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Dialectical Orientations and Psychology

by

Ⓒ Brian Joseph Boon

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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To my parents, Justyn and Joyce, and my brother, Lauren

Abstract

A dialectical orientation in psychology is theoretically reviewed and compared to other models governing psychological enquiry. The popular "objective" natural scientific approach, with its implicit philosophy, is considered to be too limited to capture the dynamics of human action or interaction. Equally narrow in perspective, subjective models do not adequately acknowledge the impact world events have on the individual. Dialectical psychology, with its implicit philosophy, symbolizes the synthesis of the objective and the subjective perspectives. The bi-polarities omni-present in psychological study become one in the same process: science-art; object-subject; quantitative-qualitative; fact-value; etc. Dialectical psychology's emphasis on unity also legitimizes an eclectic orientation to psychotherapeutic intervention. Acknowledging the changing person in the changing world translates into a different view of the counseling process and research on the effectiveness of the intervention.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of science is to establish knowledge. Scientific research is essential for understanding natural phenomena and one of the more powerful methods for acquiring information is the experiment. Also important to the scientific process is the philosophy of science. The philosophy of science considers the logical and epistemological underpinnings of the scientific method. Topics such as the bases of knowledge, nature of perception, conditions for testing and verification, etc. all revert to philosophy. Philosophy reveals the fundamental limitations of the approaches to truth. Experimental methods rely upon general presuppositions and assumptions about the nature of the world and how information about the phenomenon of study can be extracted.

Social science is primarily concerned with the study of people. In comparison to the hard, rigorous physical and biological sciences, the social sciences are stereotypically described as soft, and highly tentative. Yet some disciplines, for example psychology, still try to apply objective scientific methods to the study of people. The philosophy that has dominated the direction of North American psychology is a neopositivist image of science that relies upon the methods of natural science. North American psychology equates the study of 'things' to the study of people.

In the past 20 years there has developed controversy within the discipline of North American psychology concerning whether the study of people should be guided by a rigorous scientific route modelled after the natural sciences or the route of the humanities. This unfolding dilemma is reflected in numerous competing bi-polarities: science/art, facts/values, objective/subjective, society/individual, etc.

This paper will focus its efforts in directing attention toward a philosophy that acknowledges the existence of numerous bi-polarities and attempts to resolve them in order that the progress in understanding human knowledge, can be sustained. That philosophy is dialectical philosophy and its strength lies in its ability to identify and synthesize seemingly irresolvable dilemmas. Present dialectical orientations within psychology will be reviewed and extended to counseling psychology.

The first chapter will deal with the impact the natural scientific perspective had in moulding the shape of North American psychology. The limitations of natural science, with its narrow understanding of "empirical" research and experimental methodology in the study of human behaviour will be discussed. The relationship between social fact and values will also be discussed as subjectivism is presented as being inherent in scientific activity. This chapter represents the influence a philosophy can have on the activity of psychology.

The second chapter is intended as an introduction to dialectical philosophy and psychology. Through history, dialectic has acquired a variety of meanings or definitional qualities. Four basic meanings of dialectic are: as a world principle; as a method to approach truth; transcending 'known' human experience; and Hegelian idealism. The next section concerns dialectical psychology and evaluates it within an epistemological framework resulting in knowledge acquisition via an active person and active environment. The dialectical orientation also discusses: subject-object structures within psychological theories; the dialectical opposition of idealist and materialist accounts of nature; the benefits of dialectical logic in an ambiguous world, and; the role of dialogues in individual and scientific knowledge.

The final chapter of this paper attempts to merge the dialectical perspective within the framework of counseling psychology. Both objective and subjective approaches to counseling are reviewed and the synthetical answer proposed falls within the all-encompassing dialectical perspective. Dialectical psychology's emphasis on process, change, values, has implications for research (eg. biographical or historical), and practice (eg. "eclectic" counseling").

II. PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

A. Part I

In its attempt to gain credibility psychology has faced two classes of problems. Those that are solvable by empirical methods - 'scientific problems' and those that cannot be solved by scientific methods - 'philosophical problems.' As the "science" of psychology has progressed there has been a demonstrable shift from an exclusive preoccupation with philosophical problems to the point at which psychology disregards them. This avoidance is due in part to the fact that psychology gradually became a separate discipline from philosophy by being able to solve familiar problems scientifically rather than philosophically by rational analysis. This process has been described as the naturalization of philosophy by Royce (1982).

A mark of a mature science is the existence of routine problems, that are identifiable a priori as likely solvable by established methods of inquiry and modes of explication (Fodor, 1968). However, in psychology there still persist questions for which no clear answers exist (Allport, 1943). There are philosophical problems embedded within psychology (for example, the dualism of mind/body; subject/object) which are inescapable.

Gibbs (1979) suggests that North American psychology has paid dearly for its aversive attitude towards philosophy and that in order to learn from the past it is worthwhile to

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reflect on its epistemological bases. A review of the natural scientific tradition in Western psychology will show the way(s) in which philosophy has effected modern psychological inquiry.

B. Part II

The Limitations of Natural Science

Psychology has attempted to apply the methods and principles of the natural sciences to the affairs of man. The natural scientific approach is based on three main assumptions: (a) the object of study must be observable; (b) the object of study must be measurable; and (c) more than one person must be able to observe and agree upon the object's identity and characteristics (Valle & King, 1978). An implicit philosophical position within the natural science perspective is positivism. The presupposition that one only knows facts, and that the validity of knowledge can only be assured by experimental science reflects the philosophy of positivism (Eysenck, Arnold, & Meili, 1979). By following a positivistic approach (eg. Auguste Comte), psychology became scientifically oriented and copied the methods of physics, chemistry, and biology. The positivistic attitude has tended to limit the methods and content of psychological inquiry. Although North American psychology has become more sophisticated in its procedures and methods, the implicit philosophy of contemporary psychology has

changed very little (Manicas & Secord, 1983). Modern Western

psychology unquestioningly complies with scientific realism

as if it were the natural order (Heather, 1976). Modern

Western psychology is conducting science characterized in

the main by monolithic philosophical conformity (Koch,

1961).

In the 1920's a group of logical positivists known as

the Vienna Circle was formed with the expressed purpose of

labelling questions of morality and value as unscientific,

meaningless pseudo-problems and excluding the possibility of

any metaphysical apprehension of the profound nature of

things. Such an attitude was readily accepted by early

behavourists as they too rejected the notion of subjectivism

in scientific inquiry. In its early days, in order to become

a true science, psychology focused upon the description of

elementary facts because such content was compatible with

the characteristics of a positivist orientation to inquiry.

This led to the tenets of reductionism, operationalism, and

physicalism.

Reductionism denotes a philosophical viewpoint that

accounts for the superior by means of the inferior promoting

the conception of a causal link between the various levels

of reality (Eysenck, et al., 1979). One example of

reductionism which takes a materialistic form would be to

reduce the mind to matter. Another example would be to

reduce all sciences to one, physics for example.

Operationalism allows scientific questions to be posed in

such a way that to answer them requires the empirical methods of science (Eacker, 1975). The purpose of operational definitions were to apply scientific concepts to procedures which could eliminate inconsistent and contradictive meanings from scientific language, reflecting the consistent physical world. Lastly, physicalism characterizes a view that all scientific knowleldge can be expressed in the language of a physical science which is universal, homogeneous, and free of metaphysical implications. Therefore, only the observable properties of things are considered and when applied to psychology results in the methods of behaviourism.

Psychic life was viewed in a deterministic perspective. Determinism is a doctrine which (analogously to the physical world) interprets psychic events dependent on preconditions that are material and/or mechanistic (Eysenck, et al., 1979). Materialism resolves all existence into matter thereby making matter the ultimate reality. Mechanism suggests that any concept of the universe is explicable in mechanical processes; it seeks to demonstrate that the universe is nothing more than a vast system of intricately linked motion. People were described in mechanistic terms, as complex machines. This standard materialist portrayal of the person can be attributed to Thomas Hobbes as he applied Galileo's physics to the study of persons, believing as radical behaviourists still do, that the origins of a person's motives can be found in the external world or

environment. Hobbes opens his polemical work, the <u>Leviathan</u>
(1651) by stating, "...life is but a motion of Limbs....For
what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many
Wheeles, giving motion to the whole body..." (p.81). Human
behaviour became explainable in terms of the causes over
which one had no control. A person's relationship to the
environment could be called a relationship of control (eg.
operant control of eliciting stimuli).

Another important tenet of the logical positivist
position is the principle of verifiability. The logical
positivist doctrine holds that the sum total of our
knowledge came from science rather than from philosophical
reflection. Along with an insistence on empirical
observation was a criterion of meaning that was linked to
the routine pragmatism of a laboratory scientist (Russell,
1959). The meaning of a proposition is its method of
verification. This position is exemplified in the work of
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) who was known for research in the
fields of mechanics and optics. His attempts to free physics
from metaphysical concepts helped to establish a scientific
methodology. He shared with other logical positivists
contempt for metaphysics. His research in mechanics best
represents reverance to science. He replaced the
metaphysical concept of force by defining it in terms of
acceleration. Psychology adopted the verifiability principle
by adhering to the doctrine that facts become scientific
only if verified. Psychology became a science of observable,

collectable facts. Description gave way to measurement and calculation replaced debate.

The philosophical doctrine of empiricism asserts that sensory experience instead of reason (rationalism) is the source of knowledge. When this is translated into scientific methodology, the result is an experimental basis of modern science (Eysenck, et al., 1979). In natural scientific psychology, empirical means that the researcher uses data only perceivable by his own senses (Fischer, 1978). In effect, the proper meaning of empiricism is misunderstood in natural scientific psychology. For example, "empirical" psychology and behaviourism have often been used interchangeably (Broadbent, 1973). A chief argument for behaviourism is that if psychology is to be a science, it must deal with what is observable. Behaviour is observable, but the mind or consciousness is not. In natural scientific psychology, the experiences of the subject are never solicited because the researcher can never make reliable and repeatable observations of another person's mind. Thus the study of another person's sense experience would be impossible. This is the case in an experimental design, but experimental methodology cannot be equated to empiricism. In phenomenological research sense data of the subject is also studied and this may take the form of descriptive research. The point is that there is more than one way to derive psychological knowledge not just limited to experimental methods modelled from physics or chemistry. Psychology

acquires facts, as does any science, but the mere collection of "observable facts" does not constitute science.

Natural scientific psychology has managed to adhere to an extreme positivistic attitude by creating the fiction of a value-neutral observable fact. Bixenstine (1976) argues that as researchers we cannot escape the evaluative nature of all our experiences. This is the idea that our perceptual experiences are a unity in which meaning is derived through evaluation, and that facts emerge as a special class of values. Values are real, therefore are a part of the scientific process. Values act as catalytic agents that permit scientific activity but do not participate in the process. In essence, he argues that we cannot set science and ourselves apart. Values, facts, people, and science are of the world rather than in the world (Osborne, personal communication, March 21, 1985).

Hence, psychology has followed the classical (Kessel, 1969) or standard view (Manicas & Secord, 1983) of science. This perspective affirms a positivistic epistemology where scientific propositions are founded on data. Furthermore, theories are understood to be hypothetico-deductive systems. That is, a theory emerges by way of hypotheses deduced from primary postulated principles based on empirical observation. These hypotheses are then accepted or rejected depending upon confirmation via observation (eg. Hull, 1952). This process then results in a hierarchy of logically deduced propositions which parallel all the observed

empinical relationships composing a science, that is a theory (Eacher, 1975). Lastly, research appears to be limited because the psychological researcher seeks only to test hypotheses related to variables that can be clearly tied to observation, avoiding theory as far as possible (Manicas & Secord, 1983).

The accumulation of observable facts and the experimental manipulation of those facts constitute one approach to psychological inquiry, the natural science perspective. In North America, psychology is synonomous with an experimental, natural scientific perspective. There remains the popularized caricature of the radical psychologist applying his methods reductio absurdum. Within an experimental setting, the natural science approach to understanding the complexities of people's activity is at best a narrow one. Experimental psychology strives to eliminate any interfering factors which may confound "ideal" experimental conditions. However, ideal experimental conditions would be those that best represent the real world of the experiencing person. Instead, the real world is eliminated in favour of describing the isolated behaviour of the individual in an idealized form of language inculcated with statistics. Experimental psychology, in keeping with a positivist tradition, incorporates the belief that it is possible to attain truth providing the methodogy is correct. The truth however is beyond human experience and thus it appears a paradox that the goal of experimental psychology

with its methodological rigor tries to realize that which is beyond empiricism. A noted positivist in his time, Schlick suggested, "I am convinced that we are in...[a] final turn in philosophy....Our time, so I claim, possesses already the methods by which conflict [problems] is rendered superfluous, what matters is only to apply these methods resolutely (cited by Koch, 1981, p. 263). This statement reflects the hope, not the assurance, that the methods derived from the natural sciences can solve the problems confronting people. This optimism relies on the faith of methodology and persistence of the positivist to adhere to his approach indefinitely. Experimental psychology adheres to this attitude and contributes to the myth of methodology (Kaplan, 1968), suggesting correct methods can explain all. A positivistic orientation in psychological inquiry has also led to scientism (Giorgi, 1970) (methods adopted from the natural sciences have been assigned the only acceptable approach of inquiry under the empirical paradigm). The application of methodology, in the form of fact collection and manipulataion can be labelled at best naive empiricism. Experimental psychology, based on natural science, is only one form of empiricism which leads to certain Forms of Knowledge.

Facts have meanings, as well as hide meanings. The fallacy of autonomous facts should be challenged as no fact exists independent of some degree of interpretation or evaluation (Bixenstine, 1976). As a nineteeneth century

phenomenon, experimental psychology was destined to fail in putting meaning back into the psychology it so radically eliminated. Meaning was eliminated in the experimental frenzy as researchers stopped wondering about what they were doing and why. Theorizing was also de-emphasized. If enough experiments were done and enough facts were collected, they could arrive at a complete understanding of human behaviour. However, without a solid theoretical framework, facts are unrelatable and untranslatable meanings. The implicit values in scientific theory and the evaluative nature of facts must be acknowledged in order that research findings prove valuable and increase our knowledge of ourselves. Meaning is not something that can be added to a system following analysis, rather it is the most essential topic for any inquiry by human beings of human beings (Riegel, 1978). North American "empirical" psychology has squeezed the study of people into closed laboratory situations where people become different than their naturally occurring form in the dynamic events of the world. As Koch (1959) aptly suggests, psychology's 'institutionalization preceded its problems....man's stipulation that psychology be adequate to science outweighed his commitment that it be adequate to man (cited by Manicas & Secord, 1983, p. 399).

Another drawback of a positivistic tradition is that because experiences are seen as private it would not be possible to share scientific observations resulting in the collapse of science. How can we have reliable knowledge of

another? As Heather (1973) points out our use of language and other symbols demonstrates that we cannot avoid at least attempting it. The transmission of fact by language creates the reality of social fact, the world of open systemic events. In science, the subj   /e experiences of each researcher is unique, yet there exists a common thread binding him to a greater totality. We do not live in a world that is closed, isolated from each other, a philosophical position known as solipsism. A behaviourist would posit that we could never have reliable knowledge of another person's experience. As Sarte (1957) suggests, behaviourism has solipsism as a working hypothesis.

The context of behaviour must be understood if an "observed" fact is to acquire importance in scientific pursuits. Behavioural ecology, an offspring of systems theory, primarily focuses on the contextural variables but not the subjective experiences of people. Gibbs' (1979) transactional model tries to incorporate subjective human experience within the framework of contextual analysis but the methods of research still lean in the direction of natural science (see Osborne, 1985, in press). The fallacy of reductionism is exposed when the context is reduced to its rudimentary constituents. To highlight this through example, the simple act of an insulting hand signal in a heated debate can be reduced to a neurological transmission, but this destroys the meaning essential to understanding the human act, that is the meaning the human act has in a

particular culture. Reductionism becomes a method of deception, an imminent consequence of method fetishism (Koch, 1981).

A reductionistic attempt at explaining an arm signal imposes a narrow explanation of what is a broad social fact. The behaviour in context is significant in relation to others rather than understanding it as an isolated act. To expand this logic, knowledge is in 'fact' social in nature.

Research in the area of perception will prove useful to the present discussion. The natural scientific approach views perception as the relationship between the physical characteristics of light or elementary sensations and the reactive internal physiological processing of that information (McConville, 1978). Propounded is the unidirectional causal relationship between the visual world and the passively perceiving subject. Any meaning derived from the perceptual process according to the traditional approach is a by-product of the process. In contrast to the preconceptual empirical approach to perception, a phenomenological perspective states that meaning is not discovered as a well articulated picture, but is a primitive and spontaneous perceptual event. It transcends the physical attributes of the object being perceived and emerses the subject in his or her lived-experience.

Keeping in mind the phenomenological perspective on unique individual experience does not exclude the possibility of sharing a similar perception. In a perceptual

event, for example the reversible figures drawing, it is possible that two people can see two very different experiences, either the face or vases. If both people see the vase regularly in their own lived-experience, there exists a high intrapersonal redundancy to that phenomenon. Furthermore, if both perceivers see and communicate a common perception, the experience also has high interpersonal consensuality. Pairing high intrapersonal redundancy with high interpersonal consensuality creates the social fact (Bixenstine, 1976) or the social meaning of one's immediate experience. To extend this notion, two people can be party to the same community of knowledge (Hamlyn, 1978) in spite of their unique experience. Social fact in essence is the result of a social contract.

To further elaborate this sociological slant, it is apparent that we evaluate our action not only on the basis of being skillful or not, but in terms of good and bad, right or wrong, etc. This inclination to evaluate our actions with respect to the goals, interests, and values we share with other human beings suggests that even when we perform action alone, it is still social in nature which challenges the mechanical models of causal explanation to the human context. Mechanisms function according to general rules rather than to a particular evaluation of circumstance. The accounts of the social human being in a social world and our practical knowledge of it differs markedly from the objective, reductionistic account of the

natural world involving Humean billiard balls, Copernican planets, Kepler's laws of planetary motion, and Dalton's atomic theory. These are in the terms of which we have attempted to explain human conduct in the past. Collections of atoms or planets do not by definition regulate their interaction with one another in terms of meanings or interpretations they assign to one another's actions.

In contrast to the natural scientific view, the emphasis on humans in the social world takes meaning to be human activity, something people do between themselves or as Wittgenstein (cited by Gillhan & Howarth, 1981), would say 'of the use to which one may put one's behaviour rather than the nature of the behaviour itself.'

Perhaps the philosophical analysis of the social world is warranted as it may lead to change in psychology as a social science, as an extension of the productive relation between knowledge provided by the scientist and the reflective nature of the philosopher upon its meaning. As MacMillan and Garrison (1984) suggest, philosophical criticism without scientific practice is empty, but scientific practice without philosophical criticism is blind.

Subjective Intrusion: the psychologist's denial of himself

As a result of experimental emphasis, one of the major implications of a standard scientific view is the notion that science can be differentiated from non-science since

the confirmation or disconfirmation of scientific knowledge claims to be "independent of the whim, preferences or some subjective factor within the individual investigator" (Kessel, 1969, p. 999). In Wundt's laboratory, by way of experimental procedures based on the natural sciences, the subject of the experiment was assigned the status of an object or 'thing-like' character, alienating the subject from the object. In turn what this led to was denial of the experimenter's participatory role in the experiment. What remains is an experimenter observing the psychological processes objectively without admitting his role in the experiment as active.

Historically, this subject-object alienation was recognized by Goethe who in his opposition to the analytical, abstract bias of the natural sciences emphasized the intricate role of the experimenter and the dependency of the experiment on its creator, the experimenter. This was highlighted in Goethe's theory of colour perception that was based on the appearance of colour to the observer, in opposition to Newton's colour theory of underlying pure colours. Goethe's emphasis on the role of the participant experimenter was ignored by the scientific community. Since the practices of the behavioural sciences followed those of the natural sciences, the role of the experimenter in psychology tended to be ignored. The outcome of this imitation was a paradoxical confusion of terms in psychology (Riegel, 1978). The real and participatory subjects in the

experiments are called observers or experimenters, but they eliminate themselves from the object of study denying their intrusive participation in the conception, delivery, and interpretation of the study. "The object of the experiment on the other hand, came to be known as the subject, but in this disguise it had lost all of its distinctive subjective characteristics, that is the individual and social qualities of the human being" (Riegel, 1978, p. 27). The psychological experiment degraded the person as the subject of study, and simultaneously alienated itself from its own topic - people.

Recently there has been an indication of a breakdown in the objective aspect of science or "the intrusion of subjectivity in the classical view of science," (Kessel, 1969, p. 999). In sociology, the intrusion of subjectivity has been recognized by Karl Mannheim who suggests that the sociologist (or psychologist) is in no way exempt from the approach he applies to his subject (or object in psychologus empiricus): he is always in part, writing about himself. For example, in the area of personality theory, most clinicians relied upon their own personal experiences, they studied themselves (Monte, 1980) and developed and tested their theory. Like all human beings, we are a product of class, creatures of culture, subject to the whims and passion which in itself defines the human character. It does not make sense and causes conflict within a discipline if it fails to recognize this 'fact.' By being reminded of Freud's theory of what it means to be impelled by unconscious impulses, and

Marx's economic and historical polemic asking us to be cognizant of what it means to belong to a particular social class, perhaps E. G. Boring's <u>History</u> <u>of</u> <u>Experimental</u> <u>Psychology</u> (1957), and other monographs pressing us to remember what we know about the activity of man, it is a pretense to imagine a value free, objective experimenter.

Perhaps it is because we are human ourselves that we cannot help being partisan. We must accept the proposition that subjectivity and values (Bixenstine, 1976) are embedded in the research process. There appears no reason why a scientific foundation cannot be laid on ground as soft as this provided we know the properties of the soil, its bearing capacity, that is, how much weight can be placed on the ground before it (foundation) sinks and make reasonable allowances for it. This leads to the recent call for a new evolution in the discipline of psychology to look at ourselves, the experimenter, as the participant in the experiment (eg. Grover, 1981; Mahoney, 1976).

Polanyi's (1964) account of the rise of the Copernican solar system theory suggested that Copernicus and historians overlooked large discrepancies in his mathematical calculation. Despite this discrepancy Copernicus refused to dismiss his system of planetary motion. Polanyi (1964) then developed a term to describe the confidence, the psychological act of an active imagination in anticipation of a discovery as 'tacit knowing.' Feyeraband (1963) concluded after studying the work of Galileo and Copernicus:

"This is how modern physics had started, not as an observational enterprise, but as an unsupported speculation that was inconsistent with highly confirmed laws" (cited in Kessel, 1969, p. 5). It is plausible that scientific discoveries are derived from personal knowledge of unarticulated experiences and not only from observation-based hypotheses. For example, the history of physics has been witness to the fact that the testability of empirical evidence is desirable though not necessary or sufficient. Presently 'scientific' physics favours a theory based on nonempirical factors (Einstein) over a theory which has accumulated a great deal of empirical evidence (Newtonian physics). Brownoski (1960) cogently points out:

> In the physical and in the logical worlds, what we have really seen happen is the breakdown of the plain model of a world outside ourselves where we simply look and observe.... For relativity derives essentially from the philosophic analysis which insists that there is not a fact and an observer but a joining of the two in observation. This is the fundamental unit in physics: The actual observation. And this is what the principle of uncertainly showed in atomic physics. That the event and observer are not separable (pp. 83-84).

Even the myth of objectivity in the physical sciences appears to be waning.

The Psychological Experiment as a Valid or Invalid Organon

Psychology's uniform experimental ascent to an approach to truth can be described as an atheoretical cul de sac (Royce, 1983). North American "empirical" psychology, for whatever reasons, remains entrenched in an opinion that the natural scientific modelled laboratory experiment is the best if not the only way of ascertaining truth. This amounts to a form of naive realism which presupposes the existence of a physical world independent of observation; scientific effort becomes a passive reflection of outer conditions. The view that truth is a fixed entity that can be captured within a specific monocular perspective via the methods of a central tendency creature (Koch, 1981), fails to recognize the creative, imaginative potential of science.

The laboratory experiment is executed under conditions of an authoritarian relation (Argyris, 1968) where the controlling party (the experimenter) exists independent of the object of control (the subject) under conditions of social isolation. Levine (1974) argues that one problem in research is that studies generally cannot be executed on the basis of random sampling of the total population. Subject pools are from restricted social settings; typically undergraduate psychology students. If possible (in most research it is not), the subject pool is then randomly assigned to one of the treatment conditions. Though cognizant of the fact that the subjects are members of a larger social milieu, there is no asurance that some

independent variable affects all subjects uniformly, or that some extraneous source' unknown and perhaps never knowable to the experiment is interacting with the experimental variable to produce a particular set of findings. The fact that there exists the social nature of human beings does not permit one to take the liberty of assuming the interchangeability of humans as subjects of experiments. The logic of experimental and statistical inference requires the independence and neutrality of each subject which randomization to experimental conditions cannot circumvent. The neutral subject is registered as a "faceless, undifferentiated, psychically distant" being (Koch, 1981, p. 260).

Problems of replication in experimental psychology also place into question the appropriateness of this method in studying human beings. In its infancy, psychology could test simple sensory events and motor movements. The German experimentalists were at the forefront of this research. Hering studied light and chromatic perception, Von Helmholz the rate of nerve conduction, Weber quantified sensory experiences, and Fechner extrapolated Weber's work in developing the measuring methods of psychophysics. But as soon as psychology ventured into other valid and realistic areas of psychological activity such as emotion and motivation, Wundt's criteria of repeatibility of test results fell by the wayside. Riegel (1978) suggests that Kurt Lewin's social psychology was a major break from this emphasis upon replication. In turn, though, Lewin

systematically eliminated other conditions such as the individual's developomental stage and historical concepts in his social psychology.

As one of many areas in psychology, social psychology studies people in a historical vacuum; science without a social human being in contemporaneous conditions (Riegel, 1978). The study of humankind in a social world or any dynamic system must not fall prey to the assumption of a constant world about which we acquire knowledge in an abstract, mystical, quasi-religious sense. In social psychological research the observer is not severed from the phenomena, but very much a part of the phenomena. The researcher is being influenced by the phenomena of study and in turn influences the phenomena simultaneously. As mentioned earlier, ecological psychology (Gibbs, 1979) has attempted to address this interaction, but does so in a natural scientific way.

In the world of psychologus experimentum, the psychologist/statistician has recently started to look at the interaction of variables but regard these interdependencies as an added complication, as an annoyance rather than a step toward a science of persons. There still resides an emphasis on main effect over interdependency. As a psychological researcher you must be cognizant that you change the person being measured and in turn change yourself in the very act of measurement (Levine, 1974). What all this leads to is an appeal for a revamped attitude in psychology

which requires the methodologist to look at concerns which
are applicable to experimentation and those which are not.
It is then possible to rid ourselves of the persistent dogma
that insists all problems are better handled within the
logic of experimental design and statistical illation.
Perhaps freedom from this constrictive position or attitude
will lead to a discipline that will deal with substantive
problems of human interest, incorporating the meaningful
'value' that psychology has denied as existing. A shift in
emphasis from a methodology defining questions to questions
of human significance defining the methodology.

Psychology as a Melting Pot or Mosaic

In recent years the Zeitgeist of psychology has become
less constraining particularly with the rise of the 'softer'
third force in psychology. This development has accentuated
the dilemma of an appropriate mode of inquiry to study human
beings. But this reflects the inherent quality of psychology
as a discipline whose roots stem both from the sciences and
humanities contemporaneously. Psychology is at the
crossroads of two cultures (Royce, 1970).

Psychology by nature is highly diversified,
incorporating a multitude of specialized areas with
non-interactaing subdisciplines (Taylor, 1973; Toulmin,
1978), leading to intellectual fragmentation. Bevan (1982)
suggests that psychology's drift toward self-induced
demarcation will inevitably stunt the growth of human

understanding. Concomitantly we have witnessed the growth of a class of scientists known as cult experts, defining reality within a highly specialized language community (Koch,'1975), where strength lies long on technique but falls unquestionably short on questions. The Age of Fact has created a science of psychology where knowledge is attainted as a result of automatic or data driven processing the consequence of ameaningful thought (Koch, 1981). A cognitive pathology or desacralization keeps psychology from confronting its subject matter. In Maslow's terminology desacralization leads individuals to fear themselves. To draw an analogy, perhaps as a science psychology fears the same fate, the danger of self-knowledge as a legitimate discipline in its present form. Furthermore, psychology is often felt to provide confused fragments of realities among which humans live. Toulmin (1978) suggests this fragmentation is a result of a still dominating neopositivist image of science. Koch (1961) ardently points out that psychology in the twentieth century has done even more to sharpen, perpetrate, and obfuscate the division between the humanities and the sciences. Psychology has amounted to a highly ambiguous element in modern civilization.

Reappraisal of psychology reflects the need for a common denominator. The major issue confronting psychology revolves around its methods, its tasks, its limits, ostensibly its future. The psychologist as a scientist must

be emancipated from an encapsulation within a neopositivist position. Psychology can remain legitimate in the scientific community with an emphais on creative processing over linear input/output manufacturing. To reduce the work of a poet, a musician, or artist to the formalism of a high powered analytic model destroys the beauty and creativity of the work. Psychology must reorient or recenter itself with respect to the humanities. However, to submerge its focus in this area would be equally wrong. Psychology can profit from a broad, diffuse focus as well as the sharp focus of natural science (Osborne, 1985, in press).

It is apparent that psychology is conceptually pluralistic. Royce (1982) suggests that a philosophy of psychology cannot be characaterized unless it is mindful of psychology's multiplicity, and that future advances in psychology hinge on the resolution of conceptual problems. To what extent can psychology challenge at this point in time Wittgenstein's famous charge that psychology has experimental methods and conceptual confusion. Perhaps it is not the resolution of conceptual problems that will loosen the tenacious hold of natural science, but a conceptual revolution.

To paraphrase Royce (1982) the past of psychology has caught up with the future, and data collection, research design, and statistical analysis alone are not sufficient to deal with the future. The future will demand some conceptual clarification or reformulation requiring philosophical input

on studying that class of questions that are meaningful to
all humankind and not yet adequately dealt with by present
forms of inquiry. Royce (1982) further states that a
philosophy for psychology should take the form of a
dialectic, the result of a dialogue between the humanities
and the sciences. A constructive dialectic, which Royce
refers to in his position paper as an investigator's
theoretical conceptualization, will maintain the tensions
between viable conceptual alternatives. This dialectic will
also take the form of an integrative dialectic involving the
sorting out of complimentary epistemologies of empiricism,
rationalism, and metaphorism - a merging of the arts and
science.

Manicas and Secord (1983) have proposed a new heuristic
for the social sciences. psychology in particular, with
their emphasis on the integration of the main themes of the
'subjectivist' and 'objectivist' approaches in the social
sciences. They have correctly identified one group of
scientists (example: action theory, phenomenology) adhering
to the importance of the intentionality and meaning of
behaviour in a social world while simultaneously denying the
objective character of society. The opposite tendency
exhibited by the objective group places emphasis on the
reality of society, its context, over the efficacy of the
human in the social world. What is proposed is a mediating
discipline in which the social structure and the individual
actions become simultaneous events. The social environment

becomes the continuing product and also the medium of human activity. We must acknowledge the premise of open systems thus incorporating additional conditions and contexts of analysis such as historical and biographical knowledge. Manicas and Secord take a realist position which favours a world view of the contingent integration of real structures opposing the view of a repetitive integration of contingent events. The past is determined, therefore subject to causal explanation, but the future cannot be determined because systems of the world and related intricate structures are constantly changing. The importance of their position is not the realist stance, but rather the notion of flux and change. Hence a shift from a static to a dynamic science with an emphasis on emergent activity over linear "planned" activity. This will result in a discipline that goes beyond cumulative efforts to interactive efforts.

The general consensus is that the future of psychology lies in its ability to deal with the multiplicity of existence, to be a dynamic subjective/objective science simultaneously. A new philosophy should allow many views to flourish without contradiction. A future psychology should allow (note this emphasis on 'ought' is a value contamination) psychologists to fuse their scientific attitude with humanistic sensitivities (Koch, 1960). Loftus - Senders (1978) suggests psychology's future lies in synthesis.

It is proposed that a philosophy and psychology presently exist in a neophyte state which can address concerns and appeals for change, while simultaneously encountering philosophical predicaments not subject to naturalization. As a discipline it would emphasize the flux of existence; the changing individual in a changing world. The psychology is dialectical psychology and it provides a different theoretical orientation to a conceptually and theoretically chaotic discipline. It answers Bruner's (1971) charge of parochialism in psychology. As a model of human activity dialectical psychology acknowledges that humans are effected by economic, political, and social forces though remain developing individuals in a developing world. A notion of separate-but-relatedness. Furthermore, the assumption of a constant world from which we extract or mine knowledge by way of a mystical process must be abandoned, and in its place reinstate the basic research instrument of human intelligence, not something external to human consciousness. Dialectical psychology concedes that some questions of great importance to humans "transcend the competence of human reason" (Kant cited by Koch, 1981, p. 262). As a philosophy, dialectical psychology provides a perspective that may allow us to accept the reality of uncertainty in science and more importantly in life.

The next chapter will deal with dialectic as a philosophy, then as a psychology. Dialectical philosophy will be reviewed in its multitude of definitions and

qualities - its use as a world principle, as a method of approaching truth, and as a form of transcending human experience. Hegelian dialectics will also be reviewed.

As a discipline, dialectical psychology will be discussed in relation to other psychological models within a design proposed by Riegel (1978). Dialectical psychology will be represented as an approach emphasizing the interaction between an active person and an active environment in acquiring and creating knowledge. The subject-object bifurcation that persists in psychology will also be discussed within a dialectical perspective. Also acknowledged is the struggle between Hegelian idealism and Marxian materialism that posits different approaches for dialectical psychology. Finally, dialectical logic and dialogue are discussed to highlight the resolution of conflict, movement in terms of decision making, and the inevitability that answers will be followed by questions and questions of questions - a never ending process.

III. DIALECTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

A. Part I

In the preceding section the role of neopositivism as the dominant force in psychology was reviewed. It was noted that this orientation has created a certain amount of discontent within the ranks of North American psychology and has led to a feeling of uncertainty about psychology's future. It was further suggested that North American psychology should emancipate itself from scientism. The study of people as a focus was lost, as North American psychology directed its energy to validating itself as a science. An alternative is dialectical psychology with its emphasis on the changing human being in a dynamic social world. Dialectical psychology represents a synthesis of the 'subjective' and 'objective' views in psychology.

In order to comprehend and appreciate dialectical psychology it is necessary to review the philosophical theorists whose work contributed to the development of dialectical psychology. To be mindful of philosophical controversies is important since they are still embedded in modern scientific and psychological enquiry.

B. Part II

Dialectic's Definitional Qualities

It is difficult to capture the notion of dialectic into one single, timeless definition which is representative of all its meanings. This evasive quality of dialectic mirrors the salient characteristics of the conception of dialectic (Rychlak, 1976). Because dialectical formulations are active and ceaseless, to encapsulate dialectic into a unitary or fixed definition would be to destroy its essence. Hence, over the course of time dialectic has acquired a multitude of meanings.

A brief review of ancient Greek philosophy reveals the dominant influence of a number of bi-polarities which in various forms continue to be topics about which philosophers or psychologists continue to write or argue. At the base of all of them lies the distinction between truth and falsehood, followed by bi-polarities of good and evil, harmony and strife, appearance and reality, mind and matter, freedom and determinism, chaos and order, etc. Many of these bi-polarities effect the 'modern science' of psychology. The methods used by philosophers to tackle these problems is most enlightening. Typically, one school of thought developed espousing one side of bi-polarity, while another adopted and honourably defended an opposite view. In the 'end,' a third school would arise out of some kind of compromise, superceding both its precursors. Hegel developed

his notion of the dialectic by observing the recorded battle of rival doctrines amongst pre-socratic philosophers.

As previously mentioned, one cannot boil down the meaning of dialectic into a unitary definition. The next few pages will concentrate on the many definitions of dialectic. Dialectic will be defined as: a way of construing the world or as a world principle; as a method to seek knowledge and approach truth; and as a means of transcending known human experience. A brief final discussion will focus on Hegelian dialectics, introducing idealism.

Dialectic: World Principle

Early Greek philosophy (Milesians) characterized the universe as a composition of various elements or forms of matter (eg. water). Anaximander (610 B.C.) proposed that the elements were in continual strife with one another (eg. hot against cold) causing an imbalance and change. Since the elements formed all things, change was inherent. Hence the notion of opposition leading to change and balance versus imbalance invades philosophical thought.

Another dominant philosopher in his time was Pythagoras whose philosophy is said to have flourished in 523 B.C. The Pythagorean position adopted the stance that resulted in a shift from the Milesian thinkers who saw philosophers as men of action to a philosophy resulting in the detached contemplation of the world. To Pythagoras, the philosopher's role was equated to the role of the spectator. The

philosophic way of life was the only hope left of transcending the errors or accidents of existence. The Pythagorean school gave rise to a more scientific and mathematical tradition in philosophy. Pythagoras discovered the single numerical relations of what is known as musical intervals and corresponding ratios in harmonic progression (Russell, 1959). Intervals of a tuned string were related to ways of life. This notion of harmony, in the sense of balance, the adjustment and combination of opposites like high and low, via proper tuning is well established in Pythagorian theory. The notion of harmony is important to this discussion.

By synthesizing Anaximander's competing opposites and Pythagorian harmony, Heraclitus (565 B.C.) developed a new theory of the real world that consists in a balanced adjustment of opposing tendencies. Behind the strife, between the opposites, there lies a hidden harmony or attunement which is the world. Fire was regarded as the universal substance, and metaphorically, the qualities of fire, motility, and vitality best represent the moving forces of nature. Two important propositions cogent to our discussion can be attributed to his philosophy. They are: 1) Strife is the father of all things; 2) You cannot step twice into the same river for fresh waters are everflowing (Russell, 1959).

Implied in the first statement is that change and development represent a process of continuous

differentiation through the effectiveness of opposing forces. The real world consisted in a balanced adjusting of opposing forces (eg. birth/death). In the second proposition, Heraclitus provided the first theory of development and history. By emphasizing that no system can ever attain the same original state again, he characterized nature as being in continuous change and flux. Therefore, the unity of our existence consists of perpetual change or, as Plato stated, 'Our being is a perpetual becoming.' As a brief summary of a Heraclitean stance, the notion of 'all things in flux' and the 'theory of opposites' reminds us that what appears to be conflicting features are really essential parts of a situation.

It is also important to note that the Heraclitean school had a dialectical antagonist by way of Parmenides of the Eleatic school. The Eleatic philosophy propounds that truth can only be attained by thinking or speaking of something *out there.' Since you can always think or speak on many different occasions, objects of thought or discourse must always exist. If they cannot fail to exist at any time, change must be impossible. This notion leads us to a view of the world that is rigid, uniform, and motionless. A depiction of the world quite opposite to Hereaclitus. As a teaser, it will suffice to say that dialectical psychology represents a shift from a rigid, static view of science to a perspective emphasizing movement (flux) in which facts, interpretations, logic, and methods all change. The past

discussion of dialectic as a world consisting of opposites is referred by Rychlak (1976) as a 'world principle.' This view led to another definition of dialectic as the means by which knowledge can be attained. Hence, dialectic as an organon or instrument to attain truth.

A Dialectic Approach to Truth

In one form dialectic can be used as an instrument for approaching truth. To approach truth involves the process of knowledge acquisition. Rychlak (1976) points out that when we deal with knowledge we invariably concern ourselves to a question of meaning. A dialectical perspective espouses a view that most meanings are bipolar. Even the case of seemingly unipolar events are bipolar. For example, when we point to an object we say 'that is that.' The way up and down are the same. If you remove one, you remove the other. Heraclitus was aware of this in his dialectical rationale when he suggested we could not be aware of acts of justice without the existence of negative behaviour in human affairs.

Dialectical formulations lend themselves to theories of morality and ethics as well. For example, theologians have capitalized on dialectical formulations propounding a position in which the person has the capacity by dialectical opposition to opt for good over evil, thus leaving behaviour causation up to the individual.

One prominent view of the dialectic is exemplified by Socrates (469 B.C.) in Plato's Dialogues wherein he sought knowledge by means of discussion in the form of questions and answers. Socrates would pose a question for his students to take a stand on and then defend the opposite position. Socrates would choose A if the students chose not-A. In a dialogue, the offspring of dialectical thought, truth emerges out of a continual cooperation of the participants involved in a process of mutual interrogation and reply. Truth in human affairs is not something that already exists (whether it be in Socrates' mind or in someone else's) or is ready made, awaiting discovery under a stone on a road. Hence, a dialectic does not encompass a predetermined end by following a scenario a la sophists. The dialectical process of discovery is never ending; neither of the participants know where the dialogue will end. Truth or knowledge is man-made or a socially negotiated (Bergsen & Luckman, 1967) affair not independent of the ways of seeing the world already in existence. It is important to note that questions raised by dialectical enounters often exceed those which are answered. Hence, questions of questions appear to be the offspring for further debate and knowledge. Final answers are not just around the corner.

Modern empirical psychologists have inherited most of their view from Aristotle (384 B.C.) who pointed out that knowledge cannot come from intellect alone but also from the senses. For Aristotle, knowledge was part of the natural

world, not the transcendental world as suggested by his predecessor Plato. Aristotle argued demonstrative reasoning is most important, not dialectical reasoning. He suggested that when two men talked they were fooling themselves into believing that they were coming to know the truth. In contrast to Aristotle who came to 'know' by passively looking at nature, Socrates' endeavours were more active. Socrates talked to men because he thought it was impossible to attain knowleldge without first talking to man. An Aristotelian bias incorporates the notion that the secrets of man could be found in nature, again foreshadowing modern empirical psychology.

An Aristotelian position is an intellectual monologue in which one observes, classifies, and invents theories to explain the reality of human nature. In the many areas which Aristotle studied he always turned to observable facts of actual and concrete evidence. Even in Politics, his very first words are "Observation shows us...that every polis..." (Barker, 1978, p. 1, 125a). Aristotle conducted his study of 'things human' in the field of politics and ethics (logic, poetry, and oratory) side by side with a study of 'things natural,' such as physics, medicine, and biology (Barker, 1978). Hence, the methods and findings of his study of 'things natural' were linked to the methods of 'things human.' Knowledge was 'out there' in empirical reality and then brought 'in here,' that is the mind.

Rychlak (1976) points out there exists a state of unipolarity in which one could not take an either/or approach, based on Aristotle's syllogisms and in particular the law of contradiction. As well, Russell (1959) also points out that a difficulty with Aristotle's logic is that it was seriously incomplete because it could not concern itself with relational arguments such as if A was greater than B, and B greater than C, then A is greater than C. The relational argument is analogous to the human being's natural existence. Empirical observation alone will not reveal the human character. This view is rather inefficient since it is only through exchanges with others that human nature is exposed. It is through social relations or interactions that we find out whether people are shy or outgoing, honest or dishonest. These unique qualities are not things that humans are 'in themselves' but rather things that are expressed only in relation to other humans (Howarth & Gillhan, 1981).

Historically, Aristotelian logic funnelled its way to the British empiricism of the seventeenth century casting aside dialectical reasoning in favour of a Lockean model of human beings. Human reasoning parallelled probability estimates, and Lockean academic psychology left no hope for a dialectical account of human reasoning. The Zeitgeist of a rigorous experimental methodology and accompanying epistemology severed the dialectic as a model for human behaviour and theory for psychology.

.The dialectic in the Socratic view emphasized dialogue. The aim was not a finite explanation but the process of dialogue initiated by opinion, involving the persistent clarification and exposure of ignorance. It involved the realistic appraisal of one's immediate circumstances in order not to live as one can but as one may. The role of modern psychology which historically incorporates Aristotelian logic in some form of apostolic susccession while ignoring a dialectic position can be likened to the tensions between the Sophists and Socrates over 2000 years ago. The sophists had a negative attitude toward knowledge, because it could not be had, or at least not by the means of dialectical method. Knowleldge was declared as unimportant (Russell, 1959). Each person's opinion is true for themselves, and debates amongst people cannot decide truth. No wonder the sophists define justice as the advantage of the stronger, not necessarily the most truthful. The positivistic tradition appears most certain to be in the strongest position. The dialectical position is not, though it recognizes that knowledge is derived from the dynamic social nature of human existence. What the sophists were interested in was sound practice (perhaps a soft sign of premorbid method fetishism). Socrates held that this was not enough...the unexamined life was not worth living. Perhaps an unexamined psychology is not worth doing!

Any philosophical speculation of a non-conforming variety will have an unsettling influence on the status quo.

Anomalies, in a Kuhnian sense, are considered subvervise in the realm of acceptable or normal science. One does not need to look back too far in reviewing psychology to see the opposition confronting third force psychology. Questions sometimes cause sudorific reactions, but this is part of the dialectic.

Transcendent Quality of Dialectic

The philosophical position pertinent to our discussion of dialectical psychology is Immanuel Kant. Kant combined the empiricist principle that all knowledge has its source in experience (Lockean view) with the rationalist belief in knowledge obtained by deduction, suggesting that although knowledge must be discovered through experience itself, the mind imposes form and order. Kant rebelled against the passive view of humans characterized by the empiricists as an impression of the external world. He turned the dominant empirical notion that perception gives us concepts upside down, espousing the view that percepts are given to us according to our concepts or inborn ways of perceiving the world which he labelled filters or categories. Kant granted the empiricist claim 'things in themselves' which mean things as they exist outside of human experience are unknowable. Therefore, knowledge was limited to the 'phenomenal world' of existence. Metaphysical beliefs about the soul, cosmos, and God (the world of noumena) transcend human experience and are matters of faith rather than

scientific knowledge.

What is important about Kant's philosophy is that what we observe is dependent upon how we collect, interpret, and classify our sense impressions. Hence, we cannot see the external world independent of our human ways of knowing (Howarth & Gillhan, 1981). Furthermore, Rychlak (1976) suggests the capacity for mental organization is more important in reasoning because when we cogitate in pure reason it is possible to have ideas which transcend sensory experience. In the free play of thought, a dialectical notion, it is possible to have ideas which are totally unrelated to external reality and yet can acquire the attention of millions of people. By the reasoning of opposites and the opposites of opposites (or negation of negation) one can remove oneself from the realm of familiar events and 'known facts.' The mind can create something completely outside of experience, outside of the unidirectional demonstrative ways of knowing. Man can transcend what is human, for what is not uniquely human today may be uniquely human tomorrow.

Hegelian Dialectics

Dialectical psychology (Riegel; 1976, 1979) is rooted primarily in the Hegelian philosophy of dialectical idealism. Hegel was influenced by Kant's idealism and this was used for a new conception of logic in which conflict and contradiction were regarded as the necessary elements of

truth. Furthermore, truth is regarded as an active rather than a fixed state. The source of all reality for Hegel is an absolute spirit or cosmic reason which develops from an abstract undifferentiated being into a more concrete reality by triadic stages. Before further explicating triadic states it is necessary to discuss a basic premise of Hegel's system.

The main premise is 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational' (Lancaster, 1959). By this Hegel means that everything that exists is an embodiment of reason; an idea or thought does not achieve actuality until it is embodied in something objective and that the rational principle gives meaning to, for example, political institutions as it also gives harmony to what humans call the universe. Furthermore, by asserting that the actual is rational involves a logic. For example, in political terms the State is thoroughly logical, which means it is held together as an organic whole, no part of which exists apart from anything else. Thus the relations between these parts is what constitutes reality, therefore one cannot think of any part of the whole without in the end thinking of it. Nothing is really real except the whole.

Also important in Hegelian philosophy is the distinction between Verstand (understanding) and Vernunft (reason) (Lancaster, 1959). Understanding or analysis can only give us a description of isolated facts which are in a sense unreal becaue they are separate from the whole. By use

of reason, one can account for reality because it involves a synthesis, an operation by which relations among isolated entities become unified. This leads us to the triadiac stages.

The dialectic involves triadic states of a thesis, antithesis (opposite state) and a higher state, a synthesis. The contention is that the synthesis becomes a new thesis and the dialectic process begins again, and so on until we take in the whole universe. The dialectic is self-propelling (Lancaster, 1959). A brief example will further highlight the dialectic. The thesis proposed is that a Ph.D. in psychology is valuable. The antithesis is that a Ph.D. in psychology is not valuable. Now the synthesis depends on the circumstances. If you are applying for a job in the academic world your degree is a required qualification. However, if you are in the desert and in need of water the Ph.D. has no value. This amounts to saying that the full significance of anything only emerges when it is viewed in all its possible connections, that is in its setting in the world as a whole (Russell, 1959).

Hegel also emphasizes that reason rules the world - the universe of the mind and the universe of nature - a knowledge of the laws of thought is at the same time a knowledge of the nature of reality (Lancaster, 1959). The dialectic joins these two sets of laws, that is the movement of reason in human affairs (historically) and as a technical method by which truth is arrived. Hence, Hegel's objective

idealism incorporates a law of logic which denies a distinction not only between thought and things but between thought and different persons. The dialectical method is applied not only as an instrument of the theory of knowledge but directly as a description of change in the world. In technical terms, Hegelian processing not only has epistemological status, but ontological status.

As a final philosophical antecendent to dialectical psychology it is necessary to acknowledge Marxian philosopohy as this will prove useful in later discussion. Marx's dialectical materialism was a revision of Hegel's system in which the ultimate reality was recasted into matter rather than the mind. Hegel's clash of the spirit of people was replaced by the opposition of economic forces and resulting class struggles.

Having laid down the philosophical attitude prevalent in dialectical psychology it is time to dive 'head first' into dialectial psychology. The metatheoretical assumptions discussed are those upon which dialectical psychology is founded.

C. Part III

Dialectical Psychology: psychology elan vital

In the first part of this paper numerous objections were directed at modern psychology. At the conclusion of this section an alternate paradigm was proposed to

rehumanize the study of human behaviour. That alternative is dialectical psychology. With the various meanings of dialectic discussed in a philosophical review, the remaining section will be devoted to an introduction of dialectical psychology. In order to understand dialectical psychology, it is by dialectical tradition to acquire an understanding of it in relation to the whole, that is, other models dominant in psychology.

Epistemological Models and Dialectical Psychology

One of the first questions to be answered is where dialectical psychology fits in the grand design of epistemological models of psychology? By using J. S. Bruner's description of enactive, iconic, and symbolic modes of cognitive representation, Riegel (1978) applies Bruner's distinctions in a different sense as he uses it to characterize the state of knowledge and science. In western cogitation, the criteria for knowledge and science has been primarily a sensory-perceptual exercise or iconic in nature as a scientific statement is evaluated to be true on the basis of perception. Psychology places an emphasis on this criterion by engaging in empirical research endeavours. The iconic criteria blends into symbolic levels as the scientist seeks an isomorphism between the structure of the observed event and a verbal or mathematical description of that event. In psychology this takes the form of statistics. What has been de-emphasized in western thought and psychology is

the enactive operation, therefore ignoring the practical and social effect activity contributes to science and humankind. By de-emphasizing the symbolic criterion, Riegel compares the iconic and enactive modes in relation to the person and the environment. The person and the environment can be interpreted as either passive/receptive or active/constructive. The first interpretation relates to the iconic mode while the latter refers to the enactive mode. By the juxtaposition of the person and the environment being either passive or active, four orientations to knowledge acquisition in relation to psychological models can be developed.

(i) Passive person and passive environment

This model operates on what can be described as a mechanistic orientation to knowledge acquisition. Hobbes saw man as a brutish, selfish hulk, each individual engaged in a struggle against others. Social order must be essentially imposed so that a future or society be guaranteed. This mechanistic position asserts that 'thinking is mere reckoning' or adding and subtracting. This is an indication of the influence mathematics had on eighteenth century thought.

John Locke compared the mind to a tabula rasa upon which external contingencies were to leave their impression. Neither the person nor the environment participated actively in the selection or organization of knowledge. Riegel (1978) comments that when Darwin's notion of 'survival of the

fittest' is coupled with Hobbes' 'untamed beast' the result
is an Anglo-American paradign that puts the model in a
cultural perspective. This is due to the fact that societies
such as Great Britain and the United States eminently value
competition and achievement.

Interestingly, in the Lockean model of knowledge
acquisition, the main, if not sole, criterion for
intellectual excellence was the amount of information
accumulated in the black box. Riegel (1978) draws the
analogy that this is like the amount of 'hard' cash
deposited in a safety deposit box which brings about social
respectability. Perhaps psychology as a science has suffered
the same fate as it has become a discipline accumulating
hard facts. In considering the development of these two
competition-based countries (U.K. and U.S.A.), the young
middle-class male who engaged in trade or manufacturing
swiftly became the sole criterion for comparison. From here,
other individuals (the old and young) or groups (black,
hispanics, females) were not evaluated idiographically, that
is, on their own terms, but rather against a unitary
criterion. Those different were labelled negatively in terms
relating to a deficiency in some form. In psychology, this
is exemplified in statistical psychology where exceptions to
the rule are dealt with as error variance rather than
legitimately as real instances (Lourenco, 1976). Galton's
eugenics when coupled with the pragmatic goals of stock
farming suggests that the weak be crowded out by the strong .

(Riegel, 1978). Hence the development of the white man's burden, the realization of the 'menace of the feeble minded' which itself resulted in placing selective quotas on certain eastern-European immigrants to America.

(ii) Active person and passive environment

This position can be couched philosophically in Leibniz's monadism. The world is reviewed as an infinite number of small units of force, called monads, each of which is a closed world but 'mirrors' all other monads in its own system of perception. All monads are spiritual entities. God is considered the Monad of monads, who created all other monads and predestines their development in accordance to pre-established harmony which results in the appearance of interaction between the monads. Leibniz's view thath all things are organic and spiritual initiated a philosopohical tradition of idealism (Eacher, 1975).

This tradition of knowledge being innate is exhibited in Chomsky's language acquisition theories and Piaget's cognitive developmental psychology. When accounting for language acquisition, Chomsky relies on innate capacities or blueprints, reinstating the Cartesian split of inner and outer conditions that haunts psychology. Chomsky views language acquisition as first the learning of elements, phonemes, or words and secondly the learning of sequential dependencies that explain the production of more complex utterances. What becomes neglected is that the child is the recipient of elements in context not in isolation. Piagetian

psychology emphasizes the process of accommodation and assimilation in terms of outer conditions leading to higher and higher levels of cognitive perceptual organization. But the processes accommodation and assimilation are within the person. Furthermore, Piagetian tasks involve the child's interaction with objects, being noncognizant of the possibility that some objects may be other subjects. Thus, in this orientation little emphasis has been placed on the outer conditions of interacting individuals.

In a philosophical/historical perspective, this second perspective has been labelled as the continental-European paradigm. In particular, J. J. Rousseau's romantic naturalism or social philosophy characterizes 'man as being born free, but everywhere he is in chains' (Rousseau, 1977). Natural man or 'prehuman' man is inherently good but society or civilization has corrupted and perverted him. As a restrictive cloak, society was covering the natural beauty and knowledge of children. This led to a view of education in which children should be treated as children and kept innocent as long as possible; that is, isolated from the dangerous world. The continental-European paradigm emphasizes the individual's lonely conquest of the outer world or in a Rousseauian sense a need to overcome the bonds of a coercive reality. This parochial view separates itself from the social structures of the world in favour of a mentalistic explanation of knowledge acquisition.

(iii) Passive person and the active environment

This orientation finds illlustration in Skinner's and Vygotsky's model of humans in relation to the acquisition of knowledge. It is also exemplified in G. H. Mead's symbolic interactionalism and behavioural, ecologically-oriented perspectives in psychology.

From a Skinnerian perspective, modification was possible, though at the mercy of outer forces. For example, Skinner's educational model involved the use of a teaching machine in which the person was subjected to the decisions of its operant conditioner. In Vygotsky's earlier Soviet psychology work, cognitive development was explained as a consequence of internalizing overt social organizations such as the activities of play and conversation. An activity consists of a gradual transference of links in the activity's function system from the interpsychological to the intrapsychological (i.e., from the social to the individual) plane. This can be contrasted to western psychology which emphasizes the externalization of internal structures (e.g., Piaget, Chomsky). Where Piaget is concerned with how the child abstracts the logical features of his actions carried out in a physical world, Vygotsky concentrated primarily on how the child internalizes certain features of activities that are social and cultural in nature. Thus, Vygotsky and other Soviet psychologists can be applauded with focusing attention to the constructive effects of social/cultural factors. Psychological processes emerge through social and historical evolutions. Behavioural

ecological perspectives likewise emphasize the contextual situation in knowledge acquisition.

The emphasis on outer or environmental conditions is dominant in various sociological 'self' theories. Cooley (1902) described the development and knowledge about self via his concept the 'looking-glass self.' This consisted of three elements: the image of our appearance to the other person, the image of his judgement of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling. In a related fashion Mead (1934) described the development of the self as conceiving oneself the way you believe significant others conceive you. Hence the internalization of the external world of other. Mead distinguishes two aspects of self, the 'I' and the 'me.' 'Me' sees self as an object and thus it represents the attitudes and opinions of others toward self. The 'I' remains an ambiguous part of Mead's work (Riegel, 1978, 1979).

The emphasis on the external world is a valid one since humans live in a world of other people and other things. Though we may think of ourselves as autonomous individuals, separate and distinct, we cannot overlook the rest of the puzzle. This external orientation in some theories in psychology and sociology in part reflects the type of society in which we live, a post-industrial era. Ferdinand Tonnies (1957) describes two types of contrasting societies useful to discussion. His terms are Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft is the primary, closely knit

society in which relations are informal and personal. There
is a commitment or identification with other community
members. Gemeinschaft can be described as intimate relations
based on sentiment (Holland, 1967). At the opposite end of
the continuum is a Gesellschaft society based on contractual
arrangements, bargaining, and a highly defined division of
labour. Relations are utilitarian and impersonal. A
Gesellschaft society is composed of rational relationships
based on the calculation of individual self-interest
(Holland, 1967).

The Gesellschaft society is manifested in the creation
of the Silicon Valley Technocrat, or the Young Urban
Professional (Yuppie), a result of the wedlock between the
protestant work ethic and large modern corporations and
organizations. In order to succeed in a competitive market
one must go out and compete, follow the rules which often
means doing what somebody else tells you. In the pursuit of
individual achievement, personal creativity falls behind.
This can easily be confirmed by seeing how the university
curriculum has become vocational and job oriented,
concomitant with a drop in interest in the liberal arts and
humanities. The paradox though is that actions linked to
self-interest lead to an external orientation to the world
while simultaneously the person is drawn further from
himself. The Gesellschaft society has serious ramifications
for the development of individuals and the human race. The
high rates of divorce, delinquency, crime, mental illness,

and other group and individual pathologies are evidence for an impersonal, competitive society.

Keeping the orientations of each society in mind, it is plausible to argue that psychology suffers from a Gesellschaft pathology. Psychology is a discipline that has fragmented itself into a multitude of sub-disciplines. This fragmentation, a result of many self-interest groups within psychology, has led psychology to remove itself further and further away from important topics of value to humans. Should psychology adopt a Gemeinschaft attitude, individual interests would be valid. Also acknowledged though is that individual interests are an integrated part of the ultimate community, the human world. Individual ends are integrated with the purpose and ends of the group. In the case of psychology, the purpose is to contribute towards a science of persons. Relations in a Gemeinschaft are shared relations, personal relations. If a science is to establish a relationship with its topic of study, it should be a Gemeinschaft relation so that it remains personal, therefore valuable. In this form of relationship motives are general, diffuse, or indefinite in character. The products of a Gemeinschaft relation cannot be predicted. Not all realms of human behaviour can be explained in rational Gesellschaft terminology. Often we just attempt to offer rationalization as 'good reasons' to explain behaviour. Gemeinschaft relations cover a multitude of interests inexplicable to rational compartmentalization. Why one gets married falls

prey to a myriad of reasons, not just one or two, nor easily explained in rational terms but rather in a 'hard to describe' form. Those things that are 'hard to describe,' often contaminated by a metaphysical notion, are very much a part of the human condition. A personal psychology will at least attempt to take into consideration these important questions. In a Gesellschaft psychology, as technocrats, we remove ourselves from here to there. In a Gemeinschaft psychology we remain in touch with ourselves. Psychology should slip out of its armoured, formal attire into something more comfortable and personal.

Before presenting the fourth paradigm, it is useful to look at the schematic definitions for the paradigms discussed.

The mechanistic or anglo-American model emphasizes knowledge acquisition as a process in which outside information is accumulated. The mind is wet cement upon which impressions are made. There is no active interaction between the human and the world.

PERSON   ENVIRONMENT

This separation between humans and their environment has led to the compartmentalization of human activities which in turn has led to the development of separate,

quasi-communicative sciences such as sociology, psychology, and biology. Human behaviour becomes dichotomized in various controversies in psychology such as trait/situation, exogenous/endogenous, nature-nurture, etc. Even intelligence falls prey to partitioning as it is defined in relation to a percentage of innate and/or environmental influences. To paraphrase Riegel (1978), little attention was given to putting the pieces together, the task was seen as breaking Humpty Dumpty apart.

The mentalistic continental-European paradigm emphasizes the individual disproportionately in relation to the environment. The inner condition gained priority at the expense of outer conditions. As humans emerge, the world remains static. Human behaviour can be characterized as a function of human processes or $B = F(H)$. In its pure state, cognitive psychology advances the emphasis of inner condition to the point the environment is constructed by inner cognitive processor $E = (H)$. The inner human world dominates the external world.

The likes of Skinner, Vygotsky, and Mead emphasized outer
conditions, the social and cultural aspects of the human
world. As an environmental position behaviour is a direct
result of situational influences or $B = F(E)$. Even when
extended to social learning theory the emphasis on the
environment remains as human activity is determined by
social learning history or $H = F(E)$ (Buss, 1979). Reese and
Overton (1973) describe the emphasis of the environmental
effects on human activity as the reactive organism model of
man. In its pure form, this model characterizes the human as
inherently at rest, and movement a result only of external
forces. Cognitive activities are acknowledged as complex
phenomena, but due emphasis is circumvented by proclaiming
that thoughts, wishes, etc. are reducible to simple
phenomena directed by outside influences. When scrutinized,
creativity, activity, the emergence of novel action and
qualitative change is explained as epiphenomenal and
reducible to quantitative analysis. The human state is
static in an ever dynamic world.

WORLD HUMAN

(iv) Active person and active environment

In comparison to the previous perspectives this
paradigm operates on the conception that both the human and

the world are active, and interactional or reciprocal in relation to one another. However, psychologists tend to conceptualize interaction a variety of ways which will require clarification for the purpose of this paper.

One type of interaction takes the form of $B = F(H, E)$ as a result of the synthesis between $B = F(H)$ and $B = F(E)$ submodels. In this synthesis both the human and the environment interact to produce a determined behaviour. But as Buss (1977) points out, this interaction is actually unidirectional in nature because the causality is from the human and the environment to behaviour. The human and the environment are assigned as independent variables and behaviour a dependent variable. In relation to the trait/situation controversy in psychology, the $B = F(H, E)$ position has been examined in terms of an ANOVA model where the variability of the dependent variable is separated into additive components of human variables, environmental variables, and interactional components. However, the ANOVA model is linear, and unidirectional in nature (Overton & Reese, 1973). The interaction defined within the model specifies a nonreciprocal relationship as the human and the environment co-determine the behaviour, or explain and predict behaviour variability.

If one merges the perspectives characterized by the formulas $E = F(H)$ and $H = F(E)$, the resultant takes the form $E \leftrightarrow P$, whereby the human and the environment affect and are affected by one another. The relationship is reciprocal and

bidirectional as the human and the world are both dependent and independent variables simultaneously. This position advances the organismic model of the human world (Overton & Reese, 1973) in which the basic metaphor is the living organism, an organized or unified whole. In psychology this model is represented in the active organism model of humans where the individual is inherently active. Change can now be described qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Furthermore, change does not involve the chainlike mechanical connection of cause and effect but rather emerges out of the reciprocity within and between the human and the world. In such a system, prediction and quantification appear to be hard tasks indeed.

The emphasis on activity, inherenet both in the person and the world carries us into the fourth paradigmatic position of the active person in the active environment. This paradigm emerges to carry psychology into a twenty-first century perspective, a dialectical psychology.

Schematically, this takes the form of both the individual and the environment changing and emerging to quantitatively different state.

HUMAN > < WORLD

In order to understand this schematic, progress is
conceptualized as in either direction. it is neither left or
right, in favour of the person or environment, but in both
directions, left and right, A and not-A. In comparison to
pre   viewpoints, dialectical psychology regards
knowledge as both individual and social simultaneously.
Knowledge emerges as individual progressions are linked to
inner and outer conditions. These two systems of interaction
include the operations of inner foundations (physiological,
biological, including the mentalistic perspectives),
interacting with the cultural-historical environment in
which a person thrives. The individual's psychic activities
are seen as a changing development of these two interaction
systems.

Activities interpenetrate from the person to the
environment and vice versa; activities permeate in both
directions,. each a cause and consequence of the other.
Individuals are 'shaped' by existing givens and in turn

shape their own destiny by changing those given historical conditions. Thus, knowledge is not only acquired through the activities of individuals, but equally through cultural and social activities. Knowledge is social in nature.

This position, the dialectical orientation, has its roots in the philosophies of Hegel, Marx, and Engels. In particular, Soviet psychology has been the carrier of this orientation. To sum up those features of Soviet psychology which distinguishes it from its Anglo-American counterpart is that the former emphasizes the active part played by the subject (especially the conscious human subject) in structuring the world and perceived experience in contrast to the traditional weakening mechanistic insistence on a passive organism in which associations are formed by the interplay of 'mindless' processes (e.g., reward and punishment) guaranteeing assured adaptation to the environment. It is important to note that this formulation almost parallels the classical philosophical controversies between the British empiricist school (Locke, Hume) for whom the mind was a blank slate and the continental philosophers such as Leibniz and Kant who believed the structure and activities of the mind shaped in important ways perceived experience.

Not only does the dialectical paradigm acknowledge the enactive mode of knowledge acquisition, it also represents a synthesis of the mechanistic and mentalistic perspectives, of the subjective and objective camps in psychology.

S. L. Rubenstein's work (1889-1960) on the double interaction theory provides an initial perspective for the role Soviet psychology plays in the development of dialectical psychology exemplified in the work of Klaus Riegel, A. R. Buss, and others.

Rubenstein's double interaction theory was a reformulation of the mind/body problem, one that persists as a problem in psychology today, as a result of vulgar mechanistic and pretentious mentalistic perspectives. Rubenstein extended the first interaction system (inner base) by relying on Pavlov's second signalling system, hence dialectical materialism. The outer condition or environment system is composed of Vygotsky's work, hence dialectical historicalism. Rubenstein's synthesis emphasized the unity of consciousness and behaviour (Riegel, 1978). Consciousness is not a passive or contemplative pulse but an active state. By means of internal organization behaviour becomes directed and not considered mere movement. Activity objectives the inner subjective world while concomitantly the objective world is reflected in and by the subject. These processes are interpermeating, therefore resulting in the emergence of continuous change in both the individual and the world.

Marx suggested that as a result of acting on the external world and changing it, humans simultaneously change their own nature (Tucker, 1978). You change the world and in turn you are changed by it. Thus, the activities of society and the person's own activities result in the acquisition of

'knowledge humana.' Structual change initiated by an individual can bring about modification. But along with structural change comes functional change - they develop as a whole. For example, the inventions of some tools and linguistic forms change the significance and expression of human work and communication. The development of the computer is one good example of this.

Riegel (1979) also points out that dialectical interactions between the individual-psychological processes and cultural-sociological conditions are 'co-influenced' by a second system of interaction which he refers to as inner-biological and individual psychological activities. Psychological activity is influenced by its dual relationship to inner and outer matter.

> Thus the boundaries between mind and matter are not fixed, but determined in multiple ways. The inner and outer material reality provides and anchoring conditions for two interaction processes or in dialectical jargon, they represent relations of relations. Thus like two interlaced links of a chain, psychological activities are found at the center of those interactions: but at the same time, they are relegated to a secondary position. Studying them has to be founded in the inner biological and outer cultural-sociological processes. Psychology without these foundations would be fictitious.
> (Riegel, 1978, p. 14).

The task that dialectical psychology has assumed is to put
Humpty Dumpty back together again. To shift the emphasis
from partialistic orientation to a holistic endeavour. In
principle it answers the outcry for change, in favour of a
synthesizing, enactive psychology.

To ground some of this discussion into the reality of
psychological research, a brief example of a dialectical
orientation in developmental psychology will prove useful.
Developmental psychology has been particularly receptive to
the dialecltical perspective as both share a common interest
in aspects of change and process (Baltes & Cornelius, 1977).
Buck-Morss (1975) has looked at cross-cultural differences
in Piagetian reasoning tasks in relation to socio-economic
variables. She argues that cross-cultural differences in
Piagetian abstract formal reasoning reflects the inherent
influence and degree of development of industrial
capitalism. In a more subjective manner, Buck-Morss also
looks at the level of activity or participation in relation
to social order and change within the cultural context, that
is at different classes of people within a culture. The
position forwarded is that the lower socio-economic group
within highly industrialized societies are exposed to a
concrete reality over which there is little control and
therefore no applicability for manipulation, transformation,
and abstract formal thought. This type of reserch attempts
to incorporate larger social issues in relation to
individual cognitive development, thereby emphasizing the

interplay of the individual and the human world (including political, social, and economic climates). As well, this analysis is partially historical in a sense, as the ontogenetic development of cognition can be related to the historical development of the culture in which a person lives. This orientation, in trying to encompass a fuller understanding, stresses that the development of the individual is inherently linked to the culture in which one lives while concomitantly being aware that the activity of the individual can change the social order and in turn transform his own capabilities.

Dialectical Resolution to Subject-Object Dilemma

The unacknowledged subject-object contradition which has persisted in psychology's paradigmatic evolution has facilitated psychology's poor progression. Buss (1979) has identified prototypical statements underlying the deep structure of psychological theories. They are: humans construct reality and reality constructs humans. What Buss suggests is that as a discipline psychology is not appreciative of its history and constantly repeats errors in terms of subject-object relations. That is, psychological paradigms tend to emphasize one or the other aforementioned prototypical statements which in turn lead to separate structural solutions. Subject-object relations in psychology are characterized by a shift in emphasis between the person and environment. Buss' analysis relies on the transformative

method developed by Ludwig Feuerbach.

The transformative method is typically unknown to psychologists as it falls within the realm of unnaturalized science, that is philosophy. This method involved reverting the subject and object of Hegelian idealism. For Hegel, the human being is God or Geist in the process of self-alienation and self-realization. The truth according to Feuerback is the reverse. Instead of visualizing the human as a self-alienated God, we must see God as a self-alienated human. This means that when humans project and idealize an image of themselves in heaven as God and then worship this imaginary Geist, it becomes estranged from itself; 'its own ungodly earthy reality becomes alien and hateful' (Tucker, 1978). To circumvent this alienation humans must repossess their alienated being, take God back into themselves, and recognize in the human being the proper object of care and love. In this sense, religion becomes viewed as a phenomenon of self-estrangement. Important to this discussion is that Feuerbach turned Hegel upside down postulating humanity as the subject and thought as the object (Tucker, 1978). In essence Feuerbach wanted to demystify what was once mystical and place humans in a real and active role rather than one of passivity; a metamorphosis of Hegelian idealism to Feuerbachian humanism-materialism.

Historically, similar transformations have occurred in psychology. Wundt's early structualism is often viewed as a precursor to behaviourism. His work may have been influenced

by German idealism as introspection, became his primary
method; the subject (human) was seen as reflecting on world
experiences. Behaviourism replaced structualism and
materialism replaced idealism as 'J. B. Watson's subjects
became determined, receptive objects. The shift from
structualism to behaviourism followed a structural change of
the human creating reality to reality creating the person
(Buss, 1979).

Behavioural experimentation took manifold forms but
overall these varieties denied the status of the subject
being the true subject. An inversion of the subject-object
relation has occurred with the advent of cognitive
psychology, emphasizing information processing and other
creative, open-ended acts such as language. The subject was
reassigned true subject status as the shift from
behaviourism to cognitive psychology led back to the person
creating reality.

Buss also analyses the birth of the psychoanalytic
movement, emphasizing Freudian motivation theory based on
unconscious and irrational forces that govern human
behaviour. Previous to the psychoanalytaic viewpoint, human
rationality and consciousness were emphasized in accordance
to the maxim 'Do what a reasonable person would do' -- the
individual was assigned subject status. However, Freud
considered the person of instinctive drives, repressed
wishes, past experiences, therefore a consequence of
reality. With the rise of third force humanistic oriented

psychology, the individual created his own destiny in striving towards self-actualization. Thus a shift from the psychoanalytic view to a humanistic view, from the person created by reality to the person creating reality. The individual in humanistic psychology is a creative, undetermined being, thus a subject again.

One can go on ad infinitum about the structural subject-object relation underlying psychology's paradigms. If no change is forthcoming, the paradigmatic structures will flop back and forth, and in a sense remain fixated at an unresolved state of tension. The point to be brought forward is that each of these structural modes emphasizes the unidirectional nature of the relationships between the organism and the environment, and fails to recognize that the reality of the relationship is at least bidirectional if not multidirectional. Psychology should be aware of its adherence to a self-imposed structual dichotomy. In essence, the ultimate transformation will lead to a dialectical paradigm in psychology. Such a paradigm transcends the boundaries of limited partialistic perspectives in its emphasis on the reciprocity between the person and the environment. The subject and object become one side of the same process, not collapsing into one category but rather a part of a greater totality, a dialectical unity. To accept this notion of unity requires a new conception or ethos of the role of psychology as a study of human beings.

Dialectical Psychology: the struggle of Hegelian idealism and Marxian materialism

As there exists some endpoint in Marx's or Hegel's theory, so there exists an endpoint in Buss's (1979) structual analysis. The finality in Buss's analysis is exemplified in his wish to complete the revolution in structures to end all revolutions. But to refer to endpoints is really non-dialectical in character. This point uncovers a covert struggle within dialectical psychology, the rift between idealist and materialist positions.

Those who take a materialist position on dialectical psychology (Buss, 1979; Tolman, 1981) often quote Marx.s Thesis on Feuerback as one source aiding credence to their argument. In this exposition Thesis 3 reads:

> The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself (Karl Marx, Thesis on Feuerbach, 1845; in Tucker, 1978; p. 144).

The above view suggests that a mechanistic or materialistic view ignores the role of an active constructing human in the world. Thus the development of a Marxian philosophy emphasizing humanism or naturalism. In the concluding Theses 11, Marx then opposes the exclusive idealist position by asserting, "The philosophers have only interpreted the

world, in various ways, the point, however, is to change it"
(Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1845; in Tucker, 1978,
p. 145). Here truth does not become a matter of
contemplation, but something that has to be demonstrated in
practice. Anything outside of practical significance remains
a scholastic endeavor. Tolman (1981) uses Theses 11 to
fortify his assault on Riegel's (1976, 1978, 1979) work by
sardonically asking what methods the idealist position can
offer. This insistence of a Marxist 'humanistic' yet still
materialist position suggests a dangerous weakness of the
materialist perspective because it comes dangerously close
to the pragmatist school of thought which asserts the test
of a thing is its practical utility. Riegel was aware of
this fact and wanted to transcend the pragmatist psychology
practiced in the laboratories such as Wundt's.

Marx showed great dismay for the 'fetishism of
commodities' in his labour theory. This fetishism resulted
in the trading of commodities which not only alienated the
workers from their product, but the exchange of commodities,
in particular, articles of utility, resulted in a relation
between things rather than social relations between persons.
So too, in a parallel sense, can a dialectical materialistic
bias in psychology 'fall prey to method fetishism, and
formalism, which adheres to technique in favour of mere
proficiency. The 'craft-idiot' identified by Marx denies the
human significance of his or her skills and becomes enslaved
in the trappings of efficient methods. Psychology's sequel

is the hard fact accumulative-manipulative-objective scientist applying scientific methods in extremis, at the expense of the human beings and him/herself.

To augment the distance between the idealist dialectics and materialist dialectics, William Barrett's Illusion of Technique (1978), proves useful in that it addresses issues related to method (technique) and philosophy (ideas). Barrett states that technique involves a decision procedure that leads to an invariant end (obviously non-dialectic). A machine operates on methods which excludes the possibility of creativity because method requires a specific result, a condition similar to the thinking of a cybernetic machine with input/output modes, and no error (Rychlak, 1976). In his discussion Barrett asserts that the very elements that constitute a technique are in fact a creation of philosophy, therefore methods may be an offspring of philosophy. What Barrett then states is that the philosopher disappears into the technician and gets lost in detail, separating him from the larger questions of calling. It is this vulnerability to get lost in technology that psychologists as scientists should be aware.

In a historical sense, the Hegelian philosophy of the eighteenth century was not connected with the scientific optimism of the later nineteenth century in which everyone thought the answer to everything was just around the corner (Russell, 1959). For dialectical idealists, knowledge is unable to reach a perfect termination, not even in the

methods of ideas. But it is ideas which are the impetus to search and continue along the never ending thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and so on.

Another shortcoming of a Marxian dialectical inclination should be addressed. Marx appears to have been right when he said general scientific interests of a society reflect in some respect the social interest of the domineering group. However, this does seem somewhat inadequate as it is evident that solutions of particular problems within a scientific field need not have connections with social pressures of any kind. This leads to another major weakness, in the dialectical materialist position, that is, the failure to recognize the scientific movement as an independent force. Of course, no one would deny that there are important links between scientific inquiry and other things that go on in society but the pursuit of science, through the course of history, has gathered its own force, insuring a measure of autonomy. Without some measure of autonomy science fails to exist (Bishop, personal communication, December, 1983).

It is important that dialectical psychology remain aware of the differences between dialectical idealism and dialectical materialism. Dialectical theory need not be materialistic or idealistic, but rather encompass a manifold of different conceptions. But the emphasis on ideas remains, as Riegel (1979) points out:

Hegel's dialective idealism, from which most of our

present interpretations were derived, has been followed and superseded by the historical and dialectical materialism of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. For two reasons it seems appropriate to wait and contemplate before one embraces these historical developments. First Hegel's philosophy...provides an exceptionally rich source and distinct model of development of the mind both in regard to the individual and society.... Second, Hegel, much more than dialectical materialists, has preserved this conception of an active developing organism or more precisely, he has proposed a developmental model in which activities (labour) and products (material) remain in dialectical interdependence. It seems a regression, indeed, if we were to abandon this delicate notion too readily in order to obtain a naive material underpinning whose utility was recognized in a theory of labour, products and economy, but not in a theory of a developing organism within a developing world. (pp. 54-55)

In a similar vein, Barrett states that the material products of technology become obsolete and are replaced by another. If technology becomes obsolete what remains is the idea, a philosophy. The search for truth then, lies in the process of cognition, but even this will not lead to the so called absolute truth. It is possible that truth is as natural as change and cannot be explained. But the search for truth

must continue and it is to this that dialectical psychology
aspires. What remains is the search, the quest, a never
ending process. To reiterate Bevan's (1982) charge that his
young colleagues are long on technique but short on asking
significant questions, a dialectical perspective emphasizes
that not even the answers to the questions are of ultimate
importance but questions of questions. By emphasizing
balance in the form of answers the target goal of psychology
becomes satisfaction, rather than excitement.

Satisfying psychology involves a mind set in which data
are isolated unequivocal fragments, not to be doubted.
Doubts cause anxiety. Data are externally related to each
other, quantifiable and given (Kvale, 1976). As well, data
are abstract, isolated from their original social and
historical situation. Satisfying psychology maintains a
comforting delusion in a world of uncertainty. To accept the
uncertainty, or at least to learn how to live without
certainty, requries a certain mind set or logic.

Formal Logic and Dialectical Logic

The most notable distinction differentiating formal and
dialectical logic lies in the role contradiction plays in
dialectical logic and its absence in formal logic.
Unambiguous and consistent inferences are derived from the
systems and methods of formal logic. The classical view of
sciences uses this logic. Dialectical logic represents the
origin and movement of thought, not only in the individual

but in the society.

In order to survive in a changing human world of ambiguity, paradox, and conflict, individuals must apply dialectical logic suggesting inconsistency and contradiction as having a place in human concerns. Formal logic in the life situation would leave a list of possibilities, and no aid in reaching decisions and initiating action (Riegel, 1979). Humans often take risks. An example will suffice to highlight this point. Students of a graduate developmental psychology class are puzzled by a seemingly pointless question during an exam. The task at hand is to pick a book, from a number piled at the front of the class, that best represents the most modern theory of developmental psychology by looking at the covers only. If you are fixated in formal logic, you'll probably say that "You can't judge a book by its cover!" The application of formal logic in this case does not allow you or aid you in making a decision on which book cover you should choose, and whether it is correct or not. Really, it matters little for an understanding of the student's thinking whether or not they do finally choose the 'correct answer' or even what the correct answer is. If there is an answer, it would be: A and not-A. What is important, though, is that the ambiguities and contradictions are confronted as they are experienced leading toward movement, that is a decision. Thus, dialectical thinking involves the process of transforming contradictory or conflicting experiences into momentary

stable events. These stable structures consolidate the
contradictory evidence, but in themselves do not represent
the 'process of thinking rather the products of thinking.'
In dialectical logic, the acceptance of contradiction
depicts a shift in emphasis from the closure of a question
to the generation of its root, the endless sequence of
raising questions. To this extent, answers are assigned
temporary status in the enduring process of evolving
questions. To further extend this logic, good theories
should destroy themselves (Bishop, personal communication,
November, 1983).

Dialectics and Dialogue: search of questions

In the search of questions, Riegel (1978, 1979)
emphasized the importance of the dialogue. In a dialogue,
the participants are subject and object at the same time and
the relations established between them with each utterance
is reflective. Dialogues do not have a fixed quality, but
are constantly being derived through the evolutionary
efforts of the participants. This of course requires a
shared code for communication. Each utterance (word or nod)
also has an internal structure, therefore to perform a pure
monologue remains a process of imagination. The human being
is never in isolation. In the most basic dialogue the
participants relate their statements to their opponents
preceding statements as well as their own previous
statement. A continuity prevails as the antithetical

statement to a thesis is not just a reaction but a reflection backward on the thesis. The thesis initiates and awaits the antithesis, the antithesis reinterprets and changes the thesis. Neither can be thought without the other, hence all statements are interdependent.

> If a statement never becomes part of some outer or inner dialogue, it is of no interest at all and is bare of any meaning ....A statement in complete isolation is like the sound of a tree falling in the woods in the absence of any listener. One might, with Wittgenstein, question its existence. That is, one may question whether there are sounds in the woods if there is nobody present to hear them. But as one begins to think about these sounds, they enter into an inner dialogical interaction. Therefore they gain meaning whether they really exist or not. All reality lies in the dialogical - or rather in the dialectical - process. (Riegel, 1978, pp. 54-55)

In scientific dialectics, the dialectical logic or process of a single person and betwen persons leads to a developmental and historical awareness that finds expression in competing scientific perspectives. It remains a- possibility that shifts in emphasis between individuals and within an individual can lead to scientific revolutions by conceptions alone. Can we discount the dialogues of Plato? Any form of debate or opposition to dialectical psychology

is indicative of being embroiled in a scientific dialectic. Competition amongst perspectives is essential for the progression of knowledge. What changes the conception of this competition is the present meaning attributed to competition, that is, an 'against something' notion. However, the Latin root of compete, competere, means to come together, to agree or to strive with instead of against. It is this common emphasis that dialectical psychology aspires.

The philosophy ingrained in dialectical psychology leads mainstream psychology to a heightened state of existential neurosis with its emphasis on questions. Questions lead to doubt and uncertainty - a state confronted by humans daily. Not only does each day bring anticipated satisfaction but potential excitement. To risk a step in the direction of progress and excitement realizes a simultaneous step towards uncertainty. Dialectical psychology represents movement towards excitement in which the perceptual screen is tinted with various colours, unlike the old black and white model.

A dialectical orientation accepts conflicting and interdependent conceptions of phenomena. It incorporates the study of both inner and outer conditions in relation to each other. Also acknowledged is the interdependence existing between the observing subject and the observed phenomena of study, hence active-interpretative research. Furthermore, dialectical psyschology recognizes the impossibility of value-neutral descriptions and theories, therefore the

contextual or socio-historical aspects of study are given

due attention.

Being mindful of the philosophy inherent in dialectical

psychology, the next task to be undertaken is the

application of dialectical psychology to the area of

clinical/counselling psychology.

IV. DIALECTICS AND COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY

A. Part 1

The final part of the paper will focus upon dialectical orientations within counseling psychology. As in the previous section, a brief critique of the dominant orientation guiding the clinician is warranted before the alternative can be discussed. A review of the clinician's discontent with the inapplicability of research findings and a summary of objective and subjective approaches to counseling will then be followed by a dialectical perspective on counseling. As an alternative direction, the notion of activity, dialogical relationship, value, change, process and the individual in a private, social, and historical context will be discussed within a dialectical framework. It is proposed that a dialectical orientation may better suit practicing counselors who can find little theoretical guidance commensurate with their eclectic activities.

Practice and the Clinician's Discontent

Criticism of modern clinical/counseling research comes not from an ivory tower philosopher but actual practising clinicians. Many psychologists are dismayed with the failure of the integration of practice and research, which stems predominantly from the fundamental inadequacices of modern research methods (Barlow, 1981). The inapplicability of

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research findings are so blatant that Matarazzo (cited in Bergen & Strupp, 1972) states that "[e]ven after 15 years few of my research findings affect my practice. Psychological science per se, doesn't guide me one bit .. . . . My clinical experience is the only thing that helped my practice to date" (p. 340). The clinician appears to acquire his skills like a craftsman, through experience and practice rather than through scientific guidance. As a result, the clinician is forced to decide whether the behavioural scientific route, along with its methodological traditions, is more appropriate or the route identified with the craftsman.

In 1949, at a conference in Boulder, Colorado, the American Psychology Association (APA) ratified the scientific route as the clinical psychologist was to be a "scientist-professional." In a scholarly, scientific tradition, the student was to be trained in the Ph.D. and was expected to be broadly grounded in the major areas of psychological theory, knowledge, and research and also in the fields of personality, psychopathology, and social psychology followed by training in clinical intervention. Counseling programs approved by the APA also follow the scientist-professional model. The Boulder conference emphasized the integration of research and practice with research receiving priority. But the lofty goals of the Boulder model calling for integration of research and practice appears to have lost its appeal as the clinician is

saying no to science and is focusing on practice (Conway, 1984).

In the summer of 1973 at a conference in Vail, Colorado, APA participants voted to legitimize an alternate route for graduate training in clinical psychology. The alternate is to award a professional degree (Psy. D.) to students without a research thesis being trained to be a clinical practitioner. The recent proliferation of professional schools offering Psy. D. programs lends credence to a notable shift from science to practice.

The practising counselor does not use specific research findings to guide practice but rather relies upon experience, or the result of trial and error eclectism. Goldfriend (1980) has pointed out that recently there has been a growing trend among practitioners toward greater commonalities in psychotherapeutic practice, and a de-emphasis on particular schools from which the procedures originated. The practising clinician borrows from both the mechanistic and humanistic orientations. In essence, the active counseling psychologist acquires a broad perspective which results in the counselor of a dialectical orientation.

Scientific and Humanistic Counseling

Scientific counseling concerns itself primarily with observation and classification of the status quo. This notion is similar to the Eleatic philosophy previously discussed, which depicts a world which is rigid, uniform,

and motionless. The scientific counseling perspective
implies that humans are what they have been in the past and
thus will continue to remain (Arbuckle, 1969). The result is
a view of people as being static, stable, and relatively
unchanging. This orientation discourages us from thinking
about what man could be, limiting potential for
extraordinary change (progress).

Scientific counseling is also set within a stable
framework. The scientific counselor sets therapeutic goals
to be met through planned stages and proven techniques.
Stable techniques for stable people. For example,
intelligence testing is thought to be one of the more
rigorous and respected sub-disciplines within psychology.
The assumption with intelligence testing is that the IQ
score remains relatively fixed or constant over age. The
positivistic approach can be seen as the psychometrician
attempts to draw out the same kind of static and objective
measurements from people that the chemist does from various
substances. A test is used as a means in counseling, but
there remains a danger that it may dictate the ends. It is
easy to allow the goals of counseling or the direction of
problem-solving to be determined by the nature and
limitations of the testing instrument. Scientific counseling
relies heavily upon objective, mechanical testing
procedures. One danger is that it may represent an
abdication of responsibility on the part of the therapist to
contribute valuable information in the decision-making

process of counseling by relying on safe, pseudo-scientific test results.

In summary, the scientific counseling perspective remains steadfast in its attempt to capture the dynamic nature of man within the confines of statistically neat and discrete, categories and traits. It tries to stabilize that which is naturally unstable by adhering to its rigorous scientific approach.

In reaction to this scientific-oriented counseling, humanistic or a client-centered, more 'personal' type of therapy began to flourish. The objection was that the scientific approach reduced people to passive objects, capable of being analyzed, managed, and engineered into 'refined' states (Strupp, 1976). It was the contention that North American psychology relied solely upon scientific methodology to the exclusion of valid approaches which stressed the importance of less well defined human qualities such as thinking, values, emotions, etc. The humanistic approach emphasized a safe, open, understanding, and empathetic environment based upon unconditional positive regard. This 'confessional' approach, however, de-emphasized the therapist's intellectual powers as he was taught to interact in a more emotive style. To some extent the influx of an irrational and anti-intellectual process had resulted in abandoning any value that a scientific approach has to offer. Thus, the humanistic alternative becomes embroiled in the dialectical struggle between science/art.

intellect/emotion, and public/private. Meehl (1973) suggests that "[we are] at the mercy of a crew that is so unscholarly, anti-scientific, groupy-groupy, touchy-feely that [there is] no concern for facts, statistics, diagnostic assessment or the work of the intellect in general" (p. 280). The point to be brought forward is that the therapist functions not only as a catalytic agent of emotion, incorporating the qua███s of warmth, empathy, and understanding but th██powerful reasoning ability can be of great use in the counseling process. Thought is the hallmark of being human and it comes naturally to humans (Tiedeman, 1980).

The Counseling Alternative

B. Part 11

Counseling psychology theory should closely reflect the attitude and practice of the counseling psychologist who picks and chooses from a variety of techniques and orientations. This entails bridging the gap between the objective and subjective approaches, the esoteric and exoteric perspectives (Allen, 1980). As Strupp (1976) predicts, new directions in psychology will lead the psychologist to oscillate between observation and participation, taking part and standing back, feeling and thinking. The counselor will employ a more holistic, flexible, and emerging orientation in the counseling

process. The counseling psychologist acquires a more active role in both the psychotherapeutic environment and in the larger social context. Also acknowledged is the interdependency between the therapist and the client, and the therapeutic context and social-historical contexts. Inherent in these interdependent relationships is change, where the focus of counseling is on process rather than on outcome. The outcome of therapy remains a momentary stable structure in the evolution of the individual. These points reflect the dialectical nature inherent in the counseling process and thus warrants an alternate "meta-theoretical" perspective.

Dialectical perspective on change and the counseling relationship

The counseling relationship involves both verbal and nonverbal interactions. The verbal interaction or dialogue is an exchange and creation of information between the client and the therapist. The counseling process is based on dialogical interaction, that is therapeutic progress relies upon the movement of verbal cooperation. The counseling relationship between the counselor and client is never static (Gilmore, 1973) and the client is always moving toward, away, or alongside the therapist. The dialogical character of the counseling process exemplifies the observation that people are social in nature, not isolated individuals, and that behaviour can be understood by

focusing on the social interdependence of the counseling relationship in which the client and therapist change. The notion of movement, flux, and change is inherent in the therapeutic relationship. For the purpose of this discussion, the concept of change requires further classification.

The very process of living implies continuous change in the biological, the psychological, the cognitive, the social, and the spiritual domains of an individual. Even the universe, according to the "Big Bang" theory, is in a motion of constant evolution. However, in relation to studying people, psychological theories (eg. Heiders balance theory) reflect an emphasis on equilibrium, balance, and rest over conflict and change. The dialectical perspective suggests that change and conflict should be given due attention. Change is primary, and imminent; stability in the person and the world is a derived state (Overton, 1978). North American psychology has accounted for change in terms of contingent events (S-R psychology) or unexplained cause-effect occurrences (accidents). If change is a natural part of life, it need not be explained or accounted for by some external cause. Change is just change. The key to understanding change is to investigate the events (biological, psychological, social, etc.) that accelerate, retard, or deflect change.

Since change is inherent within the person and the counseling relationship, questions arise as to how

counseling psychology deals with change. A traditional approach to counselilng involves a stepwise progression through various stages which are continuous and stable in form; intake, interview, problem definition, evaluation or testing, problem exploration, problem solution, and the endpoint or closure. The advantage of this recipe format is that it provides an ordered sequence of events allowing the use of pragmatic techniques at crucial points during counseling. However, the danger of such an approach is that change in counseling may be forced to fall within the linear sequencing of a preconceived route. The ebb and flow of the relationship may be lost in mechanical-like counseling. This 'stability' oriented counseling approach can stifle creative human potential and both the therapist and client become one dimensional.

In his book, One Dimensional Man, Marcuse (1964), suggests that technology is a form of social-control persuading people to accept the givens of their existence while simultaneously transforming them into passive entities void of responsibility and obeying the decisions of others. In an extreme form stability-oriented counseling could reflect the one-dimensional society envisioned by Marcuse. The client enters into a therapeutic relationship with a person who persuades, knowingly or not, the client to conform to givens in society. Adjustment is usually the goal in most counselling encounters. Adjustment requires that the client meet some predetermined criteria of what is meant to

be normal or adjusted. The process of counseling requires change, or adaptation but the outcome prescribed is a stable state - equilibrium. If everyone adjusts how does progress come about? Somehow counseling psychology has paired the active notion of change with the static concept of adjustment.

The counseling relationship does not occur within the confines of an enclosed environment but rather as a part of the larger social context in which both the therapist and client are members. Since adjustment is a major goal of therapy the psychologist may inadvertently insist upon a client's conformity to social norms. In behavioural engineering, therapeutic direction takes the form of conformity to the presenting environment. Behaviour that falls outside of the environmentally-defined boundaries of normality is defined as maladjusted, immature, or pathological. Environmental adjustment, stability of traits, and the acquisition of competencies find operational use in psychometric testing. Adjustment is really a hypothetical state which manifests itself in statistical interpretation. T. S. Elliott was perhaps right when he suggested that 'we humans are hollow men and we have a hollow psychology to prove it' (Heather, 1975).

Values, are also inherent in the counseling relationship as goals acquire value orientations. The therapeutic act plunges the counseling psychologist into the metaphysical realm, because as an applied science, the

therapist is concerned about 'what ought to be.' The counseling psychologist also transmits the knowledge, goals, and values of the society to the client. The counselor's definition of normal and abnormal behaviour implies a value orientation rooted in a particular social and/or cultural context. Adjustment usually denotes the notion of conformity (normality) towards something, like a social role. A problem that arises in the counseling interaction is how can both the client and the therapist concentrate on conformity toward a social role and be at the same time "themselves." Congruence is required by both the client and therapist in a situation that is naturally non-congruent. Conformity toward a specified and expected role can result in a concomitant decline in creative thought and activity. Deviance from the norm has acquired a negative connotation in psychology. To allow both the inner conditions (oneself) and the outer conditions (social roles/social world) to flourish within therapy acknowledges the multidimensional nature of the person in the world - to be "many-in-one." This does not have to be considered a pathological state such as ego fragmentation but rather exemplifies the unique human ability to operate in conflicting situations and to progress not in spite of conflict, but because of conflict. The result of operating within conflicting conditions manifiests itself either maladaptively, adaptively, or creatively.

The counseling relationship is ever changing, incorporating values and short-term goals which are

momentary stable points in a world of change. Counseling is not something the therapist does to, or practices upon, a client. It is something the therapist participates in with the client, that is a dialogical interaction. Overtly, the relationship appears to involve a surface dialogue, however there is a multidimensionality involving deeper inner structures and covert outer activities. This orientation reflects the dialectical nature of the counseling process, in which dialogical cooperation (Riegel, 1976) is exhibited along with the fact that the counseling relationship is set within a particular social and historical context. For example, the counseling of a young unmarried couple who are about to have a child, would have involved different value orientations and practical options in the 1930's than now in the 1980's. Thus, the socio-historical context in which the counseling theories were developed, and an application of those theories in the present context must be understood.

Change as a function of therapeutic intervention

In the previous section four types of epistemological models were compared on the basis of whether or not the individual and environment were passive or active in terms of knowledge acquisition. This same framework can be used to compare therapeuetic procedures in relation to individual change. Riegel (1976) suggests that Freud's psychoanalytic therapy concentrated on individual change as a result of the client's own activity; the exploration of repressed

memories, childhood experiences, and intrapsychic conflict. The environment played little part in the patient's change, and therefore remained in a passive role. The psychoanalyst's position in the asymmetrical therapist/patient relationship could be best described as elitist. The analyst was a 'father figure.' Change could not be directly influenced by the analyst but hinged on the patient's acceptance of psychoanalytic theory and the interpretation of their actions in light of the given premise. By changing themselves through intrapsychic resolution, patients could better cope with the environment.

The client-centered, non-directive type of therapy freed the client from any theoretical constrictions and resulted in a more liberal counselor/client relationship. As the official opposition, liberal, humanistic psychologists attempt to set free the individual from a deterministic past. They rejected the 'mindless' approach of behaviourism. Human reasoning power found an ally in the humanistic movement. The non-directive approach allows the client to freely construct his inner experiences in a warm, accepting environment structured by the therapist. The incongruent client receives empathic reflection from the congruent therapist (Rogers, 1957). The client is not railroaded into resolving his psychological dilemma by adhering to strict theoretical postulates as is the case in psychoanalysis. Again, in non-directive therapy, the environment takes a passive role in the development of the fully functioning

person. This approach fails to recognize the effect the world has on the individual's inner constructions. The individual's experience of the world is not really attached to the social, economic, and political forces that influence his life.

The behaviour modification approach typifies the passive client/active environment counseling mode. In the extreme form the therapist is passive as well. The client is reduced to an object being manipulated and reinforced. In essence, this approach is also aristocratic in form (Riegel, 1976). The modifier has "supreme" knowledge, manifested in his technology, and the client is targeted as the passive recipient of that information. Thus, this counseling relationship is asymmetrical in nature.

A dialectical perspective on counseling

The counseling relationship, as defined by the dialectical perspective, can be considered an interdependent developmental effort between the therapist and the client based on a shared code of communication between two dialogical partners within a socio-historical context. Dialogical interactions form the basis of psychotherapy and are potentially a democratic orientation to intervention.

In a dialogue, both speakers are subject and object simultaneously, and the relations established with each utterance, gesture, nod, etc. are always reflective in nature. The counselor cannot always separate his/her

reactions which may be dialogical, intellectual, and emotional in nature from those of the client (Wrenn, 1980). This non-dualistic approach is not a new one but has been ignored by counseling psychology. Counseling psychology adheres to the subject-object duality which restricts the range of interaction between the therapist and the client in a supposed open environment. In a subject-object relationship the openness is unidirectional - from the therapist to the client. However, a true interaction is at least bidirectional, incorporating a non-dualism. This notion of non-dualism is not new or unique to a dialectical perspective. This is also found in the ancient philosophy of Zen Buddism. A brief review of some of the concepts in Zen may prove useful to this discussion.

The Zen Buddist philosophy opposes such duality of subject-object relations and dualistic thought. Dualistic thought takes the traditional Aristotelian form of: A=A. It follows then that something cannot be both A and non-A. This duality is denied by Zen. For example, in the early stages of therapy, there is usually a great deal of ambiguity. The concept of ambivalence can be exemplified in the idea of the client being both "A and non-A" simultaneously (Berger, 1969). The client may both love and hate a particular person. In turn, the counselor may be both A and non-A - immediately liking and disliking the client. The counseling environment itself is imbued with the ambiguity of tension, and conflict. This non-duality perspective objects to

ignoring the potential of objects, people, and nature for being something other than the abstractions of them represented in words or concepts used to describe them. It confuses the abstractions of the world with reality (Berger, 1969).

In terms of subject-object relations a Zen form of counseling would entail a mutual person-to-person relationship in which each person responds to and influences the other (Berger, 1969). This is descriptive of the dialogical relationship between the therapist and client. A dialectical perspective breaks from the Zen counseling approach in that Zen psychology would emphasize the fact that in the relationship social roles must be forgotten in order to have a maximally open encounter in which both participants are open to change. This cannot be accepted by the dialectical position as it places the counseling relationship outside the realm of the concrete social world, in which both the client and therapist are members.

The dialectical orientation recognizes that a true dialogue in counseling embodies the participation and mutual recognition of both persons who engage in a process, a developmental effort, in reaching some decision based on the client's presenting concern. However, the co-accepted decision that results does not reduce the responsibility of the client in taking an active part in the decision which ultimately translates into action. Thus, through the mutual participation of dialogical partners the client's rate of

change is influenced. The dialogical commitment between the client and the therapist represents a true openness, and more importantly, an acceptance to change.

Just as the client changes during this "dialogical cooperation" so does the therapist. In behaviour modification the conditioner gets reinforced through the success or failure of his/her client (Riegel, 1976). Effective orientations are sustained by the therapist while ineffective procedures cause change in the therapist. The counselor then accumulates therapeutic power through developmental efforts covering a history of dialogical interactions. As a result of this process the therapist develops insight into people and it becomes manifested in their 'expert counseling.' It is possible that experience guides practice. The skill of a gifted clinician appears to involve a 'trained intuition' that falls within the realm of human reasoning. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that when these special therapists leave, their skills disappear unless one takes a scientific stance and tries to articulate and make sense of the intangibles essential in the practical skills of the therapist. Just as it is impossible to enter the same dialogue twice, it is impossible to replicate the special skills of a talented therapist. However, the skills of the gifted clinician become part of the dialectic and will, therefore, effect "newer" forms of counseling.

The temporal nature of counseling, in a dialectical sense, reflects the fact that both the individual and

society are in a constant state of flux. Earlier states
cannot be replicated but are related to previous and future
events. This can be highlighted within the counseling
context by extending Kvale's (1977) research on memory. The
dialectical perspective on the temporal nature of counseling
involves a network of past, present, and future relations in
a socio-historical context. The counseling process involves
a series of sessions (or dialogical interactions) - session
1, session 2, etc. The relationship of a session is effected
and in turn reflects back upon the previous session. That
is, session 1 effects session 2, but in turn session 2
reflects back upon and changes the experience or memory of
session 1. Both the two previous sessions effect session 3,
therefore the overt activity, exemplified in the form of
dialogue, is not only important but the history of previous
counseling dialogues also has an effect. As well, the
dialogical interaction may reflect the development of the
client's problem, that is an approximate replication of past
events.

By use of content analysis, the counseling process can
be evaluated. The analysis could take two forms: "within
therapy" and "between therapy and the client's
socio-historical conditions." It is possible to look at a
particular phase of the counseling process as having
valuable reflective qualities of the process itself. That
is, a "within therapy" analysis looks at a particular phase
in relation to events preceding and following it.

Understanding the counseling process is derived from each phase being studied in relation to the other phases. The "between therapy and a client's socio-historical condition" content analysis involves linking the isolated therapist-client relationship to the real world of the client. In essence, the interaction may have approximately recapitulated the historical development of the client's problem within the social world, as well as understanding the client's present concerns in relation to the larger context, be it social, economic, or political. By use of this form of content analysis, the therapist will study the process of counseling as a projection of the temporal, shifting, and changing qualities of the client within the social world.

At this point, content analysis may be something that the therapist engages in during the relationship rather than after the client has resolved his problem. To adequately understand the history of the client, how it is manifested in the present, and its possible effects in the future, the study of the client's biography will prove most valuable and valid. The study of biography entails the memories, hopes, and fears that are interwoven into the fabric of the individual, and at a macro level of analysis may reflect patterns of experiences within social and historical condition. One of the strengths of psychoanalysis was that it acknowledged the historical influences, thereby allowing the individual to reprocess new events. Gestalt therapy has

similar intentions. To further extend this logic, the activity of the individual within the counseling session is not only dependent upon the retention of past dialogical interactions, but is influenced by intentions and future expectations. As each session passed by, it changes the individuals' (therapist and client) expectations of the following ones. This notion is similar to the way existential-phenomenological counseling deals with experience in therapy. Experience is described as perspectival, that is by acquiring new experiences, the view of past experience is continually changing (Brice, 1978). What people were before is being changed by what they are now and what they hope to be in the future.

The relationship developed between therapist and client is more intense than the usual social relationships but it is still social in nature. Part of the responsibility of the therapist is to transmit to the client, the values and ideas generated in society. This task does not require a technical specialist, but rather an educated common knowledge of the society within which the client functions. Only a dialectical perspective will openly admit the role values play in the therapeutic event.

Invariably, the counseling psychologist's values will find expression in therapy and the dilemma faced is whether to conceal or make known these values. As an active participant, the counselor's needs and values are implicit in the therapeutic process. Acknowledging one's values does

not mean, that the therapist should impose values on the client, to indoctrinate him. If this were the case, the client would resist any attempt to participate in a true dialogue. The dialogue would be an act of mutual pretense. On the other hand, if the therapist concealed his values the relationship would become artificial. Thus, the counselor should be aware of his values, and also be cognizant that they may change over the course of the counseling experience. Counseling experience can effect value orientations.

One cannot encase in glass the fragile client, set him apart from social, political, and economic forces. Being mindful of this, the individualistic, ego-centered counseling theories appear to be too narrow an approach and do a disservice to both the client and the community. The role of the counseling psychologist is to act as an intermediary between the direction and knowledge seeking of the individual and the values and ideas of the community. This involves a much more complex dialogue in which exchanges between the participants includes not only two individuals but the broader social context.

Any form of psychotherapy does not operate in a vacuum, insulated from society. Each client and therapist is a part of a greater whole, therefore therapeutic intervention on one person has implications for a greater part. It is philosophically and professionally less threatening to scrutinize only the therapist-client relationship with its

outcomes, leaving extended implications for the community unexamined. The counselor therefore must be aware of the social ramifications of this work. Counseling psychology should scrutinize its roll within Merton's (1957) framework of manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions are intended and recognized while latent functions are those which are unintended or unrecognized. In the therapeutic environment self-knowledge for the client and therapist is important (manifest function) but also implied is an ethical obligation to serve a world of human beings (latent function). As Whiteley (1980) states, counseling psychology takes a reactive approach to its endeavours. Counseling psychology should also acknowledge its potential proactive position. Through the dialogical interactions and interpretations, the counseling psychologist constructs a more complex dialogue within the discipline and among colleagues, which leads to new interpretations and orientations. By acting on these new formed perspectives the counselor changes conditions intrapersonally, and at the societal level. It is evident that counseling is an interaction between a counselor and client. What is not clear is the latent function of the counseling psychologist. For example, should the counseling psychologist work politically, in the community, to modify an institutional or societal policy in order to prevent damage to his clients (eg. nuclear threat and Psychologists for Peace)? Is this role consistent to that of a counseling psychologist (Hurst

& Parker, 1977). The role of the counseling psychologist is evolving, thus latent functions become transformed into recognized and legitimate manifest functions. For example, Krauskopf, Thoresen, and McAleer (1973) found in their survey of professional activity and service delivery systems that training in counseling that emphasizes one process (counseling) only accounts for 24% of the counseling psychologists activity. The rest of the activity centers around administration duties, policy committees, and teaching activities. Hence, the profession must be educated and re-evaluated to its influence and potential worth in the community. Along with this, counseling psychology should remain sensitive to social problems.

The dialectical perspective not only provides a different theoretical option for the practicing psychologist, it also points to areas of possible research. Some of those areas will now be discussed.

In the early stages of the counseling relationship the communication between the therapist and client is asymmetrical or out of balance. Communication becomes more intimate and possible because both people share fundamental meanings linked to a more common social system. But in keeping with a dialectical tradition, the meaning employed by counselor and client are actually bipolar constructs. Hence, cognitive processing within the counseling setting in relation to bipolar meaning constructs should be further examined. For example, research similar to that of Osgood,

Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) on the analysis of semantic space, which suggests that people do in fact define events, meaning elements in terms of dichotomus, and graduated polarities (negative or positive), would have important implications for counseling. It is often the case that crucial life events or crises (eg. divorce, job loss, death of spouse, etc.) bring people into therapy. In order that the counselor deal effectively with the client's problem, there must be some congruence between the client and therapist as to the significance (meaning) of the crisis. For the relationship to be an open dialogue, the interconsensus of meaning must be addressed. Existential-phenomenology proves a useful theoretical starting point from which the counseling psychologist can address meaning. Meaning analysis, an intellectual endeavour, would have concrete implications for the counseling process.

The dialectical emphasis on the individual within a social and historical context leads to other areas of practical worth. Subjective attempts comprehend the individual opposes the scientific interest in developing nomothetic theories which tries to explain the activity of people in general. Behavioural observation is valid in that it attempts objectivity. However, the practicing clinician also requires additional subjective like insights into the individual. This requires a historical analysis which helps to reveal the complexities of the individual's past, his

thoughts, feelings, and orientations. Again a biographical analysis is useful. As well, individual cases can be studied within the case study design, and an accumulation of these studies can lead to well described procedures and realistic approaches to change in the therapeutic schema (Kazdin, 1981).

Also of interest in the dialectical perspective is the emphasis upon the development of the individual. The individual is a developing being and must be understood within a developmental time period. For instance, vocational counseling for a grade 12 student presents different considerations than for a 55 year old retired businessman who took an early retirement and has decided to return to university. In response to phenomena such as this, counseling psychology will have to cover a more encompassing life-span approach which will require further study of those areas unique to the developmental process which have direct implications for practice.

Not only is the therapeutic context considered in a dialectical orientation but so are counseling research results. Typically, we focus on the success rate of therapy. But the bipolarity of research also directs our attention to the failures of therapy. This may involve analysis into the realm of error variance - those uncontrolled factors (personal characteristics, events during treatment and measurement) that may have caused "locale departures from the modal effect" (Cronbach, 1975, p. 125). For example,

further resarch could concentrate on personological factors operating within the person and between the therapist and client such as: motivation, value orientation, cognitive and emotional development, etc. Since no counseling relationship is isolated from the real world, demographic factors should be studied: socio-economic class, culture, ethnicity, religion, etc. As well, treatment effect could also be analyzed by a time-series analysis which could pinpoint crucial times for intervening action. Lastly, the dialectical perspective also acknowledges that treatment effects need not to be limited to statistical significance but that clinical significance can be determined by <u>social</u> validation (Kazdin, 1977).

Summary

It has been suggested that advancements in dialectical psychology will less likely come from efforts to use dialectics as a specific methodology, which Riegel (1979) suggests, but to employ dialectics as a general theoretical orientation (Baltes & Cornelius, 1976). A dialectical orientation can be implemented through various research paradigms including the separate mechanistic and mentalistic views. Its strength lies in its multidimensional perception, allowing many views to flourish. Thus, both reactive and active models are complementary and require fusion if the complexities to human existence are to be understood. In this sense, the counseling psychologist must be a humanist,

a mechanist, phenomenologist, and positivist if he is to
function effectively/affectively. This may be a fantasy but
the powers of human reasoning can transcend the seemingly
impossible. Though this dialectical orientation appears
idealized, it closely conforms to the actual practice of
counseling psychologists who call themselves "eclectic."
They can incorporate the dialectical perspective which is a
holistic perspective emphasizing the biological, social,
psychological, and socio-historical person. They are able to
accept the sophisticated hardware and software that
technology rapidly introduce into the discipline (eg.
biofeedback, vocational choice programming), while remaining
sensitively human in relationship to the client. In essence,
the counseling practitioner within the dialectical
perspective regains the use of his legitimate individual
common sense and social knowledge while acknowledging the
flux and interplay of the private and public, inner and
outer - to become a member of the dialecltical unity.

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