

University of Alberta

**The Reunification of North and South Korea**  
**A Possibility When Using Madman**

By  
Bohdan Horich ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in  
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

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
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
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
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
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## **Abstract**

The thesis focuses on the possible future unification of North and South Korea by analyzing the reunification policies of both regimes. In particular, it is considered how the North Korean policy of Madman and its Federation proposal can be harmonized with South Korea's openness through its Sunshine Policy. Additionally, the thesis considers what role the four regional powers, namely China, Russia, Japan and the US, will play in the reunification process. The paper argues that Washington's adoption of the Perry Report and Pyongyang's persistent use of Madman will lead to reunification taking place in Seoul's favour.

## Acknowledgement and Dedication

First of all I would like to thank my advisor, professor Juris Lejnieks, for all of his help and hard work. His dedication to helping me develop my ideas and the constructive way in which he focused his time were major factors in my successful completion. In addition, Dr. Lejnieks's good humour and open nature helped me stay positive throughout the writing of this work.

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## Thesis Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the Korean Peninsula has been divided into two fundamentally opposed states. Both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (also called the DPRK or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (the ROK or more commonly referred to as South Korea) have claimed to be the sole legitimate successor of a united Korean nation. Each also has its own preference as to how reunification is to take place. The military option has long been favoured by Pyongyang, while Seoul is partial to peaceful and gradual overtures. These processes, however, can differ significantly from the officially stated reunification policies of both. Each state has outlined how it foresees the two Koreas coming together peacefully and understandably each envisions its own continued role in ruling the Peninsula. Thus any talks towards reconciliation have been hampered by the unwillingness of either side to face up to the reality that one of them will have to cease to exist if real reunification is to take place. As a result, outside influence, particularly from the four regional powers, will have to play a significant role in bringing the two Koreas to the bargaining table. More specifically, the United States will likely force the DPRK to talk and compromise on reunification or else face eventual military destruction. Long the closest ally of the ROK, Washington has realised that it can no longer safely allow conditions to continue as they are and therefore will force reunification to take place at North Korea's expense. The question is whether North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-il prefers the peaceful

approach, thereby saving significant bloodshed, or if he will continue with his acts of madness and in the end justify military action being taken against his DPRK?

The purpose of this paper is to study how the official and stated reunification policies of the two Koreas will affect the approach and process of actual unification. Specifically, Pyongyang's Federation model and Seoul's Sunshine Policy will be discussed. These policies shall be analyzed for their likely effectiveness, probable results and the thinking behind their formulation. Although we cannot accept either official reunification policy at face value, by analyzing them it is possible to at least hypothesize on the likely direction that will be taken towards reunification. In addition, the paper will consider how the policies of the four major regional powers, namely China, Russia, Japan and the US, will affect reunification. These nations, long involved in Korean issues, hold a great deal of sway since they themselves are largely responsible for the division of Korea. Their choices will shape the future of the Peninsula, be it by a lack of involvement or a newfound willingness to take concerted action. Most important of all, America's Perry Report will be presented as Washington's solution to the Korean problem. In the end, America will ensure that the two Koreas initiate an improvement in relations that will eventually lead to reunification. Once that process has started, evidence indicates that the ROK will come out on top, swallowing the economically feeble North. Otherwise, the continuance of tensions may well lead to conflict and a more brutal end to the DPRK.

The paper will test many of the arguments forwarded by the scholar Nicholas Eberstadt in his book *The End of North Korea*.<sup>1</sup> This study is in agreement with Eberstadt's hypothesis that because most of the DPRK's goals have failed since the

very beginning, it is now conceivable to foresee the end of the North Korean “project”. In addition, the paper depends on Eberstadt’s conclusion that Pyongyang’s current threats, and all of its peaceful gestures, are but last ditch efforts at regime survival. However, a departure is made at this point. In particular, Eberstadt claims that up till now the division of the Korean Peninsula continues due to the international communities inability to even imagine Northeast Asia without the DPRK. I hypothesise that this is no longer the case and depend on America’s Perry Report to prove it. This document is a signal that the US and its allies are no longer willing or able to settle for the status quo. The Perry Report is actually an ultimatum to Pyongyang to change its ways and unite with the South or face eventual destruction in war. Washington’s willingness to take such a stand is a direct result of a realization that it is now too dangerous to try and maintain the status quo. In addition, America has perceived that due to changing circumstances, particularly in relation to China and Russia, as well as improved military capabilities, the US can now *force* North Korea into better behaviour and reunification on terms favourable to Seoul. This new ability, combined with increasing North Korean inability, has finally presented Washington and Seoul with a real opportunity to reunify the Korean Peninsula.

Although traditionally hostile, there exists reasonable hope that relations between the two Koreas can improve. This hope became most evident at the 2000 Summit of Korean Presidents in Pyongyang. There both leaders announced what they saw as the likely timeline of the reunification process, agreeing that some 20-30 years would be needed for the two states to fully integrate their economies, thus fostering reunification. They also cited what they saw as many similarities in their

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<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, Washington DC, The AEI Press, 1999.

reunification policies, thereby ensuring a simplified process where fewer compromises would be required. This study agrees with this scenario, and will ultimately explain why such a timeline was chosen. In particular, it shall be understood how this gradual approach will help pull North Korea out of its traditionally isolationist shell by being non-threatening, thereby reducing its dependence on the policies of Madman, a policy of hostile relations. In addition, the process will place upon Seoul many of the financial responsibilities of feeding the Northern populace that has been struggling for years against famine. Helping the Northern economy to recover also lessens the chances of complete state collapse, a prospect South Korea actually wishes to avoid due to the dangers of military confrontation and the sudden financial burden this would entail.

The paper is divided into two chapters. Chapter One discusses the military method for reunification traditionally favoured by North Korea. It outlines how this approach is not only used as a tool of reunification, for it is also a tool of survival. Known as the Madman theory, Pyongyang continuously acts irrationally as a means of gaining outside financing, scaring its opponents and ensuring its own survival. Today, however, the DPRK has provided the world with another peaceful reunification model that it claims to favour over the military option. This Federation plan is analyzed for how it is to work, its flaws and the reasoning behind it. The second part of the first chapter focuses upon South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy. His model grew out of a desire to finally reconcile with the North, bring real peace to the Peninsula and pull the DPRK out of its self-imposed isolationism. This section considers Seoul's predilection for peaceful rather than

military reunification and explains why the gradual process is preferred. Finally, the chapter considers the probable outcome of both plans were they to be implemented.

The second chapter considers the approach to Korean reunification taken by the region's four major powers. China's and Russia's role as North Korea's traditional allies could help pull the hermit state out of its isolation. Inversely, as allies they have for some time found Pyongyang's threatening tactics a considerable nuisance to regional stability. Turning their backs could well facilitate reunification by demonstrating to North Korea that none will support it and that its only hope rests in normalizing relations with Seoul. The policies of Japan are relevant due to the economic role that nation plays in Northeast Asia. Any process of recovery by the North is likely to need Tokyo's financing. Therefore the strategy of pulling Pyongyang out of isolation may depend on Japan's willingness to provide funding for recovery. In addition, the traditional hostility and repeated threats by the North are at least partially responsible for Japan's new course of greater militarization. This process could entail Tokyo backing Seoul and Washington if there were to be a conflict with the DPRK. Finally, the US is the ROK's closest ally and is pivotal in ensuring its continued survival. As such Washington would only allow reunification to take place on terms favourable to Seoul. This American policy is outlined in the 1999 Perry Report. Although classified, the available information suggests that Washington will use its influence to force Pyongyang to reunify gradually on terms based largely on the DPRK's own Federation model. But in due course North Korea will have to surrender itself to South Korea. If it does not, then eventually North Korea will itself justify military action be taken against it due to its likely continued

use of the Madman approach. This dependence on Madman will almost inevitably lead to acts that would justify the Pyongyang regime's complete annihilation. The chapter concludes that the role of the four regional powers is pivotal in any reunification developments.

In order to understand why Washington's approach will work, it is necessary to consider past plans that have failed. In the early stages of division, the US pushed for the United Nations to resolve and reunite the Korean people through consultations. Despite opposition from the DPRK, the UN General Assembly continued to raise the issue till 1975, but ultimately failed.<sup>2</sup> A second method used has been to undermine the other state's government by creating an uprising that would be characterized as a people's revolution, one that would have to be militarily supported by the first state. Pyongyang has long relished this approach, placing many spies and provocateurs in ROK territory. But Seoul's improving defensive capabilities have effectively stifled these attempts. Whereas that approach has never been accepted by the South Korean government as an option. Nor would such a plan be likely to meet with success due to North Korea's immense internal security apparatus. A third, and very ineffective approach to reunification has traditionally been practiced by the region's four powers. All officially supported Koreans resolving their own problems. This essentially equalled complacency with the status quo, preferring to do nothing and expecting the problem to somehow resolve itself. A fourth, and most obvious option is attempting premeditated reunification by military force. North Korea tried it, but ultimately failed and no longer has the capabilities

necessary for such an endeavour. Meanwhile South Korea never really depended on this policy and has traditionally preferred a more peaceful approach. Although today South Korea has the forces necessary to achieve military success, it would need a very significant pretext to justify such action to its people. Finally, a hard line and demanding rhetoric between the two Koreas have been maintained during most of the period of separation. Such an approach has been unable to get either side to the bargaining table very often to discuss bringing the two countries together again.

It should also be considered that both Koreas have forwarded conciliatory approaches in the past, and that today's proposals are but their continuation. The modern Sunshine Policy reflects South Korea's willingness for some time to drop many of its demands in return for talks, an improvement in relations and a guarantee of peace. Seoul even promises to leave North Korea with its existing powers, at least for the time being. North Korean proposals have traditionally taken the form of the Confederation and Federation models. These foresee the two Koreas holding equal powers within a joint state, each controlling its respective region, with a Supreme National Committee handling matters of mutual interest.

Although North Korea's approach today is not much different from earlier proposals, a vital factor has arisen that will ultimately force Pyongyang to practice what it preaches, namely America's Perry Report. This new element indicates that the US and South Korea are now able to force North Korea to actually act on its own proposals, a truly original approach. Washington and Seoul, who today have superior military capabilities on and around the Korean Peninsula, will no longer have to

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<sup>2</sup> North Korea, along with China and the USSR, viewed the UN as a belligerent due to its participation in the Korean War. They therefore refused to cooperate with the international body on resolving

suffer Pyongyang's insolence or refusals to cooperate. Nor will North Korea be capable of continuing in its Madman ways because it no longer has the military upper hand or any real support from its allies. Simply stated the Perry Report will force North Korea to do mostly what Kim Jong-il himself publicly claims to want. If implemented, these Northern proposals will inevitably lead to greater openness, thereby facilitating reunification and undercutting the DPRK regime's ability to escape it. However, the Perry Report is not just an ultimatum. It does add some incentive to the North by giving its leadership a last chance to adapt and maintain some sort of positions in the newly united Korea under Seoul's rule. In this way the final decision has been handed to Pyongyang to once and for all choose between complete reunification and total destruction.



## Chapter One

### Reunification Policies of the Two Koreas

The Korean Peninsula, long divided between the competing Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, has been described as "the last front of the Cold War"<sup>3</sup>. Since being separated in 1945, the two states have remained in a drawn-out competition where ideology is used by both governments as the basis for claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of the Korean people. This state of affairs has persisted since the end of the Second World War and has torn apart friends, families and an ancient culture. Despite this severing of ties, the question of reunifying the two Koreas has been prominent in the minds of both the people and statesmen alike, yet to little avail. The Koreas remain divided, a situation that has oft been blamed on the unwillingness of either government to change its ways.<sup>4</sup> On the one hand there is North Korea, an entity that regularly makes use of deception in the guise of goodwill, outright military threats and actions that seem to border on madness as the only reliable method of reunifying the peninsula. The Pyongyang regime has cared little for its people and appears to be concerned primarily with its own survival and the maintenance of personal power. Faced with such a threatening neighbour, the ROK has long been fearful for its own survival, attempting to avoid military confrontation in the face of North Korea's constant belligerency. Unlike Pyongyang, Seoul has placed its faith in reunifying the

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<sup>3</sup> Roger Dean Du Mars, "There goes the sun", Asiaweek, Sept. 14, 2001, vol. 27, no. 36, pg. 20-21.

<sup>4</sup> pg 2, Robert J. Myers, Korea in the Cross Currents. Palgrave, New York: 2001.

Peninsula through a slow, outwardly friendly and peaceful process that has been aptly named the Sunshine Policy. The policies of each state are unique in and of themselves, posing considerable challenges in their actual implementations. It is therefore vital to study and understand whether or not the unification policies of either state can deliver the unification that is so important to the Korean people. Despite the fact that each state has its own stated policy, we simply cannot accept these at face value or assume that said policies fully reflect the actual objectives or methods of either of the Korean governments. Nor can we trust the one-dimensional goodwill that the two enemies claim to be their true intentions. Therefore, a thorough analysis is essential in understanding how the DPRK and ROK actually propose to reunify their people.

The division of the Koreas is a complex question that touches on a variety of issues and levels. On the surface it appears that ideological differences are the primary source of tension. Although important, loyalty to ideology cannot be justified in the face of a real desire by the people on both sides of the DMZ to reunify.<sup>5</sup> Despite this yearning, private individuals on either side of the inter-Korean border have no mail, telephone or other direct means of communication with their brethren.<sup>6</sup> Politics and history have further complicated matters, placing the desires of the people below the needs of state survival, economic success and the politics of belligerence. Nor can it be forgotten that the two Koreas fought a highly destructive war against one another as a result of which many people died, families were divided

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<sup>5</sup> pg. 253, Sharif M. Shuja, "Korean Unification: Some theoretical and analytical suggestions" Asian Thought and Society, An International Overview, Volume XXIV, No. 72, Sept-Dec 1999. pg. 250-259.

<sup>6</sup> "Korean talks take on 'special meaning'", The Globe and Mail, Sept. 19, 2001, pg. A12.

and deep animosities have remained.<sup>7</sup> The above-mentioned factors must be kept in mind when we introduce and discuss the reasoning behind each of the unification policies that promise to bring the Korean people together again.

Recently, new hopes have arisen that compromise can be reached and that progress made towards the long sought-after reunification. The June 2000 Summit between Kim Dae-jung, the South Korean President, and Kim Jong-il, the North Korean National Defence Commission Chairman and General Secretary of the ruling Workers Party, was a monumental event in Korean relations and did much to reinvigorate the unification discussion. Summit euphoria even hinted at the possibility of both regimes making significant concessions and easing tensions to the point where they could someday lead to real and peaceful reunification. Hopes for friendship were understandable since by meeting face to face, the two Korean leaders were finally forced to admit publicly that it is in no way realistic to assume that the other regime will willingly relinquish power to ease the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.<sup>8</sup> Having faced up to this reality, both sides promised not to absorb or conquer the other and committed themselves to forming a loose confederation that would serve as a foundation for eventual reunification.<sup>9</sup> Further, the leadership agreed that reunification and the full integration of their economies was something

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<sup>7</sup> This is something that the two Germanys did not have to experience and, although limited, their people had at least some contact. Therefore, a comparison between German and Korean reunification will be mentioned only in passing and a detailed comparison must be reserved for future study. For further information please see: Heiner Flassbece and Gustav A. Horn, German Unification – An Example For Korea. Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishing, 1996.

<sup>8</sup> For further information on the statement made during the Summit, please see Appendix 1. Officially Pyongyang has acknowledged that neither system can be expected to compromise its own ideology. Pg. 107. Koh Yu-hwan, “Unification Policies of Two Koreas and Outlook for Unity”, Korea Focus, November-December 2000, Vol. 8, No. 6, pg. 90-113.

<sup>9</sup> pg. 64, Selig S. Harrison, “Time to Leave Korea?”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pg. 62-78.

that could only be attained gradually, taking some 20 to 30 years to implement.<sup>10</sup> At the Summit, the two Kims promised to work together at improving relations by building bridges, focusing on what they saw as many similarities in their official reunification formulas, and formally acknowledging that unification truly is the desire of their peoples.

There should, however, be no illusion that the 2000 Summit of the Koreas proved to be more of a symbolic event, rather than one that would pave the way to any immediate reconciliation. Indeed, many of the agreed-upon follow-ups have not occurred; family reunions have been few, economic contacts although expanded remain largely stagnant, and military confidence building measures for the purposes of ensuring peace have been limited to little more than a reduction in threatening rhetoric.<sup>11</sup> Nor has Kim Jong-il visited South Korea as promised. The significance of this fact cannot be overstated since it has put a considerable damper on all levels of talks between the two states. That being said, and despite the fact that the Summit gave an inflated image of friendship, the meeting was nevertheless a truly monumental political event between two enemies who have not even signed a formal peace agreement to end the Korean War. Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the Summit did much to strengthen the relevance of the official unification policies of both Koreas by increasing the likelihood of at least attempts being made in their implementation.

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<sup>10</sup> pg. 113, Kent E. Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia", Foreign Affairs, January/February 2001, pg. 106-122.

## Unification by Madness

Since its inception and throughout its entire existence the DPRK has largely justified its very existence on the claim that it is the only entity capable of uniting the Korean Peninsula under an “independent, socialist” regime.<sup>12</sup> Such a unified state was to achieve great success under the banner of the uniquely North Korean socialist model known as the *Juche* ideology of self-sufficiency.<sup>13</sup> The ideology promised to give its people continuous socialist growth while providing them with a degree of material prosperity. From the beginning, *Juche* portrayed all Koreans as victims of superpower politics, and was therefore formulated with the intension of overcoming the division of the peninsula. This division was seen as unnatural and externally imposed upon Koreans by the Soviets and Americans at the end of World War II.<sup>14</sup> However, to achieve reunification and make *Juche* the salvation of the Korean people meant that South Korean territory would have to come under the Northern regime’s control. Claiming to act in the best interests of all Koreans justified to Pyongyang its attempts at establishing sovereignty over the entire peninsula. To the Northerners this ideological claim rationalizes the use of any and all means to gain control of the South and unite the two states, be they by hook or by crook.

From the beginning North Korea had a dual approach to reunification, the official, publicly declared one, and the actual one. Significant discrepancy has always existed between the two. During the period of 1945-1950, the official policy

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<sup>11</sup> Talks have been on-again and off-again ever since the Summit, and tend to have only minimal results. Meanwhile, dangerous military tensions still arise as was demonstrated by the sinking of a South Korean patrol boat by North Korea in June 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 4.

<sup>13</sup> Myers, pg. 2.

was to call for elections in both Koreas while the real strategy depended upon force and military expansion of socialism into the South, as was demonstrated by the 1950 invasion. The 1960's saw Pyongyang proposing unification through an interim federation system. Meanwhile serious attempts were made at inciting revolution in the ROK. For instance, in January 1968 North Korea attempted to assassinate the South Korean president, and in October of the same year landed 120 provocateurs on the east coast of the ROK. During the 1970's, when for a brief period relations improved, engagement with Seoul became possible. At the same time Pyongyang endeavoured to foment insurrections against American imperialism and capitalism, trying to characterize the civil unrest as popular Southern uprisings for national liberation that had to be supported militarily by the North. Throughout this period the DPRK launched many infiltrations into the South, depositing spies, as well as long-term subversive agents who were meant to foment insurrections.<sup>15</sup> Finally, in the 1980's Pyongyang switched to a proposal for a federation, but continued in its attempts to destabilize the South through state-sponsored terrorism. One such terrorist attempt saw North Korean agents plant explosives when trying to assassinate President Chun Doo-hwan in 1983 in Rangoon. During the 1990's, the federation proposal continued as Kim il-Sung and Kim Young-Sam, then leaders of the two Koreas, were for the first time scheduled to meet for talks.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile the North armed itself with weapons of mass destruction and threatened to destroy Seoul.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> pg. 4, Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini, Eds, Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Pg. 240. Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans, Contemporary Politics and Society, edited and revised by Donald N. Clark, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996.

<sup>16</sup> This came to naught due to the sudden death of Kim il-Sung. In order not to hold talks from a position of weakness Pyongyang withdrew and re-initiated its bellicose diatribes.

<sup>17</sup> Koh Yu-hwan, pg. 100-101.

This dual system has been used to smokescreen the regime's true intentions, both from its own people and from the outside world.

The reality is that North Korea's unification policy has always been based on the threat and use of raw force. According to Nicolas Eberstadt, the 1950 invasion of the South that started the Korean War (1950-1953), or the "Fatherland Liberation War" as it is known in the North, is simply the most obvious display of this policy in practice.<sup>18</sup> Force was to be used to swiftly overrun the South and unify the country under the "glorious" *Juche* system. The first sign of weakness of this policy was the failure to implement a successful conclusion to the Korean War; this despite the significant military superiority the DPRK enjoyed over the struggling South Korea at the time. Yet the military option remained the primary focus of Northern policy in the decades following cessation of open fighting, with little change and despite the fact that the DPRK regime itself nearly collapsed during the Korean War.<sup>19</sup> As a result of this military-only approach, the North decided that it needed to maintain its forces in a constant state of military preparedness. Then, should the ROK experience even a brief period of weakness, Northern forces would be ready to reunify the peninsula by force, even at a moment's notice.<sup>20</sup> The result was a massive military build-up, which in the 1970's made Northern land forces the world's fourth largest. Eventually, troops numbered some 1.25 million; no small feat for a population of 20 million. The reasoning behind this massive mobilization stem from the North Korean

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<sup>18</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 26-27.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pg. 29-30.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, pg. 31. Oddly enough a significant moment of weakness was missed in 1960 when President Rhee was driven from office by student riots. He was replaced by a rather weak caretaker government that was itself ejected by General Park Chung Hee's military coup a year later. Despite the economic costs, the incident underlined to Kim Il-Sung that his military must be kept in a constant state of alert and be willing to take bold and decisive action at all times.

view that, despite the huge economic burden it creates, military build-up is its only source of strength.<sup>21</sup> This is a process that appears to continue to this day where presently the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintains the world's fifth largest army in terms of manpower.<sup>22</sup>

By the 1980's however, with the economy "running on something close to a full war footing for over a generation"<sup>23</sup>, the policy of military unification upon which the DPRK had hedged all its bets appeared to have worn itself out. As Eberstadt points out, the plan had always been little more than a desperate gamble where all the eggs were put into the basket of one plan. Keeping itself on a permanent war footing cut deeply into the resources of the state, leaving it incapable of modernizing the very military forces upon which it was so reliant. The gamble seemed to have failed.<sup>24</sup> The situation was compounded by the fact that American forces stayed on the Peninsula following the Korean War and helped rebuild the Southern military into a force that would be able to defend the ROK from another Northern invasion. Pyongyang's insistence on the departure of US troops was the only foreseeable way of defeating the South.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, it could even be suggested that most North Korean efforts at normalizing relations with the South can be attributed to this desire for US troops to leave, allowing Pyongyang more leverage and a better chance of conquering the ROK. Yet, to the DPRK's frustration this departure has never taken place.<sup>26</sup> The

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<sup>21</sup> pg. 54, Fred C. Bergsten and Il SaKong, eds. Korea-United States Cooperation in the New World Order. Washington DC, Institute of International Economics, 1996.

<sup>22</sup> pg. 101, Chon Hyun-joon, "Internal Changes in North Korea: Reality and Prospects", Korea Focus, September-October 2000, pg. 90-111.

<sup>23</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 8.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, pg. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Chinese military forces had all left North Korea by 1958.

<sup>26</sup> Actually, the entire issue has now become something of a moot point since the North is no longer capable of victory even if Southern forces were to stand alone.



unification policy as it stood for over half a century would appear to have been a complete failure.

Simply put, North Korea is no longer in a position to force a reunification on its own terms in the traditionally preferred militarily form. It is just not possible.<sup>27</sup> The Northern economy is no longer capable of maintaining even the military forces needed for a sudden and swift military campaign, never mind the drawn-out one that is more likely to be encountered.<sup>28</sup> Despite the military's vast pool of manpower, its morale has been immensely affected by the fact that some 40% of its troops suffer from tuberculosis and other malnutrition and hunger-related diseases; a major blow to combat readiness.<sup>29</sup> The army is terribly short of food and has had to support itself as a result of the entire country's continued famine.<sup>30</sup> In conjunction with food shortages, military hardware has fallen victim to extensive decay and ageing resulting in a considerable disparity of military power between the two Koreas.<sup>31</sup> For instance, the modern jets supplied to South Korea by the US are significantly superior to the aged North Korean MiGs.<sup>32</sup> Although the Northern air force is larger in numbers, its aircraft are antiquated, often in a state of disrepair, or grounded due to shortages of fuel. Under such conditions there is not likely to be another Fatherland Liberation

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<sup>27</sup> Harrison, pg. 65. However, the DPRK remains dangerous. It enjoys numerical advantage in several areas: tanks, long-range artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and has the world's second largest special operations force of 55,000 men that are meant to insert themselves behind enemy lines. U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: North Korea", Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. October 2000. [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov).

<sup>28</sup> Even Northern military strategists have long acknowledged that North Korea cannot successfully partake in a drawn-out military conflict.

<sup>29</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 101.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*, pg. 93.

<sup>31</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 42.

<sup>32</sup> Today South Korea has 162 F-16's and 240 F-5's and F-15's. Harrison, pg. 77. All told the ROK has 568 combat aircraft to the DPRK's 593. Anthony Davis, "Making Waves", *Asiaweek*, Vol. 26, No. 31, August 11, 2000, pg. 42-43. In addition, South Korea has recently begun to manufacture the F-16K, the mainstay of its air force. *International Harold Tribune*, [www.iht.com](http://www.iht.com), April 19, 2002.

War resulting in glorious reunification on Pyongyang's terms, at least not a successful one.

Or is there? Most other states, if faced with such overwhelming problems, would have collapsed long ago, been forced to make considerable reforms or would have at the least suffered from serious internal dissent. But not North Korea; it appears to play by rules different from those of the rest of the world. Some international observers have suggested that North Korea could tough it out for a long time, even under present circumstances.<sup>33</sup> This situation naturally begs the question how such survival is possible. Despite its seemingly insurmountable problems, the Northern leadership appears to have actually bought itself more time by raising the stakes of its gamble. Realising that it can no longer compete with the US or even South Korea in conventional weaponry, the North Koreans have switched to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). All resources are now believed to be focused on developing long and medium range missiles, chemical and biological agents, and even nuclear warheads. This spending of scarce resources by a country that is starving may seem odd to most, but to Pyongyang such acts of madness are normal since in a way they are the very means by which the regime plans to escape its present predicament. These are the actions of a regime raising the stakes and upping the ante ever higher, hoping that its final roll of the dice will make all the gambles worthwhile and will somehow gain the financial resources from abroad to help in the country's recovery. These are the actions of a madman, the madman that is the Pyongyang regime.

## Madman as a Rational Policy

To truly understand the nature of North Korea's policy it is pivotal to familiarize oneself with the concept of Madman. Simply put Madman is an attempt to obfuscate a regime's true intentions and make the leadership seem as if it were somehow mentally unbalanced, particularly in its rational decision-making process. This is demonstrated by a state's willingness to take extreme measures if faced with a desperate situation. An example of this took place during talks in 1994 between the two Koreas when a North Korean negotiator declared to his Southern counterpart that "Seoul will turn into a sea of flames".<sup>34</sup> Such erratic behaviour makes negotiating far more difficult for opponents since it seems to border on the insane. Yet in actuality, the Madman policy is a carefully orchestrated series of strategic deceptions. At its core the effectiveness of Madman is not connected so much to the threat it poses to others; had this been so, it is likely that North Korea would long ago have been the focus of far more concerted international attention. Instead, the practice is a demonstration of desperation and a loss of the leadership's control over its rational faculties. It demonstrates that in a desperate situation the state may prefer to commit suicide rather than surrender. Yet in this final suicidal act, the perpetrator takes with him as many of his adversaries as possible. Therefore, Madman can be said to work on the principle of hurting oneself as a means of threatening others.

Historically, many of the advantages gained by Pyongyang have been through this threat, not so much to others, but through callousness to its own well-being.

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<sup>33</sup> Harrison, pg. 69.

Indeed, a “careless or even self-destructive attitude... can be a genuine strategic advantage”<sup>35</sup>, and a “threat of mutual damage” can frighten many an adversary.<sup>36</sup> North Korea has readily adopted this suicide before surrender option. A suicide, or scuttling of one’s own ship so to speak, particularly one that takes with it as many opponents as possible, can serve as a significant spoiling action highly detrimental to the victor. Pyongyang has stated clearly that should the US decide to impose war upon the DPRK then America would face “ruin in nuclear disaster”.<sup>37</sup> It is hardly a veiled threat. Quite frankly, it must be unnerving to an adversary to imagine that someone is willing to suffer serious personal losses simply for the sake of inflicting token injuries upon an enemy, especially since America’s counter-strike capabilities are well known. Pyongyang’s dependence on this tactic has been well illustrated by the use of its own starving people and the games played with food aid as a tool for gaining political advantage and economic concessions. North Korea has been known to demand significant compromises from donors as a pre-condition to accepting humanitarian aid. Many countries, not knowing how to deal with North Korea but desperate to help its starving people, give in to some of the regime’s demands.<sup>38</sup>

The simple reality is that North Korea lives by different rules than the rest of the world. According to Eberstadt, North Korean policy approaches are actually not at all mad or irrational. They are simply rooted in precepts and premises entirely different than our own. Hardly an act of madness, North Korea’s plan for unifying

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<sup>34</sup> pg. 333, John T. Rourke. International Politics of the World Stage, Guilford: Dushking Publishing Group/Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1995. The actual title “Madman” appears to have been an invention of Dr. Juris Lejnicks, this author’s thesis advisor.

<sup>35</sup> Pg 17, Thomas Schelling, “The Retarded Science of International Strategy”. In Elements of a Theory of Strategy. Full citation is not available.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, pg 12.

<sup>37</sup> “Boldly Going”, The Economist, April 3, 2002.

the peninsula by military conquest is characterized as a “careful, calculating, high-risk venture.”<sup>39</sup> The fact that it appears to have failed in the end does not make the plan insane, it merely presents another stumbling block the policy must overcome. Economic difficulties are but a temporary roadblock on the road to glory, and there is no reason not to use the very military forces that caused North Korea’s financial woes as a tool for gaining the financing needed to help in economic recovery. But this temporary setback *must* be checked if eventual victory is to be achieved. Thus, since conventional weapons are no longer seen as being capable of attaining lightning victory, then arming itself with weapons of mass destruction is the next logical step. To an outside observer a weakened economy and a starving populace could not justify such an expensive and seemingly rash endeavour. Yet this enterprise to gain potential nuclear capabilities serves the regime well by underlining to the outside world that, in their hunger, the North Koreans have been maddened to new levels.<sup>40</sup>

One must never make the mistake of forgetting that to all this apparent madness there is carefully calculated method. Basically Madman works as a very simple game of extortion. Traditionally what happens is that North Korea communicates by committing a dangerous military act, then demands concessions for not repeating it.<sup>41</sup> North Korean rocket sales to other terrorist-sponsoring states is a good case in point. Pyongyang has stated that it would gladly give up this

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<sup>38</sup> Eberstadt, pg 4.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, pg 6-7.

<sup>40</sup> It has also been suggested that the true genius behind North Korea’s long-range missile programme is that it is an entirely expendable bargaining chip. Pyongyang lacks both the money and foreign help needed to perfect the Taepodong missiles capable of hitting the continental United States. (Harrison, pg. 65.) However, in order for previous threats to be perceived as real, the next one must always be of a greater degree of magnitude or else outside observers may assume North Korea is no longer dangerous and will no longer feel the need to appease it. (Schelling, pg. 34.)

destabilizing activity, for \$3 billion a year in compensation. Pyongyang uses Madman simply as a tool for blackmail. The North Korean policy of survival depends in whole upon the use of force to extort money. Their belief is that “the nation can become prosperous only when the gun barrel is strong.”<sup>42</sup> Oddly enough, despite appearing to be ideologically contrary to *Juche* self-sufficiency, the policy of seeking tribute actually is *Juche*!<sup>43</sup> In this way self-reliance is constantly maintained, but in the form of North Korea relying upon military threats to take that which it needs from others. What is truly astonishing is the policy’s apparent success and the fact that North Korea has been able to create problems and instability greatly disproportionate to both its size and economic strength. It is therefore not surprising that Pyongyang depends on Madman since the military threats that it poses are among the few sources of leverage the regime has with the outside world.<sup>44</sup>

Despite its apparent success however, the reality is that such a tributary system simply cannot gain the finances needed to revitalize the Northern economy.<sup>45</sup> The threats are too costly and do not bring in enough money as compensation. In addition, the United States, Japan and South Korea, may eventually call North Korea’s bluff. These countries can only be pushed so far. This is perhaps why North Korea has partially changed its tune and is attempting to show that money can be donated by means other than fear. One should then not be surprised that at times Pyongyang has a very friendly approach, as was demonstrated by the 2000 Summit.

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<sup>41</sup> pg. 19, “Country Briefing, Republic of Korea”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 20 December 2000, Vol. 34, No. 25, pg. 19-26.

<sup>42</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 19.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Calder, pg. 114. Madman has also allowed North Korea to isolate itself from the outside world, thereby frustrating any foreign attempts to tamper in its internal affairs.

<sup>45</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 21.

In essence what has happened is that Kim Jong-il realises the limits of receiving tribute through intimidation and threat, acknowledging that it is not enough for economic recovery or continued isolationism. Thus he is now attempting to extol tribute through reconciliation, but without reducing the demand for tribute from threats.

In order to succeed in this endeavour, Kim Jong-il has had to present himself as a rational man ruling an irrational bureaucracy. He openly blames the functionaries below him for not allowing their leader to implement the rational policies, which he claims to espouse.<sup>46</sup> This is a wonderfully effective system where the leader blames others for any failure to implement promises he made but never intended to keep and for the threats that constantly permeate from the DPRK. Ultimately, however, Kim Jong-il's dependence upon such excuses, excuses that allow his leadership to blame others for irrationalities both past and present, is not due to an unwillingness to take responsibility for bad decisions. Rather, it is based on an unwillingness to renounce the time-tested Madman policy, yet at the same time try to avoid its possible negative consequences. Kim Jong-il must have realised that he cannot continue to depend solely and indefinitely on acts of madness to keep his country going. Bellicose statements and threatening actions could potentially backfire and instead of gaining concessions they could paint North Korea into a corner from which there is no escape.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 100.

<sup>47</sup> One cannot discount the possibility of a military official committing a monumentally dangerous act in the name of Kim Jong-il, yet without the leader's knowledge or consent. Such an act, however, could lead North Korea to a war it had not planned.

Here then we must question whether Eberstadt is correct in his contention that North Korea has no fallback plan. Indeed all the difficulties Kim Jong-il faces *seem* to have forced him to adopt a more outwardly rational plan for reunification and survival. At the time of the 2000 Summit it appeared that the DPRK had indeed changed its ways, even if that was little more than a new method of gaining money and concessions through reconciliation rather than military threats. But have things really changed? North Korea remains isolated, as per its wishes. The tribute system continues and few outsiders have any influence on North Korea. Finally, military threats persist. Any reduction in hostilities tends to be a temporary rather than a permanent trend. Then is outward friendliness really a new policy? Certainly not, since in times past Pyongyang has improved its conduct in order to gain foreign aid.<sup>48</sup> Moreover, as indicated above, all such improvements contained outward friendliness and, at best, hardly veiled intimidation. Therefore, Nicolas Eberstadt may be correct in stating that things have not really changed, that the official unification policy is not a fallback, but rather a continuation of the previously officially friendly but actually threatening policy. To understand whether there is any hope of North Korea changing, we must study the unification proposal set out by its leadership.

## A Peaceful Unification Policy?

The officially declared reunification policy of the Pyongyang regime is based around what it calls the Federation Model. This proposal can be broken down into a

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<sup>48</sup> During the 1970's the DPRK gained extensive foreign aid and loans from OECD countries in return for improved international behaviour. The money was used for modernizing North Korea's production



relatively simple two-stage plan.<sup>49</sup> The first stage involves the organization of one nation, one state, two systems and two autonomous regional governments. Within this new federation a Supreme National Federal Congress and Standing Federal Committees would be organized in order to straighten out the details and design a structure for the newly unified state. These bodies would manage North-South relations in an attempt to find commonalities inherent to the interests of all Koreans. A major component of these common interests is for the two *regional* governments to form a unified *national* government that recognizes and accepts the other's ideology and system.<sup>50</sup> In the second stage, parliamentarians from both regions would work together to draft a new constitution that would attempt to codify this complex new state.<sup>51</sup> This second and final phase envisions a permanent resolution of the degree of power and areas of affairs (such as defence, politics and foreign affairs) that are to remain under the control of the two regional governments, within the unified Korea. Once this has taken place, people would be able to travel freely between North and South, while the two regional governments remain permanently intact, retaining their own systems of government.<sup>52</sup>

On the surface the North Korean proposal seems quite rational and constructive, a departure from Madman. Under this scheme neither of the regimes would be required to give up power or surrender their people to a sworn enemy. Gradual integration would alleviate any sudden shocks and give people a chance to

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capabilities, particularly in the military sphere. Pyongyang refused to repay any of the borrowed moneys.

<sup>49</sup> For further details please see Appendix 2.

<sup>50</sup> pg. 10, Park Kun Young, "North-South Summit Talks and Outlook for Seoul's Engagement Policy", *Korea Focus*, May-June 2000, Vol. 8, No. 3, pg. 1-16.

<sup>51</sup> Koh Yu-hwan, pg. 109.

<sup>52</sup> Chon Hyun-joon pg. 94.

adapt. Ensuring the continued existence of both regional governments within a federation-like structure would help guarantee continued rule for existing elites, ensuring both their survival and co-operation. Such a union would also increase the influence the Koreans have regionally since the two would now work together towards “common” goals such as security and historical redress.<sup>53</sup> Finally, with freedom to travel, all Koreans would have a chance to feel truly united as one people. All in all, the proposal appears to provide a very rational compromised solution to the reunification question.

What the North Koreans are proposing, however, cannot be considered a real unification plan. First of all, if this two system, one state structure were all they wanted, then it would be relatively easy to achieve. The two Koreas could share a single seat in the United Nations General Assembly and even have a common flag. Nor would it be all that difficult to create a rump parliament-type assembly where delegates do little more than bicker. These facts notwithstanding, none of the goals of North Korea’s policy, including those on the chart, have actually been implemented and few attempts have been made to do so. To move beyond this structure the Northerners would have to be willing to do more than just talk or make proposals, especially since even talking is something they rarely agree to do. Further, many of the proposals are simply unrealistic since they are contrary to everything the DPRK holds dear. For instance, how can North Korea *desire* free travel for its citizens? This is impossible since it would allow the people to be contaminated by Southerners through modern music, clothing, money, independent thinking, the questioning of

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<sup>53</sup> One is almost tempted to envision this united Korea existing in a European Union-like structure, with open borders, a joint parliament, yet separate states. However, this idea will have to be postponed

authority, etc. The entire proposal is dangerous since “contact with wealthy southerners might make northerners resent the regime that keeps them poor.”<sup>54</sup> It is more likely that North Korea means to allow its elite to travel as a reward for loyalty, as was the case with the Northerners who travelled for family reunions in late 2000. In addition, such a free travel proposal is incomprehensible when coming from the very same North Korea that has been unwilling to allow travel even with its communist allies.<sup>55</sup>

Essentially the best the Pyongyang proposal can do is provide for newsworthy events such as the joint entering of the two Koreas in the 2000 Sydney Olympics. This is the type of symbolic unified state that would be the result of reunification on Pyongyang’s terms. The new state and its “united” parliament would be hardly more than a rump body that does little given that it would have minimal national influence. And since the regional governments would control their own areas, the national parliament would only be able to have a say on issues seen as being common and somehow separate from regional issues. The North Korean plan sees the systems divided, but under the same flag, essentially perpetually. The point of such a “unified” state would be highly dubious since it would only give the impression of unity and would instead continue to cement the Koreas into two separate systems.

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for future study.

<sup>54</sup> pg. 51, “Unusual excursions, Destination 2: North Korea”, *The Economist*, December 22<sup>nd</sup> 2001 – January 4<sup>th</sup> 2002. pg. 50-52.

<sup>55</sup> pg 224, James Palais, “Nationalism: Good or Bad?”, in Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini, Eds, *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity*, The Regents of the University of California, Berkeley, 1999.

The changes would be strictly formal and symbolic in nature; institutional rather than popular; a *de jour* rather than *de facto* reunification.<sup>56</sup>

## Reunify? Survival is the Real Issue.

The severe economic difficulties faced by the DPRK, combined with the collapse of its financial support system from formerly communist allies, has made Pyongyang's policy of military reunification largely irrelevant.<sup>57</sup> In point of fact, the entire North Korean unification policy of the 1990's has actually become more of a defensive strategy due to fears of being absorbed by the ROK.<sup>58</sup> Realistically, the most pressing matter at hand is regime survival and the simple fact remains that the federation model is little more than a last-ditch survival plan. The model is the product of a desperate attempt to retain socialism in an "institutional reunification" where the absorption of South Korea is realised as being impossible to achieve, at least for now.<sup>59</sup> In addition, it appears that Pyongyang considers its reunification policy as a cure for all of its ills.<sup>60</sup> The goal of reunification is therefore twofold: as a source of capital and as a guarantor of survival. The regime appears to assume that with coexistence and mutual support the two systems and their government can somehow endure permanently. Simply put, Pyongyang is trying to beat the odds. It knows full well that in cases of national reunification, it is the superior side that

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<sup>56</sup> It is interesting to note that no mention is made of any ideology that might unite the two states. But since the ideology would likely be strictly symbolic, a return to a Confucian model may provide the historical impetus for a seemingly united state. Confucianism could be interpreted by both states differently and as meets their needs. This study will have to be reserved for the future.

<sup>57</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 38.

<sup>58</sup> Koh Yu-hwan, pg. 108.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, pg. 104.

<sup>60</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 94.

eventually absorbs the weaker one. The DPRK is hoping to avoid this seemingly inevitable reality by striving instead for reunification where both the weaker and the stronger systems survive, something it likes to refer to as *reunification by mutual agreement*.<sup>61</sup>

How this system is supposed to work can only be understood by considering North Korea's attitude towards international trade and investments. Although this factor is not mentioned directly in the reunification outline, it is highly relevant since economic recovery is largely the point of the Federation Model. What Pyongyang wants is to save its economy, and maybe make a bit of profit, by covering its entire territory with what it calls the *Mosquito Net*. As an agricultural tool the net keeps out pestering bugs while letting in fresh air for plants to flourish. North Korea has adapted and plans to expand the use of the *Mosquito Net* economically by allowing money and financial transactions to enter in order for the economy to prosper. At the same time, however, the net keeps out bothersome and dangerous ideas such as liberalism and capitalism. The system can be described as a direct funnel of payments by foreigners to the North Korean state, and by extension to the elite, but where the North Korean masses remain untouched.<sup>62</sup> An example of such a net in action is the Mount Kumgang tourism project. South Koreans visit the site and leave their money without ever coming into contact with or polluting the Northern populace.<sup>63</sup> Such hopes for more foreign currency stems from the fact that if the

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<sup>61</sup> Koh Yu-hwan, pg. 111.

<sup>62</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 15.

<sup>63</sup> In 1999 more than one fifth of North Korea's export revenues came from the Mount Kumgang tourism project. "Two Koreas set for tourist resort talks", Reuters, Oct. 2, 2001.

economy does not recover, eventually Kim Jong-il could lose his “divine authority” to rule.<sup>64</sup> This is an unacceptable prospect.

But what in particular does the regime fear and why does it feel itself weaker? It has, after all, weathered a severe famine and huge economic downturns.<sup>65</sup> Kim Jong-il’s rule appears to be cemented; his extended trip to Russia proved him unsusceptible to coups d’état. The population, although poor and starving, has not only retained but even increased its loyalty to the regime.<sup>66</sup> Otherwise, a highly effective and sizeable internal security apparatus easily quashes any dissent. Threats to the regime must therefore be assumed to be external in nature and that is indeed how they are viewed by the regime itself.<sup>67</sup> And for the Pyongyang regime, any threat to its own security is seen a threat to national security. This behaviour naturally begs the question of why the regime views its own security as being so important? More than anything the fear of losing power is primary in the minds of the Kim Jong-il regime, not the fall of the *Juche* ideology or the welfare of his people. These things are but tools of power. Currently the regime has the power and does not want to lose it. It is a basic dictatorial instinct not only to survive, but to *dominate!* For the North Korean regime its hubris is far more important than the good of the people. Therefore, the DPRK military serves to ensure the survival and status of the

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<sup>64</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 110.

<sup>65</sup> Despite receiving very little outside aid, North Korea has recently been able to partially reverse this downward spiral. Myers, pg. 2.

<sup>66</sup> Apparently criticism of the system has been dampened due to the fact that proportionally more party members have died of starvation than ordinary citizens, since they have largely refused to participate in black market activity. Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 92. Despite such naïve claims of ideological sacrifices it is far more likely that people naturally rally around their leader during bad times. In addition, although things are bad, people are continually told that the rest of the world has it worse. The sun only shines on North Korea, after all. And the people believe it because they are *told* to believe it!

<sup>67</sup> North Korea has quite genuine security fears. In the South it faces a technologically more advanced ROK. With US backing Seoul could potentially launch a pre-emptive strike. Harrison, pg. 64.

Pyongyang regime,<sup>68</sup> and the Kim dynasty in particular. Thus, if external dangers can be reduced, then the regime will be given a period of reprieve in which a sense of security can be regained. This is the primary reason for Kim Jong-il's negotiating. Maintenance of personal power is his only concern.

Nicolas Eberstadt has pointed out quite reasonably that from the very beginning everything has failed for North Korea. Unification has not taken place, the people do not live in a socialist paradise and the country is essentially bankrupt. Partially to blame for this is the fact that unification always had to be strictly on the DPRK's terms, with no consideration made for others.<sup>69</sup> Since these terms have been the state's "overriding policy objective since its very inception"<sup>70</sup> we can then understand Eberstadt's dramatic statement that it is now realistic to seriously contemplate the end of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The failure of its ultimate goal equals the failure of the entire North Korean "project", as Eberstadt calls it. Yet, despite its inherent challenges and failures, *Juche* remains the official guiding principle of political and economic decisions made by Kim Jong-il, his party and the bureaucracy.<sup>71</sup> Indeed the young Kim has remained quite faithful to the model set out by his father, publicly pursuing the federation model of "one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments"<sup>72</sup>. It is a model not dependent upon military conquest, promising instead a peaceful transition by mutual agreement. At the same time vast resources continue to be spent on improving the DPRK's

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<sup>68</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 93.

<sup>69</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 4-5.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, pg. 25.

<sup>71</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 91.

<sup>72</sup> Koh Yu-hwan, pg. 106.

military strike capabilities. On the surface it appears that the young Kim is prolonging the disastrous ideology laid out by his father.

Appearances notwithstanding, a dramatic change has actually taken place in the policies of the Pyongyang regime. As has been pointed out by the scholar Vasily Mikheev, since the demise of socialism around the world Pyongyang has already been forced to change many of its theoretical concepts in order to survive.<sup>73</sup> Few, however, have been publicly acknowledged. On the surface all policies remain in the guise of a continued unwavering *Juche* ideology, typically paired with continued military build-up. Yet military strategy has changed subtly, but substantially, from one of conquest, to one bent on ensuring defence. Therefore, what we are actually seeing is not a change in the official unification policy. Rather, for the first time the official, publicly stated policy, long a smokescreen of true intentions, has overtaken the military option as the more likely to be pursued since it appears to be the one more likely to ensure long-term survival. In this departure from the military-first strategy, the Northern plan has actually moved gradually closer to the South Korean model.<sup>74</sup> For the first time, and due mainly to reduced capabilities, North Korea appears to be giving far more serious consideration to the Federation Model than to the traditional military option. Given the choice between utter failure and partial success, Kim Jong-il has predictably chosen the latter.

Despite its isolationism, the regime historically has been remarkably prescient in its decision-making process and there is no reason to assume it is not so today.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, Pyongyang must have come to the conclusion that it may not be able to

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<sup>73</sup> pg. 88, Vasily Mikheev, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Cold War Era"

<sup>74</sup> pg. 13, Hwang Jang-jin, "A Monumental Step Forward", Korea Now, June 17, 2000, pg. 12-13.



continue its existence, since the very point of its existence cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. So the regime is left with a choice, ultimate failure, or a chance of partial success in the guise of survival. This partial success would take the form of reunification on terms appearing to be North Korean, but would put an end to any chances of absorbing the South, at least for the time being. It can therefore only be concluded that Pyongyang must see improved relations with South Korea as being in its own best interests. What has to be considered now is whether Seoul will respond in kind. For indeed it is largely up to South Korea to decide whether or not the DPRK's proposals are relevant. The ball is increasingly in the DPRK's court and the North Koreans will have to create conditions that will, in the end, be favourable to South Korea if the Kim Jong-il regime wishes to survive.

## The Sun Always Shines from South Korea

South Korean unification policies have varied widely in the past. In the late 1940's President Syngman Rhee, threatened to use force and "march North for unification". This policy, however, was hardly a concerted military effort. Rather than reflecting an actual state of military preparedness, the policy was intended to reduce internal ROK political tensions.<sup>76</sup> In the early 1950's, South Korea had to fight to save its very existence. The opportunity that arose with the American advance into the North was missed and following the Korean War Seoul had to settle into a more defensive strategy. When in the 1960's General Park Chung-hee gained power through a military coup, the question of reunification was postponed, putting it

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<sup>75</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 33-34.

in second place to modernization and economic development.<sup>77</sup> This policy continued well into the 1980's, and it can be said that outside of economic development, defence and the avoidance of a military defeat from the North were South Korea's primary concerns. In 1988, President Roh Tae-Woo changed the outlook of North Korea from that of an adversary to a partner in inter-Korean dialogue. This was during the time of greater regime openness and reform that was sweeping through Eastern Europe. Roh Tae-Woo hoped to create a new partnership using "peaceful and democratic means as the guiding principles for attaining unification"<sup>78</sup>, a process that worked in formalizing relations with both China and the Soviet Union. For some time the approach did raise the level of talks between the bickering Koreas. Although ultimately unsuccessful at reunifying the two Koreas, the idea later served as a model for both Kim Young-Sam's and Kim Dae-Jung's reunification policies and led to the development of the Sunshine Policy. 1993 saw Kim Young-Sam as the ROK's new president. He hoped to benefit from the collapse of the communist bloc and South Korea's obvious economic advantages over the North to push for closer relations. In 1994 Kim Il-sung and Kim Young-sam were to meet but the North Korean leader's sudden death led to the meeting's cancellation and a deterioration in relations.<sup>79</sup> The current president, Kim Dae-jung, has based his Sunshine Policy on what he sees as a more practical level. Concluding that there is little real possibility that North Korea will collapse or reform of its own accord, this

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<sup>76</sup> Koh Yu-hwan, pg. 91.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pg. 93. North Korea's present policy of economic recovery before military reunification seems to mirror Chung-hee's plan.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., pg. 96.

<sup>79</sup> This is a good example of a time of weakness for North Korea that forced it to increase its belligerence in order to appear stronger, more resolute, refusing to take part in talks from a position of weakness.

president is attempting to improve relations through a variety of good-will gestures, particularly in the sending of food aid to his malnourished neighbours.<sup>80</sup>

Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy can be organized into a gradual three-stage process.<sup>81</sup> It is based primarily on the principles of self-reliance, peace and democracy. The first step envisions the creation of an inter-Korean Confederation. During this period steps would be taken towards a peaceful coexistence with the goal of eventual reunification. The establishment of structures for peace through arms control agreements is foreseen as an important movement to that end. The intention here is for the two Koreas to finally sign a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War.<sup>82</sup> A body, known as the Council of South-North Confederation, would begin implementing the process of ensuring reunification moves forward. Its functions would include the enhancement of mutual cooperation, increasing exchanges and reviving a common national heritage by organizing more family reunions. Essentially, this initial stage of the Sunshine policy lays out the creation of the following structure: one confederation, one nation, two states, two systems and two independent governments.

The second stage of Kim Dae-jung's policy envisions a coming together of the two Koreas. A single federal government would be in charge of foreign relations, defence and any important issues that might affect both Koreas. However, the two regions would retain autonomous governments. The structure would be organized

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<sup>80</sup> Yu-hwan, pg. 95-97.

<sup>81</sup> As it stands now Kim Dae-jung's and the ROK's official policies are very similar and nearly overlap. Both demonstrate a considerable degree of flexibility and therefore shall be analyzed as one. Also, since South Korea is a democracy and no homogenous idea on policy can possibly exist, Sunshine will be our focus. For further information, please see Appendix 2.

into one nation, one state, one system and two autonomous regional governments.

The third and final stage foresees the complete reunification of the two Koreas.

There would be one state, one nation, one system and one central government.<sup>83</sup> The country would embrace democracy and a market economy, thereby ensuring for its people social welfare, peace and a non-expansionist foreign policy.<sup>84</sup>

The late 1990's have seen the Sunshine Policy come into its own. Its significance cannot be overstated since it was largely thanks to this policy that Kim Dae-jung won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. It also started serious détente and reconciliation with the North and paved the way for the June 2000 Summit of Korean leaders. Indeed, the Sunshine Policy has been described as something of a personal mission for Kim Dae Jung,<sup>85</sup> one that he has pushed despite growing opposition and significant economic setbacks. But why does he pursue it so doggedly? What is the real strategy behind Kim Dae-jung's policy and can these rays of sunshine really melt the hostile DPRK?

As must be clear to even the casual observer, in order for unification to take place at least one of the two Koreas will have to cease to exist. Since Seoul is not likely to surrender itself to a weakened Pyongyang, it would be natural to conclude that the ROK expects the situation to be the other way around. Yet, during his inauguration in 1997, President Kim Dae-jung declared that he did not have "any

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<sup>82</sup> The US and the ROK both want a peace treaty between the two Koreas. North Korea on the other hand, wants a peace treaty only between itself and the United States, since Pyongyang views the US to be its principle adversary, and the ROK as merely Washington's puppet. Harrison, pg. 73.

<sup>83</sup> However, Seoul has considered allowing for several regional governments in lieu of a single central one. This may be necessary as insurance to members of the Northern elite who may be wary of joining a unified state where Seoul is the capital.

<sup>84</sup> Such a democratically oriented unification would certainly find greater favour among the region's four major powers.

<sup>85</sup> Du Mars, pg. 20-21.

intention to undermine or absorb North Korea".<sup>86</sup> We must therefore consider that, at least in the short term, unification is not Dae-jung's goal. Instead, the policy initially concentrates on two areas that are of far greater importance to South Korea: seeking a peace treaty and saving North Korea from total collapse. Since taking office, and as a means to this end, President Kim Dae-jung has pursued a very open engagement policy with the North. This policy has included economically aiding the DPRK as a method of pursuing peace.<sup>87</sup> Although surprising that it would support an enemy, it is in South Korea's interests to avoid facing millions of hungry refugees that would result from a Northern disintegration.<sup>88</sup> In addition, Seoul simply cannot afford to finance a collapsed North nor presently pay for reunification.<sup>89</sup>

Since it is also the North's goal to survive and revive its own economy, it becomes obvious that peace and the recovery of the Northern economy are closely tied together. In light of this fact, South Korea has been pursuing a deeper integration of the two economies as a method of saving the DPRK. Although the process would be lengthy, President Kim Dae-Jung has suggested that a full integration of the two economies would take place within 20 to 30 years.<sup>90</sup> However, in order to do this the Northern economy would need to be reformed significantly. Yet, the Southern president knows all too well that he can't expect to save the Northern economy by calling for reforms. Even today North Korean officials consider any South Korean hopes that the DPRK reform its economy to become more open as "an intolerable,

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<sup>86</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 43.

<sup>87</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 95.

<sup>88</sup> Harrison, pg. 71.

<sup>89</sup> According to the Bank of Korea, the estimated costs of reunification would be anywhere between \$100-\$500 billion. Calder, pg. 116. Aiding the North would help defer these costs.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, pg. 113.

grave challenge to the North”... that “defames the dignity of the North and its system.”<sup>91</sup> Faced with such rhetoric, and the nearly insurmountable task of getting North Korea to open its borders, Kim Dae-jung has tried to pursue a friendly policy, doing so in the name of his populace that tends to prefer détente to confrontation with its Northern neighbour.<sup>92</sup> Thus, instead of reacting belligerently, the president has made the Sunshine Policy very accommodating to North Korea.<sup>93</sup> In the short term at least, the Sunshine Policy should be viewed as a promise not to undermine the North Korean state or unify it by absorption.<sup>94</sup>

Throughout its existence, the DPRK has reacted to any foreign attempts to influence its internal affairs by responding with overt hostility and threats. The extremist rhetoric, when combined today with very significant armed forces, poses a real danger to South Korea’s safety.<sup>95</sup> Like a cornered animal, North Korea reacts by lashing out at its enemies. It is a natural reaction for dictators, when they feel they are losing their grip on power, to close themselves within a “fortress mentality” and attack those around them.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, “the potential enemy... if he is not to react like a trapped lion, must be left some tolerable recourse.”<sup>97</sup> It is unimaginable that such a situation, whether on humanitarian or security grounds, could be allowed to drag on for much longer. For this reason South Korea has been willing to spend

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<sup>91</sup> pg. E12, “North Korea presses South to lift alert”, Edmonton Journal, November 11, 2001.

<sup>92</sup> Playing no small role in this has been the fact that some 15 percent of the population, or 7.5 million people, have relatives in North Korea. Despite the small number of family reunions organized up till now, the meetings have managed to spark a deep yearning in the Southern populace for closer social ties. Calder, pg. 112.

<sup>93</sup> Myers, pg. 4-5.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, pg. 139.

<sup>95</sup> Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ would almost certainly ensure significant civilian losses were any conflict to erupt.

<sup>96</sup> Paul Globe, “Lukashenka Lashes Out”, RFE-RL, March 5, 2001.

<sup>97</sup> Schelling, pg. 6.

significant resources if only to have an open channel of dialogue with the North. As a result, the Sunshine Policy has been marked by significant success due to its consistent approach and showing a great deal of faith in Pyongyang through “the principle of giving first and getting something back later”.<sup>98</sup> The hope for Kim Dae-jung has been to place relations on a level sufficient to “induce change” in the North.<sup>99</sup> Where past governments have tended to view reunification as a zero-sum game, Dae-jung has decided to play a waiting game.

If one assumes that Kim Dae-jung has naïvely trusted North Korea’s proposal at face value only, then there should be little surprise that the man won an international peace prize. However, one should not forget that despite the fact that early reunification is not Seoul’s goal, it is nonetheless acting in its own best interests. By making peaceful coexistence and exchanges the number one priority, the ROK is demonstrating a lesson learned from the Germans. Such actions can help foster a sense of homogeneity among the people and almost certainly lead to reunification, even if it takes 20 to 30 years.<sup>100</sup> The reality may well be that, as West Germany did with the East, South Korea hopes that the North will lower its defences thereby hastening reunification.<sup>101</sup> In this light, we should consider that the Sunshine policy is something of a South Korean gamble. Although its rewards may not be immediate, the gamble actually has *two* possible payoffs: one, there is peace, despite continued separation, and two, sometime in the future the entire process undermines the DPRK and eventually causes it to implode. Although a great deal of patience is required for

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<sup>98</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 98-99.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> A figure on which both Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il agree. “Pyongyang approaching Seoul on unification, Kim says”, Korea Herald, 09/10/2000.

the second result, it is by no means absurd to assume that Seoul would be happy to eventually be rid of its northern pest. And ultimately, despite promises not to absorb the North, Sunshine makes it quite clear which system it foresees as triumphing in the final stage of reunification.

Conspicuous by its absence thus far is any mention of human rights. Despite the fact that North Korea was rated among the world's worst states for political rights and civil liberties by the US based human rights organization Freedom House, South Korea has had to largely ignore these abuses.<sup>102</sup> Indeed, Sunshine Policy pays little heed to human rights because it would be detrimental to engagement. Seoul is caught trying to ignore humanitarian issues in the hope that rapprochement with Pyongyang will do more to at least improve the material lot of the North Korean population. This practice, however, cannot be seen as being permanent. For although it realises that any serious attempt to raise human rights issues with the North could end all dialogue between the two neighbours and stop any progress that has been made, Seoul also knows that the issue is important to modern South Koreans.<sup>103</sup> Southern voters may not suffer a lack of democracy in the North forever. Although this has not yet become a political hot potato, in the long run it will have to be dealt with, especially if Seoul hopes to bring the Sunshine Policy to its envisioned conclusion where unification takes the form of a free and democratic state.

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<sup>101</sup> Myers, pg. 146.

<sup>102</sup> Pg. 121. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian, eds. Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders, Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum, St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1998.

<sup>103</sup> John Larkin "Refugees in Purgatory", Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 6, 2001, pg. 18-20.



## If Only the South Koreans Would Unite

It has by no means been easy for the South Koreans to formulate a workable reunification policy. First of all, despite the present economic and military decay taking place in the DPRK, the country is by no means a paper dragon. North Korean military threats remain very real. Ground forces are still significant and despite being somewhat obsolescent, Pyongyang's tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers and other major pieces of offensive equipment outnumber the combined US/South Korean forces by a margin of 2 to 1.<sup>104</sup> Also, this figure hardly takes into consideration the significant arsenal of ballistic missiles arrayed just north of the DMZ.<sup>105</sup> Nor has it been lost on the South Koreans that such armed forces do not exist for their own sake; they are instruments that are meant to be utilised.<sup>106</sup> So, although North Korea can no longer launch a successful war of reunification, it can certainly cause a great deal of damage.<sup>107</sup> Therefore, in all of its calculations Seoul has had to consider that all their goodwill gestures are but one way for North Korean hardliners to bide their time waiting for an advantageous opportunity to present itself for a successful military assault and takeover of the ROK.

Secondly, North Korea has delayed implementing confidence-building measures that would help serve *détente*.<sup>108</sup> To outside observers it is never quite clear precisely what the country is doing. Dependence upon Madman has created a considerable challenge for South Korean policy-makers. These representations of

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<sup>104</sup> Rourke, pg. 329.

<sup>105</sup> Pg. 24, "Country Briefing, Republic of Korea", *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

<sup>106</sup> Pg 200. Peter Paret, ed. "Clausewitz." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the nuclear age*, 186-213. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

<sup>107</sup> It is understandable why South Korea wishes to avoid war when one considers that 4 million lives were lost during the Korean War. Rourke, pg. 329.

insanity, which take place in conjunction with supposedly peaceful overtures, have been unnerving, even when North Korea's capabilities are in doubt due to its economic problems. And for good reason. Pyongyang's refusal to even consider a peace treaty with Seoul has left many in the ROK with the uncomfortable feeling that even if given what it wants, the North will still be free to invade the South. Further, were South Korea to sign a peace treaty with Pyongyang, the US would find itself under considerable pressure to leave the Peninsula. American forces would then be less able to intervene in defence of their ally against a North Korean invasion. So even when the North Koreans appear to be talking in the interests of peace, justifiable suspicions remain.

Finally, the DPRK has proven itself very resilient. To survive into the new millennium when all other communist states have either collapsed or have reformed their national economies to more capitalist models, is no small feat. This has added a significant difficulty to South Korean policy-makers. Thanks largely to its isolation, the North has been able to avoid many, if not most, of the impurities to its ideology which so effectively undermined all other members of the communist block. Indeed, North Korea's very isolation, which may seem a hindrance to strength, has allowed the hermit kingdom to ignore and neutralize threats to its very existence.<sup>109</sup> With such an adversary even talking is a challenge.

The other major difficulty has been opposition to President Kim Dae-jung at home. Some analysts have pointed-out that the Sunshine Policy's very specific and

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<sup>108</sup> Calder, pg. 119.

<sup>109</sup> Schelling.

consistent character makes it prone to controversy.<sup>110</sup> Political party antics aside, significant opposition exists for legitimate reasons. There is some justification to the argument that the entire peace process and thawing of relations is little more than another “strategic deception” on the part of Pyongyang. One should not misinterpret this argument as merely being suspicious that North Korea is using its new “openness” as a method for gaining certain concessions or more aid. The unwillingness to accept North Korean goodwill overtures is based on historical precedent. Less than a week before the June 1950 invasion of the South, Pyongyang made proposals for a peaceful and voluntary unification with the ROK. The tactic was a diversion from its true military intentions.<sup>111</sup> As a result, when conservatives in Seoul fear that North Korea’s display of friendship is merely a ruse, they have legitimate reason for this. With the construction of a railway and highway link between the two states, a ready-built corridor would be available for an invasion. Although defending forces would quickly destroy such infrastructure, the corridor would nevertheless present a welcome route into the South. Such an invasion could work in the unlikely chance that the preparedness of the South Korean military forces were to be reduced due to complacency, Northern WMD knocked out significant portions of the South’s defensive network and the US troops were to pull out due the illusion that North Korea no longer posed a military threat. Therefore, it is understandable why many in Seoul are uncertain as to North Korea’s real intentions.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> pg. 119, Shin Ji-ho, “Carrying Out the Sunshine Policy for Chochongnyon”, Korea Focus, Nov-Dec 1999, pg. 119-123.

<sup>111</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 27.

<sup>112</sup> “Country Briefing: Republic of Korea”, pg. 19.

Although some may dismiss the 1950 invasion as ancient history, the continued strain of today's relations warrants such fears. Thus far, Kim Dae-jung has gained none of the confidence-building measures that would make South Koreans feel secure. For instance, requests for a hotline between the two governments, prior notification of major troop movements and the observation by each side of the others' military exercises have come to naught.<sup>113</sup> It would seem that part of North Korea's policy is to be deliberately ambiguous on important issues such as security. This has given many of his countrymen the impression that Kim Dae-jung is being "soft" due to his policy of reconciliation with the North.<sup>114</sup> However, President Kim has been able to silence much of this criticism by continuing very pragmatic practices alongside of Sunshine Policy. Under his rule the ROK has not only maintained a level of military preparedness sufficient for defence, it has considerably increased military spending.<sup>115</sup> This has given Kim Dae-jung the image of a man exercising considerable restraint. For indeed, why be soft with someone you can actually defeat in an armed conflict, especially someone who continually makes threatening gestures?<sup>116</sup>

The fact remains that reconciliation with their Northern brethren is far too important an issue to the majority of South Koreans for any opposition group to do little more than criticize certain parts of the Sunshine Policy. As a matter of fact, most real opposition to Kim Dae-jung's approach has more to do with the costs

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<sup>113</sup> Howard W. French. "Korean Defense Chiefs Meet", *NY Times*, Sept. 25, 2000.

<sup>114</sup> Myers, pg. 138.

<sup>115</sup> "Country Briefing, Republic of Korea", pg. 19. Indeed, such has been the level of spending that it has even been suggested that the ROK could conquer the North quite handily.

<sup>116</sup> There is also rumour that the powerful military-industrial complex is connected to the opposition to détente with the DPRK since they stand to lose considerable profits. Harrison, pg. 66-67. However, we shall not entertain such speculation in the present study.

incurred, particularly during a time of economic downturn.<sup>117</sup> It is justifiable for people to be annoyed when significant time and resources are spent, while the North gives so little in return.<sup>118</sup> However, the little the North has given, particularly in the form of family reunions, has sparked a deep yearning in the Southern populace for closer social ties.<sup>119</sup> These social ties can exist only if political relations improve and North Korea is pulled out of its isolationism. There is also a high degree of impatience since the separated are getting old and time is running out for reunions; and it is perhaps this notion of a deadline that has many feeling anxious. Thus, the majority of South Koreans seem willing to let their president continue in his efforts of placating the North.

## Conclusions

The models laid out by the two regimes mask many of the true intentions of each state. However, a close look and analysis of them has given us many answers as to the goals and methods likely to be used. Ultimately, the proposals must be taken seriously because they provide for peace where otherwise there could be war or continued disunity. The key difficulty will be in implementing *any* steps towards reunification among countries that rarely talk. In this case the responsibility for taking the first steps lie with the DPRK, since Seoul has already made clear its willingness to move forward. From its position of weakness Pyongyang faces an added incentive to sit down at the negotiating table because the conciliatory Kim

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<sup>117</sup> John Larkin, "It's Not Over", Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 20, 2001, pg. 24.

<sup>118</sup> Dong-s Ilbo, "Time to review North Korea Policy", Korea Now, March 24, 2001, pg. 50.

<sup>119</sup> Calder, pg. 112.

Dae-jung's term ends in February of 2003.<sup>120</sup> Were he to be replaced by a less accommodating successor, the North would miss an excellent opportunity as it did when inviting US President Bill Clinton far too late in his term. If a harder line president were to be chosen, then Seoul would be sure to dictate terms far more demanding of Pyongyang, who would then find itself facing an adversary far less accommodating of its threatening posture. Given its present difficulties it is by no means guaranteed that the DPRK could survive or continue its dependence on Madman in such conditions. With such pressures, the unification policies of the two states become very important because they are a starting point from which the Koreans could begin to at least talk and compromise.

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<sup>120</sup> Presidential elections will be held in December 2002, while the current president's term expires in February 2003.

## Chapter Two

# The Policies of the Four Powers Towards Korean Reunification

Both North and South Korea have declared that reunification is strictly a Korean issue. The DPRK in particular has placed the blame for division solely on foreign meddling and does not want any outsiders to dictate or influence in any way its policies or its future. However, despite this Korea-first preference, the issue of reunification is heavily affected by the foreign policies of the four major regional powers, namely China, Russia, Japan and the United States. For better or for worse, many of the decisions Pyongyang and Seoul make, and the policies they practice, are affected by these four states; particularly since the Korean Peninsula has been something of a nexus of big-power strategies in Northeast Asia.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, it must be assumed that the question of reunification will also be significantly influenced by the wishes of these Big Four. Of course the variance in policies and the power of each nation certainly dictates the impact each will have on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>122</sup> In this case, the US, as the sole remaining superpower, will play the biggest role and may well be able to force North Korea to reunify or face destruction if it continues to threaten America's interests and its allies. This chapter shall consider each of the

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<sup>121</sup> Northeast Asia is considered by some to be the most dangerous place on earth. It is the only place where the three largest nuclear powers, Russia, the US and China, and the world's two largest economies, US and Japan, are all engaged both politically and geographically. Calder, pg. 106.

<sup>122</sup> Difference in economic power is an obvious measurement. The 2000 GDP of each is as follows (in US \$): China \$1.1 trillion, Russia \$310 billion, Japan \$4.2 trillion, United States \$9.87 trillion. These

Four's foreign policies individually, analyze how they fit into the Korean context and suggest their role in bringing about Korean reunification.

## China

Throughout its communist history, Chinese foreign policy determinants have been based on very strict guidelines: tradition, ideology and perception of the country's capabilities.<sup>123</sup> Today, however, new principles are being adopted. With foreign policy now being decided by Jiang Zemin<sup>124</sup> the Chinese government is attempting to portray a more modern policy of strategic nonalignment and active participation in the international economy.<sup>125</sup> This has been necessary to adapt China to the realities of its position as a rising economic and regional power. What this means is that although today's principle concern is its internal economic development, Beijing is increasingly looking outwards, hoping to increase its international prestige. Of primary concern is that the world realise this new importance that China has found for itself. In order to achieve this end, the rising power is seeking to improve relations with its neighbours, Europe and especially Russia, in the hopes that the world and the United States will take it more

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figures are based on market exchange rate, not purchasing power. "Country Briefings", [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com), April 9, 2002.

<sup>123</sup> June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Political System, Modernization and Tradition*. Allyn and Bacon, Toronto, 1996. pg. 305.

<sup>124</sup> Fei-Ling Wang, "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and Policy on Korean Reunification", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 1999. Pg. 168. At this time it is not possible to speculate as to the policies of the likely future leader vice-president Hu Jintao since precious little is known about him. "Getting to know Hu", [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com), May 2, 2002.

<sup>125</sup> Hongying Wang, "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy, The Limits of Socialization", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 3, May/June 2000, Pg. 478.



seriously.<sup>126</sup> In this context, it must be realised that China's posture towards the Korean Peninsula, and Korean reunification specifically, play no small part in the larger picture. For, as will be demonstrated, the Korean Peninsula is something of a focal point for strategic manoeuvring among the region's powers.

One of the main concerns for China in its policy towards the Koreans is a fear that it could be left out of the loop on decisive issues. The significant role it played in Pyongyang's survival in the past, particularly during the Korean War, is no guarantee that it's importance will remain. Due to the troubled nature of the Peninsula, the political situation could change suddenly and to not participate would mean a loss of influence in this strategically important area<sup>127</sup>. The Chinese realise that they must play a continuous role in dealings with North and South Korea lest the other players involved, particularly those with greater financial resources, gain too much influence in the region. Specifically, China wishes to forego the possibility of Tokyo, Washington and Seoul working too closely without Beijing and forming a strategic alliance in their dealings with North Korea.<sup>128</sup> To this end, Beijing often underlines the unique rapport it feels it has with Pyongyang.

Further, China is becoming well aware of the fact that what happens on the Peninsula can profoundly influence its own security. Due to Beijing's strong opposition to the American Theatre and National Missile Defence (TMD and NMD)

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<sup>126</sup> To foster better relations China has even taken a conciliatory tone on border disputes with Russia. Xiaoming Huang, "Managing Fluctuations in U.S.-China Relations, World Politics, National Priorities, and Policy Leadership", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 2, March/April 2000, Pg. 279-280.

<sup>127</sup> China fears that it will lose influence with North Korea if the US improves relations significantly. Miro Cernetig, "U.S.-Viet thaw worries China", *The Globe and Mail*, November 30, 2000, pg. A13. Although at present it may not appear to be very realistic, it could happen.

<sup>128</sup> This is particularly true of the 1994 nuclear dispute and the light water reactors being built for Pyongyang. Wu Ximbo, "The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations, Warily Watching One Another", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 2, March/April 2000, Pg. 302-303.

systems, the rising power is finally realising that it cannot separate itself from issues such as the suspected North Korean nuclear program, yet at the same time protest the effects Japan's and the US's security policies have on China's sovereignty.<sup>129</sup> The biggest concern is that TMD may be installed in Taiwan, an island Beijing claims as its own. However, until Pyongyang stops making threats to "blow up the U.S. territory as a whole"<sup>130</sup>, China will have considerable difficulty convincing Washington to cancel its NMD program, whatever its real purpose. For neither China nor Russia believes US claims that NMD is really meant to defend itself against North Korea and other small but seemingly dangerous states. Rather they see it as a tool for minimizing Chinese or Russian retaliatory strikes were a war to start.<sup>131</sup> Since the North Korean missile threat is America's justification for creating a system that could potentially neutralise Chinese strategic missiles, Beijing must undermine that excuse and make NMD appear to be directed solely against China and Russia, states supposedly friendly to America.<sup>132</sup> For this reason, China has been quietly pushing Pyongyang to cancel its suspected nuclear programme, thus making it more difficult for Washington to justify its anti-missile initiative.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> China has actually been attempting to deflect attention away from its own missile programme by claiming that the US pursuit of NMD is creating instability. Without NMD/TMD China will have considerably greater powers of coercion and intimidation over the US and its allies in Asia. Peter Brookes, "The Case for Missile Defence", Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 7, 2000, vol. 163, no. 36, pg. 33.

<sup>130</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 41.

<sup>131</sup> pg. 129, Joseph Cirincione, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain", Foreign Affairs, Spring 2000, pg. 120-136.

<sup>132</sup> Even though the US wants TMD/NMD, it may be willing to compromise on the issue if it's own security and that of Japan were improved by a less hostile DPRK.

<sup>133</sup> Cernetig.

One of the main policies that China maintains is a very strong focus on the inviolability of state sovereignty.<sup>134</sup> Such an emphasis is tied to the wish that no other power will ever meddle in China's own internal affairs. This has a profound impact on its relations with other states. In order to avoid any foreign meddling in its affairs, China must publicly take this stand on the side of North Korea as a matter of principle.<sup>135</sup> Needless to say this affects China's stand on the question of reunification, for it is unlikely to push North Korea to unite or do anything on terms not acceptable to the hermit partner. China even claims that, as a sovereign state, North Korea is free to develop missiles and weapons of mass destruction if it so chooses. The matter is considered to be nobody's business but the DPRK's.<sup>136</sup> What is interesting about this unwavering public stance is the fact that it is based on inherent good faith towards North Korea. China and Russia share a notion that by not meddling in North Korea's internal affairs, they will somehow not be affected by any negative repercussions that may result from that country's policies. Indeed, to strengthen their position on the issue of sovereignty, the two often stand by North Korea no matter what it does, what promises it breaks, or who it threatens. This naïveté, however, cannot last forever since both China and Russia are gradually coming to realise that the instability North Korea exports negatively affects their own political and economic interests in the area.

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<sup>134</sup> This is particularly true after the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the emergency landing made by an American reconnaissance plane in China. It is actually quite surprising how closely China and the US are working to resolve the Korean issue, particularly with the suspicions the Chinese have following these incidences. Hongying Wang, Pg. 479.

<sup>135</sup> This policy is considerably eased by the fact that China has settled all border issues with the DPRK. pg. 128, Mikhail Titarenko, "Russia in Asia", *International Affairs*, 2000, 127-133.

<sup>136</sup> Samuel S. Kim, "North Korea in 1999, Bringing The Grand *Chollima* March Back In", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No. 1, January/February 2000, pg. 156.

Publicly the Chinese government has always supported the reunification of the two Korean states. Privately, however, China is very much afraid of the conditions that would bring about such an event or what the result would be of such an occurrence. First of all, unification may well be brought about by war or if one of the Koreas collapses. Both scenarios threaten to destabilise the entire region. Secondly, there is the chance that a united Korea could be unfriendly towards China.<sup>137</sup> This would create another power broker limiting China's ability to reach its full potential, particularly due to the likelihood that American forces would remain on the Korean Peninsula following reunification. It is not surprising that Beijing would construe their presence as a policy to contain China.<sup>138</sup> For these reasons China prefers to let things remain the way they are and focus instead on the status quo, as is reflected by its policies. But to maintain a status quo the DPRK's survival is vitally important. To this end the Chinese have been quietly mentoring Kim Jong-Il as he tries to expand the foreign ties that could conceivably extend the life of his regime.<sup>139</sup> For China is not interested in having an unstable neighbour, as it needs stability on the Korean Peninsula for its own economic development, which is of critical importance to becoming a greater regional power.<sup>140</sup>

There is also the issue of the other powers. If the two Koreas were to unite there is the chance that the US would pull out of the Peninsula, or even Northeast

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<sup>137</sup> Beijing's fear of such an outcome underlines the realisation that any reunification will likely take place in favour of the ROK.

<sup>138</sup> Harrison, pg. 78.

<sup>139</sup> Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Chinese Official Beats Albright to North Korea", New York Times, October 23, 2000.

<sup>140</sup> Odaga Ko, "Japan-North Korea Reconciliation Needed for East Asian Stability", Japan Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4, October/December 2000, pg. 12. Also, were the two Koreas to unite South Korea would have to redirect its investments from China into the economically devastated North. This would negatively impact many existing and potential South Korean investments in China.

Asia altogether. Although this would give China more leverage in its dealings with Taiwan, this seemingly attractive prospect could well lead to Japan becoming more militarised and a bigger challenger to China.<sup>141</sup> Alternatively, many Chinese officials fear that should the two Koreas improve relations or even unite, it could bring American soldiers right up to the Chinese border.<sup>142</sup> Meanwhile, the American presence helps check Japanese ambitions and improved relations between Washington and Pyongyang could increase the provision of aide and loans to the DPRK from such institutions as the IMF and World Bank.<sup>143</sup> In this way Beijing's past burden of being North Korea's chief aide provider would be lightened, a happy prospect since China simply can no longer provide significant financial contributions to the DPRK.<sup>144</sup> Since it is difficult to gauge which prospect is better, China has opted to maintain such balance as exists, publicly support the slight improvement in ties between North Korea and the United States, as well as between the two Koreas, and leave things the way they are.

Though often not openly stated, a very notable change has taken place in Chinese policy. Specifically, this is the growing reluctance of the Chinese government to support its North Korean ally at any cost. A realisation that it is more important to have a strong economy than a communist ideology has made China weary of bearing the financial burden of supporting a government that cannot support itself. Nor is Beijing blind to the negative affects North Korea has had on its country.

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<sup>141</sup> Anthony DiFilippo, "Can Japan Craft An International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?", Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No. 2, July/August 2000, Pg. 586.

<sup>142</sup> Rosenthal.

<sup>143</sup> Penny Crisp and Laxmi Nakarmi, "Now it gets Harder", Asiaweek, June 30, 2000, Vol. 26, Number 25, pg. 20-22.

<sup>144</sup> Calder, pg. 120. Nor are they willing, particularly after aid from Moscow trickled off. Eberstadt, pg. 100. Exact figures, however, are not available.

It is now believed that there are between 150,000 and 300,000 North Korean refugees in northeast China.<sup>145</sup> These people have surreptitiously crossed into China in search of work, food and money. Despite a pact with the DPRK mandating that these peoples be returned, few have been, and this places a great deal of strain on the local Chinese economy, particularly in the Heilongjiang province.<sup>146</sup> Nor is it worth prolonging Cold War rivalry by helping maintain North Korea as a thorn in the side of Japan and the US. These countries are far more important and valuable today as trading partners than as enemies. While economic transactions with Pyongyang are far too small to be of any significant value.<sup>147</sup> For Beijing, trade with and investments from the US, Japan, and even South Korea, are far more important. Indeed they are critical to China's expanding regional role.

Simply stated, Beijing has become annoyed with Pyongyang's antics. Yet the maintenance of good relations is pivotal to both China and the other powers since it is one of the DPRK's last remaining friends. As such Beijing is one of the few entities that might be able to pull the hermit kingdom out of its self-imposed isolation and onto a road towards reform and economic recovery.<sup>148</sup> Although attempts to push reforms similar to its own have largely failed, China remains pivotal to the reunification question. In one sense it is the only force that could potentially stop a violent reunification effort on the part of South Korea and the US. It is also the country that can most quickly decide if North Korea survives by choosing not to

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<sup>145</sup> Larkin "Refugees in Purgatory".

<sup>146</sup> Rosenthal. Oddly enough one of the major reasons that North Korean refugees are rarely returned has to do with Beijing's worries about its human rights image in the West. "North Koreans allowed to leave Beijing", *The Globe and Mail*, June 24, 2002, pg. A10.

<sup>147</sup> In 1995 there was only \$486 million in trade between China and the DPRK, a figure that has since dropped. This is nowhere near the year 2001-trade figure with the US at \$80.6 billion and Japan at \$87.9 billion, supposed former enemies. "Country Briefing", [www.economist.com](http://www.economist.com).

support it militarily were such an invasion to take place. This would certainly spell the end of the DPRK in any war. At the same time China is Pyongyang's partner in the uncharted world of international relations. By gently prodding, mentoring or even threatening to sever ties completely, China can slowly pull the DPRK out of isolation and encourage better relations with the ROK.

## Russia

Since the collapse of the USSR, Moscow has been faced with a decreasing level of foreign influence. This fact is closely tied with a weakened economy, as a result of which a great deal of internal problems have arisen. Faced with such dilemmas, the Kremlin leadership has had to grapple with the challenge of revitalising the economy and maintaining the Russian Federation as a great power.<sup>149</sup> These problems can be well understood by considering Russia's approach to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula in particular. Korea actually exemplifies many of the issues and problems Russia faces, such as its opposition to NMD, the economic desperation of the Russian Far East, and the loss of status in many of the decisions made concerning Korea. Despite these significant challenges, the nonsense President Vladimir Putin has managed to regain some influence in foreign policy by concentrating first on economic recovery.<sup>150</sup> When combined with the fact that Russia shares a border with the DPRK and enjoys open relations with both

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<sup>148</sup> Larkin, "Refugees in Purgatory", pg. 18.

<sup>149</sup> "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russia Federation", International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 5, 2000, pg. 1-14.

<sup>150</sup> According to the Russian Constitution, the President provides guidance to the country's foreign policy. By focusing on the economy President Putin has promised his people to return to them the

Koreas, it is obvious that the former superpower will play at least some role in reunification. However, due to its relative economic insignificance the Russian leadership will have to exercise serious efforts if it wants to have any real input in the complex web of Korean politics.<sup>151</sup> The reality is that Moscow is desperately trying to find a niche that it can influence.

Many of the policies Russia has formulated for Northeast Asia have more to do with its own economic recovery.<sup>152</sup> The creation of economic links with East Asia is seen as an important step towards that goal.<sup>153</sup> Currently, Russia has found great profit in oil and gas exports, particularly to Europe. The state now hopes that this boom can also be extended to Asia, which in fact has started with a project to build a gas pipeline under the Yellow Sea to the ROK and Japan. If that venture goes well, and relations improve on the Korean Peninsula, then future plans are in the works to build another line, this time directly overland from Russia to North and South Korea. Another profitable venture envisions rail shipments speedily moving cargo from Asia to Europe via the Trans-Siberian railway.<sup>154</sup> Since this would allow South Korean goods to travel more easily to Europe, Russia is hoping for substantial South Korean investments in infrastructure improvement to the local Gyeongui and its own Trans-Siberian rail systems. Such improvements and profits would inevitably include the

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respect they feel they deserve on the world stage. "Putin's annual address to the nation taken positively by some...", *RFE-RL*, 19 April 2002.

<sup>151</sup> Officially, Russia's foreign policy efforts are "focused on assuring equitable participation of Russia in the solution of the Korean problem and on maintaining balanced relations with both Korean states." "Foreign Policy...", pg. 13.

<sup>152</sup> Titarenko, pg. 127.

<sup>153</sup> Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "The Russian Far East's Economic Integration with Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, Summer 1999, pg. 210.

<sup>154</sup> It is expected that transport time would be cut from the 40-45 days it takes today by ship through the Suez Canal, to an estimated 10-12 days by rail. Costs would also be reduced by some \$400 per



DPRK, since goods would have to travel through that territory.<sup>155</sup> Yet this infusion of money can only occur if relations on the Peninsula improve significantly. For this reason Moscow hopes it can positively influence Pyongyang and help turn it from a barrier into a bridge to the global market.<sup>156</sup> Therefore, better relations between the two Koreas are of primary interest to Russia.

Another area of major concern is the economic weakness of Russia's Far East. This region has suffered disproportionately more than the rest of the country since the Soviet collapse that ended subsidies. With a weakened economy the Far East is in desperate need of investment, moneys that will not come if Northeast Asia is unstable. Of even greater concern is security and sovereignty over the area. Since the Russian Far East has a very small population, only 7.4 million and decreasing<sup>157</sup>, there is a very real fear of China trying to gain control over the area, whatever friendly overtures may exist today.<sup>158</sup> And like northeastern China, the area is facing increasing numbers of hungry North Korean refugees, people who place a great strain on the already desperate local economy.<sup>159</sup> For these problems to be overcome, stability is needed. The refugees will only stop coming if the economy of the DPRK recovers and its people are fed. Significant foreign investment will only flow if there is no chance of North Korea triggering a regional conflict or collapsing. And Chinese

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container. "Aksyonenko hammers out rail unification in Pyongyang", Vladivostok News, <http://vn.vladnews.ru>, March 23, 2001.

<sup>155</sup> Meyer, pg. 217-218.

<sup>156</sup> Calder, pg. 107.

<sup>157</sup> Meyer, 221.

<sup>158</sup> Russia fears that it will gradually lose control over its Far East due to poor economic performance and a demographic shortfall. Such a situation is also unfavourable to the US since China would likely step in and gain from this. "Is Russia Going to Lose Its Far East?", RFE-RL, August 27, 2001. Although President Putin has cemented his rule over the area, and the Russian military would not allow for this to occur unopposed, a historically based fear remains.

influence can only be checked if Russia maintains a strong presence in the area and is not threatened by North Korean instability.<sup>160</sup> For these things to happen, in the short term, Russia needs improved relations on the Korean Peninsula. However, it does not want relations that would suddenly unite the two Koreas since this would cause complications that Moscow would have difficulty dealing with at this time. Rather, Russia prefers relations between the Koreas that would maintain an easy to deal with status quo.<sup>161</sup>

The role Russia envisions for itself is significant. Primarily it sees itself as a tool for the creation of regional stability and economic expansion by helping North Korea to recover. First, Russia is hopeful that by integrating the power grid of the two states, electric failures will be a thing of the past for the North Korean population.<sup>162</sup> With the recovery of the DPRK economy, the demand for Russian energy supplies will increase significantly and so will Russian profits.<sup>163</sup> In addition, despite the huge drop in trade between the two states since Russia began to demand hard currency in its transactions, Moscow still hopes to gain significantly from economic co-operation with the hermit state. Principally, it sees future profit in rebuilding and repairing facilities and equipment provided by the USSR during the Cold War. Although this may seem an expense North Korea cannot afford to pay,

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<sup>159</sup> Park Heung Soon, "Role of NGO's in Improving Human Rights in North Korea", *Korea Focus*, Nov-Dec. 99, Volume IV, pg. 34-45.

<sup>160</sup> The Russian/Chinese friendship is only formal in nature, with little real political or economic reason for its tenability. In reality it is more of a temporary effort to reduce US global influence. Peter Clement, "Russia's International Relations in 2000" roundtable discussion, participants Peter Clement, Stephen Jerome Blank, Aurel Braun, Robert Owen Freedman, Paul Joseph Marantz and Carol R. Saivets. AAASS (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies) 2000 national Conference, Denver, November 10, 2000. Currently there is approximately \$5 billion in trade a year between Russia and China. Some 20% of that are arms. "Defense Minister Finishes Talks in China...", *RFE/RL*, June 3, 2002.

<sup>161</sup> Peter Clement, "Russia's International Relations in 2000".

nor Russia give away for free<sup>164</sup>, a seemingly simple solution has presented itself. By investing money in North Korea's infrastructure, Russian government officials hope they can cancel some of their Soviet-era debt to South Korea.<sup>165</sup> Another role Moscow envisions is the use of its rockets to propel North Korean satellites into space; again at great profits to itself.<sup>166</sup> All these factors are seen as being in the interests of Pyongyang because they would seemingly solve some of its problems with infrastructure, foreign-currency supply and energy shortages. Finally, since the two countries share a border and President Putin is the first Kremlin leader to visit North Korea, Russia naturally feels that it is in a unique position to play an important role on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>167</sup>

There are, however, some fundamental flaws in the role Russia has envisioned for itself. All the above mentioned proposals are completely profit-motivated. In fact, they all depend on other countries footing the bill for Russian products and services. Nor are they connected to any real motivation for regional stability. Moscow imagines that its own profits will somehow serve as a stabilising force in the region. It is not exactly a realistic hope. In addition, envisioning one's role is easy, but confusing it with one's capabilities and real long-term interests is something else

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<sup>162</sup> "Russia, North Korea sign energy accord", RFE-RL, Oct 31, 2001.

<sup>163</sup> Calder, pg. 107.

<sup>164</sup> Some North Korean debts to Russia have actually been paid off by sending "indentured servants" to work in Siberia at various industrial and construction sights. "...As Russian Media Sheds Light on his Kremlin Talks, Payment Practices", RFE/RL, August 7, 2001. It should be assumed that this practice cannot last long since it is not profitable to Russia, which is not short of skilled labour in these difficult economic times.

<sup>165</sup> Moscow has suggested that this is also an effective way for South Korea to reduce the costs of reunification. "Russia Hopes to Repay Some of its Debt to South Korea With Investments in North Korea", RFE-RL, August 8, 2001.

<sup>166</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 101. This came after a proposal by Kim Jong-il stating that he would stop North Korea's missile program if other states launched his satellites free of charge. It was assumed that a third party such as the US or Japan would cover all costs. Talks have only been preliminary, thus a precise value cannot be attributed to such an endeavour.

altogether. For instance, instead of seeking quick profits, Russia could instead mandate that its proposed aid to North Korea would only be provided if Pyongyang significantly improves relations with the ROK. This would still ensure significant profits for Russia, but also provide longer-term stability which although less glamorous today would be profitable nevertheless. If it is to be taken more seriously, as it hopes, Moscow will have to concentrate far more on stabilising the region than on looking for quick profits.<sup>168</sup>

Another factor that must be considered is whether or not Russia will continue to support North Korea as it did in Soviet times. The \$150 million in goods the two countries traded in 2000 is not enough to justify supporting the fledging state. In fact, North Korea is more important to Russia as a transit point for South Korean goods than as an ally.<sup>169</sup> Nor is Moscow any longer willing to support or suffer the instability Pyongyang causes with its missile program. The issue is too closely tied with the NMD system the Americans are developing and Russia simply cannot afford an arms race it feels would result from such a system's creation.<sup>170</sup> Finally, despite the unique rapport some Russians feel they enjoy with the Kim Jong-il regime<sup>171</sup>, the country simply does not have the influence it thinks it has. Even during Soviet times,

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<sup>167</sup> "...Stresses Russia's Role in Region", RFE/RL, November 15, 2000.

<sup>168</sup> One of the few real roles Russia can play is in helping North Koreans feed themselves. "Russia defends granting fishing permits to North Korea, Ukraine", BBC Monitoring Service, Aug. 9, 2001. Russia is not suffering from any food shortages.

<sup>169</sup> John Ibbitson, "Putin, Kim bring back Cold War", The Globe and Mail, August 6, 2001, pg. A8.

<sup>170</sup> According to the 1972 ABM Treaty a system such as the NMD would force the US to leave the agreement. Therefore, the US officially withdrew from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002.

<sup>171</sup> Titarenko, pg. 132-133.

authority was largely illusory.<sup>172</sup> Today, with aid cut to almost nothing, Russia alone simply cannot induce North Korea into better behaviour, whatever Moscow claims.

Despite Russia's desire to have significant influence in Northeast Asia, the most likely scenario envisions it playing the role of a passive observer. The days of unwavering support for the Pyongyang regime have turned into a more pragmatic realisation that the regime is negatively affecting Russia. Therefore, despite a new "Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness, and Co-operation" being signed between Russia and North Korea on Feb 9, 2000, Russia will no longer serve as a guarantor of North Korean survival.<sup>173</sup> And despite the short-term preference for maintaining the predictability and comfort of the status quo, in the long run the survival of the Pyongyang regime is not in Russia's interests. Finally, given Moscow's unprecedented levels of co-operation with America since the September 11, 2001 incident, it is entirely likely that Russia will give in to any reasonable US plans for the Korean Peninsula.<sup>174</sup> In fact, it may be safe to say that Russia would even side with the US, albeit passively, if North Korea ever provokes a conflict. Like China, Russia may well facilitate Korean reunification by turning its back on Pyongyang.

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<sup>172</sup> Pyongyang continually played off Beijing and Moscow against one another in a competition for supposed influence over the DPRK by having them grant ever-increasing quantities of aid.

<sup>173</sup> Unlike its Soviet/DPRK predecessor, the present agreement does not require Russia to provide North Korea with military assistance even if it were to be attacked by a foreign aggressor. "Russia, North Korea put relations on new footing", RFE-RL, Feb. 10, 2000.

<sup>174</sup> Katrina vanden Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen, "U.S. risking Russian anger", The Globe and Mail, May 6, 2002, pg. A14.

## Japan

Among the four powers, Japan's position is uniquely challenging. As a result of its colonial history on the Korean Peninsula, many Koreans, particularly the Northerners, remain embittered and distrustful of Japanese intentions. Thus, despite the fact that Japan is the biggest economy in the region, Tokyo's influence on inter-Korean politics remains minimal. Yet, Japan has a significant stake in the issue due to the direct threat the DPRK poses to Japanese security. At the same time, however, the role Tokyo can play in dealing with the North is hampered by Japan's adoption of Article Nine following World War Two. This legislation does not allow Japan to use its military as an instrument of foreign policy. Some have even said that in this manner Japan is limiting its natural leadership role in the region.<sup>175</sup> However, Tokyo is not wholly without influence. It is the largest economy in Northeast Asia and can therefore play a major role in any Korean developments. In addition, there are increased calls to drop Article Nine and allow Japan to play a bigger role in global security issues. As a result, Japan may well be able to force some of its own interests upon an unwilling and hostile Pyongyang.

One of Tokyo's primary aims is the reforming of the North Korean economy to a more capitalist structure. This is perhaps a somewhat selfish goal, since it stems from a desire for profit. Were relations to improve and a more market-oriented North Korea to emerge, Japanese businesses could make use of less expensive North Korean labourers for the production of goods. For this to occur, Japan realises it will have to significantly improve relations with the DPRK. Theoretically this could take

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<sup>175</sup> Pg. 43, Nicolas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory", Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 1998, 37-49.

place along the same lines as it did with Seoul, whom Japan paid a huge sum of money in 1965 in order to achieve diplomatic normalization between the two countries and as compensation for abuses during the colonial period. Were a similar deal to be struck today between Pyongyang and Tokyo, it would mean billions of dollars for the starving Northern economy.<sup>176</sup> However, few Japanese are willing to make such a compensation deal with the DPRK. Nevertheless, many in Tokyo realise that since their country is the principle economy in the region, and in order to improve relations, Japan will be saddled with many of the costs of rebuilding the DPRK, despite the current economic stagnation.<sup>177</sup> However, sensing Pyongyang's hostility, economic reforms have played a very minor role in relations between the two states.

Instead of focusing on economics, Japan has concentrated on what it views as more pressing issues, such as the improvement of relations, security, resolution of kidnapping issues and human rights.<sup>178</sup> The improvement of relations is a considerable challenge since they are strained even at the best of times. To achieve an improvement Tokyo has first to shed the conception of an "economic giant without moral conscience", an image Japan attempts to foster by raising human right issues.<sup>179</sup> Further, it must dissuade fears that it is attempting any form of imperialism when it pushes for changes in the North. It is for this reason that Japan limits the issues raised in talks with the DPRK. Meanwhile, communication in itself is a considerable

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<sup>176</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 18. Pyongyang has demanded at least \$10 billion in compensation for Japanese colonial abuses.

<sup>177</sup> Calder, pg. 109.

<sup>178</sup> Yohei, pg. 8.

<sup>179</sup> Ko, pg. 14-15. It is interesting to note that the improvement of human rights in the DPRK is raised at all. Japan is actually the only one of the four powers that has such a human focus in its foreign policy. However, it is not a top priority and will therefore not receive any more attention here.

challenge. The reality is that Japan has no diplomatic ties with North Korea. Yet Tokyo has concluded that in order to gain greater regional peace and stability it will have to rectify relations with North Korea.<sup>180</sup> To this end, the Japanese government sent the former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to Pyongyang in early December 1999. His job was to start negotiations on bilateral ties. Although they have yet to bear fruit, the very fact that occasional talks take place between the two sides gives Japan hope that relations can be normalised.<sup>181</sup>

This effort continues. At the time of this study's publishing, the current Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the DPRK and personally met with Kim Jong-il. For the first time ever, North Korea admitted to having kidnapped some one dozen Japanese citizens for the purposes of training spies. Even more remarkable was that he apologized for the occurrences and promised such things would never again take place.<sup>182</sup> However, so long as Pyongyang denied any connection to the kidnappings, that mere apologies may do little to sway Japanese popular opinion, which remains largely suspect of the North due to these and other threatening events. Nor is Tokyo likely to be able to demand compensation for its lost citizens, as does Pyongyang for Japan's colonial history.<sup>183</sup> Thus, as with the summit of the two Korean leaders in 2000, for this meeting to truly bear fruit,

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<sup>180</sup> Kono Yohei, "Pursuing Positive Korea Policy", *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, October-December 2000, Pg. 6.

<sup>181</sup> Kim, pg. 158. Following the Berlin Agreement of 12 September 1999, Japan demonstrated its good faith by lifting all of its sanctions against North Korea, which include an end to the ban on charter flights between the two countries. This is significant due to the large number of ethnic Koreans living in Japan.

<sup>182</sup> This is another good example where Kim Jong-il blamed horrendous acts on overzealous underlings. John Larkin, "Japan-North Korea Ties, Breakthrough", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Sept. 26, 2002, pg. 24.



Pyongyang will have to take some concrete steps for the citizens of Japan believe that Kim is really sincere. For instance, the surviving abducted Japanese will have to be returned as soon as possible and better guarantees will have to be made regarding Japan's security. Only then will these talks prove to be a real breakthrough in relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang.

On the issue of security, Japan views North Korea as one of the primary threats to its safety. This is not a new concern. Historically the Japanese have had the perception that Korea is a "dagger pointing at the heart of Japan" and many still feel this way.<sup>184</sup> When one considers Pyongyang's overt hostility, then it becomes clear that the threat can be perceived as being quite real. In addition, North Korea's missile and WMD programs frighten Tokyo. The August 1998 launch of the Taepodong I missile over Japan persuaded many that a harder line may be necessary in dealing with the DPRK.<sup>185</sup> It is therefore understandable why the Japanese view North Korea as a direct threat to their safety and very survival. As a result many of Japan's efforts have been focused on dissuading the Northerners from further weapons development and testing. Success has been only partial thanks to a temporary moratorium on launching on Pyongyang's part, but at least no new missiles have flown over Japan in the past few years.

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<sup>183</sup> "Koizumi gaining support for N. Korean stance: poll", Mainichi Daily News, Sept. 24, 2002. It may well be that by apologizing for the kidnappings Kim Jong-il managed to derail any of Tokyo's efforts at equating North Korean abuses of Japanese citizens with Japan's abuses during its colonialist period.

<sup>184</sup> Shuja, pg. 250.

<sup>185</sup> Some experts claim that the threat is exaggerated, pointing to the fact that the third stage of the three-stage rocket malfunctioned and failed to place its satellite payload into orbit. John Newhouse, "The Missile Defense Debate" in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001, pg. 102. Others however feel that the rockets could be easily modified and weaponized. Dr. William J. Perry, "Dr. William Perry testimony on North Korea", [http://www.state.gov/policy\\_remarks/1999/991012\\_perry\\_nkorea.html](http://www.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/991012_perry_nkorea.html).

After its defeat in World War II, the Japanese government and people adopted an anti-militarist principle in their constitution in the form of Article Nine. This article was meant to show that Japan would never again have imperial aspirations and was no longer a threat to its neighbours. Such a move was possible thanks to the security guarantees provided by American military forces with the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951. Today, however, despite the emphasis placed on security guarantees with the signing of the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996 and the Revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, there remains a gnawing doubt in Japan that the US-Japan security ties are not as certain as they once were.<sup>186</sup> There is growing speculation that the United States will gradually cut back on protection of its ally, leaving Japan to increasingly fend for itself.<sup>187</sup> At the same time much of the Japanese populace feels that it is time to drop Article Nine and allow their country to play a greater role in regional security, a role seen as natural for a country of Japan's economic importance.<sup>188</sup> Such a move would not be all that difficult. Although today the Japanese do not have offensive weapons, thanks to their advanced technology and wealth, such weapons could be built relatively quickly.<sup>189</sup> To a certain degree this has already started. Realising that it cannot depend on the US eternally, the Japanese have begun to seize the opportunity to improve control over their own defences. In reaction to the Taepodong missile test, Japan decided to launch its own reconnaissance satellites and partake in America's

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<sup>186</sup> pg. 158. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism", *International Security*, Winter 2001/02, Vol. 26, No. 3, pg. 153-185.

<sup>187</sup> Meyer, pg. 213.

<sup>188</sup> Kristof, pg. 47-48. Also: "Tired of pacifism, some Japanese want to try the nuclear option", *The Globe and Mail*, June 3, 2002, pg. A7.

<sup>189</sup> DiFilippo, pg. 580-581.

research and development of the TMD. This has had the effect of reducing Japan's dependence on the US for its security and intelligence in terms of the strategic activities of China and North Korea. The satellites serve Japan's early warning needs, while the TMD would potentially reduce the impact of any strategic missile attack upon its territory.<sup>190</sup> It can therefore be concluded that Japan is gradually refocusing its efforts towards a more independent defence policy due in large part to the threats posed by North Korea.

A more aggressive and well-armed Japan would cause a profound shift in the balance of power in Northeast Asia. China and Russia both fear the prospect of a militarised and TMD armed Japan since this would weaken their deterrence capabilities.<sup>191</sup> Yet neither can deny the fact that North Korea launched a rocket over Japanese territory, not their own. And despite claims that the launch was peaceful in nature, the rocket could well be used to hit targets in Japan. As a result both Russia and China are experiencing considerable difficulty in dissuading Japanese participation in TMD. They must have realised by now that one of the main issues causing Japan's more active role in its own and the region's security is the lack of stability on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>192</sup> And if Moscow and Beijing can't force Pyongyang to be a better neighbour, Tokyo may well deal with the DPRK as it sees fit. A possible hint of Japan's future policy on more aggressive self-defence can be surmised from the considerable efforts spent on proving that the vessel involved in a shootout with Japanese coast guard ships on December 22, 2001, was a North Korean

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<sup>190</sup> In addition, Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) are no longer limited solely to defence of the Japanese home islands. Katzenstein, pg. 159.

<sup>191</sup> Ximbo, pg. 299-300.

spy boat. Tokyo hopes it can prove Pyongyang remains a serious destabilising factor in the region by raising the boat and pointing the finger at North Korean spying and drug trading in East Asia.<sup>193</sup> If the vessel, disguised as a fishing trawler, could be conclusively linked to North Korea then a case for a military solution to the Korea problem would gradually gain strength. Therefore, Japan's concern for its own security could well force Russia and China to deal with North Korea, before Tokyo deals with it using its own military.

Finally, although Japan has been slow in waking from its security-induced slumber, it appears that the country will now take more control over its own defences. In particular, Tokyo is likely to take a more aggressive policy towards North Korea, either forcing it into better behaviour or aiding in its collapse. Both could hasten reunification. It should not be surprising that such an option is possible when one considers that most of the Japanese population does not trust the Pyongyang regime, no matter the recent peace overtures made by Kim Jong-il.<sup>194</sup> In the end, Japan may well play a more than passive role in the military destruction of North Korea and facilitate a process of reunification by paying for many of the costs involved. It is simply not likely that a regional power like Japan will sit idly by while an impoverished and economically insignificant country like North Korea threatens its very existence.

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<sup>192</sup> Pg. 24. Sakamoto Kazuya, "Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance", *Japan Quarterly*, April-June 2001, pg. 18-24.

<sup>193</sup> "Body found on N. Korean 'spy boat'", [www.cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com), May 6, 2002.

<sup>194</sup> Frank Ching, "Japan's Korean Dilemma", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 16, 2000, pg. 37.

## The United States of America

Within the group of four powers it is the United States that will play the most decisive role in settling the future of the Korean Peninsula. As the world's last remaining superpower and with an economy bigger than the other three regional powers combined, a concerted effort on the part of Washington will have a profound influence. Sheer capability aside, however, the US also has a great deal of immediate interests in the region and the Koreas specifically. As a matter of fact, the Peninsula represents a microcosm of foreign policy concerns that are important to Washington. Among them is the security of allies, support for democratic states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist threats and economic well-being.<sup>195</sup> These are not problems unique to the US and to a certain degree are faced by all four of the powers. What makes the US position prominent is that much of the burden of resolving the Korean issue has been placed in its lap by the rest of the world not just due to America's status as the biggest global player, but because of its importance as a regional power. Therefore, the degree of interest Washington dedicates to Korea will inevitably promote or stunt reunification. It is likely that the US will be key in finally resolving the protracted dispute on the Korean Peninsula by facilitating reunification. It is equally likely that such reunification will not take place at the expense of a valued US ally but rather at the expense of an irritant that has long threatened it.

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<sup>195</sup> It is interesting to note that the question of human rights has been largely ignored by the United States. This in the face of the US-based human rights organization Freedom House which rated North Korea among the world's worst abusers of political and civil liberties. Zhang, pg. 121. It should also be noted that gone are the days of fear of a communist domino effect. There is no longer a threat of North Korea "exporting" communism to its neighbours or creating revolutions in other states.

One of the biggest issues that interest the US is security. This particular problem, more than any other, will affect key US political issues such as the global economy and regional stability. It is therefore not surprising that Washington would spend so much time concentrating on North Korea since that country poses a clear and present danger to the United States and its allies. This is understandable when a country that is under suspicion of attempting to build WMD makes threatening statements that envision mass destruction of both the United States and its East Asian interests.<sup>196</sup> In particular, America is very concerned with the safety of South Korea. North Korea has made continuous threats against the ROK; a dangerous situation considering Pyongyang was only willing to sign the 1953 armistice with the United States, not South Korea.<sup>197</sup> In addition, the DPRK is still considered a state that sponsors terrorism and being labelled a terrorist is not a desirable title after September the 11<sup>th</sup>. The United States has long envisioned a terrorist launching nuclear tipped missiles at friendly territory and on the basis of this danger has proceeded with the development of the NMD and TMD systems.<sup>198</sup> Finally, North Korea continues to sell missiles to Iran and Syria, both countries of concern for Washington. This situation threatens the security of the Middle East and America's

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<sup>196</sup> One such statement tried to dissuade the US from bombing suspected North Korean nuclear facilities by saying: "‘Surgical operation’ – style attack and ‘preemptive strike’ are by no means an exclusive option of the United States.... It must be clearly known that there is no limit to the strike of our People's Army and that on this planet there is no room for escaping the strike." Eberstadt, pg. 20.

<sup>197</sup> Pyongyang was only willing to sign the armistice with the US because it felt the fight was with American imperialists. As a result both the US and the ROK refused to sign the agreement, but have conducted themselves in the spirit of the agreement. The only signatories were the DPRK and China. U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: North Korea". It can be hypothesised that the DPRK did not want to sign an armistice with the ROK in order to give itself a free hand in a future attack.

<sup>198</sup> The Bush administration is fully pursuing the NMD program reasoning that a terrorist could someday direct a rocket at the US, or Russia for that matter. "Bush will push for missile defence in meeting with Putin", Edmonton Journal, October 13, 2001, pg. A7.

allies in the area.<sup>199</sup> Within this highly charged and dangerous context we must consider the position of the US towards Korean reunification.

The United States has long suffered the bellicose diatribes and exaggerated demands of the North Korean regime. During the Cold War little could be done about this situation because of the powerful military support Pyongyang enjoyed from its allies. Today, however, a more concerted effort can be made at reunifying the two Koreas and it can be pursued with significantly less fear of a negative Chinese or Russian reaction. Therefore Washington officially endorses peaceful reunification and supports a process where Koreans set their own terms. The American leadership expresses itself publicly by saying that matters on the Peninsula are primarily up to the Koreans to decide for themselves.<sup>200</sup> Unofficially, the US is far more hopeful that the DPRK will simply disappear of its own accord. However, it realises full well that this is improbable, having come to the conclusion that the regime is unlikely to topple as a result of current economic hardships.<sup>201</sup> Coming to grips with the reality that North Korea is not going away any time soon, the US has been forced to tailor its policies accordingly. Instead of pushing reunification at any cost, America prefers to concentrate on the adoption of a peace treaty between North and South Korea to replace the old armistice. To this end, the primary short-term concern for the US is not unification, but rather a commitment to creating the conditions for a North-South

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<sup>199</sup> It is actually quite impressive how such an economically insignificant country can export so much strategic insecurity, whereas most states instead export goods and services for profit. Eberstadt, pg. 22.

<sup>200</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: North Korea".

<sup>201</sup> "Dr. William Perry testimony on North Korea",

[http://www.state.gov/policy\\_remarks/1999/991012\\_perry\\_nkorea.html](http://www.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/991012_perry_nkorea.html).

dialogue and a stable system of security.<sup>202</sup> In the long run it is hoped that this will create better conditions for peaceful reunification favourable to America's ally.

The approaches that Washington has taken in dealing with Pyongyang have been both patient and pragmatic. The former presidential administration under Bill Clinton appeared to make significant in-roads in its dealings with North Korea. In a conciliatory tone the State Department even dropped the use of the term "Rogue Nation", referring instead to the DPRK as a "State of Concern".<sup>203</sup> Certain economic barriers were also removed allowing chartered flights between the two countries and the sale of North Korean goods in America. President Clinton also sent former Secretary of Defence William J. Perry to the region to formulate a plan for future relations with the North Koreans. The Perry Report, which will be analysed in greater detail below, called for an improvement in relations based on fair treatment and was adopted as American policy towards the Korean Peninsula. Even greater hope arose when then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited the hermit state, leading to speculation that President Clinton may accept an invitation to visit North Korea. Despite this progress, however, Washington realised that the gestures being made by the DPRK were only cosmetic in nature and had more to do with a fear of a Republican president taking office. The reality remains that a US President would only be willing to visit North Korea if there is a chance of significant breakthrough.<sup>204</sup> A breakthrough is something completely different from the mostly empty and symbolic gestures that have been made thus far. The North Koreans missed their

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<sup>202</sup> Samuel R. Berger, "A Foreign Policy for the Global Age", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 2000, Pg. 36.

<sup>203</sup> Time, July 3, 2000, Vol. 156, No. 1, pg. 11.

<sup>204</sup> Nayan, pg. 22.



chance by appealing to Clinton far too late in his administration and refusing to make the changes that would make such a trip possible. In addition, the US continues to refuse to drop North Korea's designation as a state that supports terrorism, despite indications that it has renounced its support for terrorists and appears to be keeping its distance from such activities.<sup>205</sup> This hard line remained in place while diplomatic efforts attempted to create a real dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. Ultimately the Clinton administration failed to open a door to North Korea. But it does not appear that the door would have been opened any wider with an even softer approach. As a result we should not be surprised with the new label formulated by the Bush administration placing the DPRK into the "axis of evil" camp. It indicates that a hard line is the preferred American approach regardless of which administration is in power.

Upon taking office, the administration of President George W. Bush appeared reluctant in adopting former President Bill Clinton's somewhat conciliatory attitude towards North Korea. President Bush demanded that talks on ending North Korean missile testing and sales also include conventional weapons, a somewhat unrealistic demand that Pyongyang rejects outright.<sup>206</sup> The new administration even criticised President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy efforts and significantly cut food aid to North Korea. If these initial Bush policies towards the Koreas appeared to be confused, it is because they were. Pyongyang reacted in kind by blaming Washington

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<sup>205</sup> It is somewhat in the interest of the United States to eliminate the North Korean terrorist designation. This would open North Korea to financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund, a move that would help create the conditions for economic reforms of North Korea that are a priority for the US. Pg. 6. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists. Harvard University Press, London, 1999. However, with the terrorist label still in place, America has more leverage in terms of use of the military option.

<sup>206</sup> Larkin, "Refugees in Purgatory", pg. 18.

for stalled talks between itself and Seoul.<sup>207</sup> At the outset, the new Republican administration had no clear Korea policy, a shortcoming that took some time to rectify. This situation should be considered normal when a new administration takes office from a different political party. While the sparring taking place between the two capitals is merely a testing of each other's wills and is a part of the learning process. More recently President Bush appears to have mellowed in his rhetoric towards the DPRK.<sup>208</sup> He has even stated that America is open for talks with Pyongyang and it seems that once again dialogue is possible. In addition, it appears that the Perry Report remains the primary policy focus of the United States towards the DPRK and thus reunification. Therefore the policies of the Bush administration are not all that much different from those of Clinton. Significant food aid has re-started<sup>209</sup> and strong support has been placed behind Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine policy of reconciliation.<sup>210</sup> But there should be no mistaking the United State's methods and goals. Food aid only continues because the US fears that cutting it off would cause instability<sup>211</sup>, and a hard line will be maintained because this seems to be the form of communication Pyongyang is most likely to understand.

It is now necessary to analyse the Perry Report as it is the best indicator of America's policy towards Korean reunification. In addition, the report outlines

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<sup>207</sup> "Two Koreas set for tourist resort talks".

<sup>208</sup> This may be due to the current crisis surrounding Iraq.

<sup>209</sup> North Korea is actually the largest recipient of US bilateral assistance in the region. Over the course of 5 years at the end of the 1990's, the US gave approximately \$1 billion in food and heavy fuels to the North Koreans. Pg. 12. Douglas H. Paal, "The US in Asia in 1999", Asian Survey, Jan/Feb 2000, pg. 2-15.

<sup>210</sup> Susan Shirk, "Summary of Key Points from Presentations and Discussions: Foreign Policy Trends in the U.S. Roundtable" March 29, 2001, San Diego.

<sup>211</sup> One third of North Korean population is fed by foreign donors. It is interesting that despite Bush's tough stance, America's re-starting of good aid is still officially not connected to any political

Washington's interests in Northeast Asia, the path that should be taken to maintain these interests and, most importantly of all, how to deal with the DPRK. Although the report is still classified, elements have been released and enough information exists to glean a general outline of US policy.<sup>212</sup> Basically the Perry Report outlines two possible paths. The first calls for a step-by-step process that would result in an improvement in relations after North Korea addresses the issues of concern to the US. Once this is done, Washington and its allies would normalise relations, relax sanctions and take other positive steps. The second path envisions Pyongyang remaining hostile and uncooperative. It concludes that in such a case the US and its allies would be forced to take measures that would "assure their security and contain the threat"<sup>213</sup> posed by North Korea. We must carefully analyse both and consider if there is any likelihood of them being followed.

The first path, as outlined by the Perry Report, appears to offer some sort of genuine guarantee of continued aid to North Korea and the survival of the Kim dynasty. This will not come cheaply to Pyongyang. In order to improve relations, the US feels significant progress must be made in the following areas: condemnation and forswearing of terrorism, continued dialogue between the two Koreas on reunification, resolution of nuclear proliferation issues, restraints on the development of long-range missiles, the return of remains of US soldiers killed during the Korean War, greater respect for human rights, and a reduction of conventional military threats

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considerations. Doug Struck, "Food crisis worsens in N. Korea", Edmonton Journal, May 17, 2001, pg. A17.

<sup>212</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: North Korea".

<sup>213</sup> *ibid.*

posed by North Korea.<sup>214</sup> If progress is made in these areas, Washington has the ability to influence any recovery efforts by North Korea through the immense role it plays in bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank.<sup>215</sup> All such improvements could be in Kim Jong-il's interests. For him diplomatic recognition of his state by the US is pivotal to the regime's short-term survival. It would significantly reduce the threat of a forced unification with the South that could result from internal weakness.<sup>216</sup> At the same time, it would give the North Korean elite more opportunities for earning money, thereby helping persuade them to open up their economy. Therefore, the first option of the Perry Report proposes open and amicable relations between the US and North Korea. This would almost certainly open the doors to closer relations with South Korea and may well facilitate a genuine reunification that would be in everybody's best interests.

Although the process seems simple, it would be far from it. The initial concessions by North Korea will be the most difficult since Pyongyang considers any concession as a slide into disaster. As with a single pebble starting an avalanche, North Korean strategists have long considered the first compromise as a beginning of the end. Pyongyang has analysed the fall of the Socialist Block in Europe and concluded that: "One-step concessions and retreats from socialist principles ha[ve] resulted in ten and a hundred step concession and retreat, and, finally, invited grave consequences of ruining the working class parties themselves."<sup>217</sup> But the regime may be willing to yield if the long-term security of the Northern elite is assured.

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<sup>214</sup> *ibid.* Essentially these are most of North Korea's tokens of power.

<sup>215</sup> Calder, pg. 108.

<sup>216</sup> DiFilippo, pg. 583.

<sup>217</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 12.

Giving the upper crust a real opportunity to replace political power with financial and economic power may just be the carrot that pulls the regime out of its shell. The surrendering of power is never a natural process, especially for a dictatorship. But one must not forget the role expanded financial opportunities for the communist elite played in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly we can count on greed eventually weakening *Juche* and thereby the DPRK's independence. Truly once the slide begins none will be able to stop it; yet the first pebble will be tossed by North Korea itself and most of the slide will be Northerners following suit.

The second path is destined not to be quite as rosy as the first and augurs war as more likely. Were the North Koreans to refuse to compromise in their actions or take at least some conciliatory steps, then the US has made it quite clear that it reserves the right to take necessary actions to defend its interests. An indicator of this is President Bush's recent announcement that all states producing "weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorize nations... will be held accountable."<sup>218</sup> The threat by Washington is quite clear, Pyongyang must co-operate or eventually face war. Although the Perry Report indicates that any hostilities would be designed only to ensure security and limit threats, they would have to be quite extensive in order to be effective. As a matter of fact, the first draft of the Perry Report included a contingency plan in case North Korea remained uncooperative. This plan is known to have included military action.<sup>219</sup> It can therefore be argued that the Perry Report is

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<sup>218</sup> Lorne Gunter, "After Afghanistan, who's next?", Edmonton Journal, Nov. 30, 2001, pg. A18. The article also claims that such a move would be in the interests of the US since it would help assuage the fears of Muslim nations that the fight against terrorism is aimed solely at them.

<sup>219</sup> Interestingly, this section of the report was not included when parts of the final document were released to the public. pg. 29. Kim Jae-hong, "Political and Economic Implications of the Perry Report", Korea Focus, Nov-Dec 1999, pg. 25-33.

more like an assignment to Pyongyang. This assignment demands the North Koreans gradually open up and prepare their state for integration into a united Korea, where Seoul is the ultimate ruler. This would allow time for the Northern regime to prepare its people for reunification, claim that it is still on their own terms and remain in at least some positions of influence. If this does not take place, then the Kim Jong-il dynasty will come to an untimely end. The Perry Report is a clear warning that the US will eventually reach a point when it will no longer suffer North Korean threats.

In fact, the Perry Report foresees that the US may one day *have* to fight North Korea because eventually Pyongyang will force Washington's hand with a horribly miscalculated raising of the stakes. The reason for this is that although the US would not willingly involve itself in another Asian conflict, such an occurrence may well come about. Obviously such actions would only occur if a truly abhorrent attack were committed or threat made against the US or an ally. In my opinion, the Perry Report foresees such an event inevitably taking place due to North Korea's continued dependence on Madman. The dangerous methodology Pyongyang uses makes an eventual threat all too real. It is the type of policy North Korea has chosen for itself. To abandon such a path would demonstrate that the DPRK has an empty hand and would be construed as a sign of weakness, inevitably leading down the much-feared path of compromise and concession, but this time without America's guarantees.<sup>220</sup>

In either case, North Korea will not fare well. Although such events may be far in the future, eventually Kim Jong-il and his ruling elite will be hoist with their own petard

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<sup>220</sup> The serious error on the part of Pyongyang may come about from a frustrated effort to prove its capabilities in case the outside world stops taking it seriously.

and be crushed by the resulting American whirlwind. Basically there will come a time when the cost of peace will overtake the cost of war.

The Perry Report concludes that in a military operation the balance of military forces would favour the US and its allies. Specifically this represents South Korean ground forces and American air and naval superiority.<sup>221</sup> However, such a positive military outcome would only be possible if Washington works closely with both Seoul and Tokyo. The report also concludes that South Korea would likely face the greatest risk.<sup>222</sup> It is largely for this reason that if a military campaign was to begin, it would have to be taken to its full consequence, otherwise the population of the ROK would suffer unbearable losses with little to show for them.<sup>223</sup> Once a campaign starts, it will have to finish off the Pyongyang regime completely in order to reduce and finally eliminate the threat to Seoul.

This is not to say that a military action would be easy. North Korea still has very significant military forces. But they are aged and do not compare with the modern weaponry of America. Were Pyongyang really as belligerent as it claims it would have gone to war over the June 1999 incident when one of its torpedo boats was sunk by the South Koreans during a territorial fishing dispute. It sometimes appears as if North Korea survives largely on hollow threats, comparable to those of a dog with a loud bark but with very little bite. Nor should there be any doubt as to America's capabilities. The US has proven itself able to launch successful military

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<sup>221</sup> Japan is also required by treaty to provide "rear area support" to the US if it has to fight a war nearby. Kazuya, pg. 24.

<sup>222</sup> "Dr. William Perry testimony on North Korea",  
[http://www.state.gov/policy/remarks/1999/991012\\_perry\\_nkorea.html](http://www.state.gov/policy/remarks/1999/991012_perry_nkorea.html).

<sup>223</sup> The 1991 conflict with Iraq underlined to Washington that regime change is necessary if the desired level of stability is to be achieved.

campaigns against foes with considerable military resources, particularly ones whose rhetoric envisioned ultimate disaster for any invader who dares attack them. Among these were Iraq and Yugoslavia in terms of more traditional military campaigns and Afghanistan that boasts both tough terrain and a long history of adept guerrilla fighting.<sup>224</sup> When the resolve is there on the part of Washington and its allies, there is no reason for North Korea to think it could fare any more successfully than America's previous adversaries. The danger to the DPRK is that the US, Japan and South Korea may eventually interpret North Korean threats as real but consider its defensive chest pounding as little more than a bluff. One can reasonably augur such an outcome since Pyongyang will likely continue developing WMD that could directly threaten Seoul, Tokyo or even western American states, while conventional defensive weapons continue their slide into decay and obsolescence.

An endeavour that would annihilate a regime and integrate its territory into another country would, to say the least, raise some eyebrows and create a degree of international opposition. In the past the greatest resistance would have been expected from North Korea's traditional allies, China and Russia. But as has been argued above, neither is willing to unconditionally support the DPRK if it continues in its belligerency. In fact, both would likely remain neutral and leave their former friend to fend for itself. Russia has already come on side with its deep co-operation with NATO on international security issues. While the notion that China would never allow such a campaign is long obsolete. The Chinese economy is so dependent upon

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<sup>224</sup> Few could have predicted that America would have involved itself in a ground war in Afghanistan, particularly following the terrible experience in Vietnam. Therefore, given the right set of circumstances and a major error on the part of Pyongyang, one cannot discount the possibility of US forces moving on North Korea.



the US that despite possible protests, Beijing will be brought on side or at least decide to remain neutral so as not to anger Washington.<sup>225</sup> Resistance from other countries is also not expected to be strong.<sup>226</sup> With the amount of instability Pyongyang exports, few would protest the end of such a regime. In addition, the prospect of war does not necessarily mean war. As a matter of fact, it appears that the stern line being taken by President Bush has been largely responsible for Pyongyang's recent resumption of talks with both South Korea and the US.<sup>227</sup>

Such a reading of the Perry Report does not necessarily guarantee better behaviour on the part of North Korea. There is the danger that Pyongyang will misinterpret the situation and continue in its mad behaviour. It may well mistake the Perry Report as but a continuation of a weak-willed international community that lacks the resolve or imagination to properly deal with it. Nicolas Eberstadt has made such a claim in the past arguing that the international community prefers to do nothing and avoids dealing with North Korea as much as possible. He has even suggested that the two-state status quo on the Korean Peninsula is mostly the result of all the powers lacking enough imagination to envision the Peninsula without North Korea.<sup>228</sup> However, the current interpretation of American intentions negates such a pessimistic argument. The plan laid out by William Perry, although simple, is very serious because it does not merely threaten the Northerners but gives them a way out

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<sup>225</sup> If doubt exists, then the incident of the US reconnaissance plane crash-landing in China is a good indicator. At first the Chinese protested and screamed bloody murder, but eventually they had to give in to US demands to return both the crew and the plane. Beijing's dependence on the US will bring the same results with North Korea. However, one should not discount China profiting in its neutrality from a grateful United States that would appreciate non-interference.

<sup>226</sup> Gunter, "After Afghanistan, who's next?"

<sup>227</sup> "South Korean President quits party over corruption scandal", Globe and Mail, May 7, 2002, pg. A15.

<sup>228</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 23.

of their predicament. I would argue that the Perry Report is actually a demand that Kim Jong-il prepare his country for complete and final reunification with the ROK. Appropriate time will be made available to him for this endeavour but he should not be mistaken and think that things will continue as they are. Actually, the longer Pyongyang continues in its time-honoured ways, the more likely a military solution on the part of the US and her allies; because, the longer North Korea raises the stakes in its mad game, the higher the probability of a threat being taken too far. Today Washington has also come to the conclusion that it may be necessary to destroy those who threaten it verbally before they gain the military capabilities to do so in actuality. Given a situation that the warning is interpreted as being too severe and North Korea again escapes into its shell of paranoia and threats, then this will simply signify a further slide into ruin. The Pyongyang regime is so dangerous that it will almost certainly bring about an event that will justify and trigger a full-scale retaliation. In such a case Pyongyang will find itself with nobody to help it out of the mess of its own making.

The approach the United States has taken on the reunification of Korea is a long-term and realistic one. Washington has given Pyongyang one last chance to clean up its act and improve relations with its Southern neighbour, paving the way for eventual reunification. If it fails in this it will spell the end of the regime. Eventually, although it may take some time, the DPRK will do *something* that will justify a military campaign that will lead to its ultimate destruction. This long-term schedule should not be misinterpreted by the North as an acceptance of the status quo, political support or weakness on the part of America and its allies. One day the US will have

had enough of North Korea. At that point it will unite the Koreas by force, making sure that Seoul comes out on top. The only question is whether Pyongyang will accept the peaceful proposal that ensures a softer landing for its elite and people or if it prefers to pound its chest and call out the dogs of war, a war it will certainly not survive.

## Conclusions

In the past all four powers have been willing to maintain a status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Other than paying lip service to Kim Dae-jung's policy of Sunshine<sup>229</sup>, none of the powers was willing to immerse themselves too deeply in Korean issues or make significant efforts at reunifying the country. Today, however, the situation has shifted closer to a permanent solution. The four powers are less and less willing to suffer the regional instability North Korea causes, or put up with the impediments it throws into the gears of economic expansion. The DPRK's traditional allies in Beijing and Moscow are no longer willing to defend the unstable country were it to begin a conflict because of its own belligerency. They have concluded that they have nothing to gain and everything to lose if they support North Korea in its madness. Japan is playing an increased role in its own defence and may one day be pushed into more concrete action against Pyongyang. The United States has realised that any threats, from even poor regimes, can directly threaten the lives of its citizens. Therefore, we must conclude from the Perry Report that the United States, Japan and South Korea are giving North Korea one last chance to change before it heads in the

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<sup>229</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 96.

direction of war. If Pyongyang accepts this proposal, then both its people and elite will have a soft landing with significant opportunity to re-establish themselves in a united Korea. If it does not, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo will have little choice but to eventually destroy that which threatens them. Although the fight would be bloody, the DPRK will not be able to count on China or Russia to bail it out. Thus reunification will be achieved with Seoul coming out on top. Despite the fact that all four publicly state that reunification is a purely Korean issue, the role of each of the four, be it passive or active, will eventually play a significant role in bringing the Korean people together again.

## Thesis Conclusion

In conclusion we must consider how the unification policies of the two Koreas and the policies of the four powers relate to each other. Officially, both Koreas and all four of the region's powers wish for reunification to take place. Each would prefer this to occur peacefully, with their own interests somehow protected and the balance of power remaining largely unchanged. However, the prospects of a willing and peaceful unification where everybody comes out on top is far from realistic. One must never forget that the entire concept of reunification is based on the physical elimination of one of the two states by the other. It is not a natural process for any regime to adopt policies that would mean the end of its very existence. As we have seen, there is little to indicate that either Pyongyang or Seoul will willingly take such a step unless some unforeseen event forces it upon them. Therefore, we will consider how it is that the US, using the Perry Report as its primary policy, will one day compel Pyongyang to peacefully unify with South Korea or else face unification by force.

When discussing the North Korean reunification policy, it was relatively simple to come to the conclusion that in the past Pyongyang was not ready to partake in unification unless it was on terms favourable to itself. However, the years of economic turmoil have taken such a significant toll on the DPRK that it can now be proposed that the leadership has come to the realisation that not only can it not win today, it is unlikely to be successful tomorrow either. The economy of the ROK has overtaken that of the DPRK to such an extent that there is little feasibility in catching

up or dominating, as was the case in the first decades immediately following the Korean War. Militarily the discrepancy between the two Koreas has also grown. Although the Northern military is huge by any standard, the forces are in a state of moral and physical decay. Measures taken to create a more lethal force by putting all of the state's resources towards WMD are not likely to gain a victorious reunification either. In fact, they are more likely to lead Pyongyang to greater isolation, not only from its enemies, but allies as well. Therefore, the DPRK regime has found itself in a situation where its prospects of losing are far more probable than winning if it continues with its traditional and threatening approaches.

Since reunification on terms favourable to North Korea are now seen to be impracticable, it appears that the regime has decided that at the very least it must protect itself and survive for as long as possible. The unification proposal it laid out at the 2000 Summit indicates that Pyongyang hopes to achieve this end by creating a state unified in name only, in which both Korean regimes survive and continue to have full control over their respective regions. Such a political structure is seen as being a guarantee of at least not being eliminated, yet at the same time allow for the gaining of significant financial support from the ROK through the *Mosquito Net* economic policy. In this way the Pyongyang regime would be able to maintain at least a modicum of power and avoid a conflict that would likely end in its own destruction no matter the devastation it may still be able to inflict. Thus since long-term territorial integrity can no longer be guaranteed, at least securing the regime's standing may be acceptable.

In order to survive, and maintain status and continued support from the population, some sort of economic recovery will have to take place. Before going through with even a limited reunification, the Pyongyang regime has decided to continue to try and at least raise itself from the desperate situation in which it finds itself. This will give it a stronger position when negotiating with the South. To this end measures are being taken to secure more financial and technical support from the outside world. Both friendly and unfriendly approaches are being implemented simultaneously to gain desperately needed finances and resources to keep the DPRK from collapsing. Today, it appears to be taking the form of more engagement to gain capital. In order to facilitate such funding, Kim Jong-il has changed his outward character and become something of an enigmatic leader, presenting himself as a reasonable person who keeps a lid on an uncooperative and dangerous bureaucracy. It is allegedly this bureaucracy that practices Madman for gaining finances, at the same time as friendly and reasonable proposals are supposedly preferred by Kim Jong-il. Initially his good behaviour had gained the Northern Leader considerable international popularity, particularly in South Korea.<sup>230</sup> However, the regime has been unwilling to begin the process of negotiations for reunification and most talks between the two Koreas have come to naught. This is primarily due to the fact that the North Koreans realise that even moving towards reunification on their *own* terms would in all likelihood mean the end of their rule.

It would appear that Pyongyang has chosen to postpone continued talks until conditions arise that would provide a greater guarantee of its survival. A Northern economic recovery, a significantly weakened South or some other unforeseen

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<sup>230</sup> "Psychiatrist cites Koreans' amnesia behind Kim Jong-il syndrome." Korea Herald 09/10/2000.

windfall would likely meet such conditions. Such unrealistic hopes actually have the opposite effect and gradually increase the possibility that the regime will one day face complete physical elimination as a result of a conflict with the US, Japan and South Korea. Such a conflict could very well take place due to North Korea's persistence in raising the stakes in its attempts to gain financing to ensure survival. These finances are also needed to increase Pyongyang's bargaining position during reunification talks. In addition, to back down from such demands would be interpreted as weakness, thus they continue and are even raised with the growing role of the WMD's. Yet based on this realisation of an almost inevitable future conflict, it is possible to speculate that the ruling elite has concluded that losing power may be more attractive than losing their lives. Based on this assumption it can now be suggested that so desperate is the ruling elite to survive, that they may no longer consider their state to be as important as they did earlier. The elite now fears for its very lives.

At this stage we must consider a statement made by the late Kim Il-Sung is his 1993 proposal of a "10-Point Program of Great Unity of the Whole Nation for Reunification of the Country". The tenth point is of particular interest: "Those who have contributed to the great unity of the nation and to the cause of national reunification should be highly estimated."<sup>231</sup> The point was later elaborated by official broadcasts saying that "What is important in appraising people is, above all, to grant special favors to those who have performed feats for the great unity of the nation and the reunification of the country, patriotic martyrs and their descendants."

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<sup>231</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 43.



<sup>232</sup> Nicolas Eberstadt interprets this as a proposal for reunification on terms favourable to the ROK, but on condition that the current Pyongyang leadership and its descendants are protected. Although an older proposition, it nevertheless seems to suggest that the North has realistically considered the prospect of total collapse or war as being unavoidable. In fact, it would indicate that there is a willingness to allow reunification to take place where Seoul is the ultimate winner, as long as the elite of the North are given some sort of guarantee of remaining in positions of comfort and safety. So long as the elite is protected, it should be possible to coax Pyongyang into allowing reunification to take place on South Korea's terms.

The Sunshine Policy proposed by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung is a conciliatory approach to improved relations with the North. It does not call for immediate reunification. Instead, the Sunshine Policy seeks peace, Northern economic recovery and a gradual process of increased talks and exchanges. Only after a significant period has passed will the two Koreas reunite in a democratic and market-oriented single state. The 20-30 years for complete economic integration, which have been proposed by the two presidents, seems to indicate a fairly precise timeline envisioned for successful reunification. The plan was laid in such a way that Pyongyang would see Seoul's honest intentions and not revert to its traditional hostility. In addition, due to the staggering costs of reunification, the South prefers to help the North in its recovery by spreading out the costs. This gradual approach would also help ensure that haste is not interpreted as threatening intentions. Finally the Sunshine Policy is meant to avoid the war and chaos that would result from a sudden Northern collapse or attempt at forced reunification.

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

Nor is South Korea completely averse to the North's stated reunification plans, as long as they are actually implemented or at least initiated. For instance the *Mosquito Net* could work for South Korea and reunification. First, it will introduce the notion of profits and exports, thereby weakening loyalty to the *Juche* ideology. Secondly, it will tie the North Korean economy very closely to the ROK's. Once profits are identified with ties to South Korea, it will be difficult to dissuade the Northern elite from seeking even more connections. At the same time, however, Seoul will not let down its guard. It is increasingly conscious of the fact that although a conflict would be costly, it may one day be necessitated by a Northern bellicose action that is taken too far. The ROK leadership is also well aware that in such a conflict it would enjoy the backing of America and even Japan. In this case reunification could be achieved militarily, a process traditionally avoided by Seoul but today no longer discounted out of hand due to increased capabilities. Such a prospect also helps persuade Pyongyang that it must improve relations or else war may well be the outcome.

In any action that is taken by the ROK, the opinions of the four regional powers are pivotal. Although it appears that all of the four have traditionally been more comfortable with the status quo than with any actual action, it is likely that all would now prefer a final resolution of the Korean issue. Badgering from Beijing and Moscow, Pyongyang's traditional allies, could potentially pull the hermit state out of its isolation and add impetus to Korean talks. However, the reduction in aid and economic contacts between the DPRK and its two allies has left the small state largely ignored and resentful of even *their* influence. To a large extent this is because

today China and Russia are far more concerned with their own economic growth than with North Korean recovery or survival. In addition, the instability the DPRK causes to Northeast Asia had limited potential economic activities and earnings. Finally, Pyongyang repeatedly threatens to destabilize the balance of power, increasing the probability of heightened Japanese militarization and US implementation of NMD and TMD. In all likelihood, Beijing and Moscow would not mind North Korea being taken out of the equation, as long as the new reunified Korean state is friendly and pacifist. Therefore, were military action on the part of Washington to be justified, neither China nor Russia would step in to save their purported ally.

Unlike China and Russia, the US and Japan are disposed to playing less than passive roles in the reunification of the Koreas. Their economic and military capabilities are pivotal in coaxing North Korea out of its self-imposed shell. In addition, along with South Korea, they are likely to be the primary targets in any attempts by North Korea to use its WMD's. For this reason they cannot watch passively while Pyongyang makes threats such as: "We are fully ready to mercilessly annihilate the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean rulers who are keen on invading the D.P.R.K."<sup>233</sup> When combined with rocket firings over Japan, such statements cannot be ignored nor realistically placated with limited economic aid, as has been attempted in the past. Washington has realised that leaving things be has led to this situation. Constantly avoiding difficult decisions and actions has allowed North Korea to become the destabilizing pariah it is today. The fact is that all four of the region's powers are equally to blame for this situation, and they now seem to know it. It would appear that all four powers, but the US in particular, have concluded that

they can no longer maintain the status quo to which they have grown accustomed,<sup>234</sup> the status quo Nicolas Eberstadt claims they prefer. The instability caused by an unwillingness to do anything has been amply illustrated. Thus Washington accepted the Perry Report as its approach to North Korea and unification as a whole, a policy that will likely be accepted by all the players involved.

Nicholas Eberstadt claims that the current focus on maintaining the two state status quo on the Korean Peninsula is mostly a case where all foreign powers involved lack the imagination to envision the Peninsula without North Korea.<sup>235</sup> This may have been the case in the past but it can be argued that the Perry Report represents quite the opposite phenomenon. It amply illustrates that the US and its allies can create an imaginative plan that will eradicate North Korea, but do so peacefully and with consideration to the lessons learned by Pyongyang in connection with the collapse of other socialist states. The Perry Report gives the DPRK a last chance to implement its own reunification policy, thereby facilitating eventual reunification, but where the ROK ultimately comes out on top. It provides some guarantees to the Northern elite of continued status in the new state and even gives them time to adapt to the new capitalist system in which they will live. Otherwise, the Perry Report concludes that sooner or later North Korea will commit an act of such vile aggression that it will justify a military solution to the Korean issue. In such a case American military might, South Korean forces and Japanese technology will

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<sup>233</sup> Cirincione, pg. 131.

<sup>234</sup> "Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations." October 12, 1999, Washington DC, Dr. William J. Perry.

[http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012\\_northkorea\\_rpt.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html).

<sup>235</sup> Eberstadt, pg. 23.

ensure that not only is North Korea terminated, but its all-important elite will be entirely crushed.

Although for the most part classified, the Perry Report can be interpreted as Washington's last offer to Kim Jong-il to implement his own reunification policy. It is a very lenient and pragmatic approach. North Korea will be allowed to use the *Mosquito Net* strategy to place its elite on a competitive capitalist footing through its significant control of the Northern market. By this means the elevated status of the elite can be maintained in a newly unified Korea. More than anything, the fear of losing power is primary in the minds of the North Korean regime, not the fall of the *Juche* ideology or the welfare of its people. All these things are but the tools of power. But if unification goes ahead in conjunction with economic prosperity, then political power will be replaced by economic opportunities. As a result there will be far less resistance to reunification since the tools of power, today *Juche*, will be replaced by wealth. At the same time this system will allow capital to flow in to the North, thereby repairing infrastructure and feeding the populace. The end result, however, will be that political power will eventually be surrendered to Seoul, but where the Northern elite will do so willingly since it will be given some guarantee of an elevated social status in the new Korea, a choice far better than death. In effect, the DPRK and ROK will together implement the final stage of reunification that Pyongyang avoids mentioning in its policy. In this final step Seoul comes out on top and the DPRK is terminated.

The question that naturally arises from such a proposal is whether or not the Northern elite will accept surrendering their state. In this case the position of Kim

Jong-il is pivotal since only he can initiate such a process. Although opposition can be expected, there are ways of dealing with it. The resuscitation of the Northern economy would strengthen Kim Jong-il's hold on power.<sup>236</sup> And although his powers would remain dictatorial in nature, one can consider the South Korean example where a prosperous populace was willing to support the former military authoritarianism that existed in its state in exchange for material advancement. It can therefore be assumed that an improvement in the quality of life of the average North Korean may actually solidify the support of the population behind Kim Jong-il, despite a new pervasiveness of influence from the outside world.<sup>237</sup> Nor must one forget that party members are for the most part extremely loyal to Kim Jong-il. It is clear that when the "dear leader speaks, North Korea acts".<sup>238</sup> It is their way of life. Thus they will integrate with the South because he will tell them to do so. Greater protests can be expected from the military, which is likely to resist any open-door policy that Kim Jong-il may decide to introduce. However, his influence over the military is considerable and thus it should not pose any serious problems. In case there is resistance, the Dear Leader holds a number of control mechanisms that would reduce any organized or collective protests.<sup>239</sup> When Kim Jong-il decides unification should go forward, it *will* go forward.

Nor would this be done simply through mechanisms of power or threats.

Rewards will play a significant role in placating the elite for loss of political status. A

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<sup>236</sup> Kim Young-Yoon, "Investment for Balanced Growth Between North and South Korea", Korea Focus, vol. 9, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2001. pg. 65.

<sup>237</sup> Pr. 254, Don C. Shin, Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

<sup>238</sup> Chon Hyun-joon, pg. 91.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 108. Although these mechanisms are difficult to identify, they must exist considering the Dear Leader's unquestioned hold on power.

capitalist approach to the North Korean elite would make the plan far more effective. Despite their supposed indoctrination with the values of *Juche* and anti-capitalist and anti-materialist tendencies, there nevertheless exists a natural human attraction for the flashy products produced by the West. The regime's existing policies of rewarding its elite loyal subjects with expensive Mercedes automobiles, foreign trips and better housing and food, actually proves that this is a policy that could work. Given the chance to make considerable amounts of money was a prime factor in weakening the ideological resolve of the old-guard communists in the former Soviet Union and today in China. The same greed and desire for financial security and luxury would likely meet with at least some success in North Korea, especially if it is encouraged by Kim Jong-il. It has also been reported that the youth of upper-class families have a particular penchant for modern South Korean pop music and videos, as opposed to songs proclaiming the glories of *Juche*.<sup>240</sup> The seeds of decadence, once planted, are extremely difficult to combat and will instead be allowed to flourish.

The most important factor in this proposal is that any achievements made in inter-Korean relations are, and are likely to continue to be, portrayed as personal exploits of Kim Jong-il for his people, a policy that will help permanently cement Jong-il's standing.<sup>241</sup> Although this seems contrary to the surrendering of power, it is not, for Kim Jong-il himself will never surrender power. Whilst the 20-30 year timeline indicated by the two Korean presidents is important for the integration of the two economies, it has a far more significant meaning. Kim Jong-il will never have to surrender power personally because the sixty-year-old man will be given twenty to

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid, pg. 105.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid, pg. 106-7.

thirty years to live out his life fully as the last ruler of North Korea. He will have time to prepare his people for reunification and fill their heads with perpetual love for him. But most important of all, he will die with the glory of being the man who brought about Korean reunification. For only with his death will Seoul fully and openly take control. Meanwhile, the Dear Leader's personality cult will continue. For an autocrat a lasting legacy is vital! If that legacy is guaranteed, then Kim Jong-il may not care who or what follows him.

Nor will Seoul be overly concerned about North Korean propaganda laying claim to any progress as the achievements of Kim Jong-il. Giving them this sense of victory helps ensure the continuance of more open policies.<sup>242</sup> Thus, it is acceptable if in the short term Kim Jong-il gets the credit for reunification since this will make him all the more willing to surrender his state because there is assurance of a long-term legacy. The issue of succession will also be solved. Kim Jong-il himself will create the conditions where none will have the power to take his place; not an impossible prospect considering nobody dares challenge him today.<sup>243</sup> And since the two economies will have been integrated very closely, any attempts at reversing the situation will fail. As long as the myth of the man is maintained and believed in as much as people continue to believe in Kim Il-sung today, then the present ruler will die a happy man and the ROK will unite the Koreas into one state. The illusion will be for the North to enjoy in the short term, the reality will be for the South to savour in the long term.

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid, pg. 111.

<sup>243</sup> This will include his own son and any family members who may wish to ascend to the ultimate position of power in the DPRK.



If Kim Jong-il does not take the road proposed by the Perry Report, then he knows full well that one day his beloved people's paradise will be hit by the whirlwind of American military might. He therefore has the choice of gradually surrendering his state to the South and ensuring a soft landing for his elite and population. Or he can take his chances and continue in his bellicose and threatening ways. But if past North Korean prescience is any indicator, Kim Jong-il likely knows only too well that one day his plans will backfire and he will be hoist with his own petard. The DPRK will be left entirely without friends since no foreign power is willing to settle for the status quo any longer and thus the Kim Jong-il regime will be finished. The two Koreas will one day unite. The only issue that now remains to be seen is whether Pyongyang will do so willingly and thus safely, or whether reunification will come about militarily. In either case South Korea will come out on top and the two Koreas will finally be one.

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## APPENDIX 1<sup>244</sup>

Joint Declaration signed by the leaders of North and South Korea in Pyongyang, North Korea.

Upholding the lofty wishes of the Korean people yearning for peaceful reunification of the fatherland, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of (South) Korea and Kim Jong-il, chairman of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of (North) Korea, held a historic meeting and summit talks on June 13-15, this year.

Noting that the meeting and talks held for the first time in the divided Korean history carry grave significance in promoting mutual understanding and developing South-North relations and achieving peaceful, national reunification, the top leaders of South and North Korea declared as follows:

1. The South and North, as masters of national reunification, will join hands in efforts to resolve the issue of national unification independently.
2. Acknowledging that the different formulas that the North and South favor for reunification have common factors, they will strive to work together to achieve this goal.
3. The South and North will exchange groups of dispersed family members and their relatives around Aug. 15 and resolve as soon as possible humanitarian issues, including the repatriation of Communist prisoners who have completed their terms in jail.
4. The South and North will pursue a balanced development of their national economies and build mutual trust by accelerating exchange in the social, cultural, sports, health and environmental fields.
5. In order to put these agreements into practice, the South and North will hold dialogue between government authorities at an early date.

President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited National Defense Commission chairman Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul and he agreed to do so at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

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<sup>244</sup> Korea Now, June 17, 2000, Volume 29, No. 12, pg. 4-5

## Appendix 2<sup>245</sup>

	<b>North Korean Government</b>	<b>President Kim Dae-jung</b>
<b>Names</b>	Plan for the Establishment of the Koryo Democratic Confederal Republic	The "Three-Stage Unification" Formula
<b>Stages</b>	One stage: Unified state in the form of a Federation	Three stages: South-North Confederation, Federation, Complete unification
<b>3 Principles</b>	Self-reliance, Peace, Grand National Unity	Self-reliance, Peace, Democracy
<b>First stage</b>	<p>Unified state in the form of a federation (1 nation, 1 state, 2 systems, 2 autonomous regional governments).</p> <p>The Supreme National Federal Congress and the Standing Federal Committees decide on national defense, external relations, and unification issues.</p>	<p>The stage of inter-Korean Confederation (1 confederation, 1 nation, 2 states, 2 systems, 2 independent governments).</p> <p>Implementation of policy guidelines. Peaceful coexistence, exchange and unification. The establishment of the inter-Korean Summit and the Council of South-North Confederation for the peaceful management of national division. The unification process. The first establishment of a peace structure through an arms control agreement. The enhancement of mutual interest through all round exchanges, cooperation and restoration of common national homogeneity.</p>
<b>Second stage</b>	Possibility of allowing greater degree of power to two regional governments on external affairs, defense, and international matters as a transitional arrangement.	<p>The stage of Federation (1 nation, 1 state, 1 system, and 2 autonomous regional governments).</p> <p>A federal government in charge of external, defense, and major internal matters, and 2 autonomous regional governments.</p>
<b>Third stage</b>		The stage of complete unification (1 nation, 1 state, 1 system and 1 central government or several federal regional governments). Democracy, market economy, social welfare, advanced moral state, pacifism.

<sup>245</sup> "Comparison between the unification proposals of the two Koreas and the 'Three-Stage Unification' formula", *Korea Now*, June 17, 2000, 12-13.