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On Sport and Social Relations: Laying Down a Framework in Theoretical Sociology

by

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A THESIS

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Abstract

The purpose of this inquiry is to correct a serious deficiency in the sociology of sport by developing a conceptual framework of sport with respect to social production, reproduction and transformation. Using Bosley's mode of criticism and the sociology of Toennies, forms of association are considered and three fundamental problems are confronted. These are: a) freedom and constraint in social life; b) what is; and c) how we know.

The inquiry is a concatenated argument that has three steps. The first step discloses sport and social relations as elements of the social world to which attention must be paid. Sport is conceptualized as a sufficiency of social constraints for likelihood embodied in varying mixtures of play (a sufficiency of social constraints for possibility) and work (a sufficiency of social constraints for certainty). Social relations are conceptualized as varying mixtures of *Gemeinschaft* (a sufficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction) and *Gesellschaft* (a sufficiency of social constraints for transformation). The second step discloses the range of possible relations among these elements. Sport and social relations can be both antecedent and consequent conditions. The third step discloses the conceptual framework as two orthogonally intersecting continua representing process and product. Four ideal-typical social conditions of sport are generated. These are given the names **PAIDIA**, **ASCESIS**, **ATHLOR**, and **KERDOS**.

Each of these steps is assertive but empirical support is provided by studies of karate, cycling and climbing. Thirteen definitional propositions, 8 comparative relation propositions, 20 causal propositions and 4 potential falsifiers are derived from the framework.

Acknowledgements

It is impossible to remain untouched by those with whom one speaks and shares, especially one's teachers. Professors Arthur K. Davis, Richard S. Bosley and R. Gerald Glassford have touched me deeply in ways too numerous to list here. By turns they lead and followed, pulled and pushed. They encouraged and supported me through what I must now admit was a most stimulating part of my life. I owe them a lot but I will remember them best for their honesty and integrity because they touched me with an attitude. Emerson once asked, "Do you know the secret of the true scholar? In every man there is something wherein I may learn of him; and in that I am his pupil". This is the true spirit of scholarly inquiry and the attitude they shared with me. They showed me that certainty is but a fleeting and elusive glimpse of what is possible. I extend my respect and appreciation to these scholars.

I have also been touched by others. Professor Barry McPherson, my external examiner, offered valuable criticism. Professors Rosalind Sydie, Alexander Matejko, Harvey Scott, Garry Smith, Gerald Redmond, Peter Lindsay and Robert Wilberg shared their knowledge, their experience, their candor and demonstrated that rare quality, the capacity to listen. I acknowledge my debt to them all.

Finally, I am forever in the debt of The Trustees of the Killam Estate for what, nowadays, is a most necessary condition for inquiry - financial support. Without their help the mundane distractions to thought would have been unbearable.

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Unroll it, and it reaches in all directions.

Roll it up, and it withdraws and lies hidden in minuteness.

Chu Hsi

CHAPTER ONE

PRELIMINARY BEARINGS

1. Introduction

If Jean Jacques Rousseau could have observed modern sport he might well have agreed with Thomas Hobbes. If only he had seen a cycle race, for example, he might not have insisted that solitary individuals are indifferent to each other. The cyclist sees his own ability at hand, and other cyclists at a distance and they are in that point more equal, than unequal. Every one of them is contented with his share and there is no greater sign of the equal distribution of anything. From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the attainment of a win. So if any two cyclists desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become competitors and in the way to the win endeavour to subdue one another. One cyclist may be physically stronger or mentally quicker but the difference between them is not so great that the weakest may not, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others in the same position of losing, gain the victory. By dint of jostle, nudge or push, deception or otherwise, the vulgar have at hand the means to destroy, to force the stronger rider to lose. For during the time the cyclists ride without a common power to hold them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called racing. In this condition every cyclist is competitor to every cyclist and the life of a cyclist is nasty, brutish, and if he is not careful, short (cf. Hobbes, 1968: 183-184[1]).

Rousseau need not have worried, though, for while it is true that the cyclists come together and make a social contract to ride side by side in peace and while it is also true that the cyclists agree to give up their freedom to do anything they wish in pursuit of their own individual desires, nevertheless the individual cyclist assents only to those obligations which he deems necessary and valid. The chief among these obligations is to ride according to rules which specify what constitutes a race and how it is to be ridden. The social contract is an agreement whereby no cyclist benefits more than any other nor sacrifices more than any other. The second among these obligations is to ride safely. Collective self-preservation comes only

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[1]A large part of this paragraph paraphrases Hobbes' original idea in *Leviathan*.

after the advantages gained in the free submission of the individual to the Collective Will of cyclists. To the extent, therefore, that a cyclist's first obligation is to the structure of competition, sport, like war is a social construction and in the manner of Hobbes, Rousseau and generations of social inquirers since, this prompts us to ask - what is involved in the social production, reproduction and transformation of sport?

The answer to this question requires some theory that would serve as a vehicle to our understanding of what is, after all, a fairly commonplace phenomenon. Such a theory would give an account of sport and the social world in such a way that we could explain the occurrence of particular sports activities, cycling for example, the social practices which maintain them and how they change over time. But as familiar as this question is, if we turn to the sub-discipline which views the study of sport as its sole concern, we would find very little to help us to answer it, for not only is the sociology of sport bereft of a theory concerning how its major phenomenon is produced, reproduced and transformed, there is very little theory of any kind concerning sport. Indeed, it is a constant complaint among some sociologists that the sociology of sport is atheoretical (Dunning, 1971; Krawczyk, 1977; McPherson, 1978; Gruneau, 1983), that it is, in fact, struck with a malaise (Ingham, 1979), and this can be laid squarely on the shoulders of individual inquirers insofar as there is a deficiency in the way they conduct their investigations of sport and the social world.

There would appear to be some degree of consensus, at least among its critics, that the sociology of sport has been suffering and continues to suffer from the myopia of abstracted empiricism (cf. Mills, 1959). The malaise is an imbalance, an overemphasis on empiricism and a fetish with The Method. Its symptoms include trivial and excessively repetitive questions; very little inquiry that could be construed as systematic or cumulative; no sense of history; no apparent continuity; and results which are insignificant. In short, it is superficial and epistemologically sterile and it could be argued that this state of affairs was to be expected. Since it was born of interdisciplinary parents that bowed to the tenets of Science, we should not be surprised to find the sociology of sport strewn with quantaphrenics, number crunchers, nominalists and other technicians who pose as literatii. After all, when the sub-discipline emerged there was a certain amount of academic integrity at stake and not a little credibility and respectability to be won. So, with suitably abject apologies for studying such meaningless phenomena as sports, sociologists hastily climbed on the race horse of Science and looked

forward to a quick and painless journey toward explanation. Most of them think they are still astride it but a few have realised that they have been unseated or, in fact, that they borrowed the wrong horse in the beginning.

To inquire correctly there needs to be a balance between empirical and theoretical concerns. As Mills (1959: 74) put it:

> It is commonly recognized that any systematic attempt to understand involves some kind of alternation between (empirical) intake and (theoretical) assimilation, that concepts and ideas ought to guide factual investigation, and that detailed investigations ought to be used to check up on and re-shape ideas.

The obvious solution to the lack of theory in the sociology of sport, therefore, is to add theory and if we are going to stand any chance at all in understanding how sport is produced, reproduced and transformed then this is what we must do. By making up the deficiency in theory we would, in effect, be contributing to a more balanced inquiry because as we add theory we would reduce the empirical excesses. This is not, however, a simple matter for on close examination the epistemological structure of the sociology of sport involves a deficiency in both theoretical quantity and theoretical quality. Adding theory to gain an explanation of sport is not just a matter of more of it; it also has to be of a kind to do the job.

The deficiency of quantity we can call the argument from causal importance. Where sociologists attempt to explain sport by locating it within a prevailing social milieu, they are lead down a predetermined path because they assume that sport mirrors society. Sometimes expressed as sport is a microcosm of society, this assumption fuels the sociology of sport. According to Eitzen and Sage (1982: 20):

> Perceiving the way sport is organized, the types of games people play, the degree of emphasis on competition, the compensation of the participants, and the enforcement of the rules is a shorthand way of understanding the complexities of the larger society in which sport is embedded. The converse is true also. The understanding of the values of society, of its type of economy, and of its treatment of minority groups, to name a few elements, provides important bases for the perception or understanding of the organization of sport in society.

This is a claim to sameness between sport and society that impels all facets of inquiry in the sub-discipline. It is an assumption which begins inquiry; it provides impetus to continue inquiry; it is used at the end of inquiry as the researcher concludes that, indeed, sport really does mirror society; and it is put forward as an explanation.

It amounts, of course, to no explanation at all for it is a circular argument at best and at worst it is extremely misleading. Its effects are quite pernicious because it serves as the first premise in a very persuasive argument of the form:

1) Sport mirrors society;

2) Society is X;

3) Therefore, sport is X.

We can substitute anything we wish for X; secular, bureaucratic, meritocratic, egalitarian and so on can all be used but the most common is, perhaps, the notion of rationality. Thus, going back to Eitzen and Sage (1982: 20) we may note, *mutatis mutandis*:

> Instead of player-oriented physical competition (informal sport), sport has become a spectacle, a big business, and an extension of power politics. Play has become work. Spontaneity has been superceded by bureaucracy. The goal of pleasure in the physical activity has been replaced by extrinsic rewards, especially money.

This argument, though, fails on two counts. On the first count the "mirror" assumption fails to recognize that a claim to otherness with respect to sport and society can be made: there is more to sport than the reproduction of society. On the second count, to describe society as, for example, secular, meritocratic, bureaucratic or rational is really to mask the infinite complexity of a dynamic phenomenon. Not all society is secular, meritocratic, bureaucratic or rational and by the same token neither is all sport. The assumption is deficient, then, in that it hides other factors that could be incorporated into an explanation and, to the extent that it diverts our attention, it promises more that it can actually deliver.

The deficiency of quality we can call the argument from conceptual inadequacy. What it amounts to is that we do not know what is to count as sport and so research is limited to the more visible and popular activities such as baseball, soccer, football or basketball, activities about which there can be no doubt. This compounds the argument from causal importance because these activities, in their institutional glory, tend to follow societal trends in terms of secularization, meritocratization and so on. This deficiency of quality becomes pernicious when we infer from these activities to those activities which we are not sure are sport and which might or might not follow the same trends. To some extent, of course, this is the fallacy of grand theory put forward by Mills (1959) in that the theories which are available to the sociologist cannot be used at the level of observation. Sport is either taken for granted, as in those models put forward by Goffman (1961), Luschen (1967) and Brohm (1978), or it is not mentioned at all, as in general sociological theories. The inquirer of sport, then, must virtually make up the rules about what to include as sport as he or she proceeds.

This has several effects on inquiries of sport. First, at the individual level of inquiry it makes it very difficult to begin, for if we do not know what to look for it is not likely that we

will find it. Moreover, if we do happen to get started and conduct an inquiry, any critical evaluation of it quickly degenerates from an argument about fact into a disagreement over terms. In either case, the chance for further inquiry is lost. Second, in the sub-discipline as a whole the lack of adequate conceptualization has lead to the following state of affairs:

> . . . the accumulation of a large number of diffuse, unrelated, non-generalizable facts which describe but do not provide explanations . . . and . . . the sociology of sport is rapidly approaching . . . a . . . state of chaos (McPherson, 1978: 73).

This is to say that the sociology of sport is bogged down in a pre-paradigm condition (cf. Kuhn, 1970). It has gathered the facts which draw attention to sport and which state what is the case but it has failed to move on to the paradigm stage of sub-disciplinary development wherein the facts are structured. It has yet to move toward explanation.

With little reservation, then, we can say that if the sociological theories which have been applied to sport provided adequate conceptualizations of the phenomenon, then researchers would be able to formulate generalizations. If they are provided with unambiguous concepts so they know exactly what is to count as sport, then the facts they collect would describe a class of phenomena and would, therefore, structure expectations with respect to those phenomena which are unexamined. As it is, the concept sport is ambiguous and vague. There is no provision of a mechanism for deciding what is within the class and so empirical research results are restricted to isolated phenomena. The diffuse, unrelated and non-generalizable facts that characterize the sociology of sport are indicative of confusion and ambiguity and this, of course, compounds the first deficiency. Researchers are denied the opportunity to make generalizations: they can collect only isolated facts; they must make only particular statements; and they have recourse to the argument from causal importance. The obvious remedy, then, is to resolve the problem of conceptual inadequacy and lay down a theoretical framework that goes some way toward providing the means to answer the question of what is involved in the social production, reproduction and transformation of sport - to indulge in theoretical sociology.

2. *Aims and Strategies*

The major aim of this essay is the development of a conceptual framework of sport as a social phenomenon. What it amounts to is a conceptualization of sport that would be sufficient to achieve a continuity of discourse in the sociology of sport. This is to say that in a very general way the application of the framework would permit us to categorize and structure expectations and so allow us to proceed toward explanation. The essay is a critical inquiry of sport and the social world in general and as such it does not focus on particular instances of sport because they are, rightly, of empirical concern. This is not to say that particular instances will be ignored, only that our primary concern is to give an account of sport and the relevant social world and their role is to support that account. The framework is abstract by necessity but it should be applicable to spatial and temporal instances. It is a tool to be used in the process of inquiry. But let us be quite clear about how it fits into that process.

The development of a conceptual framework should be looked on as laying down a path that can be followed. It includes procedures, principles and rules and generally functions in a way similar to that of a paradigm in the special sense of that term as it is used by Robert Merton[2]:

> First, paradigms have a notational function. They provide a compact arrangement of the central concepts and their interrelations that are utilized for description and analysis . . . Second, paradigms lessen the likelihood of inadvertently introducing hidden assumptions and concepts, for each new assumption and each new concept must be either logically derived from previous components of the paradigm or explicitly introduced into it . . . Third, paradigms advance the cumulation of theoretical interpretation. In effect, the paradigm is the foundation upon which the house of interpretations is built . . . Fourth, paradigms, by their very arrangement, suggest the systematic cross-tabulation of significant concepts and can thus sensitize the analyst to empirical and theoretical problems which he might otherwise overlook . . . Fifth, paradigms make for the codification of qualitative analysis in a way that approximates the logical if not the empirical rigor of quantitative analysis. (Merton, 1967: 70-71)

If the development is unsuccessful then at the very least we will have some idea that the avenue of inquiry down which we will journey need not be travelled again. If it is successful, though, the essay will be of practical consequence in furthering inquiry. It will not provide a cure to the malaise from which the sociology of sport suffers but it will contribute to the treatment of the disease.

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[2]Other authors have used different terms with slightly different connotations. See for example, Masterman's (1970) way of seeing; Stark's (1958) grid; and Gruneau's (1983) significative scheme.

We will proceed on our journey of development according to the tradition of classic sociology as it is outlined by C. Wright Mills in *The Images of Man* (1960). The tradition helps us to manage the achievement of disclosing the framework by focusing our attention on specific problems that must be raised and resolved in turn. In particular we will use the work of two men who are exemplars of this tradition - Ferdinand Toennies and Richard Bosley. Toennies can be regarded as one of the founders of modern sociology. His works, even though they were only recently translated into English, have influenced subsequent generations of sociologists. His major work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* forms an underlying structure to the essay and we will use many of his assumptions to begin the journey. Bosley, writing nearly a century after Toennies' major work was first published, is of the tradition but not in it. His work, *On Truth*, is used here to supplement Toennies and it provides the means by which we can conduct a critical inquiry. That we can engage in such a synthesis is due to the similarities in the works of both men. It is true that they owe much to different intellectual forebears but there is a singular complementarity to their ideas.

What distinguishes them for our purpose, and what distinguishes the tradition of classic sociology, are three important characteristics. First, the questions which begin inquiry are large in scope although very simply formulated. They address fundamental problems. Second, their research culminated in the construction of working models or, as we are calling them, frameworks. Writing of the classic tradition in general, Mills (1960: 3) described these in the following way:

> In these working models are contained statements of (1) the elements to which attention must be paid if we are to understand some particular feature of society as a whole, and (2) the range of possible relations among these elements. The elements are not left merely to interact in some vague way. Rightly or wrongly, they are constructed in close and specific interconnection with one another . . .

Third, the questions are resolved by a generally diffuse methodology that emphasizes social reflection. We will incorporate these characteristics in our journey.

The fundamental problem on which we will focus is that of freedom and constraint in social life. We will attempt to reconcile the persuasive arguments for sociological determinism with the real experience of its counter-doctrine of libertarianism. To do this we will look to Toennies' writings on human volition. With a belief that social life is driven by reason, that being human involves the notion of *appetitus rationi pareat*[3], Toennies attempted to reconcile

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[3]Let your desires be governed by reason (Cicero).

rational modes of thought with those modes which appeared to be non-rational or somewhat less than rational. Most importantly he situated all modes of thought in basic forms of association. We will complement this focus with Bosley's writings on two crucial questions - what is; and how do we know? His answers to these questions are useful because they have an eminently social emphasis.

With this focus we will attempt to construct the conceptual framework. We will draw on the elements and the range of possible relations of Toennies' most influential work - *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. As a heuristic device it will be the foundation on which we can build a framework of sport while keeping its basic function in the process of inquiry. We will supplement this achievement with Bosley's framework for criticism that incorporates the triadic notions of defect, sufficiency and excess. Such a critical framework is necessary because the conceptual nature of the inquiry forces us into those perilous waters engendered by the logical gap between universals and particulars - without the benefit of an empirical lifeline. The framework is a means to avoid the hazards. It is a device for negotiating conceptual reefs and, because it is grounded in social practice, it will not leave us vulnerable to accusations of banality and formalism. Most importantly, though, it will help us to conduct a critical inquiry.

We will engage in what Toennies termed pure and applied sociology or in Bosley's terms laying down a path and following it. Toennies distinguished general sociology, in which he included social biology, social anthropology and social psychology, from special sociology. He subdivided special sociology into three parts - pure, applied and empirical (Toennies, 1926). Pure sociology deals in a very static way with concepts, basic ideas and their relationships. It is philosophical sociology, often characterized as theoretical sociology, and it is to this part that the developing conceptual framework in this essay rightly belongs. This is complemented by applied sociology. In Cahnman and Heberle's words:

> Applied sociology, which is likewise theoretical in nature, applies the static concepts of pure sociology to the dynamic processes of history. It has been labeled a philosophy of history, but it is actually a sociology of history or, in contemporary parlance, a theory of social change[4] . . . It follows that pure and applied sociology, while conceptually distinct, are not easily kept apart in analysis: pure ideas must be illustrated by reference to historical reality, and social processes must be understood in the light of pure ideas (Toennies, 1971: xi - xii).

It is to applied sociology that the supportive role of particular instances of historical sport phenomena belong. To make this more specific let us turn to Bosley for the manner in which

[4] "Empirical sociology, or sociography, aims at the accurate description and analysis of human relations" (Toennies, 1971: xi - xii).

we will proceed.

We can break our journey into a series of manageable steps that have, to some degree, been determined by the manner in which our objective was laid out. There are four general things that we must do. We must disclose the elements of the framework; disclose the range of possible relations among the elements; disclose the framework as a whole; and use the framework. It is important, then, that we determine the nature of these steps, the manner in which we take them, and the manner in which we progress from step to step. We can put these down as assertion, concatenated argument, and the notion of criticism. Let us begin by focusing on the nature of the steps.

Each step of our journey is, in general, an assertion. Each step contains statements that are intended to describe, clarify and explain certain concepts and in putting forward the statements as assertions we will proceed on the following manner:

> There are two stages which we pass . . . in making an assertion. The first step is one of instigation; the second, one of use. The first stage has three steps. The first is taken by selecting an example, . . . or a standard . . . The second step is reached having laid down a path of language with respect to the example, . . . or the standard selected . . . The third step of the first stage is reached by creating a potential basis the realization of which is sufficient for continuance . . . by applying and following the premise you reach the second stage; for you make complete use of it (Bosley, 1982: 50-51).

Each step, then, will comprise the selection of an example or topic; clarification and support for the topic, including the disclosure of one or more premises; and some indication of utility. Each subsequent step will make use of the premises laid down previously and will rely for any support on the rigor and clarity of previous steps. It is important to realize, therefore, that the essay is a series of arguments or concatenated premises and the whole depends on how we link the steps together to reach our objective.

Each step of our journey, of the concatenated argument, is viewed as a means toward reaching the objective. Each step represents the management of a basic achievement of knowledge in disclosing the elements, relations and framework. Consequently, in order to complete the journey we must ensure that each step and achievement of knowledge is subordinated to the main journey and is not merely incidental to it. We must ensure that each step begins, develops, and is completed adequately and that these achievements are coordinated with each other and with those of other steps. Furthermore, we must ensure that, as coordinate actions, the steps and achievements of knowledge are taken up one after another; that they are continuous as we proceed toward completion. But to continue, to coordinate, and

to subordinate requires a mode of criticism for the journey. Such a mode, when applied, would ensure consistency and completion. Bosley (1982: 10) provides us with a mode of criticism in this way:

> First, inquire as to the dominant objective of a given act, action or activity. Second, inquire whether, and if so, how our notions of beginning, continuing, developing and completing apply and also our notions of subordination and coordination. With respect to the second family of notions we wish to know what acts are sufficient in order to bring the principal objective to completion. Third, inquire as to appropriate modes of criticism . . . In following the third step . . . we put three supreme critical questions: whether there is defect of means for the end, whether there is sufficiency and whether there is excess of means for the end.

Each step and achievement of knowledge, then, is deemed to be sufficient means to complete our journey and, since we are dealing with assertions and not truth or falsity, they may be criticized as being deficient or excessive: in one case they may not provide enough support or in another case they may provide too much. Yet we should acknowledge that while this kind of framework is adequate for conceptual criticism it might not be adequate for those with empiricist leanings and we should make some provision for that kind of criticism because theirs is the burden of proof. This amounts to structuring the journey to help in the verification or falsification of the framework by empirical means.

In conducting a critical inquiry we must, to be consistent, be as critical of ourselves as others would be and, as importantly, include in our work some provision to help others to criticize.[4] With this in mind we will adopt the principle of falsification as more compatible with the assertive nature of the essay than would be the criterion of verification[5]. This entails the provision, in our framework, of two classes of statements or premises - those which are consistent and compatible with it and those which are not. After Popper (1968) we will term the first class the class of basic statements and the latter class the class of potential falsifiers[6]. For the framework to be falsifiable the class of potential falsifiers must contain at least one member and in order to falsify, the critic must find one regularity in the world which would be within the range of truth-values posited by one of the potential falsifiers. This is one way of criticizing, empirically, the assertions of the essay. It relies on experience. Another way,

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[5]In fact, the criterion of falsification competes extremely well with verification. It is more rigorous in overcoming the problems of induction and manipulation with respect to universal explanatory statements. For a justification of this, see Williams (1981).

[6]The use of this criterion is analogous to the way in which a turtle moves forward; it only makes progress by sticking its neck out. Many scholars find this quite threatening, but it is part of the spirit of this inquiry that we make assertions which are put forward for refutation. Indeed, should they be refuted, the knowledge we will gain is as significant as if they are not refuted.

which relies on experience but is not viable for falsification or verification, is to criticize the basic assumptions of the framework.

3. Assumptions

The basic assumptions of a framework provide the ultimate support for the elements and relations. They are the statements that describe our understanding of the world and as such they are formed through experience. But they cannot be validated by empirical means; they are usually taken as given, or sets of "if . . ." statements. Yet despite this reliance on what amounts to belief or opinion, they are very important to framework construction because they provide support and an intellectual starting point to an inquiry. They address the fundamental nature of the elements and relations of the framework and allow us to state what is possible so that we can move, however tentatively, toward certainty.

Most, if not all, frameworks rely in this respect on the answers to two questions. First, there is the question - how can we know? This is a central theme of epistemology and it is important for our purposes because it provides a justification for our attempt to develop a framework and, more importantly, it addresses the very nature of the social world and the processes by which man, as a social animal, functions within and, indeed, creates that world. Second, there is the question - what is there? This is a central theme of metaphysics and it is closely related to the first; so much so that they arise almost simultaneously if we were to ask what occurs when we observe sport. How do we know that it is sport? How do we know that it is sport? However, we should tread very carefully in answering these questions because there are many positions to be taken and many possible answers. There is a danger that we inadvertantly include in our assumptions, or the answers to these two questions, epistemic and metaphysical statements that preclude the adoption of some sociological perspectives as they admit others[7]. We will confine the discussion, then, to very basic positions and limit their number to only those which are really necessary to reach our objective.

To answer the question - how can we know? - we should begin by giving an account of what it is to know. To do this, we must make two broad distinctions that concern the mind

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[7]There is a curious phenomenon in the sociology of sport regarding these assumptions. Many scholars in the area, upon hearing or reading the terms epistemology and metaphysics, immediately put shutters down around their minds. They think the terms belong only to philosophy and cannot see how they bear on the sociological inquiry of sport. The consequences, however, are rather disastrous because these scholars have no idea of the assumptions that support their inquiries and research results.

and the worlds we inhabit. Turning again to Bosley (1982: 12-13) we can assert that the mind has certain powers and can manage certain acts and achievements that are distributed among three levels:

> . . . with respect to the first level I mention the power to see, to hear, to feel, to attend, to concentrate and to remember; with respect to the second I mention certain acts and achievements of perception: looking at and seeing something, listening for and hearing something, picturing something, remembering something and recognizing something, and with respect to the third I mention certain acts and achievements of language, for example formulating an opinion and coming to know something.

The second distinction is made between the natural, social and communicative worlds:

> In the natural world one moves one's arms, lifts things and walks; in the social world one sets boundaries, lays down a procedure and follows a rule, and in the communicative world one speaks, writes and draws (Bosley, 1982: 12).

To reach the third level of mind, of thought and knowledge, one must, first, master the acts and actions of the natural, social and communicative worlds and second, one must master these at the first two levels of mind.

To reach knowledge one must manage an achievement that depends on the use of certain resources, namely the first two levels of mind and mastery of the natural, social and communicative worlds. These resources are the means utilized to achieve the objective of knowledge so that between the means there are relations of support. Now from this, we can assert that first, the world of communication is prior to the third level of mind and, second, that the social world is prior to that of communication. One must manage a framework of language in order to reach knowledge and the framework itself is laid down in the social world. Knowledge, then, is a social phenomenon that has two necessary conditions - experience of the natural, social and communicative worlds which involves acts and achievements of perception; and the possession and use of a conceptual framework which involves acts and achievements of language.

With these two conditions in place we can, now, see how the construction of a framework is related to the management and achievement of knowledge and disclosure in the sociology of sport. Such a structure provides a framework of language necessary for achievements of knowledge and disclosure. In this essay we are laying down a framework as a path that can be followed. This is to say that, given the multiplicity of domains within the social world that have their own frameworks, the study of sport being one such domain, the sociology of sport is bereft of its own explicitly stated framework and has had to rely on frameworks from other domains in order to manage achievements of knowledge and disclosure.

However, sport has a unique framework that should be utilized. This is precisely the task we have undertaken but, given this, let us not make the mistake of ignoring the fact that frameworks have some common elements. Indeed, many frameworks overlap to the extent that some elements are interchangeable and, as we shall see, we will incorporate some of these elements in the developing framework while using those elements that belong to the framework of sport. But how should we view these elements and frameworks? What is the nature of the objects of our inquiry?

Following from our epistemic assumptions there are two kinds of phenomena which can be the object of inquiry. The first phenomena are termed particulars and they are the objects of experience, of perception. They are the concrete realities which empiricist/nominalist inquirers take as their object of study. Each particular enjoys a spatial and/or temporal position and, in this, each particular is unique in itself since no other particular can enjoy the same position. But while it has the quality of otherness with respect to position, each particular may share one or more characteristics with other particulars and this quality of sameness permits us to group particulars together into classes. In addition, we can keep conjoining classes, using properties of sameness, until an hierarchy is formed that extends from individual particulars all the way up to the class of all particulars.

However, let us not doubt the importance of particulars. Even though this essay does not focus on them, they are necessary for knowledge, as this extract from Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1956: B1) indicates:

> There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecendent to experience, and with experience all knowledge begins.

Moreover, we have admitted the importance of experience in our epistemic assumptions in that not only does knowledge begin with experience but that experience continues to inform us as we generate and acquire new knowledge. Yet we must admit, also, that experience without concepts, without the framework of language laid down in the social world, is blind and the material particulars merely dead data that persist in presenting themselves to our perception. Without the framework we would not know what kind of thing something is, nor how it is related to other things. Experience, and thus empiricism, relies on the second phenomena,

termed universals, to give it life.

Universals are the objects of knowledge. They differ from particulars in that they are neither spatial nor temporal. Yet they are similar to particulars in being arranged in an hierarchy on the basis of sameness and otherness. This is to say that universals can be conjoined and disjoined but the hierarchy of universals is not related to that of particulars. Particulars and universals are not combined; the latter do not help form parts of the former and the former the latter. Both are separate; each neither gives nor receives support from the other. Universals are the focus of this essay in the form of sport, as elements. It is these which give meaning to, and make intelligible, the behavior of humans in specific contexts. It is these notions as abstractions that constitute the properties and relations of the social world of sport and which constitute the framework to be developed. Nor is this position unusual since we utilize universals in our everyday life. The mind, or reason if you prefer, has the capacity to order experience. Recurrent elements are taken to engender, modify and reinforce by some process of comparison, selection and abstraction the universals that make up our conceptual frameworks. These, in turn, operate as principles for ordering subsequent experience and, moreover, in forming expectations of the behavior of others.

What we have done, here, in making this distinction between particulars and universals is to follow the distinction between the second and third levels of mind. We find that one looks at something and thinks. Upon looking at something one sees something and upon thinking one knows what kind of thing one is looking at and can see. Thus, in looking at individuals we see that they are moving, they are exhibiting some kind of behavior. But what kind of behavior does not present itself to our perceptions. Rather, to determine what it is that they are doing we must find recourse to the third level of mind; in thinking and the conceptual framework. In certain situations some behavior is given the label sport and in different situations it is given another label, but the important point to note is that one does not perceive sport as such since it is an object of knowledge and not of perception. Sport is a universal. But sport also concerns the behavior of humans in groups, in social entities, so to be consistent we must treat these entities in a similar fashion. We are making the assumption that they are, in a sense, artificial so that they have some theoretical utility. However, one could just as easily posit them as particulars by giving them temporal, but not spatial, continuity of position. This is to say that an entity such as a team can be treated as a particular in that the entity is

viable in time in a continuous way, but in space only in a discontinuous way since the members separate after playing.

There is a danger, though, in positing social entities as particulars in that should one take the whole as distinct from the parts, one would be guilty of reification, or as Whitehead (1925) termed it - misplaced concreteness. Consider a hypothetical entity that has two members, P and Q. These members are particulars and the whole, designated as $P\&Q$ and formed by conjoining the two members together, is also a particular. This is to say that the members, P and Q, stand in a relation to the whole, $P\&Q$. The danger, here, is that one cannot claim $P\&Q$ as distinct from P and Q because they comprise the whole and the members and the whole are particulars. Should one do so, however, and claim that $P\&Q$ exists *sui generis*, one would be conferring a status of universality on $P\&Q$ as distinct and separate from the members as particulars. There is really nothing wrong with this claim as it is, but it would limit the inquiry of the entity because, as a universal, it is not open to empirical investigation. Reification, then, is the mis-translation of a universal into a particular when, as we have argued, there is a logical gap between universals and particulars. But one can avoid this danger if one takes the entity for what it is; namely a particular comprised of the conjunction of two lower-order particulars. The three particulars, thus, form a part of the hierarchy of particularity. But this is for the purpose of empirical inquiry and we are keeping to the hierarchy of universals in our discussion of social entities. But we should be quite clear about the exact nature of social entities because, along with sport, they comprise the most important notion of this essay.

When we use the term social entity we are refering to a configuration of social actors. Such configurations are social relationships and their characterization buttresses the totality of Toennies' sociology. Indeed, his notion of pure sociology is a theory of social entities and while the different forms they take will be dealt with at some length later in the essay, it behooves us to detail their simplest form before proceeding.

There are three very important points to be made concerning Toennies' characterization of social relations. The first is that in their simplest form they are dualistic. This is the lowest order of universality at which we can have knowledge of them but we can extend them to include several persons. This is to say we can conjoin them and this will be important when our discussion turns to social collectives (*Samtschaften*) and social corporations

(*Koerperschaften*). The second is that social relations exist in the imaginations and thoughts of the participants: they are objects of knowledge. According to Toennies (1965: 19) they:

> . . . exist through a common will of two or more persons to give each other mutual aid or support, the least that can be done being mutual toleration or refraining from hostility.

And, the third point is that they signify for the consciousness of the participants a unit that is capable of willing and acting. This is to say that the members of the relation perceive the relation as "a person comparable to an individual human being", (Toennies, 1965: 19): the participants reify the constructs.

This last point is rather consequential for Toennies' theory of social entities because in some way he has to account for human volition. As a universal, a social relation cannot be admitted into the range of causal factors that influence human behavior much less that of collective behavior. However, he avoids this problem by emphasizing the reification of the concepts. If individual members of the relation treat the relation as a reality and perceive that the expectations and mutual obligations are in the same sense real, then the relation has etiological force on their individual wills. In this sense, then, social relations can and do act as causative agents and can be admitted into an explanation of social behavior. Indeed, we rely on this notion in our everyday lives to support our categorical attitude toward the social world. We have a tendency to view social entities as things, to transmute the flowing into the static and hold the relative as absolute. We can make sense of the social world only because we impose some regularity on it; that as social actors we, *a priori*, seek social patterns.

The assumptions of hierarchies of universals and particulars are allied to the assumption that certain parts of the hierarchies, while made up of conjunctions, nevertheless contain persistent elements, or patterns. In the social world these parts of the hierarchies are often viewed as systems:

> When the behavior of many people living together is examined as a system of relationships, it is found to be orderly; it has a pattern. . . . Society is a tissue of reciprocal activity, differentiated into a variable number of systems, some of them quite distinct, highly structured and persistent, others not so directly traceable but amorphous and transient, and all interlinked to such a degree that one sees different systems according to the perspective taken. Whatever system one is viewing, however - whether it be the master system (society) or any of its component sub-systems (community, family, etc.) - the elements which constitute it as a social system remain the same. Stated simply, society and its parts are not made of different stuff; on the contrary, certain persistent elements appear at any level of orderly interaction. (McKinney, 1966: 120)

Systems and sub-systems quite clearly correspond to our notion of hierarchies with levels, or

first-, second-, . . . n-order universals and particulars. Moreover, and leaving aside particulars, this makes a distinction between homoeomerous and anomoeomerous properties.

A property is homoemerous if, for all particulars, x, which have the property, then for all parts y of x, y also has that property (cf. Armstrong, 1978; Peck, 1926). A property which is not homoeomerous is termed anomoeomerous. In grouping social entities together and asserting an hierarchy, we are invoking this principle of homoeomereity. The sport system has subsumptive systems that keep the property of sport. In addition, we can claim a case of some non-identity between subsumptive systems, and between these systems and the total sport system, based on the opposite principle of anomoeomereity. These assumptions can lead us in three directions. First, they highlight the dialectic; second, the corollary of these assumptions is the principle of predominance; and third, it raises the problem of whole-part relationships. For the moment, we will delay a discussion of the first and second directions until later in the essay where they will be more relevant and where they will explain how this philosophy of inquiry is applied to, and is consistent with, the developing framework. But, we can discuss the whole-part relation, here, because it links the denial of entities *sui generis* with the principle of homoeomereity.

When we denied the ontological status of social entities *sui generis*, we posited a theoretical entity that had three properties: P, Q, and $P\&Q$. If we regard $P\&Q$ as the whole, and the individual properties P and Q as parts, then P stands to $P\&Q$ as a part stands to a whole. Wholes and parts, then, are not identical, yet they are not completely distinct from each other. They are partially identical in that there are homoeomerous properties and this partial identity is the relation of whole to part. For example, P and $P\&Q$ are related by the homoeomerous property P. This admits a degree of identity that is dependent on the level of universality. For example, if we posit the property P as a conjunctive of properties P' and P'', then the degree of identity between $P\&Q$ and P will be greater than that between $P\&Q$ and P''. Thus, the higher the order of part, the greater the degree of identity between part and whole. But, with the sport system, partial identity will always include the homoemerous property of sport. This whole-part relation will allow us to explain change, because if a whole changes, the change will be a change in a part or in the relations between parts that comprise the whole[8].

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[8]If we had given ontological status *sui generis* to the whole, we could not do this. In fact, the holists would have great difficulty in explaining the change in the whole without contradicting their original assumption.

Thus, if we liken the sport system to a table that has a top and four legs, then a change in position or size of a leg will produce a change in the state of the whole because of the relation between whole and part. Similarly, if a member of a basketball team is replaced by a new member, the team changes, because a part of the whole is different. It would be a new team, but still a team. It is this homoeomereity which allows us to infer some regularity.

The principle of the regularity of the social world appears to be a reasonable assumption to hold on the basis of common sense[9]. The principle does not entail, however, that nothing changes because this would not accord with past experience. What is entailed in the principle is that change is perceived against a background of permanence and that which does change is actually quite regular. We observe this phenomenon in our everyday life. Through experience, or as Hume (1962) would have it, constant conjunction, we live our lives and behave according to what we expect will happen; that given A, B will follow. We think other people will behave in certain ways in certain situations according to our own expectations that are based on previous experience. We ascribe a pseudo-nomic necessity to social situations and behavior and behave in light of this necessity[10]. However, this position relies on a certain commitment to the doctrine of social determinism. We should consider this very carefully and raise the problem of freedom and constraint at this point.

It follows from our first assumptions about the conditions of knowledge that there is a certain amount which is given to the individual social actor by the social group. If we accept that there is no such thing as an isolated man, an individual who has grown up outside the social bond, then whatever knowledge an individual acquires must in some degree be dependent on the processes of social living. What an individual feels, thinks and is conscious of is in some way influenced by the social milieu in which the frameworks he uses to achieve knowledge have been laid down. This applies to achievements of knowledge of physical reality and social reality and since we have assumed that these two realities are not in the same sense existent it is particularly important that we grasp the crucial role of the conceptual framework as a necessary condition of social knowledge.

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[9]This is an assumption that cannot be supported by any factual evidence since the use of such evidence rests on the assumption it would attempt to justify.

[10]We can also claim that everyday life is patterned with the principles of assertion and falsification that we are using in this essay. People believe something is so and they behave accordingly until it is shown that it is not so. Thus, we hold onto our conceptual frameworks until they are shown to be incorrect or not useful.

The conceptual framework is laid down by the social group. It is socially generated. It contains elements and relationships that help participant social actors to structure their experiences with fellow members. Most importantly, the framework contains meanings that are applicable to certain acts, actions and events that occur in the physical world. It is the application of the meanings to physical phenomena that make the acts, actions and events significant or not - indeed it is the addition of meanings that makes them social. As such, the conceptual framework influences the consciousnes of social actors; it makes for ". . . a socially determined, socially specified, socially filled consciousness, the consciousness of a man who lives within a certain social order and apprehends all social events in terms of it" (Stark, 1958: 15). Man the knower, then, cannot be divorced from man the member of a particular society since he will always function as man the user of conceptual frameworks.

We can give some credence, therefore, to the notion of social determinism. We can accept quite readily that laying down a path constitutes a constraint on how the user of such a path feels, thinks and becomes conscious of social experience. Thought and behavior are determined by the prevailing pattern of social life as it is embodied in the conceptual framework. Because the framework is given to the individual it is reasonable to suppose that his thought and behavior are determined by those who have done the giving. This is strict social determinism in which the individual is passive (what Popper called the bucket theory of the mind). Unfortunately the doctrine paints a picture of man which is mechanistic and mindless as this extract from the writings of Baron Paul-Henri d'Holbach (1966) indicates:

> Nous naissons sans notre aveu, notre organisation ne depend point de nous, nos idees nous viennent involontairement, nos habitudes sont au pouvoir de ceux qui nous les font contracter, nous sommes sans cesse modifies par des causes, soit visibles, soit cachees, qui reglent necessairement notre facon d'etre, de penser et d'agir. Nous sommes bien ou mal, heureux ou malheureux, sages ou insenses, raisonnables ou deraisonnable, sans que notre volonte entre pour rien dans ces differans etats[11] (p. 225).

Now we cannot deny that there are contraints on how an individual thinks and behaves but strict social determinism takes the contraints to be total. The position denies man any control

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[11] We are born without our own consent; our organization does in nowise depend upon ourself; our ideas come to us involuntarily; our habits are in the power of those who cause us to contract them; we are unceasingly modified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which we have no control, which necessarily regulate our mode of existence, give the hue to our way of thinking, and determine our manner of acting. We are good or bad, happy or miserable, wise or foolish, reasonable or irrational, without our will being for anything in these various states.

over his own behavior and this is unreasonable not only on the basis of felt experience but also on the basis of a paradox. In placing the control or determination of an individual's behavior in hands other than the individual's own, the strict social determinist must place that control in some other individual's hands or in some collective hands. But all individuals are controlled so who is it that is exercising this control? In addition, for change to occur at least one individual must escape the determination and so the proposition 'all individuals are always constrained to act in a certain way' would be false. No, the doctrine is problematic if we take it in its strictest sense. We must allow the individual some freedom and we can do this by positing a dynamic social world.

We have assumed that the social world precedes the development of frameworks and achievements of knowledge and disclosure. Inherent in this assumption is the crucial notion that humans interact with each other and it is in that interaction that social life is produced, reproduced and transformed. It is through interaction that the conceptual frameworks are laid down and modified. Interaction provides the experience necessary for knowledge. It is a negotiative process, one of application and adaptation, through which individuals make sense of and construct the social world. What makes interaction what it is, then, is its reciprocity - a social sharing that includes frameworks and experiences and, hence, knowledge. Now there are several important corollaries to this reciprocity that will concern us. The most fundamental of these is the notion of habitualization.

It appears to be contingently true that the regularities in the social world are, to some degree, habitual modes of action. In the words of Kluckhohn (1942: 67) "most men, most of the time, dread both spontaneity and change in most of their activities" and so certain regularities are developed. This applies to the social behaviors that are often taken for granted and to the expectations generated within social relations. It is part and parcel of the categorical attitude that man *qua* social actor has and it is important on two counts. First, it precedes institutionalization so that, second, it may allow human activity to proceed without the time consuming efforts of decision-making. This has the effect of structuring the social world so that some continuity is gained. It makes it unnecessary to reproduce anew each of the social relations and situations in which an individual interacts. Now what is vital for our purposes is that this produces the necessary conditions that allow the individual some freedom in that "the background of habitualized activity opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation"

(Berger and Luckman, 1967: 71).

A second corollary to the notion of reciprocity is the thesis that the human mind is an active creator. Social actors are agents rather than passive receptors; that even though social life introduces a fundamental *a priori* axiological layer, the individual is free to operate within the given framework and has the capacity to change it. The individual must accept some of the constraints if social life is to be at all possible but there is a flexibility to those constraints - a range of permissable behaviors and moral decisions that allows the individual to construct his own mental universe. Within the social constraints, therefore, man "is not a captive in a narrow prison-house, but rather the inmate of a generously laid-out mansion with many apartments" (Stark, 1958: 145). Thus, the range that is available provides the latitude to choose and act in such a manner that it can be said of the individual that he could have chosen or acted otherwise (cf. Campbell, 1938). To understand this better, let us make a distinction between two kinds of freedom implied in this conception: positive and negative freedom.

Negative freedom, often referred to as freedom from something, is a condition characterized by the absence of constraint or coercion:

> . . . a man is said to be free to the extent that he can choose his own goals or course of conduct, can choose between alternatives available to him, and is not compelled to act as he would not himself choose to act, or prevented from acting as he would otherwise choose to act, by the will of another man, of the state, or of any other authority. (Partridge, 1967: 222).

Now much hangs on the interpretations of certain key words in this characterization. If we regard the absence of constraints as a necessary and sufficient condition of freedom then there are two particularly important points to consider. The first concerns the alternatives available if there is an absence of constraints. In order to be free the individual must have some alternatives from which to choose and, by the by, the capacity to choose. The limiting case of such alternatives is two. As long as the individual has a choice between an act of commission and an act of omission, and presuming he is choosing of his own volition, then he can be said to be free from any constraints that would coerce him to choose necessarily one particular course of action.

Problems arise, though, when we consider what is to count as a constraint. Should it include direct limiting factors or should it include also the indirect restrictions imposed by, say, social manipulations inherent in the giving of conceptual frameworks? However, if we broaden the interpretation of constraint to include the direct and indirect, as we must do to admit the

conceptual framework as a condition of knowledge, there is a diminishing seriousness to the problem with respect to freedom. By positing a range of choices or behaviors within the social constraints we have allowed what seems to be a necessary condition of negative freedom: namely, having the alternatives from which to choose. If some alternatives are available, even as fundamental a choice as that of doing or not-doing, then the individual is free.

The second point is that we might wish to extend this notion of constraint to include constraints other than those engendered in the will of other individuals, the state or other authority. Such an extension supports the idea of positive freedom. Positive freedom, or free for something, implies two additional necessary conditions. These are: the absence of those material conditions that would prevent an individual from choosing a particular alternative and the presence of the means or power to achieve his objective. Thus, if an individual is not able to do X, does not have the means to do X, or does not have the power to do X, then he is not free to do X (Partridge, 1967: 222). Now there are some obvious difficulties with these additional conditions but they are not immediate impediments to our assumptions so for the moment let us consider them as provisional baggage for our journey and discuss their inclusion later in the essay. Of more pressing concern, however, is a third corollary to the notion of reciprocity.

Our assumption of reciprocity places us in a difficult positon with respect to the principles of cultural and historical relativity. If we accept the assumption that the meaning and significance of certain acts, actions and events are the products of the social life of a particular society or group in a particular spatial and temporal location, then it is reasonable to infer that a particular meaning, say of sport, imputed to a particular social practice is understandable only in terms of the particular social milieu in which the meaning and practice are situated. It would further follow that meanings and practices would change with a change in temporal or spatial location. If this is so, then we have here the root of the problem concerning the inability of sociologists of sport to make generalizations. They have no continuity of discourse because meanings of sport and social practices of sport change by time and place - they are the products of different social conditions. Now the only way we can resolve this difficulty is to assert a similarity that would support a continuity of discourse. We can regard our journey, then, as a search for sameness in meanings and practices of sport among and between temporal and spatial locations. We must, somehow, come to terms with

cultural and historical relativity in a theoretical way while admitting particularity in meanings and practices. Before we get to that, however, we would do well to document these ideas at the level of observation in order to grasp their significance for the discussion to come and so let us return to the example of a cycle race.

In the cycle race we saw how important the social contract was to the integrity of the activity and to the safety of the riders and in the study which follows we examine a state of conflict in which that contract is broken. The source of the conflict is displayed in two different meanings of what it is to be a cyclist held by riders from two separate clubs. Using the term ideology in its descriptive sense, equivalent to our use of the term conceptual framework, we consider these meanings as constraints on how the cyclists behave. We see how different social conditions produce different types of association and the social relations resulting from this are existent in the thoughts of the riders as they help to define and shape the objects of knowledge. The riders view their respective clubs as entities capable of willing and acting - an "us" and a "them". We see how the ideologies are built up through reciprocity to a point of habitualization whereby they define persistent and appropriate patterns of cycling behavior and what is particularly interesting about them is that they represent the two extreme conditions, social and asocial, we touched on at the beginning of the essay. One represents the primacy of self and one represents the primacy of the group and because these two notions are so fundamentally opposed to each other there is ideological conflict.

4. The Futile Decalogue of Mode

There are two conditions under which a cyclist would not ride according to the social contract and its inherent code of conduct prevailing whenever cyclists ride together. One, and by far the more frequent of the two, occurs when a novice rider participates in a race. He either does not know the content of the code and does not, therefore, know what to do, or he knows the content but does not have the skill needed to implement it. He cannot, say, ride smoothly or in a straight line but whether through his ignorance or his lack of skill, the experienced riders avoid him. He is a danger to them and he generally finds himself situated at the rear of the pack. This is a position in which he can do the least harm for if he makes a mistake and falls, he falls alone, but it is a position in which he does not have to share any of the work in leading the pack and breaking the wind. He sits in behind and gets a free ride, a

state of affairs the other riders accept as part of cycling. As a hazard he is better off, for them at least, where he is and besides at one time, of course, they too were novices and they know that the condition is temporary.

The other condition, however, is not accepted as gracefully. It is the more interesting of the two and it occurs when an experienced rider, who knows the content of the code and has the skill necessary to implement it, chooses to disregard it and deliberately rides in a dangerous manner. This kind of cyclist cannot be avoided because it is difficult to deny him the advantages of the pack. He rides near the front, he has the skill to stay there and he is a menace because no one knows when he will strike. He blatantly disregards the rules of order and, superficially at least, his behavior is irrational because the rider knows what will happen at the time and he is cognizant of the future consequences. Simply put, he is aware that someone could be seriously injured or even killed and he knows that sanctions can and will be applied against him - but he rides dangerously anyway. But if the consequences of his actions are so enormous, and he knows their magnitude, why, then, does he persist in his actions? One such case of dangerous riding occurred in a major Canadian metropolitan area and it is fairly representative of the condition whereby the social contract and its decalogue of mode is broken.

There are two cycling clubs in Coldville, Canada: the Grinders Cycling Club and the Spinners Cycling Club. Riders from both clubs compete in the weekly road races that take place around the Province during the racing season and for the past three seasons these races have been marred by inter-club conflict. In 1980 the Grinders was the only cycling club in Coldville. The club organized mid-week training races and generally provided an administrative and competitive structure within which the various individuals could develop as cyclists. Anyone could compete; a rider did not have to belong to the club and in the races and on the training rides it was everyone for himself. To this situation came seven novice riders. They raced and trained with the Grinders but did not join the club. According to one of these riders, the Grinders "had nothing to offer us - they were only interested in individual glory", even when training. The seven were friends and the obvious individualism of the Grinders did not appeal to them. As one of them put it, the Grinders "worked against each other, instead of for each other and this made no sense to us". Moreover, this feeling of senselessness was compounded when, in the 1981 season, the friends saw the effectiveness of cooperation when three riders from another province won every stage of a three-stage race in Coldville. Prior to

the event the three riders agreed to share the prize money and during the three races they employed team tactics. "They cleaned up" said one of the friends, "because the (Coldville) riders wouldn't work together". With this in mind, then, the friends approached the owner of a local cycle shop and with his sponsorship they formed the Spinners Cycling Club.

The Spinners had seen how effective team work could be and it was not long before they tried it. They had the right attitude, of course, because as friends they were willing to work together and in the latter part of the 1981 racing season they tried team tactics in two races. Their efforts were crude but notwithstanding this they achieved success and that prompted one of the Spinners to spend the winter cycling in another province. The following season he returned to Coldville with a wealth of experience on strategy which, naturally, he shared with the other Spinners. They utilized this new knowledge to great effect in the 1982 season and considering the fact that it only had 12 members, the club did very well. It did even better the next season, 1983, when it had 56 racers, all of whom were willing to contribute to the collective goal. This dramatic increase in the number of riders is noteworthy because there is no doubt that the club's success of the previous year had contributed to attracting new riders, but the majority of them, 38, had been developed by the club. They were friends or acquaintances of existing members and were drawn to the club by personal ties. As the club sponsor put it,

> Members should join the club because they like so-and-so, they like to be with them. When this happens they feel close to each other and will work for each other, help each other.

The members did work for each other and it was so effective that many members progressed rapidly from B category to A category races[12]. In the meantime, they "had a lot of fun together - there was a lot of spirit, togetherness". This was due in some measure to the discomfort of the Grinders because while the Spinners were winning, the Grinders were losing and losing in frustration. The Spinners took great delight in beating them; they were the common enemy and this tended to unite the Spinners even more. Moreover, it fostered a view of the Grinders as "non-aggressive, slow to respond to anything new, dull and introverted". Quite clearly, then, neither side was overly fond of the other.

Within this context there have been several instances of dangerous riding. Riders have been seen weaving back and forth across the road in an effort to shake off a cyclist from the

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[12]The B category race is of a lower standard than the A category races. A rider becomes an A rider when he has placed highly in a certain number of B races

other club who was drafting close behind. There have been accusations from riders that members of the other club cut them off on a corner. There have been races in which cyclists have pummeled each other about the head and shoulders and, by far the most serious, riders have been pushed off their bikes. In the 1983 provincial championships, for example, a Grinder attempted to crash one particular Spinner. After two unsuccessful attempts he transferred his attentions to another Spinner and succeeded in knocking him off his bike. The hapless Spinner suffered multiple skin abrasions - in cycling parlance, a bad case of road rash - and after the race one of his club-mates took the Grinder to one side and exacted retribution. Now while each of these instances is an example of significant disregard for the rules, the pattern of the total is of some importance.

Over the past three seasons there has been an increase in the frequency and magnitude of the instances of dangerous riding and this suggests two things. First, within the context there has been an increase in the intensity of the mutual dislike between the riders from the two clubs. From a beginning of studied pre- and post-race avoidance, the mutual dislike intensified, through heated confrontations, to violent exchanges. Second, as perceived injustice was heaped on perceived injustice there was an increase in the polarization of each side in the conflict. With each confrontation there was a successive and accumulative legitimation and strengthening of each position. The division became more and more acute as the sides crystalized and this holds the clue to an explanation of the condition which produces a blatant disregard of the rules for as the positions became more extreme so the riders believed their side to be morally right. It was a belief in the rightness of their actions which prompted them to disregard the code of conduct and endanger other riders. The conflict, then, is more than a difference of opinion over who did what to whom. Rather, it is a difference of belief over what constitutes cycling and what means are appropriate to win. In both cases, each club has a different set of interrelated ideas about its own ways of doing things, and about the other club's ways, that reflects its own particular interests and commitments. The set of ideas serves as a philosophical justification for a rider's actions while serving to interpret and, hence, repudiate the actions of the other club's riders. This set of ideas is the ideology of the club and it is accepted as truth by its own riders and, by definition, as falsehood by the other club. The conflict, then, is an ideological one manifested in the concrete actions of the cyclists. Each club has its own decalogue of mode.

The Grinders Cycling Club has an ideology which stresses individualism. It is the older of the two clubs. It reflects the traditional way of racing in the province as a whole. The decalogue of mode holds that the best and only way to race is for everyone to begin slowly and after approximately thirty minutes to increase the pace. In this way, the better riders attempt to drop what they call the no-hopes; they try to reduce the size of the bunch, to burn off as many riders as they can, so that when the finishing line is close there are fewer cyclists to contest the sprint for the line. There are, then, two requisites to winning: a rider must stay with the bunch and he must be able to out-sprint the other riders at the finish. Needless to say, those riders who are good sprinters tend to do well. Now the important point to be made here is that once the race starts there is really no advantage to be gained by belonging to a club such as the Grinders. It is true that they might all wear the Grinders' racing jersey, but once the race starts each rider competes against all of the other riders, even other Grinders. Nor could it be said that working together in the pack, sharing the task of leading, would constitute a club effort because all riders, including those from other clubs, are expected to do their share. Paradoxically, though, one of the most despicable actions, according to this ideology, is for a rider to sit in the pack, failing to do his share of leading. When he sits in like that he is conserving energy while the others break the wind for him and near the finish he has the temerity to sprint past everyone and win. But such riders are justified by the ideology of individualism; each cyclist is riding to win for himself and for this to happen the other riders, including his fellow Grinders, must lose. According to this ideology, then, the Grinders are a collection of individual cyclists.

The Spinners Cycling Club, on the other hand, has an ideology which lays great emphasis on the group. Its decalogue of mode holds that the best way to race is for the Spinners to work together as a team so that one Spinner can win. It does not really matter who wins, as long as it is a Spinner. This is accomplished by sending one or two Spinners on a break away once the pack has been established. The breaking cyclists work together to increase their lead while their team-mates in the pack do eveything they can to let this lead widen: this they can do by controlling the bunch. Controlling the bunch calls for great effort and sacrifice and it is achieved in two ways. First, the Spinners take more than their usual share of breaking the wind, but when they get to the front of the pack they slow the pace down and may even ride two or three abreast, forcing the other riders wide and into the wind when overtaking.

Second, whenever any non-Spinners try their own break, to catch the first one, a Spinner will go with them and sit in behind them, forcing the chasers to drag him along. This is very tiring for the chasers and gradually they give up and the pack catches up to them. By controlling the pack in this fashion, the Spinners let their breaking team-mates get further and further ahead and when victory is achieved, it is a victory for the club. The winner knows, and acknowledges by sharing his prize money, that it was due to everyone's efforts and not just his own. Quite clearly, then, there is every advantage to be gained from belonging to a club such as the Spinners for they help each other during the race. When one wins, they all win and this is an entirely different ideology than that of the Grinders. Neither is compatible with the other. This ideological conflict, though, has other aspects to it which are of some further interest.

According to the modern view of sport as ultra-rational, rule-bound, almost *Gesellschaft*-like behavior, the condition we are examining is most unexpected. Here we have what is clearly a *Gemeinschaft*-like set of social relations among the Spinners achieving success in sport over the, in other sports, more hegemonic *Gesellschaft* of individualism. It is an anomoly that cannot be passed off as an anachronism which will eventually disappear under the influence of the more dynamic ideology of individualism. In this case, individualism might well be the loser because the conflict is a peculiar case of a reversal in the institutional priorities of the cycling subculture as a whole. At the international level, at the national level and in many of the other Canadian provinces, the ideology of the Spinners is the norm and that of the Grinders is a deviant. This raises the additional problem of how this reversal came about; a problem which is made the more intriguing by the curious fact that if success in sport is the primary determinant of social behavior, why did the Grinders continue to behave in a way that was inefficient and ineffective?

The primary reason for the failure of the Grinders to adopt more successful behaviors was their inability to mobilize their collective resources. The ideology with which they cycled set each against the other and no rider was prepared to sacrifice his efforts for the benefit of someone else. They could not generate enough cohesion, certainly not enough to mount an effective opposition. They were firmly convinced of the legitimacy of individualism: they took it for granted and would make no concessions to any other ideology for in a very real sense they were incapable of making them. Moreover, their justification was supported by three powerful social factors. First, provincial consensus was on their side. The majority of cyclists in the

rest of the province had the same ideology of individualism and rode in a way which reflected it. Second, the executive and race officials of the Provincial Bicycle Association endorsed individualism and went as far as sending an official letter of complaint to three Spinners who had controlled the pack in one particular race. The letter made it quite clear that cycling is an individual activity and this official stance is not surprising since the executive and race officials were, or still are, cyclists. In addition, they, and others in similar positions in the past, have helped to shape the course of cycling in the province.

This points to the third and, perhaps, the most powerful legitimating factor - the authority of tradition. Individualism of the sort now practised has been a part of provincial cycling for at least fifty years. In 1934, for example, a six-man team represented Coldville in a 148-mile race. The six riders were drawn from the four cycling clubs then extant and were conveniently divided into two smaller teams of three riders. According to the local newspaper at the time,

> In each team the riders will take turns breaking wind until they reach a point - which will be predetermined - a few miles from the finishing line. From here each cyclist will make an individual effort to win the race.

This notion is still in force. The cyclists will cooperate as long as each does a fair share of the work but they are, in this, on their own. The notion that one or more team members should do more than their share for someone else's benefit is quite alien and over the years individualism has been consolidated as a hegemonic ideology to the extent that it has resulted in a suspension of doubt. But this was possible only because the nature of cycling in the province reinforced it.

When a potential cyclist enters the subculture in the province three things become immediately apparent. First, he becomes aware that it is a very expensive sport. The bicycle and its associated accoutrements represent a large initial investment and there are myriad maintenance costs once the season has begun. Equipment failures, crashes, race fees, racing licenses, travel costs and wear and tear on gloves, jerseys and shoes, all contribute to a heavy financial burden. Second, he finds that he must expend a lot of time training. Just to keep up with the pack in a race over 70 miles requires daily training and this means riding for up to three hours a day. As a result there is very little time during the normal day, after going to work or school, for non-cycling activities and this represents a serious and heavy commitment to the activity. Concommitantly, he finds; third, that he must train on his own for most of the time. Other club members are scattered over the city and never seem to have schedules which

coincide with his and so the lonely cyclist pedalling the evening road is a common sight. Moreover, it is an extremely demanding exercise, so demanding, in fact, that it requires frequent eating and drinking while on the bike and once off the bike it is very common for a cyclist to have difficulty walking. This commitment quite naturally results in a large degree of selfishness. It is his money, his effort, his time and his sacrifice and he expects that on the day of the race his commitment will result in benefits to him. Moreover, he is used to orienting his cycling around himself. Consequently, he is loath to put his efforts in the service of someone else. The very idea is unthinkable because he cannot understand what he is to gain by it and these conditions reinforced the ideology of individualism and in turn they were reinforced by that ideology.

Imagine, then, a Grinder riding in a pack which is being controlled by a group of Spinners. As the pace gets slower and slower, the Spinners who have broken away increase their lead and every second they gain makes it that much harder for the Grinder to catch them. The Grinder knows this, but there is very little he can do because every time he attempts to increase the pace of the pack, by taking the front position, the Spinners eventually slow it down. The Grinder cannot stay at the front for too long because he would exhaust himself and he does not want to do that because he would then be sacrificing himself for the others. The Spinners, though, are only too willing to take his place and when he gets tired one of them takes the front and slows down. Needless to say, the Grinder feels frustrated. His efforts are not being rewarded and he becomes angry over the unwillingness of his fellow Grinders to work with him. As a result, he vents his anger against those who are actively frustrating him, rather than against those who are passive, and he is spurred into action in the only way his beliefs will permit - as an individual, he attacks the Spinners by riding dangerously and any particular Spinner can become his target. He is prepared to disregard the code of conduct of the pack because his way of riding, his ideology, is not producing the desired results. His actions, then, reflect his ideology and we would expect the same thing from the Spinners: they should act in concert to counter the individual threat. And indeed this is what happens for in addition to resorting to violence after the race on behalf of an injured club-mate, the Spinners react as a team during the race by working together to ensure that a Spinner wins. And if a Spinner wins, a Grinder does not and this is further proof for the Spinners that their way is the better of the two. It is quite significant, then, that the Spinners' ideology does not countenance individual

action to deliberately push a Grinder off his bike and throughout the duration of the conflict only Grinders have acted in that way. The very individualism of the Grinders, coupled with the intensity of mutual dislike engendered in the confrontation with team-work, is sufficient for a Grinder to disregard the common sense rules for riding together. On the other hand, the Spinners' emphasis on the group is enough to ensure that they will not disregard the rules of the pack for they are social in the face of the asocial influence of individualism.

Clearly in this case, the ideology of each club constrained the cyclists to act in a particular way. The discursive elements of concepts, ideas and beliefs about what constitutes cycling meshed in each club with the non-discursive elements of attitudes and practices to produce a mobilization of knowledge with regard to what is appropriate and inappropriate behavior. In short, for the members of the two clubs there was a difference in what it meant to be a cyclist. Each club produced and reproduced different forms of the sport and this illustrates the importance to our discussion of the mutual dependence of the conceptual framework and real experience for the two come together and shape each other - in this case, in cycling. Moreover, it is in this mutual dependence that we can find a sameness in meanings and practices with respect to sport.

CHAPTER TWO

SPORT

1. The General Problem of Conceptual Inadequacy

In our search for sameness in the meanings and practices of sport we can begin by confronting the problem of conceptual inadequacy with respect to inquiry in general and sociology, and therefore sport, in particular. To a large degree this will serve to lay bare some of the misunderstandings that have occurred in attempts to resolve the ontological status of sport while making it quite clear where we stand in relation to other positions that have been taken. These other positions are in some ways drastically and fundamentally different from each other and from our own and in some ways they are very similar. They tend to reflect, though, a general neglect of serious considerations of epistemological and ontological questions on the nature of social phenomena, a posture that has been passed on to the sociology of sport from mainstream sociology in North America. This is unfortunate[13], because conceptual adequacy is crucial to any understanding of phenomena.

Conceptual adequacy is a necessary condition of inquiry. Concepts help us to identify and classify. They organize our perceptions of the world by grouping phenomena together according to certain rules. The rules allow us to group phenomena on the basis of sameness and to exclude phenomena on the basis of otherness. We inquire correctly when we follow the rules correctly, when we include only those phenomena of which we can claim sameness. However, if the rules of application are unclear, then we are not sure to what the concepts refer. We would not organize experience correctly since we would include phenomena which ought to be excluded or exclude phenomena which ought to be included. To inquire of something, then, it is necessary that we do so with unambiguity and precision.

Conceptual adequacy allows the inquirer to formulate generalizations. By including phenomena on the basis of sameness, and only those phenomena of which the claim can be made, the inquirer may examine some of them and state that whatever is the case with those examined may also be the case with those unexamined. The process is inductive in that a

[13]Perhaps it could be said of sociology, and with appropriate apologies to Plato, that the unexamined social theory is not worth using.

universal statement is inferred from particular cases but to the extent that the generalization is an assertion and serves to structure expectations toward the unexamined cases then the spectre of Hume need not haunt the inquiry. Conceptual adequacy, then, via the claim to sameness, provides a continuity of discourse between inquirers and between particular cases. In contrast, conceptual inadequacy, based as it is on ambiguity and vagueness, will not support a continuity of discourse between inquirers or between particular cases; it will not, therefore, support generalizations. We cannot be sure whether the claim is one of sameness or otherness and this makes it very difficult to begin, continue and finish an inquiry.

Conceptual inadequacy is particularly troublesome in the social sciences. The difficulties stem from a distinction between the physical and social worlds and an example may help to clarify things. Consider the concept triangular as a case for the physical world and the concept social relation as a case for the social world. In order to inquire of things triangular the starting point is the question "What things are triangular?" and it would appear to be relatively simple to answer. We would merely determine whether what is in front of us is a plane rectilinear figure with only three sides; we could point to a thing and say "That is (or not) a triangular thing." With social relation, though, it is not as clear how we can do this even if the same kind of question is asked. The question "What things are social relations?" could be answered by merely pointing to a reciprocal pattern of interaction that persists over time so that a stable set of social expectations develops. But we could do this only if it is amenable to sense perception in the same way as triangular and there is doubt over whether social relation is a thing at all. It is certainly difficult to perceive expectations as tangible entities. Social world referents, then, are somehow different to those of the physical world and the question beginning with "What things are . . .?" is inappropriate for dealing with social science concepts. Rather, the kind of question which is appropriate to the social world has the form of "What is to count as . . .?" and with this question conceptual adequacy is supported by the argument from received opinion.[14]

The initial sociological inquiries of sport were not hindered by conceptual inadequacy. An extremely loose conceptualization of sport allowed sociologists to pursue empirical inquiry

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[14]The argument from received opinion calls for agreement on the meaning of terms. It has the form 'everyone would say that *p*; but on your definition it would be self-contradictory to say that *p*; so the definition must be wrong' (Hare, 1971: 121). This is to say that once we have learned the meaning of a term then we have learned to what the term can be correctly applied. Once we have learned the meaning of social relation, then we have learned how to apply the concept and we know what is to count as a social relation.

in a general way and the efforts of John Loy are, perhaps, representative of this initial state of affairs. Loy (1968) conceptualized sport as a game occurrence involving playfulness, competition, outcome attributes and physical prowess; as an institutionalized game comprised of organizational, technological, symbolic and educational spheres; as a social institution operating at primary, technical, managerial and corporate levels; and as a form of social involvement analyzed in terms of types, degree, patterns and boundaries. Quite clearly this conceptualization does not proceed according to the rules of classification since none of the categories are mutually exclusive and it is vague and ambiguous. Notwithstanding this, Loy's efforts have been extremely useful to later inquirers because his conceptualization had an heuristic structure which called their attention to aspects of sport that might otherwise have been overlooked. Indeed, we could go as far as saying that without his efforts in this regard at the time, the development of the sociology of sport would have been retarded considerably. However, once attention was gained the inadequacies of the concept soon proved to be a hinderance to inquiry.

The attraction of a small number of dedicated inquirers to the sociology of sport brought the problem of conceptual inadequacy into focus quite early in the short history of the sub-discipline. The so-called first-generation sport sociologists attempted more rigorous conceptualizations but they were hampered from the start by the very frameworks which had informed Loy's efforts. The available sociological perspectives which had provided Loy with such notions as institutionalization and social involvement were doubly restrictive. They included no mention of sport so that inquirers could not look to them for guidance and they served as blinkers that prevented the sociologists from looking elsewhere in an original manner. Nevertheless, they tried and on their efforts we know a lot more about the social regularities of sport. However, their empirical observations brought to light so much variety that they could not reach a consensus. It was analagous to the tale of the six scientists attempting to describe an elephant when each has felt only one part of the animal in a darkened room. After some debate and several pronouncements the sociologists quickly turned their attention back to empirical concerns and sport was left to be defined by the argument from individual opinion.

While the sociologists were having their brief and altogether unsettling flirtation with conceptual clarification, philosophers of sport were attempting to play an underlaborer role. In concert with the quantitative bias of many of the sociologist's attempts, a major position

emerged on the nature of sport. It was termed essentialism and philosophers who defended it took as their foundation the Aristotelian doctrine of *universalia in rebus*; that is, the necessary property of sport is inherent in the actions which occurred when sport occurred. The essentialists wanted a real definition of sport that used a species, a genus and a differentia; it would give the essence or necessary property in the absence of which sport would cease to be what it is and the presence of which serves to distinguish those things which belong to the class of sport and those which do not. Now the important point about this position that held great hope for the sociologists was that the essence, presuming it was quantifiable or at least amenable to sense perception, would provide a notion of sameness. It would provide a property that was common and inherent in all sports at all times and in all places. In short, it was just what the sociologists needed to support empirical inquiry and help them to make generalizations. Unfortunately, the essentialist's position proved to be no help at all to sociologists.

Several arguments can be, and have been, advanced against the essentialist's position. In retrospect, though, the essentialists damaged their own position without any help from their critics. They generated long lists of the properties of sport but could not agree on which was the essential property and which were merely accidental properties. This multitude of properties only fueled the arguments of the non-essentialists who added a touch of nominalism to support their counter-position. The non-essentialists, notably McBride (1975), denied that universals existed at all and called on the essentialists to stop their silly game of trying to find something that does not exist. They supported their position with two points. First, 'sport' has a multitude of meanings in common everyday language. According to The Oxford English Dictionary (1970: 655-659) there have been one hundred and twenty seven different usages of the term 'sport' over the past six hundred years. 'Sport', then, is an ambiguous concept. Second, all attempts to eliminate ambiguity have resulted in failure. They concluded from this that sport is an indefinable concept and so demolished the essentialist position.

Superficially, the non-essentialists were stating the obvious. Sport is an ambiguous concept and the essence has not been found. But they made a point for which they received no credit, a point which has more force than their original conclusion. The point which was overlooked focused on the multitude of meanings over six hundred years - the meaning of sport has changed. It is this point which really undermines the transhistorical essence that the

essentialist's position puts forward. Their position has no regard for cultural or historical relativity. The essence of sport, the position implies, should not change from one culture to another or from one historical period to another. The essence is inherent in the physical actions of people and those actions are intrinsically appropriate when termed sport. The notion of change, therefore, induces a loss of probitive force to their argument and to take away the remaining support we have only to note that they have ignored the social world.

The essentialists, like the sociologists, began with the question "What things are (sport) . . .?" In attempting a precise and unambiguous characterization of sport that would be amenable to quantification they conferred an ontological status on sport that was wholly objective. They placed it quite squarely in the physical world and lumped it together with such concepts as triangularity. But they failed to bring into their account the social and communicative worlds. Sport is not a physical phenomenon. The same actions performed in the same way by the same people will not in themselves permit a categorization of those actions as sport. Such a categorization proceeds from a conceptual framework in which meaning is embedded and that conceptual framework is socially generated. Categorization is dependent on the meaning of sport afforded by a conceptual framework and by the social practices which engender experience: each is sufficient in its own way and they are jointly sufficient for categorization. This effectively counters the position of the essentialists and, we should add, that of their critics.

The non-essentialists who argued with a nominalistic bias are guilty of the same neglect that we levelled at the essentialists. In placing their emphasis on words, they placed sport in the communicative world without giving credence to the *a priori* position of the social world. In conferring a sort of semantic reality on sport they, too, ignored the mutual dependence of meaning and practice. To quote Winch (1958: 123) "To give an account of the meaning of a work is to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse into which it enters". Quite obviously this mutual dependence argument stems from our assumptions on the social world outlined in the previous chapter but in using it to disarm the arguments of the essentialists and the nominalists we seem to have withdrawn any hope of completing a search for sameness. This, however, is not the case. There are two avenues of inquiry that are open to us.

The first avenue is that of historicism. Given the mutual dependence of meaning and practice, the search for sameness would follow an inquiry of the meaning of sport in particular historical periods as it is manifested in particular social practices. The different social conditions produce different meanings and practices. There is, then, a claim to otherness. There is no claim to sameness between contexts and, therefore, there is no basis of comparison of meanings or practices. Discourse may be achieved through a consideration of particular meanings held by particular groups and engendered in particular social practices but it would be an isolated discourse. This is the very approach which lends itself most readily to the collection of diffuse, unrelated and non-generalizable facts and this is exactly what we wish to avoid. But it is very difficult to see how we can avoid it for in a strict sense there can be no claim to sameness between historical periods, or for that matter between cultures. In a very strict sense each social practice that is reproduced and each meaning held is unique. They cannot be exactly the same from one historical period to another or from one culture to another; or as Giddens (1979) has taken pains to explain, social actors do not reproduce empirical similarity. On the other hand we do know that social actors reproduce the same kind of social meanings and practices. Some social practices are recurrent and some meanings continue to be held over time. How, then, can we reconcile this apparent contradiction? The answer would appear to lie in the narrow interpretation of the notion of sameness. We are forced into historicism because sameness is equated with identity. No two meanings or practices are identical and so we must be denied the ability to make generalizations. Identity and recurrent practices are irreconcileable. What we must do, therefore, is to relax the notion of sameness to include more than just identity and this will allow us to follow the second avenue of inquiry.

The second avenue, and the only one that appears to be left to us if we are to attempt generalizations, is that of theoretical sociology. The recurrence of some social practices and meanings supports, contingently at least, the adoption of an approach which focuses on regularities rather than on unique phenomena. The particular meanings and practices are different and distinct. They are not identical but we can expand this notion of sameness to include the idea that they are similar in kind. Theoretical sociology, then, allows that the otherness of particularity is really an otherness with addition and it is this notion of with addition that provides a basis of comparison between historical periods and between cultures. To see how this is so, we have recourse to examine Bosley's mode of criticism in more detail

because it resolves the problem of relativism.

There are three aspects to the mode of criticism which require explication. First, it utilizes the notion of means and ends. Action is viewed as means for the achievement or non-achievement of some end in the social, natural or communicative worlds. Clearly, this is teleological but not in the same sense as the pejorative way this term is used as an indictment against the sociological perspective of functionalism. Teleology, in the sense we are using it, does not impute purposes on behalf of social systems (cf. Giddens, 1979: 7). With our denial of the social system *sui generis* such an entity cannot have purposes, reasons or needs. Only individuals can have them and we can so impute this to teleology. In addition, there is a non-purposive aspect to it that includes, in the case of individual action, non-intended consequences[15]. The only commitment that we need to make to this notion of teleology is that there is a direction in which the means are employed. The employment of means will bring about some state of affairs and this bringing about may be purposive or non-purposive.

Second, there is a triadic conception of the social world in that any action is deficient, sufficient or excessive for the achievement of some end. The elements of deficiency, sufficiency and excess differ in degree and their variance is one of otherness with addition. The basis of comparison is given by the assertion of the common means and the otherness with addition is given by how much is required for an end to be brought about. Two of the elements are inadequate, in degree, for reaching the end. Deficiency asserts that the means are not enough to reach the end and excess asserts that the means are too much to reach the end. It is sufficiency which asserts the means are enough, so the matter of addition begins at deficiency, goes to sufficiency and culminates at excess. Moreover, each element will admit of a range of values: there is a range of deficiency, a range of sufficiency and a range of excess.

Third, and this is how it can sustain our use of theoretical sociology, it uses the notion of social relativism. It carries the assumption that each social group has standards for acts and achievements. This is quite compatible with our assumption of the mutual dependence of meanings and practices and does in fact complement it very well. Deficiency, sufficiency and excess as acts or achievements are standards that are worked out within the social milieu of a particular temporal and spatial location and it is this triad which allows the otherness of particularity to be regarded as otherness with addition. This is so because not only is the triad

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[15]In the case of concepts, these too are teleological because they imply eventual use.

applicable in a local and restricted sense but it is always applicable. Looked at pictorially, imagine a range of sufficiency stretching back through history like a roadway with deficiency and excess on either side. In some places the roadway is narrow, in other places it is wide - but it is always sufficiency. In the case of the Grinders and the Spinners, for example, each had a conception of cycling that differed but which was, for all that, still a standard of sufficiency. In each club there were negotiated criteria of what was to count as cycling and what was to be regarded as actions or achievements of sufficiency. The particular social practices of the Grinders differed from those of the Spinners but for each they were sufficient. That which is sufficient for one group may well be deficient or excessive for another and this gets around any problems we might have with social relativism because it relates particular meanings and practices to the negotiated standards of a particular social situation and allows us to talk about the standard in general.

Before we can apply this triadic conception to sport, though, we must say something further about the use of a conceptual framework in social life. There are many conceptual frameworks that are available for use in the social world. They provide, in the words of Berger and Luckman (1966:55), semantic fields that circumscribe various zones of meaning. There is much overlapping of the many conceptual frameworks, just as there is much overlapping of the different social realities, but while each framework may reflect differences in content there are general similarities that we may call upon to support an adequate conceptualization of sport. One similarity concerns the division of social life into contexts

Each social group demarcates specific contexts that serve as points of orientation for group members. The contexts are marked out as particular situations in which problems can be confronted and resolved through the utilization of specific means or practices. The contexts and practices are imbued with meaning; they are embedded in a conceptual framework that is generated through the body of social relations that evolves within the group. To a large extent the contexts provide a setting in which meaning and practices can come together so that group members know when a particular practice is needed and which practice would be appropriate. The appropriateness of practices is very important to the resolution of some problems since inappropriate practices will not achieve the needed resolution. When the practices are inappropriate it is often said that the behavior is out of context; they are appropriate to a different context. It is vital, therefore, that each group member knows the contexts of social

life; knows the meanings of each context, and that the member knows which social practices are appropriate to particular contexts. This is to say that each social group attaches certain standards of sufficiency to a context and these standards are known to, and used by, the members of the group.

How the group does this is very much a matter of the utilization of paradigm cases. A particular kind of behavior is held to be the paradigm case of what is to count as X. A member being socialized will be shown an example of X and told "That counts as X". He or she then compares other behaviors to X and decides that the behaviors under observation is sufficiently similar to the paradigm case to count as the same kind of thing or it is not sufficiently similar to so count and would, therefore, count as sufficiently similar to another paradigm case of another concept. In terms of the range of sufficiency posited in our triadic conception, this would place the paradigm case at the very centre of the range and would entail a decrease of similarity toward deficiency and excess. Those behaviors which are most similar to the paradigm case will cluster around the centre of the range and those which are less similar will cluster near the edges. They differ in comparison to the paradigm case but as long as they are deemed to be sufficiently similar, then they are within the range and will count as X. A conceptual framework, then, utilizes this notion of sufficiency as a principle of selection and as a principle of order. It operates as an *a priori* classification scheme by which standard a member of the group can say "This is to count as sport" and "That does not count as sport" and mean by this that the social phenomenon is sufficiently similar (or dissimilar) to the paradigm case to warrant its inclusion (or exclusion) within the range of what is to count as sport. This, *mutatis mutandis*, makes use of the notion of family resemblances put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein. There is a complicated network of similarities and relationships overlapping and criss-crossing. Sport is extended as in making a rope:

> What ties the ship to the wharf is a rope, and the rope consists of fibres; but it does not get its strength from any one fibre which runs through from one end to the other, but from the fact that there is a vast number of fibres overlapping (Wittgenstein, 1958: 87).

However, we have developed this notion of resemblance by grafting onto it the triadic conception of deficiency, sufficiency and excess and we can now see how it is applicable to sport.

2. Sport as a Context

Initially, let us recall two of our epistemological and ontological assumptions. We asserted that sport is a universal, it is an object of knowledge and not of perception, and that its meaning is embedded in a conceptual framework. Now the notion of embedded here takes on great importance because it implies that sport is not an isolated universal. It is located within the conceptual framework in relation to other universals. It stands in a relation to these other universals in such a way that these other universals set the boundaries, as it were, of the concept sport: they demarcate the contextual field of the social reality of sport. And it is because of these relations that we are able to differentiate sport from other contexts in the same way that we can differentiate, say, good and evil or high and low. Sport is relative to other concepts. It is what it is, in whatever different social form it takes in different cultures and in different historical periods, in virtue of its position in the conceptual framework with respect to these other universals.

As an object of knowledge, therefore, it is crucial to our conceptualization that we consider two questions about the embeddedness of sport. These are: first, to what other universals is sport related and second how are they so related? The first question calls for a description and the second calls for an explanation. Here we can see the advantage of using the notions of resemblance and sufficiency over, say, the realist characterization that has caused so much confusion in the sociology of sport. The realists confuse description and explanation because the question of why sport is sport is answered by saying it is what it is because it instantiates the appropriate universal. In their case they explain by offering a description and this clearly will not do. Our approach, on the other hand, has merit because we can offer an explanation in causal terms. We have denied any intrinsic appropriateness to human behavior and placed the emphasis, rather, on the social world. We, as humans and therefore as social agents, give whatever appropriateness we deem sufficient and so it is that the explanation of sport must begin with ourselves.

To answer the first question - to what other universals is sport related? - we have only to look at the many descriptions of sport that permeate and, indeed, dominate the literature of the sociology of sport. Among those descriptions two concepts stand out as more closely related to sport than any other concept or group of concepts is so related. These two concepts are play and work. They appear more frequently than others do in characterizations of sport

and we can assert with some confidence that the location of sport relative to play and work in the social stock of knowledge is historically general[16]. Play and work set the boundaries of sport and the three concepts as historically cumulative zones of meaning, are interdependent in the social life of a group.

To answer the second question, though, is not quite as easy because we must go beyond description to explanation. What it amounts to is a consideration of how we, as social actors, can come to know sport. To understand this we must reiterate what should already be clear about the nature of sport as a universal. However, we will restate it because much hangs on its simple formulation concerning objects of knowledge. First, sport is an object of knowledge. As such, it is not amenable to sense perception. Thus, when we observe people moving we do not and cannot see, hear, taste, touch or smell sport because there is no thing there to so-perceive. All we can sense is that the people are moving. Second, we have recourse to the third level of mind so that we can order the experience of seeing moving bodies. It is by using this third level of mind that we can determine what it is that the bodies are doing and it is here that the concepts play, sport and work are used. However, there is a problem with their relation that an example will illustrate.

Suppose we are standing next to a field observing a group of people moving. We are in a position to see them move and so we can use the first two levels of mind. Now in order to know what they are doing we must use the third level of mind and categorize the movement into appropriate ranges of sufficiency. But here is the problem. We can say they are playing; we can say they are working; but it makes no sense at all to say they are sporting. On the other hand we have asserted that all three are universals. Play and work, then, must be somehow different as universals to sport as a universal: they are not the same kind of universal.

Let us, therefore, distinguish between two kinds of universals: those which are applicable to temporal or spatial particulars and those which are not so applicable but are in fact abstract objects. Play and work are of the first kind. We can apply them to objects of perception (of the physical world) in order to manage an achievement of knowledge; thus the bodies moving are playing or working. Sport, though, is of the second kind of universal. It is

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[16]There is a third concept, games, which appears in the literature with some frequency. It is not included in this inquiry, however, because it adds an, as yet unresolved, problem. It complicates any consideration of sport because the species of activities which we call games includes some, such as card games or hopscotch, that are not usually given the label of a sport. If we were to include the concept of games, then, whatever we had to say about those which are sport, because they are sports, would apply equally and falsely to those which are not.

an abstract object. It cannot be applied to a temporal or spatial particular and so we cannot use it to describe what the people are doing. But we might well ask how we can know sport if it is not applicable to temporal or spatial particulars. The answer to this question reveals the relation between play and work and sport as universals: it is that in order to manage an achievement of knowledge of an abstract object it is first necessary to manage an achievement of knowledge of universals applicable to temporal or spatial particulars. This is to say that a knowledge of play and work is a necessary and sufficient condition of a knowledge of sport.

The relation between sport on the one hand and play and work on the other is a relation of dependence. Sport is dependent upon play and work. A knowledge of play and work is the means by which we can achieve a knowledge of sport. We are asserting, then, that there must be elements of play and elements of work in order to reach a knowledge of sport. Thus, it makes no sense to apply play to moving bodies, to say "They are playing", and then to talk of sport. This would be a claim of identity between play and sport when it would be sufficient merely to categorize the behavior as play. Play is play, it is not sport. Similarly, the same case can be made for work. Work can be applied; we can say "They are working" but we cannot then claim identity between work and sport. Work is work, it is not sport. Where there is a mixture of play and work, though, then we can talk of sport. Thus, to talk of sport is to talk of play-like elements and work-like elements. We can assert, in addition, that the three concepts are related through the notions of deficiency, sufficiency and excess. We can claim sameness, as otherness with addition, by locating sport in the middle place of sufficiency and by giving play and work to one of deficiency or excess. The range of sufficiency (sport) as a contextual field or zone of meaning is thereby bounded by the ranges of deficiency and excess. Now we can save a lot of discussion here if we anticipate much of what is to come and place the extremes. Let us, then, place play in the position of deficiency and work in the place of excess. Simply put, this is to say that the context of sport is other than the contexts of play and work but that which makes the sport context what it is is similar to that which makes the play context what it is and that which makes the work context what it is. There is an overlapping of whatever it is as otherness with addition. To find out what this it is, let is consider why social groups should demarcate contexts in the first place.

We asserted earlier that social groups demarcate contexts that serve as points of orientation for group members. It is within specific contexts that meaning and practice come

together as appropriate responses to specific problems. This assertion is based on the assumption that all human action is an ongoing series of efforts to solve problems. Any social group faces a multitude of problems from two general sources. One source is the physical world; the group must somehow resolve problems such as getting enough to eat, keeping warm or coping with drought. The other source is the social world; the group must somehow maintain order, reproduce itself, and resolve other problems that might arise out of group members' interactions. Now every continuing social group has tackled these kinds of problems and while groups differ on the degree of success they achieve, it is apparent that the process of resolution, coupled with members' interactions as it must be, brings about a complex of cultural mechanisms and a body of social relations. In an overt way, these may be characterized by particular social practices or behaviors among group members. In a covert way, they involve a social stock of knowledge which governs the particular practices through mores, codes and rules. This is to say that group members act in particular ways as a result of expectations generated within the body of social relations that evolve in the group and members orient their lives according to the knowledge, techniques and attitudes that are produced and reproduced within this social milieu.

Within the contexts meaning and practice are socially contested through the interactions of group members. Through the process of negotiation and renegotiation, particular resolutions to the problems which face the group are developed. Particular practices evolve as coping strategies that are called upon when the need arises. The behaviors are sufficient for problem resolution; they are sufficient, that is, in their particular manifestations as negotiated in the group. At the same time, these contexts and their attendent practices are given meaning. The meaning evolves with the practices and this allows the group members to communicate with each other while permitting the individual to call upon the stock of knowledge, techniques and attitudes and to do so with sufficiency. Meaning and practice support each other; they reinforce each other through the reproduction of sufficiency in bringing about particular outcomes. Social contexts, then, are spheres of life in which knowledge is brought to bear on the problems which face the group in general or individuals in particular[17].

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[17]At a later date we might well want to distinguish between types of knowledge. Scheler (1953), for example, makes a distinction between knowledge born of a desire to achieve control over nature (*Herrschaftwissen*); knowledge born of a desire to cultivate and refine personality (*Bildungswissen*); and knowledge born of a desire to achieve salvation (*Erlosungswissen*). These distinctions could be useful because they represent reasonable achievements to be reached by playing and working.

There are two ideas which appear to be compatible with our discussion of social contexts. The first is that the contexts have outcomes that vary according to the problems which confront the social group. When the problem is consequential to the very survival of the group or an individual member then every effort is made to ensure that the outcome is certain. One does not want to risk an outcome which is uncertain because the stakes are too high. On the other hand, when the problem is not severe, that is it is not consequential to the survival of the group or individual member, then uncertain outcomes can be risked. There is room for possibility. Let us, then, posit these two outcomes, possibility and certainty, as extreme contextual objectives. Between them lie outcomes which we can characterize as likely. This yields a triadic conception of contexts as possibility, likelihood and certainty. The second idea is that the means used to achieve these various outcomes will vary with the context. In effect, control is wanted, to a greater or lesser extent, for the achievement of an outcome in proportion to the severity of the problem being confronted. In order to do this, restrictions or constraints are placed on behaviors as means for the achievement of the various outcomes. Where the outcome is certainty, constraints are established to limit practices sufficiently to bring about outcomes that are predictably certain. Where the outcome is likelihood there is also a sufficiency of social constraints; there are enough to limit practices in such a way that the outcome achieved is perhaps one of only a few and not one of many. There is a degree of flexibility among those behaviors which can be practised and yet not that much flexibility that the range of outcomes is increased. Where the outcome is possibility there is a great deal of flexibility of behavior. There are some social constraints but not many; there are enough to bring about an expansion of uncertainty - possibility. A great many behaviors are allowed within relatively few social constraints.

We can illustrate these points by looking at the social development of an actual group engaged in a sport. There are three things about this group which are particularly interesting. First, they produced and reproduced a context that was completely alien to them. Over a relatively short period of time they were able to negotiate a shared social reality of a sport, in this case *karate*, that, compared to their previous experience, was unlike anything they had ever known. Second, they were able to do this by conjoining rules, practices and performance, mediated by reflexive judgements of identity. They demonstrate that as a principle of selection and order, the notion of sufficiency cannot be separated from the particular experience of the

social actor. Experience confirms or denies the discursive and non-discursive elements of the framework and this, in turn, orders subsequent experience. Third, as we follow the development of the group we can see quite clearly how the individual becomes constrained to think in a particular way until the social reality of the context is so dominant that it is taken for granted. Within this structure the individual interprets the social events he or she experiences in such a way that it is not so much a having and a resting as it is a growing and becoming.

The group practises *Wado Ryu karate* in a Canadian city and has been doing so for four years. During that time there have been two distinct phases in the group's development. In the initial phase, which lasted for two years, the group came together for the first time, started to meet regularly in a facility designated as a *dojo* (practice hall) and the *sensei* (teacher) gradually laid down rules. We shall call this the production phase because it was a time of learning, of instability and of a high turnover in group membership. It was a time of great emphasis on the individual and of a struggle to make some sense of what were considered exotic rules and practices. Behavior could be rationalized in terms of what the individual wanted to get out of the activity and it mattered only to that individual whether the rules were followed or not. Many individuals were hesitant and unsure of what they were expected to produce and reproduce. They tried to understand the activity and could do so only by giving significance to their actions on the basis of private experiences. There was an internal ostensive definition of the few established rules and, since the private experiences were non-karate in nature, their interpretations of the activity differed from what was expected by the *sensei*. The individual emphasis meant that behavior could vary so much that anything would satisfy following a rule since any behavior was as good as any other. As a result, many individuals could not adjust to taking ultimate responsibility for their efforts; the context was too uncertain and so they left. Some, however, did adjust and they formed a small core around which order was centred and around which group development occurred in the more stable second phase. In the second or reproductive, phase, uncertainty was reduced by the addition of more rules, by clarification and by certain limitations placed on extant behaviors. The small core remaining from the first phase could reproduce the activity with some consistency and the emphasis shifted from the individual to the group. Sanctions and rewards accompanied the rules and some degree of social control was effected. There was a consensual interpretation of the rules and shared expectations that greatly added to the stability of the group. People joined and stayed, partly

because they could see in the behavior of the small core what could be achieved and partly because the structure of the group was comparable to their non-karate experience. They took comfort in order and stability afforded by structured expectations and we can look on this phase as one of following the rules established in the first phase

At the beginning of the productive phase there was the establishment of a group of individuals who wished to engage in the activity of *karate*. By far the most important person in the group was the *sensei* for it was he who established the time/space context in which the activity could be instantiated, the rules by which it could occur and the kinds of practices associated with those rules. Even though the students had some knowledge of the activity garnered from television, books and popular myths, that knowledge was sparse and only the *sensei* knew the particular rules and practices. He knew them from his training as a student with his *sensei* and he knew them well enough to be able to reproduce the same kind of context. The *sensei*, then, set a standard of what was to count as karate, what was to count as appropriate practices and what was to count as following the rules. He could recognize the actions of the students as karate-type behaviors or not and he could evaluate those actions as correct or incorrect.

The *sensei* established a complex of overlapping and connected rules that had as the final objective, the achievement of individual control. Perfection in *karate* is to behave in a manner in which the individual has complete control and mastery of all desired actions. This is accompanied by certain incidental behavioral qualities such as humble demeanor, calmness in the face of great stress, great intestinal fortitude and perseverance, courtesy and forebearance. The rule laid down by the *sensei* defined the context within which the final objective could be accomplished, within which the individual could grow and become. For example, the rules specified certain practices that began and ended the context. These practices included donning the familiar *gi* or white pajama-like uniform, bowing on entering and leaving the *dojo*, and so on. They effectively separated the *karate* context from other contexts because they were so different; as rituals they were associated only with the martial arts. The rules specified, also, the kinds of practices which were to occur inside the *dojo*. Techniques of kicking, striking and blocking were repeated over and over again in the familiar lines. Everyone did the same action at the same time to a voiced count in Japanese. There were a required number of kicks, strikes and blocks to learn and also a series of *kata* or formalized patterns of multiple techniques to

master.

With the establishment of the various rules and practices there was an immediate stratification within the group based on the possession of the required knowledge of the rules and practices. The students had very little knowledge and so they looked to the *sensei* for guidance. They, in effect, recognized their own ignorance and placed themselves in the subordinate position of a dependent relation with the *sensei*. He, in turn, demanded and expected obedience. That he got it is due in part to a third dimension of the standard he established; namely, performance. He set a standard of performance by how he acted when following the rules and enacting the accompanying practices. He showed more control and mastery than the students. He could perform more gracefully, strike faster and more accurately, kick higher and more forcefully and continue performing long after they had collapsed from fatigue. The students, new to the activity, could not meet the performance standard and so accorded expert status to the *sensei*. The relative difference between he and the students was just too great to do anything else and so there was an immediate comparison of individuals on following the rules, knowing the practices and performing: in effect, on using the standard.

During this phase the students acquired and consolidated knowledge of the rules from the *sensei*. This occurred in three ways. First, they were told how to behave. They were advised, warned and exhorted by the *sensei* to "Do this..." and "Don't do that..." Their behavior was corrected, shaped and molded to fit the pattern of expectations inherent in the established standard. Second, they could see the *sensei* perform. He was a role model whose actions reinforced the verbal commands of what to do and how to do it. Third, they followed his example and experienced the actions of kicking, striking and blocking. They came to experience, through imitation and repetition, what it was like to feel pain, fatigue and the movement of the body in the prescribed ways. In short, they came to know the kinds of practices that count as *karate* and gradually they used that knowledge to reproduce the activity. Toward the end of the first phase they could produce, with some consistency, the same kind of thing they had produced on previous occasions.

Near the end of the productive phase the students were acting on their own. They did not need to be reminded of the rituals and other practices for they could reproduce them by habit. They suspended doubt about much of the context and no longer felt strange or silly.

They accepted, for example, the act of bowing to another person, an act that would seem peculiar in their non-karate social life. Gradually, the context became different to other contexts. As soon as the students put on the *gi* and entered the *dojo*, the world outside ceased to exist. There was only the here and now reproduced in the rules, practices and performances of the activity. The students knew the rules, they knew the practices and they intended to conjoin the two and to do so each time they reproduced the occasion. But there was a difference between knowing the standard and being able to perform within the standard. Each time the activity was instantiated the students tried to narrow the gap between their performance and that of the sensei. In a relative sense, of course, it was a futile effort because as they improved so did he. In an absolute sense, though, they did perform better: they became more graceful, more accurate, faster and more forceful in kicking, striking and blocking.

Such improvement, however, was not uniform within the group. After everyone had learned the rules and practices and could have been considered equal, there was a differentiation between students that had taken shape around the small core of students which had, quite literally, survived the training. The differentiation was based on linking the time spent in the group with the performance of the student. There was a tendency among the students to equate seniority with performance and by and large the view was borne out in practice: the more time that one had invested in the activity, the more training one had had and so the higher the level of performance. Social status, then, was given by students to others according to how much social coinage they had banked in the group. But of course in this phase the emphasis on the individual gave no particular significance to any such differentiation. Nevertheless, there were sub-units in the group comprised of individuals who had started their training at the same time. Each sub-unit had different amounts of time invested and so, to the students, there was an inequality in performance between the sub-units and the seeds were sown for the formal recognition of this differentiation. This was to come with the adoption of a belt-system at the beginning of the reproduction phase.

In a very general sense, the development of the belt-system within the group proceeded according to G. Stanley Hall's (1904) famous thesis that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. The group's ontogeny recapitulated the phylogeny of *karate*. During the group's production phrase there were two changes in practices that were reminiscent of how *karate* changed after

its inception on the island of Okinawa. When the group came together initially, the *sensei* had the rank of brown belt but he chose to dress in the same way as the students and wore a white belt. Traditionally, the wearer of the white belt is a beginner and it is quite significant that the *sensei* chose to wear the white belt in the production phase because it denoted that all were equal and all were learning. Within a year, however, the *sensei* was given the rank of *shodan* (first degree black belt) by his teacher and told to wear it. He did and this immediately gave visible support to the ascribed status already accorded him by the students. This was the first change. The second change came when the *sensei* adopted the *kyu* system, a series of grades or ranks, for the students. There were six *kyu* grades used and, in keeping with the individual emphasis, students were notified of their rank by letter. They could keep their rank secret or not; it was their choice but they all had to wear white belts in any event. Those who did not tell others of their rank attached no significance to it, while those who did were quite disappointed because their achievement was not materially rewarded: they still looked the same as everyone else. On Okinawa, the same sort of thing occurred in that the student learned the activity without any visible promotions. One learned for as long as it took to satisfy the *sensei* that a certificate of full proficiency was warranted. Recognition came only at the end and it was in this spirit that the group under study, here, practised *karate* - individually. This worked quite well, despite some turnover in student membership, for as long as the group was small; a factor that was also present on Okinawa. But as the group enlarged toward the end of the production phase, some structuring was needed to cope with the increase.

A similar situation had occurred in *karate* in 1922 when the activity was taken up by large numbers of Japanese. They had resolved the problem of handling large groups by adopting the belt system from judo and other martial arts and this group did the same thing. The first visible sign of student rank occurred when the small core that had been with the group from the beginning were given green belts. This placed them approximately half way between the later-starting white belts and the black-belted *sensei*, giving a three-fold division within the group. This event marked the end of the production phase and true beginning of the reproductive phase because it was the first public recognition that these green-belted students could, in fact, reproduce the context consistently, that they knew the rules and practices, and could perform better than the others. Further structure was added when, about a year later, the remaining students were differentiated according to a belt-system used internationally.

This system has six colored belts in the following order: white, yellow, orange, green, blue and brown. In this group the highest rank attained to date is blue, representing approximately four years of training and effort.

At the beginning of the reproductive phase the *sensei* gave significance to this hierarchy of rank by ritualizing the process of advancement. He evaluated the students constantly during training but every so often he held a formal grading session. Time was set aside for the students to perform kicks, strikes, blocks and *katas* under the critical eye of the *sensei* and after the test a ceremonial change in rank occurred. The students lined up in rows facing the *sensei* and everyone knelt. When a student's name was called, the individual walked up to the front, bowed, and knelt down facing the *sensei*. The student removed the belt which signified the old rank, folded it and offered it to the *sensei*, who took it and offered a new belt denoting the advanced rank. The individual put it on, bowed and joined the other students. Those who had been promoted had now received public recognition that their performance had improved and they wore the symbol of this around their waist. It counted, within the group, as evidence of personal growth and development toward the final objective of individual control.

The visibility of the belt was very important to the functioning of what was by now a relatively large group of thirty. First, any student could tell at a glance where they stood in the hierarchy. As long as the individual knew the order of the belts, they could determine which students were their juniors, which were their seniors and which were their peers. This was important when training in pairs and a constant switching of partners occurred. The belt was a cue to adjust the speed and force of a kick, strike or block according to the level of performance of the partner. In any pair, the onus was on the senior belt to reduce speed and force so that the junior belt was not overwhelmed. Second, it served to spotlight the role models. When a junior was having difficulty, he or she could distinguish a senior quite easily in the group when everyone was wearing the all-white *gi*. The bright colors of the belts stood out in contrast to the *gi* and the junior could find someone to watch or ask for help. Third, it was a constant reminder to junior ranks that it was possible to achieve promotion. It gave them an objective to aim for with the knowledge that effort and performance will eventually be rewarded. But most importantly, the visibility of the belt served as a very effective means of social control.

The public display of one's rank in the reproductive phase carried with it the knowledge that all behaviors must be in accord with the rank displayed. One must perform at the same level as the belt indicated and one must do so consistently. Each belt carried expectations that must be met or the wearer lost credibility in the group because if they did not behave according to expectations, they were, in fact, taking away from the significance of the belt-system and rendering other belts worthless. But if, for some reason, the wearer could not perform consistently, then several avoidence strategies were enacted. This was especially true among the senior ranks where the expectations were correspondingly greater and they included leaving the *dojo* for a drink or to visit the washrooms, adjusting the *gi*, and helping a junior. In each case, the person stopped training for a period of time so that they would not exhibit behavior more consistent with a junior belt. They did not want to be seen as unworthy of the belt they wore and generally the strategies worked; they could avoid any embarassment when they were employed infrequently. When they are used infrequently, their peers and seniors gave them the benefit of the doubt - the individual really was thirsty; the *gi* was uncomfortable; a junior's technique did need immediate attention. When used frequently, however, everyone knew the individual was taking a rest and was not, therefore, meeting the expectations of his rank.

Each rank, then, had its own rules according to which the students were expected to reproduce certain kinds of behaviors and a certain level of performance. The rules demarcated a standard for a particular rank that as a sub-unit had such a variability that we must consider it a range rather than a single point. Within each rank sub-unit there were some who were stronger, some had more stamina, some kicked higher, and some punched more quickly. Yet they were all grouped together in the same rank according to a range of sufficiency of performance in following the rules of that rank. They could all meet a minimum level of performance and could, in fact, be differentiated by how far beyond that minimum they had progressed. And when they could follow the rules of that rank correctly and consistently, they would pass into the next rank and attempt to follow its rules. The ranks, with their ranges of sufficiency, permited the student to make sense of their own behavior and that of others. The rules for each rank specified what was to count as appropriate kinds of practices and performances for that particular level and taken as a whole the group delimited the size of the range of sufficiency in performance. The range of the white belt rank, for example, was extremely broad. It permitted many kinds of behaviors and many different performances.

The black belt rank, on the other hand, was very narrow because it permitted only one action and one performance. Thus, the higher the rank, the narrower was the range of sufficiency. This is to say that with respect to the general rules established by the *sensei*, there was a tolerance or range of latitude of what was to count as following those rules correctly that depended on the rank of the student. The tolerance became less and less the higher the rank and it then became easier to recognize when a student was not following the rules, when an individual was not meeting the expectations of rank.

With the establishment of the belt system and the rules for performance of each rank, the structuring of behavior passed out of the hands of the *sensei* and into those of the students. The students became less dependent on the *sensei* for stating the rules, for defining practices and for correcting behavior because, in effect, the students could now do it themselves. In defining the range of sufficiency for each rank, and meeting expectations, the students effected an internal control over their own behavior. They had no need of reminders about what they should or should not do for each one assumed the responsibility of his rank whenever they put on their belt. They could not only reproduce the activity according to their rank but most importantly they could evaluate each other. Their self-perpetuating social control depended upon the possession of the knowledge of what was to count and they had it when they could reproduce the context consistently and accepted their responsibility for doing so. They had the means to judge the actions of others and this placed the *sensei* in a position of jeopardy.

When he advanced students to a higher rank the *sensei* ran the risk of weakening the significance of the standard he had established. With the belt-system and the means to evaluate the actions of others, the students were aware of everyone's position within the group. They had a very good idea who deserved to be advanced and who did not and since the gradings were witnessed by everyone, the *sensei* jeopardized the standard when he promoted a student who, in the eyes of the group, could not meet the minimum standard of the higher rank. If he did promote such a student, then he lost his credibility as *sensei* for insisting on following certain rules but not following them personally or for changing the rules. This weakened his authority because any action was as good as any other; the rules became meaningless and ceased to structure behavior. In this particular group, several students received undeserved promotions, undeserved that is in the opinion of many students, and the effects were widespread and consequential. The promoted students immediately lost status and the new

rank gave them an inflated view of their own performance. They could not follow the rules engendered in the narrower range of sufficiency of the new rank and this bred resentment among their peers. The efforts and performances of their new peers were belittled and confusion abounded because they were obviously not compared according to the same criteria. Moreover, it bred indifference among juniors for they thought that they need not train as hard to improve their performance. If the performance standard was so low, then they could attain the minimum level quite easily. The overall effect, then, was to take away the significance of performance and weaken the social control afforded by the belt-system.

That the students could evaluate each other is indicative of the importance of rules to the maintenance of the context. It was through the process of evaluation that rules were used to make judgements of identity. In order to reproduce the context, the members of this group had to make judgements of identity in the following general instances. They had to recognize the context as one which was similar in kind to others they had experienced. They had to recognize that within this context certain rules were appropriate and in force. The rules, in fact, helped to make up the context as one of *karate*. They had to recognize that certain kinds of practices were appropriate to *karate* and others were not. They had to recognize what it was to perform correctly according to the rules and practices. They had to recognize in the behavior of others whether they were using the appropriate rules, engaging in the appropriate kinds of practices and performing according to the appropriate standard of sufficiency. In short, they had to recognize regularities in order to reproduce the context and they could do this by following the rules. The rules gave a standard, a set of criteria for making judgements of identity as to what was to count as *karate* and this was missing in the production phase.

We can see in the production phase a certain chaos. It was a period of establishing the standard and learning to use it. But the standard was vague. The students were ignorant of what was to count as appropriate rules, practices and performances. Any rule, practice and performance was as good as any other and so there was no order, no structuring, no consistency. The students could not make judgements of identity because they did not know what was to count. They did not know what to look for and could not evaluate each other. They could not, then, reproduce the same kind of practices on the same kind of occasion. With the introduction of the belt-system at the beginning of the reproductive phase, however, the standard became established. Judgements of identity could be made and the context could

be reproduced consistently and regularly. The students now knew what to look for and could perform correctly. This resulted in ordered *dojo* behavior and to a large extent that behavior carried over into other parts of the students' lives. Once the students knew what was to count as appropriate rules, practices and performance, they could then reproduce the activity outside the time/space of the *dojo*. This occurred in two forms: First, they could engage in *karate* in another space and time; they could do so at home, in a public park, and, so on, either in the company of others or alone. They could reproduce it when alone because they had the standard and could use it; that if someone saw them who also had the standard, they would be able to recognize the behavior as *karate*. Second, they could apply the *karate* standard to other contexts within their spheres of social interaction. This is to say that the qualities of their behavior in *karate*, especially those which they now classified as good, became transferred to other contexts. They could act with humbleness, forebearance, perseverance, courtesy and control in their non-*dojo* contexts and many *karate* practitioners would say that this is the ultimate benefit of the activity. As the individual grows and develops in the activity, so ordinary everyday life is the richer for it and providing the foundation are the rules of *karate*. In this sense, the rules of *karate* are the rules of everyday life. They are ranges of perfection, standards pushed ever higher by individual performance and they provide a structuring to the context within which the individual can grow and become.

We should realize from this that while these social actors reproduced the same kind of thing, there is a sense in which there was continual transformation. This occurred on two counts. First, there was a transformation through performance as individual control improved. Performance changed from the characteristic possibility of the white belts, a stage at which we could say they were playing at *karate*, to the certainty of the black belt, a stage at which we could say they were working at *karate*. This transformation allowed the participant to progress, to grow and become, through successive ranges of sufficiency that differed in the number of constraints and, thus, available means. This is not to say, though, that the problems confronting the group were consequential to their very survival, although there was no doubt that at the back of their minds there was the knowledge that some day they might have to use their skill in a real fight and by reproducing certainty they could survive it unharmed; but it is to say that reaching certainty mattered to them. They all wanted to improve, to become black belts, and so each of them concentrated on reproducing means to

eliminate possibility. Second, the rules of the different ranges of sufficiency, while contributing to the reproduction of the same kind of activity, nevertheless permitted empirical dissimilarity. They allowed a certain amount of variation of meaning, of interpretation, of practices within the context and despite this being subject to social negotiation it was still individual variation. Thus, all rules are transformational (Giddens, 1979) and what we have done here, in effect, is to re-focus our attention on the problem of freedom and constraint in social life. What remains to be done is to consider how the concepts play and work are applicable within the notions of freedom and constraint in light of the discussion to this point. It is very important to our journey that we make it quite clear what is to count as play and work and so we will give them separate consideration.

3. Play

In the sociology of sport, play is usually equated with freedom. Consider a small child playing in a sandbox. He is free, the argument goes, to behave in any way he wants to behave. He can make castles and highways in the sand; he can use cars or trains; he can be a policeman one minute and an astronaut the next minute. He does not, by necessity, have to do anything he does not choose to do or be anything he does not choose to be. He is free to choose. Within the play context, then, practices may be enacted at will and terminated at will. Man may exercise his free will to its fullest potential because it is he who decides where to play, when to play and how to play. The context allows man to be self-creative and innovative, to realise and produce his basic humanity. He may do so because the context allows an increase in the choices of behavior open to him - it expands possibilities (cf., Esposito, 1979; Huizinga, 1950; Meier, 1980).

Allied to this basic thesis is the notion that the play context is separate from real life. The play context is set aside from real life. It is bounded by certain rules to which we voluntarily submit and whatever behavior is manifested within these boundaries is non-consequential for social life outside them. This is to say that the rules of play, the restraints, are applicable only to play and have no force in other spheres of life. Put another way, the ordinary rules of social life are suspended for the duration of the play act. In 13th century England, for example, social life was filled with holy days (holidays) when feasts were held. At the feasts, riotous conditions prevailed and ordinary life was suspended. The

lord-tenant-relation was held in abeyance for the duration of the feast. As another example, it was and is a common practice in Japanese Zen monastries to set aside one day each year for the novitiates to play. The abbot leaves the monastry so that he does not witness the quite literally extra-ordinary behaviors of his charges. The ordinary restraints of everyday life are set aside.

The thesis equating play and freedom supports the notion that play is culture-creating; that it has a generative and transformative nature. William Sumner's (1906) notion of emerging patterns of social practices, for example, uses the thesis. In his *Folkways*, social practices are adaptations. Through a process of trial and error social groups reduce many ways of doing things to a way of doing things. A.L. Kroeber (1948) uses the thesis by linking play with social and technological invention and Johan Huizinga uses the same argument to assert play as the driving force behind changes in civilization.

Opponents of equating play and freedom view the thesis as a flight of fancy. They have argued, *ad hominem*, that it is the product of romanticism and idealist philosophy. They have argued, *ad consequentium*, that play is not culture-creating and, therefore, the thesis is not true. They have accused its proponants of theology and what they take to be the most appalling and damning sin of all - metaphysics. All of these arguments, of course, do not begin to shake the basic thesis of freedom. They are invalid arguments and not at all successful. However, there is one persuasive argument that has been brought against the thesis and it has gained partial success.

The argument uses the notion of the person playing as a social actor. He cannot and does not suspend what he already knows and has experienced. One does not enter the play context with, as it were, a *tabula rasa* by conveniently forgetting all that has gone before. Going back to the child in the sandbox, he knows that cars and trains do some things and not others. He knows that he can and should do some things and not others. He cannot play too roughly or even kill a playmate. He is, on this argument, restrained by what he already knows of the physical world and by the moral imperatives to which he is socialized. Such knowledge is brought into the play context and applied. So far so good. The argument is shaping up to be a serious threat to the freedom thesis.

Unfortunately, those who propose the argument make an error by putting it up as a contradiction of the freedom thesis. Thus, Gruneau (1983: 21), for example, states

". . .the study of play is haunted by a fundamental paradox. Play gives the impression of

being at once both an *independent and spontaneous* aspect of human action or agency and a *dependent and regulated* aspect of it". But he is mistaken. It is not a paradox in the sense of being contrary to accepted opinion; it is not a paradox since it is not opposed to common sense; and it is definitely not a paradox because the two characteristics of play that are used in the argument do not exclude each other. For the two to be mutually exclusive it must be shown that the imposition of constraints is total. Such a case would then contradict the notion of any freedom. This is not shown and so the most that the argument can conclude is that play includes some freedom and some constraints.

With such a conclusion, of course, the original freedom thesis is left intact although in a watered down form. The child in the sandbox, the 13th century english villagers and the Japanese Zen monks are still playing. They are playing because they are making choices and enacting behaviors within the rather broad range of possible choices and behaviors. However, against the notion of play as a separate context such a conclusion is contradictory. If play is subject to some constraints and those constraints originate in social life then we cannot hold to play and real life as two distinct contexts. Play is a part of everyday life. The two are interdependent as a part is to a whole. Play is integrated into our ordinary everyday life so that we cannot suspend our knowledge of either. We bring all of our knowledge to play and we use it. Thus, at 13th century feasts, in Zen monastries and in the sandbox the rules of everyday social intercourse were still in effect and constrain behavior. The feasts, the play days and the sandbox are what help to constitute social life in the respective historical and cultural settings.

The crucial point of the argument against equating play and freedom, and the point which moderates the thesis, is that all things are not possible: only some things are possible. Much hangs, then, on what we mean by possible and since it is central to our characterization of play we should take pains to clarify the concept. There are two senses of the possible that concern us in our discussion of freedom and constraint. In the first sense we might ask "Is John free to walk across the Pacific Ocean?" The appropriate answer to this question is "He is free to, if he can" and mean by this use of the term 'can' that it is possible for John to walk across the Pacific Ocean providing he has the resources that will allow him to do so. These resources comprise a range of subjects for an objective (walking across the Pacific Ocean). Implicit in this notion is that the range of subjects is known. Thus, we have a sense of possible that coincides with positive freedom in the use of the term 'can' and 'can' "indicates

sufficiency of a marked range of subjects for an objective" (Bosley, 1982: 194).

With this sense of the possible and the case of asking whether someone can walk on water, the subjects within the marked range will be comprised of resources of the physical world. If John can utilize the appropriate physical resources, then he is free to walk across the Pacific Ocean. These resources might include extra-large feet, inflatable shoes and so on. Now the important point here is that there are some physical resources which are not within the marked range of subjects (such as wearing stilts or shoes with holes in the soles) and are not, therefore, subjects for the objective of walking on water. The physical world, then, has limitations with respect to the possibility of achieving an objective and these same limitations will apply to play. Human movement occurs in the physical world and the human body is subject to the limitations of that world. The body can curl, stretch and twist and do nothing more. It is not possible to do more. For play to occur, therefore, we must allow that the person who plays is able to utilize to their fullest all of the physical resources which are subjects in the range of sufficiency for an objective. Moreover, we can assert that this will be so for all people on Earth.

However, there is the use of this sense of possible that will not be so for all people on Earth and this sense concerns the use of social resources. Suppose we have two people named John and Mary and both of them want to fly to Hawaii for a vacation. We can ask "Are both John and Mary free to fly to Hawaii?" and be answered "They are both free to, if they can". That is, if they are both able to utilize the appropriate physical resources, then they can so fly. Now suppose we made Mary rich and John poor, would the same answer be appropriate? It would not be appropriate because John does not have sufficient social resources, namely money, whereas Mary does. This is to say it is not possible for John to fly to Hawaii whereas it is possible for Mary to fly to Hawaii and mean by this that Mary is free to do so in a way that John is not. Mary can utilize the social resources that are within the range of subjects and John cannot utilize them. Both John and Mary know what resources are within the range of subjects for the objective but only one of them, Mary, has access to those resources and can use them. In the case of play, then, we should allow that the person who plays is able to utilize to their fullest all of the social resources which are subjects in the range of sufficiency, and of which they have command, for an objective.

The second sense of possible concerns the phrase "it is possible that . . ." In this sense the notion of can is linked to the notion of negative freedom. This is freedom involving a lack of constraints and it is additive to 'can' in that it denotes the sense of allowance. This is to say that the range of subjects for an objective is not delimited. We may employ a variety of physical and social resources to achieve an objective because the appropriate range is not marked - it is not clear what is within the range since it admitted of a lack of known constraints both physical and social. But we should allow that the objectives for which the range of subjects is sufficient will also consist of a range. Since the range of means is not delimited then we have no way of knowing the precise objective to be achieved and so we must admit that an allowance in the means will *quo ad hoc* entail an allowance in the objective achieved.

When we equate play with possibility and freedom, therefore, we mean that play involves a knowledge of what is possible in using certain physical and social resources (freedom to) and ignorance of the appropriate means for a variety of objectives (freedom from). There is, then, a manipulative aspect to play that can admit to the notion of experimentation. We can use a variety of means to gain knowledge of which objectives or range of objectives can be brought about and it is just this aspect which many scholars have laid down as a process by which culture and science proceed. However, once we have a knowledge of the range of means and the objective for which that range is sufficient then we pass from the possible to the certain. We will come back to this later in the discussion of work and in the discussion of social relations and how we gain knowledge of sufficiency. What we should do now though is use the characterization of play by developing a paradigm case. This will illustrate the concept more clearly and at the same time extend it.

Suppose we walked down a street and we saw a man leave a toy shop with a small rubber ball. He has just purchased the ball. He stands on the sidewalk and manipulates the ball. He rolls it around in his hands, he throws it up and catches it, he bounces it on the ground and generally moves the ball in many different ways. We now ask each other the question "What is he doing?" and we decide that "He is playing". Then we ask each other "What is he playing at?" and decide, finally, that since he does not appear to be playing at anything, then "He is only playing".

Quite clearly in this case the context is fundamentally play. The means used are various. The physical resources that are within the range of subjects for the objective are a

ball, a place to play and a time to play. The social resources at the man's comman are utilized and he buys a ball. He might also be in a social position whereby there is nothing else he must do and there would be no social stigma attached to a grown man playing with a small rubber ball on the sidewalk. In addition, his behavior and that of the ball are subject to the limitations of the physical world. He cannot, for example, pass the ball through his body, nor can the ball hang in the air after he has thrown it. Still, what he is doing is playing because he is doing that which it is possible for him to do within these limitations. Moreover, he is only playing because we cannot discern the range of objectives. There might be no pattern to his use of what is possible and so our question concerning what he is playing at cannot be answered. He could, conceivably, be playing at anything at all.

Suppose, however, that we walked down the same street one week later and saw the same man playing with the ball. This time, though, we notice a pattern to his movements. He is no longer manipulating the ball in a number of different ways but only in some ways. Also, he is now moving up and down the sidewalk. We ask ourselves "What is he doing?" and decide that "He is playing". We ask "What is he playing at?" but decide that even though he appears to be playing at something we do not know what it is. So we ask him what he is playing at and he replies, "I am playing at sidewalk ball". We are, of course, none the wiser for this revelation so we ask further, "What is sidewalk ball?" He tells is that, first, he must keep the ball moving; second, he must move up and down the sidewalk; and third, he must avoid contact with all pedestrians.

On this second visit we would notice that the man has imposed certain constraints on his behavior. He has imposed rules on the activity of playing with a ball to the extent that these rules, simple though they are, and the impedimenta of sidewalk, ball and pedestrians constitute the activity of sidewalk ball. They make sidewalk ball what it is and not, say, cross-country skiing. Sidewalk ball is now a social phenomenon because he has laid down a path and has followed it. Moreover, he has shown us the path and if we wanted to play sidewalk ball then we would have to follow it. We would have to play sidewalk ball as it is constituted in order to do so correctly. Should we play with the ball on a large open field with no-one else around, then we would not be playing sidewalk ball because we are not following the path correctly. We would not be playing it as it is constituted. How it is constituted, therefore, is made known to us by specifying the range of objectives to be achieved.

It is important to realize, though, that as it is constituted, sidewalk ball is full of possibility. Even though the physical trappings of the activity do limit possibility and even though the rules of the activity limit possibility, there is a broad enough range of behaviors left to us to claim a sufficiency of possibility. This is to say that that which is possible within the constraints that are imposed is sufficient for us to continue to refer to the movement as play. Within the constraints that constitute sidewalk ball we could not predict with much degree of certainty what the outcome of the activity will be. We could not predict with much degree of likelihood, and therefore of certainty, what the outcome of the activity will be. There are not enough social constraints for us to achieve likelihood or certainty of outcome. The man is still playing because we do not know, and he has not specified, what the means are that he is free to use. There is, in short, no marked range of sufficiency of subjects for the marked range of objectives.

We can summmarize these ideas in a set of premises that characterize play. They are:

1.0 Play is a sufficiency of social constraints for possibility;

1.1 Play is a deficiency of social constraints for likelihood;

1.2 Play is a deficiency of social constraints for certainty.

This is to say that the more an activity is socially constrained the more its outcome becomes predictable and the less it is similar to play. For it to be play, the outcome must fall into the category of possibility and it is this notion of possibility that is one of the means necessary to manage an achievement of knowledge of the abstract object of sport.

4. Work

In the sociology of sport, work is usually taken to mean that activity which is primarily instrumental, undertaken within a context that has strong economic obligations. On this view there is a purposeful aspect to work. Behavior is directed toward the attainment of some end or ends. It is so directed because there is a duty to do so that is tied in with some kind of reward, usually monetary, once the end is achieved. Work, then, is productive activity that is basic to man's survival as a biologically inadequate creature. It involves the production of needed goods and services, or their overproduction, in order to ensure physical survival. Survival is ensured by the use of the goods produced directly as a result of work behaviors or indirectly by the use of certain social symbols gained from work behaviors. These symbols are

exchanged for goods and services produced by others. On this view, therefore, one cannot separate work from those activities regarded as occupations. Part of the meaning of work is that he who works is paid to engage in the activity and this thesis supports many positions with respect to work and sport.

Some of these positions have exerted considerable influence on how we should view sport. It is quite common, for example, to distinguish between amateur and professional sport. Supported by the view that the professional receives remuneration and the amateur does not, professional sport is regarded as work while amateur sport is something else - perhaps true sport. The professional, then, does something different from the amateur and this, unfortunately, has clouded the judgement of many observers. It has lead to the view that U.S. college sport is different to, say, professional football or basketball when in fact there are many practices common to both. So similar are they, that college sport is regarded as a training ground for the professional leagues. Another common distinction that is made concerns the utility of work. The rationality of work behavior is often contrasted with the apparent irrationality of play. Work is purposeful and play is clearly non-purposeful. Work is productive and play is non-productive. Now the strange thing here is that we could put this view forward to counter the view of play as transformative. If play is non-productive, then it cannot produce social change and this is strange because the two views are often held together. This is not an indictment of the basic thesis, of course, but it does raise doubts over the utility of the view.

The major doubt we can raise against viewing work as instrumental activity concerns the notion, admittedly implicit, of intent. To view work as purposeful activity goes too far in that it would admit any behavior, even play, in which the agent intends to achieve a particular end. There is a deliberateness implied which makes the concept excessively broad. At the same time it does not go far enough in that it would exclude those behaviors which are non-deliberate and those behaviors such as housework which are not remunerative. As we have argued earlier, the achievement of ends does not necessarily entail the utilization of purposeful means and so we can assert that the view of work which is usually put forward in the sociology of sport should be regarded as one species of activity within a genus that is more extensive. This is to say that there is more to work behavior than instrumentality and certainly more to it than mere remuneration. If we are to characterize work, therefore, we must do so while accounting for

the view usually held and in a way that will differentiate it sufficiently from play. Such a characterization has been asserted by Bero Rigauer (1981).

Rigauer's main thesis is that modern industrial society has imposed its norms on sport. He equates sport with work to the extent that both display the characteristics of discipline, authority, competition, achievement, goal-oriented rationality, organization and bureaucratization. Now while he can be accused of imposing on work the restrictive implication of intent and is confusing at times because of this, his thesis is based on an interesting idea. This idea is the principle of achievement. Civilization, and especially western capitalist society, is fueled by man's need to achieve. This principle is institutionalized in work and individuals and groups are evaluated on the basis of how well they do achieve. This leads, inevitably, to a motivation to increase achievement. Achievement has, according to Rigauer (1981: 15) "become a socially sanctioned model of behavior related to high productivity, economic competition, material rewards, vocational practice, and social mobility". It is, in short, a measure of material and non-material values on social life (cf. Veblen, 1934).

The important point about this principle of achievement and the point which really distingushes work from play, is that we can differentiate between merely achieving and optimally achieving. This is to say that we can differentiate between means that will bring about one objective that is within a range of such or similar objectives and means that will bring about one particular objective. Where there is a range of objectives we can say that the use of such and such means will accomplish such and such possible objectives and quite clearly this corresponds to our characterization of play as possibility. Where there is only one objective, though, we can say that such and such means will accomplish such and such an objective and mean by this that the particular objective will certainly be achieved. Thus, this latter use of means involves the maximization of objectives or the pursuit of certainty and this is very much a matter of social knowledge.

In order to achieve an objective with certainty, we must know *a priori* which means are best suited to that end for the activity to be termed work. This is to say that there are standards of sufficiency generated in the social world with respect to which means will achieve which objective and that this will be true of all continuing social groups. We need not then posit, as Rigauer does, that this will inevitably lead to discipline, bureaucratization, and so on. We cannot doubt that this is the course that work has taken in modern social life, but we need

not claim that it is a necessary development. It is enough to claim only that particular means are associated with particular objectives and that this *a fortiori* is enough for our assertion that we are working when we accomplish an objective by employing appropriate means. With work, therefore, the socially generated range of sufficiency is very narrow since it is delimited not only by the limits of the physical world but also by the imposition of social constraints. The social constraints distinguish the appropriate and inappropriate means and they demarcate the range of sufficiency.

It could be argued against this point that it is not much different to the view we found restrictive. It is, the argument would go, merely a dressing up since work is still characterized as purposeful activity, as rational behavior. To this we can concede. There is rationality involved in work but the fact that we are emphasizing the social genesis of rationality puts work in a completely different light. Knowing a range of sufficiency that involves physical and social constraints imputes a relative sense to rationality that does not appear in knowing a range of sufficiency involving only physical constraints. It makes no sense, then, to impute an absolute quality to rationality and therefore there is no sense in an absolute notion of work. To illustrate this let us compare the practice of husbandry in the 10th and 20th centuries.

Husbandry is work. It involves ploughing, seeding, harvesting and so on as means to achieve a certain end; namely, growing a crop. We can say, then, that because the 10th and 20th century husbandmen employed these kinds of means then they were acting as rational husbandmen. Each is limited by the physical world in that the range of subjects for growing a crop includes soil, seed, water, sunshine, ploughing seeding and so on. Even taking the differences in technology into account, they are doing the same kind of thing. They are working as any rational husbandman would. But they differ in <u>how</u> they worked. They differ in particular work practices in that the 10th century husbandman did some things, such as growing the same crop in the same field year after year, which the 20th century husbandman would find irrational. To use a cliche, it seemed like a good idea at the time; meaning that how he practised husbandry seemed reasonable and rational to him at the time.

We can account for this difference in what is to count as rational practices by appealing to the differences in available knowledge concerning husbandry and to the differences in social constraints. This is to say that the range of sufficiency will differ between historical periods but that range is very much a product of custom and available knowledge with respect to what

will achieve the end in an optimal fashion. The husbandmen are each rational in their own way because each is orienting his behavior to principles of order and the respective principles of order are embedded in the respective conceptual frameworks of their historical period. They are adapting to their material situation in ways that are laid down by the social group; in this case, other husbandmen. But we can appeal to these principles of order to account for the similarities between the two periods and thereby give an adequate characterization of work.

Notwithstanding the differences in particularity we maintained that both groups of husbandmen worked. They both oriented their behavior to principles of order and, we might add here, to principles of selection. They chose and followed particular practices within ranges of sufficiency that would accomplish particular objectives with a reasonable amount of certainty. There was, then, a characteristic conservatism about their choices and behaviors that we can use to distinguish work. This is to say that work is characterized as a social practice by consistent behavior. It is behavior that can be described as repetitive, routine, and methodical. On the basis of past experience and by using a conceptual framework we know which means will achieve which objectives and when we wish to bring about one particular objective we know the means that will achieve it, as long as we do so with consistency. We can observe a body moving and say "He is working" if the body is repeating the same actions. We see a clock working when its hands move repeatedly and consistently but when the hands move inconsistently do we not say "It is not working properly"?

This is not, of course, to anthropomorphize a clock. It is an example of consistency in the utilization of the sufficiency of means as a very narrow range. It does have the advantage, though, of drawing our attention to a deficiency in the characterization just outlined. An inanimate object and a human can both be said to be working if we look only at the means employed. But there is more to human work than employing means consistently that serves to distinguish it from work done by inanimate objects. It is the specification of objectives. Thus, in the same way that we posed the question "What is he play at . . .?" we can now ask what does it mean to ask "What is he working at . . ?"

When we asked the question "What is he playing at . . .?" we were able to reply with an activity that was constituted by the specification of a range of objectives. The same kind of reply is appropriate to the question "What is he working at . . .?" We might take the objectives of ploughing, seeding, harvesting and crop production to be constitutive of the

activity of husbandry. We might take the objectives of crediting, debiting and balancing to be constitutive of the activity of accounting. We might take the objectives of taking bets and paying winners to be constitutive of the activity of bookmaking. The list could go on, of course, but while these are all different activities, in that they are constituted by the different ranges of objectives, they are similar in that the ranges of objectives is narrow and known. As such, the objectives can be achieved with certainty. We can specify the range of sufficiency of the means (practices) that will achieve the known objectives and we can use those means with surety.

The use of means with surety implies that the means are known *a priori* to the user and this, according to our assumptions, is dependent on experience and the use of a conceptual framework. Given this interdependence of experience and framework, it would follow that the approriateness of particular social practices is very much a matter of historical accumulation. This is to say that the practices used as means to achieve objectives with surety evolve over a period of time. They do not, as it were, spring up full-blown overnight. Rather they are the products of negotiated standards of sufficiency whose criterion of success is the principle of achievement. Practices are kept, rejected, or modified according to whether they bring about the objectives. At any particular time, then, the practices are embedded in the conceptual framework in close proximity to the objectives they achieve and *quo ad hoc* this constrains us. The social generation of knowledge of standards of sufficiency for work as accumulated and negotiated practices imposes restrictions on how we behave. We cannot transgress the principles of selection and order by which we use conceptual frameworks.

We can summarize these ideas in a set of premises that characterize work. They are:

2.0 Work is a sufficiency of social constraints for certainty;

2.1 Work is an excess of social constraints for likelihood;

2.2 Work is an excess of social constraints for possibility.

This is to say that the less an activity is socially constrained the less its outcome becomes predictable and the less it is similar to work. For it to be work, the outcome must fall into the category of certainty and it is this notion of certainty that is the other means, in addition to play, necessary to manage an achievement of knowledge of the abstract object of sport. To see how this is so, let us turn our attention to how play and work are related to sport.

5. *Play, Work and Sport*

From the myriad empirical investigations of sports, especially modern sports, there has emerged a consensus with respect to the relations of play and work to sport. As Rigauer (1981: 91) has expressed this consensus there is on the one hand the possibility of unregulated structures of behavior and on the other hand there is a normatively structured field of behavior. This is to say that there is a range of freedom bounded by social constraints. Thus, Elias and Dunning (1970: 67) have observed the following phenomenon in soccer:

> The dynamics of this grouping and regrouping of players in the course of a game are fixed in certain respects and elastic and variable in others. They are fixed, because without agreement among the players on their adherence to a unified set of rules, the game would not be a game but a "free-for-all". They are elastic and variable, otherwise one game would be exactly like another. In that case, too, its specific character as a game would be lost. Thus, in order that group relations can have the character of a game, a very specific balance must be established between fixity and elasticity of rules. On this balance depend the dynamics of the game (p.67).

The notions of fixity, elasticity and balance quite clearly parallel our notions of deficiency, sufficiency and excess of social constraints and with this our characterization of play and work appears to coincide with the prevailing consensus. It would appear, further, that we would be very near to characterizing sport if we combined play and work as jointly sufficient means. This too coincides with the consensus although it is not expressed in the same terms. However, the manner in which we can accomplish the achievement of combination differs drastically from the consensual view.

The difference concerns the metaphysical assumptions we have made in contradistinction to those used in the overly empiricist and nominalistic sociology of sport. Their assumptions, following a predeliction for reifying sport as an object *sui generis*, would have us view human behavior and take the following steps:

1. We can describe X behavior as play;
2. We can describe X behavior as work;
3. Therefore, what we are observing is sport.

With our assumptions, though, we can agree to the first two steps but we cannot make the giant leap of identity from combining play and work to saying "That is sport". Because we have taken sport as an abstract object it has no temporal or spatial being - it cannot be perceived. The position that we can adopt would have these steps:

1. We can describe X behavior as play;
2. We can describe X behavior as work;

3. The humans are engaged in an activity;

4. Therefore, that activity is *a* sport.

By combining play and work we can know the activity, we can name it, and this process of combination is supported by the notion that as we have characterized play and work it is quite legitimate to assert that we can play at and work at the same activity. This is to say that the activity, as it is constituted by the range of objectives, remains as it is so constituted and what distinguishes playing at and working at is the means used to achieve the objectives.

This difference follows John Searle's (1969) distinction between constitutive rules and regulative rules. In our scheme constitutive rules concern the range of objectives for which a range of means is sufficient. In our paradigm case of sidewalk ball these objectives included physical paraphenalia and the social rules of keeping the ball moving while moving up and down the sidewalk and avoiding contact with pedestrians. Regulative rules on the other hand specify the range of means that are allowed in achieving the objectives. They guide performance by limiting how we might use the means. Thus, when we play there are relatively few guides because the range of sufficiency is very broad. The range is not marked; there is a lack of regulative rules. When we work, though, there are guides to performance because the range of sufficiency is narrow. The range is marked; there is an abundance of regulative rules that delimit in what way we are allowed to achieve the objective.

In the case of sidewalk ball we left the man playing. He did not specify any regulative rules, and we could not determine any beyond the means allowed by the imposition of the constraints of the physical world. The range of sufficiency, then, was unknown and admitted to the achievement of a wide range of possible objectives within the constitutive rules. Now in order for us to say he is working at sidewalk ball he must regulate how he may achieve the objectives. He must, in short, reduce the number of means he is allowed to use to ensure that the objectives are achieved with certainty. One way he could do this is to carry the ball in his hands while walking up and down the sidewalk in the dead of night, a time when no pedestrians are around. He would, then, specify regulative rules that would limit his behaviors to these and with the imposition of these regulative rules he would have gone from playing at to working at sidewalk ball; from possibility to certainty.

In the pursuit of possibility and certainty, of freedom and constraint, and of play and work there is opposition and contradiction. They represent extremes. Between the extremes in

a compromise position lie the means that are regulated to some extent and unregulated to some extent. Here lies a range of sufficiency that is not as broad as play but not as narrow as work. This sufficiency implies freedom and constraint as to which means are allowed. The sufficiency, then, has play-like qualities and work-like qualities and as a range it is a balance of the two extremes. To this range belong those means which are the social practices of sports. Moreover, to the extent that the balance of freedom and constraints is tipped one way or the other by the regulative rules so to that extent will the outcome achieved be more uncertain or more certain. This is to characterize the range of sufficiency in sport as likelihood.

Now in order to apply this compromise position to sidewalk ball we would have to structure the activity to ensure likelihood of means. We might do this by having rules according to which, for example, one may use the head, the hands, the feet and no other parts of the body to manipulate the ball so that there is only brief contact made with the ball. This is to specify a range of sufficiency of means. We would not know with certainty which particular means will be used. It is possible that the hands would be used and it is possible that the head or feet would be used. We are certain with respect to which means are allowed but we must admit that the use of any one means is at best only likely. By the same token, the outcome of the activity may be likely. One might lose control of the ball, one might hit a pedestrian, and so on. These are likely; it is not certain that they will result, only probable. Nor is it possible to achieve the objectives carrying the ball. We have, literally, ruled out such a possible outcome by stipulating brief contact with the ball.

This combination of play and work in the range of sufficiency can be regarded as a sporting chance. It makes the achievement of objectives problematic. For example, 13th century english villeins who worked for the lord rather than pay rent were given a customary gift by the lord after they had made hay. The term gift, however, was a misnomer because rather than making certain the thing gifted was actually received by the mowers, the lord structured the activity of giving so that it was uncertain. Thus, in Barton-in-the-Clay the lord ". . . will place a sheep at large in the meadow in the midst of the mowers, and if they can catch it, they can have it, and if it can escape, in that year they shall lose it" (Homans, 1941: 270). In this example the achievement of catching the sheep was likely. It was as probable that the mowers would catch it but not certain that they would and this raises again the distinction between ranges of objectives that differentiate play and work outcomes from a sport

outcome.

The middle place among ranges of sufficiency can also be given to the range of objectives of an activity. Between the unmarked broad range of objectives that characterizes play and the marked narrow range of objectives that characterizes work lies the marked range of objectives that are likely. This is to say that we can play at, work at, or turn into a sport, the same kind of activity but what distinguishes a particular activity as play, work or a sport is the range of objectives that make up the constitutive rules of the activity. The constitutive rules make the particular activity what it is and this is very much a matter of the negotiated standards of sufficiency with respect to the objectives. A social group will structure a kind of activity so that in one instance the range of objectives is sufficient to be designated play; in another it is sufficient to be designated a sport; and in another it is sufficient to be designated work. Moreover, and given the obvious relation of support of the means for the range of objectives in each instance, the social practices which are enacted in each particular activity will be appropriate.

A sport, therefore, is not full of possibilities because it has more social constraints than play; neither is it certain because it does not have as many constraints as work. Suppose, for example, two teams set out to play soccer. The outcome of the game is likely to be one of three results: team A wins; team B wins; or team A ties team B. Any of the three results is likely to occur and it is not possible for any other result to enter into the range of outcomes; nor is it certain which outcome in the range will occur. In addition, the means used to achieve one of these results are controlled. Players may, for example, manipulate the ball with any part of the body except the arms and hands. This is a constraint on behavior that cuts down on possibility while allowing some flexibility in which of the permitted body parts are to be used. This is to say that there is a great deal of order and some degree of predictability as to what is not possible but the constraints are not enough to eliminate a great deal of uncertainty. The constraints are sufficient to maintain enough uncertainty within limits deemed appropriate.

We can, then, designate an activity as a sport according to the range of means and the range of objectives in which there is likelihood. Such an activity has elements of play and work. Both elements are jointly sufficient for designating an activity as a sport. This activity will fall within the zone of meaning of the abstract object sport in that it resembles other such sports according to the social criterion of being sufficiently similar. This is to say that

individual sports may differ in the actual content of the range of objectives and so will differ constitutively and regulatively but they are sufficiently similar in the provision of likelihood that they are included in the class of sport. Sport, then, is the totality of sports in an empirical sense. It is a social context, a social reality, that we as social actors can, as it were, call upon when required.

We can summarize these ideas in a set of premises. They are:

3.0 Sport is a sufficiency of social constraints for likelihood;

3.1 Sport is an excess of social constraints for possibility;

3.2 Sport is a deficiency of social constraints for certainty.

This is to say that the more a sport is socially constrained the more it will resemble work and the less it is socially constrained the more it will resemble play.

Such a characterization of sport, however, is descriptive and it does not, contrary to practice in the sociology of sport, count as an explanation. We cannot offer the answer to the question "What is to count as sport?" as an answer to a why-type of question. Clarification, or stating what is the case, does not explain. To explain sport we must assert the antecedent conditions of sport. More specifically we must assert those conditions with respect to knowledge and the problem of freedom and constraint in social life. This entails a consideration of social relations.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIAL RELATIONS

1. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

There is a certain amount of epistemological determinism to the way in which we must explain sport. From our assumptions about the social world, especially its interactive nature and the interdependence of meaning and practice, it would seem to follow that if we are to disclose the antecedent conditions of sport then we have recourse to a consideration of the forms of association between social actors. It is through associating with other humans that we negotiate, produce, reproduce and transform the social world. The forms of association support our common existence and a knowledge of them is, therefore, of extreme importance not only for our everyday social intercourse but also for the sociological explanation of that everyday interaction. Now in the same way that we have based our use of frameworks in everyday life on principles of order and selection, so too must we base our consideration of forms of association and herein lies a problem because in order to reduce the obvious complexity of the social world to manageable proportions we must, somehow, categorize it. We must select criteria that will impose a pattern and, unfortunately, there is no one set of criteria, and probably never will be, that will achieve a categorization to everyone's satisfaction. Notwithstanding this we have chosen to use the criteria outlined by Ferdinand Toennies. Of particular importance here is the investigation of the knowledge, resulting from forms of association, that makes possible and sustains a common existence. Such knowledge is considered in the light of a seemingly irrefutable premise. This premise is that each social actor knows many other social actors but the actual number is few in proportion to the total number of people. This distinguishes two classes of people relative to the social actor: those that are known to the actor and those that are not known. The importance of this distinction becomes evident when we think about how we behave toward those we know and those we do not know. We may behave differently with respect to both groups.

How we behave with respect to others is prompted by what we know of them and what we know of what they expect. Those people we know also know us and we know more about

them than about people we do not know. Between people who know one another there develop ways of behaving based on mutual expectancies. Now if a society is to be regarded as at all possible there must develop expectancies of how to behave with respect to people we do not know. Moreover, these expectancies must also be mutual. But how we know these expectancies and how we know those we share with people with whom we have an acquaintance are different. Each achievement arises from different types of social relations. Toennies thought these types were two in number and he regarded them as dichotomous and ideal-typical.

Toennies postulated the dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. They refer to social relations that are based on differing types of will. *Gemeinschaft* is based on the assumption that a perfect unity of human wills is possible. This unity is based on natural will, which is an original condition that can be preserved in spite of physical separation. With natural will (*Wesenwill*) there is a direct and mutual affirmation which Toennies represented in three *Gemeinschaft* social relations. Manifesting sequentially decreasing strengths of natural will, they are; kinship, neighborhood, and friendship. These are, respectively, a *Gemeinschaft* of blood, locality and mind in which there is a reciprocal relation of individual wills. This implies cooperation and coordination of action toward common goals so that human beings are kept together as members of a totality. The totality is based on an understanding achieved by consensus; on language, attitudes, experiences, and dispositions that are similar. Between individuals in a *Gemeinschaft*, then, there is a concord (*Eintracht*) of natural will which can be expressed in social entities as small as two people and as large as could comprise a community of individuals. The concord has the bonds of liking, habit and memory which, as simple forms of natural will, tie the members of a totality together. The ties are unconditional.

In contrast, a *Gesellschaft* is predicated on the existence of rational will (*Kurwille*). A *Gesellschaft* is an artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings who are separated despite uniting factors. As a product of thinking, rational will seeks to direct behavior toward the attainment of an imaginary end and it is this end that establishes a standard by which activities are planned and determined. On the basis of rational will an individual is moved to give away a good only if something is received that is perceived as better than the good given away. This involves deliberation, discrimination and conception as the three simple forms of rational will in calculating the value of behavior to attain a desired goal. The obligations in a

Gesellschaft, then, are conditional and contractual, and by necessity the original and natural relations of human beings to each other must be excluded. This is so because unlike the *Gemeinschaft*, the individual in a *Gesellschaft* strives for his own advantage and will only affirm the actions of others as long as they can further his interest. The binding force in the *Gesellschaft*, therefore, is the perception that any relationship entered into contractually is based on a promise. The promise is valid according to will and it is obligatory that the promise be honored.

Gemeinschaft and *Gesellschaft* are concepts that represent the primacy of different wills in three possible social entities distinguished by Toennies. These entities are evolutionary and include a social relationship (*Verhaltnisse*), a collective (*Samschaften*), and a social organization (*Korperschaften*)[11]. In a social relationship, members affirm the entity as an existing reality, they are mutually dependent, and each has rights and duties claimed for himself and conceded by others. A collective is a plurality, an aggregate of many people. It is not capable of real volition; for that it must organize itself. A social organization is capable of creating a definite will which binds and constrains its members to act in conformity with such will. Each of these three entities can be based on natural or rational will and whichever will achieves primacy, so in that manner the entity is called; either a *Gemeinschaft* entity or a *Gesellschaft* entity. In other words, concrete social organizations are a mix of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* elements but the predominance fixes the nomenclature.

Social entities, categorized as primarily *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*, will exhibit the subsumptive properties of these concepts which Toennies inferred from natural and rational wills. Some of these properties are discussed below. They are taken from the work of Charles C. McKinney (1966) and represent a transposition of properties from the original work of Toennies into more familiar sociological terms. The transposition is rigorously consistent with the original formulation but there is a particular theoretical bias. McKinney admits to belonging to the structural-functionalist school of thought and the transposition and the choice of properties reflect this perspective. In choosing the properties, McKinney (1966: 123) asked the question: "What are the aspects of the social interactive process that must be present if a

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[11]We should note, here, that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are usually applied at the macro-sociological level. They are used as historical descriptors of societies and societal trends. As these social entities of *Verhaltnisse*, *Samschaften*, and *Korperschaften* indicate, though, we are applying the concepts to many different levels, including the micro-sociological ones. We are following, then, Toennies original intent and treating them as sociological categories.

form of social organization is to be established and persist through time?" His answer was that there must be roles, beliefs, sentiments, goals, norms, power, sanctions, and facilities. These are "prerequisite to the maintenance of a viable relationship through time on the part of a plurality of actors" (McKinney, 1966: 123).

The primary difference between the *Gemeinschaft* and the *Gesellschaft* relations, predicated as they are on natural and rational wills, is in goal-orientation. In the *Gemeinschaft* the relationship is an end in itself so that there is a fusion of ends and means. The goals, beyond the relationship, are diffuse and are based on and chosen through the common understanding which exists as a product of natural will. Even those goals which might be regarded as essential, such as survival goals, are remote and regarded as givens. Goals as such, then, are not considered as important in the *Gemeinschaft* as they are in the *Gesellschaft*. There, they are explicit. The relationship is considered a means to an end. Means are chosen according to the criterion of expediency and, therefore, they possess value only in relation to goal achievement. The two types of relations, then, start with differing emphases in goal-orientation and as a consequence the articulation of differing processes follow from each emphasis.

The two relations differ drastically with regard to roles as a result of the differing goal-orientations. In the *Gemeinschaft* relation interpersonal attachment and involvement are not delimited to any specific behavior or event and consequently the roles are diffused throughout an entity. Roles are similar and transcend particular situations, based as they are on blanket rights and obligations. Because of this, the roles tend to be few in number but those that do exist are filled by ascription. There is an emphasis on 'who people are' and roles become ascribed according to age, sex, or social rank. In the *Gesellschaft* relation there is a loss of diffuse attachments and blanket commitments and as a result the roles are characterized by specificity. Rights and obligations are prescribed and limited to specific spheres of interaction. In any one role, and there are many roles, the incumbent is responsible to fulfil only his role and he is, therefore, only segmentally involved with others in an entity. Roles are filled on the basis of competency through the possession of specialized personal attributes which have utility for the attainment of specified goals. There is an emphasis, then, on 'what people can do', and this results in personal independence and role interdependence.

The differences in role structures are also manifested in role articulation because of the contrasting bases of beliefs in the two relations. In the *Gemeinschaft* knowledge is based on tradition. Such belief is considered conclusive and final to the extent that any attempt to change it is perceived as doubting the validity of tradition and the relation. Since the relation is firmly based on tradition, any attempt to initiate change is ruled out on moral grounds. There is, then, an inherent dogmatism in the beliefs of the *Gemeinschaft*. Any departure from the established traditions is criticized by an appeal to the commitment to tradition. In the *Gesellschaft*, on the other hand, beliefs are held for their future utility to accomplish relation or personal goals. There is a degree of traditional belief but it is not regarded as final or conclusive. Beliefs are kept as long as they are pragmatic so there are no commitments to tradition and no moral constraints. There is only critical thought with an eye to future goals and belief is utilized to select appropriate means.

The differing beliefs, in turn, effect differing expressive reactions to the world. The *Gemeinschaft*, with its emphasis on the relation itself, is very expressive and personally affectual. The members, tied together with bonds of solidarity, intimacy and sympathy, use sentiments as standards by which they initiate their own actions and by which they judge the actions of others. Their actions tend, then, to be spontaneous. This contrasts with the deliberation that is characteristic of action in the *Gesellschaft*. Personal affect is neutral because of the rational pursuit of ends and sentiment exists only to the extent that ends and means are selected through self-interest. Certain actions are valued as appropriate for effectively realizing certain ends. However, just as the *Gesellschaft* is more goal-oriented, so the *Gemeinschaft* is more normative-oriented. Norms, or the rules and guiding standards, in the *Gemeinschaft* are stable and uniform as a result of repetition, tradition, and a consensus through unquestioned acceptence of moral obligations. There is a total commitment to the set of norms because of their perceived legitimacy and they are, therefore, universal throughout an entity. There is very little deviancy and this, while keeping the relation stable, prohibits change. The mechanism for change is stifled by the rigidity of the set of norms. In contrast, the *Gesellschaft* has norms based on consensus that is subject to change since the stability of tradition is not present. Instead, a measure of stability is provided by the utility of the set of norms. The norms are maintained on the basis of expediency, efficiency, opportunity, and strategy. There is, then, a degree of deviancy from the norms and the amount of deviancy

becomes normative if and when enough people practice it. Consequently, the norms are flexible, susceptible to change, and localized within a part of the *Gesellschaft*.

The primacy of either natural or rational wills directly affects the allocation and distribution of power in the two relations. In the *Gemeinschaft* there is an allocation and distribution on the basis of direct, intimate, and interpersonal influence. Authority, vested in roles, acquires legitimacy according to tradition, either through behavior or expectations. The individual is expected to sublimate his own self-interest in deference to the interest of others for the maintenance of the relation. To a large extent, then, a *Gemeinschaft* relation is self-regulating on the basis of the stable set of norms, sentiments and beliefs. When power is exercised it tends to be interpersonal influence and, therefore, is localized within the immediate sphere of interaction. This is not the case in the *Gesellschaft*. With the multiplicity, variety, and specificity of roles in the *Gesellschaft* there is a corresponding differential in power allocation. Power is vested in the primacy of authority of office and law. It is based on the rational-legal and contractually defined norms that foster self-interest. There is a pragmatism to power in the *Gesellschaft* which is predicated on possession, pay-offs, superior knowledge and indebtedness and obligations. As a result, power is wielded impersonally and it is possible for its effects to reach throughout an entity. The allocation and distribution is accompanied by the exercise of sanctions in the form of penalties or rewards. In the *Gemeinschaft* sanctions are informal as a result of personal interaction that is intimate, coupled with a high commitment to the relation. The type of sanction exercised, as well as its time and place, is determined by custom. Responses tend to be structured and typical because any deviancy is an offense against the common beliefs, morality, and norms. The sanctions, then, are collective and repressive. In the *Gesellschaft* the sanctions are formal because of the rational-legal mechanisms. They involve access to, or denial of, goods, services, power, and prestige and they are applied by codified rules. Moreover, they are specified in kind by these rules and tend to be instruments of restitution rather than repression. Responses, then, are reactions against infringements of individual rights instead of against common morality.

The facilities, or the resources drawn upon to achieve the goals of each relation, provide a final difference between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Lacking specific goals, the *Gemeinschaft* uses facilities that maintain the normative-oriented relationships. The facilities that are emphasized, therefore, are those skills which are used in meeting the social expectations

of others. While these include interpersonal communication skills primarily, the facilities include the common sentiments, beliefs, and norms. In the *Gesellschaft* the relation itself is a facility since it is used to further self-interest. Similarly, the interdependency of specific roles to attain goals and the technical facilities inherent in each role are also facilities. The diverse roles imply a specialization of knowledge, skills, or possessions that can contribute to specific goals and self-interest.

It would appear then, that Toennies' use of the dichotomous *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* parallels a social contradiction engendered by the individual and the social group. To be sure we have in large measure come to terms with this common sociological contradiction by asserting a range of alternatives within which the individual always has some freedom. But how does this apply to *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*?

2. *Freedom and Constraint*

In predicating *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* on acts of will, there is the assumption that an act of will is a way of acting rather than an action and this is so even though it cannot be separated from an action. It is a will with which we act and it indicates that a choice is being made. It is a choice of some action, a choice which is not an action distinct from the overt action chosen. If it were otherwise there would be an infinite regress of choices always preceded by choices. Choosing would entail an individual making an infinite number of choices prior to any action. Moreover, the choice does not necessarily entail a mental act. The choice can be automatic and we mean by this that a way of behaving could be chosen out of habit. But it need not be an habitual choice, of course, and this raises questions about when do individuals choose to act in one way and not in another way.

There are two preconditions in an act of will as a way of acting. The first is that there is a range of choices from which to choose. Now if it is so that the individual, having made a choice, could have chosen otherwise, then the minimum number of choices within the range will always be two - a choice to act or not to act. Further, in order to choose from the range of choices, the individual must be aware of some of the choices available. If he is not aware of some choices and only aware of one, then, it is reasonable to conclude that he has no choice and is, in fact, constrained to act in only the way which is available to him on the basis of what he knows of the range. This is to say that the individual would be constrained by a lack of

knowledge. We are asserting, though, that this cannot happen because there are always at least two choices in the range. We must, then, add to this the condition that the individual knows the minimum choices. He knows he may act or not act.

The second precondition is that a choice is made from the range available according to some criteria. A course of action X is chosen from a range, say, of X,Y,Z, . . . on the basis of X being more suitable than Y, or Z and so on. Choosing, then, is a comparative process. The choice is made relative to those available. It is made, also, relative to the achievement which will be brought about once the chosen action has been implemented. It should be clear immediately that this precondition is the notion of sufficiency and that the criteria according to which an individual compares is the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the questions concerning individual choice are reduced to one: namely, how does the individual come to know the standards of sufficiency?

We have assumed that social life is divided into contexts, one of which is sport, as a means by which social actors can orient their lives. We assumed, further, that the regularities in the social world are to some degree habitualized modes of action and that this habitualization allows social actors to deliberate and be innovative. This follows a very broad distinction between two classes of problems. First, there are those problems which are familiar and seem to be recurrent. They crop up with some frequency and they are just as frequently resolved. Second, there are those problems which are non-familiar and present great difficulty in their resolution.

We handle the recurrent problems of everyday life by using what Berger and Luckman (1967: 56) term recipe knowledge. Recipe knowledge consists of a stock of routines that are used to master the recurrent problems. The routines are habitual ways of behaving to deal with problems arising in the physical and social worlds in such a manner that the resolutions are both efficacious and acceptable to ourselves and those around us. The routines are the ranges of sufficiency. They are the means that we utilize because we know that on the basis of past experience they will achieve certain ranges of objectives. Now there are several points to be made about such ranges of sufficiency in recipe knowledge.

The first point is that the means are utilized on the understanding that the problems to be resolved can be resolved with those means. This is to say that we apply a specific range of sufficiency to a specific range of objectives. We must know of and recognize the problems

which are recurrent and we must know which means can be used to resolve these problems. The second point is that because the problems are recurrent and attempts have been made to resolve them previously, the range of sufficiency is historically cumulative. As a result of previous attempts at resolution we distinguish those means which are deficient and excessive from those which are sufficient. Thus, over time we mark out the range of sufficiency for specific ranges of objectives. But this is so only because, third, there is a pragmatic continuity to the standard of sufficiency. We do not use those means which are ineffective because we know they will not achieve resolutions. We use those means which have been sufficient and we continue to use them as long as they are sufficient.

The fourth point is that because there is historical accumulation and pragmatic continuity, the standards of sufficiency do not require constant verification. As successful means that resolve recurrent problems we use them by habit. We do not need to look beyond what we know to be sufficient and so we suspend doubt. This is to say that we take the recurrent problems and their ranges of sufficiency for granted. The fifth point is that the suspension of doubt concerning standards of sufficiency is predicated on the knowledge that the ranges of sufficiency are shared. Through accumulation, continuity and experience the ranges of sufficiency are marked and held as a social stock of knowledge. It is available to all and all contribute to it. It is the common conceptual framework and it finds its most explicit expression in the language with which we communicate with each other.

The sixth and by far the most important point is that we are given the ranges of sufficiency. The previous five points are only true if the range is a social product. It is negotiated and developed in the common experience and, once begun, it will in turn help to construct the common experience. It is given to us in the conceptual framework that we use to select, to order, to interpret, to give meaning and to resolve the recurrent problems of everyday social life. This is important because if the ranges of sufficiency are given then we are constrained to view the physical and social worlds in a way that is determined. Being given a range of sufficiency is similar to being given a set of spectacles. When we wear the spectacles, and we must wear them if we are going to "see", then we can think and act only on the basis of what they permit us to perceive. This is not, though, as deterministic and as rigid as we might think because the social individual as an active creator uses the *a priori* ranges of sufficiency as a foundation. It provides a point from which the individual can proceed.

It is in just this way that Toennies characterized the *Gemeinschaft*. The *Gemeinschaft* as a unity, a common experience, is a point of departure as an existential fact (Cahnman, 1973: 112). The expectations, moral obligations, imperatives and prohibitions engendered in deficiency, sufficiency and excess are given to the individual in the *Gemeinschaft*. When we ask why an individual chose to act in one way and not in another, we can appeal to the *Gemeinschaft* and the given ranges of sufficiency. This is so because in the *Gemeinschaft* the individual is bound to, in a sense of being dependent on, other individuals. He is conscious of being related to them and he subordinates his will to the collective. In so doing he submerges his individual identity and his life is stable. He is guided by, and makes his choices according to, the given ranges of sufficiency embedded in the *Gemeinschaft* conceptual framwork. To see how this can be applied at an empirical level, let us consider sufficiency in terms of the social life of the medieval English village. It is in these terms that the majority of sociologists view a *Gemeinschaft*.

Life in a medieval English village centred around husbandry. There were many recurrent problems to be resolved, not the least of which was getting enough to eat and keeping warm, and the practice of husbandry was an ongoing recognition of these problems coupled with the utilization of means that were custom bound. One had to prepare the soil, plant, tend livestock, harvest and so on and all of these actions occurred in a yearly cycle. How one ploughed, sowed and harvested and when one did so was the result of generations, even centuries, of experience. Unsuccessful practices were deleted and successful practices were embedded in the conceptual framework of the village. Practices were coping strategies that had accumulated over time and they were ritualized. For example, the husbandman's yearly cycle began on Plough Monday. It was always the same Monday, the first Monday after Epiphany; never before and never after. On that day there was a ceremonial breaking of the ground and tilling began.

Such customs concerning how and when specific practices were to be enacted kept village life stable. The tried and true practices were successful most of the time and while modern farmers can probably think of better ways to do things, given the technology of that historical period, to the villagers the traditional ways were dependable. But so embedded were the ranges of sufficiency in custom that the villagers, according to Homans (1941: 24), "do not conceive of the possibility of reflecting upon their methods so as to invent better ones or adapt

the old ones more accurately to the requirements of the environment". In short, so dependable did they take their customary practices to be, that they suspended doubt. In addition, the prevailing conceptual framework in which the customary practices were located was shared and transmitted from generation to generation with relatively little change. Everyone knew what was deficient, sufficient and excessive for the achievement of recurrent ranges of objectives and they rarely questioned these standards.

Medieval village life is usually held up as the closest approximation to *Gemeinschaft* since it engendered all of the requisite roles, beliefs, sentiments, goals, norms, power, sanctions and facilities. Unfortunately, and while the approximation is extremely close, this has fostered a gross misunderstanding of Toennies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Toennies observed that over centuries, society moved away from a dominance of *Gemeinschaft* and moved more toward *Gesellschaft*. On the basis of this many sociologists present a *prima facie* case that Toennies compared modern *Gesellschaft* social life to the disappearing *Gemeinschaft* and found the former wanting. As a result, Toennies is usually grouped with the romantic social philosophers of the 19th century. But this reads more into Toennies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* than he actually put in. There is no perjorative attitude taken toward *Gesellschaft*; medieval life is not viewed as idyllic and bucolic gothic; in fact, there is no evaluative stance taken in the work as a whole. One can understand, though, how such a misrepresentation can come about. It is based on a superficial reading of the original or on third hand interpretations. The medieval village was an approximation of *Gemeinschaft* because there was a unity based on kinship, neighborhood and friendship. But this is only a part of *Gemeinschaft*. *Gemeinschaft* stresses the bonds between people, a cohesion, according to that which is held in common. It is, therefore, applicable over greater social and geographical distances than the misrepresentation takes it to be. In addition to the *Gemeinschaft* of the medieval village we can talk of a *Gemeinschaft* of scholars, a *Gemeinschaft* of artists and so on. However, let us now turn our attention to those problems in social life which are non-familiar.

When we are faced with a problem that cannot be resolved by the application of the familiar and taken-for-granted routines that comprise recipe knowledge, then social life is temporarily interrupted. Such a problem may occur when we apply our habitual means according to what we take to be sufficiency but we experience no achievements of the objectives. It may occur when we do not recognize the objectives as recurrent or when we

recognize that even though we have encountered it in the past we do not have a range of sufficiency for it. For such a problem our conceptual framework is inadequate in that we cannot use it to resolve the problem readily. We do not know either the range of means or the range of objectives. To resolve the problem, though, we might well do a number of things. We attempt to impose order and compare the problem to those we have encountered previously. We look for similarities in objectives and means. We attempt to construct a range of sufficiency and to apply the means in order to see if they are adequate. If they are adequate then we have resolved the problem and if they are not adequate then we must alter the means and construct a different range of sufficiency. Whatever we do and however we do it, there are commonalities to a resolution. The first is that we recognize the problem as a problem. We must be aware that the problem cannot be resolved by using habitual means. Second, we can use only those resources to which we have access. We must proceed toward a resolution from a starting point provided by our previous experience and a conceptual framework. We do this to recognize the problem as non-familiar and we do this in constructing a range of sufficiency. We proceed from the known to the unknown. Third, we proceed on the basis of deliberation and this is a mental act. It entails our faculty of reason, a faculty that we use quite literally to question our world. How we resolve these kinds of problems, then, is in contradistinction to how we resolve familiar ones, except in one or two details.

Resolving non-familiar problems is different because, first, the historically accumulated ranges of sufficiency cannot be utilized without modification. Second, the ranges of sufficiency for the objectives are not marked and so we have no knowledge of what is deficient, sufficient or excessive. Third, doubt is raised rather than suspended: we question. Fourth, we are not constrained to utilize a given range of sufficiency but are free to construct one and this leads to, fifth, the notion that we take, in the sense of being free to choose, the means when we construct the range. On the other hand, there is a similarity in resolving non-familiar and familiar problems with respect to pragmatic continuity. In that we must use that which we already know and we know, within limits, how specific means are linked to specific objectives, then we combine these to construct a new range of sufficiency. We pursue achievement according to that which we know has pragmatic value according to the notion of sufficiency.

It should be clear from this that the resolution of non-familiar problems is dependent on rational will and *Gesellschaft*. As Toennies formulated *Gesellschaft*, the rational will is used egocentrically. This is to say that when we ask why an individual chooses one way rather than another we can appeal to the *Gesellschaft* and say that he chose freely for his own benefit. Now this is problematic on two counts. On the first count we have *Gemeinschaft*, the collective, constraint and natural will in opposition to *Gesellschaft*, the individual, freedom and rational will. Of these, it is not reasonable to exclude rationality from the *Gemeinschaft*. We have argued already that rationality is relative to time and place. Moreover, one cannot deny intellectual activity in the *Gemeinschaft* because this would make its members something less than human. Nor could we deny that an individual can choose rationally, to act on behalf of the group. On the second count, and following from what was just stated, natural will and rational will are not logical contradictions. They do not exclude each other and so they do not stand in opposition.

Much of the problem, here, stems from the translation of *Kuerwille* as rational will and *Wesenwille* as natural will. Rather they should be translated, more correctly as arbitrary will and essential will. Thus, in Cahnman and Heberle's words the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* rests on essential will and arbitrary will - ". . . 'essential' refers to the unity of life and thought, while 'arbitrary ' refers to the emergence of thought as an independent agent" (Toennies, 1971: xxi). In this sense, then, essential and arbitrary stand in opposition as an emphasis on the group on the one hand and the individual on the other. It is not a logical opposition but it would appear to be an empirical opposition.

The increasing dominance of *Gesellschaft* in history is put down to a rise in individualism. Man is an individual who must relate the world he perceives to his ego. He cannot help but do this except where his ego is bound by and determined by custom. Over time, though, customs have loosened their hold on the ego; reason has achieved a dominance over tradition. This has resulted in the development of planned societies with consciously conceived ethics. In short, individualism has come to the fore in modern social life as the *Gesellschaft*. The *Gesellschaft* is an asocial relation that stands in opposition to the social *Gemeinschaft* just as freedom stands in opposition to constraint.

The paradigm for the asocial character of the *Gesellschaft* is the self-interest of the trader. According to Cahnman (1973: 113):

> The trader is a stranger, a man who enters the magic circle from the outside; in the context of the society where he plies his trade, he is a detached individual. Even where the trader is not an actual stranger . . . he is regarded as one. In the larger society he stands outside the confines of *Gemeinschaft*.

The trader represents reflection and calculation. He acts in his own interest and, by definition, not in the interests of others. He profits at the expense of other people since he must use them as means to further his ends.

Now there are two very important notions implicit in this characterization of *Gesellschaft* in opposition to *Gemeinschaft*. The first is that the concepts are in opposition as ideal types, of which we will say more in chapter 4, but they interpenetrate in the empirical situation. The second is that the *Gesellschaft* is transformative. In the same way that we resolve non-familiar problems by constructing ranges of sufficiency from the contents of those we know already, so a *Gesellschaft* relation arises out of, and is conditioned by, a *Gemeinschaft* relation. Moreover, once a new range of sufficiency is marked it becomes incorporated into the conceptual framework as part of the stock of knowledge. In the same manner does the *Gesellschaft* relation, through a common existence and bonds established by interaction, become a unity of *Gemeinschaft*. Thus:

> *Gemeinschaft* is unity prior to the rise of individuality, *Gesellschaft* is individuality prior to the establishment of unity. In *Gemeinschaft* unity is a point of departure . . . in *Gesellschaft* unity is deliberately constructed. (Cahnman, 1973: 112)

Or, in Toennies' own words that support our discussion of constructing ranges of sufficiency:

> The substance of (arbitrary) will is freedom in so far as it is present in the individual's mind as the total of possibilities or forces of volition or nonvolition, action or nonaction. The mind encompasses a large quantity of such substances; it chooses from it and gives it form and formal unity. (Toennies, 1957: 136)

It is not difficult to see, now, how this interpretation can lead us to the mutuality of freedom and constraint.

Freedom must be seen in relation to imposed constraint. They define each other as interpenetrative forces. Thus, because of its emphasis on individuality and freedom, the *Gesellschaft* is a force for change in social life. For change to occur there must be a departure from custom and tradition. There must be freedom from custom and its constraints. This establishes the gap between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. The *Gemeinschaft* is a productive and reproductive relation whereas the *Gesellschaft* is a transformative relation. The *Gesellschaft* has been the historical and revolutionary force in changing communal man into associational man and its empirical agents have been traders, merchants, entrepeneurs, princes,

3. *Frameworks and Social Relations*

We began the discussion of social relations by raising the problem of how we know the expectancies of other people. We distinguished between those people of whom we have knowledge and those people of whom we do not have knowledge. This distinction was used to outline *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and in the process we gave an account of how we come to know the ranges of sufficiency. In the *Gemeinschaft* we are given those ranges and this seems to be quite clear. The ranges of sufficiency are negotiated within the common and mutual ties that we have with people we know. What is not clear, though, is how we know the ranges of sufficiency and therefore the expectancies of people of whom we have no acquaintance. Superficially this would be made clear by appealing to the *Gesellschaft* relation but there is more to the problem than contractual obligations. We can achieve clarification by focusing our attention on conceptual frameworks.

We have given the impression that each person has one conceptual framework and that the person uses that framework in everyday life. This simplification was given for the sake of exposition and it has served us well. The time has come, though, to reveal the intricacies hidden in this necessary reduction. They are many to be sure and we could not do them justice without descending into the labyrinth of particularity. However, they can all be subsumed in one of three different positions. The positions are based on the notions of sameness and otherness with respect to the conceptual frameworks possessed by social actors.

Let us suppose a dyad comprised of person A and person B and let us further suppose that A and B have the use of one conceptual framework. Now when A and B meet there are three different social situations that can arise. In the first one, A and B have the use of the same conceptual framework. Each would then know the expectancies of the other because the ranges of sufficiency are the same. Each has the use of the same social resources. In the second one, A and B have the use of different frameworks. Each framework is distinctly and totally different so A and B do not know the expectancies of each other because their ranges of sufficiency are not the same. They do not have the use of the same resources. In the third one, A and B have the use of frameworks that are in some ways the same and in some ways different. There is sameness but it is otherness with addition. A and B, then, would know some of each other's expectancies because some of their ranges of sufficiency are the same.

statesmen, scientists and others. Whether motivated by profit, power or the advancement of knowledge, they have freed themselves from the manacles of custom in order to effect change. However, before we go too far with this and unintentionally paint the *Gemeinschaft* as a totally repressive relation, let us re-consider that aspect of freedom which we have termed positive freedom.

Positive freedom most closely coincides with the *Gemeinschaft* relation. Because of its unity and social nature, the *Gemeinschaft* relation is an enabling relation. It enables the individual to accomplish more than he would or could do alone. Of course, he pays the price for this kind of freedom: he cannot act in his own self-interest but must subordinate his will to that of the collective. This is not to say, however, that the *Gesellschaft* does not have positive freedom; nor is it to say that the *Gesellschaft* has no constraints. In that it involves contractual obligations there are constraints and these enable one to exchange something of value. Nothwithstanding this, it is positive freedom allied with the constraints that makes the *Gemeinschaft* the productive and reproductive relation that it is and it is the positive freedom allied with the negative freedom that makes the *Gesellschaft* a transformative relation.

We can summarize these ideas in a set of premises. They are:

4.0 A *Gemeinschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction;

4.1 A *Gemeinschaft* relation is an excess of social constraints for transformation;

5.0 A *Gesellschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for transformation;

5.1 A *Gesellschaft* relation is a deficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction.

This, in a very simple way, is Toennies' fundamental thesis viewed in conjunction with Bosley's notions of deficiency, sufficiency and excess. It is an attempt to portray the basic social processes underlying permanence and change. Social life, though, is much more complex than we have outlined and in order to deal with that complexity we must expand on the discussion to this point by confronting several problems.

The first social situation is similar to that found in a *Gemeinschaft*. We might find it, say, in the case of a *Gemeinschaft* of blood, location or mind approximated in the medieval village. Through the shared and common ranges of sufficiency the individual villagers have the same values, attitudes and beliefs; they behave according to the same norms; they have access to the same roles and facilities in the pursuit of the same goals. Their unity is a unity of ranges of sufficiency embedded in the meanings and practices of a common conceptual framework. It provides a basis of knowledge that selects, orders and interprets the world in which they live. It is a concord (*Eintracht*) in as much as the same framework will create the same social reality, the same taken-for-granted view of the same things.

The second social situation is similar to that found in a *Gesellschaft*. We might find it approximated in the case of two individuals from different cultures with different languages. They have nothing in common. They do not share the same values, attitudes or beliefs; they do not behave according to the same norms; and they do not have access to the same roles or facilities as they pursue different goals. Theirs is a discord involving independence, strangeness and perhaps even mistrust. They cannot communicate with each other since they do not possess the necessary resources. Neither knows the other's language; not even one or two words since if they did there would be some knowledge of the same ranges of sufficiency. Nor will they have the same social reality; they will select, order and interpret the world on the basis of different ranges of sufficiency engendered in different conceptual frameworks.

Now if these first two social situations appear to counter experience it is because they represent extreme positions and this is the crucial point which those who misrepresent Toennies cannot seem to grasp. They are unreal positions in the sense of being outside our experience. They are unreal because they do not vary. In the first situation there is always sameness and in the second there is always otherness. They are unreal, also, in that any real individual has the use of more than one conceptual framework; that we can find some basis of sameness, however, slight, between any two individuals on the planet and this makes the third position more realistic.

The third social situation combines the first two positions. There is concord and discord, unity and individuality, in the otherness with addition of their conceptual frameworks. Where they share the same view of the same things there will be a common suspension of doubt while they will question each other's view of the things they do not share. Where each social

reality overlaps or coincides, there we will find a common reality; where they do not coincide, there we will find different realities. In the common reality, which we can quite literally transcribe as a common sense, there will be sameness in selecting, ordering and interpreting and in the un-common reality there will be otherness in selecting, ordering and interpreting. Now it can be argued, here, that by putting forward two of these three positions as unreal we have in fact put forward only one position and that that position is so extensive that it encompasses everything. But this would really miss the point because without the two unreal positions there would be no understanding of the real one. The two extremes demarcate the most important aspect of the middle position; namely, its variance engendered in otherness with addition. Nevertheless, the middle position does encompass everything so let us consider this point more closely because the notion of otherness with addition provides the conceptual framework we are developing with a heuristic structure.

One of our first assumptions was that the social world was comprised of systems and subsystems in a hierarchy of universals and that we could distinguish between systems and other systems, between a system and its subsystems, and between a subsystem and other subsystems on the basis of homoeomerous and anomoeomerous properties. Let us, now, take one of these homoeomerous properties as sameness with respect to a conceptual framework and one of the anomoeomerous properties as otherness with respect to a conceptual framework (sameness and otherness are certainly easier to pronounce). In addition, let us consider three different levels of a composite society: the inclusive whole, the individual and a group of individuals less in number than the totality. We will consider them in order of size.

At the highest level there is a superstructure, a conceptual framework, that contains elements of sameness common to all of the individuals that comprise the totality[19]. This sameness provides a theme for an underlying social reality that makes the composite society what it is and serves to distinguish it from other composite societies at the same level. It is a social reality shared by all individuals in the totality, a common sense that provides all of the individuals with ranges of sufficiency (and deficiency and excess) so that they know what the minimum expectations are in their society, even if the individuals are not known to each other.

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[19]This use of the term superstructure and the subsequent use of the term substructure parallels their use in the sociology of knowledge. However, they are used differently here in that there is no inclusion of the concept ideology. Ideology is a very complex concept still being debated in Marxist and Neo-Marxist circles and because it does not add to the discussion it is best avoided.

These ranges may be explicit, such as criminal laws or codes of conduct for driving automobiles, or they may be implicit, such as attitudes toward gambling. They serve to order life in the composite society and may even foster a sense of 'we-ness' relative to the 'them-ness' of other composite societies.

At the intermediate level there are substructures, pluralities of conceptual frameworks. Each conceptual framework is peculiar to a sub-group of people and it is a variation on the theme of the composite whole. Each variation is different, in the sense of otherness with addition, to other frameworks at the same level in that it provides peculiar ranges of sufficiency. These ranges give the expectancies, in addition to those of the superstructure, for the sub-group holding them in common. They serve to construct a social reality which is peculiar to the group.

At the lowest level is the individual who has one conceptual framework comprised of many sub-frameworks. He shares with all others in the composite whole the elements of sameness in the superstructure and he shares with some others in some of the plurality of frameworks at the substructural level. Thus, we may posit each individual's total framework as unique in that no other individual has the same configuration of substructural frameworks and posit similarity on the basis of the common superstructure and of some common substructures.

The most problematic of these three levels is the substructural one because there are few criteria beyond the claim to sameness of conceptual framework that we can use to distinguish substructures from each other. We can see this quite readily in the myriad roles that we adopt in everyday life. We might adopt the roles of parent, friend, student, teacher, and so on but each one is embedded in a part of our individual conceptual framework, in a sub-framework, and at the same time each role is embedded in a framework that is shared with others. It is these shared frameworks to which we have access that constitutes the substructural level and we can designate them in various ways although none of the designations are completely satisfactory. We can designate them on the basis of geographical location: the north or the south; a region, a province, or a state; a city, a town or a village; an electoral district, a neighborhood. We can designate them on the basis of occupation: scholar, bus driver, clerk, accountant and so on. The list of criteria could go on, of course, and each criterion would separate our world into understandable parts; each would permit us to envisage

a part of the *communitas communitatum* of social life. And yet for all this there is a sense in which the division is based on a grouping and regrouping of physical bodies in various and manifold permutations. But there is another sense, one of more interest to us, in which the division is a division of reality.

At this substructural level the sharing of frameworks is a sharing of reality. To the extent that frameworks help individuals to select, order and interpret, so they help to construct social reality. In a way, they are that reality because when we share a common framework we share a view of how things are. We share the same meanings and the same expectancies. At the substructural level, though, there are myriad realities that we have termed spheres of life or contexts. They are the "finite provinces of meanings, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribed meanings and modes of experience" (Berger and Luckman, 1967 : 39) that interpenetrate each other. This is to say that the many contextual realities in combination make up a paramount reality as substructural frameworks in combination make up the superstructural framework so that each part of the whole is influenced by the other parts with which it is combined to make up the whole.

We may assert, then, that insofar as every member of a composite society, and we may include the global society, shares in the minimum claim to sameness of the superstructural framework, so to that extent is there a common bond sufficient for some degree of *Gemeinschaft*. We may talk of a *Gemeinschaft* of humanity and implicitly maintain that however small there will me some mutual expectations in force. In addition, we may assert that insofar as every member of the composite society does not share identical substructural frameworks, so to that extent is there an otherness sufficient for some degree of *Gesellschaft*. We may talk of a *Gesellschaft* dimension to even the most close and binding human relationship. In the same way that increasing sameness implies decreasing otherness and vice versa, so it is that an increase in *Gemeinschaft* implies a decrease in *Gesellschaft* and vice versa.

Two very important questions can be raised from this conceptualization. If we focus on the whole and a part we may ask of the relation between them. We may ask how they are the same and how they are different. We may ask by how much they are similar and by how much they are different and expect that where the similarity is great and the difference small we could term the part well-integrated, and where the similarity is small and the difference great we could term the part ill-integrated (cf. Stark, 1958: 74). In addition, we can ask how

and to what extent do the parts interpenetrate. We may ask how the meanings and practices of one part coincide with and inform the meanings and practices of other parts. Should we ask these questions of a particular group in a particular time and place we would obtain some indication of the embeddedness of a context in the substructure and superstructure of social life. We could get some idea of how the context is situated relative to the whole and to other contexts. With respect to sport we have answered these questions to some degree in asserting the interpenetration of play and work but we have not touched upon the superstructure-substructure notion.

4. *Superstructure, Substructure and Sport*

We have asserted that sport is an abstract object demarcated within a conceptual framework by its position relative to play and work. If this is so, then it will hold true for every level in the hierarchy of universals that constitute a social totality. At the individual level, at the various substructural levels and at the superstructural level in a composite whole the relative position of sport in the conceptual framework will stay the same but what will differ between levels will be the meanings and practices of sport. This is to say that the ranges of sufficiency of means and the ranges of objectives of what constitute likelihood will vary according to the negotiated standards promulgated at the different levels. We have, then, a range of meanings and practices that extends from a point representing the totality to a point representing the individual; a range between the composite superstructural framework and the individual framework.

Two things follow from this notion of variance. First, the point of the range at the individual level represents the maximum variation of meanings and practices of sport from the theme provided at the superstructural level for a particular composite whole. Second, the myriad meanings and practices between the extremes will always entail the meanings and practices given as constraints by the superstructure and the meanings and practices taken as freedom by the individual. Thus, when we view a composite whole of any size with respect to sport there will be a combination of the constraining *Gemeinschaft* and the freedom of the *Gesellschaft*. The individual must submit to the structure imposed on an activity by the objectives that constitute the activity at one extreme but within that structure he is free to behave however he wishes at the other extreme.

Consider the sport called baseball. At the superstructural level, say at a macro level designated by continental North America, baseball is constituted as an activity by specific objectives. These objectives may include such things as four bases in a diamond shape, batting, pitching and so on. At the substructural level, say at a micro level designated by a neighborhood of a medium-sized western Canadian city, that which is baseball may be constituted by slight variations in the objectives. It may have the bases arranged in a shape that only approximates the diamond of the superstructural level. It may include slow pitches from a point nearer to the batter's plate than the superstructural level and so on. Concomitantly, at the individual level, one is free to behave however one wishes as long as one does so within the constraints of the activity as it is so constituted. One need not dive head first into second base; one need not backhand every fly ball as a fielder; one need not even use a baseball glove.

However, we should be quite clear that as long as the activity is structured in a similar way, that is it is constituted by the same range of objectives, at each level then it is the activity called baseball. What may vary, though, is how the activity is regulated. At the various levels differences may be found with respect to how one engages in baseball and it is this variance which includes using one's bare hands, proceeding from base to base in a certain way and so on. Nevertheless, the meaning of baseball at a particular level is a combination of how it is undertaken and in what way it is constituted; once we know this in its particular form in a particular social setting then we can engage in this particular activity as a sport. Or, we can use the term baseball correctly and engage in the activity once we know the ranges of sufficiency of the particular social group.

Despite the differences evinced in particularity there are, nevertheless, some generalizations that can be made with respect to the range of objectives and the range of sufficiency in the sport context. To a large extent we can take these generalizations to be peculiar to the sport context. They are peculiar in that they serve, in particularity, to demarcate the sport context, to make it distinct as a part of the inclusive whole and to separate the part from the other parts. They are substructural generalizations in that they are considered with respect to a context and they are superstructural in that they are embedded in the inclusive framework of a social group. One of the generalizations concerns the physical world.

Particular physical conditions, usually in combinations of two or more, are incorporated into the range of sufficiency and the range of objectives. These physical conditions include a circumscribed space such as a court, a field, or a route; implements such as a bat, a racquet, a club, a scoop, or a stick; a goal or a target; an obstacle such as a net; an object to manipulate such as a puck, a ring, or balls of various shapes and sizes; and various mediums in or on which the activity takes place such as water, ice, snow, air, or *terra firma*. Thus, in order to engage in a sport one must first achieve some mastery of skill to use the physical environment. One cannot engage in ice hockey without some mastery of the skill of skating, water polo without swimming or soccer without walking. These physical conditions are added together in specific combinations so that they are part of an activity; so much a part that we can recognize their configuration as belonging, both superstructurally and substructurally, to the sport context. This might include, for example, the adding together of a cylindrical bat, a small ball, three bases and a plate in a diamond arrangement and a fan-shaped field. In North America such a configuration is given cultural significance for the activity of baseball. It has been socially developed in that culture as an appropriate physical environment for use in that activity.

How these physical conditions are used and how an individual behaves when other individuals are using the environment are matters of social constraints that delimit the range of objectives and the range of sufficiency. It is a social imperative, for example, that the objectives of basketball include the use of the hands and exclude the use of the feet. These constraints exert a social pressure for order upon the participants while allowing a limited choice of actions. Similar social pressure is exerted on the participants with respect to the range of sufficiency as the choices are narrowed still further by developed best ways of behaving. These are "habits of predetermined cooperation" (Rigauer, 1981: 53) by which arbitrary actions are possible but not chosen. In basketball, for example, particular roles such as forward, centre and guard have developed while particular actions such as rebounding, blocking, leading and others have become associated with those roles. These constraints that narrow the range of sufficiency further are not, of course, necessarily influential on the constitutive rules because one can engage in basketball without employing the developed practices. Yet for some groups the variant activity which includes those practices is embedded in the conceptual framework as a sufficiency and the practices make up the constitutive aspect

of the activity. This will be true at, say, the college level and at the professional level.

These social constraints on the objectives and range of sufficiency are restrictive and facilitative. They are restrictive in the denial of some choices to the objectives and the range of sufficiency but the individual has some negative freedom. They are facilitative in that the subordination of an individual to the influence of other individuals extends that individual's positive freedom. To the extent that plurality implies order and cooperation so subordination enables the individual to accomplish more than he could alone. However, the imposition of such constraints that reduce negative freedom are facilitative, in addition, when they expand uncertainty. This may well be very peculiar to the context of sport in that it is applicable to the objectives that constitute an activity and to the regulative rules that are part of the range of sufficiency.

The imposition of social constraint applied to the objectives that constitute an activity is exemplified by the activity of golf. What makes the activity what it is is the limitation of how one advances the ball. It cannot be kicked, thrown, blown or otherwise advanced using parts of the body directly. Rather it must be advanced by striking it with an implement. If one could manipulate the ball with the hands then the outcome of the activity would be more certain than it is if one is restricted to using an implement. The implement increases uncertainty. Applying constraints to the range of sufficiency is exemplified by the activity of basketball. It used to be a common practice to position a very tall player under the offensive basket, pass the ball to him and be assured of a score. Nowadays there is a limitation on how long the player can stand under the basket - the so-called three-second rule - that has made the outcome of a shot more uncertain. Constraints are placed on the range of sufficiency without altering the activity as it is constituted, thereby expanding possibility. Similar constraints are imposed on other sports; the off-side rule for instance in ice hockey, soccer and football prevents what is termed goal-hanging.

The expansion of uncertainty of outcome in the sport context points to what is, perhaps, the major discursive element peculiar to the context's location in the conceptual framework; namely, the display of achievement. However a particular activity is constituted, the social genesis of the constitutive rules ensures that the context is a vehicle by which the individual can show evidence to himself and to others that he can achieve. Sports are social expressions of achievement. They are demarcated with marked ranges of objectives that

include combinations of physical conditions arranged in such a way that the outcome of achievement is in doubt. Social groups develop, either purposely or non-purposely, activities which are, on the face of it, irrational. They are irrational in that if all we wanted to do was achieve a specific objective then to structure the situation so that the achievement is not certain seems to make no sense.

Suppose, for example, we wanted to travel 200 metres or we wanted to engage in getting a small ball into a cup some distance away. In the first case we could walk the distance and in the second case we could carry the ball and place it in the cup. Now this is what we could do if these single objectives are to be achieved with certainty. To put the achievement in doubt, though, a social group structures the activity in the first case by adding other travellers who try to cover the 200 metres before each other and in the second case by adding an imperative that the ball may be advanced only by the use of an implement. The substructural reality of sport, then, involves making an activity more problematic that it would otherwise be if we were to engage in the activity in another context. To see why this is so, let us consider the rise of individualism in the writings of Thorsten Veblen (1899).

Veblen lays out a sequence of cultural and social development in an attempt to account for the rise of a leisure class. Underlying the sequence is the principle of achievement which he expresses in the following way:

> As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent. He is, in his own apprehension, a centre of unfolding impulsive activity - "teleological" activity . . . By force of being such an agent he is possessed of a taste for effective work, and a distaste for futile effort (Veblen, 1899: 15).

The initial phases of social development are of particular interest to us. In the first phase, termed peaceable savagery, the individual's efforts are directed to furthering the life of the group because there is no individual ownership in the community. In the second phases, though, termed the predatory phase, the "activity of the men more and more takes on the character of exploit; and an invidious comparison of one hunter or warrior with another grows continually easier and more habitual" (Veblen, 1899: 16).

With this change the pattern of individual achievement is set in motion down through the course of history and it is cemented into the conceptual framework by the development of two general social practices. First, "esteem is gained and dispraise avoided by putting one's efficiency in evidence" (Veblen, 1899: 16). Second, esteem was given for and came to be linked with material evidence of achievement. Veblen goes on to develop his account of the

exploitive nature of social life using these ideas as generalizations to view the historical particularity of what passes as accedited and worthy forms of self-assertion in social groups. Our assertion, here, is that the sport context has always provided such accredited and worthy forms of activity by which individuals may be compared with each other.

There have been two general forms of activity by which comparison may be made. One form involves the physical environment in which a social group is situated. Throughout history the individual who runs, jumps, throws, lifts, swims, skates or skis more effectively or more efficiently than his fellows has received social esteem. The examples of these are legion: runners and throwers in ancient Greece; climbers and skiers in Austria and Switzerland; strongmen in French Canada; and rowers in the Maritime Provinces of Canada and the eastern seaboard of Australia were all accorded social status on the basis of their physical prowess in mastering their environment.

Within this general form we can distinguish between indirect and direct comparisons. With indirect comparisons an individual engages in an activity alone. He might run or jump by himself and then he or someone else will compare his performance to those past performances achieved by others or himself. In his opinion or in the opinion of others he may, then, be said to be improving his performance or to perform the activity better than other individuals. The comparison, though, is made with individuals who are not actually present at the time of achievement. Direct comparisons are made with individuals who are present at the time of achievement. In this comparison two or more individuals run, jump and so on in the same general spatial and temporal location with one individual attempting to perform better than the other or others. The comparison is explicit and immediate. Such activities as weightlifting, track and field, swimming, diving and cycling provide this type of comparison.

The other form of activity by which comparisons are made involves the additive dimension of other individuals who attempt to prohibit another's achievement to enhance their own. These are zero-sum activities in which two individuals or groups vie with each other to achieve a range of objectives. It is additive to the other form in that it presupposes the physical environment and some degree of mastery of it in addition to the presence of individuals and some degree of mastery over them. Such activities as football, basketball, tennis, soccer, wrestling and boxing provide this form of comparison. The comparison is explicit and immediate because it is direct. The individuals are all present during the activity.

We may, though, make an indirect comparison with individuals or groups from previous times and places and so accord social esteem on that basis.

Such substructural particularity as these various forms of activity take on, though, is given accreditation and worth only to the extent that it is related to the superstructural framework. Sport as a substructural reality is related to the superstructural reality insofar as it provides a mechanism for social differentiation. It is one of many such contexts that reflect the principle of achievement as a hegemonic ethos; for without such a relation the display of achievement has no significance and with such a relation social esteem and its material evidence gained in the sport context take on significance in everyday life. This is so whether the sport context is considered as a means for self-assertion or whether achievement contributes to the group.

We can discern quite readily, here, that the notion of self-assertion has no place in the *Gemeinschaft*. Self-assertion belongs to the *Gesellschaft* and this should not surprise us for Toennies saw in the *Gesellschaft* the Hobbesian condition of individuals pitted against each other; a condition which develops in the struggle for survival. Self-assertion involves the weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of choices and actions and the opting for those which bring about individual achievement. In the *Gemeinschaft* there is no weighing of advantages and disadvantages. It is simply not permissable because the individual is always subordinated to the collective will as a greater good. Achievement in the *Gemeinschaft* is not individual achievement, it is group achievement. Nevertheless, such contributions as the individual makes to the group achievement is recognized and esteem is so ascribed. The esteem tends not so much to differentiate according to individuals as much as it differentiates according to the role or position.

We can assert, then, that there are two extremes in the substructure-superstructure relation: one relation in which they are the same and one relation in which they are different. In the *Gemeinschaft* they are the same insofar as they are indistinguishable. There is really no distinction between the various parts of the inclusive whole. Each context runs into all other contexts so that the whole is well-integrated. With the diffuse nature of values, norms, beliefs and so on there is an interpenetration of the same standards of sufficiency into all contexts. Homans (1941: 362) draws attention to this interpenetration in medieval village life. On Plough Monday, 1291, the Lord of the village of Carlton and six other men engaged in a plough

race. But it was not just a question of seven men engaged in a sport. The activity incorporated several aspects of village life. It involved superordinated and subordinate role incumbents. They used the plough, the most important instrument of village life. All of the participants knew how to plough since such knowledge was recipe knowledge and part of the practice of husbandry. The ceremonial first striking of the ground signalled the beginning of the husbandman's year and joined together symbolically the plough and the hearth. The plough was symbolic of the men's condition and the rock was symbolic of the women's condition; both were linked in that Plough Monday was also termed Rock Monday. In addition, the land which was ploughed during the race was communal property; the activity brought under tillage land that was outside the regularly tilled portion of the village. The group achievement, then, was that land was tilled and at the same time the village was unified. The race cemented the common bond.

In the *Gesellschaft* the relation between substructure and superstructure is one of otherness. Each context will be distinct and separate with only the most meagre interpenetration, if any. Each part is different in the extreme and so the whole is ill-integrated. An approximation of this *Gesellschaft* quality can be found in the distinct ranges of sufficiency that guide behavior in the sport context and outside it. In modern professional ice hockey, for example, there are ranges of sufficiency with respect to how much force can be used against an opponent. However, should those same means be used in other contexts they would be considered excessive. Professional hockey violence, then, is socially acceptable in that sport context but unacceptable outside that context, in ordinary everyday life. But this *Gesellschaft* quality is not restricted to ice hockey or other modern sports like boxing. In the Greek pankration, medieval jousts, 19th century bare-knuckle fighting and Okinawan *te*, the force used to kill an opponent was not considered excessive because the sport context was imbued with a powerful excursive quality.

The substructure-superstructure relation as sameness or otherness is quite consistent with the freedom-constraint relation as sameness and otherness. The two sets of extremes coincide in the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* social relations and form the basis of our account of how we know social expectations. The important point about this account is that we have used extremes to set the boundaries of the concept sport. We have, as it were, mapped out a conceptual space using these boundaries in such a way that the everyday reality of sport is

represented by this space as otherness with addition. This is to say that the reality of sport consists of varying mixtures of substructure-superstructure otherness and varying mixtures of freedom and constraint. In short, it consists of varying mixtures of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Thus, in order to use the abstract object sport and in order to engage in an activity as a sport it is necessary to manage an achievement of knowledge with respect to the ranges of sufficiency and the ranges of objectives of a particular social totality. One must know what is expected, what is not expected and how one can behave.

CHAPTER FOUR

EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES

1. Methodological Excursis

We turn our attention, now, to a synthesis as we attempt to pull together all of the ideas we have discussed to this point. In what follows, two empirical inquiries are presented as independent papers. Each attacks its own distinct problem and attempts to make a contribution to knowledge without the support of the other. They are, however, variations on the theme of what is involved in the social production, reproduction and transformation of sport. In the first inquiry, entitled *Swinging Round the Circle*, we take a broad look at historical transformation following a critique of the interpretation of Toennies' work by scholars in the sociology of sport. To some extent we reiterate some of our earlier comments on Toennies but they bear repeating because, apart from introducing the problem under study, they give some clear indications of the kind of theoretical confusion we are hoping to treat by laying down a conceptual framework and how the framework can clarify matters. To make this point, we look at the development of a sport over some seven hundred years. We trace the diffusion of the idea of *karate* from China, to Okinawa, to Japan and, finally, to North America. We note how the diffusion is a pattern of change followed by adaptation and accommodation followed by change and so on. Data were collected from English translations of Japanese social histories and various works on *karate*. In addition, data were gathered from the multifarious martial arts magazines published in the United States and to a large extent this source imposed limitations on the study because it is difficult to distinguish fact from fancy within the subculture. Because of this difficulty, only those articles were used which reported events as they had just happened or which were reports of interviews with the participants. With events occurring more than a hundred years ago, however, the problem of unreliable data from all sources was exacerbated because, putting it as baldly as we can, no-one knows much about the history of *karate*: there are a lot of stories, an abundance of myths and many histories have been written but the simple fact is that historical data are in very short supply. This state of affairs in attributable to the extreme age of *karate*, a deliberate attempt to keep its

practice a secret and to the destruction of historical documents kept at Shuri Castle, Okinawa, during the Second World War. To alleviate this problem, somewhat anyway, Kerr (1958), Kim (1974) and Draeger (1974) were taken as authorities.

In the second inquiry, entitled *Stoop Not to Show of Dross*, we come to grips with how sport is possible. We examine the relationship between work and play in a range of sufficiency and consider *Gemeinschaft*-like and *Gesellschaft*-like conditions. We focus on the subculture of climbing over the past 200 years in an attempt to account for the reproduction of likelihood. We trace the development of climbing from a leisure time activity into a sport. Of particular concern is how the basic form of the activity has been influenced by transformations in external social conditions. The data were collected from climbing periodicals and books of an almost autobiographical nature. Thankfully, climbers like to talk about their experiences and to do so in print. They give detailed accounts of the technical and emotional problems they face before, during and after a climb. Moreover, climbers are for the most part extremely literate. They write clearly about the issues which concern them in maintaining the attractions and practices of their sport and they do so in a way that makes it very easy to distinguish what is important to them. These sources, coupled with some excellent sociological analyses done by Davis (1946), Tejado-Flores (1967) and Donnelly (1981a, 1981b, 1982), provide a wealth of data relevant to continuity and change.

2. *Swinging Round the Circle*

In his monumental work *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1957), Ferdinand Toennies reached the conclusion that the main trend of history was that of increasing rationalization. He saw society heading toward a *Gesellschaft* condition in which there was atomization, capitalistic production, compulsary exploitation and the dominance of science. As a result of this observation, in the realm of what Toennies termed applied sociology, he was accused of romanticism. His critics fastened on the notion of historical evolution from rather primitive communism through individualism to socialism and saw in his work a yearning for the long gone bucolic ideal of *Gemeinschaft* and a distaste for the modern *Gesellschaft*. Toennies, of course, disclaimed such interpretations for his intent had been to develop concepts that could be used to make sense of the historical process. He had merely applied his concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and nowhere in his theoretical sociology is historical

transformation equated with progress (or the lack of it). The misinterpretation persisted, however, and today he is probably best remembered for the conclusions he reached in his applied sociology than for anything else. When his work is used it is nearly always the historical trend from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* that receives the most attention and in a way this is understandable because it is a very persuasive conclusion supported by masses of evidence. Indeed, it is so persuasive that on the strength of the evidence there is a tendency to focus on application and confirmation while ignoring much of the theory underlying it. There is a tendency to think that in his theoretical sociology, Toennies formulated the process of historical transformation as inexorably linear - that in fact, as well as in theory, the increase in rationalization and the shift toward *Gesellschaft* is ever-onward, inevitable and irreversible.

In the sociology of sport the shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* is a dominant theme[20] and the tendency of linearity is particularly noticeable. There is overwhelming evidence to support the historical transformation of traditional folk activities into modern rational sport, thereby confirming the conclusion reached in Toennies' application, but in concentrating on this single idea many sport sociologists have given more credence to it than is warranted and they have run into problems where none should exist. Ingham (1975: 339), for example, notes the following paradox:

> . . . at the level of the performer, sport can be fun and provide for sociability - it possesses quasi-*Gemeinschaft* qualities. Yet, as a part of the labor market, sport can be used for pecuniary emulation, social mobility, and social status enhancement - it is part of the trend toward the meritocratic *Gesellschaft* society.

The paradox arises, though, because of the emphasis on inevitable, irreversible and linear historical transformation, on the inexorable shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, that cannot account for the presence of quasi-*Gemeinschaft* qualities. These qualities should not be there; they run counter to expectations and so the paradox arises. But the point is that they are there and as such they can be accounted for if only our expectations were not structured by the emphasis on irreversible and linear transformation. This emphasis lays out a causal nexus that has one set of antecedent (*Gemeinschaft*) conditions and one set of consequent (*Gesellschaft*) conditions and so sport sociologists are hard put to explain any abberations. Anyone would be, of course, and the only thing they can do is to pass them off as somehow paradoxical.

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[20]The theme runs through scores of studies on commercialization, professionalization, bureaucratization and a host of other -izations in the sociology of sport.

The important idea that seems to have been missed from Toennies' theoretical sociology is that historical transformation is a cyclical process. Driven by social interaction and heavily influenced by commercialization, there is a dynamic oscillation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* to *Gemeinschaft* and so on as a group is created, as it ages, as it disintegrates and as new groups form. Thus, according to Cahnman (1973: 112), "*Gemeinschaft* is unity prior to the rise of individuality, *Gesellschaft* is individuality prior to the establishment of unity" and from this we can draw out three particularly relevant points. First, the process of historical transformation is linear only to the extent that the *Gesellschaft* relation is the relation of change in the pair. Any transformation is produced by virtue of the freedom inherent in the *Gesellschaft* condition. It cannot come about by virtue of the *Gemeinschaft* condition because the *Gemeinschaft* emphasizes stability and it is a relation of production and reproduction. Second, the oscillating nature of the process of transformation allows that in addition to a *Gesellschaft* resulting from a *Gemeinschaft*, it is just as feasible for a *Gemeinschaft* to result from a *Gesellschaft*[21]. Third, while either relation may achieve dominance, it nevertheless exists alongside the other and in an empirical sense, of course, this has to be so because *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are ideal types. Their empirical referents always co-exist and modify each other; the one giving emphasis to the group over self while the other gives emphasis to the self over group. Each is conditioned by the other according to the situation.

For applied and empirical sociology, of course, this idea has significant implications for it means that we may expect an historical inquiry in which we are swinging round the circle rather than one which takes us on a restrictive linear path. Instead of equating the past with *Gemeinschaft* and the present with *Gesellschaft*, we should look for the oscillation and look for both relations in any historical period. This is to say that whereas before we might have equated the Middle Ages only with *Gemeinschaft* and confirmed that it was, we may now expect elements of *Gesellschaft*. Similarly, whereas before we might have equated modern times only with *Gesellschaft* and confirmed that it was, we may now expect elements of *Gemeinschaft*. We may expect, and look for, not one set of antecedent conditions but at least two sets and perhaps more if we use the notion of different mixtures of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as co-existent conditions. We may expect not the linear and repetitive *Gesellschaft* after *Gesellschaft*, but a cycle of *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft*. In effect, we can expect

[21]See, for example, Toennies' comments under the heading "The Process of Gesellschaft May Result in New Forms of Gemeinschaft" in *Historismus und Rationalismus* (Toennies, 1894).

a better explanation of how social groups are created, how they are maintained and how they disintegrate. Most of all we can expect a better explanation of how they change over time. However, let us not stand on assertion - let us, instead, put these ideas to work and apply them to historical events.

One of the areas in which we would expect to find the cycle of historical transformation is that of cultural diffusion. Usually defined as, "the process by which culture traits or complexes spread from one society to another, or one part of society to another" (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 114), diffusion has received some considerable attention from sport sociologists and historians. For the most part, though, they have focused on the diffusion of British and European sports around the world. From the "cradle" of sport, the ideal activities went forth and multiplied under colonial conditions. The rulers introduced the ruled to civilized sports such as football and cricket and research on this aspect of diffusion shows more than a little ethnocentricism[22]. Now while we cannot deny the worldwide impact of these sports, particularly on our own forms of activity in North America, it is worth noting that other diffusions have occurred. One of the most successful of these and one that has apparently gone un-noticed has been the diffusion of *karate*.

Karate, along with other oriental martial arts, is practised throughout the world. It receives various degrees of popular support and more than its fair share of myths and misconceptions. One of the most widespread of these is the notion that it is a Japanese martial art. Certainly the Japanese had a lot to do with spreading *karate* around the world but then so did the Americans, the British and other nationalities which occupied Japan in 1945. Nor, we might add, is *karate* indigenous to Japan; it enjoyed only a relatively brief stay there before being exported although during that time, from 1922 onwards, the Japanese made profound changes. Rather, and there is a certain irony here, the activity owes its genesis to the gentle people of Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyu chain of East Asia. They did not invent it, for the idea came from China, but they contributed the foundations to this outwardly violent activity.

Prior to the year 1372 the people of Okinawa lived in relative isolation. They were cut off from their nearest neighbors, China and Japan, by hundreds of miles of ocean and their

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[22]One of the first studies to recognize this and, most importantly, to admit to it, was that done by Glassford and Redmond (1979). They write, "This study, like most histories of physical education written by Euro-North Americans, commences with Europe and then moves on to other political and geographical areas of the world" (p. 105).

island kingdom developed a social structure in which the most important unit was the village. The villages were isolated and autonomous *Gemeinschaft* communities that had their own dialects and ways of doing things. The primary characteristic of these villages was a deep-rooted belief and tradition of mutual aid and obligation. Born of an intense struggle with famine, disease, typhoons and extremely poor material resources, mutual aid and obligation grew as collective action resolved the depressingly recurrent problems of everyday life. Individual villagers were part of a unity of blood, location and mind. They owed loyalty, duty and obedience to the collective whole and they took this for granted because they were, in this, constrained to act and think in ways determined by the will of the village. This constraint was supported by the superstructure-substructure sameness existent in the *Gemeinschaft*. There was a unity between particular substructural contexts to the extent that the virtues derived from mutual aid and obligation permeated all aspects of village life. Each context was influenced by the superstructural whole and in turn influenced it. They had a martial tradition of sorts that had devloped through inter-village conflict but they were peaceable people in the main and their fighting techniques indicated a low level of martial knowledge. After all, their geographical isolation had ensured that they had little need to develop it further or to use it to any great extent.

All this changed in 1372 when Okinawa submitted to Chinese suzerainty. The peoples' extended isolation came to an end when the Chinese finally "discovered" them. At the time, the Chinese emporate was seeking to extend its sphere of influence during one of the periods of paranoia that seemed to have characterized Chinese history but the remarkable thing about the Sino-Okinawan relationship was that it was truly a *Gesellschaft*. Despite the obvious differences in size, wealth and power, the two nations entered into an exchange relation in which each gave and received exactly what it wanted. On their part the Chinese wanted to bring Okinawa under its protective umbrella and at the same time they wanted intelligence reports. The Okinawans were more than willing to express fealty to the Chinese court and to send intelligence reports because in return they wanted, and got, the opportunity to trade[23]. As a result, trading routes were established between Naha, the main port of Okinawa, and Chinese ports on the coast of Fukien Province. The major effect of the *Gesellschaft* trade relation was a radical transformation of Okinawan social life in general. Compared to the sophisticated

[23]It is worth noting here that in Toennies' opinion the trader was the primary harbinger of transformation.

Chinese, the Okinawans were materially poor and culturally primitive. They had a social stock of knowedge embedded in village life but their resolutions to problems stood in stark contrast to the advanced knowledge of the Chinese.

Along the trading routes Chinese culture made massive, but peaceful, inroads of the Okinawan village *Gemeinschafts*. Khowledge of textiles, paper construction, administration, ceramics, medicine and building poured into Naha and quickly diffused throughout the island's villages. The Okinawans incorporated the new ideas and skills into their own social stock of knowledge and so struck were they with things Chinese that they quickly looked on their trading partner as their teacher. Among the cultural traits they accepted was the practice of *Ch'uan-fa* (fist way)[24]. *Ch'uan-fa* was a system of *wu-shu* (war arts) that had been developed and refined in China by the efforts of fighting monks from the Shaolin Temple at Honan. As a social practice it was a form of boxing used for combat and for beneficial exercise.

We can count two groups of people who were responsible for the transmission of *Ch'uan-fa*. The first group was comprised of Okinawans who went to China as traders, as official envoys to the Chinese court and as students. They learned the language, beliefs and social practices of the Chinese and on their return to Okinawa they helped to spread *Ch'uan-fa* to all corners of the island. They had gained a knowledge of *Ch'uan-fa* as a part of the Chinese culture as a whole. For the most part they had gained the esoteric knowledge incidentally but some Okinawans went to China with the intent of learning the combat art. Chatan-Yara, for example, was sent to Fukien Province early in the 1600's (Kim, 1974: 9). He was sent by his uncle, a trader, to study the martial arts under the tutelage of Wong Chung-Yoh at the port of Foochow. After 20 years he returned to his native village of Chatan with an extensive knowledge of *Ch'uan-fa*. The second group was comprised of Chinese immigrants to Okinawa. They formed a cultural elite in Okinawan society and in 1393 established the community of Kume village close to the port of Naha. Many of them had some incidental knowledge of *Ch'uan-fa* and some were adepts. Kushunku, for example, was highly skilled (Kim, 1974: 21-22) and he and others like him provided cultural models for the assimilation of *Ch'uan-fa* into the island's communities.

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[24]The exact date of the introduction of *Ch'uan-fa* is lost to us but it was more likely to have been after the initiation of the *Gesellschaft* relation in 1372 than before it. It was being practised, though, before the Japanese invasion of 1609.

By 1609, Okinawa had become the Venice of the Orient and its ships plied between most of the countries in East Asia. What effect this had on the development of *Ch'uan-fa* we do not know. We do know that the frequent trading exchanges with nations other than China did result in some cultural assimilation but an educated guess would put their effect as minimal. There are two reasons for this: first, the Okinawans continued to follow the Chinese lead with filial piety and second, as the Okinawan trading sphere increased, the authorities restricted foreigners (and their influence) to the port of Naha and its surrounds. However, there was one influence which the Okinawans could not ignore and that was the influence of their closest neighbor, Japan. Japan had been casting eyes on the Sino-Okinawan arrangement for some time and in 1425 Okinawa developed a *Gesellschaft* relation with the Japanese court in Kyoto. By 1572 Okinawan students were travelling to Japan and taking home a knowledge of the Japanese language, beliefs and practices. It is probable that this included some aspects of martial arts such as swordfighting but, we cannot be sure. We are sure, however, about the dramatic influence the Japanese had on *Ch'uan-fa* for in 1609 they invaded Okinawa and effectively took control of the island's trade.

The effect of the Japanese invasion was a return to *Gemeinschaft* conditions in the Okinawan villages. Under the direct influence of the Tokugawa Japanese, Okinawan social life with all its Chinese modifications became stable. The Tokugawa shogunate wanted to regulate society and their wishes were followed assiduously by the Okinawan leaders. This coincided with the introduction of the sweet potato and sugar cane to Okinawan agriculture and the basic economy of the island changed from a dependency on trade to a dependency on the production of foodstuffs (Kerr, 1958: 184). With the dominance of the Japanese, the waning influence of trade with China and the growing importance of agriculture, Okinawa was to endure years of relative isolation once again. This time it lasted for 350 years and during that time social life was frozen in place. Social practices became institutionalized in a village setting and this included the consolidation and development of *Ch'uan-fa* which by this time was known simply as *te* (hand). By the late 1800s, *te* was to become distinctly Okinawan.

The meanings and practices of *te*, or *karate* (China hand) as it became known later within the Okinawan *Gemeinschaft*, revolved around three principles. The first principle was that of *do* or way of life. Heavily influenced by the Confucian tradition introduced from China, *te* as *do* involved an emphasis on physical culture stressing *i* (the will) and *Ch'i* (vital

energy). The *i* and *Ch'i* were cultivated through physical exercises and this was practised with the eminently pragmatic moral precepts of the Confucian ideal. Loyalty, duty, obedience and above all courtesy, another legacy of mutual aid and obligation, suffused the *te* context just as it did the other parts of life. Precepts such as "if your hand goes forth, withhold your temper; if your temper goes forth, withhold your hand" and "*karate* begins and ends with courtesy" were practised in this and other contexts of village life. Indeed, so integrated was *te* that its movements were incorporated into folk dances and most *te* masters served as peace magistrates. The second principle was *kaho* or the performance of *kata*[25]. A *kata* was a series of formal movements that embodied the basic techniques of a style of combat. The *te kata* were generated by Okinawans such as Chatan-Yara who had studied *Ch'uan-fa* in China and they were usually developed as a substitute for actual killing. From *Ch'uan-fa* the Okinawans took the technical knowledge of fighting stances, defensive skills, offensive skills and training methods and used it to create the *kata*. They were dance-like in that they were fixed and the student performed them repeatedly in training. This was believed to have had three effects. First, if done properly the *kata* brought about the development of mind and body as an integrated whole that was very much in the spirit of the *Gemeinschaft*. Second, once learned the *kata* formed a stock of technical knowledge that the practitioner could call on should the need to use *te* arise. Third, because the movements in the *kata* were fixed, the collection of *kata* that a style has developed acted as a vehicle by which technical knowledge was transmitted from one generation to the next.

The third principle was *katsu* or the use of *kata* in actual fighting and it was *Gesellschaft*-like. Between members of the same village *Gemeinschaft*, *katsu* was not practised: it was not used in training and it was not used to resolve the village's internal problems. Rather it was used to resolve external problems of a *Gesellschaft* nature that threatened the integrity and unity of the *Gemeinschaft*, problems which strengthened that unity in their resolution. There were two types of problems. One type concerned the activities of bandits operating in the vicinity of the village. Practitioners of *te*, usually the peace magistrates, were often called upon to persuade the bandits to ply their trade elsewhere. The bandits posed a threat to life and possessions and dealing with them by using *te* enhanced the

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[25]Today, *kata* are practised in all of the martial arts as a way of learning and perfecting movements. In *Tae Kwon Do* and *kung-fu*, though, they have the name "forms" or "patterns".

reputation of the *Gemeinschaft*, the status of the magistrate, and strengthened social solidarity. The second type of problem concerned the reputation of the village but did not threaten the *Gemeinschaft* materially. This was *Gesellschaft*-like because it involved a *shiai*, or match, in which practitioners from different villages would uphold the reputation of their respective *Gemeinschaft*. In Naha, for example, there was a challenge ground where rival schools of *te* from Shuri and Naha fought. Participants would touch a huge rock called *Uke-kake-shi* and rivals had to take up the challenge or lose face. Nor was this type of *Gesellschaft* resolution limited to inter-village rivalry. On a much larger scale, Richard Kim (1974) describes a Japan-Okinawa rivalry enacted through a contest between *judo* and *te*. A *Naichi* (mainland Japanese) policeman on Okinawa issued an open challenge to *te* practitioners. Itosu Yasutsune took up the challenge on behalf of Okinawa and a match took place. Itosu was 75 years old at the time and the *Naichi* in the crowd were outraged at the insult because a win by the policeman over an old man would lose its meaning: it would not be a fair comparison of *judo* and *te*. To their shock, however, Itosu won.

It would appear, then, that over the centuries of isolation following the Japanese invasion, *Ch'uan-fa* was changed to *karate*. The principles of *do* and *kaho* involved the production and reproduction of existential knowledge and the principle of *katsu* was transformative. The stability and unity of the village ensured a constancy of meanings and practices of *te* within the *Gemeinschaft* from the 17th to 19th centuries. *Do* and *kaho* were integrating principles in that they constrained action and thought. But with them alone there would have been no distinctive Okinawan *te*: there would have been only the perpetuation of *Ch'uan-fa*. For *karate* to develop, transformation was required either through the introduction of disparate ideas or through a spur to streamline existing techniques. The autonomy of the villages would have been sufficient to ensure that techniques adopted from other *Gemeinschaft* after a *shiai* were disparate and combat *per se* would have been sufficient to stimulate the pursuit of effectiveness and efficiency, a process about which we will have more to say later in this paper.

Following this long period of consolidation in a *Gemeinschaft* environment, the evolution of *karate* was taken a step further at the hands (no pun intended) of the Japanese. During its Okinawan development *karate* had been outlawed by the conquering *samurai*, so it is with some surprise that we see it given a good reception in Tokyo in 1922. In that year

Funakoshi Gichin, a schoolteacher, represented Okinawa at a demonstration of martial arts at the Women's Higher Normal School at Ochanomizu in Tokyo. He took along three scrolls of photographs of stances, *kata* and the movements of the hands and feet. The visit was a great success despite the dislike most Japanese felt for Okinawans and Funakoshi stayed on to teach *karate* to members of the Tabata Poplar club, a painting group. Of his own admission he then decided to spread *karate* throughout the nation (Funakoshi, 1975). He used the Meisei Juku Okinawan student dormitory as a temporary *dojo* (practice hall) initially and then built the first *karate dojo* in Japan with money from a nationwide committee of *karate* supporters. By the end of the Second World War, *karate* had penetrated to all parts of Japan.

This introduction had several *Gesellschaft* aspects. First, Funakoshi arrived in Tokyo at a time when the Japanese military-industrial complex was building and gaining influence. Ultranationalists and militarists in the government deliberately fostered the martial arts for they saw in them a means for the development and control of the spirit of the people. They sought to heighten the courage and patriotic fervor of Japanese citizens through the cultivation of *seishin* (spiritual energy) in the practice of *shinbudo* (new martial way of life). Japanese *budo* involved such activities as *kyudo* (archery), *juken-do* (bayonet), *naginata-do* (halberd), *aiki-do*, *judo*, *kendo* and *kempo* (boxing) and Okinawan *karate* was sufficiently similar to these that it can be said to fall in the same generic category[26]. Moreover, the Okinawan emphasis on morality and discipline through *karate* was extremely compatible with the official needs of Japan at the time and with this deliberate encouragement *karate* gained popularity.

Second, Funakoshi made two changes to the practice of *karate* as he was forced to react to the public acceptance. On Okinawa, *karate* had been taught in a voluntaristic *Gemeinschaft* tradition that was quite adequate for dealing with small numbers of students and Funakoshi introduced *karate* to Japan in the same vein. He worked as a watchman, caretaker, gardener and room sweeper at the Meisei Juku dormitory and taught *karate* in his free time. It quickly became apparent, though, that as more students sought him out he could not devote enough time to earning a living, meager though it was, and so he began charging a fee for his instruction. As a result he combined his livelihood with *karate* and continued to teach increasing numbers of eager Japanese. In time, though, the numbers were so large that he needed a means of keeping a fairly objective record of each student's progress. On Okinawa

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[26] *Karate* and Japanese *kempo*, for example, owe the Shaolin Temple monks the same debt.

this had been relatively simple because the number of students was so small that the *sensei* (teacher) knew exactly where each one stood relative to the others and to mastering the art. But this was not possible in Japan and so Funakoshi adopted the practice of grading students, a practice of comparison that had been used with success in *kendo* and *judo* to cope with large numbers.

Third, the principle of *kaho* so firmly embedded with *do* in the Okinawan practice of *karate* underwent transformation in 1927 when three Japanese students of Funakoshi decided that practising *kata* was not enough. They introduced *jiyukumite* (free fighting) to the Shichi-Tokudo *dojo* and Funakoshi, true to his Okinawan principles, rejected this practice. He thought it belittled the art of *karate* and he never went to the Shichi-Tokudo *dojo* again. The practice, though, continued and flourished for it provided an uncommonly objective mechanism for judging scrupulously the differences in ability between individuals. In effect it was a merit system and its introduction would seem to run counter to a strong Japanese belief in equality of ability. If this was so then we would be lead to account for its acceptance as a practice by appealing to the influence of western individualism, a notion that was making major inroads of Japanese social life in the 1920's. But promotion by merit in general and *jiyukumite* in particular was nothing new to the Japanese. This *Gesellschaft* aspect had always been a part of Japanese history. Merit or the comparison of individuals on the basis of achievement, was engendered in the Japanese martial tradition (*bushido*) under the rubric of *bujutsu* (martial skills). *Bujutsu* were activities pursued for the purpose of actual combat. They involved effective and efficient technical skills that were learned for application and the comparison between individuals was effected by *buaishinkenshobu*, or "combat to the death between professionally trained and highly skilled equals" (Draeger, 1974: 58). With *buaishinkenshobu*, merit was immediately and directly evident and after the official cessation of feudal Japan during the Meiji era this notion continued to be practised although in symbollic form. In a *shiai* the winner symbolically kills his opponent according to certain rules designed to avoid actual loss of life. This type of contest, of course, had been practised on Okinawa but in Japan it was more popular and more extensive.

These transformations of *karate* amounted to a shift in emphasis that effectively distinguished the Japanese activity from its Okinawan antecedents. On Okinawa the principles of *do* and *kaho* had dominated *karate* under the influence of the village *Gemeinschaft* and the

Gesellschaft principle of *katsu* was given only minor emphasis. In Japan the increasing emphasis on *jiyukumite* and *shiai* (corresponding to the Okinawan *katsu*) meant a decreasing emphasis on *do* and *kaho*. But once in place, this new emphasis stabilized and *karate* took on the distinctly *Gemeinschaft* characteristics of unity, tradition and group primacy.

The stabilization of *karate*, and the development of *Gemeinschaft* characteristics, was due in large part to the reproduction of the activity within the many *dojo*s that had sprung up to give training space for the interested Japanese. Akin to the French and Italian fencing schools, the *dojo*s were a part of the Japanese tradition of *bushido*. They were places wherein practitioners could meet and train together. They provided a context in which the members of the *dojo* became bound together in a unity of position, common experience and shared interest. The members were part of a family; they regarded each other as younger and older brothers and trained under the paternal eye of the master of the *dojo*, the *sensei* (teacher) (cf. Urban, 1967). The *dojo*s became autonomous communities within the larger *karate* world and they developed as distinct schools or *ryu*s. Each *ryu* had its own variant of the generic activity according to the interpretations of the activity made by the *sensei*[27]. Through frequent and regular interaction and prompted by the urgings of the *sensei*, traditions built up within each *ryu* that effectively controlled the behavior of *dojo* members. One of the most important of these traditions, and one that was shared by all of the *ryu*s because of the inlfuence of the larger Japanese society, was the attainment of rank.

Rank was, and is, extremely important to the Japanese and its addition to the *karate dojo*s shows an aspect of *Gemeinschaft* that was peculiarly Japanese. Instead of the horizontal *Gemeinschaft* we would expect to find in western societies, the *Gemeinschaft* of Japanese society is vertical. This vertical *Gemeinschaft* is manifested in a *sempai-kohai* (senior- junior) relationship, a relationship which, because of a weak sense of collegial solidarity, makes distinctions between homogeneous members by ranking them in a definite hierarchy. The hierarchy adopted in *karate* used *kyu* gradings or beginner's ranks and *dan* gradings or expert's ranks. Moreover, because everyone must be aware of the rank of other individuals, it was necessary to distinguish beginners and experts visibly and so the *kyu* grades wore white belts and the *dan* grades wore black belts thus copying the practices of other martial arts such as *judo*. With this hierarchy in place a *kohai* would have a more intimate relationship with a

[27]Examples of these included Funakoshi *sensei*'s *Shotokanryu*, Otsuka *sensei*'s *Wadoryu* and Yamaguchi *sensei*'s *Gojoryu*.

sempai than he would with another individual at his rank.

One consequence of this vertical *Gemeinschaft* in Japanese society as a whole and in *karate* in particular was that it fostered the feeling of "if he's promoted, then I should, too" (Nakune, 1972: 32). The Japanese pay a lot of attention to effort because they believe in an equality of ability and since there is no discrimination within the same rank, groups tend to rise within the hierarchy together. One's rank within the *dojo*, then, was very much a matter of the length of time one had been a member and the intensity of one's contact with other members, especially *sempai*. Thus, the more time one invested in contact with the group, the higher one's rank. As such, this dependence on contact made rank non-transferable to other groups. Should one move to another *dojo*, the social capital invested in the previous group could not be spent in the new group and on transferring one was placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. According to Nakune (1972: 32) this widespread social practice "reduces to a minimum the individual's capacity to rate himself objectively" and we can regard this as an integrating mechanism of the *Gemeinschaft*.

But the result of this development of autonomous *Gemeinschafts* was, ironically, a fragmentation of *karate*. As each *ryu* developed its traditions and independent identity, inter-school rivalry generated ideological rifts in the generic whole. Each *ryu* claimed to be the "true" or "best" *karate* and jealously upheld its own *katas*, movements and philosophy so that these *Gemeinschafts* were characterized by introversion and the faithful reproduction of the style and by 1945 there was no one Japanese *karate*. Rather, there were several versions of it and it was in this state that it was spread around the globe after World War Two. It was transmitted as *Shotokankarate*, *Gojuryukarate*, *Wadoryukarate*, *Chitoryukarate*, *Kyukushinkarate* and so on. In effect, it was transmitted piecemeal, as different and set ways of doing the activity but this was to change after its introduction to non-Japanese cultures. The most significant of these changes took place in the United States.

Okinawans and Japanese have been emigrating to the U.S. for over 80 years and some of these immigrants were practised in *karate* but they did little to introduce the activity to non-orientals. They restricted its practice to their own isolated and somewhat introverted *Gemeinschaft* communities within the larger American society and it was not until the late 1940's and early 1950's that the larger society became aware of and accepted *karate* as a worthwhile endeavor. Credit for the actual transmission of *karate* at this time must go to

ex-military personnel who had been members of the Occupation Forces in Japan following World War Two. They had studied *karate* in Japan and on their return to the U.S. they introduced it to the American public. Its acceptance, however, was due to a combination of a change in social attitudes, the influence of individualism and the transformation of the activity to a form resembling the already popular American sports.

In the years following 1945 there was a gradual shift in American public attitudes toward Japan and things Japanese. During the hostilities, of course, that attitude had been one of intolerance and rejection but with the superficial Americanization of Japan this changed considerably. With a certain amount of arrogance, people in the United States viewed the Japanese with paternal benevolence and while few of them actively sought to understand the Japanese there was an increasing tolerance and respect for Japanese ideas and social practices. In the case of *karate* this shift in attitude was a necessary condition to its acceptance. Moreover, its cause was helped by the fact that it was Americans, and ex-servicement at that, who were introducing *karate* and opening *dojos*. Robert Trias opened the first of these *dojos* in 1946, giving instruction to members of the Arizona Highway Patrol, and he was in the vanguard of the popularization of the activity.

This popularization began slowly. From its beginnings in the western States, *karate* spread to the southwest and eventually to the eastern seaboard. Public awareness was fostered by demonstrations of skill and power. *Karate* practitioners displayed *kata*, split boards and broke bricks in spectacular fashion to the delight of audiences at such events as basketball games. This new and awesome activity appealed to large numbers of Americans brought up on a steady diet of rugged individualism and competitiveness and they began to enroll in the various schools of *karate* that were springing up all over the country. These schools were transplanted *ryus* in that American ex-servicemen tried to reproduce the *dojo* conditions, the style of *karate* and the instructional methods according to the pattern set by their Japanese *sensei* but it quickly became evident that whereas the Japanese *dojos* were supported by the peculiar *Gemeinschaft*-like conditions of Japanese society, the more *Gesellschaft*-like conditions of American society would not be compatible to this introduction of exotic social practices. American students, for example, proved to be somewhat impatient with, to them, boring repetitions of fundamental skills; they wanted quick results and they wanted to fight. If the activity was to become popular, then it needed to appeal to the American students and so

two transformations were wrought on *karate* to make it compatible with the prevailing *Gesellschaft* of American society.

One of these transformations involved the *Gesellschaft* notion of profit. In Japan, the *dojo*s had operated with nominal contributions from their members. The *sensei* had the traditional *samurai* disdain for money and counted their commitment to the way of life of *karate* above any consideration of financial gain. Any money they did receive was just enough to operate the *dojo* and provide food. In the United States, however, the *dojo*s became commercial schools. The American *sensei* owned the *dojo*s and sold their services to interested students. The *sensei* and students entered into a *Gesellschaft* contractual relationship wherein the student signed up for a package of lessons and the *dojo* operator received substantial remuneration. Indeed, during an initial boom period in the 1960s and 1970s, the profits were so large that *dojo* owners expanded their operations and opened chains of *dojo*s within a geographical area. But this *Gesellschaft* transformation of American *karate* had two rather drastic consequences. First, the lure of profits attracted the attention of shady and dubiously self-styled black belts who cheated the public out of large sums of money only to disappear and open up another *dojo* in another area. This brought *karate* into disrepute and tarred the legitimate operators. Second, these legitimate owners had to face a moral conflict. On the one hand they tried to keep the philosophy of *karate* intact while on the other they had to give the customers what they wanted. They knew that client dissatisfaction meant lost business and, therefore, lost profits.

The philosophy of *karate* entailed hard work and pain and many of the owners who chose to keep it intact quickly went out of business. To Americans, paying to do innumerable push-ups and taking orders was not their idea of a good time and they deserted the traditional *dojo*s. Those owners who catered to student demands, however, chose profits and today they are successful businessmen. They attract students with instruction and facilities that are a far cry from the simple and austere conditions of the Japanese *dojo*s. John Worley, whose Mid America Karate School chain in Minnesota services over 3,000 students, is typical of the modern American owner and offers sumptuous conditions:

> (The) largest facility is a 6,400-square-foot karate school, with some extras like whirlpools, saunas and showers, adjoined to a 2,500-square-foot health club under the same ownership but operated as a separate entity, and offering Nautilus equipment, a Universal gym, other exercise equipment, Hydro-gym, sun beds and so forth. (Hoag, 1984: 66).

Add to this a plethora of gimmicks such as colored and flashy *gi* uniforms and we can see the transformation of *karate* into a commodity.

The other transformation was a shift in emphasis to individualism and direct comparison based on achievement. The principles of *do* and *kaho* got shortshrift from American customers but the merit system introduced to *karate* in Japan caught on in the United States. American individualism exaggerated that merit system with the rise of tournament or sport *karate*. The first *karate* tournament in the U.S. was the First Arizona Karate Championships staged in 1955 by Robert Trias. This was the forerunner of regular and frequent tournaments in such places as Dallas, Long Beach, Washington (D.C.), New York City and Chicago. Many were prefixed by the words All-American, National, International and World. Often they were bloody affairs due on the one hand to aggressiveness combined with a lack of skill and on the other hand to a lack of rules that would limit the dangerous practice of making contact but they were spectacular and the winners gained fame, reputations and even a few movie contracts. Gradually, though, rules were imposed and the participants gained skill and it is in this area that the *Gesellschaft* influence is most noticeable for despite training within a recognized *ryu*, the contestants were willing, even eager, to drop the introverted attitude that had characterized the Japanese systems and to search for more efficient and effective technical skills. The result was an advancement in skill, which John Corcoran described in the following way:

> Today, most green belts score tournament points with flamboyant techniques which, ten years ago, would have been considered unquestionably brilliant. Brown belts are demonstrating a level of competence which would have characterized them as first-class champions a decade before. Contemporary black belt fighters perform techniques which, in terms of *total* efficiency, were entirely unknown to their forerunners in the sport (Corcoran, 1977: 21).

These new techniques, however, are in large part adaptations of skills from other martial arts. In a rush to find a winning edge, *karate* practitioners borrowed from *kung-fu*, *tae kwon do*, *kempo* and other forms of combat that now proliferate in the United States (imported, like *karate*, from East Asia).

These two major transformations are, of course, quite compatible with each other because of the American penchant for staging sports events for profit. The lure of gate money at tournaments, television contracts, even films, drew the interest of promoters. Fighters, too, were attracted and professional *karate*, or kickboxing as it has come to be called, came into being. The events advertized the *dojos* and winning became a criterion of *karate* quality. But

while these transformations would seem to be widespread and hegamonic, they have not gone unopposed. If the frequent debates in *karate* magazines are any guide, the signal characteristic of *karate* in the United States is internecine conflict between two groups whose differences are irreconcilable. To a large degree the conflict is one of *Gesellschaft* in opposition to *Gemeinschaft*. According to Randall Hassell (1983: 30):

> On the one side are the staunch "moderns" who insist that the whole idea of keeping the martial arts traditional, and indeed Oriental, is a gross waste of time. If you want to learn to fight and you want more than 100 spectators at your tournament, they say, forget all about the traditional nonsense and do what works in America. On the other side are the rigid "traditionalists" who insist that the martial arts be maintained in their original form. This group often speaks only Japanese in the dojo and seeks to imitate, in manner and speech, the Japanese teachers with whom they have come in contact.

The traditionalists, though, are attempting to keep the principles of *do* and *kaho* as they were practised in Japan and Okinawa. Such attempts face almost insuperable odds in the United States and even in present-day Japan and Okinawa they might well be anachronistic. The moderns, however, practise a *karate* which is not without its own integrating principles.

Despite the predominance of *Gesellschaft* in tournaments and in commercial schools, *Gemeinschaft* dimensions did evolve in the *dojos* and in the U.S. *karate* community in general. As with many sports that are practised by a minority there was a feeling of fraternity between practitioners. There was a subcultural unity based on a shared belief in the worthiness of the activity; on the common lengthy and rigorous training they underwent; on a certain attachment to the romantic idealism of the early American frontier; and in no small way on the exotic and esoteric aura that American society seemed to attach to *karate*. These factors distinguish the *karate* practitioners as a group and serve to separate them from the rest of society. This applies, also, to members of the same *dojo*. They made themselves distinct by practising the same style of *karate*, by wearing the same color of *gi* (*karate* uniform) and, often, by wearing jackets emblazoned with the name of their *dojo* and other insignia in non-*karate* contexts. In addition, their behavior in the *dojo* followed formalized patterns and they used shared technical terms. All of this bound them together within the *dojo* in a *Gemeinschaft* of mind and locality that was strengthened by frequent interaction and inter-school rivalry. But these *Gemeinschafts* are not the same as their Japanese counterparts: they are American and lack the *sempai-kohai* relation since they are tinged with the *Gesellschaft* qualities of money. The *sensei*-student relation has only superficial commitments to the mutual respect, duty, loyalty and rituals that had so characterized Japanese and Okinawan *karate*. American *karate* is built

on a foundation of ego and materialism.

In this brief account of the diffusion of an idea, we can see that historical transformation is a cyclical process. The pattern is one of change and consolidation, adjustment and accommodation, *Gesellschaft* and then *Gemeinschaft*. In each phase we have looked at, there was a mixture of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and while there was no indication of the exact proportion of either, nevertheless there was a sense of dominance of one or the other. It is important to realise, then, that neither is at any time absent: they co-exist and influence each other. They are interdependent for each give rise to the other as conditions dictate and there is nothing paradoxical about it. The paradox is merely a misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of Toennies' notion of change. His theory is not linear; it does not paint a picture of change as ever-onward, inevitable or irreversible. On the contrary, it is an oscillation between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. It is a swing around a circle.

3. Stoop Not to Show of Dross

Over the past one hundred years or so, a small but distinct subculture has developed around the activity of climbing. One necessary and sufficient condition of this development and, indeed, the condition which underlies the maintenance of the subculture as a viable, dynamic social phenomenon, has been the resolution of certain contradictions engendered by social constraints on the one hand and the capacity to change on the other. Ostensibly, the climbing subculture is similar to other such cultures of identifiable societal groups with respect to the general way in which it is formed, maintained and changed by resolving the social contradictions, but it differs from others in the specific way that these resolutions have been brought about. Particular meanings and social practices within the climbing subculture serve to set the subculture apart from others and these differences are attributable to the specific part played by the activity of climbing. The activity serves as a context within which the contradictions have been reconciled and it is to how this has occurred that we direct our attention in this paper. Specifically, we will consider how climbing is constituted, how it was produced, how it was reproduced and, finally, how it is transformed. Initially, then, let us focus on how climbing is constituted as an activity.

Climbing is play-like. It is constituted by an unmarked range of achievements which are termed ascents. The achievements are unmarked because there is considerable doubt over

what will be achieved. The outcome is extremely problematic and this is maintained by three factors. First, the activity occurs in a physical environment, such as cliffs, mountains and frozen waterfalls, that has inherent hazards. These hazards may include a fall, an avalanche, a cold wind and so on; they are dangers that one might or might not foresee but which one cannot avoid because despite action by the climber, they remain as a part of the situation. Second, climbing occurs in that part of the physical environment which necessitates the use of the hands and feet. This extends what it is possible to do and at the same time ensures that one ascends in a part of the environment more hazardous than that requiring only the feet (as in backpacking). Now to a certain extent these two factors are not unusual if we accept that they are often present in other activities. There are many activities, both sports and non-sports, which occur in hazardous physical environments but what distinguishes climbing is the combination of these two factors with the third factor - the notion of jeopardy.

Jeopardy is a constitutive element of climbing. The climber must be placed in jeopardy by being exposed to the hazards which are part of the physical environment. Moreover, the degree of jeopardy in climbing is greater than that in most other sports and Donnelly (1981a) makes this point quite clear with the observation that climbing journals have regular obituary sections. In a content analysis of the obituary section of *Mountain* he found that 847 British climbers died in climbing or climbing-related accidents in the period January 1969 to December 1979. However, while he cannot give an accurate indication of the amount of risk involved in climbing, he does note the important place it occupies in the subculture, for "risk is the essence, the spice that attracts climbers to the sport, keeps them involved, and may eventually cause them to leave" (Donnelly, 1981a:40). Indeed, jeopardy is so important that to remove it from climbing would be to make the activity something else; whatever it would be, it would not be climbing. Now the remarkable thing about these constitutive elements of climbing is that they are defined and maintained by socially constructed rules.

The constitutive elements of climbing are supported by ranges of means. Sufficient jeopardy is maintained by regulative rules that serve double duty. They increase the exposure to hazards above that encountered in everyday life and they keep that exposure relatively constant. The rules demarcate a constructed range of means which are appropriate for a given environment and which are sufficient to achieve the degree of jeopardy agreed to as a constitutive element. They are proscriptions or negative imperatives and were brought to light

in an explicit and systematic way in a seminal paper published by Lito Tejada-Flores (1967). He outlined a hierarchy of climbing games that is in evidence throughout the world. In ascending order (no pun intended) they are bouldering, crag climbing, continuous rock-climbing, big wall climbing, alpine climbing, super-alpine climbing and expedition climbing. The hierarchy takes the variety of hazards in the different physical environments into account by grouping particular enacted behaviors together in such a way that the degree of jeopardy is constant. The important thing to note, though, is that the ranges of means differ between hierarchical levels in an additive way. Tejada-Flores found that the games at the bottom of the hierarchy have more rules than those games at the top and that this is inversely related to the difficulty of the physical situation. Thus, there are more rules where the physical situation is less difficult and less rules where the physical situation is more difficult. To put it another way, the range of means expands with each rise in hierarchical level such that it is sufficient to achieve a degree of jeopardy consistent with other levels. It is apparent, then, that hazard, jeopardy and social behavior are interdependent in the case of climbing. The physical environment, the range of objectives it encompasses and the socially constructed ranges of means all seem to combine to make climbing a distinct activity. This interdependence dates back to the initial social production of European climbing as a sport; an event which was spread over many years but which we can arbitrarily divide into two phases.

The first and necessary phase was the production of climbing as an activity. It began with some seriousness on the first ascent of Mont Blanc in 1786, it drew to a climax with the so-called Golden Age of mountaineering between 1854 and 1865 and it ended with the Matterhorn disaster in July, 1865. The phase was characterized by first ascents throughout its extended life and it culminated in a lack of virgin peaks at its close. The major objective within the phase was simply to get to the top of the mountain and it is this objective which separates the phase from the one which came after it because the desire to achieve the conquest of a peak, often by the most easy of routes, is singularly different to the modern conception of climbing as searching for difficulty. Moreover, the social production of climbing as an activity owes its genesis to rather peculiar combinations of social influences.

Prior to this first phase, Europeans tended to avoid mountains and this inhibited the production of climbing as an activity. According to Clarke (1976), there were three main reasons for the avoidance. They were:

> A natural dislike of Europeans for a landscape which apparently had no utilitarian virtues and which hampered their efforts to raise what would now be called the standard of living. Second, there was the sheer difficulty and inconvenience of crossing the Alps in the days before wheeled traffic could traverse the passes. Third, and perhaps no less important, was the occupation of the world above the snow line by a variety of dragons, described by the scholarly J.J. Schentzer as late as 1716, and by the spirits of the damned (Clarke, 1976:6).

Such attitudes were part of the European world-view. Mountains were shunned and in order for climbing to become an activity it was first necessary that the world-view which maintained and legitimated this attitude should be changed. The world-view had to be transformed in such a way that the social constraints embedded in it would be looked on as anachronistic and that the new world-view should be so powerful that social practice could change. Such a transformation did take place throughout this phase in the development of climbing and the new world-view seemed to take shape inexorably.

The new world-view gave an increasing emphasis to individualism. The deadening shackles of traditionalism, with their emphasis on conformity, stability and dogma, were weakened by an historical trend toward rational thought and the emancipation of the individual. It did not, of course, originate full-blown, but gathered force slowly in earlier centuries to increase doubt about the traditional ways of behaving and thinking. Constant striving and an unparalleled dynamism were hallmarks of this individualism that was accumulating strength and influence and it was the product of many strands of religious, philosophical and social thought that converged in the early 1800s to enable climbing to be socially produced. Davis (1946:166-168) outlined several of these historical trends. First, Renaissance humanism gave an impetus to the primacy of the well-rounded, fully developed individual. This was complemented, second, by the asceticism and need to master nature inherent in the Calvinist doctrine of Protestantism. Third, these two ideals found expression in the social practices of the Industrial Revolution and Science. Industrial capitalism legitimated individualism; it stressed self-assertion, hard work and extolled the virtues of achievement. It was bound up with the rational pursuit of knowledge and truth underlying the objective suppositions of science as humankind struggled to overcome the forces of nature that were ranked against it. Superficially, science and industrialization were winning the battle because material benefits were accumulating. Europeans were achieving in all spheres of life, including the new activity of climbing.

These trends contributed to a breakdown of the traditional attitude toward mountains and made climbing socially acceptable. Europeans began to conquer new peaks at a rapid rate and, initially, this was a direct result of the trend toward individualism in three major ways. First, mountains were climbed under the aegis of science. Lugging many pounds of equipment to the top of a peak and then making scientific observations added a respectability to climbing as a utilitarian action. The growing authority of science legitimated climbing as a vehicle in the pursuit of knowledge. Second, the material wealth of the Industrial Revolution accrued to large upper and middle classes and gave many of their occupants the wherewithall and the leisure time necessary to make the protracted journeys to mountain tops. Climbing became a fashionable activity. Third, inherent in the ideology of industrial capitalism was the need to dominate nature. Conquering an awesome peak was, in fact, domination on a grand scale and it fueled the belief that man was no longer insignificant: he could, quite literally, change the world for his own purpose now that he possessed the means to do it. In combination, these conditions made climbing an activity both popular and socially acceptable for ostensibly it was produced to be compatible with the new world-view. Most importantly, though, the foundations were laid for the second phase.

The second phase of climbing, like the first, was a peculiar combination of social forces but in a more complicated way. In this second phase the activity became a sport in a way that has changed but little since the Matterhorn disaster that heralded the new era. The pursuit of jeopardy, for whatever personal reasons, become entrenched in a new ethical standard following 1865 but its production as an ideal can be traced directly to the very forces which had supported the first phase. For the most part the new sport was the result of a reaction to certain prevailing conditions within cities and in the mountains. There were four main contributary influences. First, the success of science and industrial capitalism reinforced the primacy of individualism as a legitimate and impelling ideal. They worked, and, not surprisingly, their success gave greater force to the view that the moral virtues and social practices which supported them were, in fact, worth holding onto. Moreover, their success was cumulative as the virtues and practices continued to yield the desired results of material benefits. Humankind had come into its own and constraints evolved to maintain the success; social life became characterized by an increasing rigidity of moral precepts. There was orderliness, stability, certainty and conformity.

Second, the rational impulse of industrialization brought on rapid urban growth and the development of factory-cities. Efficiency and effectiveness were served by massive concentrations of the populace that quickly degenerated into grim, squalid and degrading urban places. These, in turn, provided startling contrasts to the perceived tranquility and simplicity of rural life. In the comparison, city conditions were found necessary but wanting and bucolic standards were idealized. Third, the wealth and leisure time of the privelleged classes gave to many the opportunity and the squalid conditions gave the incentive, to pursue the bucolic ideal in other surroundings. And fourth, out of these conditions came the Romantic revival. As a reaction against the social rigidity, the sordid conditions and the alienation of the individual, it was an attitude tempered by the glorification of individualism and a distaste for the more destructive aspects of industrialization. It embodied a critical stance toward the order and rationality of the time, including the moral seriousness of Protestantism and the constraints this imposed, but it laid great emphasis on the uniqueness and importance of the very individualism that had generated the conditions which had spawned it. It held to the importance of immediate sensation prevalent at the time but did not see gratification in the hedonistic pleasures afforded by cities.

As a consequence, men and women were motivated to seek out places where they could escape the suffocating conditions produced by industrialization and for many of them this meant seeking arousal in the natural surroundings of mountains and dales. They sought not to dominate by making first ascents but to appreciate and many found it sufficient simply to be there or to be seen there. On the other hand, they could do little else, for by the end of the first phase nearly all of the peaks had been climbed. They were, though, products of their age: they had been steeped in the ideals of individualism and achievement and since they could not claim first ascents they looked for other ways to express their ideals. The result was to climb by a difficult route and it is in this that we find the genesis of the modern search for jeopardy. Old mountains were climbed by routes other than the easiest one that had yielded the first ascent and this was quite in keeping with the qualities of the Romantic revival because climbers approached the new objectives seeking spontaneity, variety, unpredictability and rebellion. Quite literally, they made the activity more difficult than it needed to be and thus added a new range of objectives to those already in place. The emphasis was not solely on the top of the mountain but also on how one got there.

This search for jeopardy, or taking the hard way (Davis, 1946: 171), was reinforced and legitimated by the precepts of what has come to be known as "Muscular Christianity". Most often seen in the English public schools, Muscular Christianity was an expression of middle and upper class values leaning heavily toward asceticism. At its most extreme,it glorified moral discipline, rectitude, fortitude under adversity, self-development, leadership and all of the other qualities purported to be possessed by a gentleman and activities were sought which could serve as vehicles for the socialization of young men toward these ideals. Climbing was just such an activity. It provided the challenge and asceticism necessary for the expression of these ideals and in a very real sense it was a gentlemanly sport. It was well suited to the inculcation of the right moral virtues and to the expression of same. As a result, sportsmanship came to climbing, both through the participation of public school graduates and via the prevailing climate of what was considered fair. Ascending a difficult route was fair and sporting, but taking the easy way was unfair and not sporting: anyone could do it the easy way but not anyone could do it the difficult way. Thus was the standard of achievement laid down and in a similar way was the range of sufficiency of means.

There were two important aspects to the construction of jeopardy, however, and both contributed to the social production of rules demarcating the ranges of means. In the first place, there was competition inherent in industrial capitalism. The desire to achieve was enacted within social practices that saw one win at the expense of one's competitors. Competition was a comparative process and worth went to those who succeeded. It differentiated, hence the drive for first ascents, but it could do so only within a framework which specified what was to be achieved and how this was to be done. In climbing, the achievement was stipulated by the difficulty of the route, but the how of it was left open until certain rules could be formulated. Until they were, individuals could not be compared, they could not be differentiated, and worth could not be ascribed. In the second place, in order to effect a standard of achievement as a sporting accomplishment, the range of means must support the objectives. The preservation of variety, spontaneity and uncertainty was supported by a range of means constructed not to guide behaviour in a given direction but to prohibit those means which yield certainty and which specifically narrow the range of objectives. As a consequence, the rules of climbing maintained the constitutive elements of the activity, according to the moral precepts in force, by regulating against such artificial aids as rockets,

metal chockstones and the like. They were considered inappropriate and not sporting. Resorting to their use was, opinion went, cheating and certainly not conduct befitting a gentleman.

It is worth noting, here, that those social forces which contributed to the production of climbing in the 19th century, especially in England, had similar effects on other activities. Activities such as Association Football and Rugby Football were legitimated, popularized and subjected to specific ranges of objectives and means in much the same way as climbing. Some kind of order was imposed on the activities by the formulation of rules. However, climbing differed from the other sports in that whereas they were organized formally, this was not the case with climbing. Large organizations were created to govern other sports and many of them currently tend towards the lethargy of bureaucratization; climbing on the other hand was developed informally and has remained somewhat immune to ab extra intervention and social pressure. As a consequence, climbing is characterized by a social paradox. It is a dynamic activity subject to quite rapid transformation once a new technique or aid is invented and yet its fundamental structure has changed little. It still retains, for example, the same spirit of rebellion which contributed to its development over a hundred years ago: and this may be a recurrent attraction to participants. To explain this apparent contradiction between social constraint and an ability to change, we must look at how the sport has been reproduced and examine some of the traditions which have become embedded in the subculture after its initial production.

The reproduction of climbing depended on a certain amount of immunity from outside influences and several factors helped to isolate the emergent subculture. First, climbers developed a possessive attitude toward the mountains they had climbed and to the wilderness in general. It was their territory. They cherished the peace, the splendor and the calm solitude. They were loath to popularize their activity because that would have meant bringing to their mountains the very conditions they had escaped [21]. Very definitely they did not want to share. Second, the activity was pursued away from the public eye, in places so remote that spectators had to be climbers anyway. It was an activity pursued for the doing of and not for the watching of and it escaped attention in a way that sports such as football could not. At the

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[21]This is one side of a continuing debate on increased use of mountain wilderness areas. However, the arguments are usually couched in terms of the effect such use will have on the environment.

same time, third, the remoteness of the suitable environments limited those who did climb to a relatively small number that could afford it. Even after cheap, mass transportation opened many of the Alpine valleys, it still took a long time to get there and not many people had the leisure time to undertake the journey nor enough money to buy equipment and hire guides. As a sport, then, climbing was limited to the middle and upper classes: men of academic, scientific and religious callings and men from business, the arts and public life (Davis, 1946:166). They wanted to preserve the integrity, as they saw it, of their privileged activity and were loath to include the other classes: they even acted condescendingly toward the uncouth guides upon whom they depended.

Fourth, the degree of jeopardy which these people sought and exposed themselves to was not that which was considered normal for the average person. Ordinary everyday life was structured to decrease jeopardy and the risks inherent in climbing were considered excessive. Consider a reaction to the Matterhorn deaths of 1865 in *The Times*:

> But in the few short moments a member of the Alpine Club has to survey his life when he finds himself slipping, he has a sorry account to give for himself. What is he doing there and what right has he to throw away the gift of life and ten thousand golden opportunities in an emulation which he only shares with skylarks, apes, cats and squirrels? (Clarke, 1976:69).

This was an expression of a general opinion of climbing and climbers which has persisted. It embodied a sense of the futility of the sport but it was tinged with an admiration for climbing feats and this supported the belief that climbers were different to ordinary folk; a difference which class barriers exaggerated. At worst, climbers were anachronisms; at best they were social anomolies. For their part, climbers viewed ordinary life with a conceit, an impatience, because by their standards daily life was dull; there was a deficiency of jeopardy and this made it rather humdrum. They were above it, often literally, and so regarded themselves as different. Both of these situations reinforced and exacerbated each other. The more climbers thought they were different and acted differently to non-climbers, the more non-climbers thought climbers were different and acted toward them to further legitimate that difference. All of these factors served to differentiate the emerging subculture from the larger societies in Europe but at the same time they helped to make the people who climbed more of a cohesive group than just a collection of individuals.

In many ways, the people who climbed had a common social background and so brought to the activity similar values, beliefs and attitudes. In effect, they viewed the activity

through the same set of social spectacles. We have seen, for example, how the notion of difficulty went unchallenged in Muscular Christianity and how it was expressed in climbing. We have seen, also, how individualism was an unquestioned premise that fueled the drive to search for difficulty. This shared view, then, of what was good, what was worth pursuing and how one should behave, took on a permanence in climbing in the form of the range of objectives. The jeopardy, the uncertainty, and the physical environment became a legitimate combination of some considerable social value for these people and to a large extent this basic pattern has supported the subculture ever since. It became a focal point, a nexus of unity, around which the negotiations over regulative rules has taken place. It fostered a *Gemeinschaft*-like set of relationships between climbers that, in many cases, has been strong enough to transcend national boundaries. These relations, in turn, gave credence to the authority of the social practices which had produced the activity and a cycle of mutual reinforcement was set up in the form of social constraints that relied on the power of tradition. To the climbers of the 19th century, jeopardy, difficulty and uncertainty were inextricably linked in the climbing context and the context itself was imbued with a reality. And, because the range of objectives still has the basic pattern, that reality is reproducible under multifarious physical conditions. This is possible, though, only with two antecedent conditions: a shared conceptual framework and a shared experience of using the framework.

The framework produced for climbing did a number of things which, when added together, helped to generate social reality. It defined the jeopardy, difficulty, uncertainty and physical environment as appropriate; it established the ranges of means considered sufficient to support the jeopardy, difficulty and uncertainty in light of the physical environment; it distinguished climbing from other activities; it distinguished those who climbed with style and those who did not, the hard men and the ordinary climber; it provided a set of demarcation points within which one can act. In effect, it set out a common notion of what being a climber entailed and, therefore, set out what constituted the social reality of climbing. It was, then, a constraint because it defined worth, standards of achievement and ranges of sufficient means in an *a priori* fashion. It structured expectancies toward appropriate social practices and these expectancies were of sufficient strength to guide behavior in the absence of explicit, formal rules. They derived their force from the simple fact that an ascent was judged to be of worth and given meaning only by other people who shared the conceptual framework. Non-climbers,

who did not have access to the framework, could not view the achievement in anything but a highly generalized, and from their point of view pejorative, perspective. They could not appreciate the achievement and did not have access to its meaning within the framework because they lacked that most vital ingredient that differentiated them from climbers; namely, the shared experience.

The shared experience of climbing was very important to the social reproduction of the climbing context and its reality. First, it fostered a unity among climbers that circumscribed and sustained the *Gemeinschaft* of the climbing collective. One, admittedly extreme, example of this was the intense *Gemeinschaft* of mind experienced by Reinhold Messner on his and Habeler's ascent of Hidden Peak in 1975:

> All the time I thought of us as a single unit. Although we were not roped together, we felt like a roped party. We were a self-created entity. There was something synchronous about the way we thought, the way we did things. A short glance was enough to ascertain the other's intention and frame of mind, to know and do what the other wanted. It wasn't just shared exploits in the past that gave us this heightened mutual understanding; it was also the extreme tension we were sharing now. And our feeling of one-ness grew, along with our concentration, the nearer we drew to the summit. Peter kept saying the same thing that I had thought a moment before. But it was not even necessary to speak to feel the communication flow between us. Even 20 or 40 paces apart, the one senses what the other did, saw or thought. And always the one climbing ahead had the responsibility for finding the best passage, the second following unconditionally, behind. The change of lead, whilst not precise, took place around every 200 metres (Messner, 1977: 185).

We should notice here the mutuality, reciprocity and unconditional nature of this relationship, but we should not make too much of the apparent close friendship between the two men. As Donnelly (1982) has noted, this kinship of the rope does not produce close friendships very often despite the mutual dependency needed to climb. But then close friendships are not really necessary to create and sustain a perception of climbing as a fraternity or, for that matter, to generate a shared reality. It is enough that one's expectancies are structured sufficiently, that through the shared experience of what it is to be a climber one knows that other climbers will in fact behave according to the expectations engendered in the framework. Thus it is possible, as the recent Canadian Everest Expedition indicated so plainly, for a climbing party to fragment and collapse and yet members can still climb together (Bratton, 1983). This can be accomplished despite a lack of friendship only because of the more important, second, contribution made by experience.

The use of the conceptual framework provides a necessary condition for knowing what it is to be a climber. For the social reality of climbing to be produced and reproduced it is

necessary that those producing and reproducing it do in fact know what to create and how to create it. One must know the ranges of sufficiency and objectives of climbing, one must have the use of the conceptual framework of climbing, and one must apply this in the appropriate environment. For example, it is not enough to have an acquaintance with what a belay system is or how it works. Rather, one must use it and it is only in the using of it that one can come to know how it is a part of the social reality of climbing; and it is only when this occurs can one reproduce that reality and its social practices. It is on the rock, then, that the conceptual framework of climbing, and all it entails, comes together with an experience of the environment to produce the social reality of climbing and the fact that the experience and framework are held in common among climbers ensures that they can produce and reproduce a common social reality. It is the common social reality, therefore, which supports and sustains the *Gemeinschaft* collective of climbing. It constrains climbers in such an effective way that one can climb alone or with someone who is not even a friend and still be said to be climbing in style because one knows what is expected and one conforms. In a very real sense one cannot do much else for when one climbs in style the experience of the rock reinforces the conceptual framework, and *vice versa*, so that doubt is suspended. And if doubt is suspended then the social reality becomes more firmly embedded and takes on a permanency of tradition or to put it another way the more the ranges of subjects and objects coincide with experience on the rock, the stronger the conviction that the social reality is correct and the less susceptible it is to change. In this way, the constitutive elements of climbing, those characteristics of the activity which make it a unique context, have remained intact. They provide a unique context that has been and continues to be a departure point for social transformation: it is the social constraints which enable climbers to reproduce the climbing context and which form a structure within which they can transform their social practices.

We have noted that the framework and its application come together on the rock. We have noted further, that at the level of generality the context has not changed and that the constitutive pattern of jeopardy, difficulty, uncertainty and physical environment has been consistently reproduced. Within these constraints, however, the social practices of climbing have changed quite drastically. The notion of individuality has been kept alive in the context by the very pattern of the context because the constraints which make the activity so uncertain and remote, also allow for the possibility of any individual climber transforming the

framework, not in its generality but in its particularity. This is to say that on any single ascent, the social practices of climbing may be transformed. For such transformation to occur several initial conditions are required. First, there must be some doubt raised as to the appropriateness of both the ranges of means and objectives in the conceptual framework. The methods used on a particular climb and the resultant jeopardy must be called into question. Either the means or the objectives must be considered deficient or excessive. Second, the doubt can only be raised when the conceptual framework does not coincide with experience and this is only possible, third, when the framework is used on the rock. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, according to Leslie Stephen (Clarke, 1976: 80):

> First, a mountain would be "inaccessible". Then it would be "the most difficult point in the Alps", followed by "a good hard climb but nothing out of the way". The next step downward made it "a perfectly straight-forward bit of work". Finally, it became "an easy day for a lady".

As the range of objectives becomes marked and more narrow, a climb becomes easier. The activity is more work-like than play-like because the jeopardy has decreased and so doubt is raised.

After doubt has been raised and the ranges of subjects and objects are no longer taken for granted, then three more conditions are required for transformation. First, negotiations begin over the appropriate means and results. Second, alternate ranges of sufficiency must be put forward and then, third, they must be tried out on the rock. If they yield the desired result, then they are adopted in place of the old range. If they do not yield the desired result, then further adjustments are made in the light of the experience. Thus we can note that a first ascent establishes a range of sufficiency of means for that particular climb and every climber who follows can and does either reinforce the range as appropriate and therefore he reproduces it or he re-defines it. He may use the same means, more means or less means and with successive experiences a settled and legitimate range is negotiated for that climb.

Quite clearly, then, doubt is a precursor of transformation and it can be prompted by social forces from two entirely different sources. First, it can arise in a comparison between social practices within the climbing subculture and those in the rest of society. Since climbers are members of the larger group, they will observe new techniques or inventions in other contexts and wonder whether they can be tried on the rock. In this way, such artifical aids as bolts, nylon ropes, and the like have been introduced to climbing. Sometimes these new practices are accepted, sometimes they are not, but their adoption or rejection is the result of

intense negotiation about whether they fall within the range of sufficiency of means that supports the constitutive objectives. If they decrease the amount of jeopardy or difficulty and hence increase the certainty, then they will be rejected. The fierce debate over bolting is one example of this, for by using bolts the difficulty imposed by the rock is negated and the range of objectives becomes narrower and marked. This debate climaxed in 1970 when Cesare Maestri and his team climbed Cerro Tarre in Patagonia. Using a gasoline-powered compressor they built a staircase of bolts in order to reach the summit and their efforts received widespread condemnation because they had used excessive means and reached the summit with a deficiency of jeopardy. Bolting is now considered unsporting by the majority of climbers. On the other hand, such advances in synthetic materials that made possible the manufacture of new boots, ropes, helmets, clothes and other paraphenalia have been accepted because they add comfort or safety to the ascent without altering the jeopardy.

A second source of doubt arises within the *Gemeinschaft*-like collective itself as climbers find that their expectancies, structured by the conceptual framework, do not coincide with experience. This results from either a search for unclimbed peaks and routes or from the dissatisfaction of a previously accomplished ascent. It results from a comparison between climbers, a social phenomenon that Donnelly (1981b) has termed competition. Competition differentiates climbers according to achievement and it was inherent in the initial production of the activity as a sport. It followed on the heels of individualism and was thrown into greater emphasis by the adoption of difficult routes once peaks had been climbed. The difficulty of a route provided an ideal measure of who could achieve the objectives under the most adverse conditions. Thus it was that reputations were made on the basis of the first winter ascent, the first solo ascent and so on. In effect, of course, this basis of comparison serves to drive the standards of climbing upward because the social constraints that regulate the activity set a minimum standard to the degree of jeopardy. Any decrease in the standard, by employing excessive means, is negatively sanctioned and the meaning of the achievement is derided. Ascents made with excessive means pass out of the range of sufficiency and, thus, out of what constitutes climbing. They are given the name "rock engineering" or "steeplejacking", but not "climbing". The boundary between excessive and sufficient means, then, is fairly stable. However, this is not the case of the boundary between sufficiency and deficiency for it is in this area that competition occurs as to who can climb with more style than normal.

Among climbers who can achieve the minimum standard of style, that is those who can use the ranges of sufficiency correctly, there is social inequality resulting from competition. Social acclaim is given not to those who show they are as good as everyone else, that is they can meet the minimum standard, but to those who show that they are better than everyone else and this is fostered by a comparative process of who can do the more difficult climbs. Worth is granted to those who climb using what amounts to a deficiency of means and when this occurs successfully there is a transformation as ranges of sufficiency are re-defined. Transformation occurs, then, when a range of means that was considered deficient is shown to be sufficient or, to put it another way, when a traditional range of sufficiency is shown to be excessive and this is precisely what happened when Messner and Habeler climbed Hidden Peak in 1975. They showed that the super-alpine range, considered deficient for an 8,000 metre peak, was, in fact, sufficient and that the expedition range, considered sufficient, was really excessive. But we might note, here, that there is an added condition for true transformation; namely, there must be a change in social practice and not merely a change in the standard of sufficiency.

In the same way that social production and reproduction are dependent on using the conceptual framework, so transformation is dependent on the other climbers being able to achieve with the new range of sufficiency. Unless they can achieve with the new range, they will not accept it as legitimate and will not, therefore, change their social practices to accord with it. Their experiences in using the new range will determine whether it remains an ideal, a one-off, or whether it passes into ordinary usage. In the first case it might differentiate an elite group who can come close to the ideal, it might attain the status of a legend or myth, or it might serve as a goal to attain. In the second case it becomes accepted as a new way of doing things; it is taken for granted and forms part of the new social reality to be reproduced on future climbs. But such a drastic transformation that a complete re-definition of a range of means entails is a slow process in climbing due to the inevitable trials that must occur in conjunction with social negotiation over the appropriate degree of jeopardy that results and it is this degree of jeopardy that separates the elite from the ordinary in the comparative process of competition. David Hopkins (1980), for example, questioned the feasibility of Messner's and Habeler's new range of sufficiency for the majority of climbers. He did this publicly fully five years after the new standard had been set and in that time many climbers had died. But he readily acknowledged the difference between himself and Messner in being able to use the new

range and counted Messner as among the elite.

In conclusion, climbing is peculiar in its particularity. The reproduction and transformation of the context and its social practices are the result of quite different constitutive and regulative rules than those comprising the more popular sports. Individualism manifests itself within the limits imposed by social constraints; there is mutual support and reciprocity between these antithetical dimensions of social life in a way that provides for many variations among individuals. For it is the individual who climbs, who is the potential agent of change every time he climbs, who has the ability to match framework with experience, and who, as an active social agent, may alter the framework in the light of that experience and according to his wishes. He may increase or decrease the jeopardy to which he and he alone chooses to be exposed, for

> Men that hazard all
> Do it in hope of fair advantages:
> A golden mind stoops not to show of dross.
>
> William Shakespeare.

CHAPTER FIVE

LOGICAL RELATIONS

1. A Principle of Order

The task which now confronts us is one of achieving a clear explication of the range of possible relations among the four major elements which we have discussed to this point in the essay. This achievement constitutes the last step of our journey and it amounts to a synthesis of the notion of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* in such a way that we can account for their varying mixtures in particular instances of sport. In this chapter we will focus on the conceptual nature of the major elements in order that we might proceed more smoothly and with greater understanding toward the final conceptual framework. This is important because the peculiarity of the concepts, especially *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, raises problems concerning heuristic utility. We will consider these problems in some detail because without their resolution we cannot hope to use the conceptual framework. One of them concerns the principle of order and its role in inquiry.

In our discussion of what is to count as sport we outlined the use of paradigm cases in the social generation of knowledge. The paradigm cases and the agreed upon ranges of sufficiency help us to inquire of the world on the basis of sameness and otherness. The paradigm cases provide us with an *a priori* classification scheme with which we select facts and thereby perceive what is relevant and by which we reduce complexity and order the world. With the necessary and sufficient conditions of a conceptual framework and experience we can manage an achievement of knowledge but that achievement makes use of the fact that the world we experience is sufficiently similar to the paradigm cases we possess. We can only achieve knowledge if we have the use of a paradigm case that in some way is applicable to the world we inhabit. However, it is in the nature of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* that we are asserting them as ideal types: as paradigm cases they are not applicable to the real world because there is no experience sufficiently similar. This, of course, is problematic since it would appear to deny any heuristic structure in our framework by removing a necessary condition for knowledge. But ideal types are unique.

Ideal types have been used many times in the social sciences. They have been very influential in theoretical and empirical work and Max Weber remains, perhaps, the most important proponent of this device. We can turn to him to explain their unique characteristics:

> An ideal type is formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct (*Gedankenbild*). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*. (Weber, 1949: 90)

Ideal types approximate the content, focus, and intent of concepts but they have the additional purpose of advancing concept formation, from description to the construction of a theoretical system. Play, work, *Gemeinschaft*, and *Gesellschaft*, then, are accentuations that describe isolated features of the world. They are conceptual reference points, boundaries if you will, that demarcate the limits of social reality. They encompass reality and while we might not be able to use them directly in our inquiry of the world, we can use them indirectly. They act as guides to isolated parts of reality and help us to generate propositions about the world. We can justify their use, then, in that even though the concrete instances only approximate in their totality the purity of the ideal type, the ideal-typical properties act as directives to important regularities of sports as social phenomena. Even in approximation there is enough heuristic structure in the types to generate conditional propositions of the form 'If P, then Q'.

There is some doubt, however, over the utility of the propositions generated from these types. Those who have raised the doubt usually advance the argument that while propositions may be generated and they may be useful in some way, they are not actually testable propositions at all. Howard Becker (1950), for example, argues that because of the abstract nature of the ideal type, the consequent seldom follows the antecedent. Every proposition, he goes on, must be supported by a *ceteris parabus* clause. Any falsification which does occur in empirical inquiry, therefore, will falsify the *ceteris parabus* clause and leave the proposition intact. On the basis of this he concludes that ideal types have no testable and empirical content because they are immune to falsification. This is a very ingeneous argument but it rests on two rather shaky premises. The first is that there has never been a claim for empirical content of ideal types, unless one wants to count those claims based on reification. The types are conceptual accentuations of reality and it would be foolish indeed to state this and then in the next breath state that they do after all coincide with that reality. Second, empirical inquiry,

especially in science, is rarely normative and because of this we do not necessarily need a *ceteris parabus* clause. We would need one only if the ideal type has empirical content and since it does not then the most we can expect is that it structure our expectations with respect to the object of our inquiry. And this, the ideal type can do. Let us admit, therefore, that in principle there is no impediment to our use of ideal types.

The question we should now pose is can we use play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as ideal types? The obvious answer to this is that we can use them in any way that we think is theoretically beneficial as long as we remain consistent in our application. As simple and somewhat naive as this may sound it is in fact a reasonably good answer because we have formulated these major elements as extreme types at least and it does not need any distortion to regard them as ideal types. In the case of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* they were originally formulated by Toennies as ideal types and they have continued to be so regarded. Play and work, though, are more commonly treated as extreme types but in our discussion of them we did accentuate certain characteristics: namely, the accentuation of possibility in play and the accentuation of certainty in work. Neither condition can be supported with any empirical evidence but they remain as objectively probable as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and have the same theoretical benefits. However, in positing all four major elements as ideal types we are in fact making our task more difficult than it at first appears.

One of the major difficulties of using ideal types is that they represent rather sterile categories. As logical, distinct and non-variable classes they exhibit the characteristics of classificatory or natural types except that they have no empirical content. Moreover, they are quite simple to use: on the basis of the stated properties a social phenomenon either belongs to the class or it does not. The problem, though, is that in every case the class is an empty one and it is difficult to see how this can be useful in inquiry. Nor is the sterility of such classes changed in any significant way if we take an empirical phenomonon and see how much it approximates the ideal type. The non-variable nature of the class would give us no idea of a comparison and in any case the empirical phenomenon would still be excluded. All empirical phenomena would belong to the complementary class and this would not help at all. But this difficulty rests on the use of an ideal type in isolation. It is its singular use which makes the class sterile and we can obviate this difficulty by using the types in pairs.

The advantages of using ideal types in pairs arise from the simple notion of a continuum. If we regard two ideal types as conceptual reference points in the manner of extreme types and the logical gap between them as social reality, then logically and empirically the major characteristic of that gap is dispersion. This is to say that social reality can be represented by a continuum that uses the degree to which the properties of either ideal type is approximated in the empirical reality. By using them in this fashion we can make the process of inquiry truly comparative because the principle of order uses a serial array or, in reference to our previous discussion, the continuum is a gradation of otherness with addition. It will yield an understanding of phenomena in terms of the sociological notion of dialectical relationships.

We have assumed that the world is a complex of processes. It is also an assumption that the world has an unfinished quality; it is not static, but rather there is a state of flux perceived against a background of permanence. Nowhere is this more readily observed than in that part of the world which we have termed the social. The social world is dynamic. Entities and individuals change and in the social relation, homoeomerous properties become anomoeomerous. They change from similarity to otherness and this is a dialectical conception. It is a conception to which we are implicitly committed because of the assumptions that we have made, especially those concerning the use of reason as a mediator between the group and the individual. The relation of mutual mediation in the social relation is dialectical. The reciprocity between individuals and between individuals and social entities is dialectical. The social contradiction between the individual and his subordination to the social entity is dialectical. The notions of necessity and free will are dialectical and even the view of science as a relation of assertion and falsification is dialectical. Most of all, for this discussion, the notions of excess and deficiency are dialectical. We must view the ideal types, then, as relative to each other. Each ideal type stands in a relation to the other of the pair and that relation is represented by the continuum. In this fashion we can treat them as extreme types.

A primary characteristic of extreme types is the notion of polarity. According to Mirkovic (1980: 46), "polarity denotes two contrary qualities at two opposing points of the same body". It is a characteristic of the world that this polarity, this opposition and contradiction, is perceived as simultaneous or nearly so. It is a property; the homoeomerous-anomoeomerous dichotomy within a phenomenon. These properties can take various qualitative forms, such as actual and possible or continuity and discontinuity, but each

polarity is contained within the other. In actuality there is possibility and in continuity there is discontinuity. But the property is also a relation in that there is a unity of opposites; that, given the complexity of the world as relation and change, there is a passage from one extreme to the other; from possible to actual, from continuity to discontinuity, and *vice versa*. The passage from one extreme to the other, represented by the continuum, is a relation of becoming and it is a reciprocal relation. In our conception of sport and social relations we have two sets of extremes that have a dialectical relationship. There is the unity of play and work, and the unity of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and the continuum is a becoming of play into work and *Gemeinschaft* into *Gesellschaft*, and *vice versa*. From this we can generate a proposition to represent each continuum. These are:

6.0 All sport is play-like and work-like; and

7.0 All social relations are *Gemeinschaft*-like and *Gesellschaft*-like.

This relationship is additive to the domination-subordination relation of the classificatory type and it is a legitimate attempt to represent the nature of a dynamic social world. And, in using extreme types, we can dispense with the notion of presence or absence of properties and replace it with the notion of the continuum because the continuum is more useful in terms of relationships. It is a comparative device which, in using a serial array, will allow the categorization of concrete phenomena in terms of the primacy or prevalence of one or the other opposite. Each concrete phenomenon will contain both opposites but it will have more of one than the other. But this rests on a very important assumption.

In order to treat the ideal types in this manner and gain the considerable heuristic structure that such a view affords, we must assume that it is legitimate to regard these specific ideal types as opposites. This is a condition for the use of a continuum and in our case it is problematic. The problem, though, lies more with *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* than it does with play and work. Play and work are commonly used as extreme or polar types in the sociology of sport (cf. Loy, 1978) and as we have formulated them the notion of possibility stands in opposition to the notion of certainty. With *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, on the other hand, it is difficult to see how essential will and arbitrary will stand in opposition at all. We gave some thought to this in the discussion of social relations and asserted that the two types were contradictory. However, this problem is very important so we should examine it at greater length.

The problem involves the notion of inverse correlation. The main criterion that must be satisfied is that, given two properties in opposition, as one property increases then the other property necessarily decreases. Is this the case with *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*? Among Toenniesian scholars there is a consensus that the two types are antithetical. Jacoby (1973: 76), for example, notes that Toennies constructed the types "as limits of a continuum in the degree of predominance of either natural volition or rational reflection"[29]. Parsons, in *The Structure of Social Action* (1968:) takes a stance that he will later contradict (see below) and says in a footnote, "These are, of course, polar types, so there is a transition between them". They are polar to the extent that constraint opposes freedom and an emphasis on the group opposes an emphasis on the individual. As freedom increases, so constraint decreases. As more emphasis is placed on the group, so less emphasis is placed on the individual. Or, "If *Gemeinschaft* weakens, to the extent that it weakens, *Gesellschaft* must take its place" (Cahnman, 1973: 112).

Such consensus, of course, does not necessarily constitute the truth of inverse correlation in this case. The experts could be mistaken and one particular argument has been put forward to show that they are mistaken. Two major proponents of the counter-view were Herman Schmalenbach and Talcott Parsons. Their main premise asserts that under some circumstances *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* vary independently. To show that this is the case, Schmalenbach (1922) posited the notion of *Bund* or a covenant and Parsons (1973) posited the notion of *Professional role*, as third categories. But, as Toennies responded to *Bund* in the Preface of the sixth and seventh editions of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* and as Cahnman replied to Parsons in the Introduction of *Ferdinand Toennies: A New Evaluation* (1973: 13-14), there is no need of these extra categories. The mistake that Schmalenbach and Parsons made was to assume that because *Bund* and *Professional role* do not fit exactly into either *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*, they do actually constitute a third category. On Toennies reasoning such a lack of fit is due to the mixture of social reality:

> All relations, collectives and corporations are communal (*Gemeinschaft*-like) in character to the extent to which they rest on immediate and mutual affirmation, that is, on essential will; they are associational (*Gesellschaft*-like) to the extent to which the affirmation rests on rational considerations, that is, arbitrary will. (Toennies, 1963: XLV)

Parsons, particularly, is confused in this respect. In *The Structure of Social Action* (1968) he

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[29]He is using the Loomis (1957) translation and thus the terms natural and rational.

refers to *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as "concrete types of relationship" and "ideal types of concrete relationship". Clearly, both statements cannot be true.

One final word on this matter is in order here because it really sums up the peculiar conceptual nature of ideal types, their relation to each other and the heuristic structure that they afford. Speaking of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, but it is just as applicable to our conceptions of play and work, Toennies stated:

> Observation and inference will easily show that no natural will can ever occur empirically without rational will by which it finds expression, and no rational will without natural will on which it is based. But the strict distinction between these normal concepts enables us to discern the existing empirical tendencies toward one or the other. They can co-exist and mutually serve each other, but on the other hand, to the extent that each aspires to power and control, they will necessarily contradict and oppose each other . . .(1957: 141)

Gemeinschaft and *Gesellschaft* co-exist and oppose each other in social relations and play and work co-exist and oppose each other in sport. And in this they conform to a certain logic.

2. *Logical Structure*

There are two different kinds of relations that need to concern us. One kind is the relation between the extremes engendered in each pair of ideal types and the other kind is the relation between the antecedent pair and the consequent pair. The first kind offers a comparative relation and the second kind a causal relation. Both kinds of relations make use of the notion of sameness and otherness but they differ in their application in empirical inquiry. The comparative relation yields a description and the causal relation yields an explanation. Both of them are necessary if the sociology of sport is to continue the journey toward understanding. We will deal with the comparative relation first.

The unity of opposites as co-existent contradictions implies the uneven development of empirical phenomena. In the production and reproduction of social life there is usually a predominance of one set of properties within the mixture of the sets from the paired ideal types. Moreover, in the transformation of social life there is the passage from one extreme to the other involving a shift in the predominance and a state whereby there is an equal amount of both sets of properties. Where there is a predominance there is an asymmetrical relation that has the form 'C is more A than it is B' and where there is no predominance there is a symmetrical relation of the form 'C is just as much A as it is B'. Thus, any point on the continuum between the paired types will satisfy one of three conditions. If A and B represent

the two extremes and C represents an empirical phenomenon, the conditions are:

(i) C is more A than it is B;

(ii) C is just as much A as it is B; and

(iii) C is more B than it is A.

These conditions, because the continuum represents social reality, are mutually exhaustive and are, therefore, very useful in generating propositions.

We can generate propositions from these conditions by substitution. We can substitute C with sport and social relations and we can substitute A and B with play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. However, since the whole continuum between play and work represents sport (see proposition 6.0) and the whole continuum between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* represents social relations (see proposition 6.0), we cannot use the quantitative 'All'. Each condition will permit us, as a part of the whole, to use only the quantitative 'Some'. Thus, by substitution we have:

6.1 Some sport is more play-like than it is work-like;

6.2 Some sport is just as much play-like as it is work-like;

6.3 Some sport is more work-like than it is play-like;

7.1 Some social relations are more *Gemeinschaft*-like than they are *Gesellschaft*-like;

7.2 Some social relations are just as much *Gemeinschaft*-like as they are *Gesellschaft*-like;

7.3 Some social relations are more *Gesellschaft*-like than they are *Gemeinschaft*-like.

In each case the proposition would describe an empirical phenomenon and allow us to discriminate between phenomena on the basis of otherness with addition: the difference being given by variance in predominance that is additive. And because the continuum is representative of social reality, we are able to account for every possible relation between each pair of types; those relations being embodied in the possible combinations of each set of properties. Any empirical phenomenon, therefore, can be located somewhere on the continuum.

Moreover, any empirical phenomenon can be designated according to its location on either continuum. This would give us the following designations:

(i) Play-like: sport that is more play-like than it is work-like;

(ii) Play-work: sport that is just as much play-like as it is work-like;

(iii) Work-like: Sport that is more work-like than it is play-like;

(iv) *Gemeinschaft*-like: a social relation that is more *Gemeinschaft*-like than it is *Gesellschaft*-like;

(v) *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*: a social relation that is just as much *Gemeinschaft* as it is *Gesellschaft*;

(vi) *Gesellschaft*-like: a social relation that is more *Gesellschaft* than it is *Gemeinschaft*.

These are, then, descriptive terms for the various sport phenomena on the one hand and the various social relations on the other.

The causal relation, however, is much more complex than this simple comparative relation. For one thing we have to account for all of the variance on the one continuum as a result of any variance on the other continuum. We must, somehow, keep as much variance as possible and to complicate matters we have to account for either continuum as an antecedent of the other. However, we should aim at the generation of conditional propositions and we can do this by taking two small, simple steps.

The first step is to outline the possible combinations of the elements that comprise sport and social relations. We do this to indicate the possible relations between them and the most effective way is to make use of a Venn diagram. In Figure 1 the universe of discourse is the social reality of sport and the elements of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are represented as classes in the manner of classificatory types. In this arrangement several things are evident. First, all of the classes intersect to give sub-classes of various combinations of two, three and four elements. Second, there are four sub-classes which are not the result of intersection. These sub-classes denote the ideal types of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and they have been marked as empty. Third, where there is intersection, nine sub-classes result and they fall into two distinct groups. There is one group of four comprised of combinations of two elements and there is one group of five comprised of three and four elements. We are concerned with these two groups but we will save them for discussion until after we have taken the second step.

The second step is to lay out a general model of explanation in causal terms. Using Bosley's (1982) mode of criticism, a cause is a range of factors necessary and jointly sufficient for an effect. This has the conditional form of 'If (f1. . .,fi), then E'. Now to give an



Figure 1: The Logic of the Relations Between the Major Elements.

explanation we must do two things: we must show that the range of factors is sufficient for the effect and we must show that the effect depends upon the range. This implies, of course, that there is a temporal difference between the operation of the range and the effect being brought about and we can designate this with the terms antecedent condition and consequent condition, terms that will help us to examine the two groups of sub-classes. Let us turn our attention to one of these groups; the group comprised of five sub-classes.

In very general terms the group of five sub-classes indicates a combination of sport and social relations. The group represents empirical phenomena classified according to various degrees of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and what we must do now is specify which are the antecedent conditions and which are the consequent conditions. In our previous discussion we emphasized that a social relation is an antecedent condition of sport. This is to say that sport cannot occur without the presence of a social relation *a priori* and from this notion we can derive the statement:

8.0 If social relation, then sport.

But we should admit, also, that sport can be an antecedent condition of a social relation. Sport can be a context in which social relations can be produced, reproduced and transformed. From this notion we can derive the statement:

9.0 If sport, then social relation.

Therefore, we can assert that in any one of the five sub-classes in this group one of these two propositions will be true.

We can derive further propositions from these two general ones by substituting the elements of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* for the major concepts. We would have to do it, though, according to the designations for the empirical phenomena and as suggested by the Venn diagram. To make the process easier to understand and to enable us to substitute systematically, let us number the five sub-classes (See Figure 2) and deal with each one separately. It will help, also, if we number the propositions according to the previous two general statements (8.0 and 9.0). (See Appendix B for a summary of ordered propositions.)

In sub-class 1 the following propositions will be true:

8.1 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.4 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then play-like;



Figure 2: Sub-class Numeration.

8.7 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-like;

9.1 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.2 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.3 If play-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like.

In sub-class 2 the following propositions will be true:

8.1 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.2 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-work;

8.3 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then work-like;

9.1 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.4 If play-work, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.7 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like.

In sub-class 3 the following propositions will be true:

8.3 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then work-like;

8.6 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then work-like;

8.9 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then work-like;

9.7 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.8 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.9 If work-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like.

In sub-class 4 the following propositions will be true:

8.7 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.8 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-work;

8.9 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then work-like;

9.3 If play-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like;

9.6 If play-work, then *Gesellschaft*-like;

9.9 If work-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like.

In sub-class 5 the following propositions will be true:

8.1 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.2 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-work;

8.3 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then work-like;

8.4 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then play-like;

8.5 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then play-work;

8.6 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then work-like;

8.7 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.8 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-work;

8.9 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then work-like;

9.1 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.2 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.3 If play-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like.

9.4 If play-work, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.5 If play-work, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.6 If play-work, then *Gesellschaft*-like.

9.7 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.8 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.9 If work-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like.

This set of propositions is very unwieldy and this is due in large part to all of the possible causal relations for which we must account. However, there is a simple schematic way in which this set can be represented. To construct it we need to return to the simplicity of the two continua that we asserted as models of sport and social relations. The continua are linear models whose various parts correspond to the various sub-sets of the set of propositions just outlined and we must structure them so that the range of each one is kept to a maximum while reflecting the antecedent conditions of sport and social relations. In other words we must relate the continua to each other in such a way that each proposition we have generated remains intact. The only configuration which would satsfy this criterion would be if the continua intersect and that they do so orthogonally. Such a configuration is illustrated in Figure 3 and

one or two things are noticable straight away. First, the continua intersect at the theoretical point of equilibrium or where the condition 'C is just as much A as it is B' is true for both continua. Second, quadrants are produced and because the continua intersect at their mid-points these quadrants are theoretically of equal size.

Such a division which this configuration provides is very useful theoretically. What it amounts to is a four-fold division of the social reality of sport on the basis of prevalence of the ideal-typical properties. This is to say that because we can locate any empirical phenomenon on either continuum and because either continuum can be antecedent to the other, then we can locate any empirical phenomenon in this two-dimensional space. Moreover, we can assert that those empirical phenomena will cluster into four general groups on the basis of sameness of prevalence. Any empirical phenomenon of sport, then, will tend toward one of the quadrants in this configuration and this would indicate that under any of the conditions we have stipulated we can, in fact, distinguish one particular from another. We can do this for a description and for an explanation in a comparative way and we can do it for a single particular over time and thereby account for change.

This division of the social reality of sport, even if we regard it only in terms of general tendencies, conforms to the notion of prevalence. But instead of using one continuum to represent it, we now have a two-dimensional space and the use of two sets of ideal-typical properties. We can indicate this two-dimensinal prevalence with statements of the form 'C is more A and B than it is D or E' to show asymmetry and statements of the form 'C is just as much A as it is B,D, and E' to show symmetry. We would, then, have five statements of prevalence: one corresponding to each of the quadrants in the configuration and one statement for the point at which the continua intersect. In this way we could designate the empirical phenomena in their respective quadrants but in a theoretical way we could extend the notion of prevalence so that a limit of particularity is reached and then extend it further to construct new ideal types. We could, then, accentuate the combinations accounted for in using the continua in the configuration and these accentuations would correspond to the group of four sub-classes in the Venn diagram.



Figure 3: The Structure of the Continua.

3. The Framework Disclosed

The four sub-classes, which we have not yet discussed, constitute a group characterized by combinations of two elements. But because they are formed by the intersection of only two elements and because each of those elements is an ideal type, then these four sub-classes are all ideal types. Diagrammatically, the same result obtains by extending orthogonally each ideal type at the extremes of the continua. The resultant intersections locate the new ideal types within the structure. They are formed by combining *Gemeinschaft* and play, *Gemeinschaft* and work, *Gesellschaft* and play, and *Gesellschaft* and work. In Figure 2 these sub-classes are numbered 6, 7, 8, and 9 but in order to show them in the schematic model we will follow sociological tradition and assign names to them. The names are Greek and they embody the inherent notion of each combination of the major elements. However, these names do not correspond exactly to these notions and, therefore, they should not be considered as paradigm cases. The names are assigned as follows:

(i) *Gemeinschaft*-play is given the name **ASCESIS**[30];

(ii) *Gemeinschaft*-work is given the name **ATHLOR**[31];

(iii) *Gesellschaft*-play is given the name **PAIDIA**[32];

(iv) *Gesellschaft*-work is given the name **KERDOS**[33]. (See Figure 4).

And we can describe these ideal types in terms of their accentuated properties

In the ideal type **ASCESIS**, the following propositions will hold:

1.0 Play is a sufficiency of social constraints for possibility;

4.0 A *Gemeinschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction.

In the ideal type **ATHLOR**, the following propositions will hold:

2.0 Work is a sufficiency of social constraints for certainty;

4.0 A *Gemeinschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction.

In the ideal type **PAIDIA**, the following propositions will hold:

1.0 Play is a sufficiency of social constraints for possibility;

5.0 A *Gesellschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for transformation.

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[30]Exercise, practice, or training. See Plato's *Republic* (1974, 403d-404c).
[31]Prize for a contest. The plural is **Athlos**.
[32]Child's play.
[33]Gain, profit.



Figure 4: The Conceptual Framework

In the ideal type **KERDOS**, the following propositions will hold:

2.0 Work is a sufficiency of social constraints for certainty;

5.0 A *Gesellschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for transformation.

As ideal types, **ASCESIS**, **PAIDIA**, **ATHLOR** and **KERDOS** constitute the boundaries of the social reality of sport. That reality is represented by the two-dimensional space between the types and we can depict this representation with an allegory. Consider the framework, with its square shape, as a two-dimensional fish tank. Along each side of the tank are colored lights that represent the variable concepts. Across the top of the tank the lights are red, down the left side they are green, down the right side blue, and across the bottom the lights are yellow. Each row of lights has a pure colored light at one end and each successive light in the row diminishes in color. Thus, the red row, for example corresponding to *Gemeinschaft* and play, has a pure red light at the top left corner of the tank. This is the **ASCESIS** ideal type and the further away from this light we travel along the top the less red the lights. In the tank are white fish which correspond to the empirical phenomena of sport. Each fish is a single phenomenon. As they swim around, they take on the color of the lights nearest to them. All fish will be a different color depending on where each is in the tank. However, none will be white, although those in the exact centre of the tank will be more white than the others because they are further away from all the lights, and none will be a pure color. All of the fish will be a combination of colors and these colors change as they swim around the tank. But there will be patterns to the coloring. The fish in each quadrant of the tank can be grouped together on the basis of hue. There will be four patterns: 1) reddish hue; 2) greenish hue; 3) yellowish hue; and 4) blueish hue. These patterns correspond to the empirical phenomena that group together in the quadrants of the framework; they approximate one of the ideal types according to predominance, but all are sport since they all have the sufficiency. In the fish tank, all are fish.

The notion of social constraint can be represented in the fish tank allegory if we insert feeding nozzles all round the tank and feed the top of the tank food A. Food A is the expectations transmitted to individuals. The bottom of the tank is fed foods B,C . . . Z. Now we can posit some fish as more dependent on food A. They will swim near the top of the tank where there are nozzles that dispense food A. They tend to be dependent on that type of food and are determined to swim there forever. The fish which are less dependent on food A

congregate nearer the nozzles that have other types of food although they can feed from any nozzle round the tank. They can swim anywhere in the tank since they are independent and there swimming territory is not determined by the type of food they eat. The challenge to all the fish is to swim away from the nozzles, away from the tank boundaries, and the fish keep swimming. There is a constant change in the position of all fish. In the real world, sport phenomena manifest similar changes. They have a constant dynamism as the predominance of play, work, *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft* changes and oscillates within the dialectical unity of opposites.

In terms of the propositions already asserted, we can describe the empirical phenomena of sport as they approximate each of the ideal types. For those which approximate the ideal type **ASCESIS**, the following propositions will hold:

6.1 Some sport is more play-like that it is work-like;
7.1 Some social relations are more *Gemeinschaft*-like than they are *Gesellschaft*-like;

For those which approximate the ideal type **PAIDIA**, the following propositions will hold:

6.1 Some sport is more play-like than it is work-like;
7.3 Some social relations are more *Gesellschaft*-like than they are *Gemeinschaft*-like;

For those which approximate the ideal type **ATHLOR**, the following propositions will hold:

6.3 Some sport is more work-like than it is play-like;
7.1 Some social relations are more *Gemeinschaft*-like than they are *Gesellschaft*-like;

For those which approximate the ideal type **KERDOS**, the following propositions will hold:

6.3 Some sport is more work-like than it is play-like;
7.3 Some social relations are more *Gesellschaft*-like than they are *Gemeinschaft*-like;

These propositions are assertions to the effect that any one set of two will be true of any

empirical phenomenon of sport. And to provide a mode of criticism they must be accompanied by statements that are potential falsifiers.

A potential falsifier is a statement which is contradictory to a proposition asserted as true and they can be derived logically. In the logic of the framework, the propositions disclosed above can be falsified by showing that the sub-classes designated as empty in the Venn diagram (See Figure 2) are occupied. This would be accomplished by showing that the following statements are applicable to one or more empirical phenomena of sport:

10.0 Some sport has no elements of play;

11.0 Some sport has no elements of work;

12.0 Some social relations have no elements of *Gemeinschaft*; and

13.0 Some social relations have no elements of *Gesellschaft*.

These, of course, would falsify the approximation to ASCESIS, PAIDIA, ATHLOR and KERDOS and if this is accomplished we would have to give very serious consideration to abandoning this framework.

If we were to search for evidence that would falsify our class of basic statements, strictly speaking we would need to find only one empirical phenomenon that would occupy any of the sub-classes in the class of potential falsifiers. This is so because one occupant of a sub-class warrants the quantifier 'Some' and it need only be one to contradict the 'All' of the universal statements we have made. Logically, therefore, falsification by one empirical phenomenon constitutes a falsification of the whole framework. But this is problematic on two counts. On the first it is not at all clear what kind of evidence is sufficient for falsification in the sciences. If we take one contrary instance as sufficient, then we might lay ourselves open to the dangers of the fallacy of converse accident; nor is Popper (1968) any help in this matter because in developing the notion of falsification his criterion of sufficiency included the rather vague term 'regularity'. But how many times does an empirical phenomenon have to occur before we can say it is a regularity?

On the second count, it is part of the scientific tradition to use faulty frameworks. As Thomas Kuhn (1970) has illustrated, it is quite common for scientists to use partial, or even non-representative, frameworks in their work. And if we stretch this label of science to include sociology we can see this rather graphically in the many competing perspectives and theories that contribute to the fragmentation of sociology as a discipline: they all have faults

but they are used nonetheless. But the criteria for abandoning a framework in the scientific tradition includes falsification and the use of an alternate framework. This is to say that falsification by itself is not sufficient: there must be another framework that can be used once the first one is abandoned. Moreover, the alternate must be better, in some way, than the one it is replacing. In our case, and at the present time, there is no alternate framework; so we must continue to hold onto this one in spite of falsification. This does not mean, however, that we should do so dogmatically; for knowing it can be falsified makes our grasp of it tenuous at best and it is certainly in the spirit of this inquiry that we should surrender it willingly if an alternate is developed.

4. Using the Framework

The framework is designed for the interpretation of the social reality of sport and, due in large part to the use of Toennies' sociology, this includes the interpretation of totalities "in all their structural, structurable, and structured manifestations . . . all the depth, levels, scales and the sectors directly with the aim of following their movements of structuration, destructuration and restructuration and rupture" (Gurvitch, 1964: 11). The framework takes into account that a totality is not a static entity but a dynamic phenomenon that has mutual mediation between its parts and between the whole and parts. It recognizes that a totality has vertical depth, horizontal breadth and an internal uneven development. It recognizes the complexity of totalities within totalities, of a *communitas communitatum*, as a structured, self-creating, developing whole (Kosik, 1969) and it caters to this by enabling us to locate the totality within the two-dimensional structure.

To locate a totality within the framework we have recourse to simple description. Using the properties detailed in the analysis of sport and social relations we measure, if we can, and enumerate the relative incidence of the approximations to the ideal-typical entities **ASCESIS**, **PAIDIA**, **ATHLOR**, and **KERDOS**. By using the degree of possession of at least two properties, one of sport and one of social relations, we can utilize the scalar quality of the two continua to plot the location of the totality within the framework by cross-referencing. The important thing is to determine which ideal-typical entity the particular totality most closely resembles. This is so because the heuristic structure of the ideal-typical methodology puts great emphasis on the pattern of deviation of the particular totality, which will have only

some degree of some or all properties, from the ideal-type which, by definition, has all properties and total possession of specific properties. Thus, by describing the pattern of deviation it can be determined how many properties are or are not exhibited by the particular totality and which properties are or are not exhibited. Both of these facets are important and it should be clear from this that at its most simple the framework is a comparative device. We juxtapose a particular totality and an ideal-typical entity and describe the pattern of deviation in sport and social relations. And by noting the degree of divergence we can then proceed to investigate the reasons for the deviation with respect to the degree of possession of specific properties or with respect to the presence or absence of a number of properties. In other words, we expect to find the ideal-type, knowing full well that we will never find it, and try to determine how and why our expectations are not met.

The device makes use of the notions of sameness and otherness and this is, of course, fundamental to all inquiry but the power of this heuristic structure lies in its capacity to handle otherness with addition. It can do this in two important ways. First, we can use the framework to compare particular sport totalities. Taking them as separate totalities or as totalities within totalities we repeat the basic process of location for each one and by comparing them individually to the ideal-typicala entities we can plot their relative dispersion within the framework according to the individual patterns of deviation from the ideal-typical entities. We are then in a position to ask (a) how are two or more X's the same or different? and (b) why are they the same or different? At the same time we can question the dispersion of the totalities within the framework. Are the totalities widely dispersed? Are there clusters? Do totalities cluster within specific areas in the framework and if so, why? Is there a prevalence of an approximation to a single ideal-typical entity? Are there areas in the framework where totalities are absent? And once the pattern is established we can ask questions about the clusters along the lines of - what do sport entities in one cluster have in common and how do they differ from entities in other clusters? But the key to this is that it is possible only because the comparison is based on otherness with addition. The individual patterns of deviance use exactly the same properties and must, therefore, have some degree of sameness. Any differences, then, will be due to variations in the possession of those properties and this will be in addition to the degree of sameness.

Second, we can make the inquiry multi-dimensional. For example, we can add the notion of history to the comparative process and plot changes in particular individual totalities and groups of totalities. If we locate one or more of them within the framework at time A, repeat the process at time B, C, . . . and so on, then we could determine the pattern of change over time. We could focus on just one totality and mark the change in sport or social relations or we could mark the change in the pattern of dispersion. What it amounts to, in a non-causal way, is the addition of a third dimension to the two already in place. Figuratively speaking, it would involve stacking several two-dimensional slices one on top of the other and comparing them vertically on a third dimension. However we want to look at it, the change is viewed against a background of permanence, as some otherness with addition is relative to a background of sameness. Moreover, if we can do this with time, it seems reasonable that we can also do it with levels of particularity. In the same way that we can repeat the comparative process over time on the same units of totalities, so we can take one particular totality and compare hierarchical levels. We can take horizontal slices of particularity within a sport totality and as long as we keep to the same properties we can give an internal description of the whole according to process and product. Thus, at least in theory, there is really no limit to the number of comparisons we can make and this is an indication of the flexibility of the framework. It has the capacity to handle macro-structures and micro-structures, from a simple dyadic unit all the way up the hierarchy of particularity to a unit comprised of all humankind. Such might not be practical, of course, but it does show the power and versatility of what is, after all, a very simple idea.

If we look back at the empirical observations we have used to support the discussion we can see how this simple idea might well be employed. In the paper, *Stoop Not to Show of Dross*, for example, we noted that climbing is produced and reproduced within a *Gemeinschaft*-like subculture. The activity is a judicious blend of play and work that reproduces likelihood. Within the subculture there is an oscillation as the *Gemeinschaft* gives rise to particular practices which approximate the **ASCESIS** (*Gemeinschaft*-play) and **ATHLOR** (*Gemeinschaft*-work) ideal-typical entities. As practices such as bolting reduce uncertainty so the activity becomes work-like and there are negotiations among the climbers to introduce more play-like aspects, thereby increasing the jeopardy. Against this background of reproduction there are shifts to *Gesellschaft* when individual climbers, on the rock, transform

the practices for particular routes. As individuals they assert their capacity to doubt the given way of doing things and bring about change as the activity, for that moment, approximates **PAIDIA** (*Gesellschaft*-play) ideal-typical form when the transformation increases the jeopardy and approximates **KERDOS** ((*Gesellschaft*-work) when the transformation increases the certainty.

In *Swinging Round the Circle* we focused on the pattern of *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft*. Using the added dimension of time we observed several slices of the development of *karate* and noted a different pattern of dispersion within the framework. There were shifts in emphasis in the three elements of *do*, *kaho* and *katsu* that were, in fact, shifts between play (the uncertainty of *katsu*) and work (the certainty of *do* and *kaho*). Thus, on Okinawa the dispersion was along the **ASCESIS-ATHLOR** axis; in the United States it was along the **PAIDIA-KERDOS** axis; and in Japan it was in between these two. Moreover, there were also shifts between **ATHLOR** and **KERDOS** with the transmission to Japan and between **ATHLOR** and **PAIDIA** with the transmission to the United States as change was brought about. But perhaps the most interesting aspect of this was that we accounted for a reproduction of the activity in three different cultures and in three different historical periods. It resolved the problem of cultural and historical relativity through the notion of sufficiency. The relativity was still there but it was there in its particularity and we could still compare the practices over time and from culture to culture. It was a comparison of what constituted sufficiency.

In the cycling observations, *The Futile Decalogue of Mode*, our main concern was the explanation of a particular state of affairs at a particular point in time and there was very little concern with aspects of transformation. Within this context we focused on two levels of particulars. The conflict arose in the totality formed whenever the two clubs got together and raced. When that happened the totality approximated the **KERDOS** entity as the practices of the Spinners produced the certainty of victory while the practices of the Grinders produced the certainty of defeat. To explain this we looked at the internal relations of each club and found differences in ideologies for at this lower level of particularity the Spinners club approximated the **ATHLOR** entity and the Grinders club was in limbo somewhere between **ASCESIS**, which reflected a reproduction of their ideology, and **PAIDIA** which reflected their individualism. The Grinders were never able to achieve the unity of **ASCESIS** whereby they could race

together nor nor did they come close to **PAIDIA** whereby they could achieve a transformation to meet the spectre of defeat.

In the *karate dojo* illustration we focused on a context in which a group of strangers came together and gradually developed into a social group. From an initial *Gesellschaft* condition, and with much ignorance, their evolution began as an approximation to **PAIDIA** because they were receptive to the individual transformation of their old ways of doing things and because they could not produce certainty. As more and more rules were added and as their performance improved, so they could reproduce certainty more often and the group moved toward **ATHLOR**. They built up a unity, not unlike the Spinners' in the cycling study, by which they accepted the ranges of sufficiency and achieved internal group control. Now, the interesting thing about this is that, more than the other three, this study shows quite clearly the production and reproduction of a social relation, in this case a *Gemeinschaft*-like relation, arising from the activity itself. From the initial *Gesellschaft*-like relation, the activity evolved and the interaction which was subsequently fostered produced the *Gemeinschaft*-like relations. The activity, then, as a context, preceeded the rise of the *Gemeinschaft*.

Taken as a group, these four major studies support the claim we made about the flexibility and power of the framework. We said that it could be applied to macro- and micro-structures and we see this in these studies. We observed macro-structures in the subculture of climbing and in the diffusion of *karate*. We observed micro-structures in the two cycling clubs and in the *karate* group. We said, also, that it could be used to view totalities within totalities and we saw this in the cycling conflict and in the different belt levels in the *karate dojo*. Moreover, we have incorporated comparisons between historical periods and between cultures. It seems reasonable, therefore, that on the basis of all this we can claim some success in demonstrating its worth as a heuristic device and we can see in this the meaning of the quotation by Chu Hsi cited at the beginning of this thesis - "Unroll it, and it reaches in all directions. Roll it up, and it withdraws and lies hidden in minuteness" (Chan, 1963: 97).

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. On Reaching the End

We have now come to the end of our journey and it is as well if we take a moment to reiterate what it was that we set out to do. From the outset we have labored under the rationale that we can help to give some direction to the rather chaotic conditions of inquiry in the sociology of sport by laying down a framework in theoretical sociology and this we have done. With the aid of Bosley's (1982) mode of criticism we set out to construct a working model of elements and the range of possible relations among them (Mills, 1960). We put these elements forward as sport and social relations, taken from the literature of sociology of sport and from Toennies' sociology, and generated a theoretical framework. Moreover, we supported the theoretical framework with empirical observations for our intention has always been to put forward the framework to treat the disease of extreme empiricism. The intention was and is to affect the theoretical imbalance within the subdiscipline but having said this we must realise that such treatment lies out of our hands. Indeed, the cure rests with individual inquirers and, short of clubbing them over the head with the framework, there is little we can do to bring about change beyond that which we have already done.

The most we can do is to persuade individual inquirers that the essay is acceptable, that the framework is, in fact, worth using and we will attempt to do that in this concluding discussion. Before we do, though, we might remind ourselves that we have been emphasizing social reflection in the tradition of classic sociology and that the essay is written from a critical stance. It follows a pattern of assertion and support and comes out in favor of falsification rather than confirmation. The burden of proof, then, is not a matter for discussion. Rather, having laid down the framework, we will attempt to persuade by presenting a case that takes up two very important questions. The first of these is - in what ways does the essay contribute to an understanding of sport? And the second is - how can the framework be evaluated?

2. Contributions to Understanding

It should be abundantly clear that in this essay we have been engaged in bashing the sociology of sport. We have taken up the cudgels discarded by Dunning (1971), Krawczyk (1977) and McPherson (1978) in response to an over-abundence of facts and statistics that continues to retard the advance toward explanation. We have joined Gruneau (1978) and Ingham (1979) in posing an alternative view of the nature of the social world and we have supported it by paying considerable attention to questions of metaphysics and epistemology in coming to grips with social reality and sport. All of these scholars criticized researchers for the ways in which sociological inquiries were conducted and we have done the same but we have differed on one very important point. While previous criticisms contained accusations of wrongdoing, the point emphasized in this essay has been the recognition of a deficiency in what is usually dished up in the sociology of sport, a deficiency that we can clarify by considering a recent argument put forward by Theberge (1984).

Theberge calls for a more adequate theory of sport participation. Her argument has a disjunctive form that can be laid out in the following way.

1. The purpose of research on sport participation is to explain.
2. There are three approaches we can take to study sport participation. These are:
   a. a voluntarist approach; or
   b. a determinist approach; or
   c. a voluntarist-determinist integrated approach.
3. The voluntarist approach is defective because it under-emphasizes social structure and political factors and as such it will not yield an explanation.
4. The determinist approach is defective because it under-emphasizes the individual and as such it will not yield an explanation.
5. Therefore, the integrated approach, which under-emphasizes neither the individual or structure, is the one to take since it will yield an explanation.

On this argument we should follow the example set by Giddens (1979) according to which sport participation would be viewed as "a process by which men and women actively create their sporting lives within the constraints of particular social and political structures" (Theberge, 1984: 32).

This is an argument about what is to count as an explanation and it is confusing. The point of confusion is that when Theberge accuses the others of offering no explanation at all, she is, in fact, accusing them of offering a different explanation. In effect, Theberge has taken the explanation offered by the integrated approach and applied it to the voluntarist and determinist approaches. Not surprisingly, she finds these latter two defective and they are so because they do not, and cannot, offer the same explanation. What this amounts to is that if we accept that a perspective, a theory, a methodology and so on, are all bound up with the activity of pursuing sociological inquiries of sport and if we accept, further, that that activity proceeds according to certain rules, then Theberge is bashing people for not following the same rule as she follows. For Theberge, the rules are those of Giddens (1979). Our contention here, though, is that even when there is an over-emphasis or under-emphasis on the individual or structure, there is still an explanation and all that Theberge has shown is that they have used the argument from causal importance. This is to say that they have used some factors and ignored others but it counts as an explanation. It counts as a partial or incomplete explanation and it is, therefore, a defective form. The important point, then, is that the majority of researchers in the sociology of sport cannot offer the form of explanation Theberge requires because she and they differ on the topic of sociological explanation. Her argument, therefore, is legitimate only if the researchers accused of wrongdoing have not offered any explanation, where the activity of research is undertaken to collect brute facts. But this does no more than reiterate McPherson's (1978) critique.

In this essay we started with the assertion that any explanations offered to date were, in fact, not adequate. The voluntarist and determinist approaches are not wrong, incorrect, or what have you, they are merely incomplete and, therefore, too superficial. We have proceeded, on the other hand, along the lines of Elgin's (1975) argument:

1. There are three topics of explanation in sociology.
    a. empirical regularities;
    b. constitutive rules; and
    c. interpretations.
2. Explaining empirical regularities depends upon constitutive rules.
3. Explaining constitutive rules depends upon interpretive accounts.

On this argument we have attempted to admit sufficient factors into the range of those involved

in producing, reproducing and transforming sport and thereby offer a more complete explanation. We have, then, extended previous criticisms with respect to what is needed in two important areas.

One area concerns the assumption that sport mirrors society. In the discussion of social relations we supported this belief by postulating that the social relations were reproduced in the context of sport on the condition that there was superstructural-substructural sameness. Moreover, we extended the assumption by showing that if sport is shaped by social conditions and if these conditions are social relations, then there is a range of social relations with different mixtures of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* elements that will reproduce sport and which can in turn be reproduced in the sport context. But we also challenged the assumption by showing that it was not true when there was a condition of superstructural-substructural otherness. We corrected the deficiency of the argument from causal importance with our old friend, the notion of otherness with addition. We admitted to the range of antecedent conditions a state in which sport is not a mirror of society; that is, in addition to a state in which it is a mirror. Thus, we have made a simultaneous claim to sameness and otherness.

Another area concerns the syllogistic argument which concluded that sport is rational. This conclusion was supported in the framework by that part of it which approximated the *Gesellschaft* ideal-typical entities. Moreover, because the literature deals mainly with sport which is work-like, by posing a range that includes work, play and mixtures of both, we extended the conclusion. This is to say we added the form of activity *Gesellschaft*-play. But we challenged the notion that all sport is rational, whether work-like or play-like, by showing that mixtures of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* and the oscillations between the two extremes were not only possible but did occur. And this too corrects the deficiency of the argument from causal importance in a similar way to the first one because in saying that there are *Gemeinschaft* aspects which accompany the rational *Gesellschaft* aspects we are saying there is otherness with addition. This, too, is a simultaneous claim to sameness and otherness and the important consequences of this support and addition are that the framework provides an alternative to the pattern of circular inquiry. By extending the assumption that sport mirrors society and, furthermore, by offering conditions under which the opposite is the case, we have increased the opportunities for research. We have increased the capacity, for example, to ask questions about sport, especially about the dynamic aspects, because we have a framework

which can describe its various forms according to the particularity of its structural configurations and the production of possibility, likelihood and certainty. In addition, once we crack the mirror we can ask questions about the nature of the relationship between the multifarious particularity of the different contexts of sport and the different societal contexts which are not-sport.

The framework provides, therefore, a continuity of discourse on the basis of which further inquiries can be made. But before we go too far in extolling the virtues of the framework we should reflect on what it does not contribute. Except in the provision of the empirical examples, we have not brought the forms of association, sport, the notion of sufficiency and the other ideas down to the concrete level. The framework and its categories contains no consideration of matters such as the economy, military, government, law, art, education, religion or the family. There is no consideration, either, of social mobility, class, deviance and technology; nor did we work in age, sex, occupation, income or race. We have not, then, treated the social world in the familiar way that sociologists do or in the theoretical way found in the work of such writers as Comte, Mill, Marx, Spencer or Sumner. We have not, for example, discussed the effects of ethnicity with respect to social process and the ideal-typical entities, but for this omission and the others we can appeal to the generality of the framework. Our claim is that it cuts across all of these factors and permits us to ask questions about them. Our ultimate appeal, therefore, is that while it is true that these factors should be considered we can but acknowledge that they accompany the reproduction and transformation of sport in a particular context. The manner in which they do that, though, is a matter for future inquiries for it is only by studying their particularity can we incorporate them into the framework. These claims, however, have little substance unless the essay can be evaluated.

4. Epistemic Appraisal

In the latter parts of this essay there is an implicit hesitancy to the discourse. We seem to be appealing, perhaps too frequently, to future inquiries and this makes the discussion more assertive than demonstrative. But then it is assertive. It is meant to be so because we have only claimed to have laid down a framework, and to have laid it down to be followed, as a contribution toward knowledge and explanation. We have made no claims, beyond the empirical examples of support, to using it. In fact, in the light of the previous statements

about what the framework does not contribute, it seems very reasonable to doubt whether the next step after this one, that of use, can be taken at all. We have indicated how it is to be taken but we must be sure that it is, indeed, a step in the right direction. Obviously, the claim here is that it is a step in the right direction and we are quite willing to open any discussion on the matter. We can start by providing the conditions of evaluation that might be used. Unfortunately, this is another appeal to future considerations but we cannot seem to escape it.

Let us, initially, make a distinction between the two necessary conditions for knowledge as an emphasis on particular ways of pursuing sociological practice. On the one hand we have the condition of experience which, very roughly, can be viewed as an emphasis on empirical sociology. The world of sense experience, perception and particulars is the object of research of the majority in the sociology of sport and the intent of that research is to describe and analyze particular human relations as they are thought to exist in time and space. On the other hand we have the condition of a conceptual framework which, again very roughly, is an emphasis on theoretical sociology. Sometimes called pure or philosophical sociology, it deals with pure concepts, basic ideas and their interrelationships. Now the distinction, insofar as it is artificial, is really vague in practice because, quite rightly, neither condition is sufficient by itself, but if we view these two sociologies as tendencies to rely on one condition or the other, then it could be useful. It will allow all of the variations in methodology that lie between them while perhaps granting a middle place to applied sociology, a sociology in which there is an equal reliance on experience and conceptual framework. It will have been noted, though, that this essay appears to contradict this epistemic position because of the emphasis, throughout the discussion, on theoretical sociology. In fact, this was quite deliberate for it was felt that the use of this framework with the collection of facts in the sociology of sport would be sufficient for knowledge and this is quite reasonable given the abundance of empirical data and the paucity of frameworks. This becomes problematic, however, when we consider that the grounds for evaluating empirical sociology differ from those used for evaluating theoretical sociology. We should, then, give two sets of grounds for appraisal - one set for empiricists and one set for theorists.

As it is currently practised, the sociology of sport relies on observational content and a correspondence theory of truth as major epistemic principles. Purportedly, it is a science of the sociology of sport; its statements can be evaluated by going out and looking at the

phemonena which it takes as the object of research. The statements are then confirmed or denied by appealing to a comparison between the content of the statement and the content of the observation. If they correspond, the statement is said to be true and we accommodated this empirical position to the extent that we outlined falsification as a major process of evaluation. Among the propositions that accompany the framework we included a set which would serve as potential falsifiers and the idea was that by showing occupancy in the sub-classes designated as empty, the empiricist could falsify the framework. At the same time we said that in principle there was no impediment, beyond a claim to truth on our part, to this achievement. But this is in principle; in practice it turns out to be difficult because in using the framework a problem arises in the process of locating particular sport entities on the two continua. This is so because we never did give any actual measurements that could be used. Indeed, the whole process was left rather vague except for a discussion of basic principles of use and this lack of objective precision is a hinderance in the comparative process because it appears to deny the empiricist any benefit of the initial step of description. In principle, it could be argued, if description is denied, then the empiricist cannot falsify and this puts us in a quandry for how can we expect the sociology of sport to accept the framework if the majority of researchers, the empiricists, cannot falsify it?

The problem can be alleviated, however, if we consider what kind of description the empiricist requires and what kind of description we can provide. The empiricist must be able to recognize certain features of the social world of sport and requires an adequate conceptualization of those features with which to do it. We have developed such a conceptualization that would help the empiricist to achieve description by approximations to the ideal-typical entities. We have derived a framework that includes the kind of thing which is to count as a feature of the social world of sport but this does not include the specific particulars that are necessary and sufficient. Where we cannot help, then, is in the matter of precise empirical referents for in this the empiricist would be asking more than we can provide. Moreover, the empiricist must face two additional problems that we cannot resolve at this time. First, precision is attained through use and negotiation among researchers within the sub-discipline and since this has not yet come about it cannot be asked *a priori*. Second, the empiricist assumption of a correspondence theory of truth works against the realization of accurate description in this case because in wanting precise objective measures the empiricist is

open to the dangers of reification. The elements of the framework have no intrinsic appropriateness; the framework does not, in the nominalistic sense, correspond to the world of perception. The most that has been claimed, and indeed the most that can reasonably be expected, is that the framework is a heuristic device that guides inquiry. It can only predict theoretically that particulars will tend toward certain ideal-typical states and this is sufficient grounds for its use. The empiricist, then, can inquire and can falsify but the matter of precision must await further discussion.

The theorist, on the other hand, has a much easier time of it because there is so much more with which to work. Two-thirds of the essay is devoted to theoretical concerns and even the empirical inquiries have some theoretical content. But to handle the evaluation the theorist has recourse to two related tools of appraisal. First, the theorist should look for signs of inconsistency among the statements that have been made. Every effort has been made to make the framework internally consistent, that statements derived from others do follow and that no statement contradicts any other, but one never knows . . . Second, we can appeal to critical discussion as a arbiter of epistemic acceptibility. In fact, we can direct the process with the very apparatus used in the essay. Let us say that possibility is a sufficiency of conceptual means for starting an inquiry. The claim is that in putting forward the framework there is the provision of means for beginning an inquiry of sport and that there is sufficiency in the provision of elements, relationships, logic and directions for use. To deny this claim it must be shown that the means are either deficient (they are not enough, so we cannot begin the inquiry) or excessive (there are too many, and it is not clear how we can begin) and the critic should direct the attack to this point initially because a denial of possibility, given reasonable grounds that is, is to assert the certainty of not-possibility[34]; our argument will then collapse. Now if we say that likelihood is a sufficiency of conceptual means for continuing an inquiry and certainty is a sufficiency of conceptual means for finishing an inquiry, then the most we can claim is likelihood. The claim is that in putting forward the framework as an internally consistent scheme with directions for use, there is a sufficiency provided for continuing an inquiry claimed as possible; but there is no claim that there is a sufficiency of means for finishing an inquiry.

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[34](1) Possibly p; (2) not-possibly p; (3) certainly not-p.

The epistemic appraisal of this essay, then, relies on conditions of publicity in a minor and a major key. The minor key is the requirement of publicity in traditional empiricism; it is supported by the meaning of publicity as "anyone can observe the phenomena in question if they wanted to" (once they have negotiated empirical referents) and there has been an attempt to accommodate this meaning so that it can be used by those who think it necessary. The major key, though, is supported by the meaning of publicity as "an opportunity to reach an intersubjective agreement through critical discussion". It is this epistemic principle on which the essay stands and it is hoped that the argumentative structure, the disclosure of the elements and relations within the framework and the directions for use have been made sufficiently clear that the process of critical discussion can proceed.

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APPENDIX A

Methodology

As a brief review of the table of contents will reveal, there is no consideration given to methodological matters of the essay as a whole text of this dissertation. There are two reasons for this omission. First, to disclose how the study was undertaken would have been anomolous. It would have detracted from the flow of the narrative steps. The intent of the text is to take the reader on a journey from first assumptions to the development of the framework and its use and any methodological excursis beyond disclosing the general critical apparatus would have been an unwarranted interuption. Still, even if it had been included, such an excursis presupposes an orderly and systematic inquiry when in fact this is far from how it actually happened. So second, the methodology was not disclosed because it was disorderly and generally unsystematic. It was a very, very long journey that had many meanderings and side-trips. It began with the sociology of sport but quickly turned to sociology and then to philosophy. It retraced the history of the social sciences in order to understand many of the notions used; it delved further back in time to the writings of many, often not-so-famous or well-known, scholars in antiquity. This historical journey reached its most ancient point with the pre-Socratics and then followed a path back through philosophy. Yet the methodology should be stated somewhere, if only to counter future charges that the framework displays formalist tendencies and is ungrounded, so it is disclosed in this appendix such as it is. It has the form of a horizontal analysis that presents the sub-problems that were attacked but the actual process was not in the sequence presented. The crucial point to bear in mind, however, is that the ideas presented in this essay were developed with the aid of this methodology and, abstract though they may be, they did not spring full-blown out of nothingness. It makes little sense to view theory and empirical data as anything other than mutually supportive; it is a common argument in the philosophy of science that particulars are only identifiable with the aid of some theory and that some particulars underlie a theory.

PART 1: Finding a problem to study.

SUB-PROBLEM

1. What is the state of past and current research in sociology of sport?	2. Can the sociology of sport progress beyond the pre-paradigm stage of development?

WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?

Knowledge being generated. Process of research and the development of a substantive area. Significant vs. trivial research. The stage of development of sociology of sport.	What is needed to progress? What is a paradigm? Are there any paradigms to study sport? Significant research connects diffuse facts and generalizes. Sociological paradigms.

HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?

Survey of the literature of sociology, sport sociology, philosophy of science and social science.	Sub-problem 1.

ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?

Application of Thomas Kuhn's developmental model of research. Pre-paradigm, paradigm, post-paradigm stages.	Justify a need for a paradigm. Assess capability of existing sociological paradigms to explain sport.

PROBABLE OUTCOME?

Sociology of sport is at the pre-paradigm stage of development.	A problem to study. A framework for the sociology of sport.

PART 2: What must be taken for granted before the framework can be developed.

SUB-PROBLEM		
3. What is real and existent?	4. How is reality known?	5. How is reality known to be true?
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
The doctrine of idealism. The doctrine of realism.	Sources of knowledge. The doctrines of nominalism and realism. The doctrine of conceptualism. The problem of universals.	Truth. The doctrines of empiricism and rationalism. Synthetic and analytic knowledge. *A priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge. Necessary and contingent truths.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
Survey of literature of philosophy.	Survey of literature of philosophy and philosophy of science.	Survey of literature of philosophy and philosophy of science.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Assess arguments and assumptions of doctrines. Description. Argument.	Assess arguments and assumptions of doctrines. Description. Argument.	Assess arguments and assumptions of doctrines. Description. Argument.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
A position on what is real and existent.	A position on how reality is known.	A position on how reality is known to be true.

PART 2 continued . . .

SUB-PROBLEM		
6. What is social reality?	7. How is social reality known?	8. How is social reality known to be true?
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
Individuals and social entities. Social entities as universals. Ontological status of social entities.	Individualism and holism. Whole-part relationship. Systems. Social knowledge. The doctrines of free will and determinism.	Verifiability and falsifiability. Testability of theories. Principle of uniformity of nature. Social determinism and free will. Existential calculus.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
Survey of literature of sociology and philosophy of social science.	Survey of literature of sociology, philosophy of social science, and sociology of knowledge.	Survey of literature of sociology and philosophy of social science.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Assess arguments and assumptions. Follow from sub-problem 3. Description. Argument.	Assess arguments and assumptions. Follow from sub-problem 4. Description. Argument.	Assess arguments and assumptions. Follow from sub-problem 5. Description. Argument.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
A position on what is social reality.	A position on how social reality is known.	A position on how social reality is known to be true.

PART 3: What must be known to develop the framework.

SUB-PROBLEM		
9. What is a concept?	10. What is sport?	11. The social world as process.
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
Concept formation. The use of concepts. Defining. Properties of a concept.	Essentialism and non-essentialism. Definitions of play, sport, work, and leisure. Properties of sport.	Statuses, roles, expectations, reciprocity. The doctrine of necessity. Social knowledge. Socialization.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
Survey of literature of sociology, philosophy, philosophy of social science.	Survey of literature of sociology of sport, philosophy of sport, sociology of work, sociology of leisure.	Survey of literature of sociology, philosophy of social science and social philosophy.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Description. Follow from sub-problems 3-8.	Assess arguments and assumptions. Follow from sub-problems 3-8. Dialectical method. Philosophy of the mean. Argument.	Compilation and description. Argument. Follow from sub-problems 3-8.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
Background knowledge of concepts.	A definition of sport. Properties of sport.	A position on the social world as process. Social relations as mediators between individual and social entities.

PART 3 continued . . .

SUB-PROBLEM		
12. Regularities in social relations.	13. Properties of social relations.	14. Social relations and the social knowledge-behavior nexus.
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
Will. *Gemeinschaft*. *Gesellschaft*.	Properties of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Roles, sentiments, beliefs, goals, norms, power, sanctions, facilities.	Choice and action. Deliberation. Reason.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
Toennies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. Survey of literature of sociology and social philosophy.	McKinney's *Constructive Types and Social Theory*. Survey of literature of sociology and social philosophy.	Survey of literature of sociology and philosophy.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Description. Follow from sub-problems 3-8.	Description and compilation. Transposition.	Philosophy of the mean.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
Dichotomous social relations.	Properties of social relations.	Causal nexus of social relations to subsequent behavior.

PART 4: Developing the framework.

SUB-PROBLEM		
15. How may social complexity be simplified?	16. What is a type?	17. The concepts as ideal types
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
Process of classification. Common sense and scientific knowledge.	Classificatory types. Extreme types. Variables and non-variables. The logic and epistemology of types.	Logic and epistemology of ideal types. Causal nexus. *ceteris parabus* clause.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
Sub-problems 6-8.	Survey of literature of philosophy of social science and sociology of sport.	Survey of literature of philosophy of social science.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Description. Argument. Follow from sub-problems 6-8.	Description. Concepts as extreme types. Dialectical unity of opposites.	Description.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
Typological method can be used.	Theoretical statements.	Two continua. One of process, one of product.

PART 4 continued . . .

SUB-PROBLEM		
18. Structuring the continua.	19. Properties of the types.	20. The framework and social reality.
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
Concepts play, work, sport, *Gemeinschaft*, *Gesellschaft*. Concepts as variables. Principle of predominance.	Properties of play, work, sport, *Gemeinschaft*, *Gesellschaft*.	Assumptions. Logic of extreme and ideal types.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
Sub-problems 10, 12, 13, 14.	Sub-problems 10, 12, 13, 14.	Sub-problems 3-8, 16-19.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Description. Diagram. Orthogonal continua.	List properties from sub-problems 10, 12, 13, 14. Combine sets according to structure.	Description. Argument. Allegory.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
Structure and generation of a framework with types. Theoretical statements.	Delimitation of types in the framework. Theoretical statements.	The framework as a model of the social aspect of sport.

PART 5: Using the framework.

SUB-PROBLEM		
21. How to use the framework.	22. Limitations.	23. Future directions.
WHAT FACTS ARE NEEDED?		
Dialectical totality. The research process and ideal types. Heuristic devices. Meaningfulness. Significance.	Restrictions of the assumptions. Fallacies of cross-ranking and reification. Caution against mis-assigned qualifiers.	Testability. Refuting the framework. Evaluationg the dissertation.
HOW AND WHERE WILL FACTS BE OBTAINED?		
All previous sub-problems.	Sub-problems 3-8.	All previous sub-problems. Survey of literature of sociology, philosophy of social science, sociology of sport.
ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FACTS?		
Description.	Description.	Description.
PROBABLE OUTCOME?		
Directions for use.	Limitations of use.	Directions for research.

We should also outline here the methodologies employed in the cycling and *karate dojo* studies. In the cycling study, the data were collected by participant-observation and interview techniques. The author joined one of the cycling clubs engaged in the conflict and spent one season racing and training with many of the cyclists involved. This proved to be necessary because much of what happens in a cycle race is hidden from the view of spectators. The race is mobile while the spectators are not and even the race commissaires, who adjudicate from a vehicle following the riders, cannot see all that happens. Quite literally one has to be there among the riders to observe their behavior. It was also necessary because the type of behavior studied is mentioned rarely in cycling periodicals and not at all in the extremely sparse sociological literature. It should be noted, therefore, that the study contains no explicit references. This is due in part to the lack of previous studies and in part to protect the anonymity of the parties involved in what was a very intense and highly emotional situation. However, the references are available upon request from serious academic scholars.

In the *karate dojo* study, to some extent a continuation of the diffusion study, the data were collected by the same method of immersion as the cycling study. The author joined the group just after its inception in 1979 and attended all of the training sessions for four years. The group met three times a week and data were collected in a diary, kept intermittently, and from interviews with the members. In retrospect, this inquiry was the most difficult because the author was intimately involved in the group's activities. It was hard to ignore the intense individual experiences and concentrate on the broader context of the group but it was here that the heuristic device proved so useful: it helped to channel the thoughts toward the transformation of the group's structure. On the other hand, the individual experience was advantageous in coming to grips with the activity and, of course, this was true of all the inquiries. It allowed an understanding of the production, reproduction and transformation of sport practices.

APPENDIX B

Summary of Propositions

A. Definitional Propositions

1.0 Play is a sufficiency of social constraints for possibility;

1.1 Play is a deficiency of social constraints for likelihood;

1.2 Play is a deficiency of social constraints for certainty.

2.0 Work is a sufficiency of social constraints for certainty;

2.1 Work is an excess of social constraints for likelihood;

2.2 Work is an excess of social constraints for possibility.

3.0 Sport is a sufficiency of social constraints for likelihood;

3.1 Sport is an excess of social constraints for possibility;

3.2 Sport is a deficiency of social constraints for certainty.

4.0 A *Gemeinschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction;

4.1 A *Gemeinschaft* relation is an excess of social constraints for transformation;

5.0 A *Gesellschaft* relation is a sufficiency of social constraints for transformation;

5.1 A *Gesellschaft* relation is a deficiency of social constraints for production and reproduction.

B. Comparative Relation Propositions

6.0 All sport is play-like and work-like.

6.1 Some sport is more play-like than it is work-like;

6.2 Some sport is just as much play-like as it is work-like;

6.3 Some sport is more work-like than it is play-like;

7.0 All social relations are *Gemeinschaft*-like and *Gesellschaft*-like.

7.1 Some social relations are more *Gemeinschaft*-like than they are *Gesellschaft*-like;

7.2 Some social relations are just as much *Gemeinschaft*-like as they are *Gesellschaft*-like;

7.3 Some social relations are more *Gesellschaft*-like than they are *Gemeinschaft*-like.

C. Causal Relation Propositions

The following designations apply to these propositions:

(i) Play-like refers to sport that is more play-like than it is work-like;

(ii) Play-work refers to sport that is just as much play-like as it is work-like;

(iii) Work-like refers to sport that is more work-like than it is play-like;

(iv) *Gemeinschaft*-like refers to a social relation that is more *Gemeinschaft*-like than it is *Gesellschaft*-like;

(v) *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* refers to a social relation that is just as much *Gemeinschaft* as it is *Gesellschaft*;

(vi) *Gesellschaft*-like refers to a social relation that is more *Gesellschaft* than it is *Gemeinschaft*.

8.0 If social relation, then sport.

8.1 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.2 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then play-work;

8.3 If *Gemeinschaft*-like, then work-like;

8.4 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then play-like;

8.5 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then play-work;

8.6 If *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*, then work-like;

8.7 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-like;

8.8 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then play-work;

8.9 If *Gesellschaft*-like, then work-like;

9.0 If sport, then social relation.

9.1 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.2 If play-like, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.3 If play-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like;

9.4 If play-work, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.5 If play-work, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.6 If play-work, then *Gesellschaft*-like;

9.7 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft*-like;

9.8 If work-like, then *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft*;

9.9 If work-like, then *Gesellschaft*-like;

D. Potential Falsifiers

10.0 Some sport has no elements of play;

11.0 Some sport has no elements of work;

12.0 Some social relations have no elements of *Gemeinschaft*; and

13.0 Some social relations have no elements of *Gesellschaft*.