

sought loan guarantees that would enable her to borrow large amounts of capital in the international markets for its exports. The Israeli leadership had understood that receptivity of the U.S. and Europe to these requirements depended on Israel's responsiveness to the peace process.⁶

As well, Syria had more of an incentive to cooperate in promoting the Arab-Israeli peace process. In the past, Syrian President Hafez Assad had objected to a peace conference with Israel on the grounds that with its military superiority in the area Israel would have little incentive to make concessions to the Arab states. Therefore, a peace conference would only yield Arab capitulation to Israeli demands and Assad believed that the only way the Arab states could obtain meaningful concessions from the Israelis was through strategic parity with the Jewish state. As long as the Soviet Union was willing and able to supply the Syrians with sophisticated military hardware, Assad could wait for the day Israel would be sufficiently intimidated by his military prowess to make the kind of concessions he wanted.⁷

But with the collapse of the Soviet empire and the economic problems that made the former communist superpower a virtual hostage to western political will, Syrian President Assad was quick to weigh his options and to understand Syria's need for alternative patronage.⁸

⁶ Indyk, p. 82.

⁷ Dawisha, p. 5.

⁸ Indyk, p. 77.

As well, the Gulf War had helped to improve American-Syrian relations since Syria had sided with the allies and Egyptian President Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd had worked hard to bring Assad to accept the American-sponsored peace process with Israel and the benefits were immediate with two billion dollars from Saudi Arabia, a summit meeting with President Bush and several visits by Secretary of State Baker to Damascus. Furthermore, Assad knew he would not get the Golan Heights by remaining a rejectionist and his commitment to engage in the peace process was a quantum leap in the right direction.⁹

With regard to the issue of representation, from the outset of the Madrid talks the official Israeli position was not to negotiate with a representative of the PLO, which meant that PLO officials had to meet the Palestinian delegates in secret. Consequently, the PLO was officially left on the sidelines at the beginning of the talks in October, but by the time of the multilaterals in Moscow in January 1992, the Palestinians had chosen their own delegation, rather than the one dictated by Israel.¹⁰ The PLO was not accorded recognition as an equal negotiating partner in the talks, even though the delegation took their orders from the PLO.¹¹

⁹ Yosef Yaakov, "Why Assad Agreed", Excerpt from the Jerusalem Post, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, September 1991, P. 9.

¹⁰ Daoud Kuttab, "Palestinian Representation", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, February 7, 1992, p. 5.

¹¹ Andoni, "The United States Attacks Palestinians", p. 6.

The head of the PLO's political department Faruq Quddumi argued against participation because the issue of representation would weaken the credibility of the Palestinian delegation and the PLO.¹² The inability of the Palestinians to win recognition as a separate delegation has led to a sense of despair and an increasingly frustrated constituency, thus the PLO challenge has been to find a strategy that would keep it engaged in the process without undermining popular support for the organization.¹³

After the fourth round of talks that concluded at the end of March 1992, it was evident that Israel would not give up the occupied territories, nor address Palestinian national rights. Former Prime Minister Shamir would not offer substantive concessions and maintained his own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 which meant no territorial compromise. Moreover, Jordanians and Israelis would not find common ground on which to build, since for the Jordanians forward movement meant negotiations on territorial compromise, acceptance of resolution 242 and a halt to settlements.¹⁴

Another area concerns whether or not the peace talks have brought the Palestinians closer to realization of the goal of self-determination and national independence. Palestinians in the fourth round of talks declared Palestinian sovereignty as their goal since they forcefully brought up Palestinian statehood

¹² Kuttab, p. 5.

¹³ Lamis Andoni, "The Washington Talks: Deadlock Or The End?" MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL March 6, 1992, p. 3.

¹⁴ Ibid.

at the negotiating table. The delegation stressed Palestinian national rights and demanded the right to self-determination and offered a detailed plan for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which outlined steps toward Palestinian sovereignty. The interim plan challenged the United States and Israeli refusal to accept Palestinian self-determination and addressed Palestinian statehood. The plan asserted that the source of authority during the interim period would be an elected general Palestinian assembly and not Israel as indicated in the Israeli plan. Moreover, the plan advocated that the Palestinians should be able to exercise their legitimate rights during the interim period.¹⁵

There is a wide disparity between the Israeli plan for self-rule during the interim period, which seeks to maintain Israeli occupation and closes the door to Palestinian sovereignty and the Palestinian, which paves the way for an independent Palestinian structure. The Israeli proposals do not refer to "authority" as cited in the Palestinian plan, but to limited administrative arrangements that will involve Arab civil servants and there is no mention of any withdrawal or redeployment of Israeli forces or elections of Palestinians. The Israeli plan implies that Israeli authorities will appoint the Palestinian administrative staff. In contrast, the Palestinian plan called for a phased Israeli withdrawal accompanied by a transfer of administrative and judicial power to the Palestinians.¹⁶

¹⁵ Andoni, *The United States Attacks Palestinians*, p. 6.

¹⁶ Lamis Andoni, "Conflicting Proposals For Interim Self-Government", *MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL*, March 6, 1992, p. 4.

Under the Israeli plan the interim self-government would remain under the overall authority of the military occupation government, which would retain a wide range of "residual powers", but it would also be subordinate to a supreme "liaison committee" that would have the right to change primary laws or terms affecting Palestinian authority and would have a direct role in every aspect of Palestinian life in the occupied territories. In the end the Israeli plan offers so little territorial and functional integrity to the Palestinians.¹⁷ The chief Palestinian negotiator, Dr. Haidar Abd al-Shafi was incredulous at the Israeli plan. It would seem that with the current peace talks the Palestinians are no closer to realization of their national aspirations.

The bilateral Arab-Israeli talks were deadlocked less than six months after they started and nothing has been achieved as far as the Palestinians are concerned. From the Arab point of view Israel has not been put under real pressure to make concessions by either the international community or the sponsors of the talks. The PLO leadership has had to come to terms with the broadening opposition to the peace process inside and outside the occupied territories as the fragile internal unity that had existed since the beginning of the intifada showed signs of falling apart, with a major divergence between Hamas and the nationalist groups in the PLO-backed Unified National Leadership. The victory of the Islamic bloc in the elections to the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce

¹⁷ Yezid Sayigh, "Israel And The Palestinians: Reinstating Occupation, Legalising Annexation", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, December 18, 1992, pp. 16-17.

in early March 1992 sent a chill down nationalist spines, since it had always been a nationalist stronghold.¹⁸ Thus, Chairman Arafat has been under increasing pressure from not only the fundamentalists and leftist factions, but some leading PLO and Fatah officials, although the Palestinian "national camp" still wants to continue the talks.¹⁹

The lack of any significant progress in the Madrid process may be attributable to the original frame of reference which excluded the PLO from the process. Since the PLO remains in control it is senseless to keep it out of the peace process. Therefore the original Madrid formula would have to be amended since it was clearly evident after six months that there would be no progress unless Israel agreed to change the framework and agenda of negotiations. The Palestinian insistence on raising the issues of settlements and human rights were not considered to be in the terms of reference to the peace process.²⁰ With regard to commitment, it is doubtful whether there was real commitment by former Prime Minister Shamir to the process. Although initially, after his election in June 1992, current Prime Minister Rabin had committed himself to a comprehensive resolution, the indications are that this may have been more rhetoric than substance. Chairman Arafat continues to be committed but will have increasing

¹⁸ Daoud Kuttab, "Factional Infighting" MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL March 6, 1992, p. 6.

¹⁹ Kuttab, "Arafat Meets The Team", MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL June 26, 1992, p. 10.

²⁰ Andoni, The Washington Talks: Deadlock Or The End? p. 3

difficulty maintaining his support if he cannot show tangible signs of movement to disaffected Palestinians.

Therefore, the peace talks that held out high hopes for a negotiated solution have failed to achieve significant results so leadership is critical to keep the process going.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A CONCILIATED FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

A conciliated framework for conflict resolution includes recognition of certain basic principles for peace derived from the discussion. The first is recognition that the area defined as the former mandate of Palestine west of the Jordan River is home to both peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, so the negotiation must focus on development of a formula for sharing the land between the two peoples.¹ The terms for sharing the land should be based on "pragmatic justice" that accounts for both equity and reality which embraces the changes that have occurred over time and the historical context in which the changes have evolved. Moreover, the terms that are negotiated must address the basic needs of the parties - especially their sense of injustice and their need for national identity and security.

For the Palestinians, under Yasir Arafat and the PLO, the dream has been for formation of some form of independent Palestinian state as declared in the Declaration of Independence in November 1988.² Within the state the Palestinians would enjoy their collective national and cultural identity, in complete equality of rights, where their political and religious convictions and human dignity would be safeguarded by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance.

¹ Herbert Kelman "Creating Conditions For Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations", THE JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26(March, 1982), p. 45.

² Edward Said "Declaration of Independence", Translation in AL-FAJR (November 28, 1988) Reprinted in HARPERS (March 1989) pp. 60-61.

In the Declaration, the Palestine National Council was prepared to trade recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination for PLO recognition of Israel as required by U.N. Resolution 242 as part of a quid pro quo.³ It is clear that the Palestinian leadership has been willing since then to negotiate a solution which accepts a sovereign state of Israel side by side with a Palestinian state. Although the Palestinians want sovereignty they have compromised in the Madrid talks and have accepted the concept of "marhaliyyah", or stages in achieving a Palestinian state.⁴ The Palestinians seem to have accepted that independence will come in stages with interim steps and agreements.

The Palestinians offered a detailed plan for the Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority in the fourth round of the peace talks, which provides steps towards Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinians wanted the source of authority during the interim period to be an elected general Palestinian assembly and not Israel as the Israeli plan asserted. Moreover, the Palestinians wanted to exercise their legitimate rights during the interim period.⁵ The main point is that a settlement that ultimately withholds sovereignty from the Palestinian people will not hold and will be repudiated.

³ Hart, p. 537.

⁴ Muslih, pp. 27-28.

⁵ Andoni, "The U.S. Attacks Palestinians", p. 6.

A second principle in order to achieve a lasting peace is that both Israelis and Palestinians must be directly involved in negotiations.⁶ Even though negotiations are part of a larger multiparty framework, it is essential that Israelis and Palestinians communicate with each other directly in order to develop an understanding and an agreement that is responsive to their needs and that leads to an outcome that they will be committed to maintain.⁷

A third principle is that each party should be accorded recognition as an equal negotiating partner so that they may benefit from the highest national and international recognition that they have achieved. But the PLO was effectively left on the sidelines at the start of the Madrid peace talks and the inability of the Palestinians to win recognition as a separate delegation as the talks progressed, fostered an atmosphere of despair. Thus, an important principle is that there must be mutual recognition, and not exclusion between Israelis and Palestinians, if there is to be genuine movement towards peace.

A fourth principle is that no imposed solutions by third parties will lead to a lasting resolution of the conflict. The United States under former President Bush's administration had acknowledged that it would not impose a settlement but would be a catalyst and help to create the atmosphere if negotiation could take place.⁸ Washington had in the post Gulf War period, gradually weakened

⁶ TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP, p. 5.

⁷ Kelman "Overcoming The Barriers To Negotiation of The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", p. 17.

⁸ Reiser, p. 2.

its close identification with Israel, conciliated the Arabs with a more evenhanded policy and endeavored to entice the Palestinians into some sort of settlement.⁹ The United States has been important as a facilitator in reducing the risks and enlarging the rewards for the parties to reach agreement. But the U.S. as a third party would not impose an agreement on Israelis and Palestinians because it is important that each party work to arrive at their own solutions to which they will then be committed. Therefore, the details of an Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal should not be dictated by the United States or any outside party.

Another principle is that Israelis and Palestinians will have to work closely with Jordan, a majority of whose citizens are Palestinian, in negotiating a durable peace¹⁰ and in arriving at a solution to the occupation of the West Bank. King Hussein formally renounced his claim to the territory in 1988 but he is as interested as the Palestinians in resolving the issues.

A further principle is that informal talks as part of a prenegotiation format, which could involve problem solving workshops¹¹ and other related vehicles for

⁹ Hyland, p. 51.

¹⁰ REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP, p. 5.

¹¹ H.C. Kelman, "An International Approach To Conflict Resolution And Its Application To Israeli-Palestinian Relations", pp. 99-122.

Leonard W. Doob, "The Impact of The Fermeda Workshop On The Conflict In The Horn of Africa", INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GROUP TENSIONS 1(January-March 1971), pp. 91-101.

Leonard W. Doob, William J. Foltz & Robert B. Stevens, "The Fermeda Workshop: A Different Approach To Border Conflicts In Eastern Africa" THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 73(Nov 1969), pp. 249-266.

direct communication between politically influential representatives of the two parties, can be an important contribution to the resolution process. The evidence suggests that prenegotiation experience that involved study and discussion with opposing representatives facilitated resolution.¹² As negotiations are also taking place, the informal interaction of policy-influencing communities on both sides can promote establishment of relationships so prejudices and stereotypes can be broken down. Related to this would be the promotion of confidence-building measures such as exchanges and joint ventures that would be encouraged. Networks based on professional and other interests could cut across national boundaries and contribute to stability and integration.

Another principle relates to the importance of an economic development plan. If we assume that poverty and impoverishment breed conflict then something akin to an Arab Marshall Plan may be needed to deal structurally with economic problems and aid the Palestinians to enhance the chances of economic viability of an interim Palestinian regime. It could be organized with a peace settlement in order to ensure adequate material support for a reconstruction and development program to the occupied territories and to improve the well-being of the poor.

A final principle is that the peace process is at best a negotiating process embedded in a political process. This relates to the role of leadership in the

¹² Daniel Druckman, "Prenegotiation Experience And Dyadic Conflict Resolution In A Bargaining Situation", *JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY* 4(October, 1968), p. 367.

political process with the emphasis on the ability to leaders to adapt and avoid short-term and self-defeating policies of "no-change".

In Israel, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Shamir, efforts to move effectively toward peace were stymied. With the change of leadership to Yitzhak Rabin it seemed at first there would be a greater chance of a settlement because a specific commitment was made to bring the autonomy talks to a successful conclusion "within nine months". Although Prime Minister Rabin signalled a new openness to Palestinian aspirations it seems that it was more rhetoric and not substance. Critics have emphasized that his past record of being the "bone-breaking" defence minister, who encouraged the army to smash the intifada by naked violence indicates that his empathy for the Palestinians is no greater now than it was in the past.¹³ Therefore, doubts have been raised as to whether he is really committed to resolution of the conflict.

The atmosphere to peacemaking would be significantly improved if there was an end to all violence, revoking of the policy of deportation and collective punishment. Violence polarizes the conflict and every act of Israeli brutality in the occupied territories lends credence to the more radical militant groups like Hamas, who argue that peace with Israel is impossible.

On the issue of settlements Prime Minister Rabin seems to have reneged on his original undertaking to freeze settlement activities in the occupied

¹³ EDITORIAL, "What Are Rabin's Intentions", *MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL*, July 10, 1992, p. 2.

territories. He, however, has drawn a distinction between "political" and "security" settlements and promised to freeze the former variety; but made no promise with regard to the latter, which included areas of the Jordan valley, the Golan and "Greater Jerusalem".¹⁴ It would seem from the evidence that leadership under Prime Minister Rabin has not changed significantly from that of former Prime Minister Shamir.

One Israeli leader underlined the pressing need for Israel to find the courage to change, which would entail relinquishing the territories, setting the necessary security arrangements and negotiating on that basis. Although apprehensive about the idea of a Palestinian State, the leader argued that ruling over 1.7 million Palestinians was even more dangerous, "both we and the Arabs will have to get used to living together in a United Jerusalem, capital of Israel." It was concluded that if Israel did not find the courage to change then she would lose out on her historic opportunities and at the same time, not move one step closer to peace.¹⁵

Therefore, time is of the essence, which means that the peace process must be kept moving. Leadership at this point is critical because the forces that oppose it gain great strength and a breakdown in the peace process will lead to further radicalization of Palestinian politics in the occupied territories.

¹⁴ Kidron, "Rabin And Baker Work Towards A Deal", p. 3.

¹⁵ Teddy Kollek, "Israel Must Find The Courage To Change", THE EDMONTON JOURNAL March 29, 1992, p. A7.

CONCLUSION

A genuine peace for Israelis and Palestinians means an outcome from negotiations that meets the basic felt needs of both parties and leaves them better off and more secure than they are today and meets their minimal requirements for justice. A resolution to the conflict would require solutions that allow each party at least minimal satisfaction of its basic needs and national aspirations, rather than solutions experienced as defeat and subjugation.

The advocacy of a conciliated framework that is non-imposed based on human needs can be of central importance to conflict resolution. A conciliated framework that is non-imposed which emphasizes human needs, underlying causes, win-win solutions, stages in the negotiation process, interim arrangements and non-adversarial relationships offers a framework for peaceful change.

"Settlement" processes as evidenced in the peace plans that were outlined can be holding strategies and can lessen the likelihood that there could be a satisfactory solution for the parties in a protracted conflict. They have led to temporary solutions, or no solutions at all and have, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict failed to address the human needs of the parties to the conflict. On the other hand, a framework that is based on conciliation underlines the importance of exploration of the needs of the opposing party in order to understand their importance in arriving at solutions to conflict.

A conciliated framework for conflict resolution as part of a decision process must aid leaders in the selection of alternative futures whereby violence can be

replaced by means that are less costly and conducive to discovery of additional options and satisfactions in peaceful relations. Conflict resolution processes are effective to the extent that parties to the dispute are helped to cost the consequences of change and no change. What is needed is a language and conceptual framework that is non-adversarial - instead of revolt, insurrection, revolution and dissent, we need problem-solving, conciliation, cooperation and reconciliation. The goal of establishing good functional relationships is sought in an effort to put aside the past relationships in order to transform the overall relationship between Israelis and Palestinians.

The two peoples must find through negotiated solutions ways of coexisting harmoniously. Therefore, a multitrack approach is important combined with opportunities for informal interaction. Confidence building measures must be encouraged so that Israelis and Palestinians will learn to trust one another. But, at the same time, many at first will not be in favor of peaceful relations so some very stringent guarantees to protect the security of Palestinians and Israelis will have to be worked out.

The current peace talks that held out high hopes for a negotiated solution at the beginning have achieved limited results. There is still reason to hope, but time is running out and the forces in opposition to the peace process grow in strength every day. Thus, the continued importance of leadership at this point is critical to keep the process going.

Both Jewish and Palestinian peoples perceive themselves as nations, which means they have a variety of cultural and ethnic elements held in common, such as selective memories, language and historical experiences that are part of a national identity. Because the search for both peoples for political expression of their national identity has centered on the same territory, a denial of the share of land to either people would be experienced by them as total defeat and such an outcome would not be the basis of a stable peace. Therefore, a settlement that denies sovereignty to the Palestinian people will not hold and will be repudiated.

Resolution if not now, but in the future for the Palestinians would entail real achievement of Palestinian self-determination, which means a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state under Palestinian leadership, democratically selected without interference by Israel. Whether there is direct or indirect participation of the PLO is something for the Palestinian people to decide by free and fair elections.

We are living in an era in which freedom is increasingly indivisible, where to deprive the Palestinians of their collective identity and human rights can no longer be tolerated and is increasingly indefensible because it obstructs movement toward genuine peace in the Middle East. At a certain point it must be recognized by creative leaders that you must accommodate the enemy for there is no other way.

Palestinians claim to be heirs to a proud history and a rich heritage that will assure them of a better future. And hopefully they will achieve what the Palestinians' best known poet has stated:

"Our land, my friend, is not infertile.
Each land gives birth in due time.
And each dawn has its own DATE WITH
FREEDOM."

*Khalil Barhoum, "What Price Madrid For The Palestinians", MIDDLE EAST
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