action ... this activity in turn helps keep the attention focused on what is perceived as of urgent importance and prepares for emergency action, if necessary" (54). This is why, in Section 2.2.1, I qualified this theory as reactivist, with

the proviso that it differs from other reactive theories in that it sees the body as performing a highly central and active role.

Differing from the affective appraisal theory, the enactive theory emphasizes the role of action tendencies as being of primal importance in emotion processes. It holds that consciousness must result from *actions* performed by self-organizing entities with the purpose of preserving the organism's patterns of self-organization and cannot result from mere reactions. From this viewpoint, the organism uses the environment for its own purposes.

Another difference is that only the enactive theory develops the notion of *action tendencies* (or enactive affordances) into a theory of subjectivity and this is where it is especially relevant to this thesis. However, I will also indicate some of its limitations and the need to resort to the phenomenological insights to fill in the gaps of what it leaves unresolved.

According to the enactive perspective, the concept of primitive agency comprehends the various senses of self, including the “embodied self” and the “higher-order self,” which R. Ellis sees as two aspects of the same unified concept (156). Similar to Damasio's proposal (*Feeling, Self*) the “embodied self” is grounded in the “core self” and has physiological basis with its roots in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) and upper brainstem (Panksepp, “Affective Neuroscience”; R. Ellis 147). This notion follows from Panksepp's observations that this brain area initiates action in the interest of the organism's motivations. In fact, Panksepp suggests that the PAG is the most indispensable core of the “self” and is considered as the agent of action and not of

reaction. He also holds that emotional systems are indispensable for all forms of consciousness (“Affective Neuroscience,” “The Neuro-Evolutionary Cusp”).

So far, this means that, from an enactive perspective, emotions cannot be seen as separate from an overall bodily composite. This is also true for affective appraisal theories. The difference here lies in the fact that, from an enactive perspective, any subjective consciousness, including the capacity to reflect on it, is linked to a *capacity for agency* that is primal to the whole process and not simply a by-product of it, as Robinson puts it. According to the enactive theory, any form of subjective consciousness would derive from the core self’s motivations to act and generate sensorimotor action imagery (R. Ellis 133-134). Thus, the enactive view of self is based on growing evidence indicating that consciousness is dependent both on the core self’s motivated action-initiating capacity and on the activation of emotional brain areas (*idem* 134-135). Due to its physiological basis, the enactive theory views the core self as more basic than any other self (*idem* 137). Enaction is then somehow dependent on the agentic function of the core self. This provides a possible rationale for envisioning the reader as an active participant in the act of reading. Granted that the reader is described as an active participant in many theoretical and empirical accounts about reading (e.g., Green and Brock; Oatley, “Why Fiction”; Rabinowitz; Rosenblatt, *Reader*), the enactive theory could add to these theories and elucidate other mechanisms of that agency.

Besides the embodied self, the other aspect R. Ellis proposes is the “higher-order self,” which he defines as “a higher-order phenomenon than any particular subjective state, and is constituted by the *patterning of* the various states in the stream of consciousness. ... This pattern allows identification of ... a unity across the various states

in the stream” (138-139). What this concept implies is that emotion determines a continuous direction in which the organism moves from one state of consciousness to the next, temporally. This means that it preserves this directional continuity and unity of organisms (*idem* 153). Discussing this notion of self is important because the enactive theory actually conceives of an integrated concept of “an embodied yet higher-order and trans-temporal self” (R. Ellis 158) that unites and gives direction to the various particular experiences within the self-organizing stream.

As the enactive theory and these concepts of self are applied to a theory of reading, the act of reading can be seen as playing a role in the organization of these “higher-order patterns” of the self. This is why the enactive theory and its various notions of self can be taken as a provisional rationale for understanding “self-modification,” i.e., the very basic transformations in the organism that occur over a period of time and guarantee the flux of changes toward “higher-order patterns” of self-organization.

This is the reason why the way in which the flow of experiences of individuals is expressed allows the perception of the self. This rationale is relevant for the conceptual framework of this thesis as it seems to be the case that the patterning of words in the flow of individuals’ experiences is motivated actively, by their bodies, and translated into action imagery. Although they depart from a task and from a context (see Chapter 4), in the experiment carried out here, the readers are free to choose to say what they want. This means that, in its search for emotionally significant experiences potentially offered by the environment—in this case, the text—the subjective self can be revealed through the flow of words and patterns readers choose to express themselves.

Summarizing, according to an enactive perspective, human beings have a core self that is unconscious and embodied (in the sense of an organism that acts rather than merely passively reacts to stimuli). This self is also higher-order in the sense that it unites and gives direction to the various particular experiences within the self-organizing stream.

The enactive perspective also holds that humans can also *experience* the self. This experiencing or sensing is dependent and directed by this unconscious core or embodied self. I believe, however, that the enactive theory has more to say about the self that humans have (which is empirical and embodied) than the notion of experiencing a self (which is a conceptualization), and that there is still a gap here that needs to be bridged. In other words, coming to a definitive theory about how readers experience reading (and self-modification) in light of the enactive theory of consciousness leaves us with only a provisional model. In any case, the potential of the enactive theory to tell us more about how humans can experience this embodied self is promising, especially if it links with insights from phenomenology. This is why, in the meantime, resorting to a hybrid between an empirical and phenomenological approach is necessary.

For now, it is possible to conclude that, from an enactive perspective, the embodied self is the “immediate subject-of-experience component” of each of our particular experiences, which are “concrete,” (R. Ellis 154) something to which it is possible to refer in any given experience. R. Ellis argues that this is what we seem to resort to when we reflect on an experience, for example, and that its concreteness is due to the possibility of being explicated in terms of concrete bodily experiences (155). He concludes that, in reflecting on the self, we are actually reflecting on our embodied sense

of what the affordances would feel like (*idem* 156). This view is consistent with the phenomenological analyses of consciousness, discussed in the next section. I believe that drawing relations between the enactive and the phenomenological perspectives will enable this thesis to contribute more to an understanding of *experiencing* a self than the enactive theory, on its own, would.

2.3.2. Phenomenological Insights

Similarly to the enactive theory, the phenomenological view of consciousness also holds that the body is deeply and essentially implicated in our active relation with the world, with others, and with our self.²⁷ In addition, the phenomenological perspective²⁸ presents itself in contrast to the Cartesian way of thinking about the mind in relation to the world, to its mind-body dualism and to the notion of the brain-in-a-vat, as discussed above (see Section 2.2.1). Instead, the Cartesian perspective argues for a “detached, universal, and immaterial soul” whereas an embodied and phenomenological perspective argues for an “involved, situated, material body” (Dreyfus 236).

What empirical evidence has been proving is that Cartesian and disembodied views of the mind have been losing ground (e.g., Varela, Thompson, and Rosch; Wheeler). It supports former phenomenological analyses and proposals that we are, in fact, embodied and situated beings in the sense that cognition, perceptions, actions are shaped by our bodily existence. Erwin Straus, for example, has shown how the shape and function of the human body are determined by the upright posture, and how our

27. As Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception*) states, “to be a consciousness or rather to be an experience is to hold inner communication with the world, the body and other people, to be with them instead of being beside them” (111).

28. Besides Merleau-Ponty, Husserl (*Thing and Space, Ideas II*), Sartre, and Henry have analysed the body phenomenologically.

anatomical structures define our capabilities (qtd. in Gallagher and Zahavi 132).

Developmental psychologist Katherine Nelson has also discussed how new levels of locomotion from the part of the infant—first sitting up, then crawling, then cruising, followed by walking freely—open up new vistas for the child (19). In fact, the idea that our biological body affords different kinds of action and shapes the way we perceive and think has been pioneered, in psychology, by James J. Gibson.

In my view, phenomenology can help us understand the role of the body in shaping our experiences of the world with the kinds of questions it poses, which stem from the proposal of a paradigmatic alternative to the Cartesian distinction between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. These two categories are taken as part of the “natural attitude” and are put into abeyance. Thus, phenomenology shifts the focus of discussion from an ontological distinction to an explication of two different ways to experience the body. It distinguishes between one’s body as an object of exploration, whose functions can be studied by the anatomist, for example, and therefore viewed from a third person perspective (the objective body), and that which is experienced, which permits one to see, touch, smell, to move and manipulate things in the world. This lived body is understood from an embodied first-person perspective, as experiencer, as agent. It is a sensorimotor body and the way we structure “our primary way of being-in-the-world” (Husserl, *Ideas* III 128; qtd. in Gallagher and Zahavi 137). As Merleau-Ponty words it, “[this] body is ... conceived as ... the horizon latent in all our experience and itself present and anterior to every determining thought” (*Phenomenology of Perception* 106).

In my view, the concept of lived body broadens the enactive perspective by adding an experiential dimension to the enactive discussions of consciousness, emotion,

and the body. Moreover, the phenomenological notion of the lived body dissolves the dualistic view of affective appraisal approaches (e.g., Robinson, cf. Section 2.2.1), and contributes to our understanding of the body.

The sense of the lived body is multifaceted. It is experienced as feelings and moods. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the body is a feeling “infested-space,” and he explains, “if I say that my foot hurts ... I mean that the pain reveals itself as localized, that it is constitutive of a pain-infested space” (*Phenomenology of Perception* 107). If I fear high places, I will see them as *scary-heights*. If I am hungry, as William James noted, an apple appears larger when I am satiated (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*). Thus, the body already finds itself with feelings, drive-states, kinaesthetic sensations, embodied categories and typifications, etc., which are partially defined by the environment in which it must function. It also defines the environment as circumstances for action and as situations of meanings, which are, therefore, categorical and languaged.

Apart from being a feeling-space, the lived body is also non-perspectival. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, “I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk around them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe” (*Phenomenology of Perception* 104). This non-perspectival bodily frame of reference is precisely that which allows us to perceive objects from a certain point of view. Strictly speaking, we do not perceive our body; we simply *are* it. (see Gallagher and Zahavi 143-4 and O’Shaughnessy)

The bodily spatial frame of reference is also proprioceptive. It explains the intrinsic position sense that I have with respect to my limbs, posture, and bodily movement. This kind of reference is neither allocentric (defined in purely objective

space, independent of the perceiver's position; e.g., latitude, longitude, height, etc.) nor egocentric (as defined relative to the perceiving or acting body; e.g., the computer is in front of me, but if I turn 180 degrees, then it is behind me; cf. Gallagher and Zahavi 143-4). As proprioceptive, it is also innate and intrabodily, or the necessary embodied basis for the egocentric frame of reference.

Bodily space can be contrasted with perceived space as it tends to remain in the background of awareness; it is tacit and recessive. As phenomenologists understand it, we do have a pre-reflective sense of ourselves as embodied (cf. Gallagher and Zahavi 141-4). In Merleau-Ponty's image, this pre-reflective sense is "the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the performance" (*Phenomenology of Perception* 115). Being pre-reflexive and intrabodily means that this bodily frame of reference occurs below the threshold of consciousness, a view, thus far, that resembles the enactive perspective.

The body's actions upon the world are taken to be goal-oriented, a view that is also similar to the enactive perspective. What phenomenology adds to that perspective is an explication of the experiential dimension, as it views the body as tending to efface itself on its way to its intentional goal. Gallagher and Zahavi illustrates this function in the following way: "I can say that I am reaching to grasp a cup; but my sense of this is oriented toward the goal or intentional project that I am involved in, and not towards the specifics of my movement" (145). Sartre has indicated that, when I reach out to grasp something that has caught my attention, "my hand has vanished; it is lost in the complex system of instrumentality in order that this system may exist." He also suggests that the lived body is invisibly present, precisely because it is existentially lived rather than known (qtd. in Gallagher and Zahavi 145). In other words, from a phenomenological

perspective, our intentional focus is normally on the task to be performed, the project to be accomplished, or on some worldly event that seems relevant to our action and not on our bodily movement.²⁹

In light of empirical studies of readers, these reflections allow us to suggest that, when absorbed in reading, individuals may see themselves in the story world, sensing more bodily feelings as they become more involved in the story. Kuijpers and Miall's study seems to suggest that, in reading, the body orients itself towards the story world, towards the act of reading, effacing itself from an awareness of its own self.

In thinking of how the intrabodily space, or this bundle of non-perspectival and proprioceptive composite, functioning through goal-oriented feelings and moods acts upon the world, Merleau-Ponty proposes:

What [psychologists] were expressing, badly it is true, by 'kinaesthetic sensation,' was the originality of the movements which I perform with my body: they directly anticipate the final situation, for my intention initiates a movement through space merely to attain the objective initially given at the starting point; there is as it were a germ of movement. I move external objects with the aid of my body, which takes hold of them in one place and shifts them to another. But my body itself I move directly, I do not find it at one point of objective space and transfer it to another, I have no need to look for it, it is already with me—I do not need to lead it towards the movement's completion, it is in contact with it from the start and

29. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, bodily associations of any kind "must be constantly subject to a unique law ... implied in a comprehensive bodily *purpose* and must originate in that *purpose*" (*Phenomenology of Perception* 113-4, my italics).

propels itself towards that end. The relationship between my decision and my body are, in movement, *magic* ones. (108, my italics)

Merleau-Ponty usually uses the word “magic” to refer to that which he cannot explain (Dreyfus). Thus, I would suggest that here Merleau-Ponty assumes that, even though providing a sharp analysis of how this intrabodily space contributes to our experience of the world, he cannot describe the whole process. This embodied alternative and the gaps that Merleau-Ponty could not fill in can be supported scientifically today. In fact, he anticipates many of the neuroscientific findings about the emotional brain that later would come in support to his interpretations. First, there is the workings of the mirror neurons (see Section 2.2.2), which seems to confirm his assumption that we share with others the intention to achieve a goal rather than the literal physical movement. Second, Merleau-Ponty suggests that this intrabodily frame of reference, which is a “feeling space,” has primacy in originating bodily movement and shaping how we act upon the world. To my knowledge, the pre-allocentric and pre-egocentric feeling space of the body has not been dealt with so far by neuroscience literature (see also Section 2.3.2).³⁰

In this respect, not only has Merleau-Ponty anticipated important findings of what we know today about the physiology of the brain, but the neuroscientific results also enable clarifying, even though still partially, his accounts of the role of what he calls the “body schema” and the “body image.” In fact, these two concepts inherent to the notion

30. It can be argued that Merleau-Ponty also anticipates the primacy of the *efferent* over the *afferent* enervation in conscious processing (Damasio, *Feeling* 127; Dennet *Consciousness Explained* 80; R. Ellis 12) in his analyses of the phenomenon of phantom limb. For him, it results from the efferent action commands still being sent to the nonexistent limb: “we add to the accepted explanations, in terms of cerebral tracks and recurrent sensations, only if the body schema ... becomes the law of its constitution.” (*Phenomenology of Perception* 114)

of the lived body have been used in both scientific and philosophical literature rather ambiguously. For example, R. Ellis (2-3) proposes that the body image is constituted by interoceptive and proprioceptive afferent information of the kind proposed by Damasio (*Looking for Spinoza*)³¹ whereas the body schema is based on sensorimotor action imagery of the kind studied by Jeannerod.³² Gallagher and Zahavi's characterization seems to be in accordance with R. Ellis, even though they disagree in regard to the role of proprioceptive functions.³³

In this thesis, and based on empirical evidence presented above, I hold that body schema entails sensorimotor efferent action imagery and that any body image always presupposes the body schema. As Merleau-Ponty argues, "the body-schema is ... a way of stating that my body is in-the-world" (*Phenomenology of Perception* 112-115). In a certain way, therefore, the body image involves partial awareness of body schematic processes.

I would suggest, then, that, in both senses—in feelings and physiological processes—the lived body defines what is meaningful for itself and enables possibilities for action. In other words, the lived body relates to the environment in the sense that it regulates and is regulated by the environment. So the body is in some sense "the expression or reflection of the environment" (Gallagher and Zahavi 138). For example, I

31. In R. Ellis' words, "the brain forms this body image out of information received *from* the body." (3)

32 According to Jeannerod, this imagery results from *sending* information rather than merely *receiving* it (cf. R. Ellis 3).

33 Gallagher and Zahavi characterize the body image as "composed of a system of experiences, attitudes, and beliefs where the object of such intentional states is one's own body," involving perceptual experiences, conceptual understandings, and emotional attitudes toward the body whereas body schema is defined as "a system of sensorimotor capacities and activations that function without the necessity of perceptual monitoring ... responsible for motor control." (146) Their proposal is that it includes our "pre-reflective, proprioceptive awareness of our bodily action." Whenever one does become explicitly aware of one's own body in terms of monitoring or directing perceptual attention, to limb position, movement, posture, pleasure, pain, kinaesthetic experience, and even due to loss or absence of a limb, such awareness constitutes aspects of a body image and presupposes the tacit contribution of the body schema (*ibid*).

feel tension in my shoulders and neck when under stress and, consequently, the environment becomes experientially different.

In sum, we experience the world from the point-of-view of our bodies and their skills, which are, themselves, grounded in the world. An embodied perspective means that it is *bodily movement* that expresses the “relationship” (Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* 107) between consciousness and the world. We have seen that much of this bodily movement, or body-schematic processes, is pre-reflective and thus partially remains unconscious. This is exactly what occurs in any kind of reading experience. The act of reading is, then, understood here as a mode of consciousness that is embodied, experienced as feelings and moods, and shaped by body-schematic processes. This means that, while reading, the individuals’ intentional focus is on the text itself, sometimes on the act of reading, but they are scarcely aware of their tacit bodily movement towards reading, although they might become aware of aspects of their bodily feelings when asked about them directly (see Kuijpers and Miall). If our body is engaged in the way described by Merleau-Ponty in our interactions with others and the world, then this phenomenological contribution sheds further light on the nature of this immediate moment of interaction between readers and texts. It holds that this enactive-form of pre-reflective engagement is an embodied composite of sensorimotor capacities and activations that function without the necessity of perceptual monitoring, including a proprioceptive awareness of our *bodily action*. From both an enactive and phenomenological perspective, we are actively in the world in an embodied way that is sensorimotor and purposeful, using the environment according to what is meaningful for itself. A central notion for the sense of an embodied, sensory-motor engagement with the

world that is pervasive to all forms of intentionality (remembering, imagining, thinking, etc.) is that of *bodily movement* or *positionality*. It reveals how the body is in the world, or how the reader is in the text.

2.4. Positionality in Language

Sections 2.2 and 2.3 have shown that, in the light of the enactive and the neurophysiological evidence, enactive affordances and action tendencies play a critical role in readers' pre-reflective engagement with texts. I have focused on how we understand others, including characters in fiction and the text itself by means of a kind of action imagery, in which goal-oriented action commands continue being sent into our brains, but are inhibited later in the cortex. However, bearing in mind that human experiencers must be understood in terms other than solely their nervous system and/or sensorimotor capacities, a phenomenological perspective was needed. From this perspective, pre-reflective bodily schematic movements shape and express the relationship between consciousness and the world. If these are such essential aspects of how we relate to the world, it follows that readers also position themselves, in an embodied way, vis-à-vis the text, and that these are essential elements in their experiences of texts. The question of whether it is possible to observe evidence of the structuring of the body in shaping reading will now be addressed.

Initially, I will refer to what we already know about the relation between language and bodily positionality. Some indication derives from a discussion begun in Section 2.2.2 and that at this stage needs to be extended. More specifically, I refer to the growing neurophysiological evidence that language comprehension is actually embodied (Zwaan

and Singer).³⁴ Metaphors have already been empirically proven meaningful when first grounded by an embodied source domain (Gibbs; Gibbs, Lima, and Francozo). Further evidence of a connection between linguistic acts and motor possibilities has been provided by recent brain imaging studies, which have held that some aspects of language, such as semantics and phonology, can be embodied in the sensorimotor system represented by mirror neurons. For example, Foroni and Semin show that reading action verbs that refer to emotional expressions (e.g., to smile), even when subliminally presented, shape judgment and elicit the same facial muscle activity as visual stimuli. These results indicate that in reference to facial muscular activity language seems to be not amodal, but actually bodily grounded (see also Fogassi and Ferrari; Rizzolatti and Craighero). Brain imaging data have also revealed the possible link between syntax³⁵ and the basic cortical organization of intentional action sequences (Fogassi and Ferrari; Grodzinsky and Friederici). Thus, evidence has been accumulating which indicates that language comprehension—including reading and listening to words (e.g., Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermuller) or even simple sentences (see Tettamanti et al.)—entails a kind of bodily action, shaped by motor potentialities.

In an analogy to these findings on language comprehension, I suggest that the enactive theory enables connections to be made between motor capacities and language production. According to the theory, the embodied and higher-order self (cf. Section 2.3.1) seeks for emotionally significant experiences potentially offered by the text and can, therefore, be detected in embodied language. I propose that this subjective life has public manifestations, and that readers' discourse, or how they *use* language, can be

34. I would argue, however, that Zwaan's model of cognition still retains some Cartesian traits.

35. The authors understand syntax as "a rule-based system combining elements into a sequence that has a specific meaning." (Fogassi and Ferrari 140)

understood as one of these manifestations and can be observed. In this sense, we would have access to how this embodied and higher-order self acts (as opposed to reacts) in relation to the object of experience, or how the body (reader) orients itself to the object of experience (text). Thus, I propose that investigating discourse structure (as well as its content), as Chapters 4 and 6 do, can be quite revealing.

I argue that, when readers respond to textual passages, what they find evocative is still partially unreflective. While being concerned with explicating their feelings and thoughts about the text (in this case, the task they perform in the study described in Chapter 4), readers are perhaps more aware of the content of what they say, but are very likely unaware of the words they choose and, especially, of *how* they report their experiences. My point is that their readerly style of discourse might bring out the positionality of their bodies in relation to texts, and indicate, for example, how close or distant they feel towards the text, how engaged or disengaged they present themselves in the moment of reading.

Differing from cognitive linguistic studies that argue for levels of consciousness but disregard what remains at unconscious levels in the processing of deixis in fictional texts (Emmott, *Narrative Comprehension*, “Embodied”), here I hold that, by observing deictic shifts and how readers place themselves in discourse, it might be possible to have access to the way they position themselves, even if they are unaware of this positioning. My proposal is then to turn a theoretical possibility into a method of analysis that is sensitive to capturing the positioning and re-positionings of the body as the reading unfolds in time. I propose to observe, for example, what stands out as readers talk about their experiences of reading, to observe, along with word choices, *which themes* are

manifested and *how these themes* manifest themselves linguistically. Focusing on the discourse structure and not only on its content can enable access to the hidden nuances of felt qualities, a further step in attempting to clarify the intentionality of feelings, or what feelings are really *about*. After all, meaning derives from both content and form. As an example of this possibility, I draw here from one of Gendlin's ("*Befindlichkeit*") analyses of Heidegger's concept of *Befindlichkeit*, which is how he views feelings, affects, and moods (one of the basic parameters of human existence):

In German a common way of asking "How are you?" is "Wie befinden Sie sich?" This literally says "How do you find yourself?" One can also say to a sick person "Wie ist Ihr Befinden?" ("How do you feel?") The same form can also be used to say that something or someone is situated somewhere, or in some way. For example, one can say, "The White House *finds itself* in Washington, D.C.," or "I find myself in Chicago," or "I find myself in happy circumstances."

As Gendlin explains, the term "Sich befinden" (finding oneself) has three allusions: the reflexivity of finding oneself; feeling; and being situated. He argues that all three are entailed in the phrase, "How are you?," that refers to how you feel but also to how things are going for you and what sort of situation you find yourself in. I would add to his analyses that, in opting for using "How are you?" instead of "How do you find yourself?," people make choices. In opting, they emphasize certain meanings of what they want to say and, by so doing, they reveal themselves. Analogously, I understand that, when readers choose how they talk about fictional characters or about any aspect of the world of the text, they also reveal themselves in emphasizing certain meanings. Thus,

the key questions for a method that proposes to analyze positionality in discourse becomes: How do readers say whatever they say?; How do they express themselves in language? Here I assume that the *choice of* words and the *use of* language reflect how readers comment on the text from an external or distanced perspective or from a closer perspective, that is, it indicates their bodily positioning in relation to the text. It is my objective to observe if and how this positioning changes as the reading experience unfolds and how it can reflect a sense of bodily spatial re-orientation of the reader in relation to the text.

The method of analysis is based on stylistics (more specifically, on lexical repetition, see Chapter 4), but its application is novel in empirical studies of how readers read (see Toolan, *Narrative Progression*). Studying positionality in discourse through the uses of pronouns, adjectival phrases, among other linguistic markers, differs from cognitive approaches carried out so far (Emmott, *Narrative Comprehension*; Jeffries; McIntyre) as it considers what might be at stake at pre-reflective levels. It also differs from other phenomenological studies of readers (e.g., Kuiken, Miall and Sikora, “Forms”; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”) as it not only investigates the use of figurative language *per se*, but also discourse more broadly speaking. In my view, this level of analysis, still lacking in stylistics and in phenomenological studies of reading experiences, might contribute to richer descriptions of literary reading. Since the method offered by stylistics can be quite valuable to this kind of analysis, I will resort to it when looking at the discourse produced by the participants (see Chapters 4 and 6).

2.5. Reflective Enactment

In Sections 2.2 to 2.4 I discussed the possible modes of engagement between readers and texts at unconscious levels and how these modes emerge partially to a conscious level in language use as readers comment about texts. In this section, I refer to one that involves the possibility to reflect upon the enactive affordances or upon the embodied self that emerges as readers are affected by foregrounded passages or as they meet fictional characters. In phenomenological terms, this entails the possibility to reflect upon the lived body as it experiences a given text, and which I call “reflective enactment.”

In this chapter, I also argued for the importance of addressing the terminological challenges in adapting emotion theories to an aesthetic and experiential view of reading and this point will continue to be addressed as I word this form of reflective engagement between readers and texts. The term “reflective” might lead to an association with cognition and analytical engagement, even though this is not the only sense for the word (see, for example, the notion of phenomenological reflection, as described by van Manen 77-109).³⁶ Here, however, I assume both a phenomenological and an enactive stance in understanding that emotion and cognition cannot be separated as two independent categories. I hold that reflection is experiential as it involves what has been referred to as emotion as well as cognition.

Strictly speaking, based on the arguments developed in this chapter, I also assume that every reflection is enactive because this is our primordial way to engage with the world and with others, including how readers engage with literary texts. On this matter, I

36. According to van Manen, the purpose of phenomenological reflection is to grasp the essential meaning of phenomena (77).

endorse R. Ellis' view (167). However, we are not always necessarily aware that we engage in the world this way, but we can become aware. In order to elaborate on the possibility of reflecting upon the embodied self, I will resort to the distinction R. Ellis makes between "reflective" and "nonreflective" experiences so as to describe the different modes of reflective enactment. I argue that this distinction not only enables a theoretical systematization of what happens as aspects of the pre-reflective level of our engagement with the world emerge to a more conscious level, but that it can be applied to an aesthetic and experiential view of reading.

From an enactive perspective, "in *nonreflective* experience, we focus attention on the object of the experience rather than on the subjective affordances that make the experience possible" (R. Ellis 156). In an analogy to Husserl's concept of the noetic-noematic poles of intentional experiences (see Giorgi, *Descriptive* 105), this mode of experience entails inhabiting the *noematic* side of a given experience (R. Ellis 156). This kind of reading has been previously described by Rosenblatt (*Reader*) as "efferent".³⁷ In her words, "As the reader responds to the printed words or symbols, his attention is directed outward, so to speak, towards concepts to be retained, ideas to be tested, actions to be performed after the reading" (24). It can also be understood in light of what Vipond and Hunt and Miall and Kuiken ("Aspects of Literary Response" 42) call "story-driven reading" to refer to the focus on the plot or story-line, when readers show interest in action and compelling conclusions. I argue that, in this kind of reading, individuals focus on the more traditional tasks of literary analysis and interpretation when they analyze the

37. Rosenblatt (*Reader*) justifies the terminology used based on its etymology, "from Latin *efferens*, present participle of *efferre*, to carry away." (24) However, her terminology does not consider the physiological sense of the word used in this thesis and, therefore, can be misleading. Efferent, in this thesis, is understood according to R. Ellis' definition, presented in Section 2.2.2. Rosenblatt (*Reader*) also argues that efferent reading can be applicable to both literary and nonliterary reading (24-5).

style of the text or as they read a text in light of a given critical theoretical perspective. I also suggest that it is possible to recognize some of the questions that are most frequently associated with traditional tasks of literary analysis and this kind of reading, based on analyses of the teaching manuals of the anthologies that are usually required as course material in literature courses (e.g., *The Norton Anthology of World Literature*, *The Longman Anthology of World Literature*, and *The Bedford Anthology of World Literature*). These analyses indicate that students are usually required to read the text for textual meaning, and have led me to formulate what I call “interpretive instructions,” designed to carry out an empirical study of pedagogical interventions. Here is an example of how these instructions can be worded: “Select passages that you consider *important to the understanding of the text*; write about your initial *interpretation of the text* as a whole: *what is the story about?*” (my italics; see Fialho, Zyngier, and Miall, “Interpretation,” “Experiencing”).

In academic settings, irrespective of the strategy that has been employed over the years (close reading, applied literary theory, stylistic analysis, etc.), so far, educational interventions have prioritized this form of engagement between readers and texts and have resulted in clinical and analytical perspectives towards literary texts that have distanced students from the actual experience of reading (Carvalho; Fialho and Zyngier; Gribble; Miall, “Empowering”; Todorov; Zyngier and Shepherd). These results actually support Rosenblatt’s predictions (*Reader*). In our studies of pedagogical interventions (Fialho, Zyngier, and Miall, “Interpretation,” “Experiencing”), we have confirmed this tendency. In following these interpretive instructions, students read in a story-driven way, focusing on the development of the plot rather than on their beliefs and values. Therefore,

because readers were not aware of the relations between text and what is meaningful for their lives, this kind of reading tends to come close to what Robinson has called “dispassionate” (in the sense of being, for her, purely cognitive), which is how she views the mode of reading that is typical among literary critics, who focus on textual interpretation (134). In our studies (Fialho, Zyngier, and Miall, “Interpretation,” “Experiencing”), we observed that, in assuming an interpretive mode of engagement, readers were unaware of how their personal interests are put at stake while reading. Therefore, by neglecting to imagine what it would be like to be in characters’ shoes and being inattentive to how they share or reject characters’ views of the world (Hakemulder; Oatley, “A Taxonomy,” “Why Fiction”) an interpretive engagement actually prevented the readers investigated from enlarging their emotional horizons.

The other possible form of enactive reflection upon the embodied self is reflective experience, as explained by R. Ellis:

reflective experience focuses attention on the bodily sensing of the affordances themselves ... in phenomenological terms, we could say that to reflect on the self is to inhabit the *noetic* rather than the *noematic* side of any given experience [Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*]. This concept has the advantage of making the self into an embodied being rather than an abstraction; the self is already an aspect of the body at any given moment, and can be reflected upon as such (156).

This mode of reflection can be understood in terms of what Rosenblatt (*Reader*) called “aesthetic,” meaning a kind of reading in which the reader lives through the text (25). In her view, this mode of reflection pervades all forms of intentionalities. In her words,

“Sensing, feeling, imagining, thinking ... the reader who adopts the aesthetic attitude feels no compulsion other than ... to concentrate on the complex structure of experience that he is shaping and that becomes for him the poem, the story, the play” (*idem* 26). In line with the terminology proposed in this thesis, I prefer to call this mode of reflection “experiential,” where readers comment on how they are affected by the text.

One example of how readers become aware of how they sense the text in their bodies has been provided by Kuijpers and Miall. In their study, they asked participants to mark sentences in a given text that evoked bodily feelings. This raised their awareness that their bodies were implicated and they found that, in reading “Miss Brill,” participants reported having sensed their chest and the stomach most frequently, the two body parts implicated in “gut-feelings” (Prinz). While reading “The Story of an Hour,” participants most often named the heart and the head. These results indicate that the stories affected the readers in their bodies in different ways.

In order to verify how readers sense their own bodily affordances, I have devised what I call “experiencing instructions,” and which is based on how Miall and Kuiken have been wording their phenomenological studies of reading experiences: “As you read, take time to linger and reflect; *give the text a chance to affect you,*” “As you read, give emphasis to a passage that you find *especially striking or evocative,* giving the text, especially the passage you select, a chance to affect you,” “*Describe any thoughts, feelings, images, impressions or memories that were part of your experience*” (my italics; Fialho, Zyngier and Miall, “Interpretation,” “Experiencing”). In this mode of reflection, readers are asked to resonate affectively to the text. Our results indicate that the students who followed these instructions had a more active role, participating in the class

voluntarily more frequently than the ones who followed the interpretive instructions. Another important difference found in this experiment was that readers following the experiential instructions were interested in the more literary aspects of the stories whereas those reading in an interpretive way read them primarily to find out what had happened. They were attentive to the most basic level of narration, one that was less relevant to readers who engaged “reflectively” (in R. Ellis’ terms), or experientially with the story. They also produced essays that were lexically richer, drawing more comparisons and being more imaginative than those who followed interpretive instructions. One important finding was that these readers demonstrated a greater sense of agency and promptness to act in relating the text to their own experiences. These were evident in the way they used pronouns (Bergen and Chang; Brunyé et al.; Herman). Moreover, we found that these readers had a more positive perception of the classes, showing more involvement and even informing the instructor that they intended to pursue further studies.

Discussing experiential modes of reflection brings us closer to the concept of literariness. Based on previous empirical work, the hypothesis is that it is through this form of reflection that the literary experience unfolds. More specifically, previous studies have indicated that engaging and dwelling within the experiential reflection enables the unfolding of readers’ emotional aims, leading them to re-structure their senses of themselves (cf. Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”; Miall and Kuiken, “Shifting Perspectives”; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”). In other words, this form of reflection might provide the appropriate context for the experience of self-modification to unfold.

At this point, I would like to suggest a third mode of enactive reflection that would involve a more balanced awareness of both the text as an object as well as the bodily sensing of textual affordances (see, for example, “total enactment,” a form of reading described in Sections 5.1.3 and 6.4). In this case, awareness is given to both poles of the noetic-noematic intentional relation between readers and texts, or between interpretive and experiential forms of reading. This possibility is not envisioned by either R. Ellis, Rosenblatt (*Reader*) or Robinson. I observed this mode of engagement with my own students and as a result of educational intervention (Fialho, Zyngier and Miall, “Interpretation,” “Experiencing”). In this more balanced mode of reflection, one can see the expression of “meaningful reading” in a classroom setting, as student-readers are not only challenged intellectually, producing insightful criticisms of the text, but also become engaged personally and meaningfully and enlarging their own emotional horizons.

In sum, reading experiences are complex because they involve different modalities of consciousness both at the level of pre-reflection (Sections 2.2 to 2.4) and reflection (Sections 2.4 and the present one). As I assume that the wording of instructions can affect the way readers become aware of their embodied selves, the instructions to be used in the study carried out here were carefully elaborated. This will be the topic of Chapter 4, where I will make clear the relation between experiential modes of reflection and modalities of consciousness that are part of the process of literary experiencing.

Chapter 3. Numerically Aided Phenomenology

In this chapter, I discuss the research paradigm and the methodological assumptions that inform the present investigation of self-modification in literary response (see also Chapter 4). The general objectives of numerically aided phenomenology (NAP, Kuiken, Schopflocher, and Wild; Kuiken and Miall, “Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) are dealt with so as to contextualize the methodological option adopted for the present study. NAP has been developed to enable the location, identification and description of the subtleties of experiences. It has been used in studies of dreaming (Kuiken and Sikora), forgiveness (Wohl, Kuiken, and Noels), and in responses to both visual art (Wild and Kuiken) and literature (Kuiken and Miall, “Numerically Aided Phenomenology”; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”).

This chapter explains why NAP has been chosen as a tool for the description of aesthetic moments of reading. So far, the use of this methodology for this purpose has been limited to researchers at the University of Alberta. This thesis offers one further step in empirical investigations of this nature.

To situate the present study, previous research on self-modifying reading is discussed so as to indicate what is already known about the phenomenon (Section 3.1). The original propositions of NAP follow and their strengths and limitations for a study of self-modification are presented (Section 3.2). This leads to an argument that justifies the creation of a version of the method, called LEX-NAP, presented later in Section 4.5.1. Before detailing it, and discussing its terminology, NAP is here introduced as both a

phenomenological form of inquiry and a classificatory procedure. The general form of phenomenological inquiry will then be discussed so as to contextualize the methodological option for the present study (Section 3.3), followed by a brief review of methods of classification in the social sciences. Section 3.4 proposes that, among the different taxonomic approaches offered, a version of NAP was used to so as to enable inductive examination of first-person experiential accounts.

3.1. Review of Previous Studies

NAP enables systematizing participants' *in vivo* experiences of a text. So far, however, these studies have yielded static descriptions of reading experiences; that is, despite enabling the systematization of the richness and complexity of categories of experience, they have resulted in frozen descriptions of phenomena. One example is *expressive enactment* (Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, "Enactment"; Miall and Kuiken, "Shifting Perspectives," "A Feeling for Fiction"; Kuiken, Miall and Sikora, "Forms"; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, "Expressive Reading"), which represents the closest characterization of the phenomenon of self-modification arrived at so far. Within this form of reading, self-perceptual change occurs through a succession of evocative reading moments, which involve (a) aesthetic feelings, as well as *narrative feelings* in response to situations and events in the text; (b) blurred boundaries between the self and the narrator or story characters, suggestive of metaphors of personal identification; and (c) active and iterative modification of an emergent affective theme (for more details, see Section 3.2). For some readers, these iterative modifications are manifest as thematic developments

that move toward saturation, richness, and depth (Kuiken, Miall and Sikora, “Forms” 171,193). Such “movement,” a higher-order inference based on previously identified NAP constituents, is what the authors call *self-modifying feelings*.

The argument so far is that self-modification is likely to emerge in the context of repetition with modification of an affective theme, thus resulting from a dynamic process. An indication of how the modification of affective themes might unfold is provided by the analyses of readers’ responses to Coleridge’s poem “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” reported by Kuiken, Miall and Sikora (“Forms” 189), where, in response to a passage identified as particularly striking, the following comment occurs:

Passage No. 1: He holds him with his glittering eye—/ The wedding guest stood still, / And listens like a three years’ child: / The mariner hath his will. // The wedding guest sat on a stone: / He cannot choose but hear. (Lines 13–18)

Commentary: I like it because it appeals to me because of the . . . just knowing that stories do have that kind of power. There’s also an element of threat to it, like an enchantment, but there’s also an element of danger because he’s not there because he wants to be. He feels he has no control. I relate to this just because I have been known to get caught up in books or in stories. I love listening to stories, so I know that they do have just about that kind of power. You don’t want them to end; you have to hear what happens. Curiosity is so completely aroused. P02 (01)

Later, responding to a different passage, the same reader says,

Passage No. 2: The ice was here, the ice was there, / The ice was all around: / It cracked and growled, and roared and howled, / Like noises in a swound! (Lines 59 – 62)

Commentary: I just like the image, the feeling of nature being alive, like it's ice but there's more to it, that there's a spiritual force. There's again a threat ... the feeling of being surrounded. It's like a completely alien world that we're not used to being in ... of being surrounded by ice with no living thing around. It's hauntingly beautiful and powerful but very frightening. P02 (02)

Between Commentaries 1 and 2, the authors identified reexpression and modification of a central theme: the danger of enchantment. Reference to this theme is made in the reader's first commentary, when she views stories as entailing the threat of being caught up in something which "you" are powerless to escape from. The expression "caught up in books or in stories" led the authors to interpret this as "a kind of threat in which the reader herself is at least distantly implicated." The same threat is revisited in her second commentary, when, "the nature of the threat and the reader's familiarity with this theme in her life is modified" (189).

This demonstration opens up the possibility for a mode of analysis that is focal to the present study, as NAP provides a guideline on how to systematize readers' *in vivo* experiences. More specifically, the interest here is to gain access to and describe the way readers experience a text and the changes that may occur in their sense of self. However, in order to observe, describe, and systematize the unfolding of such experiences, that is, so as to account for the (possible) dynamic description of the phenomenon of self-

modification, it is necessary to clarify the strengths and limitations of the method before the adaptations are provided and discussed (Section 4.5.1).

3.2. Strategies and Definitions

One of the strengths of NAP is the effort towards reciprocity between quantitative and qualitative methods (see also Section 3.3). Its general strategies, as described by Kuiken, Miall and Sikora (“Forms” 186) are

- (a) To examine readers’ commentaries comparatively, identifying and paraphrasing recurrent meaning expressions, called constituents;
- (b) To create matrices reflective of the profiles of constituents found in each commentary;
- (c) To create clusters of commentaries according to the similarities in their profiles of constituents;
- (d) To systematically examine each cluster to ascertain its distinctive attributes.

During its first stage, the participants’ experiential accounts are read so that the researcher becomes acquainted with the general experiences that characterize their reading of a given text. These are then systematically compared for the identification of similarly expressed meanings (see Wohl, Kuiken and Noels for an illustration).

Discrepancies in the interpretation of statements in participants’ accounts are usually reviewed by two or more judges and final classification is usually determined by consensus. When sentences with similar meaning occur in two or more protocols, they are paraphrased to reflect their common meaning.

In their study of readers' responses to Katherine Mansfield's "The Wrong House," Kuiken and Miall (5) described how the method works. The following two statements, each from a different protocol, were understood by the authors to express a common meaning: (a) "I feel a great compassion for her. I would like to know what makes her sigh"; (b) "I sympathized with her, like I felt for her, I guess, when she started to panic." These two comments were paraphrased by the authors in the following constituent: "I felt sympathy for her in her anguish." This wording, or constituent, was carefully established so that the similarities in meanings were captured. As they pointed out, constituents did not derive from any pre-established theoretical category and, being verbal, their components could be examined linguistically.

According to NAP, once a constituent is identified, each protocol is systematically re-read to determine the presence or absence of that expressed meaning. An array of constituents expressing that meaning cannot be rare (i.e., found in less than 10% of the accounts) or ubiquitous (i.e., found in more than 90% of the accounts). Once this array is identified, hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward's method, Euclidean distances) is conducted to group protocols according to the similarities in their profiles of constituents. Comparison of the prevalence of each constituent across clusters enables determination of those constituents that are prototypic of each category. Details of how constituents are established can be found in Section 4.5.2.1 and of how they distinguish what is defining of a cluster, in Section 5.1.3. The way constituents become a prototypic exemplar of categories of experience is detailed in Chapter 6.

3.3. A Phenomenological Method of Inquiry

In spite of the debate over the concepts and the terms that define phenomenology, many critics agree on a common core: its method. As Giorgi (*Descriptive* 68) explains, although a full-blown, articulated exposition of the method is still to be delivered, it is already implicit in the writings of Husserl (*Logical Investigations, Ideas I*) and Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception, The Visible and the Invisible*), among other phenomenologists. However, as its principles presuppose but do not entail each other (Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 679), the steps and procedures vary according to the perspective taken.

This methodological plurality has produced some reticence and led a few researchers to offer proposals that they tend to name as “not ready-made” or “embryo models” (Giorgi, *Descriptive* 14). As a result, the method has been criticized for lack of rigor or confused with introspective approaches to lived experience (e.g., Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* 44, and Metzinger 83; see also van Manen 22-3; Gallagher and Zahavi 19-21; Giorgi, *Descriptive* 19-20).³⁸ While some researchers, such as van Manen, prefer to preserve the flexibility that the lack of a prescriptive method affords and dissociate themselves from “hard” human sciences (22, 125), others have developed more systematic approaches, such as Giorgi’s “descriptive phenomenological method in psychology” (“Psychology,” “Idea,” *Descriptive*) and Kuiken and Miall’s “numerically aided phenomenology” (see also Section 3.2). As Giorgi explains, “phenomenology is not intrinsically against quantitative methods ... [it is] against the arbitrary imposition of

38. According to Gallagher and Zahavi (21), phenomenologists consider a metaphysical fallacy to locate the phenomenal realm within the mind and to suggest looking inwards to access and describe it (*introspectio*). Introspectionism favours the Cartesian division between consciousness and world, rejected by Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.

quantitative approaches to intrinsically qualitative questions” (*Descriptive* 30). While the author defines his method as “following a broader model than what guides the natural sciences” (14), Kuiken and Miall (“Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) argue for the need to protect phenomenological methods and NAP from subjugation to the criteria of a strict natural empirical science. In this sense, these two methods have, in their own ways, systematized Husserl’s proposal.³⁹ By offering a hybrid alternative, NAP has merged the scientific values of both qualitative and quantitative methods while Giorgi’s descriptive method, although open to quantification, has remained basically a qualitative method.

So far, applied research in Empirical Science of Literature (ESL) has been placed as an alternative to the prevailing methods of literary criticism and hermeneutics. In so doing, it has alternated between experimental situations involving quantitative treatment (see van Peer, Hakemulder and Zyngier for a review; see also Bortolussi and Dixon; Cupchik, Oatley, and Vorderer; Green and Brock) and qualitative investigations (e.g., Andringa; Long). As it does away with this need to opt for one approach or the other and offers a balance between them, NAP widens the scope of research questions asked by ESL.

Formulating a method of scientific research that assumes the reciprocity between qualitative and quantitative approaches requires a specific mode of expression. In clarifying the style I have opted for, I will comment on the way NAP can assist an empirical science of literary reading and provide an example of how phenomenology can

39. Other examples of systematization of the phenomenological method and of how a balance between qualitative and quantitative approaches can be achieved are provided and discussed by Gallagher and Zahavi. They show how phenomenology can complement and inform ongoing work in the cognitive sciences.

become pertinent to experimental science in broader terms, although this was not the primary aim of Husserl and his followers (see Gallagher and Zahavi 28-30).

To this purpose, some of the principles that guide phenomenological research and that are critical to NAP are here presented. I will first comment on two elements that are closely linked as part of a phenomenological method: the *epoché* and phenomenological reduction, followed by a discussion of the notions of intersubjectivity, eidetic variation, the differences between morphological and exact essences, and the ultimate goal of a phenomenological analysis: describing categories of experience. These discussions aim at clarifying the manner whereby phenomenology provides not only a conceptual, but also a methodological framework for NAP.

3.3.1. Reduction⁴⁰

While investigating the basis of scientific knowledge, phenomenology proposes a difference between the *natural attitude* and the theoretical life, within which a *philosophical attitude* must critically question the very foundation of experience and scientific thought (cf. Husserl, *Husserliana* XXV, qtd. in Gallagher and Zahavi 22). It focuses on the domain of “ignored obviousness” and in so doing the first step is to bracket our acceptance of a natural attitude, a procedure which Husserl calls the *epoché* (*Ideas* I). This implies putting beliefs or theories about experience into abeyance and describing it without the imposition of pre-determined theoretical categories throughout the entire research process (Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 680; Gallagher and Zahavi 222-4).

40. See Husserl’s *Ideas* (the performance of reduction is implied or presupposed rather than explicitly described by him, cf. Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 711).

The notion of *epoché* is closely linked to that of phenomenological reduction and both are elements of philosophical reflection. This means that reflection is focused on first-person perspectives motivated by transcendental philosophical concerns, which has an effect on how the structure of consciousness is understood. As Husserl writes, “the objects of which we are ‘conscious’ are not simply in consciousness as in a box ... they are first constituted as being, what they are for us, and as what they count for us, in various forms of objective intention” (*Logical Investigations* 275). In other words, phenomenological reduction analyses the intentional interdependence between specific structures of subjectivity and specific modes of appearance or givenness of objects. From an etymological perspective, *re-ducere* means “to depart from an unreflective ... immersion in the world and to ‘lead back’ to the way the world manifests itself to us” (Gallagher and Zahavi 25). Consequently, in adopting reduction, phenomenologists investigate not only *what* things are (whether particulars or essences) but also *how* they appear to us in consciousness (e.g., perception, judgment, valuation, etc.). After all, phenomenology holds that the intentional quality of the experience is strictly associated with its intentional matter (cf. Chapter 2). In sum, phenomenology is a mode of philosophical analysis of the different types of world-disclosure (Gallagher and Zahavi 25-6), which means that this view of consciousness differs from understanding the world naturalistically.

Even though this mode of reflection should systematically explore phenomena in the sense of *what* appears and in the *way* in which they appear, not all phenomenologists have paid equal attention to both aspects of phenomenological research. The *ways* of appearing have been usually overlooked due to a concern for *what* appears. I hold that the

same applies to NAP, and subscribe to Spiegelberg and Schuhmann's (704) view that "there is ... definite reason to believe that a conscientious study of the *ways* of givenness can throw light on certain problems of epistemology" (my italics). Phenomenological reduction is not the only method that aims for unbiased descriptions, but if, on the one hand, its weakness is mainly the danger of becoming too narrow, on the other hand, its strength lies in this effort towards finding a balance between *what* constitutes givens and their *modes* of constitution.

It must be emphasized that this temporary suspension of belief does not necessarily lead to the permanent neglect of the suspended question. On the contrary, as Spiegelberg and Schuhmann argue, "carrying out the reduction may supply us with all the evidence needed to answer this question" (711). In resorting to reduction, phenomenologists return to and persist exploring the temporarily bracketed question of reality and being (see, for instance, Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*).

It is my argument that, so far, NAP studies have focused on one aspect of phenomenological research: *what* appears to consciousness. For example, Kuiken, Miall and Sikora ("Forms") found that one of the categories of reading experience they articulated, "expressive enactment," involves (a) aesthetic feelings, as well as *narrative feelings* in response to situations and events in the text; (b) blurred boundaries between the self and the narrator or story characters, suggestive of metaphors of personal identification; and (c) active and iterative modification of an emergent affective theme (171,193) (Section 3.1). What they do is to provide us with information regarding the content of such experience: the elements which, combined, form the structure of this experiential type. It must be pointed out that in their 2011 study, "Expressive Reading,"

Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall claim that *the manner whereby* such elements present themselves to the reader's consciousness is addressed. In analyzing Coleridge's poem, "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," they show how to identify and paraphrase recurrent meaning expressions (called constituents) (see Section 4.5.2). They called "expressive enactment" the kind of response in which the readers' comments a) reflect metaphoric and quasi-metaphoric engagement with sensory imagery; b) show progressive transformation of an emergent affective theme; and c) where there is metaphoric blurring of boundaries between the reader's and narrator's perspectives. This study offers one step further in observing the way readers articulate feelings and works towards a "poetics of the reader" (Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, "Expressive Reading" 259). In line with these studies, this thesis contributes (see Chapters 6 and 7 for the description of other contributions) with an alternative to systematizing the way into how meaning expressions are identified. To make this difference clear, here is an extract in which Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall describe how they form constituents:

During comparative reading, if a similar expression was found in at least two commentaries, the basis of that perceived similarity was made explicit in a paraphrase called a constituent. Here is an example:

Statement 1. "I think there's an awful lot of times, and I can list quite a few, where there's something that you really, really want to do . . . and something gets in the way."

Statement 2. "It reminds me of times when I felt despair and end up with nothing good in my life."

Constituent. "I was reminded of a generic autobiographical event."

In this example, Statements 1 and 2 suggest a similar aspect of reading engagement; both refer to personal memories that are generic in form. In general, as indicated by this example, the nature of the mental act (generic autobiographical reference), rather than its content (e.g., reference to a moment of despair), is emphasized. (“Expressive Reading” 260)

This extract shows how the paraphrase (constituent) derives from what the authors call the “nature of the mental act” rather than from the observation of lexical repetition, which could be indicative of modality, or the way readers position themselves in discourse (see Chapter 2). Without access to the full transcripts, I cannot offer a more detailed argument. However, for the sake of illustration, the statements the authors presented as paraphrased above would actually produce a different constituent if lexical repetition were considered. Here is an example of how a constituent would be formed from those two statements if LEX-NAP were applied:

Statement 1. “***I think** there’s an awful lot **of times**, and **I** can list quite a few, *where there’s something that you really, really want to do . . . and something gets in the way.*”*

Statement 2. “It ***reminds me of times** when **I** felt despair and end up with *nothing good in my life.*”*

In both statements above, the reader uses the first person pronouns “I” and “me” in repetition to refer to him/herself. The verbs “think” and “remind” could be considered a kind of repetition. The word “times” also occurs more than once. In a LEX-NAP analysis, it is also important to observe the paradigmatic relationship between words and expressions (see Section 4.5.2.1). In this sense, it is possible to argue that these two

expressions “there’s something that you really, really want to do ... and something gets in the way” and “I felt despair and end up with nothing good in my life” are similar in the sense that they both express negativity and a kind of frustration (although, in this case, the lexical repetition is more subtle). This argument can be made clear in Figure 4.1 below:

Figure 4.1: Alternative Constituent Formation

a	b	c
I think of	there’s something that you really, really want to do . . . and something gets in the way.”	times [and I can list quite a few]
It reminds me of	I felt despair and end up with nothing good in my life.”	times
I think of	negative [frustrating] moments	many times

Constituent: <I think of negative [frustrating] moments many times>

The constituent that Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall (“Expressive Reading” 260) produce (“I was reminded of a generic autobiographical event”) places the focus on “generic autobiographical event” whereas here “I think of negative [frustrating] moments many times,” the focus is on personal frustration. This shows how in this thesis constituents are formed as a result of the way the words the reader chooses to talk about his or her experience occur in repetition and how they stand in paradigmatic relationships. A detailed description is offered in Section 4.5.2. This difference is advanced here to point out why Halliday’s notion of modality in language is used as a

basis for understanding how, through repetition, the reader positions him/herself in terms of what is experienced (cf. Chapter 2). I hold that a linguistic analysis of first-person experiential accounts is necessary to shed light on the way each of the elements that constitute a given experience presents itself to the consciousness of experiencers. Studying not only the contents of experience but also their *form* of expression, or their *style* of presentation to consciousness can help systematize a form of understanding that goes beyond what is here seen as one of the limitations of NAP (Section 3.4.4). Balance between finding out *what* constitutes phenomena in consciousness and how they materialize in discourse which might enable a more comprehensive and substantiated analysis (or “richer description”) of phenomena. To highlight this focus on the lexis used by respondents, I propose that the name of the method is here changed to LEX-NAP instead of just NAP (see Section 4.5.1). It is important to point out that, while LEX-NAP is performed, the question of the nature of reading experience, initially bracketed, is kept in view. In this sense, LEX-NAP not only takes reduction into consideration, but, by looking at lexical repetition, provides a solid linguistic basis for constituent production. Such issues will be readressed in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.3.2. Intersubjectivity

Despite not being necessarily a methodological step, every phenomenological analysis presupposes intersubjectivity and a theoretical stance towards the world. For this reason, like any other phenomenological method, a NAP (and by extension a LEX-NAP) procedure should be explicit about how the method is informed by intersubjectivity and how meaning is assumed.

Before I proceed, it is necessary to do away with the common belief that phenomenology consists only in studying subjective phenomena or that it relapses into introspectionism. Such views are unfounded, as Gallagher and Zahavi explain:

intersubjectively accessible objects are intersubjectively accessible precisely insofar as they can be accessed from each first-person perspective. There is no *pure* third person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. To believe in the existence of such a pure third-person perspective is to succumb to an *objectivist illusion*. This is, of course, not to say that there is no third person perspective, but merely that such a perspective is exactly a perspective from somewhere. It is a view that *we* can adopt of the world. It is a perspective founded upon a first-person perspective or to be more precise, it emerges out of the encounter between at least two first-person perspectives; that is, it involves intersubjectivity. (40)

This is precisely where some of the differences between phenomenology and empiricism are made explicit. The former relies on intersubjectivity as a theoretical stance whereas the latter works with the guiding presupposition of a metaphysical reality. Having said that, this thesis holds that these two perspectives can be complementary if one understands empiricism more broadly by accepting a transcendental conception of knowledge. On the one hand, phenomenology denies the possibility of an “absolute” or “dehumanized” approach (Gallagher and Zahavi 40), a view usually held by the natural and empirical sciences. A broader understanding of empiricism, in this case, would require suspending questions of “objectivity” and “subjectivity.” In addition,

phenomenology shares with empiricism the aim of achieving “scientific objectivity,” or unbiased results. In so doing, it relies on the private observations and experiences of individuals as well as on what is public, or on the knowledge shared by a community of experiencing subjects. It presupposes a triangulation of perspectives.

Both NAP and LEX-NAP begin by examining experiential accounts comparatively for it is presupposed that the essence of phenomena can be discovered by analyzing what is shareable among experiencers and what can be intuited (“seen”) on the part of researchers. What is shareable, or public, is materialized in the form of constituents (see Section 3.2). By so doing, the researcher using NAP and LEX-NAP practices the reflective move of transcendental phenomenology and brackets the assumption of pure objectivism, or of a metaphysical reality. In this sense, subjectivity becomes pivotal to the pursuit of scientific knowledge for it assumes that the researcher is an experiencing subject, whose intersubjective observations should not be ignored. They are central to the constitution of the phenomenon and should be triangulated for making explicit what is shareable and public. In other words, a NAP researcher should, ideally, not work alone, and is expected to compare perceptions with others. By systematizing intersubjectivity more explicitly, the researcher “naturalizes” (see Gallagher and Zahavi 41) NAP even further (see Sections 4.5.1 and 5.1.2). Bracketing the assumption of pure objectivism and practicing the reflective move of transcendental phenomenology is one of the ways by means of which NAP, and, by extension LEX-NAP, applies a broader conception of empiricism, which, in part, is what characterizes its hybrid style.

3.3.3. Eidetic Variation

Phenomenology aims at discovering what Plato called *eidōs* or essence of things. Yet, differently from Plato, Husserl insisted that the general essence or *eidōs* has no reality superior or equal to that of particular entities, but the status of “ideal” being. Some phenomenologists prefer to use less charged terms such as “experience of essences” as they argue that there is no difference between the intuiting of essences and the experience of them (cf. Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 696-7).

In order to apprehend the general essences or universals, particulars are studied as examples, or as instances that stand for the general essences, even though the latter differs from the former. In seeking essences, Husserl proposed the method of free imaginative variation, which involves exploring situations in reflection, or simply using imagination to draw out the essential and invariant characteristics of a given object. This core set of properties essentially makes a given thing what it is (Gallagher and Zahavi 27) and the operation by which we proceed from the particular to the universal is called “intuiting” (Husserl’s *herausschauen*, or “ejective intuiting,” cf. Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 697).

The function and the possible value of phenomenological reduction (Section 3.3.1) is the promise of facilitating genuine intuiting, analyzing, and describing the given. The step of eidetic reduction shows that phenomenology considers all the data, real or unreal, and avoids judgments that can be biased, such as understanding such data as “solid reality” or “mere imagination.”

In adapting the phenomenological method, some adopt a descriptive, line-by-line approach to draw out the psychological essences of experiential narratives, relying

strictly on free imagination, like Giorgi (*Descriptive* 132, 154). Even though the author mentions that the results of his imaginative variations must be “accessible to the critical other,” (134) they themselves are not reported and thus are not subject to intersubjective corroboration.

Differently from Giorgi (*Descriptive*), and in an attempt to naturalize phenomenology, the dependence of the eidetic reduction on “free” imaginative variation is circumvented by NAP and LEX-NAP. In aiming at achieving intersubjective corroboration regarding invariant structures, both methods propose two adaptations. First, they study *first-person descriptions of phenomena from a third-person perspective*. The researcher is considered a second order observer who describes others’ experiential accounts. Second, instead of focusing on comparison between actual and imagined variations, their analyses are based on comparisons between actual variations. In this sense, NAP and LEX-NAP also follow traditional empiricism as their criteria for knowledge are based on real or actual objects. In other words, instead of focusing on *imaginative variations*, NAP and LEX-NAP assess *empirical variations*.

For Husserl (*Ideas I*), a real (or empirical) object is in space, and time, and is regulated by causality. An object that would lack any of those characteristics would be unreal (e.g., ideas, dreams, memories, and images). The latter are phenomena that would not be considered real in the strict sense, but are experiential in the sense that they can only appear in the consciousness of individuals. A broadened sense of “empirical” is required to appropriate these two kinds of objects—the real and the imagined—adequately, or to span this distinction (Giorgi, *Descriptive* 67, 75). NAP and LEX-NAP analyze first-person experiential accounts comparatively. These are taken to be concrete

and potential instances (or particulars) of a given experience and, by means of comparisons, general essences are intuited. Differently from more traditional phenomenological methods (e.g., Giorgi *Descriptive*), variations among particulars should be pinpointed empirically and are reported by means of paraphrases, or constituents (see Sections 3.1 and 4.5). If feelings, images, or memories (or, “unreal objects”) are reported, these are taken as “real objects” as they materialize in discourse. Here, another aspect of the hybrid style of NAP becomes evident and demonstrates how it adds to the empirical perspective. In fact, LEX-NAP systematizes this move even further as it pays careful attention to the expression by means of which experiencers report feelings, images, memories, among others. This is the way it concretizes “unreal” data,⁴¹ that the wording of constituents captures as closely as possible. When worded, constituents become actual representations of the forms of expression that characterize the essence of a given category of experience (see Section 4.5.1). This means that LEX-NAP follows a phenomenological procedure by enabling the intuition (in a phenomenological sense, analyzing what is “present to”) and by describing the actual manifestations of experiential phenomena.

3.3.4. Exact and Morphological Essences

Husserl was quite explicit about mental experiences being characterized by an essential vagueness and inexactness, which he called “morphological essences.”

Establishing that cognitive and emotional phenomena are of a different nature as

41. This view presents itself in contrast to Giorgi’s (*Descriptive*), for example, whose methodology does not enable spanning the distinction between “real” and “unreal” data. He states that “at a certain level of generality the stream of mental events can be understood as concrete, and specific perceptual experiences could be seen as concrete, but their emotional aspects, for example, as abstracts.” (75)

compared to “concrete” or “real” objects led him to argue for the impossibility of classifying and defining them with the same kind of exactness and precision that one might find in geometry, for example (*Ideas I* 166).

There are at least three consequences for a method that proposes an empirical application of the phenomenological method. First, assessing eidetic variation of objects such as feelings or imagination might be questionable, so intersubjective corroboration becomes an important tool in the quest for invariant, essential structures of experience (Gallagher and Zahavi 28; see also Section 3.3.2). Second, “morphological essences” carries with it the inherent notion that categories of experience are similar and not identical, which becomes critical for a phenomenological method. Third, as phenomenologists reckon that the grounds of affinities among particulars (what is invariant) are grasped by different experiencers in varying degrees, it is a necessity not only to study the component parts of essences, but also to explore the nexus of how each part relates to each other. Husserl himself admits that exact and descriptive sciences may combine and interact (*Ideas I* 166-8) in assessing these degrees and in exploring these nexus. In this light, quantification can become an auxiliary to qualification in measuring, for example, the degrees of agreement among researchers identifying invariant elements of a given phenomenon (see Section 5.1.2, for an illustration). Giorgi (*Descriptive*) provides another example of the possible complementarity between quantitative and qualitative methods. He argues that quantification can make precise magnitude and frequency, but, in elaborating these dimensions, it abstracts from the content of the phenomenon being studied. Conversely, he argues that “one can measure the fact that one is intensely happy or intensely anxious, but the intensity dimension tells us very little

about the difference between happiness and anxiety” (78-9). The combination of these two perspectives can throw light upon different dimensions of phenomena in a more rigorous manner. This has been one of the main arguments of Kuiken and Miall (“Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) in discussing NAP. They criticize the phenomenological work that identifies kinds of experience but ignores levels of their manifestation, and, in so doing, avoids quantification, as Giorgi (*Phenomenology, Descriptive*) does.

Both Kuiken and Miall (“Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) and Giorgi (*Descriptive*) argue that a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches can become rigorous. However, the former systematize this complementarity more effectively than Giorgi does. Thus, another strength of NAP, and, by extension, of LEX-NAP, is to assess phenomenological questions systematically and rigorously by means of a hybrid method. The general form of phenomenological inquiry is the following:

What are the aspects (elements, constituents) ($A_1 \dots A_N$) of “this” such that, when they are jointly present as aspects of “this,” “this” is an X? For example,

What are the aspects of an experience such that, when they are jointly present in an experiential narrative, that narrative is an expression of “aesthetic experience?”⁴²

Due to its hybrid nature, NAP enables approaching responses according to the *kind* of attributes that are invariably present in the given experience (qualitative aspect) as well as their *levels* of manifestation (quantitative aspect). By these means, the assessment of

42. Kuiken, personal communication; see also Kuiken and Miall, “Numerically Aided Phenomenology” §2.2.

“morphological essences” becomes even more precise. Kuiken and Miall (“Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) explain the meaning of precision for NAP: “precision refers to the *distinctiveness* that fosters reliability, the *coherence* that assures validity, and the *richness* that is appropriate to a targeted construct” (§13).

Kuiken and Miall (“Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) reinterpret Husserl’s notion of “exact” and “morphological essences” in the following way: the former are those categories of experience that can be identified independently of their levels of manifestation and their variations might be pursued in imagination. Because they manifest themselves in different levels, the latter can only be identified empirically (§16-17).⁴³ A prototype is, then, articulated, which is an ideal type and thus may have no correspondent in reality, but becomes a standard for measurement of the extent to which particulars share attributes with it (§17-18; see also Section 3.2). NAP assumes that categories of experience have the structure of a polythetic class (see Section 3.4.1 for a description), and follows its criteria. Therefore, it

43. As the authors explain, variations in “exact essences,” e.g., the essence of “triangle” can be pursued in imagination. In their words, “it is possible to imagine that *a single discrete attribute* of that phenomenon (e.g., its color or its number of sides) is changed. After varying this single attribute in imagination, judging whether the variation remains an instance of the phenomenon (as in the case of varying a triangle’s color) or whether it does not (as in the case of varying its number of sides) reveals whether that varied aspect is essential for the phenomenon to be the kind of object that it is, i.e., a triangle.” (§16) Variations in “morphological essences” work differently. They continue to explain as follows:

Red oaks *usually* appear as trees with leaves having spiny pointed lobes; in contrast, white oaks *usually* appear as trees with leaves having rounded lobes ... The bluejack oak, for example, is a type of red oak that, unlike its red oak companions, has leaves with rounded lobes. Nonetheless it is considered a red oak because it possesses many of the other attributes of members of the red oak family, such as their characteristically bitter acorns, the hairy surfaces inside their acorns, and so on. In these circumstances, varying a concrete representation of a red oak tree in imagination so that it has rounded lobes cannot help to determine whether spiny pointed lobes are essential for a red oak tree to be the kind that it is because *some* red oaks do *not* have leaves with spiny pointed lobes. Within this deciduous domain, using the imaginative variation of single discrete attributes to identify essences simply (and in principle) does not work. (§17)

- (a) compares entities across a large number of their constituent elements, which becomes the mode of access to polythetic categories (with a large but unspecified number of elements);
- (b) presupposes that each constituent element is more-or-less invariant (extrapolations from these invariant element identifies the ideal—prototypic—limits of the category, i.e., its morphological essence);
- (c) assumes that no element or constituent is strictly invariant (which defeats the possibility of imaginative variation) (Kuiken and Miall, “Numerically Aided Phenomenology” §20).

By using a technique of numerical analysis for the identification of such classes and of their more-or-less invariant attributes (see Section 3.4.1), NAP presupposes interpreting Husserl’s notion of “morphological essence” in a way that assumes an inherent quantification of “extent” and “degree” within similarity judgments in comparative thought (Kuiken and Miall, “Numerically Aided Phenomenology” §20-21). This is the manner whereby both NAP and LEX-NAP aim at articulating the morphological essences of categories of experience.

3.3.5. Explicative Description

Reporting research findings leads us to the question of meaning: whether findings are interpreted or described. Some in the phenomenological tradition have given emphasis to hermeneutic interpretation, like the existentialists, who do not distinguish between meanings (and, consequently, descriptions) and interpretations (e.g., Van Manen). According to this view, results are interpreted. Others adopt a more classical

distinction between results and their interpretation, like Giorgi, who prefers to use the term “description” as the basis for the clarification of meanings (“Description,” *Descriptive* 64, 77). Giorgi (*Descriptive*) differentiates both terms on the grounds that “interpretation implies bringing in a nongiven factor (such as hypothesis, theory, assumption—to help account for the essential presence). The descriptive phenomenological attitude neither adds to nor subtracts from what is ‘given’” (77-78).

In fact, Giorgi (“Description”) holds that most recent preferences for the term “interpretation” can be explained historically. The term “description” is more closely associated with the philosophy of logical empiricism, the age of modernism and the Enlightenment, having a longer history in the span of human or social sciences and, for this reason, perhaps, being considered more “outdated” whereas the idea of interpretive science has been legitimized more recently, beginning with the thought of Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Taylor, and developed in the many forms of deconstructionism, structuralism, and post-modernism (120; see also Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 712-715). Nevertheless, he follows a more Husserlian transcendental phenomenology rather than an interpretive one and, accordingly, views phenomenology as a strictly descriptive science (“Description,” *Descriptive*). Giorgi (“Description”) argues that the descriptive and the interpretive attitudes are not reducible to each other, being based on strategies tied to situations (121), and that both approaches share similarities in that they are both concerned with meanings, their discrimination, and their status (122).

For Kuiken (personal communication), it is important to differentiate the phenomenological view of “meanings” as discovered, and as an articulation of what is “given” in experience from the notion of “meanings” as conventions, which can discern

which objects are meant by concepts as used (e.g., Rudolf Carnap's "explication"). Due to the middle ground view adopted in this thesis, which argues for the possibility of empirical phenomenological study and has its basis in one, Kuiken's differentiation becomes critical.

Thus, this thesis follows Giorgi's ("Description") argument in favor of a descriptive analysis which can be "effective and ... done in such a way that the results can be correlated with phenomenological [or empirical] evidence, which then makes the finding solidly based in the sense that no assumptive, hypothetical, or theoretically dependent factors are included" (125), which is in accordance with an empirical perspective. At the same time, it holds that analysis can follow different levels. In a first level, the phenomenological intuition is performed in the search for essences, but this intuition is based on variations among empirical particulars and are, therefore, inducted in a second level of analysis. For this reason, Kuiken's notion of "explicative description" is adequate in this balanced method.

According to Kuiken's view (personal communication), "explicative descriptions" might derive from the comparison of either actual or imagined variations and, through them, conceptions of phenomena are articulated, revealed, or uncovered. Their principles are the following:

a) "Explicative description is not causal explanation"

This binary opposition amplifies the meaning of what is phenomenological in an empirical phenomenological perspective. In investigating what it is like to experience a given phenomenon, empiricists usually claim that good descriptions enable better causal

explanations and that it would be counter-productive to omit the descriptive phase.⁴⁴ For example, while arguing for the manner whereby phenomenology can assist work that is being done in the cognitive sciences, Gallagher and Zahavi explain its role on the grounds that the phenomenological description is “relevant and useful for scientific work” for being “systematic and detailed” (10), and conclude that “the terrain of the *explanandum* (the thing to be explained) has to be properly investigated before explanatory proposals can make any sense” (16). Despite supporting phenomenology, they seem to view it as subservient to causal studies. In discussing NAP, however, Kuiken (personal communication) argues for the importance of understanding the phenomenological work as going beyond the form of a necessary step to explanatory methods. He emphasizes the relevance of the phenomenological work *per se* and holds that the aim of NAP—to study, describe, and classify what experiences are like—can be comparable to the work of a biologist in search of biological taxonomies and can be justified as such. As part of the reduction, concerns about eventual causes of the phenomenon should be put aside. Accordingly, LEX-NAP follows this principle.

b) “Explicative description is not interpretation”

An explicative description involves putting aside the contextual conditions (e.g., biology, history) that enable phenomena to occur. Therefore, it is closely related to a Husserlian perspective in that it aims to describe phenomena neither adding to or subtracting from what is “given” in experience. At the same time, by using the adjective

44. This discussion can be traced back to the mid nineteenth century, with J.S. Mill’s views regarding the inductive method of inquiry and his proposal of what has come to be called the “covering Law” model of explanation or the “deductive-nomological” model, accepted later by positivists such as K. Popper. The model holds that good descriptive work is needed before explanatory accounts are made (see his 1843 essay “System”).

“explicative,” Kuiken preserves the flexibility of retaining the contextual conditions (e.g., etymology, history) that clarify the sense in which phenomena are presently “given” in experience. In LEX-NAP, this is obtained at a second level of analysis (see c below for a description of the three levels of analysis). Since the wording of constituents derive from lexical repetition patterns that stem from the way readers structure their discourse, it can be considered an explicative description of what readers say and of how they talk about their experiences (see Section 4.5.2.1, Table 4.1).

c) “Explicative description is primarily the use of language to elucidate (bring to light, uncover) how the phenomenon is ‘given’ in experience.”

As NAP searches for a middle ground within the continuum description-interpretation, LEX-NAP steps further as it emphasizes this third principle in its search for rigor, precision and substantiation. LEX-NAP understands that, on a first level of analysis, constituents are intuited from actual examples. There is a certain degree of interpretation in such intuition. However, it sees constituents as paraphrases and paraphrases as a form of lexical repetition (cf. Section 4.5.2.1). This means that constituents are based on observed patterns of lexical repetition that actually occur in readers’ experiential accounts and their wording reflect this patterning as closely as possible (see Section 4.5.2.1, Table 4.1).

Constituents are the result of an interpretation, but their elements, or their wording, are not the researcher’s. They are based on the repetition of words used by the participants. In fact, for LEX-NAP, “explicative description” is not a final step in the empirical-phenomenological procedure, but a process that spans three levels of analysis:

- (a) constituents are intuited and/or interpreted based on a comparison among empirical variations;
- (b) constituents are worded. Their wording is inducted from repetition of patterns observed in the actual words used by readers. Constituents of this kind are subjected to a numeric procedure so as to account for the number of empirical variations (see Section 3.4.2). This procedure enables the differentiation of types of experiences; that is, the elements that constitute their structure are empirically derived and described, requiring a degree of interpretation to go beyond the data;
- (c) the meaning of these different structures is theorized (e.g., the argument of a given structure as the essence of a type of self-modifying reading experience) (see Chapter 6).

3.4. A Classificatory Procedure

In this section, key issues regarding methods of classification in the social sciences are discussed so as to contextualize NAP and, by extension, LEX-NAP. This contextualization includes elaborations on a) principles and levels of analysis, b) cluster analysis, and c) the goals, advantages and limitations of this methodology, which are here assessed.

Classification by (dis)similarity is a basic human conceptual activity. It is both an end in itself and a process *per se*; a descriptive, rather than an explanatory tool, which can be understood as a foundation for explanation, but not always necessarily as such. Classification schemes in the social sciences stem from the earliest interests in qualitative typological methods of the nineteenth century (and even earlier) and twentieth century

(e.g., Max Weber; Howard Becker; John McKinney; qtd. in Bailey *Typologies* 10), through the development of computerized clustering methods and packages still being developed (SAS 1982; CLUSTAN, Wishart; SPSS 1984, 2010).

3.4.1. Analytical Principles and Levels

Classification procedures may include three levels of analysis: the conceptual, the empirical, and the combined conceptual-empirical level. NAP encompasses the latter. Differing from traditional procedures in which a conceptual classification is followed by identification of empirical examples (Bailey, *Typologies* 3), here the inverse occurs: data are collected first and based on inductive observation it is then conceptually classified.

NAP follows the basic concepts of the generic classification process (cf. Bailey, *Typologies* 3). Here, three main principles are explored. The first one holds that the classes formed are *exhaustive*; that is, there must be an appropriate class for each member involved, and *mutually exclusive*; that is, there is only one correct class for each case, with no cases belonging simultaneously to two classes.

The second principle establishes that the kind of classification considered is a *typology*. Differing from multidimensional and conceptual typologies, those resulting from NAP resemble biological taxonomy, even though the resulting classifications of NAP studies are not always hierarchical or evolutionary. Nevertheless, they resemble taxonomies in, for instance, biology, in that they involve the identification of empirical cases for a conceptual typology.

It must be pointed out that, since analysis derives from inductive observations on the part of a researcher, the boundaries between what is conceptual and what is empirical

are blurred. Irrespective of that, and as typical of other taxonomic methods which generally stem from a data set of empirical objects (such as individuals) measured on a number of variables, NAP studies result in classifications that are *multidimensional* and *empirical*.

The third principle holds that *polythetic*, rather than monothetic classes, are formed. That is, they do not contain cases that are identical on all variables, but rather group cases by overall greatest similarity. According to Beckner, a polythetic class is defined in terms of a set of N of properties f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n such that (a) each individual possesses a large number of the attributes that characterize a class; (b) each attribute is owned by large numbers of the individuals in a class; (c) no attribute is possessed by every member of the class. In sum, NAP is not only a qualitative but also a quantitative method of classification. As such, it makes use of cluster analysis to enable the description of an *empirical* and *polythetic* typology.

3.4.2. Cluster Analysis

NAP takes advantage of computerized numerical classificatory methods, specifically of cluster analysis, which has been used for over 70 years (in anthropology, Driver and Kroeber; in psychology, Tryon; Zubin).

A multivariate statistical method, cluster analysis begins with a data set that contains information about a sample of entities, and seeks to form a classification empirically, through numerical analysis of these empirical entities or cases. Basically, cluster analysis groups these entities into homogeneous classes on the basis of their similarity on N variables (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 7; Bailey, *Typologies* 35). The

usual procedure is to either compute measures of similarity (such as a correlation coefficient) or compute measures of dissimilarity (such as distance measures) for all cases. In NAP, a well-known representation of distance (Euclidean) is often used.

In addition to using (dis)similarity coefficients, NAP follows the standard procedure of cluster analysis to group objects (such as individual persons), so that clusters of objects (persons) are constructed on the basis of their similarity on the variables. This requires the analysis of relationships between variables, or *Q*-analysis. Bailey explains two of the problems that social scientists often face with *Q*-analysis. In his words,

while we can use sampling theory to derive a random sample on N persons from a population of persons, it is difficult to derive a random sample of N variables. This is because we generally do not know how to define a population or universe of variables from which to draw our sample. A large number of variables can be defined, and we can assume that this constitutes a universe, but cannot really be sure. Another problem ... is that we generally need several times as many variables as objects in order to avoid degree of freedom problems (*Typologies* 40).

Therefore, the choice of variables to be used with cluster analysis is crucial. For Aldenderfer and Bashfield (20), ideally, variables should be chosen within the context of an explicitly stated theory that supports the classification. In practice, however, the theory is often implicit, which makes it difficult to assess variable relevance. In the case of NAP, such a theory is phenomenology. The authors warn that cluster analysis may lead to “naïve empiricism” (20), since the technique is ostensibly designed to produce

“objective” grouping of entities and because of its heuristic nature (Everitt, Landau, and Leese).

These are some of the most pressing challenges for NAP. In dealing with them, one must know how to evaluate the chosen clustering method. Different clustering methods can and do generate different solutions to the same data. The strategy of cluster analysis is structure-seeking although its operation is structure-imposing. In other words, clustering methods are used to discover structure in the data that is not readily apparent with the naked eye. A clustering method will always place objects into groups, which might differ in composition when varied methods are used. Likewise, even the choice of a similarity coefficient affects the resulting matrix. In this sense, cluster analysis is used as a criterion to illuminate the formation of groups that are not imposed on the data by the method (see Aldenderfer and Bashfield 15-16). It is true that results are always going to be biased by theoretical prejudgments. However, the aim of empirical methods of the kind being used here is to move away from imposed interpretations and to obtain descriptions that are based on observed data. Thus, it is important that these methods are explicitly stated and evaluated.⁴⁵

3.4.3. Criteria for Evaluating Clustering Methods

Some of the criteria frequently found, and therefore critical to NAP analyses are (a) method of viewing; (b) naturalness of clusters generated; (c) numerical predetermination; (d) levels of clusters yielded; (e) overlap; (f) outliers; (g) form of linkage; (h) similarity level; and (i) weight.

45. A review of criteria for evaluating clustering methods can be found, for example, in Bailey (“Cluster Analysis” 74-78; *Typologies* 40-48) and Sneath and Sokal (202-214).

It must be stressed here that the method should be compatible with the desired nature of the classification, the variables, and the (dis)similarity measure used. In terms of methods of viewing, although there are seven major families of clustering methods (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 35), there are only two basic perspectives for viewing: the agglomerative (“bottom-up”) and the divisive (“top-down”). In NAP analyses, *bottom-up* methods are preferred. The sample is viewed as consisting of N separate clusters, which successively combine and recombine (agglomerate) them into a smaller set.

The second criterion, that of naturalness of clusters generated, involves agglomerative methods, which virtually seek *natural*, underlying *clusters*. The underlying assumption of so-called natural clustering is that groups of homogeneous objects exist empirically or “naturally” and that the task of cluster analysis is to identify, replicate, or even “capture” these already existing clusters.⁴⁶ Since homogeneous “natural” taxa are desired, the clusters should be “tight,” exhibiting as little internal variability as possible. In addition, leading to the criterion of numerical predetermination, because preexisting natural clusters are expected to be identified, the *number of clusters is not predetermined*; researchers simply allow the data to determine them (see Aldenderfer and Blashfield). In addition, most commonly used agglomerative methods are *hierarchical*, which leads us to the fourth criterion (levels of clusters yielded). Hierarchical methods involve successive clustering and reclustered from small to larger clusters. One common technique is to resort to similarity coefficients, represented in dendograms.

The fifth criterion holds that, by definition, hierarchical agglomerative methods produce *non-overlapping* clusters; that is, clusters are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so they should be as separate from each other as possible. Finally, agglomerative methods

46. The notion of natural clustering has been criticized by Fleiss and Zubin.

are *less likely to leave outliers* (sixth criterion), because each case is admitted to the cluster that it has its highest similarity level with, even if this similarity level is low.

As to the seventh criterion, different *linkage forms* have been proposed. Usually, in both NAP and LEX-NAP analyses, Ward's method, a hierarchical clustering method that retrieves categories in monte carlo studies, is used. It is designed to optimize the minimum variance within clusters (Ward), a function that is also known as the within-groups sum of squares or the error sum of squares (ESS). It begins with each object treated as a cluster of one (ESS=0). The method works by joining those groups or cases that result in the minimum increase in the ESS (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 43; Bailey, *Typologies* 57).

The eighth criterion requires that the (dis)similarity level is objectively set. The researcher does not make decisions about admittance levels, but only accepts the objects that have the highest similarity (or lowest distance), whatever that may be, at each cycle. This guarantees maximum homogeneity for the cluster.

Finally, the ninth criterion considers the controversial issue of whether variables are weighted or non-weighted. There are various forms of weighting, such as considering some variables as more important than others. Some critics consider weighting inherently arbitrary and/or that unequal weighting should be done carefully and for good theoretical or empirical reasons (Aldenderfer and Bashfield 21-22; Bailey, *Typologies* 47). For Sneath and Sokal (212), in all procedures this problem is unavoidable because researchers who fail to weight some variables more than others are actually weighting (perhaps arbitrarily) all of them the same (they are *de facto* multiplying them all by one).

This criterion will be returned to and discussed more extensively in Section 4.5.1 where LEX-NAP is further explained.

Finally, both NAP and LEX-NAP follow the five basic steps that characterize cluster analysis studies, and which have been outlined by Aldenderfer and Blashfield: (a) a sample to be clustered is selected; (b) a set of variables on which to measure the entities in the sample is defined; (c) the similarities among the entities are computed; (d) a cluster analysis method is used to create groups of similar entities; (e) the resulting cluster solution is validated (12).

3.4.4. Assessment

Every method has its advantages and disadvantages. NAP also shares some of the limitations of cluster analysis and classificatory methods in general. One limitation is that of reification. Most cluster analyses are relatively simple procedures that, in most cases, are not supported by an extensive body of statistical reasoning. This means that the researcher has to be cautious not to reify cluster solutions (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 14). Moreover, the types need to be specified carefully in order to be defined as a construct or an empirical entity (Bailey, *Typologies* 15). The problem some of the NAP studies meet is that these types lack thorough specification and, therefore, present problems for replication and validation.

A second common criticism among social scientists about classification in general also applies to NAP: classification may be static rather than dynamic. Many research approaches in social science, including most popular statistical techniques, are static rather than dynamic. Bailey has good arguments in response to this criticism. He states,

“although some classifications may seem inherently static, so does regression analysis” (*Typologies* 15). His point is that in the use of empirical taxonomies, the problems with static analyses are probably no greater in numerical taxonomy than in statistics in general, and may be accepted as a limitation of the statistical method. In fact, some of the problems stem not from the classification procedures *per se*, but from the statistical measures that they incorporate (*idem* 15). Although he raises a relevant point, this problem becomes critical for a study that proposes to investigate the temporality of readers’ experiences of their own sense of self while reading a text. This problem, therefore, should be here addressed more extensively.

Another alleged limitation is the difficulty of selecting dimensions and finding cases for classifications. Though this may be true, Bailey again makes the case that the problem is true for all of social research and is not unique to the classification process. He states, “It is true that the resulting classification is directly shaped by the selection of variables, but the same is true of regression analysis, for example” (*Typologies* 16). And he adds, “there is no magic formula for selecting the correct variables, but care and foresight generally result in successful typologies” (*idem* 16). In Section 4.5, these issues are addressed and the minimization of these limitations is attempted in the development of LEX-NAP for the study of self-modification in literary response. This adaptation is presented as the study conducted is contextualized and described. The next chapter will set all these principles into action by describing the study undertaken.

Chapter 4. Description of the Study

In this chapter, the study conducted, the text used, the profile of participants, and the strategies for data collection are described. In addition, an analytical framework for data analysis is proposed. In reviewing the traditional lines of research in the social sciences, the most appropriate alternatives will be introduced for (a) examining readers' responses, and (b) gaining access to the way readers experience changes in their own sense of self.

4.1. Contextualization

As a social study depends on an understanding of the context for its interpretation, this section provides the criteria for text selection and describes the participants' profile. The procedures for data elicitation and the transcription of recorded data are also explained.

In order to carry out a close and systematic investigation of the phenomenon, the following questions were defined as guidelines:

- (a) What is a self-modifying experience?
- (b) How does the process of self-modification unfold?
- (c) How can different constituents be articulated?
- (d) What characterizes qualitatively distinct constituents?

Much of the analytical task involved “follows the tracks of a porpoise ... which occasionally reveals itself by breaking the surface of the sea” (Hayes and Flower 10). This image reflects the difficulty in spotting the phenomenon as evidence indicates that the occurrence of self-modification is rare and hard to grasp. For instance, the percentage of occurrences in Miall and Kuiken’s studies corresponds to only 15% of their total data. I am aware that many of these processes might also occur at the level of the unconscious, but this realization is not an impediment for following at least two questions: (a) how the processes that can be detected are expressed by the reader, and (b) how they can be identified by the researcher. In order to find out and follow the tracks of what is possible to be traceable, this study focuses on feelings and perceptions that accompany such experience and that are concretely evident in readers’ discourse.

4.2. Materials

The rationale for the selection of the text used in the study is presented and the post-reading questionnaire respondents completed is introduced in this section.

4.2.1. The Text

Previous empirical work indicates that modes of “participatory responses” (Gerrig) towards a text, such as identification, facilitate the exploration of readers’ feelings, memories, and provoke an engagement with reading that is personally relevant (Larsen and Seilman; Oatley, “A Taxonomy”; Tan). However, these studies provide relatively little insight into the role of the text itself—into stylistic, narrative, content

issues—in producing such responses. This creates difficulties when selecting material that can be appropriate for studies such as the one carried out here.

Some works have been quite relevant to the present research (Cupchik and László; Cupchik, Oatley, and Vorderer; Kuiken, Miall and Sikora, “Forms,” among others), as they shed light on the nature of the text and on the specific form of participatory response that might be associated with self-modification. For instance, Cupchik and László’s participants read more slowly in response to segments that provide “insight into characters’ experiences” whereas surprising segments were read more quickly (304). According to Cupchik, Oatley, and Vorderer, it seems that texts providing detailed descriptions of characters, especially the ones that give access to their emotional experiences, are absorbing (375), facilitate the exploration of readers’ emotional reactions more freely, and elicit “fresh emotions” on their part (374). Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora’s (“Forms”) articulation of *expressive enactment*, which comes closer to an empirical concretization of self-modification (see Section 3.1), adds significantly to the discussion by providing one indication of the context in which self-modification might occur as well as explanation for how identification is likely to be associated with this kind of reading experience. It seems, then, that narrative style and the manner in which a character is portrayed or shown experiencing a certain moment are important determinants of identification, or empathy, which might be part of a form of response that prefigures self-modification.

For the present study, a text that requires the reader to go deeper into the mind of a character and experience his or her impressions of the world was given preference in the assumption that it would help the formation of expressive enactment and, by

extension, of self-modifying feelings. It is true that short stories are not ideal for long-term development of character (Bowen 280). However, this genre was chosen for its prose form, which is here assumed to be of easier accessibility to the young adults who participated in this study (see Section 4.3). Moreover, preference was given to presenting readers with a whole story rather than a passage from a novel.

One of the central figures in the development of the modern short story, Katherine Mansfield was chosen for being, in her dramatic use of character, an author concerned with the exploration of the interior of ordinary lives, with the poetry of feeling, the blurred edges of personality, the minute detailing of sensations. Her works have also been noted for their distinctive wit, psychological acuity, and perceptive characterizations (Votteler 274). More specifically, her modernist short story “Miss Brill” was chosen for the present study as it centers on an elderly woman who, as the story develops, undergoes a dramatic change herself while she spends an afternoon in a park in France observing the people around her (see Appendix 1).

Like her contemporaries Virginia Woolf and James Joyce, Mansfield proposes to represent, through her fiction, moments of realization, awareness, vision, insight, and understanding, a modern attempt to analyze human nature, which Woolf described as “moments of being” (Schulkind) and Joyce called “epiphanies.” Moving away from the linear plots and documentary descriptions of especially late nineteenth-century realism, these authors developed a type of fiction in which sensitive personal experience could be valued, observed, and detailed by depicting their characters’ inner and psychic life, which resides in the “chamber of consciousness.” (James 388) In this sense, their works evoke moments of everyday life, in which sensations, memories, feelings, conceptions, fancies

and imaginations, intuitions, visions, and insights become central, including Mansfield's short stories, which have been noted for their "hyper-sensitivity." (Bowen 280) According to Daiches (276), she writes to tell "the truth for the characters themselves," for their investment in feelings and change.

As part of self-realization, the description of these moments becomes a path towards what constitutes experiential knowledge. They offer, to a certain extent, a fictional representation of the emotion theories proposed by Prinz and Damasio, for whom feelings modulate the meaningfulness of our embodied convictions (see Chapter 2). In other words, as what may occur with the readers, in Mansfield's writings we see the fictionalization of how feelings may inform the characters about themselves, how they relate to the world, and how their feelings may also taint judgments, bias accounts, but still change the way the world is experienced (see Chapter 2).

In fact, Mansfield's stories center on perception. Relying on intuitive knowledge, her letters and journals reveal how, in Bowen's words, "we see her moving into the story, from its visual periphery to its heart, recognizing the 'why' as she penetrates" (277). The singular beauty of her language has led Bowen to claim for its poeticity when she writes that "she was to evolve from noun, verb, adjective, a marvelous sensory notation hitherto undreamed of outside poetry." (*idem* 278) Similarly to what happens with Woolf's prose (Lodge, *The Modes* 177), Mansfield moves from metonymic and realistic details (in "Miss Brill," the fur coat, the honey-cake, among others) to a metaphoric representation of experience. But her writing, like Woolf's, "does not so much imitate experience as questions it" (*idem* 177).

The poetic quality of her prose, together with her focus on the characters' feelings and impressions of the world in a way explain her preference for free indirect discourse in which the narrative is used to illuminate feelings rather than plot. Indeed, plots are turned into moments of realization her characters undergo. As Gargano puts it, "Miss Brill' is the story of a woman who, while seeming to see everything, sees nothing. She ... has a blind side and a singular ability to see things from a strangely interesting but incomplete point of view." In this sense, the stories in *The Garden Party, and Other Stories*, where "Miss Brill" was published, display some of Mansfield's most successful innovations with narrative technique, including interior monologue, stream of consciousness, and shifting narrative perspectives.

The text selected for the study, "Miss Brill," is set on a Sunday afternoon in 1920. Rather plotless, it is the story of a solitary elderly woman living in France whose deprivation and loneliness are reflected in her dark little room, "her meager treat of a honey-cake which she looks forward to each week as her only self-indulgence" (Fullbrook 299). Metonymically, she identifies herself with her fur-piece, "a decayed thing that she keeps in a box under her bed and which represents to her all the luxury and adventure in life that she convinces herself to share" (*idem* 299-300). Fullbrook summarizes the story as "the portrait of a woman caught by the contradictions of social preconceptions that she herself has internalised. What Miss Brill stuffs into the box under the lonely bed of the *femme seule* is, according to the image, herself." (300)

In line with most Modernist productions, the narrative point-of-view in "Miss Brill" is that of the protagonist herself and the most striking parts of the story are mediated through her consciousness. This is how Mansfield explains her creation,

... in Miss Brill I chose not only the length of every sentence—I chose the rise and fall of every paragraph to fit her—and to fit her on that day at that very moment. After I'd written it I read it aloud—numbers of times—just as one would *play over* a musical composition, trying to get it nearer and nearer to the expression of Miss Brill—until it fitted her. (*The Collected Letters* IV 165)

In this story, Mansfield reflects on the relation between the representation of the moment to moment process towards self-knowledge, insight and revelation, towards awareness and epiphany, the move from the portrayal of exterior occurrences and inner thought interludes and how such representation relates to readers' revisiting themes, and experiencing the different feelings involved in this kind of reading. A first attempt in this direction is made in the proposed analysis of the text, detailed in Section 5.2.

4.2.2. Post-Reading Questionnaire

One questionnaire was devised to be completed by the participants after they read the text and followed the procedures for elicitation of experiential accounts described in Section 4.4. It consisted of

(a) two scales of the Experiencing Questionnaire (*EQ*, Kuiken, Carey, and Nielsen; Kuiken, Campbell, Sopčák):

(ai) the self-perceptual depth scale;

(aia) ethics (non-utilitarian respect: human); and

(b) individual difference measures:

- (bi) the Tellegen Absorption Scale (*TAS*, Tellegen);
- (bii) the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (*C-M SD*, Crowne and Marlowe).

Description of each scale and justification for their inclusion in the research design are provided as follows.

4.2.2.1. Experiencing Questionnaire (EQ)

Consisting of 58 items (rated from 1 = “not at all true” to 5 = “extremely true”) and grouped into 9 pairs of subscales, the EQ (Kuiken, Campbell, and Sopčák) was developed to assess empirically the generative and self-altering aspects of literary reading, which are part of relatively uncommon reading experiences. The questionnaire derives from the phenomenological conception of “experiencing,” described by the authors as a four phase process, which involves (a) participation in a situation according to historically grounded preconceptions; (b) emergence of an inexpressible felt sense of this situation that embodies “more” than can be grasped within those historically grounded preconceptions; (c) explicating (clarifying) expression of this felt sense that alters how both self and object within this situation are understood, and (d) extension of those freshly expressed categorial understandings within and even beyond the text (see Chapter 2 and Gendlin, *Experiencing*). These four phases describe the temporal unfolding of the experiencing process. Here, two subscales are used, which allow access through psychometric tests to some of the traditional outcomes of the experiencing process: *self-perceptual depth* and *ethics (non-utilitarian respect for humans)*.

To capture shifts in self-awareness – which might be transient and occur when experiencers move toward explicating freshly realized expressions of felt senses (Phase Three)—the 7-item subscale *self-perceptual depth* was also included. This instrument allows the researcher to observe how experiencers achieve deepened understandings and realize possible commitments to enduring truths. This subscale consists of items such as “After reading this story, I felt sensitive to aspects of my life that I usually ignore,” “After reading this story, I felt like changing the way I live,” and “After reading this story, my sense of life seemed less superficial.”

To assess the moral implications that might result from moments of intensive reflection during the experiencing process (Phase Four), the 3-item subscale *non-utilitarian respect for humans* was used. Its items are three: “After reading this story, it seemed wrong to treat people like objects”; “After reading this story, I was keenly aware of people’s inherent dignity”; and “After reading this story, I felt deep respect for humanity.”.

4.2.2.2. Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS)

A further instrument tested “absorption,” defined by Tellegen and Atkinson (268) as a disposition for having episodes of “total attention” that (a) fully engage one’s representational resources (i.e., perceptual, enactive, imaginative, and ideational), (b) heighten the sensed reality of the attentional object, and (c) alter experience of the attentional object, including an empathically altered sense of self. The TAS is a unidimensional measure consisting of 34 (true-false) items such as “I can be greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language” and “If I wish, I can imagine (or daydream) some

things so vividly that they hold my attention as a good movie or story does.”

Absorption was here used as a measure of individual difference because it relates to several factors that might be involved in self-modifying reading (see Kuiken et al., “Locating” for a review). For example, research has shown that people who are high in absorption report visual-auditory synaesthesia (Rader and Tellegen) and vivid imagery (McConkey and Nogrady). Second, they report self-perceptual shifts during psychotherapy (Lloyd and Gannon) and intensive self-reflection (Kuiken, Carey, and Nielsen). Third, they report that the visual, musical, and literary arts influence their feelings in a way that is important in their everyday life (Wild, Kuiken, and Schopflocher). Fourth, they describe themselves as motivated to read literary texts for insight (Miall and Kuiken, “Aspects of Literary Response”). A particularly relevant contribution that explains the associations between absorption and self-modification has been provided by Kuiken et al. (“Locating”). They found associations between absorption and (a) theme variations, among readers who engage the text using metaphors of personal identification; (b) self-perceptual shifts in response to specific passages in a story (the middle section of the story used). However, (c) no relation was found between absorption and feeling involvement; only between high absorption and self-directed feelings (278-281). Due to these findings, the TAS is here included as post-reading measurement in order to test the hypothesis that readers who experience self-modification are those with high absorption scores.

4.2.2.3. Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (C-M SDS)

One of the concerns in designing experiments is the view that the testing situation is similar to other socially evaluative situations in that motives and social forces extraneous to the experimental setting (e.g., class membership, the effects of role playing and faking; Crowne and Marlowe 28) might affect test responses. This is what in part led Crowne and Marlowe to formulate the phrase “need for approval” and take account of one motivational determinant of test-taking behavior. The C-M SDS is thus proposed as an individual difference measure of the approval motive, which reflects a self-evaluative style that may come into play in the testing situation. The 33-item (true-false) scale consists of a kind of abbreviated universal personality test that captures the tendency for response acquiescence, that is, the indication of agreement or uncritical responses due to personal endorsement. In other words, it assesses the disposition of individuals to respond in a socially desirable manner. Individuals who display social-desirable responses are interpreted as being more conforming, cautious, and persuadable, and their behavior is more normatively anchored than those who depict themselves less euphemistically (189).

For the study presented here, a masked version of the C-M SDS was used and administered in a form that mixed its items with those 34 (true–false) of the TAS. The resulting 67-item questionnaire was presented to participants as a “series of statements a person might use to describe her or his attitudes, opinions, interests, and other characteristics” (Kuiken et al., “Locating”). As in any scientific experiment, it was expected that the group under study would score low on the C-M SDS, thus assuming that responses would be as unbiased as possible and not given to please researchers.

In sum, it was expected that results of the EQ would provide access to aspects of the

experiencing process, assumed to be involved in self-modifying reading experiences. The TAS and the C-M SDS would test and generate hypotheses regarding associations between individual differences and the experience of self-modification. More importantly, since tacit understanding of the phenomenon is available due to previous investigations (see Chapter 3), these scores would help track and identify the phenomenon (see Section 4.1) and, consequently, validate the interpretation of the data. These results are presented in Section 5.1.3.

4.3. Participants

Any reader may experience self-modification but those who read for insight and understanding, and who engage in aesthetic reading (Rosenblatt, *Literature*), may be more prone to “expressive enactment” (Kuiken, Miall and Sikora, “Forms”; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”), and are here considered to be “aesthetic readers.” As this study depended on verbal accounts, these readers were considered more suitable participants. Accordingly, fifty psychology students in Introductory Psychology courses at the University of Alberta were selected. Two participants were dropped from the study because of missing data. Therefore, this study involves forty-eight students (36 female and 7 male; age varied between 18 and 35; $M=19.2$) who obtained above-median scores on the Insight-Orientation subscale (IOS) of the *Literary Response Questionnaire* (Miall and Kuiken, “Aspects of Literary Response”; see also van Schooten, Oostdam, and de Glopper) and above-median scores on the *Attitudes Toward Poetry Questionnaire* (ATPQ), developed by Kuiken (personal communication). Reading for insight and understanding was thus measured by the IOS. It reflects an approach in which the literary

text is considered a guide to recognition of previously unrecognized qualities, usually in the reader, but also in the reader's world. Engagement with aesthetic reading was probed by the ATPQ, which assesses readers' general attitudes toward reading poetry by means of ten rating scales such as "I read poetry as often as I can," "I have read poetry that helps me deal with situations in my life," "I actively seek poetry for my own enjoyment." Participants who scored above-average on the IOS and the ATPQ scales were here considered "aesthetic readers" for their individual orientation towards Literature (with capital L), including avid reading of poetry. It was here assumed that avid readers of poetry were probably more likely to be avid readers of other texts with "literary" qualities. Whether this is really the case remains an empirical question.

For additional information on the selected participants' actual selves as readers (i.e., how they typically see themselves as readers) and in order to shed some light on the initial assumption for the selection of participants, two questionnaires were administered after they completed the experiment: the "Reading History Questionnaire" (RHQ) and the "Current Reading Questionnaire" (CRQ).

In general, these participants' above-average scores on the RHQ items revealed that they understand reading as being part of their lives since childhood. They also indicated that they saw their parents as having had an important role in the formation of their reading habits, encouraging them to read "poetry, stories, and novels," suggesting them what to read, and being readers themselves. Their highest mean score to the 6 point scale questionnaire items was in response to the question "During your high school years, when you read poetry, stories, or novels, how much did you enjoy doing so?", indicating that these participants, in general, had a positive experience with reading during their

high school years ($M=4.77$; $SD=1.41$). Women's responses ($M=5.03$) were significantly higher than men ($M=4.08$) on this question (t of 2.144, $df=46$, and $p=.037$). Overall, the lowest mean score was in response to the question "During your high school years, how often did your parents suggest poetry, stories, or novels that you might read?" ($M=2.88$; $SD=1.81$), which might indicate that school played an important role in the selection of the texts they read during those years. Another significant gender difference was found in the way these participants responded to the following question: "During your high school years, when you read poetry, stories, or novels, how much did your reading influence you afterwards (e.g., how you felt, what you talked about)?" Women ($M=4.49$) recognized this effect of reading significantly more frequently than men ($M=2.54$; t of 4.108, $df=46$, and $p=.00$).

These participants' responses to the "Current Reading Questionnaire" (CRQ) were somewhat different from their responses to the "Reading History Questionnaire" (RHQ). The whole group scored below average in response to 85% of the questionnaire items. This difference in results indicates a mismatch in these participants' perceptions of their reading history and their current reading habits. Even though the empirical data collected do not provide evidence for this hypothesis, these results might indicate that the role of reading in their lives has been diminished the more they progressed in school. These results are partly supported by data collected among Canadian readers from the same university, of about the same age, and schooling year (Fialho, Moffat and Miall). These results might also indicate a mismatch in these readers' sense of their "historic" and "actual" selves.

Responses to the CRQ revealed that the participants' lowest mean scores were in response to the following items: "I regard myself as an expert in literary studies" (M=1.23, SD=.994), "I am planning to pursue advanced literary studies" (M=1.25, SD=1.37), "When I read poetry, short stories, and novels in times of personal distress, this reading influences what I decide to read afterwards" (M=1.77, SD=1.32), "When I read poetry, short stories, and novels in times of personal distress, this reading influences what I talk about afterwards" (M=1.92, SD=1.48). Their highest mean score was in response to the item: "When I read poetry, short stories, or novels on my own, I enjoy doing so" (M=3.6, SD=.939). Women (3.77), however, declared that they enjoyed reading on their own significantly more frequently than men did (M=3.15, t of 2.10, $df=46$, and $p=.04$). Gender differences were prominent as regards perception of current reading habits. The women saw themselves as more current readers than the men, given the considerable number of items (11) in response to which their scores were higher. They declared that they regularly read poetry, short stories, or novels on their own, i.e., independently of any educational requirements (M=2.91 > M=1.69, t of 3.702, $df=46$, and $p=.001$), but also as part of their educational requirements (M=3.26 > M=2.54, t of 2.215, $df=46$, and $p=.032$).⁴⁷

The selected participants' actual selves as readers can be summarized in the following way: they said that they read for insight and understanding, declared that they

47. They also reported reading these genres more regularly than men to rest and relax (M=3.31 > M=2.46, t of 2.006, $df=46$, and $p=.051$) as well as in times of personal distress (M=2.37 > M=1.31, t of 2.280, $df=46$, and $p=.027$). In all of these contexts, they declared that these types of reading influence what they talk about afterwards (M=2.89 > M=2.08, t of 2.137, $df=46$, and $p=.038$; M=2.66 > M=1.54, t of 2.770, $df=46$, and $p=.008$; M=2.71 > M=1.62, t of 2.628, $df=46$, and $p=.012$; M=2.20 > M=1.15, t of 2.262, $df=46$, and $p=.028$, respectively). In addition, they reported having acquired a significant personal library of poetry, stories, and novels (M=3.03 > M=1.92, t of 2.616, $df=46$, and $p=.012$) and regarding themselves as experts in literary studies (M=1.43 > M=0.69, t of 2.391, $df=46$, and $p=.021$).

were readers of poetry and were, therefore, more likely to engage in aesthetic reading. They saw reading as playing an important role in their lives since childhood, but female participants considered themselves as more current readers than males. Even though they declared themselves to be readers of poetry more frequently than the average of first year psychology students, overall, these participants did not regard themselves as “expert readers” and did not show interest in pursuing more advanced literary studies. In general, they did not believe in the carrying over effect of reading to affect mood or influence what to talk about and what to read afterwards, but women recognized this “literary” quality more easily than men.

4.4. Procedures

In phenomenological studies, it is usual for the researcher to consider the lifeworld situation wherein the phenomenon of interest occurs spontaneously (Giorgi, *Descriptive* 59). For a closer contact, I could have interviewed readers at home or in a place where they usually read and about a book that they were reading at the moment for personal choice. As this was not carried out, it remains one of the limitations of this research. Due to the nature of the phenomenon I investigate, the chances of assessing readers at the moment modifications in their sense of self occur would be minimal, so I opted for compromising this aspect. For higher chances of obtaining access to the phenomenon, I interviewed readers in the lab and used the selection criteria detailed in Section 4.3. Therefore, even though the research situation looked very different from the analog in the world outside the lab, I tried to be faithful to the essential characteristics of the situation in light of the purpose of research ... by asking them to report aloud on their

experiences. In this sense, I believe that a certain fidelity to everyday reading situations was honored (see Giorgi, *Descriptive* 59-60).

To elicit experiential accounts, an adaptation of the *self-probed retrospection technique* (Larsen and Seilman) was used. Following this procedure, readers were instructed to (a) read the text from beginning to end; (b) select five evocative passages, one from each of the five episodes, respectively; in response to each of the five passages, they were asked to (c) describe aloud any thoughts, feelings, images, or memories evoked by each passage. As soon as their reading was finished, participants were asked to (d) describe aloud any thoughts, feelings, images, or memories evoked by the text overall. These comments were audio-recorded. To acquaint them with the procedures, participants rehearsed by reading two episodes from Kate Chopin's "The Story of an Hour." The experiment was conducted in the research lab, but in privacy, which may facilitate intimate self-description (Kuiken, Miall and Sikora, "Forms"; Kuiken et al., "Locating"). The data recorded were transcribed in conventional orthography. Paralinguistic signs, such as pauses, hesitations, laughter, among others, were disregarded.

4.5. Tracking Readers' Experiences

As a strategy, the reader and the text were initially treated separately. Since very little is known about the relation between textual features and self-modifying reading experiences (as discussed in Section 4.2), readers' experiential accounts were first analyzed irrespective of the possible textual influences that might constrain these experiences. The text was also analyzed separately, based on theoretical assumptions and

empirically derived hypotheses of what might determine readers' experiences in general (see Chapter 1 and Section 4.2.1). The option for this strategy also opens up the possibility to account for the role played by unanticipated textual determinants. As an exploratory study, this investigation aims at looking for meaningful associations. Relations between reading experiences and textual determinants were only considered later in the process of data analysis, once both levels of analyses—that of readers' experiences and textual determinants—were completed. These relations are described in Chapter 5. The present section is restricted to the method of assessment of readers' experiences.

4.5.1. Lexical Basis for Numerically Aided Phenomenology (LEX-NAP)

Real data of spoken discourse may seem at first rich and complex, but they are also rather chaotic. In the context of this investigation, when readers talk about a text and comment aloud on their experiences of an evocative passage, they do not refer exclusively to themselves, or to their memories, or to their feelings, or to text description, or to its imagery; at times, they do it all at once in a single commentary.

Adding to that, from the point-of-view of the analyst, verbal data do not offer initially clear-cut points for analysis, which may lead to flawed results. This problem seems to be at the core of one of the first unsuccessful empirical studies of readers' responses to poetry, namely, I.A. Richards' research. Although working only with written reports, which tend to be more structured than oral renditions, Richards was unable to handle the complexity and variety of responses that he obtained from one hundred readers, concluding they yielded "a hundred verdicts from a hundred readers." By now,

his methods and results have been questioned and proved misleading, and his work has been considered to have had an unfortunate impact on the area (Martindale and Dailey).

In fact, the difficulty of assessing readers' open responses to texts has been the concern of numerous researchers (Andringa; Channell). The first challenge resides, then, in analyzing this kind of data inductively. Another challenge is to allow the data to speak for themselves without interference from the researchers' theoretical perspective (cf. Section 4.5.2 and Chapters 5 and 6; see also Channell 39; Wootton 6, 64).

Bearing on these assumptions, the version of NAP developed here, NAP based on lexical repetition (or LEX-NAP for short), aimed to fulfill two criteria. The first one was that no pre-established theoretical category is imposed on the analysis of the experiential accounts. Analysis is determined by the data. Inductive analysis of the kind proposed here needs to be carried out with rigorous attention to justification within the structure of the experiential accounts themselves. The second criterion was replicability and verifiability. To this purpose, it is necessary that working definitions of the key concepts that underlie the establishment of the analytical framework proposed here are provided. Thus, the following section will detail how the units of analysis were established and, consequently, how constituents were identified.

4.5.2. Analytical Units

Following the standard procedures of NAP, Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall ("Enactment"), Miall and Kuiken ("Shifting Perspectives", "A Feeling for Fiction"), Kuiken, Miall and Sikora ("Forms"), and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall ("Expressive Reading") identified and articulated different kinds of reading experience. They

established recurrent meaning expressions across commentaries as unit of analysis (which they called *constituents*) and worked at sentence level. Their findings indicate that it is in the recurrence of affective themes that modifications in a reader's sense of self have the potential to occur. These results have two implications for the method here proposed. First, they enabled the establishment of the unit of analysis that becomes focal to the kind of investigation developed here: it must be represented by the passages in readers' experiential accounts in which a theme is revisited and transformed, or re-articulated, by the reader. However, before the establishment and identification of the units, several questions emerge: (a) Is it possible to identify constituents of such a kind; that is, constituents that reflect the rearticulation of a given theme? (b) If possible, what are the guidelines that inform the search for constituents of this kind? (c) What is to be considered a "theme"? (d) What is to be considered a "modified theme"?

These questions lead to the second implication of the researchers' findings. The identification of the context in which self-modification is likely to occur constrains their understanding of self-modification and the guidelines that would inform the selection of constituents in this study. Given that self-modifying experiences are the focus of this study, the following guidelines were adopted in the search for constituents:

(a) *Forms of repetition*: A theme was defined in terms of what was repeated in readers' experiences; anything a reader returned to, elaborated, transformed, as, for instance, concern with a character's feelings, concern with a character's motives; autobiographical references. To maximize the possibility of finding transformations, a theme was first understood to be something recurrent across and within commentaries.

(b) *Forms of feelings*: Explicit expressions of affect in a broad sense, including what has been described in the literature as emotion, mood, sentiment, passions, evaluations also guided the initial identification of constituents. Any re-occurrence with transformation of explicit expressions regarding the feelings of characters, feelings embodied in setting descriptions, readers' feelings, etc., were considered.

(c) *Forms of understanding*: Changes in the way understanding was conveyed by the participants were observed. Attention was given to any use of uncertainty, illustrations, demonstrations, realization, summary, imagery vividness, or any other form of understanding articulated by the participants.

(d) *Forms of self-implication*: comparison between self and other (including objects and setting) also informed the identification of constituents. Instances of what has been referred to in the literature as empathy, identification, similarity, personification of objects, among others, were also considered.

These initial guidelines informed the identification of “affective themes” as they manifest themselves in discourse, an area which has not yet been systematized or assessed empirically. The definition of “affective theme” that will be relevant for understanding and defining self-modification will be one of the results of the inductive analysis here proposed. The establishment of criteria to constrain the identification of constituents was, nevertheless, still needed. Thus, following the underlying concepts at the heart of NAP, alongside with repetition, frequency was also considered. These two criteria enabled the observation of what stands out in the experiential accounts studied and indicated that the most frequent “theme” articulated (and possibly modified) by the participants of this study was the characterization of the protagonist of the short story

“Miss Brill” (254 out of a total of 288 commentaries). Despite this fact, the focus of the inductive analysis revealed itself to be the reader, that is, how he or she reflects the description of this character. Thus, the text is here viewed metaphorically as a kind of mirror that captures the image of the reader and is contemplated. In other words, readers observe its shape, color, glassy surface, but it is also there, at hand, for readers to reflect on their own selves. This analogy helps explain the phenomenological attitude assumed here: while looking at his/her image and becoming conscious of the act of perceiving, the mirror becomes something immanent to the reader’s reflection.

This analogy, in fact, leads to the underlying questions of this study (see Chapter 1): how does the text appear to these readers through their perceiving it? How do readers appear to themselves through their perceiving the text?; or, when readers read the text, how do they see themselves? How is such perception/appearance modified? How does such perception/appearance materialize in discourse? In other words, while characterizing the protagonist, how do readers position themselves in discourse? How is this same theme modified throughout a succession of comments? How can modifications of such a theme be described and justified linguistically? These are the main questions that helped establish the units of analysis, as described below.

4.5.2.1. Constituents (C):

LEX-NAP adopts and modifies to a certain extent one of the principles and strategies of NAP: that of constituent formation. To clarify how LEX-NAP relies on linguistics for this level of analysis, I will revisit the description offered in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1 of what is involved in the identification of constituents from a NAP perspective

and where Kuiken, Schopflocher and Wild (380), and Kuiken and Miall (“Numerically Aided Phenomenology”) define constituent as a paraphrase:

the phenomenological task is to identify and explicate the similarities in meaning among recurrent expressions ... it is crucial to capture as fully as possible the shared meaning of such descriptions, drawing out the nuances of meaning that they explicitly or implicitly share. *A paraphrase of that shared complexity is called a constituent.* (Section 3.1)

In Section 3.3.1 I demonstrated how, in NAP studies, paraphrases derive from what Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall call the “nature of the mental act” (“Expressive Reading” 260). Differently, LEX-NAP considers paraphrase a form of repetition, a concept that has been broadly studied by linguists and stylisticians (Halliday and Hasan; Hoey; Quirk et al., *A Grammar, A Comprehensive Grammar*; Toolan, “Emotions in Texts”; Winter, “Replacement as a Function,” “Replacement as a Fundamental Function”; Zyngier, *Crossroads*). It has been described as the fundamental aspect of metonymic writing (Lodge, “The Language”) in which any word that is repeated can carry with it a record of its occurrence. Stuart Gilbert (34) illustrates the complexity of repetition in the “Penelope” episode in *Ulysses*, arguing that “there are certain words which, whenever they recur, seem to shift the trend of [Penelope’s] musings, and might be called the ‘wobbling points’ of her monologue.” This shows how lexical repetition can be a very complex phenomenon. Even the notion of simple repetition (that is, words that share phonological and morphological identity) is not unproblematic.

In one of the most comprehensive and detailed studies on lexical cohesion, Hoey offers a typology of repetition. He is primarily interested not in itemizing cohesive

features but in observing how they combine to organize a text. He makes it clear that his description is not applicable to all texts (he excludes the analysis of narratives) and the main application of his theory is to obtain abridgements (including summaries that can be performed by computers). His classification is, nonetheless, useful here for the establishment of the unit of analysis. This concern is also Hoey's, when he asks: What are the elements that allow a speaker (or writer) to "say something again?" He describes lexical repetition as being signaled by the repetition of a word, by synonyms, antonyms, paraphrases, and by collocation. To him, paraphrase can, therefore, serve the function of repeating and assumes "close approximation [of items] in a context" (56).

Paraphrases can be *simple* or *complex* (62-68). Here is Hoey's definition of *simple paraphrase*:

simple paraphrase occurs whenever a lexical item may substitute for another in context without loss or gain in specificity and with no discernible change in meaning ... A paraphrase link is simple if an alteration needed to substitute one item for another in context is necessitated by a grammatical paradigm. (62-3)

He exemplifies this type of paraphrase by means of the words "sedating" and "tranquilized." These are in simple paraphrase because the change of "sedating" to "sedated" and "tranquilized" to "tranquilizing" when they substitute for each other is occasioned solely by a different syntactic choice from the verb-form paradigm (63).

Hoey's notion of *simple paraphrase* corresponds to Hasan's *synonymy*, except that she treats this as a general relation whereas Hoey stresses the importance of context in making or negating the relation. As the author observes, items can only be considered to

relate in paraphrase if they share collocational characteristics (63). It is true that work on collocation has already demonstrated how a word does not signify alone. The creation of texture depends heavily on how words collocate, that is, on how a lexical item relates to its environment (Halliday and Hasan; Sinclair, *Corpus*). Hoey illustrates with the words “Statesman” and “politician” and how they might constitute a paraphrase in one context and be contrasted in a different context (63).

The second type is defined by Hoey as *complex paraphrase*:

complex paraphrase is a can of lexical worms ... interpreted broadly, it may be said to occur when two lexical items are definable such that one of the items includes the other, although they share no lexical morpheme.

(64)

Hoey restricts its application to three situations. The first one is that of antonymy, including those that do not share a morpheme, such as hot/cold, as examples of complex paraphrase. The second case includes complex repetition of a given item (i.e., writer/writings) and a simple paraphrase (or antonymy) of a third item (i.e., writer and author). In this case, he identifies a complex paraphrase link between the second and the third items (writings and author).

It is true that the establishment of relations by means of paraphrase is context-dependent. Hoey acknowledges that the conditions to interpret what is to be considered a paraphrase are “open to the objection that they involve subjective judgment” (62). This is the reason why, while developing LEX-NAP as a method of analysis that has the potential to become replicable and verifiable and in order to have the level of subjectivity

decreased, it is important to substantiate the analysis conducted here on empirical evidence, in this case, the repetition that occurs in participants' experiential accounts.

More specifically, and for the purposes of this study, LEX-NAP relies on repetition and other aspects of language that may constitute modality (cf. Section 2.1), including vague language and deixis. In other words, in a LEX-NAP approach, constituents depend on the identification of repetition in readers' discourse that reveals modality.

In approaching this form of lexical analysis that enabled the identification of constituents, the first step was to be attentive to what stood out in each commentary. Like in NAP, LEX-NAP analyses are comparative. The following example from two commentaries from two different participants illustrates how the comparative analysis *across* commentaries and *across* protocols was conducted. Repetitions here play a relevant role. In response to the first selected evocative passage Participant 01 (P01) and Participant 18 (P18) say, respectively:

P01 (1):

I found *this passage of the excerpt very a little **disturbing** actually and quite **odd and quirky. The fact that she** *feels like stroking this dead animal that she wears as almost - **she almost** wears it as jewelry even. It's just kind of **disturbing** and the fact that she put so much into it and **she's so almost** inspired by it and feels so pretty and powerful when **she** has it on. **The fact that she just feels so much compassion for this dead fur that **she** wears is quite **disturbing in my opinion.******

P18 (1):

I think what impressed **me** the most was that it was really **weird** that **she** thought of **her** fur coat or fur whatever it is, as real and alive. And kind of talked to it in **her** head, which is **something that most people don't normally do**. So basically **I think** **she's** just a little **odd** right now.⁴⁸

These two commentaries were paired because the same kinds of repetition stand out, as detailed below:

a) In Commentary P01(1), there is simple repetition of the lexical item “*disturbing*,” which occurs three times in the commentary. The word “*disturbing*” can be linked with “*odd*” and “*quirky*” as these three “general words” carry a negative connotation of attitude on the part of the speaker. According to Hoey’s terminology, in commentary P18(1), “*weird*,” “*odd*” and “*something that most people don’t normally do*” form a simple paraphrase. Because they also carry a negative attitudinal connotation on the part of the commentator, these items are in relationship with the words discussed above.

b) In Commentary P01(1), the expression “the fact that she” also appears repeated, three times in the commentary. The personal pronoun “she” is repeated several times, keeping the protagonist under evaluation. The same kind of repetition occurs in Commentary P18(1). In this case, however, adding to “she,” the pronoun “her” is also repeated.

c) In Commentary P01(1) the expressions “I found that” and “in my opinion” can be said to be linked as simple paraphrases. They are also both expressions that create proximity

48. All of the commentaries included in this thesis are *ipsis litteris* transcriptions of what participants actually said during the interview.

to the self, to the “I” who speaks. They indicate that the commentator positions him/herself in the discourse. In Commentary P18(1), the expression “I think,” repeated twice, and the objective pronoun “me” are linked because they also refer to the “I” who speaks.

d) The use of vague language and intensifiers abound in these two commentaries. In P01(1), the items “very a little,” “quite,” “almost,” “kind of,” “so much,” “so almost” appear in repetition. The same form of repetition is typical of P18(1): “really,” “whatever,” “something,” “just a little.” Here, more caution must be exerted in assigning a function to these items. In her comprehensive analysis of conversational uses of vague language, Channell (1965-1995) details a number of possible purposes vague language might fulfill in communicative situations, among which are (a) “lexical gaps,” when readers might make use of vague language to convey meaning in situations where they do not have at their disposal the necessary words or phrases for the concepts they wish to express and, therefore, the use of vague language can be indicative of a pre-lexical or pre-language cognitive level being articulated); (b) “lack of specific information”; (c) “displacement,” when speakers use vague language to indicate uncertainty about what they want to say; (d) “self-protection,” when vagueness is used as a safeguard against being later shown to be wrong); (e) “power and politeness”; and (f) “women’s language,” although there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case, there are subjective impressions that women use more vague expressions than men. Uses of vague language and intensifiers were here organized under the same category because they were considered indices of commentators’ feelings. This will be, however, further explored

later, in Section 4.5.2.2 when the analysis of whole protocols is presented, providing appropriate context to validate the analyses.

It is important to observe that, in this study, I am not concerned with descriptions of vague language or any other use of evaluative language *per se*. I am interested in the analysis of how readers talk about their experiences of reading and how language becomes a way into what readers feel and think.

Having said that, it is important, to notice, however, that a modifier usually accompanies the words that carry negative evaluation of Miss Brill on the part of the two readers. In Commentary P01(1), “*very a little disturbing*”; “*quite odd and quirky*”; “*kind of disturbing*”; “*quite disturbing.*” In Commentary P18(1), “*really weird,*” “*just a little odd.*” These modifiers attribute a certain level of intensity to the adjectives. I am open to observing how modality is expressed: whether by means of intensifiers or through hedges, which introduce “fuzziness with respect to the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition being conveyed” or “fuzziness within the proposition that the speaker is expressing (Channell 16-17), considered instances of vague language (Channell 16-19), among other aspects of language.

In summary, what Commentaries P01(1) and P18(1) share are the two referents: the “I,” or the commentator, and “she,” or the character Miss Brill. The participants, then, comment on how they position themselves in relation to the protagonist, who is the primary object of their derogatory evaluation. Their comments are affectively charged (given the levels of intensity attributed to each adjective). Feelings abound and are here materialized by the words that carry negative connotation and also by the use of vague language and intensifiers.

Once this first analysis was conducted, it was then necessary to create paraphrases, or constituents to express similarities in meaning expressions between the two commentaries most closely related. As discussed throughout this thesis, the linguistic component constitutes an important aspect of the approach, so the wording of such paraphrases, or constituents, needs to be carefully established to enable similarities in meanings to be thoroughly grasped. To this purpose, it is important to be attentive to the two distinct ways words make relationships. First, words may relate because they occur in repetition. Second, they may establish paradigmatic relationships. The links described in “a,” “b,” “c,” and “d” above could potentially fill the same slot in a language string. In other words, the paradigmatic relationship between the repeated words described above can be organized as follows:

Table 4.1: Lexical Repetition and Paradigmatic Relationships, Example 1

a	b	c	d
<p>I found that In my opinion I think</p>	<p>very a little quite kind of really just a little something...</p>	<p>disturbing odd quirky weird ...that most people don't normally do</p>	<p>the fact [about Miss Brill] she</p>
<p>I</p>	<p>evaluate negatively</p>		<p>Miss Brill</p>

The links established among the items because they establish a form of relation of repetition and their paradigmatic relationship in the *specific context* of each commentary enabled the constitution of the following constituent:

Constituent: < I evaluate Miss Brill negatively >

It must be stressed that constituents are tightly linked to the context from which they originated, thus preempting the possibility that their affective charge being other than what surges from the source texts. In this sense, the working definition for *constituent* as a paraphrase, here considered a kind of repetition, may describe dynamic modifications throughout entire protocols. The next section provides a working definition of *transformation constituent*.

4.5.2.2. Transformation Constituents (TC):

The method to identify *transformation constituents* differs from the one for *constituents* because, for the identification of the former, commentaries were compared at two different levels. First, comparison was drawn *across* commentaries *within* the same protocol. Second, comparison was drawn *across* protocols. Commentaries by the same Participant 01 (P01) discussed above illustrate how the first level of analysis unfolds. Here are Commentaries 1, 2, and 3 by Participant 01 (P01) in response to the first, second and third evocative passages selected, respectively:

P01(1):

I found this passage of the excerpt very a little **disturbing** actually and quite **odd** and **quirky**. **The fact that she** feels like stroking this dead animal that she wears as almost - she almost wears it as jewelry even. It's just kind of **disturbing**

and **the fact that she** put *so much* into it and **she's** *so almost* inspired by it and feels *so* pretty and powerful when she has it on. **The fact that she just feels *so much* compassion for this dead fur that she wears is *quite* disturbing in my opinion.**

P01(2):

This passage **I found**—well, before it **she's** talking about how **she's** like, feels that **she's** important enough to listen in to other people's conversation and judge them upon what they're doing. Which was *quite* **odd** and *very* **disturbing** ... But **the fact that she** says that the old couple, *perhaps* they would go soon, it seems to be referring not to **the fact that** maybe they would leave the park or wherever they are, but *perhaps* they would die. Which that **I found** that idea that **she** would even think that to make **her** seem *very, very* **rude** and *very* **insensitive** to the people around **her** ... **The fact that she** puts that kind of judgment and thinks that **she** can say that about somebody is—**I find** it *very* **rude** and it's—it's *rather* **godly of her** ... like, **she's** playing out their lives for them which **I find** *very* **odd** and *very* **disturbing**.

P01(3):

That line **I found** it portrayed **Miss Brill** as *very* a **conceited** and **arrogant** **woman**. **The fact that she** finds other people's lives as a play themselves, that **she** has entertainment from the distress and the pain and the intrigue and the

happiness of other people's lives, that **she** takes them into such consideration, **she** doesn't consider them that is. **She** judges them and **she** interprets them however **she** desires and **the fact that she** thinks that somebody wouldn't notice **her** if **she** wasn't there, that somebody would be sad that **she** wasn't there. **I**

think is *a little bit* **odd** considering **she** doesn't speak to anybody and **she** just sits there as an observer, **she's** not part of the performance, **she's** a prop sat there to – judge them. **She** doesn't act as a participant whatsoever. **So the fact that she** sees **herself** as an actress within the world itself is **odd**. **She** doesn't really have to have any part in it for **she** doesn't change it or have anything to do about the way it works, all **she** does is observe, which doesn't connect **her** to anybody, it just makes **her** – **she's almost like a tree**, **she** just – **she's not a person**, **she's** just somebody who's there and is present at a scene but doesn't take part in it.

Initially, the words that stand out by means of repetition (represented here by different font sizes and styles) were observed. Comparative analysis across commentaries and within the same protocol P01 reveals similarities in meaning expressions. Relations among words in terms of repetition and the paradigmatic relationship they draw are summarized below:

Table 4.2: Lexical Repetition and Paradigmatic Relationships, Example 2

a	b	c	d
I found/find that In my opinion I think	very a little quite kind of very rather a little bit almost	disturbing odd quirky rude insensitive godly conceited arrogant	the fact [about Miss Brill] she
I	evaluate negatively		Miss Brill

There are similarities in the way each of the three commentaries is expressed: the reader refers to the character and continues to evaluate the protagonist negatively. An even closer analysis, though, enables the identification of nuances that will distinguish each of these commentaries. Closer analysis was conducted when each of the columns of the table above was further assessed. It is noticeable, for instance, that reader P01 continues to use the “I” to refer to herself, that Miss Brill’s actions and/or feelings continue to be the object of her negative evaluation. However, when observing the content of such evaluation, differences that are lexically marked are noticed. More specifically, different modifiers contribute to the negative evaluation.

In Commentary 1, the reader refers to Miss Brill’s actions and/or feelings as “*very a little disturbing*,” “*quite odd and quirky*”; “*kind of disturbing*” and “*quite disturbing*.” In Commentary 2, the reader evaluates the character’s actions and/or feelings as “*quite odd and very disturbing*”; “*very, very rude and very insensitive*”; “*very rude*”; “*rather godly of her*”; “*very odd and very disturbing*.” In Commentary 3, the reader refers to Miss Brill

as “*very conceited and arrogant woman*”; “*a little bit odd*”; “odd”; “**almost** like a tree, she just—she’s not a person.” These examples show that the intensifiers vary in degree. Between Commentaries 1 and 2, the reader’s evaluation increases in intensity (from “*quite odd*” in Commentary 1 to “**very, very odd**” in Commentary 2). In Commentary 3, the evaluation becomes so negative that the reader even resorts to a simile and draws a quite unusual comparison between Miss Brill and an inanimate object: “*she’s almost like a tree.*” These observations allowed classification according to degrees of intensity in negative evaluation (Appendix 2)

The same occurs with P18 below:

P18 (1):

I think what impressed **me** the most was that it was *really* **weird** that **she** thought of **her** fur coat or fur *whatever it is, as real and alive. And kind of talked to it in her head, which is something that most people don’t normally do. So basically **I think** she’s *just a little* **odd** right now.*

P18(2):

This struck **me** because it was *really* **weird that most normal people wouldn’t do that. If I knew** someone was listening to my conversation on purpose **I** wouldn’t be too happy. Overall **she just *seemed pretty* weird** and this emphasizes it.

P18(3):

This struck **me** ‘cause it’s *very* **weird** that **she** considers normal, everyday life as everyone being on stage. And simply because **she** does the same thing every week,

she thinks it's *part of* – **I** don't know, *part of* a performance. It shows that **she** really has no purpose in life, **she** has nothing better to do. So **she** sits and listens to other people's life to *like*, fulfill **her** own life, which is very sad.

The shared similarities in profiles of lexical relation between P01 and P18 can be described as follows. Across the three commentaries above, P18 evaluates Miss Brill negatively throughout. Like in P01, such commentaries vary in degree of intensity. In Commentary 1, the reader hesitates in her judgment of Miss Brill, whom she considers “*really weird*” and “*just a little odd*” at the same time. Such hesitation is absent in the subsequent commentaries. In Commentary 2, the character's actions are considered as “*really weird that most people wouldn't do.*” In Commentary 3, she is definitely “*very weird.*”

Across the three commentaries, P01 and P18 vary in the way they use discourse to evaluate the protagonist, which can be expressed by means of the following

Transformation Constituent:



Another variation in the theme of negative evaluation of the protagonist can be demonstrated by the analysis of subsequent commentaries of P01. In response to the

fourth selected evocative passage, this reader changes her attitude, now evaluating the character in a positive light:

P01(4):

I found that section *very* interesting, it gives *kind of* an inside look at **Mrs. Brill**. Before all **she's** seen as is somebody who's an observer and **she** likes to understand everything about everyone's lives and be a part of it even though **she** has no business of it. And **the fact that she** didn't understand what they were thinking because it wasn't a verbal – the beauty of not knowing what they were understanding brought **her** emotion, which **I think she** needed because **she** felt so connected to everyone, yet in this instant the beauty of not knowing is what gave **her** *the most emotion*, which **I felt was quite pretty and gave her a little bit of a morality**, it *kind of* made **her** an *easier person to connect it to* because you don't understand what people are thinking and even though you wish to know, you can't....

Now, P01 evaluates the character's actions as “*quite pretty*” and with “*a little bit of morality*” and chooses words that carry positive connotations. P01 can now be paired with another reader (P07), whose extracts of his response to the first selected evocative passage and overall commentary on the text are as follows:

P07(1):

... So here **she** is, **she's** rubbing the life back into these little eyes and **she's** describing it through the fur, **she's** not connecting it to **herself** but ultimately **I** **believe** that's what's happening in this passage. And why **I thought** it was

evocative is just because it seemed – okay, **pathetic is not exactly the word I'm looking for. Weak? Umm. Weakness, yes, but – I feel** a sense of sadness. Sometimes I feel sad in little happy moments. **She's** trying to do something better for **herself** but it's sad because at the end of the story we realize how much it hurts **her** in the end and how it doesn't work and how nothing's really changed. And I think that's why it's so sad is because **she** was trying and I think that everyone who tries should be rewarded for it or have some kind of happiness if you're willing to make the difference in your life but it's just not happening for **her**. So that's what I thought on that passage.

P07(6):

All right, so the text as a whole. At the end when **she** turns to **her** neighbours with tears in **her** eyes because the music is so moving and **she's** imagining everyone coming up and singing together and **she's** a part of it too and that's what's so **moving** about **her** character, is how much **she** wants to belong and **how** really **interesting of a character she really is**, if people just got to know **her** I'm sure that they'd really like **her** but **she** just doesn't have that opportunity. And I think—it's easy for me to say well, **she** should probably like maybe start talking to people instead of just listening in to their conversations, that would go a long way ... So, yeah, that's what I feel about it.

Like P01, this reader evaluates the protagonist negatively in Commentary 1. He calls her “pathetic” and states that she has “weakness” in character. In contrast, in Commentary 6, he evaluates her positively. Now the character becomes “moving” and “really interesting.”

This specific kind of modification exemplified in P01 and P07 throughout commentaries is expressed by means of the following *Transformation Constituent*:



Hoey’s typology of repetition as a framework for articulating a working definition for the concepts of *Constituent* and *Transformation Constituent* becomes clearer here. He considers antonyms as one of the forms of complex repetition (64). Here, it is understood that throughout the commentaries of P101 and P107, repetition of modification of a given theme occurs. In the context of P101(4), “quite pretty” and “a little bit of morality” and in the context of P107(6), “moving” and “really interesting” are understood as being in an antagonistic relationship with the negative words these participants used in their previous commentaries to qualify the protagonist negatively.

Having discussed more of the context of the protocols, the use of vague language in these commentaries is revealing of the readers’ feelings and can be here further explored and validated. In her Commentary 4, P01 states explicitly that her feelings are at stake. She says: “*which I felt was quite pretty and gave her a little bit of a morality.*” P07 also

refers explicitly to his feelings. In Commentary 6, he says: “*So, yeah, that’s what I feel about it.*” This argument can be further validated by other evidence. According to Channell’s findings, one of the situations in which speakers make use of vagueness is that of “lexical gaps.” Speakers can use vagueness to convey meaning in situations where they do not have at their disposal the necessary words or phrases for the concepts they wish to express (180). She offers substantial evidence that people can and often do think about concepts that they cannot really talk about, i.e., that there may be a pre-lexical or pre-language cognitive level (180). Here, this pre-language cognitive level surges in terms of feelings, which as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.4, anticipate cognitive efforts. Evidence of what Channell calls “lexical gap” is provided by P07, in the first commentary. Justifying his selection of an evocative passage, he says: “... *and why I thought it was evocative is just because it seemed—okay, pathetic is not exactly the word I’m looking for. Weak? Umm. Weakness, yes, but—I feel ...*” Here it is possible to see that this reader clearly struggles to find an appropriate word that expresses what he feels towards the character. These examples show how the discourse analysis of participants’ commentaries might reveal much of the readers’ feelings.

It must be stressed that constituents and transformation constituents are not exclusive. Several constituents might be revealing of the expressed meanings of a same commentary. In this line, several transformation constituents reveal re-articulations of a theme in the same protocol.

In developing LEX-NAP, the methods of identification of *constituents* and *transformation constituents* were exposed and their working definitions elaborated in Sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2. Chapter 5 explores how the identification of *constituents* and

transformation constituents is combined in the analysis of reading processes and form the basis for the articulation of a typology of reading experiences.

Having described the methodological framework used, the next chapter explores the data analytical procedures that inform the present research. Readers' experiences are classified into different types and their textual determinants are identified. This will enable a better understanding of the relation between readers and text.

Chapter 5. A Typology of Reading Experiences

Trawling through the vast quantity of data generated by LEX-NAP is a challenging task. As this study aims at producing descriptions that are faithful to the diversity, richness, and depth of readers' commentaries, complexity cannot be avoided in the data if we are to reveal patterned structures that reflect reading experiences. Empirical studies rely on the strength of their evidence. Therefore, this chapter offers systematic guidance through the analytical procedures carried out. In Section 5.1, the framework that informs the analysis of readers' experiential accounts is presented. Section 5.2 discusses the textual determinants of the reading experience. It is assumed that this framework will allow a better understanding of how participants responded to the text they read.

5.1. Experiential Accounts

When readers talk aloud about their feelings, memories, or impressions in response to an evocative passage, these are considered experiential accounts. Section 5.1.1 carries out the analysis at two levels. Section 5.1.2 discusses the reliability of this analytical method. Finally, Section 5.1.3 reports the results of the cluster analysis conducted.

5.1.1. Two Levels

Transformation *Constituents* are the units of the present investigation (Section 4.5.2.2). In order to identify them in each of the 48 accounts observed and trace their

patterns of development, shifts in articulation of themes were described. Findings of previous research on self-modification seem to support the tendency for these shifts to occur early in most of the experiential accounts: more precisely, in the second commentaries. While investigating the role of individual differences in self-modification, Kuiken et al. (“Locating”) noticed that the second marked passage played a significant role in the temporality of experience. They pointed out that shifts occurred mostly (1) in response to the second and also to the third marked passages, where readers with high absorption scores were more likely to report modification of previously expressive affective themes; (2) with high-absorption readers, who were more likely to report a shifting sense of self in the second marked passage; (3) when readers used metaphors of personal identification. In this case, theme variations tended to be positively correlated with reported self-perceptual shifts (278-9).

Thus, to observe how readers’ responses develop through a succession of evocative passages, the cut-off point for analysis was here set at the second commentary. More specifically, the focus of the investigation lies on whether there is a difference in the articulation of themes between a reader’s first encounter with the text (Commentaries 1 and 2) and the subsequent (lack of) re-articulation of these themes throughout subsequent Commentaries 3 to 6.

To this purpose, each account was divided into two moments: the first one corresponding to the first two of the six commentaries and representing the reader’s first encounter with the text. Moment 2 corresponds to Commentaries 3 to 6. Commentary 6 was added due to the fact that it was assumed that the reading experience still lingers as readers comment on the text as a whole. To illustrate this point, the observation of change

in readers' experiences of themselves while reading a text can be expressed by means of the formula:

X BECOMES Y

Figure 5.1 below offers a graphic representation of these two moments: X represents the initial moment of readers' encounter with the text and Y stands for the variations of the initial posture towards the text developed throughout their subsequent commentaries.

Figure 5.1: Two Moments in Experiential Accounts

Commentaries		
X	Moment 1	1
		2
BECOMES		
Y	Moment 2	3
		4
		5
		6

In NAP studies conducted so far (e.g., Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, "Forms"), constituents usually derive from analysis conducted within commentaries (e.g., only within Commentary 1) across experiential accounts of different readers. Focus is placed upon repeated expressed meanings, which can be paraphrased. Here, a somewhat different strategy is followed. First, variations *within* commentaries (i.e., within Commentary 1, within Commentary 2, etc.) of the same reader are observed. Second, repeated variations are identified *across* commentaries of the same reader (across Commentaries 1 to 6). Third, repeated variations are observed *within* and *across* commentaries of different readers.

5.1.1.1. Moment 1

In order to get hold of readers' initial experiences, the first two commentaries in the 48 accounts were read, without establishing any links with the selected segment to which they referred. After this initial exploratory approach, the first two commentaries were systematically compared and similarly expressed meanings were identified. At this stage, no additional judge was asked to review the identification. When sentences with similar meanings occurred in two or more of these commentaries in each account, they were paraphrased into constituents so as to reflect as much as possible their common meaning. Constituents were identified according to the strategies described in Section 4.5.2.1. For example, the constituent <*I evaluate Miss Brill negatively*> paraphrases the similar meaning expressed in the first two commentaries of two different readers. Here are extracts of the first two commentaries of P01:

P01(1):

... **The fact that [Miss Brill] feels like stroking this dead animal that she wears as almost—she almost wears it as jewelry even [is] kind of *disturbing* ...**

P01(2):

... **the fact that [Miss Brill] says that the old couple, perhaps they would go soon, ... perhaps they would die ... I found that idea that *she* would even think that to make *her* seem *very, very rude* and *very insensitive* to the people around *her* ...I find *very odd* and *very disturbing*.**

Extracts of the first two commentaries of another reader (P18) are presented as follows:

P18(1):

... Basically I think [**Miss Brill**]’s just a little **odd** right now.

P18(2):

*This struck me because it was **really weird that most normal people wouldn’t do that.** ... Overall **she just seemed pretty weird** and this emphasizes it.*

Constituent: <I evaluate Miss Brill negatively>

Once a constituent was identified, each of the first two commentaries of each of the accounts were systematically re-read to determine the presence or absence of that expressed meaning. After repeated readings, an array of 29 constituents across 96 commentaries was identified.

5.1.1.2. Moment 2

After formulating constituents for Commentaries 1 and 2 of the 48 accounts (Moment 1), Commentaries 3 to 6 were analyzed (Moment 2). The manner whereby Moment 1 constituents presented repetitions and modifications was observed; that is, the focus was now on whether the repeated patterns identified in Moment 1 recurred and how these recurrences were modified. The analyses generated an array of 574 *Transformation Constituents* (TCs). A summary of the distribution of each constituent per moment is presented in Figure 5.2 below. Transformation Constituents reflect the combination of one of the constituents in Moment 1 with one of the constituents in Moment 2. Figure 5.2 below shows some of the possibilities of combinations between constituents in the first column and constituents in the second one. In other words, readers’ first two commentaries (Moment 1) were characterized by one or more of the 29 constituents

listed under Column X of Figure A3 (see Appendix 3). Their succeeding commentaries (Moment 2) were characterized by one or more of the 76 constituents listed under Column Y in the same figure. In other words, Figure 5.2 below shows a sample of the patterns typical to the experiential accounts here investigated (for a complete overview, see Appendix 3):

Figure 5.2: A Sample of the Repetition Patterns

X Moment 1 Commentaries 1 and 2		Y Moment 2 Commentaries 3 to 6
I evaluate the protagonist negatively	BECOMES	I evaluate the protagonist negatively
I evaluate the protagonist positively		I evaluate the protagonist negatively in a slightly different way
I evaluate the other characters negatively		I evaluate the protagonist negatively with increased intensity
I feel for the protagonist		I evaluate the protagonist negatively with decreased intensity
I feel for the protagonist (noetic/personal)		I evaluate the protagonist positively
I feel for the protagonist (noematic/impersonal)		I evaluate the protagonist positively in a slightly different way
I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself		I evaluate the other characters negatively
I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself		I evaluate the other characters negatively with increased intensity
I do not acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself		I evaluate the text (overall) positively
I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery		I hesitate to evaluate the text (overall) positively
I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone		I evaluate the text (overall) negatively
I recognize aspects of Miss Brill in others		I feel for the protagonist
I characterize the text/setting with vivid imagery		I feel for the protagonist in slightly different ways
I evaluate the text positively		I feel for the protagonist (noetic/personal)
I evaluate the text negatively		I feel for the protagonist (noematic/impersonal)

From the data observed, a total of 574 different types of transformations over 288 commentaries by 48 readers were obtained. 164 TCs were neither rare (i.e., found in less than 10% of the narratives) nor ubiquitous (i.e., found in more than 90% of the narratives). By using this criterion, the undesirable effect of working with extremely sparse matrices was avoided and one of the general principles of NAP and of cluster analysis in general was guaranteed: that of obtaining *polythetic* clusters (see Section 3.4.1).

After this close examination of reader's commentaries with a focus on the content and, in particular, the style of what they said about their reading experience, the next step was to assess the reliability of these discriminations.

5.1.2. Reliability

Since the proposal here is to extend the descriptions of previous investigations into forms of self-implication in readers' response to literary texts (e.g., Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, "Forms"; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, "Expressive Reading"), the next step was to verify the level of reliability of the analytical method. As indicated in Section 4.5.1, one of the criteria that LEX-NAP aims to fulfill is that of replicability and verifiability. To this purpose, it was necessary to provide not only working definitions of the key concepts that support the analytical framework, but also to verify whether the analysis was reliable.

In order to meet the criterion of reliability, a second judge, who was acquainted with the TCs, but who was blind to the previous analyses, performed deductive content analysis (Elo and Kyngas) of the 48 experiential accounts based on about 60% of the

resulting 164 TCs that were neither rare nor ubiquitous. This second rater scored these accounts for absence or presence of TCs. The objectives here were to a) strengthen the analytical method by verifying whether it could be replicated by other analysts; b) ascertain whether these initial findings could be replicated; c) carry out a finer-grained analysis to assess further subtleties. After the second analyst conducted the deductive content analyses, inter-judge agreement was measured. Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was used as a criterion. Results of this assessment are summarized in Table 5.1 below and as reported by Siemens.

Table 5.1: Inter-Rater Reliability

Measure of Agreement Kappa	Interpretation	Proportion of Transformation Constituents
1.00	Perfect agreement	41.42%
0.81-0.99	Almost perfect agreement	8.57%
0.61-0.80	Substantial agreement	41.42%
0.41-0.60	Moderate agreement	8.57%
0.21-0.40	Fair agreement	0%
0.20-0	Slight agreement	0%
<0	No agreement	0%


As Table 5.1 shows, 91.41% of the time agreement was better than moderate. The two judges did not disagree in their analyses of any TC. Since agreement ranged from moderate to perfect, and analyses were consistent, the method was, thus, considered reliable and replicable. The analyses of the second judge (Siemens) substantiated the analytical framework here developed.

5.1.3. Cluster Analysis

Reliability assured, the next step was to submit the array of 164 TCs over 48 experiential accounts to cluster analytical procedures. Hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward's method, Euclidean distances) was conducted to group accounts according to similarities in TC profiles. Squared Euclidian Distance coefficients assessed the (dis)similarity between each pair of commentaries. Ward's method was used to group commentaries according to the (dis)similarity in the profiles of constituent features. The programs SPSS and Clustan Graphics were used to perform the cluster analysis.

The results yielded four distinct clusters of experiential accounts. A k-means cluster analysis, beginning with the four cluster centers identified using Ward's method, was used to optimize cluster compactness, resulting in four clearly interpretable clusters with 22, 14, 8, and 4 members each. To determine whether the structure displayed by this cluster solution was non-random, the input matrix was randomized and reanalyzed across a series of 500 trials to provide mean fusion values and their confidence intervals (Wishart; Wohl, Kuiken, and Noels). It is true that a common problem to all clustering techniques is the difficulty of deciding the ideal number of clusters or the appropriate fusion values. It is generally suggested, however, to examine the dendrogram for large changes between fusions (Everitt, Landau, and Leese 59). Figure 5.3 below presents the dendrogram yielded from the analyses here conducted. The three large gaps between the fusion lines distinguish the four interpretable resulting clusters of this study.

Figure 5.3: Dendrogram



The prevalence of each transformation constituent across clusters was compared to determine the constituents that differentiated one cluster from the other. A constituent was regarded as differentiating if the proportion of individuals expressing it within a cluster was greater than the proportion expressing it in at least one other cluster. Fisher's LSD test was used as a guideline as it takes into account both mean differences and variability ($p < .05$). It should be emphasized that, since clustering algorithms maximize between cluster differences, the LSD statistic was used descriptively here and not in its usual role for testing non-random departures from group equivalence (Everitt, Landau, and Leese 180; Wohl, Kuiken, and Noels 552). Results for the 117 (of 164) constituents that met criteria for cluster differentiation are summarized in Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.

Results of LEX-NAP were assessed not only by means of measures of reliability (Section 5.1.2) but also by calculating the constituent prevalence of the resulting four clusters. Such prevalence is summarized in Table 5.2 below:

Table 5.2: Constituent Prevalence

Differentiating	Distinctive	Unique
71.3%	38.4%	4.2%
Total: 164 TCs		

Table 5.2 shows that, out of the 164 transformation constituents, 71.3% are *differentiating*, that is, the constituent proportion in one cluster differs from that in at least one other cluster even though it does not differ from one or more other clusters; 38.4% are *distinctive*, that is, the constituent proportion in one cluster differs from the constituent proportions in all the others using the LSD criterion; and 4.26% are *unique*, that is, the constituent is evident only in a single cluster and is never present in any of the others. In sum, 41.36% of these transformation constituents help distinguish one cluster from the other three or are unique to one of the clusters. They allow stronger descriptions of phenomena because they do more than just enabling the identification of what makes these accounts the kind that they are; they enable the identification of the attributes that are distinctive and unique to each cluster. If understood in terms of a cline of relevance, these are the finest constituents and the ones that enable more sensitive descriptions of phenomena. Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 below summarize the results for the 117 (out of 164) constituents that met the criteria here established for cluster differentiation. In other words, the analyses below entail the description of the meaningful patterns, that is, the empirically established differentiating features that characterize each of the four clusters.

Cluster I:

Table 5.3 below summarizes results that differentiate and distinguish Cluster I from the other three.

Table 5.3: Compared Member Proportion (Cluster I)

Cluster #		Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV	
n		22	14	8	4	
Moment 1		Moment 2				
I describe the protagonist from a distance	BECOMES	TC103: I describe the protagonist from a distance, but in slightly different ways	.27 ^d	.00	.00	.00
I evaluate the protagonist negatively		TC52: I generalize the protagonist's qualities to everyone	.05 ^b	.50	.13	.50
		TC43: I feel with the protagonist	.00 ^b	.36	.13	.50
		TC71: I realize something (about myself)	.00 ^b	.29	.13	.50
I feel for the protagonist		TC83: I evaluate the sentence/text (overall) positively	.00 ^b	.29	.13	.50

Note. ^aMore frequently present than in the other three clusters, p.<.05 (italics in proportions indicate where differentiation occurs); ^bless frequently present than in the other three clusters, p.<.05; ^c **distinctive constituents**, p.<.05; ^d unique constituents; ^e **distinctive and unique constituents**, p.<.05.

As Table 5.3 indicates, this is the cluster with the greatest number of members and the smallest amount of differentiating constituents (see Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 below for comparison). Cluster I is characterized by the unique transformation constituent: <I describe the protagonist from a distance BECOMES I describe the protagonist from a distance in slightly different ways> (TC103), which is only present in this cluster. Only in this cluster participants remain as external observers of the protagonist from Moment 1 to Moment 2. This unique transformation is subtle: there is no change in terms of content

or theme variation, but there is a slight change in the style of the description (“but in slightly different ways”).

Among the TCs that distinguish the other three clusters (see Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 below), 25% are less frequently present in Cluster I than in the other three and about 90% are less frequently present than in two other clusters, so the TCs that distinguish the other three clusters have very low or null occurrence among participants in Cluster I. In other words, forms of feeling expressions (i.e., “I feel for the protagonist”), evaluations (i.e., “I evaluate the protagonist negatively”), or expressions that indicate any form of personal involvement (i.e., “I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself,” “I feel for the protagonist”) are totally absent or are expressed in very few experiential accounts (TC52, TC43, TC71, TC83). The pattern that is brought to light here is the following: these readers’ accounts focus mainly on the protagonist, taken as an object of observation. If there is any sort of feeling in Moment 1, this is almost never modified (TC52, TC43, TC71, TC83). What particularly differentiates this cluster from Clusters II and IV are modifications in the negative evaluations of the protagonist in Moment 1, which less frequently take the form of generalizations (TC52), and never that of empathy (TC43) or self-realizations (TC71) in Moment 2. Moreover, none of these readers experience sympathy for the protagonist (TC83). Due to their lack of emotional involvement, these readers stand as external observers of the text.

Cluster II:

As compared to Cluster I, Cluster II is characterized by a larger number of transformation constituents. Table 5.4 below summarizes the patterns that are meaningful to the experiential accounts of members of this cluster.

Table 5.4: Compared Member Proportion (Cluster II)

Cluster #		Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV	
n		22	14	8	4	
Moment 1	Moment 2					
I evaluate the protagonist negatively	BECOMES	(TC1) I evaluate the protagonist negatively in a slightly different way	.09	.79 ^c	.25	.25
		(TC3) I evaluate the protagonist negatively with decreased intensity	.00	.43 ^a	.00	.25
		(TC4) Absence	.09	.64 ^a	.25	.50
		(TC6) I feel for the protagonist	.00	.79 ^a	.25	.75
		(TC8) I feel for the protagonist with increased intensity	.00	.57 ^a	.13	.25
		(TC15) I feel for the protagonist with decreased intensity	.00	.29 ^c	.00	.00
		(TC33) I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.00	.36 ^a	.25	.00
		(TC47) I recognize the protagonist's qualities in others	.00 ^b	.43 ^a	.13	.25
		(TC56) I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery	.00 ^b	.64 ^a	.13	.50
		(TC76) I evaluate the passage/text (overall) negatively	.00	.29 ^a	.00	.25
		(TC88) I generalize aspects of the other characters to everyone	.00	.29 ^a	.00	.25
		(TC175) I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.00	.79 ^c	.25	.25
I feel for the protagonist	(TC55) I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone	.00	.29 ^a	.00	.25	
	(TC99) I evaluate the protagonist negatively	.00	.29 ^a	.13	.00	

I recognize aspects of the protagonist in others	(TC18) I feel for the protagonist	.00	.43 ^c	.13	.00
	(TC19) I feel for the protagonist with increased intensity	.00	.29 ^a	.13	.00
	<i>(TC20) I evaluate the protagonist negatively</i>	.00	.43 ^c	.00	.00
	<i>(TC53) I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone</i>	.00	.29 ^c	.00	.00
	<i>(TC92) I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery</i>	.00	.43 ^c	.00	.00
I evaluate the text positively	(TC176) I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.00	.36 ^a	.13	.00
	(TC198): I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.09	.00 ^b	.75	.75

Note. ^aMore frequently present than in the other three clusters, $p < .05$ (italics in proportions indicate where differentiation occurs); ^bless frequently present than in the other three clusters, $p < .05$; ^c **distinctive constituents**, $p < .05$; ^d unique constituents; ^e **distinctive and unique constituents**, $p < .05$.

Here, seven transformation constituents distinguish and/or are unique to Cluster II, the second largest in terms of membership. Four kinds of feeling transformations are unique and distinctive to Cluster II; that is, these feeling modifications not only distinguish this cluster from the three others, but are only present in it, namely, (a) modification from negative evaluation of the protagonist in Moment 1 to sympathy for the protagonist with decreased intensity in Moment 2 (TC15); and external reference of the protagonist in Moment 1 to (b) negative evaluation of the protagonist (TC20), (c) generalizations (TC53), and (d) use of vivid imagery to characterize the protagonist in Moment 2 (TC92).

Three kinds of feeling modifications distinguish Cluster II from all others, but are not unique to it, namely, (a) prolonged negative evaluation of the protagonist, with modification of the style of such evaluation from Moment 1 to Moment 2 (TC1); (b) negative evaluation of the protagonist in Moment 1 to sympathy for the protagonist,

which is expressed in a personal way in Moment 2 (TC175); (c) external reference of the protagonist in Moment 1 to sympathy for the protagonist in Moment 2 (TC18).

In sum, what particularly distinguishes this cluster from the other three are slight changes. The initial negative evaluation of the protagonist and external reference to her turns into sympathy, expressed in a personal way and with vivid imagery, but with decreased intensity and with generalizations. Even though feeling expressions become more self-implicating, these readers continue to reject the protagonist as negative evaluation remains. The overall pattern that characterizes this cluster is a decrease in readers' feelings.

Cluster III:

As for Cluster III, Table 5.5 summarizes results obtained:

Table 5.5: Compared Member Proportion (Cluster III)

Cluster #		Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV	
n		22	14	8	4	
Moment 1	Moment 2					
I describe the setting/text with vivid imagery	BECOMES	TC104: I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery	.05	.07	.50 ^a	.25
		TC106: I evaluate the protagonist positively	.05	.00	.38 ^a	.25
		TC115: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.18	.14	.75 ^c	.25
		TC111: I feel for the protagonist	.09	.14	.75 ^c	.25
		TC123: I generalize the protagonist to everyone	.09	.14	.75 ^c	.00
		TC127: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.05	.07	.50 ^a	.25
		TC136: I evaluate the sentence/text (overall) positively	.05	.14	.63 ^a	.25
		TC283: I realize something (about myself)	.09	.07	.75 ^c	.00

	TC285: I feel with the protagonist	.00	.07	.38 ^a	.25
	TC287: I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.09	.14	.63 ^a	.25
	TC329: I feel uncertainty	.05	.00	.38 ^c	.00
	TC330: I feel for the protagonist with increased intensity	.00	.14	.50 ^a	.25
	TC331: I evaluate the protagonist negatively	.09	.14	.63 ^c	.00
I feel for the protagonist	TC348: I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.00	.14	.38 ^a	.00
	TC357: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.00	.00	.38 ^a	.25
I (partially) acknowledge aspects of the setting in myself	TC112: I feel for the protagonist	.14	.00	.50 ^c	.00
	TC116: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.14	.00	.63 ^c	.00
	TC124: I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone	.09	.00	.50 ^c	.00
	TC137: I evaluate the sentence/text (overall) positively	.09	.00	.63 ^c	.00
	TC280: I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.05	.00	.50 ^c	.00
I acknowledge aspects of the text in myself	TC277: I realize something about myself	.05	.00	.63 ^c	.00
	TC282: I describe the protagonist with vivid imagery	.09	.00	.38 ^c	.00
	<i>TC368: I evaluate the protagonist negatively</i>	.00	.00	.50 ^e	.00
I evaluate the text positively	TC199: I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone	.00	.00	.75 ^a	.50
	TC206: I realize something (about myself)	.00	.00	.63 ^a	.50
	TC290: I feel with the protagonist	.00	.00	.38 ^a	.25
	TC292: I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.00	.00	.50 ^a	.25
	TC294: I describe the text/setting with vivid imagery	.05	.00	.38 ^a	.25
	TC322: I feel for the protagonist with increased intensity	.05	.00	.50 ^a	.25
	TC365: I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.00	.00	.38 ^a	.25

Note. ^aMore frequently present than in the other three clusters, $p < .05$ (italics in proportions indicate where differentiation occurs); ^bless frequently present than in the other three clusters, $p < .05$; ^c **distinctive constituents**, $p < .05$; ^d unique constituents; ^e *distinctive and unique constituents*, $p < .05$.

As compared to Clusters I and II, Cluster III is distinguished by a greater number of TCs. Fourteen of them distinguish it from the other three and/or are unique to it. This cluster also presents TCs marked by an initial use of vivid imagery to describe the setting and an initial self-referential description. This result indicates that members of this cluster begin their reading process more self-implicated as compared to those of Clusters I and II.

The initial use of vivid imagery to describe the setting reveals an inversion of what happens in Cluster II. In Cluster III, members initiate their reading process by resorting to the senses with focus on the description of the setting rather than on that of the protagonist, as members of Cluster II do in Moment 2. Thirteen kinds of TCs differentiate this cluster from the other three regarding the initial use of vivid imagery to describe the setting, which, in Moment 2, becomes a self-referential description of the protagonist (TC115); empathy (TC285); sympathy for the protagonist (TC111); a generalization (TC123); a self-realization (TC283); an uncertain feeling (TC329); and a negative evaluation of the protagonist.

With regard to the initial self-referential description of the setting, 8 TCs distinguish Cluster III from the other three. What is particularly distinctive and unique to this cluster is the transformation to a negative evaluation of the protagonist in Moment 2 (TC368).

Seven other kinds of transformation are distinctive, but not unique to this cluster. The initial self-referential description of the setting becomes (a) positive evaluation of the text overall (TC137). What seems to be relevant here is a transformation in the mode of engagement with the text, from an initial self-referential description of the text to

evaluations in Moment 2. What is also distinctive but not unique to Moment 2 are modifications in terms of theme, as in Moment 2 members of this cluster are more concerned with the protagonist; they (b) feel sympathy for her (TC112), (c) express their feelings in a personal way and, therefore, with focus on the noetic pole of experience (TC280); (d) describe her in a self-referential way (TC116); (e) use vivid imagery to do so (TC282); and (f) generalize aspects of the protagonist (TC124). Finally, this initial particular kind of self-referentiality (g) takes the form of self-realizations in Moment 2 (TC277). These distinctive modifications are absent in Clusters II and IV.

The overall range of transformations that are particular to the reading process of members of Cluster III are more elaborate as compared to the TCs obtained from members of Clusters I and II. They are not only larger in number, but are thematic in nature and also marked by changes in style, which will be explored in Section 6.3. In sum, readers are self-implicated and focus on setting descriptions in Moment 1. In Moment 2, they become more attentive to self-referential descriptions of the protagonist, they empathize with her, feel sympathy for her, make generalizations, and experience self-realizations. They also evaluate the text positively from beginning to end. Apart from the complexity in feeling transformations these readers undergo, what prominently distinguishes them from readers in Clusters I and II overall is the fact that they experience self-realizations in Moment 2.

Cluster IV:

The results obtained for Cluster IV are presented in Table 5.6 below:

Table 5.6: Compared Member Proportion (Cluster IV)

Cluster #		Cluster I	Cluster II	Cluster III	Cluster IV	
n		22	14	8	4	
Moment 1	Moment 2					
I evaluate the protagonist negatively	BECOMES	TC5: I evaluate the protagonist positively	.00	.21	.13	.75 ^c
		TC23: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.00	.57	.25	.75 ^a
		TC60: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.00	.21	.13	.75 ^c
		TC64: I think of how I treat others	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
		TC183: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.00	.43	.00	.75 ^a
		TC184: I describe the setting/text with vivid imagery	.00	.36	.00	.50 ^a
I feel for the protagonist (impersonal)	BECOMES	TC9: I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.05	.07	.13	.50 ^c
I feel for the protagonist		TC13: I feel for the protagonist in slightly different ways	.05	.36	.13	.75 ^a
		TC26: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.05	.36	.00	.75 ^a
		TC45: I feel with the protagonist	.00	.29	.00	.50 ^a
		TC48: I recognize the protagonist's qualities in others	.00	.14	.13	.50 ^c
		TC57: I characterize MB with vivid imagery	.00	.29	.00	.50 ^a
		TC61: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
		TC65: I think of how I treat others	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
		TC73: I realize something about myself	.05	.07	.00	.50 ^c
TC188: I characterize setting/textual elements with vivid imagery		.00	.29	.00	.50 ^a	
I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)		TC168: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.05	.07	.00	.50 ^c
I describe the protagonist		TC413: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.00	.14	.00	.50 ^c
	TC14: I feel for the protagonist	.05	.14	.00	1.00 ^c	

with vivid imagery	TC28: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.00	.07	.00	1.00 ^c
	TC54: I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
	TC59: I describe the protagonist with vivid imagery in slightly different ways	.05	.21	.00	.75 ^c
	TC63: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.05	.07	.00	1.00 ^c
	TC67: I think of how I treat others	.00	.00	.00	1.00 ^e
	TC75: I realize something about myself	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
	TC84: I evaluate the sentence/text (overall) positively	.05	.07	.00	.75 ^c
	TC94: I describe the setting / text with vivid imagery	.05	.14	.00	.50 ^c
	TC95: I recognize aspects of the protagonist in others	.00	.14	.00	.50 ^c
	TC174: I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
	TC179: absence	.00	.14	.00	.75 ^c
	TC191: I evaluate the protagonist positively	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
	TC192: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.05	.07	.00	1.00 ^c
I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone	TC302: I feel with the protagonist	.00	.21	.00	.50 ^a
	TC16: I feel for the protagonist	.05	.14	.25	.75 ^c
	TC24: I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.05	.07	.25	.75 ^c
	TC46: I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	.05	.00	.13	.50 ^c
	TC51: I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone in slightly different ways	.05	.14	.00	.75 ^c
	TC72: I realize something (about myself)	.00	.07	.13	.75 ^c
	TC89: I evaluate the protagonist positively	.05	.00	.13	.50 ^c
	TC90: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.09	.00	.00	.75 ^c
	TC219: I evaluate the sentence/text positively	.05	.14	.00	.50 ^c

	TC220: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.05	.14	.00	.75 ^c
	TC399: I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery	.05	.14	.00	.50 ^c
	TC424: I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)	.00	.07	.25	.50 ^a
I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself	TC58: I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery	.05	.21	.00	.50 ^a
	TC62: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.05	.00	.00	1.00 ^c
	<i>TC66: I think of how I treat others</i>	.00	.00	.00	1.00 ^e
	TC74: I realize something (about myself)	.05	.21	.13	.75 ^c
	TC85: I evaluate the sentence/text (overall) positively	.00	.07	.00	.75 ^c
	TC214: I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone	.05	.21	.00	.50 ^a
	TC216: I feel for the protagonist	.05	.14	.13	1.00 ^c
	TC217: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.05	.07	.00	1.00 ^c
	TC371: I describe the setting/text with vivid imagery	.09	.00	.00	.50 ^c
	TC197: I evaluate the sentence/text positively in different ways	.09	.00	.63	.75 ^a
	TC200: I evaluate the protagonist positively	.05	.00	.38	.50 ^a
	TC201: I feel for the protagonist	.09	.00	.63	.75 ^a
	TC202: I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)	.09	.00	.25	.75 ^c
	TC203: I think of how I treat others	.00	.00	.13	.75 ^c
	TC204: I evaluate the other characters negatively	.14	.00	.38	.75 ^a
	TC295: I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery	.05	.00	.38	.50 ^a
	TC325: I recognize aspects of the protagonist in others	.05	.07	.38	.50 ^a

Note. ^aMore frequently present than in the other three clusters, $p < .05$ (italics in proportions indicate where differentiation occurs); ^bless frequently present than in the other three clusters, $p < .05$; ^c **distinctive constituents**, $p < .05$; ^d unique constituents; ^e *distinctive and unique constituents*, $p < .05$.

This is the most consistent group. Its members are clustered when Ward's method is used. They are also grouped when Ward's method with the k-means correction is used as cluster analysis. Only four members belong to Cluster IV, but these provide the most complex experiential accounts with forty-four distinctive constituents. Two transformation constituents are distinctive, unique and characterize the reading process of all Cluster IV members: *<I describe the protagonist with vivid imagery becomes I think of how I treat others>* (TC67); and *<I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself becomes I think of how I treat others>* (TC66). The initial vivid and self-referential description of the protagonist unfolds into ethical reconsideration in Moment 2.

This cluster is characterized by complex emotional engagement from Moment 1 to Moment 2. There is no feeling oscillation, an aspect that is more frequently expressed among Cluster II members (TC15), but here a reversal in feeling valence is distinctive to Cluster IV, as a modification occurs from negative to positive evaluation of the protagonist (TC5). Cluster IV is similar to Cluster II in that paradoxical feelings characterizes Moment 1: initially, Cluster IV members reject the protagonist at the same time that they feel sympathy for her. However, and differently from Cluster II, this paradox is here distinctive. The use of vivid imagery to describe the protagonist, the use of generalizations, and self-referential descriptions of the protagonist are also significantly more frequent among members of this cluster in Moment 1. In Moment 2, the initial negative evaluation of the protagonist changes to a positive one (TC5). The negative evaluation is now attributed to the other characters (TC60, TC61) and the feeling of sympathy is prolonged (TC9, TC168, TC14, TC174), which indicates that this type of feeling is more prominent among members of this cluster, as compared with

members of Clusters I, II, or III. References to the protagonist become more self-implicated (TC26, TC413, TC24) and are also extended to others (TC48, TC95). External references of the protagonist come later than in Cluster II. Moment 2 is also distinguished by self-realizations (TC73, TC75, TC74) and ethical imperatives (TC64, TC65, TC203). The initial vivid description of the protagonist is also prolonged in Moment 2 (TC59) and extended to setting descriptions as well (TC94). Cluster IV is also distinguished by general understandings in both Moments 1 and 2 (TC54, TC51). In addition, the text is evaluated positively (TC219, TC85). In this cluster, the pattern that stands out is one that indicates that these readers experience self-realization and the reassessment of ethical commitments in Moment 2.

Having analyzed the experiential accounts, identified TCs, and obtained four clusters empirically, focus now turns to how these clusters relate to each other in quantitative terms, including the observation of how they relate to the post-measurement used here (see Section 4.2.3), namely self-perceptual depth and ethics scale, absorption, and social desirability. These measurements will not only enable the identification of more aspects that characterize each of the groups, but will serve as additional indicators of the empirical and conceptual classification elaborated in Chapter 6. In other words, establishing these relations will indicate more differences between the groups and will contribute to the validity of interpretations that lead to the articulation of a typology of reading experiences. These analyses will be limited to the relations that stand out initially and most prominently. The following five sections describe these findings quantitatively.

5.1.3.1. Experiential Accounts' Length and Lexical Variety

The experiential accounts of members of Cluster IV are the lengthiest of the four (M=2,516). Cluster III members used more words (M=1,949) than Cluster II members (M= 1,720), followed by Cluster I (M=795). In order to assess lexical variety, Wordsmith Tools was used (Scott). One of the tools it offers provides data on the number of different words (types) and running words (tokens) in each of the corpora. It also produces the standardized type/token ratio of words, which allows the assessment of lexical variety. As this ratio varies according to text length, standardized type/token ratio was used here. In this case, instead of single items, WordSmith computes the ratio for groups of tokens (every 1,000) and then calculates a total average. This means that the higher the result, the more lexically varied the corpus is. Results obtained show little difference regarding the standardized type/token ratio of the whole group of experiential accounts (30.66%) as compared to each of the four clusters. They also indicate that Cluster I and II members use fewer words to describe their experiences as compared to members in the other two clusters, but their experiential accounts are lexically richer. Their standardized type/token ratios are 31.89% (Cluster I) and 31.17% (Cluster 2).

As regards Cluster IV and III members, they are more fluent, but produce less lexically rich experiential accounts. Their standardized type/token ratios are 29.79% (Cluster IV) and 29.00% (Cluster III). The fact that Clusters III and IV present less lexically varied accounts is consistent with the fact that the repetition patterns in these two clusters are more numerous, which enabled the identification of more TCs for these two clusters. To a certain extent, these findings also validate the analyses: Clusters III and IV produce accounts that are more focused and consistent. They present more clearly

defined patterns. In contrast, the rich lexical variety found in Clusters I and II indicate that these members produce more idiosyncratic accounts, which restricts the identification of patterns.

5.1.3.2. EQ: Self-Perceptual Depth Ratings

To compare the four clusters further, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on the self-perceptual depth scale of the Experiencing Questionnaire. These results should be read with caution. The standard deviation of Clusters I, II, and III are at least twice as large as the standard deviation of Cluster IV, and with small samples that differ in size from cluster to cluster, the p-value obtained from the one-way ANOVA ($p=.117$) is not completely trustworthy. Nevertheless, this scale met the traditional level of significance ($p=.02$) as regards mean differences between Clusters II and IV. *LSD post hoc* test revealed that participants in Cluster IV ($M=4.4$) scored significantly higher on the self-perceptual depth scale than did those in Cluster II ($M=2.7$). Table 5.7 below summarizes results.

Table 5.7: Four Clusters and Self-Perceptual Depth Scale

Self-perceptual depth scale	Cluster IV		Cluster III		Cluster I		Cluster II	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
	4.4*	.42	3.5	1.5	3.2	1.2	2.7*	1.2

*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

As Table 5.7 indicates, the significant difference in mean rating scores revealed by the *LSD post hoc* test was found between the clusters with the highest mean rating scores attributed to Cluster IV and lowest to Cluster II. As members of Clusters IV and III score the highest means, they are more likely to experience shifts in sense of self. They also

achieve deepened understandings of freshly realized meanings (or self-realizations), which are key aspects of the experiencing process involved in self-modifying reading experiences. Members of Clusters I and II are less likely to experience these processes. The measures obtained from the groups involved reveal that the differences between Clusters IV and II are greater than one would expect to find by chance alone.

5.1.3.3. EQ: Ethics

A one-way ANOVA was also conducted on the ethics scale (non-utilitarian respect: human) of the Experiencing Questionnaire. Similarly to the results of the self-perceptual depth scale, these results should also be read with caution due to the fact that the standard deviation of Cluster II is about twice as large as the standard deviation of Clusters III and IV, and with small samples that differ in size from cluster to cluster, the p-value obtained from the one-way ANOVA ($p=.233$) is not fully trustworthy. Having said that, this scale also met the traditional level of significance ($p=.05$) as regards mean differences between Clusters II and IV. LSD *post hoc* test revealed that participants in Cluster IV ($M=5.2$) scored significantly higher on the ethics scale than did those in Cluster II ($M=3.7$). Table 5.8 below summarizes the results.

Table 5.8: Four Clusters and Ethics Scale

Ethics scale	Cluster IV		Cluster III		Cluster I		Cluster II	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
	5.2*	.86	4.2	.84	3.9	1.2	3.7*	1.6

*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

As Table 5.8 indicates, the significant difference in mean rating scores revealed by the LSD *post hoc* test was found between Cluster IV, presenting the highest mean rating scores and Cluster II, the lowest. These findings reveal that since Clusters IV and III present the highest mean scores in this scale, their members are more likely to experience the moral repercussions resulting from moments of intensive reflection. The probability that Cluster IV members experience such a process and Cluster II members do not is higher than what can be attributed to chance.

5.1.3.4. Absorption

To verify the role individual differences play in differentiating the four clusters, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on the absorption scale. No significant differences were found between the four clusters on this rating. The mean rating scores are summarized in Table 5.9 below.

Table 5.9: Four Clusters and Absorption Scale

Absorption scale	Cluster III		Cluster IV		Cluster I		Cluster II	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
	.73	.20	.69	.19	.68	.14	.61	.15

Results here are not significant and might be random. However, it should be pointed out that Clusters III and IV presented the highest mean rating scores for absorption. Cluster II presented the lowest mean rating scores for the two scales of the EQ: self-perceptual depth and ethics and also for absorption.

To begin studying the relation between absorption and self-perceptual depth and ethics and to find out whether there is linear correlation between these scores, Pearson

correlation was calculated. Results indicate a tendency for correlation between absorption and self-perceptual depth [$r(46)=.251$; $p=.08$]. No significant correlation was found between absorption and ethics [$r(46)=.068$; $p=.64$].

5.1.3.5. Social Desirability

A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the C-M SD scores. Similar to most of the results obtained here, these should also be read with caution, given that the standard deviation of Clusters I, II, and IV are about as large as the standard deviation of Cluster III, and with small samples that differ in size from cluster to cluster, the p-value obtained from the one-way ANOVA ($p=.07$) is not completely trustworthy. Still, this scale met the traditional level of significance ($p=.01$) as regards mean differences between Clusters I and IV. *LSD post hoc* test revealed that participants in Cluster I ($M=.64$) scored significantly higher on the SD scale than did those in Cluster IV ($M=.46$). This scale also met the traditional level of significance ($p=.04$) as regards mean differences between Clusters III and IV. *LSD post hoc* test revealed that participants in Cluster III ($M=.63$) scored significantly higher on the SD scale than did those in Cluster IV ($M=.46$). Table 5.10 below summarizes the results.

Table 5.10: Four Clusters and Social Desirability Scale

Social desirability scale	Cluster I		Cluster III		Cluster II		Cluster IV	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
	.64*	.14	.63*	.07	.57	.07	.46*	.14

*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

As Table 5.10 indicates, socially desirable responding does not seem to affect Cluster IV members' responses to the research materials as it affects Cluster I members. In other

words, Cluster IV members are individuals who are less prone to socially desirable responding and are thus less attuned to what is desired from them and to respond in a more normative way, as compared with members of Clusters I and III (see also Section 4.2.2.3).

5.2. Textual Determinants of the Reading Experiences

Besides individual differences, which might determine how readers experience a text, the role of the text in constraining these experiences is also relevant. An effort in this direction was carried out by means of the analysis of textual foregrounding, which is detailed as follows.

5.2.1. Foregrounding Analysis

In order to investigate one of the possible textual determinants of readers' experiences, "Miss Brill" was analyzed for foregrounding features. In its linguistic and psychological manifestation, foregrounding is known to "dehabituate" the reader, standing out against a background of common language usage and textual patterns (*Language and Literature* 2007; Miall, *Literary Reading*; van Peer; see Section 2.2). Thus, it is an important component of the recontextualization cycle (Fialho, "Foregrounding") that readers undergo while experiencing or interpreting a story. The short story selected for the study contained 1,978 words, and was therefore considered short enough for a single experimental session of under two hours. The story was divided

into 130 segments. The mean number of syllables per segment was 19.23 (Std. Deviation: 12.73).

Three independent judges (the first author and two graduate students, one in English and one in Comparative Literature) analyzed the segments of the story for the presence of foregrounded features at the phonetic, grammatical, and semantic levels. Miall and Kuiken (“Foregrounding”) explain that the hierarchical structure of foregrounded features around a dominant is critical in understanding the effects of foregrounding on readers. They rely on the frequency of foregrounding within a segment as an index of the complexity of such structures. Even though judges tended to agree on the segments that contained a larger or smaller array of features at all levels, it must be stressed that individual differences in sensibility or preference usually play a role in judgments of foregrounding (Fialho, “Foregrounding”; Miall and Kuiken “Foregrounding”). For this reason, inter-judge agreement was calculated by correlating the frequencies of features identified per segment by each judge. Correlations (across each of the three levels) were highly significant and ranged from $r(129)=.977$ to $r(129)=.765$; $p=.00$. Through discussion, a consensual list of foregrounded features was drawn up for the story. An example analysis of four story segments is given in the table below:

Table 5.11: Foregrounding Analysis of Four Segments of "Miss Brill"

Segments	Levels		
	Phonetic	Syntactic – grammatical	Semantic
1. <i>Although it was so brilliantly fine—the Blue Sky Powdered with gold and great spots of light like white wine splashed over the Jardins Publiques—Miss Brill was glad that she had decided on her fur.</i>	alliteration: “light like”; “white wine”; “gold and great”; assonance: “Miss Brill” /o/ x 4 /s/ x 7 /ay/ x 7 /d/ x 7 /a/ x 3 /ur/ x 2 /i/ x 5	inversion of subordinate clause; parenthetical sentence	metaphor: “sky powdered with gold and great spots of light”; simile: “sky like white wine splashed over the Jardins Publiques”; foreign language: “Jardins Publiques”
2. <i>The air was motionless, but when you opened your mouth there was just a faint chill, like a chill from a glass of iced water before you sip, and now and again a leaf came drifting—from nowhere, from the sky.</i>	/s/ x 6 /n/ x 8 /d/ x 3 /i/ x 4 /m/ x 6 /o/ x 3 /l/ x 6 /yu/ x 3 /f/ x 6; spondee: “faint chill”	repetition: “chill” and “from”; 3 subordinate clauses; subordinate clauses after dash	simile: “chill like a chill from a glass of iced water before you sip”; contradiction: “from nowhere, from the sky”
3. <i>Miss Brill put up her hand and touched her fur.</i>	/h/ x 3 /ur/ x 2		
4. <i>Dear little thing! It was nice to feel it again.</i>	/t/ x 3 /i/ x 4 /l/ x 3	interjection; sentence fragment	

Table 5.11 illustrates how syllables per segment were counted, so that the foregrounded elements per segment were adjusted according to sentence length. To control for differences in segment length, the frequencies of phonetic, grammatical, and semantic foregrounded features were converted to frequencies per syllable. In order to give equal weight to each of the three levels of foregrounding, frequencies per syllable were then converted to standard z-scores, which allowed comparison across different collection of values (i.e., they indicate the position of each observed value in relation to

the group's mean). An index of overall foregrounding per segment was produced by computing the mean of the three separate standard scores. The segment "*The air was motionless, but when you opened your mouth there was just a faint chill, like a chill from a glass of iced water before you sip, and now and again a leaf came drifting—from nowhere, from the sky*" was then established as the one with highest foregrounding and the segment "*She sat there for a long time,*" as the least foregrounded. This index became a parameter to measure the effects of foregrounding as a determinant of readers' responses.

The first step in the study of the relation between textual features and readers' experiences was to see whether the sentences that were most frequently chosen by the participants corresponded to those that were more densely foregrounded. This analysis looks into which textual patterns determined readers' experiences when they were asked to select passages that they found evocative. To this purpose, it was assumed that segment choice and level of foregrounding were proportional or linearly related. Thus, partial correlation was calculated between frequency of sentence choice and the overall foregrounding index, as well as the three separate indices for phonetic, grammatical, and semantic foregrounding while controlling for the effect of the number of syllables per segment.

Results indicate that the research hypothesis was not supported. Overall foregrounding index did not correlate significantly with frequency of sentence choice. Frequency of sentence choice did not correlate significantly with the three separate indices for phonetic, grammatical, and semantic foregrounding either.

Different relations between textual features and readers' experiences were found by Kuijpers and Miall in their study of readers' responses to the same story. They found correlation between the same foregrounding index used here and frequency of text choice when her readers were asked to select passages that invoke bodily feelings [$r(128)=.197$; $p<.05$]. They also found correlation between segment choice and index for phonetic foregrounding [$r(128)=.287$; $p<.01$].

Differences between the findings obtained here and Kuijper and Miall's may be an indicator that the type of instruction might influence the extent to which readers are responsive to foregrounding and to how they respond to stories overall. As previous studies reveal, foregrounding correlates with importance, discussion value (van Peer), strikingness (Miall and Kuiken, "Foregrounding"; van Peer), reading time, and affect (Miall and Kuiken, "Foregrounding"). It does not, however, correlate with flow (Jandre and Fialho) or with evocativeness, as shown here.

5.2.1.1. Four Clusters

For a more nuanced understanding of how the readers here investigated responded to foregrounding, the four clusters discussed in Section 5.1.3 were compared further. To this purpose, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on the average foregrounding index of the segments chosen by each participant. The test was used to check whether there were significant differences in the average foregrounding index per cluster. No significant difference was found. However, given that the standard deviation of Clusters I, II, and III are at least twice as large as the standard deviation of Cluster IV, and with small samples

that differ in size from cluster to cluster, the p-value obtained from the one-way ANOVA ($p=.858$) is not trustworthy.

A series of correlations were then calculated between frequency of segment choice per each of the four clusters and the overall foregrounding index, as well as the three separate indices for phonetic, grammatical, and semantic foregrounding per cluster. In this case, the research hypothesis was partially supported. Overall foregrounding index correlated significantly with frequency of sentence choice only among members of Cluster I [$r(127)=.168$, $p=.05$]. Frequency of sentence choice, however, did not correlate significantly with the three separate indices for phonetic, grammatical, and semantic foregrounding among members of this cluster. The hypothesis was rejected for Clusters II, III, and IV.

5.2.1.2. EQ: Self-Perceptual Depth

An average foregrounding index per reader was calculated based on the frequency of segment choice and foregrounding index of chosen segments. This enabled the assessment of the relationship between self-perceptual depth scores and frequency of foregrounded segments chosen. A two-tailed analysis revealed strong correlation between average foregrounding index per reader and self-perceptual depth scores only among members of Cluster IV ($r(46)=.99$; $p=.005$).

5.2.1.3. EQ: Ethics

A two-tailed analysis assessed the relationship between ethics and average foregrounding index per reader and revealed no correlation between the two [$r(46)=.018$;

$p=.90$]. No correlation was found between these two scores when the four clusters were treated separately.

5.2.1.4. Absorption

A two-tailed analysis assessed the relationship between absorption and average foregrounding index per reader and revealed no correlation between the two [$r(46)=-.011$; $p=.94$]. No correlation was found between these two scores when the four clusters were treated separately.

5.2.1.5. Social Desirability

A two-tailed analysis assessed the relationship between social desirability and average foregrounding index per reader. It revealed a negative correlation between average foregrounding index per reader and SD scores only among members of Cluster I [$r(46)=-.468$; $p=.02$].

The analyses reported in detail above allowed the observation of empirically established differentiating (more-or-less characteristic) features of the group of readers that emerged from the cluster analysis. The clusters obtained here define four types of reading experiences. Chapter 6 suggests an elaboration of this resulting typology by analyzing the language that characterizes each type.

Chapter 6. Discoursal Basis for the Typology

In the previous chapter, first a framework of readers' experiential accounts was offered based on cluster analysis, and then the shifts that characterize their articulation of themes were detailed. From the perspective of a reliable observation and systematization of the traces left by the embodied self in discourse, four different clusters were articulated, which comprise four different types of reading experiences. In Chapter 5, the form of explication used, which is present in other NAP studies, was the identification of the cluster-differentiating transformation constituents (see Sections 3.4 and 5.1). The resulting constituents were thus empirically established differentiating features of the groups of readers that emerged from the cluster analysis conducted.

Having identified the clusters and obtained a typology in Chapter 5, a close reading of the prototypic instances of these clusters is offered in the present chapter. At times, resorting to extracts from the experiential accounts of other particulars that are not prototypic will be necessary to clarify the reading. In addition, the pattern of linguistic features that stand out in observing how each prototype uses modality will be presented. Thus, a different form of explication will be at work here: an analysis of the modality of each of the prototypic instances that may be revealing of how these prototypic readers position themselves in discourse (see Chapter 2). The features of modality identified here have not been empirically demonstrated to differentiate the groups of readers that constitute the four clusters as yet. Rather, they suggest that a further linguistic analysis may suggest how to elaborate the typology articulated in Chapter 5.

In sum, the present chapter will show how the four types can be further explored to determine more precisely whether they are characterized by different moments and specific linguistic markers that indicate shifts in sense of self. Whether the features identified in this chapter reliably and consistently differentiate the clusters (or types) according to criteria comparable to those set for differentiating constituents in Chapter 5 (see Sections 3.4 and 5.1) is still speculative. In other words, the elaborations suggested here will remain unsubstantiated until the classificatory methods made focal in Chapter 5 can be used to examine the expanded set of potentially type-differentiating features/constituents discussed here, a summary of which can be found in Appendix 5. A proposal of the kind of analysis that can be performed along these lines is also provided in Appendix 4.

In this chapter, more detail will be given to the language used by the participants at different moments of reading, which may be revealing of the action affordances realized, both in a conscious and in an unconscious way (cf. Chapter 2). It is important to remind the reader that the kind of analysis conducted here focuses not only on the content of what is said but also on the way it is said (see Chapter 4); more specifically, LEX-NAP is used to observe how each prototypic reader characterizes these experiences and how they unfold. This chapter will thus provide the proposal of a linguistic basis that may further substantiate the typology of reading experiences presented in Chapter 5, an assessment of the method itself, and a discussion of its results.

The strategy used here differs from the one resorted to in Section 5.1.1. In that section, the accounts were divided into two moments so as to enable the identification of transformations. The division to be presented now obeys an episodic structure to mark

shifts in sense of self and it is not pre-established. Thus, the number of moments corresponds to the degree of narrative elaboration, that is, to the number of shifts in the sense of self. These shifts are meaningful for the unfolding of the experiential accounts and can be differentiated linguistically. Because the most prototypic examples of each of the four clusters discussed in Chapter 5 are selected to illustrate the description of the four types of reading experiences articulated, I would like to stress that a prototype is a standard for measurement of the extent to which particular accounts share attributes with an ideal type with no full corresponding example in reality (cf. Section 3.3.4). In other words, the prototypic examples here discussed are the particulars that share the greatest number of attributes with the ideal type of each cluster, including both shared present and shared absent TCs. For this reason, at times, I will resort to extracts from the experiential accounts of other particulars, or other cluster members, that are not prototypic, but that will be relevant or even necessary to clarify a given attribute, or a given element in the experiential structure unrepresented in the prototypes. Each of the four types will be here named according to the pattern of linguistic features that stand out in observing how each prototype uses modality: external, as-if, expressive, and total enactment. Far from being idiosyncratic, each of these examples is prototypic and stands for the entire group (see also Chapter 5 and Appendix 4).

6.1. Type I: External Enactment

As discussed in Section 5.1.3, this type is constituted by the largest cluster in terms of membership (up to 46% of the total number of interviewees; see Table 5.3). It also differs from the other types as it presents modest narrative elaboration. The

transformation constituent: *<I describe the protagonist from a distance BECOMES I describe the protagonist from a distance in slightly different ways>* is unique here; that is, only in this cluster do participants remain external observers of the protagonist from beginning to end, which justifies the epithet “external.” Absence or very low occurrence of transformation constituents that express any form of feelings, evaluations, or personal involvement is also observed in Section 5.1.3 (see Table 5.3, TCs52, 43, 71, and 83). These accounts tend to focus on descriptions of the protagonist and there are no subdivisions into moments because shifts in sense of self are nearly absent. The following extract illustrates the experiential account of a prototypic example:

P13

Passage 1:

... rubbed the life back into the dim little eyes.

Commentary 1:

And I just thought this part of the sentence was ironic because it's usually, you never usually think of fur being – you never think of personalizing it but that's what she was doing to it and it goes on to say how she felt like it was asking her a question. And I just thought that by her rubbing the life back into it, it was almost like it was almost giving her the life because it was giving her the excitement so like, she did all this stuff to the fur but it was actually all for her just to get her excited about something.

Passage 2:

... her special seat ...

Commentary 2:

And I picked this because kind of throughout this excerpt here we're seeing how Miss Brill sees everything from her point of view and when she says "her special seat" it lets, well, it wants to tell the reader that we're perceiving her as being high status and she's quick to judge everyone else – everyone on what they're doing, how they're acting, what they're saying, and she's quick to give judgment on that. And we almost assume that she would be an ideal woman and but that it – so her special seat is just, you know, lets us know that she thinks she's special because it's hers and it's special and that she's sharing it with someone. So we see her as being high status, that is, until we read on basically.

Passage 3:

They were all on stage. They weren't only the audience, not only looking on; they were acting.

Commentary 3:

And I chose these sentences because this for me was the first point that...

Passage 4:

...the hero and the heroine...

Commentary 4:

For excerpt four, the passage I chose was the hero and the heroine... Miss Brill calls them the hero and the heroine and she's kind of accentuating they were beautifully dressed, they were in love and they were singing soundlessly....And she's idolizing the idea of the happy couple and ... you know, she thinks that these people must be like, radiating positiveness... Earlier on it says that her tears, or her eyes were filled with tears because she was smiling and they all just had this

universal understanding of what was understood but they didn't know what it was that connected them....

Passage 5:

... her room like a cupboard ...

Commentary 5:

... I believe that she was mentioning how the people who come sit on the green seats ... look like they just came out of a dark cupboard and she's almost ostracizing them for being on the outside and for almost not fitting in...

The pattern that emerges here is the following: the reader narrates the events as presented in the text and describes or interprets the protagonist's feelings, motivations, from beginning to end. Throughout their experiential accounts, readers in this cluster never lose sight of textual features and segmentation: "*this part of the sentence*" (Commentary 1), "*throughout this excerpt*" (Commentary 2) "*the first point that*" (Commentary 3), "*the passage I chose*" (Commentary 4); they quote the text: "*when she says 'her special seat'*" (Commentary 2). The text may also become an agent: "*[the text] wants to tell the reader that ...*" (Commentary 2); "*earlier on it says that her tears, or her eyes were filled with tears*" (Commentary 4). As Table 5.3 in Section 5.1.3 indicates, 27% of these accounts produce only objective descriptions of the character throughout the comments (TC103).

These descriptions turn the text into an object of study rather than a way into experience. Narrating the events as presented in the text results in the readers deducing and describing the protagonist's feelings rather than internalizing them. Linguistically speaking, in Moment 2, generalization is used in 5% of the cases (see Section 5.1.3,

Table 5.3, TC52), self-referential descriptions appear in few of them (see Section 5.1.3, Table 5.4, TC198 [9%]; Table 5.5, TC115 [18%], TC116 [14%]; Table 5.6, TC26 [5%], TC24 [5%], TC46 [5%]) and only very few experience self-realizations (see Section 5.1.3, Table 5.5, TC283 [9%], TC277 [5%]; Table 5.6, TC73 [6%]).

In the few instances in which language of self-realization occurs, modals and adverbs are used, which lower the intensity of these realizations. In addition, whenever self-referential descriptions of the protagonist and/or generalizations are brought about, they are always logically justified. A longer extract of P13's third commentary illustrates these processes:

P13

Passage 3:

They were all on stage. They weren't only the audience, not only looking on; they were acting.

Commentary 3:

And I chose these sentences because this for me was the first point that it was actually like a personal realization that this actually happens and it totally related to me, like because that's how we perceive ourselves but everyone in a way is kind of acting in a play. Not acting as in pretending to be someone who they're not, which some people can be, but more acting in a part that every one of us is, you know, has our schedule, has our system down, and we're just kind of doing it day after day and we just think that that's how it is but in actuality if someone stepped back to look at this, you would see that it is almost like a little play going on....so that's why I picked these sentences, is because it was almost like a self-

realization and it was the first point that I actually connected and got something that made me truly think about what was going on in this story. It made me, you know, kind of think of things other than just what was happening and how the story was getting played out. I related it back to my life, so that's why I thought it was significant.

This example shows the reader's awareness of textual segmentation (“*the first point that ...*” is repeated twice) and even though the text has physical presence in his discourse (“*I chose these sentences,*” “*the first point that ...*”), the reader is self-implicated (“*it totally related to me,*” “*I related it back to my life*”). He resorts to generalizations by selecting the first person plural (“*that's how we perceive ourselves*”) and explicitly refers to self-realization, although hedging it with the adverb “almost” (“*it was **almost like** a self-realization*”). He also justifies his understanding and self-realization logically using discourse markers of cause and consequence such as *because, why, so* (“***because that's how** we perceive ourselves,*” “***so that's why** I picked these sentences, is **because** it was almost like a self-realization*”).

Most frequently, this prototypic reader as well as other readers in the same cluster, may be aware of changes in the text but not that they themselves may undergo changes. Instead, they see self-realization as something distant from them, which only the protagonist may undergo. Similes such as “*it was almost like a self-realization*” are frequently used. The verb “to think” is also quite common, which indicates that these readers experience the text as a form of cognitive simulation.

At times, however, they may place themselves in the character's shoes (Commentary 3), but they do not consistently empathize with the character. They may be

drawn into the fictional world by means of thinking or remembering but they do not internalize the experience, as the following examples taken from other readers in the same cluster indicate:

P15, Commentary 6:

... The text starts off pretty positive and then it kind of ends on a sour note. And it's the sour note that you remember the most.

P43, Commentary 1:

After reading this particular passage that I've selected from the excerpt I think of my own feelings when it comes to how she has expressed herself in writing. That while she is wearing this fur, she feels a sort of gentle pleasure, some sort of light euphoria....

P43, Commentary 6:

...and when I look at this entire text as a whole, I think of myself. I imagine myself putting on a favorite outfit of mine, for a particular occasion that I like to attend and going out and feeling other people's emotions, seeing their reactions, seeing a brief glimpse into their lives or just being a part of it all, just having a role, just playing a part in the play that we all take a niche in. So I find this entire text very interesting. And very relatable to real life.

In these commentaries, the readers think of themselves performing the roles of characters and are momentarily taken into another world. They are aligned with the text, or they walk in the company of the text, but they do not feel with or live it: “*it's the sour note that you remember the most*” (P15, Commentary 6), “*I think of my own feelings*” (P43, Commentary 1), “*I think of myself. I imagine myself ...*” (P43, Commentary 6). By

having a “*brief glimpse into [characters’] lives*” (P43, Commentary 6), they show a mental process devoid of affective resonance. Instead, they engage in “interpretive” reflection (see Section 2.5).

In sum, the processes involved in this type of reading experience are the following:

A. *Psychological process*: Readers narrate the events as presented in the text and describe or interpret the protagonist’s feelings, motivations, from beginning to end. They produce objective descriptions of the character throughout. These descriptions turn the text into an object of study rather than a way into experience. Although they think of themselves in the roles of characters and may be momentarily taken into the fictional world, they do it from an external or distanced perspective.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the interpretive context of commentaries (see Section 2.5).

- a. Modest narrative elaboration (cf. Section 5.1.3.1).
- b. Awareness of text segmentation (“*this part of the sentence*”; “*throughout this excerpt*”; “*the first point that*”; “*the passage I chose*”).
- c. Textual quotation.
- d. Style of subjectivisation:
 - di. Text as agent (“*[the text] wants to tell the reader that...*”; “*[the text] says that ...*”).
 - dii. Use of “I”; prevalence of third person referential descriptions.
 - diii. Similes of personal identification (first and third person referential descriptions; preposition *like*).

- div. Use of modals and adverbs that lower the intensity and hedge self-realizations (“*it was **almost like** a self-realization*”).
- dv. Use of discourse markers of cause and consequence (*because, why, so*) to justify self-realizations logically (“***because that’s how** we perceive ourselves,” “**so that’s why** I picked these sentences, is **because** it was almost like a self-realization*”).
- dvi. Repetition of the verb *think*.

6.2. Type II: As-If Enactment

Differing from “external enactment,” readers here are charged with feelings from beginning to end and their experiential accounts can be subdivided into an episodic structure of two moments, from an initially negative response to a decrease of the intensity of this first feeling.

Moment 1:

In the first moment, readers evaluate the protagonist negatively. Although they feel sympathy for the protagonist (Section 5.1.3, Table 5.4, TCs 55 and 99), most of them present external references. They try to come to terms with what is being read by comparing the protagonist to others (Section 5.1.3, Table 5.4, TCs 18, 19, 20, 53, 92, and 176). In a few cases, self-referential descriptions of the protagonist are present, but transformations in this form of self-implication are less frequent (see Section 5.1.3, Table 5.5, TCs 277, 282, and 368; Table 5.6, TC 58 to 325). In other words, explicit reference to the self in this initial moment is not what prevails. Participants are primarily concerned

with describing the protagonist's thoughts and feelings. Commentaries 1 and 2 from P18 are illustrative:

P18

Passage 1:

Little rogue biting its tail just by her left ear.

Commentary 1:

I think what impressed me the most was that it was really weird that she thought of her fur coat or fur whatever it is, as real and alive. And kind of talked to it in her head, which is something that most people don't normally do. So basically I think she's just a little odd right now.

Passage 2:

She had become really quite expert, she thought, at listening as though she didn't listen, at sitting in other people's lives just for a minute while they talked round her.

Commentary 2:

This struck me because it was really weird that most normal people wouldn't do that. If I knew someone was listening to my conversation on purpose I wouldn't be too happy. Overall she just seemed pretty weird and this emphasizes it.

Here the protagonist is evaluated negatively “*it was really **weird** that she thought...she's just a little **odd***” (Commentary 1); “*it was really **weird**. ... Overall she just seemed pretty **weird***” (Commentary 2), and her comparison to others is repeated: “*which is something that **most people** don't normally do*” (Commentary 1); “***most normal people** wouldn't do*

that” (Commentary 2). Explicit comparison to self appears briefly in Commentary 2: “*If I knew someone was listening to my conversation on purpose I wouldn’t be too happy.*”

The conditional form indicates that the reader views this comparison as a possibility but not a realization. The reader here sees herself as the protagonist, but does not show that she is fully immersed in the situation, sharing the character’s feelings, a process quite similar to what readers in Type I go through. Like them, Participant 18 “walks in the company” of the text in Moment 1, but does not feel with it.

Moment 2:

In Moment 2, the intensity of the initial negative evaluation oscillates (Section 5.1.3, Table 5.4, TCs 3, 4, 8, 15, and 19), but what characterizes these readers is mainly a decrease in feeling intensity (TCs 3 and 15), which does not occur in the other three experiential types. Absence in the expression of this initial affective context (TC4) also characterizes Moment 2. These processes can be depicted in the unfolding of Participant 18’s commentaries:

P18

Passage 3:

They were all on stage.

Commentary 3:

This struck me ‘cause it’s very weird that she considers normal, everyday life as everyone being on stage. And simply because she does the same thing every week, she thinks it’s part of – I don’t know, part of a performance. It shows that she really has no purpose in life, she has nothing better to do. So she sits and listens to other people’s life to like, fulfill her own life, which is very sad.

Passage 4:

“No, not now,” said the girl. “Not here, I can't.”

Commentary 4:

I chose this 'cause I kind of misinterpreted it the first time I read it because before that it says they were in love, so when the girl initially says that I thought that she was like, saying no ... But then later, reading on I realized that he wanted her just to tell him something I guess, perhaps a secret, but she wouldn't tell it in front of the old woman ... Anyways.

Passage 5:

But when she put the lid on she thought she heard something crying.

Commentary 5:

I chose this one because - I don't know, if it's supposed to represent her, like she feels like she's being shut in a box. And so she's portraying what the animal would say if it was alive, for being shut in a box. Because that's how she feels in life, she goes back to her little cupboard. And so she feels like she's locked in I guess.

Commentary 6:

On the whole, I'd say the text seemed very odd. But it had to do – I envisioned a very lonely old lady that's not married, doesn't have any kids, doesn't have anything really to look forward to in life except going to some sort of Sunday event that she does every day, or every Sunday. I feel sad for the woman that she amuses herself by listening to other people's conversations. I almost feel like that she's a little screwed up in the head because she likes to consider her fur coat as

something alive and real and talks to it in her head. Overall I guess, well at least from the ending, it seemed that she felt like she was locked in a box and was trying to show it. By saying she's a – been an actress all her life, just putting on a façade. Overall I would say there wouldn't be much deep meaning to this text for me.

Decrease of intensity becomes clear, for instance, in both evaluations in Commentary 1, where the protagonist is described as “**really weird**” and as “**just a little odd**.” The same occurs in Commentary 2, “where **really weird**” and “**she just seemed pretty weird**” replicate the toning down of the intensity. This effect is produced by the choice of the pre-modifiers “*just a little*” (Commentary 1) and the modal “*seemed*” (Commentary 2) which reduce the strength of the evaluation. In Commentary 3, the protagonist is referred to as “**very weird**,” but in Commentary 6, the adverbs selected point at a decrease: “*I almost feel like that she's a little screwed up in the head.*” The same occurs with the feeling of sympathetic pity, or compassion: from “**very sad**” (Commentary 3) to “*I feel sad for*” (Commentary 6). In Commentaries 4 and 5, these feelings are absent (TC4), an additional indication that the initial affective context loses its intensity as these readers' accounts progress. Moreover, Commentaries 4 and 5 are similar in form to commentaries that characterize the reading process of Type I members, where distant descriptions of the protagonist are provided. In both cases, readers describe the character's feelings or try to interpret them without getting involved with them or becoming immersed in the text.

A transition from feeling distanced from the protagonist towards proximity to the self only occurs in Commentary 6. As repeatedly expressed, sympathy becomes more personal, modifying from “**the fact that she ... is very sad**” (Commentary 3) to “*I feel*

sad for the woman” (Commentary 6). At the same time that there is a greater sense of agency in how these readers express compassion, they resort to their senses to make the experience vivid, tangible, and concrete, and to feel closer to the protagonist, as in “***I envisioned a very lonely old lady.***” The reader uses language that refers to her sight to produce a pictorial representation of the character. The two adjectives (“lonely” and “old”) are not negative here. Now they express sympathetic feelings for the protagonist. The choice of adverb (“very”) adds to the intensity of such sympathetic feelings (TC56, TC92). Although they do not result in evaluative change, these strategies reveal paradoxical feelings. Like most members in this group, in Commentary 6, Participant 18 reengages in negative evaluations towards the character (TC1): “*I almost feel like that she’s a little screwed up in the head.*” At the same time she feels for this character, she also rejects her. Due to this presence of paradoxical feelings, Commentary 6 is the most complex one in terms of affective elaboration, as compared to the others.

All in all, Type 2 readers start by rejecting the character and trying to come to terms with what is being read by comparing the protagonist to others. This is how there is a decrease of feelings. As they progress in their reading, they become sympathetic, but, as the prototypic example discussed above illustrates, there is also decline in feeling. Paradoxical feelings for the protagonist emerge in the last commentary, and resorting to the senses to make the experience concrete later on does not guarantee a form of reading that is considered meaningful. These readers evaluate the text as a whole negatively (TC76), as pointed out by Participant18: “***On the whole, I’d say the text seemed very odd,***” “***Overall I would say there wouldn’t be much deep meaning to this text for me.***”

The typical processes of this type of reading experience are:

Moment 1:

A. *Psychological process*: Readers describe the protagonist's thoughts and feelings. They evaluate her negatively and refer to her externally so as to come to terms with what is being read. If self-referential descriptions are made, these are seen as a possibility, but not as a realization.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential (cf. Section 2.5) context of commentaries.

- a. Adjectives of negative evaluation modified by adverbs of intensity (*really weird, a little odd*).
- b. Style of subjectivisation:
 - bi. Personal deixis: first (reader) and prevalence of third person (character) referential descriptions.
 - bii. External reference (*most people*).
 - biii. Use of the conditional form for explicit comparison to self (*"If I ... I wouldn't ..."*).

Moment 2:

A. *Psychological process*: The initial emotional intensity readers experience oscillates and eventually decreases. Readers' negative evaluations and sympathetic feelings for the protagonist decrease. There is progression towards higher degrees of personalization and proximity to self. At the end, they experience feelings that are paradoxical (i.e., they express sympathy for the protagonist at the same time that they evaluate her negatively; see Table 5.4, TCs 1, 3, 6, 8, 15, 175, 18, 19, and 176) and use vivid imagery to make the

experience concrete. However, their reading experience does not seem to be meaningful to them.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, the following markers characterize the experiential context of commentaries:

- a. Adjectives of negative evaluation modified by adverbs of intensity (*really weird, a little odd*).
- b. Use of modals and pre-modifiers which tone down the intensity in feelings (“*really weird*” becomes “*just a little odd*”; “*really weird*” becomes “*she just seemed pretty weird*”).
- c. Expressions indicative of sympathetic pity, or compassion (“*very sad*”; “*I feel sad for*”; “*the fact that she ... is very sad*”).
- d. Vivid imagery (“*I envisioned a very lonely old lady*”).
- e. Style of subjectivisation:
 - ei. Personal deixis: first (reader) and prevalence of third person (character) referential descriptions.

6.3. Type III: Expressive Enactment

This group of readers, whose comments belong to Cluster III, resembles those in Type II in the sense that they are emotionally engaged with the text from beginning to end. This is the second smallest group in terms of membership (8 members, see Table 5.5) and these experiential accounts are characterized by a large number of transformations, or narrative elaboration, as compared to those of Types I and II readers

(see Section 5.1.3). I will argue that this is the first group where self-modifying reading experience is articulated (see Section 6.5.3), which unfolds in three different moments.

Moment 1:

Differently from those in the other three clusters, readers here initially make explicit reference to the setting and the mood of the story. Like those in Type IV, these readers are initially self-implicated, but make self-referential descriptions to the imagery or to the mood, as illustrated by the first two commentaries of the prototypic example below.

P23

Passage 1:

The air was motionless, but when you opened your mouth there was just a faint chill, like a chill from a glass of iced water before you sip ...

Commentary 1:

So this one was just kind of – I liked it because it kind of sets up the story with, you know, it shows, like – I just liked the imagery, you know. Just thinking about kind of comparing this chill of outside but comparing it to just to the chill from the glass of iced water, it's just kind of – I like how it compares to them and sets it up for the story and it also shows it later on when it talks about when it kind of personifies the fur that she's wearing and she's kind of—this excerpts kind of open up the imagery and kind of gets your mind moving. And there's a lot of really good imagery in this excerpt.

In Commentary 1, the reader refers explicitly and positively to the imagery, made evident by the repeated use of positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction: “*I liked it because ... I just liked the imagery ... I like how it compares to them ... there’s a lot of really good imagery in this excerpt.*” Responding to the textual simile “a faint chill, like a chill from a glass of iced water before you sip,” this reader compares the sensation conveyed by the text to that of his own world: “*just thinking about kind of comparing this chill of outside but comparing it to just to the chill from the glass of iced water*” and resorts to his senses to make the experience vivid: “*this excerpts kind of open up the imagery and kind of gets your mind moving.*” By using the first person pronoun as self-reference, referring to the sensation experienced, and by being attuned to the mood of the story, the reader begins to step into the textual world.

Moment 2:

Moving to Moment 2, and compared to Commentary 1, a similar engagement is now observed. The style of such engagement is, however, different, as illustrated below.

Passage 2:

It was like some one playing with only the family to listen.

Commentary 2:

That kind of just made me think of how much you know, it’s kind of—it brings kind of home, you’re like a – kind of comfort too. Like, the music, because it’s talking about the bands who, you know, the way they play it makes you feel like—you know, you don’t need to be shy or you don’t need to hold back. Like, because for me I know there’s a lot of things that I’ll do, you know, that I feel comfortable doing around my family that I would never do around other people but it’s just—

it's kind of cool just to say, it shows like how much the amateur in music affected the woman just 'cause you know. Yeah, just with ... the family to listen where it kind of just makes you feel at home.

The reader continues evaluating the text positively: “*but it's just—it's kind of cool just to say.*” In both commentaries, the repeated use of hedges and terms of appraisal reveals that he is hesitant, which might signal a pre-lexical cognitive level language (Channell) or, in other words, emotion language (see also Toolan, *Narrative Progression*, “Textual Signalling,” “Texture,” “Verbal Art”). Despite these similarities in the selection and use of lexical items in both commentaries, in Commentary 2, the reader reveals a somewhat different style of self-implication. He is also responsive to the mood conveyed by the band playing which is mentioned in the story: “*the way they play it makes you feel like – you know, you don't need to be shy or you don't need to hold back ... just makes you feel at home.*” However, he now selects the second person. It is true that in Commentary 1, he uses the second person pronoun, but he does it only once, in its possessive form, “*kind of gets your mind moving,*” and with the function of exclusion. In Commentary 2, however, the reader speaks not only personally, but also inclusively of himself and of the protagonist, engaging in a metaphor of personal identification⁴⁹ (Cohen; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”). Understanding such use in light of

⁴⁹ See Kuiken, Sikora and Miall (“Forms” 179-180): “Ted Cohen (1999) has argued that the momentary state of a reader's absorption within an author's, narrator's, or character's perspective can become self-modifying when the reader metaphorically identifies with that figure. Cohen has in mind a mode of identification resembling dramatic enactment: a figure in literature may be brought to presence, as in method acting, through the embodying experience of the reader. Within this mode of reading, the embodied self is present but subsidiary within a performance that enlivens and extends, rather than merely mimics, the character's demeanor in the world of the text. As in metaphor, the relation between reader and character during this mode of reading is not symmetrical: reading as though ‘I am (character X)’ has quite different force than reading as though ‘(Character X) is me’ ... Within the moment of emerging metaphoric identification, the possibility of changing the reader's sense of self also emerges. Within that transition, argues Cohen, there is an opening for self-modifying feelings.”

Glucksberg and Keysar's interactive theory of metaphor, the reader is not simply comparing the character's sense of the music playing and his own. In an implicit and asymmetrical comparison, he recognizes Miss Brill and himself as members of the same class, of which she is an exemplar. In other words, his sense of the music playing is also hers, in this particular order or positioning within the class. Further explication is provided by Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora ("Forms", 184): "the pronoun 'you' has an externalizing 'otherness'; the description enlivens and extends [the character's] experience of the world of the text; and, in this way, she is brought to presence while the reader remains implicated but subsidiary." In sum, the reader's style of subjectivisation indicates that from Commentary 1 to Commentary 2 there is a quick progression from stepping into the textual world towards becoming totally immersed in it. A somewhat different engagement with the text is observed in the commentary that follows:

Passage 3: They weren't only the audience, not only looking on; they were acting.

Commentary 3:

This part was kind of—I found that this was kind of the epiphany, or when they—when the woman in the story, Miss Brill, has kind of her epiphany. When she realizes that you know, in life we're all—we're not just watching things happen, you know, we're part of it, we're actors in the play of life type thing. Like, we are – we don't just watch everything go by, we're actually—we have our part and everyone has a part in life, you know, and that—kind of I guess she just enjoys seeing everyone else's part, you know, like seeing how everyone works together and how everyone kind of combines to make the play or to connect together in life.

The third passage the reader selected is foregrounded by repetition “They weren't only the audience” and “not only looking on.” It is evocative because it sheds light on the protagonist’s epiphany, which is explicitly referred to by the reader: “*I found that this was kind of the epiphany ... Miss Brill, has kind of her epiphany. When she realizes that... .*” While elaborating on this epiphany, he still hesitates, resorting to hedging (*kind of, just, like*), but he is more assertive in the sense that he uses the words “*epiphany*” (twice), “*realizes*” and “*actually*.” He also speaks in general terms: “*in life we’re all—we’re not just watching things happen, you know, we’re part of it, we’re actors in the play of life type thing. Like, we are—we don’t just watch everything go by, we’re actually—we have our part and everyone has a part in life.*” The repeated use of the first person pronoun “we” indicates that the reader continues to be self-implicated and engages in an implicit and inclusive form of comparison between himself and the character, typical of metaphorical engagement. Nevertheless, the plural form of the pronoun and the use of the word “everyone” suggest a particular kind of engagement. The pronoun “we” and the word “everyone” reveal a generalizing otherness. The character’s realization has personal implications, which is also generalized to everyone. This form of engagement is, however, temporary, as the two next commentaries signal:

Passage 4:

And what they played was warm, sunny, yet there was just a faint chill—a something, what was it?

Commentary 4:

If you just kind of take out the rest of that sentence and just kind of leave it out for there, it kind of goes to, like, it foreshadows what’s coming up, you know, when

the young boy and the young girl who are in love, come together, meet and when they—when kind of the woman’s world starts getting kind of turned upside down, when she’s—I guess just insulted by these people who, you know, act like they don’t want her there and that she should just keep her silly old mug at home type thing. And—I just thought it was kind of cool how it foreshadowed it and just kind of shows the kind of the—what’s the word—the um—sometimes the insolence of young people, you know. They don’t maybe realize what they’re doing but to this woman they kind of destroy a certain part of her. And that will be shown more in excerpt five when we read it.

Passage 5: ... went into the little dark room—her room like a cupboard—and sat down on the red eiderdown.

Commentary 5:

Or something. It’s kind of I think a significant part because it talks you know, like it’s just the darkness that she kind of feels inside after she’s, you know, devastated by the actions of those, of the young boy and young girl who kind of take away from her part in the play and it says her room like a cupboard. It’s kind of symbolic you know, because instead of the world being that big open play that she’s talking about earlier and that big, you know, open stage for everyone to go on, she’s alone in her room, kind of like a cupboard where it’s closed in and where it’s dark and really she feels, you know, like it’s not really a play when you’re alone in your little cupboard, you know. Dark.

The repetition of *kind of, just, like* is still recurrent in Commentaries 4 and 5. This indicates the reader continues to hesitate, is not direct, uses hedging, or reveals a sense of

vagueness as if he were unsure about which words to use for what he wants to express. The context where this occurs shows that this hesitation is not indicative of low linguistic skills. In fact, it does create an affective context that permeates this experiential account from beginning to end (Channell). This reader's sensitivity is also expressed in terms of the synesthetic effect of the cross-sensory metaphor in Commentary 4: "what they played was warm, sunny," where music has tactile sensation. The contrast between the warming sensation of music and that of the "faint chill" is evocative to the reader, who returns to the effect of the sensation of the "faint chill," which is also phonetically foregrounded. The fact that he repeats the word "foreshadow" twice is important theoretically as one might claim that, even unaware of it, the reader may be acknowledging that feelings play an important anticipatory role (see Miall, *Literary Reading*). More precisely, this reader's first commentaries reveal that the sensation and the mood produced by "faint chill" anticipates his understanding of the character's feelings, which occurs later, in Commentary 4: "... *kind of the woman's world starts getting kind of turned upside down, when she's—I guess just insulted by these people.*" It is interesting to point out here that the rhyme "chill/Brill" may be echoic to the reader (Tsur, *Sound*). At this moment, the reader compares the actions of the young couple to those of others: "*sometimes the insolence of **young people**, you know. **They** don't maybe realize what **they**'re doing but to this woman they kind of destroy a certain part of her.*"

The external reference here has a different function from that in Type II readers. Negatively evaluated actions are associated with those of others. The feeling of being hurt is described in concrete language ("*part of her*" is "*destroyed*"). This ability to share the character's feelings or, in other words, the ability to empathize with the protagonist, is

quite clear here. Other members of this group express empathy by referring explicitly to bodily feelings (38%; TC285; TC290, Section 5.1.3, Table 5.5). For example, in his Commentary 3, Participant 8 states: “*she’s fascinated by it and it kind of draws you in and makes you fascinated by it as well*”; in their sixth commentaries, Participant 34 says “*you can feel her loneliness in the story,*” and Participant 32 produces “*my heart kind of went out for her to sort of—almost understanding where she was coming from.*” The fact that these readers’ comments belong to the same cluster provides stronger evidence for their embodied empathetic engagement.

Closer insight into the character’s feelings is provided by the prototypic participant here discussed in his Commentary 5 and as he elaborates on the room:

*it’s just the **darkness** that **she kind of feels** inside after she’s, you know, **devastated** by the actions of those, of the young boy and young girl who **kind of** take away from her part in the play and it says her room like a cupboard. It’s **kind of** symbolic ... **it’s dark and really she feels**, you know, like it’s not really a play when **you’re** alone in **your** little cupboard, you know. **Dark.***

The textual simile “*her room like a cupboard*” is here highly symbolic. It helps the reader gain insight into the protagonist’s and his own feelings. To the reader, darkness is a reminder of death. The sensation he mentioned in Commentary 1 is now reconceptualized in terms of a deadly chill. The reader senses the darkness of death and fears it (“*like it’s not really a play when **you’re** alone in **your** little cupboard, you know. **Dark***”) even though he does not seem to be totally aware of that. He does not declare his fear but shows it by means of hedging and vagueness that characterize the context of his discourse. Towards the end of Commentary 5, he uses the inclusive “you” when he refers

to both Miss Brill and himself, once more engaging in metaphor of personal identification. Therefore, in this context, the interpretation of *you* as being impersonal loses strength in favor of inclusion.

A gradation can now be observed: in Commentary 4, the protagonist's feelings are described even more concretely and vividly than in previous commentaries; in Commentary 5, this description becomes so vivid and concrete that the boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) are indistinguishable. The reader here repeats a pattern of empathetic response initiated in Commentary 2. Results of this full empathetic engagement, which is revisited as soon as the character's feelings are concretely and vividly lived by the reader are seen in his response to the text overall, which marks the emergence of a third moment in this reader's response to the text.

Moment 3:

In Moment 3, the reader revisits meaningful textual aspects and a final shift in the sense of self is observed in his commentary to the text as a whole.

Commentary 6:

As a whole, for this text—I like how it starts off once again with the use of imagery that kind of just sets the tone and with the imagery, it—for like the metaphor of life as a play, as a stage, you know, it sets it up really well with that—those first images that it shows in the first excerpt. And I like how it just goes through the different, you know, like different people interacting and just it kind of makes you feel like it kind of brings the text home to you, like, it makes—you know, when you read it you think of people or you think of vacations in your—I guess my own life that have, that kind of resemble that and you know,

like, if you just open your eyes this happens. This is happening all around us too and I like how it kind of gives meaning to the text kind of and it makes me fond of kind of my own life but I like also how—hmm. Just that, I don't know, I like the color of the imagery or just the colour or vibrance, that's the word I'm looking for, the vibrance that it gives kind of like and it's also—even though it's mega sad, but it's kind of—I think it adds to the text when they add in the part that you know, life really isn't always perfect and colorful and vibrant, you know, like that life can be tough, you know, and that—I like how it kind of contrasts them and works things together and how it shows the differences in this woman's life that a period of a couple minutes makes and how it—and it kind of brings knowledge of how the actions of maybe two, maybe unsuspecting actions can sometimes cause big repercussions and how we need to be careful sometimes how we act around people and um. Overall it's pretty good text and I enjoyed looking at different perspectives.

The indication that revisiting evocative aspects will occur is provided right at the beginning: “*it starts off once again.*” Here, the sense of “being home” that he starts elaborating in Commentary 2 is conveyed by the textual imagery: “*... like the metaphor of life as a play ... it kind of makes you feel like it kind of brings the text home to you.*” In Commentary 2, “being home” reflects the manner whereby the band plays (see above). In Commentary 6, it acquires a somewhat different meaning. After sensing the darkness of death, a fear we all share (Commentary 5), the reader now returns to life. The notion of “home” implies comfort, safety, in sharp contrast with the image of the “cupboard.” In this way, being home becomes a metaphor that appropriately describes the interaction

between reader and text, as the reader's innermost unconscious (or pre-reflective; see Chapter 2) fears are brought to consciousness. Here is how his innermost experiential meanings are modified: first, the felt sense of the faint chill of the glass of ice is shifted to the deadly chill of his finitude, which brings back the safe and comforting sense of life, as these innermost meanings become conscious.

In this last commentary, Participant 23 resorts to a neologism to express what he wants to say: *"I like the color of the imagery or just the colour or **vibrance**, that's the word I'm looking for, the **vibrance**."* It is at this stage that he arrives at his own epiphany. The use of the first person pronouns and the word "own" is indicative of this reflexive moment, one in which he demonstrates strong sense of agency and ownership over his feelings: *"I like how it kind of gives meaning to the text kind of and it makes **me** fond of kind of **my own** life ... life really isn't always perfect and colorful and vibrant, you know, like that life can be tough, you know."* In this sense, agency, ownership, and intimacy mark the restructuring of his sense of self. This reader also extends his concerns for others in *"it kind of brings knowledge of how the actions of maybe two, maybe unsuspecting actions can sometimes cause big repercussions and how we need to be careful sometimes how we act around people and um."* The use of the first person plural now becomes an ethical imperative. This formulation, however, seems to be idiosyncratic as it is not a distinguishing characteristic of this group. The reader ends his commentary declaring the fruition of his literary experience: *"Overall it's pretty good text and I enjoyed looking at different perspectives."*

In a word, Type III readers initiate their reading experience focusing on the textual imagery and its affective connotations, which become gradually more vivid and

concrete, and reconceptualized. As their narratives progress, there is even closer proximity to the self as character's and readers' feelings become one. One reader summarizes this process well:

that sort of affects how the reader's feeling too because you get really involved with this character, you kind of enjoy the things that she's noticing and you think it's kind of interesting. Then all of a sudden it's— she's really sad and it makes the reader feel bad too. I guess all this describing what's been going on in her head you get kind of I guess sort of emotionally involved (P4, Commentary 5)

This empathetic involvement enables them to share, momentarily, someone else's feelings. In this process, their sense of agency and ownership of feelings increase and at the end of the account, the "I" becomes clearly distinguished again. These feelings become their own. This process, thus, creates the necessary context for the restructuring of the sense of self and the experiencing of the elated feeling of self-discovery and of meaningful reading.

A description of the progression of this first type of self-modifying reading can be summarized as follows:

Moment 1:

A. *Psychological process*: Readers are attuned to the mood of the story imagery. Such emotional engagement occurs via positive evaluation and vivid imagery. The boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) are clearly distinguished. The emergence of an affective theme is observed.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential (see Section 2.5) context of commentaries.

- a. Positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction (*like, really good*).
- b. Modality of indeterminacy and use of vague language: hedges, softening modals or appraisal items (*kind of, just*).
- c. Vivid imagery (*imagine, imagery, gets your mind moving*).
- d. Style of subjectivisation: simile of personal identification, or explicit comparison
 - di. Personal deixis: first (reader) and third person (character) referential descriptions.

Moment 2:

A. *Psychological process*: From stepping into the textual world, the reader becomes totally immersed in it. The boundaries between self (reader) and other (character) are blurred and the style of engagement with the text now shifts to one suggestive of metaphor of personal identification. The reader is empathetically engaged with the text, and empathy is bodily felt. Description of feelings becomes more precise and concrete. The emergent affective theme is modified.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential context of commentaries.

- a. Positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction (*like, really good, cool*).
- b. Modality of indeterminacy and use of vague language: hedges, softening modals or appraisal items (*kind of, just, like*).

- c. Lexis indicative of assertiveness (*actually, realizes, epiphany*).
- d. Style of subjectivisation: prevalence of metaphor of personal identification
 - di. Personal deictic shift: “I” and predominance in the use of inclusive “you.”
- e. Expressions that indicate awareness of bodily feelings (“*you can feel her loneliness,*” “*my heart kind of went out for her,*” “*she’s fascinated by it and it kind of draws you in and makes you fascinated by it as well*”).
- f. Negative evaluation of external reference (“*they are insolent*”).

Moment 3:

A. *Psychological process*: Reader experiences self-modification. The boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) are, again, clearly distinguished. Agency and ownership of feelings are asserted as the implications of the emergent affective theme are re-discovered in a new way. Reader experiences the fruition of meaningful reading.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential context of commentaries.

- a. Positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction (*like, really well, fond of, pretty good, enjoy*).
- b. Indeterminacy or vague language: softening modals or appraisal items (*kind of, just*).
- c. Style of subjectivisation:

- ci. Personal deictic shift: first (reader) and third person (character) referential descriptions; prevalence of “I” (agency).
- cii. Lexis indicating ownership (“*my own life*”).

6.4. Type IV: Total Enactment

The second type where self-modification occurs, Type IV is similar to Types II and III in that the experiential accounts of the members of this group are also charged with feelings from beginning to end. Although the smallest in terms of membership (with 4 members, see Table 5.6), Type IV readers present the largest number of transformations (see Table 5.6, Section 5.1.3), or narrative elaborations, including shifts in sense of self. Type IV readers are also the most prolific ones (see Section 5.1.3.1). Their responses are more detailed and expressive in many ways, revealed by the four different moments, which characterize the progression of this type of reading experience.

Moment 1:

Total enactment readers start to engage with the text just where those of Type II end. Initially, there is paradox in the way they express their feelings and in how they position themselves in discourse. They also imagine the protagonist vividly. Thus, a rich experiential context characterizes Moment 1, as exemplified by extracts of the first two commentaries from Participant 12:

P12

Passage 1:

“Dear little thing! It was nice to feel again ... What has been happening to me?” said the sad little eyes. Oh, how sweet it was to see them snap at her again.”

Commentary 1:

So I picked these lines because I think there's obviously like a parallel between the two, so between the fur and—and then Miss Brill. So I think because like, you obviously get the sense that it's been a long time since she's taken the fur out. And she says like, oh, how nice it was to feel again. Like she's happy to have it with her. And then her, it's her putting this comment on the fur, like saying so like her giving her fur a voice saying “what has been happening to me.” And then ... the first time you read it it's a little—like, I almost laughed because it's kind of—when you get that image of someone giving like, this fur a voice and then talking about it being like so sweet that the eyes, like she talks about the eyes having feeling, like them snapping at her, is kind of like disgusting or you're like ah, that's not very cute at all. But once you get—like, you read the entire thing and you understand it I think, like you get this sense of—like, she gives that voice to the fur because that's what she's feeling. So “what has been happening to me?” ... The woman talking about her spectacles and she wants to slap her so, like these things that she doesn't really like in all of them but then she ends up getting the sense from all of it, like once she has her little epiphany, like oh we're all a part of this play, that she has this appreciation for everything so then when she kind of gets to that point right, like where she had been in her life in this stage like oh, like what's been happening, like it hasn't been the same lately. I've been

coming on my Sundays and then it's like she has her little epiphany but then that's immediately like turned back and back against her. So I think that these lines are the most important in this first passage, like it's foreshadowing for what's going to be happening. And anyway, I like it because it gives the sense of what she's feeling and also like her ideas of the world that she, like, projects that on to this object of hers, this fur of hers.

In Commentary 1, this reader is emotionally affected by the personification used. Like Type III readers, she resorts to indeterminacy, using a lot of hedging or softening modals or appraisal items (“*kind of*,” “*like*,” “*almost*,” “*a little*”), which create an experiential context for the entire commentary. She says: “*I almost laughed because it's kind of – when you get that image of someone giving like, this fur a voice and then talking about it being like so sweet that the eyes, like she talks about the eyes having feeling, like them snapping at her, is kind of like disgusting or you're like ah, that's not very cute at all.*” The experience is quite vivid (“*you get that image of*”) but also paradoxical, as she laughs at the same time that she evaluates the protagonist's behavior as “*disgusting.*” This paradox is also evident in how this reader evaluates the character (“*disgusting,*” “*not very cute at all,*” but also “*like[s] her ideas of the world that she, like, projects that on to this object of hers, this fur of hers*”). Positive and negative verbs and lexis of evaluative reaction are used. Contrasting emotional reactions—negative and positive evaluations, laughter and disgust—co-habit this initial experiential context.

As regards the use of personal deixis, the third person reference to the character prevails, followed by the use of “I.” The second person pronoun “you” is seldom used, except in its exclusive form. This personalizes the sharing of information and projecting

of the situation (e.g., “*you’re like ah, that’s not very cute at all*”), but does not reveal that the reader feels with the protagonist. Participant 12 steps into the world of the text by means of imagining it vividly and by means of a paradoxical evaluative reaction towards it.

While responding to the personification of the fur, she comments: “*So I picked these lines because I think there’s obviously like a parallel between the two, so between the fur and—and then Miss Brill.*” Later in the same passage the reader says: “*So I think that these lines are the most important in this first passage, like it’s foreshadowing for what’s going to be happening.*” The sense of foreshadowing here is important. This reader’s feelings seem to anticipate what comes next: “*the parallel*” that she notices is reenacted in subsequent commentaries by means of a somewhat different interaction between herself and the text, revealed in Moment 2.

Moment 2:

Augmentation in evaluative reaction and empathetic engagement is observed in the following Commentary 2, as the texture of the writing becomes focal to her:

Passage 2:

Other people sat on the benches and green chairs, but they were nearly always the same, Sunday after Sunday, and—Miss Brill had often noticed—there was something funny about nearly all of them. They were odd, silent, nearly all old, and from the way they stared they looked as though they'd just come from dark little rooms or even—even cupboards!

Commentary 2:

So this line—these lines actually—I think are great because, like it’s before her little epiphany and that she views everything as a play but I think it’s great because she’s viewing all these other people that do the same sort of thing she does. So, like coming “Sunday after Sunday” and sitting on these chairs and things like that. ... And that—so she’s viewing the other people that way but then when you get to the end of the story, the couple at the end views Miss Brill, like they put her in that category. Like, calling her old or joking about her fur and stuff, like thinking that she’s an odd duck, you know. So I think that’s interesting. And I guess, like, separate from the rest of the line, if I read it separately, like “there was something funny about nearly all of them”—I guess I relate to that where they’re nearly always the same. Relate to that in the sense of, like, I remember a year or two ago, like, going to West Edmonton Mall with my brothers and it was surreal because we were walking in and a few different groups of women came out, like, you could tell like separate people coming out of the mall but like a few, like, middle aged, like, varying ages but like—anyway, different women coming out of the mall and they all looked like the same. Like, it was hilarious and just because that sometimes we have these images and we all try and get that image so it was just surreal so, yeah, I didn’t really want to go in after that but I thought of that when I read those lines. And then I guess, like, the lines “they looked as though they’d just come from dark little rooms or even cupboards”—obviously like will relate to her going back to her own cupboard, like, described as that. But it’s funny, it made me think of how our buildings almost all of them are like, our rooms are rectangles and things like that, like, and

they can be like—like, it's funny that she uses "cupboards," like, she doesn't use the word boxes, like it contained—well, I guess cupboards and boxes contain things but like, cupboards, the idea that—what was I going to say ... like, that it's something that you just—you store stuff in and it's not necessarily that important. Yeah, or that we just sort of hide ourselves away in those or it's like a glass coming out of the cupboard and you use it and then you put it back and there's nothing, like, beautiful or different in that act. So I don't know, I thought about things like that too.

Participant 12 continues evaluating the text, but now other textual aspects and not only the protagonist's actions become focal: "*these lines actually—I think are great.*" Moreover, she comments on the way the protagonist perceives the world around her and compares the character's perceptions and her own. By so doing, the "*parallel*" between the character and the fur that she notices in her Commentary 1 is now reenacted in somewhat different terms:

there was something funny about nearly all of them – I guess I relate to that where they're nearly always the same. ... I remember a year or two ago, like, going to West Edmonton Mall with my brothers ... we were walking in and a few different groups of women came out, like, you could tell like separate people coming out of the mall ... they all looked like the same ... sometimes we have these images and we all try and get that image.

"they looked as though they'd just come from dark little rooms or even cupboards" ... it made me think of how our buildings almost all of them are like,

our rooms are rectangles ... it's funny that she uses "cupboards" ... the idea that ... you just – you store stuff in and it's not necessarily that important. Yeah, or that we just sort of hide ourselves away in those or it's like a glass coming out of the cupboard and you use it and then you put it back and there's nothing, like, beautiful or different in that act.

This reader initiates both extracts by quoting the text. It is evident that the way the protagonist's experience of the world is worded provides the necessary context for the emergence of personal reminders. The fact that Participant 12 quotes the text is important as it provides an interesting contrast with the poetics of Type I readers. In Type I and IV, the physical presence of the text is important. Type I readers dissect and study it, but the text becomes an agent. Those in Type IV quote or paraphrase the text: "*Sunday after Sunday*," "*there was something funny about nearly all of them*," "*they looked as though they'd just come from dark little rooms or even cupboards*," repeatedly, just as it was in Commentary 1: "*So I picked **these lines** because I think there's obviously like a parallel between the two*," "*how nice it was to feel again*," "*what has been happening to me?*" (repeated three times), "*we're all part of this play*." However, when compared to what occurs with external enactment readers (Type I), here the texture has a different function. It is an essential part of this reader's poetics, as it shapes and gives direction to personal reminders. Instead of the text becoming an agent as it does for Type I readers, in Type IV this role is performed by the reader him or herself. Another difference between Types I and IV is that here, from the beginning, readers are already self-implicated whereas in Type I they observe the protagonist from a distance.

The two extracts reveal the way by means of which the wording of the text structures and provides the opening for personal reminders as they both follow the same temporal unfolding: first, the reader quotes or paraphrases the text and then explicitly uses the pronoun “I” to refer to herself. In both extracts, the use of “I” is followed by the inclusive “you” and “we.” This choice of pronouns indicates that the reader speaks both personally and more generally. The boundaries between reader, protagonist, and others in the world merge. There is no clear differentiation between these references. The reader’s relation with the text can be understood, once again, in terms of the interactive metaphor theory of Glucksberg and Keysar. She is not simply comparing the protagonist’s observation to the people sitting on benches at the park with her own. In an implicit and asymmetrical comparison, she includes Miss Brill, herself, and others (“we”) as members of the same class, of which the protagonist is an exemplar. While engaging in a metaphorical relation to the text, the first person pronoun is expressed in its plural form “we,” suggesting a general self. Miss Brill’s perceptions are, thus, equal to those of this general self. The relation is asymmetrical in that, for the reader, to say “We are Miss Brill” is different from saying “Miss Brill is us.” The pronoun “we” has an externalizing and generalizing otherness. The description of the character’s experience of the world of the text is brought to presence by means of this extended self, which remains implicated but subsidiary. Due to this general understanding, and, in order to differentiate this style of engagement from that of metaphor of personal identification (which is marked by the use of the inclusive “you,” Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”), I will refer to it as “metaphor of general identification.” The unfolding of Commentaries 1 and 2 culminates

not so much in a “*parallel*” but in a juxtaposition of perceptions, in which the boundaries of text, reader, character, and others in the world are blurred.

Another relevant aspect of Participant 12’s experience is that of textual enactment, which is observed in two different ways. On the one hand, she enacts (even though in a somewhat different way) the relationship between Miss Brill and the fur by means of the juxtaposition of perceptions that she assumes. On the other hand, the form of the text gives shape to this reader’s patterned style of response. The unusual sentence structure in the second textual passage she selected is foregrounded because of its repetition: “nearly always the same ... nearly all old,” “Sunday after Sunday,” “even—even cupboards!”. Participant 12 herself engages in a repeated pattern of interaction with the text: she quotes the text twice, then engages in a style suggestive of “metaphor of general identification,” which culminates in a juxtaposition of perceptions. This indicates that she is not only aware of the patterning of the text, which she finds evocative, but, more importantly, that she enacts this formal patterning. The same occurs in her response to Passage 3:

Passage 3:

... they were acting. Even she had a part and came every Sunday. No doubt somebody would have noticed if she hadn't been there ...

Commentary 3:

... it's just a great piece of commentary and I like it a lot. Anyways, I picked the last paragraph, these kind of bits of the sentences ... So, I like her little epiphany and I guess you could say, like, say that it's a cliché now, like we're all actors in this play. But I think this is kind of a new twist on that and anyway, I like it a lot

but – like, I like her comment ... So like kind of her giving a word and for herself like, yeah, I am important or I have this role to play. And then saying, like, no doubt somebody would have noticed if she hadn't been there. ... so it's interesting that she has this idea that she'll be – it would be noticed if she wasn't there just because it's like a routine and she feels like some self-worth. So it's sad that she – like, feels self-worth and then it's obviously crushed near the end. But I think it's interesting and it's a neat way of bringing it up that we all have these ideas of would we be remembered or would anyone notice if I wasn't here or would things be different, so like I know I've asked myself those questions about different things and I think that's why, like, I just have like intrinsically in me, like tell people on a regular basis, like, I don't wait for events or birthdays or anniversaries to tell people what they mean to me. Like I, on a regular basis, will talk about how I appreciate them or different things like that because – just because I think it's an important thing for people to know, that they are – they are noticed and that someone does, like, care about them and things like that. So I guess this story, like, it doesn't blatantly raise these questions, like it – but it does if you think about it. Anyways, those were my lines I guess. And they were acting kind of bring in the couple before, like chatting and then he walks away and it says she sat, like, smiles more brightly than before or something like that and then just like pretends to see someone and walks away, so it's interesting that way too, the way we act amongst each other, that we put on these different, these different roles and things like that ... how we yeah, how we hold ourselves around each other and how it's interesting that she talks about it like a play, like our lives are such this

production. Like, this elaborate – this elaborate production I guess. Anyway, those were the things that I thought about.

Now, the initial paradox in evaluative feelings characteristic of Moment 1 is solved, which is marked by a shift in the initial evaluation of the protagonist. In Moment 1, Participant 12 was negative, but paradoxical, and in Moment 2, positive (See Section 5.1.3, Table 5.6, TC5): “***I like her little epiphany ... so it’s interesting that she has this idea...I think it’s interesting and it’s a neat way of bringing it up.***” Her evaluations are expanded not only to the protagonist, but also to the text more broadly speaking. Once again, following the same pattern of Commentary 2, it is the way the protagonist perceives the world, and which is revealed by the wording of the text, that this reader finds appealing: “*I loved that ... Like, it’s just a great piece of commentary and I like it a lot ... so it’s interesting that she has this idea that she’ll be – it would be noticed if she wasn’t there just because it’s like a routine and she feels like some self-worth.*”

As the texture remains relevant, the reader’s feelings for the protagonist are now somewhat different. She feels sympathy for the protagonist: “*So it’s sad that she – like, feels self-worth and then it’s obviously crushed near the end.*” Here, bodily feelings are not explicitly stated, even though the word “crushed” imparts concreteness to these feelings. They are, however, quite explicit among other members of this same group. One example is provided by Participant 47, who clearly and recurrently refers to the way in which sympathy is embodied:

P47

Commentary 2:

*... it's really quite sad because you can't help but feel bad for her because she's lonely, ... it's really sad, because ... **and your heart kind of goes out to her** because ... it's just really sad. ... I feel really bad for her.*

Commentary 4:

*... it's absolutely devastating ... it must have been so devastating. ... **my heart sunk, it felt like it shattered into a million pieces** ... it's like jabbing the knife in a little deeper. ... It just makes me really feel bad for Miss Brill.*

Commentary 5:

*... so it's really sad to see that she's going through this ... **but inside you're just shattered to a million pieces and everything hurts** ... it's devastating.*

Commentary 6:

*... it's—you know, **your heart breaks for Miss Brill**. Like, really—like you want to just jump into the pages and just give her a hug, ... And so it's—you know, you feel really bad because ... it's really hard ... you feel bad for her. I mean, anyone who doesn't feel bad for her is just, you know, they're heartless, they have no emotions.*

As feelings become concrete and bodily felt, and just as they do in Commentary 2, in Commentary 3 Participant 12 repeatedly engages in a style of response suggestive of “metaphor of general identification.” The reinstatement of this style is revealed by the following extract:

*that **we all** have these ideas of would **we** be remembered or would anyone notice if I wasn't here or would things be different, so like **I** know **I've** asked **myself** those questions about different things and **I** think that's why, like, **I just have like** **intrinsically in me**, like tell people on a regular basis, like, **I don't wait for events or birthdays or anniversaries to tell people what they mean to me. Like I, on a regular basis, will talk about how I appreciate them or different things like that because – just because I think it's an important thing for people to know, that they are – they are noticed and that someone does, like, care about them and things like that. So I guess this story, like, it doesn't blatantly raise these questions, like it – but it does if you think about it ... so it's interesting that way too, the way **we** act amongst each other, that **we** put on these different, these different roles and things like that ... it's just how **we** yeah, how **we** hold **ourselves** around each other and how it's interesting that she talks about it like a play, like **our** lives are such this production. Like, this elaborate – this elaborate production I guess.***

The reader's style of engagement is repeated, but now it has new implications. The general reference to "people" and the use of the externalizing third person plural reference to others in the world are indicative of the emergence of ethical reconsiderations (see extract in bold). It is noticeable, however, that such ethical reassessment is marked by the prevalence of "I." It reveals a moment of intimacy, in which this reader's self is profoundly implicated by its ethical commitments and concern for others.

This form of transformation, involving ethical reconsiderations in Moment 2 characterizes the reading process of most of the readers in this cluster and is almost absent among members of others (Section 5.1.3, Table 5.6, TC64 [75%], TC65 [75%], TC66 [100%], TC67 [100%], TC203 [75%]). What I here call “metaphor of general identification” provides the appropriate context for the emergence of ethical reconsiderations. This style is not recursive in Commentary 4, which thus indicates a different moment in the episodic structure of Participant 12’s response.

Moment 3:

Deictic shift marks the different engagement of this reader with the text at this Moment 3. Now, there is prevalence in the use of “I” and the inclusive “you,” as seen in the following commentary:

Passage 4: Yes, we understand, we understand, she thought—though what they understood she didn't know.

Commentary 4:

So this is after she’s had her epiphany and she’s been listening to this music that the band’s playing. And she imagines let’s all sing, like she has this feeling in her that it’ll be that way. So I love this line and I actually forgot about this so I’ll mention it now. Like, it made me remember just this moment, like times where you’ve been in a regular situation ... or a routine situation I should say, like in a classroom, but that something like the lights that day or just the smell or the atmosphere of it makes you feel like – like, kind of in the moment I guess and like you’re – like you have this heightened sense of things and that it feels like almost like being at home, like being around family or something ... like, you feel content

I guess or that it's strangely familiar but in a new way, like a heightened sense of things. I don't know if that makes any sense but I thought of that, like, how I've had times where I've been, like, in a classroom or somewhere else where I just get that feeling and it's not like déjà vu, it's not like oh, I've been here before but it's this idea of— like, you obviously have been there before because I'm talking about routine situations but just this heightened sense of it. So I think that's it's interesting that the music has done this for her so I like that there's emphasis kind of on that, like how our different senses can create these things, like these ideas or these — they can help create like these epiphanies. So I really like that and that it's so interesting and that, like, it's the same stimulus, that you react a different way. ... Anyway, and I like that she says 'thought what they understood she didn't know.' I think I like that so much because it's not this obvious sort of statement, or she's not generalizing anything, like she's not saying like we understand that, like we are, we share these common threads with each other. Or she doesn't say like we understand that we are like these members of a play, that she doesn't say something that she's sort of hinted at before. Like, she says what they understood she didn't know. And I think I've had feelings like that before where you just maybe like the air that day or something, where you feel like you are content and you understand life for a few brief moments, so I relate with it a lot that way and I think it's so perfect the way she — like, the author, says this. Because it allows for multiple interpretations and it allows the reader to just come up with their own idea of what they know, what they understand I mean. We understand. So yeah, I picked that line for those reasons.

While commenting on the character's epiphany, Participant 12 makes explicit comparison between the protagonist's feelings and her own:

*So I love this line and I actually forgot about this so I'll mention it now. **Like, it made me remember** just this moment, **like** times where you've been in a regular situation ... **like** in a classroom ... And **I think I've had feelings like that** before where you just maybe like the air that day or something, where you feel like you are content and you understand life for a few brief moments.*

The over-repetition of the preposition "like," the reference to the self using "I" and the inclusive "you" indicate that this reader now engages in simile of personal identification. After the metaphorical engagement with the text, which was typical of Moment 2, in Moment 3, she regains some distance towards the text. Self (reader) and other (text) are clearly distinguished. This distance is now the necessary context for her verbalization of how it feels to have her meanings confronted and reshaped, evident in the following extract of Commentary 4:

***you feel** ... that it's **strangely familiar but in a new way**, like a heightened sense of things ... so I like that there's emphasis kind of on that, like how **our** different senses can create these things, like these ideas or these – they can help create like **these epiphanies**. ... Anyway, and I like that she says "**thought what they understood she didn't know**" ... And I think **I've had feelings like that** before where **you** just maybe like the air that day or something, where **you** feel like **you** are content and **you understand** life for a few brief moments, so **I relate** with it a*

lot that way and I think it's so perfect the way she – like, the author, says this....

We understand.

In this explicit self-comparison with the protagonist, Participant 12 quotes the text and verbalizes the manner whereby it becomes a means for the reconceptualization of her own understandings, or her own process of defamiliarization: “*you feel ... strangely familiar but in a new way*” (Šklovskij), even though her realization is expressed in general terms “*We understand,*” This reader’s final words provide a link for the emergence of the last moment (Moment 4) of her response.

Moment 4:

Textual enactment is recursive and a final shift in the sense of self is now observed, and as revealed by the last two commentaries:

Passage 5:

Sometimes there was an almond in her slice, sometimes not. It made a great difference.

Commentary 5:

So for this, I guess I relate to it in the sense that, like, she has this routine where she buys this honey cake at the baker's every Sunday and it's so awesome because not enough people will treat themselves. Like, yeah, like indulge in a piece of cake or like, you know, do these things for themselves. So I related to that immediately and it reminds me of the movie “Emily,” which is awesome. Anyways, just that idea of these simple things that make a great difference. Oh, I just totally used the sentence. But yeah, like how – yeah, like the line it made a great difference. And I think—I guess I should add ... when she says like it's a tiny present, like a

surprise, and something that might very well not have been there. I'm going to underline that one right now too. Like, that without that simple thing you wouldn't have maybe had this little bit of excitement in your day or that, like, you had this—she recognizes that yeah, it could have not been there. So I like that because it's like these very simple things in daily life that I think can—that influence your thoughts I guess. If you're willing to be receptive to them so I think like simple things like noticing like how the look of the ice melts, like or different formations, like, yeah, and like snow, I'll use snow as my example. Like, how that can be interesting and magical in a way and I guess we sometimes, especially with our culture and I mean, we put so much—we have such big decisions to make or at least so many problems to solve and all of these things but that sometimes it is really small things that make a difference, like I don't think she's like some obsessive-compulsive woman, like I think we all kind of – or hopefully all do this where we have something simple that matters to us I guess. So yeah, those were the lines I picked and that's kind of why.

Commentary 6:

This is my thoughts on the text as a whole. I tend to be pretty verbose so I'm going to try to keep it kind of short. I'll talk about the last paragraph first I think. So the idea of putting her fur away and then she thought she heard something crying. So this obviously can relate, like it can just be the object that you see that as. Or you can see her fur as a parallel to her. And I kind of take it both ways because at the beginning she talks about this fur and like it's something that's a comfort to her, like she likes it and I know for me there's certain things, like even certain cutlery

that I like to use more than other ones. Like, the nostalgia of some things or just certain objects that are somewhat important. So I think it's – I kind of like that idea, that it has such importance to her or that, like, she hears it crying, like that she gives that object feeling. Because I think we can project our, like – we can create like a relationship with an object. Yeah, I don't know exactly how to describe it, but it's like a work of art of something, right. Like, it's a picture on the wall but you can have a relationship with that photograph or with that picture, like, you can create that? So anyway, I like that idea within this text. I also like if you view the fur as a parallel for her, like the author does a great job of doing that and that you can view her through that – and that – I guess the crying too, that she was so happy before, like she was happy to be observing the world and having all of these ideas and thoughts go through her head and that then she goes back – yeah, it says go back to her little dark room, her room like a cupboard. Like she shuts herself away and then she hears this crying, like it is this sad thing when we become so – well, when something makes it in our lives that we pull away from life and it's wonder even the horrible things that can happen so I guess that's one of my lasting impressions with this, is – like, there's the ideas like – I can just – I'm guessing that most people when they discuss this, talk about that we're all like these actors on a stage, like that that's kind of a main theme, but – and I understand that and I think it's a main theme too, but for me it's the idea of that and this simplicity of life, so that there's like this connection with all of us. I kind of like that idea, so just, yeah ... I like that concept that we're all interconnected and you get a sense of that in this. It's funny because you get a

complete opposite of that, like with the relationships that she discusses that are distant and awful, so those ones are like, oh, but that's just a part of life I guess. And then you also get this – but through those you get this sense of almost even more connectedness because she can relate to those people, like she can relate to the husband that must be exasperated with his wife about the spectacles and things like that. So I like that and that – but even greater than that, I think the sense that I get in this that I like is that the simple things are important and that the ability to have this sense of self-worth or that you matter is important regardless of the fact of who might express alternative points of view on your own worthiness is like, a human being so I'm left with kind of that idea I guess, that – yeah, simple – enjoying and recognizing the simplicity of life. But then also seeing this greater picture is important. So that's my kind of favorite part of this story I think, is that it deals with such detail but that it has these over-arching themes. So, yeah, that's my overall impression of this text.

In Commentaries 5 and 6, Participant 12 again selects a style of engagement suggestive of “metaphor of general identification,” as the following extracts of Commentaries 5 and 6, respectively, illustrate:

*... Like, that without that simple thing **you** wouldn't have maybe had this little bit of excitement in **your** day or that, like, **you** had this – she recognizes that yeah, it could have not been there. So I like that because it's like these very simple things in daily life that I think can – that influence **your** thoughts I guess. If **you**'re willing to be receptive to them ... how that can be interesting and magical in a*

*way and I guess **we** sometimes, especially with **our** culture and I mean, **we** put so much – **we** have such big decisions to make or at least so many problems to solve and all of these things but that sometimes it is really small things that make a difference ... I think **we all** kind of – or hopefully **all** do this where **we** have something simple that matters to **us** I guess. (Commentary 5)*

*...Because I think **we** can project **our**, like – **we** can create like a relationship with an object.... Like she shuts herself away and then she hears this crying, like it is this sad thing when **we** become so – well, when something makes it in **our** lives that **we** pull away from life and it's wonder even the horrible things that can happen ... **we**'re all like these actors on a stage, like that that's kind of a main theme ... but for me it's the idea of that and this simplicity of life, so that there's like this connection with **all of us**. I kind of like that idea, so just, yeah ... I like that concept that **we**'re all interconnected and **you** get a sense of that in this ... (Commentary 6)*

In both extracts the use of the inclusive “you” and the inclusive generalizing “we” prevails, indicating the deixis that characterize the metaphorical relation with the text and the merging boundaries between self (reader), other (text), and others in the world.

Even though this reader re-engages in a metaphorical and generalizing relation with the text, there is an interesting progression towards proximity to self and self-realization: after spelling out the reassessment of her ethical predicaments in Moment 2, which is one of the mechanisms whereby her paradoxical feelings in Moment 1 are

resolved, in Moment 3 Participant 12 clearly expresses a self that is distinguished from the text. Now, in Moment 4, the boundaries between self (reader), other (text), and others in the world become blurred again. In this moment, the text regains primacy.

Textual enactment is observed in two different ways. First, what is noteworthy about the selections of the fourth and fifth passages are not only the repetition of the word “understand” (Passage 4), which reverberates in the cadence of this reading experience, but also the contrasts of “understanding” and “not knowing” (Passage 4) and of “sometimes there was” and “sometimes not” (Passage 5), which are foregrounded. In a way, these contrasts are a recursive theme that is not only evocative but which also shapes her own engagement with the text. In Moment 1, they are revealed by the paradoxical feelings she experiences, which are resolved by means of a repeated style of engagement with the text. Second, Participant 12 explicitly refers to the role of the text in the investment of her emotions: the words of the text become a voice of her own: “*just that idea of these **simple things that make a great difference**. Oh, I just totally used the sentence.*” This reader is not only aware of texture, as she was in Moment 2, but the words of the text become her own. This appropriation is critical towards her path of realizing epiphanies of her own, spelled out at the end of Commentary 6:

*I think the sense that I get in this that I like is that the **simple things are important** and that the ability to have this sense of self-worth or that you matter is important regardless of the fact of who might express alternative points of view on your own worthiness is like, a human being so I’m left with kind of that idea I guess, that—yeah, simple—enjoying and **recognizing** the simplicity of life.*

In this moment of epiphany, the “I” is brought to the forefront and the modality of indeterminacy that characterized all of the commentaries of this reader now co-habits with assertiveness, marked in the extract above by the expression “*the fact of*” and the word “*recognizing*.” The prevalence of “I” during the intimate moment of self-realization indicates that this reader regains the clear distinction between self and others and makes it clear that the renewed recognition of the “*simplicity of life*” is the manner by means of which this text is relevant to her life.

The unfolding of this second type of self-modified reading can be described as follows:

Moment 1:

A. *Psychological process*: Readers describe the protagonist’s feelings vividly and their emotional engagement with the text is paradoxical. The boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) are clearly distinguished. The emergence of an affective theme is observed.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential (cf. Section 2.5) context of commentaries.

- a. Positive and negative mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction (*like, disgusting, not very cute at all*).
- b. Modality of indeterminacy and use of vague language: softening modals or appraisal items (“*kind of*,” “*like*,” “*almost*,” “*a little*”).
- c. Vivid imagery (“*you get that image of*”).
- d. Style of subjectivisation: simile of personal identification, or explicit comparison.

- di. Personal deixis: first (reader) and third person (character) referential descriptions; prevalence of third person description; second person pronoun “you” is used in its exclusive form.

Moment 2:

A. *Psychological process*: Moment 2 is characterized by resolution of paradoxical feelings and amplification in feelings. Evaluative reaction is augmented: the reader not only evaluates the protagonist’s actions and feelings, but also the text. The reader becomes attuned to the making of the text, which shapes and guides her personal reminders. Moreover, the reader empathizes with and feels sympathy for the protagonist. Augmentation in self-referential description is observed: the reader engages in a style suggestive of “metaphor of general identification.” Feelings become more concrete and are bodily felt. Reformulation of the emergent affective theme is elaborated. The text provides the opening for personal reminders. The reader enacts the textual repetition by means of a patterned style of engagement with the text. Finally, by feeling with and for the character, the reader realizes an ethical alternative.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential context of commentaries.

- a. Prevalence of positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction (*like, love, interesting, neat*).
- b. Negative evaluation has external reference (“*they are insolent*”).
- c. Modality of indeterminacy and use of vague language: hedges, softening modals or appraisal items (*kind of, just*).

- d. Lexis indicative of assertiveness (use of words such as “*actually*,” “*realizes*,” “*epiphany*”).
- e. Textual quotations and paraphrases.
- f. Style of subjectivisation: prevalence of metaphor of general identification (empathy)
 - fi. Personal deictic shift: predominance in the use of inclusive and generalizing “we,” and “I”.
 - fii. Prevalence of “I”; use of the externalizing third person plural “they” in reference to others (ethical implication).
- g. Expressions that indicate sympathy (“it’s sad that”) and reference to bodily feelings (“*and your heart kind of goes out to her*,” “*my heart sunk, it felt like it shattered into a million pieces*,” “*your heart breaks for Miss Brill*”).

Moment 3:

A. *Psychological process*: The boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) are clearly distinguished. Reader’s engagement with the text is suggestive of simile of personal identification. In this explicit self-comparison with the protagonist, the texture remains important for her expression of the sense of defamiliarization. The reader experiences a heightened sense of self and anticipates its alteration.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential context of commentaries.

- a. Prevalence of positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction (*like, love, interesting*).
- b. Modality of indeterminacy and vague language: hedges, softening modals or appraisal items (*kind of, maybe*).
- c. Lexis indicative of assertiveness (use of words such as “*actually,*” “*understand,*” “*epiphany*”).
- d. Textual quotations and paraphrases.
- e. Defamiliarization (“*creation of epiphany,*” “*strangely familiar but in a new way*”).
- f. Style of subjectivisation: prevalence of simile of personal identification
 - fi. Personal deictic shift: use of “I,” the inclusive “you,” and over-repetition of the preposition “like.”

Moment 4:

A. *Psychological process*: Self-modification is experienced. The reader re-engages in metaphor of general identification and experiences empathy, when boundaries between self (reader), other (text), and others in the world are merged. Textual enactment: the words of the text become the reader’s words. This wording opens up the way for the boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) to be, again, clearly distinguished.

Agency and ownership of feelings asserted.

B. *Linguistic markers*: Occurring in repetition, these markers characterize the experiential context of commentaries.

- a. Modality of indeterminacy and vague language: softening modals or appraisal items (*kind of, just*).
- b. Lexis indicative of assertiveness (“*the fact of,*” “*recognizing*”).
- c. Textual appropriation, or ownership (“*I just totally used the [text] sentence*”).
- d. Style of subjectivisation:
 - di. Personal deictic shift: predominance in the use of inclusive “you” and generalizing “we”; and “I” (metaphor of general identification).
 - dii. Use of first (reader) and third person (character) referential descriptions; prevalence of “I” (agency).

6.5. Assessing the Typology

The typology articulated in Chapter 5 and further supported by the linguistic evidence provided in this chapter can be evaluated in light of the primary objective of this thesis, which was to gain a deeper understanding of self-modifying reading experiences. To this purpose, two of the specific objectives were detailed in this chapter, namely, to (a) gain access to readers’ mode of engagement during the type of reading experience that is self-modifying, and (b) focus on the moments in which changes in sense of self occur. In this section, I will discuss how this typology enables the location, identification, and explication of the four types of reading experiences, articulated in Section 5.1.3 and further described in Sections 6.1 through 6.4. Moreover, I will argue that this thesis contributes to the study of literariness in three ways: (a) providing a more accurate

description of these four types of reading experiences; (b) establishing relations with expressive enactment; (c) enabling the description of readers' (re-) positionalities in discourse as well as their (re-)orientation in space; (4) defining self-modifying reading experiences in an evidence-based way. Each of these findings has important implications for a theory of literary reading, as discussed in detail below.

6.5.1. Relations with Expressive Enactment

The identification of a category of aesthetic experience that resembles one that has been previously articulated in studies of aesthetic experiences using NAP (*expressive enactment*, Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, "Enactment"; Kuiken and Miall, "Numerically Aided Phenomenology"; Miall and Kuiken, "A Feeling for Fiction"; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, "Forms"; Kuiken et al., "Locating"; Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, "Expressive Reading") leads us back to the discussion initiated in Section 3.4, where I pointed out the limitations of classificatory methods in general and, by extension, of NAP and LEX-NAP. Here, I will argue that the articulation of a type of experience that is closely related to expressive enactment shows in what ways the resulting typology of this study can be evaluated in light of these limitations. I justify why I believe that it can be considered a "good" (Bailey, *Typologies*) typology.

From the perspective of natural and empirical science, the first limitation that this study based on LEX-NAP might share with classificatory methods that also use cluster analytical procedures is that of reification of its cluster solutions (cf. Aldenderfer and Blashfield 14 and Bailey, *Typologies* 15). It is true that this study may lack statistical power given the small population that it is based on. Its results describe the reading

experiences of 48 readers (see Section 4.3) at the particular moment of the interview and cannot be generalized to a larger population. “Good” typologies, however, and according to Bailey (*Typologies* 12-15), if specified carefully and comprehensively, enable the identification of similarities and differences between the sets of dimensions found and other sets of dimensions that are part of the structure of other types previously articulated. This means that good typologies show the relationships between the types and dimensions, allowing the comparison of types. In this sense, the typology that resulted from this study can be considered “good” as it enables the validation of the analyses carried out as well as of establishing comparisons with expressive enactment.

This evaluation can be extended to NAP studies (see Section 3.1 and below for references), which have started to produce “comprehensive” typologies (in the sense described by Bailey) as they generate the description of experiential types that can be compared and validated. It is possible to say, then, that expressive enactment seems to be an empirical entity rather than a construct. This study shows that NAP, and by extension, LEX-NAP, is effective in describing and classifying aesthetic experiences and that it allows for the emergence of an inventory of aesthetic experiential types that can be comparable.

The second criticism among social scientists about classification in general, and which might also apply to NAP, is the articulation of “static” rather than “dynamic” classifications (Bailey, *Typologies* 15). LEX-NAP, however, has allowed for the description of the dynamics of reading experiences as the four types articulated in Chapter 5 and further explicated in Sections 6.1 through 6.4 reveal the linear progression

of readers' experiences. Therefore, I have provided the grounds to hold that LEX-NAP is a promising method to resolve this limitation.

The third and final alleged limitation also mentioned in Section 3.4.4 is the difficulty of selecting dimensions and finding cases for classifications. The problem that Bailey (*Typologies* 16) raises is the fact that the resulting typology might be directly shaped by the selection of its variables and constituents.

In phenomenological terms, it is possible to say that the present typology enables the identification of the elements of the structure of the aesthetic type expressive enactment, namely, (a) aesthetic and narrative feelings in response to situations and events in the text; (b) blurred boundaries between self and narrator or story characters, suggestive of metaphors of personal identification; and (c) active and iterative modification of emergent affective themes (cf. Section 3.1). Moreover, it extends these findings by providing a richer description of the phenomenon in three ways.

First, Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora ("Forms"), Kuiken et al. ("Locating") and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall ("Expressive Reading") identified and described the elements of the structure, but did not offer a systematic description of how the experience unfolds in time. This study suggests the description of three moments which characterize shifts in sense of self and which are marked by linguistic features. These moments reveal that the elements already described by Kuiken and colleagues progress in the following way:

Table 6.1: Expressive Enactment in Time

Attributes ⁵⁰ / Moments (this thesis)	Linguistic markers	Example:	Psychological processes
<p>Moment 1</p> <p>(a) aesthetic* and narrative feelings in response to situations and events in the text</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction* • Modality of indeterminacy* • Vivid imagery* • Simile of personal identification or explicit comparison (first p. s. and third p. referential descriptions)* 	<p>P23 Commentary 1: <i>So this one was just kind of – I liked it because it kind of sets up the story with, you know, it shows, like – I just liked the imagery, you know. Just thinking about kind of comparing this chill of outside but comparing it to just to the chill from the glass of iced water, it's just kind of – I like how it compares to them and sets it up for the story ... it kind of personifies the fur that she's wearing and she's kind of – this excerpts kind of opens up the imagery and kind of gets your mind moving. And there's a lot of really good imagery in this excerpt.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on mood of story imagery via positive evaluation and vivid imagery. • Boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) clearly distinguishable. • Emergence of affective theme: E.g., (Commentary 1): the felt sense of the faint chill of the glass of ice
<p>Moment 2</p> <p>(a) aesthetic and narrative feelings in response to situations and events in the text</p> <p>(b) blurred boundaries between self and narrator or story characters, suggestive of metaphors of personal identification*</p> <p>(c) active and iterative modification of emergent affective themes*</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction* • Modality of indeterminacy* • Lexis indicative of assertiveness • Metaphor of personal identification (first p. s., inclusive second p. s., and third p. referential descriptions) • Expressions indicating awareness of bodily feelings • Negatively evaluation (external reference) 	<p>Commentary 5: <i>Or something. It's kind of I think a significant part because it talks you know, like it's just the darkness that she kind of feels inside after she's, you know, devastated by the actions of those, of the young boy and young girl who kind of take away from her part in the play and it says her room like a cupboard. It's kind of symbolic you know, because instead of the world being that big open play that she's talking about earlier and that big, you know, open stage for everyone to go on, she's alone in her room, kind of like a cupboard where it's closed in</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reader totally immersed in textual world. • Boundaries between self (reader) and other (character) blurred • Style of engagement with the text shifts to suggestive of metaphor of personal identification. • Empathetic engagement with text (explicitly bodily felt)⁵¹ • More precise description of feelings • Emergent affective theme modified:

⁵⁰ The attributes were originally described by Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora (“Forms”), Kuiken et al. (“Locating”) and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall (“Expressive Reading”)

*The elements that are present in the commentary offered as an example.

⁵¹ This process is not illustrated by Commentary 5.

Attributes ⁵⁰ / Moments (this thesis)	Linguistic markers	Example:	Psychological processes
		<i>and where it's dark and really she feels, you know, like it's not really a play when you're alone in your little cupboard, you know. Dark.</i>	E.g., (Commentary 5): the felt sense of the faint chill of the glass of ice is shifted to the deadly chill of his finitude, even though the reader is not completely aware of that
<p>Moment 3</p> <p>(a) aesthetic* and narrative feelings in response to situations and events in the text</p> <p>(c) active and iterative modification of emergent affective themes*</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction* • Modality of indeterminacy* • Personal deixis: first p. s. (prevalence) and third p. referential descriptions* • Lexis indicating ownership* 	<p>Commentary 6:</p> <p><i>... I like how it starts off ...with the use of imagery that kind of just sets the tone... for like the metaphor of life as a play, as a stage... it kind of brings the text home to you ... when you read it you think of ... I guess my own life ... if you just open your eyes this happens... and I like how it kind of gives meaning to the text kind of and it makes me fond of kind of my own life but I like ... I like the color of the imagery or just the colour or vibrance, that's the word I'm looking for... life really isn't always perfect and colorful and vibrant, you know, like that life can be tough ... and it kind of brings knowledge of how the actions of maybe two, maybe unsuspecting actions can sometimes cause big repercussions and how we need to be careful sometimes how we act around people ... Overall it's pretty good text and I enjoyed looking at different perspectives.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of self-modification • Boundaries between self (reader) and other (text) clearly distinguishable • Agency and ownership of feelings asserted • Emergent affective theme re-discovered • Fruition of meaningful reading: <p>E.g., (Commentary 6): the felt sense of the faint chill of the glass of ice is shifted to the deadly chill of his finitude, which brings back the safe and comforting sense of life, as these innermost meanings become conscious.</p>

As Table 6.1 shows, these moments as well as their manifestations in language reveal the forms of intentionality that characterize expressive enactment: an experiential mode of reflection (see Section 2.5) that is pervasive to the experience. More specifically, it reveals that the modalities of consciousness that characterize this experiential type are

imagination and a form of metaphoric engagement that enables readers to see themselves anew.

The second way whereby these moments extend and enrich the description of expressive enactment is by revealing the sense in which the body reorients itself in space, and which will be discussed in Section 6.5.2. Finally, expressive enactment is found to be one of the two types of self-modifying reading experience, explored in Section 6.5.3.

6.5.2. Body Schema, Language Enactment, and Re-Orientation in Space

From the perspective of an embodied theory of language, I assume that the way readers use language might be revealing of how their judgments and perceptions of the text, the world, and themselves are shaped via motor resonance. Language is, therefore, here viewed as situated in a body and in a world (cf. Section 2.4). Chapter 2 also proposes that the language that readers use can be understood as a public manifestation of how the embodied self is situated in relation to the world of the text and how this self acts in relation to the object of experience (the text). Consequently, I proposed that investigating discourse structure (as well as its contents) can be revealing of how readers position themselves in their transactional relation with texts, even though this level of embodied organization might be pre-reflective (cf. Section 2.2). In this section, I discuss (a) how readers' style of discourse in the four types obtained bring out the (re-) positionality of their bodies in relation to the text read; (b) the linguistic markers that characterize this embodied (re-)positioning; and (c) how (a) and (b) might contribute to an even richer description of aesthetic phenomena, from a phenomenological point-of-view.


Results stemming from the data show that readers reveal their bodily spatial (re-) positionings in relation to the text by the way they use deixis, which helps them anchor meanings, even though this use might be pre-reflective. The notion that deixis is central to the manifestation of embodied perception and the possibility to track deictic patterns through texts has been widely discussed and demonstrated (Emmott, “Embodied”; Galbraith; Jeffries; McIntyre; Stockwell; Zwaan, Magliano, and Graesser; among others). Although adapted to literary discourse, Stockwell’s description can be useful here if we see literariness in terms of how readers talk about their experiences of reading. This application of the theory of deixis is novel to both cognitive linguistics and phenomenological studies of reading experiences. In this way, the preliminary observations of the data resulting from this LEX-NAP study opens new vistas for investigation.

One of the categories mentioned by Stockwell and that stood out in the analyses conducted in the present study is what he calls “perceptual deixis,” that is, expressions concerning the perceptive participants in the text. They include personal pronouns as well as mental state verbs, like “thinking,” “believing” (Stockwell 45). Since what I here call modalities of consciousness (see Section 2.1) include the mental state verbs “imagining” and “thinking,” I will now detail how they are realized by means of perceptual deixis and can be viewed as a form of located and participatory action.

The prototypic instance of the first type of readers (external enactment) here analyzed focuses more on the text itself and seems to prefer the noematic pole of experience (cf. Husserl, see Section 2.1). Perceptual deixis indicates prevalence of the third person pronoun in reference to the text and characters, although the first person

pronoun (reader) is also used. This manner of being anchored in the text is supported by the use of “textual deixis” (Stockwell 46), or explicit reference to text segmentation and textual quotation. Here, the text is foregrounded as the agent in the transactional experience of reading (Rosenblatt, *Literature*). Similes of personal identification characterize the modality of consciousness here (cf. Section 2.5). The prototype of this group perceives him/herself and the text as two separate entities that do not overlap. Even though the use of “spatial deixis,” or expressions locating the deictic centre in a place, including spatial adverbs such as “here/there” and “nearby/far away” (Stockwell 45) was not foregrounded in these analyses, it is possible to argue that the linguistic markers mentioned here reveal an implicit and static spatial orientation in which the reader perceives him/herself as a distinct entity that is separate from the text. Figure 6.1 below offers a graphic representation of this kind of transactional relation.

Figure 6.1: External Enactment (Type I)




In this figure, the bolded marker and the larger font indicate that the text is the focus. A different picture is obtained in As-if enactment, which is characterized by a somewhat more dynamic embodied repositioning, as compared to external enactment.

In the analysis of the prototypic instance of as-if enactment, both Moments 1 and 2 are characterized by the use of the first and the third personal deictic centers and, similar to the prototype of the external enactment group, the use of the third personal

pronoun prevails. This means that the experience is also more noematic than noetic. However, when modalities of consciousness are compared, there is a change from a conditional form of explicit comparison between reader and text as two separate entities in Moment 1 to sympathetic pity (or compassion) and vivid imagery in Moment 2. This means that, still in a simulation-like form of transaction, this reader imagines what it would be like to be in the role of the main character, a move that brings the text closer to him/her. Here is a graphic representation of this form of spatial reorientation:

Figure 6.2: As-If Enactment (Type II)




The bolded marker and the larger font indicate that, from Moment 1 to Moment 2, there is progression towards greater proximity between reader and text. However, the focus still remains on the text, as it does with Type I reader.

The picture is rather different with Type III and IV readers. The prototypes of expressive enactment (Type III) and total enactment (Type IV) share a similar form of spatial reorientation to each other, as compared to the two previous experiential type

readers. In Moment 1 of the prototype of expressive enactment, the use of the first and the third personal pronouns, vivid imagery and simile of personal identification indicate that the reader perceives the text as a separate entity and from a certain distance. In Moment 2, the use of the first person pronoun and the prevalence of the second personal pronoun, which characterize the metaphoric engagement of personal identification between reader and text, reveal their co-constitution, or that both the noetic and the noematic poles of experience are lived as equally present. In other words, reader and text become one. In Moment 3, the reader resumes the form of spatial orientation of Moment 1, as both the first and the third deictic centers are again selected for expression. The prevalence of the first personal pronoun, however, shows that this return is refreshed, as the experience is now more centered on its noetic pole (reader's self). The bolded marker and larger fonts in Figure 6.3 indicate where the focus lies and how the experience unfolds.


Figure 6.3: Expressive Enactment (Type III)



A similar picture is obtained for the prototype of total enactment (Type IV). In Moment 1, the reader uses the first and third personal pronouns, but the use of third person pronouns prevails. The presence of the second person pronoun in its externalizing form emphasizes the focus on the noematic pole of experience (text) that characterizes this moment. Vivid imagery and similes of personal identification are other indications that Type IV perceives the text as a separate entity. In Moment 2, the use of first person pronoun and the inclusive second person pronoun reveal the same kind of spatial reorientation present in expressive enactment (Type III) when readers and text are totally merged. This metaphoric form of engagement that reveals the modalities of consciousness as well as the reader's awareness of how his/her body is implicated in total identification emphasizes that the noetic and the noematic poles of experience are not

distinguishable. In Moment 3, the first and the second personal pronouns (in its inclusive form) continue to be used, and relying on simile, the emphasis is on the noetic pole of experience (reader's self), which is similar to the third moment in expressive enactment (Type III). In Moment 4, there is a return to a metaphoric engagement with the text, which is now more general, given the use of the first person pronoun and the second, in both its singular and plural forms. Figure 6.4 shows a graphic representation of prototype IV's embodied re-positionings:

Figure 6.4: Total Enactment (Type IV)



At this stage, I hope Figures 6.1 to 6.4 have helped clarify how deixis anchors the various entity-roles in the four kinds of participatory relationships described in this chapter and suggests the way participants have embodied their positioning and re-positioning during the process of reading. These analyses suggest how the study of deixis can become a powerful tool in the description of reading experiences at the level of discourse. Besides showing how readers perceive and engage with texts differently, they reveal how the process can be dynamic and constantly shifting.

6.5.3. Defining Self-Modifying Reading Experiences

The analyses carried out in this research (Chapters 5 and 6) have provided the data that allow us to hold that self-modifying experience is not a unified concept. They only occur here in two of the types articulated and described: expressive enactment (Type III) and total enactment (Type IV). The interstructural variability (Giorgi, *Descriptive*) between these two forms of enactment and the other two (external and as-if) enables their articulation as different phenomena. Even though expressive and total enactment have sufficient coherence, enabling the classification of both as self-modifying experiences (or as the same phenomenon), there is enough intrastructural variability to allow for the identification of two different kinds.

Here, I will focus on the intrastructural coherence between expressive and total enactment observed in Section 5.1.3 and further substantiated in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, which enables the description of a poetics of self-modifying experiences,⁵² characterized as follows:

⁵² Construct validation awaits further studies.

- (a) elaborate overall range of transformations, that are large in number (as compared to Types I and II) and thematic in nature, resulting in self-realizations, or deepened understandings of freshly realized meanings (see also Section 5.1.3.2);
- (b) fluent, but focused and consistent materializations in discourse, presenting clearly defined lexical patterns (see Section 5.1.3.1);
- (c) self-perceptual depth, or shifts in sense of self, which are marked linguistically by shifts in use of deixis and modality of consciousness (see also Section 5.1.3.3);
- (d) high absorption (see also Sections 5.1.3.4);
- (e) complex and holistic noematic engagement, as readers focus continually on character and setting descriptions, as well as on the makings of the text;
- (f) complex emotional engagement with text as reading unfolds (i.e., marked by paradoxical feelings, feeling augmentation, sympathetic pity and empathy);
- (g) experiential reflection (see also Section 2.5), that gradually becomes more intimately personal and concrete. This mode of reflection might be marked linguistically by
 - i. Use of mental process verbs and words of evaluative reaction throughout;
 - ii. Modality of indeterminacy (first moment) that is repeated and modified due to co-occurrence with lexis indicative of assertiveness (subsequent moments);
 - iii. Deictic shift (which marks the transition from moment to moment);
 - iv. Progression towards textual appropriation.
- (h) Spatial re-positionality that might progress from clear differentiation between self and other (Moment 1) towards proximity to self and total blurring of boundaries between self (reader) and other (text or others in external but inclusive reference), in subsequent moments (see also Section 6.5.2);

(i) complex modalities of consciousness: movement from a simile-like form of enactment that is vividly imagined to a metaphoric and empathetic form of enactment that is consciously lived as embodied;

(j) fruition of overall reading experience.

Differently from Types I and II, which reveal a basic form of enaction as described by R. Ellis, the form of metaphoric and empathetic enactment that is consciously embodied and that characterizes self-modifying reading experiences has been unanticipated by Ellis' enactive theory of textual engagement. This study reveals that, in living self-modifying experiences, empathy is central and seems to emerge after sympathetic pity is experienced.⁵³ Empathy here is seen as a form of undifferentiated quality that merges readers and text. This undifferentiated quality is felt through the surface of the body (heart and chest), enveloping readers' whole beings, resulting in a heightened awareness of the close relatedness between readers and text. Readers experience total identification and merging, and consequently a heightened experience of unity (see Ehrenweig's account in Tsur, "Oceanic Dedifferentiation" 175). They become immersed in characters' thoughts and feelings and experience full empathy as they experience what Tsur refers to as a "dedifferentiated oceanic experience":

The descriptive content of this term refers to an experience of fusion and dedifferentiation with which many persons may be familiar through introspection, namely, the intense experiencing of one's own self, or of relationship to one's environment, resulting from a suspension of boundaries. ("Oceanic Dedifferentiation" 175)

⁵³ It remains to be seen if in the context of other stories different patterns emerge.

Self-modifying reading experiences, as here articulated, reveal this intense experience of one's self. They are built and unfold around repetition, returning again and again to certain forms of engagement that are gradually modified. This study shows how language, a highly categorized conceptual system, can reveal some of the hidden tracks, that is, the undifferentiated, pre-categorical aspects of self-modifying reading experiences.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

In the opening of this thesis, and following Slingerland, van Peer, Hakemulder, and Zyngier, as well as the contributions to the first issue of *Scientific Study of Literature* (SSOL, 2011), among others, I made the point that the crisis that hovers over the discipline of literary studies is an indication that the time is ripe for the cross-fertilization between sciences and literary studies, as, in Gottschall's ("Measure") words:

Literary studies ... should embrace science's spirit of intellectual optimism [and] be transformed into a discipline in which real understanding of literature and the human experience builds up along with all of the words.

Although I am diffident that the use of scientific methods will remedy the crisis in the Humanities, in this concluding chapter, I agree with Gottschall (*Literature* 7-8) that science progresses cumulatively and that literary studies so far, "spinning stories inside stories" (Slingerland 4), has not yielded the cumulative findings necessary to develop a scientific tradition. In order to arrive at the third culture Snow had anticipated, one in which literary scholars would be more conversant with scientific methods, an alternative path should be pursued. In this thesis I hope to have demonstrated one of the ways for cross-fertilization: finding new modes of doing sciences in the Humanities. Rather than merely applying scientific methods without adaptations, the scholar may start with a problem posed within the literary domain and see how an empirical perspective may help find a solution. In line with Miall ("Science"), I developed a method (LEX-NAP) to fit a

specific problem in the literary domain, which, in my case, was how readers experience literary reading.

True to a cumulative tradition, it is important to make it clear that this study did not emerge from a vacuum. It stems from previous research carried out by Miall and Kuiken (“A Feeling for Fiction”), Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora (“Forms”), and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall (“Expressive Reading”), which articulated self-modifying feeling and the context in which it might unfold (expressive enactment); the proposal of the linguistic-psychological-aesthetical cycle of refamiliarization (Fialho, “Foregrounding”); and the concept of Literary Awareness (Zyngier, “Crosswords,” “Introducing”; Zyngier, Fialho and Pinheiro). In contributing to this tradition, I hope to have produced new knowledge about the processes of literary reading. In fact, this thesis has provided evidence on how readers change over the course of reading a literary text, how they move from one moment to the other and thus establish patterns that characterize their mode of engagement with the text.

From the beginning of this thesis and through its entire process I have indicated where and why cross-fertilization was needed in building the rationale for this study, in carrying it out and in discussing the results obtained. I will now concentrate on the major contributions made here to better understand the experiential domain of literary reading.

7.1. Main Contributions

This thesis has yielded an in-depth study of how actual readers respond to a particular literary text and what it means to experience self-modification. It has provided a richer and more delicate definition of self-modification and articulated four

contributory types of aesthetic experience. It has offered a deeper understanding of the structures of literary reading by having detailed the self-modifying mechanisms that make literature a means for reconceptualizing readers' understandings.

The objectives set out in Chapter 1 have been met: modes of consciousness were described whereby readers become engaged during their reading experience. The description offered in Chapter 6 would not have been possible without the creation of LEX-NAP, one of the most important contributions of this study. In adapting NAP (Kuiken and Miall, "Numerically Aided Phenomenology"), I have resorted to stylistics (see Chapters 2 and 4), which is another indication of how the cross-fertilization between phenomenology, stylistics, and classificatory procedures have contributed to even more nuanced descriptions of reading experiences.

The extent to which LEX-NAP enriches descriptions of aesthetic experiences is most evident in how much it has allowed adding to what Miall and Kuiken had previously shown of self-modifying experiences (see Chapter 1 and Section 3.1). More specifically, it draws attention to systematizing aspects of self-modifying reading experiences not focused by previous studies. I show how an investigation into not only the content but also the *form* of such experiences might take us to places not previously envisioned. Miall and Kuiken ("A Feeling for Fiction" 223) initially proposed that *self-modifying feelings* restructure readers' understandings during literary reading and, simultaneously, their sense of self (see also Chapter 1). The present work not only confirms that self-modifying experiences involve the types of feelings they described – aesthetic, narrative, and evaluative – but details how each of them materializes in discourse (see Chapters 5 and 6). It also adds a better understanding of the types of

evaluative feelings (see Chapter 6) and narrative feelings involved in this type of experience: two different forms of empathetic identification (comparable to what has been described by Keen; Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms”; and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”) and sympathetic pity. It also shows how the kind of empathetic identification already observed by Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora (“Forms”) and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall (“Expressive Reading”) can manifest itself differently in the form of expressive and total enactment (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, this thesis articulates one form of self-modifying experience not anticipated by any previous research, namely, total enactment.

By conceptualizing the relation between readers and texts as modalities of consciousness (instead of feelings), this study challenges current approaches to the topic (see Chapter 2). In other words, it proposes a renewed conceptualization of the relation between readers and texts at the same time that it argues for the need to develop the most appropriate terminology to refer to aesthetic experiences.

One of the important findings here is also the description of the modalities that are central to self-modifying experiences. The study has described two different forms of metaphoric enactment: one that is personal, and the other general, both unanticipated by R. Ellis’s theory of aesthetic engagement. Descriptions of how each of these experiential modes manifests itself in discourse were provided in Chapter 6. LEX-NAP also enabled the observation of readers embodied repositionings as they (dis)engage with texts (see Section 6.5.2). Such description stems from empirical data and not from pre-established and conceptual categories (see, for example, scales of aesthetic distance). Further explorations of such scales might be one of the possible directions for future studies.

LEX-NAP has also enabled the observation and the description of the dynamics of aesthetic experiences, or of how they unfold in time, enhancing the possibilities offered by NAP in investigating reading experiences. LEX-NAP shows that different aesthetic experiences manifest themselves by means of different moments, which are characteristic to each of them and marked by shifts in sense of self. Linguistic description of how readers' sense of self is manifested in discourse has also been provided (see Chapter 6), turning a conceptual proposal into an empirical construct.

In other words, I have proposed a method that observes processes of reading and articulated a typology of aesthetic experiences, enabling the description of aesthetic experiences of a transformative nature. Ultimately, this thesis has provided a different approach to literariness (cf. Jakobson) by holding that certain modalities of consciousness, in combination, are what actually make literature *literary*. This thesis has provided evidence of how literariness comes about as readers talk about their experiences of texts, which opens up directions for further investigations.

Other implications for literary studies arise here as well, contributing to what we know about the relation between textual properties (stylistic variations, narrative style, character description) and what people do when they read a literary text. It also bears educational implications for literary studies and for the teaching of literature. What this means is that a better understanding of how student-readers respond to texts and of what the structure of self-modifying reading is may throw some light on the design of alternative teaching methods with focus on experiential reading of a transformative nature.

I must make it clear that this kind of reading is not to be always privileged. What

must be stressed here is that it is relevant in cases where the pedagogical objective is to have students resonate affectively to literary texts and not necessarily when they are asked to learn facts about the text (biographies, dates, literary tradition, plot, what critics say about it, etc). In the next sections, I will detail some of the implications of the findings involved and where further studies are still needed.

7.2. Towards an Experiential Reading

Different forms of engagement between readers and texts have been described by means of various theoretical models of reading experiences, especially after the 1960s and the 1970s, with the renewed appreciation of the centrality of the role of the reader as an active participant in the creation of a text's meaning. Some of these proposals have lent themselves to purely cognitive construals, for instance describing literary reading in terms of schema refreshment models (e.g, Cook), or, when affect is considered, to construals of appraisal (Robinson). Here, I argue that these theoretical models may contribute to Cognitive Poetics, but also present problems for understanding the nature of literary reading and its affective dimensions. For instance, Oatley ("A Taxonomy") proposed a taxonomy of emotions that constitutes arguably five "distinctive modes" of engagement to fiction. However, little is elaborated on *what* makes the five modes of emotional responses he describes really "distinctive" to the literary domain and *how* such distinctive processes occur. As Oatley himself acknowledges, more information is needed on how such processes occur for clarifying how literary reading can be meaningful and play such a fundamental role in our lives. The issue of whether literary reading really is distinctive is also still in contention. This thesis has contributed with new evidence of

how observing the modalities of consciousness can help indicate where the distinction lies.

In addition, Oatley (“A Taxonomy” 69-72) theorizes the role of identification even further by means of his simulation theory, a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of *mimesis*, according to which “identification is mediated by cognitive processes – adopting the goals of a protagonist, ... creating an imaginary world, ... speech acts to the reader, ... and potential for constructive integration of disparate elements.” One of the problems here is that the affective dimension is still seen as a product of cognitive processing, an after-effect of the encounter between the reader and the text, which is even more evident in the explanation of how the mind runs a simulation:

Whereas computer simulations run on computer, literary simulations ... run on minds ... Narrative is based on the actions of human agents, who have intentions that meet vicissitudes. *These vicissitudes prompt emotions.* The human simulation of narrative therefore runs on the human planning processor ... both narrative fiction and games allow human participants to take, as it were, rides on goal-and-plan structures that are those of real life. When we take such rides, we experience *the emotions consequent to adopting the goals* and engaging in the action sequences that are afforded. (“A Taxonomy” 441, 444, my italics)

Recent neuroscientific findings have helped cognitive theories understand how emotions work (see Chapter 2). Within the literary domain, what this means is that even though cognitive components such as imagery or memory are clearly part of literary responses, they are modulated by readers’ feelings, an argument that Miall has been pursuing for

some time (*Literary Reading*, “A Neurophysiological Approach”). By resorting to the phenomenological and the enactive perspectives, I have actually questioned the usefulness of the dichotomy feeling-cognition and proposed the language of experiencing, which entails both pre-reflective and reflective modes of consciousness (see the porpoise metaphor in Chapter 2). In this sense, the findings of this thesis provide us with a different rationale for understanding and conceptualizing the role of experiencing literary reading.

A further complication of cognitive theories is that in subjecting them to empirical testing (e.g., Oatley, “A Taxonomy” 448-451), it is assumed that a cognitive approach that overlooks emotions is adequate, which turns out to be a problem for understanding the role of experiencing literary reading. It follows that the question of how to gain access to readers’ experiences of literature remains challenging as a certain level of bias can be introduced when existing methods are applied in investigations of how readers become involved in literary reading (see, for example, Oatley’s adaptation of Larsen and Seilman’s method in “A Taxonomy” 448). The question of the extent to which forms of reading that might be close to a first reading, or how readers really read, are addressed should not be disregarded. In sum, existing cognitive theories are necessary but not sufficient to explore the experiential dimensions of literary reading. To this purpose, we need more appropriate models of consciousness and subjectivity.

This leads us to the second point of criticism about cognitive theories. Since feelings engage the reader’s sense of self, a better understanding of how they work within the literary domain will inevitably take us into questioning the notions of subjectivity that should inform our theoretical explorations. My argument is that cognitive theories, in

general, tend to rely on a Cartesian model of cognition and subjectivity, according to which “subject” and “object,” “reader” and “text” are understood as dichotomous. Such a model is made evident, for example, when Oatley (“A Taxonomy”) uses Goffman’s metaphor of the “semi-permeable membrane” to suggest that, despite its porosity, there are clear boundaries between the reader and the text. This creates difficulties for understanding processes that occur inside the membrane of the text where readers and texts “merge” (“A Taxonomy” 445-6) in identification. Views of this kind make it difficult to grasp how “aesthetic experiences” as described by Rosenblatt (*Literature*) come about. How to differentiate empirically such processes in which there seems to be a (bodily) re-orientation within a cline of aesthetic distance is indeed a challenge. In order to do so, my point is that an alternative theoretical framework that accounts for both reader and text in their co-presence is made more central (see Chapter 2).

A third point is that Cognitive Poetics has, to this date, shed little insight on the relation between narrative and emotion. This relation has started to be more systematically pursued by corpus stylisticians, for instance Toolan (*Narrative Progression*; “Emotions in Texts”), who has contributed with investigations on what makes language “empathetic.”

In opting for a bottom-up approach, this thesis has shown how exploratory studies of the kind carried out here might shed light on some of the problems Cognitive Poetics leaves unresolved. More specifically, in aiming at an empirical rather than a theoretical typology, this thesis has provided evidence on how identification might be fundamental in response to art (an issue that begins to be clarified by Kuiken, Miall, and Sikora, “Forms” and Sikora, Kuiken, and Miall, “Expressive Reading”). Moreover, in the search

for alternative theoretical models that account for more appropriate views of cognition and subjectivity, I have shown how exploring the notion of the embodied transaction between reader and text can help re-orient the observations on the role of the affective dimensions in literary reading. Indeed, positioning the body in the world and sensing the experience reminds us of how Wordsworth describes his own experience in his body in response to the landscape around Tintern Abbey:

These beautiful forms,
Through a long absence, have not been to me
As is a landscape to a blind man's eye:
But oft, in lonely rooms, and 'mid the din
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them,
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart ("Lines Written a Few Miles
Above Tintern Abbey")

This quotation in fact stands as an illustration of how readers embody texts. As discussed more specifically in Section 2.1.1 and in Wordsworth's poetical account, consciousness depends both on the self's motivated action-initiating capacity and on the activation of emotional brain areas, which allow the poet to recollect his emotional experience of the view.

What I have argued here is that reading experiences are complex because they involve different modalities of consciousness, at both the levels of pre-reflection and of reflection. After the initial pre-reflective moment of readers' engagement with texts characterized in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I have proposed that the experience begins to

emerge to consciousness as readers talk about the text. In expressing themselves, part of their embodied engagement with the text remains below the threshold of consciousness, but some aspects begin to emerge consciously (Sections 2.4 and 2.5).

In proposing a language-based method to observe the realizations of readers' action affordances, I have demonstrated how a detailed observation of the language participants use to express their experience can result in a model of readers' responses. More specifically, and from the perspective of an enactive and phenomenological theory, I have argued that literariness can be perceived in the way readers use embodied language, or by means of the specific way they talk about textual experiences. It is true that their readerly poetics might be distinctive. How distinctive it may be still awaits further exploration. Despite the linguistic-stylistic perspective that supports LEX-NAP, a more delicate and nuanced examination is required, especially on the descriptive level of reading experiences, before a more solid theory of literary reading is developed.

7.3. Literary Studies and Stylistics

As pointed out in several parts of this thesis, focus on the reader is not new to literary studies. In the 1960s, for instance, questions of validity of interpretation, on readability, among others, brought to the forefront the individual who actually does the reading. Various models of readers have since then been forwarded: Riffaterre's "super reader," Fish's "informed reader" ("Literature in the Reader"), Iser's "actual reader" and "implied reader" (*The Act of Reading; The Implied Reader*), Eco's "model reader," Rabinowitz's "authorial reader," and de Beaugrande's "naïve reader," to cite a few.

As it might be expected, radicalizations of such movement occurred and were

twofold. From one perspective, this concern with the individual identity of the reader was emphasized at the expense of the concern with the author, which led Barthes to proclaim “The death of the author” and Foucault to ask “What is an author?” The shift of focus from the author to the reader was discussed by Grosz as follows:

.... it is nonetheless necessary to understand that no text wears its political status as a nameplate or label, no text can be classified once and for all as wholly feminist or wholly patriarchal: these appellations depend on its context, its place within that context, how it is used, by whom and to what effect. These various contingencies dictate that at best a text is feminist or patriarchal only provisionally, only momentarily, only in some but not in all possible readings, and in some but not all of its possible effects. (23-4)

Views of this kind have dislocated the question of individual identity or signature from the author to the reader and claimed that everything depends on the way by means of which the reader, a contextualized being, constructs meaning.

At the opposing pole are the voices that claim the return of the author. Saramago argues that

a book is not made only of characters, events, adventures, surprises, stylistic effects, mere demonstrations of a technique. A book is, above all, that in which we can identify as being the author, its author... the author is in the book, the author is the book. (189-190, my translation)

Similar concerns have led Atwood to state that “[the author’s] fingerprints are all over the martini glasses ... [I am] this text, this it, which was performed by me, and by me alone, with a blue Express ballpoint pen on a Hilary lined notepad.” (17-18) However, in search

of a common ground between both perspectives, she alerts her readers that “she is me as you conceive me” (17), and that the author “is the one you find plausible, she’s the one who takes you in, because she is your creature. But I am not” (18). To Atwood the author is constructed by the reader from the marks in the text as we do not have access to the flesh-and-bone-author, the one we imagine wears “gauzy Madonna whites, black leather and whips, brisk little suits” (17). We do not have access to the kind of pen she uses while producing her work. What we do have access to is our conception of the author built from those marks she leaves.

One of the contributions of this thesis to literary studies is the attempt to move away from this philosophical debate between the death/rebirth of the author and to revisit the emphasis it has given to the concepts of *defamiliarization/dehabituation* and *foregrounding* (Iser, *The Act of Reading; Language and Literature* 2007; Miall, *Literary Reading*; Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; Mukařovský; Šklovskij; van Peer). To my understanding, these two concepts deal not only with the forms of literature (foregrounding), but mainly with how readers experience them (defamiliarization/dehabituation). In this thesis, attention was given not to who is actually responsible for making the text come to life but on how the text is lived, how it is experienced.

By now, many studies have dealt with this aspect of literary studies and have investigated the text’s strikingness, reading time, and affect (*Language and Literature* 2007; Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding”; van Peer). In addition, claims have been made about the universality of foregrounding (Auracher; Hogan; Miall and Kuiken, “What is Literariness?”; see also Sections 2.1 and 5.2.1). This means that the extent to which

defamiliarization and foregrounding explain what happens when readers read and how they see literary quality in language are not new.

I must point out that the concepts of foregrounding and defamiliarization have not been immune to debate. Since the 1970s, these concepts have in fact been used in attempts to distinguish (or not) literary language (see, for example, McRae; Carter and McRae; Carter, “Common Language,” *Language and Creativity*; Verdonk; Simpson, *Stylistics*, among others). The need for the divide between ordinary and literary language was questioned (Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind*) due to the fact that foregrounding is also found in ordinary language, urging the call for a poetics of everyday language (Hall). In trying to solve the dilemma, Carter and Nash, for example, offered a cline of literariness.

I do not intend to go further into these debates that have been part of literary studies for nearly a century. It suffices to say that although foregrounding might not explain literariness in its full actualization (see Section 5.2), it has been finding empirical support in recent developments in the growing field of digital humanities, which indicate that literary language is actually distinctive (Archer and Culpeper; Culpeper; Louw; Zyngier, “Macbeth”).

In fact, these recent findings, based on huge masses of data, suggest that it is the language of emotion, or what has been referred to in this thesis as “experiential,” that contributes to the distinctive character of literary language. To support this argument, in a recent review,⁵⁴ Ben Zimmer showed that the claims that modern fiction, particularly American (and as pioneered by Mark Twain, Stephen Crane, Gertrude Stein, and Ernest Hemingway), is free from stylistic artifices and that it relies on “a straight-talking vox populi” are mistaken. He cites one advocate of this view, Richard Bridgman, who wrote

54. The review is dated July 29, 2011.

that: “Whereas in the nineteenth century a very real distinction could be made between the vernacular and standard diction as they were used in prose ... in the twentieth century the vernacular had virtually become standard.” However, the results corpus linguistics yield show otherwise. In fact, some words and collocations are much more frequent in these fictions than in spoken discourse and other genres. To carry out his analysis, Zimmer used the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), compiled by Mark Davies, and which assesses 425 million words of text from the past two decades, with equally large samples drawn from fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, academic texts and transcripts of spoken English. He reports, for example, that past-tense verbs such as “grimaced,” “scowled,” “grunted,” “wiggled” and “gritted” show up more frequently in fiction compared with academic prose. One of the important conclusions is that, in Zimmer’s words, “sour facial expressions, gruff noises and emphatic bodily movements (wiggling fingers and gritting teeth)” seem to rule the verbs peculiar to today’s published fiction. He also reports the results of a study conducted by the lexicographer Orin Hargraves, encompassing about two billion words of twenty-first-century English, and using the Oxford English Corpus, which revealed peculiar patterns that occur more frequently in fiction than in other genres. For example, the verb “brush” appears very frequently near “lips,” which defies everyday and colloquial uses of the word. Other fiction-specific turns of phrase revealed by the corpus include “bolting upright” and “drawing one’s breath.”

Nowadays, findings such as the ones produced by computational linguistics enable tracing echoes in a way that transcends any single analyst’s selective attention and go beyond the response of readers to individual words. They can now demonstrate how

some collocations are typically and recursively *literary*. Zimmer concludes that creative writers seem to be drawn to using descriptive idioms that allow their characters to convey their emotional experiences through the description of their physical actions.

The relevance of these findings to literary reading and which seem to support the results obtained in this thesis is that investigations of *how* writers describe characters' thoughts and feelings (see Section 4.2.1) will bring the reader closer to identifying what makes language *literary*. In this sense, a better understanding of how literary texts promote the experiential dimension of textual worlds through lexical choice seem an appropriate way to explore literariness. For this reason, systematic efforts to articulate the language of empathy and the makings of emotion language such as the ones carried out by Toolan (*Narrative Progression*, "Emotions in Texts") and Neary seem to be, at the moment, highly needed.

This is where empirical studies of real readers (a point also raised by Toolan, *Narrative Progression*), like the one conducted here, become necessary. I hope to have demonstrated, by describing and applying LEX-NAP, how studies of this kind can be complemented and made possible. What this thesis has shown is that we can investigate, when a fictional character "bolts upright" or "draws a breath," how readers join in this silent game, picking up the subtle cues of a literary style. Here is where a needed development of the present work emerges: a detailed analysis of the passages chosen by the group of readers who participated in this study so as to corroborate Toolan's and Neary's findings and check empirically what makes literary language "evocative" (see also discussion in Section 5.2.1).

Having argued so far for a literary language based on foregrounding, and contrary to expectations, the results of the study reported in this thesis revealed that overall foregrounding did not correlate significantly with frequency of sentences chosen by the participants, especially with the three separate indices for phonetic, grammatical, and semantic foregrounding (see Section 5.2.1). The fact that these findings differ from those that validate the theory and from another study that used the same short story here investigated and which actually reported high correlation between foregrounding and frequency of sentence choice (Kuijpers and Miall) is relevant. One possible reason of these negative results might be that I did not give readers free choice of passages to mark, but required that they chose one passage from each of the several story sections (see Section 4.4). All in all, by providing these negative results, this thesis augments our knowledge of what is *not* there and questions the soundness of the concept of foregrounding, demonstrating the limits of previously reported results (see Lehrer et al. 66).

This is where the present study offers another contribution: the suggestion to shift the emphasis from textual features to the instructions given to readers, despite the results we have available thus far pointing at different directions (e.g., Halász, Short, and Varga) found that it is the actual textual content and not the expectations derived from the genre of the text that shaped their readers' responses. On the contrary, Zwaan found that factors external to textual features may also determine how readers approach stories. In fact, the present study signals that the language of instructions can play an important role in the way readers perceive foregrounding and how it shapes their reading experiences (see Section 5.2.1). What the findings here suggest is that, albeit important, foregrounding

only describes partially what makes language “literary” to the reader. In other words, the linguistic manifestation of foregrounding (Fialho, “Foregrounding”) might not be the sole responsible factor for shaping readers’ responses. Besides linguistic clues, other elements might be involved in shaping self-modifying reading experiences of the kinds described. This remains an empirical question.

7.4. Literary Education

Another central point in this thesis is the argument that, for the purposes of studying consciousness and cognition, some advocate that both empirical scientists and participants in experimental studies ought to receive a certain level of training in phenomenological method (see Varela, “Neurophenomenology”). Analogously, I have suggested that literary educators could benefit from exposure to the phenomenological method, especially in practicing one of its tenets to stay closer to descriptions of experience rather than to theory. By supporting this argument, in a way, I declare my alignment with a Freirean approach to pedagogy. For example, depending on the objective of the course, we might invite students to set aside the tradition of interpretive hermeneutics, and focus, instead, on the way texts are experienced and how they affect them intimately and personally. Being informed by phenomenology, literary experiencing seeks to be guided by that which is actually experienced, rather than by what we expect to find given our theoretical commitments. It asks us not to allow preconceived theories form our experiences, but to let our experience inform and guide our theories.

This is where one of the problems in literary education becomes apparent, that it tends to focus on application of theory, requiring a theoretical commitment sooner rather

than later. In this light, theories have been forming students' interpretations rather than allowing them to experience the text first. Literary education thus becomes a matter of intellectualization of experiences in the way described by the largest group of readers, Type I (external enactment, see Chapter 6) where students are not invited to live their experiences. What the description of this experiential type shows and what literary educators should realize is the distance of this attitude from the naïve and immediate experience of reading a text, or of a first reading, which results in an educational system that has been qualified as “deadening” and “cold” (see Chapter 1).

I have also argued for the need to change the focus of literary education from knowledge about literature (traditional objective) or awareness about verbal artistry and its effects on the reader (Literary Awareness, Zyngier “Crosswords,” “Introducing”; Zyngier, Fialho, and Pinheiro) to experiential reading. I believe that in order to work towards an Experiential Pedagogy, research should be developed to identify and describe experientially-based strategies that may help student-readers learn to draw on their emotional responses more purposefully in order to understand and savor literary texts before any critical theory is introduced.

I believe I have made clear how an in-depth study of the processes of literary reading of the kind conducted here can illuminate teaching programs. This thesis is one example of how we can work towards bringing the findings of our empirical studies of readers into the classroom. It contributes through the articulation and description of the processes involved in self-modifying reading experiences (or by describing the structure of this experiential type). In this way, this thesis sheds light on how literature becomes a means for the reconceptualization of readers' understandings. It examines what people do

when they read a literary text and what it can do for them. In other words, it observes the processes of reading and works towards articulating a typology of transformative reading experiences.

The educational perspective I hold here suggests a better understanding of how student-readers engage with texts and how the processes involved in self-modification can inform the design of alternative teaching methods with focus on experiential reading of a transformative nature/quality. I emphasize that the way instructions are formulated in the classroom should be carefully considered. When bringing literature into the classroom, the manner whereby we invite students to read needs to be tackled with care given its influence on their encounter with texts.

This thesis contributes to previous work on the issue. Fialho, Zyngier, and Miall (“Interpretation,” “Experiencing”) investigated whether the language of instructions affected the experience of reading. We examined instructional interventions so as to draw a comparison between interpretive and experiential reading processes. We studied how to word instructions of these kinds and what happens in classes where instructions differ. In-class experiments were conducted with first and second year university students who worked with two different sets of pre-reading and reading instructions. Results showed that the students working under the interpretive instructions promoted a more argumentative posture, focused on defining their experiences, and regarded the text and classes from a more distanced perspective. In contrast, those working under the experiencing instructions perceived texts and classes as offering more personal relevance, showed more involvement with texts and classes and demonstrated a greater sense of agency and promptness to act. In addition, the students working under the interpretive

instructions preferred to focus on the plot or story-line and showed interest in action and compelling conclusions whereas the group in the experiential condition indicated higher voluntary participation, increased interest in authors' distinctive perspective, themes, and style, as well as the author's biographical place in a literary or intellectual tradition. The two groups differed qualitatively as regards (a) students' voluntary participation; (b) the kind of questions they asked; and (c) their identification with the characters in the text (see Section 2.5).

Although still on a small scale, studies of this kind might help reestablish the relevance of literature in the classroom setting. They also reduce the gap between the Humanities and the Natural Sciences, and might help bring more life into literary studies. Ultimately, I hope this thesis will help reposition readers so as to promote the experience of self-modification reported by so many writers and which seems to transcend culture, literary education, and time.

This thesis provides empirical evidence that we cannot do away with beauty and fiction, remaining only with facts about literature. Like Dickens's Cecilia Jupe in *Hard Times*, student-readers may be able to account for the patterns on the wallpaper but must also be free to see the flowers for themselves, enjoy the beauty of the making, and experience the elated feeling of self-discovery. If Literature is to survive, this is the only way it will.

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Chapter 8. Appendices

8.1. Appendix 1: Short Story Used in Empirical Study

Miss Brill

Although it was so brilliantly fine—the blue sky powdered with gold and great spots of light like white wine splashed over the Jardins Publiques—Miss Brill was glad that she had decided on her fur. The air was motionless, but when you opened your mouth there was just a faint chill, like a chill from a glass of iced water before you sip, and now and again a leaf came drifting—from nowhere, from the sky. Miss Brill put up her hand and touched her fur. Dear little thing! It was nice to feel it again. She had taken it out of its box that afternoon, shaken out the moth powder, given it a good brush, and rubbed the life back into the dim little eyes. "What has been happening to me?" said the sad little eyes. Oh, how sweet it was to see them snap at her again from the red eiderdown! . . . But the nose, which was of some black composition, wasn't at all firm. It must have had a knock, somehow. Never mind—a little dab of black sealing-wax when the time came—when it was absolutely necessary . . . Little rogue! Yes, she really felt like that about it. Little rogue biting its tail just by her left ear. She could have taken it off and laid it on her lap and stroked it. She felt a tingling in her hands and arms, but that came from walking, she supposed. And when she breathed, something light and sad—no, not sad, exactly—something gentle seemed to move in her bosom.

There were a number of people out this afternoon, far more than last Sunday. And the band sounded louder and gayer. That was because the Season had begun. For although the band played all the year round on Sundays, out of season it was never the same. It was like some one playing with only the family to listen; it didn't care how it played if there weren't any strangers present. Wasn't the conductor wearing a new coat, too? She was sure it was new. He scraped with his foot and flapped his arms like a rooster about to crow, and the bandsmen sitting in the green rotunda blew out their cheeks and glared at the music. Now there came a little "flutey" bit—very pretty!—a little chain of bright drops. She was sure it would be repeated. It was; she lifted her head and smiled.

Only two people shared her "special" seat: a fine old man in a velvet coat, his hands clasped over a huge carved walking-stick, and a big old woman, sitting upright, with a roll of knitting on her embroidered apron. They did not speak. This was disappointing, for Miss Brill always looked forward to the conversation. She had become really quite expert, she thought, at listening as though she didn't listen, at sitting in other people's lives just for a minute while they talked round her.

She glanced, sideways, at the old couple. Perhaps they would go soon. Last Sunday, too, hadn't been as interesting as usual. An Englishman and his wife, he wearing a dreadful Panama hat and she button boots. And she'd gone on the whole time about how she ought to wear spectacles; she knew she needed them; but that it was no good getting any; they'd be sure to break and they'd never keep on. And he'd been so patient. He'd suggested everything—gold rims, the kind that curve round your ears, little pads inside the bridge.

No, nothing would please her. "They'll always be sliding down my nose!" Miss Brill had wanted to shake her.

The old people sat on a bench, still as statues. Never mind, there was always the crowd to watch. To and fro, in front of the flower beds and the band rotunda, the couples and groups paraded, stopped to talk, to greet, to buy a handful of flowers from the old beggar who had his tray fixed to the railings. Little children ran among them, swooping and laughing; little boys with big white silk bows under their chins, little girls, little French dolls, dressed up in velvet and lace. And sometimes a tiny staggerer came suddenly rocking into the open from under the trees, stopped, stared, as suddenly sat down "flop," until its small high-stepping mother, like a young hen, rushed scolding to its rescue.

Other people sat on the benches and green chairs, but they were nearly always the same, Sunday after Sunday, and—Miss Brill had often noticed—there was something funny about nearly all of them. They were odd, silent, nearly all old, and from the way they stared they looked as though they'd just come from dark little rooms or even—even cupboards!

Behind the rotunda the slender trees with yellow leaves down drooping, and through them just a line of sea, and beyond the blue sky with gold-veined clouds.

Tum-tum-tum tiddle-um! tiddle-um! tum tiddley-um tum ta! blew the band.

Two young girls in red came by and two young soldiers in blue met them, and they laughed and paired and went off arm-in-arm. Two peasant women with funny straw hats passed, gravely, leading beautiful smoke-coloured donkeys. A cold, pale nun hurried by. A beautiful woman came along and dropped her bunch of violets, and a little boy ran

after to hand them to her, and she took them and threw them away as if they'd been poisoned. Dear me! Miss Brill didn't know whether to admire that or not! And now an ermine toque and a gentleman in gray met just in front of her. He was tall, stiff, dignified, and she was wearing the ermine toque she'd bought when her hair was yellow. Now everything, her hair, her face, even her eyes, was the same colour as the shabby ermine, and her hand, in its cleaned glove, lifted to dab her lips, was a tiny yellowish paw. Oh, she was so pleased to see him—delighted! She rather thought they were going to meet that afternoon. She described where she'd been—everywhere, here, there, along by the sea. The day was so charming—didn't he agree? And wouldn't he, perhaps? ... But he shook his head, lighted a cigarette, slowly breathed a great deep puff into her face, and even while she was still talking and laughing, flicked the match away and walked on. The ermine toque was alone; she smiled more brightly than ever. But even the band seemed to know what she was feeling and played more softly, played tenderly, and the drum beat, "The Brute! The Brute!" over and over. What would she do? What was going to happen now? But as Miss Brill wondered, the ermine toque turned, raised her hand as though she'd seen someone else, much nicer, just over there, and pattered away. And the band changed again and played more quickly, more gayly than ever, and the old couple on Miss Brill's seat got up and marched away, and such a funny old man with long whiskers hobbled along in time to the music and was nearly knocked over by four girls walking abreast.

Oh, how fascinating it was! How she enjoyed it! How she loved sitting here, watching it all! It was like a play. It was exactly like a play. Who could believe the sky at the back wasn't painted? But it wasn't till a little brown dog trotted on solemn and then slowly trotted off, like a little "theatre" dog, a little dog that had been drugged, that Miss Brill

discovered what it was that made it so exciting. They were all on stage. They weren't only the audience, not only looking on; they were acting. Even she had a part and came every Sunday. No doubt somebody would have noticed if she hadn't been there; she was part of the performance after all. How strange she'd never thought of it like that before! And yet it explained why she made such point of starting from home at just the same time each week—so as not to be late for the performance—and it also explained why she had a queer, shy feeling at telling her English pupils how she spent her Sunday afternoons. No wonder! Miss Brill nearly laughed out loud. She was on the stage. She thought of the old invalid gentleman to whom she read the newspaper four afternoons a week while he slept in the garden. She had got quite used to the frail head on the cotton pillow, the hollowed eyes, the open mouth and the high pinched nose. If he'd been dead she mightn't have noticed for weeks; she wouldn't have minded. But suddenly he knew he was having the paper read to him by an actress! "An actress!" The old head lifted; two points of light quivered in the old eyes. "An actress—are ye?" And Miss Brill smoothed the newspaper as though it were the manuscript of her part and said gently; "Yes, I have been an actress for a long time."

The band had been having a rest. Now they started again. And what they played was warm, sunny, yet there was just a faint chill—a something, what was it?—not sadness—no, not sadness—a something that made you want to sing. The tune lifted, lifted, the light shone; and it seemed to Miss Brill that in another moment all of them, all the whole company, would begin singing. The young ones, the laughing ones who were moving together, they would begin and the men's voices, very resolute and brave, would join them. And then she too, she too, and the others on the benches—they would come in with

a kind of accompaniment—something low, that scarcely rose or fell, something so beautiful—moving. ... And Miss Brill's eyes filled with tears and she looked smiling at all the other members of the company. Yes, we understand, we understand, she thought—though what they understood she didn't know.

Just at that moment a boy and girl came and sat down where the old couple had been. They were beautifully dressed; they were in love. The hero and heroine, of course, just arrived from his father's yacht. And still soundlessly singing, still with that trembling smile, Miss Brill prepared to listen.

"No, not now," said the girl. "Not here, I can't."

"But why? Because of that stupid old thing at the end there?" asked the boy. "Why does she come here at all—who wants her? Why doesn't she keep her silly old mug at home?"

"It's her fu-ur which is so funny," giggled the girl. "It's exactly like a fried whiting."

"Ah, be off with you!" said the boy in an angry whisper. Then: "Tell me, ma petite chère"

"No, not here," said the girl. "Not yet."

.....

On her way home she usually bought a slice of honeycake at the baker's. It was her Sunday treat. Sometimes there was an almond in her slice, sometimes not. It made a great difference. If there was an almond it was like carrying home a tiny present—a surprise—

something that might very well not have been there. She hurried on the almond Sundays and struck the match for the kettle in quite a dashing way.

But to-day she passed the baker's by, climbed the stairs, went into the little dark room—her room like a cupboard—and sat down on the red eiderdown. She sat there for a long time. The box that the fur came out of was on the bed. She unclasped the necklet quickly; quickly, without looking, laid it inside. But when she put the lid on she thought she heard something crying.

8.2. Appendix 2: Degrees of Intensity (a Sample)

Negative Evaluation		
1	2	3
Modals; Hesitation; Reader evaluates Miss Brill negatively and feel for her	Comparisons, Neutral (combination of 1 and 3)	Intensifiers; Superlatives; Uncommon comparisons; Neologisms
<p>P01(1):</p> <p>I found this passage of the excerpt very a little disturbing actually and quite odd and quirky. The fact that she feels like stroking this dead animal that she wears as almost - she almost wears it as jewelry even. It's just kind of disturbing and the fact that she put so much into it and she's so almost inspired by it and feels so pretty and powerful when she has it on. The fact that she just feels so much compassion for this dead fur that she wears is quite disturbing in my opinion.</p>		
<p>P01(2):</p> <p>This passage I found - well, before it she's talking about how she's like, feels that she's important enough to listen in to other people's conversation and judge them upon what they're doing. Which was quite odd and very disturbing ... But the fact that she says that the old couple, perhaps they would go soon, it seems to be referring not to the fact that maybe they would leave the park or wherever they are, but perhaps they would die. Which that I found that idea that she would even think that to make her seem very, very rude and very insensitive to the people around her.... The fact that she puts that kind of judgment and thinks that she can say that about somebody is - I find it very rude and it's - it's rather godly of her ... like, she's playing out their lives for them which I find very odd and very disturbing.</p>		
<p>P01(3):</p> <p>That line I found it portrayed Miss Brill as very a conceited and arrogant woman. The fact that she finds other people's lives as a play themselves, that she has entertainment from the distress and the pain and the</p>		

intrigue and the happiness of other people's lives, that she takes them into such consideration, she doesn't consider them that is. She judges them and she interprets them however she desires and the fact that she thinks that somebody wouldn't notice her if she wasn't there, that somebody would be sad that she wasn't there. I think is **a little bit odd** considering she doesn't speak to anybody and she just sits there as an observer, she's not part of the performance, she's a prop sat there to – judge them. She doesn't act as a participant whatsoever. So the fact that she sees herself as an actress within the world itself is odd. She doesn't really have to have any part in it for she doesn't change it or have anything to do about the way it works, all she does is observe, which doesn't connect her to anybody, it just makes her – she's almost like a tree, she just – she's not a person, she's just somebody who's there and is present at a scene but doesn't take part in it.

P01(6):

... That she's living through other people and listening to them, that I still found **very, very disturbing** in the end that she still is listening to other people's conversations without them knowing and judging them based on that, I found that **quite disturbing** still. In the end.

P18(6):

... But it had to do – I envisioned a very lonely old lady that's not married, doesn't have any kids, doesn't have anything really to look forward to in life except going to some sort of Sunday

P18(1):

I think what impressed me the most was that it was **really weird** that she thought of her fur coat or fur whatever it is, as real and alive. And kind of talked to it

P18(3):

This struck me 'cause it's **very weird** that she considers normal, everyday life as everyone being on stage. And simply because she does the same thing every week, she thinks it's part of – I

event that she does every day, or every Sunday. I feel sad for the woman that she amuses herself by listening to other people's conversations. I almost feel like that she's a little screwed up in the head because she likes to consider her fur coat as something alive and real and talks to it in her head...

in her head, which is something that most people don't normally do. So basically I think she's just a little odd right now.

don't know, part of a performance. It shows that she really has no purpose in life, she has nothing better to do.

P18(2):

This struck me because it was really weird that most normal people wouldn't do that. If I knew someone was listening to my conversation on purpose I wouldn't be too happy. Overall she just seemed pretty weird and this emphasizes it.

P02(2):

Yeah, this struck me because I thought it was a little bit odd and it was – you know, it just kinds of gives like a – a strange kind of feeling... that was kind of weird because ... it's almost like the author's trying to portray her as a separate person of that crowd but really she's actually a part of it because she went back to it. Yeah, I just thought that was really weird. Maybe she's delusional or she's dreaming or something of reality, you know, out of the normal.

P02(1):

I just thought it was gross and just – I'm not really one to support people wearing fur ... I thought that was just really – distasteful, it was just – yuck ... I don't know if she really liked it or if she was crazy or something ... I just found that that passage in particular was just – unethical, cruel ...

8.3. Appendix 3: Complete List of the Repetition Patterns

X Moment 1 Commentaries 1 and 2	BECOMES	Y Moment 2 Commentaries 3 to 6
I evaluate the protagonist negatively		I evaluate the protagonist negatively
I evaluate the protagonist positively		I evaluate the protagonist negatively in a slightly different way
I evaluate the other characters negatively		
I feel for the protagonist		I evaluate the protagonist negatively with increased intensity
I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)		I evaluate the protagonist negatively with decreased intensity
I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)		I evaluate the protagonist positively
I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself		I evaluate the protagonist positively in a slightly different way
I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself		I evaluate the other characters negatively
I do not acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself		I evaluate the other characters negatively with increased intensity
I characterize the protagonist with vivid imagery		I evaluate the text (overall) positively
I generalize aspects of the protagonist to everyone		I hesitate to evaluate the text (overall) positively
I recognize aspects of Miss Brill in others		I evaluate the text (overall) negatively
I characterize the text/setting with vivid imagery		I feel for the protagonist
I evaluate the text positively		I feel for the protagonist in slightly different ways
I evaluate the text negatively		I feel for the protagonist (personal/noetic)
I think of how I treat others		I feel for the protagonist (impersonal/noematic)
I make intertextual commentaries		I feel for the protagonist with increased degree of personalization
I relate to aspects of the setting/text		I feel for the protagonist with decreased degree of personalization
I do not relate to aspects of the setting/text		I feel for the protagonist with increased intensity
I characterize the protagonist from a distance		I feel for the protagonist with decreased intensity

<p style="text-align: center;">X Moment 1 Commentaries 1 and 2</p>	<p>BECOMES</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Y Moment 2 Commentaries 3 to 6</p>
<p>I reflect on the action (of reading)</p> <p>I feel with the protagonist</p> <p>I characterize my bodily feelings</p> <p>I fear that I will end up like the protagonist</p> <p>I feel compelled to action</p> <p>I give the protagonist advice</p> <p>I feel uncertainty</p> <p>I discuss textual elements</p> <p>*Absence of constituent X</p>		<p>I do not feel for the protagonist</p> <p>I feel sympathy for the protagonist</p> <p>I feel sympathy for the protagonist with increased intensity</p> <p>I characterize my bodily feelings</p> <p>I characterize my bodily feelings with increased intensity</p> <p>I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself</p> <p>I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself in slightly different ways</p> <p>I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself with increased intensity</p> <p>I acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself with decreased intensity</p> <p>I partially acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself</p> <p>I do not acknowledge aspects of the protagonist in myself</p> <p>I acknowledge aspects of the other characters in myself</p> <p>I fear that I will end up like the protagonist</p> <p>I fear that I will end up like the protagonist with increased intensity</p> <p>I hope I do not become like the protagonist</p> <p>I feel with the protagonist</p> <p>I recognize the protagonist's qualities in others</p> <p>I recognize the other characters' qualities in others</p> <p>I generalize the protagonist's qualities to everyone</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">X Moment 1 Commentaries 1 and 2</p>	<p>BECOMES</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Y Moment 2 Commentaries 3 to 6</p>
		<p>I generalize the other characters' qualities to everyone</p> <p>I describe the protagonist with vivid imagery</p> <p>I describe the protagonist with vivid imagery in slightly different ways</p> <p>I can almost describe the protagonist with vivid imagery</p> <p>I think of how I treat others</p> <p>I feel compelled to action</p> <p>I feel compelled to action with increased intensity</p> <p>I realize something about myself</p> <p>I evaluate the text (overall) negatively</p> <p>I describe the setting/text with vivid imagery</p> <p>I make intertextual commentaries</p> <p>I relate to the protagonist</p> <p>I do not relate to the protagonist</p> <p>I relate to the text</p> <p>I relate to the text in slightly different ways</p> <p>I partially relate to the text</p> <p>I do not relate to the text</p> <p>I feel uncertainty</p> <p>I do not understand the text</p> <p>This story evokes a sense of unfamiliarity</p> <p>I reflect on the action (of reading)</p> <p>I wonder about the protagonist</p> <p>I give the protagonist advice</p> <p>I reflect on society/the world</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">X Moment 1 Commentaries 1 and 2</p>	<p>BECOMES</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Y Moment 2 Commentaries 3 to 6</p>
		<p>I discuss textual elements (i.e., style)</p> <p>I describe the protagonist from a distance</p> <p>I describe the protagonist from a distance in slightly different ways</p> <p>I feel bad that I am like the protagonist sometimes</p> <p>I think that the protagonist's punishment is justifiable</p> <p>I justify the importance of this passage</p> <p>I feel compelled to action</p> <p>I feel compelled to action with increased intensity</p> <p>I reflect on the action (of reading)</p> <p>I think of my own feelings</p> <p>I think of myself</p> <p>I imagine myself as the character</p> <p>Absence of constituent X</p>

8.4. Appendix 4: Probing the Corpus

Having yielded the clusters and obtained the prototypical examples, the comments were further submitted to corpus analysis for more substantiation of the results. The experiential accounts of each cluster were digitized *ipsis litteris* and made machine-readable. In this study, Clusters I, II, III and IV contain 17,510, 24,081, 15,598, and 10,064 words respectively, numbers that qualify the four corpora as small (Berber Sardinha 2004: 26, Ma 1993). They were probed by WordSmith Tools (Scott 1999), which offers three main tools: WordList, Concord and KeyWords. As four small corpora were being compared, only the first tool was used. WordList provides data on the number of different words (types) and running words (tokens) in each of the corpora. It also gives information on the standardized type/token ratio of words, which allows us to assess lexical variety (see Sections 5.5.1 and 5.1.3.1). To this purpose, each word was first calculated proportionally to the total number of words in each corpus. Then, a hypothesis test (the two proportion z-test) was conducted to identify significant differences between these proportions. It must be pointed out that this analysis was performed in this thesis so as to provide more empirical data to support the results obtained from a phenomenologically-oriented investigation. I am aware that submitting the commentaries of the four types or readers to corpus analysis requires many other steps necessary to this kind of examination that have not been taken here and are still in line. The provisional results obtained are detailed in Table A4.1 and as follows:

Type I: External enactment

a) Text segmentation:

This aspect was more frequently present in Type I. One of the first evidence that supports the analyses of the prototypical examples, when comparing the four corpora, is the fact that “text” (0.19% > 0.11%; p=0.03), “part” (0.33% > 0.20%; p=0.01) and “parts” (0.02% > 0.00%; p=0.03) occur more frequently in Type I than in Type II. Although not statistically different, “passage” also occurs more frequently in Type I than in Type II (0.38% > 0.18%; p=0.06).

“Text” (0.19% > 0.10%; p=0.03), “excerpt” (0.14% > 0.06%; p=0.02), “passage” (0.38% > 0.20%; p=0.00), “part” (0.33% > 0.19%; p=0.01) occur more frequently in Type I than in Type III. Although not statistically different, “parts” also occurs more frequently in Type I than in Type III (0.02% > 0.00%; p=0.08).

“Text” (0.19% > 0.09%; p=0.04) and “passage” (0.38% > 0.16%; p=0.00) occur more frequently in Type I than in Type IV. Although not statistically different, “excerpt” (0.14% > 0.07%; p=0.1) and “parts” (0.02% > 0.00%; p=0.16) also occur more frequently in Type I than in Type III.

b) Personal deixis:

The first person pronoun in the objective case (“me”) was more frequently present in Type I. This is evidence that readers are seen as the objects, not the agents of actions. “Me” occurs more frequently in Type I (0.71%) than in Type II (0.48%; p=0.00), Type III (0.43%; p=0.00), and in Type IV (0.56%; p=0.14), although this particular difference is not significant.

The third person pronoun plural in the objective case (“them”) was more frequently present in Type I (0.28%) than in Type III (0.18%; p=0.06), although this difference is not

significant. This result indicates that, as with the first person, the repetition of third personal references might be an indication that the reader performs more of a passive than active role. “Their” is more frequently present in Type I (0.23%) than in Type II (0.12%; $p=0.01$), Type III (0.07%; $p=0.00$), and Type IV (0.08%; $p=0.00$), supporting the evidence that there is a preference for first and third persons as separate entities, as seen in 6.1.

As to the protagonist’s name, “Brill” occurs more frequently in Type I (0.28%) than in Type III (0.17%; $p=0.04$). Although these differences are not significant, it also occurs more frequently in Type I than in Type II (0.23%) and Type IV (0.22%), reinforcing what has been said about lack of identification in Section 6.1.

c) Modals and adverbs lower the intensity and hedge self- realizations

As discussed in Section 6.1, the intensity of feelings is low in Type I, as evidenced in the use of “almost,” which is more frequently present in Type I (0.21%) than in Type II (0.17%) and than in Type III (0.13%; $p=0.07$), although these differences are not statistically significant. In future studies, it would be necessary to study the collocation of the modals and adverbs found to better assess the context in which self-realizations emerge.

d) Processes

Mental processes were very prominent in the corpus. Although differences are not statistically significant, “thinks” is more frequently present in Type I (0.07%) than in Type II (0.05%) and Type III (0.05%). With “thought,” differences are, mostly, not

statistically significant either, but it is more frequently present in Type I (0.28%) than in Type II (0.23%), Type III (0.24%), and Type IV (0.16%; $p=0.05$). As to the mental process “reminds,” it is more frequent in Type I (0.15%) than in Type II (0.04%; $p=0.00$), Type III (0.04%; $p=0.00$), and Type IV (0.04%; $p=0.01$).

Type II: As-if enactment:

a) Adjectives of negative evaluation modified by adverbs of intensity

“Weird” is more frequently present in Type II (0.11%) than in Type I (0.03%; $p=0.00$).

“Odd” is also more frequently present in Type II (0.06%) than in Type I (0.01%; $p=0.01$).

Some adverbs of intensity were also found to be more recurrent in Type II. “Really,” for example, is more frequently present in Type II (0.89%) than in Type I (0.66%; $p=0.01$).

“Little” is more frequently present in Type II (0.44%) than in Type I (0.24%; $p=0.00$).

Studying the collocation of these words would contribute to the analyses.

b) Personal deixis:

The pronoun “she” showed very few significant differences, but tendency to occur more frequently in Type II. Even though I cannot guarantee that the pronoun was used in reference to the protagonist, it must be taken into account that the protagonist is female.

Even though the differences were not significant, it occurs more frequently in Type II (2.33%) than in Type I (2.08%), Type III (2.29%) and Type IV (2.12%). Some significant differences were found. “She’s” occurs more frequently in Type II (1.01%) than in Type I (0.64%; $p=0.00$), Type III (0.99%; $p=0.00$) and Type IV (0.88%; $p=0.02$). Even though results are not significant, “her” occurs more frequently in Type II (1.54%) than in Type I

(1.46%), Type III (1.41%), and Type IV (1.26%). “Herself” occurs more frequently in Type II (0.21%) than in Type I (0.14%), Type III (0.15%), and Type IV (0.20%). Like in Type I, these findings supporting the evidence that there is a preference for first and third persons as separate entities, as seen in 6.2.

c) Conditional form:

“If” occurs more frequently in Type II (0.39%) than in Type I (0.27%; $p=0.04$). Although the differences are not statistically significant, “if” is also more frequently present in Type II than in Type III (0.34%) and Type IV (0.28%). “Would” is also more frequently present in Type II (0.26%) than in Type III (0.25%) and Type IV (0.16%). “Wouldn’t” is more frequently present in Type II (0.05%) than in Type I (0.0%; $p=0.00$). Although differences are not significant, it is also more frequent in Type II than in Type III (0.02%) and Type IV (0.02%). This data support the findings that when self-referential descriptions are made in this Type, these are seen as a possibility, but not as a realization.

d) Vivid imagery

Mental processes that could be indicative of vivid imagery were prominent. For example, “think” is more frequently present in Type II (0.64%) than in Type I (0.45%; $p=0.01$). Although differences are not statistically significant, “thinking” is more frequently present in Type II (0.10%) than in Type I (0.07%), Type III (0.07%), and Type IV (0.05%). “Sense” is more frequently present in Type II (0.14%) than in Type I (0.06%; $p=0.01$) and Type III (0.04%; $p=0.00$). It is less frequently present than in Type IV (0.18%).

Type III: Expressive enactment:

a) Personal deixis

The pronoun “you” occurs more frequently in Types III and IV. Some significant results were found. It occurs more frequently in Type IV (2.08%) than in Type I (1.27%; $p=0.00$), Type II (1.37%; $p=0.00$), and Type III (1.31%; $p=0.00$).

“You’re” is more frequently present in Type III (0.27%) than in Type I (0.17%; $p=0.05$), Type II (0.13%; $p=0.00$), and Type IV (0.12%; $p=0.01$).

This pronoun is also present in more forms in Type III (“you,” “you’re,” “your,” “yourself,” “you’d,” “you’ve,” “you’ll”) than in Type IV (“you,” “you’re,” “your,” “yourself,” “you’d,” “you’ve”), Type II (“you,” “you’re,” “your,” “yourself,” “you’ve”) and Type I (“you,” “you’re,” “your,” “yourself”). Here, the inclusive “you” might be seen as an index that readers engage in metaphors of personal identification.

“Self” is also more frequently present in Type III (0.04%) than in Type II (0.01%; $p=0.05$).

b) Processes

“Think” is more frequently present in Type III (0.63%) than in Type I (0.45%; $p=0.02$).

c) Indeterminacy or vague language: hedges, softening modals or appraisal items

Although most differences are not statistically significant, “just” is more frequently present in Type III (1.57%) than in Type I (1.53%), Type II (1.47%), and Type IV (1.16%; $p=0.01$). “Kind” is also more frequent in Type III (1.45%) than in Type I (0.80%; $p=0.0$), Type II (1.06%; $p=0.00$), and Type IV (0.65% $p=0.00$).

Type IV: Total enactment

a) Personal Deixis:

“I” is more frequently present in Type IV. It occurs more frequently in Type IV (2.99%) than in Type I (2.74%), Type II (2.78%), and Type III (2.87%). Although differences are not significant, this might be evidence that readers are seen as the agents and not as the objects of actions.

Second person pronouns are also prominent. “You” occurs more frequently in Type IV (2.08%) than in Type I (1.27%; $p=0.00$), Type II (1.37%; $p=0.00$) and Type III (1.31%; $p=0.00$). “We” occurs more frequently in Type IV (0.52%) than in Type I (0.28%; $p=0.00$), Type II (0.23%; $p=0.00$), and Type III (0.10%; $p=0.00$). “We’re” also occurs more frequently in Type IV (0.06%) than in Type I (0.04%), Type II (0.02%), and Type III (0.04%), although these differences are not significant. “Our” also occurs more frequently in Type IV (0.11%) than in Type I (0.03%; $p=0.01$), Type II (0.07%), and Type III (0.02%; $p=0.00$). The same occurs with “ourselves,” which is more frequent in Type IV (0.02%) than in Type I ($<0.00\%$), Type II (0.01%), and Type III (0.0%), although these differences are not significant.

“Self” is more frequently present in Type IV (0.09%) than in Type I (0.01%; $p=0.00$), Type II (0.01%; $p=0.00$), and Type III (0.04%).

Table A4.1: Proportion Differences

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	p	Cluster1	Cluster3	P	Cluster1	Cluster4	P	Cluster2	Cluster3	p	Cluster2	Cluster4	P	Cluster3	Cluster4	P
text	0.19%	0.11%	0.03	0.19%	0.10%	0.03	0.19%	0.09%	0.04	0.11%	0.10%	0.77	0.11%	0.09%	0.60	0.10%	0.09%	0.80
sentence	0.05%	0.03%	0.30	0.05%	0.02%	0.15	0.05%	0.08%	0.33	0.03%	0.02%	0.55	0.03%	0.08%	0.05	0.02%	0.08%	0.02
excerpt	0.14%	0.08%	0.06	0.14%	0.06%	0.02	0.14%	0.07%	0.10	0.08%	0.06%	0.47	0.08%	0.07%	0.76	0.06%	0.07%	0.76
passage	0.38%	0.18%	0.06	0.38%	0.20%	0.00	0.38%	0.16%	0.00	0.18%	0.20%	0.65	0.18%	0.16%	0.69	0.20%	0.16%	0.47
passages	0.00%	0.00%	1	0.00%	0.03%	0.02	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.03%	0.01	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.03%	0.00%	0.08
part	0.33%	0.20%	0.01	0.33%	0.19%	0.01	0.33%	0.34%	0.89	0.20%	0.19%	0.83	0.20%	0.34%	0.02	0.19%	0.34%	0.02
parts	0.02%	0.00%	0.03	0.02%	0.00%	0.08	0.02%	0.00%	0.16	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00
I	2.74%	2.78%	0.81	2.74%	2.87%	0.47	2.74%	2.99%	0.23	2.78%	2.87%	0.60	2.78%	2.99%	0.29	2.87%	2.99%	0.58
me	0.71%	0.48%	0.00	0.71%	0.43%	0.00	0.71%	0.56%	0.14	0.48%	0.43%	0.47	0.48%	0.56%	0.34	0.43%	0.56%	0.14
my	0.34%	0.27%	0.20	0.34%	0.15%	0.00	0.34%	0.25%	0.19	0.27%	0.15%	0.01	0.27%	0.25%	0.74	0.15%	0.25%	0.07
myself	0.07%	0.05%	0.40	0.07%	0.02%	0.04	0.07%	0.03%	0.17	0.05%	0.02%	0.14	0.05%	0.03%	0.42	0.02%	0.03%	0.61
mine	0.02%	0.00%	0.03	0.02%	0.00%	0.08	0.02%	0.00%	0.16	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00
you	1.27%	1.37%	0.38	1.27%	1.31%	0.75	1.27%	2.08%	0.00	1.37%	1.31%	0.61	1.37%	2.08%	0.00	1.31%	2.08%	0.00
you're	0.17%	0.13%	0.29	0.17%	0.27%	0.05	0.17%	0.12%	0.30	0.13%	0.27%	0.00	0.13%	0.12%	0.81	0.27%	0.12%	0.01
your	0.15%	0.12%	0.41	0.15%	0.16%	0.82	0.15%	0.11%	0.38	0.12%	0.16%	0.29	0.12%	0.11%	0.81	0.16%	0.11%	0.30
yourself	0.03%	0.02%	0.52	0.03%	0.05%	0.36	0.03%	0.00%	0.08	0.02%	0.05%	0.10	0.02%	0.00%	0.16	0.05%	0.00%	0.02
you'd	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.12	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.32
you've	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.03%	0.02	0.01%	0.01%	1.00	0.01%	0.03%	0.18	0.01%	0.03%	0.24
you'll	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.12	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.32
Brill	0.28%	0.23%	0.31	0.28%	0.17%	0.04	0.28%	0.22%	0.34	0.23%	0.17%	0.20	0.23%	0.22%	0.86	0.17%	0.22%	0.37
Brill's	0.04%	0.03%	0.59	0.04%	0.03%	0.63	0.04%	0.03%	0.67	0.03%	0.03%	1.00	0.03%	0.03%	1.00	0.03%	0.03%	1.00
she	2.08%	2.33%	0.09	2.08%	2.29%	0.19	2.08%	2.12%	0.82	2.33%	2.29%	0.80	2.33%	2.12%	0.23	2.29%	2.12%	0.37
she's	0.64%	1.01%	0.00	0.64%	0.99%	0.00	0.64%	0.88%	0.02	1.01%	0.99%	0.85	1.01%	0.88%	0.26	0.99%	0.88%	0.37
she'd	0.05%	0.01%	0.01	0.05%	0.01%	0.04	0.05%	0.04%	0.71	0.01%	0.01%	1.00	0.01%	0.04%	0.07	0.01%	0.04%	0.11
she'll	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.12	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.32
her	1.46%	1.54%	0.51	1.46%	1.41%	0.70	1.46%	1.26%	0.17	1.54%	1.41%	0.30	1.54%	1.26%	0.05	1.41%	1.26%	0.31
herself	0.14%	0.21%	0.10	0.14%	0.15%	0.81	0.14%	0.20%	0.23	0.21%	0.15%	0.18	0.21%	0.20%	0.85	0.15%	0.20%	0.34
hers	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.02%	0.08
we	0.28%	0.23%	0.31	0.28%	0.10%	0.00	0.28%	0.52%	0.00	0.23%	0.10%	0.00	0.23%	0.52%	0.00	0.10%	0.52%	0.00
we're	0.04%	0.02%	0.23	0.04%	0.04%	1.00	0.04%	0.06%	0.46	0.02%	0.04%	0.24	0.02%	0.06%	0.06	0.04%	0.06%	0.47
us	0.02%	0.05%	0.12	0.02%	0.01%	0.46	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.05%	0.01%	0.04	0.05%	0.02%	0.21	0.01%	0.02%	0.51
our	0.03%	0.07%	0.08	0.03%	0.02%	0.57	0.03%	0.11%	0.01	0.07%	0.02%	0.03	0.07%	0.11%	0.24	0.02%	0.11%	0.00
ourselve																		
s	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.01%	0.00%	0.21	0.01%	0.02%	0.46	0.00%	0.02%	0.08
they	0.48%	0.41%	0.29	0.48%	0.49%	0.90	0.48%	0.41%	0.41	0.41%	0.49%	0.24	0.41%	0.41%	1.00	0.49%	0.41%	0.35
they'd	0.01%	0.01%	1.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.21	0.01%	0.00%	0.32	0.01%	0.00%	0.32	0.01%	0.00%	0.32	0.00%	0.00%	1.00
they're	0.13%	0.13%	1.00	0.13%	0.10%	0.42	0.13%	0.16%	0.52	0.13%	0.10%	0.40	0.13%	0.16%	0.50	0.10%	0.16%	0.18
them	0.28%	0.23%	0.31	0.28%	0.18%	0.06	0.28%	0.25%	0.64	0.23%	0.18%	0.29	0.23%	0.25%	0.73	0.18%	0.25%	0.23
themselv																		
es	0.03%	0.02%	0.52	0.03%	0.01%	0.21	0.03%	0.03%	1.00	0.02%	0.01%	0.44	0.02%	0.03%	0.58	0.01%	0.03%	0.24
their	0.23%	0.12%	0.01	0.23%	0.07%	0.00	0.23%	0.08%	0.00	0.12%	0.07%	0.12	0.12%	0.08%	0.31	0.07%	0.08%	0.77
people	0.72%	0.74%	0.81	0.72%	0.61%	0.22	0.72%	0.74%	0.85	0.74%	0.61%	0.13	0.74%	0.74%	1.00	0.61%	0.74%	0.21
people's	0.07%	0.06%	0.69	0.07%	0.04%	0.25	0.07%	0.11%	0.27	0.06%	0.04%	0.39	0.06%	0.11%	0.12	0.04%	0.11%	0.03
self	0.01%	0.01%	1.00	0.01%	0.04%	0.08	0.01%	0.09%	0.00	0.01%	0.04%	0.05	0.01%	0.09%	0.00	0.04%	0.09%	0.11

because	0.55%	0.67%	0.12	0.55%	0.85%	0.00	0.55%	0.84%	0.00	0.67%	0.85%	0.04	0.67%	0.84%	0.09	0.85%	0.84%	0.93
so	0.66%	0.92%	0.00	0.66%	0.86%	0.04	0.66%	1.46%	0.00	0.92%	0.86%	0.54	0.92%	1.46%	0.00	0.86%	1.46%	0.00
why	0.09%	0.14%	0.14	0.09%	0.12%	0.40	0.09%	0.20%	0.01	0.14%	0.12%	0.59	0.14%	0.20%	0.20	0.12%	0.20%	0.11
almost	0.21%	0.17%	0.35	0.21%	0.13%	0.08	0.21%	0.22%	0.86	0.21%	0.13%	0.07	0.17%	0.22%	0.33	0.13%	0.22%	0.08
like	1.43%	1.27%	0.16	1.43%	2.36%	0.00	1.43%	3.20%	0.00	1.27%	2.36%	0.00	1.27%	3.20%	0.00	2.36%	3.20%	0.00
liked	0.03%	0.01%	0.14	0.03%	0.10%	0.01	0.03%	0.00%	0.08	0.01%	0.10%	0.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.32	0.10%	0.00%	0.00
likes	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.02%	0.03%	0.56	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.02%	0.03%	0.53	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.03%	0.02%	0.63
think	0.45%	0.64%	0.01	0.45%	0.63%	0.02	0.45%	0.70%	0.01	0.64%	0.63%	0.90	0.64%	0.70%	0.53	0.63%	0.70%	0.50
thinking	0.07%	0.10%	0.31	0.07%	0.07%	1.00	0.07%	0.05%	0.52	0.10%	0.07%	0.33	0.10%	0.05%	0.15	0.07%	0.05%	0.53
thinks	0.07%	0.05%	0.40	0.07%	0.05%	0.46	0.07%	0.06%	0.76	0.05%	0.05%	1.00	0.05%	0.06%	0.74	0.05%	0.06%	0.74
thought	0.28%	0.23%	0.31	0.28%	0.24%	0.48	0.28%	0.16%	0.05	0.23%	0.24%	0.84	0.23%	0.16%	0.20	0.24%	0.16%	0.17
thoughts	0.02%	0.03%	0.53	0.02%	0.01%	0.46	0.02%	0.03%	0.60	0.03%	0.01%	0.19	0.03%	0.03%	1.00	0.01%	0.03%	0.24
rememb er	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.02%	0.03%	0.56	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.02%	0.03%	0.53	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.03%	0.02%	0.63
rememb ered	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.02%	0.08
reminds	0.15%	0.04%	0.00	0.15%	0.04%	0.00	0.15%	0.04%	0.01	0.04%	0.04%	1.00	0.04%	0.04%	1.00	0.04%	0.04%	1.00
reminded	0.06%	0.02%	0.04	0.06%	0.03%	0.20	0.06%	0.02%	0.13	0.02%	0.03%	0.53	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.03%	0.02%	0.63
weird	0.03%	0.11%	0.00	0.03%	0.03%	1.00	0.03%	0.03%	1.00	0.11%	0.03%	0.01	0.11%	0.03%	0.02	0.03%	0.03%	1.00
odd	0.01%	0.06%	0.01	0.01%	0.00%	0.21	0.01%	0.03%	0.22	0.06%	0.00%	0.00	0.06%	0.03%	0.26	0.00%	0.03%	0.03
strange	0.04%	0.05%	0.64	0.04%	0.01%	0.09	0.04%	0.00%	0.04	0.05%	0.01%	0.04	0.05%	0.00%	0.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.32
strangers	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.08%	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.08%	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.08%	0.00%	0.00
if	0.27%	0.39%	0.04	0.27%	0.34%	0.25	0.27%	0.28%	0.88	0.39%	0.34%	0.42	0.39%	0.28%	0.12	0.34%	0.28%	0.40
would	0.32%	0.26%	0.26	0.32%	0.25%	0.23	0.32%	0.16%	0.01	0.26%	0.25%	0.85	0.26%	0.16%	0.08	0.25%	0.16%	0.13
wouldn't	0.00%	0.05%	0.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.05%	0.02%	0.14	0.05%	0.02%	0.21	0.02%	0.02%	1.00
Really	0.66%	0.89%	0.01	0.66%	1.05%	0.00	0.66%	0.60%	0.55	0.89%	1.05%	0.11	0.89%	0.60%	0.01	1.05%	0.60%	1.00
little	0.24%	0.44%	0.00	0.24%	0.12%	0.01	0.24%	0.38%	0.04	0.44%	0.12%	0.00	0.44%	0.38%	0.44	0.12%	0.38%	0.00
just	1.53%	1.47%	0.62	1.53%	1.57%	0.77	1.53%	1.16%	0.01	1.47%	1.57%	0.42	1.47%	1.16%	0.03	1.57%	1.16%	0.01
pretty	0.06%	0.07%	0.69	0.06%	0.04%	0.42	0.06%	0.02%	0.13	0.07%	0.04%	0.23	0.07%	0.02%	0.07	0.04%	0.02%	0.38
seem	0.06%	0.07%	0.69	0.06%	0.04%	0.42	0.06%	0.00%	0.01	0.07%	0.04%	0.23	0.07%	0.00%	0.01	0.04%	0.00%	0.04
seems	0.15%	0.15%	1.00	0.15%	0.27%	0.02	0.15%	0.07%	0.07	0.15%	0.27%	0.01	0.15%	0.07%	0.06	0.27%	0.07%	0.00
seemed	0.03%	0.04%	0.59	0.03%	0.10%	0.01	0.03%	0.00%	0.08	0.04%	0.10%	0.02	0.04%	0.00%	0.04	0.10%	0.00%	0.00
for	0.40%	0.66%	0.00	0.40%	0.55%	0.05	0.40%	0.52%	0.15	0.66%	0.55%	0.17	0.66%	0.55%	0.24	0.55%	0.52%	0.75
imagine	0.05%	0.00%	0.00	0.05%	0.02%	0.15	0.05%	0.03%	0.44	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.03%	0.01	0.02%	0.03%	0.61
fact	0.06%	0.19%	0.00	0.06%	0.18%	0.00	0.06%	0.00%	0.01	0.19%	0.18%	0.82	0.19%	0.00%	0.00	0.18%	0.00%	0.00
very	0.36%	0.37%	0.87	0.36%	0.20%	0.01	0.36%	0.13%	0.00	0.37%	0.20%	0.00	0.37%	0.13%	0.00	0.20%	0.13%	0.19
sad	0.18%	0.26%	0.09	0.18%	0.28%	0.06	0.18%	0.27%	0.12	0.26%	0.28%	0.71	0.26%	0.27%	0.87	0.28%	0.27%	0.88
feel	0.32%	0.27%	0.35	0.32%	0.27%	0.40	0.32%	0.32%	1.00	0.27%	0.27%	1.00	0.27%	0.32%	0.43	0.27%	0.32%	0.47
feeling	0.13%	0.11%	0.56	0.13%	0.11%	0.60	0.13%	0.13%	1.00	0.11%	0.11%	1.00	0.11%	0.13%	0.62	0.11%	0.13%	0.65
feels	0.11%	0.06%	0.08	0.11%	0.13%	0.60	0.11%	0.23%	0.01	0.06%	0.13%	0.02	0.06%	0.23%	0.00	0.13%	0.23%	0.06
feelings	0.06%	0.04%	0.36	0.06%	0.10%	0.20	0.06%	0.00%	0.01	0.04%	0.10%	0.02	0.04%	0.00%	0.04	0.10%	0.00%	0.00
sadness	0.04%	0.05%	0.64	0.04%	0.00%	0.01	0.04%	0.00%	0.04	0.05%	0.00%	0.01	0.05%	0.00%	0.02	0.00%	0.00%	1.00
sense	0.06%	0.14%	0.01	0.06%	0.04%	0.42	0.06%	0.18%	0.00	0.14%	0.04%	0.00	0.14%	0.18%	0.39	0.04%	0.18%	0.00
senses	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.02%	0.08
kind	0.80%	1.06%	0.01	0.80%	1.45%	0.00	0.80%	0.65%	0.16	1.06%	1.45%	0.00	1.06%	0.65%	0.00	1.45%	0.65%	0.00
good	0.10%	0.11%	0.76	0.10%	0.14%	0.29	0.10%	0.12%	0.63	0.11%	0.14%	0.40	0.11%	0.12%	0.80	0.14%	0.12%	0.67
enjoy	0.03%	0.02%	0.52	0.03%	0.01%	0.21	0.03%	0.02%	0.62	0.02%	0.01%	0.44	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.01%	0.02%	0.51
enjoys	0.02%	0.00%	0.03	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.02%	0.02%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.02%	0.02%	1.00
enjoyabl	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.01%	0.12	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.01%	0.02%	0.51

e																		
enjoying	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.02%	0.00%	0.16
enjoyed	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.03%	0.02	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.03%	0.01	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.03%	0.00%	0.08
you'll	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.12	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.01%	0.00%	1.00
epiphany	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.19	0.00%	0.05%	0.00	0.00%	0.01%	0.12	0.00%	0.05%	0.00	0.01%	0.05%	0.05
realize	0.05%	0.06%	0.67	0.05%	0.06%	0.70	0.05%	0.03%	0.44	0.06%	0.06%	1.00	0.06%	0.03%	0.26	0.06%	0.03%	0.29
realized	0.01%	0.02%	0.42	0.01%	0.01%	1.00	0.01%	0.00%	0.32	0.02%	0.01%	0.44	0.02%	0.00%	0.16	0.01%	0.00%	0.32
realizes	0.05%	0.00%	0.00	0.05%	0.04%	0.67	0.05%	0.00%	0.02	0.00%	0.04%	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.04%	0.00%	0.04
realizing	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.06	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.02%	0.03	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.02%	0.00%	0.16
realizatio n	0.03%	0.00%	0.01	0.03%	0.00%	0.03	0.03%	0.00%	0.08	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00	0.00%	0.00%	1.00

8.5. Appendix 5: Discoursal Features of Prototypes

Enactment s/ Moments	External	As-if	Expressive	Total
One	<p><i>interpretive</i></p> <p>(a) Modest narrative elaboration</p> <p>(b) Awareness of text segmentation</p> <p>(c) Textual quotation</p> <p>(d) Subjectivisation:</p> <p>(d.1) Text as agent</p> <p>(d.2) first p. and prevalence of third p. referential descriptions</p> <p>(d.3) Similes of personal identification (first and third p. referential descriptions; preposition <i>like</i>)</p> <p>(d.4) Modals and adverbs that lower the intensity and hedge self-realizations</p> <p>(d.5) Discourse markers of cause and consequence to justify self-realizations logically</p> <p>(d.6) Repetition of <i>think</i>.</p>	<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Negative evaluation adjectives modified by intensity adverbs</p> <p>(b) Subjectivisation:</p> <p>(b.1) first p. and prevalence of third p. referential descriptions</p> <p>(b.2) External reference</p> <p>(b.3) Conditional form for explicit comparison to self</p>	<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Positive mental process verbs and evaluative reaction words</p> <p>(b) Subjectivisation: simile of personal identification, or explicit comparison</p> <p>(b.1) first and third p. referential descriptions</p> <p>(c) Indeterminacy and vague language: hedges, softening modals and appraisal items</p> <p>(d) Vivid imagery</p>	<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Positive and negative mental process verbs and evaluative reaction words</p> <p>(b) Subjectivisation: simile of personal identification, or explicit comparison</p> <p>(b.1) first and third p. referential descriptions; prevalence of third p. description; exclusive “you”</p> <p>(c) Indeterminacy and vague language: softening modals and appraisal items</p> <p>(d) Vivid imagery</p>

Enactment s/ Moments	External	As-if	Expressive	Total
Two		<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Negative evaluation adjectives modified by intensity adverbs</p> <p>(b) Modals and pre-modifiers which tone down the intensity in feelings</p> <p>(c) Expressions of sympathetic pity, or compassion</p> <p>(d) Vivid imagery</p> <p>(e) Subjectivisation:</p> <p>(e.1) first p. and prevalence of third p. referential descriptions</p>	<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Negative evaluation with external reference</p> <p>(b) Positive mental process verbs and evaluative reaction words</p> <p>(c) Indeterminacy and vague language: hedges, softening modals and appraisal items</p> <p>(d) Expressions that indicate awareness of bodily feelings</p> <p>(e) Lexis indicative of assertiveness</p> <p>(f) Subjectivisation: metaphor of personal identification</p> <p>(f.1) “I” and prevalence of inclusive “you”</p>	<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Negative evaluation with external reference</p> <p>(b) Positive mental process verbs and evaluative reaction words</p> <p>(c) Indeterminacy and vague language: hedges, softening modals and appraisal items</p> <p>(d) Expressions that indicate sympathy and reference to bodily feelings</p> <p>(e) Lexis indicative of assertiveness</p> <p>(f) Textual quotations and paraphrases</p> <p>(g) Subjectivisation: metaphors of general identification</p> <p>(g.1) “I” and inclusive and generalizing “we”</p> <p>(g.2) “I”; externalizing “they”</p>
			<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Positive mental process verbs and evaluative reaction words</p> <p>(b) Indeterminacy and vague language: softening modals or appraisal items</p>	<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Positive mental process verbs and evaluative reaction words</p> <p>(b) Indeterminacy and vague language: hedges, softening modals or appraisal items</p>

Enactment s/ Moments	External	As-if	Expressive	Total
Three			<p>(c) Subjectivisation:</p> <p>(c.1) first and third p. referential descriptions; prevalence of “I” (agency)</p> <p>(d) Lexis indicative of ownership</p>	<p>(c) Subjectivisation: simile of personal identification</p> <p>(c.1) “I”; inclusive “you,” and over-repetition of the preposition “like”</p> <p>(d) Lexis indicative of assertiveness</p> <p>(e) Textual quotations and paraphrases</p> <p>(f) Defamiliarization</p>
Four				<p><i>experiential</i></p> <p>(a) Indeterminacy and vague language: softening modals or appraisal items</p> <p>(b) Lexis indicative of assertiveness</p> <p>(c) Textual appropriation, or ownership</p> <p>(d) Subjectivisation:</p> <p>(d.1) Inclusive “you” and generalizing “we”; and “I” (metaphor of general identification)</p> <p>(d.2) first and third p. referential descriptions; prevalence of “I” (agency)</p>