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Historical Cycles from Missionary to Neo-liberal Evangelism: Peripheralizing Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa

by

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ABSTRACT

Africa, and black Africans in particular, have run into a number of thought-provoking policy problems in the contemporary era of neo-liberal globalization and post Cold War capitalist triumphalism. Few problems rank as high as the challenges associated with educational developments, or lack thereof. This dissertation contends that the reassertion of economic globalization and the complementary structural adjustment programs in sub-Saharan Africa has had a pernicious effect on institutionally weakened and debt-ridden national states, undermining the development of public education systems and particularly the tertiary institutions (universities). Furthermore, it will be argued that contemporary conditions in the region speak to a sustained failure of policy thinking with reference to the region and people of African descent worldwide.

By developing the macro-sociological notion of historical cycles, the dissertation delineates a materialist socio-historical reframing of the official policy discourse for the region of the world known as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It proceeds with a specific focus on the historical preconditions and circumstances surrounding the development of modern education systems. The primary assumption of the study is that the cultural artifacts of official policy documents represent the materialized afterglow of an embedded imperialist political ideology that has not served Africa and Africans well. The objective is to challenge the reigning policy discourse overwhelmingly dominated by the "managerial-entrepreneurial" perspective and to provide an alternative interpretive framework of thinking about the region's educational systems and the failing re-development industry based on corporate commercialization and pseudo-humanitarianism.

The enduring assumptions garnered from the Anglo-American centre for the sub-Saharan periphery continue to be flawed and potentially fatal in delivering the worst of two worlds: too much financial and "aid" capitalism and too little industrial capitalism. This failing agenda is compounded by the already

disarticulated preconditions - such as the peripheralized economies and the specific nature of the sub-Saharan post-colonial state -and failure of previous colonial and neo-colonial experiments. The trajectory is pregnant with unforeseeable possibilities.

The thesis explores the consequences of these failed experiments through the lens of differentiated sub-regional developments, an interrogation of official policy discourse and the objective political, social and economic manifestations for the major historical epochs under consideration: pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, and post-Cold War neo-imperialism. It will be observed that the inquiry emphasizes the continuous intrusion of imperialism in the educational expansion processes experienced across the region. Thus what is not required is yet another microanalysis or macroeconomic statistical study or mathematical deductions and projections by the World Bank because the latest models for development draw on various historical models entrenched in the cultural archive of colonialism. An important sub-assumption of this study is the Gramscian moral-ethical imperative that it is the responsibility of the emerging global intelligentsia, the *nebuleuse* (Cox 1996), to side with the interests of the most oppressed and disenfranchised people and to acknowledge and reconstruct the existing documentation as a highly problematic socio-historical cultural formation embedded with the assumptions of the privileged states, classes, "races" and cultures.

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This study embodies the influence of a variety of historical circumstances, ideas, generations of extraordinary teachers and scholars/individuals whose implicit presence throughout this study I would like to acknowledge.

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Chapter One

Problematizing the Field

A Russian child grows under the influence of his native imaginative literature: a Chinese, a Frenchman, a German or an Englishman first imbibes his national before attempting to take in other worlds. That the central taproot of his or her cultural nourishment should lie deep in his or her native soil is taken for granted. This ABC of education is followed in most societies because it is demanded by the practice and the experience of living and growing. Not so in Africa, the West Indies and the colonized world as a whole, despite the crucial role of literature and culture in making a child aware of, and rediscover his or her environment. Ngugi wa Thiongo, (1981).

This is not only a matter of school organization and curriculum. Social values are formed by family, school, and society - by the total environment in which a child develops. But it is no use our educational system stressing values and knowledge appropriate to the past or to the citizens of other countries. Julius Nyerere (1970).

I always tell them that there is no Africa of the Portuguese, nor of the French, nor of the English. There is an Africa upon which the Portuguese language was imposed at the expense of the native languages. Paulo Freire (1987).

2. Identifying the Subject and Significance of the Study

The fields of education are extensive and span many disciplinary boundaries, cultures, geographies and discourses or schools of thought. Within this enormously wide range of scholarship, the relationship between education and the wider dimensions of social change in the colonized world has stood at the center of my research interest and inquiry as a student of the sociology of international education and policy studies. Given this general academic inclination and an undergraduate political science degree as a backdrop, my Masters thesis (1994) explored the post-apartheid transitional processes and education policies of Namibia. Much was learned from that undertaking. Since there is no space to go

into details, however, I will only recall the events and observations that led me to look closer and more critically at the education systems and processes endemic in the wider sub-Saharan African region. The mode of interpretation offered here focuses less on what (content and method) is being transmitted in sub-Saharan Africa's colonial education systems and more on the socioeconomic structural processes and political purposes served by the expansion and their permutations over time.

One may certainly interrogate the expansive subject of educational systems and their practices in SSA from different epistemological, analytical and theoretical perspectives and ideological conceptions of the world we live in. Needless to say, I do not subscribe to the veracity of "pure" empirical research in this area of inquiry. My own research into the subject matter emerges from what may be formally called a diasporic African perspective, one forged in the contingencies of personal struggles/experiences, both in my formative years as a privileged child schooled in the region and later, in the context of migration, a history of activism and advanced education in Canada. It is this range of experience that has enabled me to reconstitute myself as a worker and intellectual and participate in the privileged debate over international educational and development policies that pertain to Africans in the continent and blacks in the West (via the debates on multiculturalism and so on). Positioned in Marx's analysis of history, I have often wondered why blacks gravitate towards minimum or subsistence levels of existence even in the core-advanced countries. Why are immigrants from Africa not faring well in the labor market even though they are more highly educated than the Canadian-born population? Why is there widespread illiteracy among black Africans and what is the historical relevance and contemporary purposes of higher education for Africans if it cannot even provide them gainful employment in some instances?[1] In a similar vain, why are higher education and the benefits of

[1] In the debate over the growing impoverishment of "new immigrants" in Canada, it has come to light that if immigrants who fall in this category find employment at all, the men earn "40% less than non-immigrants of similar education and work

science beyond the reach of millions of black Africans in this day and age? More curiously still, why do millions of Africans, despite the well-known resources and extensive natural wealth of the region, live such culturally abject (illiterate), technologically backward, aid-dependent and economically displaced lives both in the peripheries and centers of the globalizing world system? When looking at the state higher education institutions of the world, why are African university graduates, few and far between to begin with, increasingly compelled to migrate to the metropolitan-industrialized countries with little possibility to use their education, while "expert" foreign technicians and policy "advisers" are routinely imported to "fix" water pumps and "cure" the region's seemingly chronic economic and social policy problems?

More relevantly, one may ask, what is really the purpose of African higher education systems if they cannot produce an intelligentsia that can play a technical, organizational and directional function in these deeply troubled and impoverished societies? Clearly these are complicated issues. I must confess, however, I have found no convincing explanations or straightforward answers to the many questions that come to mind when critically contemplating the state of educational development, social change and future direction of the region. In all my reading on the subject, however, there are two unmistakable regional trends. Namely, the entire SSA's educational and development policies are falling under the domination of the World Bank-IMF institutions and the disastrous impoverishment of sub-Saharan Africans in the modern world has accelerated, particularly in the course of the last quarter century or more with the encroachment of globalization and the neo-liberal "market transformation" of societies and education systems around the world. These experiences/perceptions

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experience" and the figure grows to 44% for women. In addition, in the Greater Toronto Area alone apparently "the families of 4000 immigrants with doctoral qualifications depend on Toronto food banks" for sustenance, according to a recent article in the Globe and Mail (5, 26. 2006, Improve Immigrants' Lot, Kennedy says, Campbell M, A8.). Far too many Africans are subject to what is euphemistically known as the "immigrant success gap."

and ongoing global developments and unequal education systems and opportunities have no doubt influenced my particular interpretative approach to this wide subject matter.

As a way into the discussion, let me begin by stating what the expansive concept of "education' and the related term "educated" convey. The concept's root meaning, speaking from the etymological standpoint, is bound up with the pedagogical processes of drawing out, bringing up (socializing), cultivating minds. This is accomplished in schools by way of handing down society's culture, knowledge, tradition and values from generation to generation. Approached in this way, education involves some form of "intergenerational dissemination of culture and knowledge," a process that occurs, one way or another, in all societies. What is significant, for our purpose, is that the educational processes at issue here are the ones historically systematized by colonialism and institutionalized into state-run formal schooling systems of independent states. Consequently, when we discuss education from an international and sociological perspective, the locus of reference tends to revolve around the formal education systems and institutionalized schooling processes and practices found across the world's countries or nation states today (Abdi, 2003, 25).

Certainly, the modern history of the world's social formations and those of the formal education systems are closely interdependent. In addition, as Namibians struggled to implement universal primary education for African children in the post-apartheid era of the 1990s, it was hard to overlook the instructive historical parallels. Barely a generation ago, the newly independent states of the sub-Saharan region were addressing similar issues and struggling with the severely poor educational levels and facilities inherited from European colonialism. This parallel reinforced my awareness that the legacy of educational deprivation for indigenous Africans was, in fact, a universal condition under any "colonial situation" (Fanon, 1961). In other words, European Colonial regimes of whatever national origin are not distinguished for making education widely accessible to

native "Others" under occupation. The literature on Namibia, furthermore, opened my eyes to the destructive collusion between the state policies of "apartheid" (racial aparthood) and educational provision for indigenous Africans in this southernmost region of the continent, also known as Africa of the "Bantustans" (native-African Reserves). These connections and insights encouraged me look deeper into the broad subject matter of colonial education systems and their functions in the overall process of historical development or underdevelopment in the wider sub-Saharan African peripheries. Thus, I am led to ask, what are the historical-structural conditions and circumstances under which the colonial educational systems of the region have been imported, expanded and evolved over the centuries?

To distill the complex background of Namibia's educational history, a few details are in order. The South African apartheid state had occupied and gradually incorporated the Namibian people into its grand apartheid economic and geopolitical scheme designed for the entire Southern African sub-region. The white "supremacist" (Hooks, 1995) principles of the apartheid regime enforced strict territorial "separation" and/or "territorial segregation" between what are considered different "races" and "tribes" in the Namibian population.* After decades of conquest and domination, with the support of Western imperialist powers, the white apartheid authorities had passed the Bantu Education Act

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* The doctrinal assumptions of white supremacist discourse are universal and systemic, however, historically and context-specific they may be. Fundamentally, the doctrine represents the white (Caucasian) peoples of this world as genetically, intellectually, morally and in every way superior over "other" inferior black-African people. A major theme in the European claim to superiority lies in the legacy of Christianity and the Renaissance/Enlightenment. This claim itself is questionable. Still, their achievements served as a backdrop for justifying the doctrine and subsequent expansion of slavery and the "mission civilisatrice" of imperial Europe into every corner of the globe. Apartheid represents a specific affirmation of this doctrine of "racial' superiority. The latest reinscription of this supremacist discourse of imperialism and its implications on black-African consciousness and intellectual practices will be addressed in the concluding reflections of chapter eight. A major assumption of this study is that racism in various guises remains a major international problem.

(1953) that, among other things, accelerated the expansion of "Bantu Education" for the indigenous black African population, carved up into separate Reserves. Amidst the well-known infamies of apartheid capitalism and "crimes against humanity" perpetrated against the indigenous Africans, the least acknowledged must be apartheid's educational policies and practices. These policies were pursued ruthlessly, with western support we might add, and in the name of upholding "European civilization" in the region. The expansion of Bantu education was to contribute to this undertaking. Apartheid's educational institutions were in fact designed to stifle the mobility of Africans beyond a certain level of "Bantu civilization" limited to unskilled seasonal labor for European farms, plantations and mining industries. When confronted with the stark evidence that White supremacy and Bantu education systems were "two sides of the same coin," the "naïve" (Freire & Machedo, 1987) vision that education necessarily enhances the full development of the faculties of every individual in society began to fade quickly.

What decidedly struck me during the research process and intellectual journey, as it were, was the rigorous racial configuration of the educational facilities, systems of finance, administrative structures, syllabus, expectations and policies put in place by the apartheid state. There is universal, free and compulsory education of the highest standard for the white community. The educational policy for Africans, on the other hand, was designed to restrict the physical and mental horizon and expectations of Africans to level of certain forms of unskilled and menial forms of labor. When commenting about the "academic ceiling" imposed on African children by the state, a former Minister of the apartheid system revealingly asked "who will do the manual labour, if you give the Natives an academic education?" (La Guma, 1971, p.46). Clearly, the squalid "Bantustan" Reserves existed as zones or "reservoirs" for mobilizing a disenfranchised, cheap, unskilled labor force, necessary to satisfy the material comfort and dominance of the Boer settlers and, of course, to safeguard the development of international capitalism and white civilization in the region. In this grand apartheid scheme, so-

called Bantu education systems were organized to strengthen and reproduce the historical structural underpinnings of capitalist production/accumulation processes on a world scale, while legitimizing the supremacist ideological and cultural practices of the region's apartheid state. It occurred to me that after sacrificing so much to physically eject the colonialist oppressors from power through bloody "national liberation" struggle, the material circumstances and subjective dimensions established by apartheid's educational policies will continue to occupy the independent Namibian Republic for a long time to come.

The experience and insight gained from that inquiry has prompted me to reconsider the sociological dynamics and policy objectives of educational systems and universities in the wider region of the world system, generally referred to as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). After all, the basic economic, social, political and cultural/educational infrastructures of most SSA societies were woven out of imperialist acquisitions and under colonial historical conditions in which the land, resources, national cultures and labor power of the colonized are appropriated from the pre-capitalist agricultural formations and subjected to the forces of expanding capitalism and the cultural supremacy of the colonizing powers. There is no doubt that capital accumulation and colonial educational expansion interact structurally and historically but, in what ways did the imperial educational policies pursued in other non-apartheid/-Bantustan formations of the region differ from those encountered in the Southern African complex?

Given this background and interest, the major issues addressed in this dissertation revolve around how and under what historical and structural conditions sub-Saharan Africa's education systems have evolved and where the region's universities are heading in the contemporary era of globalization. Situating myself within the larger debate concerning the contemporary state of the region, I will argue that a greater part of the region's contemporary crisis must be sought in the wider imperial history and the region's social and educational developments, rather than in individual countries' schools and higher education systems. I expect

a careful reading of the historical dynamics of the region's political economy, educational philosophies and policy discourses, particularly in the higher education sphere, to provide an important barometer of the region's prospects in the new knowledge-based economy (NKE) associated closely with the onset of globalization. In other words, I am suggesting that the policy initiatives at the higher education (HE) level constitute important indicators of where SSA societies, as a whole, might be heading in the new "globalized-transnationalized" division of labor in the foreseeable future.

Right away, this term "SSA" is problematic, in so far as it refers to multiple and diverse countries, cultures and peoples distinguished only by their alleged "race." This is a product of a particular history, itself saturated with imperial historiography and points to a larger imperialist discourse critics have identified as "Africanism' or "Africanist." This specialized discursive field involves "a systemic language" coded words and vocabulary for dealing with and studying black Africa "for the West" (Said, 1994, p.193). Similar to the doctrinal field of "Orientalism" it was developed and popularized by European explorers/politicians and further entrenched by colonial-imperial policy-makers. In time, it came to authoritatively refer to an indeterminate geographic space in the continent, one inhabited predominantly by black Africans as opposed to Arab Africans. This tradition of scholarship continues, in reinscribed forms, with all the important institutions (The World Bank, IMF, UNESCO and so on) deeply involved in the region's travails. Without embracing the term fully, I suggest it is still an indispensable category for grappling with a series of contentious issues related to the sedimentation of imperial racism that permeates "official" perceptions and policy discourses on the region. Attachment to the "pseudo-concept" of race, as we shall see later on, has limiting implications for the articulation of viable educational and development polices for the racialized region, as it were.

The suggestive reframing proposed here recognizes that the relationship between education systems and society occurs under the sway of imperialism. In addition,

the provision of formal education for Africans has served as a major vehicle for the expansion of state rule, both of the colonial and post-colonial type, well until the onset of globalization. The mounting pressures of neo-liberal policies sought to increasingly deregulate and privatize the national systems of state-subsidized education systems. These policies have, as we shall see, led to the destruction of public education systems and the emergence of private schooling and universities. The reform takes place in "partnerships" between the mediating elites of SSA, transnational organizations, government and non-government organizations (NGOs) and the corporate world. External forces preponderate in the contemporary re-organization and management of educational policies and opportunities available in SSA. These new "reform" trends pursued under the rubric of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) are at the core of the major changes that are reshaping the devastated sub-Saharan political economic and educational landscape.

As mentioned earlier, the phenomena of education may be interrogated from various discursive principles and theoretical commitments. The approach advanced here is rooted in personal experiences/commitments to African and human freedom on a global scale and draws from the theoretical principles and analytical insights developed by what are known as critical sociologists of education (Bourdieu, Althusser, Apple, Carnoy, among others) also known as "reproductive" discourse of education. The other strand of influence comes from the analysts of imperialism and culture (Fanon, Cabral, Said, Ngugi, among other). Considered from this combined perspective of "reproduction" and the realities of empire and global economic and power relations, education systems cannot be viewed as neutral, color-blind, apolitical or benign liberal institutions that produce equal opportunities and deliver meritocratic results to all pupils, regardless of race or color as it were. From the point of view of imperialism, the educational systems and practices at issue are seen as crucial ideological and cultural elements in the state apparatus of nations and leading institutions in the reproduction of the existing international division of labor and global inequalities.

In other words, the education systems that emerged in SSA are better conceived as complex "historical-cultural" constructions that constitute "the stakes and instruments" of world-historic struggles between the hegemonic colonizer capitalist nations of the metropolitan core and colonized peoples of the preripheries.

Seen from this international and long-term "reproductive" macro-sociological point of view, the expansion of formal education in the region has undergone four major, defining and, in my view, historically significant cycles of expansion. They are, in shorthand, the "Missionary," "Colonial," "Bandung," and "Globalized" cycles of educational expansion. The formation of these coexisting and overlapping cycles of educational expansion corresponds to changes in the underlying capitalist world system (in the relations of production) and the reigning policies of imperialism towards the region. I will attempt to elucidate these connections in more theoretical depth to obtain a clearer historical materialist interpretation of the educational problems and issues under consideration.

In differing proportions, the nations and societies in the region have been shaped by the centuries-long impact of capitalist slavery and colonialism. In our own era of globalization, direct enslavement or political subjugation of African "natives" via colonialism may have ended, but to recall Said (1993,9) in *Culture and Imperialism*, imperialism "lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices" of the colonized peoples of the so-called Third World nations. To use Gramscian language, the region's modern education systems represent Euro-American cultural "outward radiation" in its most organized and institutionalized form. The key point to underline here is the manifestly subjugating and "imperializing" history of the region's imported formal education systems and schooling practices, a feature that distinguish them from the "organic" schools developed in metropolitan countries of the North. These fundamental assumptions

and premises will be more thoroughly fleshed out and explored while detailing the four significant cycles of expansion within the political economic and sociological tradition of historical materialism,

Explicitly stated, the thesis of this study holds that the expansion of modern education systems of sub-Saharan Africa is closely bound up with the worldwide extension of capitalist imperialism and the successive foreign policy interests of dominant European powers, imperial ruling classes and mediating or "comprador' native African elites. These interests may be complementary or conflictive depending on the historical period and cycle under consideration. In the end, the colonial education systems form part of the central problematic in the region's contemporary social and economic regression or ongoing peripheralization, as we prefer to refer to the particular phenomenon.

An underlying trans-historical reality for this thesis, one often undertheorized by mainstream policy analysts, concerns the original "foreignness" of the schooling systems. In other words, the organization and content of the teaching and learning process in these colonial institutions is not "organic" to the native African soil and culture, to use Ngugi's metaphors. Their Eurocentric construction and transmissions do not reinforce the cultural-linguistic self-awareness of the African youth, or strengthen what Kwame Nkrumah has referred to as "the African personality." Those prefaced in the quotations above and other critical African educators who have looked at the internal relations in these institutions, have charged that colonial educational institutions are incompatible with the objective practice and experience of productively living, growing and working in African villages, where the great majority of Africans must produce its livelihood. As Nyerere portrays the colonial educational practices in Tanzania, "there is nothing in our existing educational system which suggests to the pupil that he (she) can learn important things about farming from his (her) elders" or the surrounding communities, often despised as ignorant and cast as "uneducated." He might as well have spoken for the wider region's existing education systems. Almost

without exception, the region's transmissions fail to foster adequate and effective knowledge of local cultures, available resources-raw-materials, or the attributes of indigenous staples, medicines or plants necessary for local use. Thus, in contrast to the educational realities of the Russian, American or German child, Africa's post-colonial education systems and their cultural transmissions remained dangerously disengaged from the everyday lived experience, indigenous culture, language and identity of the African child. In short, the education and knowledge Africans receive does not seem to enable mastery over their immediate natural environment, production processes and social conditions and thereby become subjects of their own historical development.

To paraphrase Achebe's memorable observations on the subject of colonial education systems and practices, their transmissions force Africans to bear the impossible burden of living another experience, assuming another culture, language and identity. Under the existing education systems, it is estimated that the vast majority of students enrolled in the wider SSA region's schools tend to "drop out" before completing four years of basic education. In effect, they become deskilled as far as their immediate community's productive needs and challenges are concerned. Moreover, this gulf (disconnect) between the "lived experience" material and cultural needs of the SSA communities and the "formal curriculum" and knowledge transmitted in the context of formal schooling becomes, I would argue, even more pronounced at the highest level of the region's educational system i.e., the universities. In the end, the educational legacy of imperialism has proved devastating to the region's human development and frustrated the people's post-colonial economic and political aspirations for a half-century. Herein lies the seed of the multiplying crises bedeviling the "human subjects" social formations and education systems of the region concerned.

What stands out for our purposes is that the postcolonial educational systems of the region have changed very little since the days of colonialism. Notwithstanding the bitter anti-colonial resistance struggles and hard-won political independence

in the 1960s, the language or medium of school instruction continued to be that of the erstwhile "mother country." Despite some personnel reshuffle witnessed after independence, the basis of Africa's primary school education is still the preparation/selection of pupils for secondary schools and the basis of the latter is preparation/selection for university entrance and, among these, those destined for continuing specialized/advanced forms of "higher education" overseas. It is also still the case where "the higher the educational qualification, the higher the status and opportunities for top level employment, an overseas education being rated the highest qualification of all" (Nkrumah, 68, 1970). These Eurocentric values and hierarchies are still pervasive.

More often than not, the higher the levels of African education achieved by students, the less relevance the graduate's skills tend to have to the life conditions and challenges facing their communities and countries of origin. To acquire insight into the seriousness and systemic nature of this legacy of "brain drain," let us briefly touch on the case of Kenya. The country is beset by multiple problems associated with the modern problems of poverty and where less than half the population is estimated to have access to safe drinking water. Yet approximately 90% of the 6000 skilled physicians educated annually in Kenya's public hospitals leave the country routinely, thereby joining the estimated 77,000 African professionals known to migrate annually from the region to the more developed and industrialized countries. African nurses, teachers, degreed public servants and entire "educated" classes are migrating en masse in search of employment opportunities and more hopeful future overseas. The illustrative case of Kenya merely offers a useful microcosm for entering the wider debate on "brain drain" and the general educational and human resource/capital challenges facing the region as a whole. I fear that if the present course should continue, the crisis-ridden African public universities may well become an irrelevant burden to the impoverished, terrorized and aid-dependent SSA societies and national social formations.

The major question for us, however, remains. Why are African university students, educated at great public cost, not receiving the kind of postsecondary education needed to tackle their communities' glaring economic and social and health needs and set their stagnant productive forces in motion? Notably during the era of globalization, as mentioned above, the region has grown synonymous with poverty and hopelessness, a "sick patient" of the international community and disaster relief/emergency workers. What is curious is that this decline happened in the course of the unprecedented production of global wealth and spectacular advances in science and technology over the last quarter of a century. At the same time and notwithstanding the torrent of official policy discourses about "sustainable development " or "capacity building" and "fighting poverty," African productivity and standards of living continued to plummet to the levels of the 1960s, while the region's share of world trade has dwindled to around 2% today. In a technology-driven and knowledge-intensive world of capitalist production, SSA's agricultural production is still being carried out on the backs of oxen and its populations still live at the mercy of the capricious natural elements and swarming locusts. The miserable condition of the region's inhabitants is echoed across borders. Consequently, outright starvation, HIV-AIDS and malaria pandemic, natural disasters and/or civil conflict are known to kill "a child every three seconds" and average regional life expectancy has dwindled to less than fifty years and is falling lower still. Also with deepening poverty, the region's imperial subservience and dependency at all levels has dramatically increased with the spread of neo-liberal economic discourse in social and educational policy-making around the world. It is truly humbling to think that at the time of independence in 1957, Ghana boasted a comparable standard of living with South Korea/Malaysia! In short, current circumstances in the region cry out for more plausible explanations.

Connected with this precipitous decline, the wider debate on the region has also shifted. In past decades, the universal topic of discussion about the region was its potential for "development" through the expansion of, amongst other things,

education opportunities for Africans. Today any discussion on the subject tends to revolve around the crisis of its extreme impoverishment, AIDS, political instability, corruption and unmanageable indebtedness. This poses a challenge to social scientist and economists influenced by the dominant "Human Capital Theory" discourse on educational development. They have long asserted, for half a century at least, the idea that the economic capabilities of people and nations are not racially determined, inbred or inherited but rather predominantly acquired through expanding the opportunities of education. According to this perspective, investment in the expansion of formal education systems is commonly associated with raising the productivity of society's labor forces (workforce) and stimulating "national" economic "development." Thus, expansion of educational opportunities was expected to lead to social and economic development and towards more demands for freedom from the arbitrary powers of the "authoritarian" states that drove the "Bandung" cycle of educational expansion. The problem is that despite significant state-led growth of schools and universities in the 1960s and 1970s, constructive and sustainable social, political and economic development has not been discernible throughout sub-Saharan Africa for a long time. After decades of "development" work and investment in education, sub-Saharan Africa represents the poorest and most underdeveloped and indebted region in the world, It is a region where over 30% of the world's out-of-school children live amid extremely cruel forms of poverty and enforced ignorance, commonly known as illiteracy. What is more, this widespread inability "to read the word and the world" (Freire) exists amidst new possibilities for satellite-based basic and higher education sites and at a time when the right to basic education "compulsory and available free to all" is considered a fundamental human right.

Finally, amidst all the momentous changes wrought by recent history, it is still a world of conflict between those who possess the world and the word and "Others" who merely have the use of both, to echo Freire and Sartre's opening sentences in the preface to Fanon's classic work *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). It is ironic

that the present generation of Africans lives under more impoverished, harsher and crueler Hobbesian conditions than the previous one, a generation that paid scant attention to human rights, democracy or the market-based structural adjustment policies (SAPs) imposed by the forces of globalization. How then do we account for these developments?

Naturally, opinions vary and the so called "root causes" of African regression. From the perspective of the dominant G 7 policymakers, represented at the peak by Wolfensohn and Wolfowitz, former and present presidents of the World Bank respectively, the crux of the region's problem flows from bad or "predatory governance" fueled by pervasive "corruption" and bad leadership. These factors account for the blight of the region rather than the customary suspects i.e., the "exploitative" trade and aid policies pursued by "rich" nations, according to the eminent Harvard scholar Jeffrey Sachs (special adviser to the UN on Millennium Development Goals) in his recent work on the region The End of Poverty (5. 14, 2005). According to this dominant narrative, the obstacles to "development" are largely internal and deeply rooted in the widespread corruption of the unaccountable native post-colonial leadership that has "betrayed" and squandered the hopes and resources of the African people. The donors are, on the other hand, seeking solutions. Thus, by reducing this massive "corruption" and providing aid to the sum of "$135-billion to $195-billion U.S. per year from 2005 to 2015" and allowing the near-mythical "market forces" to operate more freely, Sachs argues that sub-Saharan Africa can once again be set on a dramatic path to reducing poverty and towards "sustainable development." In this "authoritative" policy design, the necessary "poverty alleviation" resources would come from overseas development assistance or as aid from the G7 countries in the form of 0.5% of their GDP and debt alleviation concessions. This figure contrasts with the 0.7% of the GDP [the so-called "European model"] recently suggested by the Blair's Commission on Africa. Incidentally, this is a tired (Big Push) idea proposed some thirty years ago by the Pearson Commission and never heeded by the leading powers and "donors" including Canada and Washington.

In line with the remarks above, I suggest that the multiple challenges associated with the region's poverty cannot be overcome with more aid or a paternalistic policy of "charity," whatever the amount promised and delivered. This is another band-aid and "feel good" approach that leads to nowhere, although it has beknighted Sir Bob Geldof and immensely enriched the West's "Lords of Poverty" (Hancock's term, 1989). To be sure, international political decisions of this enormity are rarely shaped by altruism. More importantly, the first "Live Aid" gala and NGO-cum -celebrity-driven fun- raising for the "great" Ethiopian famine of 1985 has not led to any significant alleviation of poverty or aversion of the ever-present threat of famine to the Ethiopian masses. It merely institutionalized international emergency response protocols and mechanisms and routinized begging by "recipients" as another means of supplying food to the public. Whole communities meet their nutritional requirement through "food" aid. Meanwhile fertile lands owned by the state remain fallow and await "foreign investors." The whole "donor" discourse assumes scarcity of capital to be the root cause of the region's problems rather than a consequence of the historic process of exploitation, dependency and ongoing peripheralization.

The paradoxes are striking. The whole jargon-blighted discourse of "international development" in the present era has not only reached a theoretical and practical "impasse" but is riddled with demagogic euphemisms and what Churchill famously referred to as "terminological inexactitudes." The dominant discourse lacks historical depth, disparages indigenous knowledge/skills and is grounded on "pathologizing" the region's widespread poverty and "externalizing-philanthropizing" its solutions. The current Geldof-Bono "make poverty history" campaign is the ultimate expression of this Core-led and philanthropic approach to historical human development in the region. It ultimately demeans the people of Africa as helpless and passive victims of their own corrupt and murderous leadership. As ever, Africans are projected as helpless and ever in need of Western help or that of the "international community." This is only part of the

approach. Blair's more recent crusading discourse about Africa being a "scar" on the conscious of the world, finally frames African development as an issue of conscience clearing by the West, abandoning any historical and reasoned approach to understanding and alleviating the region's deteriorating conditions and human progress. In my view, the region's vulnerability and poverty today expresses less a "humanitarian" failing of the West and is more a product of intended and unintended policy implementations attending the region's incorporation into the world of nations and international division of labor.

To reiterate the core argument of this thesis, the principal problems of the region are rooted in the educational legacies and policies of imperialism as much as in objective economic and political conditions and relations that link the region with the rest of the world system. In other words, the region's poverty is as much a consequence of exploitative economic relations as it is of successive educational and social policy discourses that tend to reinforce the West's hegemonic control, cognitive subjugation and economic peripheralization of the region's social formations. Increasingly, there is a huge disconnect between the global challenges Africans face in the contemporary world and the social, political and educational institutions and policies to confront them.

To look more systematically into the major theoretical issues, contradictions, assumptions and historical trends sketched out in this introduction to the study, the structure of the inquiry will be organized along a combination of chronological and thematic lines and presented in the following manner.

After introducing the subject and significance of the study, the first chapter starts out by exploring the overall extent and scope of the educational problem of the region in more detail and poses some major questions for more focused analytical exploration and discussion. Based on this background, the second part of this opening section makes a case for a suggestive reframing of the historical and developmental trajectory of sub-Saharan Africa, as a prelude to dissecting the

process of educational expansion and reforms in the light of world systemic thinking and political economy. This repositioning, we might add, involves a major reconceptualization of the traditional conception of the role and function of education in the colonized world.

In line with this challenge, the second chapter argues for the application of the philosophical categories and conceptual principles of world-systemic thinking and neo-Gramscian critical educational research to the subject. The section proceeds to discuss crucial conceptual categories relevant to the study and establishes analytical distinctions between the dominant discourse of integration and the concepts of peripherality vs marginality while it introduces the issues and processes related to incorporation and peripheralization. The section then moves towards synthesizing the various theoretical and conceptual principles necessary for a historical materialist grounded approach to the complex series of challenges under consideration. In this section, the (heuristic) notion of the cyclicity of educational expansion and incorporation of the region into the expanding capitalist world system will be addressed with more evidential and theoretical rigor.

Drawing on these principles and assumptions, the third chapter starts out by briefly outlining the state of indigenous pre-colonial education systems in the region prior to its encounter with the expansive forces of Western capitalism. This section will proceed to elaborate the educational significance and impact of Atlantic slavery and Europe's Christian missions, the two structural and institutional pillars that drove the first cycle of educational expansion. Discussion will focus on the causations and subtleties of what I have called the "Missionary" and "Colonial" cycles of educational expansion into the region.

In light of this background, the fourth chapter looks at the processes and issues surrounding decolonization and neocolonialism i.e., the driving forces and agencies behind the emergence of the anti-colonial African nationalist movements

and the "Bandung cycle" of educational expansion that exploded across the region. This extensive state-led cycle of expansion gave rise to a "cult" of formal education that fetishized enrollment numbers and the acquisition/granting of more credentials or diplomas rather than aligning the growing education systems to the needs and interests of the emerging economies and nations. As a result, neo-colonialism took hold at all levels. This section also discusses the multilateralization of so-called development economics/studies during the earlier Cold War years and the growing authority assumed by rising US domination and the Bretton Woods multilateral organizations over international policies and finances related to national educational expansion and the overall "development/modernization" and "nation-building" agenda of the new states.

At this point, the fifth chapter will focus on the historic origins and expansion of higher-tertiary education, particularly "colleges" intended to "serve colonial territories" during the immediate post-World War ll years. The section will then proceed to explore, in more detail, the crises gathering around the region's rapidly expanding national public university systems during the post-colonial period or when the state-led "Bandung" cycle of educational expansion, exceeding that of "Southeast Asia and South Asia" in educational investment, was in full swing.

Focusing on the present trajectory, chapter six will discuss the main issues surrounding globalization and the attendant rise and dominance of transnational forces, trends, discourses and practices in education policy thinking with regards to sub-Saharan Africa. Against the setting of this new "globalized-transnationalized" world, the section discusses thematically the crisis of the postcolonial states of the region, the growing debt-bondage and the emergent neo-liberal policy priority for the expansion of primary over tertiary levels of education. The new policy directions were rationalized in terms of augmenting the comparative advantage of the region. This market-oriented and economic rationalization constitutes the hallmark of what I describe as the "globalized" cycle of educational expansion and reforms, showcased at the world conference

on education for all in Jomtien, Thailand 1991 and, lately, re-affirmed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Chapter seven discusses the emerging challenges for universities in the era of transnationalized processes of production and the rise of knowledge-intensive flexible accumulation of capital and wealth on a "borderless" scale. Taking these defining developments into consideration, the section looks at the emergence and policy ramifications of the DAE (Development of African Education) and WGHE (Working Group on Higher Education). The section continues to discuss the crystallization of the dominant neo-liberal policy vision for the region's universities and, in this light, evaluates the proposed transition towards the so-called "proactive" university and the emergence of the African Virtual University (AVU). The study will close with some concluding remarks.

By way of concluding thoughts chapter eight re-examines the cycles of educational expansion in the Gramscian hegemonic frame and queries the policy wisdom and humanity of imposing neo-liberal market-based SAPs in social formations where the education field and capitalist markets are minimally developed. The second part moves to consider the educational elaboration and "compradorist" functions and dilemma of native colonial and neocolonial intellectuals. With advances in corporate globalization and SAP, social "reforms" in the region have become the domain of a highly specialized and infallible/unaccountable techno-managerial elite cadre structure operating out of the World Bank. Correspondingly too, the challenges of democracy, "poverty" and "illiteracy" are becoming depoliticized and administrative to be micromanaged from afar, compounding the rising currents of powerlessness and resistance throughout the region.

3. Mapping the Extent and Scope of the Problem

Massive poverty and obscene inequality are such terrible scourges of our times ...that they have to rank alongside slavery and apartheid as social evils (Mandela 2.4. 2005)

The dominant neo-liberal narrative that the brave new world of globalization, with its borderless and deregulated "free" markets, will offer the world and "everyone" opportunities for enormous economic growth and development stands radically denounced by events and "facts" in SSA. Instead, the opposite process of social disintegration, political fragmentation and economic decline appears to have taken hold during the decades of neo-liberally-conditioned policy initiatives. In terms of the existing state of educational crises in sub-Saharan Africa, the data indicate some disquieting trends. As the lead institution for researching and promoting international education, UNESCO reiterates the extent of problem in a straightforward and comparative manner. Namely, "almost all of the out-of-school children live in developing countries, and most (73 per cent) live in sub-Saharan Africa (46 million)(http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php). In other words, sub-Saharan Africans are educationally in worse shape than people in other "developing" regions. Given the mutual interdependence between production and educational development, it is not surprising that they are also economically worse off than any other region of the world.

In a related trend, a recent study by the International Labor Organization (ILO) indicates more than one in five young people across the continent are out of work (Plaut, 2004, BBC). These data provide a picture of the extent to which illiteracy, unemployment, among other deprivations, plague the region, as a whole. They provide a snapshot of the wasted minds and labor power that inhabit the region. Clearly, widespread illiteracy and severe suffering and economic regression among Africans appear to have accompanied the spread of neo-liberal globalization in recent decades. What is known as "massification" of even primary public schooling has not been realized in any SSA country. We need to inquire into why this colonial-minded "neglect" and abuse of the region's "human

capital" persists despite neo-liberal evocations of "sustainable development" and "capacity building."

Failures in education policy started long before the onset of globalization. To be sure, the region's post-independence leaders had set a target for "100% primary school attendance by 1980" (Hughes, 49) at the **Addis Ababa Conference of 1961**. This extremely optimistic educational goalpost has been missed, moved and revised several times since 1980. A central objective of the recent Millennium Development goal or MDG, for instance, is to reduce poverty by half and to achieve universal primary education by 2015, thus reinscribing the Education For All "Jomtien" agenda of 1991. We are interested in finding out what historical circumstances, social forces and policy discourses are responsible for this condition.

Overall state of public education in the region is in disarray. The existing infrastructures of public education are in a state of penury and with budgetary support and "conditionality' from overseas funding sources. In as far as public education exists, it is for the most part sub-standard. That is, the majority of African children never attends schools or may leave them without having touched or seen a computer terminal. Needless to say, entering the competitive 21st century, the widespread illiteracy, unemployment and limited educational capacities have surfaced as serious problems for the region's progress and human development. Moreover, the current neo-liberal market reforms are exacerbating the problem internally as well as "the gap between education rich and education poor regions and states" thereby magnifying the existing educational deprivation and economic and technological limitations of the latter. By the standards of the prestigious World Economic Forum, the region's countries consistently rank low in the Networked Readiness Index, considered a major instrument for measuring a country's Global Information Technology Connectivity in the era of the NKE. Whatever the yardstick, the digital divide, which is at bottom an educational divide, is widening and the scope of the problem is regional. In this complex and

globalized world, the OECD countries, with barely 19 percent of the global population, have 91 per cent of Internet users and information access. This desolate international educational and economic landscape is a growing social and economic "time bomb" for all concerned. How to overcome this widening economic and technological gap in this shrinking and highly competitive "global village" of ours is a major educational challenge to all educators and policy-makers involved in the fate of the SSA region.

Also, compounding the region's peripheral and stagnant socioeconomic situation, we find that the higher levels of skills needed to compete in today's global knowledge-driven market economy are severely limited. Similarly, science and research or S & R development, so vital for competing in the NKE, appears to be stunted across SSA. The region's tertiary level has very limited capacity to produce post-secondary level graduates. Its gross enrollment ration (GER) is, by World Bank (2003) estimates, a mere 4% of the population, with "a regional average of 339 students per 100,000 persons." Evidently, in the sub-Saharan context publicly-funded higher education remains the privilege of a small minority whose members, as we have noted in the introduction, are likely to migrate to the core countries for employment opportunities that rarely exist in the region. Given this reality, we need to inquire into how the region's universities are responding to the neo-liberal policies of deep re-structuring of the public sector and the overall "drift of universities to market economy" (Pannu, Plumb, Schugurensky, 1992) that is taking place world-wide at present. This is where supranational organizations, including the World Bank and the IMF and a host of international non-government organizations (INGOs) and investors have all but usurped the policy-making prerogatives of the highly indebted and severely impoverished African nation states. Indeed, the fragile sub-Saharan peripheral state apparatus and its ruling stratum survive largely at the discretion of official bilateral and multilateral assistance from the core, the international banking, lending and financial institutions (IFIs) and the Bretton Woods institutions (BWI).

Much has been said and written about the impact of globalization on societies and education reforms in general. As Sussmuth (2002, 318) rightly emphasizes, the ascent of neo-liberal market-driven challenge of "globalization is seen as one of the most important survival issues of the 21st Century." No area of society is immune to its effects, "not least the education sector." Thus the importance of analyzing and understanding recent trends in the region's higher education reform in the context of globalization, a process which is changing the meaning of employment and the production of wealth across societies, rich or poor. It is worth questioning what lessons may be drawn from the core-Western experience.

Following Urmetzer (1999, 21) it is important to note that the standard "official" definition for what "globalization" is (increased integration/interdependence), according to influential transnational organizations like the IMF, happens to be "identical to the one used by political economists to show what globalization is not." Globalization, conceived political-economically, refers to the globalized expansion of capital and ascendance of the new Post-Fordist knowledge economy, a historic transition that has brought into the foreground the increased fragmentation and dependence of peripheral societies and universities in the contemporary era. Certain dominant educational thinkers in the field highlight the emergent convergence in certain policy areas of international education. This is because the structural imperatives and processes of economic globalization tend to demand certain "mandatory adjustments" in each and every country's education systems. In Heyneman's (1998, 67) view, since the "cold war rivalry ended," the world's growing economic interdependence has brought on, amongst other things, a "common vision for educational excellence" applicable to all education systems around the world. In this dominant vision "standards for performance of an education system do not differ systematically between Ghana and Georgia," in so far as notions of international accountability ("standardization and competition") are increasingly replacing national standards and restricted boundaries. Extending this theme further, Altbach (2004) speaks of the "emergence of a global education marketplace" combined with the movement of

professional human resources, skills and talents around the "borderless" world. Thus, as the regulatory arrangements and legal framework of the WTO and GATS proposals seek to establish "open markets" on knowledge and education products and services, they tend to carry a host of negative implications for peripheral countries still dependent on the exploitation of cheap labor, debts and the ongoing extraction of more raw materials for mere economic sustenance.

From our perspective, these issues are steeped in what Amin (1997) refers to as the "great divide" in the new "dimensions of polarization" and disparity between the industrialized centre and non-industrialized peripheral regions. This divide needs to be sufficiently acknowledged in any analysis of education that goes beyond the national and "developmental" perspective of the past. In the developmental mode of thought the peripheries are presumed to be increasingly integrating and gradually "catching up" to the core industrialized countries. It is often lost sight of that in this great divide, the latter are inheriting pre-industrial era "material" production techniques and relations of production increasingly anachronistic to the NKE. The latter relies primarily on knowledge or a highly-educated and skilled labor force from around the world to propagate itself. The present education-knowledge disparity spanning the North-South divide threatens to leave almost entire nations as a labor reserve for the core countries. Evidently, countries of the South-peripheries, are finding it more and more burdensome to keep up with the relentless technological/communications advancements necessary to negotiate this "adjustment" to the knowledge-intensive international economy, much less to compete successfully in it. Thus, with the spread of globalization, the world of centers and peripheries is growing more separated, apart and unequal and sub-Saharan Africa's grinding poverty and underdevelopment has emerged as a pivotal policy challenge to world leaders and the vast Washington-based transnational bureaucracies (Bretton Woods Institutions) concerned with world development issues since the end of World War II.

In this globalizing and polarizing world, the greatest challenge and threat of being "excluded" or falling below the standards set by the metropolitan powers belongs to those regions of the world poorly educated or with "under/unqualified" human resources. Nation-states in this broad category are unable to take advantage of the new demands for advanced skills, digital technology and innovation and a vast array of market-led educational opportunities spawned by the NKE. Stated otherwise, those countries standing on the lower levels of the international "education index" also tend to have a low proportion of post-secondary educated labor force, exhibit low social productivity in terms of "output per worker" (31, 2002) and appear to exist more and more on the margins of the NKE capitalist production and consumption loop. This raises various questions related to the basic dilemma of how to interpret and understand recent neo-liberal and "market-driven" educational restructuring policies imposed on the sub-Saharan African peripheries.

The educational crisis is comprehensive, that is, it begins at the primary level and spans the continuum to the tertiary sphere. Also, it should be remembered that the expansion of university-level educational opportunities in the region is quite recent as far as historical development is concerned. It is a process that began with the late colonial period and one that assumed a policy priority in the post-colonial or "Bandung" cycle of educational expansion. Higher education for Africans was actively discouraged, outright denied or "neglected" by the colonial authorities, well into the 1940s. In the case of the Portuguese colonies of SSA, this "neglect" lasted until independence in the early 1970s (Boahen, 1987, p. 106). In other words, the expansion of post-secondary public education systems and opportunities, limited as they were, was primarily a product of the state-driven post-independence expansionary cycle. After a generation of expansion SSA had the lowest post-secondary participation in the world, placing the region in a severely disadvantaged position vis a vis its competitors and the demands of the new knowledge-intensive global economy.

Considered in the wider context of the changing contemporary "global realities" SSA's public schools, vocational and academic institutions/communities are increasingly under siege both from their own inertia and decline as well as from international "market" and policy pressures, originating in the "donor" cores and the transnational Bretton Woods organizations. Comparisons of "annual per student costs in higher education" conducted by the World Bank and others (Hinchliffe, 1987, p. 79) found higher education in Africa to be a "very high cost activity" of manpower development. Calculated in United States currency, the cost per student is estimated to be comparable and similar to those in "developed" countries. Hinchliffe writes: "In some African countries, however, the costs are well above particularly in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Botswana while in others such as Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia they are much lower." More importantly, what is called the "absolute cost" of higher educational institutions in the region "excelled those of Asia and Latin America." In addition, there is hardly any community or sub-region of Sub-Saharan Africa, which is not suffering from the aftermath of socio-political and structural "adjustment" policies (SAPs), which have devastated a greater part of the region's meager public-educational and socioeconomic infrastructure. Meanwhile, the cost of attending higher education keeps climbing and stands well beyond the reach of the vast majority of Africans.

As elsewhere in the globalizing world, state funding devoted to public education began to stagnate for the region as a whole beginning in the 1980s (Delors, p. 96). In the face of rising educational costs and diminishing social returns, at least for African graduates, it was becoming harder to justify the provision of what was a state subsidized national university education for a few. By the 1990s what Tedesco (1998, p. 84) refers to as "denationalization as a strategy for educational change" had arrived at the higher levels of education. The neo-liberal encouragement of private investment at this level had begun to pose a challenge to the national universities. Foreign academic institutions and religious establishments began founding "private" academic institutions, "satellite universities" and "twinning" opportunities, offering considerable benefits to

students and, needless to say, stiff competition to the declining public university systems of the region. Increasingly too, private and denominational universities have begun setting up higher educational institutions in the region, drawing students from the established national universities. Incidentally, the new private universities' academic staff grew by cannibalizing the scarce and underpaid talents of the crisis-ridden national universities.

Clearly, the SSA states' educational institutions are in the grip of a crisis that goes beyond the obvious "mismanagement" or budgetary "dollars and cents" issues. There are frequent violent strikes and closures of higher education institutions across the region. The neo-liberal educational reform process lacks any form of popular mandate from the students and the region's populations concerned. The recent case of violent student demonstrations in normally peaceful Tanzania is illustrative of this growing trend of resistance toward the authorities implementing it from the top-down, as it were. The contradictions unfolding in the region's universities strike at the core of the credibility and sustainability of Africa's public educational institutions and particularly those of higher learning, research and science.

From its inception, public university education with boarding room was available at very little direct cost to students in Tanzania, as elsewhere in the region. This is gradually changing, however, as part of the dynamics of the neo-liberal reform processes imposed on the region. Students across the region are resisting the initiative of "cost-sharing" or "cost-recovery" policy which, incidentally, underpins many of the tertiary education reforms proposed by the transnational Bretton Woods Institutions or BWI. As a World Bank document (January 20, 2003) makes it clear, "the cost-sharing initiative is an important precedent in light of the projected budgetary shortfalls" in the public education systems. The same "market-based" neo-liberal policy rationale prevails in different national contexts and circumstances. As cost-sharing policies are making headway, particularly in Anglophone countries, students inevitably resist and demonstrate against them. In

Tanzania's case, the recent protests and clashes between police and students and closure of the university began a day after parliament passed legislation requiring students to apply for government loans to pay for their education. This pattern is unfolding in country after country across the region.

More and more, the above-mentioned transnational institutions and a host of specialized United Nations organizations are setting the educational restructuring agenda for what have become "highly" indebted and even "failed" states in the discourse of Washington's foreign policy practitioners. To the extent this is taking place, the region's indebted states are more acutely experiencing *"the growing loss of national sovereignty, particularly"over social reform and government policy"* (Teeple, 2001). The state apparatus of the national bourgeoisie has fallen under increasing indebtedness and is incurring more trans-national policy scrutiny. Managerial reforms are proceeding haltingly and under the exacting standards of neo-liberal market-discipline, expressed in the so-called three Rs of Retrenchment, Reduction and Rationalization. We will expand on their implications when analyzing, in more detail, the policy discourses and various prescriptions offered by UNESCO and the World Bank consortium. This state of affairs, i.e. the growing loss of national sovereignty over policy direction, including in the education sphere, has posed a challenge to the state-led model of educational expansion adopted throughout the "Bandung" cycle which began some 45 years ago with the independence era. Thus, along with the advent of globalization, the nature and function of the nation-state and region's state universities is undergoing a process of restructuring. We are interested in understanding the process and the policy rationale that drives its elements. What is the new role envisioned for the universities in the region's development process at the present stage in history? We will explore various dimensions of this question in more analytical detail as the study unfolds.

4. A Proposal for Suggestive Reframing

Bearing in mind the foregoing general themes, questions and assumptions, the overarching problematic for this analytic-theoretical inquiry revolves around the following generative question: why, despite centuries of formal educational expansions (beginning with the early missionary educational cycle) and enormous recent investments in universities, have sub-Saharan Africa's education systems failed to alleviate the wretched situation of economic backwardness, low-productivity and illiteracy so prevalent throughout the region? Or, looking at a more recent time frame, why has the prodigious educational investment by Africa's postcolonial leadership since the 1960s failed to improve the quality of life of the vast majority of Africans? Might the existing state of the region's education systems have something to do with the continuing economic and social deterioration of life (quantitatively and qualitatively) throughout the region? In other words, how can centuries of educational expansion and learning grow simultaneously with increased poverty in sub-Saharan Africa? This anomaly implores us to look closely and critically at the purported purpose of region's education systems and universities, once heralded as "the principal instruments for national development" (Ekong, 1996). Prior to the onset of globalization, the universities represented the crown jewel of colonial education systems.

From this standpoint, education was thought of as a means for escaping national impoverishment or underdevelopment and attaining the "development" experienced by the OECD core states. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the expansion and "modernization" of educational services did not result in a predictably linear "developmental" sequence dutifully following pre-existing patterns of social developments predicted by "educational planners" or "development" theorists of the "developmental" school of thought. Clearly, the effect has been towards more peripheralization and widening global inequalities in virtually all vital indicators of educational and social progress, as the above figures demonstrate. Looking at the data closely, this study argues that educational expansion and the process of peripheralization are historically and

structurally interrelated processes. To reflect critically on these mutually reinforcing processes, the political economy of educational expansion and peripheralization in SSA must be scrutinized over time and across the historical expanse.

To capture significant or "nodal" phases/periods in the large-scale and inter-generational educational expansions experienced in SSA, the concept of historical *educational cycles* will be detailed. Each of these cycles traces out important economic, political and social changes driving the process of educational expansion during a particular period in the history of the region's incorporation, ultimately leading to the various challenges recounted above. To approach the underlying analytical challenges and questions presented by this notion of education for peripheralization, a dialectical image of the historical process and a clear and convincing conceptualization of the transition from one historical cycle to the next and, ultimately, to the current globalized era are indispensable. This task involves nothing short of what Apple (1995, xxvii) refers to as "repositioning" ourselves to read social formations and education systems differently and hopefully deeper than a reified "sectoral' perspective and/or straightforward application of "human capital" and "national developmental" models would allow. As we note in our introduction, educational expansion in the peripheries of SSA is analytically and practically related to the effects and problems of imperialism.

After all, when it comes to research and analysis into this region's higher education institutions, Altbach and Kelly's (1974, p. 3-4) concerns are still valid. Namely, key statistical data concerning universities (enrollment rates, budgets etc.) are generally available and continue to be collected/documented by "regional academic groupings," governments, international and multilateral "funding" organizations. Among these, "the work of UNESCO stands out as particularly important," and a useful source of data for educational research. On the other hand, there is little "analytic research" concerning the relationship or defining

linkages between the societies and universities in Africa. I would argue the terrain remains much the same today, as intellectual-analytic engagement with the peripheries has become more and more the domain of "experts" and "institutional intellectuals" working for the Bretton Woods institutions and other bilateral "donor" agencies. The notion of "institutional intellectuals" has been adopted from Petras (1991) and refers to "intellectuals" who work within the ideological confines of institutions like the World Bank "and write for other such intellectuals." They are specialists in these institutions managerial discourses that serve to understand the Third World countries. More importantly and notwithstanding the "posture of objectivism" projected in their writings, Petras writes (p. 63):

> The institutional intellectuals are just as ideologically driven as their predecessors: their "science" is harnessed to a world of managed conflict, electoral elites, private markets and social engineering. They are the ideological watchdogs who have banished the politics of anti-imperialism to the netherworld of forgotten language.

Their analytic foray into the education field is based on methodologically "sectoring" the subject matter. This approach isolates the processes/institutions of education from the surrounding economic, political and cultural functions, social struggles that underpin them. As such, it simplifies and restricts the processes to their "internal" institutional manifestations. The focus is on so-called fiscal and managerial problems. From the world-systemic approach to educational and social change proposed here, the notion of studying education systems-in-themselves, outside and without active reproductive influence upon social structures/relations, capitalist development and the peripheralization processes is rather ingenuous. In other words, the process of educational expansion is integral to the general worldwide process of imperialism, capitalist expansion and peripheralization of the region that we find today.

I will conclude this part with some words on the need for analytical repositioning in the face of "stubborn" facts. The existing official policies are not accomplishing what they claim to. The reframing argues that despite national varieties, the educational problematic is essentially the same across the region known as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Educational expansion in the region occurs within the exploitative structures and processes of capitalist production, accumulation and imperialist expansion on a world scale. As such, educational expansion is an integral dimension of the processes of "capital accumulation, concentration and centralization (through the "broadening" and "deepening" of capitalist development, to use Lenin's opposite pairing), which, in turn, engender the processes of "reproducing core-periphery relations" (Hopkins, p. 151).

The more one researches/studies the devastating social and economic crises confronting the people of SSA, the more the trail leads to the major culpability of the long-entrenched Western educational/training systems and schooling practices founded by European imperialism. The schools and imperial curricula of the region constitute flawed "carbon copies of those of the metropolitan countries" (Boahen, 1987, p. 106) and have not freed the majority of Africans from ignorance and exploitation or softened their cultural oppression and economic dispossession. Instead, the process of educational expansion tends to exacerbate poverty, misery and peripheralization across the social formations investigated in this study. Seen over time and as an integral part of the imperial project, the region's education systems tend to be complicit in the ongoing process of what we recognize as peripheralization, or what the dominant discourse refers to as "marginalization" of the societies of the sub-Saharan region. We now turn to a discussion of the substantive analytical and theoretical conceptions that frame the issues under consideration.

Chapter Two

Methodological and Theoretical Frames

1. Peripherality vs. Marginality

Somehow the discourse manages to forget that it is natural and entirely appropriate that Africa should be marginal to non-Africans just as it should be primary to Africans. Worse still, it represents the development of Africa, not so much as what Africans do, as what is done by outsiders about Africa. Development is thus strategized in such a way that those who have the most interest in development, those who should be its means and ends, the Africans themselves are marginalized. Ake, C. (1996, 12)

As scholars of the evolving world-system remind us, imperial expansions seek to place the peripheries at the service of the reigning "logic" of capital accumulation elaborated at the center. By the same token, no formal educational process or public school site has ever been "neutral" in the workings of capital accumulation or intelligible on its own terms or internal relations/organization alone, as the "sectoral" analysis of the World Bank implies. In other words, any valid propositions concerning the spread or decline of formal schooling in the region must acknowledge formal education's "historicality," "politicity" and "sociality" and come to terms with the economic and ideological legacies of imperialism and colonization by clarifying pivotal political economic developments and cultures of ideas animating each historical cycle of educational expansion. Education in the African context has developed as a core institution of imperial domination and surplus extraction.

The uneven forces of globalization and the financial-debt bondage imposed by the SAPs and austerity measures frame the current educational crisis. The syndrome of underdevelopment continues to deepen. Its momentum was accelerated largely by the imposition of what Overbeek and Van der Pijl refer to as "monetarism, the battering-ram of neo-liberalism" (pp.13 - 19) which informs the present cycle of world-wide educational expansion. Disciplinary neo-liberalism is, as the dominant policy discourse, is clearly implicated in the ever-intensifying peripheralization

process growing bolder and harsher in so many sub-Saharan nation-states and societies in the last decades. The grim statistics are self-evident.

In order to critically comprehend the processes of educational expansion and stagnation in the region, the concept of peripheralization must be further clarified. For world systemic thinkers, peripherality does not mean marginality "in the sense of dispensable" for without peripheries no core and without both no capitalist accumulation of wealth on a world scale (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1987, p. 13). Rather, marginality implies a position of subservience in the complex process of world capitalist production, accumulation and cultural/ideological reproduction with which, we argue here, the educational enterprise has been bound up for centuries. Rather than marginalized, Africa continues to be exploited by market-driven neo-liberal policies with tragic consequences.

The world-wide metamorphosis and expansion of the complex accumulation processes of the capitalist system "as a whole" entails extraction of surplus through low-skilled, cheap, labor-intensive production and barely-subsistence agricultural economy with which the peripheral areas have been associated for centuries. The fact that the prices of most primary commodities SSA exports have "fallen to their lowest in a century and a half" according to the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1999 published by the UNDP at the end of the 20th century, is testament to their ongoing peripheralization rather than marginalization. In our view, it is not convincing to use the discourse of marginality when we know that the SSA region has been in the thick of the accumulation process and highly "integrated" into the global economy, albeit at the extractive or low-end of the "commodity chain" for centuries. The region currently provides nearly 30% of its GDP for export in contrast to "only 19% for the OECD" according to the HDR document. We must be careful and more precise in the use of terminologies and discourses when discussing the region's present condition.

It is fashionable to talk of the recent marginalization of Africa. Under the present circumstances of globalization, it is not Africa per se that has been marginalized but rather the old colonial labor forces and means of production, production processes, circuitry, networks and so on which are at odds with the emergent innovations of the NKE. As Ake (1966, p.13-15) points out in essay entitled *The Marginalization of Africa, Notes on Productive Confusion*, the marginalization discourse tends to divert attention from these objective forces and changing realities that exert their own dynamics and impact on developments in the region, including the state of education. These are responsible for the region's lack of economic weight and lack of voice or power at WTO and GATT negotiations and trade talks. These realities tend to be glossed over by the discourse of marginalization. This subjective discourse, as Ake suggests, ends up inviting non-Africans to pay "benevolent attention to Africa" while continuing to marginalize and alienate Africans from their own development processes. Rather than promoting understanding of the region and its people's circumstances, he writes, "this discourse about the fate of Africa is focused on non-Africans. It orchestrates concerns about non-Africans taking enough interest in Africa, not doing enough with Africa" and diverts attention from collapsing infrastructures and the tragic consequences of various "development" policies and remedies advanced by international development agencies and the African elite. Paradoxically, continues Ake, "the agents of development in Africa, namely, the African elite and the international development community are the ones who have engendered this exogenous development strategy. They have, in effect, devised a development project which, in practice, negates its stated objectives and produces underdevelopment on an increasing scale" or what is referred to as a process of peripheralization in the lexicon of world systemic thinkers. Thus, pursued from a historical materialist sociological perspective, the discourses of capital accumulation, exploitation, peripheralization, surplus value and hegemony rather than marginality and integration, discussed below, provide a more convincing

explanation and relevant understanding into the subject matters and institutions under consideration here.

A foremost exponent of colonial interests and practitioner of early British imperialism in the African region expressed the necessary basis and imperatives for peripheral accumulation more concretely. Cecil Rhodes, infamous for having named Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) after himself, explicitly declared that "we must find new lands from which we can easily obtain raw materials and at the same time exploit the cheap slave labor that is available from the natives of the colonies. The colonies would also provide a dumping ground from the surplus goods produced in our factories" (Goldsmith, 1996, 254). He is talking of the economic rationale behind the process of peripheralization, systemic colonialism and the onset of what is discussed as the colonial cycle of educational expansion in the region. In other words, without the conquest of "their" cheap labor power and raw materials in the peripheries, no thriving manufacturing industries in "our" European cores are possible. The global reproduction of capital or its worldwide propagation, since its inception, has been based on the systemic exploitation of African labor power by a combination of well-established means and institutions among which the educational system is indispensable. In sum, the externalization of the capitalist world-economy is inextricably bound up with educational expansion and the processes of peripheralization.

2. The Dominant Discourse of Integration

How we understand the means and purposes of SSAs incorporation into the world system shapes the way we interpret educational institutions and social changes of the SSA peripheries. In contrast to the foregoing interpretation, the dominant and official discourse of *the World Bank* on its website, speaks of countries that have successfully "embraced integration" (Dollar 2004,) with the capitalist world economy and others that have failed to do so. We start the following discussion from the assumption that the SSA region, as a whole, is economically well integrated into the global economy. As the aforementioned

1999 UNDP data suggest, with exports at "30% of GDP for sub-Saharan Africa" a case could be made that it might be even more "integrated" than the OECD, which exports only 19% of its GDP. The point is that varying degrees of integration into the world economic system have long been "embraced" and promoted by peripheral elites. In contrast, considering that there is no more than 10-15% Inter-African trade implies that the region's countries may be more integrated commercially and economically with certain parts of the core than among themselves. The problem lies not in the absence of integration, but rather in the unfolding unequal relations between the peripheral and metropolitan regions of the world system.

David Dollar (2004), is the World Bank's director of Development Policy, sees the issues differently. To him, when countries of the "developing" world "lower barriers such as tariffs and open themselves up to investment and trade with the rest of the world - economic integration occurs." Dollar concedes to the existence of "many aspects of integration," though his concern lies with "trade and direct investment" better known as "trade liberalization." He suggests that the process can cause "disruptions" in the peripheries by forcing certain types of "adjustments" to the new realities at the level of trade and investments. These disruptions are seen as short - term glitches on the way to more successful integration into the larger international economy. The process is approached as a "choice" that "developing countries" are actually making to consciously improve their conditions through a "trickle down" process, which has yet to materialize.

This "integrationist" analytical position, steeped in the paradigm of "developmental economics" and "rational choice" theory, sees the integration process as voluntary and offering "powerful net benefits to developing countries" as well as "a lot of opportunities" to developing countries. In this dominant narrative of the Bretton Woods agencies, privatization and liberalization (deregulated markets) offer the opportunities for reaping the benefits of established foreign trade and investment/exchange systems heavily weighted in

favor of the cores. Quite simply, problems of "development" are reduced to a question of integrating poor nation-states into the asymmetrical world market and trading systems via donor-driven SAPs and the basic education for all (EFA) programs prescribed by World Bank planners. In other words, widening global inequalities are theorized away as stages in the process of voluntary integration.

In this integrationist view of international relations and "development," the long-term historical past and prospects are generally de-emphasized, as is conflict, or are perceived in terms of progressive convergence of "rich" and "poor" nations presumably dovetailing each other to the mutual benefit of both and ultimately all humanity. This ahistorical and short-sighted perspective disregards that the world system has been constituted by an integration of unequals based on metropolitan needs and that the international economic system continues to massively polarize or widen the gap between the centers and peripheries, despite or because of their unequal and uneven integration into the global market and trading systems, framework of rules and regulations enforced by the leading global agencies of capitalism, including the World Trade Organization (WTO). With a mandate extending globally, the WTO is an institution designed to enforce the rules of the existing international trading system, which does not operate on a "voluntary" basis as commonly perceived.

In contrast, the political economic lens of incorporation sees the processes in more structural terms and as involving large scale social transformations, subjection to an "export oriented" rearrangement of long-standing pre-capitalist labor processes and differential/unequal trajectories of "development" in the centers and peripheries of the system. The peripheries' constant reconfiguration into the Euro-American structured world economy, ongoing since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, renders a repetition of the West's exceptional historical, social and economic circumstances and structures of reproduction unrealizable. It is a logical and historical impossible expectation, which carries an erroneous linear view of historical time.

Having drawn attention to this basic distinction between the integrationist and "incorporation" perspectives, as it were, I prefer to use the term incorporation because it more accurately captures/explains the region's overall historiography, its evolving unequal realities and subaltern position in the world-wide process of accumulation since the mercantilist period (1500-1700). In short, it is more reflective of the historical cycles and present developments of the region. Moreover, when it comes to the expansion of educational opportunities and schooling institutions, there is little evidence of tangible "benefits" given centuries of "integration," whereas an overall decline in income and in the well being of the local communities concerned is difficult to overlook today across SSA.

We may therefore surmise that as the colonial empires were created/established over the centuries, educational expansion of unequal and different degrees was initiated to "re-orient" peasant-based economies towards "extroverted" export-based mining/plantation economies. While education has many intended and unintended consequences, the primary function of the region's educational systems revolves around producing the requisite workforce for the expansive needs of "imperium" to which the region has been subjected. As part of what Althusser (1971) describes as the ideological apparatus of the colonial state (ISA), public schools came into existence in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, primarily to channel/recruit subjects into the colonial labor force. This brings to the fore the problematic of collapsing agricultural production and spreading famine conditions along with the expansion of European patterns of education.

Thus the process of imperialist incorporation not only involve guns and the forceful creation of "labor reserve" enclaves for international capital but also the provision of educational services however rudimentary or extensive the skills required to reproduce, over time and space, the general processes of peripheralization. Managan (1993, p. 4) relevantly details the racialized

ideological functions or legitimating chore of imperial educational provisions for Africans during the colonial cycle. In his view, the task of native students "was to believe and internalize the white colonialist myths about themselves and thus read themselves out of history. In short, the historical function of schooling, the curriculum and textbooks, are all products of white colonial rule, aimed at establishing domination" of a supremacist type.

The relationship between the labor process or the overall relations of production and education is a complex one. Theoretically speaking, the less any social formation is characterized by antediluvian forms of slavery, serfdom and the modern "sweatshop" varieties of compulsory forms of labor relation and production processes, the more the necessary skills and discipline of labor power are provided by the formal "capitalist education system" and in ways that ensure (ideally) the reproduction of the existing peripheral colonial social order and "submission to the ruling ideology" (Althusser, 1971, p.132). In our four-cycled analysis of educational expansion, state-sponsored formal public education systems had to await the emergence of the colonial state or the onset of second or colonial cycle in the late nineteenth century. We must understand that each historical cycle of educational expansion is part of a historic continuum of the region's incorporation into the world system.

To reiterate, the first and longest cycle of Western educational expansion into the region spanned the long mercantilist and industrialist eras (1500-1870). The second cycle began with the onset of 19th century colonialism and subsides with the independence of Ghana in 1957. The third "Bandung" cycle developed with the post independence era and levels off by the end of the 1970s, making way for the ongoing globalized cycle of educational expansion and market-reform policies, For instance, The Education for All movement and MDG consensus are expressions of the present cycle which is driven by the forces of neo-liberal globalization. Depending on the wider historical context and relations under investigation, each cycle of educational expansion tends to favor the incorporation

of specific social forces into "modern" capitalist production or, more technically, into the evolving world-wide socio-technical division of labor.

At this point, I want to underline that the field of inquiry has an unusually broad regional focus primarily because the key issues surrounding the dynamics of educational expansion and incorporation resonate throughout the region. Moreover, educational expansion, in every cycle, tends to impose virtually similar types of basic formal schooling, imperial policies and ideological structures of dominance across the region, regardless of pre-existing cultural, ethnic or later national distinctions and particularities. The contention is that each cycle imposed a similar "exogenous" educational regime driven by the needs and interests of the core. For instance, looking at educational experiences and developments in the British colonies of Africa, Mangan (1993, p. 4) argues that the history of educational provision "for the African" whether in Kampala (Uganda) or Kaduna (Nigeria) was "determined" primarily by imperial needs and, we might add, the requirements of incorporating more indigenous labor power, of a particular kind and level of competence, into imperial relations. Not being neutral in content, the process of Western education anywhere in the region was closely linked with the enterprise of imperialism. Everywhere in the region, education provision for natives takes the form of imposition of cultural imperialism. Wherever it occurs, the imported educational processes valorize the Western-hegemonic view of the world and denigrate the African personality, culture, language and belief systems. This is key to understanding the cultural influences of these institutions. Despite their secularization over the centuries, the foundations of western education systems found throughout the region have a long history in the early Christian missionary schools. This is not to disregard the specifics of national contexts and processes amplified by national peculiarities and structures, rather to suggest that understanding the region's collective (aggregate) historical experience with imperialism and the cyclical rhythms of educational expansions, expounded here, will provide us useful analytical insights for pursuing more concrete and critical analysis of educational systems and policies in the crucible of particular national

histories. To reach that point, however, it is necessary to engage in a process of suggestive reframing.

In this theoretical project, analysis is grounded on "the regional perspective, " which in Ikeda's (1996) view enables world-systemic thinkers to study the region specificity of the world-systemic processes as well as the region generality of the national processes (p.65). With regard to detailing the contradictory historical role played by the education systems in SSA, we will draw from critical thinkers of the sociology of education to complement and elaborate on the world-systemic understanding of the worldwide political economic processes and contradictions involved in the development of peripheral capitalism and education systems.

3. Education and Peripheralization

We have argued that the complexity of educational challenges faced in the region requires a different research programme and principles of investigation than the dominant ahistorical "positivist rational choice" and developmental/integrationist model employed by the World Bank and allied lending/regulatory agencies of global capitalism (Torres, 2002). This study's suggested analytical repositioning requires that *the dynamics of educational expansion be scrutinized in the context of historical capitalism and the on-going process of peripheralization of the region.* Economically speaking, the capitalist world-economy "peripheralizes" areas by incorporating them increasingly into the unequal international division of labor and exchanges that sustain the capitalist world system.

To manage the vast and disparate historical data on educational expansion we need to delineate what constitutes a historical cycle of expansion. It designates, conceptually, a certain historical time frame or an arc, as it were, which by definition tends to be significantly curved and open-ended. More specifically, it can be seen as denoting a certain historical time-span (temporality), which illustrates a moment when a significant educational expansion has taken place

across in the region. Such was the case, for instance, during the early mercantilist period when metropolitan missionary institutions established themselves and their newly built mission outposts in the coastal areas and began disseminating their bible-based education toward the "interior" of the so-called Dark Continent. The missionaries, it must be added, were the basis for all that followed. During the initial cycle of Western expansion into the region, missionaries exercised full monopoly over what passed as the formal education of SSA natives. This continued well until the onset of colonialism when ecclesiastical political powers and pedagogic reaches began to be subordinated to the interests of the colonial state. The missionary basis of Western education systems in Africa is a product of the West's historical expansion and gradual hegemony over what used to be pre-capitalist African formations with Islamic influences in the Northeastern coastline and the Sahel region. If the Turco-Arabian formations of the East had risen over the West, we would probably pay less attention to the missionary dimensions of early formal educational expansion across the region.

The following great cycle of educational expansion occurred during the heyday of colonialism (1885-1957). This cycle is distinguished by the emergence of the colonial state which began to expand government-funded schooling for natives without, we shall see, displacing the missionary authority and influence over the education of SSAs inhabitants altogether. The next cycle of educational expansion set in during the independence era of the post-1960s. With the rise of this crucial cycle, the colonial education systems, philosophies and policies were not displaced either. A portion of the previous arc can extend itself under the rising cycle, each representing a period of time signifying the totality of the historical process. In view of this imagery, the greatest expansion of elementary, secondary and tertiary education took place during the post-colonial cycle. In all cases, the previous cycles provided the basis for the rising cycles of expansions. In every historical cycle of expansion identified here, specific forms and levels of education were given prominence with a view to incorporating specific

indigenous social strata and kinds of labor into the ever-expansive capillaries of dominant capitalist world's economic and ideological/governance structures.

It is finally around the beginning of the 1980s that the globalized cycle of educational expansion consolidated itself in the region emerged and still prevails. The Bandung cycle was driven, first and foremost, by the political logic of the NB post-colonial state, and the international geo-politics of the so- called Cold War era. The distinguishing feature about this most current educational cycle is that is driven pre-eminently by the economic considerations, monetary calculations and managerial imperatives that dictate the tenor of neo-liberal reforms. Increasingly, large transnational corporations (TNCs) and institutions like the World Bank and the IMF have developed control over the region's impoverished states' national and educational policies. In the present cycle, private schools and foreign educational interests, international non-government organizations (INGO), and private universities are beginning to gain access and define the educational arena and opportunities of the region. Each cycle of educational expansion tends to correlate with certain changes in the world-historical dynamics of accumulation.

Thus, we have drawn a four-cycled consecutive and overlapping history of educational expansions in order to come to grips with the complexity of the educational challenges faces by contemporary SSA. Seen from the perspective of political economy, the declining terms of trade and accumulating miseries of the African people are vividly documented and require little restatement here. In the present period the peripheral economies and fiscal capacities of sub-Saharan African states are regressing to the level of the 1960s (Bello, 1996; Saul and Leys, 1999; Arrighi, 2002). Almost everywhere, the devastation wreaked on public schooling is threatening to eclipse previous gains and achievements in the struggle to widen educational opportunities to all Africans. The cumulative educational expansion attained so far, we have seen, has not raised the majority of the region's populations beyond a hand to mouth subsistence level of existence. In other words, the most basic needs of food and shelter remain elusive to so many

in a region so rich with resources and potential. Given these dismal results and projections, we must reinterpret and appraise the meaning and purpose of education in the African context from a wider perspective offered by the conceptual categories of world-system thinkers.

In his famous essay, Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere (1968, p. 268) looks at this issue in some detail. He writes that education systems around the world differ "because the societies providing the education are different." Moreover, he adds, all education has a purpose, namely that of transmitting "from one generation to the next the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of society. In this connection, Nyerere is known for emphasizing the reality that African children are not being handed down the wisdom of their elders in the schools of "independent" SSA but those of the colonialist and their missionary antecedents. Long before it became rather obvious, Dumont (1977, p. 87) similarly suggested that the prevailing formal education systems available to Africans are dysfunctional and actually serve to dispossess and peripheralize the rural areas by stripping them of their peasant laborers and means of subsistence. In the process, he offers a broad critique of the colonial education systems worth reproducing at some length here:

> Education servilely copied on our own in wholly different conditions has slowed down agricultural development by pushing the best farmers' sons out of farming. The gap between the exploiting town and the exploited countryside increases the rural exodus and the size of the shantytowns. Agriculture cannot find the trained personnel necessary for its modernization. Many of the workers in agriculture have lived in the cities, are sometimes European educated and they cannot reintegrate into the rural atmosphere.

This is not what was supposed to happen according to the "developmental" models put in place by international development agencies and local elites. Dumont insisted Africa was on the wrong path of servile educational emulation

during the heydays of the post-independence or Bandung cycle of expansion. In retrospect, many of the tendencies identified above have already materialized. As such, he is one of the early thinkers who offers a prescient analysis of the impending crises both educational and agricultural/environmental or, in short, of the processes associated with peripheralization. The approach here positions itself with those who have argued that Africa is on the wrong path and that colonial schools represent an integral aspect of the economic, political, cultural crisis of underdevelopment.

Difficult as it is, we must refer to phenomena by their proper names. Part of Europe's famous "civilizing mission," educational expansion, such as it exists, is threatening the very cultural survival and ecological integrity of the SSA societies. Mazrui (1986) refers to the existing practices and processes of formal education as involving "dis-Africanising Africa" from the rural-based cultures, inherited languages and civilization worldviews. Abdi (2003, p. 24) likens the educational process to "a programmed destruction of peoples, lands and indigenous knowledge and life systems" and languages "for the benefit of the European metropolis." The major theme in this critical interpretation is that the colonial education system is not designed to create a better world for Africans and to develop the innate intelligence and cultural resources they harbor. Invariably in fact, it has proved harmful to the indigenous environment, life forms and all but erased the identity and linguistic formations of the colonized. Indeed, it is a telling testament to the effects of centuries of Western education or symbolic violence, to use Bourdieu's terminology, that the contemporary African Union uses the colonizing English, French, Arabic and Portuguese languages to communicate in its pan-African summits. This is one of the most glaring embodiments of hegemony. More than any other institution, the colonial education regime, particularly its system of higher education, disengages the educated elite from its own cultural and social roots, cognitive and linguistic modes. It imperializes the mind, so to speak

Events at a recent African summit of heads of state highlight the concerns expressed by critical African scholars. When the Mozambican president decided to address the assembled delegates in the indigenous Swahili language for the occasion, massive confusion apparently broke out. This was ascribed to lack of translation in this indigenous language, spoken by over 100 million East-Southern Africans. As it has for over four decades of its existence, the proceedings at the AU quickly reverted to the imperial languages of "instruction" as they were aptly called in colonial education discourse. The language of the uppermost "educated" strata and ruling groups across SSA is foreign and alien to that spoken by the majority in SSA. The uppermost levels of SSA system of higher education, the academic process and governmental functions still operate in the language of the colonizers.

How can we explain this phenomenon? This inadequacy of contemporary neocolonial elites and public schools to safeguard the most fundamental economic interests, cultural traditions, languages and identities or "personalities" of Africans is felt deeply in every country of the region. This undercurrent of popular sentiment is taken up in Mosha's (2002, p. 180) blunt assertions that the overriding "purpose of colonization and neo-colonization was to fleece Africa and therefore the aim of the little education given to a few is exactly the same." It is clear that in the sub-Saharan African region the practice of education involves imperial domination/control, subjugation and exploitation (fleecing). In other words, the expansion of formal schooling throughout the region involves, beyond fleecing, an ongoing and complex ideological and cultural process, which serves to Westernize-Europeanize and dominate the minds of the colonized "Others."

Highlighting education's critical role in social reproduction, domination and legitimizing existing inequalities Bourdieu (Lane, 2000; Bellamy, 1994, 123) identified it as "the ideological apparatus number one." The dominant group's "cultural capital" is transmitted intergenerationally in families and schools and it is proximity and mastery of its linguistic "codes" which is sought by students.

Carnoy (1974) refers to the wider cultural imperatives of educational expansion into the peripheries as practices of "cultural imperialism." Freire refers to this practice as education for "domestication" in contrast to education for transformation. In sum, the ideologies of formal education systems and institutions in the region have always promoted the social and intellectual superiority and legitimacy of Western (Eurocentric) knowledge forms and languages along with the intellectual subordination and inferiority of pre-existing African worldviews, vernaculars and peoples concerned (Natsoulas and Natsoulas, 1993,, p. 8). As Ake (1996, p.6) reminds us, despite the development of an increasingly integrated world system and hype about globalization, we cannot lose sight of the substantive fact that it is "not Hausa that is globalized but English, not Togolese technology but American and Japanese" that is spanning the world.

At any rate, this ongoing programme of formal educational expansion, by way of "de-indigenization" (Mosha, 2000) of knowledge has emerged as a key educational problematic for those who wish to understand the workings of imperialism and ultimately reclaim the region's educational systems from Eurocentric cognitive, cartographic and linguistic mapping (Zeletza, 2002, p. 60). It is this mental/ideological subjection attending educational expansion (Eurocentric ontology of modern/formal schooling) that moulds the identity formations and conflicts challenging the modern "educated" Africans. The foundational theme here is that "education for domination/domestication", (Freire) or "the colonization of the mind" (Ngugi wa Thiong'o), or what Mazrui refers to as "cultural dis-Africanization and Westernization" is an intrinsic part of the imperial education and learning systems found in SSA. The higher one ascends the educational pyramid of the peripheries, the less one hears of local languages, history and indigenous knowledge forms.

The region's educational crisis cannot be reducible to current problems of financial-fiscal impoverishment or "inefficiency" in administration, "lack of

resources" or "accountability" alone. From our perspective, most aspects of the educational crisis begin outside the education sector per se, and in the contradictions of larger peripheral social structures and relations of the world system. This "sectoral" approach not only overlooks the wider economic, social and political forces that impinge upon the institutions of education but conveniently ignores the cultural and cognitive effects of the imperial structures of exploitation, domination and subordination. Most conspicuously, it is remote from the actual life processes and production relations of the region and still rooted in the naïve and neutral and pre-structural conception of educational systems and institutions.

4. Education for Incorporation

Incorporation has the effect of creating new production zones with low-cost labor, which then feeds simultaneously the ability of the world economy to expand economically and the possibility of a renewed higher share of global surplus accumulation going to the high accumulators. (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1987)

Closely linked and logically interlocked with the concept of peripheralization via economic subordination is the phenomenon of incorporation. It raises the issue of incorporating billions of people, lands and resources formerly outside capital's ever-expansive circuits of worldwide production and accumulation. This section argues that interpreting the role of education in the ongoing social changes of SSA requires an understanding of the notion of incorporation and its significance in this context. Education represents one of the major ideological and institutional instruments deployed to incorporate African elites and other peripheral social forces and societies into their changing interests.

The processes of peripheralization cannot be conceived mechanically, that is, without agency or the need for continually incorporating and absorbing the region's "natives" into the changing imperial economic processes, social, ideological and political relations. In other words, these broader processes raise the fundamental problematic of hegemony which implies and presupposes, more

or less "a certain collaboration, i.e. an active and voluntary (free) consent" (Gramsci, 1974, p. 271) in Gramscian thinking. The absorption of peripheral elites and incorporation of their respective nations is less and less achieved by violence and force alone and more by assistance to indigenous compradorist forces who see it in their class interest to incorporate the nation more firmly into capitalist-imperialist relations.

This exercise of incorporation therefore suggest various combinations of coercion/domination and persuasion/conversion strategies (force -consent continuum) with the intention of subordinating the African people into the world's division of labor and interstate political system organized by successive cycles of European expansionism. The interrelations, contradictions and struggles of incorporating the pre-capitalist SSA economic forms into the process of world capitalist economy are an ongoing process, still being played out by the metropolitan powers and their native allies in the region. Imperial education systems, schools and curricula, in every cycle, have served as principal means and sites for selectively incorporating and subjugating both the labor power and consciousness of the region's predominantly peasant inhabitants into the interests of the expanding imperium. The process is never assured and involves countervailing struggles and resistances on an ongoing scale. Luxemburg's (Frank, 1979, 142) explicit synthesis of the processes involved, written at the beginning of the 20th century, serves as a *locus classicus* for understanding the political economic dimensions of incorporation which continue down to the present day:

> Capital in its struggle against societies with natural economy pursues the following ends: To gain immediate possession of important sources of productive forces such as land, game in primeval forests, minerals, precious stones and ores, products of exotic flora such as rubber, etc. (2) To "liberate" labour power and to coerce it into service. (3) To introduce a commodity economy. (4) To separate trade and agriculture...Each new

> colonial expansion is accompanied, as a matter of course, by a relentless battle of capital against the social and economic ties of the natives, who are forcibly robbed of their means of production and labour power.

In a sense, incorporation and the exercise of hegemony can be conceived as two sides of the coin of European imperialism and, we may also note that Luxemburg emphasizes the moment of force rather than consent. Beyond its foundations in crude forms of coerced and unfree or indentured labor power for its exercise in the peripheries, the practice of hegemony also requires subordinate "professional, political and ideological" (Gramsci, 285) intermediaries for enabling the process of colonial incorporation to proceed.

The opening up of the "overseas" peripheries, it is well known, involved prodigious violence: the establishment of slavery, forced labor mines and plantations under the intended purpose of "liberating" labor power." But the process also involved certain ideological and cultural forms, educational practices or hegemonic exercises which highlight the moment of consent. In any case, the predominant objective of these imperial educational-cultural institutions is to meet imperial needs rather than those of the native African populations whose labor power is subjected to various forms of surplus value exploitation combined with forms of "cultural imperialism" (Carnoy, 1974; Altbach and Kelly, 1978) that express themselves in the modalities of education. The issue of incorporation draws attention to the fact that the relationship, peripheral societies have with those of the coreis not mutual in the ordinary sense of the term, but driven by compulsion and negation of the historicity of the "Southern" peoples and producers concerned (Martin, p. 852). To fully incorporate themselves, the people of the region would have to abandon any sense of African identity and cultural autonomy. European patterns of schooling were alien and "had little to do with the society and culture of the colonized" (Altbach and Kelly, p. 5). As such, they served as principal mechanisms of incorporation into the "worldwide network of production" and exchange systems (Martin, p. 853-854). The process

of incorporation emphasizes the exploitative and forcible subordination of the labor processes and relations of production of the peasant-based rural African communities/economies into the ever-externalizing and expanding network of the capitalist mode of production:

> Historically viewed, this structural and reciprocal interdependence of core and peripheral production is a fundamentally new phenomenon for the peoples who had previously been in an external arena of the capitalist world economy. African empires and states, once masters of their own history and civilization became incorporated or bound up into a capitalist world network and modern history though in a subordinate position. Almost without exception this has meant a decline in the well being of the communities concerned (Martin, 854).

Our argument here is that education expansion in the region needs to be linked with the complex historical-structural process of incorporation into the dominant capitalist mode of production (CMP) and Eurocentric cultural world.

5. Cyclicity of Educational Expansion and Incorporation.

To give some sense of order to the investigation of the vast array of data on educational expansion, the notion of historical cycles of educational expansion will be developed and applied on a regional basis. Drawn from the work of world-sytemic thinkers, the category of a cycle permits us to aggregate and trace a particular chronology of educational history (as part of a complex sequence of events). Every cycle is bounded by time of certain duration, enabling us to construct entire historical sequences (i.e., past, and present and foreseeable future in the region's educational development). In this way, we may conceptualize the entire historical period in four cyclical formations, with each cycle providing the focus for a historical unit of analysis.

Every cycle denotes a different era and duration in the history of educational expansion. Broadly, the cycles of educational expansion are rooted in the logic of capitalist expansion or more precisely its "externalization" process and attendant peripheralization of the SSA region. Moreover, every major cycle of expansion is encased within a certain policy orientation or discursive frame of reference which draws attention to the play of human agency and educational purpose within each cycle. Each cycle is ultimately conditioned by the particular productive functions the periphery fulfills at the "essential needs of accumulation at the center" to recall Amin.

The basic assumption in this cyclic approach is that educational expansion in Africa has been racial and regional in scope and that it takes place within certain identifiable chronological patterns and sequences. The cycles we propose have left a legacy that resonates in every "national" setting of contemporary SSA. The analysis of these chronological cycles of educational expansion contributes to a broader world systemic understanding of the historical configurations that contributed to the region's contemporary educational and economic conditions. Pursuing this line of thought further requires delineating what are considered the most significant historical cycles of educational expansions into the region.

Thus, for exposition purposes I have divided the available data into four educationally relevant cycles/periods or phases of expansions: the foundational and longest-running missionary cycle 1500-1885, the colonial cycle 1885-1957, the Bandung cycle 1957-1980 and the globalizing cycle of educational expansion and incorporation. The latter cycle began earnestly in the early 1980s and is still ongoing under the policy agenda of neo-liberalism. We are suggesting that educational expansion, during each historical cycle, has produced certain parallel educational institutional patterns and practices across the region, which are often obscured under the weight of country-by-country and "sectoral" analyses. The first commonality lies in the basic fact that the education systems are alien to the traditional indigenous cultures. The provision of Western education implies that

the languages of teaching or "instruction" of formal education, and higher "logos" in particular, are still those of the imperial masters.

Nothing is suggested or implied, so far, about this generalized cyclic phasing of historical time except to convey that one comes later than or "after" the other. In other words, the necessary conditions for the globalized cycle to emerge lie in the circumstances and contradictions of the previous cycles. Christian missionaries promoted the initial expansion of European education into the region, a cycle contingent on the expansion of what Marx referred to as "merchant's capital." This cycle began with the era of slavery and continues to the present. Thus, at the basis of Africa's literacy and educational development lies the long and painstaking missionary cycle of educational expansion, where missionaries of different denominations shaped educational policies for natives and , in time, provided educational services under the policy direction of the colonial state. This foundational educational campaign had the intention of evangelization by means of "proselytization" and in its more organized forms, of spreading "Europhilosophy" (Ogundowale, 1985) through "mission schools." The distinction of the initial cycle lies in the fact that missionaries exercised monopoly over what constitutes African education or education for natives. Their pedagogical practices were based on the "scriptures" with the intent of converting "savages" and extracting their services in the name of the "Lord." Learning to read the scriptures and submitting to the Christian faith, as interpreted by its European representatives, was the highest form of education possible for Africans. It was also a precondition for fostering an elite endowed with the requisite amount of "Europhilosophy" of the times

It is noteworthy, for instance, that a modern education system was not in place anywhere in the region, prior to the onset of the colonial cycle in the 1880s. Similarly, the provision of post-elementary education did not emerge throughout the region until the colonial period made headway. Also, the expansion and provision of higher education for Africans was disregarded until the 1940s at the

peak of the colonial cycle (Boahen, 1987). Further consolidation of full-fledged, degree-granting African public universities had to await the onset of what I have called the Bandung cycle. In the same vain, the proliferation of private schools and universities across the region is a product of the globalizing cycle of expansion. The expansion of "private" institutions of higher education and the idea of imposing "user fees" on university students seemed quite unlikely during the colonial cycle and the short-lived Bandung period of educational expansion.

It is important to note that these cycles/stages of educational expansion are not sealed or mutually exclusive but could be running concurrently in any country within the geographic space under consideration. During the initial cycle, missionary policies commanded the norms and values of African educational expansion to the extent that those of the "national bourgeoisie" did during the Bandung phase. This lasted until the "neo-liberal project" which Overbeek and Van der Pijl (1993, p. 15) describe as the "fundamental expression of the outlook of transnational capital" emerged hegemonic in the 1970s and spread to SSA. In the present cycle, the post-Fordist imperatives of the NKE and neo-liberal policy principles are setting the guiding norms and values for university expansion and restructuring processes taking place in virtually all countries of the world. Together with "privatization" "internationalization" is encouraged at all levels of the educational enterprise. We will say more about these commonalities, their significance and consequences later.

In the current cycle, higher education reforms are infused with market logics and taking place against the background of what has been called a devolution of state funding for higher education by all national governments (Eisemon and Nielson, 1995). The national universities of the region are in a crisis and being thrust to the centre of the."international academic marketplace" which, in effect, siphons academic talent from the impoverished South to the high-wage North. Consistent with the current policy agenda of internationalization "Universities from the core are establishing campuses in the peripheries", in Altbach's (2004) view "to satisfy

unmet demand by local students." This is a familiar pattern across the region we shall address later as well.

The challenge in each educational cycle is to explore, in more detail, the wider economic, social, political and ideological conditions and processes of development which provide the impetus for its emergence, expansion and manifestations within the social changes occurring in the broader region. This calls for a world-systemic political economic understanding of the relevant social changes/transformation (summed up as peripheralization) influencing the dynamic. Based on the broader hypothesis that education is complicit in the reproduction of peripheralization, analysis will focus on issues and questions crucial for illuminating the extent, duration and nature of educational expansion. What policy agenda (discourse formation) underpins a given cycle? Where lies the source of power and resources to expand education? What are the effects of the transmitted knowledge forms in terms of both "official" and "hidden" curriculum? Who in the peripheral communities benefits from the expanded opportunities in each cycle? Inquiry will proceed by elaborating on these questions in more detail.

6. Towards a Historical Materialist Suggestive Reframing

In her article "*Introduction: Theorizing About The Expansion Of Educational Systems*" Archer (1982, p. 3) outlines the "best known theories" or explanations of educational growth in ways that suggest, more or less, a point of departure and further discussion for this section. They are "Human Capital Theory, Consumption Theory, Social Control Theory and Ideological Diffusion Theory." The argument offered is that rather than any of these "best known theories" the application of dialectical materialism and world-systemic thinking to critical educational research can offer sociologists of international education insights into the evolving role and function of education in the context of SSA's ongoing peripheralization/incorporation process. A major reason why a repositioning is called for stems, I would argue, from a manifest failure of the "development

project" and the accompanying theories of "human capital," "modernization" and "nation-building" to deliver the goods, as it were, and account for the present crisis-ridden trajectory and stagnation/regression dynamic that prevails in the region. In this repositioning effort, the point of departure lies in recognizing the historicity of the modern world-system of capitalism and the existence of "multiple and unequal states" consisting of cores, peripheries and semi-peripheries rather than the standard "developing" and "developed" countries discourse of the dominant institutions. The interconnecting element lies in the exploitative international division of labor and exchange relations that define historical and existing social relations or more precisely social relations of production.

In keeping with the general conceptual frameworks and premises discussed above, this study proposes to pursue a world systemic interpretation of the issues surrounding educational expansion in the sub-Saharan region. The philosophical basis for understanding the wide-scale societal changes and historical transformations involved in the expansion of Western education to the region is found in what is known as historical materialism. This refers to Marx' and Engels' theoretical and philosophical-methodological approach to history and the dynamics of social change in the course of humanity's or "mankind's" development. Historical materialism refers to the theory of history and social development and transformation elaborated by its founders Marx and Engels.

Engels refers to the materialist conception of history "above all" as a guide to the study of history and social development. The classical literature on this subject is expressed in different sections of their volumes (e.g. , *The German Ideology, Selected Correspondence, The Poverty of Philosophy*) of writings and in contradistinction to the reigning mechanical and idealistic discourse on the development of society, history and social relations current at their time. The founders of historical materialism thought that their contemporaries were idealist thinkers with scant regard for the material preconditions for the

production/maintenance human life and pursuit of literacy, philosophical thinking and other thought processes. One of the greatest merits of historical materialism is to affirm the intrinsic and dialectical unity between the productive and cultural activities and social relations that take place in diverse societies elaborating the history of humanity. Marx and Engels (Tucker, 1978) highlighted the dialectical complexity and interdependence of the various socioeconomic spheres with human consciousness in the making of "human history." They distinguish men from animals by "consciousness," which they define as "conscious existence, and the existence of men in their actual life processes (p. 154)." History, they write "is nothing but the succession of the separate generation, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces, handed down to it by all proceeding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances with a completely changed activity (172). Consciousness and mental-cultural activities in general, acquire further complexity and sophistication through increased productivity and the further division of labor between physical and mental labor.

Historical materialism offers an analytical discourse with universal scope and application. Man is "in the most literal sense of the word" writes Marx in his Critique of Political Economy (273) "a zoon politikon, no only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society." Writing to Bloch (1890, 417), Engels makes it clear that mankind everywhere elaborates its own history under very definite conditions and material circumstances. Thus "according to the materialist conception of history, the ultimate determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life." Henceforth, they wrote, society and social development must be understood dialectically, and in the context of the ongoing development of "man's" material development of the productive forces. Writing to Kugelman in Hanover, Marx (1886) gives further insight into the working of his method. Mentioning his works in political economy and Duhring's criticism thereof, he writes that "he knows very well that my method of development is not Hegelian, since I am a materialist and Hegel is

an idealist. Hegel's dialectics is the basis form of all dialectics, but only after it has been stripped of its mythical form, and it is precisely this which distinguishes my method" (Selected Correspondence, 1955). Engels'(1894) letter to Starkenburg (466) and Schmidt (415) again and again tries to distinguish Marx's and his method of dialectical materialism and its materialist approach to social scientific inquiry. In the first letter mentioned, Engels elaborates explicitly on the premises, namely "what we understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the determining basis of the history of society, is the manner and method by which men in a given society produce their means of subsistence and exchange the products among themselves (in so far as division of labor exists)" Thus, production of subsistence and exchange are found at the basis of the materialist understanding of historical development and transformations.

In summary, a materialist analysis of world historical changes is pursued with a critical understanding of the history of political economic relations or how societies produce their livelihood through their means of subsistence and exchange their products among themselves and in the larger international context of the international division of labor and the world market.

Lest readers are tempted to stick an economic determinist or reductionist label on historical materialism, Engels (415) , writing to Shmidt, ought to dispel this notion emphatically. Engels reiterates the materialist method by underlining that:

> while the material mode of existence is the primum agens this does not preclude the ideological spheres from reacting upon it in their turn, though with a secondary effect...the economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure-political forms of the class struggle and its results...constitutions established by the victorious class...juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political juristic, philosophical theories, religious views

and their further development into systems of dogmas – also exercise their influence upon the course of historical struggles.

The ideological sphere may often "preponderate" in determining the forms of historical interactions and developments that occur as well. The inner interconnections between the various dimensions or spheres (economic or superstructural) of society and what is driving historical development in a particular era, must, in each case, be analyzed to understand what constitute decisive forces of the resultant social events and economic developments shaping educational expansion. That is to say, historical materialism offers not "fixed" formulas for studying social and historical developments but provides powerful theoretical and philosophical pathways to understanding vast or macro processes of social and historical developments. History-makingin the materialist conception is rooted in economic production and reproduction of " real-life processes" that are considered the most primordial basis of existence and human transformation but this does not preclude the "relative autonomy" of the various dimensions of the "superstructural-political" or cultural and ideological moments nor their "preponderance" in the course of historical development. This is important when we attempt to understand the proposed cycles of expansion in more detail.

Based on this methodological/theoretical perspective, the notion of suggestive reframing proposes a synthesis of the world systems perspective with the critical works in the sociology of education. The overall analytical approach is informed by Marx's dialectical and historical materialism of social inquiry, also known as historical sociology. The pursuit of historical materialism, as we see, combines both a philosophical-analytical approach to social change, as well as a critique of the existing state of affairs and methods of social analysis. In this sense, the materialist method of critical inquiry has a clear normative component of "changing the world" in its research program. As a social critique, historical materialism regards the production of knowledge in society, not merely as an

"academic" exercise in understanding society but also as a means of changing its prevailing unjust relations characterized by exploitative capitalist relations of production and institutions. As a philosophical and analytical approach to understanding the economic, social and cultural transformation of humanity or "man," Marx and Engels elaborated a number of principles widely recognized as their combined contribution and influence on contemporary historical and sociological inquiry.

At the philosophical level, the historical materialist approach to social science rejects the separation of subject and object and the structure-agency dichotomy found in the positivist perspective. Historical materialism holds that human beings are "social animals" or "animals with culture" who are uniquely capable of understanding their world and themselves and by so doing they can transform their surroundings, themselves and the social world. Historical change is inextricably associated with the process of social reproduction and purposive action, which endows us with the uniquely qualities of being human. This is why the historical materialist mode of analysis gives primacy to the social relations of production in attempting to understand the character, changes and development of unequal class-based capitalist societies and their social relations extending on a world historical scale. The relations of production "in their totality" wrote Marx in the German Ideology "constitute what are called the social relations, society, and specifically, a society at a definite stage of historical development." It is the contradictory and changing permutations of the social relations of production and "ensemble of social relations" that offer insight into the development and changes associated with modern capitalist societies or the workings of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) whether central, semi- or peripheral.

Livingstone (1994, 57) usefully summarizes the contemporary methodological challenges and analytical assumptions involved in pursuing a historical materialist interpretation of social, cultural and educational realities rooted, as they are, in

material production and reproduction of life. As he sees it, there are three irreducible analytic assumptions that distinguish historical materialist inquiry:

> The first assumption is that the relationship between the owners of the means of production and the actual producers of goods and services provide a primary basis for the continuous construction of historical societies. The second is that in capitalist societies, characterized by exploitation of hired labor, it is among those dependent on selling their labor power that that the primary historical agency for transformation of the mode of production may be found. The third assumption is that the analysis of these production relations can have strategic political relevance for human emancipation.

Capitalist societies, it is well known, develop through the exploitation of labor power, the accumulation of surplus for profit and in the interests of those who own the means of production or the "ruling classes" in any society. Their interests and needs also tend to become the driving factors in the development of institutions, including the education systems of society. In terms of our theoretical problematic related to the SSA peripheries and the historical development of the region's education systems, the emphasis is on long-term processes, historical continuity, cross-national similarities (macro-generalities) and shared problems/challenges related to imperial subjugation and control of education and cognitive processes via language, racial and cultural subordination by one or more of the respective core imperial powers. The resulting structural and ideological commonalities borne from imperial incorporation and mode of subsistence, in my view, are usually absent or under theorized in country-specific and ahistorical structural functionalist studies of educational "development" theories catalogued by mainstream "mathematical economists and econometricians" (Balogh, 1964, 548-549) who seek exact positivist calculations and predictability in social analysis by ignoring the subjective forces or the role of

"consciousness" and class struggle in the course of historical change and transformations. Not only can men be distinguished from animals by "consciousness by religion or anything else you like" wrote Marx and Engels in the *German Ideology*, but by producing the "means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce" they realize their humanity much more fully.

The dominant macroeconomic studies of educational indicators and policy trends for so-called "developing" countries are eloquently profiled in World Bank documents and "sector" studies. Sectoral level analysis has tended to be fragmented and fragmenting of the constituent processes, interests, powers and social relations of production, exploitation and exchange that drive education and society in "prosystemic" (Ikeda, 2002) directions that world-systemic political economists study. The developmental-minded and ahistorical studies of education tend to theorize under the assumption of positivist objectivity and the notion that education is neutral and benign in its provision. More still, their authors believe that educational investment in human capital and their own national/transnational planning activities result in "improved economic conditions for the population as a whole" rather than certain elements of the population. This sectoral and "expert" human capital theory-driven approach to educational planning and development is excessively status-quoist and takes existing social structures "as givens and for granted" thereby a priori suppressing the social and subjective dynamic, conflict/polarizing effects of the whole (Ikeda, p. 104) "interplay between prosystemic and antisystemic historical processes" rooted in the contradiction of the reproductive processes of the capitalist world-system and the resistance of the producers and exploited nations. While the dominant positivist inquiries are obsessed with social order, historical materialist inquiry considers contradictions, class struggle and social conflict to be the driving force of the historical development of societies and the handmaiden of the transformative praxis to "change society" in an emancipatory or democratic direction. Education systems may be considered as a foremost "reproductive" ideological apparatus of states

but they are also a precondition for organizing emancipatory social praxis in the antisystemic direction.

To reiterate, the education apparatus in any state in the evolving capitalist world system is part of the institutional mechanism of the systemic accumulation process and cannot be isolated or "sectored" from the contradictory relations of coercion and subjugation/subordination and power relations involved in the exploitative historical development of the system. In the critical political economic tradition, the relevant world historical processes related to the historic "broadening" and "deepening" of capitalist development give rise to the interstate system or "multiple state-jurisdictions" which embodies a fundamental and "inherent contradiction" in the worldwide evolution of the historical system of capitalism (Hopkins, 1978; Wallerstein 1992). Hopkins (1978, p. 24) lays out the fundamental theoretical claim of this perspective:

> It is the articulation of the processes of the world scale division and integration of labor and the processes of state-formation and deformation (the latter in the twin context of interstate relations and relations of imperium) that constitute the system's formation and provide an account, at the general level, for the patterns and features of its development (hence the patterns and features of modern social change).

The result is not linear and evolutionary "development" or ever-improving conditions for the world's labor force at large and across "all" social groups and countries. In the articulation of these processes, the capitalist world system develops unevenly/unequally when it casts its relations of imperium on a global scale. The processes involved are polarizing on a local-national and world scale, resulting in the absolute enrichment of the better-off and further impoverishment, disenfranchisement, unemployment and illiteracy of those worse off. This deepening of "global capitalism and modern social change is enjoined with ever more intensive "peripheralization" and "corification" as expressed by Hopkins &

Wallerstein (1987). In terms of the proposed synthesis, the emergence and expansion of the modern educational institutions in SSA is theorized as an integral part of the historic relations of imperium forged over the centuries. In the midst of this macro-articulation of historical processes, one must remain focused on Bourdieu's injunction that education systems represent the "stakes and instruments" of world historic and contemporary struggles.

If we revisit the "Missionary" cycle of expansion in this light, its rise is associated with the rise of mercantilist capitalism in Europe of the Middle Ages. Since the "rosy dawn" of capitalism in medieval times (the mercantilist era), the expansion of European capitalism and relations of production was accompanied by the ideology of manifest destiny and the "civilizing mission" narrative which gave Christian missionaries instructional and ideological monopoly over the earliest forms of expansion of education in the region. During the long stretch of the mercantile era, the structure of accumulation was dependent on "the mobilization of slaves" from the wider SS African region. Throughout this long cycle, the foundation of native education remained the prerogative of European missionaries of various denominations. This practice continued well into the establishment of colonization when the colonial settler state began to take over educational governance and set the pace of educational expansion and development for natives. The patterns of peripheral accumulation and labor processes required similar structures of educational regime deemed appropriate for African "natives," regardless whether they lived in East or West Africa. Africans speak of the "totalitarian" character of the accumulation process in the African peripheries.

Under these circumstances, the path towards education for "natives" became part of the extension of the capitalist mode and relations of production and exchange to the peripheries. As Amin (1976, p.202) argues, the peripheral formations of the evolving international-world system are fundamentally different from those of the core: "while at the center the capitalist mode of production tends to become increasingly exclusive, the same is not true of the periphery", where pre-capitalist

economic and political modes persist. Moreover, "the forms assumed by these peripheral formations depend, on the nature of the pre-existing formations and upon the forms and epochs of their incorporation into the world system". This general analytical insight "enables us to grasp the essential differences that contrast the peripheral formations" with the "young central formations" as portrayed by world-systemic thinkers. Within this critical and materialist vision of world history and the development of capitalism, Amin is recognized for giving "greater attention" to the different and evolving roles and subordinate economic functions played by the peripheries-colonies and neo-colonies in the historical process of metropolitan-driven capital accumulation on the world scale. If the cyclical expansion of Eurocentric education systems and attending cultural forces are to be understood in this materialist and world-systemic light, core-periphery relations must be grasped as "categories of the world-scale division of labor" as well.

Continuing along this line of thought and method, we link our understanding of the cyclical educational expansion and incorporation process to the ongoing peripheralization of the non-European-regions within the "axial division of labor" of the evolving world and "interstate system" of capitalism. This notion of the single "axial division of labor" suggested by world systems thinkers draws attention to the methodological stance that single national economies can scarcely be understood in their own terms. At the analytical level, it points to the materialist conviction that human labor or social labor and the development of its productive capacities constitute a basic element in the emergence, development and change of human history. This philosophical and analytical perspective on the wider historical processes involved provides us with the "dynamic relational setting" to analyze the expansion of European modes of production and educational models over time and along with the deepening processes of incorporation and peripheralization.

In this analytical context, we may use the term incorporation with respect to identifying/distinguishing the educational/cultural dimensions and social processes aimed at incorporating African labor and resources into the international division of labor. Furthermore, incorporation "has the effect of creating new production zones with low-cost labor" which in turn feed "the ability of the world economy to expand" and "the possibility" of realizing higher rate of return and "higher share of global surplus accumulation" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 171) along with the perpetuation of lower wages. Various and specific forms of educational expansion into the region constitute part of the wider context and strategy of realizing this ability of "surplus extraction" over different historical time periods and circumstances. To be sure, the concrete and historical processes of incorporation involve the inclusion, economic and cultural, of an area "external to the world economy into a world-relational system" (Martin, 884). The processes move on unevenly and can span centuries. The main point is that the colonial education systems are central to the operations of the imperium and "at the service" of the essential needs of accumulation at the center, to use the language of world systemic thinkers.

This framework of conceptualizing the educational cycles as integral to the processes of capital accumulation on a world- scale makes it possible to integrate the historical and theoretical perspectives of world-systems researchers with those of the sociologists of international education/critical educators/scholars whose studies offer insights applicable to the sub-Saharan African region/Southern trajectory. I am thinking of scholars like Freire, Cabral, Fanon, Bowles and Gintis, Illich, Carnoy & Samoff, Giroux, Bernstein, Bourdieu and Apple who see education/schools as important elements in the reproduction of the ideological hegemony of the dominant classes and recognize that schools "create and recreate forms of consciousness" that reproduce important aspects of inequality. These political economists of education (Apple, 1990) remind us of the need to understand schools as sites of cultural production, distribution resistance and "in a more complex manner than simple reproduction," cultural subordination and

submission (Apple, 1990, 14). That is to say broader connections must be drawn between the content of the cultural capital "which schools preserve and distribute" and "the economic institutions and practices which surround it" to determine what drives the contradictory dynamics of educational expansion, incorporation and peripheralization during each cycle.

By linking the process directly with the imperatives of international capitalism and its structures and relations of domination and dependency, Carnoy (1974) was among the first education researchers to provide a historical-structural reappraisal of the dramatic educational expansion in "Third World" in the immediate post-independence era. His notion of education as "cultural imperialism" was a substantial contribution to the literature on African education, which had been encased in the "developmental" perspective dominant since the post world war ll era. In his view "schooling as we know it today and as it was spread by the Europeans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was and continues to be part of the capitalist social and economic structure" (p. 42). His interpretation of the role of education in societal change among the colonized was based on the theory of dependency and colonialism and within the context of the imperial international structure. Dependency theory rejects the conception of schooling as merely an "allocator of social roles" and "developmental" in content. Thus "the schooling that accompanied European influence and economic interests was and is part and parcel of empire" (p. 44) building since the metropole or core and its native allies dominate these institutions. Yet at the same time, Carnoy realized that imperial "education can be used to maintain imperial relations or to break them" (32) although the latter has proved rarer in the present international context unlike earlier periods of history of successful anti-systemic struggles.

Seen from this perspective, the four historical cycles of educational expansion proposed (ie., the missionary, colonial, post-colonial and globalized) coincide with different phases of the metropolitan accumulation process but are not

automatically reducible to changes in the latter economic processes/categories or so-called "laws of motion" of capital, most forcefully articulated by world-systems researchers (Wallerstein, Hopkins, Amin, Arrighi, Frank, Ikeda). In other words, the policy directions, institutional functions and practices of peripheral education systems cannot be mechanically "*read off*" the world-historical political economic transformations convincingly articulated by proponents of world-historical studies. That is, the complex and multidimensional factors that have shaped the relationship between educational expansion or schooling processes and the evolving global relations of productions throughout the significant historical cycles cannot be "automatically" reducible to the operations of the political economy of capitalism. While on this analytical note it must also be stressed that "educational planning and practices encompass conflicting priorities that cannot be reduced to a simple economic rationale" as proponents of human capital theory tend to do (Wotherspoon, 1998, p. 130). Again we must turn to the important concept of hegemony. Indeed, in the words of Si Okita, it was "not just the rise of capitalism, but its Europeanization, that led to the emergence of European hegemony (1985, p. 182). It is this attempted Europeanization of the colonized that much of the colonial education regimes advance and with considerable symbolic violence. Pursuing this line of inquiry further requires interpreting/illuminating what may be called the successive historical cycles of educational expansion and incorporation occurring within the movement (expansions and contractions) of the capitalist world-system. In country after country, the history of sub-Saharan Africa shows, amongst other things, how disastrous it is for nation's to be subjected to external cultural ideological and linguistic domination over the very longue duree (for centuries) or intergenerationally.

To gain a clearer historical and international perspective on this process, the study frames the issues within historical materialism and adopts "the relational conception" of world systemist thinkers (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1982; Ikeda, 1996, 2002). Within this framework, the Gramscian construct of hegemony will

be deployed towards a more nuanced and "extensive" dialectical conception of the cultural, ideological, linguistic and policy regimes related to the successive cycles of educational expansions and incorporation of the sub-Saharan peripheries. To a greater or lesser degree, the "West's" continuing hegemonic grip upon the people of the region is most crystallized at the level of schooling and in the scientific/technological, intellectual "scholastic/academic" and culture/ideology spheres. This hegemonic form of relationship exists not only throughout society but internationally and as Gramsci (1971, 350) reminds us, "Every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which a nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilizations." These broad theoretical and methodological principles and generalizations will be further elaborated and refined through an analysis of the available empirical and historical evidence bearing on the overall subject of educational expansion in the sub-Saharan peripheries of the world system.

Chapter Three

The Anatomy of SSA's Modern Education

1. Revisiting Pre-Colonial Systems of Education

"A people without the knowledge of their past history, origin and culture is like a tree without roots" Marcus Garvey

Contrary to the available historical evidence, there is a tendency in mainstream scholarship to shroud sub-Saharan Africa's pre-colonial past in mystery or present it as a continent hopelessly mired in illiteracy and ruled by witchcraft and shamanic powers prior to its "discovery" by Europe. Hegel's "historiless" Africa of the Negroe "race" and the archetypal "primitive man" of Levy-Bruhl or Manioni's "natives" awaiting to be historicized by Enlightened Europe and "modernized" by Judeo-Christian-Western education, provided the dominant policy perspective until recently. From our standpoint, this is an ahistorical and simplified representation of the region's people and distant pre-capitalist past. It draws on a tradition of supremacist myths and historiography concerning "the dark continent" and ends up justifying the "civilizing mission" of the great powers.

Prior to the region's incorporation into the expanding capitalist mode of production and world economic system through trade in slaves, minerals, crops and other natural resources, the people of sub-Saharan Africa had elaborated indigenous economic and social structures under the rule of dynastic states. These dynastic states interacted with the ancient civilizations of the Near East and the Mediterranean world, long before the emergence of Christian Europe into the picture. History records the growth of the trans-Saharan trading system and the conversion of most of the powerful traditional African royal dynasties to Islam. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the traditions of Islamic scholarship thriving in Sudanic towns along the trans-Sahara route. The maintenance of these complex pre-capitalist kingdoms without some form of educational transmission would be unthinkable. In other words, the existence of education institutions and written

modes of communication or age-graded schooling systems and the transmission of knowledge in the region is not an exclusively Western invention.

Africans in various parts of the continent had developed a wide range of symbols and means for communicating various ideas and concepts although the use of scripts was limited and often confined to a priestly hierarchy. In this connection, Geez (Ethiopia), Meroitic (Nubia), Hieroglyphics (Egypt), Bamum (Cameroon), Vai (Liberia), Nsibidi (Nigeria/Cameroon), Ajimi (Nigeria/Niger) the Adinkra pictographic system (Akan- Ghana,Ivory Coast) and others may be recalled. The pre-capitalist indigenous African modes of knowledge production and transmission are mainly understood through a few historians and Afro-centric academics, usually labeled "Egyptologists" like Diop (1974) or "Afrocentric" like Rodney (1972), who offer a persuasive documentary evidence of the political, social, organizational and educational accomplishments attained throughout the region we presently refer to as sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, more rigorous studies in this area is necessary.

In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the historical record indicates that sites for indigenous education and higher scholarly pursuits were in operation. In fact, the region may be considered as undergoing its own educational cycle of expansion at the moment that he encounter between Europe and Africa took place. The records of European navigators and "explorers" of the fifteenth century testify that the civilizations and states encountered by Europeans around the African littoral of the Atlantic Ocean had well-organized social systems and economic structures. In Diop's observation (1974, p. 23) "the political organization of the African States was equal, and often superior, to that of their own respective states." Culturally or morally speaking, they were no less or more evolved than the Greco-Roman civilizational entities that had brought about the "rise" of Europe and the "modern" planetary expansion of capitalism as a world-system. These African empires could not have existed, as early Europeans suggest, without the provision of education to their subjects, however limited and traditional in scope this may

have been. At the same time the economic processes of reproduction of the dominant empires of the Sudanic, Mali and Songhai empires leaned heavily on what Diop (p. 91) refers to as "domestic slavery" which enjoyed international repute and also provided a suitable point of access for European mercantile capitalism. The point is that the historical record speaks to the existence of a vigorous indigenous material and intellectual culture prior to the fateful encounter with the West and the violent process of incorporation.

Prior to its encounter with Europe, tropical Africa was experiencing a lively inter-regional commerce. Trade by camel caravan flourished across the Saharan region connecting West Africa with the Sudanic central African empires and the Eastern African coast with the Southernmost region of the continent. Overall however, it is conceded that "technical development was less stressed than in Europe" when the famous encounter took place in the fifteenth century. Rodney (p. 112) writes of Europe's obvious advantages in shipping technology, lethal cannons and modern firearms, still, in his view, the European systems of production and technology cannot be regarded as superior or more developed than those possessed by the indigenous African empires and state formations (from the tenth to the fifteenth century) of which Arab travelers and authors (Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, Al Bakri) wrote. What these writers have in common is to disabuse us of the misrepresentation that Africa was devoid of a literate civilization and what Diop calls the "current legend of the primitive Negro" (p. 23) and images of the noble savage prior to the encounter with the expanding world-system and Europe's civilizational currents.

In terms of sociological thought, this perspective holds that the famous contemporary "gap" between the West and Africans was not as pronounced prior to the region's encounter with the capitalist "West." In other words, there were perhaps an equal amount of illiterates, considered in the context of their own vernaculars and contrasting institutions, in pre-capitalist Africa and Europe of the Middle Ages. It was under these conditions that the Portuguese, Danes, French,

Dutch, British imperialist and merchants like the Brandenburgers "began to set up trading posts on the West African coast.." What occurred over the centuries is subject to controversial interpretations. Today, the indigenous languages, historic pictographic and writing systems and scripts of the region are either extinct or present an exotic background to the Roman scripts dominant in contemporary educational and intellectual pursuits across the region. Consequently, French, English and Portuguese continue to hold uncontested positions of hegemony as languages of instruction across African schools, especially at tertiary levels of education. Ultimately, I want to offer an analysis of a particular transformation in sub-Saharan Africa in which the subjection/incorporation of indigenous education and knowledge systems by the hegemonic world powers plays a decisive role in sustaining the evolution of the accumulation process and the division of labor maintaining the current world system.

2. The Missionary Cycle of Educational Expansion

> With the exception of some countries of the Asian continent, formal education provision in most parts of the world by the European mode, whose educational traditions derive from two main formative influences: Greco-Roman culture, and institutionalized Christianity. The former may well have been influenced by African elements, acknowledgement of which seems to have been suppressed...it is truism that organized religion and formal education go hand in hand (Brock & Tulasiewicz).

Both historically-structurally and logically the starting point of what we refer to as African education systems, including higher education, is rooted in the pedagogical practices of early European churches and their missionary orders. Beginning in the fifteenth century, the initial ***missionary*** cycle of educational expansion began gaining momentum along with the world historical economic processes known as the primitive accumulation of capital. We note the enduring longevity of this historical cycle, relative to the following ones. This initial ***"missionary"*** cycle of educational expansion stretches from the fifteenth century to the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

During the elaboration of this cycle of expansion and incorporation dynamics, educating the "natives" of Africa was seen as "the white man's burden" and considered the exclusive purview of the European clergy. For Christian missionaries of the era, what distinguished the African Negroes was the condition of heathenism and therefore savagery or failure to assume the life styles and likeness of the West and become Europeanized. The prescription was to use missionary education as a civilizing agency and salvation of the savages. Just as the capitalist commands the field of the peripheral production process the field of education and humanizing the natives was commanded and organized by missionaries. Thus during this cycle incorporation of African natives into "Europhilosophy" became the prerogative of various European missionary orders. The process started with the royal rulers and grew wider with the opening up of the interior to trade and commerce.

Just as organized religion and the provision of formal education for Africans went "hand in hand," so did the cycles of expansion with particular phases and forms of capital accumulation. Here too began the subjection of the African labor force to the earliest forms of "primitive" capital accumulation. As such, the onset of missionary cycle of educational expansion synchronized with what Marx referred to the "chief momenta of primitive accumulation" of capitalism by European nations at the end of the 15th century. During the course of this long period of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, the supply of labor for the New World's plantations and mines became the economic mainstay for generating Europe's industrial capital as well as the peripheralization of the region. The "commercial" methods of this era depended primarily on force, plunder and coercion and the systematic enslaving of so-called aborigines/natives or "Others" of the non-Europrean races continents (Capital Vol. 1, p. 703). Specific to the African region, Marx observed that:

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population,

> the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for commercial hunting of black skins signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of European nations, with the globe for a theatre.

The development of capitalist civilization and history at this juncture also became planetary, with "the globe" emerging as the theatre of the endless accumulation process initiated by the Atlantic-core merchant bourgeoisie. As capitalism expanded over large parts of the globe its demand had effectively converted the societies and empires of the West-coast of Africa as suppliers of slaves to the worldwide systems of plantations and mines around which in Amin's (see letter to Frank 1979, 9) estimate "all of America turns from the XVl to the XVIII centuries." Similarly, virtually the entire world-system began to turn on slavery. Wherever the agents of capital, including the missionaries, set foot, disease, large-scale agricultural devastation/expropriation, migrations, depopulations and war tend to be triggered. In the same process "great fortunes" sprung up "like mushrooms" to merchant houses and European monarchies sponsoring the slave trade. Quoting Howitt's "on the barbarities and desperate outrages of the so-called Christian race" towards "Others" the bourgeoisie, adds Marx (p. 704-706), set out "without restraint to model the world after its own image" and "proclaimed surplus-value making as the sole end and aim of humanity." Missionary pedagogical efforts and institutions thus became one of the most important levers for these proceedings and processes vividly captured by Marx above.

As the educator-thinker Illich (1992) has suggested, early missionary pedagogical efforts considered Africans as alien-pagans (a cultural tabula rasa) who must be saved and helped by the universalistic mission of civilization initiated in Europe. To be elevated to the new civilization, the Negro-African pagans must be instructed (evangelized) in "the language of prayer" and incorporated/converted

into Christendom. Hence the provision of education for natives in imperial tongues became "for four hundred years the white man's assumed burden" (94). In other words, the evolution of modern education in SSA finds its terms of reference in the hegemonic discourses of European Christianity and its secular manifestations, rather than exclusively and spontaneously in the production processes and social relations of the region.

The focus of world-systems analysts tends to revolve around economic (surplus production/exchange) and political reproductive processes (intra-state and class relations). Their perspective tends, in my view, to understate the cultural and ideological or "subjective/qualitative" components of the global accumulation process. It is, to be sure, in the field of what Bourdieu and Bernstein refer to as "symbolic control" rather than the politico-economic movements where the regulative effects of language, culture and consciousness become most manifest. Hopkins (22-23) concedes this point when he suggests "there is a definite place where processes of consciousness and ideology enter as integral to the theories on a world scale. But it is also here that we come to an abrupt halt theoretically" and look at what might be called the writings of "third world" intellectuals like Du Bois, Williams, Freire, Fanon, Memmi. They, amongst others, might "point the way towards the kind of theory of consciousness that appears indispensable to an adequate theoretical account of the process of unequal exchange."

I read this to be a form of deference to the integral historical experience, insight, judgment and resistance of these Third World and subaltern intellectuals of the peripheries. To them the appropriation of surplus-value and institution of unequal exchange relations involves more than contending with lower wages. It instills civilizational subordination and self-negation, which find their way into the regulative structures of imperialist ideologies that inform the nascent education apparatus and "pedagogic communication" established by mission and later colonial schools for natives.and much later by the "experts" of the Bretton Woods institutions. It is mostly due to the work of the critical sociologists of education

that we have a better understanding how "pedagogic communication" functions as what Bernstein (1996, p. 39) refers to as "a relay for ideological message and external power relations" and how schools/classrooms play their part "in legitimizing some identities and de-legitimizing others." The delegitimation of the African identity and "subjectivity" as well as the culture and history of the people informed the missionaries' pedagogic communication and its "codes" were transmitted through the limited educational provision for Africans.

The problem of imperialist cultural transmissions and "racialized" ideology, inherent in the education process of natives or the colonized has been a central issue for these Third World thinkers. Fanon (1972, p. 16-17) draws the interconnections between the externalization of the world system and incipient colonization of the mind/culture complex of the "natives." He states the matter forcefully when he writes "expropriation, spoliation, raids, objective murder, are matched by the sacking of cultural patterns...the social panorama is destructed; values are flouted, crushed emptied" under the official doctrine of salvation and assimilation. It is important to remember that this form of predatory and exploitative interrelationship between the expanding "West" and the natives was not restricted to SSA.

From his research into the cultural universe of African and Latin American peasants in their rural-agricultural setting, Freire observes in almost similar terms how the impoverished people of the peripheries have been denied not just their economic and political freedoms but their essential humanity and "historicity" (i.e., ideologically and structurally prevented by foreign domination and exploitation from becoming authors/agents of their own historical transformation). The conditions of imperial domination and "historical-cultural climate" of pillage, occupation and systemic colonization re-oriented the transformative possibilities of the peripheries to serve their imperial purposes, or in Freire's words, "the society in transformation is not the subject of its own transformation" (pp.129-130). The two processes, that of economic exploitation

(quantitative data) and cultural control/domination and (qualitative data) are reciprocally linked in enforcing the widespread "cultural of silence" that Freire writes about. In the words of Sekou Toure (1972), cultural power tends to be "the container and contents of economic and political power." What is known as symbolic control thus functions as a potently "oppressive weapon in the hands of the exploiters" who organize and restructure global process of domination and regard the indigenous cultures of the people as *bete noire* (60). To him, as other leaders/intellectuals of the peripheries, the educational expansions in question come at the objectionably high cost of suppressing indigenous ideas/cultures and identities or what Mazrui (1986) refers to as the practice of "dis-Africanising Africa" without consulting indigenous cultural continuities. Fanon rightly emphasizes that the process of incorporation and official doctrine of assimilation involves acculturation and deculturation at the same time (p. 22). This practice has long-term implications for the consciousness and development of the colonized or dominated people.

In the cultural and symbolic domain, the mercantilist extension of the modern capitalist world-system brought in its wake a Manichean Christian ideology and social consciousness. Manichaeism is a concept which dates back to a heresy in the 3rd century AD. It apparently "propounded a dualistic theology, according to which Satan was represented as coeternal with God. Matter was evil and God by his nature could not intervene in the world of evil matter. In the world of Fanonist and post-colonial studies, the concept depicts the self-referential and "binary structure of imperial ideology" (Ashcroft, Griggiths, Tiffin 2000, p. 134) which polarizes society and races into irreconcilable categories of extremes as part of its mission - black and white, pagan and Christian and them against us, master and slave and so on. As Jordan (1994, p. 16) emphasizes, according to Christian cosmology "Negroes stood in a separate category of men" altogether. This religiously-sanctioned inferiorization and forced immigration of youthful African labor to profitable use overseas was apparently "in tune" with mercantilist theories of the era which Bacon (1606) described to James I as gaining a "double

commodity" which allows for "avoidance of people here, and the making use of them there" (Williams in Northtrup, 1994, p. 5). From the above sketch, the ideological justifications for culturally enslaving or converting Africans during the missionary cycle of expansion were doctrinal and mercantile, with the latter rationale assuming a directive force.

Simply put, the principal commercial interest of the great powers in this region hinged on the riches of the slave trade first initiated by the Portuguese imperialism. As Rodney (1972, p. 92) points out, "the records show direct connections between levels of exports from Africa and European demand for slave labor in some parts of the American plantation economy." Whether by capture in war, kidnapping or sale, "the Atlantic slave trade" emerged as an adjustment to "external" factors and strategies requiring the "forced emigration-shipment" of millions of Africans to the New World as commodities. It is also common knowledge that the teaching of Christianity was deployed to sanction and justify the cruel international trade in slavery carried out by the leading imperial powers. Still, its extent and its enduring and baneful influence on the political economy and consciousness of the region's inhabitants is less talked about in the context of education discourse.

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3. Atlantic Slavery and Religious Instruction

> I speak of the Christian religion, and no one need be astonished. The Church in the colonies is the white people's Church, the foreigner's Church. She does not call the native to God's ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master of the oppressor. And as we know, in this matter many are called but few chosen (Fanon 1963, p. 32).

Organized religion and commerce in human beings (slavery) held no contradiction to mercantilists. Indeed, they tended to go hand in hand, as it were. The Portuguese-Spaniards in particular "made a great point of baptizing the slaves" before branding them with hot irons (as evidence of ownership) processing and packing them into ships for the "middle passage" necessary to make use of their labor "there" (i.e. in the plantations and quarries of the New

World). Part of the official processing involved "catechists for slaves" (catequizador dos negros/dos escravos); according to Miller (1994, p. 131) "normally, clerics were responsible for their religious instruction, none could be processed through the custom house without a bilhete (chit or pass) certifying their knowledge of the Catholic faith and their baptism." These bilhletes may be seen as the earliest forms of "credentials" for Africans to negotiate the postmodern "Middle Passage" to the West. In any case, European enslavement involved a large scale, systemic and forcible movement of the most productive people from agrarian-based production and civilizations across continents. The end was legitimized by both the economic and religious doctrines of the era, which held the Negro-African to be an inferior species.

The center of gravity for this human trade began "at least" by 1450 with "Portuguese sailors traveling the coast of Africa supplying an emerging European market for house slaves" and soon spanned across the entire Western African coastal zones and the hinterland of central Africa. African slave labor soon became the basis of production and "unequal exchange" as new and more intensive forms of intra-state European rivalry/competition appeared in the wake of the Portuguese successes. More lethal firearms and larger slave ships entered the competition. As Davidson (1980, p. 70-71) recounts it, "the French and English grew bolder and were joined by Dutchmen and Danes and Swedes, and afterwards by the Prussians." The enterprise was gaining greater momentum as the region was becoming commercially incorporated into the evolving capitalist world economy via the slave trade. The flow of missionaries and diplomats to the region continued as did the inauguration of mission schools around the coastal territories and further inland.

To be sure, there was an equally devastating Eastern slave trade centered on the Eastern Coast of Africa that went on for centuries and developed extensively "in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (Klein, 1994, p. 118) exerting similar pressures, raids and warfare in search of African captives bound for the Eastern

slave trade via the Islamic Middle east, the Ottoman Empire and further towards India. There is a conservative estimate in Held et al. (1999, p.293) that "4.3 million people from north east, east and central Africa" had made this journey by 1900.

The Trans-Atlantic slave trade in particular, heralds the incorporation process of both the Caribbean islands and large parts of sub-Saharan Africa into the expanding world capitalist-system. The cultural-social devastations, dislocations, depopulations and overall psychic/moral and economic consequences to the region and its peoples can only be imagined from the estimates of the captured and transported Africans presented by Held et al. (1999, ibid.). Although estimates range anywhere from 10 to 30 million, Held uses Curtin's data and suggests that "contemporary historical debate has settled on a figure of around 9-12 million transported between 1445-1870." As the literature suggests, the practice of slavery was becoming routine, religiously sanctioned and commercially "normalized" by the time European powers codified the trading systems and mechanisms of the emerging "interstate system" through the Treaty of Westphalia 1648 (Wallerstein, 1992).

It is an established historical fact, acknowledged or otherwise, that generations of Trans-Atlantic slavery provided the economic impetus for the growth and development of the modern capitalist world-system. A vital part of the overseas trade endeavors of these mercantilist core states vying for dominance in the emerging world-system, the cannon and slaver's whip alone could not safeguard the world-scale reproduction of slavery. The coastal towns of Whydah connected to Dahomey and immortalized as a "slave-mart," Porto Novo, Andra and other outlets or "entrepots" of the trade in the Southern Atlantic were administered under successive indigenous rulers/monarchies or their representatives "educated" by missionaries. Missionary education was not available to all. Privileged members of traditional African ruling classes or dynasties who would cooperate with Europe's trade/diplomatic representatives and secure the necessary

commodities for the emergent world market would be the first to have access. Thus converted/incorporated native "ruling groups" in every cycle have the function of safeguarding a certain economic, political and legal-hegemonic order conducive to the accumulation of wealth by the European merchants and indigenous royal houses.

The relationship of hegemony was forged by "educating" the traditional offspring of African kings and royal chiefdoms in the so-called Christian ways of Europe. As such, the personalities who had initial access to Western education tend to be drawn from what Polanyi (1966, p. 104) refers to as their own "Royal Cousins." For instance the emperor of Andra, which grew to become a major port of the new slave world-scale economy by the mid 1600s, was educated in a Catholic convent on the Isle of Saint-Thome and openly expressed his preference for "the Most Catholic monarch, the King of France." Another ruler of the period, the king of Commendo (present-day Ghana) was promptly put to death by the local Dutch trading company for having been friendly to the French and thereby risking the Dutch "sphere of influence" and privileged access to the "slave marts" of the region.

From the moment Portuguese merchants initiated their first slaving forays in the coastal areas of Angola and Guinea, the coastal areas of West Africa had begun their incorporation into the emergent international division of labor and world market. The intra-European commercial competition was intense and fueled by investing merchants and European monarchies, eventually allowing the Dutch to acquire the notorious island off the Cape Verde coast known as Goree from the local African ruler. African slavery thus formed one of the pillars of Holland's preponderance in international commerce, manufacturing and industry, which was surpassed by England by the beginning of the 18th century. According to experts in the area, the old Dutch East India Company was forced to concede to the supremacy of its British namesake.

In this particular region, writes Polanyi (1966) discussing the Dutch pursuit of the slave trade in the region, "they built two forts" and in the opposite mainland "they ran up store houses and established a 'factory' - which meant a trading post" where nothing was manufactured. The dominant export-economy of the region was constructed around slavery (i.e. the forceful extraction of labor-power from the region and the hinterlands to the metropoles progressively). As Marx declares in the Poverty of Philosophy "without slavery no cotton, without cotton no modern industry" to express the pivotal character of trans-Atlantic slavery in the industrialized reproduction of the capitalist world-system and the development of its advanced-mechanized core and backward-labor intensive peripheral structures.....The more European 'core' capitalism moved towards the eighteenth century and the 'industrial revolution' the slave trade which incorporated vast regions of Africa became less Portuguese-Dutch in rhythm, but rather Franco-English (Polanyi, p. 121) thereby consolidating the economic dominance and hegemonic position of the latter powers in the interstate system and the African peripheries well into the twentieth century.

Although the motive force behind slavery was economic rather than racial in the sense that "it had to do not with the color of the laborer, but the cheapness of the labor," (Williams, 1994, p. 10) the legacies are racial subordination. Citing archival (1518) correspondence between prominent officials on the cruel calculus of mercantilism, Williams wrote that the "Spaniards discovered that one Negro was worth four Indians" and the history of the New World and the construction of the world system became inextricably tied to labor supplies from Africa. Whatever the rationale and calculus, without the trans-Atlantic slave trade, which grew in intensity and volume in the following centuries, the early developments of the capitalist world system would have been unthinkable nor, we might add, the enduring racism and racist doctrines, which became an established feature of the densely accumulated pseudo-scientific discourse against Negroes and sub-Saharan Africans over the centuries. C.L.R. James' (1994) thought expresses the implications of this history for social scientific thought rather clearly. To think of

imperialism in terms of race alone is disastrous, but to neglect the racial dimensions of this capitalist process of exploitation as "merely incidental" leads to an error of judgment at least as grave as to make it fundamental. That racism is all-pervasive and an indissoluble part of capitalist-imperialism is no longer at issue, at least, for those subjected to its indignities on a daily basis. In the larger sphere of counter-systemic political praxis, the debate continues whether the question of race may be subordinate to that of class or not. But the issue gets more complicated if we pursue the issues in this debate.

By way of conclusion to this section, let me say the following. Throughout the region, the missionaries' long-lasting and exclusive authority/control over what came to constitute mission schools for African natives began to wane towards the last quarter of the nineteenth century, giving way to the "colonial" cycle of educational expansion and the emergence of the colonial state and bureaucracy. This apparatus gradually took over the administrative reins and policy initiative governing the education of natives.

4. The Colonial Cycle of Educational Expansion

> Colonial domination, because it is total and tends to oversimplify, very soon manages to disrupt in spectacular fashion the cultural life of a conquered people. This cultural obliteration is made possible by negation of national reality, by new legal relations introduced by the occupying power, by the banishment of the natives and their customs to outlying districts by colonial society, by expropriation, and by the sytematic enslaving of men and women. The colonial situation calls a halt to national culture in almost every field (Fanon, 1963, p. 190-191).

What are known now as public education systems throughout the region of SSA today have their institutional origins in colonial conquest and the intra-imperialist division and re-division of the "Black Continent." Henceforth, the existing African-indigenous cultural practices were relegated to "folklore." Outside small "enclaves" of the evangelized and what were considered educated strata or "Europeanized Africans" direct and extended contact and communication with Europeans was a late nineteenth-century phenomenon, and "colonization occurred

essentially only after 1885" as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 (Appiah, p. 103-104; Fage, p. 326, 1988). That is to say, prior to the colonial phase of European imperialism, the "cultural life of most black Africa remained largely" outside the sphere of direct European intervention, colonial administration and patronizing/inferiorizing Christian ideological penetration. During this cycle many new nation-states emerged in the region and the global intra-state system was transformed to reflect the European balance of power and imperial interests in Africa at the time. The emerging era of systemic and "direct colonization" process has left its legacy in the region's developing national educational structures and institutions of higher education whose evolution pose a special interest for this inquiry

The onset of this particular cycle of educational expansion also corresponds to wide-ranging changes in world systemic relations. The nineteenth-century colonial "Scramble for Africa" was a crucial watershed in transforming the evolving relations between the dominant cores and the subjugated peripheries. It had a substantial impact on the course of the world's economic and political history. The Conferences of Berlin entrenched the parceling or balkanization of the peripheral region's territorial, economic and political structures between the core's rival empires as colonies. For the next seventy-five years of the direct "civilizing mission," wrote Rubin & Weinstein (1972, 89) the invading and conquering Europeans "had established new trade networks and reoriented part of the economy, they had founded and staffed new schools to teach their language and technology" to Africans in the process creating new state formations, national identities, new class cleavages and political demands and, of course, anti-colonial resistance movements. The latter represents what Ikeda (2000) succinctly diagnosed as one of the major and uncompleted anti-systemic processes of the "long" twentieth century. The reorientation of the economy and the installation of colonial education system are closely related processes.

That is to say, ultimately, any attempt to understand the complexity of the educational system's expansion and "functions' during this cycle requires understanding the nature of the colonial state. The colonial state in organizing this colonial situation was typically led by white supremacist settler-colonial interests, or bourgeois fractions spawned by the various metropolitan ruling classes in the course of the nineteenth century's heightened intra-imperialist rivalry/competition for the treasures and big markets of the whole world. During this cycle, the various spheres of influence long cultivated by the great powers had to be conquered and incorporated as profitable colonies and dependencies. Citing Driault in his work on imperialism, Lenin clarifies how "this is why all Europe and America have lately been afflicted with the fever of colonial expansion, of "imperialism" that "most noteworthy feature of the end of the nineteenth century" (Lenin, 1967, 744). During this period, the "***colonial***" cycle of educational expansion began to take shape within the formation of the colonial "settler" state and in the form of colonially administered public schools.

Broadly, this period of colonial encroachment and occupation led to the establishment of the "colonial situation" (Fanon, 1963, p. 31-35), which is characterized by a racial "dichotomy" and division the settler-state "imposes upon the whole people." In this racially divided world seemingly "inhabited by two different species" the contrasting ways of life and immense "inequalities" are reflected at every institution and level of the human condition. In every instance, what matters concretely in the colony is "the fact of belonging or not belonging to a given race." It is a racially divided world, where the reigning Manichaeanism "goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes the native" and turns him "into an animal." Notwithstanding the absence of a clearly defined apartheid principles, the colonial situation was "based on an absolute refusal to regarded the African as a human being" equal to the colonizer. This was implied in Europe's "mission civilisatrice" executed with various degrees of brutality. There is clearly a difference in method and detail between the colonialism of the British in Kenya,

the French in Senegal, the Belgium in Congo and Portugal in Angola, but education was deployed in a racially disparaging mode.

Fanon zeroes in on what he considers the specificity or "the originality" of the colonial context (p. 31) otherwise known as the colonial situation. "In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich." Indigenous class distinctions and layers had not yet properly formed to obfuscate the racialized patterns of ownership, privileges and provision of education. The above pattern of history, similar in broad outline across the region's colonies, had the effect of biologically crystallizing the social structures in the colonies. One lives in certain parts of the colonies or works in certain industries or attends certain schools because of race (i.e., by birthright more than by merit).

In the colonial context, it is clearly the white colonial statewhich commands history (Cabral, 1969, p. 75, Fanon, p. 32) and accumulates wealth. Only whites are seen as embodying any sense of humanity and industriousness. The settler paints the native as a sort of "quintessence of evil" both lacking in civilized values and as "the negation of values." Still, from the standpoint of forging the international division of labor, the region was being gradually incorporated into the reproductive cycle of world capitalism and the interstate system as a zone specialized in cash-crop agricultural production and mineral extraction or at the low-skill end of what Wallerstein refers to the world's "commodity chain." Arrighi and Saul (1973, p. 68) reemphasize that "compared with other areas of the underdeveloped world" a "classic" pattern of "extractive imperialism" characterized the region's mode of incorporation. Needless to say, this legacy has wreaked far-reaching imbalances, inversions and "extroversions" in the internal sociopolitical, educational structures and skill formations of the region.

This particular stage under discussion witnessed the foundation of so-called "formal" and secular native education systems in the African peripheries. The

influences of the missionary cycle of the education remained in the background of subsequent educational developments. Even in non-mission schools, the instructional and conceptual language of schooling (Bernstein, 1996) was couched in religious cosmologies and racialized ideologies of imperialism. Otherwise known as Black Africa, as opposed to Arab North Africa (Maghreb), a "racialized" and distinct sub-Saharan region (SSA) began to emerge and acquire discursive saliency during the era of what Hobson/Lenin describe as imperialism or that "most noteworthy feature of the end of the nineteenth century." The notion of the "dark continent" referring specifically to the Tropical sub-Saharan area populated by blacks/Negroes began to gain academic-anthropological currency.

In this sphere, Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1981) along with Cabral, Fanon, Rodney, Nkrumah, amongst others, embodies the critical voice in African thought when he raises the issue of culture and education for Africans. For instance, with regard to the historical role played by colonial education, he suggests that it is "part and parcel of the thorough system of economic exploitation" set up by the core's ruling classes. He argues that cognitive/cultural power variously expressed as education, literature or language has always constituted a major agency of domination and control or "cultural imperialism" and becomes even more pronounced during what he calls "the latter phase of imperialism in Africa." The problem as he sees it is that "the colonized" who are privy to these hegemonic cycles generally end up by being bound to see the world "as seen, analyzed, and defined by the western ruling classes" (60-61) whose epistemological perspective and "definition of social reality was rooted in European history, race, culture, and class." As Fanon (1972, 13) might say in the colonial situation set up across the region, imposed "occidental values" begin to masquerade as universals in the provision of education for colonized countries. On their part, the colonized are instructed to perceive and judge themselves through "the filter" of these occidental values enforced by the colonial administration.

5. Educational Expansion in Colonial "Settler" State Formations

> The settler makes history; his life is an epoch, an Odyssey. He is the Absolute beginning: "this land was created by us"; he is the unceasing cause: If we leave, all is lost, and the country will go back to the Middle Ages.' Over against him, wasted by fevers, obsessed by ancestral customs, form an almost inorganic background for the innovating dynamism of colonial mercantilism (Fanon, 1963, p. 40).

Notwithstanding the divergent frames of thought between the missionaries and the colonial administrators on the delicate subject of native education, there was consensus on the need to run the colonies profitably and efficiently, and to instruct "subject races" along Christian lines and in the economic interests of the "mother country." In the African colonies, there was what amounts to a division of labor between the heavenly and earthly representatives of the metropolis when it came to administering the education process of natives.

The decisive fact here is that it was the "settler" colonialists who laid the foundations for what were to become the region's formal education systems during the next major cycle of expansion. For now, this particular cycle saw a pattern of colonial elementary, secondary and post-secondary institutional growths, which extended educational opportunities to a limited number of Africans. The process of expansion in the new cycle also allowed more secular colonial textbooks rather than scriptures "a proportionately greater role" in the socialization of the African child (Lilly, in Managan 1993). This process of settler-state-led expansion of education lasted well into the 1950s when the "counter-systemic" forces of decolonization disrupted the existing racialist ideological and structural parameters of peripheral reproduction through colonial labor regimes based on extractive industries and cash crops.

It is commonly recognized that the basic motivation of colonial education policy during this period was to provide schooling and training "for a small minority of the indigenous population that was needed to serve the colonial powers interest" and comfort (Rubin & Weinstein, 1974). This is a common function of all

colonial education systems, whether governmentally run directly by the settler-states or in government-aided mission schools and vocational training facilities. Colonial schools were to serve as civilizing, moralizing and socializing agencies for preparing "inferior" natives to participate in the semi-skilled jobs needed to run the externalized "modern" economies on behalf of the colonizing powers. As theorized by critical educators like Fanon, Cabral, Freire, Macedo and Giroux (Freire & Macedo, 1987, p. 143), the phenomenon of schooling in these colonies takes on an added dimension of "deculturating the natives" while acculturating them into a "predefined colonial models" and imagery defined by the European colonizers. Thus:

> Schools in this mode functioned as part of the ideological state apparatus designed to secure the ideological and social reproduction of capital and its institutions, whose interests are rooted in the dynamics of capital accumulation and the reproduction of the labor force.

In other words, the general formation of the colonial state and its educational apparatus for "natives" constitutes part of the broader government-enforced institution-building processes on which the region's extractive incorporation into the wider processes of capital accumulation and unequal exchange is predicated. It is a truism that every colony needs a "suitably educated" subordinate-staff and low-cost African labor forces. Together with monopoly over land, economic and political power the European settlers defined the limits of native education.

During this cycle, the common sense colonial belief that Africans-blacks "knew no education until the Europeans came" prevailed and was rarely challenged (Rubin & Weinstein, p. 207). It had its corollary in the "arrogant assumption by the colonial rulers that there could be no education without schooling as it was known in Europe." In a similar vain, what was subsequently institutionalized and taught in the emerging schools was fundamentally Catholicism, Portuguese, French, English or German but certainly not "African" in terms that the great masses of the region recognize. Almost nothing about schooling was based on the

languages, social needs, subsistence interests and underlying historical processes of Africa's subjugated populations and communities. The imperial curricula projected a vast array of racial mythology and stereotypes about the "dark continent" and its inhabitants. Most importantly, these illuminate the premises behind the policy thinking of the times. In sum, through complex administrative and legal means, the educational needs and limits of achievement for the colonized were set or defined by the colonizers.

This colonial cycle of educational expansion is embedded in a particular type of state and logic of conquest, economic exploitation and cultural subjugation associated with the latest global transformations of capitalism. Boahen (1987, p. 58) gives us the broad and characteristic features in the region by the "end of the first decade" of the twentieth century, a period associated with the initial conquest and intensification of colonial policy:

> Despite the spirited defense of opposition put up by the Africans, the colonialist imperialist conquest and occupation had been almost completed, thanks mainly to the maxim gun; and the continent of Africa had been carved up into colonies of different sizes and shapes among the imperial powers of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. As we have seen, the most important reasons for the partition and occupation of Africa were the need for raw materials to feed the factories of industrial Europe and the need for markets for sale of manufactured goods.

However powerful, the maxim gun alone was not sufficient to construct the colonial situation and extract the wealth and profits to sustain the extended occupation that was colonialism. To realize its interests and ends more or less permanently, the colonial state laid out the necessary administrative infrastructures, including those of public education "to produce educated Africans to be employed in the various sectors of the economy as well as in the civil service" (Boahen, 58). Herein lies the broader context for the genesis of the so - called modern public educational systems of the region. It constitutes, ultimately,

the ideological instrument of colonial society and the cultural propagation of its economic interests and values.

Clearly, education was expanded to support Western penetration into the native societies with the intention of incorporating their energies, wealth and cultural life into the monopoly channels and modes of accumulation first explored by Hobson and Hilferding and Lenin in particular . The sociopolitical conditions and mechanisms involved in facilitating these developments and the concomitant generation of "monopolist profits" from the colonies are complicated and operate at various interacting macro- and micro-sociological levels with the emergence of native education playing a crucial role in legitimating this process.

Classical Marxist historiography locates the educational apparatus of the modern state, as a pivotal site of capitalist reproduction, accumulation and legitimation processes. Marx and Engels emphasized the class origins of the modern secularized state and approached it as a coercive and bureaucratic apparatus, a "mechanism" of domination and control in the interest of capital and the "ruling classes" concerned. Marx reveals the state's inherently violent and expansionist tendencies both within the national and international spheres, a tendency necessitated by the need to reproduce itself in tandem with the expansion and concentration of capital on a world scale. At the most basic level, the modern state apparatus of the bourgeoisie primarily ensures the subjugation of the working classes and peripheral peasants to the "market" dictates and logics of surplus value extraction and global accumulation. Understood in its generic and institutional-coercive capacities, Althusser has called the state a "machine of repression... and surplus value extortion" (Althusser, 1971, p.133) which also institutes a form of ideological subjection that ensures provisions for the "reproduction" of the skills of labor power. The state in the colonies is also a machine of racial exploitation.

The civilizing and democratizing characteristics of the capitalist state was not the distinguishing element of the state in the case of the conquered colonies. Instead, the settler state was a racist-totalitarian apparatus and responsible for brutally expropriating land from Africans, enforcing the cultivation of certain cash crops and mining enterprises over others. The re-direction of production processes and labor power in the interest of the industries and "surplus" of the "mother countries." The "civilizing mission" wrote Kenyatta (Cartey and Kilson, 1970, p. 26-27) was in method and motive more destructive than constructive, It disorganized Africans in order to "exploit and oppress them." The first step in this process, especially in South and East Africa, was to take away the best African land' and disrupt their ability to reproduce their means of production and livelihood. In various ways, this destruction formed the basis of their incorporation into the wider capitalist mode of production or CMP.

The rapidly accelerated colonization and administration of the African region in the early 1900s included extreme measures that disrupted the traditional African modes of production and indigenous education systems. It was an enterprise of outright expropriation, material and cultural, "grounded in the use of organized force." The colonialists proved utterly ruthless in their pacification campaigns, which assumed genocidal proportions in Eastern, Southern, Central and West Africa. More importantly, for our purposes, colonization called "for the invention of a Euro-racialist hegemonic ontology" (Okita, 1985) appropriate for incorporating the wealth and labor power of Africans into the evolving "axial division of labor" underpinning the "imperialist restratification of the universe" during this particular phase of capitalism.

This destructive and racist enterprise was reflected in the discourse of distinguished European architects of colonialism. Resistance of any form was dealt with by force and massive slaughter. For instance, the Governor of Sierra Leone during the famous Hut Tax War (1898) suggested that "the only argument understood by Africans was that of force" (Ukpadi, 1970, p. 368) rather than

negotiation, diplomacy or compromise. Colonial policy was administered predominantly by superior force of arms and civilizational claims of "superiority" which expressed themselves dramatically across the colonial institutions and schools for "subject races" in the "Euro-racialist" ontology of the time. The provisions of "government-run" primary schooling defined the early period of the colonial cycle of expansion.

As the colonial state entrenched itself throughout the region, firmer control over the colonial subjects was exercised, among other means, through the organization and control of public education systems where missionaries still played a key role as teachers and ideologues in colonial schools. The more the colonization process was advanced, control of the educational system began to be wrested from the ecclesiastical hierarchies of the various religious orders and centralized by the settler state. In the previous cycle, it will be recalled, the missionaries had exercised near-monopoly over the education of Africans. This trend cannot be overstated. Missionary orders continue to influence and administer educational provisions in many countries across the region today. In the rural hinterlands, mission schools largely administered the population's literacy and "stations missionaires" whose authority over various levels of educational institutions continued to expand and decline unevenly across the region. Instead of their previous alliance with the colonial states, they continued collaboration with the respective Ministries of Education since "independence" and the onset of the Bandung cycle. For instance, long after independence, in Gabon private and religious-oriented schools "enroll over 40% of all students." Likewise in Lesotho, where "the administration of the schools is a joint venture between the government and the Christian churches and Swaziland where most primary schools are "operated by Christian religious groups and are government-aided." This is also the case in Zimbabwe where a particularly bitter war of national liberation was fought. Here too, the churches have "substantial investment in education" (Urch, p. 85, p. 133, p. 139, p. 142) and will continue to have them in the foreseeable future. Thus the missionary cycle of educational expansion and

the "Euro-racialist" ontology it propounded can be said to persist residually alongside the rise and ebb of imperialism and the subsequent educational cycles.

Again, broadly, during the Colonial cycle, the needs of the colonizers and metropolitan powers determined the institutional parameters of what an African education system is expected to consist of and achieve in the colonies. In this way, educational expansion became a vital part of the colonial institutional mechanisms to continue the subjugation and exploitation of Africans in the name of the "mother country" and the sacred trust of "civilizing" the populations incorporated into their sacred dominion, as it were. In many of the colonies where the most productive means of production and subsistence of life, their land, was expropriated, the capitalist settler-farmers begrudged even the limited and inferior education reserved for native Africans under imperial "trusteeship." In their view, the evolving system of native education led to diversions from their privileged and endless supply of cheap and abundant labor. Too much education for Natives could create an educated class of Natives who dare think "its spiritual, economic and political home" to paraphrase Verwoerd (Tabata, 1960), might be among the civilized community of Europeans.

Chapter Four

Education as an Instrument of Neo-colonialism

1. The Decolonization Process

Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor a friendly understanding, Decolonization, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say that it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. (Fanon, 1963, p. 27).

The key to understanding the onset of Bandung cycle of educational expansion lies in the historic force of decolonization and the subsequent Africanization of the colonial settler state. This was a gradual process driven by several world historical changes. Within the first few decades of the end of World War II, the major colonial empires had begun to implode under the multidimensional impact of intra-imperialist rivalry and anti-colonial nationalist struggles. The impending processes of political decolonization had unleashed formidable anti-systemic processes and movements for national liberation. This had occurred on a world-wide scale and was not limited to the region. The structural roots and political aspirations of what I have called the Bandung cycle of educational expansion are rooted in the post -World War ll world-historical movements of "decolonization."

The anti-systemic dynamics of decolonization were of such magnitude that they gave rise to the beginning of a new historical epoch transforming the world-system and intra-state relations in a fundamental way. Within the contradictory tide of decolonization and beginning in the late 1950s (1957 Ghana's independence), I am suggesting that the "neo-colonial" or Bandung educational cycle began to take shape across the newly independent nation-states of the region. Almost without exception, in the early days of transfer of sovereignty, policy-makers gave considerable attention to expanding the educational

infrastructure and "manpower" capacities of the new countries. This was justified through the discourse of nation-building. In Nkrumah's (1970, Kartey & Kilson, p. 217) words the politics of neocolonialism "gives the appearance of nationhood to the African territory but leaves the substance of sovereignty with the metropolitan power." Even more importantly, the decisive weight and levers of economic powers remain in the hands of foreign multinational and settler interests. The beginnings of the new Bandung cycle of educational expansion are inextricably bound up with the demise of the colonial state and the emergence of the neo-colonial system of "independence."

However, although the momentous world-historical changes associated with this period were significant, the dominant features of imperialism and established patterns of the formal colonial education systems and the underlying mode of production were rarely questioned. Indeed, having done away with the segregationist colonial laws and entitlements, the African "national bourgeoisie" elite that emerged as politically dominant in the colonies adapted the institutions of the colonial state and extended the formal education systems initiated during the colonial cycle. It is important to bear in mind that what is essentially a colonial education system expands across the region within the structural limitations of this "neocolonial" political economic set up and the imperialized relations of production. In other words, the rule of the national bourgeoisie is chatracterized by the appropriation of the colonial state apparatus and the crucial struggle to "Africanize" its higher structures and personnel in order to pursue "modernization" and "development"

The mechanisms of this neocolonial "transfer of sovereignty" were routine except in places like Algeria, Mozambique and Angola where armed struggle had reached an advanced state of conflict and contradiction. In most countries of the region, the more educated (lawyers, doctors, academics, accountants, teachers and so on) of the colonies organized themselves as the vanguard of the "moderate" nationalists and negotiated for "self-rule" with the colonialists. Eager to pre-empt

the "radical" strands of nationalisms from taking root, imperialism began to devolve power to these comprador elements on a "silver platter" as it was referred to in the case of Nigeria. The persistent and violent exclusion of what were considered "radicals" (those universalist intellectuals who think their spiritual, economic and political rights are equivalent to those of "civilized" Europeans and identify the class element of their struggle) was part of the Cold War geopolitics that had began to shape the possibilities of the region. In every case, economic nationalism and class analysis of the decolonization process was considered a transit point for the dreaded Communism and violently discouraged by the imperialists.

To recall Mondlane's (1970, p. 352) personal experience, the colonial powers had come to believe that "radical" nationalist intellectuals "had been infected with a communist virus and with an incipient spirit of black nationalism that should be eliminated as soon as possible before it infected other Africans." Consequently, they went to great lengths to promote a "dialogue" with "moderate elements without the dreaded "spirit" and growing anti-imperialist ideology in the course of the 1950s. By the time political independence swept across the region in the early 1960s, a small group of moderate and Western "educated" Africans had became the new leaders of the proliferating "independent" nation-states (Urch, 1992) and their all important ministries of education. This ministry now became a major institution to satisfy the surging popular demand for more education for "Africans" and to propagate the national bourgeoisie's numbers and rule.

In general, this emergent and wider postwar-world international trajectory was defined by the entrenchment of the bi-polar international system, the emergence (1944) of the supra-national monetary and regulatory Bretton Woods institutions (The International Monetary Fund or IMF, World Bank (WB) and the post -World War ll phenomenon of what Teeple (2000, 178) calls the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) which was essentially "a rationale for state intervention in the economies of the industrial nations" during the so-called Cold War. Postwar rebuilding and

the KWS emerged with U.S capital in position of international dominance and having by far surpassed that of Britain, the declining imperial power. The transfer of imperial hegemony to the rising global power was underway and a form of benevolent U.S.-led multilateralism began to crystallize around the Bretton Woods institutions.

What Gramsci referred to as Americanism and Fordism assumed economic and political leadership of these new developments in international capitalism during the post-war period. A growing United States hegemonic economic umbrella and military protection began to extend across the "free world" both to incorporate the newly independent states and top safeguard against the rising world-wide "Communist threat." As for incorporating the ex-colonial "Third World" that had suddenly emerged on the world-historical stage, the antidote was found in what came to be known as "modernization" and "developmental" discursive formations. Zeleza (2002, p. 66) explains:

> Developmentalism emerged after the Second World War following the discovery and problematization of poverty and backwardness in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It was fuelled by four forces: the modernization demands of African and Asian nationalist movements, the antidependentist struggle of Latin American revolutionaries and reformists, the anti-capitalist revolt and rhetoric of the expanding socialist bloc amd movements, and the neocolonialist designs of the former imperial powers and the postwar multilateral agencies. In short, development theory emerged in the contexts in the context of decolonization, the long postwar boom as a guide for colonial and ex-colonial states to accelerate national economic growth.

Clearly, in the immediate post-war transformations of the Marshall Plan, remarkable quantitative economic growth (in terms of GDP and GNP) was registered in the core countries and to a lesser extent in the colonial peripheries.

The interregnum saw, by all accounts, a period of unprecedented expansion of international capitalism. Western Europe, Japan and US-led international capitalism were thriving from the ashes of World War II. The period captures, in economic terms, a relatively prosperous era of enormous surplus value generation and expansion of the "Fordist" mode of capital accumulation centered in the US. All along, the proverbial winds of change were blowing from the "South" and the growing frustration and nonalignment movement of colonized peoples was gathering strength and momentum.

As we can see during this transitional period "the colonial preserves of European imperialism " were being opened up by a US multi-national whose dynamism was, by all accounts, complemented by the processes of "decolonization" mainly directed at the dominance and hegemonic presence of European colonizers. Indeed, it could be argued along with Rubin & Weinstein (1974, p. 279) that in contrast to, for instance, the Latin American region, America's serious involvement "in Africa coincided with the beginning of the process of decolonization" and the impending emergence of a large number of "independent states" disregarding for a moment the historical cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Despite the winning of "sovereignty," however, the sub-Saharan region's export-oriented and exploitative colonial economy remained unaltered and extraction of surplus became rather more intensive (Arrighi, 1970, p. 225). Postwar developments also led to increasing dependence on European, and more importantly US or Japanese capital. These patterns and shifting internal and worldwide relations grew even more pronounced as an array of indigenous "petty bourgeoisie" fractions, in Cabral's (p. 110) words, progressively gain the upper hand and give "free rein to its natural tendencies to become more bourgeois, to permit the development of a bureaucratic and intermediary bourgeoisie in the commercial cycle and to transform itself into a national pseudo-bourgeoisie" to better facilitate foreign investment and growth by aligning itself more closely with the wishes of international capital of the new multinational and tripartite variety.

For the radical nationalists, this type of "sovereignty" represented a "betrayal of the objectives of national liberation" (p. 102) and of the masses of the African people striving for freedom but still dominated by imperialism, its unequal exchange practices and unrelenting cultural/cognitive oppression transmitted, amongst other institutional channels, through the colonial education systems, vastly expanded by the new indigenous leadership. The education systems were seen as quintessential vehicles for "becoming" more bourgeois, like that of the metropolitan countries, as visualized by the dominant policy orthodoxy of developmentalism.

The US was keenly aware that these prospective "sovereign" states would soon emerge on the world-historical scene as autonomous members of the multilateral agencies and "interstate system" constructed under its relative global domination. Consequently, its policies selectively promoted "independence" and reintegration into the changing structures and processes of capitalist/modern historical system through a political power "made up mainly or completely by native agents" or what amounts to the same thing i.e., neocolonialism maintained by indigenous "junior partners" who dominate the neocolonial state.

Given these and other notable postwar developments like the formation of the United Nations (UN) and its Universal Charter of Rights, it had become not "unreasonable" to echo Chinua Achebe, to accept the idea of human equality, liberty and the right of nations to self-determination for which Africa's nationalist leaders had long agitated and died for. Compared to the European powers, Washington was a relatively late arrival on the Africa's modern economic and political scene. But in the transitional climate of the 1950s, write Rubin and Weinstein (1974, p.279) "the ties between the United States and Africa" had become extensive "at the private level there have been *inter alia*, considerable growth of trade and investment, the development programs concerned with Africa in the 2000 American universities and other institutions of higher learning...' In

other words, a concerted US economic and academic or "ideological offensive" was underway, in Simpson's (2002, Bond & Gibson, p. 66) words " to attempt to influence or recruit future leaders from around the world" and define the shape and direction of the developmental programs and official modernization discourse. The purpose, in the long-term, was to create an international "environment" as developmental theorists like Rostow and Milikan had prescribed, "in which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve." In any case, such tendencies would be crushed.

What is important to note is that this sudden flurry of US material and cultural attention bestowed upon the region was not based on crude economic-financial calculations and or altruistic considerations. It was more an assertion of a geopolitical interest in the shape of the emerging world order and about fundamentally re-aligning the general processes of the world-system and inter-state relations comprising a "system of multiple states of unequal power" (Hopkins & Wallerstein 1987, p. 768). The agenda was economic, military and educational. It included, continues McKay (p. 279 in Rubin & Weinstein) "the provision of generous funds for various aspects of African development, by such organizations as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the Carnegie Endowment."

Washington's agenda was premised on comprehensive anti-communist geopolitical strategy related to asserting military, economic and diplomatic interests and safeguarding the expansion of Western capitalist political ideals and institutions globally. The educational and cultural dimensions of its foreign policy followed from its new-found role as the rising hegemonic power. In this capacity, Washington had always conflated its struggle against genuine national liberation struggles in the region with its global struggle against communism. Unfortunately, this translated into support and long-time collaboration with tyrannical African dictatorships and white supremacist apartheid-based government policies in the Southern African context. Until quite recently, historically speaking, there was no

significant difference for Washington between Mandela's struggle and international communism. Both had to be contained militarily and through the central "Cold War" rhetoric of American moral leadership and defense of the democratic and civilized "free world."

The primary weapons of the Cold War became ideologies, culture and social science, forging alliances with foreign aid, high technology and behind them all, the juggernault of capital in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) overseas. These aspects of US foreign policy, I believe, have influenced the political economic and the intellectual and ideological life and "evolution" of the region during this crucial period. In this "ideological offensive" Simpson (1998, xxix) reminds us how "politically liberal intellectuals" from the US "articulated and rationalized" what came to be known as "development and area studies" to serve US strategic and academic activities abroad though "frequently at considerable cost to scientific integrity and to the peoples being "developed." Development and area studies are still with us but have gone managerial and neo-liberal, as it were. We will try to discern the major historical processes of this world-systemic movement and how they interact with events in the SSA colonies turned neocolonies, ironically enough, through the process of decolonization. This will help us reach a more detailed historical understanding of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the "developmental" discourse associated with educational policy-making and expansion. Also, in order to better understand what I have called the Bandung cycle of educational expansion, a critical encounter with the African national bourgeoisie state is necessary.

2. Preventive Transfer of Sovereignty

We have seen that violent usurpation of the freedom of the process of development of the productive forces of the dominated socio-economic whole constitutes the principal and permanent characteristic of imperialist domination, whatever its form. We have also seen that this freedom alone can guarantee the normal development of the historical process of a people. We can therefore conclude that national liberation exists only when the national productive forces have been completely freed from every kind of domination (Cabral, 1969, p. 102).

For our purposes, the beginnings of the new cycle of educational expansion are inextricably bound up with the emergence of the neo-colonial system of "independence" which in Nkrumah's (1970, Kartey & Kilson, p. 217) own words, "gives the appearance of nationhood to the African territory but leaves the substance of sovereignty with the metroploitan power." Specifically, in this system of international relations the decisive national economic powers "productive forces" remain in the hands of foreign multinationals encroaching oligopolistic US corporations and settler interests. Thus "transfer of sovereignty" without the economic wherewithal to enforce legitimate national rights and freedoms leads to a regional drift towards neocolonialism.[2]

The persistent exclusion of what were considered "radical" nationalists was part of the Cold War political vector that had began to make itself felt with US rising influence over the geopolitics of the region. As Grendzier (1998, p. 69) appraises the environment "the policies offered in the name of development were often designed as preventive measures to inhibit radicalization while exploiting the common endorsement of socioeconomic and political change." Clearly, the security of the US's "free World" and what is euphemistically known as the

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[2] The coinage of "neo-colonialism" is attributed to Nkrumah, the visionary and first President of Ghana. An ardent pan-African revolutionary, the notion that neo-colonialism constitutes "the highest stage of imperialism" was one of Nkrumah's themes in many of his writings. Under Nkrumah, Accra served as the unofficial capital of the pan-African liberation movement-struggle "the liberation of the African people from all forms of social injustice and economic exploitation." Nkrumah was deposed by a CIA-sponsored coup in 1966 while he was in Beijjing. Nkrumah moved to Guinea, as honored guest of fellow pan-Africanist Sekou Toure

"development" of the Third World were intertwined and the latter process had to resolve itself without endangering the economic needs and security of the US-led "Free World."

To recall Mondlane (1970, p. 352), the colonial powers had come to believe that "radical" nationalist intellectuals "had been infected with a communist virus and with an incipient spirit of black nationalism that should be eliminated as soon as possible before it infected other Africans." Thus, retreating colonialists went to great lengths to promote a "dialogue" with "moderate elements known to be impervious to the dreaded "virus" spreading in the course of the 1950s. By the time political independence swept across the region in the early 1960s, a small group of "moderate" and Western "educated" Africans had been vetted out to become the new leaders of the proliferating neo-colonial albeit "independent" nation-states (Urch, 1992). Thus despite the momentous anti-systemic changes witnessed during this period's transformations, the dominant features of the colonial economy, international trade relations and established patterns of the formal colonial educational system were rarely questioned, beyond removing the blatantly segregationist colonial laws and reinscribing the race-based entitlements enjoyed by the colonizer. It was also evident that in contrast to, for instance, the Latin American region, America's serious involvement in Africa "coincided with the beginning of the process of decolonization" and the impending emergence of a large number of neocolonial "independent states" (Rubin and Weinstein, 1974, p. 279).

The US was keenly aware that these prospective "sovereign" states would soon emerge on the world-historical scene as autonomous members of the multilateral agencies and "interstate system" functioning under its relative global domination of the "free world." Consequently, Neocolonialism selectively promoted "independence" and incorporation into the changing structures and processes of capitalist/modern historical system through a political apparatus "made up mainly or completely by native agents" (Wallerstein, p. 589, Cabral, p. 00) considered at

the time as "valid interlocutors" or "qualified representatives" of the African people.

Compared to the European powers, Washington's "crusading moralism" for democracy and freedom from colonialism thus appeared like a breath of fresh air in Africa's post-War economic and political scene. As far as the political demands of the Third World are concerned, the US appeared on the "right side" of the process of decolonization and the growing demands for independence from colonialism and "development" of the colonized economies. Overseeing pivotal postwar developments like the formation of the United Nations (UN) and its Universal Charter of Rights, it had become not "unreasonable," on behalf of the "civilized world" t (Achebe, in Cartey and Kilson, 1970, p. 163) to finally accept that the Enlightenment ideas of human equality, liberty and the right of nations to self-determination, actually apply to Africans as well. The famous Nigerian writer Achebe articulates the popular sentiment in this respect:

> Whether we like to face up to it the or not Africa has been the most insulted continent in the world. Africans' very claim to humanity has been questioned at various times, their persons abused, their intelligence insulted. These things have happened in the past and have gone on happening today. We have a duty to bring them to an end for our own sakes, for the sake of our children and indeed for the safety and happiness of the world. And we includes writers. In the past four hundred years Africa has been menaced by Europe... Arrogance, contempt, levity – these were some of the attitudes. That great imperial poet called the African "half devil, half child."

In whatever way it came, freedom from colonialism was an idea whose time had arrived after World War II and American foreign policy seized the opportunity to make inroads into a region dominated by European imperialism. Thus, in the anti-colonial climate of the 1950s "the ties between the United States and Africa" had

become extensive "at the private level there have been *inter alia*, considerable growth of trade and investment as well as scholarship and academic exchanges. Underlying all the moralistic discourse of "self-determination" and "democracy," at stake was the construction of the post-war international system of accumulation and inter-state relation inclusive of the Empire's third world subjects. Washington was making overtures towards the emerging nationalist leadership of the region. The hegemonic ideological offensive to recruit "future leaders from around the world" (2002, Bond & Gibson, p. 66) was informed by the doctrine of what came to be known as "developmentalism." The long-term purpose of this doctrine, in the worlds of its founders, was to nurture and create an international environment in "which societies which directly or indirectly menace ours will not evolve" (Rostow and Milikan). Anti-communism and developmentalism thus became synonymous in Washington's policy initiatives towards the region.

To underline this policy vision for the Third World, Rostow's opus about "Stages of development" was sub-titled the "Anti-communist Manifesto." Rostow along with Milikan and Pool, amongst others, was a member of the CIA financed and "subsidiary enterprise" MIT Centre For International Studies which elaborated the "development of programs concerned with Africa in the 2000 universities and other institutions of higher education, and the provision of generous funds for various aspects of African development, by such organizations as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the Carnegie Endowment." (McKay, 1974, p. 279). The object was to orient the emerging leadership in the direction of developmental programs and bourgeois aspirations rather than espousing economic nationalism or socialism or Marxism-Leninism as was quite common during those years. These considerations made a big difference between supporting a leader like Lumumba or a Mobutu for emergent African states.

Along with theses developmental programs, academic and political initiatives, diverse social engineering and psychological projects like Camelot were conceived "as a means of bringing social science to bear on the task of managing

national liberation movements." Alternative discourses on development were declared hostile to Western powers' interests and incompatible with existing development programs. For the most part, these initiatives provoked counterinsurgency against perceived threats and long-time collaboration with emerging one–party dictatorships, pro-US tyrants, warlords and various white supremacist and apartheid-based government policies in the Southern African context until the late 1980s. Unfortunately, the advent of neo-liberalism has not lessened US hostility to alternative forms of national, social and political arrangements in the peripheries, despite the passing of the "Communist" threat. A new threat in the form of political Islam or "Islamofascism" has already been resurrected.

3. **The Multilateralization of Development Economics**

"We defend and we build a way of life not for America alone but for all mankind" Franklin Delano Roosevelt (during World War ll).

With the independence of more and more African nations under the leadership of the aspiring national-bourgeosie, the era of collective imperialism and neocolonialism had begun (Nkumah, xiv, 1967) under the discourse of developmentalism. In this emerging model of development, the peculiarity of "Western rationalism" and the universality of its patterns of development and thought appeared as a kind of secularized missionary activity, dedicated to the extension of the "American dream," "democracy" and "free enterprise" worldwide. As the pre-eminent "capitalist power" of the moment, Washington was in a favorable position to "restructure the postwar world to reflect its own interests" (Teeple, 2000, p. 53) which had reached global proportions. National and multilateral Educational planners of the day based their analytical models on development economics and what is more specifically known as human-capital theory. We will return to the assumptions and implications of this theory when discussing the details of the Bandung cycle of educational expansion in the next piece below.

In general, development theory holds up Western developed capitalist societies as rationally developed utopian blueprint (models) for "developing" Third World societies and their stock of human capital. As Hall (1996, p. 218) sees it in his essay Formations of Modernity, "this idea of a universal criteria modeled on Western patterns of development became a feature of the new 'social sciences' to which Enlightenment gave birth." The analytic model for modernizing the human resources or/and developing the subaltern races towards a higher GNP as achieved in the advanced capitalist cores was an off-shoot of the new postwar disciplinary ferment surrounding development economics and development studies as a whole. The developmental programs conceived for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa became the fields of "modernization" studies and the post war American disciplinary science referred to as "development economics" or development studies.

Under Washington's auspices, the Bretton Woods institutions (BWI) signaled a movement towards a new international monetary and political regime. In effect, in Teeple's (p. 54) words, the future members of the UN had "created an exchange-rate mechanism by setting the parities of national currencies against US dollar" and also established two key institutions "the International Monetary Fund (IMF and the World Bank (WB)" which would grow to influence the scope and direction of educational expansion and later reform discourse in the peripheries. Initially, writes Teeple (p. 54) "the IMF was intended to regulate international trade balances" whereas its "general function" amounted to "a sort of Magna Carta for a future world economic order." On the other hand "the World Bank was designed to manage international fund for economic development" but soon grew to dictate and prescribe social and educational policy directions. As former US Under Secretary of State Philip Coombs emphasized, education and culture had became the "fourth dimension" of Washington's foreign policy (Kelly & Altbach, p. 31). With these regulatory institutions in place, the US was well on its way to defining the architectural and discursive framework of the new accumulation process and patterns of neocolonial intra-state relations.

The World Bank's mandate underwent a notable and deliberate transformation under the long presidency of former US Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara (1968-81). Before tenure, his predecessors had been corporate and establishment patricians "bankers and businessmen" predominantly interested in "doing business with sovereign governments "according to George & Sabelli, (1994, p. 38-39). The purpose was to achieve more economic growth and development through free enterprise. Initially, educational investments were a minor concern compared to capital investment in infrastructure. Moreover, and this is important to development studies, the Bank had no particular concern for poverty, beyond "mobilizing" the poor states into various nation-building projects consistent with the assumptions of goals of developmentalism. With the accession of McNamara, formerly US secretary of Defense and well-known practitioner of mathematical (quantifiable) modeling and decision-making processes, the entire discursive and policy-making parameters of the Bretton Woods institution had undergone a metamorphosis in emphasis, if not in substance. With his extension of a quantitatively oriented macroeconomic administrative technique to developmental studies, McNamara literally restructured the meaning of the Bank as both a lending and disciplinary institution. George & Sabelli (1994, p. 52) argue that this turn of events had "deeply marked the Bank's thought and action" and overall policy vision in the coming decades. In their view and I concur "the developing countries McNamara wants to help protect are not in fact countries at all but once again governments ruling against large numbers of their own people." During the period McNamara tenure at the Pentagon and the Bank, such governments had only to raise the specter of "Communist subversion" to obtain imperial "protection" and corner the benefits of developmental aid and assistance funds for themselves. The mention of "terrorism" appears to serve the same purpose today.

Mc Namara personified the rise of the US "military-industrial- complex." With the Vietnam conflict in the background, he introduced new quantitative cost-

accounting management techniques, targets and grids to measure lending and project priorities that accord with American foreign policy objectives. At the same time, new development theories and perspectives based on "institution-building" and so-called "basic needs" of the poor were being articulated by an elite group of social scientists and "development experts" associated with the World Bank and the other multilateral and specialized UN institutions advancing the multifaceted development of the Third World through "free enterprise" and US hegemonic leadership of the "free world." Coming as it does towards the end of the first decade of independence, this analytical shift is critical in understanding the Bank's ever-present populist discourse against "poverty" and its commitment to eliminate it. Concrete successes in this area have proved elusive so far.

Suffice it to say here that education development gradually became central to the Bank's poverty reduction strategies, culminating in the well-known structural adjustment policies (SAPs). The very coinage of the term "structural adjustment" is attributed to McNamara. According to its website, the World Bank has been helping advance education in developing countries since early 1963 and remains today the world's single largest provider of external funding and policy planning-advice for education in SSA. This is important in understanding the major forces and institutions, both constraining and enabling the operations of the "Bandung" cycle of expansion.

4. The Bandung Cycle of Educational Expansion

"Give me public education for a century and I would change the world" (in Degni-Segui, p. 59).

As highlighted in this simple statement attributed to Leibnitz, the power of education constitutes one of the most important resources and interventions of the modern state. Education shapes citizens' subjectivities, collective experiences and beliefs, in short their social consciousness. As such, classical economists have, at least since the days of Adam Smith, ventured to analyze and understand the contributions of education to the development of the economic system. The father

of "free market" capitalism, Smith himself wrote on the subject extensively and considered education the basis of self-improvement, social peace, stability and the all-important economic progress of society. Hence, we have both the micro and macro rationale why modern states should support a measure of mass public schooling for the citizenry.

To put it simply, an educated population is the basis for a stable state, economic progress and towards achieving the promises of the Enlightenment. Education, in the view of classical economists of the nineteenth century, helps in the creation and improvement of human skills (human capital) and the accumulation of physical capital. Both are considered equally necessary aspects of raising the production level of society (national productive forces) and civilization broadly considered. To achieve these deeply entrenched and idealized expectations of the modern education system, education policies and schools function with an overriding purpose of enhancing the overall economic, social and moral welfare of citizens and society. This was also the expectation prevalent in the newly sovereign SSA neo-colonies of the early 1960s. This human capital conception of the education system as a whole was something of a "taken-for-granted" (Abdi, 2003) or article of faith in development studies, one enthusiastically shared among the leadership of the "emergent" states.

Implicitly or otherwise, every education theory embodies a certain conception of social and economic structures and their development. In this case, developmentalism and human capital theory combined to justify the discourses surrounding the expansionary processes referred to as the "Bandung" cycle. In no uncertain terms, the dominant structural-functionalism discourse of **human-capital theory** of the time suggested that investment in formal "European type of education" (Balogh, 1964) and training would directly promote the desired "manpower" conducive to economic development in the colonies-peripheries. This conception of education also offered a particularly appealing doctrine to international education planners of the time. In time, its premises were adopted by

the neocolonial states that initiated the Bandung cycle of educational expansion. During this state-led cycle, the expansion of formal education came to be regarded as a harbinger for accelerated capitalist growth and developments commensurate with the imperial cores. These rather abstract, ageographical and atemporal formulations on the functioning and purpose of education systems were severely tested as the decades of independence moved on.

In contrast to the preceding colonial cycle of expansion, the Bandung cycle was initiated with the consent and cooperation of the so-called "national bourgeoisie" (NB) of SSA. In this particular quest to expand the education systems, they enjoyed the "continued contribution from the erstwhile metropolitan countries and other bilateral aid as well as with the help of international organizations" (Balogh, 1964, p. 526). With the onset of political independence, the provision of free public mass education and schooling had become a near-universal aspiration if not a political necessity for the neocolonial state leaderships of sub-Saharan Africa. Typically the irrepressible "social' demand for more educational provisions and opportunities cut across all classes and countries. To satisfy demands, the new states typically proceeded to build on the educational facilities and systems left behind by the colonialists.

It is necessary to bear in mind that during this expansionary cycle, the challenges were tremendous for the NB state. The inherited condition of the "public education" system was underdeveloped and entangled in the well-known colonizer-colonized logic of native inferiorization, exploitation and domination. As the evidence clearly shows, the provision of quality or widespread education of natives was not one of the hallmarks of the colonial state. At the end of the colonial cycle or by the early 1960s and the beginning of the postcolonial period, only "16% of "the children of school age" (Balogh, p. 326) in the sub-Saharan African region received any form of education. A further distinction can be drawn here. At the time of independence and the beginning of the "Bandung" cycle of expansion, the region's rate of illiteracy exceeded other regions of the world.

Citing UNESCO's 1957 figures for illiteracy "North America 3-4 per cent, Asia 60-75 per cent, Africa 80-85" Doob (1961, p. 173) draws a more nuanced picture of the region's illiteracy. Namely "the highest rate of 95-99 per cent were found Angola, French Equatorial Africa, French West Africa, Mozambique and Spanish West Africa. The lowest figure of 70-75 per cent was estimated to be in Uganda; and the next lowest 75-80 per cent- in Gold Coast and Kenya." The case of Kenya will be revisited in the appendix.

Acting on their convictions and interests, the national bourgeoisie launched a widespread expansion of the education system. The actual expansion process, however, was guided more by "developmental" and political considerations rather than education theory *per s*e, since the period was an era where, in Foster's (1982, p. 9) words "no body of research or analysis existed that could provide adequate policy guidelines for educational planning designed to maximize economic growth" either in the centers or the peripheries. In other words, the analytical and predictive capacities of international education analysis at the time were underdeveloped. Still, the absence of scholarly research/evidence or precedents in the annals of international education did not deter the NB political leaders and UN-UNESCO's institutional "mathematical economists and econometricians" from attributing "sensational effects" to education. Consequently, their members recommended and supported an expensive educational expansion programme that assumed that more education of "whatever level and type," resulted in more economic growth for the new states and the people of the region. In the process, a kind of "iron law of education" (Balogh, 1964, p. 551) closely analogous to the Rostovian "iron law of stages" of development was taking hold in international educational policy-making and indigenous leadership circles who take over power "at the end of the colonial regime" in the peripheries. The role of the African NB leadership's, rather than the nationality of the colonial masters, is more crucial in understanding the new cycle of educational expansion.

To reiterate, the Bandung cycle of educational expansion is state-driven and becomes a class project of the national bourgeoisie constructing the states. Educational expansion thus emerges at the center of the newly independent states strategy for development. Just like the colonial process of expansion fell prey to the colonizing state's imperatives, the Bandung cycle was wrapped up in the logic of the notorious one-party states, which presided over the expansion process and allocation of educational resources.

Under the direction of the new leadership, the "the human capital" doctrine became akin to a ruling state idea. In this respect, the Addis Ababa Conference (AAC) of sovereign states (May 1961) upheld this human-capital doctrine, plainly summarized as "education expenditure results directly in improved economic conditions for the population as a whole" (Balogh, p. 549) and proceeded to act upon it. The overriding objective of the Addis Ababa plan was to "establish full educational coverage for the country as a whole" and within a relatively short period of time. It committed the states to provide full primary enrollment by 1980. An unwise pledge perhaps? Yes. because, the degree to which this project of "full primary" enrollment has not been realized forever stands as a condemnation of the NB African state and its educational policies in particular.

Incidentally this basic challenge remains to be realized. With the NB state increasingly in retreat and bankrupt, the historical time-frame for its accomplishment has been moved to 2015 or by 35 years by the Education for All (EFA) (1991) Jomtien agenda. We shall look at the EFA "world consensus" educational movement in due course but note here that EFA's dateline was reinforced by the resolutions of the United Nations Millennium Development Declarations (MDDs) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) lately designed for "ending Africa's poverty trap" by the international community. A central target of these MDGs is achieving universal primary education, reversing the spread of AIDS and reducing world poverty by half. There is already controversy whether SSA or the majority of its 53 sovereign states are able to

accomplish any of the eight goals set out by the UN and the international community of states and the growing INGO-NGO community organized to "fight poverty" in Africa. This has become a major preoccupation of G7 summitry of late. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is at the forefront of this MDGs and Blair's own "new approach towards Africa," has injected a note of realism by warning that "at the present" rate SSA will miss the key targets by "more than hundred years" and "free primary education would not be available until the year 2130" (BBC, Jan. 17, 2005). That is fifty years after the original projections of the AAC!

Why did the NB fail to deliver on their pledge? The short answer is that political decolonization had little effect on changing the centuries-long economic dependency of the politically "independent" social formations and imperial education systems of the region. Writing about the post-independence education system of Nigeria, Mustapha (1996, 115) wrote something that applies to most of the region's states. Once in power, the NB started controlling the levers of national educational policy-making and the disbursement of education funds and, therefore, opportunities. They pursued this through various government agencies and nation-wide commissions that oversee primary, technical, nomadic education, colleges of education, and the universities. But at the bottom, the system was based on the 6-3-3-4 colonial model with the idea "that students going on to senior secondary school can choose between commercial, technical and grammar streams." In reality, however, the staff and materials that are needed to imitate the Western model were sorely lacking, denying the system the necessary flexibility and credibility. In the end, the former colonial system was simply modified and adopted to fit into the new reality. The NB states used existing economic conditions and colonial institutions, with superficial changes, to legitimize themselves internally to the people by expanding educational opportunities. They also ingratiated themselves with the imperial masters by, more or less, maintaining the exploitative economic relations and ties intact.

In other words, the NB education systems modified and expanded the existing colonial structures and institutions to serve the new purpose. Although their original targets for universal education proved over-optimistic, the newly sovereign states of the early 1960s did expand public education considerably.

Carnoy (1974, p. 50) elaborates that in general "the changes in the nature of imperialism, then, had important effects on the expansion of formal schooling ...yet, little or no change in the social structure accompanied this expansion." In other words, authoritarian political practices and extractive modes of accumulation for export continued without modification, either in peripheral production processes or labor and employment structures of the new states. Economic development in SSA, after a brief spike, proved illusive as the years of independence moved on. The pace of educational expansion, as we will learn below, also began to decrease by the beginning of the 1970s.

The important fact, for us, remains that with formal independence, the state-driven cycle had unleashed an unprecedented expansion of educational opportunities across the sub-Saharan region. In fact, the region witnessed a "fourfold" expansion at the primary level alone. A useful international comparative perspective on the regional condition and magnitude of expansion can be gleaned from Fosters' (1982) comprehensive analysis of the educational policies of postcolonial states:

> The period 1950-1970 witnessed a remarkable growth in formal education provision in postcolonial states. At the primary level, enrollments underwent a fourfold expansion in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding the Republic of South Africa), while in South and Southeast Asia they increased by a factor of three. To be sure, the rate of primary school expansion has now peaked in the latter two areas, dropping from a quinquennial rate of growth of almost 40 percent in the period 1955 to 1960 to less than 20 percent in 1970-

> 1975. However, the pace of expansion has not markedly diminished in sub-Saharan Africa, falling from 36% in 1955-60 to only 33 percent in 1970-1975.

At first glance, this speaks well to the NB efforts to address the staggering levels of illiteracy and poverty left by the colonial legacy. It also begs the question why the initial rate of primary school expansion had gradually declined and virtually come at a standstill in SSA by the early 1980s. Also, why has a critical mass of expansion not been achieved at any level or anywhere in the region? Most critics tend to look toward what Balogh (546) refers to as the "new rulers of Africa" or "African elite" who in Balogh's view are "soaked in the archaic attitudes of their metropolitan predecessors" and the ineffective educational discourses current among powerful "educators of the metropolis" who pretend to "derive a rate of return on capital investment in growth" (p. 551). This is a methodological and ideological critique of the intellectual dependency of the NB and what came to be known as the "rate of return analysis" school in education thinking which had began to be deployed by international education planners and World Bank experts towards the latter part of the 1960s.

Then there is a political critique. Besides having to respond to the popular "demand for education," this approach assumes that the NB was obliged to act in its own class interest, expressed in terms of "Africanizing" the colonial state apparatus. In his pioneering analysis of this NB or "under-developed middle class" which lacks economic power, Fanon had predicted that it "will have nothing better to do than take on the role of manager for Western enterprise" (1963, p. 122-128) and argued that this native middle class is unproductive and under-developed and likely to go down the path of Latin America's dependency and towards a "dead end" in developing the rich potentials, both human and material, of the region. Watching in his own days "the setting up" of government offices and services that "swell to huge proportions" not due to development and specialization, but rather because "new-found cousins and fresh militants are

looking for jobs and hope to edge themselves" into the newly-inherited governmental apparatus" he had cautioned "a different policy should be followed" (Fanon, 150). His brilliant analysis and prognosis on the region has proved more durable than his critics of the developmentalist and liberal "Left" variety.

In Fanon's nuanced analysis the play of hegemony and class dynamics of the post-independence period comes to life. In his prognosis, the dominant African national bourgeoisie emerges as a pseudo-bourgeoisie, "a bourgeoisie in spirit only" which uses its "class aggressiveness to corner the positions formerly kept for foreigners" and settlers. Members of this group use education to gain access to the economic leverages that would constitute them as a class in the Marxian-economic sense of the term. Moreover, since their members and their children stand to gain most from this "educational explosion" they tend to aggressively promote educational expansion and present it as a panacea for development. Ever "convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country" writes Fanon, the NB sets out to occupy the foreigner's positions in the administration of the state and hope to attain "their" professional wages and lifestyles in a hurry. Education and credentials become the means and hence their most important capital.

Broadly, the NB is comprised of the "educated" sectors of the colonized population and, therefore, subject to all the constraints and possibilities offered by the colonial system. As we have seen, the emergent NB was unable to accumulate a significant amount of financial capital or education and advanced skills under the colonial situation. Their members tend to be small "minuscule" in numbers, underdeveloped and not "engaged in production, nor in invention" but lodged in "compradorist" activities of the intermediary and salaried, administrative type. This "bourgeoisie" of state functionaries and the "civil service" has neither the experience, the resources or knowledge at the disposal of the worldwide church organizations and settler regimes who had presided over the previous cycles of educational expansion. Yet, it commands far more legitimacy among the popular

masses than its predecessors could ever imagine and much is expected from it. Lacking, as it does, in "sufficient material and intellectual resources" in the form of scientists and engineers and unable to fulfill the historic and early industrial role of the Western bourgeoisie proper, this national middle class "limits its claims to the taking over of business offices and commercial houses formerly occupied by settlers." Its mantra becomes "Replace the Foreigners" or "Africanization" (Fanon). In the first decade of independence, the minuscule "educated" strata needed an educated cadre of intellectuals to build up the neocolonial state and propagate its domination.

Thus, the "educational explosion" of the 1960s helped the NB consolidate its leadership in the neocolonial state. Educational credentials, degrees and diplomas provided near certain access to these positions of power and privilege in the new states. Education was expanded rapidly and the graduates or the "schooled" often turned into "government employees in jobs not necessarily suited to their education or aspirations (Kelly & Altbach 1978, p. 11). Upward mobility for the educated was all but guaranteed, increasing the popular appeal of the expansion process and reinforcing the common wisdom that access to education determines the basic opportunities for individual lives and national development. Educational expansion emerged as a powerful lever of mass mobilization and incorporation of the citizenry into the new state. It was a commitment that begun to absorb "the greatest share" of the recurrent government expenditures. Ultimately, however, Fanon argued that the NB could only raise itself to its "historic mission" as "that of intermediary" and very little genuine development would come out of this industrially "arid" period of the national bourgeoisie.

At every level, the national bourgeoisie's' state policies were ideologically reinforced with the promises of modernization-development theory and invested with the vision of what Amin (1997, p. 23) refers to as the Bandung project, a petite bourgeois strategy of Third World leaders based on state-led growth via import substitution and eventually "catching up through modernized, autonomous

national construction." Beyond the class interests of the NB, the massive post-independence educational expansion, dubbed the Bandung cycle, was predicated on crucial developmental premises and illusions. To use the discourse of the time, the NB never entertained the issue of educational and cultural import substitution.

It will be remembered that the original Bandung Conference of the nonaligned Afro-Asian world took place in 1955 and articulated deeply felt past and present economic and political injustices felt by the Third World and buried in the very exploitative structures of the world system. At Bandung, the "nonaligned" leaders vowed to redress them by a new nationalist development strategy and demands for a new and more equitable international order. Education expansion during this cycle was part of this strategy of autonomous nationa capitalist development. This Bandung-inspired agenda finally "crumbled and collapsed" as the global system of capital accumulation "entered into a worldwide crisis" around the mid 1970s heralding the onset of neo-liberal globalization and the collapse of the discourse of "developmentalism".

5. The "Cult of Formal Education"

In the interim, however, the social demand for formal education continued to rise as unparalleled expansions (infrastructural investments, enrollment) occurred at all levels of the education system. According to the Addis Ababa plan, the challenge was to provide full coverage of primary education by 1980 while raising the capacity of the secondary and tertiary levels at costs that increase "fivefold" and "fifteen fold" respectively in twenty years (Balogh, 1964, p. 530).

During the initial phases, the neocolonial state with the assistance of external economic forces, principally shapes the social structures and expansion processes of schooling (Carnoy & Samoff, 1990, p. 12). To be sure, a subtle form of educational neocolonialism prevailed, which according to Altbach (1971) deployed "the use of foreign technical advisors on matters of policy and the continuation of foreign administrative models and curricular patterns for schools" continued in various ways. During this process of expansion, the region's institutions of elementary, secondary and higher learning, in particular, continued

to be closely governed and monitored by metropolitan standards and deliberations, duly transmitted through local intermediaries in the various Ministries of Education (Mazrui, 1986, p.12). It was, writes Mazrui, as though "an informal pact between the rulers of independent Africa (the inheritors of the colonial order) and the West - a pact which allows the West to continue to dominate Africa" culturally had been consolidated and legalized under the pretext of meeting the popular demands for education services.

This pact was supplemented by various scholarships, expert advice which influenced educational expansion in the prescribed technocratic-bureaucratic direction ie., expanding enrollment, building more schools, teacher training and so on. It is clear that foreign aid programs surrounding educational assistance were "axiomatically" linked to maintaining the economic status quo as well as the prominent foreign policy objectives of the US-led metropolitan powers. Thus in the words of Kelly & Altbach (p. 342), "with titular independence came the real development of European education" in the SSA peripheries. At the same time, the expansion of education served to legitimize and fortify the dominance and state-building initiatives of the NB.

Through educational expansion, the state was solidifying its political hegemony as well as its neocolonial educational dependence on the metropolis. The content of schooling did not undergo any serious internal transformations but continued along the traditional imperialist track of teaching imported texts, curricula and elitist attitudes which came increasingly with an African face, as Africanization of the teaching and professional staff became an urgency. Educational credentials of any kind provided almost instant access to public employment and "respectability." This is where the need for the expansion of higher education institutions enters the picture. What Todare (1977) calls the growing "cult of formal education" or "diploma disease" (Dore) was taking hold in newly independent states. But there was a problem less forseen. As Carnoy (1974, p. 50) puts it succinctly, "In Africa...school expansion is occurring independently of

industrialization" and "Africans seem bent on becoming European without being able or allowed to carry out a transformation to industrial capitalism" or toward anything that mitigates the polarizing structural inequalities and exploitative relations of neocolonial production.

As under colonialism, the urban bias and well-known detachment of neocolonial schools from the majority's livelihood and agricultural foundations of the nation's export and livelihood continued. Almost without exception and across the region, nonacademic abilities or informal and traditional knowledge sources and the power of **national vernaculars** remained sidelined. And as Kelly & Altbach (1978, p. 39) observed the use of European languages in the educational system also created a "caste" of foreign-language speaking natives who "qualify for prestigious and remunerative positions" of the new states. The higher the credentials the better the possibility of joining this caste of privileged state bureaucrats. This turned out to be the pattern in all countries of the region where independence and freedom was given "on a platter of gold." Clearly the Bandung aspirations surrounding the expansion of schooling and autonomous national development in these countries had been seriously compromised by first the political and later the economic pitfalls of neocolonialism which emerged in outline by the 1970s and the so-called oil crisis.

Evidently, immediately after independence the demands for education grew enormously across the region. They were of such magnitude that avoiding spending more money/resources "on expanding educational opportunities, both horizontally and vertically" became "politically risky for the government in power" (Kelly & Altbach, 1978. p. 34). In other words, the state risked its legitimacy by not responding to the popular demands for "more education" of any kind. Thus, under the compulsion of mass demand for education and its own class imperatives, the national bourgeoisie invested prodigiously in the expansion of colonial education. Many African neocolonial governments were spending "upward of 15 percent of their national budgets on education" a figure higher than

is common among Western countries. It also represents nearly four times the 4% GNP UNESCO recommends towards education. To meet its costly policy objectives, the NB state used state revenues, borrowed and accepted aid from international agencies, international-regional banks and bilateral aid sources to build schools. Significantly, most of the resources and assistance went to the urban centers and towards expanding the post-secondary educational levels.

To get a sense of the magnitude of this expansion, some figures might be useful. Between 1950-70 the provision of university space grew "fifty fold in sub-Saharan Africa ahead of Southeast Asia and South Asia" according to Foster (1982). The wisdom of devoting the greater part of available educational resources to a privileged and scholarly-inclined minority was rarely questioned until the symptoms and practices of peripheralization began to overwhelm the expansion process. Notwithstanding the generous "provision of university space' as Todare (p. 236), the economic plight of the average citizens of SSA continued apace. Overall "unemployment and underemployment" had reached a high proportion with the "educated" increasingly joining the ranks of those unemployed. There was no provision for them in the relations of production and labor markets of the peripheries. Subsequent conditions offer ample evidence of the limitations and deficiencies in the "impractical" and "irrelevant" and academic-oriented educational policies pursued by the national bourgeoisie and their international patrons. This policy spurred a "cult of formal education" or a race for credentials, which reached its zenith by the 1970s.

Prescient scholars of the region like Bologh, Carnoy, Samoff and Dumont warned that increasing preoccupation with privileging "irrelevant" academic and Eurocentric knowledge was heading towards a certain crisis. They proposed that the unprecedented expansion needed re-examining in light of the needs of the wider rural population that make up the region's majority populations by far. Nobody in authority was in a mood to listen. In addition to the accumulating

economic and social problems, the goal of achieving universal primary education (UPE) still remained unfulfilled.

By the 1970s SSA was experiencing various forms of one-party dictatorship, bizarre military and cultist-authoritarian regimes that routinely extolled the nationalist past and waged campaigns of "authenticity" and "Africanization" while literally killing and robbing the present generation and unabashedly reinforcing the hegemony of the imperial cores. The administrative apparatus of the colonial state was expanded and staffed by university-educated compatriots. National public universities, as showcases for "development" grew in every independent state as did enrollment figures. Still, the economies of the region remained mired in extractive activities and subject to international market fluctuations and downturns in the extreme. Most significantly, the labor structures of the peripheries were not changed to employ the new graduates. The expansion process continued as economic recession and civil conflicts began to spread widely across the region. By the 1970s state spending on education per inhabitant also began to decrease by a catastrophic 65 percent while the gross enrollment ratio in the primary levels declined considerably (UNICEF: p. 13). The resources for maintaining the rate of educational expansion were beginning to dwindle fast, along with the fading legitimacy of the NB state.

During the Bandung cycle, expansion of education at all levels in SSA was primarily supported by public revenues and supplemented by foreign aid and assistance offered within the framework of constitutional independence and sovereignty. This implies that schools, educational facilities like colleges were built with a great deal of capital investment and public resources. Against a background of ever-rising social demands for education, the state's control and provision of educational opportunities became a powerful political resource for the post-colonial national bourgeoisie. Education provided mobility and access into its ranks until the famous "credential inflation" was reached in the 1970 and graduates were no longer assured employment in the civil service or the private

sector. Lacking in economic functions, higher and higher levels of education became the means to access the NB stratum. It would appear that the elite stratum managed the expansion process more as an ideological and political resource to construct the state (i.e., for state-building purposes to maintain its rule, to reproduce itself and its privileges). The discourse of developmentalism and nationalism legitimated the process up to a certain trajectory when it began to be squeezed out by neo-liberalism.

The contradictions of this cycle were exacerbated by the fact that educational opportunities were expanded, relatively speaking, while employment structures remained stagnant and unable to accommodate the wage employment needs even of "people with a minimal level of education" (1976, Morrison). The age-old structural features of the low-skill-based peripheral capitalist economy asserted themselves similarly across the region. There was no critical or necessary connection between the educational system and the surrounding production process, between schooling and employment in the peripheral economy. This contradiction also points to the structural limits of the Bandung cycle.
To alleviate the attendant contradiction, more public education was offered in the name of "educational development." Nigeria, the biggest and most populated country in the region, already in the 1976/77 the government began "canceling tuition fees in universities, polythechics and secondary schools in the country (Hughes and Fagbamiye, 1986, p. 70) ostensibly to redirect the lagging pace of "educational development" and to appease the growing unrest and poverty stalking the country, despite growing oil exports and revenues.

The Bandung cycle of unprecedented educational expansion involving "national bourgeois construction at the periphery of the system" under the ideology of "development" (Amin, 1997, p. 17) was reaching a definite plateau with the onset of the so-called debt crisis by the beginning of the 1980s. As transnational debts mushroomed in the late 1970s and 1980s, massive capital outflows were mediated at the behest of the IMF-WB complex, rendering the region the most indebted as

well as most impoverished in the world. Little wonder some refer to the 1980s as the "lost decade" for the region. It was period noted for its severe desolation, a period of "de-development" (Abdi) where the conflicting interests and last battles of the Cold War found full expression in internecine civil wars, ethnic rivalry and descent into increasing chaos and poverty.

One of the major features of the Bandung cycle of historical development was that more Africans than ever were entering schools and graduating from the region's tertiary institutions and universities. In effect, the universities were creating the post-colonial intelligentsia but with increasingly less prospects of local employment as the peripheral economies remained mired in the peripheral structures of resource extraction, primary cash-crop production and low-wage markets. It would be no exaggeration to state that in the latest cycle, somehow immigrating to the metropolitan centers has become a virtual right of passage to gainful employment for the region's so-called "educated unemployed." This "brain drain" which regularly siphons the "best and brightest" of the region has become another feature of the educational scene in the region. There are a number of reasons for this educational "outcome", of course, but it raises significant questions about what exactly the prospect for these universities might be in the NKE. To these issues we shall gradually turn in the coming sections.

Chapter Five
The Evolution of Tertiary Education

1. Rethinking The Development Of African Higher Education

While we direct our focus towards the higher education institutions here, it needs to be clarified that this study is not an effort to provide an encyclopedic and all-encompassing analysis of universities in all sub-Saharan African countries. This would require volumes. Instead this inquiry seeks a more critical interpretation of the role of the educational systems and particularly universities in the region. The educational crises have affected all countries of the region, regardless of region's political boundaries and identity of the previous colonizer. When it comes to understanding the region's formal education systems and experiences it is worth recalling Foster's (1982) insight that colonial affiliation is a poor predictor of quantitative growth and qualitative development and that, in fact, "variations between territories were less than variation within them" (1982, p. 4). It is also important to recall that these postsecondary institutions were set up to serve overseas African colonial territories rather than distinct nation-states or any of the national/regional localities as we know them today. It is also a historic fact that the provision of higher education for native Africans came relatively late in historical development and lagged severely in the colonial empire of so-called Portuguese territories.

Historically and structurally speaking, the manner in which these "national" universities have developed has tended to increase their institutional structural-curricular similarity as well as common fate as a system of institutions and community of scholars situated in the African peripheries of the capitalist economy and knowledge systems. The study's focus is more generally directed at the region's public-national university community in the current restructuring process. The key proposition advanced here is that the region's national universities share a common history and community of experience in their

institutional history, educational-research and intellectual practices. Invariably, these commonalties lend them certain generic similarities, vulnerabilities and possibilities in their relationship to the forces of their own societies, imperialism and globalization in the current cycle. The basis of their (universities) relationship with their own societies lies in their external origins or lack of organicity within the peripheral colonized societies/cultures and labor processes within which they have been transplanted and evolved. In short, the institutions entrusted with transmitting higher education to Africans are products of colonialism and have been subsequently developed and extended by the neocolonial states. As such, they are best perceived as part of the neocolonial state apparatus with little or no real autonomy from the emergent states.

This "colonial origin" of the region's institutions of higher education lends a common trait of the state-owned national universities in the region. They are elite institutions designed to perpetuate the continuity of metropolitan (Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian) history, values, beliefs and "great works" among educated natives. Thus, the definition of knowledge in these institutions is "metropole-centered" a product of the "late colonial" cycle of expansion and ever-more remote from the daily experiences and languages of the majority of peasant producers in the region. In fact, the proverbial average peasant might never get to see the outer walls of the region's national universities, unless he happens to visit the few urban centers where they were founded.

2. Imperial Evolution of African Higher Education

If European universities emerged from the medieval world, their African counterparts evolved from the modern imperial world of colonial foreign offices and "colleges" of the 1940s ostensibly designed to train and educate natives in the higher orders of knowledge. The majority of Africa's universities were established as colonial branches of metropolitan universities and expanded as independent national universities in the 1960s (i.e. during the Bandung cycle). In fact, most of the present national universities were originally "conceived and

developed" (Currey and Heineman, 1987, pp. 24-25) during the latter phases of the colonial cycle (1884-1957) or when the movement towards decolonization and "self-rule" was in motion and on the historical agenda. But it was independence from colonialism, or neocolonialism, which provided the impetus for the profound tertiary-level educational expansion experienced across the region as a whole.

The expansion of higher education in the region by the national bourgeoisie was of such magnitude that it exceeded that of "Southeast Asia and South Asia" as underscored in Foster's analysis. Thus, the historic irony lies in the reality that many among the latter countries in the emergent Pacific Rim have made more impressive gains towards the developmental model (higher literacy rates, standards of living, manufacturing, GDP raises), in some case graduating to the ranks of the so-called Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). By contrast, much of the SSA region remains stuck in the old extractive division of labor, dependent on primary production processes, low literacy rates, ill-fated commodity prices and the political economic situation even more peripheralized and impoverished than in the 1960s. This certainly lends a different meaning to the expansion of higher education in the region. What purposes does this relatively huge investment in higher education serve?

Historically, the nuclei of English-speaking SSA higher education were transplanted in Uganda in 1924 with the founding of Makerere College. The college was designed to provide technical, medical and teacher training facilities to train and educate the emergent cadre of leaders of British East Africa. It was, however, the recommendations of the so-called De La Warr Commission of 1937 which "provided the foundation for the eventual evolution of degree studies" (Eisemon & Salmi, 1002, p. 7) offering a broader liberal program of studies. Then came the Asquith Report of 1945, which proposed the residential college model of the "Oxbridge tradition" for natives and to construct "the mechanism which enabled Makerere to...becoming a university, special relationship with the University of London." This arrangement continued until 1963 when Makerere

became a college of the University of East Africa at independence and eventually a university in 1970. Thus an institutional fact, and a key point here, the conception and development of "postsecondary" education as "full-fledged" university colleges or universities, has been in existence for no more than approximately half a century in the English-speaking sub-Saharan region (Hinchcliffe, 1987). These colleges became full-fledged degree-granting university institutions during the Bandung cycle of expansion and according to the interests of the NB state.

The populations of French-speaking West Africa apparently had a slightly earlier exposure to certain dimensions of metropolitan higher education. Their encounter began with the founding of the School of Medicine of Dakar (SMD) in 1918, followed by the French Institute for Black Africa in 1935 (Eisemon & Salmi, 1992). This landmark institution, hereafter known as the SMD, was conceived as a "French University designed to serve Africa." This broad mission was in keeping with the nature of French colonialism. Broadly known as "direct rule," Gallic imperialism held out the prospect of Frenchness for the native *evolue* through acculturation, leading up to French citizenship. Not unlike the Napoleonic institutions of the metropolis, centralization was extreme. The financing, examination, curricular template, diplomas and accreditation processes were all administered under the authority of "the French Ministry of Education" even after independence. The hegemonic linkage and control was such that "only in 1971 did the Senegalese begin to pay staff salaries" (p. 5) at the institutions of higher education. The situation surrounding metropolitan control over the administration and "scholastics" of African higher education development was not much different in the case of London's influence over Makerere. This power extended deep into the "microphysics" of teaching and learning and lasted well into independence period, as underscored in Mazrui's analysis.

True to their imperial tradition of "indirect rule" the British did not regard Makerere as "a British university serving Africa." It was, in Salmi's words "a

colonial institution affiliated to a metropolitan and then to a regional university" and with a distinct mission of providing "professional training mainly to the indigenous African population" (p. 7). In the case of the British, the university was necessary to train the clerical and middle strata of the native population of British East Africa. In the longer run, however, the difference between Anglo and Franco-imperialism is not one of quality but more of degree. Both sought to expand their civilizational hegemony into the colonies and cultivate/Europeanize the emerging African elite through technical/vocational training and higher education. The difference lies in the fact that the English were not convinced in the assimilability of the African to Englishness with the same intensity as Paris' "mission civilatrice" assumed.

Just as the universities of the English-African colonies historically emerged from a "special relationship" with the metropolis and the University of London "so the universities of Dakar and Abidjan (and later, other universities of French-speaking countries were linked to Paris and Bordeaux while the University of Leopoldville was linked to the university of Louvain" (Hinchliffe, 1987, p. 34). In all cases and despite minor concessions and adaptations to national environments, politics and cultures, these institutions remain Western-Eurocentric in their institutional operations, curricular orientation or scholarship, overall ethos and language use (Kelly & Altbach, 1978; Mazrui, 1975).

The prominent African scholar Mazrui (1975) regards African universities as "pre-eminent examples of cultural multinational corporations" who are in the business of selling cultural goods and skills to African clientele. More importantly, Mazrui called the emergence of the university in the colonial situation the "most sophisticated instrument of cultural dependency" drawing attention to the intimate relationship between economic and intellectual peripheralization as played out at the highest level of the educational system available in the region. The universities are an apparatus of mental/intellectual and civilizational exocentrism (Chinwezu, 1989, p.271) serving foreign

hegemonic interests and the exploitative economic structures of colonialism and later neocolonialism. This may be the intent behind the erection of colonial universities but they have also served as a fulcrum for resistance and counter-hegemonic struggles.

As with Dakar and Makerere, the pattern of higher education expansion from the imperial centres is founded on a wider, regional-territorial basis and its gradual reorganization into different national public universities occurs only upon independence. In the case of the Eastern and Southern African sub-region, for instance, "seven of the universities" formed part of the same regional association of former English-colonized states, whereas the major universities of Dar-es-Salaam, Makerere and Nairobi were constituent colleges of the University of East Africa until its dissolution in 1970 and the emergence of Makerere university as a Ugandan national public university. And in Southern Africa "the universities of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland" once constituted parts and colleges of a single regional university. The point of these obvious examples is that their expansion and full-fledged formation as degree-granting national universities was determined mainly by the political course of the national bourgeoisie (NB) state formation occurring during the Bandung cycle.

With generous state funding also came close state control of the institutions of higher education, undermining autonomy and academic freedom for the university-academic community. Academics functioned as state bureaucrats. The expansion process of national universities was strongly sponsored by national governments, bilateral and international UN agencies like UNESCO, ILO and other specialized UN agencies. According to Salmi (5), the expansion process continued "throughout the 1970s, sometimes with the encouragement of donors like the Canadian Development Assistance Agency" who were eager to establish a highly visible presence "in a large, politically important, Francophone country." Core countries felt similarly about the need to establish their hegemonic presence and influence on the elites of Anglophone countries and participated in the

expansion process until the rate and pace began to decline in the late 1970 while enrollment rates continued to rise.

After independence, all the national public universities in the region grew and expanded considerably and under the firm control of the region's neocolonial states. Government legitimation for expanding participation was primarily framed in terms of nation-building and economic development. The fiscal position of higher education fared rather well in the priorities of earlier post-independence education planners who considered mid- and high-level manpower as a critical linchpin of rapid economic development. Higher education appeared as a sound investment given the absence of a qualified pool of highly skilled university graduates to inherit the colonial civil service. Graduate employment and employability was extremely high and almost instant in the 1960s. The investments towards building the national higher educational institutions were also immense, considering that "the relevant age sector entering this sub-sectors is still small in most nations (typically 8 percent and less than two percent respectively), unit costs remain high relative to primary education (by an average factor of 4 and 16)." Although catering to a minority elite in the new nations, the cost of higher education itself was extremely high although it came at "little or no direct cost" to the students" concerned. The state subsidy of one higher education student could educate up to 200 primary level students. Moreover, continues Foster (20) the problem of high cost "is manifest at the tertiary level where real costs per university student stand at seven times those prevailing in the developed world, relative to income per capita." With changes within and in the wider world-system, the expenses of providing a publicly funded higher education for a minority became, in time, unsustainable.

5.3. The Crisis in Higher Education

Who in Africa has respected academic freedom? Nobody! From Morocco to Tunisia! Algeria, African countries? Nobody (Degni-Segui, p. 74).

In order to provide some historical points of departure for initiating the more concrete discussion on subsequent reform process instigated by globalization, let us start out by what is considered the generic role of the university in these societies in more detail, by looking at the situation of the Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP) (CURREY, 1982, 14) which includes 18 universities in the region and is stationed in Dar-es-Salaam. In conjunction with the above-mentioned political prohibition on academic freedom, frankly acknowledged by Houphouet-Boigny, long time President of Cote d"Ivoire, the fundamental institutional expectations of the universities across the region are similar. Thus, from the perspective of ESAURPs, African universities must be seen as fulfilling three main "goals," namely:

1. The production of high-level manpower through teaching and learning;

2. The development and application of new knowledge for the benefit of society through research; and

3. The provision of public service to society through consultancies and other community-oriented activities.

In every one of these spheres, I would argue, the public national universities of the region had, by the 1970s, failed to carry out these essential functions to the standards and confidence of the internal and external critics. Even under the most favorable conditions for the universities expansion, the second and third expectations have remained intangible while the outcomes of the first one have been displaced by extensive "scholastic emigration" of the educated and un/underemployed to the OECD cores. The major unstated goal of the region's universities is arguably the export of high-level manpower to the cores. At any rate, this movement of educated human resources, I would argue has depleted the quality of learning in these universities and neutralized the possible benefits of the "high level manpower" to the impoverished societies and communities paying for

their compatriots' heavily state-subsidized higher education. The contention is that unless the current trend towards increasing peripheralization from the NKE and the deterioration of the region's public universities is addressed critically and reversed, the universities will be less capable of realizing these generic functions and goals, much less promoting competitiveness in the context of the knowledge-intensive globalized economy.

Furthermore, public support for once prestigious national universities and their noble mission in pursuit of knowledge is not what it used to be. A commentary in Kenya Times (12. 11.2003, BBC) regarding the academics' wage demands that had closed down the country's universities once again demonstrates the temper of the times. The issue of wages has grown endemic in the debate over the fate of the region's national public universities. All in all, the decline of the region's over-burdened and under-financed public universities in the contemporary period can be gleaned from various sources.

Take the Kenyan controversy for instance. Circumventing what is the main debate on the stagnant and declining academics' wages, the article waged a scathing assault on the competence of the academics and questioned their sense of entitlement and wherewithal to demand higher wages. In the strongest terms, it opined that 'the public university system is riddled with deadwoods masquerading as intellectuals. Their only claim to knowledge is that they are in the university, just like the trees growing there... no one would employ them elsewhere" and asked rhetorically "Why do you expect to get sympathy from the Kenyan public, most of who are unemployed?" These are the kind of unprecedented opinions that have come to surround the region's public universities, now more than ever asked to justify themselves in the growing competition for scarce public funds. The ever-present demands of the academic staff for better wages and working conditions is no longer met with public sympathy, as it used to be in the early days of the Bandung cycle. Evidently, the institution and its "deadwood" academics are losing some of the prestige and mystique the institution had

cultivated during the previous cycle of expansion, when universities were regarded as precious assets to conduct national development and "modernization" rather than a huge public expense most states cannot afford.

Institutionally, the region's universities are caught up in the cauldron of "deterioration of material conditions" and rising social inequalities as well as the widespread "legitimacy crisis" gripping entire regimes of the South (Soederberg, 2004; Narman, 1998). The class-based rancor and resentment expressed by the Kenyan commentator offers quite a glaring manifestation of these new trends that tend to create major problems for the authorities. The issue of low and stagnant faculty wages is one dimension of the problem. Most academics tend to supplement their income in other ways and more recently by working at one of the emergent private tertiary institutions. For the press to raise questions about the academic integrity of the teaching staff/faculty is quite unprecedented. For the public to view the university as just another site of employment is novel in itself. The insinuation that most of the academics would not be able to secure a more meaningful employment elsewhere or in any "foreign" university suggests a more fundamental critique and a low estimate of the national academic institutions' standards. This weakening institutional-financial and public support makes it harder to secure more funds without incorporating the policy perspectives of the outside hegemonic global interests. These are presented in the macroeconomic-technocratic and managerial framework and specialized discourses of the Bretton Woods Institutions we shall discuss in the next chapter. With the onset of globalization and of what I have called the "globalized" cycle of expansion, the financial wherewithal to expand education at any level grew dependent on foreign funds Narman (1998, p. 118) writes: "the positive quantitative expansion of African primary education from the time of independence turned negative during the second half of the 1990s."

The pervasive crisis in higher education provided a point of access for the transnational organizations to pursue their agenda. The World Bank's policies

towards African higher education in the 1970s and onwards was predicated on a sectoral and utilitarian perspective, grounded on the rate-of-return doctrine. The approach looked, first and foremost, at institutional and financial inefficiencies. It suggested that universities represented inefficient and expensive institutions for the region to maintain at the present rate. For the World Bank, financing higher education in the region was wasteful and the funds could be better utilized in the primary sector where the return on investment was perceived to be more tangible and accessible to the poorer sectors of society. Since the early 1980s, the growing neo-liberal ideological offensive of structural adjustment programs or SAPs has placed the fate of the region's universities under the microscope of "the international financial institutions (IFI) in particular IMF and the World Bank" (Narman, p. 113-114) and the specialized UN institutions like UNESCO. The substance of their policies began to tilt toward market mechanisms that will be explored in more detail soon.

For now, the Bank advised an administrative-managerial restructuring process of the universities to improve internal efficiency (reduce dropouts, repetitions, staff), quality (lower teacher-student ratios) and gradually shift cost to consumers. The World Bank spoke of "graduate unemployment", "overinvestment" in the region's higher education institutions and lack of "internal efficiency," and drew up "conditionalities affecting the costs and financing of higher education" (Eisemon & Salmi, Introduction) and deployed them for higher educational policy advice and financing criteria in many of the indebted countries of the region. Needless to say, these measures were unpopular among the region's university community and "sovereign" states, but the new realities of neo-liberal globalization were on the rise.

In the crisis-ridded 1980s, the region's universities began to be scrutinized more in terms of the "dictates of the marketplace" for the effectiveness of their administration, teaching staff and the relevance of their graduates to society. The "high level of cost" per graduate, overcrowding of institutions, accountability in

financing and even lack of vision (Hinchliffe, 1987; Heyneman, Blondel, 1998) were examined and failed to measure up to the "predominantly economic" and administrative criteria set by the managers of the transnationalized policies and SAPs. The Bandung cycle of educational expansion was ebbing and the realization dawned that "there can be no positive development without the adoption of a rather harsh SAP policy" with conditionalities and surveillance by the creditors (Narman, 1998; Choussodovsky, 1997).

During the 1980s, the so-called social and community benefits of higher education had also fallen into public doubt casting a deeper cloud over the relevance of the whole academic enterprise, particularly within this impoverishing milieu where too many children are unable to access elementary levels of education and a growing number of tertiary level graduates are unable to find employment in the stagnant region. For those unable to emigrate after graduation, wage-employment was growing scarcer and there was very limited mobility of higher degree students and "high level" personnel within the sub-Saharan Africa state. The question then is where does this leave the African national universities during the latest globalized cycle of educational expansion?

In the current globalized cycle of educational expansion the economic and academic fortunes of the region's states and public universities are in decline. They have not fared well in terms of drawing sustainable levels of public funding or alternative resources to cover the rising costs of education and enrollments at tertiary institutions. Nor have they succeeded in forming a functioning indigenous intellectual stratum that can decisively influence the complex course of historical development and policy thinking in the region. Relevant scholarly research and effective community-oriented initiatives are not as prominent as would be expected from national universities. Overall these state institutions are in serious trouble as private and denominational higher educational institutions are making inroads into this vast untapped educational market of the region (A. Stevens, 2004). Throughout the 1980s and 19990s, the national universities have been

sites for strikes and demonstrations by students and staff and closures by the authorities.

Generally, the universities are plagued with real and imagined inequities, political interference/instability, lack of resources, insufficient up-to-date scientific literature, limited postgraduate programmes, library shortages, overcrowding of classes and dorms, to mention some problems. There is a widespread preference for foreign university degrees over local ones and the high turn-over rate of academics is exacerbated by political economic disarray and "high inflation and low salary levels" which sends academics abroad. In short, the national governments (political authorities) have not performed well in managing the expansion of the university level, and the societies concerned have very little benefits to show for their massive investments in post-secondary education. There is what Wandira (1977, p. 6) calls the "spiral of declining reputation" of the region's universities and academic community in the contemporary period. Blondel (1998, p. 258) makes the following telling comments on the issue:

> the most obvious signs of which are a decline in the status and salaries of teachers (salaries in Nigeria are now, in real terms, at 10% of their 1978 level), the dilapidated state of installations and teaching materials (premises, laboratories, libraries in sub-Saharan Africa the number of books per student decreased from forty-nine in 1980 to seven in 1990) and the decline or actual; disappearance in many countries of scientific production...the growing number of unemployed graduates, which is, it must be acknowledged, also an outgrowth of the economic crisis, is a more indirect indicator of the lack of efficacy.

Apart from failing the expectations and financial reach of the majority of Africans, the universities' limited performance and abilities to fill highly skilled and competitive positions in their own institutions, have undermined their credibility/prestige in the world academic community. Their position in the

world's higher education and research community is precarious at best and moving further to the margins of international scholarship; the region has the smallest proportion of the population with access to high-quality higher education and suffers from a chronic lack of university trained/skilled personnel in the general population. Moreover, Kigotho (2002) writes that the rate of enrollment in postsecondary institutions in sub-Saharan Africa "is under 4 percent, the lowest in the world" (p. 2). This highly confined/restricted expansion of university opportunities tends to mark them as elite institutions. The continuous departure of members of this elite-educated stratum from the region to labor-importing core countries has spurred efforts to scrutinize the "brain drain" more closely.

The new knowledge economy or NKE, amongst other qualities, is distinguished for explicitly valorizing knowledge and research in the global economy. This has prompted an emerging world hierarchy of universities, based on the capacity for producing and trading in knowledge/research, as we shall see. The African universities' standing in this hierarchy is at the very bottom. This low status of the region's highest educational institutions raises some interesting questions about their current viability, especially to the vast majority of poor Africans who pay for their maintenance without ever realizing their diminishing benefits or personal "rates of return," to use the language of the dominant policy-makers. In a recent discussion on the state of region's higher education (scmonitor, 9/30/2003), the featured expert on the subject was asked to identify the best universities in the region and, not surprisingly, she could only come up with two institutions in the whole region. After applauding some South African universities for matching the international standards set by their US or English counterparts, she made the following observations worth quoting at some length:

> Elsewhere on the continent, I would say the two top schools might be Makerere in Kampala, Uganda and the University of Ghana at Legon outside Accra. Both of these universities have received enormous financial and institutional support from outside foundations, universities and foreign

> donor countries, and have many strong departments. They have applicant pools from around the continent and outside it and their graduates are found in top positions all over Africa.

Still, she noticed many Africans would "apply to go study at top-tier schools in the US, either for undergraduate work, or more likely, for graduate work." Part of the reason for this "flight" is that any of these schools would have better facilities, teachers, libraries and research capacities when compared to what are considered the region's best universities: Makerere and the University of Ghana. Overall, the region's universities are institutionally and scientifically underdeveloped and academically peripheral to their Western counterparts who set the standards of excellence in matters academic and scientific production/excellence. The region's scientific environment, facilities and research credibility is evidently badly deteriorating and unable to attract international applicants, while the two more plausible ones, Makerere and Legon, are sustained by generous "donor" support and the countries have been featured as showpieces for neo-liberal policies.

The evidence in the rest of the region's universities is grim. The most obvious of these problems is the exhaustion of resources to provide citizens with university level educational opportunities without first rebuilding the region's decaying educational infrastructure "from the bottom up" as it were. As Samoff (1991) points out, part of the problem lies in the growing inability of the NB state to fund the expansion of education at the post-independence rate. This "unsustainable financial arrangement" of the state and increasing indebtedness turned the African states to external agencies for assistance. Furthermore, the more these states borrowed the more they came under the neo-liberal policy conditionalities of SAPs and were forced to accommodate the new policies and the emerging relationship. This growing post-Bandung donor/debtor-recipient/client relationship tended to reinforce the historic inequalities and impel further subordination and peripheralization of the region. The "institutional deterioration" of education systems was visible in the declining educational

quality across the campuses. In Saint's assessment (2000) university graduates, overall, became less competent and qualified than they were "10 years ago" and whatever university research output existed had all but ceased. A whole array of educational problems, beyond the obvious absence of financial resources to maintain the expansionary cycle of the post-independence "Bandung" era, began plaguing the primary, secondary and university levels. We shall look more closely at the university level in the following sections of this study.

In the wake of the structural adjustment policies, poverty increased and overall public spending on education decreased drastically. As far as the leading multilateral policy-making institutions were concerned, the focus of educational expansion was now anchored on the less costly primary level of education, deemed most essential for its "social rates of return" and therefore "poverty alleviation" in the post-nation-building discourse adopted by the World Bank. We will discuss the relevant points and socioeconomic implications of this transition towards neo-liberal policy prescription/strategy central to the emergence of what I have called the "globalized" cycle of educational expansion. At the height of the Bandung cycle, conditions in these "overburdened academic institutions and systems" (Altbach, 2003) of the region had reached a crisis point. The universities, in particular, had to adapt to the new realities ushered by globalization or deteriorate further as second rate "teaching" universities with little consequence in the emerging, competitive world of the NKE.

Besides lacking in international competitiveness, it would also appear that the region's universities have lost the capacity to serve the educational demands of Africa's higher education students. Cheick Modibo Diarra, UNESCOs former goodwill ambassador for science and technology and enterprise and head of the World Bank-sponsored African Virtual University, suggests that the demands for higher education in the sub-Saharan region are so extensive that "over a million qualified, tertiary-school-age students aged 18 to 23 are turned away annually

from universities in sub-Saharan Africa due to lack of capacity" (Kigotho 2002, p. 2).

An indispensable institution in the formation of the NB state and its apparatus during the Bandung cycle of educational expansion 1957-1975, higher education fell into crisis mode along with the indebtedness and growing international insignificance of the classical one-party states built during the rule of the NB. This period coincides with the rise of neo-liberal globalization, foremost exemplified by SAPs in that particular region of the world. The African university systems began to find themselves under threat from their own atrophy and the World Bank's enforced "managerialism" that primarily questions the administrative and financial inefficiency of the state-managed national universities. With the initiation of SAPs, African universities began to undergo far-reaching processes of restructuring that, in combination, herald the onset of neo-liberal globalization. In this trajectory, the dominant discourse of the "Washington consensus" overlaps with that of UNESCO, serving as the "intellectual compass" for member states. With this background on the development of higher education in the region, I will discuss the processes of globalization and its effects on university reforms in more detail next.

Chapter Six

Globalization and the "Wasted Decades" for SSA

1. Globalization and the Emerging Hegemony of Transnational Forces and Policy Practices

This democratic trend has appeared concomitantly with another global evolution emerging in the 1970s and more so in the 1980s: a kind of generalized offensive for the liberation of "market forces" aimed at ideological rehabilitation of the absolute superiority of private property, legitimation of social inequalities and anti-statism of all kinds, etc., Neo-liberalism - the name given to the offensive - knows no frontiers and is deemed to have a worldwide validity (Amin, 1988, p. 63).

Although its influence, directly and indirectly, has been recognized in education discourse recently, the analytic of globalization is a complex, controversial and variously understood phenomenon. Urmetzer (p. 47) traces the etymology of the concept back to 1978 "when *The American Banker* already used the term" (in the world of high finance appropriately enough). The trail of literature includes the contributions and research interests of many sources, both powerful and powerless: supranational institutions of the Bretton Woods, academics, donors, INGOs, magazines, journals and pundits of the Right and Left, neo-Marxists and what are collectively and mistakenly labeled as anti-globalists. From the neo-Marxist perspective, it is necessary to distinguish usage of the term, either as a description for the contemporary epoch or as prescription- a prescribed remedy for the causes of world poverty and inequalities. In the former sense, write Petras and Veltmeyer (2001, p. 11) it refers "to the widening and deepening of the international flows of trade, capital, technology and information within a single integrated global market." Whereas as a prescription, it "involves the liberalization of national and global markets in the belief that free flaws of trade and information will produce the best outcome for growth and human welfare." In this sense TRIPS and GATS are neo-liberal policy prescriptions based on the belief of the redemptive value of applying private sector remedies and market solutions to the education crisis of the region.

There is general agreement that the series of socio-economic and educational crises and reversals facing sub-Saharan Africa today represent a culmination of both historical and current conjunctures and policies, most recently related to SAPs (Samoff, 1996; Boyle, 1999; Arrighi, 2002, p. 16). Moreover, adds Arrighi (ibid): "This negative record is almost entirely a post-1975 phenomenon," a period which saw the decline and de -legitimation of the NB-led Bandung cycle of public educational expansion. An understanding of this process and the rise of the most recent cycle of educational expansion requires a conception of the decline of the previous cycle and the emergence of neo-liberal globalization or the Washington Consensus. This latest transformation in the capitalist mode of production (CMP) is premised on the doctrine that "political and social problems should be solved primarily through market-based mechanisms" (Soderberg, 2005, p. 3) and the "rule of law." This guiding principle has infused policy initiatives related to official bilateral development agenda and multilateral loans and aid as well as transnational educational policy prescriptions, emanating from the leading Bretton Woods Institutions or BWI (The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the later World Trade Organization (WTO) etc,).

In terms of the broadest historical-structural circumstances under consideration, the period beginning from the early 1970s is known to neo-Marxist political economists as that of the onset of globalization, or as Teeple argues, a moment where "the national history of capital has come to a close, and the expansion of capital sans nationality has begun" (2000, p. 175). This process involves transnationalization of the accumulation processes, a historic shift that alters the international world of capitalism and its nationally-structured reproductive systems, including public educational institutions. Before examining this multi-directional dynamics of worldwide transformation in the more specific context of

sub-Saharan Africa, we need to look closer at some definitional issues surrounding the concept of globalization. To be sure, it is virtually impossible to conduct an informed discussion of the present era without reference to globalization. So what are the defining characteristics of this process?

For the purposes of this discussion, we understand globalization to signify an emergent and transient moment in the worldwide development and expansion/externalization of capitalism, at least in its market relations. The process has been led by the dominance of US capitalism. As noted above, Teeple's (2000, p. 179-180) definition of the properties or attributes of the phenomenon centers around the notion of "self-generating capital" accruing more and more on the global level at this moment in history or "capital as capital, capital in the form of transnational corporations, increasingly (moves) free of national loyalties, controls and interests." This defining process of transnationalization is not to be confounded with mere "internationalization" of capital. We will pursue this distinction further in connection with the educational policies and assumptions advanced by the BWI and UNESCO. The latter organization's policy towards higher education reform in the peripheries is anchored on the discourse of internationalization.

The analytical approach of **globalization** studies challenges us to look beyond the traditional "internationalist" notion that still assumes "a world of national capitals and nation states." This arrangement among nation-states, it is argued by proponents of globalization, is progressively eroded by the transnational dynamics of globalization. Indeed, the specificity of the "transnational" stems from the "supersession" of the interests of the nation-state and the national accumulation processes by supranational and transnational TNCs and market forces (capital) except in a handful of core OECD nations. The globalizing world of "disappearing" borders, shrinking time and shrinking space also turns out to be a historical moment of the shrinking national bourgeoisie project in the sub-Saharan peripheries. This is crystallized by the SSA nation-states' inability, amongst other

responsibilities, to continue funding the public educational provisions it had initiated during the previous Bandung cycle of expansion. This aspect of the thesis is specifically concerned about the globalization of education policies and the ramifications this has for the peripheral SSA nation-state's public education systems and universities in particular.

The driving economic forces of capitalist-market expansions, competition and accumulation processes, during this phase, are those of the surpranational corporations or transnational corporations (TNCs), which control most of the planet's wealth and technology and thereby dominate/monopolize the global markets in goods and services. With these powers, the transnational elite now have the power "to force national governments to defend corporate interests whenever such interests are in conflict with those of the people" (Sachs, 1996, 266). With these world-spanning economic powers they seek to create globalized conditions and regimes of production and trade that are more favorable to their class interests and surplus/profit appropriation worldwide.

The TNCs need for ever-widening and unimpeded (deregulated) access to global markets rearranges the world in a fundamental way. Their investments seek to expand into hitherto public areas like education and other services, once the preserve of the peripheral nation states, almost exclusively in the SSA context. This creeping commodification of the national and public domain and its educational services is a new reality which, as can be expected, has threatened the institutions of public education in SSA and *thereby* the threadbare "political hegemony" of the national bourgeoisie. The emerging transnational-national economic political and educational ties are further complicated by what Amin (1997, p. 4-5) suggests are five worldwide monopolistic spheres through which the growing weight of metropolitan economic and political dominance and US hegemonic activities are apt to express themselves underneath the dominant discourses of spreading "unfettered free markets" and "democratization."

These are technological monopoly, control of global financial markets, monopolistic access to the planet's natural resources, media communications monopolies and monopolies over weapons of mass destruction. The important point here is that these monopolies have been reinforced by the growing neo-liberal policy orientations, assumptions and regulations of the supranational agencies of the BWI.

Significant to this discussion is the globalization of education policy, however "masked under notions of assistance and aid." During this cycle, the BWI increasingly manifests the discursive hegemony of neoliberalism within each nation state's educational policies (Torres 2002, p. 5 - 10, Samoff, 1991, 1996). Inseparable from the overall financing of the prevalent logic of political conditionalities which the indebted recipient countries are expected to meet, writes Torres (2002, ibid.) ,"two elements radically condition the formulation of public policy: privatization and the reduction of public spending." These two policy elements express themselves variously in the SAP- inspired educational reform processes presently underway throughout the region.

This policy rationale of "conditionalities" has its analogy in the education sphere, referred to as "educational conditionalities." A concrete case of "reducing public spending" policy was, for instance, " imposed by the World Bank on Nigerian universities for a loan of $ 120 million" (Zeleza, 1994, p. 3). In this case, "the Bank recommended a reduction in the number and size of the country's universities, and the privatization of some of their operations, all in the name of increasing efficiency." There is very little disagreement with the notion of increasing the internal efficiency of these admittedly ossified institutions. But the conditions apparently went much further: "Most troubling, perhaps, the Bank asked for the centralized supervision over books, journals, and equipment purchased through the loan and the close monitoring of the adjusted university through the Ministry of Education (Zeleza, ibid.).

The BWI's neo-liberal market logic combined with "educational conditionalities" seeks to promote the ongoing commodification and commercialization of public educational services, especially at the tertiary level. It views public education systems more and more as private commodities to be duly protected by international rules and regulations and safeguarded by the peripheral state's legal apparatus. These rules, regulations, policies and practices affect the national rights and "sovereignties" of the "adjusted" countries with the force of law. In this new context the World Trade Organization (WTO), General Agreement on Trade Related Services (GATS) and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) become the primordial imperial institutions for prying open what were nationally protected and state-subsidized educational provisions, goods and services during the previous cycle of expansion. They also constitute the transnational institutional-legal expressions of the ongoing drive towards the privatization and monopolization of the world's "knowledge resources" which is another major feature of the present globalized cycle of educational expansion and reform process.

A key distinction of these treaties is that while previous agreements dealt with "trade in products" those of TRIPS and GATS deal with "trade in knowledge" or education as a commercial service exchangeable on the global market. TRIPS Articles and Agreements have incorporated the central clauses of the SAPs into their application (Chossudovsky, 1997) and within GATS education has become "one of the twelve primary services (UNESCO Education Position Paper, 2003, 6). Through WTO and GATS transnational forces, the core's exporters of education services advance the further liberalization of trade in international educational services and knowledge production. This trend has given rise to an influx of educational entrepreneurs and a booming brokerage business in international education. Needless to say, these developments which undermine local laws and institutions of the NB state have converted educational provision into a profitable commodity "compromising the entire notion of a national education system." writes Hynd (2000, p. 36) who is Oxfam's Campaign

Coordinator of the Global Action Plan for basic education. These neo-liberal reforms are bound to have important implications for SSA impoverished education systems and particularly the provision of quality public education in the contemporary cycle. There are reportedly two large educational transnational corporations registered on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Hynd, 2000, p. 36) to facilitate the process of privatization-commercialization of educational resources and knowledge. The incursion of "market forces" and TNCs into the traditionally public educational sphere is already evident beginning from the primary levels.

In this respect, EDINVEST provides direct investment opportunities for private capital to venture into SSA's education business. In Hynd's (2000, ibid.) words, "EdInvest recognizes that many poor countries simply do not have enough money to invest in education and that private investment in education is increasing globally." Hence it provides services to "education companies exploring global investment opportunities, schools and training institutions looking for investors, corporations trying to increase their presence in developing countries, nongovernmental organization, international banks and other investors." It seems that private investment in education is bound to have more and more stake in what is the provision of educational opportunities in SSA, particularly so at the higher levels. This process of deregulation and commercialization of educational services and overall privatization of knowledge is in its beginnings but there is already evidence of its ever-increasing influence. Already, there is evidence that the ruling strata or elite of the region is drifting in greater numbers towards the private-operated institutions (Boyle, 1999). Clearly, this trend carries implications beyond encouraging a two-tiered system of education to grow.

The re-construction of the new transnational capitalist global order, therefore, involves a process of hegemonic restructuring, where the locus of the accumulation process and decision-making shifts away from the inter-national terrain towards the US-led trans-national Consensus. In this far-reaching

transformation, the framework of national educational policy-making also moves more and more towards the supranational regulatory agencies of the Bretton Woods institutions (BWI) and the dominant discourse of neoliberalism and structural adjustment policies (SAPs). Looking at the broader political economy of globalization which shapes regional developments during this period, Teeple (2000) explains that "the global markets under the TNCs, then, are qualitatively different from the prewar and postwar international market and MNCs" precisely because "the global market has been constructed through the systemic dismantling of national barriers to trade and investment by the creation of supranational regulatory agencies to advance and maintain" the emerging momentum of the transnational accumulation process.

In sum, disciplinary neo-liberalism expresses itself in the prescriptive discourse of privatization, deregulation and laissez-faire "free trade" orthodoxy or what Soros has called "market fundamentalism." It is enforced by, amongst other policy instruments, the "intensification of donor conditionality and cross conditionality, a process aided by the World Bank in the strategy of donor consultation and coordination...reinforced by TINA (there is no alternative) ideology with which African governments have been confronted at every turn" (Mkandawire and Soludo, 2003, p. 245).

Ultimately, the need to incorporate the consent of peripheral elite or state "functionaries" into this US-dominated transition towards transnational-supranational governance and regulatory structures is axiomatic. This incorporation of peripheral elites is imperative to the success of the neo-liberal reform process. To this extent, the relative independent public policy space enjoyed by the state's national authorities during the Bandung cycle was also increasingly subordinated to the terms and conditions set by the emergent transnational forces and regulatory agencies. This ensures the rise of authoritarian "adjusting" states, deeply indebted to transnational financial institutions and beholden more to the donors and lenders wishes and World Bank conditionalities

than the democratic expectations and social demands of their citizens. The imposition of SAPs helped accelerate the economic and social disintegration of the African masses during the 1970s, resulting in what has been appropriately called the "lost decade" (UNICEF) of the 1980s.

In an interesting study which explores the policy responses of the SSA countries to the pace of globalization and trade liberalization policies in particular, Tsikata, (2000, p. 28, paper presented at OECD conference) observes how "external actors in the form of World Bank and IMF were extremely important" in the region's "external liberalization process." At the same time debtor-client governments were found to have very little or no input or so called "ownership" in the policy design of the complex market-oriented reform programs they have been subjected to on the threat of bankruptcy. These changing power dynamics between the nation-state and the externalizing trans-national forces has become the focus of analysis for the literature on globalization. Or in Urmetzer's (1999, p. 21) succinct summary of the reigning debate, "this distinction between increased interdependence orchestrated by nation states and globalization where supranational organizations (transnational corporations, money) has usurped the nation state, has become crucial to academia." In terms of this study, there is no doubt that the priorities of the supranational financial institutions and BWIs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and trans-national regulations (TRIPS and GATT) have effectively "usurped" the education policy-making capacities of the SSA states in the present cycle. To use the language of Foucault, more and more a multiplicity of transnational (external) and non-governmental agencies set the specifications of the policy norms to be pursued. Conditionalities can be perceived as techniques of normalization. What is more, their role is likely to become more powerful as the World Bank increasingly "asserts its role as a development advisory service and knowledge manager" and "not infrequently determining state behavior" during the era of globalization (Samoff & Stromquist, 2001, p. 641).

It must be remembered, in this connection, that foreign loans and debts provide the recurring budgets for many of these "adjusting" African states. TNCs and foreign investors are also increasingly owning (through privatization) and managing pubic services and infrastructures, including those of education and tertiary academic institutions in particular. Moreover, the need for foreign or expatriate expertise is so pervasive now as to make the whole exercise of "Africanization" witnessed in the 1960s seem meaningless. The commanding heights of macro-economic management, policy-making and NGO operations are in the hand of white expatriates and "advisors." There is suspicion that a "re-colonization" process is taking place under the discourse of "open borders" and in the name of advancing "good governance" and "democratization." Favored African governments and politicians who can put some of the managerial educational "reforms" into effect are rewarded with more aid packages, acclaims and possible debt cancellations. On the other hand, those who seek to protect the public sphere the national "teacher's unions" and public education systems, are derided as being "anti-globalization" and either undermined or pressured to accept "market-friendly" reforms. The point is to unfetter, as it were, the redemptive forces of the capitalist market from the administrative and political stranglehold of the peripheral state.

It is thus important not to see globalization as a behemoth, driven by absolute economic necessity and to which no one has recourse as it is often projected in the dominant TINA (There is no alternative) discourse. This approach renders contradictions and social agency invisible and alternatives heretic to the ruling ideology. It masks the fact that the process is ultimately mediated by human praxis or, more precisely, that it is "subject to the control of individuals who represent and seek to advance the interests of a new international capitalist class" (12) in the form of providing "optimal" conditions for the expansion and development of global capitalism "freed from the restrictions and regulations under which it has operated to date" (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, p. 9) under the

national bourgeoisie in SSA. This highly educated "technocratic" and "professionalized" new class also elaborates a layer of transnational bureaucrats and technical/symbolic cadres, whose distinguishing expertise lies in educational, ideological and organizational matters and commitment to the neoliberal ethos of efficiency and "rational economic management." Van der Pijl (1998, 40, 139) points out that the power of this in-house cadre "resides in their function as specialists with sectoral planning tasks" as favored by the transnational agencies. The crucial point is that their policy influences express themselves more and more transnationally and through peripheral states' policies. The analytical categories of the transnational cadres and specialists are being diffused to the new managerial-minded petite bourgeoisie class that has inherited the state of the NB and the responsibilities for "rolling it back," including cutting the state's education budget, particularly with respect to higher education.

Thus we see that just as the world-historical movement of decolonization in the 1950s provided the impetus and class forces necessary for the Bandung cycle to emerge, the rise of the globalized cycle of educational expansion is associated with native technocratic "compradorist" social forces subordinated to the policy *dictat* of BWI and the donors or G7-8 countries. The process more or less has instigated the collapse (demise) of the "developmental project" or what Amin (1997) calls the "Bandung Project" which provided the political conditions for the previous state-led cycle of educational expansion. During this era, as sub-Saharan NB states are slipping further into indebtedness (debt-crisis) and unable to sustain the NB project of educational expansion in the 1980s, the core countries were surging ahead and forging post-industrial economies/societies by expanding/finessing the post-Fordist, knowledge-intensive high-technology sectors of production and global accumulation. With the knowledge sector emerging as the major fulcrum of global economic competitiveness, the polarization/disparities between the cores and peripheries and among the erstwhile Third Word continued apace. Thus we find the core's advanced microelectronics and computer integrated systems of production/accumulation

linked to SSA peripheries, where the major means of production i.e. land, is still dependent on the forces of nature and the unskilled brute labor of the rural masses. The questions of increased economic inequality accompanied by a shift towards the TNCs'-BWIs' dominance over the peripheral nations' private and increasingly public reproductive apparatus and educational policies are central to the problematic of globalization.

In this analysis of world capitalism, the US postwar hegemony over the "free" world is identified as the driving force of the globalization process, particularly after the famous early 1970s "Oil Crisis" and replacement of the original Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates with the US dollar (1971) as the standard bearer of world economic value. It is during this historic shift of decreeing the dollar as a "world currency" the US Federal Reserve System had also metamorphosed as the *de facto* central bank "for all the market economies" assuring its economic supremacy over core-competitors and ending the era of inter-nationalism and moving towards de facto globalism. In Teeple's words, the mid-1970s represents a period when the "capitalist world economy," became the "world capitalist economy."

Against this background, we need to ask where did all these transformations leave the SSA region? The short and clear answer is, in deeper poverty and worse off than the Bandung days. Towards the end of the 1980s, it was becoming evident that maintaining the Bandung period of educational expansion had became problematic. Even the quantitative expansions in primary education achieved during the Bandung cycle began to turn negative. Particularly after the failure of NIEO in the 1970, writes Amin (1977, p. 1-2), the peripheries were increasingly denied "the right to an industry" and re-subordinated, based on devalued currencies, deregulated markets, cheapened raw materials "for which the advantage of low wages makes it possible to raise the rate of profit in the world system as a whole" (p. 13). That is, the region's poverty became even more

sharply pronounced in the 1980s with the region's reincorporation into the changing world capitalist economy.

Intensifying globalization in the 1980s meant enhanced transnational exploitation of the peripheries, resulting in serious terms of trade (TOT) deterioration and loss of revenues from primary products/commodities. The declining GDP growth rates crippled the ability of the NB states to respond/fund the incessant demand for public education. Fiscally and politically embattled governments grew ever more dependent on the loans and funding considerations and, in time, policy "conditionalities" framed by the cadre of expertise retained by the BWIs. The more African states submitted to SAPs and their neo-liberal conditionalities, the more they fell prey to hegemonic "micromanagement" by what Van der Pijil (1998) has called the "special category of functionaries" in command of articulating the technocratic and normative structures of the "Washington Consensus" and the new world of globalization. The Bretton Woods complex increasingly assumed control of funds and intellectual leadership over policy matters that govern, amongst other things, educational reform processes and priorities in the sub-Saharan region, The dominance of these transnational functionaries and development "experts" is such that they have been described as *de facto* ministers of finance and education in the SSA peripheries of the post-Bandung era. This problematic dimension is addressed in Mkandawire and Soludo's (2003, p. 2) biting commentary: "With Africans adjudged 'incapable of thinking for themselves and implementing policies,' a deluge of over 100,000 foreign technical experts costing over $4 billion annually to maintain have literally taken over the process of policy/project design and sometimes implementation." Here we can see a concrete managerial and technocratic reinscription of the old supremacist discourse of imperialism,. In this case, it resonates with the expertise of the transnational agencies and the NGO contingency of the international development business.

One can see that by increasingly transnationalizing their dealings with former colonies within the neo-liberal disciplinary agenda, the imperial powers had effectively transformed the national developmental quest of the South into a huge business enterprise of foreign aid, multilateral loans that can never be repaid, debt-servicing payments and foreign expertise consultancy. By the 1990s all the requirements and mechanism for global usury and debt-capitalism were in place together with a "re-compradorized" peripheral elite that, implicitly or otherwise, shares the fundamental market and managerial convictions of the transnational corporations (TNCs) and BWI. As neo-liberal globalization via SAPs increased in scope and in depth, the region grew more unstable and impoverished. Rather than the static language of "debt overhang," usury seems to describe the mechanism and rate of capital flight and compounded debt-load accrued by subservient national elites who borrow in the name of the people but pursue their own class and personal interests. Usurer's capital, wrote Marx (Capital Volume 3, p. 596) centralizes money-financial capital and "employs the method of exploitation characteristic of capital yet without the latter's mode of production."

In this changing global context, the major focus of neo-liberal education policy-making was articulated around the well-known social "rate of return" doctrine. The prescriptions came with a series of remedies directed towards paying off the state's accumulating debt by reducing public expenditure, privatization and increasing user fees for public services; revising fiscal and trade policies, decentralization, reducing state subsidies and price controls and wide-ranging institutional or "governance" reforms, all to be implemented according to the guidelines of the new transnational policies articulated by the specialized staff of the BWI and diffused throughout the major academic institutions and think-tanks of the core. In short, these considerations and emergent policy practices lead me to the conclusion that during this interregnum in world-systemic relations from the bipolar world of the cold war to the uni-polar one of globalization, the Bandung cycle of NB -state-led educational expansion had definitely run its course and conditions heralding the "Globalized," market-led cycle of expansion

were on the ascent. We will look at these conditions and circumstances in more detail in the following section

2. Crisis of NB State and Dominance of The Financial-intellectual Complex (FIC) in Educational Policy Discourse

The unraveling economic political chaos, escalating debts and the resultant fiscal crisis of the NB state throughout the 1980s led to a reduced source of public funding and support for education, particularly at the higher-university level. Increasingly all African countries began to depend heavily on sources of foreign assistance for their educational budgets and recurrent expenditures (Samoff, 1991. The education expansion of the previous cycle was entering a period of crisis. We must remember that the various administrative-technocratic crises detected in the education systems were aggravated by the persistence of the violent "spoils politics" (Bush & Szeftel, 1998) and extreme "ethnification" (Wallerstein, 2001) and corruption of the political process which had seized most of the region's one-party states during the 1980s adjustment years. This was a calamitous period of conflict, famine, genocide and massive state-led "kleptocracy" accompanied by SAPs, and ongoing "donor" intervention in what were once considered the jurisdiction and public spheres of the peripheral states.

Along with spiraling foreign debts of the 1980s, elites of "African countries" increasingly turned to external sources for assistance, thereby submitting to the "agenda and preferences of the funding agencies." In the ensuing relations, education policies increasingly became a central part in the implementation of the neoliberal disciplinary policies. In the World Bank's esoteric policy parlance, conditionalities in sectoral adjustment operations are similar in effect to those of structural adjustment in the economy as a whole. In both cases, funds are disbursed in tranches on the basis of compliance with policy conditions set out by the IFCs and other "creditor" financial institutions and international sources of funding. In the face of these severe economic and social crises, many SSA states were inducted into the process of structural adjustment via lending to carry out

educational expansions of a certain type and in the context of specific conditionalities attached to the loans. During the mounting economic, social and fiscal crises of the 1990s, the BWIs had become the dominant material and intellectual force and authority in setting the agenda for the educational sector of the SSA peripheries. Its policies, as we shall see in more detail, favored expanding the basic education sector and reducing the budgetary "expenses" associated with higher education. My notion of the "fiscal crisis of the state" has been drawn from O'Connor (1994, 2) and partly explains the dilemma. It refers to the tendency "for government expenditures to outrace revenues" as growing demands and needs "only the state can meet create even greater claims on the state budget." The typical SSA state undergoing SAPs was in no position to meet these social demands for educational services. In the course of adjustment, SSA Africa was distinguished for having the lowest average primary school completion rates, highest repetition and highest illiteracy and least post-secondary enrollment in its population.

Adesina (2002, p. 10) illustrates the escalating contradictions and policy response in the following instructive terms: "The escalation of the debt crisis and the balance of payments problems provided the entry points for the World Bank and the IMF in the illegal micromanagement of the economics of many African countries. The effect was initially within the State." Whatever the legalities involved, it is certain that the first African state burdened by unsustainable debts and economic collapse, "Ghana," was given the stark ultimatum to "implement stabilization and liberalization agenda" designed by the FIC or risk bankruptcy." Thus "between 1983-1991, with the support of donors, Ghana embarked on far-reaching reforms" (Tsikata, 2000, p. 20) with mixed results in the long term. In the same way that Ghana's independence provided the beginning for the Bandung cycle in 1957, its immersion into SAPs presents us with the beginnings of the FIC-driven globalized cycle of educational expansion.

With its new-found privileged authority over the South's economic and educational developments in the 1980s, the World Bank-IMF financial-intellectual complex (FIC) mobilized the accumulated powers of its knowledge of the region and began to dictate major changes in the policy structure and priorities of borrowing or what had become client states. In addition to "its command of expertise" over African issues and data, the FIC now assumed a "pivotal" function "in the policy initiatives regarding the provision of educational services in sub-Saharan Africa. The educational institutions could not be isolated or immunized from this all -pervasive crisis of the peripheral African states. Integral to the neocolonial state-apparatus, they were at the center of the political-economic crisis that, at bottom, reflects a failed developmental project, one associated with constructing national forms of capitalism in the region. Along with the structural adjustment measures of 1980s, ostensibly to stabilize the besieged region, the income of the majority of African workers fell below what may be called absolute poverty, throwing societies into a spiral of destitution and conflict.

The resulting economic and social grievances and class rivalries took the form of ethnic animosities and were orchestrated or manipulated as such by the leadership cliques at the top. Thus, the phenomenon of "bread riots" in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and across the "Sahel" and ethnic/class violence of the most destructive and genocidal kind were revived by the ensuing struggles for control over scarce resources and the remaining privileges of the state. Some states (e.g., Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone) totally disintegrated along their constituent ethnic lines. The descent into crisis was comprehensive and involved most communities and institutions of the postcolonial state.

This was also a period when the NB state reverted to a policy of total repression against nationals resisting pauperization and imposition of structural adjustment measures. In general, the existing neocolonial-national forms of capitalist relations had exhausted their possibilities for development. Clearly, the FIC had

used the opportunity to move from the micromanagement of the economics of the SSA region into crisis-managing what were the public functions of the disintegrating NB state. This is a moment in the historical development of societies when Gramsci (p. 210) speaks of a "crisis of authority" which amounts to the crisis of hegemony that engulfed the developmental African state. The anti-statist currents of the neo-liberal discourse identified the NB state as the source of all backwardness and corruption in the region and accused it of ruining once-prosperous countries in the region

In the process, the state's functions and instruments of "sovereignty" were being redefined to accommodate the World Bank and IMF-sponsored neo-liberal austerity measures and policy prescriptions (Chossudovsky, 1997). This redefinition or "instrumentalization" of the peripheral state's apparatus became mandatory to meet the reinforced conditionallities of the "donors" and to gain access to more loans and funding from transnational financial institutions. Throughout this reconstruction of the world systems hegemonic apparatus through SAPs and their conditionalities, the African publics, scholars and policy makers were excluded, in Mkandawire's and Solyudo's (2003, p. 2) words, "relegated to reactive protest" over the direction of their own economic, social and political fate or emigration. The austerity measures involved huge cuts in public expenditure and growing privatization of the public sphere, including the educational systems. The salient characteristic of this period, from our standpoint, is the growing emigration of the educated stratum, brought into existence by the NB state during the Bandung cycle. We will present the implications of this growing problematic known as the Brain Drain on the peripheral SSA social formations at a later point in the analysis.

3. Endorsing the Expansion Of Primary Over Tertiary Levels Education

The chronic poverty and the crisis of NB state-building in SSA did lessen abet with the implementation of SAPs. Indeed the opposite occurred, as Mkandawire and Soludo's (2003, p. 4) critical evaluation of SAPs in the wider African context

underscores. More specifically, they find that "Africa's infrastructural base and human capital formation" which were relatively fragile at the beginning "have even deteriorated further throughout the adjustment period." Furthermore Adesina (2002, p. 10) confirms that the crisis of developmentalism and the escalation of the debt crisis "provided the entry points for the World Bank and the IMF in the illegal micromanagement of the economics of many African countries. The effect was initially within the State." The education systems as part of the state apparatus were subjected to the impact of globalization with the implementation of SAPs austerity measures and market-based policy prescriptions.

For a long time the universities and education systems of the region had served as sites of learning, conflict, struggles, reproduction and growing politicization of the student body. Throughout the "wasted decade" of 1980s, public education systems grew overcrowded and deteriorated in quality, while the irrepressible "social demand" for education kept rising. Nation-states were unable to maintain the expansion process initiated during the Bandung cycle. As the crisis in the social formations deepened, governments began to reluctantly submit to policy directions and conditionalities set by the World Bank and creditor nations. As mentioned, the public education and health services were hit hardest by the impact of neo-liberal globalization and SAPs.

In the midst of the adjustment years, the "most unsettling" educational statistics, in Hynd's (2000, p. 35) words "came from Sub-Saharan Africa, where spending on education has dropped 60% in 10 years while the population in primary schools has risen by 30%." Even in a country like Uganda, often distinguished for having registered "moderate" gains in human capital investment during this period "secondary enrollments continued to be low" (Tsikata, 2000, p. 10) while in places like Senegal, Tanzania and Kenya, primary enrollments actually declined. Thus, contrary to the solemn declaration of the 1961 AAC, thirty years later, basic literacy and education was still beyond the reach of millions of impoverished African children. Conditions were deteriorating in the provision of

tertiary and specifically university education as well. Here too the state-driven expansionary cycle was grinding to a halt, as we shall see more clearly later on in this study. The NB had invested heavily in the development of the national universities during the Bandung cycle. They were the symbols and prize of its political sovereignty. With the rising enrollments and cost of higher education, the NB was unable to maintain these institutions in good repair or the pace of expansion. The conspicuous economic fact here is that soaring interest payments on loans increasingly began "crowding out" expenditures in public education, while the capacity of the states to provide education at any level became seriously compromised. Both the legitimacy of the state and the public sphere were withering under the weight of SAPs which gave preference to investment in primary levels of "basic education" based on the higher rate-of-return rationale adopted by the World Bank's policy cadre.

The growth of public national universities in SSA, we recall, was a postcolonial phenomenon. The NB gave particular attention to the tertiary sector and poured tremendous public resources into its diversification and development. It also had invested a great deal of national prestige on the construction of national universities. Thus from what had started out as just six SSA public universities in 1960, it had grown into a system of over 100 national public universities by 1993. It is a matter of proportions, to be sure. In the most populated country of the region, Nigeria, higher education for natives began with the founding of University College Ibadan in 1948. By 1962, the number of higher education institutions "increased to five" and then "to thirteen in 1973" and to "twenty one in 1980." By 1994, Nigeria alone proceeded to build around 37 public universities (Mustapha, p. 104). The regional evidence suggests that the expansion of higher education was intensified throughout the Bandung cycle. Full-fledged universities were unknown during the colonial cycle. Any form of post-secondary education, if it existed at all, was embryonic in the colonies and expanded during the postcolonial era of the NB state. Little was done to change the contents of the institution's pedagogy.

Needless to say, academic institutions were not immune to the pressures and changes occurring throughout the peripheral state apparatus in the throes of neo-liberal-inspired retrenchment policies. The condition and provision of higher education in SSA, limited as it is, suffered extensively during the 1980s budgetary cutbacks. Authoritarian states strove to stifle dissent to the new policies and kept the lid on whatever academic freedom and autonomy the national universities, staff and students had struggled to assert. As Saint (http://www1.worldbank.org/education/) documents, "recurrent expenditures per student" dropped by about two-thirds during this period. In addition, "cutbacks in research, staff development, library acquisitions and maintenance" had a debilitating effect on the moral and credibility of the institution. The region' s universities, quite destitute by metropolitan standards to begin with, were on a path towards obsolescence, particularly so in the area that mattered most for success in the NKE, namely research and science and technology (S&T). It is instructive that not one of Nigeria' s universities is considered anything close to world-class research universities. Thus, an institution that had served the NB well during the Bandung cycle had increasingly become a costly burden to the dwindling public resources available to the indebted state. Thus, when confronted with the dictates of the transnational educational marketplace and the emerging realities of the NKE, the institutional capacities of region's public universities failed to measure up to the standards of their international counter-parts. Consequently, they were unprepared to benefit from the market-driven neo-liberal educational policies and the WTOs Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) which facilitated global "borderless" trade, or some would argue monopoly, in knowledge and educational services, as part of the reform agenda. We will return to this matter in the context of forthcoming discussions on higher education.

There is no question that in the era of the NKE and globalization, the so-called "knowledge" or "digital" disparities between the Northern and Southern countries has intensified further. The principal instruments of production in the new

information and digital technologies are still extremely underdeveloped in the region. While the Northern universities are endowed with the latest information technology and research facilities, the African universities are still struggling to maintain their old and outdated library systems and to expand their facilities and educational assets. In order to highlight the widening disparities or "knowledge gap," at the end of the millennium consider the following (UNDP, 1999) comparative picture of the educational milieu in the cores and African peripheries.

> A US medical library subscribes to around 5.000 journals, but the Nairobi University Medical School Library, long regarded as a flagship centre in East Africa, now receives just 20 journals, compared with three hundred a decade ago. In Brazzaville, Congo, the university has only 40 books and a dozen journals, all from before 1993. Worse, the library in a large district hospital consists of a single bookshelf filled with novels.

Cases upon cases of deteriorating higher education conditions and standards could be adduced from the literature (the declining wages and "flight" of academics, the lack of academic freedom, loss of international status, low quality of educational services, the absence of research and what has been generally called the desolation of the higher education system). In Bollag's (2002, p.2) study of Nigeria's "decaying universities" he estimated that by the early 1980s the professors "earned no more than $2,000 to $3.000 per year." The point of emphasis is that this trend of desolation in the higher education institutional and instructional/intellectual milieu is a regional phenomenon. As a result, the potential opportunities of globalization, trade in knowledge and educational services and the benefits of the information revolution have proved illusive the region's universities.

In contrast to the Bandung era, the academic world has growing more unequal and radically stratified (Altbach, 2004) and is getting even more so. For instance, in terms of the basic telecommunications spread or so-called "teledensity" necessary for accessing the networked world of knowledge and information, the national-regional capacities of the entire SSA are minimal, sharply illuminating the

underlying international division of labor which has relegated the region to the primary/extractive dimensions of production, unresponsive to the growth of capitalist industries and the higher levels of skill-knowledge production. It must be said that the region's university system lies on "the periphery" of the research-knowledge centers of the world system. We live in a world where achieving "center" status has become more difficult and "the entry price has risen" considerably, writes Altbach (p. 5): Top-tier universities require vast resources, the accumulation of science and technology, which have remained the privileges of the core. The gap in research capacities, technological innovation and knowledge production continued to grow radically throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

In this highly competitive world of the NKE, SSA public universities are barely networked to the world's major scientific centers, laboratories and universities of the world. With regard to the most crucial communication technology of globalization– the Internet—the position of Sub-Saharan Africa is at the bottom. Sub-Saharan Africa with 9.7% of the population of the world had 0.1% of all Internet users. Excluding South Africa, the rest of SSA's 700 million people have fewer Internet connections than Bulgaria and fewer cellular phones than Thailand (UNDP-HDR 1999), severely limiting the scope of the region's participation in the global technological-information driven revolution in production/accumulation. Increasing the problem is the cost of connectivity. Average monthly Internet connection comes to an African student at a price costing ten times that of his/her American counterpart.

The implications have proved catastrophic for the development of educational infrastructure, human capital formation and academic community of many poor countries. When dealing with these powerful globalizing institutions of international capitalism, few of the impoverished states of SSA had the institutional infrastructure or research capacity to avoid the ever-present threat of "domination by policy." The weakest among the states in the world-system

become "subject to an absolutist or hegemonic system" centered around Samoff's intellectual/financial complex of foreign aid. With access to funds and loans come "clientelistic" deferrals to the transnational forces, particularly to the IMF and the World Bank and the host of specialized UN institutions like the UNDP and UNESCO and associated NGOs. Increasingly too, the World Bank has grown into the leading agency in setting the educational vision and development agenda for the region, lately designating itself a "knowledge bank."

This brings us to the characteristic feature of this Globalized cycle of expansion, namely creditors and "donors" become major actors, partners and "stakeholders" while entrusting the BWI to set the parameters of educational expansion in the region. Their priority, as we shall see, lies in expanding basic education. Thus, the policy rationale of "investing in primary education yields best returns" grew into a major theoretical premise for external agencies and education planning ministries of SSA. This assumption also sums up the inspiration behind the World Bank sponsored/promoted Education For All (EFA) movement in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990. We will take a closer look at the EFA initiative below. As Yulat (1988, p. 326) argues, one suspects that this policy offensive was based "less on empirical evidence" than on "questionable myths" related to the rate of return market rationale of the FIC's policy cadres.

In contrast to the primary sector, the World Bank was less sympathetic to the tertiary "sector" in its policy conceptualizations and discussions for educational and economic development. For a long time, the World Bank was convinced that the debtor states were already investing too much in higher education, thereby undermining the growth of the primary level. Working on the premise that primary education yields greater return on investment, their advice (Narman, 1998, p. 117) to clients had been to redirect funding from secondary and higher levels to the primary one and to introduce specific and "sustainable" poverty alleviation programmes. Based on these considerations, the primary school expansion program became a central focus or "highest priority" much to the

neglect of the higher educational institutions of the region. For the most part, and besides proposing more "magic bullets" and myths to improve educational administration, its policy stance towards the tertiary relied consistently on reducing or "rolling back" the the state and limiting its role to imposing "user fees" on universities" in line with the perspective of the new cycle. This practice is also known as "cost-recovery" in the official education policy discourse. This line of thinking ultimately leads to recommendations for imposing greater tuition fees and reducing the lodging and food expenses provided by the state to students.

With respect to higher education reform, the World Bank continued insisting on the famous formula of the three R's of reduction, retrenchment and rationalization of the university administration. For its cadres, the core educational problems lay in the failings and misplaced priorities of management. To remedy the situation, they insisted that debtor countries adopt its financial prescriptions and reduce higher educational spending by "introducing tuition or reducing the ratio of faculty and staff members to students" or staff reduction (Bollag, 2002). In a bid to institutionalize the managerial ethos of efficiency, the prescribed reductions can amount to 50%, significantly contributing to the ruin of post-secondary educational institutions and the retrenchment of the "educated" human resources or knowledge assets/stock of the region (Brutus, 1997). Staff salaries were cut across the board and early retirement (retrenchment) became mandatory for almost everyone in the public service, including teachers. Economic conditions and employment opportunities deteriorated, particularly for the professionalized human resources of SSA. Their members began to look overseas for employment. Zambia alone experienced "the exodus of 7000 teachers between 1986 and 1990" (UNDP, 1999). By the end of the 1980s, the provision of primary education appeared as a "panacea for poverty reduction" in the policy pronouncements of the supranational lending and regulatory agencies of global capitalism. The historically unprecedented expansion of higher education of the previous cycle was undergoing a fundamental crisis in the 1990s.

Despite all the economic declines and impoverishment experienced in these countries, the so-called social demand for education remained high and rising. As enrollments and demands for education keep mounting and the peripheral state is less and less able to raise the resources internally, it automatically turns to foreign loans, debts and assistance to maintain its legitimacy. Financially, the 1980s saw "significant increases in the cost of borrowing" (Manji, 1997, p. 8) and hence in the cost of servicing that debt. Using the levers of financial power and policy-based lending schemes, the World Bank and the IMF had found the opportunity to assume a more commanding role in the determination of the education policies of Third World - SSA "client governments." In the new context, the dominant forces led by the US demand nothing less than a globalized management of economic, financial, monetary and educational systems (Amin, 1996) via the Bretton Woods institutions. By the 1990s disciplinary neo-liberalism had emerged as the "predominant ideology legitimating the privatization of the state-controlled economy and the substitution of the market for the social provision of basic welfare" across the world (Overbeek and Van der Pijl (1993, p. 1).

The effects of this process were felt severely across the region, further "entrenching poverty and deeper despair" among the region's people. With growing inflows of debts and outflow of capital throughout the 1980 and 1990s, the region's GDP fell at an annual rate of 10% (UNDP) and poverty imploded. The legitimacy of the dominant social groups in the incorporated social formation was in crisis. Meanwhile, in Manji's (p. 10) evaluation "the state's role in the social sector had been effectively gelded in the process of structural adjustment, and its decisive role in determining economic policy had been appropriated by the multilateral institutions." We are emphasizing that a similar appropriation process had occurred in the determination of educational policies, leading to the eclipse of the developmental state of the Bandung era. In this rearrangement of forces, the NB state's function increasingly becomes more enforcement-oriented or "instrumental-repressive" rather than hegemonic (directive and organizational - educative) in the broadest sense that had prevailed during the early nationalist

phase of the 1960 and early 1970s. The provision of schools and educational opportunities had played a great part in securing both the consent of the various classes and ethnic groups as well as the consolidation of the dominant social group broadly known as the "national bourgeoisie" (NB), a stratum brought into prominence by the expansion of the post colonial states. With the gelding of its sovereign powers over the economic and public policy directions of these states, the political function (state-based) of the NB is diminished.

Reorienting the functions of the peripheral state implies a certain form of "regime change." In this case, Amin talks of the leaderships of impoverished client states being re-subordinated or re-compradorized with their leading members recruited at the service of the transnational agencies, TNCs and other "donor" related NGO institutions of the North. With the peripheral state's national economic and educational policy functions clearly subsumed by the forces of neo-liberal globalization, the peripheral elites evolve into a complicit "compradorist" entity, without autonomous initiative in vital public policy matters. To use Gramscian metaphors, their function becomes comparable to subaltern officers in the army. Their continued existence is predicated on the immediate execution of the policy designs and orders decided by the cadres or intellectual general staff of the multilateral institutions. In practical terms this approach implies safeguarding loans and funds to implement "donor" and BWI conditionalities and policies (i.e., removing or deregulating "barriers" to foreign capital, and privatization of public properties and institutions, including schools in their respective states). Theoretically, tit is important to remember that these are unilateral policy responses designed to enhance, the IMF's and World Bank's regulatory influence and the North's hegemony over the national formations and social policies of Sub-Saharan African countries.

Resistance to SAP-inspired macro-economic and educational reforms is widespread across the region and often takes the form of violent protests on and off campus. In the worst instances, universities became the scene of riots, killings,

intimidation of faculty by student gangs, rapes and generalized anarchy, replicating the larger society. Academic standards and wages suffered along with the free expression of ideas and all the principles of autonomy and academic freedom that give the university its name and meaning. The scale of the educated unemployed had grown into a crisis. Academic workers were producing under the lowest wages in the world, a condition which encourages "flight" toward the "new" private universities and NGOs or abroad whenever possible. A stratum that had grown around state privileges rather than economic production began to dissolve. Retrenched bureaucrats, state administrators, teachers and scientists or professionals began to look elsewhere for employment opportunities. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) estimated some 127, 000 highly educated and qualified professionals had left the continent between 1960 and 1989 and that the region has been losing 20,000 professionals each year since 1990 (IOM-idrc website). Members of the professions, in particulars, felt the rising crisis of the state and the precarious peripheral social structures and the exodus of Africa's intellectual and professional elite (the educated classes) grew more concerted in the era of globalization.

4. Debt Bondage and Eclipse of NB State

For much of the 1960s and early 70s (the active phase of the Bandung cycle) the expansion of education was considered an inherent part of sovereignty, nation-building and national development process. Expanding public educational infrastructures and enrollment rates became crucial mechanisms for legitimizing the developmental NB state, both externally and within. Internationally, expansion of educational opportunities confirmed the new state's commitment to "human capital" development. On the domestic front, the policy appeared to quench the insatiable demand for education that prevails in the region, historically and at present. Education became a highly valued "national good' both for the people and the state. It symbolized the path to a better/improved life for the "masses" and to national development for the elite. The benevolent form of multilateralism that prevailed, in turn, sanctioned and rewarded these "nation-

building" efforts. The discursive shift towards the so called less developed countries or the LDCs, in official discourse, was inaugurated by McNamara's World Bank in the course of the 1970s. What I call the pseudo-populist shift occurred when the World Bank began targeting the "poor" and poverty itself, thereby shifting its focus from financing projects requested by governments to launching a "basic needs" macroeconomic approach to national development through lending and the growing debt. Central to this emergent neo-liberal populism was the casting of "poverty" rather than national underdevelopment as the main culprit facing these peripheral countries.

The World Bank has appropriated the age-old struggle against poverty as its own institutional mission and vociferously claims to be helping the poor or even "the poorest of the poor." Under McNamara's controversial leadership, this imperial populism took a more elaborate shape and spurned the macro-economic theories that command the official discourse on LCDs at the World Bank. Under McNamara's reign, the World Bank had designed what Narmam (1998) calls a "shopping list" approach of so-called "basic needs" required by the poor to alleviate poverty. Investing in the improvement of certain economic macroeconomics indicators related to the salvation of the "poor" grew into a near-religious obsession and synonymous with expanding "free trade" and capitalism. Ranked foremost in this shopping list, education emerged as trump card in World Bank development thinking and primary "basic education" education became the favored arsenal for fighting the scourge of poverty. By the 1980s, primary education appeared everywhere as a "panacea to development" (Narman, 115) and centerfold in the policy pronouncements of the World Bank and the Bretton Woods complex. Thus:

> primary education is claimed to be the single largest contributor to the growth rates experienced. Its benefits to the individual household as well as society at large have been thoroughly analyzed; education is considered to influence heath and fertility directly and indirectly, to contribute to reduction of poverty and the increase the productive capacity.

Based on the new populism, McNamara encouraged his staff to "design and sell projects to governments" while he encouraged borrowers "to take on more debt than they could safely handle" (George & Sabelli, 1994, p. 43) eventually ensnaring the borrowing governments in a vicious "debt crisis" and ongoing peripheralization that has grown worse since. After a decade or two of poverty alleviation programs, the poor actually emerged significantly less prosperous, with real income per head steadily regressing across the region (Saul and Leys, 1999). In short, the poor grew poorer in the course of implementing the new approach to the SSA region. Overall, the period saw inequalities between countries and income gaps between "the fifth living in the richest countries" and the Other fifth also increased rapidly from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 74 to 1 in 1997 (UN Human Development Report 1999, p. 3)

In this interaction, the sovereign power of financial and education policy-making gradually slips out of the NB and devolves towards the lenders of the financial-intellectual complex (IFC). The first African state burdened by unsustainable debts and imminent economic collapse, Ghana, was given the stark ultimatum to "implement stabilization and liberalization agenda" designed by the IFC or risk bankruptcy. Thus, "between 1983-1991, with the support of donors, Ghana embarked on far-reaching reforms" (Tsikata, 2000, p. 20). In the same way that Ghana's independence provided the beginning for the Bandung cycle in 1957, its immersion into SAPs presents us with a snapshot of the rise of "neo-lliberalization without borders" and the regional rise of the Globalized cycle of educational expansion.

In the wake of neo-liberal globalization, the region's overall condition may be characterized by declining standards of living, high and often rising levels of poverty and unemployment, higher cost of attending education and declining rates of per capita income and dissatisfied youths. Caught under similar circumstances and grips of global markets and declining profits, other countries across the region began submitting to the Bank's disciplinary path and policy prescriptions. In their

adjustments to comply with the neoliberal policy strategies, SSA states continued borrowing, though with no perceivable improvement in the conditions of the majority. As the 1980s decade moved on, the consequences of coerced stabilization, deregulation and liberalization schemes sustained by continuous borrowing began to be uniformly felt across the region. Bello (1996, p. 293) writes "Sub-Saharan Africa has been even more devastated than Latin America, with total debts in 1984 amounting to 110 percent of GDP, compared to 35 percent for all developing countries."

The pattern officially refereed to as "debt crisis" or continuous indebtedness and peripheralization to repay the debt began to set in regionally as a matter of policy. If exports are not sufficient to repay for the accumulating debt, pressures rise for more loans through disciplinary re-scheduling "provided the recipient country complies with IFC policy or behaves like a good boy" to pick on Magdoff's phrase. Although there is no conclusive evidence that SAPs directly caused the destruction of national public infrastructures, the correlation between the onset of SAPs and their "conditionalities" and the decline in the provision of social and educational services in SSA is uncanny. With the evidence of extensive data, Narman confirms (Narman, p. 118) that "declining trends ...from fieldwork supervised by the author in Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, and from eleven national studies on the basis of which one may conclude that adjustment and austerity measures informed by the IFC's prescriptions contributed to the decline in the provision of social and educational services and the productive capacities of the sub-Saharan states." Although McNamara might not have single-handedly transformed the policy terrain leading to SAPs his intellectual influence over the evolving debt-driven developmental strategies and populist poverty alleviation discourse of the World Bank (WB) has proved enduring. To get a measure of his influence on the institution's modus operandi, George & Sabelli's (1994) analysis of his reign is instructive.

As a CEO of the WB and former US Secretary of Defense, McNamara sought to analyze and assimilate and control the collective reality of the peripheries through the aggregation of numbers without concrete social, historical or cultural and human dimensions of a given country. This was evident in the quantitative analytical cost-benefit techniques and instruments favored by the Bank's "policy-based" lending schemes, loan considerations, aid programs & poverty-fighting projects that matured with SAPs. The point is that it was during his tenure that the World Bank absorbed Psacharopoulos' rate-of-return analysis and mode of "instrumental reasoning," effectively transforming "education into largely an investment choice measured in costs and benefits/costs and effectiveness" (Narman, p. 116). This economistic and individualistic " prational choice" turn in education policy thinking is pervasive in the Bank's policy papers on SSA and forms a central dimension of its intellectual hegemony.

In an in-depth study of the Bank's technocratic discourse, George & Sabelli (1994, p. 45) have suggested that McNamara "equated more costlier Bank projects - and thus higher level of borrowing - with the greatest welfare of the greatest number paving the way for structural adjustment programmes...." It mattered little that there was no evidence to support this doctrine. We shall see this redefinition of the Bank's role is not inconsequential to the peripheries. As a result, every year in the 1980s "an extra $90 to $115 billion was to enter the coffers of the borrowing countries in the form of new loans" (81) which merely compounded the poverty rate instead of alleviating even its worst aspects. The capacity of international capital to continue its exploitation of the peripheries was assured under new terms and conditions, both financial and discursive. In terms of the former, the 1980s saw "significant increases in the cost of borrowing" (Manji, 1997, p. 8) and hence in the cost of servicing that debt. In terms of the latter, the period witnessed the semantics of "structural adjustment" come into prominence in the development industry. Since McNamara "first introduced structural and sectoral adjustment lending in 1979-80" the USAID, OECD, EU and other "donors" have adapted the neo-liberal vocabulary, endorsed by the IMF and

World Bank. These organizations began to serve as "a seal of approval" that international bankers and transnational corporations use for assessing the risks of investing in a given country. As a result, the rise of the IMF and World Bank's growing regulatory influence and hegemony over the economic and educational policies of Sub-Saharan African countries has eclipsed what were, at the height of the Bandung cycle, widely regarded as the "sovereign" imperatives of NB state.

5. World Conference on Education For All (EFA)
Towards Comparative Advantage or Increased Peripheralization?

Meeting the basic learning needs constitutes a common universal human responsibility. The prospects of meeting the basic learning needs around the world are determined in part by the dynamics of international relations and trade. With current relaxation of tensions and decreasing number of armed conflicts there are now real possibilities to reduce the tremendous waste of military spending and shift those resources into socially useful areas, including basic education (World Conference on Education for All - WCEA).

The onset of the market-led globalized cycle of educational expansion was conceived within the fiscal crisis of the peripheral state and "End of History" international atmosphere of the immediate post Cold War era. The totalitarian and authoritarian states of the world system were thought to be under dissolution. Optimism about prospects of "relaxation" of international conflicts and the application of "peace dividends" toward improving what came to be known generically as "human development" rather than the raw GDP-GNP index formed part of the policy climate which gave birth the Education For All (EFA) movement. In the 1990s the spread of basic education itself became central to the emerging "human development" and "basic needs" approach of the FIC and the INGOs. The provision of basic education now became linked to universal human rights. In this way expanding access to basic education and learning "of satisfactory quality" came to be synonymous with advancing human rights as well as social justice and equity in the national development process. This was a discursive shift towards what may be described as developmentalism with a human face.

In the aftermath of the crucial Jomtien world conference on education for all (EFA) in 1990, meeting the basic learning needs of "all children, youth, and adults" became a priority policy area for international policy-makers and educators. In Hughes' (1998, p. 47) estimation of the historic **1990 Jomtien Conference,** the broad evaluations of the "South's" educational sector at the time suggested a rather bleak and disturbing trend. "Using literacy, one of the most basic of human requirements, as an indicator, the situation in some sense has worsened, despite major efforts nationally and internationally" launched over the last quarter century at least. Sub-Saharan countries with low literacy and enrollment rates to begin with had seen their modicum of educational accomplishments and human capital formations achieved during the Bandung cycle dissipate during the SAP decades of structural adjustment and austerity measures.

The World Declaration on Education for All, hosted by Thailand on March 1990 is a joint Inter-Agency Commission project of UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank and was described as a "worldwide consensus" committed to ensuring that "the basic learning needs of all children, youth and adults are met effectively in all countries" by 2000. At this historic conference, we learn that "Some 1,500 participants" met. Delegates from 155 governments, including policy-makers and specialists in education and other major sectors (WCEA, 1990, Preface) had an opportunity to attend. From our perspective, the new rationale behind the globalized cycle of educational expansion was drawn up at the World Declaration on Education for All in 1990.

This central Jomtien commitment to ensuring basic education and literacy for all began to inform all subsequent poverty reduction and social-justice oriented declarations and global conferences of the 1990s. The compensatory and human rights approach to education was quickly adapted by the peripheral governments, themselves eager to appease the rising tide of fiscal and legitimacy crises combined with the stiff resistance they met to SAPs. Jomtien symbolized a

convergence in the orientations and priorities of diverse national governments and international funding and non-government advocacy groups in the field of education and (INGO) agencies with respect to providing basic education for the "wretched of the earth."

The EFA movement also for the first time promoted the **INGO** sectors as partners and "flexible collaborators" in the provision of educational services under the hegemony of bilateral and multilateral institutions and the emerging structures of transnational global governance. Re-affirmed by 185 governments in Dakar April 2000 (http://www.campaignforeducation.org) EFA stood as the new consensus of the "international community," until the declaration of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (http://www.un.org/milleniumgoals/) which stands as the most current policy on "global partnership for development." Not limited to educational issues, it nevertheless embodies the spirit and commitment of EFA, particularly in four of its eight- point program led by a pledge to ensure universal primary education by 2015 and promoting gender equality in access to primary and secondary education.

The emphasis of the EFA perspective was on educating excluded constituencies "to further the cause of social justice" where "the most urgent priority is to improve access to education for girls and women." Basic education was proffered as a prescription for fostering everything from gender equality and sustainable development. Educated women, it is suggested, do a better job at rearing and educating their children as well as increasing children's life chances and thus could bear a higher rate of return on investment. Whence the investment to attend schools in the first place? Clinton recently reiterated this common sense rationalization on Africa's contemporary educational problems when he said something to the effect that that the lack of equal opportunities in education of boys and girls is holding back much of the development which Africa could enjoy. This may sound "rhetorically" compelling in terms of abstract principle, but surely other more compelling factor than the absence of the liberal-democratic

principle of "equality of opportunities" are burdening this region. In SSA, women carry the brunt of economic poverty associated with centuries of peripheral capitalism, a system that has forced the women to subsidize the no-wage and low-waged mine and plantation labor of African men. There are also layers of traditional forms of oppression that women have to contend with. Even if schools were built for all Africans, attendance of women would still depend on the general economic conditions of peripherality which make it imperative for them to divert their productive energies elsewhere like fetching clean drinking water and raising children on next to nothing, providing food for the family and caring for the sick and elderly under the grip of high infant mortality and growing infectious diseases like AIDS. Some of these conditions are more assertively featured in the MDGs' commitment to "combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases" through coordinated international measures and in cooperation with pharmaceutical companies.

To be sure, EFA is a work in progress. Its cardinal ideas are borrowed from the past and, in turn, have themselves been incorporated into the MDGs. Its basic pronouncements on the right to public education for the poor and basic education's overrated efficacy in terms of fighting poverty, appear in every "World" or lately "Millennium" conference's objectives and resolutions. This commitment to the provision of universal public education for the poor was given further impetus at a prominent international summit in Dakar, Senegal where delegates reinforced their commitment to put "all boys and girls" in Africa in school by 2015. Dakar added a safety measure to previous commitments by pushing back the Jomtien time-line to eradicate illiteracy by another 15 years, consistent with the UN's latest MDGs.

Needless to say, the hoped-for provision of basic education implies more than opening schooling facilities for Africans who have been economically dispossessed, as the UK chancellor of the exchequer, Brown, has warned. It must also involve improving living conditions, creating employment and the like.

Talking about the MDGs to the BBC, Brown (2005) said that Africa stands to miss key targets for reducing poverty by more than 100 years, if debt cancellation and other issues are not addressed as part of the problem. Brown (17th January) reportedly added a note of caution when he told African finance ministers that, at the present rate, free primary education for all would not be assured until the year 2130. Now from 1980 to 2015 and to possibly 2130! it is obvious that the "expert" policy-makers on SSA are engaged with something less than a scientific enterprise, when it comes to analyzing issues and forecasting trends in the region. Who will hold them accountable?

6. The Myth of Comparative Advantage

Broadly speaking, the contemporary cycle hinges on the notion of basic education constituting a universal right and the most essential residual function of the neo/post colonial peripheral states of the region. Accordingly, it is recommended that that the provision of basic education should be designed to enable the peripheral states to more fully exploit the "economies of scale" and "the comparative advantage" of their export oriented economies. The long-term objective of EFA is, I would argue, to stimulate low-wage agri-business and extractive mining developments in the peripheries to accommodate the cheap staple and fuel/energy requirements of global capitalism. In other words, it is certainly not aimed at empowering rural producers for social transformation as Nyerere's education for self-reliance project had envisioned.

It is instructive that this basic educational policy design of neo-liberalism is couched in the sel-promoting ideology of education and in the principles of eminent British economists of the early nineteenth century who advanced two interrelated concepts on international trade "specialization" and "comparative advantage. " The two concepts have become "articles of faith" in neo-liberal economic thinking, despite the changed circumstances of the modern capitalist world and continuing impoverishment of those who were, in principle, to benefit from the application of comparative advantage economics. As Stoneman (George and Sabelli, 1994, p. 63) has pointed out in relation to Zimbabwe, the advocates

of comparative advantage "neither ask why a country is poor, nor if it might emerge from that poverty through a significant departure from the **status quo**, nor if state policies can make a difference." Instead, it offers a circular argument that this or that country is comparatively disadvantaged in industrial activities "and so should avoid them." Also this approach derives its ideological role from what is "a successful confusion" in Stonemans' words "between the correct argument which tells us not to grow banana in Britain, and the incorrect one that tells us not to make steel in Zimbabwe." Extended further, the discourse of comparative advantage ends up by advising the African's peripheries to continue growing and exporting bananas and other agricultural and primary products for eternity.

Moreover, while insisting on the efficacy of comparative advantage, the neo-liberal injunction ignores widening global inequalities and the myriad of protective tariff walls and asymmetrical and imperial trade structures through which the developed capitalist metropolitan countries regulate the global accumulation process and the value of commodities in favor of their own industries and comparative advantage. This is the "neo" dimension of contemporary liberal macroeconomic discourse of "free trade" and deregulation which have clearly failed to address why the region has fallen back despite achieving comparative advantage and specialization in the export of primary or extractive raw-materials for so long. Instead of addressing the comprehensive socio-cultural and economic challenges of backward and exploited social structures and "unequal exchange" in which the peripheries are submerged, comparative advantage is said to be enhanced through the expansion of basic educational opportunities. By the end of the decade of the 1980s, various INGOs and NGOs had embraced basic public education as an organizing theme for practically all their activism in the global arena.

Initially, the NB expected to achieve universal primary education by 1980! With the collapse and bankruptcy of the NB state, the core's "funders" of the universal primary education agenda seem to have taken over the initiative. The

transnational "consensus" assumed that "realistically" more foreign aid, loans and personnel will be needed to allow Africa's poorest nations to escape this predicament of widespread illiteracy by 2000! In retrospect, this paternalistic discourse was hardly convincing, while SSA as a whole was using ever-larger portions of its income to repay debts. A BBC (27/4/2000) report estimates that the region was spending "three times as much on debt repayment as on education" during the adjustment years. Also, during this period, traditional foreign aid had begun to shrink or migrate towards the former Eastern bloc countries seeking better terms and returns. In any case, enhancing "enrollment" rates in primary education, among people confounded by life-threatening conditions like drought and famine conditions, AIDS, chronic unemployment and massive indebtedness, appears more like a palliative than an earnest solution to tackle the region's "perennial problems" associated with its legacy of peripheralization.

The evidence, so far, is not favorable to the advocates of EFA. The "sectoral" and naïve approach to education pursued by the large IFC and the NGOs turns out to be ineffective. On the contrary, the direct negative correlation between neo-liberal policy initiatives and negative socio-economic consequences throughout the region is too glaring to ignore. Two-thirds of the countries are not moving in the expected direction and, in some cases, are regressing in the opposite direction. Moreover, the data indicate that primary enrollments in Sub- Saharan Africa have not only failed to keep pace with population growth but may have actually decreased for lack of material and human resources for constructing more schools.

In terms of the clients of EFA, an estimated half of the population live in dire poverty and are preoccupied with basic survival, a condition which vitiates any educational strategy that does not simultaneously address their ongoing economic privations and powerlessness spread by globalization. The effects of these contradictory national-globalizing policy dynamics had impoverished the people and reduced sub-Saharan Africa to economic penury. The region became "by far

the worst" performer among so-called Third World regions of the world (Arrighi, 2002). One of the most striking aspects of the current global reconstruction processes of the Washington Consensus is that the official rhetoric of the external FIC and the donors, their words and language, are hardly consistent with the immediate and living social and economic conditions of the majority of the region's populations. Fine declarations and trendy communiqués aside, the central propositions and objectives advanced in Jomtien have yet to show incremental manifestations in the everyday living conditions of the mass of the populations. Ironically enough, the FIC's educational-cum-developmental strategies have left populations and nations worse off than they were during the Bandung cycle. One wonders, where exactly is the projected social return on primary education in SSA?

To be certain, education reform is a long-term and multi-pronged process, but the evidence in SSA so far has not been encouraging. At the current rate, nine countries are projected to have fewer than half the eligible children in primary school by 2015, Also, we know that the ratio of girls' to boys' enrollments in primary and secondary school has barely changed since the 1990 Jomtien initiative. By the 1990s the World Bank and the IMF had began to change their discourse shifting towards the language of "human development" and "sustainable development" rather than the GDP-GNP index and of cost-benefit accounting. Based on this new measure, of the 35 countries the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) classifies as having low human development, 28 were found in Sub- Saharan Africa (UNDP, 1999) where in the course of the 1990s the largest share of people living "below $1 a day" had multiplied. Also, according to UNESCOs website, pupil -teacher ratios have been rising to a regional average of 40 students per teacher, compared to 25 per teacher in Latin America. Similarly, life expectancy had began to decline in SSA "from 50 to 46 years since 1990" according to the World Bank's website. The decline in the region's human development continues in the 2005 UN data. The substantial and growing bilateral-multilateral support for basic educational development had

perhaps made a rhetorical dent on the mounting poverty and educational problems of the region but little tangible improvement in human development resulted.

Chapter Seven:

Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century

The contemporary university, like the communities in which it is embedded, is in the midst of massive change. Such change is propelled forward by two central trends. These are acceleration in the pace of change itself and the globalization of the economy and technology. (WCHE/IAU)

1. From Academic To Service/Corporate Universities

At this juncture of the study we are ready to explore the changing higher education milieu of the region within the evolving policies initiated by neo-liberal globalization. Overall the worldwide move from the traditional publicly-financed universities to what are known as corporate or service universities is rooted in the gradual transition from a predominantly materialistic and menial labor power - based Fordist-industrial accumulation process, considered in the world historical sense, towards a knowledge/information-based and culturally intensive one. This is the essence of what is abbreviated as the NKE also known as the technology intensive post-industrial knowledge economy. In this transition, higher educational institutions have emerged as the critical links between the declining traditional national economies of nation-states and the possibilities of expanding with technologically-intensive and market-driven NKE.

In discussing this planet-spanning transformation in the capitalist accumulation process and its implications for the region of SSA and its national public universities, we start from certain premises. It is widely recognized that the advent of neo-liberal globalization has increasingly commercialized the higher education "sector" worldwide by integrating it with international trade and services, i.e. higher education has grown into a major industry for the emerging transnational economy. This is precisely the objective advanced by the GATS and TRIPS "consensus" which aspires to facilitate a sort of global "free market" in ideas-knowledge and educational services, science and technology (S&T) (Kachur, 2002; Doern & Sharaput, 2000). I use the word consensus in quotation marks because sub-Saharan Africans are too impoverished and peripheral to the centers

of knowledge production and policy deliberation to even afford permanent representation at the WTO's headquarters in Geneva (Wynberg, 2000). In other words, the term is a diplomatic one, used by the major powers that dictate the rules of the game played by governments rich and poor.

In all the major policy declarations of the BWI, the decisions of the rich and dominant powers (G7-G8) tend to be presented as reflecting the desires of the "international community." In the post -9/11 world the world community itself would be held hostage to US "preventive development" and brazen unilaterlalism through which "the American state has sought to promote the fact that US values and rules are the most desirable and just in the world" (Soederberg, 2005, p. 204) regardless of where the United Nations (UN) or Old Europe may stand on issues vital to the international community. Chief among these values is the inherent superiority of the corporate or the "private sector" over the state in the expansion of productivity, knowledge and educational services. This is characteristic of the neo-liberalism's anti-statist or monetarist ideological offensive. Under the maxim of "deregulation" it holds the "interventionist" state as a barrier to further economic and social development everywhere. At any rate, the fundamental challenges to all universities evolve from the aforementioned "drift" of the traditional state university into the domain of the corporate world of international trade and commerce and more concretely into the underlying processes of global capitalist production and accumulation (Pannu et.al. 1994; Etzkowitz; 1998, Buchbinder and Newson, 1990; Kachur, 2002). With the new transnational legal instruments in place, the SSA's state-owned universities and educational practices have been decisively drawn into the market logic of neo-liberal globalization since 1995..

This critical intersection of market-driven and investment-intensive higher education institutions and the global knowledge and "academic marketplace" has brought new challenges to Northern and Southern countries. The challenges are enormous, especially among the poorest countries of SSA where 18 of the bottom

20 so-called least developed countries LDCs of the world can be found. We are interested in exploring what policy initiatives are in evidence to address this changing role of universities in the region. Public institutions of higher education everywhere are expected to re-orient themselves to meet the technological and economic imperatives of the new computer-driven mode of production. What are the implications of this process for the region's public universities? How do they fare, in light of the emergence of the "new knowledge economy" (NKE) and the commercialization of intellectual property (IP) regimes (TRIPS) that govern contemporary international transactions in knowledge and educational goods and services?

The wider global transformation associated with the onset of the NKE implies, first and foremost, structural changes in the mode of production where information and communications technologies (ICTs) and service industries are becoming increasingly more valuable than manufacture in propagating the wealth of nations (Pannu, Schgurensky and Plumb, 1994) to use an old expression. Viewed from the perspective of the university community, these developments "place (upon it) an increasingly heavy responsibility, both to provide training and research...as well as such services as consultancies, technology transfer and continuing education" according to the Working Document of the World Conference on Higher Education (WCHE).

There is no doubt that this drift of universities worldwide into the emerging global "marketplace" has given an advantage to universities embedded in advanced industrial capitalist societies of the North. They were historically-and institutionally more prepared to participate and dominate in the global marketplace for knowledge and educational resources. Educational adjustment in the contemporary era entails the adaptation of competitive capitalist values and business practices in the administration of universities or moving towards the Canadian "service universities" or European "corporate universities" model. In this context, research-knowledge institutionalized in the universities becomes a

highly valorized commodity, readily bought and sold at market value. In short, the rules of globalization induce assimilation of the public university and its products into the international marketplace and research becomes a considerably more expensive commodity. In the developed capitalist North, this implies organizing research partnership schemes with industry and the private sector and generating alternate revenue sources to accommodate the growing cost and demand for higher education services. This option, unfortunately, is not open to SSA's universities. For reasons related to their historical origins and expansion discussed in the previous chapter, they lack the requisite research facilities and ICT density to participate competitively in the global marketplace for knowledge. In the way of delivering services to the community, public policy in this area is articulated at the inter-governmental level and under the internationalist mission of UNESCO as we shall see later.

In this emerging global race "*to lay claim to knowledge*" via accumulation of the world's intellectual and natural resources, the university's position and function in society is also rapidly changing towards more utilitarian/commercial pursuits. The most competitive and successful universities in this race are those capable of attracting the top scientists/academics of the world and instituting their own venture capitalist corporations. These top-level research universities are adept at forming strategic partnerships with business in acquiring patenting rights and marketing their innovations. These corporate-related "services" are rendered through what are known as university-industry liaison offices or ILOs in Canada. Their commercial spin-offs add considerable revenue to these research-intensive institutions and contribute significantly to national productivity and wealth creation. As Canada's Advisory Council on Science and Technology (2000, p. 1) explains it "increasingly science & technology (S&T) are recognized as being key elements" in gaining "comparative advantage" over international competitors. Given their institutional weakness in research and absence of the new productivity-enhancing technologies, I suggest sub-Saharan Africa's public universities are being re-incorporated as market preserves for Northern

universities and student-knowledge tributaries for the growing service-sectors and competing universities of the advanced capitalist world. These leading universities have taken on intellectual property or IP accumulation and knowledge-intensive economic development as an institutional mission (Etzkowitz, 1998) far beyond their borders. The race has initiated a form of primitive accumulation for knowledge workers with new opportunities for educational entrepreneurs

The powerful new axis of knowledge and power is increasingly mediated by research centers, laser-guided laboratories, well-staffed think-tanks and research universities rather than the old Fordist manufacturing plants and factories. Under neo-liberal globalization, the world of centers and peripheries is growing more technologically and economically polarized. Similarly, the hierarchy between elite-research universities and lesser "teaching" universities is also beginning to crystallize internationally. The challenge for universities in the sub-Saharan region is how to generate alternate revenues at a time of declining state revenues and high educational demands combined with pressure to reform the institutions along market-oriented lines. Their problems are, therefore, qualitatively different from the North's universities that have proved capable of harnessing the forces of globalization to their benefit while improving the well-being and living standards of their respective nations. Seen on a world scale, the SSA region's state-owned public universities are relegated to "teaching universities" of questionable quality and with poor prospects of profitability in the NKE.

Almost inevitably, the high standard and high-value research universities wielding the requisite high-technological and scientific capacities are embedded in the major core capitalist countries. Among them, they hold 97% of all the world's patents and their residents own over 80% of patents granted in developing countries (Wynberg, 2000) as well. Thus, in this particular scramble for knowledge we find (Altbach, 2005, p. 5):

> Even within countries at the centre of the world academic system in the early 21st century-the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and to some extent Australia and Canada –there are many peripheral institutions. For example, perhaps 100 of America's 3,200 postsecondary institutions can be considered research universities. Other countries exhibit similarly stratified academic systems. There are also universities that play complex roles as regional centers, providing a conduit of knowledge and links to the top institutions. For example, the major universities in Egypt provide academic leadership for the Arabic world and conduits to the major centers, while contributing relatively little themselves.

Under these changing circumstances of the NKE, peripheral universities with less research facilities risk remaining "conduits of knowledge transmission" or merely "teaching institutions" and tributaries for the "best and brightest" bound for the world-class "top-tier" universities located in the Euro-American centers. The bottom line here is that the flow of knowledge and academic talent is "directed largely from South to North" where "80% of the world's international students come from" (Altbach, 2004, p. 8). The systemic dynamics of this process leads to expediting the export of human capital or "brain drain" from the poorer regions to the Northern metropoles. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the function of peripheral higher educational institutions is increasingly relegated to transmission of knowledge forms prepackaged at the centers of the world academic system.

The picture that emerges is that developing countries account for only about 6% of the world's research and development or R&D expenditure (Correa, 2000, p. 38), though indirectly they contribute significantly to the accumulation of patented intellectual capital at the advanced core through other mechanisms, notably the emigration of the best and brightest at their prime working age. This particular mode of surplus extraction may be defined as a continuous and ongoing export/transfer of knowledge workers (skilled workforce) to the metropolis, a long-term structural fate as it were, from which SSA suffers in particular. The consequence of this trend has all but destroyed the indigenous academic

community and the public sphere's ability to reproduce itself effectively without imported "expert" personnel.

To highlight the scope of this "high skills" and knowledge transfer and its implications for SSA educational growth, some figures are instructive. Approximately 60 percent of all Ghanian doctors trained locally in 1980s have left the country (UNDO 1992, HDR) to practice in the metropolis. The numbers are all the more staggering when one considers that it takes approximately $40,000 in public investment to train a doctor in the SSA region. Perhaps one of the poorest countries in the world, Ethiopia loses the most qualified professionals of all African countries. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) records that Ethiopia lost 74.6% of its human capital from various institutions 1980-91. During the same period, more than a third of Ethiopia's doctors left the country. Likewise, a recent report on Malawi (BBC, 2004) in my view, illuminates the trend and its impact on the country's human resources rather clearly. Malawi, it is reported, has the capacity to train only around 60 nurses each year. But each year "at least 100 others" leave to work in other more prosperous core countries, especially the UK where some 12,000 nurses have been recruited this year to work from outside the European Union. This emigration or what some have called a form of organized "poaching" of skilled workers from impoverished countries by the metropolis is decimating the educational, health services and the entire social fabric of the countries concerned. It exposes the hypocrisy of the "poverty fighting" doctrine. It is also creating a crisis of confidence and legitimacy in the whole neo-liberal enterprise of national "asset-stripping" across the region. The aggregate numbers of "knowledge flight" out of SSA in this way is staggering. Surplus appropriation from SSA has historically taken the form of labor exploitation, the more recent demand centers principally on the region's "educated" human resources, a process accelerated by worsening conditions and unemployment in the peripheries over the last two and tree decades. Sooner or later, emigration becomes the best, or the only, prospect there is for escaping mass poverty and conflict and earning a living.

Globalization's rules (TRIPS-GATS) regulate this scramble to lay claims to knowledge and knowledge resources in ways that are advantageous or "favorable" to the "rights" of metropolitan and particularly US industries and universities who have become so-called "users" of knowledge resources. They have proved less protective of the "rights" of the initial "providers" of the indigenous knowledge resources concentrated in the Southern hemisphere. The rules governing TRIPS do not recognize the existence of knowledge outside the modern laboratories and have created a significant amount of resistance over ownership rights in the areas of traditional knowledge forms known as "indigenous knowledge, "The controversy over TRIPS is by no means settled and the WTO negotiations are stalled at every round (Doha etc.).[3] Despite the rising resistance to TRIPS around the peripheral world, the overall prognosis does not bode well for the region's endemically unemployed knowledge workers as well as the professional stratum and the impoverished universities. Their societies predominant modes of production still revolve around subsistence agriculture and the export of primary industries while a considerable section of the population lives in a state of chronic poverty and malnutrition within the framework of pre-capitalist modes and relations of production. University education in the region thus confronts its limitations in the pervasiveness of the pre-capitalist structures and processes of low-skill production.

The problem is that, in the contemporary era, African states are badly undermined by the exceptionally low level of the organic composition of educational and

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[3] The notion of indigenous knowledge is problematic. For more detailed discussion on the issue see Dei and Asgharzadeh's Indigenous Knowledge and Globalization: An African Perspective in Abdi, A. et.al (2006, 53), My use of the term does not invoke ideal, timeless intellectual insights, accessible only to indigenous peoples (IP) from the Arctic Inuit, all the way to the "Bushmen" of SSA. Instead the usage here draws attention to the existence of a viable body of knowledge rooted in the experiences, culture, environment and understanding of the indigenous peoples. Moreover, this knowledge is not acknowledged or rewarded as adequately "scientific" by the governing rules of intellectual rights and commerce.

cultural capital accumulated by the population, compared to other regions of the world. The average level of education among SSA aggregate populations is estimated to be at no more than between 3rd-4th grade. This has resulted in a barely literate workforce whose productivity in terms of surplus value creation has been eclipsed by the demands of the expanding "knowledge-based" and borderless economy. The region has the least number of postsecondary university graduates per capita with skills that are proving superfluous for the nations concerned.

Needless to say, with only 4% of the population exposed to post secondary education SSA countries find themselves sorely unprepared to meet the emerging challenges related to what WCHE/IAU refers to as the acceleration in the pace of change itself and the neo-liberal globalization of the economy and technology. During this transitional process, the so-called social demand for higher education in sub-Saharan Africa had grown so overwhelmingly that "over a million qualified, tertiary-school-age students aged 18 to 23" were simply turned away from universities annually (Kigotho, 2002 p.2). The Bandung cycle had definitely reached its horizon.

Knowledge and educated knowledge workers are the most important requirements for the accumulation of capital and creation of wealth in the capitalist NKE. Their worldwide mobility has grown into a formidably competitive business challenge for all higher education institutions. The global competition for knowledge workforce is waged under the discourse of "internationalization" of universities. This state of affairs has brought the attention and energetic initiative of "private" tertiary institutions or what UNESCO (2003) refers to as the new "cross-border providers of higher education" to the SSA scene.

2. The Scramble for Knowledge and Flexible Accumulation

"Knowledge itself is power" (Sir Francis Bacon).

Analysts of globalization agree that a knowledge race akin the world's arms race has erupted in the present era and Sir Francis Bacon's famous phrase rings more realistic than ever. Power and success or the "place of nations" within this emergent post-Fordist or post-industrial mode of production is predicated on the flexible deployment of human resources, new communications and information technologies and research and development (R &D) activities which are, invariably, in short supply in SSA universities. In this race, the sub-Saharan region is, therefore, more prey than competitor. In the new international context, what has come to be known as the "knowledge gap" has grown to represent one of the most "striking disparities" and challenges in the sociology of contemporary international education.

The universities in the region have not only failed to maintain a competitive standard of teaching and research but could not expand enough to accommodate enrollment of high school graduates within their own nations. Widespread graduate unemployment exists side by side with high demand for tertiary education. It is important to bear in mind that the major players of the NKE draw on the South's tertiary-level educated human resources for their competitive or comparative successes. This reality begins to explain why a worldwide demand has broken out for a knowledgeable and "diverse" workforce and why "cross-border providers of higher education" are making inroads into the region.

The growth of the NKE feeds on competition for knowledge and knowledge workers, a market that has grown into one of the most significant and profitable growth industries. This global demand for higher education and knowledge is of such magnitude, that it is expected to grow (Egron-Polak, 2002 quoting Denis Blight) massively and beyond the capacities of many of the South's countries to accommodate demand. According to the Secretary General of the International Association of Universities (IAU) the demand in Asia alone has grown "by 48

million students between 1995 and 2002" and this equates to a staggering higher education industry of "37.000 new university places each week." This massive worldwide and growing demand and expansion process of the higher education industry is not without consequences to Africa's public universities. The demand for higher education is as compelling as in other regions but the ability of SSA states to expand provision of higher education is more than ever confined. Per student expenditures are in decline, student riots have become routine and the institution's degrees and diplomas are perceived as less rewarding and inferior to those offered by the private university institutions that have entered the lucrative market for higher education in the region.

In this new knowledge-based economic landscape, Africa's public higher education institutions are, as mentioned, in the midst of a paralyzing crisis both from their own atrophy and BWI-donor enforced conditionalities. As we have suggested throughout, the crisis is comprehensive and goes beyond "inefficient management", "demoralized functionaries or "overinvestment" and the "deadwood" intellectuals targeted by critics and World Bank's "zonal" prescriptions distinguished for their harshness towards higher education. It is a crisis of the NB state and society in which these universities are embedded, so to speak. It is a crisis of hegemony as much as it is a legacy of peripheral capitalist development where the imported education systems are not adequately linked to the post-employment trajectories of the graduates. It also involves a conscious and ongoing "dismantling" of what were national and public institutions through increasing the scope of commodification and/privatization. The present educational cycle is driven by increasingly complex national-transnational, private and non-private stakeholder and partnership initiatives. In this process of global restructuring, skilled workers are being literally recruited out of the modern "professionalized" and knowledge-intensive institutions of the peripheries to wherever global markets and immigration laws of the core beckon. As Hodgson, New Zealand's minister for research emphasizes, "We no longer think of

immigration as a gate-keeping function but as a talent attraction function necessary for economic growth." (The Globe and Mail, 26.3.05, F9).

In this particular scramble for talent and knowledge, the synergistic focus of the North's knowledge economy and immigration systems are siphoning off the region's educated workforce to the most advanced metropolitan centers at an alarming rate. This process of transfer is mediated by the universities of the region. The World Bank (2002) estimates that already by 1990 "75% of all emigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and 75% of all those from India were holders of tertiary education qualifications (see Egron-Polak, p. 7). In this scramble, like other "advanced" countries, Canada is highly dependent (economically and demographically speaking) on the rest of the world and the peripheries, in particular, for much of the knowledge workers. Foreign students and immigrants from the South form the backbone if not the edge of the core's competitive high-tech and service industries.

What is significant to understand is that with neo-liberal globalization, the number of African knowledge workers crossing international borders rose substantially. It is estimated that between 1985 and 1990, the sub-Saharan region lost some "60, 000 professionals" and has continued losing "an average of 20, 000 annually" (Tsikata, 2000, p. 6) to the higher-wage regions of the metropolis. One could say therefore that in the contemporary era of the NKE, SSA's pool of knowledge workers and tertiary level students have become a source of skilled and cheap labor reserve for the growing knowledge industries, service sectors, colleges and universities of the core countries. Today the core's borders and airports are replete with high tech security measures and infrared surveillance methods to ensure that unwanted and unqualified "illegal immigrants" are kept out while immigration laws are refined to accommodate the influx of "educated" and skilled immigrants fleeing the cycle of peripheralization, unemployment and growing pauperization of educated professionals prevalent in the region.

Ever-eager to acquire higher education, African students are falling prey to overseas private educational investors, who under the credo of deregulation and internationalization are exporting satellite universities, distance colleges and cyber-universities, often of dubious quality and standards. Most of these "diploma mills" would not be acceptable to the educational authorities in the cores themselves. Targeting Third World students, higher education exporters have found a near-captive market for their educational commodities. The core universities are, on their part, charging exorbitant differential fees to foreign students, up to six times the price for local students in UK, making it cost-prohibitive to attend these institutions except for the richest classes of peripheral students. What remains in the wake of this scramble for knowledge workers are overcrowded and under-resourced African public universities of questionable academic standards. Indeed, without viable research programs, they appear more like an extension of high school and subsidiary institutions for selecting potential immigrants or the few "bright" performers who might "continue" their studies at the better universities overseas. A multi-tiered university system is forming globally and sub-Saharan African national public universities are slipping to the rock bottom of the emerging academic hierarchy. These conditions have been exacerbated by the privatization policies of neo-liberalism.

In this fierce competition for knowledge workers this recalls the views of Mazrui, namely: "higher education is viewed as an economic sector with some of its institutions acting globally as large multinationals" (Egron-Polak, 2002, p. 5). They are actively franchising, designing exporting strategies for educational services, attracting foreign students, scientists and staff. Thus under the banner of "internationalization" metropolitan universities writes Egron-Polak "are capitalizing on their brand name recognition and whole countries are doing so in order to either protect their overseas market share, as is the case for the US, Australia, the UK and to some extent Canada, which have so far enjoyed the lion's share" of this growing industry of attracting foreign knowledge workers. This transnational flow of knowledge workers is regulated by immigration laws,

which have raised the educational bar in a bid to meet the high demand and competition from other labor-importing core countries.

For SSA universities, this is not simply a crisis of academics or academia and research but one of society at large, involving both a failure of the NB state and a conscious and systemic large-scale "de-institutionalization" of the region's state/society complexes in the course of accommodating the policy conditionalities of SAPs. George and Sabelli's (1994, p. 141) detailed research into the effects of "neo-classical orthodoxies" and policy practices of the World Bank's transnational elite is instructive in this context:

> Between 1980 and 1989 some thirty-three African countries received 241 structural adjustment loans. During the same period average GDP per capita in those countries fell 1.1 per cent a year. While per capita food production also experienced steady decline. The real value of the minimum wage dropped by over twenty-five per cent, government expenditure on education fell from $ 11 billion to $ 7 billion and primary school enrollments dropped from eighty percent in 1980 to sixty-nine percent in 1990. The number of poor people rose from 184 million in 1985 to 216 million in 1990, an increase of seventeen per cent.

It is hard to resist the conclusion that the despoliation of public education institutions and the professional (educated) stratum of the region was accelerated by the policies and forces unleashed by ongoing neo-liberal globalization. The problem appears to be the very same and widespread across the continent. In the wake of SAPs, African professors, medical doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers and information technology experts or "the educated classes" began migrating overseas in larger numbers to seek better opportunities for themselves and their families in America, Europe, Canada or Australia. A 2005 BBC article (Thursday 25 March) amplifies the issues by directly implicating "private industries" for aggravating the situation by "poaching the continent's best professors." The continents best bureaucrats, educators, physicians and nurses are "poached" by the highest bidder, as it were. For Professor Chacha Nyaigotti-Chacha, the executive secretary of the Inter University Council for East Africa located in

Nairobi, this flight of academics is exacerbating the deteriorating "terms and conditions" within which African professors/academic, students are operating. This damaging loss "is a factor twice - not only does it mean poor pay, but it also severely limiting the amount of research that experts and professors can do" in the region's declining public universities. The wider question is: will the embattled public universities fall prey to their own inertia and the prospecting educational entrepreneurs or reform themselves in the context of neo-liberal globalization?

3. The Birth of DAE (Development of African Education) and WGHE (Working Group on Higher Education)

It is imperative to affirm the role and importance of higher education for sustainable social, political and economic development and renewal in Africa in a context where ongoing globalization in higher education has put on the agenda issues of increased cross border provision, new modes and technologies of provision, new types of providers and qualifications, and new trade imperatives driving education. Higher education in Africa has to respond to these challenges in a global environment characterized by increasing differences in wealth, social well-being, educational opportunity and resource between poor and rich countries and where it is often asserted that sharing knowledge, international co-operation and new technologies can offer new opportunities to reduce this gap (Preamble to World Declaration on Higher Education for the 21st Century, 1998)

Towards the end of the 1990s, the World Bank published the World Development Report 1998/99 acknowledging the ever-widening disparity between North and South and started outlining its official position on the new "knowledge economy" and its far-reaching implications for the world of education development and reform. This emergent "weightless and intangible" entity, in the words of the Bank, travels rapidly and is poised to enlighten "the lives of people everywhere" especially the billions who "still live in darkness and poverty." With these assertions, the Bank was signaling its shifting attention to the growing knowledge-information gap rather than the usual macroeconomic disparities as "a central problem of development." This was its way of affirming the importance of higher education to what it calls sustainable development and the efficacy of the new trans-national knowledge trading regime symbolized by the logic of TRIPS and TRIM Trade Rights in Intellectual Property. The Preamble above conveys the

"common sense" view of the major stakeholders and senior policy-makers in the field, a view also shared by Africa's state and higher education leadership organized in the Association of African Universities (AAU). In its Accra Declaration on GATS and the Internationalization of Higher Education (April 2004), the AAU re-affirms its commitments to the declaration and adopts it as a "guide' to the concerted action of all the major stakeholders (http://www.aav.org/).

Taking leadership of the new policy context, the World Bank reiterated the well-known rationale that in the new competitive knowledge economy (NKE) it is the accumulation of knowledge, rather than capital that is "key to sustainable social and economic development." This dichotomy itself is misleading since the accumulation of capital and knowledge are interrelated and simultaneous processes. The World Bank and UN agencies, including Secretary General Kofi Annan, amplified this new understanding and held out the promise that with the use of new ICT at their disposal, the poor South can somehow leapfrog out of peripherality and close the widening economic gap. Indeed, the "expert" cadre stratum of "in-house" policy-analysts at the FIC and the international agencies are still putting forth this idea that by harnessing the new communications technologies "developing economies" have tremendous opportunities for "catching up" with industrial nations (Salmi, 1999). Such categorical elixirs and policy advice for accelerated and "sustainable development," have been the hallmark of the FIC recommendations in this area. This time, however, the focus turned on challenges of the expanding information revolution and knowledge-based economy.

As far as the higher education "sector" is concerned, the poor countries are emerging markets for knowledge. As such, the World Bank's starting point is that the South's knowledge-poor countries must begin to acquire knowledge through "an open trading regime, foreign investment and licensing agreements as well as creating knowledge locally." The latter "local" part of this sentence comes across

as an acknowledgement of the aspirations of the African partners and an afterthought to the main point of legitimating the concept of cross-border or transnational trade in education services and knowledge, as consecrated in the GATS and WTO - TRIPS-TRIM trade agreements. The lack of pre-conditions for conducting meaningful and marketable research in these institutions is no secret. At the same time, the fact that the World Bank had started raising questions about the implications of the NKE for the region's tertiary sector was considered significant. Given the renewed economic relevance of tertiary education to the development of the new global economy and "knowledge Societies," the World Bank moved to influence and control the discourse and direction of change at the policy level. Fredriksen (2003, WB Document, iv) a senior education advisor for the World Bank's "African Region," provides insight into the "Bank team's" guiding rationale for launching tertiary reform. In his words, "the discussion of information and communications technology reflects the bank's concern about efficiency in this area and the potential for an expanded role by the universities in capacity development outside academic campuses."

Although this particular comment was written in relation to reforming Ethiopia's public universities, the rationale of "efficiency" and the discourse of "capacity building" extends to reforming the public universities, civil service and state apparatuses of all the countries in the region. The underlying assumption of the "capacity building" discourse, however, is the notion that the region lacks a competent professional class of administrators or technocratic elite to negotiate the complicated demands of globalization and the NKE. From this rather patronizing perspective, "client" states began to be advised on possible strategies for aligning their higher education systems with the new technologies of global information networks.

The new performative and productivist policy perspective in this regard speaks of promoting "greater effectiveness in the management of human and financial resources" (Saint, 2000) as a means of improving "capacity building" measures in

the sub-continent's tertiary-higher education systems. With a focus on human resource development (HRD), The World Bank's publication Constructing Knowledge Societies (2002) begins to concede to the social, public role and broader "societal benefits of tertiary education" which include "greater social cohesion, improved health, better basic and secondary education, democratic participation etc." To realize these broad policy objectives on higher education, the World Bank established another donor-led policy consultative and deliberative body. Specifically, it organized the formation of a "stakeholder" consortium known as the Association for the Development of African Education (DAE). Comprising "40 bilateral, multilateral, and private donor agencies from Europe and North America" the key functions of the DAE are "coordinated by World Bank staff members" and seek to coordinate and "improve the impact of their development funding" (Saint, 2000) through more informed and coordinated policy action in this area. Clearly, tertiary education reform in this direction has became the concern of all major stakeholders.

This new approach was deemed imperative to lending greater "efficiency" to the learning process and raising levels of national productivity. As Saint (2000) emphasizes, "universities are also the principal source of the skilled leadership and technical expertise needed to guide national development." In short, the region's higher education institutions have to be run on market criteria i.e., more efficiently and cost-effectively managed with the help of the latest information technologies and the World Bank's policy directives under the DAE and WGHE.

This transnational coordination and consultative body includes representatives of "Africa's education leadership" led by the Association of African Universities (AAU) and is organized by a "secretariat" which has lately moved out of the World Bank building and relocated to Paris under the auspices of UNESCO's International Institute For Educational Planning (IIEP). Working throughout the 1990s under the umbrella group known as Working Group on Higher Education (WGHE) and comprising a growing number of international agencies and

stakeholders. This group is reportedly emerging as a "recognized advocacy resource on African higher education" (Saint, 2). This arrangement obviously takes the higher education policy planning functions of the SSA state outside the national-regional sphere and incorporates it into the wider neo-liberal transnational project consultancy business and advocacy networks, largely organized and funded by "stakeholders" and donors.

We recall that prior to this "intra-agency" initiative, the World Bank was openly suspicious of funding anything related to the development of university expansion and particularly graduate programs in SSA. For instance, the second-generation of more technologically-oriented state universities like Mbarara in Uganda, which evolved in the 1980s were viewed suspiciously by the World Bank. In the populist discourse of the Bank, SSA states were seen as "over-investing" in higher education to the neglect of the primary levels and the poor. Based on its rate of return orthodoxy, the Bank's private capital and lending was directed to sectors deemed to have higher returns on investment, much to the neglect of SS Africa's financially struggling national universities. As budgets began to decline in the 1980s, while the states started looking for sources of foreign assistance, the World Bank was more concerned with issues of cost-effectiveness and criticizing the inefficiencies in administration and politicization prevalent in this sector. Its concerns with higher education reform could be summarized in the three Rs of Retrenchment, Rationalization, and Reduction. By the time the World Bank began to appreciate the possible social and economic values of higher education expansion and their vital linkages to success the NKE, educational conditions and academic programs in national universities were deteriorating under the weight of SAPs and their own contradictions. The limited spaces available to students also prevented higher education access to those who have completed their secondary education, thereby, fueling the crisis. Clearly, the development of public national universities in SSA had reached an impasse.

Teferra (2004, p. 4) casts a wider angle at this area of policymaking:

> the World Bank prescriptions and positions take precedence over not just those developed by nations but other international and multinational organizations and institutions. A true and living memory of relevance is the World Bank's "rate of return" study which has been highly criticized for its devastating impact on the development of higher education in Africa. When the World Bank dropped higher education as a poor investment (based on its own faulty study--which is belatedly admitted as such by the Bank) and consequently declined loans to higher education development – not only did other bilateral and multilateral agencies followed suit but also the poor developing countries reoriented their loan schemes to fit the framework and discourse of the World Bank loan schemes.

The doctrinaire and hegemonic implications of the World Bank's perspective on higher education policies for SSA comes across rather clearly here. What is more, the Bank's "misguided" and commercial calculus on the benefits of higher education development in the region prevailed for two decades. Thus, beyond enforcing the three Rs, its most significant effort to directly shape emergent policies vis a vis sub-Saharan universities is expressed through the mobilization of the DAE-WGHE and the African Virtual University (AVU) of which we shall hear more in a separate section. Under its guidance, the transnational "stakeholders" meet on a continuous basis and in what are called "rounds" to chart the direction of tertiary education policies deemed appropriate for the region.

Needless to say, the new expansion and functions of higher education have been devolved to the deliberations of the WGHE. This institution works in consultation with the Association of African Universities AAU and educational representatives (education ministers) of member states. The workings of these national institutions and transnational agencies matter to this study because they represent the sources of the reform's discourse on higher educational restructuring in the region during the present cycle. Their analyses, decisions and leadership in the tertiary sector will determine the priorities and structures of what is characterized as a "pro-active" university further discussed below.

At the heart of the debate on the current policy directions of educational change in the region is this: whose vision and principles are informing and guiding the reform process, UNESCO's and AAU's internationalism or the FICs' market-based trans-nationalism? Let us broadly identify the main characteristics of the two approaches towards tertiary educational reform. Ultimately, however, the evidence suggests that the two tendencies operate in synergy and under the dominant framework of disciplinary neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus.

4. Two Visions or One?

Kent's (1995) comparative analysis usefully brings the two approaches in the higher education policy arena into focus. On the one hand, we have the World Bank's perspective briefly discussed above. For a long time, it did not perceive higher education as a priority area in funding. Its long-standing view was that higher education, although necessary for nation building, was not a cost-effective investment for the region. Increasingly viewing education as a private good with private returns, it has belatedly argued for shifting some of the costs of higher education towards students, also known as "clients" in the policy language of the Bank. This "shift" from almost complete state subsidy towards generating more revenues from the student population, or what it (A WB Sector Study, 2003, iv) calls "introduction of up-front charges for student welfare services such as feeding, accommodation and health services" is beginning to take root across SSA. Although implementation is halting, unequal and contested, the policy trend emanating from the World Bank is towards gradual "privatization" of the public higher education sector and de-regulation of access to cross-boarder educational providers. In this vision, the national universities must compete with cross-border providers of educational services. In the larger policy scheme, it supports the transnational proposal for a minimalist or non-interventionist state and "free trade" in educational goods and services and knowledge.

In contrast to this patently neo-liberal market approach to higher education reform, UNESCO's policy stance is based on its UN mandate and rhetoric of

human rights and international cooperation. As stated in its Position Paper (2003, p. 3) "the aim is to focus UNESCO's standard-setting, capacity building and clearinghouse functions to assist Member States in the formation of appropriate policies and strategies to meet the challenges posed to higher education by globalization." As a United Nations specialized organization with specialized competence for education, it appears to give more concession, at least in principle, to the consultative process between government, non-government and multilateral-transnational "stakeholders." It works in partnership with Member States and "has the responsibility to help develop appropriate frameworks for higher education." Its watchwords are also less utilitarian or market-based and more concerned with facilitating international cooperation and the "internationalization" of higher education. Hence, its institutional offspring, the International Association of Universities (IAU), was "founded to promote international cooperation among higher education institutions" around the world.

UNESCO's (Position Paper, 2003, p. 24) vision for the Higher Education field in the region is that "higher education in a globalized society should assure equity of access and respect cultural diversity as well as national sovereignty." As such, it encourages stakeholders to bring about this reform process themselves, through regional Action Plans that aim to provide the basic framework of reform. In this sense, it can be perceived as more of a forum for inter-national deliberative initiative. The World Bank's technicist-managerial approach focuses primarily on facilitating the commodification of the higher education field everywhere. It is narrowly "zonal" in perspective and its principal interest lies in realizing the best market value or "rate of return" on educational investments. Its zonal focus tends to obscure the wider forces of history or the political economic and "superstructural" forces and relations that impinge upon the operations of the educational institutions.

UNESCO, in contrast, tends to survey the larger society and principally "asks questions about the education and social value of higher education" (p. 3) in the

contemporary world. Most significantly, it recognizes that part of the higher education crisis involves the changing "mission" and "vision" of higher education. Consequently, UNESCO counsels changes in the vision and governing principles of higher education through internationalization and "international cooperation." According to the IAU Statement (2000) "such internationalization of higher education contributes to building more than economically competitive and politically powerful regional blocks; it represents a commitment to international solidarity, human security and helps build a climate of global peace"

These differences are significant in terms of approach, but ultimately there is very little difference in substance. They are both immersed in contemporary neo-liberal assumptions and subject to the dominant developmental discourse that ultimately aims to facilitate the incorporation of higher education into global markets and subject them to WTO-GATT rules and regulations. Although admittedly they differ in the ways and means of achieving this, in the long-term the objective is to bring about the institutional reforms "necessary" to safeguard the "norms and principles" of the market and neo-liberal globalization in the region. UNESCO still talks about the "common good" and social imperatives shaping educational policies into the new millennium but its policies are closely aligned with the FIC. The main difference may lie in the fact that UNESCO's educational vision and strategy of implementation appears more considerate and empowering to state-level actors and thus more acceptable to national leaders.

In order to coordinate its lofty policy goals with the needs of the "Member States" and the "stakeholders," UNESCO convened The World Conference on Higher Education (WCHE) 1998 in Paris. Equivalent to Jomtien's EFA initiative for the primary level, WCHE has brought on board over 4,000 participants representing 182 countries (Ministers, officials responsible for education - including higher education -, teachers, researchers and students, parliamentarians, and representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, of

various sectors of society and of the world of work, financing bodies and agencies, publishing houses).

According to Federico Mayor, the "preparation of the World Conferences on Higher Education (WCHE) should be guided by the principles of equity and merit (Article 26.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and it should result in a comprehensive worldwide plan of action involving the international organizations responsible for training and overseeing development programmes. In short, it should contribute to the renewal of higher education and propose "a new university pact guided by three watchwords: quality, relevance and international co-operation."

Particularly the last policy value calls for global partnerships to "further development" in the educational field. This notion of international partnership pervades UNESCOs pronouncements, including on university reform. Encapsulated in the United Nations Millenium Goals, the role of international partnerships in spreading information and communications technologies is contained in what is referred to as Goal 8 which highlights (Position Paper, 2003, p. 14) "the importance of establishing an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory" in all global partnerships, including those pertaining to higher education reforms. Not surprisingly, the criteria of Goal 8 include the obligatory commitment to "development and poverty reduction" and good governance linking up with the policy "conditionalities" of the FIC.

5. From The National University Towards The "Proactive" University

"In many ways, we are moving into a new era of globalization in higher education, characterized by the new international agreements and arrangements drawn up to manage global interactions..." (Altbach, 2004, p.16)

Most observers and stakeholders in this debate are increasingly aware of the dangerous weakening of sub-Saharan states, economies and overall institutions, education and national university systems (i.e., the crisis of authority). The worst

cases are known under Washington's foreign policy euphemism of "failed states" and have become wardens of international aid agencies and relief organizations or "non-profit" INGOs and NGOs under the overall intellectual guidance of the World Bank's policy cadres. Known as "trustworthy depoliticizers of poverty" (Maji, 1998), these agencies were successfully inserted during the era of SAPs and there are estimated to be over 40,000 INGOs currently in operation and disbursing more "development" funds than the UN system, excluding the World Bank and the IMF. Increasingly too, more and more of the core's aid is funneled through these semi-government organizations thought to represent the nucleus of a global civil society.

Despite the mounting debts, 35% Overseas Development Aid (ODA) (IOM) to the region is spent on expatriate professionals. Despite their high costs, they have proved unsuccessful at finding solutions for the many perceived "failures" of state-led national development. With advances in neoliberal globalization, the post-independent model of publicly funded universities has been shaken to the core, but the new one remains to be constructed. We may nevertheless, discern its outlines.

The proposed restructuring process of the region's universities is beyond the internal capacity of the sub-Saharan states, routinely characterized as "inefficient" and "corruption" prone. Hence, the universities future is heavily dependent on external funding possibilities and donor priorities. What is equally certain is that the reform's analytical framework will be governed by market-oriented assumptions of the lending agencies and anchored by UNESCO's internationalism for legitimacy. Thus, the IAU-UNESCO Statement (2003) re-affirms internationalization of higher education to be "a worthy goal" and suggests that "internationalization and international cooperation can serve to improve higher education by increasing efficiency in teaching and learning as well as in research through joint efforts and joint actions." These aspects of the overall reform process fall under the general rubric of internationalization and are

based on UN principles. Thus, in its "Education Position Paper" (2003, p. 13) UNESCO asserts that its "starting position in addressing globalization and higher education is based on United Nations basic text and normative instruments."

At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that member states of the UN and the university sector are subject to bilateral agreements and the "basic texts and normative instruments" of the WTO, as indicated in the discussion on TRIPS and GATS. To be sure, both are driven by the quest to respond to the relentless commodification and deregulated "open market" processes that have transformed higher education systems around the world. I want to suggest that in looking at the changes that are going on in SSA higher education reforms, it is impossible to discuss the market-driven forces of transnationalization without reference to internationalization and vice versa. In the words of Egron-Polak (2002, p. 8) "higher education internationalization and globalization are not mutually exclusive phenomena. In fact, they can often be indistinguishable and the promotion of one can strengthen the occurrence of the other." Broadly, the former tends to be driven more by political and intra-state-centered imperatives and the latter by economics-market forces and transnational imperatives. The reform must be interpreted as a continuously developing process that includes aspects of both policy trends.

Thus when we look closely at particular reform processes and practices sponsored by the World Bank or UNESCO, the differences in the two approaches begin to look more strategic and rhetorical than real or substantive on the ground. In the final analysis, the world market provides the discriminating criteria for policy discourse on higher education rather than politics as during the Bandung cycle.

Particularly in the post 9/11 world, the distinctions between the transnationalizing policies and "free trade" normative values promoted by the transnational organizations and the internationalizing concerns of the United Nations organizations like UNESCO are rapidly blurring. Moreover, US president Bush's

recent decision to rejoin UNESCO after a 19-year absence marks recognition of the valuable role this UN institution now plays in promoting US hegemonic global interests in promoting the contested values of freedom, good governance and democracy lately combined with the so-called war on terrorism. The US return to UNESCO is regarded as a display of US renewed willingness to collaborate in international bodies (Wirth, 2003, p. 1016) at least when it serves its imperial interests. Stated otherwise, interactions within the United Nations organizations involve power disparities, which are growing clearer with each year. The major capitalist powers led by the US are "leading" the world through different mechanisms of transnational and international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and recently WTO (World Trade Organization) that, more often than not, include the UN organizations. This dominant bloc has the power to literally replace a given peripheral leadership not consistent with the new order of things.

Sounding an emergent refrain from the South, Jhunjhunwala (2004) berates the UN and the Human Development Report 2004, for its promotion of "alleged universal values" which give license to "Western civilizations" to forcibly intervene in the affairs of Others. In other words, by accepting the Western interpretation of democracy as a "deciding issue" in the development of nations, the UNDP and other internationalist organizations risk abetting US intervention in the name of Washington constructed "universal values", when it sees fit to do so. The fear is that the international organization will, in effect, be used to legitimate the unilateral use of military, economic and political power to force other countries into submission to Washington's global economic and political hegemony. No society will be allowed to threaten US global interests and breach the "five" (Amin, 1997) monopolies of power enjoyed by the US-led core capitalist countries.* This position is more systematically expressed in

* What Amin (p. 4-5) calls the "five monopolies are 1. Technological monopoly

Washington's new "preemptive" approach to developmental policies and aid-giving (the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (Soederberg, 2005).

Certain policy combinations and alignments occur as donor agencies adjust their programs in response to strategic reviews, to shifting political imperatives, and to new circumstances within the region and country. In the present conjuncture, the distinction between UNESCO's and WB policies on higher education are not as clear as they appear to be in principle. Going back to the proposed university reforms, UNESCO's liberal internationalism tends to reinforce and align with the dominant neo-liberal assumptions and seemingly iron "laws of the market-place" advanced by the transnational agencies. Of late, the Bank has re-fashioned itself as a sort of transcendent apolitical policy brain-trust or "knowledge bank" for Third World economic, social, political (democratization) and educational ills. In the words of David Dollar, the World Bank's director of Development Policy, the World Bank has "shifted to a pedagogical-minded "learning model" rather than trying to "impose a package" in all countries. The World Bank's self-designation as a "knowledge Bank" for international development is also consistent with what Dollar calls the "new vision" of the Bank:

We are not forcing policies or a model onto countries. Where you have a country that is struggling to improve the investment climate, deliver basic services, integrate with the world economy, we help them learn how to do that. That is the new vision at the World Bank. It is helping countries learn what policies and institutions are going to work for them (Http://publications.worldbank org).

In line with its new posture, the World Bank sponsors custom-designed workshops, conferences and short-term courses to enhance what it calls the *institutional capacities of borrowing governments.* In the process, the World Bank

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2. Financial; control of worldwide financial markets 3. Monopolistic access to the planet's natural resources 4. Media and communication monopolies 5. Monopolies over weapons of mass destruction.

Group has grown into the world's largest sources of development assistance/lending as well as the principal agency for managing research and knowledge on policy matters pertaining to education, social and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the new vision, there is an assumption that the major impetus for educational expansion in higher education will come increasingly from the "private sector" or through the expansion of the billion dollar global cross-border education market. Indeed, an array of "for-profit" "off- and on-line" cross-border education providers have come into the higher education setting of the region. What the working document of the WCHE (2004) calls the "tentacular expansion of MBA programmes" is a case in point. UNESCO's major concern in all this "reform" is that the education exporters operate within internationally recognized ethical guidelines and academic standards. On the other hand, we need to be aware that these exporters and free traders in education services are primarily conducting a profitable enterprise and are not responsible for "rectifying" the more comprehensive structural crisis of the universities i.e. decaying infrastructures, lack of competitive research capacities and service to community and so on. At the end of the cycle, the demise of the national university is imminent, though the birth of the "pro active" university remains uncertain and, in my view, will need more than international agreements and donor goodwill to materialize.

SSA's university concerns and their possible "solutions" are today addressed within the framework of UNESCO's World Conferences on Higher Education (WCHE) meetings, first inaugurated in the 1998 World Declaration on Higher Education in the 21st Century "to ensure a balanced achievement of educational and social missions" of higher education. Given this objective, a key theme of the WCHE initiatives is the concept of creating a proactive university, one that is responsive to community and more cognizant of the social responsibilities of public universities (i.e., the needs of learners, academics and the communities in which they are embedded). The notion of "service to community" and a new

commitment towards "civil society" and greater institutional "autonomy" and "international cooperation" and student exchange became the foci of WHCR discussions at regional meetings prepared under the supervision of UNESCO Regional Bureaux in Beirut, Bangkok, Dakar and in Caracas. To be sure, this agenda of socializing the universities' mission requires a more democratic polity with engaged and informed citizens. This calls for more democratically vibrant societies, ones in which the interest and authentic representatives of SSA's civil societies are represented in the states and in these policy deliberations. This is far from being the case today.

Still, UNESCO consistently affirms investment in higher education as worthwhile, providing the institutions concerned are internationalized and re-oriented to meet the needs of society. These needs include issues of equity such as the increased participation of women, underprivileged minorities and encouraging post-graduate research, lifelong learning, enhanced international exchanges and so on. The reconstruction of the region's universities along these recommendations is obviously a highly contested and long-term process, which plays itself out differently in every campus of the region. Also the application of these market-oriented reforms is at their infancy and almost entirely dependent on foreign funding agencies and expertise in "development knowledge" from the donors and experts. We can anticipate that, more and more, market principles and World Bank-WGHE policy planning and neoliberal market criteria and priorities will determine the direction of the region's higher educational systems and opportunities for the foreseeable future.

For UNESCO, the object of the reform process is to enable higher education institutions to promote continuous external and internal partnerships with the productive sectors and classes of society. The reform process is to be shaped by educational administrators maintaining a "proactive" stance towards the changing implications and requirements of globalization and internationalization in higher education. In effect, success will come to universities that are able to adapt to the

requirements of globalization by responding "proactively" to the disciplinary standards, conditionalities and market criteria set by the "international community." Favored governments in this endeavor are usually brought to the head of the "aid queue" (Saul and Leys, p. 24) and may avail themselves of more "conditional" loans and "expert" policy advice or "dictates" from the neo-liberal intellectual cadre of the FIC. It is important to observe that as an extension of the core-led development business, debt-lending *had become usurial rather than productive. That is to say, it brings no* significant improvements in the conditions of subsistence and life for the vast majority of the people.

The problem with these prescriptions is that they are narrowly "zonal" in their definition and analysis of the educational crisis and pay scant attention to the surrounding political economic conditions of peripheralization and attendant material and political limitations fettering the productive sectors and classes of the region. Moreover, the genuine democratization of SSA societies would be a major precondition for the concrete beginnings of constructing a proactive university. This is nowhere in sight. Instead, the crisis of developmentalism appears to be compounded by that of neoliberal globalization. Easterly (Blustein, 2001), a senior advisor in the WB research group describes a half-century history of "trillion" dollar loans and other forms of aid, technical assistance and policy advise as having been "a big disappointment" and ineffective in terms of fostering any form of economic or social and we might add educational development among the poor countries. Still, the analysis of the BWI tends to systematically disregard its own role in deepening the debt-bondage and impoverishment of African households to the present level penury and where the average per capita income today has sunk lower than the 1960's. It therefore becomes hypocritical for a BWI to attribute all failings in the region to bad governance, ancestral hatreds or rampant corruption alone.

To illustrate this point concretely, sub-Saharan Africa has received an estimated $114 billion in bilateral and multilateral aid from 1995-2002 (Dicklitch, 2004).

Yet, there is nothing tangible to show except more debts and increasing poverty. With debt burdens double that of any region in the world the indebted countries have consistently ended up at the bottom of the United Nations Development Program's Human Development report, which measures life expectancy, gross domestic product per person, and literacy. What is more, they are growing poorer in the course of globalization and while their governments enforce the FIC privatization and de-regulation policies with the force of national laws. As confirmed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization's (UNIDO) recent, those living in "absolute poverty" in the sub-Saharan region rose by 42% to 47% from 1981 to 2001, during what has been categorized as the globalized processes of educational expansion in this study. In the same period, the figure dropped from 40% to 21% in the world as a whole (BBC 20 July, 2004).

In the broadest sense, the turn of events gave rise to a "general disenchantment" (Ekong, 1996) with the decline in the capacities and expected roles of the public universities. There is, in fact, a palpable disillusionment with the wider failure of developmentalism and the collapse of national public services. The number of unemployed/underemployed university graduates kept growing considerably. Looking comparatively at the case of Uganda and Senegal, Eisemon and Salmi (1993) report how amidst all the deterioration of the institutions, the demand for university graduates "has been declining in both countries in the context of ongoing structural adjustment programs that require public enterprise privatization and liquidation" of state-public enterprises, among other conditions. The university crisis grew along with other public casualties of SAPs, causing an extraordinary exodus of the professional or educated classes of SSA societies.

6. The Emergence Of The African Virtual University: *The Discourse of Technology And Knowledge Transfer*

The African Virtual University (AVU) is a response to a desperate generation of Africans. The ills that plague Africa's higher education, the frightening deterioration of teaching and research capabilities in many countries and the absence of educational strategies to satisfy the drive for higher learning have led many of the best brains of Africa to flee the continent in search for better opportunities...The AVU aims, together with African Universities, at helping reverse that trend. As an unprecedented "interactive-instructional telecommunications network" it works towards building capacity and supporting the economic development of sub-Saharan African countries through the use of cutting edge technology "to provide world class quality education and training programs to students and professionals (see AVU Website). (Diagne 2000, p. 1)

The most tangible element of the World Bank's policy strategy of expanding higher education in SSA during the present (globalized) cycle of educational expansion is the so-called African Virtual University (AVU). This electronically interactive post secondary academic institution, as described in the statements above, is featured as the centerpiece of the World Bank's efforts to transfer knowledge to the impoverished region. Encased in the discourse of transferring knowledge and technology, the AVU is a World Bank sponsored higher education or "learning" project designed to include the region in the emerging NKE *through the use of cutting edge technology*. It is, in short, a distant educational enterprise designed specifically to incorporate Africans into the benefits of the NKE and finally break what its founders call the growing isolation of Africa from the "Global Knowledge Society."

This higher education project assumes a particular interest to this study because it presents itself as an innovative response to the growing demand for quality tertiary education in the region. Furthermore, it promotes itself as a remedy to the lack of educational strategies to satisfy the need for "higher learning" and relevant (science and technology oriented) higher educational programs in the region. These assertions or rather rationalizations for its existence are, in my view, debatable. By evaluating the explanatory material and evidence offered on its website (www.avu.org/avusite/about/index.htm), I will present an explanation of

the AVU's function and role in the contemporary provision of higher-university education to Africans. *

The first unmistakable distinction of the AVU is its novelty which combines with an abiding faith in technological and "technocratic" solutions to the region's endemic educational problems. This is not surprising given its background and the discursive formations (system of ideas) which define its mission. In origins, the virtual university (AVU) initiative started out as a "pilot project" of the World Bank. In time, it was adopted, as it were, for transmitting "world class" education and training programs from core universities to African students, professional and civil servants. Its mandate soon evolved into "building capacity" for the development of "the African continent social capital." This is, no doubt, a well-intentioned agenda, but in my view fails to address the roots of the problems besetting the universities.

At any rate, the AVU intends to achieve this ambitious undertaking in partnership with public and private stakeholders interested in the educational enterprise and welfare of the continent as a whole. Incidentally, it is not uncommon for "stakeholders" and "partnerships" to confound their own corporate or "private interests" overseas with humanitarian benevolence towards African nations and peoples. Lately, the issue of "helping" Africa out of its poverty by the core's goodwill, technological prowess and some form of debt cancellation has emerged as a subject of high level G7-8 summitry and a major platform for Blair's Commission for Africa. At the same time, there has been a blurring of the line between humanitarian and development work, as far as the dominant discourse is concerned.

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* In order to probe deeper into the institutional status and rationale for this first ever virtual university for the region, I have sought some information from its headquarters (contact@avu.org) which referred me back to the virtual university's main website. Its content offers a major source of information for this interpretative analysis of the AVU.

Since its beginnings in 1997 the AVU has metamorphosed from a World Bank project into what is described as an "inter-governmental organization" in the vague vocabulary of the BWI. This description is vague because it leaves out many dimensions, hierarchies, actors and other crucial elements invested in the AVU's institutional make up and powers. That is to say, more than governmental organizations are involved in its mechanisms and workings. Indeed, the AVU works within the context of transnational business linkages, international (UNESCO) government and non-government partnerships and the powers of new laws and regulations like TRIPS-GATT. In function, it is geared towards increasing the technological component and privatization of public higher education systems (and production of knowledge in the broadest sense) throughout the continent. This privatization or commercialization of what were the national concerns and public prerogatives of the developmental state, we have argued, is a major feature of neo-liberal globalization agenda. It affects contemporary educational restructuring or "reform" processes in all countries. Of particular interest here is the influence of these processes and diverse "stakeholder" linkages in the workings of this *"interactive-instructional telecommunications network," as the* AVU is often introduced and featured.

Reading further through the available material, one perceives how the all too well known developmental and "capacity building" themes of the Bank are interwoven throughout the AVU's expressed statements, principles and "objectives." Thus, its major goal is "to build capacity and support economic development by leveraging the power of modern telecommunications technology." Its *raison d'etre* is stated as involving the provision of "world-class" tertiary-level educational programs to the increasing number of Africans excluded from acquiring higher education in their countries. Apparently consistent with its new "inter-governmental" status, the AVU's physical headquarters have been moved to Nairobi, Kenya. Whatever lies behind this decision, the Kenyan government's repressive political stance against academics and intellectuals does

not seem to deter the sponsors of the AVU. The messy issues of academic freedom, autonomy and declining standards, the bane of national public universities, are seemingly circumvented in the rarified and virtual world of the AVU. One gets the impression that the magic of instant transferability and accessibility of "world class" education in the region constitutes the main selling point of this educational initiative. Also the most cursory examination of the material reveals that underlying the dominant discourse of building the capacity of Africa's human and social capital, the initiative is driven primarlily by market considerations (i.e., the profitable economics of higher education in the region). In the view of its sponsors, the demand for the AVU enterprise is driven by "five main factors" usefully summarized in its website (www.avu.org/avusite/about/index.htm). Namely:

> - a large percentage of high school leavers ready for university education are unable to enroll in university due to limited resources.
>
> - over-stretched government budgets owing to competing imperatives.
>
> - an expensive and overly subscribed private education sector at tertiary level.
>
> - a large labour force that directly requires the upgrading of skills and
>
> - the growing isolation of Africa from the Global Knowledge Society

These points provide a convenient summary of the persistent problem areas in the region's higher educational system. They also organize the objective context for

further investigating and discussing the AVU mission statement, principles and role in the contemporary reform process of higher education in the region.

The AVU proposal to respond with a distant "brick and click" higher education model rather than expanding the capacities and improving the existing and declining national university facilities seems curious at first. The point of the reform, however, is not to fine-tune or rebuild the "failed" institutions of the Bandung era but to encourage technological innovation consistent with the workings of the transnational market forces and neo-liberal globalization as directed by the World Bank. As such, the AVU places itself at the forefront of "Building capacity for Open, Distance, and eLearning (ODeL) and "facilitating the transfer of knowledge and technical know-how from its international content providers and other partner organizations" to Africa's higher-education-starved students. Positioned in this way and at the center of this virtual transnational educational venture, AVU represents itself as "the leading continental and virtual educational organization" working in collaboration "with, and supporting African higher education institutions through distance education programs." Certainly, the adoption of the latest technological means to enhance Africa's access to higher education is a worthy project. The question is about priorities or whether this is the most effective way to expand access to Africans excluded from acquiring higher education. Is this policy approach appropriate in circumstances where the majority of tertiary education students in SSA countries are still offline? Is this the most appropriate form of educational intervention given the extent and sort crisis that prevails in the universities in the region? Maybe so, from the perspective of the educational entrepreneurs and the multinational corporations that hold near-monopoly on the requisite technologies, but it makes little sense from the perspective of those excluded from higher education due to economic circumstances and rising costs.

Broadly the AVU proposes to provide a high-technological solution to the region's higher educational problems and failings. Undeterred by the region's

objective material and economic backwardness, the AVU promises to deploy "cutting edge" information technologies (IT) to deliver quality distance education programs and courses from the "best known" and most prestigious universities and professors around the world. The founders appear to be oblivious to the limiting material forces in the region. The controversial issues of content relevancy to the region's cultural and socioeconomic context, and other important criteria for examining educational material, remain unaddressed. The assumption is that these "world class" courses and seminars, transmitted electronically and in collaboration with the World Bank and other institutions are equally applicable to the needs of all countries and peoples in today's borderless world. Evidently, the AVU's format is more concerned with flexible delivery on "client" demand rather than improving content and relevancy issues.

Nothing will dissuade the AVU from dispensing its "cutting edge" services. What matters to the AVU's organizers is that these superior distance education programs will be delivered via satellite and fiber optics transmissions to student's location in Africa, providing conditions "where the recipients can in turn interact directly with their instructors to ask questions or to solve problems using e-mails, fax or telephone lines" (Diagne, 2000). To the fortunate recipients of these distant education programs, the "world class" courses and credentials will increase their marketability in the new labor market of the new economy. From this superficially universalist perspective, the AVU's innovative distance education and "teaching methods" feature an array of technologies or "delivery systems combining e-learning, discussions with onsite facilitators, web-seminars and video broadcast." It is clear that the AVU offers educational advantages to children of the well-to-do or elite stratum who are able to access these educational alternatives and courses usefully tailored to their career and personal needs.

Apart from signaling the end of the previous Bandung cycle of state-led higher educational expansion, the implications of this virtual and pre-packaged technology-intensive "solutions" to the region's higher education crisis are many

and complex. Right away, the project seems at odds with what Marxists refer to as the material economic base of society characterized by mass poverty and widespread illiteracy. The rate of illiteracy for people over 15 years old in SSA still stands at 41% and half the population lives in chronic poverty and without significant access to drinking water. The AVU's initiative seems particularly undeterred by the notoriously low "teledensity" of the region. There are only 18 mainline telephones per 1000 people in Africa and internet-density was estimated at "one internet user for every 5000 Africans" (Diagne, 2000, p. 13) around the turn of the millennium. The high cost of Internet access in SSA region is another limiting aspect of this Internet-mediate model of expanding higher education but remains unacknowledged throughout.

The focus is mostly on the instant and mechanical transferability of information and knowledge deemed appropriate and marketable by those who control the projects overall costs, curriculum planning and other sales operations. In this case, the knowledge deemed appropriate for Africa's leaders is more oriented towards "learning" of commercial and technical subjects that promise real job prospects rather than humanist and critical educational qualifications. The model moves closer to informationalizing and personalizing educational services. One cannot ignore that this virtual project is rooted in the donor/creditor and recipient/client relationship and subject to its powers and material disparities. The clients become consumers of electronically transmitted courses in order to enhance their qualifications and employment prospects in the new economy, one increasingly governed by the demands of transnational corporations, businesses and banking concerns and Non-governmental organizations associated with the spread of globalization. The unstated mission of the AVU is to train "specific intellectuals" to facilitate the implementation of the donors interests and TNCs practices.

The AVU represents a formidable network of partnerships behind its educational and technology transfer objectives. The impressive list is made up of African and worldwide university community (e.g., Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

USA; Carleton University, Canada; Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia), international organizations (e.g., UN, European Union-EU), bilateral-multilateral donors (e.g., DFID of the UK, USAID), private businesses and enterprises and "funding partners" (e.g., World Bank, Australian government and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) and "technology solutions partners" (Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Netsat). Concerning the latter giant and non-governmental "profit-making" partners, the AVU recognizes their "shared interests" in supporting its African educational activities. After all, this is the major purpose of the partnership. The AVU with its "continent-wide network" offers these IT TNCs a "good business" opportunity to "penetrate a new market" for the sales of their goods and services" or alternately, to become charitable "donors" and possibly reap the tax advantages which accrue. In short, the benefits of this educational and business partnership are seen as serving the "common interests" of all involved. Put somewhat differently, this is primarily a transnational educational business partnership and lacks a critical perspective on science and technology and not to mention the politics of the region. Typicaly, the AVU sees itself as neutral from the existing and historical struggles and ideologies. As such, the AVU's organizers remain mute to the possibility that "uncontextualized" technology-intensive education/knowledge transfer can reproduce the existing modes of domination and even widen the knowledge-gap between the users and providers of knowledge.

7. Recruitment Of Pupils

The AVU, above all, promises to accelerate the careers of its students. "Why study at AVU?" asks the promotional material and proceeds to identify potential student-candidates in the following instructive terms: "Have you successfully passed your exams? Have you chosen your career path and are desperately trying to enroll in a university that would give you the best value for your money? Have you been refused a student visa to study abroad? Are you among the young African students who are worried about their future studies and career?" If the

answer is yes, worry no more "by enrolling at the AVU, you become part of tomorrows leaders."

Feeding, as it seems to, on the undertones of "Afropessimism" to market its courses and programs, it is hard to see how AVU can to be a supportive force for rebuilding the region's faltering public university institutions and programs. Instead, it seems to be offering high technological educational alternatives to both the over-stretched and under-resourced national universities and the overly subscribed private higher education providers operating in the region. Reading closely through the promotional material, it is clear that this educational intervention concentrates only on a small percentage of those who are, for whatever reason, unable to access higher education facilities in sub-Saharan Africa but able to afford the computer-driven technological hardware, software and connectivity costs, not to mention the AVU's tuition fees. The crucial point stressed in the AVU publications is that the establishment of the AVU is related with a drive to enhance the personal "social capital" and international network of its African graduates, administrators, student's and bureaucrats in partnership with industry and the "donors." In other words, the project addresses the region's "professional" class said to require "upgrading of skills" in the "capacity building" discourse which infuses the AVU's principles and objectives. In short, the AVU addresses itself to the region's emerging "digital" elite.

In the World Bank's diagnosis, the root problem of the region's economic affliction and declining tertiary educational systems is located in the limited development of Africa's professional human resources or the absence of technocratic-managerial leadership. The reasons are said to lie in the social science-oriented and academically inclined education systems of the region that purportedly neglected to nurture the scientific and vocational faculties of their students. The problem is thus thrown back at the peripheries and the post-colonial leadership's poor educational planning and inability to ensure certain outcomes. This is a widespread albeit spurious and self-serving assumption and, we might

add, one not supported by the historical record and available evidence. The region's postcolonial states had, in fact, adequately invested on its higher education students and potential technocratic leadership. Citing UNESCO data in the overall provision and distribution of higher education among the world's countries, Samoff and Stromquist (2001, 647) set the record straight in this regard;

> Of higher education students in the United States in 1995, 19 per cent graduated in the natural sciences, engineering, and agriculture (UNESCO, 1998; table 9). In that year the median African country enrolled 23 percent of its higher education students in those subjects. That is more than half the African countries for which data were available, the percentage of students enrolled in physical sciences, engineering and agriculture surpassed that of the United States.

The major justification and rationale of the "capacity building" discourse i.e., absence of technological-managerial human resources, thus falters upon closer examination of the evidence. The real intent of the AVU is to provide "world class" credentials for a top layer of the region's technocratic stratum that is supportive of and able to facilitate the implementation of neoliberal bilateral and multilateral policies in their respective countries. In other words, the project is directed at those who are already economically and socially privileged enough to take advantage of the new technologies and interactive opportunities offered by the AVU. To this new technocratic elite stratum, the AVU provides extraordinary opportunities for advancing their careers and "social capital" in the new globalized world economic order.

Although it is at its earlier stages of development, in its scope and reach, the AVU has the makings of a profitable post secondary virtual "diploma mill" serving the mobile elite of the ubiquitous "stakeholders" in the region's development. It is an institution that strikes me as being at odds with the economic realities and everyday lives of the majority and the prevailing needs and logic of production in the region. In the words of Saul and Leys (1999, p. 1) " After 80 years of colonial

rule and almost four decades of independence, in most of it (sub-Saharan Africa) there is some capital but a lot of capitalism. The predominant social relations are still not capitalist, nor is the prevailing logic of production" which is based on varieties of household agricultural production. As such, this high-tech educational solution, in a region where primary education is still not massified or restricted, promises to be even less relevant to the underlying political economic development of the region than the public national universities. Eligible students are sought as virtual consumers of pre-packaged courses as well as hard- and software programs, all produced by the AVU external educational and "technology solution partners." At this point, the whole AVU initiative and recruitment drive strikes me as a poor substitute for upgrading and equipping viable regional public universities, and raising their capacities to deal with the problems.

Chapter Eight
Concluding Thoughts

1. Education For Peripheralization

The village school was a rectangular, mud-brick, one room affair; sunlight streamed through holes that had been ripped in its corrugated roof by strong winter winds. The blackboard was a cracked patch of black paint on the wall, streaked with crude white chalk. Morning and afternoon shifts of fifty or so primary students sat on stones arranged in neat rows and scribbled their work on slates, under the care and direction of two teachers who had not been paid in months and had no paper and only one book at their disposal: a dog-eared teaching handbook from France (Dallaire and Beardsley, p. 103, 2004)

We have moved through various phases in our suggestive reframing of educational and development policy discourse in the context of what is broadly known as sub-Saharan Africa. It is time now to wrap up the dissertation. Consequently this final chapter sets out to theoretically distill the conclusions and implications that may be inferred from the history of educational expansion and more recent neo-liberal university reforms explored in this study.

Education, however understood, is the institutional starting point that makes the child aware of its identity and the objective realities of the surrounding world. No other institution has a larger impact in shaping the fine print of our consciousness, our very social being, intellectual life and potentials in the socioeconomic world. Whether we look at the world's capitalist or non- and pre-capitalist social formations, it is the education systems, in their complex historical and structural interactions with the rest of society, that lend agency and intellectual potency to entire social structures. Education systems can serve as mirrors to the societies and communities. Understood in the wider philosophical and sociological framework of historical materialism, education systems are not isolated institutions or "sectors" of knowledge production/transmission that can be understood in and of themselves (i.e., internally). From the point of view of reproduction, as it were, they constitute integral institutional dimensions in the historical development of the capitalist mode of production and its systemic

expansion on a world scale. From this perspective, the historical-structural development of the region's modern education systems, without exception, owe their origins to the expansion of European mercantile capitalism and its subsequent evolution into industrial and post-industrial phases or what is, in shorthand, referred to as globalization.

Educational expansion in SSA has always been driven by profit and regulated by the economic and geopolitical imperatives and discourses of the imperial powers, considered singly or in combinations. From a historical materialist perspective, the possibilities of man's historical emergence and capitalist development anywhere, are closely bound up and circumscribed by the degree of the development of education systems, science and technology, and their integration in the overall forces and relations of production available to society. From this perspective, education represents a material and cultural productive force *par excellence*, an indispensable element in the development of historical societies, national economies, inter-state relations and the world market.
This is why we use the analysis of educational expansion as a logical point of analytical entry into the analysis of the processes of historical social change.

The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from this interpretive work is that formation of modern education systems in SSA, indeed anywhere in the modern historical world, occurs within the crucible of capitalist production/reproduction (i.e., the accumulation of capital) and cannot be grasped otherwise or "outside" the historical process. Also, the peripheral region's modern education systems are, in fact, European cultural-institutional artifacts adapted to the African region under discussion. From their origins in "mission schools," these imported educational systems have evolved, over the centuries and in successive cycles of expansion to their present state. With this in view, we can safely characterize the education systems and schooling processes of the region as foreign in design and purpose. They are institutions where an imperialized social consciousness is crystallized and the social division of labor is shaped, ostensibly to "advance the

frontiers of civilization" though, more concretely, to secure the division of labor appropriate to the extremities of the capitalist world system.

It should be noted that, in this conjunction, for centuries so-called Native education for Africans in the region consisted of little more than Christian evangelization (i.e. conversion). With the onset of colonialism in the 19th century came "adopted" or customized systems of primary education "suitable for Africans," in the paternalistic and "race" based discourse of imperialism. We also know that rudimentary levels of higher education (college-university), the *sine qua non* for participating in scientific developments the contemporary knowledge economy, were unknown in the region until the 1940-1950 period. Higher education was still outside the objective possibility of a good 95% of the region's population. Similarly, the evidence shows that the region's public institutions of higher education were more extensively developed by the national bourgeoisie (NB) states of the region. For understandable reasons, colonialism's main educative activity was not concerned with creating a skilled indigenous intelligentsia or labor force. This became a policy focus only after independence and during the "nation building" and "modernization" years of the 1960s. The NB states that emerged needed, amongst other trappings of national sovereignty, an indigenous professional cadre to inherit and administer the neo-colonial state. During the early years of political independence, prodigious investment went into expanding education at all levels. Higher education, in particular, claimed a major portion of the educational budget of the new states. Every cycle of educational expansion is directed towards a specific economic and political purpose.

As the analysis shows, decades later the public institutions of post-secondary education remain elite institutions and are inaccessible to over 95% of the region's population today. It can also be observed that the limited professional cadre stratum, cultivated at great public cost, is migrating to the cores in greater numbers. These features are not isolated in certain countries but form a regional pattern in their manifestations across SSA. Given the exodus of the educated to

the high-wage cores, it is little wonder then that African social formations lack the requisite human resources, educational infrastructure and knowledge base to adjust and benefit from the many economic and technological advances that are shaping the process of neo-liberal globalization and the transnational regime of the new knowledge economy. With the onset of globalization via the structural adjustment policies (SAPs), educational policymaking also entered into a new cycle of expansion, one informed by the disciplinary neo-liberal market logic or what came to be known as the "Washington consensus." It is clear that social change is heavily influenced by the discourse and politics of educational expansion and vice versa, although the evidence suggests that the emerging private investments in education in SSA have not stimulated higher growth rates in terms of GDP.

Educational expansion in SSA has a long structural and discursive history behind it, albeit one that remains unacknowledged in the official managerial discourses and one- size-fits-all macroeconomic analyses and policy designs prevalent at the World Bank. Consequently, the methodological reframing contends that unless the origins of the capitalist mode of production (CMP) and the imperial ascent of Christian Europe in the 15th century is addressed, the historical expansion and impact of Western educational institutions on the region, their foundational rationale/justification and processes of expansion into the present may not be adequately unraveled. More concretely stated, the process of educational expansion in the region is part and parcel of the historical encounter between the ever-expanding European capitalist mode of production and the waning African pre-capitalist formations. In the course of this history of encounter, the infrastructures of the region's modern education and schooling systems have been grafted deep into the region's pre-capitalist social formations of the peripheries. The education systems, in effect, mediate and reproduce the encounter and subsequent relations between the social formations of the centers and those of the peripheries of the world system.

The processes known as "corification" and "peripheralization" of the world economic system could not have materialized without the expansion of modern education and schooling systems.

Whatever else modern education systems and schooling processes perform, in the context of SSA's evolution, they represent crucial mechanisms of capitalist exploitation (surplus appropriation) and the legitimation of imperial rule and hegemony. If as in the Hobsen-Hilferding-Lenin thesis, export of capital is the soul of imperialism, one might say that the pseudo-science of racism constitutes the heart of the imperial systems of domination. To be sure, there exists a racialized portrayal of the African Other that has been cultivated by imperialism and continues to inhabit the defining structures of the world system. When one looks at the world sociologically, there is no doubt that institutionalized racism adversely affects the educational opportunities and everyday life chances of Africans around the world. The racial prism through which African peoples are perceived and represented has seeped into international educational policy-making and economic development discourse as well, if only by the implicit policy premise that poor Africans are incapable of managing their own affairs and require the external disciplinary measures of neo-liberalism and the humanitarian gestures of the imperial "donors" to develop themselves economically. This approach to social change, in turn, correlates with and confirms European thought about its own superiority or the so-called "White Man's Burden" prevalent among the IMF-World Bank Experts-Planners but fails to alleviate the plight of Africans. A critical theoretical approach to educational issues and policy-making, in my view, must recognize racism as an entrenched and pervasive dimension of the relations between the cores and peripheries. Imperialism designated Africans as "beasts of prey" (Gobineau) and culturally "*tabula rassa.*" Hence, their discursive designation as "subject races" to be controlled, educated and incorporated into the worldwide accumulation process. In the post-independence era, the colonial officer and heir to the missionaries was replaced by the development expert while

the enterprise of the West transforming the West, once again, acquired a new discourse.

In this context, one cannot lose sight of the fact that sub-Saharan Africa is a vast region of diverse peoples, states, cultures and histories and, as such, the region defies simple categorizations at any level. No two countries in the region are alike. It is equally clear, however, that all Africans have been subjugated and incorporated much along the same lines of capitalist slavery and colonialism and by a supremacist European imperialism. Whether British, French or Potuguese or German, all imperialist powers considered themselves "superior" to Africans and as civilizing agents. The process of incorporation was perpetrated under the self-justifying narrative of "manifest destiny" and a variety of guardianship/trusteeship claims over those belonging to the "inferior" races. The more imperialism advances in depth and scope, the more it tends to shed its violent and outright racist posture and domination assumes more opaque administrative and hegemonic modes as practiced by the Bretton Woods institutions and framed by World Bank's managerial cadre.

In order to analytically wrap our minds, as it were, around the constellation of variables and long-term data involved in this macro-level and regional sociological inquiry into educational and social change and development, the notion of cycles of educational expansion has been framed. Obviously, the cycles of educational expansion delineated in this study do not occur in historical, discursive, economic and national vacuums. Rather they are formed and reformed during certain critical nodal points in the crisis-prone worldwide accumulation process. The idea behind this conceptualization is that whichever macro-region of SSA or particular European imperial-colonial master we may be discussing, each cycle of educational expansion has shaped the political economies of all the countries in the region. This common history of race-based subordination and incorporation lends a broad historic-structural and sociological similarity to the region's social structural and institutional features. This is particularly illuminated

in the commonalities of their fundamental economic, political and educational predicaments in the contemporary era. Thus, whether we speak of sub-Saharan Africa of the "labor reserves" of "the concession companies" or "of the old colonial economy/economie de traite," the central issue is that they were all subject to the exploitative structures and supremacist discourses that accompanied the spread of capitalism, trade, technology and modern schooling facilities in the region. Ultimately, however, the veracity of this theoretical interpretation must be tested against specific national formations in the region. Having said that and with a necessary tendency towards sociological generalizations, I will proceed to present a brief summary of the wider historical movement that emerges.

Wherever we look in the region today, modern education was introduced by Europe's missionary orders that, for a long period, were in charge of the education of the "Negroe" race. The initial "missionary cycle," therefore, corresponds to and is linked to the onset of mercantile capitalism. Slavery and forced labor practices constituted the underlying source of wealth for the European mercantile bourgeoisie. The church's pedagogical practices and exclusive control over the educational provision of Africans stretched well into the 19th century. This cycle has the distinction of being, by far, the longest cycle extant. The second or Colonial cycle of educational expansion is rooted in industrial or Lenin's monopoly phase of capital's self-expansion, where the acquisition of colonial territories and cheap native labor reserves becomes paramount to the accumulation process at the cores. During this transition, the colonial state assumes the mandate for educating and provision of "appropriate" skills to Natives. In other words, the provision of Native education becomes integrated into the function of the colonial state. Subjected to the colonial situation, African inhabitants of the region were invariably provided with forms of "Native" primary schools that primed them for subservient service roles and menial wage employment in the economies of the colonies. Colonial schools, first and foremost, sought to reproduce the material and cultural basis for white-settler domination in the region. The segregated elementary state-provided schooling

facilities for colonized natives were basically a training ground for an unskilled and semi-skilled labor force. During this colonial cycle, the higher professional, managerial, skilled trades and administrative positions belonged to white settlers. During this cycle racial tyranny was justified less and less by the biblical ideology of the Genesis and more by the theory of "sacred trust" or Kipling's "White man's burden."

The colonial period was short-lived, historically speaking. It lasted an average of sixty five to seventy years or two generations. During that period, however, it implanted the structural foundations and institutional matrix for educational expansion in the post-colonial period. On the other hand, the colonial state outlawed and persecuted indigenous forms of knowledge production/transmission while degrading their vernaculars. Colonial schools are better seen as institutional and cognitive products of imperial domination and incorporation of the region's productive forces, culture and labor power into the evolving capitalist world system. Efforts to indigenize African education systems, at least, by way of changing the language of instruction to languages understood by the majority of people (like Swahili) in Tanzania, have not gone beyond the elementary levels. The languagesof higher education inevitably continues to be those of the imperial powers, extracting a profoundly alienating effect on the higher strata of intellectuals vis a vis the masses.

The colonial cycle, in turn, provided the foundations for the ascending Bandung cycle where educational expansion became a function of the NB neo-colonial state. In retrospect, the following Bandung cycle was the shortest, and most prolific in terms of the provision of educational services. With the onset of the historical currents of decolonization and independence, the Bandung cycle of educational expansion swept the region, particularly after Ghana's independence in 1957. There is no doubt, this expansion was fuelled by the insistent demand for education in the newly independent African states, a political demand no leadership could ignore. The newly independent states of the national bourgeoisie

(NB) everywhere strove to expand and provide all levels of public education to their citizens until inundated by ever-growing demands for more public educational opportunities and the so-called "debt crisis" that began to claim a greater portion of the state's public resources. Interestingly, Bandung proved to be, by far, the most expansive cycle in terms of expanding educational facilities and enrollment indicators. During this cycle, the rate of illiteracy began to decline dramatically across the region. Anyway, the prodigious region-wide investment in the construction of schools and universities during the short-lived cycle would have been impossible during the colonial cycle.

Educational expansion, we have argued, is integral to the development of capitalism and the political economy of world systemic relations. With changes in world systemic relations during the closing years of the 1980s "Lost Decade," the "Bandung cycle" was gradually deferring to the "Globalized cycle" of expansion. During this cycle of educational expansion, education policy became less the exclusive function of the neo-colonial state and more and more that of transnational institutions, closely identified with the World Bank and the international Monetary Fund (IMF). During this cycle, we find the decay of national educational institutions and the increasing influence of market forces in the determination of neo-liberal "reform" policies towards these public institutions. This most recent cycle has initiated the marketization of the region's university institutions and the consumerization of the student population, two ongoing processes manifesting in the present educational policy agenda.

To get a complicit portrait of the region's education systems, the four cycles must be envisioned on a historical continuum and in their totality. Viewed separately, we can appreciate how the interests and discourses of those who, at any time, control the cost and policy direction for the provision of education for the African masses, also determine the scope and possibilities of each cycle of expansion. These world-historical interconnections and their implications, I submit, are often obscured in scholarly discussions on education policy. The macroeconomic

theories and managerial discourses of the transnational institutions keep conspicuously silent about imperialism and its effects on the region. This may be a major part of the reason why their public policy prescriptions have proven patently ineffective in alleviating the grim poverty of the SSA peripheries, despite the legendary natural wealth at their disposal.

Thus, at the dawn of the 21st Century, the effects of centuries of capitalist-imperialist policy-making and educational expansion into the SSA region have proved disastrous, both to the societies concerned and the principal agricultural producers and inhabitants of the region. In country after country, Africans are barely able to reproduce their subsistence or feed their families without foreign aid and NGO intervention. When we reflect on the contemporary lives and socioeconomic structures of the people of "Africa South of the Sahara" within the world economy and in relation to official educational policy discourses, past and current, it betrays a saga of failure. Decades of failed development projects suggest, among other things, that the state of knowledge in the area of SSA educational and socioeconomic development is inadequate or unaware of the social formations and relations that matter in our understanding of the role of education.

The defining feature of these social formations is that they are not "developing" towards capitalism. What is significant, in this case, is that the daily economic circumstances and social relations of the region's producers remain pre-capitalist or, in concrete terms, steeped in ox and hoe-plough-based subsistence agricultural production. In other words, their livelihood rests on a variety of pre-capitalist modes and ancient, patrimonial (caste and extended-kinship-based) relations of surplus production and appropriation. Famine conditions and starvation are imminent in the existence of these formations. What matters for this interpretive framework is that the majority of the region's citizenry live in abject poverty and enjoys no more than primary level education. In other words, SSA's peripheral social formations continue to be produced/reproduced with minimum educational

and technological/scientific specialization. Thus, despite centuries of conquest and incorporation into the "epoch-making" capitalist mode of production and the sphere of Western civilization/cultural domination-hegemony, the majority of Africans can be said to produce and exist precariously on the edges of the CMP. Although subordinated to capital and subject to its laws of "unequal exchange," the CMP itself has not evolved in the region. By extending this logic further, emulating the successes and institutions of the advanced capitalist formations or even "catching up" by applying the new ICT and market formulae amounts to a Sisyphian illusion.

In short, the legacy of educational expansion in the region has not been impressive. Schools for the wider public in SSA are either sub-standard in quality or not available for some communities. Nearly half the children in the region continue to survive without the benefit of formal schooling of any kind, while their families eke out a meager subsistence from antiquated agricultural practices and cash crop production for the capitalist world market. The rest are struggling to raise the array of "user fees" lately instituted to attend the region's collapsing and inadequate public schooling systems and universities. In the era of neo-liberal globalization (i.e., the latest phase in the global expansion and transnational reconfiguration of the CMP via market forces) the region is experiencing a protracted process of social destruction, political chaos-loss of national sovereignty, re-tribalization, economic stagnation/indebtedness and an educational crisis at all levels.

At the root of the present educational crisis lies the disciplinary neo-liberal market "revolution" or the "Washington consensus" that is shaking the foundations of all public education systems across the globe. Neo-liberal globalization has valorized knowledge as the most valuable of resources and subject to trade in international markets. The cornerstone of this policy hinges on the deregulation and privatization of educational services, learning technologies and knowledge forms across the globe. It is no exaggeration to say that the transnational corporations

and ruling classes of the developed capitalist countries of the North have unleashed what amounts to a sort of primitive accumulation in knowledge in the contemporary era. The process is regulated by World Trade Organization's (WTO) TRIPS-TRIM mechanisms of international trade and commerce. These policy initiatives have heralded the beginning of the end for free or low-cost public schooling and state-subsidized public higher-university education in particular. This is also where the market-based neo-liberal reforms assume significance for this study. The African states, in particular, were not prepared to deal with the challenges of the knowledge economy.

In general, the effects of these "reforms" have compounded the crisis long brewing in the national public universities of the immediate post-colonial era. In particular, the absence of specialized research and development (R&D) in the institutional tradition of SSA colonial universities has proved an Achilles heel in the contemporary cycle. The vital academic tradition of specialized and advanced research, a pre-requisite for fostering and commercializing the region's intellectual property was found to be sorely lacking in these institutions. On account of this, the universities are obviously not able to restructure and compete on a global level with the metropolitan "corporate universities" that have proved, overall, capable of developing alternative sources for revenues from their accumulated intellectual properties (IP). Reduced to teaching establishments, the management and operations of the region's universities is increasingly dependent on World Bank-IMF policies, multilateral-bilateral loans and partnerships with NGOs, specialized UN agencies and the private high tech corporate sectors. This trend has turned the region's states into even more dependent clients/users of technological, scientific and policy knowledge developed in the North. The emerging discourse of "technology transfer" is not a solution but another dimension of the crisis. Indeed, the practice further delays the development of indigenous scientific and technological capacities within the universities of the region.

Based on economic and demographic projections, we can safely assume that the core's growing demand for young, educated knowledge workers or post-secondary graduates from the South will persist. On the other hand, conditions in the peripheries will deteriorate before they begin to improve. As such, emigration of the young, educated and unemployed will continue to fuel the intra-core race for knowledge in all its forms. As in the past, the SSA peripheries continue to supply the human resource requirements of the dominant core formations. The educational institutions, consciously or otherwise, help process the transfer of workers from the pre-capitalist formations to the advanced ones.

Faced with diminishing returns on higher education and chronic educated unemployment in the post-Bandung era, university education is increasingly perceived as an effective means for migrating to the core's industrialized capitalist countries. To be sure, the old Bilhetes certifying and attesting to the Negroe's knowledge of the dominant imperial faith during the mercantile period have been replaced by the higher education diploma or degree of contemporary higher education in the era of globalization. These higher degrees are most honored for passage or immigration to the cores. My point is that the migration of knowledge workers is less by choice than a matter of falling into the old patterns of relations established by the world systemic relations. Along with cyber capitalism, unregulated markets and privatization, the practice of forced- bonded labor practices and slavery has also "boomed" with globalization. Just as the transatlantic slave trade claimed the region's strongest, youngest and most productive laborers, neo-liberal globalization is claiming the youngest, brightest and most educated sectors of SSA. The neo-slavery of the contemporary period is epitomized in the stream of educated workers and professionals leaving the region in greater numbers and despite all the risks and costs associated with negotiating the contemporary "Middle Passage."

To reiterate the main thrust of this reframing process, educational expansion is inseparable from the insatiable production/reproduction-accumulation cycle of capital, itself predicated on the extraction of surplus from labor on an ever-expanding scale. This compels the dominant and subordinated capitalist classes in every cycle to secure ever-more reliable sources of labor power and subjection of laborers to ever-more efficient means of exploitation. Continuing expansion into non- and pre-capitalist modes and labor reserves, therefore, guarantees the very survival of capitalism's systemic logic and structures of extended worldwide reproduction. Historically, the educational facilities rendered in the region have served to perpetuate this process by instructing, disciplining and shaping African labor power to the requirements of the ascending capitalist mode. Modern educational institutions are an intricate dimension of the development of capitalist relations of production. As such, they do not enhance the productive forces and subsistence of the region's residual household peasant economies. At a given stage in the development of the production/reproduction cycle of capital, the narrow educational bases and on which the reproduction of peripheral societies operate come into conflict with the systemic requirements of capitalist expansion and extended reproduction on a world scale.

The ascending "Globalized cycle" of educational policymaking is bent on capitalizing the public education systems of the SSA peripheries by weaning them off state-subsidy and opening the sphere up to cross-border educational entrepreneurs. As a scholar, I question the policy wisdom and humanity of imposing neo-liberal market-based SAPs in a region where capitalist markets are hardly developed and such extensive human deprivation and elemental suffering exists on an expanding scale. The logic of building a virtual university dependent on computers, satellite and Pentium where clean water, food and basic heath care and well-equipped elementary classrooms are a rarity, shows a certain indifference to the human rights and plights of Africans. Under the guise of "helping" Africans, these policies primarily ensure market protection, technological innovations and profits of Northern trans-national corporations

(TNCs) . The old "trickle down" effect or redemption through market forces has yet to materialize.

Central to a historical materialist reframing process is the understanding that the historical expansion of European capitalism-imperialism and extension of Western education systems into the sub-Saharan region have been dialectically interrelated processes. Thus, educational expansion occupies a pivotal role in the world-systemic accumulation process of capital and the construction of what is known as the modern capitalist world system. More still, it must be seen as a crucial mechanism for incorporating Africans as subjects/agents in the circuits of capital accumulation and the relations of domination and subordination between the core's and periphery's social formations.

The historical and structural foundations of the nascent CMP, according to the Marxist conception of history, lie in the long and brutal history of primitive accumulation. This mercantilist process is known for, amongst other things, forcibly dispossessing the peasantry from their means of production and thereby creating the conditions (Act for enclosures of Commons and so on) for the emergence of a European proletariat or a class of wage-laborers. With respect to the peripheries of the "dark continent" the act of dispossession took the form of cannons, conquest, plunder and slave raiding expeditions that finally transformed entire states and empires into suppliers of slaves required for the imperial mines and plantations founded in the New World. At a minimum, the legacy of the Slave trade has structurally and historically, placed African formations at a perpetual disadvantage (rather than comparative advantage) in relation to the core's advanced capitalist formations. This relationship, amongst other things, reproduces the North's advantage by raising productivity in the latter or dominant mode and atrophy or absolute poverty in the former, transforming it into a huge labor reserve for the core's capitalist formations. As a result of this dynamic, the SSA peripheries end up exporting the most educated and employment-seeking

young people to the dominant capitalist formations and, in the process grow even more dependant on a neo-colonial economy based on aid and "remittances."

For students of social change and history, this suggestive reframing cautions that we must henceforth temper the human capital-based notion that investment in education leads everywhere and at all times and amongst all people to a path of capitalist "development" with the stubborn reality that it may actually lead to underdevelopment and peripheralization on an expanding scale. The policy challenge, for those who care about the future of the region and humanity, is to be cognizant of the effects of imperialism and to factor them into international educational research and inquiry. What I have endeavored in this suggestive reframing is to relocate the debate on African education expansion and reform within the discourse of imperialism. To the extent that discussions on educational expansion and university reforms in the region begin to be cognizant of the imperialist dimensions in the evolving relationship between education, state and society in the peripheries, this theoretical effort will have accomplished its purpose. It is time for a new policy approach towards Africa and Africans.

2. The Fading Political Relevance of the African Intelligentsia

The popular element "feels" but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element " knows" but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel. The two extremes are therefore pedantry and philistinism on the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other (Gramsci, p. 418)

Education systems and schools are the leading institutional mechanisms through which intellectuals of various categories are produced. The degree of elaboration and training of the intellectual element and the complexity of its practices in any region of the world system coincides with the development of the capitalist mode of production and the expansion of the formal educational apparatus.

Applying the Gramscian (1971, p.11) frame to the educational field, the complexity of the cultural life and intellectual function in different states can be examined and "measured objectively" by the quantity and gradation of specialized

schools and educational institutions existing in societies and at any particular moment in history. Thus, the more widespread the "area" covered by education and the more numerous the "vertical levels" of schooling, the more differentiated the division of labor, the more elaborated the intelligentsia and the overall cultural power of states tends to be. Cultural power, in turn, matures with the exercise of hegemony. This is a useful comparative perspective to bear in mind when looking at the data and considering the different cycles of expansion discussed in this study.

The African intelligentsia of our interest here is substantially a modern phenomenon, a result of the region's encounter with capitalism and imperial socialization processes. It is, in short, a long-term product of the Western educational organism and hegemonic expansion into the "dark continent." Throughout the region, intellectuals are drawn from the members of the "educated" native elite. As Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1981, p. 69) points out, this indigenous intelligentsia " has its roots in the early Christian converts, the early asomi who learnt to read and write, the court messenger, the policeman, the road overseers," and a host of other indigenous functionaries that emerge in the development of colonial societies.

A major characteristic of this stratum (caste) is its affinity to the metropolitan European bourgeoisie in the "superstructural" realm of culture and ideology. Its "capital," as we have underlined, is predominantly in education and comes from the absorption of imperialist culture and language. Thus its susceptibility to the phenomenon of the "colonization of the mind" as emphasized at the beginning and throughout the study. By the same token, its members are also prone to revolutionary/emancipatory and counter-systemic ideas transmitted from the West and East. Mugabe's contemporary "Look East" policy is one expression of this potential. In the earlier periods of the conquest, as it were, a few words in English, French or Portuguese and so on sufficed to exercise the function of the native intellectual as "interpreters," couriers, cocoa middlemen and so on. What

is critical to our investigation is their connective functions to the indigenous markets and society. In this broader sense, the early converts were the forerunners of the modern comprador classes, inclusive of the higher commercial and "political" strata or the national "elites" mediating the structures of governments and *states of the peripheries (i.e. various fractions that make up the national bourgeoisie).*

The expansion of schools is directly related to the development and complexity of this indigenous social category, a leading stratum in the development of the periphery's political and cultural economy. As our historical analysis of the cycles of expansion indicates, the educational experiences, facilities and possibilities of sub-Saharan Africans were at a rudimentary stage during the colonial era. The "area" covered by schools and educational institutions was extremely restricted both in quality and quantity. For instance, well into the 1930s the education of natives was the field of European missionaries and the settler states (see Appendix). The elaboration of native professionals was notably absent during the period. The provisions for native education were limited to instilling basic manual aptitudes with immediate tangible returns, somewhat reminiscent of the contemporary "basic education" scheme. Moreover, the foundations for post-secondary colleges and technical higher education did not even begin to emerge in the region until the mid 20th century. When they emerged, they did so as branches of metropolitan "mother country" institutions complete with their usual "paternalistic" overtones and Eurocentric biases and dissociated from the needs and language of the indigenous culture and peripheral economy. Let us say, then, that the educational facilities and provision for the subordinate natives populations were minimal and consistent with their expected servile or subaltern function in colonial society.

The area covered by education roughly parallels the level of the development of the forces of production and social relations. The structuring norms and practices of the "colonial situation" were plainly racist and inspired by the discourse of the

civilizing mission. That is to say, the social hierarchies were racially regulated and socially segregated. In the ruling ideology of the period, natives were deemed inherently unqualified for the more complex administrative and organizational undertakings in the professional categories. This rationale secured the higher levels (specialized functions) of the cultural and technical-managerial structures of society and state apparatus in the hands of privileged whites. Superior insights and reason were said to be the innate provenance of whites. This history of power relations between Africans and Europeans, structured originally on supremacist premises still prevails on the international level, notwithstanding the transfer of the colonial state apparatus to the indigenous national bourgeoisie (NB) who eventually amassed a great deal of political power.

The colonial relations continued under the terms and conditions of neocolonialism. When we look at the international organizations concerned with the issues and educational expansion reforms, the racial hierarchies are replicated. The "expert" layer of professionals, consultants, administrators of the multilateral organizations, humanitarian, "aid" and "development assistance" agencies and "chief economists" tend to be whites or come from the industrialized "donor" countries. Their privileged communities benefit most (financially/economically) from the development and aid industry and are least affected by the economic stagnation and human depravity caused to millions of Africans, as a direct result of the policies they formulate and disseminate through governmental and non-governmental organizations. The subservient indigenous "interpreter-informer" staff at the service of these metroplolitan "specialists" on Africa or Africanists is typically recruited from among the local intellectual strata thus reproducing the original relationship under different circumstances. It is easy to hold to the illusion that racism is in the past, especially if one is a beneficiary of the racist structures and arrangements that reinforce the imperial status quo.

Needless to say, the corrosive effects of European racism or Negrophobia (Fanon) weigh heavily on the subjectivity/consciousness of the African intellectual strata.

No African intellectual, in good conscience, can be in Cornel West's (Carew, 1997) language "race-effacing" or ignore the perverse tradition the "racial epidermal schema"(Fanon) constructed into the economic, societal and cultural-psychological structures and relations of imperialism. In other words, race matters and a critical discourse on education, culture and the role of black-African intellectuals must acknowledge that "systemic racism" remains embedded in imperial structures, intra-state relations and discourses as a direct continuation of past legal, institutional and procedural practices. What is more, the ideologies of the racist schema permeate the schooling institutions, curriculum, pedagogy and classrooms, labor structures and opportunities throughout the imperial domain. As an educator, I have grown to acknowledge that fundamental social and structural changes in the world cannot be instigated without interrogating the entrenched racism woven throughout the entrails and hierarchies of the hegemonic structures that govern relations in the world system. As an intellectual I have an ethical responsibility to engage these issues and contribute towards changing the terms of the race-evading dominant discourse.

The oppressive meta-structure of "race" arises from the long-standing tradition of codifying and classifying the human species or distinguishing human beings on the basis of "epidermal traits" or biological skin-color differences. Overall, as imperialism expands in scope and depth a whole set of discourses, special knowledges and "scientific" analysis developed around the issue of "race" and the racial inferiority of some over others. This is not about mere prejudice. Prominent Enlightenment philosophers from Voltaire and Locke to Montesquieu and Hegel elaborated on this scheme by declaring the ontological primacy of their own "race" and civilization and condemning the "Negroid" type as savage, without history and, in short, a sub-human species. Africans were "fixed" at the bottom of the modernist racial taxonomy. Throughout the centuries, the schema has been historicized, "scienticized" and reinscribed in subtle and ingenious ways, adjusting to the specific international and geographic context. Scholars understand the psychology and existentialism of racism, more so than its ontological

assertions. The point I am getting at is that metropolitan or Euro-American cultural, academic, scientific and theological elite has been instrumental in enshrining this unquestionable racist schema at the core of bourgeois white culture and scholarship. Simply put, every aspect of the modern world is structured around this schema. Fanon was certainly voicing the popular feeling when he declared that for the native intellectual, even such core European values like justice, liberty and "objectivity" appears to be marshaled against him/her. As a result, contradictory values, aspirations and identities constantly vie to take over black-Africans'. intellectuality. The responses range from Negritudist valorization of "blackness" to critical engagement with the issues.

Much has been written about "double consciousness" (Du Bois) that is said to confound the black-African consciousness burdened by the weight of racism. In effect, the oppressed Negro/Native is forced to conduct a "double discourse" depending on the audiences in question. Another way of reinterpreting this Du Boisian coinage might be to look at Gramsci's (1971) notion of "one contradictory consciousness" or "two theoretical consciousnesses" that confront the active intellectual strata seeking to organize and give expression to the aspirations of historically oppressed social groups/forces. Initially, the intellectuals of any such "subaltern" social groups lack "a clear theoretical consciousness" of themselves, of their identity and latent transformative capacities. This is largely attributed to the fact that they tend to labor under the shadow of hostile, racist laws, institutions and discourses and to their attachment to traditional, exclusionary and "extra scientific" conceptions of the world "inherited from the past." These forces continue to confound and shape the oppressed intellectual's emerging understanding of reality. Under these circumstances the mind/intellect is suspended in a "contradictory" state of consciousness. This contradiction of identity and of the "conscience" tends to produce a condition of moral and political passivity and variations of "false consciousness." In this Gramscian framework, Du Bois' existential clash in the US of the early twentieth century assumes the outline of theoretical contradiction

inherent in elaborating a more critical, transformative and "scientific" conception of the world.

Admittedly, the morbid institutions of Jim Crow slavery, colonialism and apartheid have given way to post-colonialism and globalization, yet only the crudest of pundits would proclaim the "end of racism" outright. Instead, earlier vocabularies and crudities associated with anatomical arguments, racial typologies and skull measurements have given way to the complexity of intelligence testing, subtle forms of macroeconomic imperialism, the theories of the Bell Curve and the "Clash of Civilizations." In the post 9/11 world, the impulse and indeed the self-imposed responsibility to "civilize-democratize" the non-European cultures has been assumed as the special provenance of American foreign policy by the present administration. Presently, we live in an era where the discourse of racism has been "culturalized" and operates as a constitutive and systemic feature of the dominant institutions of capitalism and the postmodern "identitarian" politics that rose to prominence with transnationalized capitalism in the last three decades. The contemporary trend towards conceptualizing differences by reifying or essentializing culture rather than genetics, has been aptly called "the new racism" (Fredrickson, 2002). The persistence of neo-racism, reincarnated in "cultural" and "ethnic" discourses has, sadly enough, inured us to the spectacle of death, hunger, war and utter destitution among black Africans in our midst. This indifference is posing a major ethical predicament to intellectuals trying to organize a planetary anti-systemic solidarity of resistance against the genocidal advance of neo-liberal policies and "free market" in the Sub-Saharan region. To avoid extremist solutions, I believe intellectuals in privileged states must join in this process by consciously standing with the various resistances of the powerless currently flaring throughout the peripheries of the empire.

At this point, we must link up with the role and function of the African intellectual stratum in the new trends emerging with the "new imperialism" which basically refers to Washington's imperial project of global dominance. It will be

recalled that the post-colonial intellectuals were educated mostly abroad and claimed devotion to national independence and freedom. Organized around a small circle of well-known personalities or the "big men" who initially enjoyed a certain charisma or popularity with the people, the mass movements were soon transformed into one-party instruments for repression. Using the coercive apparatus of the peripheral state, the national bourgeoisie deployed all sorts of ideological trappings like "Authenticity." "African socialism," "Non-alignment," "Ujama," and so on, ostensibly to create a national ethos and link itself to an imagined national past of the popular community. Ultimately, however, its petit-bourgeois class project of autonomous capitalist/socialist national development foundered but not without significantly expanding the "area" of the educational infrastructure both horizontally and vertically. The tertiary level, almost non-existent in the earlier colonial period, had experienced the highest rate of increase during the "Bandung" cycle adding complexity to the cultural-intellectual life of the neocolonial states.

The advances of US-led corporate globalization in the post-Soviet era of the early 1990s gave rise the so-called "new generation of democrats" in the region. This is the ornamental title bestowed upon submissive African petit-bourgeois agents, who can be relied upon to implement policies against their constituencies and at the pleasure of Washington and US corporations. Their members are absorbed by the new politico-ethical and ideological world order Perkins (2004) has defined as the Washington-led "corporatocracy." This term captures the triad comprised of huge transnational corporations (TNCs), international/regional banking and lending institutions led by the World Bank (Knowledge Bank) and IMF and peripheral governments. This "partnership" has been struck for the purpose of remolding and "reforming" much of the "statist" social, political and educational institutions along market/profit criteria. In case there was any doubt, the state in the peripheries is an active agent and far from "withering away" under the influence of neo-liberal globalization. Rather, it the function of the state and the

mindset of its governing personnel that have been adjusted to the new realities of global capitalism.

In the current cycle, the role of imperial mediation is performed by the re-compradorized remnants of the national bourgeoisie (NB). These "technocratic managerial types" are recruited from among the elements that prove particularly receptive to the finer points of macroeconomic sleigh of hand and "planning," designed to rob peripheral nations of their resources as described by Perkins. Sooner or later, the regimes become hopelessly indebted to the usurious loans of the international development industry and submit to the political and technical tutelage of international donors. In this mediation process, mostly re-tribalized indigenous officials do not have the political and ideological "baggage" of the NB. Their "governance" is simplified. That is, they are no longer required to lead with ideas but merely rearticulate and implement the hyperspecialized discourses and abstract macro-economic formulae preconceived by the professional technocratic cadre stratum serving the corporatocracy. In every capital of the region, the same managerial discourses and nomenclatures of "sustainable development" and "reducing poverty" and so on prevail, while poverty multiplies.

This highly elaborated and mobile stratum of transnational bureaucrats and techocrats of the so-called technical/symbolic cadre are predominantly white. Their distinguishing expertise lies in organizational, educational and ideological matters and "resides in their function as specialists with sectoral planning tasks." Their members are specialized and committed to "rational fiscal and economic management" of contemporary societies, as detailed by Van der Pijl (1998, p. 40). This commitment connects with the core idea of reforming the public schools and university "sectors" of the region according to market-efficiency. In other words, this stratum propagates the new imperialism in a quantifiable medium and under the pretext that they alone are uniquely entitled to make policy decisions for millions of the dispossessed and disenfranchised masses. Subordinate African bureaucrats and civil servants in each state extend the specialized transnational

reach of the techno-corporatocracy into the peripheries. In their regurgitation of the new concepts, the "new democrats" appear more as mouthpieces of the cadre stratum than representatives of African communities. This is not surprising, since the material preconditions and social support for corporate neo-liberal policies is almost non-existent in the region. The more advanced the reign of the techno-managerial experts, the more politics in SSA tends to give way to "micromanaged" electoral and social engineering feats. The indigenous native petit bourgeois depend on harsh repression to maintain the paternalistic terms and arrangements of the humiliating "donor-beggar relationship."

The task of intellectuals in any society is that of mobilizing public awareness of emergent problems and issues and organizing ethical and intellectual reforms. The function of intellectuals, seen through the Gramscian prism, involves not just "circulating" culture, but also adjusting the apparatus of culture and institutions of education (superstructure) to the needs of the popular masses and the practical requirements of the new realities. In the current epoch this cardinal function of the indigenous African intellectual leadership has been assumed by various officials of leading transnational organizations, banks and a host of foreign NGOs and pseudo-humanitarian organizations and Western personalities (celebrities and experts) that claim to combat poverty, build democracy and abolish illiteracy on behalf of Africans. These are ingenious ways of displacing the concerted politics of imperialism to individual ethics, to be sure. Still, their alleged commitments to the exploited "poorest of the poor" fail to pass the litmus test of humanity, when measured against the brute facts in the region. Nevertheless, their vehemence on issues related to alleviating "African poverty" is as formidable as the powerlessness of the African intelligentsia in the current epoch to influence policies and events concerning the SSA region.

APPENDIX

Educational Expansion in Colonial British East Africa:
An Archival Illustration of Kenya's experience

As you know, the colonial system of education in addition to its apartheid racial demarcation had a structure of a pyramid: a broad primary base, a narrow secondary middle, and an even narrower university apex...Nobody could pass the exam who failed the English language paper, no matter how brilliantly he had done in other subjects...The language of the African child's formal education was foreign. The language of the books he read was foreign. The language of his conceptualization was foreign. Thought in him took the visible forms of a foreign language. This resulted...in what we might call colonial alienation. The alienation became reinforced in the teaching of history, geography, music, where bourgeois Europe was the center of the universe" (wa Thiong'o, 1986 p.12 and p.16))

The archival article *African Life Under Colonial Administration, The Colour Bar in East Africa* (Norman Leys, Hogarth Press, 8/2/41) is, I believe, a significant historical document in understanding/analyzing the type and extent of educational expansion offered during the colonial cycle. It illuminates the entire political-economic and educational configurations of the colonial situation as it manifested in Kenya. The article details the condition of educational development/progress (build up) of native education and the educational inequalities engendered between children of European settlers and native Africans. After nearly half a century of *de jure* colonial subjugation/rule by Great Britain over the larger Eastern Africa, the educational provision for Africans are meager in every sense. Leys' (the author of the book featured in this particular article) observations are highly relevant to illustrate a pattern of educational expansion that is more or less characteristic of the settler-driven colonial cycle found across the region. The objective of this exercise is to highlight the pattern of educational development during colonialism in the region, by presenting the symptomatic case of Eastern Africa and Kenya in particular. It serves to show how race has always played a vital role in the provision of education for Africans.

It will be recalled that Great Britain colonized a large part of East Africa and assumed responsibility for the education of natives, as it were. In terms of broad

demographics, the whole population of "British East African dominions" comprising what became six countries was estimated at 15,000,000 at the time. Quite unexceptionally the general welfare, economic and educational opportunities of the population were determined, first and foremost, by their race. In this colonial situation, native Africans were often barred from owning land and operating modern businesses, a vocation which throughout Eastern Africa were reserved for East Indians who had emigrated from the subcontinent at London's behest. It is part of the colonial situation of East Africa that Indians occupy the middle-trading-skills strata of the racialized colonial occupational hierarchies. The fate of Africans in the colony's workforce was perceived primarily in terms of providing manual labor and domestic services for white settler-farmers and the colonial administration.

Under these classically colonial conditions, as Leys (1941) points out in this archival document, the education of all (1.160) European children, at the time, was of high standards and comparable to the metroplolitan "mother country." These schools and the educational needs and activities of the next generation of settlers were generously funded by the colonial state. That is, metropolitan educational standards prevailed. Writing of the children of the colonizers "most of them go to Government schools at a cost to the government of over 25 pounds per child per annum, exclusive of capital charges for school buildings, one of which cost 40,000 pounds." Under such privileged and preferential conditions, the minority European children in Kenya attending government-public schools, in Leys' apt observation "get nearly free education and board" as their fundamental rights.

There is nothing irregular with this picture, of course, until we contrast the data with the state and conditions of educational opportunities afforded native Africans in the same country. Their provisions and conditions of their education are strikingly different and seem rather rudimentary by comparison. Thus, a generation after colonization or by 1940, not in a single of the six British colonies

was "as many as 3 per cent of children attending Government schools. In two of those countries, there are no Government schools for African children" (Leys) and natives were still overwhelmingly attending state-subsidized Mission schools firmly implanted during the previous cycle. Furthermore, the article also reveals that when it comes to the educational expenditures for African children, the cost per child to the colonial government amounted to "6 pounds per child" resulting in monstrous inequalities even in the quantity and quality of education available to children of different races in the colonies.

We reiterate that during the colonial cycle, the education of Africans had become a joint project of the settler-state and the churches across the region. Looking at the provision of native education in more detail during this period in Kenya specifically, the article details how the colonial government made a policy of providing some assistance to the mission schools until 1938 and then "insisted on fees being charged" for educational services rendered to natives. These fees, charged per term, were exorbitant and could reportedly amount up to one third of the average African family's annual income. More specifically with respect to the prohibitive costs and their consequences, Leys' book explains how "these varied 6d. per term to 1 pounds per term in all State or State-aided schools." In his view "this is a considerable amount, considering that "the African family's annual cash income averages only 3 pounds." Under these prohibitive circumstances and costs, it is not surprising that most native aspirants to education cannot afford to go to school. The message of this policy seemed rather clear. Africans "cannot attend Government schools unless their infinitely impecunious parents can pay school fees" and should forget reaching the higher professional qualifications in the colonies which are reserved for whites.

Effectively and without the imposition of legal apartheid, the majority of African children were "debarred" from Government schools "on account of inability to pay fees." As a result, we find that "of the 57,000 African children in Kenya attending elementary school, 5,000 only went to Government schools." Deterred

by the high price of native education, the remainder went to Mission schools from whom state-subsidy, usually amounting one third of the total cost, was also withdrawn in 1938, thereby "throwing all costs on the parents" in Ley's words. These government schools taught rudimentary literacy skills, basic mathematical calculations, with some vocational/technical training in the local vernacular. In this way the British were assured of having a trained indigenous labor force that would be required to develop the colony according to the European vision. This was an educational policy initiative that helped reproduce the structural abundance of low-skilled, cheap labor in the region while serving to establish the emergent international division of labor and imperial order of the world.

This was, obviously, a disastrous policy for indigenous Africans, the majority of whom, in any case, attended sub-standard schools "in which education is restricted to that given to children of ten years and under in England," or what are recognized as "adapted" colonial education systems among colonial education planners. Their pedagogic emphasis of this approach lay on moral and religious education and submissive training for domestic services and/or unskilled participation in the emergent peripherally capitalist economy of extraction. The message is clear: the colonial situation does not need "educated Negros" per se but rather obedient and barely-skilled workers. The main emphasis has, therefore, been what Freire calls education for "domestication." To various degrees the same mentality on the kind and scope of native education prevailed among all colonialist administrators of this region. There was, in other words, a regional tendency of "transferring" a particular kind of education for Africans which, I would argue, differed very little from what was perfected in the Southern African complex as "Bantu education" by Afrikaner nationalists who, on the question of African education blatantly write that "Native education should be based on the principles of trusteeship, non-equality and segregation" (Tabata, 1960 , p. 46). This debasement of the experience of education to a system of domestication for natives, has been more completely rationalized by the architect of apartheid. In Verwoerd's view (ibid. 6) "there is no place for him (the African) in the European

community above the level of certain forms of labor....Until now he has been subjected to school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze." Verwoerd clearly intends to lead the African back to an imaginary Bantu Community where the native can "graze" freely.

Anglo-American educational theorists recognize a form of Bantu education system known as "adopted education" or the Hampton-Tuskegee model, catering to colonized populations since its inception and rationalized in terms of "educational transfer" from the civilized countries to the colonies. In practice, the model leads to a type of education that was "second-rate, rural and non-academic, preventing students from further study and urban migration" (Steiner -Khamsi, 2003, pp. 174-179). Education systems of this limited nature and for what were considered "backward" people were established throughout the region by the colonial settler states.

> The concept of adapted education was first developed around 1890 as part of the Hampton-Tuskegee model for the education of African Americans in the US South, then transferred to the African continent in the 1900, subsequently used in the 1930s for the education of indigenous peoples in the Pacific, and in the final stages in the nineteen fifties diffused wherever the British colonial administration felt pressured to deal with the education of "backward" and "retarded" people...

Clearly, this dead-end imperialist educational scheme of incorporation held little prospect to Africans by way of "achieving political, social, and economic parity with Europeans" much less of attaining requisite social and economic progress along capitalist lines, like the colonizers. The point is that this was the type of education the majority of Kenya's or sub-Sahara Africa's children could hope to attain by 1940. As would be expected, the attrition rates were severe. Pressed by meager parental incomes and severe inadequacy in provisions, adds Leys, "the

majority get only a first standard education, few get up the fourth standard" and complete their 6 - year elementary cycle before they join the colonial labor-force.

Closing his remarks on the state of native primarily levels of education in the East African dominions, Leys offers the crucial observation that children who "do not reach standard lll" tend to lapse into illiteracy very soon. This danger afflicts the majority of African students who are destined to furnish the colonial labor reserve army for the "labor-reserve economies" or "white farms" and labor-contract systems, which prevailed in the region's labor-intensive political economy of extraction. As Luxemburg had predicted, the imperial drive for possessing all "important sources of productive forces such as land, game in primeval forests, minerals, precious stones and ores, products of exotic flora such as rubber" was being accelerated everywhere in the region and the education systems were complicit in this project.. In this system, the majority African families were alienated from their ancestral lands and kept sequestered in "Closed Areas" and "Reserves" ever-ready to be hired by prosperous settlers, plantation and mining concerns. As a result, large population surpluses or "labor reserves" readily available for employment opportunities in the capitalist settler-agricultural sectors, were often sequestered in these "reserves." These employment opportunities in the "modern" wage sector, however, were available only for that minority of the labor force, the part colonial private or public employers needed to incorporate within their institutions and services. In short, they provided conditions for a limited and controlled "internal labor market" for the colonies

During the Colonial cycle of educational expansion, the internal/external labor markets in place rarely required more than rudimentary levels of adaptive education and skills. Not surprisingly, therefore, the extension of post-elementary educational opportunities, technical and vocational institutions for Africans was severely delayed and limited throughout the region. Again the case of Eastern Africa is instructive. According to the 1938 annual Kenyan Government report, there were still "no Government secondary schools" during this period. On the

other hand, there were "four State-aided Mission Schools" providing secondary education to Africans. The figures of enrollment in these Mission-run secondary institutions reveal the extent of educational "domestication" fostered under the socioeconomic conditions established by settler colonialism.

At the time of Leys' writing in 1941, that there were some 57,000 Africans attending primary levels of native schooling. In Kenya some 228 Africans attended what was considered secondary education in these colonial state-aided mission institutions. Leys provides the remaining data "213 pupils in junior forms, 18 pupils in senior forms; 55 youths have bursaries to study at Makerere College, Uganda; two youths are studying in Britain at a cost to Government of 333 ponds."

Aside from its paucity, another important aspect of this adapted education system foisted on natives is its low cost. Thus, "government spent on African education in Kenya 4s. 3d. per head per child of school age per annum." These figures are finally contrasted with the British colony in "Northern Nigeria" where "2,409 boys went to Government schools" and no provisions were made for girls education, contrary to the Eastern African dominions where "only one girl is educated to four boys." Of course, there were varieties in the provision of native education from colony to colony. What is certain is that the children of the colonizer and colonized were not privy to the same educational facilities, opportunities and institutions. Again, broadly, the needs of the colonizers and the economic interests of metropolitan powers determined the institutional parameters of what an African education system is expected to consist of and achieve in the world of production/reproduction.

Under these circumstances, education becomes a vital part of the colonial institutional mechanisms to continue the subjugation and exploitation of Kenyans in the name of the "mother country" and the sacred trust of "civilizing" the populations incorporated into the capitalist mode, as it were. In many of the

colonies where the most productive means of production and subsistence of life, their land, was expropriated, the capitalist settler-farmers begrudged even the limited and inferior education reserved for native Africans under imperial "trusteeship." In their view, the evolving system of native education lead to diversions from their privileged and endless supply of cheap and abundant labor in the colonies. Worse still, it might create an educated class of natives across the region who dare think "its spiritual, economic and political home" to paraphrase Verwoerd, is among the civilized community of Europeans.

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