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by

PAUL K. WAINAINA

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled A CRITIQUE OF ROBIN BARROW'S UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATION OF EDUCATION submitted by PAUL K. WAINAINA in partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Philosophy of Education.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation and the degree to which it is a partial fulfilment is dedicated to my mother, Hannah Wanjiku, who wrestled with odds in order that I survive.

ABSTRACT

In almost every country, education has become such an important commodity that governments are constantly under pressure to cope with an ever-increasing demand for more places in every level within our educational institutions. What is not evident, however, is the nature and exact returns expected both by the public and the recipients of this supposedly worthwhile commodity known as education. Sometimes the government's expected returns from educational institutions seem to be incompatible with the individual expectations. Other times, the general educational objectives are at variance with the educational practices they are supposed to justify.

Thus, the study undertaken here is a thorough examination of yet another attempt to justify educational practices. The justification, which is in a form of an educational theory, is based on an ethical theory commonly referred to as utilitarianism. The interest to evaluate the plausibility of utilitarianism derives from the fact that most of the educational practices offered in the former British Colonies are based on distorted versions of utilitarianism.

The study shows that education as we commonly understand it, has two basic functions: preparing one as an individual as well as a member of a certain community. In light of this, education has to develop in an individual, both individualist

and collectivist values or ideals. However, it is further shown that utilitarian educational theory, even that which Barrow advocates, fails as a justification due to its tendency to develop in individuals individualist ideals at the expense of collectivist ideals. The conclusion that utilitarian educational theory (even the most plausible), is untenable as a justification of educational practices, is arrived at by making a case that as a general ethical theory, utilitarianism is a poor guide to human conduct.

The general conclusion of this study is that the educational system in Kenya should attempt to inculcate in students, a balanced diet of both individualist and collectivist ideals. This task can only be fulfilled if the utilitarian elements are seen within deontological principles.

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This study is a culmination of putting together of efforts from various people. I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. A.T. Pearson who has availed himself to me for over a year. His comments and advice have been of great help to me.

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Finally, this study has sometimes forced me to be an unreliable husband and father. I want to thank my wife Susan and our two children Wanjiku and Wainaina for being so co-operative, even when what is rightfully theirs is denied of them.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1. A Brief Statement of the Problem

In the Western World, education has been regarded as the most efficient institution for reforming societies for the better. This faith that is placed on education as a means of improving societies is easily revealed when we look at the work of acknowledged educational theorists such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Dewey, to mention just a few. During the interaction between the West and the rest of the World, the faith in education as a means of improving the well-being of societies has been spread and reinforced. During the era of Colonization, the African Continent had picked up a share of this blind faith in education.

That the African Continent had acquired the same faith in education as a means of improving the well-being of societies became more evident during the 1960s when most of the colonized African nations were fighting for political independence. For instance, in May, 1961, the African states held a conference on Development of Education in Africa. This took place in Addis Ababa. The Conference was jointly organized and convened by the Director-General of UNESCO and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa.[1] One of the most important recommendations to come out of the conference's deliberations

was that education in Africa should be geared primarily towards manpower development. As we shall see later, the recommendations of this conference (commonly referred to as the Addis Ababa Conference) set the pace and the direction that education was to take in most of the new African states during the 1960s and the 1970s. Thus, in almost all newly independent African states, there was a call for the expansion of education in order to develop middle and high-level specialists who would take over the positions in the government or the private sectors left by the Colonial governments.

However, partly as a result of the educational policies which were inclined towards educational expansion and partly due to the rewards that accrued to positions held by those who had acquired formal education, there developed among the African people an insatiable desire for formal education. But during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the unrestrained educational expansion in Africa brought about unexpected and unwarranted consequences. Among these consequences were underemployment, unemployment and the creation of a distinctive class-structure establishing a new minority of rich people on one hand and a majority of poor people on the other. During the 1980s these problems have become so intense in some African states that they are threatening the survival of these very states.

As usual, many countries have realized the magnitude of the problems of underemployment, unemployment and class structure, which are identified with unrestrained educational

expansion. Again, many scholars have addressed themselves to these problems. The scholars most interested in these problems range from historians, sociologists, and economists, to anthropologists and planners. While I do not doubt for a moment the contribution that these scholars have made towards understanding and eventually overcoming problems associated with educational expansion, I want to contend that part of the problems that face most of the former colonized African states (particularly the former British Colonies) is that their educational policies derive their foundation on ill-conceived versions of utilitarianism inherited from the education system offered during the Colonial period. To argue my case, I will discuss Kenya's educational policies and practices before and after independence.

Having successfully shown the utilitarian assumptions behind educational policies and practices before and after independence in Kenya, I shall then attempt to indicate that although there are positive elements within a utilitarian-based education, as a theory of education, utilitarianism (even in the most plausible form) must be found wanting. To make this case stand, I will briefly discuss various forms of utilitarianism that have evolved ever since the traditional form was first articulated by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In terms of arrangement, the discussion in this section will appear as Chapter II.

Although I have claimed that both pre-independence and post-independence educational policies in Kenya are based on shades of utilitarianism, this fact has not been brought to

the attention of the educationists. Again, although many modern philosophers such as J.J.C. Smart and B. Brandt have argued a strong case for utilitarianism as a plausible ethical theory, few have attempted to use utilitarianism as a justification for educational policies and practices. Chapter III will be a discussion of Robin Barrow's bold claim that utilitarianism is the only acceptable justification of human conduct. In Chapter IV the concept of happiness, which is the cornerstone of utilitarianism, will be discussed. Chapter V will be a study of Barrow's attempt to specifically apply a utilitarian ethical theory as a justification of educational activities. However, it is important to point out that Barrow is discussed here not so much for his allegedly sound philosophical arguments for the form of utilitarianism he advocates, but first, as a provider of historical background and second, for the insight that his arguments throw with regard to the weaknesses of a utilitarian-based educational theory.

In Chapter VI, an attempt will be made to offer a more plausible philosophical base for Kenyan educational theory and practice. Finally, Chapter VII will be a recapitulation and conclusion of the main points in the thesis.

2. Some Literature Relevant to the Problem

(i) Kenya: Background Information

Kenya has an area of about 59 million hectares and only 2 percent of this is water-covered. As the country stretches

across the Equator, it displays a variety of climatic conditions, ranging from the snow-capped peak of Mount Kenya at 5199 metres to the humid tropical coast and the dense equatorial forests to a rather harsh arid area with a mean rainfall of less than 200-230 mm. Although Kenya's economy depends on agriculture, only about 18 percent of its land can support agricultural activities without the aid of irrigation.

Currently, the population of Kenya is about 16 million (1979 census) and growing at the rate of 4 percent per annum. More than 90 percent of the people live in the rural areas. About 20-25 percent of the rural population is in arid and semi-arid areas while the rest are concentrated in high potential areas. The country's population is composed of about 40 different ethnic groups of African origin. The rest of the population is composed of Asians, the Europeans and other smaller racial groups. Kenya was under the British Colonial rule for over 50 years until December 12, 1963 when the country gained its political independence.

(ii) Pre-Colonial African Traditional Education

It has been acknowledged that African societies had their own forms of education prior to the Colonial period. This is due perhaps to the realization that every community needs to have a way of passing on accumulated knowledge to the young, ensuring the survival of the community. African traditional education was primarily informal rather than formal, as is the case with the Western type of education.

Although there were no formal schools, traditional education embraced all the dimensions of the community life which included skills in various occupations such as farming, fishing, hunting and gathering; the occupations that the young were prepared to occupy were partly dictated by the geographical and climatical conditions that the particular society lived in. Apart from the learning of skills, the young people were introduced to the norms and the religious beliefs that the community held. Most important, traditional education introduced the youth to what was considered good and what was considered as evil and how these concepts related to what the community considered as the concept of good or happy life.[2]

Talking loosely of African traditional education may seem likely to imply that there was one homogeneous, indigenous African society before the period of Colonization. This is far from the true nature of the situation then and now. However, although African societies were different and were involved in different cultures, they all seemed to emphasize one thing: a social sensitivity which made one lose oneself in the group. It was the goal of education then to inculcate this sense of belonging to a group.[3] This point is further emphasized by Jomo Kenyatta (the first President of Kenya) when describing the traditional education system of the Gikuyu ethnic group when he states that:

> The striking thing in the Gikuyu system of education, and the feature which sharply distinguishes it from the European system of education, is the primary place given to personal relations. Each official statement of

> educational policy repeats this well-known declaration that the aim of education must be the building of character and not the mere acquisition of knowledge. But European practice falls short of this practice; knowledge is the dominating objective of the European method of teaching in Africa as a whole and, as long as exams rule, it is hard to see how anything can be given primary importance.[4]

Thus, it is with the personal relations that the Gikuyu education was concerned with right from the beginning. Consequently, this type of traditional education could make individuals detest any selfish tendencies that might appear in the community. As Kenyatta puts it, the selfish or self-regarding person has no name or reputation in the Gikuyu community. An individualist is looked upon with suspicion and is nicknamed "Mwebongia", or one who works only for himself/herself and is likely to end up as a wizard.[5]

One mistake that is often made when discussing traditional African education is to treat it as if it was so perfect that it would need no improvement. Even if we put traditional education within the context it operated within, we will find that it was more inclined towards retention of the past rather than encouraging the youth to be more creative. Again, for those who praise it as if it could solve all our social problems, they need to be reminded that the concept of social awareness inherent in traditional education was narrow; operating within a clan or a small ethnic group. To be of any use today, the social awareness has to go beyond one ethnic group, embracing other ethnic groups to form the new states. African traditional education may have had weaknesses but it was efficient in that it could

make the young feel a part of a larger community, which survived by its members working together. This was the picture when Western education was introduced to Africa for the first time.

(iii) Colonial Education

The first substantial Western influence in Kenya was that of the missionaries, explorers and traders. Among these groups, the missionaries were the most interested in the education of the African peoples. This is understandable, since their main objective was to convert the African people to Christianity. However, as the British government became interested in Kenya as being within its own sphere of influence, it became more and more interested in the education of the African peoples. Like the missionaries, the British government saw the education of the Africans as geared towards specific ends.

That the British government was interested in African education became especially evident in 1911 when the Colonial government established a Department of Education under the directorship of J.R. Orr.[6] Two years later, on April 30, 1913, Orr and other government officials met to establish some guidelines for African schools. During the meeting it was recommended that the Colonial government in Kenya establish primary (elementary) schools which emphasized technical and agricultural instructions.[7] The thinking behind this recommendation was that, in the past, the Africans tended to produce only what was sufficient for their own

requirements. If the recommendation proposed was carried out, then the African would develop mercantile habits of industry, which would improve not only the local production, but also the outside labour market. For example, by teaching improved techniques in agriculture, African schools would increase production in African reserves and at the same time release some labourers who would work in the European estates.[8] To put the same point in another way, the African was being trained to be a useful member of the British Empire. He/she was supposed to contribute to the well-being of the Empire for its well-being would be his/her well-being.

The interesting point about the 1913 proposal on African education was the way it ignored the African interests, even when it was assumed that they were a part of a big empire. The Colonial administrators such as Orr saw only how the Africans could be rendered more useful in terms of being able to perform certain tasks for the benefit of the Colonial government at still cheaper rates. As Robert L. Tignor correctly points out, the proposal reveals the extraordinarily utilitarian view of education. Education was always seen as an instrument for effecting conversions (through missionaries), facilitating economic development, and producing loyal subjects.[9]

The next major policy with regard to African education came in 1919. This policy was a result of a special commission set up to give further guidelines as to the type of education that the Africans were to get. The commission

was composed of the government officials, the European settlers, and the missionaries; three groups that played a major role in influencing the direction that African education was to take.[10] The Commission rejected the earlier proposal that the Colonial government establish African schools. Instead, it was recommended that the government continue giving financial support to the schools which had been established by various missionary groups. However, it was also recommended that the Colonial government ask the missionary schools to offer two specific types of education besides the religious one. First, the missionary schools were to provide Africans with literary training up to 11 years of age. Second, technical education was to be offered to students between the ages of 12 to 18 years. What seems evident is that the government officials, the settlers, and the missionaries had a stake in African education. African education was structured in such a way that it would serve the interests of these three groups. When the interests of the three groups conflicted, which was quite often, each group opted to go its own way, which meant providing Africans with a type of education which was biased towards a specific goal. The best illustration of how various groups attempted to influence the goal and structure of African education before independence is given by John Anderson in The Struggle for the Schools.

But the missionary groups were not happy with the direction that African education was taking in British Colonial Africa, following earlier government educational

policies. Thus, the Committee of the Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland submitted to the Secretary of State a memorandum that included a recommendation for the establishment of a permanent educational advisory committee within the Colonial office. Following a meeting in 1923 to consider the above memorandum, the Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed the Advisory Committee to look into the question of Native Education, in the British Tropical African Dependencies. The Advisory Committee published its recommendations in 1925 in what is now known as the Education Policy in British Tropical Africa.[11]

The recommendations of this Committee were different from the earlier policies in that there is emphasis on the African interests rather than the interests of the Colonial government. In light of this, the authors of 1925 policy asked that education of the Africans be adopted to the African living conditions. This meant that the type of education that the Africans acquired be suitable to them in their colonized situation. The programs offered in African schools included instructions on health, the use of the environment, handicrafts, preparation for home life and the use of leisure time. In terms of the medium of instruction in the school, vernaculars were used in the lower grades while English was used in the higher grades.

Ten years after the 1925 memorandum, the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies published another policy: the Memorandum on the Education of African

Communities.[14] The 1935 educational policy was an extension of the 1925 recommendations. The most important recommendations in the 1935 policy could be summarized as follows:

(i) to show the educational significance of the inter-relation of all the factors in community life. How the school could make its most effective contribution only as part of a more comprehensive program directed to the improvement of the total life of the community.

(ii) to show a clear recognition of the intimate connection between educational policy and economic policy, demanding a close collaboration between the different agencies responsible for public health, agriculture and schools.[13]

The Memorandum had established very easily how the function of African education was to be understood. On the one hand, the school life was to be related as closely as possible to the institutions and traditions of the society of which the students were a part. On the other hand, school life was supposed to provide to students knowledge and skills which would prepare them for social progress and to cope with changes taking place in their traditional communities.[14] What was most important, it seems to me, is the sincerity portrayed in the British educational policies for the African education in 1925 and 1935. Whether or not these policies were put into practice is another question. Finally, as we shall see, whether or not the above policies could be put into practice depended mainly on how the Africans, the missionaries, the government administrators and the settlers interpreted them (policies).

Despite the collaboration sought between the settlers,

missionary societies and the Colonial government with regard to African education, things did not always work well when it came to practice. This was the case, especially with the missionary societies, who suspected the government and the settlers' motives for supporing African education. The conflicts between the three interest groups occurred mostly when it came to higher education. These continuous conflicts saw the establishment of different types of educational institutions in Kenya; institutions that were to feature prominently during the later years of the history of Kenyan education. Thus, around 1925 and after, schools such as Native Industrial Training Depot at Kabete, the Jeanes School and Alliance High School were established.[15]

Native Industrial Training Depot (NITD) was in a way a response to the settlers' pressure for more training of African artisans who were to be employed in the cities and in large European farms.[16] The school was expected to teach the rudimentary techniques in building. By 1928, the school's course offerings included instructions in carpentry, blacksmithing, painting, joinery, masonary, brick-laying and tailoring.[17]

The Jeanes School was based on the recommendation of the Phelps-Stokes Commission published in 1925 which emphasized education that would help the Africans to adjust to their environment. In these types of schools, teachers were instructed on techniques of simple hygiene, sanitation, and agriculture, among other things. The graduates from the school were expected to return to their home areas and

practice what they had learnt.

Alliance High School at Kikuyu was established in 1926 as a result of a conference of the Protestant missionary groups that were already operating in Kenya at this period. To start with, the institution was proposed as a college where Africans would be given advanced training in preparation of African Christian leaders for the hoped-for African church. In the college, four courses were suggested: theology, education, medical instruction and industrial training.[18] The Colonial government, with a lot of pressure from the European settlers, did not like what the Protestant missionary groups were proposing. Thus, the government officials cautioned the missionaries against any attempts to offer too much literary education to the Africans. Mindful of the government's view on African education, the missionary groups modified their original plan and opened Alliance as a junior secondary school. To be admitted to the school, a student had to have a School Certificate of Education. The graduates from the school obtained a Higher Certificate of Education after three years of study. The programme in the school was structured in such a way that the first two years were devoted to general, or what is commonly known as academic, education. During the last year, the instructions were primarily in agriculture, teaching and commerce.[19]

As a result of the early introduction of varied educational opportunities, the Africans responded well. Guy Hunter puts the point well when he says, "While at first the European system of values and schooling was often violently

rejected or neglected, a time came when Africans suddenly saw in it their salvation, both from their poverty and from their 'inferiority' to the developed nations."[20] Although there are many reasons why Africans developed interest in Western education, perhaps the most important one was the benefits that accrued to the new knowledge. For example, the few Africans who were fortunate to acquire the new educational skills of reading and writing had a better standard of living than the rest of the community. Teachers and clerks became the standard to be emulated by the community. In other words, all of a sudden, the type of traditional agricultural activities came to be identified with backwardness while book-learning was identified with progress.[21]

But while the enthusiasm for more formal education continued, it also became apparent that the Africans were becoming selective in terms of the content of education offered to them. This is an important point to make for it introduces another interested group (the Africans) apart from those mentioned earlier, which was going to play a prominent role with regards to African education. In Kikuyland in particular, the growing interest in formal education meant that the missionaries who controlled the schools were to open up more educational opportunities. As well as offering more literary education, the missionaries were also attempting to inculcate their Western-Christian customs to the Africans.

One of the earliest cultural conflicts between the European and the Kikuyu people centered on the circumcision of girls. This custom was so fundamental to the Kikuyus that most of them were not willing to compromise it

in order to acquire Western education which was offered in the mission schools. In order to acquire literary education without compromising the circumcision of girls, the Kikuyus started what was known as independent schools or "bush schools". In these schools, students were offered primarily literary education (though of inferior quality since the teachers were mostly unqualified). Many historians think that the circumcision controversy was the first step towards the development of nationalism among the Kikuyu people.

For our purpose, some points could be made from the historical development cited above. First, the more education the Africans acquired, the more they saw it as a means of economic development. As Tignor points out, by 1930, many Kikuyu families looked upon education as the most important economic alternative to agriculture.[22] Secondly, in the early stages, the Africans had come to prefer academic education to technical and practical education, with regards to their economic returns each type of education enjoyed. This was partly as a result of careers occupied by those who graduated from the first educational institutions for Africans such as Alliance High School, Native Industrial Training Depot and Jeanes School. In other words, the graduates from Alliance had a better chance of getting better paying jobs than graduates from the other two types of institutions. Another reason which made the Africans press for more academic education was the fact that this was the type of education that was being offered to the European students. The Africans saw technical and practical education as being inferior to academic

education.

The Africans' aspirations for more education grew even stronger after World War II. This was partly due to the new awareness of the outside world that some Africans had acquired, and their roles in it. Thus, through the Colonial government and the missionary schools' efforts, the number of African children in maintained and aided schools had grown from 23,164 in 1924 to 150,000 in 1948.[23] But even this degree of expansion could not cope with the new appetite for formal education. To create more space, more unaided primary schools were started.

However, as the expansion of formal education continued, its standard began to suffer. This was pointed out by the Beecher Report of 1949 when it said that only one-fifth of all primary teachers had themselves attended a full primary school course. On top of that, even the mission schools were overcrowded, understaffed and had no adequate books or equipment.[24] In light of the above problems, the Beecher Report recommended to the Colonial government that African education be more qualitative than quantitative.

Specifically, the Report offered three suggestions to overcome the low-quality education that the Africans were getting: one that the inspection duties at the primary school level be improved by employing more European and African staff, two that the teaching staff be improved by making sure that all the teachers had at least eight years of primary education, and three that the school system be reorganized into primary, intermediate and secondary divisions.[25] The

importance of these divisions was that at each stage, an effective selection in terms of examinations would take place to ensure that only those who were qualified went on to the next higher stage. Further, by dividing the educational system into stages, the government was able to make some estimates of the proportion of the African students who could benefit from higher education. This was one of the first attempts to relate African education with manpower planning. It was also at this time that examinations became so popular as a means of controlling who advanced to the next stage on the educational ladder.

Five years prior to independence, in 1958, the tempo of educational expansion in Kenya quickened, particularly at the higher levels. This was due to the ever-increasing signs that the Africans were going to have their own government. The African government would require well-educated Africans who would take over the jobs which were occupied by the expatriates. Thus, within these five years, the number of Africans enrolled in institutions of higher learning increased fourfold.[26] This was made possible by increase in bursary and scholarship awards within and outside the country. For instance, through airlifts of students which were organized by Tom Mboya, the then Secretary of Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.), the number of Kenyan students in the U.S.A. rose from 60 in 1956 to 1000 in 1963.[27] As the expansion of education was taking place at every level, there were other radical changes within the system. For example, in 1960, English was introduced as a medium of instruction in African

schools (from Standard 1 and over) instead of the previous policy where vernacular tongues were used in the lower standards (grades) and English in the upper standards. Again, for the first time, African and Asian students were admitted in what were exclusively European schools.

From the brief outline given above, some important facts can be summarized. Firstly, the pre-Colonial education that most of the African peoples were practising over-emphasized the relationship between the individual as a member of a certain community. In other words, the individual's well-being was always viewed from the perspective of how well he/she fitted as a member of a group. This type of education was deficient for it did not encourage individuals to be more creative as individuals. Education was primarily composed of the youth interpreting the knowledge and norms that had accumulated in a community over the years. For a community where innovative and risk-taking attitudes are not encouraged in individuals, improvements of general welfare is usually slow.

Secondly, Western education was introduced to the Africans for various specific purposes. The missionaries were using education to convert the Africans to Christianity. The settlers intended that by educating Africans, they would be able to provide cheap labor, which would mean more profit from the farms. For its part, the Colonial government needed local administrators who would help to look after the large colonies at a minimum cost. Although these groups had different ideas about the purpose of education in

Africa, they had one thing in common: they all ignored the interest that Africans themselves might have had in Western education. That these groups ignored the African interests in education needs some explanation. I think it could be said that the missionaries, the settlers and the Colonial government were interested in the Africans, but the point is that these groups only saw the African well-being improving as a result of the well-being of the British Empire improving. The mistake that was committed is to take that what was good for the British Empire was necessarily good for the Africans who were colonized. This is a form of utilitarianism where the greatest happiness of the greatest number is to be accomplished by attempting to improve the community in general. If the missionaries, the settlers, and the Colonial administrators considered the African interests as explained above, then we could say a rationalized utilitarianism rather than utilitarianism was being followed. This is because these groups took the African interests for granted.

Finally, although the Africans accepted Western education, the main reason for their acceptance was for its economic value rather than for its social functions. In other words, the social element which was very strong in traditional African education, was losing ground to the economic growth which was strong in Western education.[28] This was due to the improvement of standard of life for those Africans who had an early chance of acquiring Western education under the missionaries. This way of perceiving

Western education as a sure means of economic growth, both for the individual and the society at large, will have far reaching implications after Kenya attained political independence from the British government. As shall be seen, this Western education which had lost its social functions produced an African who was more individualistic, and who saw education first and foremost as his/her only means of economic growth. In his/her mind, economic growth had come to be equated with personal growth.

(iv) After Independence

In 1965, the politically independent Kenyan position and the direction that the new nation was to take was spelled out in a government document; "Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya." (From now on it will be referred to as 'African Socialism.') In 'African Socialism' it was stated that Kenya wanted progress, but this progress would not be easily achieved by reverting to pre-Colonial conditions. To accomplish the progress expected, the best of Kenya's heritage and Colonial legacy had to be recognized and mobilized for a carefully planned attack on poverty, disease and lack of education. This had to be done in order that social justice, political equality, human dignity and economic welfare for all Kenyans could be attained.[29] Two points need to be made here. One, the new Kenyan government was not going to be radically different from the Colonial government in terms of basic goals. Two, education was seen as one of the tools that would help to bring about the basic goals stipulated in 'African Socialism';

namely political equality, social justice, human dignity and economic welfare.

While it is shown that the new nation would pursue both social and economic goals, it was rather clear that in theory, the former goals would prevail over the latter ones in terms of priorities. This is noted explicitly when in 'African Socialism' it is asserted that political equality, social justice and human dignity will not be sacrificed to achieve more material ends quickly, nor will these objectives be compromised today in the faint hope that by so doing, they could be reinstated more fully in some unknown and far distant future.[30]

How does education feature in the above assertion? In the latter pages of 'African Socialism', the government goes on to state that at this stage of Kenya's development (in the early years of political independence), education was meant to serve economic rather than social goals. However, the government qualifies this statement by pointing out that in addition to its economic benefits, widespread education should develop in people good citizenship, promote national unity and encourage proper use of leisure time.[31] What is important to point out at this juncture is that the social role of education as an institution has taken a back seat even at the level of government policies. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for our purpose, while the role of education stresses economic growth, the same education is expected to bring about such social goals as good citizenship, national unity and social justice. Thus, we would agree with Kenneth Prewitt that Kenya

inherited not only the apparatus of formal schooling from the British Colonizers, but also the idea that education is indispensable to both social and economic development.[32]

(v) Educational Structures

The structure of Kenyan education has not seen substantial changes since 1963.[33] There are seven years of primary (elementary) education after which students sit the Certificate of Primary Education (C.P.E.) examination, which is the first of a series of government public examinations. Those students with the best scores join secondary schools where they would continue with their education. They form about 14 percent of all the candidates. After two years of secondary education (junior high), students may wish to sit the next government public examination: Kenya Junior Secondary Education (K.J.S.E.). This examination is not compulsory and only those in private secondary schools who wish to join the government-maintained secondary schools or those who, due to various reasons, are not able to continue with their education for two more years, sit K:J.S.E. After four years of secondary education, the students have to sit the East African Certificate of Education (E.A.C.E.) examination. The few students who qualify by virtue of having the best scores join higher secondary school (Forms V and VI), where they continue with their education for two years. At the end of two years, these students sit East African Advanced Certificate of Education (E.A.A.C.E.). Again, the few who score the highest marks join the university where they continue for three years for a general bachelor's degree.

(vi) Education Expansion

In 'African Socialism', it had been stipulated that the most important policy for alleviating immediate problems would be that which provided a firm basis for rapid economic growth. Further than this, it was also emphasized that other immediate problems such as the Africanization of the economy, education and employment had to be handled in such ways that would not jeopardize growth.[34] It is in light of this proposition, among other things, that education saw a rapid expansion in Kenya after 1963. Thus the government plan was to train enough middle and high level manpower that would be capable of generating economic growth in the new nation.

To grasp the nature of the expansion of education that took place after independence and its implications, a few examples are in order. At the primary level the government's intention was to make sure that all the school-age children had an opportunity to attend school. Thus, by 1972, there were about 180,000 students in Standard 7 (Grade 7) alone in the country. Of this number, it was estimated that only 80,000 would be able to continue with education in post-primary institutions.[35] The pressure to expand education at the primary school level intensified even more when the government announced that it was going to provide a four-year 'Universal' free education to all Kenyans. The result was that between 1965 and 1975, the primary school level enrolment tripled.[36]

To absorb this increasing number of primary school students, the government chose to expand education at the secondary school level. Thus, while, for example, there were

158 government-maintained, 19 government partially-maintained, and 483 private schools in 1970, the government could not cope with every demand for more secondary school places.[37] This point is demonstrated by the fact that in 1972 the private secondary schools comprised 60 percent of all secondary school students enrolled.[38]

Expansion of education at the primary and secondary levels led to a demand for fuller expansion at the higher levels. For instance, in the 1970-74 government plan, it was expected that enrolment at Form V would be increased by 189 percent from the 1968 enrolment.[39] At the university level between the 1967/8-1973/4 academic years, the enrolment at the University of Nairobi rose from 707 to 3,587 students, which is a 407 percent increase.[40] Unfortunately, for a poor country like Kenya, the general expansion of education was too expensive for both the government, the students' parents and relatives. For example, by the 1970s the government alone was spending 33 percent of its annual budget on education. About 43 percent of the money earmarked for education went to primary education.[41] To assess whether this expensive expansion of education fulfils the basic objectives outlined in 'African Socialism', it is important to understand the content of education offered at various levels of schooling.

(vii) The Curriculum Content

The content of Kenyan education is very similar to what one would find in schools in Britain. Subjects such as mathematics, science, geography, English, religion, music, art and crafts are taught at various levels.

At the lower primary levels, the emphasis is on numeracy, English and Kiswahili, and simple numeracy. At the higher primary levels, (Standards 5, 6 and 7) English, mathematics, science, geography and history are the popular subjects for they comprise what will be examined in C.P.E. There are three examination papers in C.P.E.: English, mathematics and general paper. The general paper is composed of questions on geography, history and general science. Thus, although subjects such as Kiswahili, music, arts and crafts are officially on the school curriculum at every level, no teacher or student will pay much attention to them at the final years of primary education. All the effort is put on the examinable subjects.

But while the curriculum content in primary school is similar in every school, the quality often differs from school to school or from one location to another. For example, during the Colonial period, schools were usually categorized as 'A', 'B' and 'C' and each category corresponded to a racial grouping. 'A' schools were intended for the Africans, 'B' schools were for the Asians and 'C' schools were for the Europeans. While the 'A' schools were the worst qualitatively, the 'C' schools were the best. Even after this type of grading had been abolished in 1963, the qualitative differentials still exist in some of these old primary schools.

(viii) Government-Maintained Secondary Schools

As it has already been indicated, the admission to secondary school normally depends on the C.P.E. results.

Further, the type of government secondary school that one enters again depends on the scores. First, we have the national secondary schools. The most notable characteristics of these schools is that they recruit nationally, taking students with the best scores and these schools are well-established in terms of teachers and equipment.[42] Next we have provincial secondary schools which recruit from within the province. They take those students who have good scores but not good enough to secure places in the 20 national secondary schools. Provincial secondary schools are fairly new but are well equipped.

(ix) Private Secondary Schools

There are two distinctive types of private schools. First, there are 'Harambee' schools (self-help). Next, there are private secondary schools that are owned and run by an individual or a group of individuals. However, despite this financial and administrative distinction, the two types of schools have important similarities. One, they recruit their students from those who could not secure places in government-maintained schools due to their low C.P.E. scores. Two, the schools are fairly new and poorly equipped in terms of staff and equipment (the teachers are, in most cases, untrained).[43] Three, these schools are a poor replica of the government-maintained secondary schools, providing a relatively low-quality education.[44]

To underline the fact that private schools are a low-quality educational institution vis-à-vis the government-maintained school, it is noted that in 1969, while 37 percent

of the students in government schools obtained Divisions I and II (1st and 2nd standings) in E.A.C.E., only 11 percent from private schools did as well. Again, while 32 percent of the students from private schools failed the E.A.C.E. examinations, only 9 percent of students from government schools did as poorly. The understanding among most people is that private schools provide a second chance for students to continue with academic education.[45] As the fees in private schools are sometimes four times that paid in government-maintained schools, students from financially poor families are not able to continue in any academic education if they score low marks in C.P.E.

(x) Village Poly-technics

These are low-cost, post-primary training centres which are [redacted]d in the rural areas. They are a response to a large [redacted]f primary school graduates who, in the first place, [redacted]not secure places in government-maintained schools due to [redacted] poor C.P.E. scores and again they could not join private [redacted]ools, probably due to financial constraints, and finally, [redacted]ey could not find any wage employment that they anticipa[redacted]d.[46] There were about 53 village poly-technics between 1966 and 1972. As David Court observed, the essence of these institutions is the attempt to break the conventional academic orientation of secondary schools. Their objectives are quite explicit in the sense that they are oriented towards training which is rooted in practical needs of particular areas in the country.[47] The curriculum in village poly-technics includes masonary, tailoring, carpentry and metal-work.

(xi) Institute of Technology (Self-Help)

As village poly-technics sprang up to absorb primary school graduates who could not join the regular secondary schools and could not secure employment, by 1973 there was a felt need to absorb the secondary school graduates who met the same fate. Thus, although there were more openings for secondary school graduates who could not secure places in higher secondary schools, there were still some who needed some kind of training if they were to get employment. Institutes of technology were started (on a self-help basis) to provide this needed training. It should be observed here that there is an important similarity between students who join village poly-technics and institutes of technology: they consider themselves as failures vis-a-vis their counterparts who are able to continue with academically-oriented education. This attitude is confirmed by society and government agencies. The government salary structure among various professions attests to that fact. The implication is that practical and technical training are generally conceived as inferior career preparations, requiring less intelligence.

Two points could be made from what has been said above. One, the students and the society at large trust education (academically-oriented) to provide them with opportunities for jobs while in reality it is not always suited for that role. On the other hand, the social role of education is completely ignored by the recipients (students) and the

public except for the rhetoric of the politicians. In the final result, we find ourselves stuck with a system of education where its social role that would, for example, contribute to political equality, social justice and human dignity, are completely overshadowed by economic considerations. Instead of playing an important role in unifying people, education in Kenya categorizes various people for various jobs according to the level of formal education achieved. This categorization becomes more crucial when we realize that society's reward system is highly correlated with the level of education that one has attained.

(xii) Regional Disparities of Educational Opportunities

The categorization of Kenya's citizens on the basis of the level of formal education gets more complicated when one realizes the extent of regional inequality of educational opportunities. As mentioned earlier, some of these disparities are historical although they have tended to continue. For example, the people who lived in areas around the early missionary stations had the advantage of realizing the benefits that accrued to formal education before people in other areas. Again, these areas whose inhabitants had a head start in welcoming formal education are usually the same areas that have a high economic potential. This trend continues even today. For instance, Central Province, Nyanza Province and Western Province with the highest economic

potential have the highest percentages of participation in formal education than any other provinces except Nairobi.[48]

Again, as was pointed out earlier, the disparities of education opportunities have been qualitative as well. For example, in 1972, the four largest urban centres; Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu had over 94 percent of their primary school teaching staff professionally trained as opposed to 75 percent in the rural areas.[49] During the same year, 65 percent of primary school teachers in the urban areas had had secondary education or more. On the other hand, except for ten rural districts, all the other areas had about 20-45 percent of all their teaching staff untrained. Thus, although there are many factors other than teaching staff and equipment that affect the success of students in formal education, it is fain to say that overall, urban areas give students a better chance to continue with formal education than other areas. As 1976 statistics show, although only about 14 percent of primary school graduates were admitted to secondary schools, in Nairobi alone about 80 percent of those who sat C.P.E. secured secondary school places.[50]

The distribution of secondary school places show the same disparity as that in primary school. Thus, in 1968, Central Province with less than 15 percent of the national population had 21 percent of government-maintained secondary school places. By 1976, the government-maintained secondary places doubled and the private schools tripled in Central Province.

During the same year, North-Eastern Province, with 2 percent of the national population, had only 1 percent of government-maintained secondary school places and no private school places.[51] The observed educational inequalities and the fact that society's reward system, to a certain extent, correlates with the level of formal education one or a group of people have attained, has a devastating effect on national unity. This fact becomes more evident when it is realized that in most cases the regional distribution of educational opportunities correlates highly with ethnic grouping.

From what has been observed above, it is evident that formal education perpetrates inequality throughout the country. But if the same education is intended to foster social common values such as political equality, unity, human dignity and social justice, how do the government planners handle this contradicting phenomenon? First, the government has attempted to improve regional inequalities by building more schools in areas that have been lagging behind. This move has not been very successful due to the government's financial constraints. Second, the educational planners seem to explain away the inequalities within the educational system by adopting the liberal theory that is commonly referred to as meritocratic selection.[52] The educational policy that embraces the meritocratic selection theory permits sizable differences between individuals, groups or regions within a society, even when that society is committed to the egalitarian principles as Kenya has done in

'African Socialism'. Equality, as it is understood within the egalitarian context, is transformed into equality of opportunity. Thus, so long as the opportunities seem to be there for everyone to acquire formal education, the inequalities are morally acceptable. This was the logic expected in the minds of students and their families when the government decided to provide 4 years primary universal free education in 1974. Again, this has been the spirit behind the general expansion of education. The adoption of the meritocratic selection theory could only have a fair chance of success if it was possible to provide a reasonable degree of equality of educational opportunities throughout the country. But as it has been suggested, the government is not in a position to achieve that.

However, even granted that the government succeeded in providing a reasonable degree of equality of educational opportunity, and so long as education is conceived of as a means of securing a job, there would not be enough job-positions for all those with a certain level of formal education. This has been the case, particularly in the 1970s when high-level jobs have been scarce as compared with the early 1960s. The situation has caused a lot of frustration among students and their supporting relatives when the benefits that are identified with formal education fail to materialize. This is perhaps the frustration that is brought about by the intense competition among students for the few available goods.

The Kenyan educational policies that accept differential educational achievement between individuals or groups by adopting the principle of meritocratic selection have been effective for some time now. This has been partially due to the society's belief that the competition for the scarce goods has been a fair one. For most of the people, especially the students' relatives with little formal education, when one fails to score enough marks in an examination, this is attributed to the student's personal weakness. But as Court has pointed out, the tenability of the above educational policies that generate inequality in their emphasis on high-level manpower selection will be whether they could continue without alienating, to the point of violent outrage, the masses of the population who are not selected for the prestigious careers.[53]

The basic problem: the tension between the selective and social roles inherent in Kenya's educational system has been identified by various scholars, particularly those with a sociological background. Two of these scholars (Lewis Brownstein and Dharam Ghai) will be briefly cited, not only because they claim to have spotted the problem, but more importantly, because each has offered a tentative educational strategy. Brownstein has suggested a conscious creation of two educational systems; one to meet the needs of the rural sector and another to meet the needs of the urban sector. The two systems, according to Brownstein, would have a common base at the primary school level. In other words, primary school

education will be aimed at providing basic skills of literacy, needed for success in either urban or rural sectors of the economy, and not as a preparation for any particular job.[54] To differentiate who joins which of the two education systems, an examination (aptitude test) will be administered.[55]

The urban-oriented secondary school system will continue catering to the needs that formal education has been identified with urban wage employment. The rural-oriented secondary school system has the following three broad aims: (a) to raise the general educational levels of students, (b) furnishing students with information on rural development and (c) training the students for specific rural-oriented employments.[56]

Ghai, on his part, suggests an integrated educational system where the following broad aims will be emphasized: (a) the preservation and transmission of culture, (b) the inculcation of appropriate values and attitudes, (c) skill formation, and (d) promotion of the innovative and critical abilities in individuals.[57]

Looking at Brownstein's educational strategy, one cannot help wondering whether it could solve the basic educational problem in Kenya, particularly if one keeps in mind what has already been discussed. As pointed out, the categorization of people or students does not in itself matter, rather it is how the categorization is perceived. Thus, there is no doubt that the urban-oriented secondary schools that Brownstein suggests would be the more popular from the

standpoint of individual gains. The reasons for this are not hard to figure out when one realizes that even at the moment, government secondary schools are seen as preparing an individual for wage employment that is generally better rewarded than rural employment. At the end of the primary level of education, students would be preparing in every way so that the result of the examination led them to join urban-oriented secondary schools. For those who did not manage to join the urban-oriented secondary schools, they would consider themselves as having failed. This line of thinking is confirmed by the fact that in 1967, it was estimated that workers in non-rural agricultural activities (most of them urban-based) were receiving five times the yearly wages of workers on large farms.[58] What we are saying here is that so long as academic education is perceived as more worthwhile in economic terms and rewarded accordingly, the strategy offered is not going to alleviate our basic educational problems. That is why I think Brownstein has made the same mistake that Robin Barrow makes, as we shall see later, in offering a type of education that categorizes people and at the same time ignoring the judgments that accrue to these categorizations.[59]. Strike seems to be making the same point when he concludes that a theory which believes that the distribution of self-esteem can be changed without changing the distribution of achievement and income is at best incomplete.[60]

Ghai's educational proposal seems to have all the ingredients expected of an educational system. The trouble

is that when scrutinized carefully, the strategy seems to harbor the same contradictions that have been discovered earlier. On one hand, education is supposed to encourage people into one cohesive group through the assimilation of common cultural values. On the other hand, education is expected to select people for various careers. If Ghai believes that the two seemingly opposing roles of education are important the way he does, then he has to show how they (roles) could be made to work within the same educational system.

The problem with most of the critics of Kenyan education after independence is that they are either too simplistic or vague. For example, advocating social or career education or both is not going to be of much help. Again, showing that the education system in Kenya was inherited from the British system of education in itself will not be of much help either. If some of the educational goals seem to be emphasized in practise and others overshadowed, then we ought to find out why. To attempt to find out why some goals seem to be overshadowed even when they are assumed to be among the educational goals, we need to trace the basis of some educational policies formulated immediately after independence in 1963.

3. Some Educational Policies and Statements in Kenya After Independence

Even before independence it was quite clear that the expansion of education was to continue under the African

government. For instance, Kenya African National Union (one of the major political parties before independence) stated unequivocally that it intended that every child in Kenya should have a minimum of seven years free education.[61] This objective was confirmed by President Jomo Kenyatta in his address at the State Opening of Parliament when he said: "Education is perhaps the greatest single foundation of effective nation-building."[62]

The first government educational policy after independence is what is now commonly known as the Ominde Commission Report. The Commission was formed a few days before the independence-day. When the Commission established its report in 1964-1965, it had this to say as regards education expansion in the primary level:

> Looking out over the next thirty years we see radical transformation of our national life, for which large numbers of citizens will remain permanently unfitted, unless provided in their maturity with opportunities for training. Save in rare exceptional instances, the minimum foundation for such training consists of the fundamental education in respect of literacy, numeracy, manual dexterity and general knowledge of the world furnished by the primary school. To use an economic metaphor, a primary education is the minimum basic educational requirement for take-off into the modern sector of national life. Those that lack such advantages are liable to remain for the rest of their days largely outside the range of modern ways of living, unable to benefit from training or to share greatly in the rewards of a developed economy and becoming in the end an impoverished residue of a bygone age.[63]

As regards secondary education, the Commission commented that it remained true that to supply the real needs of Kenya, a much more positive attitude towards practical occupations was necessary. The Commission went on to argue for,

> . . . a broadening of the concept of secondary education

> in two respects. First, we would like to see a development of certain types of post-primary education which are designed to provide an outlet, not as hitherto, primarily into the university, the professions and various white-collar occupations, but into the production side of industry including agriculture . . . we would like to see a wider range of options in the established secondary schools and a less academic treatment of subjects.[64]

Five years after independence, Kenya's government saw fit to establish another commission under the chairmanship of Ndegwa (the Ndegwa Commission). Although its terms of reference went beyond the confines of education, the commission had something to say about educational objectives. Thus, in its Report of 1971, the commission listed the following as the primary goals of Kenyan education:

a) Education must serve the primary needs of national development.

b) Education must assist in the fostering and promoting of national unity.

c) Education must prepare and equip the youth of the country so that they play an effective role in the life of the nation, whilst ensuring the opportunities are provided for full development of individual talents and personality of the nation.

d) Education must assist in the promotion of social equality and train in social obligations and responsibilities.

e) The educational system must respect, foster and develop our rich and varied cultures.[65]

Looking closely at the Ominde Commission Report above, there appears to be a basic common ground both at primary and secondary levels: the emphasis on economic development. When literary and numerary instructions are offered at the primary level, the reason is that these skills are means to future training for various careers. This economic-oriented education is nicely illustrated at the end of the quoted

passage, when it is warned that those who lack formal education will be unable to benefit from the training as offered or share the rewards of a developed economy. According to the thinking of the commission, being outside the range of Western education would almost automatically mean one is outside the range of modern life. To be outside modern life would mean being outside the range of the ideal life. What seems interesting is that there is no indication that the ideals such as political equality, human dignity or social justice are a part of the ideal life, even when these ideals were lauded in 'African Socialism', as being among the educational goals. When economic growth takes precedence over other goals, so does education for economic growth.

At the secondary level, the story is the same, with a variation in approach. Here there is a call for practical education, especially in the agricultural sector of economy. Academic education is criticized for not equipping the youth with proper skills for the careers they anticipate. As we realize, academic or what is commonly known as liberal education is most likely to inculcate in the youth, some of the social-oriented ideals stipulated in 'African Socialism'. But education for economic growth is too important to warrant ignoring the social ideals which might be developed in the youth if general education was offered. In a word, economic development is given a higher priority as a national goal than the development of goals such as national unity or political equality.

Unlike the Ominde Commission Report of 1964-65, the

Ndegwa Commission Report of 1971 includes social-oriented ideals within the national educational goals. In fact, it is in every way a carbon copy of 'African Socialism". Like 'African Socialism', the Ndegwa Commission Report is vague. For example, to say that education must serve the primary needs of national development is open to all sorts of interpretation. National development could mean development of both economic and social ideals among the youth, or as in the Kenyan case, it could mean only economic development.

However, it is important to point out once more that nowhere is it shown that social ideals identified in 'African Socialism' are not important as national goals. The fact of the matter is that either they are taken as secondary vis-a-vis economic growth or it is assumed that they will develop as economic growth is pursued. Whatever the case might be, economic growth is too important a national goal to be compromised in favor of goals such as national unity or social justice.

The Ndegwa Commission Report reveals another interesting point when it states that education must equip the youth of the country so that they can plan an effective role in the life of the nation, whilst ensuring the opportunities are provided for full development of individual talents and the personality of the nation. The point is important for it shows the government's commitment to develop the youth both as individuals as well as committed members of a particular state. For example, taking economic development as the most important national goal, how is the government going to

encourage e[illegible] growth in an individual and the nation at the same ti[illegible]

In the[illegible]ace, the government has assumed that nation[illegible] eco[illegible] growth will be enhanced when every indivi[illegible]l at[illegible]pts to play his/her part, by generating revenue[illegible]th[illegible] in private or as an employee of the government. But the [illegible]iduals' economic growth has come to be identifie[illegible]th individual satisfaction of desires for various economic g[illegible]s (particularly material goods). Since these goods are [illegible]en in short supply a new phenomenon arises: competition[illegible]etween individuals over these scarce goods. To overcome a situation where individuals compete for a few available goods, economists have recommended the nation produce more. What is not easily realized is that the more economic goo[illegible]n individual acquires, the more he/she demands.

To me, the government of Kenya is adopting a utilitarian-based national policy where the greatest happiness within the nation is arrived at when each individual is capable of satisfying his/her economic desires to the best of his/her ability. This type of utilitarianism is plausible only if there are enough economic goods for all those who aspire to them. The only question that might be raised is whether or not the satisfaction of material goods should be the ultimate goal for human beings. However, since the economic goods are scarce and some individuals have differing ability and initiative for economic growth, then, inequalities between individuals or groups with regards to the satisfaction of

their economic desires is inevitable. How then does the government attempt to reduce inequalities of economic growth within the state?

An attempt to reduce economic inequalities within a state in a way requires that in some cases that the government interferes with individuals' freedom to pursue their own economic growth. From the quotation from the Ndegwa Commission Report, the government avoids interfering with individual development as much as possible. But as we saw earlier, the government of Kenya has a way of legitimizing economic inequalities within the state by pointing out the natural differences between different individuals in terms of talents and initiative. Thus, since some people are highly talented, it is contended, it is fair for them to have more economic goods than those who are less talented. The basis of this meritocratic theory is aptly identified by Gunnar Myrdal when he says that the modern economic speculation has never really gone beyond the forms in which it was originally set: the philosophies of natural law and utilitarianism, and the psychology implied in these philosophies of hedonism.[66] This is the economic theory which Kenya government has opted for. Thus, since education is regarded as the most efficient means of economic development, the government takes that by offering equal educational opportunities to every individual, each will have equal economic opportunities. If inequalities between individuals occur, it will be on account of individual natural differences.

Another indication of utilitarian underpinnings within educational policy is on language policies. For example, the Ominde Commission Report stipulates that "Economic development and higher standards can be achieved only through access to science and technology. In today's world the language of science and technology is eminently English."[67] What the Committee was doing was to evaluate the worthlessness of various languages. But this evaluation was strictly based on economic returns as if this was the only national goal that the society wished to pursue. If such ideals as national unity were to be considered, Kiswahili would be a more appropriate language to serve as a medium of instruction since it was spoken by more Kenyans than English, which was used only by those who had had formal education. This is how the English language was justified as the medium of instruction in schools while Kiswahili was recommended just as one of the subjects (compulsory) in the curriculum.

Finally, there is yet another distorted version of utilitarianism inherent in our educational policies. This is related to Kenya government's assumption that economic growth is equivalent to national growth. Thus, the government spends so much money to educate a selected number of Kenyans as a means of producing high-level manpower. The basic thinking behind this is that the manpower produced will generate economic growth, not only for these individual professionals, but also for the nation as a whole, so that in the end, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of Kenyans will be realized. This version of utilitarianism

would be plausible at least in some cases, for example, in a situation where the services of qualified doctors or teachers are enjoyed by the community at large. The only problem that arises in the case of Kenya is that since deontological principles such as national pride, national service and national unity are compromised to economic growth in our educational system, the individualist goals are likely to prevail over national goals, when these two happen to conflict.

A common case is the situation where individuals are offered government scholarships to undertake a particular program (outside the country) that is deemed to be invaluable for the nation as a whole. At the end of the program, the individuals decide to take jobs in the foreign country (whose standard of living is higher than the home country) instead of going back home where their services are likely to be needed most. The presupposition that education to train needed professionals is more worthwhile than general or liberal education is the reason behind the government's preference of higher education over mass or universal-free education.

In ending this introductory chapter, it is important to point out that the types of utilitarianism described here are rather distorted versions of traditional utilitarianism as it is usually applied in a social context. For instance, educational policies in Kenya have been found to be utilitarian-based since education is considered to be the most efficient means for securing economic growth. Economic

growth is then considered mostly as the only means of satisfying various desires that we have acquired. Thus, it is when most of these economically-based desires are satisfied that the greatest happiness of the greatest number of Kenyans is attained, it is assumed. But if these versions of utilitarianism presupposed in our education policies have been found wanting as a basis of a sound and evolving educational system, then we need to find out whether or not any of the various forms of well articulated utilitarianism would offer a plausible foundation, not only for educational activities but also for human conduct in general. This issue will be briefly discussed in the next chapter.

Notes on Chapter I

[1]K.A. Busia, Purposeful Education for Africa. Publications of the Institute of Social Studies, Vol. IV, (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 36.

[2]Ibid., p. 16.

[3]Ibid., p. 16.

[4]Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu, (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1938), p. 121.

[5]Ibid., p. 119.

[6]L. Tignor, The Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu and the Maasai from 1900 to 1939, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 204.

[7]Ibid., p. 204.

[8]Ibid., p. 204.

[9]Ibid., p. 204.

[10]Ibid., p. 207.

[11]D.G. Scanlon, ed., Traditions of African Education, Classics in Education No. 16, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1964), p. 90.

[12]Ibid., p. 102.

[13]Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[14]Ibid., p. 103.

[15]Although the only schools established in Kikuyuland are discussed here, there were similar schools elsewhere.

[16]Tignor, Op. cit., p. 216.

[17]Tignor, Ibid., p. 216.

[18]Tignor, Inid., p. 218.

[19]Tignor, Ibid., p. 218.

[20]G. Hunter, Education for Developing Region: A Study in East Africa. The Institute of Race Relations, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 7.

[21]Ibid., p. 7.

[22]Tignor, Op. cit., p. 224.

[23]E. Stabler, Education Since Uhuru: The Schools of Kenya, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), 12.

[24]Stabler, Ibid., pp. 12-13. Cited from G. Hunter, Education for Developing Region: A Study of East Africa, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 7.

[25]Ibid., p. 14.

[26]Ibid., p. 16.

[27]Ibid., p. 16.

[28]Although Africans used education as a means of liberation from the Colonial power, it is not clear that they saw it as a means of uniting various ethnic groups to form new nations.

[29]Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), p. 1.

[30]Ibid., p. 5.

[31]Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[32]K. Prewitt, "Education and Social Equality in Kenya", in Education, Society and Development: New Perspectives from Kenya, Edited by D. Court and D. Ghai, (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 199.

[33]Kenya government is now attempting to structure education in such a way that we would have 8 years of primary education, 4 years of secondary education and 4 years of university education.

[34]Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, p. 18.

[35]E.J. Keller, Education, Manpower and Development: The Impact of Educational Policies in Kenya, (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1980), p. 37.

[36]D. Court and Kabiru Kinyanjui, Development Policy and Educational Opportunity: The Experience of Kenya and Tanzania", in Regional Disparities in Educational Development, Edited by G. Carron and Ta Ngoc Chau, (Paris: Unesco; IIEP, 1980), p. 342.

[37]Kariru Kinyanjui, "Education Training and Employment of Secondary School Leavers in Kenya", in D. Court and D. Ghai (eds.), Education, Society and Development: New Perspectives from Kenya, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 47.

[38]Keller, Op. cit., p. 28.

[39]L. Brownstein, Education and Development in Rural Kenya: A Study of Primary School Graduates, (Washington: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1972), Chapter 8.

[40]Henry De Souza, "Technical Education in Kenya: Some Problems", African Studies Review, Vol. XIX, No. 3, (December, 1976).

[41]D. Court, "The Education System as a Response to Inequality", in J. Barkan and J.J. Okumu (eds.), Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 232.

[42]D. Court and Kabiru Kinyanjui, "Development Policy and Educational Opportunity: The Experience of Kenya and Tanzania", in G. Carron and Ta Ngoc Chau (eds.), Regional Disparities in Educational Development, p. 342.

[43]Court and Kabiru Kinyanjui, Ibid., p. 353.

[44]Brownstein, Op. cit., p. 46.

[45]Court and Kinyanjui, Op. cit., p. 357.

[46]Court, "Dilemmas of Development" the Village Polytechnic Movement as a Shadow System of Education in Kenya", in Court and Ghai; Education, Society and Development: New Perspectives from Kenya, p. 220.

[47]Court, Inid., p. 221.

[48]Court in Carron & Ta Ngoc Chau, Op. cit., p. 245.

[49]Court, Ibid., p. 345.

[50]Court, Ibid., p. 351.

[51]Court, Ibid., pp. 355-6.

[52]Prewitt, Op. cit., p. 203.

[53]Court, in Barkan and Okumu (eds.), Op. cit., p. 234.

[54]The difference of the educational strategies comes at the secondary level, according to Brownstein.

[55]Brownstein, Op. cit., pp. 170-71.

[56]Brownstein, Ibid., p. 172.

[57]Ghai, in Court & Ghai, Op. cit., p. 328.

[58]Brownstein, Op. cit., p. 176.

[59]Barrow makes the mistake by arguing that those who engage in intellectually-oriented activities are liable to be happier than those who engage in other activities that are not intellectually-inclined and yet those who are unable to engage in intellectually-inclined activities are supposed to be contented with their situation.

[60]Strike, Op. cit., p. 203.

[61]Stabler, Op. cit., p. 25.

[62]Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 287.

[63]Stabler, Op. cit., p. 25. Cited from Kenya Education Commission Report, Part II, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), para. 539.

[64]P. Wellings, "Occupational and Educational Aspirations and Expectations of Kenyan Secondary School Students: Realism and Structural Inequalities". Educational Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1983, p. 255. Cited from Kenya Education Commission Report, Part I, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), paras. 209-210.

[65]E.J. Keller, Education, Manpower and Development: The Impact of Educational Policies in Kenya, (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1980), p. 40. Cited from Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry - 1970-71, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971), p. 146.

[66]G, Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity, World Perspectives, Vol. 16, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957), p. 113.

[67]Stabler, Op. cit., pp. 48-49.

Chapter II

FORMS OF UTILITARIANISM

This chapter highlights various forms of utilitarianism that have sprung up since Jeremy Bentham first provided us with a rather well articulated form of what is usually referred to as classical utilitarianism. The main purpose of this undertaking is to relate these forms of utilitarianism with Robin Barrow's form of utilitarianism, which he claims to provide a plausible justification of education.

In the history of philosophy, there have been numerous theories that have attempted to provide justifications for human conduct. One type is what is commonly referred to as teleological ethical theories. The basic tenet of teleological theories is that the only acceptable reason for an action to be judged right is its potentiality to bring about the good or true end. Among the teleological ethical theories is the utilitarian theory. Jeremy Bentham and John S. Mill are the most staunch proponents of classical utilitariamism. According to Bentham and Mill, an action is to be approved or disapproved with reference to its tendency to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Bentham and Mill are able to arrive at this position due to their conviction that happiness is the only good that human beings strive for. This conviction that human actions are ultimately directed towards happiness is sometimes

referred to as "hedonism". Hence, the classical utilitarianism that Bentham and Mill advocate is often captured by what is commonly known as "hedonistic utilitarianism".

But although Bentham and Mill agree that the goodness or the badness of an action has to be assessed with reference to its tendency to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, their conceptions of happiness differ. Bentham takes a good action as that which has the tendency to promote a greater balance of pleasure over pain for the greatest number. Thus, a state of happiness is achieved when the amount of pleasure out-weighs the amount of pain that an action promotes for the greatest number. To put the same point in a summary form, happiness depends solely on the quantity of pleasure over pain that an action promotes.[1]

Mill agrees with Bentham that in assessing the goodness or the badness of an action, one would have to take into account the quantity of pleasure that an action is liable to promote for the greatest number. However, Mill also contends that an assessment of the goodness or the badness of an action would be incomplete if the quality of the pleasure that is liable to be promoted is not taken into account. What Mill is saying is that while two or more actions might have the potential to promote the same amount of pleasure for the greatest number, these actions are likely to differ with reference to the quality of pleasure that each promotes. As he aptly puts the point, "It is quite compatible with the true

utility principle to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and valuable than others."[2] Thus, while Bentham's conception of happiness refers only to the balance of aggregate experience of pleasure over that of pain, Mill's conception demands that the quality of those experiences be taken into account. This conception of happiness, where the quality of pleasure that an action promotes is considered, has led some scholars to wonder whether Mill could be correctly described as a hedonistic utilitarian theorist. To distinguish him from Bentham, Mill has been said to be supporting what is sometimes referred to as "eudaemonistic utilitarianism".

There are, however, philosophers who find utilitarianism a plausible ethical theory but who further argue that the goodness or the badness of human actions should not be assessed only with reference to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. These scholars are essentially saying that there are other ultimate goods that human beings strive for besides happiness. In the light of this argument then, the goodness or the badness of human actions should also be assessed with reference to their potential to promote other human goods, besides happiness. Scholars who support the above position are usually said to be subscribing to 'agathistic' or 'ideal utilitarianism'.[3] G.E. Moore is identified as an ideal utilitarian theorist due to his proposal that personal affection, human understanding, creativity and contemplation, beauty, gaining and

appreciation of knowledge are goods that human beings strive for.[4]

When Moore, Mill and Bentham are discussing knowledge, pleasure and happiness, they are essentially dealing with a basic component of utilitarian ethical theory (or any other ethical theory). Each scholar is attempting to provide an answer to the seemingly simple question; what things are good for human beings to strive for? This question is loaded in the sense that it has to address itself, among other things, to both 'moral' and 'non-moral' values on one hand and 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' values on the other. The question is further complicated by various differing definitions that each ethical theorist tends to attach to the above terms.

Consequentialism is the other basic component of utilitarian ethical theory. This component stresses the point that the goodness or the badness of human actions are to be judged only with reference to their consequences. Like the value-theory above, the consequentialist component has witnessed various differing views in the course of the development of utilitarianism. In the first place, there are those scholars who assert that the goodness or the badness of an action is to be assessed as it takes place individually. For example, the goodness or badness of telling the truth is to be determined by considering each individual case of telling the truth as it occurs rather than as part of a general practice of telling the truth. Those who hold the above position are said to be proponents of Act-utilitarianism.

Act-utilitarianism seems a plausible principle for guiding human conduct. This is due perhaps to the fact that everyone is expected to take the course of action that in his/her mind is liable to produce good consequences rather than bad consequences. However, a thorough understanding of Act-utilitarianism tends to reduce its credibility. For instance, if one were to be guided by the above principle, then it would require that he/she consider the merits and demerits of every single action he/she takes, no matter how simple. In ordinary life, this practice would be almost impossible to carry out. The practice is almost impossible in the sense that it demands that we ignore the wealth of experience that is buried in history. Further to this, it is often argued that even if the practice of considering the merits and demerits of every action is possible, the practice itself is likely to produce negative rather than positive results. For example, by the time one decides whether or not to save a drowning person, the person would have drowned already. Proponents of Act-utilitarianism, such as J.J.C. Smart, counter the above argument by saying that an Act-utilitarian would be able to take a course of action without prior direct consideration of the merits and demerits of his/her action, and yet live up to the Act-utilitarian principle.[5] To exemplify his point, Smart cites a case where an individua[redacted]on is guided by some past habits rather than by t[redacted]s consideration of the possible merits and deme[redacted] action. Such cases are to happen where

the individual either has not enough facts or has not enough time to consider the probable consequences of a particular course of action. However, Smart quickly adds that when such cases occur, the habits or the rules have to be regarded as rough guides rather than firm rules that one has to conform to all the time.[6] Smart's admission of there being cases where habits would be useful guides to certain actions seem to be an indication that well-thought rules would be more useful in guiding human conduct in society.

Most of the utilitarians who are opposed to Act-utilitarians argue that the goodness or the badness of an action has to be assessed with reference to its conformity to a rule or rules that are based on a utilitarian ethical theory. Thus, due to their emphasis on following rules, philosophers such as R.B. Brandt are usually said to be in support of 'Rule-utilitarianism'.[7] Rule-utilitarians are able to overcome some difficulties that the Act-utilitarians are confronted with. For instance, a Rule-utilitarian does not have to decide the merits or demerits of telling the truth every time the occasion arises. He has simply to follow the moral rule which has been established by noting that, generally, telling the truth has more merits than demerits. But although the Rule-utilitarian is able to overcome some of the difficulties encountered by Act-utilitarianism, he faces problems of a different kind. A common problem that is often cited against a Rule-utilitarian is that he/she is liable to become a rule

worshipper in the sense that he/she would conform to rules rigidly, even when he/she has time to reflect on a particular course of action or when he/she probably has more knowledge about the consequences of following such actions than was available when the rule was established. Furthermore, it seems difficult for a staunch Rule-utilitarian to be able to initiate reform on some rules that might have outlived their usefulness.

There is another form of utilitarianism which differs from both Act-utilitarianism and Rule-utilitarianism and which is sometimes regarded as an improvement on both. Its current standard view is that what is essential in assessing the goodness or the badness of an action is to consider what would happen if everyone were to take such an action. This form of utilitarianism is usually referred to as 'Generalized utilitarianism'. Like Rule-utilitarianism, Generalized utilitarianism avoids some difficulties by creating new ones. One noted difficulty that Generalized utilitarianism has to confront is in cases where if everyone took a particular course of action the consequences are not always as good as would have been had some of the people abstained. The most cited example is that of crossing the lawn. Thus, if everyone conformed to the rule of not crossing the lawn, the consequences would be good in the sense that the grass will not be destroyed. But if a few people broke the rule and crossed the lawn, the grass would not be destroyed and yet the few would have saved time which they could use for other

useful activities. This being the case, the good produced by some people taking a certain course of action while others abstained seems to be greater than when everyone took the same course of action. Another difficulty that Generalized utilitarianism has to contend with is that we do not always know how to interpret the term 'everyone'. To overcome this difficulty, sometimes the term is interpreted to mean 'everyone who is in the same circumstances'. Even this interpretation is not completely free of problems. For instance, how are we to interpret the phrase 'same circumstances'? Are those who do not attach much value to the lawn and those who do to be categorized as being in the same circumstance? This is a problem that advocates of Generalized utilitarianism have to wrestle with.

From what can be learned from the discussion above, it seems obvious that there are essential differences between Act-utilitarianism, Rule-utilitarianism and Generalized utilitarianism. However, in his much respected work, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, David Lyons has persuasively argued that the assumed qualitative difference between actions within Act-utilitarianism on one hand and actions within either Rule-utilitarianism and Generalized utilitarianism fades away when all the relevant conditions for the consequences of actions are taken into account.[8] The crucial condition that is often ignored, Lyons asserts, is that the consequence of a particular action whether within Act-utilitarianism or Rule-utilitarianism is always judged in the

light of 'others doing the same'. Lyons reached this conclusion by demonstrating the fact that for many kinds of actions there are 'thresholds' which must be passed before effects of certain kinds are produced.[9] For instance, there is a certain frequency of lawn-crossing that is needed before any damage could occur. This damage is what Lyons refers to as a 'threshold effect', which in our case could not occur if only one lawn-crossing took place.[10] At the end of the cited work, Lyons finds utilitarianism of whatever form an inadequate ethical theory. One of its weaknesses is that it is not able to account for human intentions and motives for following a particular course of action.[11] Further, the theory ignores rights, duties and obligations which are not exclusively grounded in producing good or preventing evil.[12]

Recently, Donald Regan has come out with yet another form of consequentialist component of utilitarianism which he refers to as 'co-operative utilitarianism'. Regan's work is based on the premise that there is a qualitative difference between Act-utilitarianism on one hand and Rule-utilitarianism and Generalized utilitarianism on the other. As we have seen, this is what Lyons has already refuted. According to Regan, the qualitative difference between the two forms of utilitarianism is based on the intuitions that whatever is the correct moral theory, it ought to be good for individuals to follow as individuals on one hand while on the other hand a correct moral theory ought to be good for 'everyone' to follow.[13] Like Lyons, Regan recognizes the fact that

whenever we are assessing the consequences of a particular action, we always assume that others would take the same course of action. But we do know that not everyone is going to take the same action that we have opted to take. This being the case, the judgment of whether or not one's action is good should always take into account those people who are not willing to take the same course of action that we have taken. For example, if it requires six people to push a car and only two are willing to push, then the best course of action would be for the two not to push. If six people required to push the car are willing to push, then their collective action will have good consequences. Thus, Regan concludes that for utilitarianism to work, each agent ought to co-operate with whoever else is ready to co-operate in the production of the best consequences possible given the behavior of non-co-operators.[14] This conclusion requires that for any course of action that an individual takes, he/she has to understand the behavior of those others who were willing to take the same course of action and those who are not, otherwise he/she will not be able to satisfy co-operative utilitarianism. Regan's form of utilitarianism has the merit of showing the logical connection between an individual and society within a consequentialistic ethical theory. However, like other forms of utilitarianism, Co-operative utilitarianism is exposed to new problems. For example, the theory is so complicated that in some cases the consequences of adopting it would be negative rather than positive. A

case in point is a situation where there is a child molester in a certain neighborhood. An individual within the neighborhood decides to report the case to the relevant authority, but realizes that other members within the neighborhood would not volunteer as witnesses even if they are all aware that this behavior is taking place. According to Regan's Co-operative utilitarianism above, the best course of action for the concerned neighbor to take is to forget that child-molesting ever took place within the neighborhood. He will do so since other neighbors are not willing to co-operate.

It is against this diverse background that Barrow develops his version of utilitarianism which he then applies to education. However, although Barrow's utilitarianism reflects both the consequentialist and the value-theory components, he seems more interested with the latter. As we mentioned earlier the value-theory or the axiological component of utilitarianism could be conceived as being composed of two distinct kinds of values or goods; moral and non-moral values. Moral values are essentially concerned with the act of man in living a communal life. Thus, a utilitarian would consider a certain action or rule to be good in the sense that it enhances communal life for the greatest number of people living as a social group. Equally, an action or rule is to be considered as bad in the sense that it impoverishes communal life for the greatest number of people living as a social group. As G.H. von Wright aptly

puts it, whether an action is morally good or bad depends upon the way in which it affects the good of various beings.[15] In the sense that a moral good has been described, above, a good action is likely to be praised while a bad action is likely to be blamed in a society. For example, under the utilitarian theory, telling the truth is likely to be praised in that it aids communication in a community (the assumption here being that telling the truth helps efficient communication and that efficient communication contributes to the happiness of members of the community in general). In the same way, lying is likely to be blamed in the sense that it hinders communication in a community. In a word, truth-telling and lying are morally good and morally bad actions respectively.

Non-moral values on the other hand involve things or activities that are considered as good or bad by individual human beings regardless of whether or not human beings lived a communal life. Following this line of thought, various philosophers have singled out some goods such as happiness, the appreciation of beauty and the search for truth, and identified them with non-moral values.[16] It is within this area of Barrow's venture to apply utilitarian theory that I am mainly interested in. In this respect, Barrow has argued that the only plausible justification for educational activities derives from the version of utilitarianism that he advocates. For instance, given two types of activities such as reading a history text book or playing soccer, a

utilitarian like Barrow would argue that reading history text is good while playing soccer is bad. This is to say that reading history is more worthwhile than playing soccer. What this might mean is that the greatest number of people are likely to derive the greatest amount of pleasure as individuals from reading of a history text book than in playing soccer. In other words, reading a history text book is here considered to be a more worthwhile human activity than playing soccer, but not that one should be morally praised or blamed for reading a history text book or for playing soccer respectively.

With the above realization in mind, the next three chapters will be composed of a thorough discussion of Barrow's utilitarianism in the field of education.

Notes on Chapter II

[1]J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation, Introduction by L.J. Lefleur, (Darien, Connecticut: Hafner Publishing Company, 1970), p. 3.

[2]J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Edited and Introduction by G. Shea, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1979), p. 8.

[3]M.D. Bayles, (Ed.), Contemporary Utilitarianism, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 3.

[4]G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), Chapter VI.

[5]J.J.C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 42.

[6]Smart and Williams, Ibid., p. 42.

[7]R.B. Brandt, "Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism", in T.K. Hearns (Ed.), Studies in Utilitarianism, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), pp. 169-199.

[8]D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). Lyons does not see much difference between Rule-utilitarianism and Generalized utilitarianism.

[9]Lyons, Ibid., p. 72.

[10]Lyons, Ibid., p. 72.

[11]Lyons, Ibid., pp. 176-7.

[12]Lyons, Ibid., p. 189.

[13]D. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 3.

[14]Regan, Ibid., p. 124.

[15]G.H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 119.

[16]C.A. Campbell has discussed these values in his essay: "Moral and Non-Moral Values: A Study in the First Principles of Axiology", in Readings in Ethical Theory edited by W. Sellars and J. Hospers, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 169-199.

Chapter III

BARROW'S HEDONISTIC UTILITARIANISM

Barrow's ethical theory that is to be considered here is scattered in his works such as Moral Philosophy for Education, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, Common Sense and the Curriculum and Happiness. In Plato, Utilitarianism and Education in particular, Barrow follows three basic lines of argument: The first is that Plato's views in the Republic are utilitarian in inclination. The second is that utilitarianism is the only acceptable ethical theory. The third is that the first two above claims have important implications in the philosophy of education, particularly in providing the only acceptable justification for various activities that take place in our educational system.[1] In this chapter, only the first two claims will be discussed. The third claim will be taken up in the later chapters.

Was Plato of the Republic a utilitarian theorist? One of the points that Barrow uses to show that Plato subscribed to utilitarianism is the text where he (Plato) claimed that actions such as telling the truth or returning what is owed are not considered good or bad in themselves but only in the sense as to how they affect the state or the individual concerned.[2] On the strength of the example above, Barrow is willing to declare that for Plato, good actions are those that contribute to the happiness of the state and consequently,

to the happiness of the individuals. This assumption seems to be equivalent to what was referred to in the first chapter as the consequentialist element inherent in utilitarianism. But is the evidence Barrow uses enough to allow us to identify Plato with the consequentialist theories? Whether or not Plato is a consequentialist will partly depend on the use of the term 'justice'.

In Book II of the Republic, Socrates argues that there are some things which are good, not only for their consequences or after effects but for their own sake. The examples he cites include understanding and health.[3] Again, in Book IV, Plato identifies three parts of individuals' souls. Justice then is defined as the correct relationship between these parts of the soul as J.D. Mabbott aptly puts it.[4] But attaining justice in an individual does not suggest that something else is hoped for. Like the example of health given in Book II, justice is what is hoped for. Thus in a rather very brief way, there is not enough evidence that would allow us to identify the term justice only with the consequences of our actions.

But even granted that my argument against identifying Plato with consequentialist theories, whether or not it is plausible to associate him with the type of utilitarianism that Barrow advocates, will depend on how we interpret the term justice vis-a-vis the term happiness. In some parts of the Republic, Plato distinguishes three natural classes of citizens: the tradesmen, the soldiers and the rulers. In

such a state, justice is achieved when every class of citizens engages in activities that each have the best ability for. There are two important characteristics detectable in a just state. The first is the efficiency which is achieved when every individual sticks to his/her natural class, specializing and therefore performing well the function or the activity that he/she is suited for. The second one is that there are no conflicts that occur when different individuals or classes attempt to engage in the same activities rather than only those who have the best ability. The picture created here is that of a state where the performance of social functions is well co-ordinated. What we have to show is that this type of co-ordination or harmony within a state could be identified with happiness, as Barrow conceives it.

There is some truth in thinking that the greatest happiness could be achieved if everyone in a state engaged in what he/she had the best ability to perform. However, the above is not a sufficient condition for the greatest happiness to be achieved in a state. For example, it does not mean that what one has the best ability to engage in is what he/she has the most desire to engage in. Hence it is not necessary that what one has the best ability to engage in will generate the greatest amount of pleasure in an individual. For instance, it is perfectly normal for one to want to engage in mathematics rather than in farming even when he/she would do better in farming than in mathematics.

Another argument that is used to link justice (harmony) with happiness is when the term 'eudaimonia' which appears in various parts of the Republic is translated as happiness. As has been pointed out, if it is correct to translate eudaimonia as happiness, then there would be ample avidence that justice could be equated with happiness.[5] But when we take the same term 'eudaimonia' as it is used by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, we have reason to doubt that the term could be identified with happiness. Thus, Aristotle asks, what is the supreme good that is attainable by human action and the answer given is 'eudaimonia'. However, eudaimonia is identified with living well and doing well. For other people, eudaimonia is identified with pleasure, wealth, health or honor.[6] The point to make here is that eudaimonia is not identified with any single activity or good but with living well or a good life. Consequently, eudaimonia cannot be identified with pleasure which is the essential element in Barrow's conception of happiness. This point is going to be taken up in Chapter III.

Yet another point that could be used to show that justice could not be identified with happiness is where Socrates in the Republic explicitly denies the claim that good is identifiable with pleasure.[7] Barrow counters this by saying that " . . . it is quite coherent for someone to argue that pleasure and good are not synonymous, but that nonetheless what is morally good has to be decided essentially by reference to considerations of pleasure and pain."[8] Barrow is trying to

argue that although Plato was opposed to the idea of identifying the good with pleasure, this in itself does not necessarily show that he was opposed to the idea of determining what is the good by referring to what maximizes pleasure.[9] This is a good argument but it falls short of Barrow's strong statement that what is morally good has to be decided essentially by reference to pleasure and pain. Thus Barrow's attempt to identify his conception of happiness with Plato's conception of justice has no support.

But even if we had a good reason to believe that Plato equated justice with happiness, we would still be required to show that he (Plato) took happiness to be the most superior good that all human beings strive for, both as individuals and as a community. This task is necessary in the sense that it is possible for someone to recognize happiness as one of the goods that human beings strive for without at the same time implying that happiness is the most superior of all the goods that human beings strive for. Barrow is aware of this problem, especially when he realizes that in the Republic the status of knowledge and truth seem to subordinate even justice in some contexts. To tackle this problem, Barrow asserts that in the Republic the pursuit of knowledge and truth is an important goal for human beings. But he adds that pursuing knowledge and truth is one with understanding justice both in the state and in individuals. That being the case, Barrow argues that even if it is claimed that a human being values the pursuit of knowledge and truth, he/she does so since it

happens to be for him/her a necessary means for maintaining the just state and also because the pursuit is necessary for the justice of the rulers, who are philosophers.[10]

The mistake that Barrow is making, it seems to me, is of attempting to identify justice in the state with justice within individuals. In the Republic we have seen that justice is achieved when individuals in their natural classes - tradesmen, soldiers and rulers - engage in those functions or activities that they are best suited for. The tradesmen provide the state with such utilities as clothes and food, the soldiers provide the state with security from external attacks, and the rulers govern the state. If this is a fair way of presenting Plato, then it means that although the pursuit of knowledge and truth is a necessary condition for achieving justice in the state, it is not a sufficient one. What the tradesmen and soldiers engage in is equally important in the process of achieving justice in a state. When it comes to justice in an individual however, the tradesman will achieve it by concentrating on activities that are related to temperanee, the soldier will achieve justice by engaging in activities that are related to courage and finally, the rulers will achieve justice by engaging in activities that portray intellect. But the interesting thing is the point that Plato makes to the effect that there is something which is greater than justice itself. This something is the object of the highest form of knowledge, and by relation to which justice derives its value, Plato contends. This is what Plato refers

to as the Form of Good. The Form of Good is both the goal as well as the basis of knowledge. Again, this Form of Good is the goal that the philosopher-rulers are striving for, for they are the only people who are capable of achieving it. What we have then is a case where the Good not only cannot be identified with justice, but is superior to it.[11] But since the Form of Good is the goal of the highest form of knowledge, then only the philosopher-rulers have the ability to strive and even achieve the Form of Good which is the highest goal that a human being could strive for. The tradesmen and the soldiers have to be contented with what they are pursuing not because they aim at the ultimate goal for a human being but only because they have no ability to pursue the highest Form of Good. If the above argument is correct, then it shows that for Plato, knowledge is the ultimate goal for an individual to strive for. This conclusion is reinforced when Plato asserts that justice in the individual is achieved when the rational element takes control of temperance and courage, the other elements that compose a human soul. All in all, no evidence in the Republic suggests that Plato subscribed to a utilitarian ethical theory, as Barrow would have us believe.

It is one thing to show that Barrow's claim that Plato's Republic is utilitarian in inclination is implausible, but yet another to show that Barrow's utilitarianism is implausible.

Thus, how does Barrow sustain his claim that utilitarianism is the only acceptable ethical theory even after it has been dissociated with Plato? Barrow starts his argument with a major premise that when free, every human being always attempts to engage in activities that are likely to generate pleasure rather than pain.[12] By this he means that whatever one chooses to do is directly or indirectly influenced by the potentiality of the activity chosen to generate pleasure. For instance, if one chooses to marry, the basic reason to get married is that the person perceives that a married state is likely to generate more pleasure in him/her than the unmarried state that the person is already in. Again, even when one decides to perform a difficult task, the only plausible explanation is that the pleasure anticipated is greater than the pain now being experienced. The point that Barrow is trying to make, it seems to me, is that no activity could be regarded as worthwhile in itself. Any activity is only worthwhile with reference to its potential to generate pleasure/or minimize pain in an individual. This is the case because the ultimate goal for all human beings is to have pleasurable experiences and/or minimize the painful experiences. But lest we take Barrow to be an egoist, he does, however, recognize that every individual in a society is pursuing the same ultimate goal - happiness. Hence, according to Barrow, an individual is not only going to engage in activities that generate the greatest happiness in him/her as an individual, but these activities should have

the potential to generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number. However, it is important to point out that under Barrow's version of utilitarianism, the individual's consideration of others' happiness is somewhat egoistic. For example, an individual is not likely to engage in activities that he/she has reason to believe would generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number, if he/she is not included.

Barrow also asserts that various activities that an individual may choose to engage in will vary with respect to the quantity of pleasure they are liable to generate. Thus, when an activity generates more pleasure than pain in an individual or society, we would normally describe the individual or society as happy. On the other hand, when an activity generates more pain than pleasure, we would say that the individual or society is unhappy. One of the implications to be derived from the above assertion is that an individual could be engaged in activities that generate pleasurable experiences without necessarily being happy. By contrast, an individual or society could engage in activities that generate painful experiences without necessarily becoming unhappy. This is so because, for one to attain a happy state, the amount of pleasurable experiences has to outweigh the amount of painful experiences, Barrow would argue. Another point that is important for our discussion is the realization of the swiftness through which Barrow's conception of pleasure collapses into a conception of happiness. That is

to say, happiness strictly refers to the balance of pleasure over pain.[13]

The amount of pleasure or pain is arrived at by taking into account the intensity and the duration of pleasure or pain that an activity is likely to generate in an individual. For instance, in a society where pre-marital sex is prohibited, an individual engaging in it might experience intense pleasure over a short period of time but on a long-term goal, this activity is likely to generate more pain in the individual (guilty conscience for the rest of his/her life). On the other hand, it is normal for a student to forego some activities such as all-night partying or dancing, activities which he/she believes to have the potential to generate much pleasure for a short time in order that he/she prepares for a major examination that he/she perceives to promise long-term pleasurable experiences. In a word, the painful experiences that the student endures for a short while is seen as out-weighed by the pleasurable experiences expected over a long period of time, Barrow would argue.

However, whether or not the quantity of pleasure that a particular activity generates in an individual is enough to lead him/her to a happy life depends both on the nature of the individual as well as his/her situation.[14] The nature of the individual, according to Barrow, includes his/her physical and mental make-up. The mental make-up includes his/her prejudices, aspirations, beliefs, knowledge and taste.[15] Here it should be noted that the nature of the

individual or rather his/her character partly depends on the basic potential inherent in an individual. When it comes to describing the situation of an individual as the other component condition for his/her happiness, Barrow finds it difficult to be precise. This, as he explains, is due to the fact that there are not any particular situations or circumstances that have to necessarily hold in order for pleasure to be generated in an individual. To overcome this problem, Barrow negatively describes the situation that would be necessary for an individual to be happy. Thus, the necessary situation for one to be happy includes the absence of frustrations, loneliness, agitation, depression, annoyance and misery.[16]

To illustrate the above claim, an individual may or may not derive pleasure from doing mathematics depending on whether he/she has both the ability and aspiration to engage in the activity. That is to say, the individual is liable to derive pleasure from doing mathematics if he/she has the ability to engage in the activity and that this is the activity he/she has the desire to engage in. This example helps to demonstrate the point that Barrow is trying to make; that the closer the relationship between the individual's ability and his/her aspiration to engage in a certain activity, the narrower the gap between his/her achievements and his/her aspirations. Consequently, the narrower the gap between the individual's achievements and his/her aspirations, the happier his/her life would become.[17] On the contrary,

the wider the gap between the individual's ability and aspirations to engage in a certain activity, the wider would be the gap between his/her achievements and his/her aspirations. Equally, the wider the gap between the individual's achievement and his/her aspirations, the more painful his/her life is likely to become. Due to these two conditions that must hold for one to be happy, there are two ways in which an individual might become unhappy (failing to enmesh with the situation as Barrow would like to put it). Firstly, he/she may have the ability but no aspiration (desire) to engage in a certain activity. Secondly, he/she may have the aspiration but not the ability to engage in the activity. For example, if the individual's ability to do mathematics was rather low while his/her aspiration to become a mathematician was high, the gap between his/her achievements and aspiration as far as mathematics was concerned is likely to be wide. This is then likely to cause frustrations. The frustrations would account for his/her unhappy life. But had the same individual had great ability for painting, and had he/she decided to engage in painting rather than doing mathematics, then according to Barrow, he/she is likely to be a happier painter than a happier mathematician.

The moral of the above paragraph is that different activities are liable to generate different quantities of pleasure depending on the nature of different individuals and the situation they find themselves in. In light of this conclusion, a particular activity would be regarded as

worthwhile with reference to the quantity of pleasure over pain that it is liable to generate in a particular individual and not the quantity of pleasure over pain the activity is liable to generate in any human being in general, regardless of the individual's say, ability, knowledge, opinions and aspirations. It should be noted that as far as various activities are acceptable in a society, they have the same worth. It is only when they are considered with regards to the happiness of different individuals that they tend to have different values. This type of argument is borrowed from Plato's Republic.

We have just shown what it would take for an individual to lead a happy life. But what does it require for a society to lead a happy life? Like Plato, Barrow has noted that in every society individuals are endowed with different abilities which enable them to engage in different activities. As indicated earlier, some individuals have great ability for engaging in mathematics while others have great ability for engaging in painting pictures for example. Thus, a happy society is that in which every individual is able to engage in activities for which he/she has both the ability and aspiration. To make it possible that each individual in a society leads a happy life, the society has to make sure that there are enough approved aspirations (activities or things that different individuals would like to attain) which are compatible with various abilities which various individuals possess. Secondly, the society has to ensure that each

individual discovers and is engaged in those activities that he/she has the ability for. It is when these two conditions are fulfilled that a happy society is guaranteed. According to Barrow, one of the functions of education is to help individuals to discover their talents.

Having briefly outlined Barrow's utilitarian theory, it seems to me appropriate at this juncture to consider whether it is tenable as a guide for human conduct. To initiate the task, two basic points are to be considered. Firstly, it seems obvious that there are some common goals that tend to unite human beings in a society; things such as the need for security or pro-creation which either one cannot acquire as an individual or that they are necessary so long as an individual lives as a member of a social group. However, beyond such common goals, different individuals or groups are bound to have different goals. Often times, these goals are opposed to each other. A case in point is a situation where a husband and a wife have a limited amount of money to spend for entertainment every week-end. The husband likes to drink in order to relieve himself of a week's exhaustion. But whenever he drinks he cannot afford to take the wife out for a movie, which she happens to like. Assuming that there are common goals that justify the continuation of their relationship, it is obvious that the two have different and conflicting goals. Thus, in order for the husband to lead a happy life, the wife is forced to an unhappy life herself.

But of course, the husband and the wife may try to make

a limited amount of money to spend for recreational services. This money is only enough either for a football field or an ice-rink. Two-thirds of the city-dwellers prefer watching football games while the remaining one-third prefers watching hockey games. If we take the greatest pleasure of the greatest number to be the ultimate guide to all human actions, the pleasure of the two-thirds of the city-dwellers will have a priority over that of the remaining one-third. That being the case, the city administrators would naturally opt to construct a football field rather than an ice-rink. This is another interpretation of the greatest happiness of the greatest number principle, where the happiness of the majority overrides that of the minority. As we have already seen, Barrow attempts to avoid this type of utilitarianism by advocating a well-ordered society where conflicts between individuals or groups are at the minimum. But if our hypothetical case above is possible in a real world, then this type of utilitarianism where the minority are forced to suffer under the majority, cannot be avoided so far as conflict of interests is a reality in social life.

The examples I have cited above emphasize the fact that individuals or groups do have different and conflicting goals or wants. This is rather a simplification of the issue on my part. The truth of the matter is that the mere fact that different individuals or groups do have different goals or wants, does not in itself bring about conflicts. Rather, the conflicts appear, it seems to me, when the attempt to pursue

some goals by an individual or group tend to interfere with goals or wants being pursued by another individual or group. To take our example again, had the husband and the wife had enough money to spend every week-end, their differences would not have come to a head.

There are some cases, however, where differences of goals or wants between individuals or groups bring about instant conflicts. For example, there might be a couple who have differences with regard to the question of having a child. The husband wishes that the couple have their own child. The wife is opposed to the idea of having to bear children at all. In such a situation, the conflict is so strong that it is difficult to resolve without one party incurring heavy losses by compromising his/her goals or wants. In order to avoid a compromise, the couple are likely to opt for divorce. In a real world, this type of conflict (where a compromise is difficult to come by) is experienced although it is not typical. This is in a way saying that most of the differences in a society could be resolved if the parties involved are willing to sacrifice something they have wanted to do or have.

The second basic point to be considered when evaluating the tenability of the implications of Barrow's utilitarian theory is that, although it is true as the previous argument indicates, that individuals or groups are bound to pursue different and at times conflicting goals, it is equally true that different individuals or groups are likely to want to

pursue similar individual goals. For instance, there will be more than one person in a society who has the ability and desire to become either a farmer or a soldier. The problem, however, arises where there are too many people who have the ability and the desire to pursue the same goal or engage in the same activity even when that particular goal or activity is limited to only one person or a few people. For instance, there might be many people with the ability and the desire to replace the retiring Prime Minister of Canada. To become the Prime Minister of Canada is the only way that the people concerned would attain the highest degree of happiness. The problem is that only one person is required to take the job of Prime Minister of Canada at one particular period in time. This would mean that all except one will be prevented from engaging in a career that they had both the ability and aspiration. From what we have already discussed, all the above people except one would be prevented from the process of narrowing the gap between their achievements and their aspirations, hence reducing the amount of happiness that each person would have attained had he/she a chance to be the Prime Minister of Canada. Thus, in a society where different individuals or groups are likely to want to pursue similar individual goals, Barrow's utilitarian theory is not going to be a good guide to human actions. To put this point in another way, Barrow's theory is liable to work only in a society where there are enough goals or wants for all those who have the abilities and the desires for them.

The conclusion arrived at above, that Barrow's utilitarian theory is untenable in our kind of society, has been adopted by many scholars though for different reasons. In particular, in his review of Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, R.S. Downie has claimed that one of Barrow's radical defects in the work is in his taking the position that utilitarianism is the view that happiness is the supreme good that human beings strive for. Contrary to the above position, Downie contends that a doctrine of happiness that Barrow describes is only contingently a utilitarian doctrine; that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for utilitarianism to maintain happiness is the supreme good.[18] Downie continues to argue that the essential point that Barrow does not seem to see is that utilitarianism is a theory not about what is good, but about what is right or what our duties are or the relationship between the right and the good.[19]

It seems to me that Downie's criticism is wrong in two counts. One, his criticism of Barrow for taking happiness as the supreme good for human beings as a necessary condition for the doctrine of utilitarism is implausible. To me, as far as Barrow is referring to the traditional theory of utilitarianism as expounded by Bentham and J.S. Mill, happiness as the supreme good for human beings, remains a necessary condition. Again, contrary to Downie's claim, Barrow is aware and in fact identifies the form of utilitarianism associated with G.E. Moore (discussed in Chapter I) where the consequential element of what we do is emphasized whereas the question as to what

good we strive for is substituted with other goods which includes happiness.[20] Downie has failed to see that Barrow has explicitly rejected ideal utilitarianism in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.[21]

The second, and perhaps the more serious objection to Downie's criticism of Barrow, is the claim that utilitarianism is about what is right rather than what is good. From the analysis carried out in Chapter I, it is evident that utilitarianism is composed of two basic elements: the consequential element and the value theory element. This simply means that within a traditional utilitarian theory for example, actions are assessed as good or bad with reference to the part they play in contributing to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The point that is often ignored by many utilitarian theorists is the manner in which the consequences, in this case happiness or pain, is arrived at. Thus, whereas there is a distinction between the right actions and good actions in some ethical theories, right and good actions collapse into good actions as far as utilitarianism is concerned. In my estimation, although Barrow's utilitarian theory propounded here is wrong in various [redacted] it is obvious that Downie's criticism is rather confusing by first attempting to define utilitarianism as consequentialism. Second it would be fair to say that utilitarianism is more concerned with what is good (the consequences) rather than what is right (the manner in which the goods are arrived at). It is theories which are within what is commonly referred to

as deontological ethical theories that tend to worry more about what is right rather than what is good.

One of the main reasons why Barrow's ethical theory is wrong, as illustrated by the two objections raised above, is that it is based on a false premise, a premise which is borrowed from Plato's Republic. The false premise is that there is no distinction between an individual and the state he/she lives in (an individual is a replica of a state). In a word, Barrow, influenced by Plato, fails to take an individual and a state as two distinct entities which have some basic similarities but at the same time some essential differences. Due to this false start, Barrow is forced to treat moral and non-moral values as if they belonged to the same category. Hence, he continues to argue as if values or the goods that human beings strive for as individuals are always the same that they would strive for as a society. For example, harmony might be a top priority as far as social life is concerned but this same good might not feature as prominently in the life of an individual as, say, self-development. The problem becomes even more complicated sometimes when we realize that there are some values such as happiness which could easily fit within both moral and non-moral categories. In such a case, both the individual and the state would be said to be striving for happiness. The tricky part is that although it is likely that both the individual and the state are striving for the same good, happiness, there are bound to be differences with regard to how each entity

pursues this goal.

As we have already shown, it is possible to describe a state or a society as happy (where the majority are doing what they have the best ability and aspiration for but where the minority are frustrated) without the individual members of the society being happy. To put the point more explicitly, Barrow takes the economic principle of division of labor found in the Republic where people come to direct their energy to the best of their abilities with a view of the needs of the state as being important as their own need. Guided by this principle, each individual in the Republic pursues an activity that meshes well with others for the benefit of all.[22] The mistake that is committed here is attempting to generalize the economic principle above to apply not only to moral (social) values but to all activities that go on within a society.. The truth of the matter is that what one has ability to engage in involves not only activities that are geared towards moral life, but the whole of human life, which includes an individual's private life.

Barrow's version of utilitarianism that we have been discussing is patched up with a principle of distributive justice (a principle whose natural home is outside the teleological theories). This enables him to avoid some of the problems that philosophers such as Bentham have been accused of. For example, Barrow is able to argue that human activities should be geared towards the greatest happiness of the greatest number but that the happiness should be fairly

distributed among the members of the society in question. However, so long as utilitarianism is based on the argument that the end justifies the means, I feel the theory is ethically wrong. For instance, you may have a society where education is recognized as the good to be pursued by everyone in future. But would it be ethical for the government officials to eliminate those who are still opposed to the idea, even if this is the only way that universal education in that society could be achieved? If we followed the utilitarian prescription, attaining universal education would justify the elimination of those members of the society that were opposed to the idea of universal education.

But how does Barrow respond to the accusation that the ethical theory he advocates allows for the elimination of the minority who might be opposed to a policy that is already popular in a society? Barrow is likely to answer his critics in two ways. First, he has already pointed out that within the utilitarianism that he holds is written an assumption that nobody's claim to a share of happiness can simply be ignored.[23] Second, he makes a point of distinguishing between Act-utilitarianism and Rule-utilitarianism, a move which seems to be designed to come into grips with the above accusation. My view is that the two points raised are not capable of reducing the force of the accusation as we shall see below.

Barrow's first point can be answered by showing that even if utilitarianism does consider the happiness of every

individual in a society, in practice, it is still possible that the happiness of the minority is bound to be sacrificed to that of the majority, so long as various individuals are likely to want to pursue different activities. The possibility of sacrificing the happiness of the minority increases especially if the happiness of the majority is dangerously threatened by the action of the minority.

To answer Barrow's second point, one needs to understand the distinction he makes between Act-utilitarianism and Rule-utilitarianism. Thus for Barrow, an Act-utilitarian is one who believes that every single act should be assessed on utilitarian principles, whereas the Rule-utilitarian believes that in assessing any individual act one should consider whether it is desirable on utilitarian principles that such an act should generally be performed; if it seems that it would not be desirable that it should generally be performed, then it should not be performed, even if in particular circumstances it might promote happiness.[24] Barrow then declares his preference for Rule-utilitarianism over Act-utilitarianism. To support his case, Barrow cites the act of killing human beings. Thus, if we adopt Act-utilitarianism, specific cases of killing might be acceptable so long as their consequences promoted more happiness in a society than not killing, he argues. Barrow attempts to avoid this conclusion which is contrary to our intuition by pointing out that even if one genuinely believed that killing, say, some individuals promoted more happiness in the society than not killing them,

the act will still be wrong for it could be shown that the likely increase in the number of actual killings, and the inevitable increase in the uncertainty that we shall all have as to whether we are going to live out the day or be killed by some sincere but misguided individual will obviously lead to considerably less happiness in general than the adoption of the rule against killing would do.[25]

This is a weak argument for it is possible to show that specific cases of killing do not necessarily lead to an increase of killings or uncertainty - consequences that are liable to decrease happiness in a society. In fact, some cases of killing, say, a dictator or robbers are likely to promote more happiness in a society than a decision against it. What we are saying is that depending on the circumstances an act of killing some human beings has the same probability of either increasing or decreasing happiness in a society. For Barrow's argument to hold, he has not only to show that an act of killing is likely to decrease happiness in a community but also that no act of killing ever promotes happiness. In other words, Barrow has been able to show that sometimes an act of killing could result in a decrease of happiness in a society. However, he has not been able to show that killing produces pain in general, and therefore should be prohibited. Barrow's claim becomes even more suspect when he admits (by implication) that killing in self-defense is a rule that could be sustained on utilitarian grounds. As in the case already discussed, there are no utilitarian grounds that could

be used to show that killing in self-defense always promotes happiness in a society while other types of killing promote opposite results.

A more interesting case, particularly for those interested in education is Barrow's attempt to support the value of truth or the pursuit of truth on utilitarian grounds. Barrow concedes that there are cases where telling the truth might promote more pain than happiness. However, he goes on to state that if an occasion ever arose in which it was suggested that in the interest of happiness people ought to be prevented from pursuing truth, no philosopher, not even a utilitarian one would accept this. Barrow does not conceive of such a case in which it is plausibly maintained it would be in the interests of the long-term happiness of the greatest number to issue a blanket restriction on the pursuit of truth per se.[26] But again, like the case of killing, it can be shown that a general restriction on the pursuit of truth might promote happiness. For example, people would be happier generally if they were prohibited from reading materials which show that they will all die from a nuclear war even if it is true they were going to die and there was nothing to prevent the disaster. Here again, Barrow fails to support the value of truth on the strength of a utilitarian ethical theory. Thus, although in the two examples (killing and pursuit of truth) he attempts to avoid the negative consequences that are likely to occur when one adopts Act-utilitarianism, the distinction between Act-utilitarianism

and Rule-utilitarianism does not help the situation. His Rule-utilitarianism avoids collapsing into the conclusions of Act-utilitarianism (pursuit of truth and killing respectively) by adopting unstated principles, principles that would seem once again to be outside the utilitarian ethical theory.

Finally, it may happen that utilitarianism derives some policies whose result might be identical to results by other non-utilitarian theories. A case in point is a situation where utilitarianism supports the principle of universal free health care, believing that this is the best policy for generating happiness of the greatest number. A non-utilitarian ethical theory might also support the principle of universal free health care, believing it to be one of the human rights. Although the two distinctive theories support the same policy, the difference would occur if the principle of universal free health care ceases to be the best method for generating the greatest happiness for the greatest number in which case utilitarians would abandon the policy. On the other hand, the non-utilitarians would still uphold the principle of universal free health care even when it ceases to generate the greatest happiness to the greatest number, since to them (non-utilitarians) the importance of the principle is not based on happiness. In speaking of rights, N.E. Bowie and R.L. Simon put the same point rather aptly when they say that one might refine utilitarianism so that the rules and practices justified on utilitarian grounds were

identical with the rules and practices that would be justified on some other non-utilitarian ethical theory. However, the essential difference is that should the world change and such utilitarian result no longer obtain, the rules and practices that protect individual rights would be surrendered.[27]

Up to this stage, my basic objections have only demonstrated the untenability of Barrow's ethical theory as far as its procedural aspects are concerned. In a word, the question that has been dealt with is whether or not an individual as well as a state would enhance happiness by following the policies prescribed by Barrow. The question that remains unanswered now is whether or not Barrow's claim that all human activities are always directed toward the greatest happiness possible could be adequately defended. To address ourselves to this question, it is important, I think, to analyze the concept 'happiness' vis-a-vis Barrow's conception of happiness. In particular, the analysis is intended to help to clarify, firstly, the relationship between happiness and 'satisfaction', secondly, the relationship between happiness and 'pleasure', and finally, the claim that there is no qualitative distinctions between pleasure derived from different human activities. These issues will be taken up in the next chapter.

Notes on Chapter III

[1]R. Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 1.

[2]F.M. Cornford, The Republic of Plato; with introduction and notes. (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), Bk. I: 331-336. Any other reference from the Republic will be from Cornford's work above.

[3]Republic, Bk. II: 357C.

[4]Republic, Bk. IV.

[5]J.D. Mabbott, "Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?", in Plato, Vol. II: A Collection of Essays; Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion. Modern Studies in Philosophy. Edited by G. Vlastos, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), p. 62.

[6]Mabbott, Ibid., p. 62.

[7]Republic, Bk. V: 505.

[8]Barrow, Op. cit., p. 40.

[9]In the discussion of his ethical theory proper, Barrow indicates that pleasure is a necessary condition for happiness.

[10]In the Republic, Plato argues that either the philosophers have to become rulers or rulers have to become philosophers if justice is to be achieved in a state.

[11]Judging from the Analogy of the Sun given by Plato in the Republic, the Form of Good is both the object and the basis of knowledge, and knowledge includes that of a just state.

[12]Barrow, Op. cit., p. 77.

[13]Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), p. 94.

[14]Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism, and Education, p. 53.

[15]Barrow, Ibid., p. 53.

[16]Barrow, Ibid., p. 53.

[17]Barrow, Ibid., p. 79.

[18]Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 103 (April, 1976), p. 167.

[19]Ibid., p. 167.

[20]G.E. Moore proposed personal affection, human understanding, creativity and contemplation, beauty, gaining and appreciation of knowledge as the goods that human beings ought to strive for.

[21]Barrow has indicated in his various works that happiness is the only ultimate value and that all the other values are in a way a means to achieve happiness.

[22]The idea is borrowed from G. Vlastos' Platonic Studies, 2nd Edition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 118.

[23]Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education, p. 99.

[24]Barrow, Ibid., p. 96.

[25]Barrow, Ibid., p. 96.

[26]Barrow, Ibid., p. 107.

[27]N.E. Bowie and R.L. Simon, The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977), p. 52.

Chapter IV

THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

The previous chapter dwelt mainly with the consequential element of utilitarianism. This chapter will dwell on the other basic element of the above ethical theory: the value-element. The value-element of any ethical theory concerns itself mainly with questions about what things are worthwhile for humanity. Utilitarianism takes happiness to be the ultimate goal that all human beings strive for. But the term 'happiness' is rather elusive both in its ordinary and philosophical contexts. It is with this point in mind that the present analysis of the term 'happiness' is intended only to throw some light on one of the basic problems of the thesis; whether or not the utilitarian-based value-element proposed by Barrow is tenable. This problem is also related to another problem: what would be regarded as a happy life or a good life for human beings to lead?

(1) The Relationship Between Happiness and Pleasure

In Moral Philosophy for Education, Barrow agrees with Bentham that " . . . happiness depends on the satisfaction of pleasures and the avoidance of pains: happiness is that feeling which arises out of the satisfaction of desires or the experiences of pleasures."[1] However, in a more recent work, Barrow attempts to clarify the concept of pleasure in

preparation for the distinction he intends to make between 'pleasure' and 'happiness'. He asserts that we may use 'pleasure' to refer to pleasurable sensations such as sexual release or scratching away a tickle. Secondly, we may use 'pleasure' to refer to pleasurable states of consciousness, brought about by doing something or undergoing some experience such as writing books or playing football.[2] Although Barrow does not say it, explicitly, his writing here suggests that when we talk of 'pleasures', normally we refer to the second sense since the activities that bring them about are co-extensive with human activity.[3] Having said that, Barrow then declares that pleasures in the second sense are the necessary and sufficient ingredients of happiness. But what is the distinction between happiness and pleasure?

Barrow intends to show the distinction between the two by pointing out that one could experience pleasure without necessarily becoming happy.[5] For instance, within a particular period of time, one might be able to satisfy only some of his/her desires, leaving the others unsatisfied. A case in point is a situation where an individual is able to satisfy his/her hunger but is still not able to satisfy his/her desires for week-end entertainments and reading. Again, one could experience some pleasure without becoming happy in a situation where the satisfaction of various desires is very low. For example, an individual might have a great desire for either becoming a successful musician or athlete.

However, the individual might have little potential for engaging in these activities and therefore end up deriving little pleasure from them. What the two examples show is that happiness is seen both as the aggregate of pleasurable moments over a period of time as well as a balance of pleasure over pain, according to Barrow.

If we take the first part of the conclusion, that happiness is the aggregate of pleasure over a period of time, and the term 'pleasure' to mean the immediate satisfaction of desires, then it seems to me that the proposition does not hold. For example, it is perfectly correct to say that "I feel happy that I am attending this conference on philosophy of knowledge." In the same way, I could say that "I am pleased" (experiencing pleasure) that "I am attending this conference on philosophy of knowledge." On the other hand, one could say that he is happy with the way his Ph.D program is going or he is pleased with the way his Ph.D program is going. These examples indicate that in some contexts the terms 'happiness' and 'pleasure' are synonymous; both applicable to immediate as well as aggregate experiences of pleasure over a considerable duration.

Barrow is not alone with regards to his position on the relationship between happiness and pleasure. This is exemplified by Jean Austin who asserts that unlike bliss or ecstasy, or significantly, pleasure, happiness cannot be momentary, and though in fact it may not endure, it cannot be seen as essentially transitory. She goes on to argue that

happiness is an assessment that we are willing to make about other people or about our past rather than about our present condition.[6] The immediate problem that Jean Austin faces here is that, according to her definition, we are only capable of assessing other peoples' and our own past happiness and not the present. But as we have already indicated, in the ordinary sense the term 'happiness' can be applied to describe not only past but also the present pleasures. This is an indication that the assertion that happiness describes past pleasures rather than present pleasures does not help us to distinguish the two terms (happiness and pleasure). In other words, the distinction between happiness and pleasure cannot be explicated by saying that 'happiness' stands for past pleasure while 'pleasure' stands for present pleasures. Again, Barrow's perception of happiness as the aggregate of pleasure over pain does however open up other problems, other than the one cited above. Thus, to experience happiness, all that one has to do is make sure that his/her desires are satisfied to the fullest. But since it is the quantity of pleasure that is needed, it is possible for one to choose to satisfy just a few of his/her desires which are sure to derive more pleasure in him/her than if he/she tried to satisfy all the pleasures. This makes it even easier for an individual to know what activity to engage in when given two or more activities to choose from for he/she is dealing with only one condition; the activity that generates maximum pleasure. For example, an individual

might choose to engage in beer-drinking the whole day rather than taking the normal meals. From what we know (those who drink), this would be a good choice. The individual is likely to experience a lot of pleasure the whole time he/she is drinking, more than he/she would otherwise experience if he/she decided to take the normal meals. The implication of this example is that it allows us to say that the individual who engaged in beer-drinking the whole day was happier than he/she would have been, had he/she just taken the normal meals of the day.

Of course, Barrow might counter the above argument by saying that the individual cited above is likely to have a terrible hang-over (painful experiences) or he/she may be so sick that he/she might be unable to do his/her important duties, something that might result in painful moments. All the above could be perfectly true but would be missing the real issue at stake. That is, even if Barrow were able to show that taking the normal meals of the day would be a more important activity for the individual than drinking beer, the reason would not be that taking the meals would be more pleasurable than beer-drinking. Here, eating seems to be an activity that satisfies a human need which does not necessarily involve pleasure as a justification.

Another example that seems to work against Barrow's claim that happiness is equivalent to the aggregate of pleasure over pain is when an individual gets 'high' as a result of taking drugs. The drugs give so much pleasure in

him/her in such a way that he/she behaves as if all desires had been fully satisfied. If we were to take Barrow seriously we are likely to say that this particular individual was happy. Once again, Barrow might be able to counter our argument by saying that our drug addict would also have some 'lows' during which time he/she would be experiencing much pain. His argument would only hold if the pain experienced during the 'lows' is more than the pleasure experienced during the 'highs'. Barrow could also argue that by taking drugs, the addict would be shortening his/her life. But this would force Barrow to admit that a long, less pleasurable life is more worthwhile than a short, very happy (pleasurable) life.[7] If this is allowed, then Barrow would be using a different criterion for evaluating the two types of life other than the aggregate of pleasure over pain. This would be contrary to the ethical theory he proposes.

Although our intention in the last few paragraphs was to show some differences between pleasure and happiness, we have only managed to indicate that contrary to Barrow's belief, there seems to be some human values or goods that are not based on pleasure. And if we take Barrow as arguing that a pleasurable life is equivalent to a happy life, then a happy life is not always a worthwhile life for it lacks some of the goods essential for a worthwhile life. But if we take a happy life to be equivalent to a worthwhile life, then a happy life demands more than a person engaging in activities that generate an aggregate of pleasurable

experiences over painful experiences.

However, it can also be shown that the term 'happiness' is sometimes used to refer to the satisfaction of particular desires. For instance, in Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism and Sikhism, there is a tendency for regarding the ordinary desires like wealth, sex and self-respect as major causes of suffering that man incurs in life. Thus, in order to attain happiness, Buddhism and Sikhism prescribe that man abstain from the above desires rather than satisfy them. The idea here is for man to try to abstain from pleasures that stress individuation and concentrate on those activities such as meditation which are believed to lead the human soul into becoming a part of the universe. This is why D.J. Kalupahana asserts that although emphasis on happiness as a goal of ethical conduct seems to give Buddhist theory a utilitarian character, there is nevertheless a ma[redacted]difference between the two. The difference is that while utilitarian happiness includes pleasure derived from the senses, in Buddhism, sense-derived pleasures such as having sex are perceived as contributing to suffering rather than happiness.[8] What the Buddhist ethical theory seems to demonstrate is that it is not the satisfaction of every or any human desire that brings happiness to an individual, but only true satisfaction of some of the desires; desires that are considered important. This example reveals an evaluative element that is inherent in some uses of the term 'happiness'.

But over and above demonstrating that happiness is a feeling that one gets when his/her important desires (those considered to be more worthwhile) are satisfied, our example also indicates that perhaps the satisfaction, or contentment that comes with it, is not as important an element of the concept of happiness as Barrow wants us to believe. Barrow's emphasis on satisfaction as being an essential element of the concept of happiness is shown when he states that an individual will be relatively happy when the gap between his achievement (satisfaction) and his goals (desires) is narrowed. That the completely happy man, if such a thing were possible, would be able to do or realize all that he wanted to realize, everything to which he had a pro-attitude (or for which he had a desire) were fulfilled. Here happiness is seen as being identical to satisfaction or contentedness.[9]

There are various examples that seem to militate against Barrow's perception of happiness as satisfaction. First, if happiness were identical with satisfaction, then people would likely choose to engage in activities that are rather simple to perform; these would be activities that human beings would derive so much pleasure from with the least pain. Logically, one would even be considered as being happy if he/she had no desires to satisfy. Secondly, sometimes when an individual is interested in activities such as the search for truth, he/she is liable to experience as much pleasure during the actual pursuit as well as from

the results of the pursuit. Thirdly, there seem to be situations in our lives where the pleasure derived from one's ability to engage in an activity seems to over-ride the pleasure generated from the outcome of the activity. A case in point is where a mountain-climber is ready to face so many risks in order that he/she can reach the top of a particular mountain. If the aim of climbing the mountain was only to reach the top, then the mountain-climber would have many options; he/she could, for example, use a helicopter to reach the top in which case he/she will be satisfied. These three examples show that there are other types of pleasure besides that of satisfaction. This point is well illustrated by von Wright when he identifies three forms of pleasure: (a) active pleasure, which an individual derives from engaging in activities that he/she is keen on doing; (b) passive pleasure, which is attributed to the senses, and (c) pleasure of satisfaction or contentedness that we feel on getting that which we desire or need.[10]

Although I do not quite see the difference between von Wright's (b) and (c), I think he is right in distinguishing (a) from (b) and (c). Following my line of argument then, (b) and (c) would be equivalent to the pleasures one experiences when his/her desires are satisfied while (a) would be equivalent to the pleasures that one experiences when in the process of satisfying desires or wants. If this argument is plausible, then Barrow seems to have reduced various forms of pleasure into only one form;

the pleasures derived from satisfied desires. This is why I would conclude with von Wright that it is futile to try to reduce various forms of pleasure to one or several others, although there might be some logical connection between them.[11]

However, I might be accused of attributing to Barrow a claim which he does not make explicitly: that happiness is equivalent to contentment. Thus, Barrow says, "... it seems to me sensible to regard contentment as a species of happiness."[12] He goes further to say that even if there is a distinction between 'happiness' and 'contentment', this in itself does not show that happiness cannot be categorized in terms of contentment.[13] The problem with this kind of claim is that although he admits that contentment is only a species of happiness, he does not spell out other species that might be within the concept of happiness and at least indicate how they are related to contentment. More importantly for our purpose, Barrow does not show that even if there may be various species of happiness, human actions are only geared towards happiness that is characterized in terms of contentment.

Barrow's perception of happiness in terms of contentedness or satisfaction is related to another claim that he makes; the claim that there are no specific conditions that are logically necessary to happiness.[14] He supports his claim by showing that all that is needed for one to experience happiness is to make sure that the gap between

his/her goals and achievements is narrowed. For instance, if one likes to dance and to travel, he/she would likely be happy if he/she were able to satisfy those desires. This claim seems to me plausible in the sense that different people are likely to have different goals that they would wish to satisfy besides the basic ones such as those of the senses. To satisfy these different goals would require different conditions.

But a harder look at the above claim indicates that it carries a half-truth. This point becomes clearer when Barrow discusses the difference between 'being happy' and 'feeling happy'. First, he points out that the importance of the two phrases is related to the question whether an individual is necessarily the best judge of his own happiness.[15] After a rather long discussion, Barrow concludes that provided the agent knows what 'happiness' means, and is not faced with problems of comparison, it is difficult to conceive of anyone better placed to determine whether he is or is not happy.[16] To take our example, if an individual derived more pleasure from dancing and travelling in various countries, it would be impossible for anyone else to know (experience) exactly what the individual feels. The best that one can do is to associate the agent's behavior with the feelings that it normally represents. As we know, this method of assessing other people's feelings is not reliable in some cases. However, we cannot discount the method for it works well in some cases. For example, if we

came across someone who has just won $1 million in a lottery, we may expect him/her to be happy (having pleasurable feelings), even if we cannot experience his/her actual feeling. The only problem is that we cannot be absolutely sure that he/she is feeling happy. Barrow's claim that the agent is the best judge of whether or not he/she is happy is more realistic in a situation where we are dealing with an individual's life-span or a considerable period of time-span. Thus, although it may be fairly accurate to say that the agent is happy as a result of winning $1 million, it is difficult to make the same claim with regard to the agent's life-span. For example, due to mistrust of other people handling his/her affairs and also due to his/her inexperience in handling such big sums of money, our lottery-winner might end up being so worried about the prospect of losing all the money. In other words, our lottery-winner could be experiencing much pain, while outsiders believed him/her to be happy.

The weakness of the claim that the agent is the best authority with regards to his/her happiness emerges when Barrow adds "provided the agent . . . is not faced by problems of comparison. . . ." The point revealed here is that as soon as one admits the possibility that one's happiness could be compared with others, one is forced to acknowledge that in a way he/she is not the standard of his/her own happiness. In my view, it is not only possible to compare someone's happiness with others but we do it all the

time. This point is well illustrated by the following two examples. One, when small children are seen playing with toys, it is usually recognized that they are having fun or they are happy. But, if on the other hand, we have adults whose hobby is to play with toys, it is likely that we are not going to say that these adults are happy, even though they may be experiencing a lot of pleasure. This is because we do not usually expect adults to be happy by playing with toys. Two, we may have a handicapped man who seems to be happy playing basketball in a wheel-chair. The notable point is that although we admit that the handicapped man is happy playing basketball in a wheel-chair, we are not ready to exchange our lives for his, even if we consider our present life not as happy as we might have wanted. Thus, although both the children and the handicapped man are happy in their own ways, their types of happiness is still below a certain conceived standard of happiness. If we take happiness as an affirmative assessment of one's life, then there are two ways of looking at it. One, a person is considered to be happy only when he meets the standards he/she imposes on himself/herself (which take into account his/her talents). That is to say, even if others considered the happiness of children and the handicapped man too low, and would never switch places with them, it remains that they (the children and the handicapped man) are happy. On the other hand, if someone is engaged in activities that are considered to be below his/her ability and capacity, he/she is likely not to

be considered happy though he/she may be deriving a lot of pleasure from the activities.[17]

The point made above that sometimes happiness is attained when one engages only in certain activities that are regarded to be representative of one's ability and capacity rather than deriving pleasure from any type of activities, is reinforced by Barrow.[18] Barrow points out that happiness is something that only creatures with consciousness can experience. Consciousness is necessary for happiness because happiness or its opposite comes into being with the emergence of desires, satisfactions and such concepts that imply a degree of freedom and manoeuverability in thought.[19] Earlier we indicated that Barrow supported the idea of happiness as the satisfaction of desires, which brings with it the atmosphere of contentment. But as far as we are aware, animals and human beings share some desires such as those of eating and mating. Unless Barrow is willing to credit animals with consciousness, the satisfaction of their desires such as eating and mating would not result in happiness (pleasure). That is to say, although the amount of pleasure the animals derive in engaging in eating and mating is more than pain, it would not amount to happiness. This conclusion becomes more crucial when we realize that there are some human beings who display the same desires as animals, but who seem to lack the kind of consciousness that Barrow is referring to. I am thinking of a high degree of mental retardation where an individual is not capable even of the

most rudimentary operation that is normally identified with concept-formation. If we follow what Barrow has just said, the individual described above would not be said to be happy since he is incapable of having a concept of happiness, even if he is capable of satisfying most of his desires, however simple they might turn out to be. To put the same point in another way, it seems as if a human being is only happy when he engages in activities that he is conscious of, where consciousness is supposed to be the element that distinguishes humans from other beings.

Barrow seems to be attempting to differentiate various activities as generating different pleasures without at the same time acknowledging these different forms of pleasures. The problem he encounters, for example, in taking consciousness as the distinguishing element between human activities (pleasures) and that of other creatures is that mentally retarded people and small children are left out. Barrow might be able to overcome his problem by noting that even if we took happiness to be the satisfaction of desires, there are two aspects to it. One, there is the subjective aspects where happiness is the satisfaction of desires with regards to individual abilities. If we view happiness this way, then various types of pleasure that are derived from activities which, for example, children, mentally retarded and physically handicapped people and even brilliant people engage in, would be accommodated. Two, there is an objective aspect of happiness which Barrow seems to apply without

acknowledging. When happiness is viewed objectively, the satisfaction of some human desires would be considered as more appropriate with regards to contributing to happiness than others.[20] Thus, although the mentally retarded people, for example, are likely to attain happiness by satisfying their desires, this happiness is likely to be seen as being of a lesser standard than the happiness that would be attained when one engaged in activities that are taken to be representative of human beings. In Barrow's case, the activities that are representative of human beings are those that involve consciousness. In my view, both the subjective and the objective aspects are essential components of the concept of happiness.[21]

Although we have given so many examples trying to figure out all the different sorts of activities that are capable of producing happiness, and in what contexts they do so, we are still at a loss. We do not yet seem to be able to give a plausible distinction between 'pleasure' and happiness. Perhaps we would benefit by observing what Mortimer J. Adler refers to as the 'psychological' and the 'ethical' meanings of the term 'happiness'.[22] When we use its psychological meaning, the term 'happiness' connotes a mental state of satisfaction or contentment that exists simply in getting what one wants. On the other hand, when we use its ethical meaning, the term stands for a whole human life well lived; a life enriched by real good - all the possessions a human life should have as well as all the

perfections that a human life should attain.[23]

By adopting Adler's ethical meaning of the term 'happiness', we are able to overcome most of the problems that have been raised in various examples cited previously. For instance, the activities of eating and mating would be considered worthwhile in their contribution to the survival of human beings, even if these activities do not necessarily produce pleasure. Some pleasures would be seen as more worthwhile than others, in the sense that they contribute to the well-being of human beings while other pleasures are not seen that way. Finally, the happiness (pleasures) generated in children in playing with toys and in the handicapped in playing basketball in a wheel-chair is considered worthwhile to a certain degree but falls short of the happiness that is usually expected of normal adults. What is interesting and important to note when using the ethical meaning of 'happiness' is that it is not by virtue of say, certain pleasures or the state of mind they cause in our mind that forms the basis of our decision that, say, some pleasures contribute to happiness (ethical). Rather, it is the way we view these certain pleasures or states of mind they cause in us. As A.R. Louch puts it, " . . . seeing something as pleasant or painful is to see it as constituting grounds for its pursuit."[24] Again, coming from another direction, R.M. Hare demonstrates the point in question by noting that words have both a 'descriptive' as well as an 'evaluative' element.[25] For words such as 'pleasure', 'desire', 'good', or

'happiness', the evaluative element overshadows the descriptive element, Hare contends.

Thus, when we talk of a happy life, we are essentially referring to the human life which we would recommend that every human being strive to live rather than necessarily asking human beings to live this or that life, say, a life of pleasure or a life that is dominated by intellectual activities. With some adjustments, Barrow's conception of happiness agrees very much with Adler's psychological use of the term 'happiness'. But as we have demonstrated in the various examples, the psychological meaning of 'happiness' cannot form a plausible basis of our conduct. In other words, not all our activities are directed towards psychological happiness as Barrow has attempted to argue. Rather, when Barrow claimed that happiness is the basis of human activities, he must have meant the ethical meaning of the term; happiness that is synonymous with good life. Adler summarized the characteristics of this type of happiness when he says:

> Only happiness itself - a whole good life - is an ultimate end, never a means to be sought for the sake of some other good. Happiness, being the sum of all real goods, leaves no other to be desired. That is why happiness should never be referred to as the summum bonum (the highest good), but rather as the totum bonum (the complete good).[26]

(2) The Happy Life

In section (1) we have already established that:

(a) Although happiness and pleasure are equated in some cases of ordinary language use, the two terms are

distinguished in important ways;

(b) Even if happiness were to be equated with pleasure, there are nevertheless various types of pleasure besides that of satisfaction that Barrow seems to advocate;

(c) Some human activities seem to be directed toward goals other than pleasure;

(d) Happiness displays an evaluative element in both its subjective and objective components.

However, even though we have come up with various uses of the term 'happiness', it is rather difficult for us to determine which of these uses are important by looking at the analysis as such. Thus, we can only determine the priority of importance of various uses of the term 'happiness' in its relation to our basic problem. Our basic problem has been to examine the tenability of the proposition that happiness is the only ultimate goal that all human beings strive for; a goal that human beings are willing to sacrifice their energies and time pursuing. If this is a fair description of our original problem for this chapter, then I would say that this is essentially the problem which involves the definition of what would be the best life for man; the life that one would wish to engage in. Barrow's position is that the best life for man qua man is the pleasurable life, where all human activities are directly or indirectly directed towards pleasure as the ultimate goal. As is already evident from

our analysis, in section (1), Barrow is wrong in claiming that the happy life for man is that where all activities are directed toward pleasure. E. Telfer supports this view when she asserts that it cannot be argued that all the ingredients of eudaimonia (which she takes to be the ideal life) are by definition pleasurable.[27]

But it is one thing to point out that Barrow's conception of the happy or the good life is implausible yet another to come up with a better alternative.[28] Thus, the challenge ahead will be an attempt to propose a more plausible conception of the good life; a life that every person would like to live as a human being. The importance of having a proper conception of the good life for a human being is indicated by the caliber of the scholars who have shown interest in the challenge. Here I am thinking of Plato in The Republic and Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, as representing the older generation and W.K. Frankena in Ethics and Telfer in Happiness as representative of the modern generation. For instance, Aristotle, like Barrow, recognizes that man derives pleasure from engaging in various activities, some of which he/she shares with animals and plants. But unlike Barrow, Aristotle also points out that a human being derives more superior pleasures from activities that are characteristic of human beings in general. Aristotle's claim is basically that to determine what activities would contribute to the happy life for a human being, one has to ask what powers and activities are

peculiar and distinctive to human beings. For Aristotle, contemplative activities are what distinguish a human being from other beings, particularly the animals. So, to attain a happy life, one has to engage in contemplative activities. One point to note here is that the difference between contemplative activities that are said to be distinctive of human beings from others such as eating or breathing that he/she shares with plants and animals is qualitative. That is to say, contemplative activities are considered to be more worthwhile than others that human beings share with plants and animals.

Aristotle's argument that the concept of the happy life has to take into account the nature of the being in question seems plausible in a way. For instance, a man would be able to enjoy the activity of thinking, only if he has the potential for this type of activity in the first place. Again, activities such as eating, mating or breathing would be necessary only due to the nature of the beings that engage in them. It is when Aristotle's conception of the good life is defined purely in terms of contemplative activities that a certain concern arises. This way of conceiving the good life for human beings seems unfortunate in the sense that it tends to ignore or take lightly the importance of some activities that would naturally contribute to the concept of the good life for a human being, even if these activities are shared with plants and animals. For example, eating and breathing are activities that are so important for human

life that they need no more justification. As we saw in section (1), these types of activities are essential for human survival even if he/she does not necessarily derive pleasure from them. Walkie seems to support this point when she asserts that:

> Even if one agrees that ergon defines the creature, one can disagree about how man, and hence his ergon [function or character] should be specified. For there are many competing descriptions of man and his various abilities which would mark him off from other animals while yet leaving room for the nutritive, locomotive, and sensory capacities which he evidently and crucially possesses but which are ignored if he is described simply as a rational creature.[29]

Another point that could be raised here is that contemplative life cannot be plausibly defended by merely showing that it is the type of life that distinguishes human beings from other creatures. To me, that would be essentially arguing that what is unique in a being is what is worthwhile, which is a fallacious argument similar to the Naturalistic Fallacy that G.E. Moore attempted to expose whereby what is good is identified with a particular natural object like pleasure. Further to this, if we take contemplative life to be the good life for a human being and then identified contemplative life with theoretical activities such as philosophy or mathematics, it would be rather clear that contemplative activities would not represent a unique element that is inherent in all human beings. This is so because not every person is capable of doing theoretical activities such as mathematics or philosophy.

However, Aristotle might be able to counter the accusation above that his conception of the good life downplays activities that are directed toward important needs that humans share with plants and animals. He can do this by indicating that while activities that are directed toward nutritive and locomotive needs, for example, are important, their importance is recognizable only in relation to the contemplative activities. This would be so in the sense that activities in the first category could be seen as a means to contemplative activities which in this context would be treated as ends. In my view, this argument is wrong for it continues to downplay the importance of activities within the first category. One is forced to see the activities such as eating as having no value except in relation to contemplative activities. This is due to our tendency to think that those activities that we refer to as means are always inferior to those activities that they are a means to. Rather than viewing activities that man shares with plants and animals as a means to contemplative activities and therefore less worthwhile, I am inclined to think that both these categories of activities contribute to human life; each category making a unique contribution to the good life for man qua human being.

There is another suggested way of overcoming the problem brought about by defining the happy life for man strictly by his rational tendencies. This is done by interpreting the contemplative activities more broadly to

include most of the activities that human beings usually engage in, such as philosophizing, mountain-climbing, money-making and dancing. What this implies is that over and above the basic activities such as eating, breathing and mating, an individual would be likely to attain a happy life by engaging himself/herself in one or all the human activities, since they all reveal a contemplative element. But as it has been pointed out by Barrow on many occasions, for an individual to derive any pleasure from an activity, he/she will require ability to engage in it. However, since each individual is likely to have different abilities for different activities, different individuals are likely to derive more pleasure by engaging in certain activities than they would otherwise do if they engaged in alternative activities. The moral of this argument is that apart from the basic ones, human activities are diverse and that each of the activities is a case where the rational elements that are identical with human beings are displayed. Thus activities such as mountain-climbing, dancing and philosophizing would not be regarded as qualitatively different from each other. In light of this, the philosophic life (where an individual engages in philosophizing for most of his/her life) would be seen as the life of a philosopher; the individual who is particularly interested in philosophic activities as the distinctive activities that hold his/her interest most.[30]

The above paragraph leaves an impression that apart from

the basic activities, each individual is going to pursue his own happy life; a life where he/she will be engaged in activities that he/she has the best ability for. This is what Barrow has been saying all along. The issue was raised and discussed in section (1) of this chapter. Thus, it was shown that children, mentally retarded and physically handicapped people were likely to attain a happy life by engaging themselves in activities that required limited abilities. But although we would acknowledge that the above groups of people were leading happy lives, we would not trade our lives for theirs. What this shows is that besides the personal happy life, where an individual is engaged in activities that he desires and has the abilities for, there is yet another notion of the ideal life for the ideal person. This is the happy life that everyone would like to attain. The ideal life is conceived by taking into account the elements that are most valued in a human being. What this means is that among the many potential abilities inherent in a person, a few are regarded as more superior. For example, the rational or speculative ability in a person seems to be valued very highly in almost every society. The personal happy life and the ideal happy life are related in that as an individual strives for the former, he/she is in a sense striving for the latter. For instance, when a boy is six-years-old, he may be said to be leading a happy life (engaging in activities that are commensurate to his abilities) but at the same time he is expected to narrow the gap between his personal happy

life and what the society considers to be the ideal life. Another point that needs to be emphasized at this juncture is the fact that although some of the highly valued human abilities, such as rationality, might transcend any one society, their standard of assessment is based on society. That is to say, the rational ability in humanity, for example, could not be considered as valuable regardless of what the society thought about it. This point is aptly put by Richard Kraut when he states that there is no system of evaluation of happy life that goes beyond culture, so that the worthwhile elements that are given as composing the happy life could only make sense if they were viewed within a tradition.[31]

It has been demonstrated, I hope, that human activities could not be directed toward one single end such as pleasure without affecting an individual's happy life adversely. This is due to the fact that there are other human needs that necessarily depend on their ability to give pleasure to an individual. Further, it has been pointed out that though not every human activity is directed towards objects of pleasure, pleasure seems to be one of the elements that an individual strives for as he pursues a personal, as well as an ideal happy life. However, we could still ask whether a happy life (in its evaluative aspect) would be achieved if an individual were to engage in activities that led to one final object, besides the basic ones such as those concerned with nutrition.[32] What we are essentially asking is whether there is one ultimate goal which is so superior in worthwhileness

such that all human beings would attain a happy life if their activities were directed towards it. This has to be a goal which all human activities and objectives will be a means to, and one that cannot be substituted with another without adversely affecting the concept of a happy life for man.

The first thing we have to note is the fact already established that although pleasure seems to be a necessary element of a happy life, it is not a sufficient one. Thus, the ultimate goal we are looking for must be distinguished from that whose worthwhileness is based on the maximum pleasure which we have discounted. The earlier example of a mountain-climber who has to risk so much to reach the top of a particular mountain helps to reveal another dimension of man that it seems to me cannot be ignored if the happy life of a person qua human being is going to be close to the concept of the ideal happy life. As we saw, the mountain-climber attains a sense of achievement if he reaches the top of the mountain through his own initiative and effort. But we could not necessarily say that the man risked his life merely to reach the top since reaching the top of the mountain would have been realized through other less dangerous methods. This means that the sense of achievement that the mountain-climber attains in reaching the top of the particular mountain through his own participation and effort seems to transcend any hedonistic pleasure which might have accompanied it. Again, when the scientist makes a unique

contribution in the field of knowledge, he/she attains a sense of achievement that is impossible to get if he/she just read about the unique contribution in a scientific journal. In a sense, the achievement of a human being through his/her own initiative and effort seems to reinforce or reaffirm his/her self-esteem. To me, the above are illustrations of human beings' tendencies for self-realization.

But although self-realization seems to be an indispensable element, it does not indicate that it is sufficient for the attainment of a happy or a good life. For instance, we may have a cancer patient who is also a brilliant scientist. Given time, the cancer-patient scientist is sure that he could invent a drug which would cure any type of cancer. This invention would help the cancer-patient scientist to attain a sense of fulfilment as well as eliminating his pain. However, if there was another scientist who is on the verge of inventing a cancer-curing drug, it would be fair for us to assume that the cancer-patient scientist would, on one hand, hail the invention as it would likely mean the end of his pain. On the other hand, the cancer-patient scientist would be missing a chance to realize himself through the invention of the cancer-curing drug. Thus, if the above example is acceptable, it indicates that there are occasions when the goal of self-realization should be overshadowed by the goal of eliminating pain.

Our discussion in the last two paragraphs helps us to

conclude that the concept of a happy life is such that human activities are directed toward various goals rather than only one. And that pleasure and self-realization seems to be likely ingredients of the ideal happy life. Goals such pleasure and self-realization seem to be within the realm of objects that many scholars regard as intrinsic values.[33] The conclusion above seems to agree with Frankena when he asserts that the good life will be a "mixed life" which is composed of activities and experiences that are enjoyable or both excellent in some degree and enjoyable.[34]

Our discussion above creates an impression that there is an all-embracing ideal happy life for all human beings. However, the truth of the matter is that the content of the ideal happy life is bound to vary due to variations concerning huma[illegible] This point is nicely echoed by Frankena when he[illegible]:

> I doubt that [illegible]ixed order or pattern [of happy life] can be laid [illegible]or everyone, as Plato and Ross thought. Hum[illegible]nature may be much the same everywhere, and I believe [illegible] is, otherwise psychology would be virtually impo[illegible]ible; however, human nature seems to vary much for[illegible]y fixed conception of it to be drawn up in detail.[3]

Specifically, the ideal happy life would in some cases differ due to historical variations. Frankena cites an example of this kind w[illegible] he asserts that A.N. Whitehead's ideal happy life emphasized ingredients such as novelty, adventure, continuity and tradition as opposed to autonomy authenticity and self-expression, values that form the backbone of the concept o[illegible] the good life today.[36] A similar

point is made in Paul Nash's work Models of Man, where each model of man seems to portray a concept of an ideal happy life that emphasizes particular goals that are considered to be intrinsic values for man of a particular period during the history of Western society. For instance, Aquinas' ideal man was one who lived a life (the ultimate happy life) that emphasizes the contemplation of the truth as revealed by God the Supreme Being,[37] as opposed to Rousseau's natural man who was to live a life that emphasized personal freedom.[38] In other cases, the content of the ideal happy life might differ due to cultural variations. For example, it is common knowledge among the African people that the concept of the ideal happy life has to include a married life, probably with children. Finally, the ideal happy life might differ due to the different arrangements of its content. This point is again well demonstrated by most of the African countries that were colonized. In these countries, the urge to self-realization in terms of self-determination and self-expression became so urgent that all other goals were to be subordinated to them. Thus, the three major variations of human nature discussed in this paragraph demonstrate that the content of the ideal concept of happy life is undergoing changes all the time, though ingredients like pleasure and self-realization seem to be rather stable.

Barrow has tried to illustrate the plausibility of his ethical theory, discussed in Chapters III and IV, by applying it in the field of education. That being the case, our next

task will be an attempt to challenge the proposition that utilitarianism offers the most plausible justification for education. In light of this, the next chapter will be concerned with this particular issue.

Notes on Chapter IV

[1]R. Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education, Unwin Education Books, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), p. 94.

[2]Barrow, Happiness, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 82.

[3]Barrow, Ibid., p. 82.

[4]Barrow, Ibid., p. 83.

[5]Barrow, Moral Philosophy for Education, p. 94.

[6]J. Austin, "Pleasure and Happiness", Philosophy, Vol. 43 (1968), p. 61.

[7]We have to assume that the quantity of pleasure generated in the addict in drug-taking is more than that generated by an individual who is taking normal meals.

[8]D.J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. An East/West Center Book, (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 60-61.

[9]Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 79.

[10]G.H. von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 85.

[11]von Wright, Ibid., p. 85.

[12]Barrow, Happiness, p. 79.

[13]Barrow, Ibid., p. 80.

[14]Barrow, Ibid., p. 69.

[15]Barrow, Ibid., p. 90.

[16]Barrow, Ibid., p. 90.

[17]The point is well illustrated in T. Benditt, "Happiness", Philosophical Studies, Vol. 25 (1974), pp. 1-20.

[18]Barrow sticks to the argument that, not that one derives more pleasure from engaging in activities that are representative of human abilities but that these activities generate more pleasure in a human being than any other alternative activities that might be chosen.

[19]Barrow, Happiness, p. 72.

[20]The subjective and objective aspects of happiness are identified with personal and ideal life respectively in section (2) of this chapter.

[21]Both the subjective and the objective aspects of happiness have an evaluative dimension in the sense shown earlier in the chapter.

[22]Mortimer J. Adler, A Vision of the Future: Twelve Ideas for a Better Life and a Better Society, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 90.

[23]Adler, Ibid., p. 90.

[24]A.R. Louch, Explanation and Human Action, (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1966), p. 80.

[25]R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 118.

[26]Adler, A Vision of the Future: Twelve Ideas for a Better Life and a Better Society, pp. 105-6.

[27]E. Telfer, Happiness, New Studies in Practical Philosophy, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), p. 90.

[28]The phrases 'happy life' and 'good life' will be used interchangeably.

[29]Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book X.

[30]K.V. Wilkes, "The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle's Ethics", in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Edited

by A.D. Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 344.

[31]R. Kraut, Review of Happiness, by E. Telfer in the Philosophical Review, Vol. XCII, No. 1 (1983), p. 135.

[32]This is an important point in the sense that even those scholars like Barrow who subscribe to the proposition that all human activities are directed toward a single ultimate goal do, at the same time, acknowledge that some activities are directed toward basic needs such as eating and breathing. However, these activities are seen as a means toward the ultimate human goal.

[33]Different scholars identify intrinsic values with different things. For example, Telfer takes aesthetic and scientific activities, the exercise of moral virtue, and the cultivation of personal relationship to be within the realm of intrinsic values, Happiness, p. 62.

[34]W.K. Frankena, Ethics, Foundation of Philosophy Series, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973), p. 92.

[35]Frankena, Ibid., pp. 92-93.

[36]Frankena, Ibid., p. 92.

[37]P. Nash, Models of Man: Explorations in the Western Educational Tradition, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 139-166.

[38]Nash, Ibid., pp. 259-279.

Chapter V

BARROW'S UTILITARIAN THEORY AND EDUCATION

At this point Barrow's theory that human actions could only be plausibly justified with reference to the ability to generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number has been expounded and responded to. Being confident of its plausibility, Barrow adopts the theory to justify activities within the educational system. The reason for making this move is due to his conviction that if a society has a fundamental aim such as happiness or freedom for all, the educational system, like any other institution, is expected to contribute to that aim or goal. Again, this claim is supported by his further conviction that political aims, methods and practices on the one hand and educational aims, methods and practices on the other are both judged and valued by reference to ethical values.[1]

To remind ourselves, Barrow has claimed that for a society to attain the greatest happiness, there has to be harmony between individuals and their situation or circumstances. To attain this harmony, either the individuals or their circumstances have to be modified, or even both. However, for Barrow, the most important task of education is that of modifying individuals in order for them to come to terms with their circumstances.

Although Barrow is ready to apply his theory within the

field of education in general, the most succinct application is found in the area of curriculum content. Here, as is already clear from previous chapters, the connection between utilitarianism and curriculum lies in the fact that the reasons given for the inclusion or exclusion of various activities in an educational curriculum only makes sense in light of the utilitarian premise. This defense of the curriculum content based on utilitarianism is expounded in his Common Sense and the Curriculum. But to avoid misunderstandings, Barrow hastens to point out that his defense is primarily concerned with the question of what the content of the curriculum should be, and not how to present it for teaching purposes.[2]

In order to make the necessary modification that an individual requires to attain harmony, and consequently to attain happiness, Barrow suggests a four-stage education. In the first stage, children are to be given training in health, literacy, numeracy and morals. Although these activities are not what individual children should be engaged in in life they are preliminary requirements for those activities that children are likely to engage in in future. In light of this, Barrow points out that training in these activities is so basic in the sense that not to be concerned about them is to act in a way that is likely to diminish the opportunities for pleasure and increase the opportunities for pain as far as both individuals and the community as a whole are concerned.[3] This being the case, Barrow rejects

the educational proposal that a child should be encouraged to engage only in those activities that he/she shows interest in.

In stage two, the individual should be encouraged to engage in subjects related to natural science, mathematics, religion, fine arts, literature and history. Although Barrow attempts to justify the inclusion of the above activities (subjects), each on its merits, the basic argument is the same for all of them: the utilitarian principle.[4] What Barrow seems to be saying is that all the proposed activities in the curriculum in stage two are likely to generate greater happiness in individuals in general than any other alternatives that might be opted for. Barrow insists that this is not the stage where individual choices are made as to what activities are worthwhile for him or her on utilitarian ground. As he puts it, the curriculum should seek to provide the individual with the wherewithal to make genuinely informed choices for himself as to which activities he wishes to pursue, and that the more we open up to individuals the possibility of informed choice between activities, the more chance they have of finding the true satisfaction for themselves.[5]

In stage three, students continue to pursue history and literature. On top of these, vocational studies and optional activities are introduced at this stage. The reason for this arrangement is that although each of the proposed activities is likely to generate pleasure in general, nevertheless,

each individual's pleasure from a particular activity will depend partly on his/her ability to engage in it. For example, an individual who has a high ability for engaging in mathematics will derive more pleasure from the activity than another individual with less ability. Again, what activities that one opts for in education have to be closely connected with what he/she plans to do in life in terms of a career or a hobby. To put this point in another way, at the third stage, rather than just introducing the individual to what is considered worthwhile in a utilitarian perspective, education attempts to reveal the abilities that each individual possesses for the various recommended activities. These are the activities that the individual is recommended to engage in in order to attain the greatest happiness. In light of this, the fourth stage of education is only for those individuals who have displayed an ability to engage in philosophy.

Having briefly laid down the utilitarian principle applied as the basis of assessing what activities are educationally worthwhile and which ones are not, next we consider the arguments that Barrow develops in order for him to arrive at this particular conclusion. Firstly, we shall consider the argument that attempts to show that an activity like literature is intrinsically worthwhile while playing bingo is not. Secondly, we shall see whether the argument put forward for some educational activities to be compulsory while others such as geography or philosophy are to be

offered as options is tenable.

Barrow has already agreed with Benditt's conclusion that there is no ideal life which is such that a person who lives it successfully is necessarily happier . . . than a person who successfully lives another sort of life.[6] This means, for example, that a person who spent his life doing mathematics successfully would not necessarily claim to have had a happier life than another person who successfully spent his life doing cooking. The essential point being made here is that everything being equal, the pleasure derived from either doing mathematics or cooking is of the same quality. However, the above contention notwithstanding, in Common Sense and the Curriculum, Barrow has attempted to show that within a society, some activities such as literature or history are more worthwhile (having a greater potential to generate pleasure in an individual or the society in general) than, say, playing bingo. Before setting up the argument, Barrow spells out the context within which it (the argument) should be judged. Thus, he asserts that it would be possible to conceive a world where engaging in bingo games would be more worthwhile than doing literature. However, it would be absurd to maintain that in any society remotely resembling the complex industrial society with which we are familiar, that the quantity of pleasure generated by doing literature or playing bingo games is equal.[7]

Barrow first supports his argument by saying that for those who have the ability to engage in both literature and

bingo successfully, the chances are that they would prefer to engage in the former rather than in the latter. This is possible because the individual will be able to have a direct comparison between the amount of pleasure he/she derives when doing literature and when playing bingo. The argument becomes more vulnerable it seems to me, when Barrow adds that even for those who are capable of doing only literature or bingo, it will be possible to realize that the former is more worthwhile than the latter if during the comparison one considers the duration, the fecundity, the extent, direct or indirect consequences of the pleasure generated in engaging in the two activities, rather than just the intensity.[8] To put the argument simply, literature gains over bingo in terms of generating the greatest happiness for the greatest number if one considers conditions other than the intensity of pleasure that each of the two activities is liable to generate. This is so in the sense that literature has great instrumental value in terms of pleasure, since, by its nature, it has the potentiality to affect significant changes in the individual in respect of his outlook, his insight, his perceptions and his ideas. These significant changes within an individual would have repercussions on the sum total of pleasure in the community.[9] On the other hand, playing bingo games has no further consequences beyond the immediate pleasure that playing games gives. Thus, when the game is over, it is all over. Barrow attempts to wrap up the argument by adding that playing bingo necessitates and

gives scope only to the capacities of an intelligent chimpanzee, while doing literature demands more.[10]

But is the above a fair claim for Barrow to make? It seems to me that there are flaws in the argument supporting the above claim. The flaws are readily revealed by observing the following points. Firstly, it is possible to have a case where the aggregate pleasure generated by playing bingo is greater than that generated by doing literature, even if we have to consider other conditions such as duration or fecundity besides that of intensity. For example, it is possible for an individual to attain more pleasure by playing bingo for a week than he/she would if he/she chose to do literature instead. Secondly, even granted that doing literature generates indirect pleasure in terms of affecting significant changes on the sum total of pleasure in the community, this in itself does not indicate that literature has the monopoly over bingo for such changes. For instance, playing bingo could affect the community in the sense that the money won might be donated to charitable organizations, an act that is capable of boosting the happiness of the community as a whole. Further than that, it does not follow that the significant changes that are likely to occur in an individual in terms of insights, outlook and ideas will necessarily have positive effects upon the community. Barrow seems to be aware of this problem when he cites famous people (who had been engaged in worthwhile activities) such as George Gissing and Baron Carvo who

brought no joy to anybody in their lives. An important point to note here is that although he recognizes the weakness in his argument, Barrow does not respond to it. Rather, he asserts that it would be reasonable to regard doing literature as a worthwhile activity on the utilitarian ground and that it would also be reasonable to suggest that the phenomenon of literature is likely to contribute more pleasure to the community as a whole than playing bingo.[11] In summary, it has not been demonstrated that doing literature generates more pleasure than playing bingo, either within an individual or upon a community. Consequently, it has not been demonstrated that literature is a more worthwhile activity to include in the educational curriculum than bingo from the utilitarian point of view.

The assertion that playing bingo necessitates and gives scope only to the capacities of an intelligent chimpanzee while doing literature demands more than that, is rather interesting, coming from a utilitarian like Barrow. Thus, while the assertion may be true, it seems to me that it could not be sustained on the basis of a utilitarian premise. In fact, the point that could be made from this is that doing literature generates a type of pleasure that is more agreeable to human beings (having more intelligence than chimpanzees) than the pleasure generated by playing bingo. This is another way of suggesting that the pleasure generated by doing literature is more worthwhile than the pleasure generated by playing bingo as far as human beings

are concerned. If Barrow were to accept this conclusion, then he would be embr[illegible]S. Mills' version of utilitarianism rather [illegible]tham's; something he has constantly atte[illegible]ed t[illegible]ociate himself from. That Barrow is uninte[illegible]onal [illegible]embracing Mill's version of utilitarianism is [illegible] revealed when, as indicated in Chapter III, he at[illegible]s to define 'happiness'. Barrow points out that hap[illegible]ss is something that only creatures with consciousness [illegible] experience. Consciousness is necessary to happine[illegible] because happiness comes into being due to the emergence [illegible] desires which imply a degree of freedom and manoeuver[illegible]ility in thought, Barrow con[illegible]. Again, that Barrow's shift from Bentham's to Mills' [illegible] of utilitarianism is un[illegible]tentional is revealed by his accusation that philos[illegible]s like P.H. Hirst's justification of education is based on the false assumption that man is a rational animal. Barrow formulates his accusation well when he says:

> One cannot help but suspect that behind the emphasis on mind-development of some philosophers, is lurking a species of naturalism: man is a rational animal, therefore he ought to be a rational animal, therefore the more he practices rational inquiry, the better he is. But it hardly need be said that the premise does not lead to the conclusion.[12]

The interesting point is that the same accusation could be levelled against Barrow by formulating his claim that man is happier engaging in intellectual activities. Therefore, to be happier, man ought to engage in intellectual activities, therefore the more he engages in intellectual activities, the

happier he is. Thus, unless other reasons are to be given, the argument above cannot be used to justify the inclusion of literature in the curriculum without borrowing from outside the version of utilitarian theory that Barrow supports.

However, even if Barrow succeeded in showing that some activities such as literature or mathematics are educationally worthwhile while playing bingo is not, we would still demand that he demonstrate why some activities are optional. Barrow attempts the following explanation. Firstly, there are those activities that are compulsory in the sense that they have extrinsic value. In other words, these activities are necessary means to other worthwhile pursuits. This group of activities includes the acquisition of literacy and numeracy. Secondly, there are compulsory activities that we have reason to believe have the potential to generate pleasure in individual agents, but we have no way of knowing this ahead of time due to the complexity of these activities. Natural science is cited as an example of this type of activity. Thirdly, there are compulsory activities in the sense that they appear in the curriculum in order to provide the understanding of other types of awareness besides the scientific awareness. No example is cited for this group but from reading Barrow, religion would make a prefect candidate.

Fourthly, there are those activities which are compulsory for every student in the sense that their worth resides

essentially in their advantage to the individual in conducting his/her life to his/her own satisfaction as well as the satisfaction of the rest of the community.[13] Literature and history would make perfect examples of this group of activities.

The optionals in the curriculum will be those activities that are relatively complex but which we have reason to believe are sources of considerable satisfaction to some agents and are, at worst, not inimical to the satisfaction of other agents.[14] Optional subjects include geography, cooking and philosophy. In a sense, these are the activities from which individuals would likely form hobbies and careers, with each individual engaging in those activities he/she has the best abilities for.

The distinction between compulsory and optional activities within the curriculum is based on Barrow's proposition that our world is made up of two basic interpretative attitudes: scientific, religious, moral and aesthetic. By basic interpretative attitude Barrow means a fundamental conception of what the world is about, or a view as to the terms in which existence is ultimately to be explained. By awareness he means different sentiments or feelings that contemplation of some phenomena is bound to arouse.[15]

Essentially, Barrow's argument is that it is necessary for an individual to understand these types of interpretive and awareness if he/she is to have a fair chance of attaining maximum happiness within a community. In light of this,

compulsory activities (except the basic ones like literacy) are intended to offer that type of understanding of the world to every individual student. But the problem with this argument is that it is based on a premise whose truth is not obvious. For instance, there are many people in this world who do not believe in a Supernatural Being or Beings, a belief which forms the basis of the religious interpretive attitude that Barrow is referring to. In short, Barrow would have to show that the world could only be understood through the types of interpretative and awareness he is referring to and no others. Moreover, even granted it is true that the world could be understood only through the above categorization, it still remains a practical question as to whether understanding the world this way guarantees more pleasure in an individual or community than if the individual remained ignorant. An example against this way of thinking is a situation where the atheist continues to have a happier life than those who have faith in both scientific and religious interpretations of the world.

Another point to be noted here is the distinction that Barrow makes between what is educationally worthwhile from what is both educationally and generally worthwhile. Thus, he asserts that an activity is educationally worthwhile if it is worth the while of the person being educated to engage in it. He gives reading as an example of an educationally worthwhile activity in the sense of being a necessary condition for doing literature.[16] On the other hand, an

activity such as literature is not only educationally worthwhile, it is also worthwhile in general from the utilitarian point of view. The point to keep in mind is that Barrow uses the same criterion (the utilitarian principle) as a basis of justifying education as well as general activities. This move is opposed to some justifications of education proposed by some philosophers of education. For example, although White is ready to justify some human activities as educationally worthwhile, he points out that what is educationally worthwhile may not be necessarily worthwhile in general life.[17] Even if it turned out that what is educationally worthwhile is also worthwhile in general life, it may be so on different grounds. Following this argument, White regards activities as educationally worthwhile primarily due to their potentiality to improve an individual's ability to choose and to widen the scope of what activities are worthwhile.[18] Whether or not what is worthwhile for an individual is what generates maximum pleasure, it is not the business of education. However, when it comes to determining what is worthwhile in general life, various criteria which may or may not include hedonic happiness will be considered, White would contend. For his part, Peters regards some human activities directed towards the pursuit of knowledge and truth as educationally worthwhile while recognizing that there are other activities in general life whose worthwhileness is based on the criteria that are different from the ones used for educational

activities.[19] The purpose of referring to White's and Peters' work is not so much to support their views on this issue, but rather to indicate that even if their proposed justifications of education may have their own problems, they have a strength that is lacking in Barrow. They have a reasonable way of distinguishing between activities which are educationally worthwhile from activities that are considered worthwhile in general. Here I am thinking of a value like pleasure which is worthwhile in general but which may not be educationally worthwhile and if it is, it may not command the same priority it has in general life.

As it has been indicated at the end of the last paragraph, attempts to justify education, particularly formal education, have been quite popular. This is primarily due to the amount of resources of both material and human capital that governments are forced to spend to support an ever-increasing need for this commodity. In arguing their cases in support of education, various philosophers of education have used the occasion to comment on the justification of education that is based on happiness.

In this regard, Peters cites three problems that anybody who opts to justify education in terms of its potentiality to promote happiness has to contend with.[20] Firstly, there is no logical connection between education and happiness. For instance, many people are uneducated but perfectly happy, Peters argues. Secondly, happiness is a complex state of mind which depends at least upon having

desires that are fulfilled and the planning of their satisfaction so that they do not conflict. More than this, happiness also entails having general expectations that are matched by the circumstances. In light of the fact that there is a conflict between different desires of an individual, education is not an effective tool for the attainment of happiness, Peters suggests. Lastly, Peters asserts that happiness also depends on the objective conditions which may change due to events that the person may not be responsible for. This being the case, there would be nothing much that education could offer to improve the situation.

Peters' first cited problem has been acknowledge by Barrow when he asserts, for example, that those intellectual qualities developed through education guarantee nothing and certainly are not necessarily conditions for happiness. The only point that Barrow wishes to make, it seems to me, is that in an open or democratic society, the developed intellectual dispositions are contingently likely to promote happiness overall.[21] However, Barrow's attempt to defend this position on the assumption that it is based on the realities of an open society exposes him to a much more basic problem, as shall be seen later in the chapter.

In his second problem, Peters concurs with Barrow that happiness is a state of mind which partly depends on having the general expectations in life matched with the prevailing circumstances. But Peters goes further to indicate that the

scheduling of individuals' desires is necessary if happiness was to be attained. As we saw earlier, Peters' position is supported by his conviction that there are not only other values that human beings strive for, but these values do sometimes conflict with happiness and that these conflicts are legitimate. Barrow has an easy way of dissolving conflicting desires within an individual; he would encourage those activities that are directed toward those desires that are likely to generate the greatest pleasure in an individual. What seems to be suggested here is that there are no genuine conflicts between individuals' desires. If there appears to be a conflict, it is only because we lack the proper knowledge as to what desires have the best chance of generating the greatest pleasure in an individual. Peters' third problem is just an emphasis of the point that even if we were able to control the individual by educating him/her, still there are many events that are likely to cause interference, preventing him/her from achieving happiness.

In his contribution to the topic, Dearden concurs with both Barrow and Peters to the effect that happiness is a state of mind which is determined by the match between our perceived life and the explicit or implicit picture which we have of how we wish our lives to be.[22] Again, like Peters, Dearden discounts Barrow's claim that education is ultimately aimed at happiness. He does this by indicating that education is appropriately concerned with other values

besides happiness.[23]

Speaking to the same problem, O'Hear concurs with the above philosophers of education that happiness has at least to do with the matter between one's desires on one hand, and reality on the other.[24] Again, like Peters, O'Hear recognizes that it is partly due to the complication involved between desires and reality that the connection between education and happiness is still problematic. For example, an individual may be quite content with his/her life without having any education, while another individual may be educated and yet have all sorts of problems which would likely curtail his/her happiness. O'Hear further points out that an individual's happiness depends also on the way he/she perceives his/her life, and expectations, and that the lower these expectations are, the more likely for them to be satisfied. This is a view that he would share with Barrow.

O'Hear makes what seems to me to be an important point when he asserts that an individual's expectations in life could be legitimately or morally lowered by the use of education. For example, it would be common to make sure that everyone engaged in activities that they had the best ability for in order to ensure maximum happiness in the community. But O'Hear points out that it would be questionable whether educators would be satisfied with only fitting people to certain roles in the society.[25] This concern brings to the open one point that seems to be underlined by each of the philosophers of education discussed

above to the effect that although education is not opposed to happiness as such, it is more suitable for achieving other human values such as respect for persons or for truth and other values that sometimes conflict with happiness. This is why I think O'Hear is correct in saying that it will be an inadequate education that saw its role in terms of deliberately restricting the intellectual and the moral horizons of children for the sake of happiness.[26]

O'Hear's point becomes even more evident when Barrow claims that his justification of education is based on an open society; a society where democratic values are cherished. He demonstrates this claim by pointing out that although it is logically conceivable that dogmatic people would be happy, dogmatism is contingently at risk if the reality consists in a society wherein it is recognized that little can be regarded as unequivocal and certain.[27] What Barrow is essentially saying is that although dogmatism might actually contribute to happiness in some societies such as totalitarian ones, it has little chance of doing so in an open society. Thus, assuming that an open society contributes to a more worthwhile type of life than a totalitarian society, it becomes interesting to note that Barrow's educational theory restricts, rather than encourages, values that form the basis of living in an open society, all in the name of happiness. In light of this, if it is true that educational activities ought to prepare individuals for what is considered to be a worthwhile way of

life, then Barrow's educational theory is inconsistent with the way of life that he regards as worthwhile.

For the sake of argument, it is possible to accept Barrow's theory that the selection of the activities to include in a curriculum be based on the utilitarian principle. However, we could still challenge the theory in that it would be impossible to implement fully in an actual situation. The challenge is based on Barrow's claim that maximum happiness will be attained in a society when everyone has a chance to engage in activities that he/she has the desire and the best ability for, provided it is not harmful to the rest of society. This situation obtains when competition between individuals or groups wanting to engage in the same activities is eliminated, hence the elimination of frustration which Barrow takes to be a contradiction to happiness.[28] Barrow's claim that a situation in a society will be arrived at where maximum happiness is achieved in the sense that everyone has a chance to engage in activities that he/she has the most desire and the best ability for, is undercut by various counter-examples. For instance, in a country where there is a shortage of manpower for particular professions, the government may decide to give priority to educational activities that are likely to lead individuals to taking these professions. A common case has been for governments to lay more emphasis, say, in mathematics or science in educational institutions, hoping that enough people will become teachers in mathematics

or science, if these are the areas that have great demands at a particular time. If such a situation prevails, then those students who are good at mathematics or science have a chance to engage in activities that they have the best ability for, and possibly desire. However, those students who have the best ability for activities other than mathematics or science, say, literature or history, may be discouraged from engaging themselves with the latter activities. This discouragement would be either due to poor prospects that the students will ever have a chance to engage in literature or history in the future, or the government may have only so much money earmarked for these educational activities. Thus, this is one situation in an educational system where not all the individual students will have a chance to do what they have the best ability for, even if that is what they wanted to do.

The second counter-example is a situation where students are engaged in activities which would lead them to careers such as engineering. The students may have the best abilities for these activities. On top of that, these students may have the strongest desire to become engineers. However, it may just turn out that there are only a few openings for engineering careers. Here, one of the likely things to happen is that some of the students will take the available engineering job openings while others will try their luck elsewhere. Even if they may be fortunate enough to get other jobs, it would mean that the latter students

will likely be doing things that they did not have the best ability for and probably things that they do like as much. Once again, these students might end up being frustrated and unhappy while their counterparts (those who got engineering jobs) will have a chance to maximize their happiness.

Barrow's position, which is the focus of the above two counter-examples, is based on the assumption that maximum happiness in a society is attainable only when everyone has the best ability to do what he/she desires. However, there are cases where people seem to attain more happiness by engaging in activities that they do not have greater abilities for than in activities that they have greater abilities for. For instance, we could have a situation where a student has the best ability for engaging in a certain activity, but he/she does not want to engage in it. Another common case is that where a student takes subjects such as chemistry, mathematics and biology in high school even when he knows well that those are not his best subjects. The student may have decided to take those subjects because he believed they would lead him to professions like medicine. Further, the student may be aware that medicine is not going to be the best career for him in the sense that it is not the area that he expects to excel in. What is interesting is that he may have decided to do all the above even when he was aware that his best subjects were history and literature and that he was bound to make a brilliant history or literature professor. The reason given for this seeming anomaly is that

the society has more respect for doctors than for history or literature professors, and that the individual in question would be happier as a poor (less ability) doctor than as a brilliant professor in history or literature. However, this argument does not, in any way, suggest that the individual student would not be happier if he had greater abilities for becoming a brilliant doctor. All that it implies is that the individual student would be relatively happier engaging, even poorly, in activities that are generally considered as worthwhile than he would be engaged in alternative activities that he has the better abilities for, but which he and the society consider as less worthwhile. The moral of this example, it seems to me, is that there are situations where happiness does not solely depend on the amount of psychological pleasure that is derived from certain activities, but also on the society's general conception with regards to the worthwhileness of these particular activities vis-a-vis other activities.

As is evidenced by the example above, it seems to me that Barrow's major problem is precipitated by his failure to pay more attention to the relationship between the individual and the society he lives in. To put the same point in another way, Barrow seems to have ignored the essential role that societal norms play in determining the general worthwhileness of various activities. Thus, in the exposition of his educational theory, Barrow regards individual students as if they each came from a different

planet, and that they were attending educational institutions with no previous general common preferences as regards various activities. The only common preference between these students is their quest for the greatest amount of pleasure possible. One has even to wonder how these students came to share the view that pleasure is more worthwhile than anything else.

As a final assessment, Barrow's ethical theory falls short as a justification of education due to its failure to take into account some important elements of human nature. The consequence of this failure translates into an educational theory which is either too inclusive or too exclusive, as will be shown by the following cases. Firstly, the theory is too inclusive in the sense that even if we agreed that every human being strives for pleasure, we have no way of distinguishing what is usually regarded as animal (low) pleasures from human pleasures. Since the theory is not capable of this essential function, activities such as playing bingo would qualify as an educational activity, so long as it has the potential to generate the greatest amount of pleasure in a society. This point has been noted by White in his criticism of happiness as an aim of education.[29] Thus, he identifies two interpretations of happiness. In one sense, the term 'happiness' is equated to a life of pleasurable sensations. Within this frame of reference, drug-addiction [illegible]e-induced satisfactions would qualify to g[illegible]ss in an individual. In the

second sense, happiness is achieved when an individual attains a complete satisfaction of his/her desires as possible, White asserts. These desires may or may not include pleasurable sensations. This is a more inclusive interpretation of happiness in the sense that both machine-induced and weight-lifting satisfactions for example, would qualify to bring about happiness in an individual.[30]

Again, even granted that we are able to recognize those activities that are worthwhile for human beings from the utilitarian point of view, still we would be required to be able to distinguish activities that are educationally worthwhile from activities that are worthwhile in general. For instance, what would be the essential difference between mathematics as an educationally worthwhile activity and bingo as a worthwhile activity in general? This problem is confirmed when Barrow takes both health training and literacy training as educational activities.[31]

Secondly, the theory is too exclusive in the sense that even if we were able to recognize that pleasure is a good that human beings strive for, it would be wrong to take that pleasure (of whatever kind) is the only good that is required for the well-being of man. Ewing put the point rather aptly when he asserted that utilitarians are right in holding that whatever is good (worthwhile) is pleasant but that they are wrong in thinking what is good is only so because it is pleasurable.[32] Ewing seems to support an earlier agreement with O'Hear who saw education as having various aims rather

than just one aim: the achievement of the greatest amount of pleasure possible in a society. If this is a fair argument, then it would mean that the selection of our curriculum content has to balance the various activities aimed at various worthwhile goods that tend to be crucial in achieving a happy society. This is where societal norms come in, in the sense of the society's general grading of the degree of worthwhileness of various educational activities at a particular period in time.

Although most of what has been said about Barrow's educational theory is rather negative, it does raise important points for educators: the firm connection between formal education and future individual careers. In light of this, it could be argued that although it is not useful to narrow the curriculum content to prepare students for particular jobs, students would be well served if our educational system could attempt to prepare them for occupations that they were likely to engage in in future. The implication of this argument is that education has two basic roles. On one hand, it is expected that education will develop dispositions that are commonly regarded as worthwhile. On the other hand, it is expected that education will prepare individuals for attaining what each regards as worthwhile. This issue will be examined further in the next chapter, when we attempt to propose the basis of how Kenya's educational system could be improved in order to successfully rise to the challenges of today and tomorrow.

Notes on Chapter V

[1]R. Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 176.

[2]Barrow, Common Sense and the Curriculum, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976), p. 39.

[3]Barrow, Ibid., p. 115.

[4]Barrow, Ibid., pp. 115-147.

[5]Barrow, Ibid., p. 126.

[6]Barrow, Happiness, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 79.

[7]Barrow, Common Sense and the Curriculum, p. 97.

[8]Barrow, Ibid., p. 97.

[9]Barrow, Ibid., p. 97.

[10]Barrow, Ibid., p. 98.

[11]Barrow, Ibid., p. 98.

[12]Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, p. 193.

[13]Barrow, Common Sense and the Curriculum, pp. 108-109.

[14]Barrow, Ibid., p. 109.

[15]Barrow, Ibid., p. 126.

[16]Barrow, Ibid., p. 100.

[17]J.P. White, Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), Chapter 2.

[18]White, Ibid., p. 21.

[19]R.S. Peters, "The Justification of Education", in The Philosophy of Education, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Edited by R.S. Peters, p. 239.

[20]Peters, Democratic Values and Educational Aims", Teachers' College Record, Vol. 80, No. 3, (February, 1979).

[21]Barrow, Happiness, p. 131.

[22]R.F. Dearden, "Happiness and Education", in Education and Development of Reason, International Library of the Philosophy of Education. Edited by R.F. Dearden, P.H. Hirst and R.S. Peters, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 98.

[23]Dearden, Ibid., p. 109.

[24]A. O'Hear, Education, Society and Human Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.), p. 42.

[25]O'Hear, Ibid., p. 44.

[26]O'Hear, Ibid., p. 44.

[27]Barrow, Happiness, p. 131. Barrow's conception of open society differs from that of Karl Popper. While Popper stresses personal autonomy, Barrow emphasizes the idea of an individual engaging in activities which he/she has the best ability for.

[28]Barrow, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, p. 74.

[29]J.P. White, The Aims of Education Revisited, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), Chapter 2.

[30]White, Ibid., p. 38.

[31]Barrow, Common Sense and the Curriculum, p. 109.

[32]A.C. Ewing, Ethics: An Introduction to the Fundamental Questions Which Ethical Theory Attempts to Answer, (New York: The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 48-8.

Chapter VI

TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN KENYA

After the description and brief analysis of both Kenya's and Barrow's educational systems, a few general remarks could be made. One, the framework portrayed in both systems are within what is commonly referred to as the Western liberal democratic theory of society.[1] Western liberal democratic theory has various shades of meaning. However, one of its essential characteristics is the respect it places upon principles of equality and liberty as these are based on the dignity of human beings in general. In the case of Kenya, 'African Socialism' advocates education that would help to achieve political equality, equal opportunities and social justice on one hand and freedom of conscience, freedom from want, disease and exploitation on the other.[2] In Barrow's case, the educational system argued for presupposes that the individual is living in a democratic or what he calls an 'open society'. Thus, although he emphasizes the importance of happiness as the ultimate goal that every individual should strive for, he does not deny the importance of the principles of equality and liberty. The only difference is that he conceives these principles as contributing to happiness which, for him, is the ultimate goal in human life.

Two, in both educational systems, intellectually-oriented educational activities are valued more than those that call for less intellectual engagement. However, the reasons for adopting this position are different in both systems. For Barrow, intellectual activities are generally expected to generate a greater amount of pleasure in an individual and the society at large than the less intellectually-inclined activities. The Kenyan educational system on the other hand, favors intellectually-inclined activities for they are highly rewarded both by the government and the society, as compared with the less intellectually-inclined activities.

Three, there is a conviction in both systems that a good or happy life is that where each individual attempts to do what he/she has the best ability for. For example, in the Kenyan case, economic growth and all the values it stands for will be maximized if everyone played his/her part to the best of his/her ability. Thus, education is regarded first and foremost as a tool that an individual and the nation need for economic growth. What this amounts to it seems to me is that in both systems education tends to encourage activities which are mostly geared towards non-moral goods such as pleasure, economic growth or self-actualization while ignoring those activities that are geared towards moral ideals such as equality, social justice or national unity.

In the absence or in a society where moral values are

down-played or overshadowed by non-moral values, there is often intense competition between various individuals or groups, each trying to pursue what each considers to be worthwhile. While there is always a degree of competition in a communal life, a situation has been reached in Kenya where individuals or groups seem to see each other as enemies; conceiving the other individual or group as having the potential to restrict the attainment of one's goals. Thus, since education is regarded as the most efficient means of attaining these non-moral values, then it is understandable why there is increased competition for formal education at every level within our educational system.

But, although there are fundamental similarities between Barrow's and Kenya's educational systems, there is one important difference. This stands out when Barrow contends that all human actions, educational activities included, are ultimately directed towards hedonistic pleasure. This is to say that activities that are recommended as educationally worthwhile are those that have the highest degree of generating pleasure both in an individual and the society at large. In Kenya, educational activities are evaluated primarily by their potential to equip an individual and the society with economic power. It is this economic power that enables the recipients to satisfy their various desires, which are mostly desires for material things.

The outcome of our analysis of the two educational systems is that both experience the same problem since they

are based on the same foundation: utilitarianism. But utilitarianism is just one element of a broader theory: the Western liberal democratic theory of society. To attempt to grasp what might be the basic problem inherent in the two educational systems, it seems to me that we would have to look closely at some of the most essential characteristics of liberal democratic theory of society, particularly the principles of equality and liberty. This will essentially be an attempt at seeking to understand how an educational system, particularly in a young nation like Kenya, would assist both individual and national development at the same time.

(i) Liberal-Democratic Theory

In a number of essays, C.B. MacPherson has thrown some light on what might be at fault in the liberal-democratic theory of society.[3] MacPherson has argued that over the years, there have developed in the Western world two views of man that seem to be inconsistent.[4] On one hand, there is a view of an individual as a consumer of utilities. From this perspective an individual is essentially treated as a bundle of appetites or desires that demand satisfaction. In light of this, a good society is seen as that which encourages an individual to maximize the satisfaction of his/her desires which are infinite in nature. On the other hand, there is within the liberal-democratic theory a view of an individual as having equal rights to make the most of himself-herself. Viewed this way, an individual is seen as

an exerter and an enjoyer of his/her unique powers. Thus, a good society would be that which allows an individual to develop his/her own unique attributes as far as possible. The first perspective of an individual is aptly demonstrated by Bentham's writings while the second perspective is demonstrated by J.S. Mills' writings, MacPherson suggests.[5]

The problem arises, however, when one attempts to maximize, as far as possible, the satisfaction of his/her desires or utilities. Often, the individual will find himself/herself blocking others from maximizing their desires. For example, an individual might have a strong desire to become a leader of the world while another person has a strong aversion for being subjected to someone else's rule. The problem is that under the liberal-democratic theory, each of the two individuals has equal rights to do what they desire. The present dilemma prompts us to ask a fundamental question: what is the basis of the proposition that individuals in a liberal-democratic society have equal rights, each to strive for his/her individual goals? A quick answer would be that in a liberal-democratic society, individuals are equal. That is to say, in a liberal-democratic society each individual has to consider others as being as important as himself-herself. However, when one looks around, the chances are that he/she would see more differences than similarities. Some people are rich, others are poor, some people are brilliant, others are not, some people are compassionate, others are not. Thus, the question

still remains; why do I have to treat others as I would treat myself even when what I see are differences between myself and others in almost every aspect? As Vinit Haksar puts it:

> An egalitarian . . . has to face the same problem about how sound the foundations of egalitarianism are, he has for instance, to justify why people are worthy of equal respect and consideration, in spite of differences in qualities such as rationality, intelligence, moral sense, and autonomy.[6]

There are various arguments that could be developed for treating others as oneself. Firstly, it has been a popular move in the West to consider human intellect as the most essential characteristic of human beings. When this is taken as a plausible premise, then every human being is supposed to have the intellectual capacity which is displayed in various ways, each according to an individual's potential and initiative. Thus, on the question of the human intellect, human beings could be said to be basically equal. This is what Gerald F. Gaus has described as the liberal's conviction of the similitude of human beings.[7] This argument is not very convincing in the sense that though we may have the same starting point (intellectual potential), our development may take different directions, some of which are diametrically opposed to other people's interests. In a word, the argument does not indicate why I have to treat others as myself simply because we have the same starting point even after our interests and goals differ in the later stages of our development. There is a second argument which also hinges on the intellectual element that is

inherent in human beings. Thus, if we take MacPherson's second premise that every individual has equal rights to develop or actualize himself/herself, then it could be argued that one of the areas to be developed is the individual's intellectual abilities. To develop these intellectual abilities successfully, an individual would need others to stimulate and criticize him/her. More than that, an individual experiences a sense of achievement if what has been done is appreciated by others. This sense of achievement is even greater when one is appreciated by people he/she respects. For example, one's self-esteem would be greater if his/her achievements are recognized and appreciated by people he/she takes interest in (parents or others) than when strangers do.

The third argument hinges on the diversity of human potential and its inequality of distribution among various individuals. Thus, although we may be basically the same as the first argument suggests, each individual excels in some capacities while others excel in other capacities. For instance, some people will develop to be artists while others develop to become musicians, mathematicians or athletes. For an individual to develop to the highest standard, he/she would need other people to supplement what he/she lacks. Sometimes we may not even develop certain abilities, not because we do not have the potential for them, but because we have to choose some among numerous abilities. Here again, we need others in order to develop ourselves to

the highest standard of human development possible. As Rawls put it, we must look to others to attain the excellences that we must leave aside, or lack altogether.[8] This seems to be a persuasive argument, particularly at the political level. For example, one would allow others to contribute their talents in the governing of social life with the understanding that one is going to benefit in the process. And when one contributes to governing others, he/she would not do anything that would harm others or block their development in the sense that by doing so, one would be indirectly blocking his/her chances of development.

The above argument is rather weak in the sense that it takes that individual development involves developing or actualizing all the potential abilities that he/she is endowed with. The truth of the matter is that an individual is likely to develop those abilities that are approved and encouraged by a particular society. However, even granted that most of the abilities to be developed in an individual are those that are approved by society, it is still possible that one would be unable to develop all those abilities that are needed for what is regarded as the highest standard of human development to be achieved. But over and above this, the two preceding arguments are weak in the sense that they are based on individual needs or satisfaction. For example, one would have no compelling reason for treating others the same way he/she treated

himself/herself if he/she did not conceive them as means to his/her own development. Despite this weakness, these arguments give some plausible (if not conclusive) reasons why we should treat others the same way as we treat ourselves. The arguments allow us to conceive the development of others as equally worthwhile as ours even if we have to conceive their development as part of our development, and even if we see ourselves as different from them in numerous ways. Carl Cohen seems to be underlining this point when he suggests that the principle of human equality is a moral one not concerned with the empirically determinable characteristics of human beings: their size, strength, color or intelligence.[9] In light of this, the strength of the principle of equality in liberal-democratic theory is that it would be more worthwhile to regard others as our equals basically, rather than treating them as different. The differences between human beings should then be seen within this basic equality and should be used positively. Our attempt to improve others' welfare would, in this case, be an attempt to improve ourselves, although in an indirect way.

But although the arguments above suggest that an individual's interest with other people is based on self-interest, this self-interest could be identified in two ways. First, there is a way in which we are interested with other people for our short-term goals. This type of self-interest is well-exemplified by say, an individual

buying another person some lunch with the understanding that this person would be useful if the individual who bought the lunch wants a certain job in the government. Again, an individual might show a considerable interest in charity organizations in order to build a high-profile image that he thinks would be an asset to entering public life. The problem with this type of self-interest is that the individual ignores his/her long-term interests with others, seeing them as enemies in some ways.

The other type of self-interest is that where the individual considers others and their interests on long-term goals. This is the type of self-interest that we have explicated above. One needs to be appreciated by those he/she respects. Thus, not to consider others' interests is indirectly not to consider one's interests.

What seems to be suggested here is that although there is an inherent tension between individual interests vis-a-vis those of others within the liberal-democratic theory of society, it would work fairly well if emphasis is put on the more stable long-term interests that we have in relation to others, rather than the egoistic interest that is portrayed in the first type of self-interest. If this is done, it would be more likely to see social goals emphasized in the society without at the same time losing touch with the individual.

My speculation is that the basic problem with Barrow's and Kenya's systems of education is that they are both

based on a distorted version of utilitarianism that tends to over-emphasize the maximization of individual pursuit of personal gratification at the expense of moral goods. In the light of this, a form of individualism is created in such a way that individual interests are conceived as being different and at times opposed to social-related goods. Thus, when education is said to develop individual abilities, this development is taken to be rightly based on what we have referred to as individual short-term interests rather than long-term interests which require that one consider others' interests as well. In a word, the educational system advocated by Barrow and practised in Kenya undermines the moral principle of equality of humans as moral beings. This makes it easier for us to understand why moral principles such as political equality, unity, and social justice are only given lip-service within Kenya educational system, as opposed to economic growth.

However, it is easy for one to commit a fallacy in thinking that just because a system of education based on one (possibly distorted) version of utilitarianism has been found wanting, it has nothing to offer. In Chapter IV it was argued that a more plausible concept of ideal happy life is that which is composed of various ingredients considered worthwhile for a human being as such. Further, it was argued that one of the ingredients of an ideal happy life is pleasure. One way of generating pleasure in an individual is found when the particular individual engages in those

activities he/she likes and has the best ability for.. Viewed from an educational context, the society would be happier if educational institutions succeeded in guiding individuals to concentrate on activities that would generate some pleasure in them, among other things. To put the point in another way, it will be an inadequate educational system that divorced itself from the task of preparing people for various satisfying careers within the society. The only problem arises when utilitarians require that the utilitarian considerations in education always over-ride other considerations. The suggestion that could be made is that since an ideal happy life is likely to involve both moral and non-moral values, a successful educational system will attempt to encourage activities that enhance moral and non-moral values.

The discussion above, however, leaves open at least four possibilities. One, some versions of utilitarianism do not really deal with distinctively moral goods at all. Two, some versions do cover many of humans' needed moral goods, but not with enough of them or not in any adequately systematic way. Three, there are versions stressing the greater measure of communal happiness, rather than aiming to maximize individuals' happiness, above all, which are morally adequate. Four, there are other versions which focus on individuals' interests more than the community which are morally adequate.

Another possibility now needs to be considered, which

may pertain more to the needs of people such as the founders of Kenya, who sought to create, direct and unify a new free nation out of a diverse colonized peoples. This version attaches the utilitarian and individualistic elements of personal freedoms, incentives and a positive competition to deontological principles from a range needed to make genuinely national and socially benevolent existence possible. This possibility will be explored in relation to education, particularly the training of future Kenyan teachers.

(ii) Educational Theory

Perhaps we could aptly illustrate the ideals that were espoused by the first founding members of Kenya nation by quoting a passage from Jomo Kenyatta, in a speech he gave during the Independence Day (December 12, 1963) celebration. During the speech, Kenyatta said:

> Today is rightly a day of great rejoicing. But it must also be a day of dedication. Freedom is a right, and without it the dignity of man is violated. But freedom itself is not enough. At home, we have a duty to ensure that all our citizens are delivered from the afflications of poverty, ignorance and disease. Otherwise freedom for many of our people will be neither complete nor meaningful. We shall count as our friends, and welcome as fellow-citizens, every man, woman and child in Kenya - regardless or race, tribe, colour or creed - who is ready to help us in this great task of advancing the social well-being of all our people.[10]

From the ideas presented above, it seems quite evident that although the original Kenya government philosophy of education was in great part utilitarian in inclination,

distinctions need to be made as to the essential elements inherent in the philosophy. Firstly, the general Kenyan government favored individual rights (for everybody regardless of race or creed) over collectivism, and therefore encouraged individuals to have the chance to pursue activities according to a personal conception of happiness. More than that, the government was ready ~~to~~ provide incentives to motivate change and progress. Hence, we could say that the government sought to encourage the pursuit of the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number of hard-working individuals. Like Mill and Bentham, the government sought to increase the happiness of the greatest majority, that as many Kenyans as possible would lead enjoyable lives. Adam Smith seems to have this same idea of an individual's self-seeking as the main spring of social benefits (the beneficient 'invisible hand'). Smith went even further by saying that: "By pursuing his own interests, man frequently promotes the interests of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."[11]

Secondly, the original Kenya government's aims were not atomistic, and did not form the 'minimal state' as taught, for example, by Ayn Rand. In other words, Kenya was not meant to become a loose, barely-related collection of egocentric individuals that Rand was thinking about, when she said that the only proper moral purpose of a government was to protect man's rights, which essentially meant

protecting him from physical violence and the right to his own life, to his own liberty, to his own property and to the pursuit of his own happiness.[12] The happiness of the greatest number of individual Kenyans was meant to be secured through national unity, national pride, national consultation, national co-operation, national identity and awareness, a nationally-strong economy and political government. To put this point in another way, having taken over a colonially-governed group of divided regions, distinctive ethnic sub-groups and languages, which were a healthy source of conflicts, the original Kenyan government could not have favored a largely individualistic or 'atomistic' form of utilitarianism.

It then follows that the kind of teleology or utilitarianism and the kind of individual freedom to pursue happiness that were advocated by the first founders of Kenya presupposed certain goods that could only be justified on the basis of deontological principles which favored a collectivist attitude and habits. It was presupposed that the child in school must be taught to revere certain goods not only for utilitarian reasons, but also for non-utilitarian reasons. This idea is echoed below when it is stated by some Kenyan that:

> The aim of education should be the creation of the capacity to live a fuller life, not to enable its advocates to obtain a 'white collar' job, buy an expensive car or avoid dirty hands. It is surely unnecessary to point out how, in the past, material criteria have been allowed, nay even encouraged, by teachers to corrupt students in this matter. Instead

> of what education can buy, the older children should be taught to consider how it can help them to help others, and so build a sturdy nation of upright, self-respecting, hardworking citizens.[13]

Again, it was presupposed that the child in school will be taught to see himself/herself both as someone whom Kenya gives various opportunities to compete, excel or prosper more than others if the potential is there, and as someone whose well-being depended on the due concern for the well-being of other Kenyans, his/her family and neighbors. He/she was to be taught to see himself/herself as a liberated atom and also as a mode inhering in a natural substance called 'nation'.

Above all, the first founding members of Kenya did not wish to educate Kenyans in a form of pseudo-utilitarianism whereby happiness is confused with some vague idea of the right to pursue hedonistic happiness in the sense that the greatest number might pursue it, but only a highly competitive, self-centered and eventually privileged minority of citizens with highly-prized positions would actually feel very happy. The danger revealed by any government that took the above route is that utilitarianism easily gives way to selfish hedonism unless it is taught in effective conjunction with the kinds of deontological principles and collectivist attitudes stressed previously. This is so because, some goods such as patriotism and self-identity are so valuable in building a nation out of diverse ethnic groups and cultures. That is why I think it was appropriate and still is for Bertrand Russell to pose the

question: "How can we combine that degree of individual initiative which is necessary for progress with the degree of social cohesion that is necessary for survival?"[14]

One of the common weaknesses of utilitarian-based social life is the inherent confusion about what goods are essential for human beings and what are not. In the case of the social life that education system is a part of, the economic-related desires have been over-emphasized at the expense of other goods or desires. But if my argument in Chapter IV that the concept of happiness is composed of various values, both utilitarian and deontological is correct, then our efforts to satisfy only utilitarian desires is bound to fail in producing a happy life in us. John King-Farlow seems to be expressing the same point when he says:

> For those of us whose ideal well-being is more like Aristotle's, many types of pleasure will form an essential part of a person's flourishing. But of course there will be for us a number of other intrinsic goods that are at least as essential to happiness (construed as personal well-being).[15]

The unfortunate thing is that in pursuit of what we wrongly conceive as happiness or the good life, we reduce our chance of ever achieving it. The point is best demonstrated by our insatiable appetites to consume in an attempt to satisfy all the desires we have developed. Our activities have resulted in the destruction of the environment, and with it the depletion of non-renewable goods.

The original Kenyan government was not at all blind to the problems of ecology and scarcity. However, the last 25 years have shown the dangers of pollution, over-consumption,

erosion and scarcity, to be far more threatening to the whole human race at present than almost anyone had suspected. Individual happiness now turns out to be far more dependent on self-discipline, and on national and international co-operation than ever before. Thus, the greatest happiness of the greatest number requires much more restrictions from a benevolent and wise society, on personal consumption, and on certain forms of competition than Bentham or Mill would have foreseen.

But how are we going to even begin to pursue a happy life under the circumstances we find ourselves in?

> Perhaps by being much less greedy and envious ourselves; perhaps by resisting the temptations of letting our luxuries become needs; and perhaps by scrutinizing our needs to see if they cannot be simplified and reduced.[16]

(iii) Educational Practice

Although we have indicated that the educational system in Kenya creates inequalities by virtue of its emphasis on manpower selection, it can still be asked whether there are ways that education could enhance social values among Kenyans. I think a case could be made for the view that education should play a socializing role in Kenya. First, we have already indicated that the content of Kenyan education includes such subjects as mathematics, science, history, literature, English and Kiswahili. Other than facilitating an individual in securing employment, these subjects are likely to help individuals to understand themselves and others, and this might improve social life.

For instance, studying of literature would help students to understand various hidden characteristics of individuals and the way they are likely to behave under certain conditions. The combination of literature and history could be invaluable, particularly in Kenya where there are various ethnic groups, in the sense that it might help these ethnic groups to appreciate others' cultural differences. If this goal were achieved then, it would definitely enhance unity among these ethnic groups, a goal that Kenya's government wishes to achieve. Learning to use Kiswahili in Kenya would be another method of attempting to make the Kenyans have a national self-identity of their own. It is one language that is easy to use, both by those who have had formal education and those without. It is the language which has not only the potential to unite different ethnic groups, but those with formal education and those without, a problem that has been created by the situation where those who have had formal education would use English in their day-to-day lives, a language that is not understood by those without formal education.

Other than acquiring various forms of knowledge, formal education has the potential to train individuals in the society to develop rational abilities. For instance, by engaging in various intellectual activities, one is liable to come to respect elements of good reasoning such as respect for truth. If this tool is developed in an individual, it is likely to make him/her a better

participant in the running of social institutions. The importance of a well-developed rational ability is underlined in political participation and by the fact that in 'African Socialism', political equality is one of the basic goals that Kenya strives to achieve. In his support of the development of rationality in individuals, Kenneth Strike makes the point that the ability to participate effectively in collective decisions requires more than the right to vote or the rights of free speech, assembly and petition [American case]. It requires the capacity to understand one's interests and to understand how to effect decisions.[17] The above arguments seem to strongly suggest that formal education could be utilized to foster social values among Kenyans. Consequently, this would make a strong case for the government to provide equal educational opportunity for all Kenyans.

But one point needs to be made. The fact that formal education is liable to enhance social common values in individuals does not logically negate the other fact that education could play a selective role. For example, the degree of rational development cannot be equal in all people. Again, different individuals are likely to excel in different intellectual activities such as mathematics, science, literature, music and Kiswahili to the extent of making careers out of these activities. The important point to note is that categorization of people with regards to the formal education they have attained and the jobs they occupy is not

a negative thing to do. The trouble arises when this is not seen within a social context at a point when we start rewarding people according to the level of educational attainment. In particular, this occurs when people are paid according to the jobs they hold (which is highly influenced by the level of formal education one has attained) rather than on doing the job well. It is when this happens that we start identifying the worth of a person with the position he/she holds in the society, forgetting his/her worth as a human being. It is this situation that has eroded the unifying functions in formal education by emphasizing the differences in individuals at the expense of the common goals.

The social functions of education are further undermined in the Kenyan educational system by the way content is presented. For instance, in the schools, students try to memorize facts rather than understand the material. This is understandable since the students are only interested in attaining the highest scores in various public examinations.[18] Thus, the intellectual development intended for individual students is not likely to take place under the above circumstances.

(iii) Education for the Future Teachers

The future teachers in Kenya must be prepared to educate the students to be happy (ethical happiness) as good Kenyans, as well as being good members of the whole human family. In other words, the collectivist element espoused in African

traditional education has to be redeemed and improved in our students. In their attempt to steer the students towards a happy life, the teachers must be ready to instil in the young minds what is the best in the individualist and collectivist traditions. But to succeed in this endeavor, the teachers must themselves understand how to steer between the obvious extremes of the above traditions. To test whether the prospective teachers have a grasp at the issue at hand, I would set them some passages which very much represent the extreme individualist and collectivist traditions. The passages will be drawn from philosophers such as Ayn Rand, Adam Smith, Karl Popper and Robert Wolff on one hand and Plato, Hobbes, and Hegel on the other.

Below are some examples of appropriate passages that I would use to evaluate the future teachers.

(a) There can be no compromise between freedom and government controls; to 'accept just a few controls' is to surrender the principle of inalienable individual rights and to substitute for it the principle of government's unlimited arbitrary power, thus delivering oneself into gradual enslavement.[19]

(b) The rational end of man is life in the state, and if there is no state there, reason at once demands that one be founded. Permission to enter a state or leave it must be given by the state; this then is not a matter which depends on individual's arbitrary will and therefore the state does not rest on contract, for contract presupposes arbitrariness.[20]

The prospective teachers will be asked to comment on the above passages and particularly show their resourcefulness in attepting to find acceptable compromise between the two.

Having a worthwhile career is what has caused so many

problems in our educational system. Certainly, students have been forced to favor certain careers merely on economic grounds. Unfortunately, such careers are fewer than the number of those who are capable to take them. Teachers would certainly help the situation if they attempted to inculcate to the students the idea that various activities are capable of bringing about a satisfying life to individuals and the nation as a whole, even when they are low in economic value. Teachers must be capable of improving the syllabus in such a way that there will be a wide range of activities from which careers will be chosen.

However, as it has already been indicated, the moral content of our education is a reflection of the moral content of our society.[21] Hence, other spheres of the larger society has to play a supportive role if the changes suggested in our educational system are to be effected. For example, teaching is one career that commands little respect within the Kenyan society at present. Two factors have perhaps played a major role in contributing to the low respect the teaching career seems to be enjoying. One, most of those who are in the teaching career had not chosen it as a career. It was perhaps a second chance after the chosen career was hard to come by. Other times, the teachers are not trained, since they are taking the job until a chance for the chosen career opens up. Two, the teachers are among the least paid professions.

Due to the above facts, teachers have very low morale,

a factor that makes them less effective in their jobs. To improve the morale of the teachers, it should be a government policy not to employ or train teachers from those students who have either no interest in teaching or those who are academically poor. On the question of rewarding system, teachers could certainly welcome an increase in salary, at least to reach the same level with other civil servants. However, since economic rewards are in short supply in our country, other means of rewarding good performance should be invented. For example, teachers who performed well might be elected to be members of respected societies or associations. The government could also establish a system of merit in stages, which is not necessarily associated with financial reward.

The teaching profession could also be improved, as well as other professions, if our institutions of higher learning (colleges and universities) were reorganized in such a way that some compulsory general courses pertaining to collectivist and individualist life are offered to all students regardless of their aspired future professions. For example, every student should be exposed to some important writings of some of the philosophers mentioned earlier (those who hold extreme positions on either collectivist or individualist ideals).

Having given the above suggestions, I am aware of the likely accusations against me, that these ideas are too abstract. For any effective change to take place in Kenya,

we need a few strong-willed and dedicated Kenyans who are ready not only to propound what they believe in (even if this is not popular) but who are also ready to live those ideas. E.G. Schumacher puts this point aptly when he says, "An ounce of practice is generally worth more than a ton of theory."[22]

Future teachers must be able to show how a strong federalism (thinking as a Kenyan) can be separated from the idea that the only kind of meaningful success is federal or international success. They must be able ~~to show~~ how Kenyan education can lead people to feel fulfilment in their life's ambitions in a country that is strongly united.

In order to be effective in exposing the students to the dangers that threaten the well-being of human beings, teachers need to be knowledgeable about pollution and other ecologically-related problems. They must be able to explain that, most of the above problems are results of human beings' unconstrained consumption of non-renewable goods.

In conclusion, I will submit that the goals discussed above could only be justified partly in a group-centred utilitarianism and partly by reference to underlying deontological principles. Again these national goals could be realized partly in individualist or 'atomistic' terms and partly in collectivistic terms. Thus, the original utilitarian tone of the Kenyan government spokesperson on education, as well as the utilitarianism advocated by Barrow, have to be understood as being qualified by a strong holistic

concern for unified national goals and communal well-being. To put the point in another way, utilitarianism is a valuable key, however, it is valueless without a lock that it fits.

Notes on Chapter VI

[1]Liberal-democracy is here conceived in its broadest sense.

[2]Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 1-2.

[3]C.B. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

[4]MacPherson, Ibid., p. 24.

[5]I do not agree with MacPherson's assessment that the first view of an individual is descriptive while the second view is ethical.

[6]V. Haksar, Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism. Clarenson Library of Logic and Philosophy Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 13.

[7]G.F. Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1983.

[8]J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkan Press of the University of Harvard, 1971, A Harvard Paperback), p. 529.

[9]J. Cohen, "The Justification of Democracy", The Monist, Vol. 55, No. 1 (1971), p. 71.

[10]Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 213.

[11]G. Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists, (New York: The New American Library, 1952), p. 42.

[12]L.J. Binkley, Conflict of Ideals: Changing Values in Western Society, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969), p. 28. Cited from A. Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics", in The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, (New York: The New Library of World Literature Inc., 1964), p. 31.

[13]"Educational Problems", Kenya Weekly News, October 1, 1965, p. 20.

[14]B. Russell, Authority and the Individual, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), p. 8.

[15]J. King-Farlow, Self-Knowledge and Social Relations: Groundwork of Universal Community, (New York: Science History Publications, 1978), p. 259.

[16]E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), p. 36.

[17]K.A. Strike, Educational Policy and the Just Society, (Urbana: Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1982), p. 12.

[18]D. Ghai, "Towards a National System of Education in Kenya", in Education, Society and Development: New Perspectives from Kenya. Edited by D. Court and D. Ghai, (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 335.

[19]A. Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. A Signet Book, (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 68.

[20]Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated and Notes by T.M. Knox, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 242.

[21]A.C. MacIntyre, "Against Utilitarianism", in Aims in Education: A Philosophic Approach. Edited by T.H.B. Hollins, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), 1.

[22]Schumacher, Op. cit., p. 36.

Chapter VII

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

Chapter I is primarily a statement of the research to be undertaken. The problem of the thesis is an attempt to assess the plausibility of the utilitarian-based educational system. The reason for being interested in utilitarianism is that (to borrow from A.C. MacIntyre) the root of Kenya's educational system lies deep in our whole form of social life, a form made articulate and self-conscious in utilitarian moral and political theory.[1] In order to understand the connection between utilitarianism and Kenya's educational system, some background is offered in terms of pre-Colonial African traditional education, Colonial African education and post-independence education. Within each of the above categories, aims, structure and content are described and assessed. At the end of the assessment, it is realized that essentially, education is supposed to have two functions. On one hand it prepares an individual for particular skills. On the other hand, it prepares the individual to be a member of a certain community. In other words, education is expected to select and prepare individuals for individual specialized duties and at the same time develop in the individual some shared dispositions - dispositions that are common to people in a community he/she lives in.

However, although there is no contradiction between the process of preparing individuals both as individuals as well as social beings, the fact of the matter in Kenya today is that the role of education is seen more as a preparation for careers rather than for the development of social dispositions. This, it was realized, has been a trend inherited from Colonial education. In light of this, the more formal education one attains (climbing the educational ladder), the better the prospect of securing a better job. At the end of the line, the worthwhileness of an individual has come to be identified with the type of job one occupies, which in turn is very much correlated with the degree of formal education that one had attained. Thus, the competition that ensues as individuals attempt to climb the educational ladder in order to secure jobs, destroys any chance that the educational system might have had of developing socially worthwhile dispositions in individuals. After analyzing some educational policies formulated immediately after Kenya attained its political independence, it is realized that they are based on a distorted version of utilitarianism.

The basic objective in Chapter II has been to understand the basic tenets of the ethical theory we wish to evaluate. In light of this, utilitarianism is shown to be subsumed under the ethical theories commonly referred to as teleological. The basic tenet of teleological theories is the fact that human conduct is judged to be

right or wrong with reference to its potential capacity to bring about what is regarded to be the good or goods that human beings strive for. In its traditional definition, utilitarianism states that the worthwhileness of any human actions is to be judged with reference to their potential to generate the greatest happiness for the greatest number. This definition is credited to Jeremy Bentham and John S. Mill who are regarded as the fathers of utilitarian ethical theory.

Ever since the formulation of traditional utilitarianism, there has developed many other forms of utilitarianism. However, all these other forms are taken to be modifications of the traditional form of utilitarianism. Thus, apart from the traditional form, the following forms of utilitarianism are briefly discussed: Act-utilitarianism, Rule-utilitarianism, Generalized utilitarianism, Ideal-utilitarianism and co-operative-utilitarianism. The brief discussion is aimed at highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of these forms of utilitarianism as seen within utilitarianism as a general ethical theory. During the course of the discussion, it is realized that utilitarianism as a general theory is composed of two basic elements: the consequential and the value-theory elements. The consequential element deals with questions on the procedure to be followed in bringing about the good or goods to be achieved. The value-theory element deals with questions regarding the type of good or goods to be achieved. Again,

the value-theory element is composed of moral and non-moral goods.

At the end of the chapter, it is shown that Barrow's version of utilitarianism which forms a large part of the research at hand, is closely related to traditional utilitarianism expounded by Bentham. It is further shown that in the exposition of his version of utilitarianism, Barrow concentrates more on the non-moral than the moral aspects of the value-theory. In his defense of utilitarianism, Barrow has an immediate task: to make a case that his version of utilitarianism is the only plausible justification of educational activities within an educational system.

In Chapter III, the main objective has been to briefly discuss Barrow's version of utilitarianism as witnessed in his various works such as Moral Philosophy for Education, Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, Happiness and Common Sense and the Curriculum. The chapter opens with an attempt to show that Barrow's claim that Plato's educational theory in the Republic is urilitarianism is unwarranted. In light of this, it is demonstrated that while there are occasions in the Republic when Plato gave an impression that he advocated a consequential element in his ethical theory, there is strong evidence suggesting that he conceived of some goods as being good for their own sake rather than just for their after effects. This point is exemplified by the suggestion by Plato that harmony within an individual soul

is the end and not a means to something else. Plato also cites health and honor as goods that are considered good for their own sake. Next, Barrow's attempt to identify Plato of the Republic with the traditional utilitarian value-theory, particularly the Benthamite type, is found to have no base. In other words, the argument that Plato took hedonistic happiness to be the ultimate good that human beings strive for is found wanting. To show that Barrow's claim is unsupported by evidence, it is established that the term justice as it is used in the Republic, is not to be equated with happiness. Further, that contrary to Barrow's contention, there is overwhelming evidence to show that for Plato, knowledge of the Form of Good is the ultimate and the highest goal that human beings can strive for. Unfortunately, only a few individuals in a society (the philosophers) are capable of striving for the ultimate goal.

The second major task in this chapter is to briefly establish Barrow's main argument in support of his version of utilitarianism. The argument runs as follows: one, hedonistic happiness is the ultimate goal for every human being. Two, every human being directly or indirectly engages in activities that are directly or indirectly geared toward attaining the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Three, whether or not a society attains the greatest happiness for the greatest number depends on whether or not every individual engages in activities that

he/she desires and has the best abilities for. Thus, in order for the greatest happiness for the greatest number to be achieved, the society would make sure that each and every individual engages in those activities that he/she has the desires and the best abilities for.

Barrow's version of utilitarianism coupled with some Platonic ideas is shown to be untenable in practice for two reasons. One, beyond the common social goods, individuals are likely to engage in activities that conflict with what others are engaging in, making it impossible for one to engage in what he/she desires and has the best abilities for unrestricted. Two, there are cases when individuals or groups in a society would likely want to pursue the ultimate goal (happiness) by engaging in similar but individual goals (goals that are a means to the ultimate goal). These goals might be so scarce that only a few of those who are interested and have the best abilities have any chance of pursuing them, forcing others to engage in pursuits that they either have less interest in or less abilities to engage in, or both. A case where individuals aspire to pursue the same but limited goals is dramatized by pointing to the leadership race for the next Prime Minister of Canada.

Finally, in this chapter, utilitarianism as an ethical theory is found wanting so long as it explicitly or implicitly maintains that the end justifies the means. Thus, policies derived from such an ethical theory are

bound to generate very unethical practices, it is claimed.

After disposing of the consequential element in utilitarianism in Chapter III, our major task in Chapter IV is to demonstrate that the element of value-theory in Barrow's ethical theory is also wrong. In a word, an attempt is made to make a case that Barrow's definition of happiness solely in terms of pleasure, is faulty. In section 1, Barrow's assertion that happiness is the aggregate of pleasurable experiences over painful experiences over a period of time is picked up. Against the implicit claim that the term 'happiness' is used for past pleasurable moments, it is shown that in ordinary language, both the term 'happiness' and 'pleasure' are used interchangeably either for immediate or past pleasures. As for the claim that happiness is the aggregate of pleasure over pain, it is demonstrated that there are cases such as beer-drinking, or drug-taking by drug-addicts which have high potential for generating pleasure in individuals in a society but which we tend to refrain from doing. If pleasure were to be the ultimate goal, then there would be no reason for refraining from engaging in these activities to the best of our abilities, or until we have discovered other activities that surpass them in terms of generating the greatest happiness within us. To make our case even more forceful, it is demonstrated that there are some activities such as eating whose worthwhileness could not be assessed solely with reference to their potential to generate the

greatest pleasure of the greatest number.

Barrow has also constantly rejected the Millian position that different activities are liable to generate in individuals pleasures that are qualitatively different. For instance, doing mathematics generates a more worthwhile pleasure in an individual than playing bingo, Mill would argue. Barrow claims that happiness is attained when individuals in a society are able to satisfy all their desires as far as is humanly possible. This is in a way identifying happiness with satisfaction or contentedness. However, it has been demonstrated that apart from pleasure that is attained as a result of satisfying some desires, there are other types of pleasures. Pleasure which is usually generated in the act of climbing a mountain is different from the pleasure that is experienced when the mountain-climber has reached the top of the mountain, it is contended. Further, Barrow is shown to be inconsistent when he later claims that happiness is something that only creatures with consciousness (humans) can experience. This latter claim is shown to be supporting the view that there are some pleasurable experiences, probably by other creatures without consciousness (animals) which would not qualify as happiness. Thus, contrary to his basic contention that there is no qualitative difference between pleasures generated from different activities, it is shown that there are indeed various types of pleasures and that some are regarded to be more worthwhile than others.

At the end of section 1 of this chapter, thanks to an insight from Adler, it is demonstrated that there are two senses of the term 'happiness'; the psychological and the ethical sense. Happiness in the psychological sense, which Barrow has adopted, is not capable of explaining human conduct. On the other hand, Happiness in the ethical sense which does not necessarily depend on pleasure, is shown to be capable of forming a basis of an ethical theory. In this latter sense, a happy life is equated with a good life rather than with a pleasurable life.

In section 2 of the chapter, an attempt is made to understand the concept of happiness in relationship to a happy life, and what this entails for a human being. In light of this, it is claimed that what would be considered as an ideal happy life is usually composed of various ingredients such as self-realization, pleasure, authenticity and creativity. The ingredients that make up an ideal life that the individuals emulate are not always stable, as they are sometimes thought to be. For instance, the composition and the emphasis put on various ingredients is bound to change from one society to another or from one generation to another. But the last point notwithstanding, there are some ingredients such as pleasure and self-realization which seem to be always present in any plausible concept of an ideal happy life. However, the ideal happy life has to be governed by some moral principles if it has to be truly an ideal good life for an individual

living in a particular society. As William K. Frankena aptly put it " . . . one's life may be better or worse in itself because it includes morally right or wrong action."[2]

Chapter V is but an application of Barrow's version of utilitarianism in a specific social institution: the field of education. The main objective then is to try and demonstrate that even in the field of education (a specific case that Barrow has chosen), Barrow's utilitarianism is untenable. This is an important undertaking in the sense that a refutation of Barrow's utilitarianism in general would not necessarily amount to its refutation as a justification of human activities in a specific social context.

To start with, Barrow's claim that his version of utilitarianism is the most plausible justification of educational activities is briefly described. Thus, as in the general case, the connection between utilitarianism and the curriculum is the fact that the reasons advanced for the inclusion or exclusion of various activities in an educational system would only make sense in light of the utilitarian premise, Barrow contends.

In Common Sense and the Curriculum, Barrow recommends a 4-stage educational system. However, it is only at stage 3 where students are required to select educational activities which seem to generate the greatest happiness for themselves as individuals. According to Barrow, the activities that are likely to generate the greatest

happiness to students are those that they excel in.

To make a credible case that activities he recommends as educational activities are more worthwhile than other activities he wishes to exclude, Barrow compares the study of literature and playing bingo. For him, studying literature is liable to generate more happiness in both the individual and the society than playing bingo. We have countered this argument by showing that if the objective of educational activities was to generate the greatest happiness in students, then playing bingo would have the same chance (or even more) of generating happiness as studying literature. Further, Barrow's inconsistency, first noted in Chapter IV, is shown to persist when he states that playing bingo necessitates and gives scope only to the capacities of an intelligent chimpanzee, while doing literature demands more. As noted in the discussion of his utilitarian ethical theory in general, Barrow is attempting to smuggle in a Millian version of utilitarianism without admitting it.

The next task is for Barrow to distinguish between compulsory and optional activities within an educational system. He argues that there are basic interpretative perspectives of reality. In order to have a better chance of leading a happy life (hedonistic), individuals ought to be aware of these fundamental conceptions of reality. It is with regard to introducing the students to the basic conceptions of reality that subjects related to literature, natural science and religion are to be recommended as

compulsory or the core curriculum in the educational system, Barrow argues. Optional subjects, on the other hand, are those educational activities which may have potential to generate the greatest happiness in various individuals but which we have no good reason for requiring that everyone engage in them. This point is related to career choices or hobbies that individuals would have to make.

Barrow's argument in support of the distinction between compulsory and optional educational activities is shown to be implausible by demonstrating that an individual need not understand or appreciate the fundamental conceptions of reality in order to attain a happy life in the hedonistic sense. Finally, Barrow's theory of education is found to be inconsistent. The educational theory is inconsistent in the sense that, while it is supposed to apply within a democratic (open) society, the educational activities related to values such as respect for truth, and respect for others' opinions would have to be given a lower priority over activities that are likely to generate happiness. At the end of the chapter, it is suggested that Barrow's basic problem emanates from his attempt to force education to perform successfully two functions that seem to be diametrically opposed to each other: to prepare individuals both as individuals as well as members of a social system, while not offering a plausible basis that is needed.

Chapter VII is an attempt to offer a philosophical position that would be capable of generating both

individualist and collectivist ideals if it formed the basis of our educational system. To start with, it is contended that utilitarianism as an ethical theory is subsumed under a more broader theory; the Western liberal democratic theory of society. One of the essential elements of Western theory of society is respect for equality on one hand and liberty on the other. To attain life that does justice to these two moral principles, a philosophy that balances individualist and collectivist is the most appropriate, it is shown.

Thus, the proper function of education is to develop in our students both individualist and collectivist dispositions. But in order that an education system based on the above philosophical positions be effective, future teachers are expected to understand how the extremes of individualist and collectivist philosophical positions could be avoided.

Notes on Chapter VII

[1]A.C. MacIntyre, "Against Utilitarianism", in Aims in Education: A Philosophic Approach, Edited by T.H.B. Hollins, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964), p. 1.

[2]W.K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 94.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

As a token of our appreciation of his efforts on behalf of international students and in recognition of the leadership he has shown in the establishment of the International Student Centre, the Dean of Student Services, the Director of the Office of International Student Affairs, the International Student Advisor, the Coordinator of the International Student Centre and the International Student Centre Advisory Board hereby grant:

PAUL WAINAINA

a lifetime membership in the

INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CENTRE OF

OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Dean of Student Services

Director, O.I.S.A.

I.S.A.

Coordinator, I.S.C.

I.S.C. Advisory Board

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
ALBERTA

December 5th, 1983.

Mr. Paul Kuria Wainaina,
544 Michener Park,
Edmonton, Alberta.
T6H 4M5

Dear Mr. Wainaina:

I realize it is several months since the success of Universiade '83 has gone on the record as yet another truly bright spot in the history of our city and its remarkable -- almost unique -- ability to respond positively when volunteer work is needed for such a worthy cause. However, I did want to write to you as your representative in the Legislative Assembly in order to acknowledge personally what has been achieved by you and all the other volunteers who did so much to make the Games a success.

World-wide attention was again focused on Edmonton and we were able to point with pride to the fact that Edmonton could not only compete with other nations and cities but that we are now considered to be among the experts in the world when it comes to such an event.

In writing to you now to express the sincere appreciation of your fellow Albertans for a job well done, I also take this opportunity to offer you good wishes for the festive season and the New Year.

Yours truly,

Neil Crawford,
M.L.A.,
Edmonton Parkallen.