

University of Alberta

Prospero's Return: An Interpretation of *The Tempest*

by

Natalie J. Elliot



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Edmonton, Alberta
Fall 2004



Library and
Archives Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*
ISBN: 0-612-95627-X
Our file *Notre référence*
ISBN: 0-612-95627-X

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing the Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

Canada

When the Assault Was Intended to the City

CAPTAIN, or colonel, or knight in arms,
Whose chance on these defenceless doors may seize,
If deed of honour did thee ever please,
Guard them, and him within protect from harms.
He can requite thee, for he knows the charms
That call fame on such gentle acts as these,
And he can spread thy name o'er lands and seas,
Whatever clime the sun's bright circle warms.
Lift not thy spear against the Muse's bower;
The great Emathian conqueror bid spare
The house of Pindarus, when temple and tower
Went to the ground; and the repeated air
Of sad Electra's Poet had the power
To save the Athenian walls from ruin bare.

John Milton

To My Parents

Acknowledgements

Not only over the course of writing this thesis, but during the several years it took to reach this stage, I enjoyed the unfaltering support and patience of my family. For this I am greatly indebted to them. My mother provided every kind of assistance, from encouragement and calming, to thoughtful questioning and conversing, to proofreading paper after paper, including the entirety of this thesis. My father, too, supported me in countless ways, from car repairs to patient listening, and he fueled my thoughts with his unending supply of comical insights into politics. My brother, Adam, always ready for a challenge, was a great partner in ‘discussions’ and his vitality has been a constant source of inspiration.

Over the past few years, I have had the good fortune of finding myself surrounded by an unusually large group of insightful and curious schoolmates to whom I am indebted in countless ways. I would like to acknowledge a few of these in particular. Tricia Fermaniuk helped me to understand the connection between what I came to learn in school and my previous life in Jasper, which at times seemed to be totally irreconcilable. Rob DeLuca generously offered his insights and ideas through our entire time as classmates. With Ruby Hussain, I enjoyed hours of great conversation which exposed me to new ideas and ways of thinking I would not otherwise have imagined. With her fine sense of humor, and subtle insights, Jessica Craig helped me again and again to regain the proper perspective on life. In introducing me to a whole host of poems, novels, pieces of music, and scientific discoveries, and in generously relaying his own reflections on these, Joel McCrum constantly reinvigorated my studies. From the beginning of my studies in political philosophy Jonathan Pidluzny has been a most excellent dialogical partner. Over the last few years he has helped me to better my understanding of countless aspects of the intricacies of political life. I am especially indebted to him for what he has taught me about myself and the regime in which I live. Most notably, over the course of my studies I have enjoyed the friendship of two free spirits, in the absence of whom, I would not have realized some of the most important connections between the greatest human achievements and the little world in which we live: Andrea Kowalchuk and Laura Field have brought the greatest books to life in ways that I might otherwise have thought impossible.

For the present project, Professor Marino, the external member of my defense committee, generously offered his thoughts Shakespeare and *The Tempest*. I owe one of my greatest debts to the two teachers who provided me with the education that allowed me to successfully complete this project. Professor Studer and Professor Craig have illuminated the highest human insights and have made me see more clearly that these insights were once possible and can be made possible again. I have been afforded a glimpse at such an insight through work on this thesis, the completion of which was made possible in large part by the countless hours of meticulous reading and thorough critiques of my ideas that Professor Craig, my supervisor, so generously and insightfully provided. By his example, he has taught me the sort of efforts I will need to undertake in order to continue to access and develop my own understanding of the great ideas. Whereas Professor Craig helped me to bring this project to its fruition, it was Professor Studer who first turned me toward political philosophy and who taught me how to read the great books. Since then, she has continued to show me how the teachings of the great books apply to virtually every aspect of political life. Above all, together, these teachers helped me to see clearly the imperative in the age old oracle: “read thyself”. For this I am eternally grateful.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter I: Mistakes in Milan.....	3
i. The Problems of Ruling With Love.....	4
ii. Secret Studies and Prospero's Psychological Idol.....	13
Chapter II: The Master-Monster Relation.....	19
i. The Rule Appropriate to a Man-Monster.....	20
ii. The Political Problems Caliban's Example Presents.....	32
Chapter III: The Heirs of Prospero's Philosophical Legacy.....	36
i. Engaging Miranda.....	37
ii. Engaging Ferdinand.....	43
iii. The Marriage Masque.....	49
iv. Ferdinand's Philosophic Inheritance.....	53
Chapter IV: Civilized Italy.....	61
i. Divergent Opinions on the Art of Politics.....	61
ii. The Problems With Alonso's Imperialism.....	68
Conclusion.....	82
Endnotes.....	90
Bibliography.....	99

Introduction

The Tempest is a play about a philosopher who becomes a king, but in a strangely roundabout way. Endowed with both a dukedom and a philosophical nature, through his indulgence of the latter, he fails to rule his dukedom effectively and is consequently expelled from it. Yet, ultimately, he returns to assert kingly powers over a newly constituted empire. To the extent that the play is representative of the nature of political life in general, through it, Shakespeare illustrates some of the consequences for philosophy when it is pursued indifferent to political power, and of the character of political life without the influence of philosophy. Seen in this light, *The Tempest* is apparently inspired by the most memorable teaching Plato has his Socrates voice in his

Republic:

‘Unless,’ I said, ‘the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy coalesce in the same place, while the many natures now making their way to either apart from the other are by necessity excluded, there is no rest from ills for the cities, my dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind, nor will the regime we have now described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of the sun.’¹

Beyond this, however, it illustrates one aspect of a variation on this teaching, a variation that has often been forgotten:

...compelled by the truth, we said that neither city nor regime will ever become perfect, nor yet will a man become perfect in the same way either, before some necessity chances to constrain those few philosophers who aren’t vicious, those now called useless, to take charge of a city, whether they want to or not, and the city to obey; or a true erotic passion for true philosophy flows from some divine inspiration into the sons of those who hold power or the office of king, or into the fathers themselves.²

In *The Tempest* we hear an echo of this latter teaching not only in the focus on philosophic kingship, but also in the emphasis on the perpetuation of philosophy through generations of kingly men. While *The Tempest* does not actually portray the divine

transmission of “a true erotic passion for true philosophy” flowing “into the sons of those who hold power or the office of king, or into the fathers themselves”, it does illustrate a promising effort to perpetuate a philosophic tradition through the generations by means of an alliance between a philosopher and his daughter, and a King and his son, and the establishment of a unified and lasting culture that supports philosophic inquiry.

Along with much else then, *The Tempest* is the story of how Prospero transforms himself from a philosophic man who is both withdrawn from and naïve about political life, to a political philosopher who not only returns to rule his former polity, but also effectively reconstitutes the polity so that it is friendly to philosophy. The following chapters will explore Prospero’s development as it is revealed over the course of the play. The first chapter focuses on what Prospero comes to recognize with respect to his failure to rule in Milan; the second examines what Prospero comes to learn about man’s form and man’s political nature through his experiences with Caliban; the third analyzes Prospero’s cultivation of Miranda and Ferdinand, focusing on what he has come to understand about the appropriate roles for each of their natures; the fourth examines what Prospero confronts in arranging his return to Italy, and how he reconstitutes the divided state in the hope that it will long remain friendly to philosophy.

I purposely avoided examining previous scholarly literature on this play until I had established the main outlines of my own interpretation. I then consulted the accounts of various well-reputed Shakespeare scholars in order to test and refine my own views. For the most part, I have not engaged with them in my notes, but do wish it understood that the works included in my bibliography have contributed to my own understanding of *The Tempest*.

Chapter I

Mistakes in Milan

In our first encounter with Prospero, we hear him explain to his daughter that, as Duke of Milan, he was a patron and student of the liberal arts. We subsequently learn, by this same account, that despite his education he failed to recognize what was necessary for keeping the ambitions of Antonio—his ruling minister and brother—in check, and was exiled from his dukedom as a result of this negligence. Between the time of his exile and the situation in which we find him as the story opens, Prospero has undergone several substantial changes, especially with respect to his understanding of political rule. In explaining to Miranda the reasons for their situation on the island, Prospero acknowledges the mistakes he made in ruling Milan. He acknowledges first, that he relied too much on the popular support of the people; second, that he assumed that the bonds of familial love would ensure that his brother, placed in the position of ultimate power, would remain loyal to him and his regime; third, and related, that he underestimated the power of personal ambition to compromise the loyalty of not only his brother but also of other members of his government. These failures of his seem to be rooted in a particular psychological inclination, an inclination that is characteristic of individuals who are captivated by philosophic questions. This is the inclination to focus primarily on similarities (as opposed to differences) between himself and the people around him, as well as in his subjects of inquiry. Prospero's manifestation of this characteristic becomes apparent with a closer look at the studies to which he withdrew, and the manner in which his studies related to his life. Ultimately, it seems to be because of this tendency that he initially misjudged the character of political life in general and especially of the

ambitious men who strove to displace him in his regime. The following will explore the details of each of Prospero's errors, and will then turn to explore his character in light of his studies in the liberal Arts.¹

i. The Problems of Ruling with Love

Prospero first explains to Miranda that as Duke of Milan, the prime duke of all the signories, he enjoyed a reputation for the "liberal Arts"—"those being all [his] study". (I.ii.70-74)². As a result of his focus on the liberal Arts, he relegated his duties of government to his brother, and "to [his] state grew stranger, being transported/ And rapt in secret studies" (I.ii.75-77). Apparently, Prospero's studies did not help him to develop an understanding of what is required to sustain political rule. That said, in referring to his private philosophic investigations as "secret studies", Prospero shows that he has some regard for the tension between what he was studying and what should be public knowledge in a regime if it is to remain decent and stable. Presumably, Prospero refers to his studies as secret because he felt they needed to be kept so. Perhaps he thought that they contained something which would have undermined the opinions sustaining the polity. However, the knowledge of what can *undermine* the order of a polity is not necessarily the same as the knowledge of what is required to *sustain* order in a polity; and, given that his position was usurped, it appears that whatever constituted Prospero's secret studies it did not help him to acquire this latter type of knowledge.

Before Prospero became entirely "transported and rapt" in his secret studies, he did give some consideration to how his regime would continue to function despite his detachment from personally ruling. Apparently, Prospero placed much of his confidence

in the power of his popularity; in his account to Miranda, Prospero tells her that he, “neglecting worldly ends, all dedicated/ To closeness and the bettering of [his] mind/ With that which, but by being so retir’d,/ O’er-priz’d all popular rate” (I.ii.89-93). He later explains that the love his people bore him prevented his usurpers from killing him outright (intending instead to accomplish this stealthily; cf. I.ii.140-143); nonetheless, this was not enough to sustain his power. He could have profited from reading

Machiavelli:

...one can say this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers, evaders of danger, eager for gain. While you do them good, they are yours, offering you their blood, property, lives, and children, as I said above [Chapter IX], when the need for them is far away; but, when it is close to you, they revolt. And that prince who has founded himself entirely on their words, stripped of other preparation, is ruined; for friendships that are acquired at a price and not with greatness and nobility of spirit are bought, but they are not owned and when the time comes they cannot be spent.³

Prospero’s error in relying on popular support was twofold. First, Prospero erred in thinking that the love his people bore him, and the popular support he enjoyed as a result, would translate into some sort of practical means for sustaining his power. Second, Prospero failed to see that the politically ambitious and active few, controlling offices and organization in Milan with outside support from the King of Naples, could easily neutralize and overcome the popular support he had. Popular support was not entirely ineffectual for Prospero, given that it was strong enough to prevent his overt assassination, but it only threatened Antonio to the extent that it might have provoked public uprising. The people, however, were neither inclined nor equipped to carry out an effective public uprising against Antonio. Whereas Antonio had trained enough men so that he could levy the “treacherous army” that fulfilled his plot, Prospero, apparently, had trained neither nobles nor citizens to bear arms in their loyalty to him. This may be one of

the reasons why Prospero's people did not feel any strong necessity to oppose his usurpation. For in training an army a ruler instills the recognition in his people that they need him for their protection, or alternatively, for the ambitious men in his army, that his guidance is essential to their success and prosperity. Again, Prospero could have benefited from reading Machiavelli:

....a prince cannot found himself on what he sees in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then everyone runs, everyone promises, and each wants to die for him when death is at a distance; but in adverse times, when the state has need of citizens, then few of them are to be found. And this test is all the more dangerous since one cannot make it but once. And so a wise prince must think of a way by which his citizens, always and in every quality of time, have need of the state and of himself; and then they will always be faithful to him.⁴

Lacking this recognition of their need of him, the citizenry did not feel under a strong enough compulsion to risk their lives for his preservation.

Prospero's failure to harness popular support by means of an army was perhaps part and parcel of his failure to recognize the potential threat of the nobles of Milan. In failing to instill a recognition of the necessity of his role to the well being of his general citizenry, he also failed to harness the ambitions of members of that citizenry who were happy to dedicate their loyalties to one who would help them to further their own ambitions. Prospero thus did not secure the active support of either the people or the few great; the latter felt free to pursue their ambitions at the cost of his position.

Prospero's failure in thinking that his people's love would sustain him, and his resulting failure to recognize the potential power of the ambitious men and nobles of Milan illustrates what Machiavelli teaches in the ninth chapter of *The Prince*, "Of the Civil Principality". There he discusses princes who rise to power from private fortune with the help of either the greats (the ambitious and noble men) or the people (the general

citizenry). While this is not what is directly at issue in *The Tempest*, several of Machiavelli's comments are pertinent to the maintenance of power generally, and thus are also relevant to our considerations here. The basic teaching of this chapter is that a prince cannot rely simply on the love of the people as a strong foundation for rule because the great who are ambitious—and as such, his natural rivals—will be his ruin if he does not show the appropriate regard for them as well. Despite the chapter's apparent concern with the people, Machiavelli seems to emphasize the importance of giving the appropriate honors to the great even more than he emphasizes the importance of the people. Given the astuteness and natural ambition of these active few, their proximity to the prince, and thus their greater potential to harm him, he must regard them with special caution. One of the ways a prince can rein in the great is by ensuring that the people are loyal only to him and cannot be made loyal to any other. To do so, a prince must convince the people that he protects them against the oppression of the other greats. Presumably, to do this, he must instill in them a fear of being oppressed by the other greats such that they feel compelled to protect themselves under his guidance. And his leadership cannot be by proxy; he must show himself personally in charge. Apparently, the people who sided with Antonio had no fear of Prospero. And one suspects it was contrary to his nature to instill it in them: that his gentleness, too, was inherent in his philosophical inclinations.

As for the great, Prospero did not attend properly to these either, for his minister, Antonio, was able to harness their ambitions for himself, having no fear that the people would impede his efforts. Prospero might have been able to ensure that the ambitions of the great were aligned with his own if he had paid personal attention to which of his men

should have been honored and which debased, proving himself the *source* of prospering in his regime. Prospero seems to have failed to recognize the problem with those who, as Machiavelli explains it, “for an ambitious cause” are not obligated to the prince. As Machiavelli teaches, Prospero could have obliged the people to himself by ensuring, by means of fear, that they recognized the benefit of his protection. The ambitious, alternatively, become obliged with the recognition that their position is maintained by the power of the prince and can be revoked at any time. Not believing that loyalty to Prospero was the necessary means to acquire honor, and perhaps also feeling resentful at the lack of honor for worthy service altogether, the ambitious men of Milan were drawn toward a man who would give them appropriate honor and feed their spirit of ambition—and the people, finding themselves without recourse or strong reason to oppose them, easily acquiesced in Antonio’s usurpation. In neglecting to attend personally to his political responsibilities on the mistaken assumption that the love of his people would maintain his position, Prospero lost his state.⁵

With Prospero thus failing to distribute personally the proper honors and orders to the men around him, Antonio took the opportunity to secure their support for himself. Unlike Prospero, Antonio was fully versed in the art of ordering the great and thus took it upon himself to make himself their ruler. As Prospero later explains it to Miranda, Antonio,

Being once perfected how to grant suits,
How to deny them, who’t advance, and who
To trash for over-topping, new created
The creatures that were mine, I say, or chang’d ‘em
Or else new form’d ‘em; having both the key
Of officer and office, set all hearts i’ th’ state
To what tune pleas’d his ear; that now he was
The ivy which had hid my princely trunk,

And suck'd my verdure out on't.

(I.ii.79-85)

In this Antonio seems to epitomize the successful follower of Machiavelli's teaching that a prince can shape the great to his own ends because "he can make and unmake them every day, and take away and give them reputation at his convenience".⁶ The 'key' metaphor Shakespeare has Prospero use here has two senses, and both reveal further how Antonio shaped the great. The first suggests that Antonio had access to both the executive and legislative offices. Antonio felt under no compulsion, constitutionally or otherwise, to be guided by the laws of the country; and, furthermore, he had the wiles and the power to execute the laws that he developed himself. In changing and executing the laws as he saw fit, he ensured they were in the service of his goals rather than those of his brother. As the second sense of the metaphor indicates, he brought a new sort of harmony to the Milanese, a harmony in a musical key different from that orchestrated by Prospero, with the result that the tone of his government would be very different from that which had existed prior to Prospero's withdrawal. By the time of Prospero's exile, then, Antonio was 'calling the tune', as it were.

Originally, Prospero did not believe that his state could be brought into such disharmony by his own brother. He had thought that the bonds of brotherhood and familial love would have prevented Antonio from usurping power, and so he neither set up institutions nor created any psychological reins with which he might have otherwise curbed Antonio's ambitions. In his explanation to Miranda, Prospero recounts with exasperation his brother's perfidy in the face of the love he felt for him, a love second only to the love he felt for her (I.ii.67-69). Later he likens his trust of Antonio to that of a "good parent" (I.ii.93-94), suggesting that he felt a love for Antonio equivalent not only

to that felt by an elder brother for a younger, but also that of parents for their children.

With respect to the first kind of love, one only need recall the frequency of sibling rivalry to see why love between brothers is not a reliable basis for restraining the self-interest of an ambitious ruling minister. As for the love and trust a parent bears for a child, this is an asymmetrical love and it in no way ensures that the recipient of it is trustworthy, nor does it necessarily imply that the love will be reciprocated. Along with the paternal love a ruler might feel for his citizenry and ministers, he will need to use additional restraints if he is to sustain his power.

As previously noted, Prospero's mistaken reliance on various kinds of love confirm another of Machiavelli's most famous (or notorious) teachings, that which addresses the question that entitles the seventeenth chapter of *The Prince*, "Of Cruelty and Mercy and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved Than Feared, or the Contrary". There, Machiavelli teaches that to rule well a prince should, wherever possible, rule using both love *and* fear; but that if he cannot manage both he should prefer to rely on fear because people's fear is something he can control, unlike their love: "men love at their convenience and fear at the convenience of the prince"⁷. As Machiavelli explains it, "men have less hesitation to offend one who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is held by a chain of obligation, which, because men are wicked, is broken at every opportunity for their own utility, but fear is held by a dread of punishment that never forsakes you"⁸. A ruler, even if he feels a paternal love for his people, or a brotherly love for his men, must use the requisite types of fear to sustain their commitment to him. Prospero, however, simply presumed that his brother felt about him as he did about Antonio. In accounting for this naiveté about human nature, one suspects

that Prospero has a natural tendency to presume that other people are essentially similar to himself, failing to appreciate human differences.

Moreover, the benefits that Prospero bestowed on Antonio as a result of the paternal and brotherly love he felt may have been more like spurs than reins for Antonio's ambitions. Antonio neither felt obliged to execute Prospero's orders and legislation, nor did he think that doing so would be necessary to preserve his ministerial position. Far from fearing the repercussions of his actions toward his brother and sovereign, Antonio thought his position would be both higher and more secure if he were to usurp him outright. But there may be more to it. Prospero—despite his emphatic claim to have loved his brother unconditionally—seems to have harbored some reservations about their respective statuses. A closer look at his description of Antonio to Miranda betrays certain subtle complications of their relationship:

Prospero: ...He being thus lorded,
Not only with what my revenue yielded,
But what my power might else exact, like one
Who having into truth, by telling of it
Made such a sinner of his memory,
To credit his own lie, he did believe
He was indeed the duke; out o' th' substitution,
And executing th' outward face of royalty,
With all prerogative;—hence his ambition growing,—
Dost thou hear?

Miranda: Your tale, sir, would cure deafness.

Prospero: To have not screen between this part he play'd
And him he play'd it for, he needs will be
Absolute Milan. Me, poor man, my library
Was dukedom large enough: of temporal royalties
He thinks me now incapable; confederates,
So dry he was for sway, wi' th' King of Naples
To give him annual tribute, do him homage,
Subject his coronet to his crown, and bend
The dukedom, yet unbow'd,—alas, poor Milan!
To most ignoble stooping.

(I.ii.99-116)

While Prospero is here making the case for Antonio's criminality, Shakespeare subtly shows that Antonio's resentment of Prospero may have been somewhat justified, and that Prospero may be painting a fairer portrait of his blamelessness than is accurate. The image Prospero uses here suggests that Antonio played the role of duke while Prospero stayed in private (i.e., behind the screen). However, as we saw earlier, Prospero proudly recalls his reputation for the liberal Arts: while he enjoyed the prestige of his rule and dukedom, then, his brother did all of the day-to-day work of ruling, much of which is tedious and petty.⁹ While Prospero showed no interest in political rule (and perhaps also, both a positive distaste for it and as a lack of understanding of it), his brother desired to rule and possessed the ability to do so; and his abilities, when put into practice, went insufficiently recognized, at least in his own estimation. We can begin to see why Antonio came to resent his brother. Moreover, the somewhat frustrated and angry manner in which Prospero demands Miranda's attention may be the result of Prospero's recollecting his anger at his usurpation, and this anger may be coloring his account. His constant insistence on Miranda's attention and his emphasis on his own pitiable state may be rooted in a latent hope that Miranda will reassure him of his own blamelessness in their arrival to their present state. His recollection, nevertheless, also reveals that he has come to understand his faults as a ruler. And while he may still harbor some longing to justify his earlier neglect, his subsequent actions on the island reveal that he has learned much with respect to harnessing and guiding ambitious men.

ii. Secret Studies and Prospero's Psychological Idol

Thus far we have looked at the problems with Prospero's understanding of political rule as he reveals it in his retrospective account of his exile from Milan. A further look at the studies in which he engaged reveals that his errors can be traced to a set of inclinations characteristic of certain sorts of philosophic natures. We will look at the evidence Shakespeare presents to this effect here. To review, when Prospero withdrew to his studies, he thought that the various bonds of love between himself and the people, himself and the nobles, and himself and Antonio, in addition to Antonio's understanding of what was required for administering the dukedom, would have been sufficient to sustain his position and influence in the polity without his direct involvement. In the meantime, his studies did not help to show him his errors. But as we shall see, it may not simply have been due to the content of his studies that Prospero failed to see his mistakes. In looking at what the play reveals about the nature of Prospero's studies, it becomes apparent that it is not simply for lack of evidence that Prospero failed to recognize what was necessary to sustain his position, but rather because of his disposition towards that evidence. This interpretive disposition hindered him from recognizing the fluctuating nature of politics and political loyalties, and thereby prevented him from seeing what was required to preserve his position in Milan.

The text offers only slight evidence as to what composed either the liberal Arts for which Prospero became publicly well-reputed, or the secret studies to which he privately withdrew. The evidence offered does suggest his secret studies were a distinct aspect of his general studies. Prospero appears to separate the liberal Arts for which he gained public repute from the secret studies with which he became rapt, and because of which he

abandoned politics. Given what we see in the play of his apparent interest in the heavens and the natural world, and abilities to harness certain powers in nature (cf. I.ii.228-230, 333-336, II.ii.138-142 and V.i.33-50), we might suspect that Prospero engaged in studies of nature and the heavens—studies that, in the past, have been known to cause political and religious upheaval, especially in Italy. He is shown to have some regard for preserving the regime (however mistaken his approach to doing so), and so perhaps it is *these* studies—yielding extraordinary power over Nature—that he pursues secretly (i.e., recognizing that they might undermine the opinions, especially the religious beliefs, sustaining the regime). If these make for the entire content of his studies, we can begin to see why they did little to reveal the problems he had with respect to ruling men. While it may be true that knowledge of the order in nature ultimately has an essential relation to human affairs, it seems that the connection between the two is not often, and not easily, seen; and that Prospero, during his time in Milan, did not make for an exception. If his secret studies comprised studies of nature and the heavens, he did not recognize in them any of the positive implications they may have had for political rule, but only that they might undermine the opinions sustaining the regime in which he lived, or unleash (super)natural powers that would be dangerous in the wrong hands.

If studying the heavens and the earth were all that Prospero had attended to, he might have appropriately been called a ‘star-gazer’, one who concerns himself with those matters of the cosmos that seem to have no relation to human matters, and one who therefore shows no concern for human matters. Having presumably inherited his position, his subsequent inability to rule men could thus be explained by his concern with the permanent features of the cosmos (as opposed to the more transient features of political

life). Yet later in the play we are provided evidence of the possibility that Prospero, at least for a time, engaged in studies in the humanities as well as in those of the heavens. There we see that Prospero's error with respect to rule may not have been entirely due to his distance from human things. Indeed, in looking at his studies in the humanities, we suspect that his failure to rule successfully was the result of his having misread texts that explore human things, his approach to ruling the ambitious men of Milan being derived from this misreading.

Later in the play, we are made aware that the men of Milan are familiar with Virgil's *Aeneid*, and so we may suppose that the *Aeneid* was one of the books in the canon of the liberal Arts of Milan under Prospero (cf. II.i.71-80 and 92-97). Prospero is shown to be intimately familiar with the text when he has Ariel imitate the harpy scene from the *Aeneid*. That Gonzalo supplies Prospero with his favorite texts and that Prospero apparently makes use of them on the island, suggests that the *Aeneid* may have been one of Prospero's favorite books. That Sebastian is also familiar with that book (although perhaps less so—he does not appear to recall Dido as she was before she arrived at Carthage; cf. II.i.76-77) suggests, moreover, that it may be part of the canon throughout Italy. Given its content, this would hardly be surprising.

That the men of Italy voice two very different understandings of the text suggests that the reading of it has not brought about a unity of opinion regarding what teachings it imparts for the time. Whereas in calling to mind the struggles of Dido before she came to Carthage Gonzalo shows a sympathy for her plight, Sebastian and Antonio find his sympathy utterly ridiculous, and act as if this fallen queen is worthy only of ridicule. It appears possible that Prospero may have given rise to Gonzalo's interpretation. Inasmuch

as Gonzalo is somewhat conventionally minded (as is evident in his humorous but somewhat serious pontification on the city of the golden age; cf. II.i.139-170), he probably did not develop this unorthodox interpretation of the text by himself. He is also well enough acquainted with Prospero and his studies to be able to supply Prospero with his most prized books, and so it is not implausible that he would have discussed or heard Prospero's account. Indeed, Gonzalo's sympathies resemble Prospero's on this point. Like Gonzalo, Prospero manifests a strong sympathy for Dido: he invokes a figure from the *Aeneid* who works a

gainst Aeneas and his men (as in the case of the harpy scene), and goddesses who work against Aeneas and his men for the sake of Dido (as in the case of Juno and Iris, invoked in the nuptial spectacle). It appears, then, that Prospero has studied the *Aeneid*, but has developed an interpretation that emphasizes sympathy for a fallen queen who made a drastic political error, instead of for an ambitious hero who successfully founded a state.

We have already seen that Prospero's failure to rule was due to his reliance on the bonds of love between himself and his people, his noblemen, and his brother, and his withdrawal from political life. What becomes evident in looking at his sympathies for Dido, is that his assumption that he could effectively rule using love is rooted in the very same tendency that leads him to sympathize with Dido rather than with Aeneas. That the balance of the *Aeneid* following the fall of Dido invokes sympathy for Aeneas while stifling the memory of Dido, suggests that it is not for lack of alternative heroes that Prospero focuses on Dido's plight. Instead, it seems that Prospero identifies with Dido in spite of Virgil's efforts to invoke sympathies for Aeneas and his men. Sympathy is based

upon the recognition that the one with whom one sympathizes is somehow like the one who sympathizes. It seems, then, that Prospero recognizes a much closer similarity between himself and Dido than between himself and Aeneas.

This is not entirely without reason: Dido made several of the same mistakes that Prospero had made, and these mistakes seem to be rooted in characteristics she shares with Prospero. Like Prospero, Dido attempted to rule using love, and ultimately failed. Dido had originally fled from Tyre after learning that her beloved husband had been murdered by his brother.¹⁰ She is initially fair but cautious (to the point of harshness) while setting her new foundations,¹¹ but she falters upon the arrival of Aeneas. Dido's first error was that she took pity on Aeneas and his men when they arrived on her shore;¹² her fatal error, however, was that she thought that her love affair with Aeneas would oblige Aeneas as though the two were married.¹³ When Mercury, in a divine vision, reminds Aeneas of his goal to found Italy, and when Aeneas is overcome with a drive to continue on his pursuit, the narrator comments that while Aeneas was thinking of how he could tactfully depart, "Dido [was] still aware of nothing...never dreaming such a love could ever be broken"¹⁴.

Despite Virgil's articulation of Dido's mistakes, Prospero makes no effort to differentiate himself from her.¹⁵ His compassion for Dido and his inclination to love his citizenry prevents Prospero from recognizing the distinctions essential to his successful rule—namely, those between himself and ambitious men like Aeneas and the men of Italy, and between himself and his citizenry. Prospero's political problems stem from his 'feminine' preference to rule through love without using fear. The reciprocation of his love does not follow, because the kinship Prospero expects is not as strong as he thinks.

His blindness to this lack of reciprocation seems to be peculiar to natures such as his—it is not for lack of evidence that he does not recognize how different he is from the rest of his citizenry. Even if he had not seen this in political life, he has read the *Aeneid* and has been exposed to the ways in which ambitious men are not reigned in by love.

His studies seem to demonstrate further that he is naturally inclined to look for unity and to see similarity. The liberal Arts and studies of the cosmos are typically studies used for pursuing answers to questions that illustrate what is both harmonious and constant, and thus in some sense always the same. The goal of such studies is to develop an understanding of the constant principles and orders; and the tendency in students of these studies is to focus on what is harmoniously unified and the same, rather than what is unique and different. Perhaps as a result of his aiming to develop answers that illuminate the unity and order in the cosmos, and of his being predisposed to seeing the similarities between himself and his human subjects, Prospero failed to see the transient and disorderly aspects of political life evident, for example, in the people's and the nobles' potential to change loyalties.

Since coming to the island Prospero has also developed a better understanding of the relation between what he discovers about the cosmos and the particular regime in which he lives. While he may have had the help of his books to develop this post-exile understanding, it appears to be the case that his experiences while on the island—his experiences with Caliban in particular—were also essential to this development. We will now turn to look at what Shakespeare shows him to have learned through his experiences with Caliban.

Chapter II

The Master-Monster Relation

When Prospero first arrived on the island, he made the same mistake in attempting to establish relations with Caliban that he made in trusting his brother to rule Milan. Approaching him with an almost familial affection (as Caliban himself attests; I.ii.333-338), he initially treated Caliban with cordiality and kindness, even lodging him in the same household. He eventually learned, however—when Caliban attempted to rape Miranda—that Caliban is hardly his kin (cf. I.ii.348-349). Contrary to what we might expect of a father who is dealing with one who attempted to rape his daughter, Prospero decided to keep Caliban alive—as a slave, to be sure—but alive nonetheless. As a result, Prospero recognized that he must rule Caliban because the latter, being slavish, cannot be counted upon to rule himself, and so continued to pose a threat to Prospero and Miranda. As a prerequisite of deciding upon this particular approach to ruling Caliban (that is, as a master over a slave), Prospero had evidently reached certain conclusions about Caliban's nature. Judging by what Shakespeare chose to show of that nature, we can imagine how and why Prospero came to the conclusion that Caliban needed to be ruled as a slave. Despite some of his distinctly human qualities, Caliban appears at the same time to be significantly bestial; and in his bestiality, he is unable to manifest the rational self-control that is the prerequisite of meaningful human freedom. It is for this reason that Prospero rules him as a slave and in so doing, reveals that he has acquired an understanding of the most important political distinctions between men, and what these distinctions imply for the polity. In particular, he recognizes the necessity of masterful rule for those who cannot rule themselves.

At the same time, Shakespeare points to some of the profound difficulties Caliban's example presents. While Prospero is shown to rule him justly in accordance with his slavish nature, Shakespeare also reminds us that this ruling relationship is highly problematic—indeed, whether it is ever politically justifiable is a question. Because of the difficulty of discerning who is naturally slavish (and thus, justly ruled by a master) and who naturally a master, a polity that allows slavery runs the risk of permitting the enslavement of free men. At the same time, however, since the preservation of the political association requires rulers and the political association is necessary to men becoming completely human (Caliban's slavish and bestial nature, as we shall see, results from his lacking the civilizing nurture possible only in political society), men necessarily run the risk of corrupting and being corrupted by political misrule. Facing the alternatives of being ruled by worse men and being threatened by Caliban, Prospero has thus come to recognize the necessity of taking up the task of ruling.

i. The Rule Appropriate to a Man-Monster

As I have noted, Prospero recognized the necessity of controlling Caliban in some fashion when, after Caliban attempted to rape Miranda, he decided to keep the savage alive. Initially, Prospero controlled Caliban by means of confining him to a rock, but as we see in the action of the play, he has subsequently allowed Caliban to work outside his cell, using several devices to control him. Given the threat Caliban poses to Prospero and his daughter (evidenced by Caliban's expressed animosity; e.g. I.ii. 323-326, 366), deciding what sort of control, and then what sort of rule, was appropriate to Caliban doubtless took some consideration. Not the least of the issues Prospero had to confront

was that of determining precisely what sort of a nature, or what sort of a thing, Caliban is. Indeed, Caliban's strange conjunction of bestial and human characteristics would have presented various possibilities with respect to his appropriate treatment. In reflecting upon the features that make for the ambiguity of Caliban's status, we can understand what decided Prospero's relation to Caliban. Considering first Caliban's physical form, and then examining his psychological qualities, we may then see Caliban as Prospero saw him, and thereby understand why he chose to rule Caliban in the manner in which he has. We shall see that because Prospero concluded that Caliban's predominant qualities make him more like a beast than like an autonomous human being, he deemed it necessary to rule Caliban as a slave.

To begin, we might reasonably presume that the first and most obvious difficulty posed to Prospero for understanding Caliban's nature arose out of Caliban's strange physical looks. In the course of the play, we are given several indications that Caliban does not appear quite human. When Sebastian and Antonio first see him, for example, they immediately speculate on what he is (V.i.264-266). Trinculo and Stephano do likewise, and then speak of him as though he is a beast, or more particularly, a fish—the former commenting on his fin-like arms (II.ii.25, 35), and the latter speculating on the prospects of taming him (II.ii.70). At one point, even Caliban himself speaks of his own animalistic appearance: he describes his long nails and how he would use them to dig pig-nuts. These sound more like the claws of birds, dogs or cats than hands and fingers of a human being (II.ii.168). Almost immediately, then, we are inclined to speculate on what Caliban is; presumably, Prospero was inclined to this speculation as well (cf. also, V.i.268 and 289-291).

It is significant that Caliban is not easily identified by his looks because it is usually by means of the look of a thing that we initially recognize what a thing is. The remarkable human ability to recognize significant form, an ability which is quite refined and precise, makes this possible. This ability allows, among other things, for humans to recognize particular instances in nature as variations of a general type, even when they have not previously seen that particular variation. They can recognize that an oak and an elm are both trees, that a robin and an eagle are both birds, and that a black man and a white man are both men, even if they had never before seen one of the variations of these types or forms. This ability is most obviously manifested in visual identification of physical shape. Caliban poses a difficulty to this immediate sense because his shape or visible form does not appear to conform fully to that of a human; as a result, his status as a human being is rendered questionable.

Nonetheless, Caliban does have physical features that seem to be distinctly human, and Shakespeare is at pains throughout the play to highlight some of these. Various characters comment on the placement of Caliban's eyes and the tilt of his head; others allude indirectly to his bipedal form. Stephano, for example finds it very strange that Caliban, who he initially mistakes for a four legged monster (because Trinculo's legs stick out from under Caliban's cloak) can speak his language. At another time, in response to Stephano's comment that Caliban's eyes (as a result of the latter's drunkenness) have nearly rolled back into his head, Trinculo asks, "Where should they be set else? he were a brave monster indeed, if they were set in his tail" (III.ii.9-10). Even Caliban himself comments on a human feature of his own form when he expresses his fear that were they to be caught in their assassination attempt, Prospero would turn the

conspirator's upright foreheads down, like apes, "villainous low" (IV.i.248-249). These instances call to mind distinct features of human anatomy and therefore bespeak Caliban's humanness. Moreover, they are features that have been at the heart of debates about what precisely defines the human form (or, in evolutionary terms, what features indicate that humans have become human¹). That Caliban possesses physical features essential to the human form, but that these are not sufficient to establish his humanity with certainty, suggests either that Caliban may not partake fully of the human form and as such is not yet a human being proper, or, that his physical form on its own is not conclusive for establishing his status as a human being.

Given the ambiguity of Caliban's appearance, Prospero presumably considered other particulars in order to determine Caliban's status, including his ancestry. When we first see him call forth Caliban, he indicates what he regards to be Caliban's parentage. He refers to Caliban as, "got by the devil himself/ Upon [his] wicked dam" (I.ii.321-322) and later speaks of Caliban as "a devil, a born devil" (IV.i.198). But instead of clarifying what kind of being Caliban is, this further complicates our understanding of Caliban's status, since it suggests that Caliban may be part human and part devil. Now he is not only somewhat bestial, but he is also spoken of as a corrupted form of a divine being, known in some circles as the beast of all beasts. And if Caliban is nonetheless proto-human, this could carry profound implications for Shakespeare's own understanding of human nature.

Despite this strange ancestry—which may help to explain Caliban's strange looks—Prospero nonetheless acknowledges that Caliban possesses something of a human

shape when he remarks that Caliban, after the death of his mother, constituted the only exception

to the island being entirely void of those possessing this shape. When reminding Ariel of the history of the island, Prospero refers to its state as it was once Sycorax died. As he describes it, “then was this island--/Save for the son that she did litter here,/ A freckled whelp hag-born—not honour’d with/ A human shape” (I.ii.281-284). The comments that accompany this determination may reveal how Prospero understands the ambiguity surrounding Caliban’s physical form. Prospero speaks of Caliban’s mother as his dam, a generic term for the mother of mammals, (cf. I.ii.322, III.ii.99). Ironically, this likeness is spoken of in reference to Caliban’s human shape; Prospero uses the metaphor likening Caliban to a dog being littered on the island in the very course of acknowledging that Caliban was the only thing that resembled a human there.

Given what we have seen of Caliban’s ancestry and animalistic characteristics, we might still wonder on what basis Prospero has come to regard Caliban as (in effect) subhuman. Perhaps the most obvious indication of Caliban’s *humanity* is the one that becomes immediately apparent when Prospero orders Caliban forth: Caliban’s ability to speak (I.ii.315-316). As Aristotle claims in his *Politics*, “man alone among the animals has speech,” meaning not only an oral means of communicating passions, but of deliberating about right and wrong, good and bad.² That Caliban possesses a somewhat human like body and the distinctly human ability to learn language is not necessarily to conclude, however, that Caliban is fully human. Possessing a form with the potentiality to *become* fully human is not the same as actually being fully human. Despite his linguistic ability and roughly human shape, Caliban is certainly not portrayed as fully human. And

so while he has a proven capacity more nearly to approach the human form of being, he has not actualized this form to the fullest. Moreover, Prospero, in response to Caliban's insolence, virtually dismisses the possibility that Caliban, could ever become more than he currently is. While Prospero's claims are spoken in anger, they nonetheless reveal some of his reasons for this doubt:

Abhorred slave,
Which any print of goodness wilt not take,
Being capable of all ill! I pitied thee,
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
One thing or other: when thou didst not, savage,
Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
A thing most brutish, I endow'd thy purposes
With words that made them known. But thy vile race,
Though thou didst learn, had in't which good natures
Could not abide to be with; therefore wast thou
Deservedly confin'd into this rock,
Who hadst deserv'd more than a prison.
(I.ii.353-367)³

Later, Prospero also exclaims that on Caliban's nature "nurture can never stick" (IV.i.188-189). It seems, then, that while Caliban possesses a potential that may have at one point allowed him to approach full humanity more closely, Prospero judges that Caliban at present still lacks qualities that are essential to a human being. He can learn language, but does not develop the reasoning ability and qualities that usually arise with the development of language. He has not acquired, then, along with his acquisition of language, the ability to rule himself by reason, nor consequently has he a capacity to share in political life. As Aristotle teaches, this requires the ability to deliberate about justice and the common good—which Aristotle associates with the human ability to learn language.⁴ Caliban's perspective on the Right and the Good, however, remains exclusively selfish (e.g. I.ii.333-334). For Aristotle, language and a sense of justice go

hand in hand in making man by nature political. It is in learning and refining language that man becomes more able to rule himself rationally and thus comes closer to fulfilling his nature; but it is only in and through the polity that man develops this linguistic capacity essential to reason, and thus to rational rule. In short, participation in political life is essential to full human development. Caliban, however, though he has acquired language, has not had the opportunity to refine it through the multitude of uses inherent to living in a community. To this extent, then, he is far from potentially becoming, not to mention being, fully human.

While a detailed account of the complex relation between language and man's political nature is beyond the scope of the present thesis (being a book unto itself), a few comments inspired by Aristotle's account of man's political nature as it appears in Book I of the *Politics* will help to illustrate what Shakespeare seems to be pointing to in these details of Caliban's nature.⁵ To repeat, in the *Politics* Aristotle cites language in support of his claim that man is political by nature. Man's capacity for language is virtually impossible to understand independently of his social nature. We need only ask the question, "Which did man need first, language to get into society or society to acquire language?" to sense the circular paradox created in understanding man as originally and naturally solitary.⁶ The problem of the origin of language can be resolved by positing instead that man is by nature social, and raised in a family, which allows him to acquire language. This does not in and of itself establish his *political* nature, however. It is in the content of his language, and not simply in his capacity to learn it, that we see his political nature as it has come into being. For in the human use of language, as Aristotle explains, "speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and

the unjust”.⁷ These questions only come into being once man is confronted with the problems of justice that arise in groupings larger than those of extended families.

Caliban, despite his capacity for language, as we have seen, has not developed a political nature as such. He has not developed his ability to use language, nor has he been exposed to the questions to which political associations give rise, questions which serve to refine each individual’s original understanding of his relation to other humans and which, thereby, would otherwise have helped him to rule himself in accordance with the refined understanding that potentially arises out of these relations. Shakespeare seems to suggest that this lack on his part may have been due to an unnatural upbringing. Caliban, losing his mother when he was very young, neither acquired language, nor developed a gregarious nature, much less a political one. He thus never developed the need for self-rule and the concern for questions of political justice that necessarily arise in extended groupings of individuals living together for extended periods of time. It is perhaps for this reason that Shakespeare has Trinculo and Stephano refer to Caliban as a monster, not once, but thirty-nine times—the central instance of which he is called a “man-monster” (III.ii.11). Caliban seems to be monstrous or a monstrosity in that he partakes of the human form but has not developed the distinctly natural capacities of this form. Aware of the danger to himself and his daughter inherent in Caliban’s lack of self control and inability to appreciate the benefits of living with others in a way that is mutually beneficial—Prospero realizes not only that he must rule Caliban, but also that he must rule him by means of the only rule suitable to Caliban: that of a master over a slave.

Ironically, Caliban’s slavish nature manifests itself most clearly in the way he understands freedom. Caliban’s longing for freedom is shown in his curses of Prospero,

but paradoxically it is conjoined with an eagerness for servitude. When we first meet Caliban, he unleashes wrathful curses at Prospero for the latter's absolute rule over him:

All the charms
Of Sycorax, toads, beetles, bats, light on you!
For I am all the subjects that you have,
Which first was mine own King: and here you sty me
In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me
The rest o' th' island

(I.ii.341-346).

Caliban, then, longs for the freedom he believes himself to have possessed when he was alone on the island. Ironically, he is mistaken in believing he ever possessed freedom, since he was then ruled exclusively by his instinctive impulses, like any beast. He does not understand that human freedom is not simply freedom from confinement, and that, in his mistaken understanding, he actually manifests slavishness. This slavishness becomes evident in his initial eagerness to serve first Prospero, and then Stephano (cf. I.ii.38-39, II.ii.148-149 and II.ii.161-171). The dark irony of Caliban's rejoicing at his new servitude to Stephano illustrates the paradoxical nature of Caliban's longing for freedom:

*No more dams I'll make for fish;
Nor fetch in firing
At requiring;
Nor scrape trenchering, nor wash dish:
'Ban, 'Ban, Cacaliban
Has a new master:—get a new man.
Freedom, high day! High-day, freedom! Freedom,
High-day, freedom!*

(II.ii.180-189)

Caliban believes that in adopting a new master, a master who will indulge his pleasures and his desire for revenge, he will become free. What he fails to understand, however, is that some masters will give rise to further enslavement, whereas others can help one attain genuine freedom through acquiring self-discipline, prerequisite of self-rule.

To the extent that certain masters can help an individual to acquire human freedom, Caliban has not totally misunderstood the need for a master for his freedom. We need only reflect on the implications of being a slave to one's desires, as opposed to being master of one's self, to begin to see why it is a certain manifestation of self-mastery that allows one to be free. The difference between feeling enslaved to one's desires (where the desires are masters) and feeling a master of oneself (where one's reason and will is master over one's desires) is apparent in the different ways we understand these phenomena. Despite the fact that both involve a master and slave that reside in one single self, we think of the former as slavery and the latter as self-mastery. This is perhaps because one identifies one's self with one's rational will, whereas the desires seem to be almost foreign masters. The desire to be free, then, is the desire to be free of the despotic rule of one's lower self: the animalistic desires of the body, those seemingly foreign masters. That said, these different parts are part of a larger whole, with which we also identify—the desires, however foreign, are one's own desires and so these too are a part of this self that wishes to be free. The longing for the whole self to be free requires that the rational willing which we identify as the source of self-mastery, rule over our desires and emotions, which at times seem almost foreign, and which we recognize to be a potential cause of self-enslavement.

Caliban's attempted rape of Miranda and his inability to control his resentful and vengeful curses against Prospero (despite his recognition that he will be punished for them) illustrate his utter lack of self control (II.ii.3-4). This lack indicates that he needs a master to rule for his own good, and to that extent experience human freedom. But as becomes clear in his enslavement to Stephano, he has profoundly misunderstood what

kind of master he needs. He fails to recognize that Stephano will not help him gain human freedom but worsen his self-enslavement. Caliban's mistake is that he thinks, first, that Stephano will fulfill his desire for revenge and, second, that Stephano will continue to fulfill his new desire for alcohol and that this will make him free. The logic seems simple—fulfill your desires and be free from them. The fact of insatiable desires, however, belies this logic, and even if Caliban's desires are satiable—as his new desire rooted in the pleasure of alcohol seems initially to be—his servitude to Stephano does not promise that they will always be satiated. Alcohol on the island is in a limited quantity (cf. III.ii.7-15 and 1-3), and Stephano certainly does not satisfy Caliban's desire for revenge, despite his own drunken aspirations to 'usurp' Prospero as the ruler of the island.

What is more, Stephano initially sees alcohol as the means to ensuring Caliban's service to himself and has no qualms about corrupting him to this end. When he first sees Caliban he immediately ponders ways in which he can capitalize on Caliban's nature:

He shall taste of my bottle: if he have never
drunk wine afore, it will go near to remove his fit.
If I can recover him, and keep him tame, I will not
take too much for him; he shall pay for him
that hath him and that soundly.

(II.ii.76-80)

He thus shows that he is willing to introduce new and possibly insatiable desires to Caliban, and then either abandon Caliban to his own individual enslavement or further enslave him.

In believing that his freedom will be realized by means of a master who will feed his desires, Caliban reveals his utter inability to make the distinction between self-rule and enslavement to one's desires. In other words, he is unable to rank which part of him

properly rules and which is properly ruled; apparently he is without any inherent sense of what is noble and what base. As a result he is motivated, as are all beasts, by pleasure and pain: he longs to be free from pain and free to indulge in whatever pleasure he fancies.

Because Caliban cannot be controlled by anything other than pain and pleasure, Prospero necessarily rules him by these means (cf. I.ii.346-350, 368-373, II.ii.1-14, III.ii.133-141).

Unlike the rule of Stephano, Prospero's mastery over slavish Caliban does seem to have the effect of initiating the recognition of the distinction between noble and base masters. Upon recognizing the extent of the foolishness of Trinculo and Stephano at the end of the play, Caliban sarcastically exclaims, "O Setebos, these be brave spirits indeed!/ How fine my master is! I am afraid/ He will chastise me" (V.I.261-263). And when Prospero orders him to trim the cell before being considered for pardon, he chides himself:

Ay, that I will; and I'll be wise hereafter,
And seek for grace. What a thrice-double ass
Was I, to take this drunkard for a god,
And worship this dull fool!

(V.i.294-297)

By the end of the play, then, Caliban has come to acquire some recognition of the distinction essential to self-rule. Apparently, in his manner of enslaving Caliban, obliging him to do useful work and exercise enough self-discipline as to avoid more punishment, Prospero has somehow inculcated this sense into Caliban. He did not feed low desires in Caliban in the way that Stephano had done, and in avoiding this Prospero may have helped Caliban to prevent these desires from masking his clearer reason. As noted, Prospero also taught Caliban speech, and in doing so may have initiated in Caliban the development of his reasoning powers (cf.I.ii.315-316). Lastly, the pleasures with which

Prospero motivates Caliban may have been conducive to his developing a sense of beauty, which may develop into some recognition of the noble and base. As Caliban himself attests, he has in the past been subject to sleep charms and music, and we might wonder whether these have had some effect on his developing his sense of the distinction between Stephano and Trinculo, and Prospero. As he tells it:

...the isle is full of noises,
Sounds and sweet airs, that give delight, and hurt not.
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments
Will hum about mine ears; and sometime voices,
That, if I then had wak'd after long sleep,
Will make me sleep again: and then, in dreaming,
The clouds methought would open, and show riches
Ready to drop upon me; that, when I wak'd
I cried to dream again.

(III.ii.133-141)

Perhaps with these Prospero was attempting to help Caliban develop a sense of harmony for the sake of fostering his reasoning powers and thereby his potential for self-rule.⁸

ii. Political Problems Caliban's Example Presents

While the ruling relation Prospero has established between himself and Caliban is suitable and effective on the island, Shakespeare also subtly suggests several problems with this model for actual regimes and for the regime to which the newly reformed citizenry shall return.⁹ We will note some of these here. As Prospero has shown in his tacit response to the choice between killing Caliban and enslaving him, the best circumstances would allow that each member of a polity be 'mastered' to the extent necessary to preserve the benefits that the political association bestows on all. This would require knowing who appropriately rules and who is appropriately ruled, and in what way. Moreover, in the case of men whose condition approaches that of Caliban, it would

require knowing who is rightly a master and who rightly mastered. But as we have seen with Caliban, the acquisition of this type of knowledge is fraught with difficulties, not the least of which is that people often make judgments of this sort based on appearances.¹⁰

As Trinculo indicates, the men of Italy have been exposed to men of varying shapes and these men have raised similar debates about what makes for a human being, debates similar to that which Caliban's appearance provoked. In fact, it is in response to his first exposure to Caliban that Trinculo calls this to mind. As he explains it,

Were I in England now, as once I was, and
had but this fish painted, not a holiday fool there
but would give a piece of silver: there would this
monster make a man; any strange beast there
makes a man: when they will not give a doit to re-
lieve a lame beggar they will lay out ten to see a
dead Indian. Legg'd like a man! And his fins like
arms! Warm o' my troth! I do now let loose my
opinion, hold it no longer: this is no fish, but an
islander, that hath lately suffered by a thunderbolt.
(II.ii.28-37)

Trinculo decides that Caliban is a human being; but human or not, this does not stop Stephano from immediately thinking that because of his strange looks, he can—and perhaps should—be made a slave for public spectacles and for Stephano's own profit (II.ii.78-80).

Caliban, then, exemplifies several political difficulties, even through they do not exist on the island as Prospero governs it. First, he presents the problem of establishing the proper demarcation between human and proto-human, a demarcation that would determine when a person becomes a person proper and should be treated as such. Second, whatever the truth about his anthropological status, he still looks very different and is regarded as such. Third, whatever his status, he still has qualities that seem to make him

less than fully human and that prescribe that he be ruled by a master. Because of the difficulty of establishing who is rightfully a master and who is rightfully a slave, and the implications of being mistaken about this—namely that some true masters will be enslaved and some true slaves will be masters—he and others like him will not necessarily be regarded as what they in truth are. In short, despite the fact that Prospero has come to recognize the best practical means of maintaining relations with a being like Caliban—one who is naturally slavish, and far from capable of responsible participation in a polity—it is a means that he cannot employ to rule other men like Caliban without risking the potential enslavement and thereby the potential harm of men who are not rightfully enslaved.

Nevertheless, whether or not Prospero's ability to rule Caliban despotically but justly is suitable or possible in Milan, it did teach him the necessity of political rule and some of the basic implications of man's political nature. Most importantly, Caliban's example illuminates what becomes of man without the family and the polity, and thus tacitly points to the necessity of the family and the polity for the fulfillment of man's nature. At the same time, however, Caliban's experience with Stephano and Trinculo shows that bad rulers and masters can make men worse than they might be even in their own bestial or instinctive enslavement. Indeed, whereas Prospero calls Caliban "A devil, a born devil, on whose nature/ Nurture can never stick," he refers to some of the men of Italy (presumably Sebastian and Antonio) as "worse than devils" (IV.i.188-189 and III.iii.35-36). The implication is that some civilized men, apparently as a result of their being civilized in the manner in which they have been, are made worse than one who developed independently of the political association. Rulers may in fact have this effect

on men, but since the polity is essential to the fulfillment of man's nature, this danger cannot be entirely avoided. In seeing the potential for the polity both to cultivate and to corrupt, Prospero has seen the urgency of good political rule. His experiences with Caliban have prepared him for ruling men; his willingness to imprison and enslave Caliban also shows that he has come to recognize the political necessity of ensuring that dangerous men such as Caliban do not harm the political association, and his recognition that the political association can potentially make men worse than the likes of Caliban suggests that he recognizes the urgency not only of rule and control but of good rule. As we shall see in the next chapters, he will combine his ability to rule potentially threatening men with his ability to cultivate them, and in so doing establish a regime more conducive to the fulfillment of man's nature.

Chapter III

The Heirs of Prospero's Philosophical Legacy

The primary objective of Prospero's project is to ensure that his daughter lives out a wholesome and fulfilling life (cf. I.ii.16-21). Finding the island woefully inadequate for this goal, Prospero attempts to re-acquire his dukedom so that in passing it on to her, Miranda can enjoy a prosperous life therein. A careful look at what Prospero relates of Miranda's past reveals that, at one point, Prospero hoped that she would take up the task of perpetuating his philosophical legacy. As we shall see, this seems to be a remnant of the approach to rule he took previously, a failed approach (as we saw in Chapter I) which was the result of his acting on the natural inclinations of his philosophic nature. Just as he came to learn that certain of his inclinations left unchecked, or at least unrefined, did not support his own effective rule, so too has he subsequently come to see that these very same inclinations prevent Miranda from successfully taking up his position. Unlike her father, however, Miranda lacks the impetus to restrain these same inclinations that her father has, being unacquainted with political life, and accordingly without any ambition for political power. In order to pass on his philosophical legacy, while at the same time ensuring that Miranda is provided the best opportunity for a happy life, Prospero thus seeks out a man who will be both a suitable husband to her and suited to sustain his (soon to be reacquired) philosophy-friendly dukedom. For these twin purposes, he has selected Ferdinand, heir to the Kingdom of Naples which now holds Milan in subordination. At the time of their initial introduction neither Miranda nor Ferdinand is quite apt for taking up the respective roles Prospero has chosen for them. Miranda's unrefined compassion and her limited experience on the island has left her ill-equipped for dealing with either a

lover's attention or her future role as queen; and Ferdinand, having inherited an imperialistic political project from his father, is not suited to perpetuate Prospero's legacy of the liberal Arts. Prospero thus intervenes to manage the courtship between the two. He refines Miranda's sense of compassion and makes Ferdinand an ally of philosophy; in so doing he prepares the two for inheriting his legacy.

i. Engaging Miranda

In explaining Miranda's past to her, Prospero tells her, "Thy mother was a piece of virtue, and/ She said thou wast my daughter; and thy father/ Was Duke of Milan; and his only heir/ And princess, no worse issued" (I.ii.56-59). In emphasizing that despite her being a princess (as opposed to a prince) he views her as his sole legitimate heir, he may mean that he is not altogether happy with the fact that political reality precludes her inheriting his dukedom and ruling it in her own name. A further hint of this surfaces again later when in response to Ferdinand's claim that the King has now lost his lords—"the Duke of Milan/ And his brave son being twain"—, Prospero says, "The Duke of Milan/ And his more braver daughter could control thee,/ If now 'twere fit to do't" (I.ii.440-445). The usual understanding of 'control' here is that it means 'confute'; and while this is likely how it would be heard by Shakespeare's contemporaries, the author himself may intend the more modern meaning as well. In the first instance, we can reasonably presume that Prospero declines to reveal his identity to Ferdinand because he assumes (and for good reason) that the knowledge of his identity would complicate Ferdinand's reaction to Miranda, whereas Prospero wishes him to love her for herself alone. Indeed, it may undermine their courtship, for Ferdinand's father is a proven enemy

to Prospero (I.ii.121-122). While Ferdinand has heard good word of him (V.i.191-195), we can assume that this knowledge of the past animosity of the families might nonetheless give him pause as to the marital suitability of Miranda. That said, Prospero's frustration at Ferdinand's error and his pointed emphasis on the potential of his "more braver daughter" may suggest the second possible meaning as well. After all, England was ruled by a woman, and her reign is remembered as one of England's most glorious. Moreover, Prospero displays a pronounced sympathy for another female ruler: Dido.

The recollection of his exile that Ferdinand unknowingly provokes may remind Prospero of his own former naiveté. Once upon a time, he believed—as a measure of his own lack of political wiles—that a philosopher could reign, and retain ultimate sovereign power, without having to mess with the lowly work of everyday ruling. And on that basis he may have hoped that his daughter—manifesting traits akin to his own—could and would take up the position of titular ruler of his philosophic dukedom. Indeed, Prospero had made some attempt to acquaint her with some of the studies that, as I suggested in Chapter I, are associated with the pursuit of philosophy. (As Caliban reveals, for example, Prospero had taught her about the heavens; II.ii.140-141.) The exacting attention that Prospero gave to Miranda's education may have initially been for the sake of cultivating her for this task (I.ii.172-174). To that extent, then, Prospero's original conception of a philosophic nature was fully compatible with a feminine nature.¹ But he has learned that neither goes well with political rule. For that purpose, philosophy must become political philosophy. And accordingly, if a woman is to rule successfully, she must be 'masculinized'.

On the island, Prospero has subsequently come to learn that Miranda is not suited for such a transformation, even should he desire it (which is doubtful). While Miranda shares some of his traits, she is profoundly—and, one suspects, unalterably—feminine, epitomized by her natural compassion. Prospero, however, through his experience with Caliban, through his own reflection on his usurpation by Antonio, and as a result of his having subsequently learned something of the problem of Dido's fall, has come to recognize that one cannot rule by being loving and compassionate. Miranda, by comparison, manifests these tendencies in a full and unrestrained form. So, while Prospero has abandoned any hope he might once have had for her to rule, he does attempt to refine her unbridled love and compassion for the sake of her return to Italy.

Prospero begins the task of preparing Miranda for their return to Italy and her marriage to Ferdinand when he has her witness the wreck of the Italian's ship. To this she responds:

If by your Art, my dearest father, you have
Put the wild waters in this roar, allay them.
The sky, it seems, would pour down stinking pitch,
But that the sea, mounting to th' welkin's cheek,
Dashes the fire out. O, I have suffered
With those that I saw suffer! A brave vessel,
(Who had, no doubt, some noble creature in her,)
Dash'd all to pieces. O, the cry did knock
Against my very heart! Poor souls, they perish'd!
Had I been any god of power, I would
Have sunk the sea within the earth, or ere
It should the good ship so have swallow'd, and
The fraughting souls within her.

(I.ii.1-13)

The desired effect of the storm, we soon discover, is to invoke her sense of compassion for the beings she imagines inhabit this new "brave vessel"; yet no sooner does Prospero

arouse Miranda's sense of compassion than he immediately calms it. As Prospero explains to her,

The direful spectacle of the wrack, which touch'd
The very virtue of compassion in thee,
I have with such provision in mine Art
So safely ordered, that there is no soul—
No, not so much perdition as an hair
Betid to any creature in the vessel
Which thou heard'st cry, which thou saw'st sink.
(I.ii.26-32)

When her anxiety persists he adds, "Be collected:/ No more amazement: tell your piteous heart/ There's no harm done" (I.ii.11-15). Despite the fact that she had just witnessed the apparent ruin of a brave vessel that she presumes contains equally brave creatures, she is immediately told to calm her compassion because the harm to these beings is only apparent. The objective seems, in part, to alert her to the problem of reactions based on her immediate sense experience. Miranda's compassion is invoked largely because the ship appears 'brave' and because she hears the men on it crying out: she feels a kinship to them based on what she sees and hears. Her natural sense of compassion is augmented by her fond approval of their visible appearance. Prospero wishes to alert her to the danger of this thoughtless sort of liking.

This initial experience foreshadows what happens when Prospero sets up the first meeting between Miranda and Ferdinand. There, too, Miranda's natural sense of compassion aroused by the appearance of harm is augmented by her recognition of Ferdinand's beauty. There again, Prospero has aroused her sense of compassion, apparently, in order to refine it. As soon as Miranda sees Ferdinand, she is immediately taken by his brave form—so much so, in fact, that she thinks him a divine spirit. Prospero assures her that he is not, but is rather one who, "eats and sleeps and hath such senses/ As

we have, such” (I.ii.415-416). He then rekindles her compassion for Ferdinand in telling her that he is one of those who she witnessed flailing in the wrack and that as result “he’s something stain’d/ With grief...for he hath lost his fellows,/ And strays about to find ‘em” (I.ii.417-419). She nonetheless determines to call him “A thing divine”, as she explains it, “for nothing natural/ I ever saw so noble” (I.ii.421-422). From the first, then, Miranda is made to feel both sympathy and awe for Ferdinand.

While Ferdinand is on trial, Miranda begs Prospero to indulge her in her pity. In response, Prospero exacerbates her sense of pity with the apparent intention of helping her to become aware that Ferdinand’s appearance—contrary to her judgment that “nothing ill can dwell in such a temple” (I.ii.460)—does not ensure that he is truly noble, nor even that he is truly handsome, since judging that requires familiarity with a plurality of people with whom he can be compared—which of course she lacks:

Thou think’st there is no more such shapes as he,
Having seen but him and Caliban: foolish wench!
To th’ most of men this is a Caliban,
And they to him are angels.
(I.ii.480-484)

Still, here too, he assures her also that his harshness with Ferdinand is not ill-intended, or actually harmful, in spite of its appearance. Despite the fact that she has nothing with which to compare Ferdinand’s brave form, she nonetheless persists in regarding him as beautiful. Is Shakespeare hereby suggesting beauty is *not* entirely relative? In any case, while on the one hand, Prospero augments her longing for Ferdinand, on the other hand, he attempts to help her to discriminate between Ferdinand’s visible appearance and his character. Because, before this encounter, Miranda has seen only Caliban and her father, she naturally presumes one can judge souls by bodies: beautiful bodies are fitted with

beautiful souls and ugly bodies with ugly souls. Prospero's efforts here seem intended to begin to disabuse her of that dangerous naiveté.

At this stage of her experience with Ferdinand, she has not yet seen the truth in what her father teaches. What she does see, however, is that Prospero's own apparent anger is simply that: apparent. As she explains it to Ferdinand, "My father's of a better nature, sir,/ Than he *appears by speech*: this is unwonted/ Which now came from him" (I.ii.499-501, emphasis added). This suggests that Prospero has achieved something of his desired effect. Her indiscriminate wonderment when later confronting all the survivors, however, indicates she has much to learn about the problem of distinguishing appearance from reality when it comes to judging people:

O, wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
That has such people in't!

(V.i.181-184)

Nevertheless, Prospero can reasonably hope that such learning will come eventually, and that in the mean time her security will be ensured by means of Ferdinand's judgment.

Once he has secured her commitment to her new husband, Prospero leaves Miranda to her natural inclinations to become a mother to the future heir of Naples (cf. III.i.75-76). The predominance of compassion, while not fitting for a political ruler, is a quality essential to motherhood, for it is through compassion that mothers are able to cultivate children. Compassion helps mothers, for example, to imagine what children and babies need before they can communicate through language, and thus helps enable mothers to teach children to speak. Prospero's hope of having future heirs, his recognition of Miranda's unfitness for political rule, and his scheme for marrying her to

Ferdinand, all suggest that Prospero has cultivated her with an eye toward her eventually becoming a mother (cf. III.i.74-76).²

As we saw with Prospero and now see with Miranda, those manifesting a dominant sense of compassion are ill-suited to political rule because this sentiment (an indiscriminate sympathy with suffering) compromises one's abilities to make and act upon the *distinctions* essential to maintaining proper relations amongst members of the political association and it undermines the *harshness* sometimes necessary for ruling a polity. Only if such individuals can be sufficiently toughened to act upon the distinctions essential to the political association (as Prospero did through his experience with Caliban, for example) can philosophically inclined individuals be trusted with responsibility of ruling the polity, including that of advising a Prince. Aware of this and Miranda's unfitness for political rule, Prospero seeks out a suitable husband for her (i.e., loving), and one who also will be suited to rule his kingdom (i.e., spirited and strong). Ferdinand, he soon confirms, meets these criteria. But like Miranda, Ferdinand's former education has not adequately prepared him to rule the polity in the manner Prospero sees fit.

ii. Engaging Ferdinand

Prospero secures Ferdinand's love and commitment to Miranda, first, by ensuring that he is initially captivated by her; second, by having him work for her; and third, by instilling in him the fear that he will suffer the wrath of both Prospero and the heavens if he strays from his promise to her. At the same time, Prospero makes Ferdinand an ally in his own political philosophic project. A close look at the nature of the courtship of Miranda and Ferdinand and Prospero's intervention therein, reveals that the goal of

engaging Ferdinand to Miranda is inextricably intertwined with the goal of allying Ferdinand with philosophy.

Ferdinand's refinement begins with some music that effectively lowers his defences and calms him from the fit of sadness that he suffers as a result of losing his father and the rest of the men on the ship. No sooner does he speculate on the possibility that the music attends on some "god o' th' island" than a new song begins, revealing to him that his father, at least as he formerly knew him "suffer[s] a sea change/ into something rich and strange" and that "sea nymphs hourly ring his knell" (I.ii.398-405). Taking his cue from the knell here, Ferdinand interprets the song as confirming his belief that his father has drowned.

In having Ferdinand believe himself bereft of his father, Prospero (temporarily) prevents further influence of King Alonso on his son. Given Alonso's apparent willingness to engage his children in political marriages, and that Ferdinand would otherwise have sought Alonso's approval of his marriage, we can see how the King's influence on Ferdinand could have been a hindrance to Prospero's objective of marrying Ferdinand to Miranda (cf. II.i.118-131 and V.i.190-191). Perhaps more importantly, Alonso seems to have adopted an imperialistic policy in order to expand his state, and since he aims to bestow his empire on Ferdinand, we can assume that he would have passed this policy on to his son (II.i.107-109). While Prospero may not have known the precise details of Alonso's political project and the extent of Alonso's influence on Ferdinand, his awareness of Alonso's presence in the area suggests he knows something of it. His previous exposure to Alonso's political actions (for example, those by which Prospero came to recognize Alonso as his "enemy inveterate"; II.i.121-122), culminating

in Alonso's being instrumental in the overthrow and the exile of Prospero, would also have given him a sense of the King's general political policy, and would have helped him to imagine the nature of Ferdinand's rearing. Prospero does, of course, adapt his own plan to the territory that Alonso had established through this policy, but through the marriage of Miranda and Ferdinand, the rule of Alonso's empire will be given a very different character. Prospero's objective, then, is to ensure that Ferdinand uses the foundations set by his father in accordance with the philosophic influence he himself asserts, rather than to rule solely in light of Alonso's political objectives.

Now believing himself bereft of his father, Ferdinand is left to his own devices for choosing a wife and queen. Prospero goes to some length to ensure that Ferdinand regards Miranda as a potential wife. In enhancing his first glimpse of Miranda with music, and staging Ferdinand's first sight of her, Prospero attempts to captivate Ferdinand. This proves effective—so effective, in fact, that Ferdinand immediately wonders whether Miranda is the goddess on which the music he had just heard attends (I.ii.424-425). Miranda, at the same time, thinks it might be fitting to call Ferdinand divine. In response, Prospero, pleased with his magical achievement of this initial step, happily proclaims, "At the first sight/ they have chang'd eyes. Delicate Ariel,/ I'll set thee free for this" (I.ii.443-444). The emphasis on eyes reminds us that the two have been captivated by each other's appearance. As we saw with Miranda, however, Prospero knows well that this experience cannot be the basis from which Miranda is to make her judgments about men. He knows equally well that this first experience—this love at first sight—is certainly not enough to secure Ferdinand's lasting love. As Ferdinand later tells her, in the past he has fallen for many attractive women, and their appearance (both

visibly and in speech) have been somewhat deceiving (III.i.39-48). Nevertheless, this first encounter is significant for it implants the initial seed of longing in Ferdinand that leads him to pursue Miranda as a potential wife. Indeed, it seems that this first sight so captivates Ferdinand that he later endures the log-piling ‘slavery’ that Prospero imposes on him for the sake of Miranda. As Ferdinand later explains to her,

The very instant that I saw you, did
My heart fly to your service; there resides,
To make me slave to it; and for your sake
Am I this patient log man.

(III.i.63-67)

This carefully orchestrated initial impression, then, proves essential to Ferdinand’s eventual commitment to Miranda.

As soon as Ferdinand hears Miranda’s pronouncement, “This/ Is the third man that e’er I saw; the first/ That e’er I sigh’d for” (I.ii.447-449) he makes his proposal: “O, if a virgin,/ And your affection not gone forth, I’ll make you/ The Queen of Naples” (I.ii.450-452). Prospero quickly puts his efforts to a halt. As his aside explains it, “They are both in either’s pow’rs: but this swift business/ I must uneasy make, lest too light winning/ Make the prize light” (I.ii.450-454). Because Miranda, unfamiliar with both the natural and conventional dynamics of courtship, will give herself too easily to Ferdinand, Prospero intervenes. Through this intervention, Prospero also begins to bring Ferdinand into an alliance with himself and with his philosophical project.

At the early stages of his management of Ferdinand, Prospero provokes Ferdinand to a struggle. This serves two purposes: it heightens Ferdinand’s longing for Miranda and it calls Ferdinand’s own understanding of his position of power into question. When Miranda first met Ferdinand, he had proclaimed himself “the best of them that speak this

speech,/ Were [he] but where 'tis spoken" (I.ii.431-433). When Prospero questions him on this claim, Ferdinand assures him that he is indeed the best, being so precisely because he is the King of Naples. Later, when Prospero provocatively accuses Ferdinand of acting as a usurper on the island (I.ii.456-459) and then orders him to enslavement (I.ii.464-467), Ferdinand refuses: "No;/ I will resist such entertainment till/ Mine enemy has more pow'r," and thereupon draws his sword. Prospero's first provocation is something of a political challenge: he accuses Ferdinand of usurping his territory and threatens to treat him like a prisoner of war. Ferdinand's response then is to treat Prospero like an aggressor. Immediately, however, Prospero shows his superior strength; it is a magical power, of course, but it reveals to Ferdinand that the powers of his sword will not be sufficient to subdue this 'enemy'. Ferdinand is made to see that his position as the King of Naples and the power of his sword do not exactly make him the best of men because Prospero has a superior form of strength. This initiates Ferdinand's awe of Prospero's power.

Before he submits entirely to Prospero's power, however, Ferdinand puts up a fight in spirit, requiring Prospero's insisting: "Come on; obey:/ Thy nerves are in their infancy again,/ And have no vigour in them" (I.ii.487-489). Ferdinand finally succumbs to Prospero's entrancement, recognizing his own strength as inferior. His submission, however, is as much to Miranda's charms as to Prospero's power:

So they are:
My spirits, as in a dream, are all bound up.
My father's loss, the weakness which I feel,
The wrack of all my friends, nor this man's threats,
To whom I am subdued, are all but light to me,
Might I but through my prison once a day
Behold this maid: all corners else o' th' earth
Let liberty make use of; space enough

Have I in such a prison.

(I.ii.488-496)

To this Prospero privately responds, “It works”; he refers to Ferdinand’s acceptance of trials and imprisonment for the sake of Miranda. If Ferdinand had continued to resist Prospero, despite the elder man’s relation to Miranda, this would have been an indication that he was insusceptible to Prospero’s cultivation.

Before he grants Miranda’s hand to Ferdinand, Prospero has Ferdinand endure a trial of servitude. Prospero intends this trial to solidify further the bond he is aiming to establish between the two. In this trial Prospero commands Ferdinand to pile so many logs that Ferdinand doubts he can finish before the day is out. This attests to Ferdinand’s unfaltering dedication to Miranda, heightens her value, and thus further strengthens Ferdinand’s bond with her. To recall the lines referred to above:

I am, in my condition,
A prince, Miranda: I do think, a King;
I would not so!—and would not more endure
This wooden slavery than to suffer
The flesh-fly blow my mouth. Hear my soul speak:
The very instant that I saw you, did
My heart fly to your service; there resides,
To make me slave to it: and for your sake
Am this patient log-man.

(III.i.59-67)

Because one’s commitment to something is strengthened by the effort one puts into it—objects of love being perhaps the most obvious example—Ferdinand’s commitment to Miranda is made stronger through this labour. What is more, trials of love often take on the character of willing slavery: willing because it is freely acceded to, but slavery because in choosing it one becomes wholly subject to the will and pleasure of another. In

taking her hand, Ferdinand confirms his willing enslavement her: “with a heart as willing/
As bondage e’er of freedom: here’s my hand” (III.i.88-89).

Given his goal of sustaining Ferdinand’s commitment to Miranda, and the effect of his enslavement to her, we can see why Prospero demanded this labour of him.

iii. The Marriage Masque

Having seen that Ferdinand is committed to Miranda, and Miranda to Ferdinand, Prospero solidifies their marriage bond by sanctioning it with a spectacle of divinities. This spectacle also arouses Ferdinand’s utter awe, and as such serves to solidify his submission to and alliance with Prospero. Before he releases Miranda to Ferdinand, Prospero invokes the heavens in order to instil a fear in the two that if they attempt to consummate their marriage before it has been sanctified with proper religious ceremony, they will suffer the wrath of the heavens; or, as Prospero tells him,

No sweet aspersion shall the heavens let fall
To make this contract grow; but barren hate,
Sour-ey’d disdain and discord shall bestrew
The union of your bed with weeds so loathly
That you shall hate it both...

(IV.i.19-22)

We can presume that this is quite believable, given the magic Ferdinand has already witnessed. In response to this Ferdinand assures Prospero,

As I hope
For quiet days, fair issue and long life,
With such love as ‘tis now, the murkiest den,
The most opportune place, the strong’st suggestion
Our worser genius can, shall never melt
Mine honour into lust, to take away
The edge of that day’s celebration
When I shall think, or Phoebus’ steeds are founder’d

Or Night kept chain'd below.
(IV.i.23-31)

Despite Ferdinand's emphatic assurance so poetically expressed, and Prospero's acknowledgement that what he speaks is "fairly spoke" (IV.i.31), Prospero shows that he is aware that Ferdinand's word may not be enough to ensure the chastity of the two. For no sooner does Ferdinand speak this fair speech than we hear Prospero enjoining them to abstain from excessive flirting:

Look thou be true; do not give dalliance
Too much the rein: the strongest oaths are straw
To th' fire in' th' blood: be more abstemious,
Or else, good night your vow!
(IV.i.51-54)

Apparently the two have been flirting or fondling each other enough to elicit this second warning.

Thus aware of the fragility of oaths and words, Prospero buttresses his teaching that the heavens will punish erotic incontinence by providing a display of the divine sanction for his teaching. The message Prospero instils in the two through the spectacle is the one he had earlier voiced: that lustful behaviour and licentiousness will lead to barrenness, and that chastity, fidelity and continence will lead to prosperity and good issue. He effects the former in having the goddesses refer to two tales that illustrate the results of lustfulness in the gods, and he effects the latter in having the goddesses bless the marriage of Miranda and Ferdinand. The first tale that serves to buttress the fear of the consequences of unsanctified lust which Prospero had earlier begun to instil in Ferdinand is the rape of Proserpina. Ceres refers to this event when she inquires of Iris whether Venus or her son now attends Queen Juno. As she explains to Iris: "Since they [Venus and her son] did plot/ the means that dusky Dis my daughter got,/ her and her

blind boy's scandal'd company/ I have forsworn" (IV.i.87-91). The events that Ceres speaks of are detailed in Ovid's *Metamorphosis*,

[Venus:]

'O you, my son, my weapon and my armor,
dear Cupid—you, my power—take those shafts
to which both gods and mortals must submit;
with one of your swift arrows pierce the chest
of Pluto—god who, when the lots were cast,
assigning the three realms, received the last.
You conquer and command sky-deities—
not even Jove is free from your decrees;
sea-gods are governed by your rule—and he
who is the god of gods who rule the sea.
And why should Tartarus elude our laws?
Why not extend your mother's power—and yours?
One-third of all the world is still not ours.
We have been slow to act, but indecision
has earned us nothing more than scorn in heaven.
And—son—if my authority should weaken,
Then yours would suffer too. Do you not see
how both Athena and the hunting goddess,
Diana, would defy me? And the daughter
of Ceres, if we let her choose, will be
like them: she is so bent on chastity.
But for the sake of all I share with you,
Please join that goddess-girl, Proserpina,
to her great uncle, Pluto.' This, she asked.
Love, opening his quiver—he respects
his mother—from his thousand shafts selects
the sharpest, surest shaft—the arrow most
responsive to the pressure of his bow.
Across his knee, the pliant bow is bent;
Love's hooked barb pierces Pluto through the chest.³

The result, of course is that Ceres—in her fury at the resulting kidnapping of her daughter to the underworld—brings famine and scarcity over the earth. Following this is a second reference to an event wherein the lust of two gods, Venus and Mars, gave rise to much dishonour and dissent in the heavens. This reference appears when Iris replies to Ceres that Venus (or "Mars' hot minion" as Iris refers to her) and her son have left for

Paphos and so do not pose any threat to Ferdinand and Miranda despite their original hope (cf. IV.i.94-95). In referring to Paphos, Iris calls to mind the story of Venus's affair with Mars to the shame of her husband Vulcan and alludes to her subsequent return to Paphos following this crime.⁴ These stories, referred to with scorn by the goddesses here—goddesses who stand for chastity, fidelity and prosperity—are mentioned in order to instil in the two young lovers the fear that misconduct will lead to the wrath of these goddesses, and thereby earthly barrenness.

By the time Alonso sees the two playing at chess we see that Prospero has succeeded in his goal of curbing their lust—which is to say, exerting rational control over this most powerful passion. Their exchange is playful, but between them is a chess board and their comments are on the game and their future kingdom:

Mir. Sweet lord, you play me false.
Fer. No, my dearest love,
I would not for the world.
Mir. Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle,
And I would call it fair play.
(V.i.172-174)

The comments of H. J. R. Murray that Frank Kermode relays in his note describe well what seems to be at work here, “At chess the sexes met on equal terms, and the freedom of intercourse which the game made possible was much valued. It was even permissible to visit a lady in her chamber to play chess with her...The Clef d’amors has much to say about the etiquette of chess from this point of view: especially how the knight will find a knowledge of chess of the greatest value in his courtship” (V.i.171, note). In showing them engaged in this moderated and civilized form of courtship, Shakespeare suggests that Prospero’s intervention in Miranda and Ferdinand’s engagement has successfully refined them for their royal marriage

iv. Ferdinand's Philosophic Inheritance

As I suggested earlier, Prospero's intervention in Miranda and Ferdinand's marriage was also intended to make Ferdinand an ally of his philosophic project. We sense this first when Prospero subdues Ferdinand with his magical powers and Ferdinand surrenders to him. The spectacle of divinities also has the effect of arousing Ferdinand's awe, but contrary to what we might suspect, this awe is for Prospero's invocation for the goddesses more than for the goddesses themselves. This is the result of his telling Ferdinand that the goddesses are the result of his own efforts: when Ferdinand asks Prospero whether the figures he hears and sees are spirits, the latter replies, "spirits, which by mine Art/ I have from their confines call'd to enact/ My present fancies" (IV.i. 120-122). Given Prospero's insistence that the young couple abstain from consummating their marriage until all sanctimonies and holy rites are ministered, and the dyed-in-the-wool conviction that Prospero seems to be aiming to instil by means of his own religious spectacle, it may seem strange that Prospero chooses to reveal to Ferdinand that these beings are actually products of his own fancies and fully acknowledges them to be so insubstantial as to vanish. What this does effect in Ferdinand, however, is not disillusionment with his previous experiences, but awe and a new respect for Prospero and his Art. Ferdinand responds to Prospero's revelation, "Let me live here ever;/ So rare a wonder'd father and a wise/ Makes this place Paradise" (IV.i.122-124). As a consequence of this awe, Ferdinand is not only committed in his love to Miranda, but also to Prospero; and his commitment to Prospero is rooted in a new respect for the latter's powers of mind.

To see further that the alliance between the two is indeed for the sake of Prospero's philosophic project, we may consider a subtle reminder of Plato's philosophic project that appears in the courtship scenes. As I mentioned earlier, *The Tempest* itself is a play depicting what is arguably the most famous idea in the philosophic tradition: the philosopher-king. Aware of the allusion to the philosopher-king, we should not be surprised to find that *The Tempest* also seems to draw on the image depicting the education of this figure, and what is arguably the most famous image in the tradition: the Allegory of the Cave.⁵ Bearing in mind the general idea of the philosopher-king, we are reminded of the cave allegory when we hear of Prospero's enslaving both Caliban and Ferdinand to chop logs. Apparently, Prospero has enjoined both of these men to serve him in building fires which warm and illuminate the cave in which he partly lives. By means of firelight, images are projected—something Prospero does throughout the play. While Caliban's experience does not span much beyond this, Ferdinand is embedded in the cave allegory more fully. Prospero's threat to manacle both Ferdinand's neck *and* feet reminds one precisely of the condition of those shackled facing the cave wall.⁶ Ferdinand's willingness to endure slavery once he has seen that Prospero's powers are beyond his former understanding of strength reminds us of Socrates' claim that he who saw the differences between life inside and outside the cave would rather be a slave on the soil than return to life as it was in the cave.⁷ Given that the very idea of philosopher-kings is subtly shown to be profoundly paradoxical in Plato's *Republic*, that Prospero has through his own experience come to understand some of the reasons for this paradox, and given that we have not been provided enough evidence to determine whether Ferdinand has the nature eventually to become philosophic, we should avoid the temptation to

conclude that Prospero is attempting to make Ferdinand a philosopher-king. However, Prospero's efforts to instil a new respect for philosophy in Ferdinand in conjunction with these allegorical references, suggests that, at the very least, Prospero is attempting to make Ferdinand a reliable ally of philosophy.⁸

Thus far we have seen that Prospero's project is intended to ally Ferdinand with philosophy so that he will perpetuate Prospero's philosophical legacy in Milan, and possibly throughout his dominion. As we also have seen, the perpetuation of this legacy is not, contrary to Prospero's original hopes, successfully realised by means of the passing on of his philosophic 'genes', for Miranda has proven ill-suited to the task. He is aware, moreover, that he cannot rely solely on what 'breeds' between Miranda and Ferdinand, for, in Miranda's words "good wombs have born bad sons" (I.ii.117-119 and III.i.74-76). The problem demands our attention, moreover, since it is alluded to throughout the play (cf. I.ii.56-59, III.ii.102-103 and V.i. 205-206). What we can see in considering it here and throughout, is that the perpetuation of philosophy requires more than just the passing on of regimes to good heirs—it requires that these too, whether philosophic themselves or not, do likewise.

The complications with the goal of perpetuating philosophy do not stop here, however. In Prospero's final explanation of the spectacle to Ferdinand, he reveals an even greater cause for perplexity with respect to this goal. Once the memory of earthly Caliban and his conspiracy shatters the divine spectacle, Prospero presents Ferdinand with a philosophical reflection on the question of inheritance in the mortal realm:

You do look, my son, in a mov'd sort,
As if you were dismay'd: be cheerful sir.
Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and

Are melted into air, into thin air:
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on; and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

(IV.i.146-158)

This wondrous speech (probably the most famous in the play) reminds us that even the “great globe itself” and “all which it inherit”—including philosophy and philosophers (at least as we presently understand them)—shall perish. Nevertheless, Prospero’s project, as we have seen, is an attempt at bestowing a philosophical inheritance on future generations despite his awareness of its ultimate dissolution. While philosophy and philosophers partake of a heightened consciousness of mortality and decay, they are at the same time profoundly concerned with the perpetuation of philosophy. In fact, Shakespeare’s own hand in the perpetuation of philosophy may be exemplified by this very speech, for it provokes philosophic reflection on subjects vital to philosophic inquiry: human mortality and natural decay.

While an attempt to resolve the full perplexity that this speech provokes can barely be initiated in this project, the following considerations will attempt to divine what Shakespeare may be suggesting with respect to the task of perpetuating philosophy—exemplified by how he shows Prospero to be passing on the tradition through Ferdinand. To review, in this speech Prospero seems to suggest to Ferdinand that all that is inherited, which is to say practically everything in the world, passes away—including the representations of the highest human achievements and realizations: the solemn temples of religion, the palaces of political regimes, and the towers of philosophy. The

realisations of those who build these foundations cannot simply be passed on or inherited; they have to be reconstituted generation by generation. The founding of great regimes requires prudence which can be learned but not taught, not 'inherited'. And similarly the 'revelation' that forms the basis of religious belief cannot be passed on: God's will must somehow be made manifest to every believer. So, too, a genuine understanding of philosophic questions cannot be acquired by inheritance: it has to be learned through one's own study. Hence, the work of founders and their foundations are perpetually subject to dissolution. Nevertheless, Prospero would have Ferdinand inherit something of all three of these: the antique Roman religion, Alonso's political acquisitions, and his own tradition of the liberal Arts in Milan. In so doing he tacitly indicates that, despite their eventual dissolution, the effort to preserve these foundations is a human endeavour of the utmost importance.

The speech by means of which Prospero informs Ferdinand of the ultimate dissolution of the world and all it contains is ostensibly intended to reassure the young man of the fact that the wondrous vision he had just witnessed has vanished. Prospero seems to be telling him, "be not troubled: this and all things pass on, including humans, whose little lives pass away too". While Shakespeare has Prospero recall the fact of human mortality, in having him liken death to a sleep, Shakespeare also subtly suggests that human consciousness may partake of something more lasting than individual mortality would make it seem.

If we look at how Shakespeare has Antonio (in direct opposition to what Prospero says in his speech) liken sleep to death, we can begin to see something of the significance of Prospero's words here. In order to encourage Sebastian to carry out the act Antonio

has suggested—murder Alonso in order to usurp his throne—Antonio contrives the argument that those who sleep are no better off than those who are dead: “Say,” he speaks of the sleeping entourage, “this were death/ That now hath seiz’d them; why they were no worse/ Than now they are” (II.i.255-257). And he repeats a similar argument in comparing the sleeping King with his presumed dead son: “Here lies your brother,/ No better than the earth he lies upon,/ If he were that which now he’s like, that’s dead” (II.i.275-277). The difference between sleep and death that suggests itself in Prospero’s speech, however, is that those who sleep *dream*. Antonio, in likening sleep to death, denies the existence of this wonderful and strange power of the human consciousness.

While on the surface Shakespeare has Prospero point to the ephemeral character of dreams, in likening death to sleep, he also suggests that the human consciousness (because of its ability to dream in sleep) seems to be more enduring than the mortal body in which it inheres. We may be such stuff as dreams are made on, but as the image goes, even in death we sleep, and so even in death we may partake of dreams. Antonio, on the other hand, had denied this enduring possibility. What is the significance of this tacit suggestion of the possibility of partaking of dreams beyond the life of an individual mortal, juxtaposed with Antonio’s claim that sleep is no different than death?

While we cannot provide a full account of what Shakespeare seems here to be suggesting with respect to the immortality of the human consciousness, we can explore one possibility with respect to what Shakespeare seems here to be suggesting about the significance of the perpetuation of Prospero’s project for the polity. In so doing, we will recognize that Shakespeare suggests a connection between the perpetuation of philosophy

in the polity and the continued flourishing of the human consciousness through generations of men.

In the 'our revels now are ended' speech, Prospero's claim that the great towers, temples and palaces of man will dissolve is subsumed under the general conclusion that we are the stuff—as are these great things we create—of dreams. While these things may ultimately be ephemeral, they are essentially manifestations of the dreams of the human consciousness. Earlier in the play, Shakespeare had Ferdinand express that Prospero's magic had made him feel as though he were in a dream (I.ii.489). (Cf. V.i.239, where the boatswain does likewise.) Prospero's project of allying Ferdinand with himself thus appears to be a project of having Ferdinand partake in his dream. As we saw, this perpetuation depends on more than Ferdinand's marriage to Miranda and their bodily heirs. In ensuring that Ferdinand, and—through their rule—the men of Italy, partake of his dream, Prospero attempts to ensure further that future men will continue, as he did in his lifetime, to be afforded the setting most conducive to the highest cultivation of the human consciousness. The stories about the gods encourage salutary opinions about the permanent things and afford valuable starting points for reflection about them; the stable polity allows for the leisure in which to engage in this reflection; and the liberal Arts provide guides for this reflection. Antonio, alternatively, in denying the qualitative distinction between sleep and death (and thereby the power of dreaming), denies the powers of the human consciousness. In regarding the sleeping men he would kill as though they are already dead, moreover, Antonio attempts to extinguish the dream that potentially inspires the highest human insights. The urgency of Prospero's attempt to offset the efforts of men like Antonio thus becomes even more apparent, for while

Prospero's project positively kindles the human imagination, Antonio attempts to stifle it altogether.

It is perhaps also significant that in sleep not only do we dream, and thus exercise the human consciousness, but that from sleeping and dreaming we also awaken.

Prospero's project to perpetuate a certain form of waking dream through generations of human beings for the sake of the heightened development of the human consciousness, may thus also serve to enhance the possibility that his dream might foster in some a more wakeful human consciousness. His revealing to Ferdinand that he and not the goddesses themselves were the cause of the spectacle, may be one indication of how the dream world he creates contains the impetus for waking the human consciousness into fuller awareness.

Whatever the case, by the time Ferdinand is re-acquainted with his father, Ferdinand is thoroughly allied with Prospero and his daughter, and so it appears that he will do his part to perpetuate Prospero's legacy. As he tells his father in explaining his new relation to Miranda,

...She
Is daughter to this famous Duke of Milan,
Of whom so often I have heard renown,
But never saw before; of whom I have
Receiv'd a second life; and second father
This lady makes him to me.

(V.i.191-196)

Alonso's happiness with this proclamation, as we shall see, is the result of Prospero's efforts to ensure that he too is allied with the project, a task that took considerable effort. We will examine in the next chapter what Prospero faced in his hope to complete this alliance.

Chapter IV

Civilized Italy

In order to establish the newly married couple and himself in Italy, Prospero also had to prepare King Alonso and the men of Italy for their return. Before fully unveiling how Prospero intends to manage them, Shakespeare gives us a glimpse at the opinions of these men and the regime in which they live. We are shown that the men of Italy hold divergent views on the nature of the polity. A look at the substance of this division reveals what Prospero confronts in his efforts to return. We see that their opinions vary with respect to both the proper character of the art of politics in relation to nature in general, and to the imperialistic policy King Alonso has employed for his kingdom. In presenting the men of Italy's various opinions on the relation between the art of politics and the natural world, alongside his exploration of the question of whether Alonso's imperialistic policy is fitting for Italy, Shakespeare effectively elucidates what is at issue with respect to this policy. Through a series of complex allusions, he suggests that while Alonso's imperialistic policy is shrewd and in part prudent, it has not adequately accounted for the difficulty of governing a larger polity and its divisive effect on the polity as a whole.

i. Divergent Opinions on the Art of Politics

After they are washed upon the island, Shakespeare presents us with a comical scene that provides a more detailed account of the various opinions held by the nobles of Italy. The scene begins with Gonzalo's efforts to comfort the king at the apparent loss of his son. It quickly unfolds into several interconnected comical exchanges that arise out of

the different sympathies that the men express for the king, and culminates in a display of the differences in their respective understandings of political rule. Again, as we saw in our earlier exploration of Prospero's interpretation of the *Aeneid*, Prospero's sympathies for Dido were rooted in a dominant disposition to feel compassion, and this made him ill suited to rule. In this scene we see that Gonzalo has naively adopted the same understanding. When he expresses his sympathy for Dido, Antonio and Sebastian immediately ridicule him. Presumably, as far as Antonio and Sebastian are concerned, Dido was not much more than a foolish woman who fell by her own hand, and so is not worthy of their concern. For them, it would be as foolish to refer to her as "widow Dido" as it would to speak of "widower Aeneas"—presumably because, to them, Dido brought on her own downfall and thus did not warrant their sympathy; and Aeneas, preoccupied with his political pursuits, was not in the least attached to her, much less pained as a husband would be at the death of his wife. Gonzalo, on the other hand, apparently believes that Dido's plight is worthy of consideration. The sympathetic understanding of Dido that Gonzalo shares with Prospero—whether it is due to some recognition of greatness in her or not—fails to appreciate the flaws in Dido's political policy and, as such, bespeaks a certain degree of blindness to the nature of ambitious political men.

That said, Shakespeare subtly suggests that the radically unsympathetic understanding of Dido shared by Antonio and Sebastian may be rooted in another misunderstanding. In having us sympathize more so with Prospero and his supporters than with Antonio and Sebastian—despite the fact that their ridicule of Gonzalo is to some extent justified—Shakespeare makes clear enough that Antonio and Sebastian's sympathies are not simply rooted in sound prudential judgments about politics. This

becomes plain when Shakespeare has Sebastian reveal his total lack of sympathy for his brother Alonso. Despite the latter's despair at the recent loss of his son, Sebastian relentlessly blames the king for his loss:

Sir, you may thank yourself for this great loss,
That would not bless our Europe with your daughter,
But rather loose her to an African;
Where she, at least, is banish'd from your eye
Who hath cause to wet the grief on't

To this Alonso responds, "Prithee, peace"; and yet Sebastian continues:

You were kneel'd to, and importun'd otherwise,
By all of us; and the fair soul herself
Weigh'd between loathness and obedience, at
Which end o' th' beam should bow. We have lost your son,
I fear, for ever: Milan and Naples have
Mo widows in them of this business' making
Than we bring men to comfort them:
The fault's your own.

(II.i.118-131)

Gonzalo, in turn responds, "My Lord Sebastian,/The truth you speak doth lack some gentleness,/ And time to speak it in: you rub the sore,/ When you should bring the plaster" (II.i.132-134).

It would be strange to disagree with the honest old councilor here. Sebastian's words and Antonio's sardonic comments do seem unduly harsh and pointless under the circumstances. His lack of sympathy bespeaks insensitivity to their sharing a common good in the well-being of the King. Gonzalo presents a very different view when he tells the King "It is foul weather in us all, good sir,/ When you are cloudy" (II.i.137). While Gonzalo is overstating the extent to which the commonality of good in the kingdom is so strong as to reflect the sentiments of the King in each citizen, Sebastian's comments fall

to the opposite extreme. In showing Sebastian's profound lack of sympathy for the king, Shakespeare suggests that Sebastian fails to appreciate the implications of shared life.

Yet this ignorance is not the only reason for Sebastian's lack of sympathy for his brother. In the course of expressing his blame of Alonso, Sebastian reveals a disagreement with the King about what the common good consists of. This is suggested by Sebastian's apparent sympathy for Alonso's daughter, Claribel. According to him, King Alonso compelled his daughter to marry an African out of obedience despite the fact that she was loath to do so. If we credit his account—and we must to some extent, as it would otherwise be pointless to berate Alonso about it—this was a strictly 'political' marriage, reflective of the King's policy. So, apparently, Alonso has political ambitions aimed at expanding the power of Naples beyond Europe: he aims at control of the Mediterranean. Sebastian, it seems, objects to this type of marriage, probably not because he cares so much for his niece's happiness, but because he does not approve—and probably does not fully understand—his brother's imperial policy. Thus he favored a more 'conventional marriage', one more respectful of ordinary expectations regarding the good of the community and his family.

In any event, by the time that we see Sebastian's willingness to kill his sleeping brother, it is patently clear that whatever Sebastian's concern for his niece and for the Kingdom of Naples, it is greatly exceeded by his resentment towards his brother. It is his susceptibility to both regicide and fratricide, and Antonio's role in arousing it, that later leads Prospero to refer to both men as unnatural. Prospero indicates this when he is recapping the crimes of these Italians:

...Most cruelly
Didst thou, Alonso, use me and my daughter:
Thy brother was a furtherer in the act.
Thou art pinch'd for't now, Sebastian. Flesh and blood,
You, brother mine, that entertain'd ambition,
Expell'd remorse and nature; whom, with Sebastian,—
Whose inward pinches therefor are most strong,—
Would here have kill'd your King; I do forgive thee,
Unnatural though thou art.

(V.i.71-79)

Their unnaturalness, it seems, is reflected in their lack of strong familial attachment to their respective brothers, and in their lack of civic responsibility in supporting their legitimate rulers. The naturalness of brotherly love, as opposed to sibling rivalry, is problematic—as the Biblical story of Cain and Abel symbolizes. The question of what precisely *is* natural about political life, however, is raised explicitly at the end of the scene and helps to further our understanding of what is unnatural about Antonio and Sebastian. There, Gonzalo begins a half-serious, half-comical pontification about how he would set up a regime on the island if he were to rule it. Through the words of Montaigne from the latter's essay, "Of the Cannibals", Shakespeare has Gonzalo point to several questions about the nature and naturalness of political life. Shakespeare's use of the speech is multifaceted and warrants more consideration than I am able to give it here. For our purposes, it raises the question of the extent to which civilization and politics lead to the corruption of man's nature or whether instead they are essential to the fulfillment of human nature—that, as ancient thinkers argued, man is political by nature. In the context of the play, the speech also points to the question of whether the particular civilization in which the men of Italy live cultivates or corrupts the nature of these particular individuals. In Chapter II, in our brief considerations on man's use of language, with the help of Aristotle's account from the *Politics*, we offered a preliminary answer to the

question of whether man is political by nature. We return to the question here in order to address which forms of his political association are to be understood as natural.

In the essay from which Gonzalo's speech is drawn, Montaigne presents an ironic case of the virtues of a tribe of cannibals from the new world. The following provides a sense of the issues with which Montaigne is dealing in the essay, and of his ironic approach to these issues. In discussing the tribe, he first raises the question of whether the fulfillment of human nature requires that humans act in accordance with the laws of nature and the remainder of the "natural" world, or whether their nature prescribes something more than this:

...I think that there is nothing barbarous and savage in that nation, from what I have been told, except that each man calls barbarism what ever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in. *There* is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and accomplished manners in all things. Those people are wild, just as we call wild the fruits that Nature has produced by herself and in her normal course; whereas really it is those that we have changed artificially and led astray from the common order, that we should rather call wild.¹

Immediately prior to the words that Shakespeare draws on for Gonzalo's speech, Montaigne distinguishes between the form of "naturalness" of such a tribe and the artifice that gives rise to the cities to which civilized men are exposed:

These nations, then, seem to me barbarous in this sense, that they have been fashioned very little by the human mind, and are still very close to their original naturalness. The laws of nature still rule them, very little corrupted by ours; and they are in such a state of purity that I am sometimes vexed that they were unknown earlier, in the days when there were men able to judge them better than we. I am sorry that Lycurgus and Plato did not know of them; for it seems to me that what we actually see in these nations surpasses not only all the pictures in which poets have

idealized the golden age and all their inventions in imagining a happy state of man, but also the conceptions and the very desire of philosophy. They could not imagine a naturalness so pure and simple as we see by experience; nor could they believe that our society could be maintained with so little artifice and human soldier.²

After he details the gruesome nature of their cannibalism Montaigne comments, “I am not sorry that we notice the barbarous horror of such acts, but I am heartily sorry that, judging their faults rightly, we should be so blind to our own”.³ Sufficiently thought about, we realize he has hereby greatly qualified his original praise of the tribe.

We are made to suspect that Gonzalo takes the view that Montaigne expresses too seriously (despite his claim that he only pontificated on them to humor Antonio and Sebastian, and in turn, to humor the King; II.i.167-170), in that both Gonzalo and his protégé, Adrian, seem to pride themselves in their knowledge of history and literature, and that their thoughts will serve to comfort the King (cf. II.i.78-79). As such, they manifest naiveté with respect to the relation between human nature and the natural world. This is suggested, first, when in response to Adrian’s comments on the temperance of the isle and Gonzalo’s observation that “Here is everything advantageous to life”, Antonio remarks, “True; save means to live” (II.i.48-49). He has a point if by ‘living’ one means ‘living a fuller human life’. It is suggested, second, when Antonio responds to Gonzalo’s speech. Gonzalo begins the speech, by speculating on what he would do were he king of a plantation on the island, while subsequently concluding that on this island there would be neither sovereignty nor service. To this, Antonio remarks, “The latter end of his commonwealth forgets the/ beginning” (II.i.153-154). Despite his pride in having some understanding of politics, nature, and human nature Gonzalo, in his semi-serious wishful musings shows a wholly inadequate appreciation of both the necessity of the benefits of

political rule and the place of art in raising human life above that of brutes. Most importantly, he has inadequately accounted for the naturalness of the art of politics.

In frustration with these musings and banter, the King exclaims, “thou dost talk nothing to me” (II.i.166). But while it is suggested that Gonzalo’s musings are highly flawed, we are also made to think that there is not simply “nothing” to Gonzalo’s speech. In fact, Shakespeare subtly suggests that Montaigne’s essay, and Gonzalo’s reflections, point to a fundamental problem that the ruling men of Italy have answered inadequately. While both art and ruling may very well be natural to man—contrary to what is suggested in Gonzalo’s musings—neither all forms of civilization or arts, nor all forms of ruling, are equally natural to man. In having Gonzalo point to the natural world as providing a standard by which to judge what is natural to man, and in having Sebastian and Antonio raise objections to this standard, Shakespeare tacitly invites us to reflect on what standard of Nature can be applied to man’s nature: is it that of the instinctive life of beasts; or is the natural life for man that in which his creative and intellectual potential can be most fully developed. There are no Shakespeares—or Montaignes—among the cannibals. Sebastian and Antonio’s actions are shown to be unnatural because they are harmful to familial and civic bonds, which are thus suggested as essential and natural to the polity. In order for a civilization to be natural, then, it must preserve these bonds.

ii. The Problems with Alonso’s Imperialism

Having caught a glimpse of Gonzalo’s naïve understanding of the political art in relation to nature, and of Antonio and Sebastian’s unnatural relation to their polity, it remains to consider whether Alonso’s policy is sound by the standard of nature. As I

suggested in Chapter III, Alonso has adopted an imperialistic policy for his Kingdom. To review, embedded in the comical dialogue of the scene that we have explored thus far, Shakespeare has Alonso reveal the object of his political ambitions. In lamenting the apparent loss of Ferdinand, Alonso refers to him as his heir of “Naples and Milan”. This suggests that he aimed to unify his Kingdom under these two cities—the major power in the North with the dominant Kingdom of the South—which, in effect, is to unify Italy.⁴ And beyond that, his alliance with Tunis would give him a commanding position at the centre of the Mediterranean world.

Shakespeare subtly hints at what is at issue with respect to Alonso’s policy in a series of strange allusions to Carthage that call the Roman Empire to mind. In raising the issue of imperialism to our attention these allusions also serve to bring out some of the problems with Alonso’s imperialistic policy. They appear in the banter between Antonio, Sebastian and Gonzalo on the subject of widow Dido:

Gonzalo: Methinks our garments are now as fresh as when we put them on first in Afric, at the marriage of the King’s fair daughter Claribel to the King of Tunis.

Sebastian: ‘Twas a sweet marriage, and we prosper well in our return.

Adrian: Tunis was never grac’d before with such a paragon to their Queen.

Gonzalo: Not since widow Dido’s time.

Antonio: Widow! a pox o’ that! How came that in? widow Dido!

Sebastian: What if he had said “widower Aeneas” too? Good Lord, how you take it!

Adrian: “Widow Dido” said you? you make me study of that: she was of Carthage, not of Tunis.

Gonzalo: This Tunis, sir, was Carthage.

Adrian: Carthage?

Gonzalo: I assure you, Carthage.

Antonio: His word is more than the miraculous harp.

Sebastian: He hath rais’d the wall, and houses too.

Antonio: What impossible matter will he make easy next?

There are multiple allusions here. We will focus primarily on the one that appears in Sebastian's comment, that Gonzalo, in likening the location of Tunis to Carthage, "hath rais'd the wall, and houses too". At first blush, Sebastian's comment seems to be a continuation of Antonio's comment that Gonzalo's "word is more than the miraculous harp". This is not simply the case. Whereas Antonio's comments refer, as Frank Kermode notes, to the powers of Amphion's harp ("Only the walls of Thebes rose to the music of Amphion's harp, but Gonzalo, by identifying Carthage with Tunis, fabricates a whole city"⁵), Sebastian's comments seem equivocally also to refer to a significant event in the second Punic War that Bodin explains in "*Six Books of a Commonweale*".⁶ Both references, however, pertain to what Shakespeare emphasizes subtly in alluding to Bodin's account and so a brief explication of Antonio's reference is useful for beginning to see that, through this reference, Shakespeare is calling to our attention the question of the proper size and quality of political boundaries in light of the question of imperialism.

According to what Homer has Odysseus recount in *The Odyssey*, Amphion and his brother, Zethos "first established the foundations of seven-gated Thebes, and built bulwarks, since without bulwarks they could not have lived, for all their strength, in Thebes of the wide spaces".⁷ In this allusion, then, Shakespeare has Antonio draw our attention to the significance of city walls and protective boundaries.

By adding houses to Sebastian's apparent continuation of Antonio's sarcasm, Shakespeare draws our attention to a different account of the importance of city walls. This reference, however, is not to the *raising* of city walls and houses but to the *razing* of city walls and houses: it refers to the time, during the Second Punic War, when the

Romans, under Scipio, razed Carthage. In his account of this event, Bodin explores the theme of whether and to what extent walls and the houses within them make a city. In having Sebastian refer to houses, Shakespeare ratifies the connection to Bodin's account of this event since throughout the chapter Bodin explores these themes, relying extensively upon the image of houses. For example, the chapter opens as follows:

What we have before said concerning a whole Family, and every part thereof, containeth in it the beginning of all Commonwealths. And as foundations can of themselves stand without the form of an house, before the walls be built higher, or any roof laid upon them: so also a Family if it self be without a City or a Commonwealth: and so also the master of a Family use his power and command over his household without depending of the power of any other man: as they say there are many such families in the frontiers of the kingdoms of Fes and of Morocco, and in the West Indies: but a Commonwealth can no more be without a Family, than a City without Houses or an House without a foundation.⁸

The significant details of the event to which Shakespeare has Sebastian allude read as follows:

Wherefore of many citizens, be they naturals, or naturalized, or else slaves enfranchised (which are the three means that the law gives to become a citizen by) is made a Commonwealth, when they are governed by the puissant sovereignty of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ among themselves in laws, language, customs, religions, and diversity of nations. But if all the citizens be governed by the selfsame laws and customs, it is not only one Commonwealth, but also one very city, albeit that the citizens be divided in many villages, towns, or provinces. For the enclosure of walls make not a city, (as many have written) no more than the walls of an house make a family, which may consist of many slaves or children, although they be far distant from another or in diverse countries, provided that they be all subject unto the command of one head of the family: So we of a City, which may have many towns and villages, which use the same customs and fashions, as are the Bailiwicks, or Stewardships of this realm: And so the Commonwealth may have many cities and provinces which may have diverse customs, and yet are nevertheless subject unto the command. Neither let it seem unto any man strange, that I stand something the longer upon this matter; if he but remember what importance the lack of knowledge of these things was long ago unto the Carthaginians. For at such a time as question was made in the Senate of Rome, for the razing of Carthage: the report thereof being bruited abroad,

the Carthaginians sent their ambassadors to Rome, to yield themselves unto the mercy of the Romans, and to request the Senate not unworthily to raze that, their city, one of the fairest of the world, famous for the noble acts thereof, an ornament of Rome itself, and a monument of their most glorious victories. Nevertheless the matter being long and thoroughly debated in the Senate it was at last resolved upon, that for the safety of the Roman Empire Carthage should be destroyed, as well for the opportunity of the place, as for the natural perfidiousness of the Carthaginians themselves, who had now already made war upon the allies of the Romans, rigged up a number of ships contrary to the agreement of peace, and secretly stirred up their neighbor people unto rebellion. The matter thus resolved upon, the Carthaginian ambassadors were sent for into the Senate, unto whom answer was given by the Consul, that they should continue in their faith and fidelity unto the Senate and the people of Rome, and pain thereof to deliver unto the people of Rome three hundred hostages and their ships: in which doing they should have their city safe, with all their rights, privileges and liberties, that ever before they had enjoyed. With this answer the ambassadors returned merrily home. But by and by after commission was given unto Scipio Africanus the younger, to go in all haste with a fleet to Carthage, and with fire and sword to destroy the town, saving the citizens and all other things else that they could carry out of the town. Scipio arriving in Africa with his army, sent Censorinus his lieutenant to Carthage, who after he had received the promised hostages together with the Carthaginian ships, commanded all the people of Carthage to depart out of the town, yet with free leave to carry out with them what they would and to build them a city further off from the sea, or elsewhere to their best liking. With this straight command of the lieutenant the Carthaginians astonished appealed unto the faith of the Senate and of the people of Rome, saying, that they had promised them their city should not be razed: to whom it was answered, that the faith given unto them by the Senate should in all points be kept; but yet that the city was not tied unto the place, neither unto the walls of Carthage. So the poor inhabitants were constrained to depart and abandon the town unto the fire, which was set upon it by the Romans, who had not had it so good and cheap, had the ambassadors before understood the difference between a town and a city. As oftentimes it chanceth that many ambassadors ignorant of the laws of arms, and of that which right is, do even in matters of state commit grosse faults.⁹

In drawing our attention to both Bodin's account of the razing of Carthage and to the building of Theban walls, Shakespeare encourages us to consider to what extent city walls, boundaries, and houses are necessary for the security and welfare of a polity. At first blush, with his emphasis on walls, Bodin seems to be suggesting that the

Carthaginians failed to understand that they could not rely on the strength of city walls for protection. A closer look, however, reveals that the Carthaginian's problem was perhaps more importantly, that they did not establish a sharp boundary or demarcation between friend and foe: they trusted that the Romans, despite their being a foreign hegemon, would fulfill their promise. Had they made such a distinction, they may have made more considerations on what was necessary for them to maintain their de facto sovereignty from Rome, and the extent to which they could successfully defend themselves with the help of their physical walls and boundaries. Walls may not secure a city, and in this sense not make a city proper, but they do help to establish the distinction between friends and enemies and this is essential to a good defense.¹⁰

At the same time, in alluding to the razing of Carthage—an event pivotal to the ultimate decline of the Roman Empire, Shakespeare also has us question the limits of the attempt to sustain political boundaries over increasingly large expanses of space. Whereas Rome effectively conquered Carthage and much of Europe—and thereby demonstrated its ability to sustain *its* boundaries—it also began to decline soon after the fall of Carthage. To be sure, the Roman Empire was amongst the most glorious empires in human history and Shakespeare is hardly suggesting that its eventual decline renders it a flawed model. On the contrary, in having Prospero adopt the territory over which Alonso had attempted to establish his empire, he suggests precisely the opposite. At the same time, however, he encourages us to consider the limits of imperial expansion and in so doing helps us to discern the prospects for Prospero's adoption of the territory and regime Alonso acquired thereby.¹¹

Judging by the success of Alonso's shrewd policy for securing his state thus far, it seems that he has successfully sustained security from external threats. Internally, however, it seems that he may have greater difficulties. Perhaps the most obvious problem with imperialism that Shakespeare suggests is that spreading peoples across increasingly expanses of space makes governing difficult. Antonio makes this point in the course of convincing Sebastian that he could safely usurp his brother because Claribel could not effectively do anything about it once it has long since been a *fait accompli*:

She that is Queen of Tunis; she that dwells
Ten leagues beyond man's life; she that from Naples
Can have no note, unless the sun were post,--
The man i' the moon's too slow, till new-born chins
Be rough and razorable...

(II.i.241-244)

Even allowing for Antonio's evident exaggeration, he does remind us of the practical problems of governing over large political entities.

It seems, nevertheless, that Alonso has successfully governed over a wide expanse of space thus far, and the Romans certainly proved that this problem can be overcome for substantial amounts of time. Shakespeare subtly suggests, at the same time, that Alonso's policy may not be so enduring because the regime he establishes lacks internal unity. Shakespeare suggests this, in part, by illustrating divisions within the ruling family. Sebastian indicates one potential obstacle to the political unity of Alonso's empire in his objection to the intercultural marriage which is intended to sustain the empire on its southern side. As far as Sebastian sees it, in marrying Claribel to an African, Alonso does an injustice to Europeans. Apparently, Sebastian would have preferred to see her married into an Italian household for the sake of uniting the nobility there rather than fusing them with foreigners' customs and allegiances.

Leaving Claribel aside, the divisions amongst the members of the ruling families in Italy, too, may be symptomatic of the general lack of unity in the regime that Alonso had hoped to sustain in Europe. The nature of perhaps the greatest division in Italy—that between Prospero and Alonso—may reveal what is at the heart of the division in the regime. Originally, Prospero wished to keep Milan independent from the rest of Italy and thereby to preserve his dukedom for the sake of the liberal Arts within it (cf. I.ii.72-74, 109-116, 121-122). As a result Prospero's concern for the independence of Milan was an obstacle to Alonso's unification of Italy. Prospero's resistance seems to have been rooted in his hope to maintain the strength of his city through familial relations and to keep philosophy in the city through familial inheritance, which, as we have seen, he had some hope would have occurred naturally through his bloodline. What seems to be an issue in Prospero's tacit objection to Alonso's imperial policy, is whether cultural unity in a patriarchy of the liberal Arts can be maintained in a large and diverse polity.

As we have seen, the men of Italy are divided in their understanding of the texts of the liberal Arts, and this division seems to stem from their diverse political backgrounds. Yet Prospero is also shown to be unable to perpetuate the unity of his household by means of the heirs to it within Milan. As Prospero realizes, Miranda lacks the nature to sustain his philosophical dukedom—married or not. The problem for Prospero's hopes is that in order to keep his house unified under those allied with philosophy, he needs a suitable heir—that is, a strong and effective ruler who is allied with philosophy. Since Miranda is not suited to this task, keeping philosophy safe by keeping it 'in the family', as it were, proved impossible. By the time Ferdinand arrives on the island, therefore, Prospero is pleased to adopt him as son-in law, and to join the two

houses. This suggests that he came to see some virtue in developing a family bond over the length of Italy. A larger pool of possible heirs allied with philosophy might be a better means to sustain a regime friendly to philosophy despite whatever practical difficulties expansion entails. And a larger stable regime might provide security for philosophy from international petty politics and volatility, to which smaller states are especially vulnerable.

While Alonso's policy seems to have effectively secured the larger state from external threats and thereby afforded it the opportunity to reap the benefit of a larger pool of philosophic heirs and a greater number of internal allies, the tradition that we would expect to provide the foundational education for citizens in the regime and thereby to unify them in friendliness to philosophy has, on the contrary, left the citizenry divided to the detriment of philosophy. Whereas Alonso had made no effort to resolve this problem, Prospero has gone to some length to renew and unify the tradition throughout Italy. In so doing he reaffirms that he now believes that the difficulties of imperialism can be overcome to the benefit of the polity. We have only briefly touched on the question of imperialism as Shakespeare presents it here, and a fuller consideration of the problem would be necessary to see whether and, if so, how the difficulties it presents can be satisfactorily resolved. Nevertheless, as I have indicated, Shakespeare does suggest by Prospero's example that they can be resolved for the Italy of his play. We will conclude in briefly considering how Shakespeare seems to be suggesting that Prospero resolves the difficulty of disunity that had previously threatened philosophy in Italy.

Perhaps the most obvious alternative means to unify a state is through religion. The Roman and Alexandrian empires seem to have been quite effective in unifying their

states despite increasing diversity, and at least in the case of Rome, this unification was to a large degree brought about by incorporating new religions into the old. Yet, the religion by means of which we might think this unity possible in the Italy of the play (a modern Italy contemporaneous with Tunis rather than Carthage), namely, Christianity, is noticeably absent. In fact, not only are the Italians not extolling Christian doctrines, it appears that various citizens are focused solely on renewing the old pagan gods and the stories about these gods. There seems to be a renaissance of old gods and stories about these gods in the Italy of the play, but, again, as we have also seen (in the various interpretations of the *Aeneid*), this has hardly resulted in unity of the regime. Unlike the Romans, Alonso has made no effort to establish unity by means of religious teachings. What is more, whereas Alonso seems to be amenable to religious belief, his son is not—at least not in the same sense: Shakespeare has Alonso request an oracle to rectify their experience on the island, while he has Ferdinand pronounce that he would believe Prospero's word "against an oracle" (cf. V.i.243-244 and IV.i.12). Why does Shakespeare display this contrast? Perhaps he is pointing to the fact that the appearance of divergent beliefs undermines religious belief, and is suggesting that this is the case with the new generation in Italy as exemplified by Ferdinand.

In any case, the loss of belief in more enduring things in the cosmos seems to be at the root of the malady of Italy. Antonio makes this explicit, for example, in his disbelief in the conscience (II.i.271-284). In response to the problem this presents, Shakespeare has Prospero invoke gods and nature in order to renew a quasi-religious teaching on the enduring things in the cosmos. The belief that he provokes through this spectacle serves to establish unity in the new polity. In Chapter III we considered the

spectacle Prospero presented to Ferdinand and the effect it was to have on the young man's psyche. Meanwhile, Prospero presents another spectacle which similarly renews something of a faith in the cosmos in the King of the regime. In this spectacle he has Ariel in the form of a Harpy pronounce to the men of Italy that they are being punished for their conduct:

You are three men of sin, whom Destiny,—
That hath to instrument this lower world
And what is in 't,—the never-surfeited sea
Hath caus'd to belch up you; and on this island,
Where man doth not inhabit,—you 'mongst men
Being most unfit to live. I have made you mad;
And even with such-like valour men hang and drown
Their proper selves. You fools! I and my fellows
Are ministers of fate: the elements
Of whom your swords are temper'd, may as well
Wound the loud winds, or with bemock'd-at stabs
Kill the still-closing waters, as diminish
One dowle that's in my plume: my fellow-ministers
Are like invulnerable. If you could hurt,
Your swords are now too massy for your strengths,
And will not be uplifted. But remember,—
For that's my business to you,—that you three
From Milan did supplant good Prospero:
Expos'd unto the sea, which hath requit it,
Him and his innocent child: for which foul deed
The powers, delaying, not forgetting, have
Incens'd the seas and shores, yea, all the creatures,
Against your peace. Thee of thy son, Alonso,
They have bereft; and do pronounce by me
Ling'ring perdition—worse than any death
Can be at once—shall step by step attend
You and your ways; whose wraths to guard you from,—
Which here, in this most desolate isle, else falls
Upon your heads,—is nothing but heart-sorrow
And a clear life ensuing.

(III.iii.53-82)

Like he had done with Ferdinand, Prospero informs these men that their swords cannot match the powers he reveals to them (cf. I.ii.471-475). He suggests that contrary to what

they understand, there are powers in the cosmos that are both stronger than their swords and that they have offended these in using their swords as they have been. In short, Shakespeare's Prospero works to instill a belief in the old divinities who are just and who, through the actions of nature, in effect, pass judgment on human affairs.

Prospero does not stop here, however. Not only does he attempt to renew an awe in the more enduring entities in nature that oversee human affairs, he instills the belief that, through his magical powers (emblematic of his superior understanding of nature), he too, is allied with these entities and so partakes of the 'divine judgment' on the men of Italy. It appears that his attempt is at least partially effective. Alonso's request for an oracle to rectify their strange experiences on the island seems to be rooted in a new awe of the powers of Prospero—which is to say, of the deeper mysteries of nature. While Antonio and Sebastian still draw their swords at Ariel the Harpy and so show that their reaction to this experience is not simply one of awed acceptance, Prospero's later attempt at curbing the ambitions of Antonio and Sebastian is rooted in the possibility that he can instill in them a fear of his invisible powers—and thus of supernatural powers as such—which to these men (given their apparently materialistic understanding of nature) would be godlike powers. Most significantly, Shakespeare has Prospero himself appear godlike. As David Lowenthal puts it, "Just before the harpy scene (III. 3.17), a stage direction calls for 'Solemn and strange music; and Prospero on the top (invisible).' How a director is to make the audience aware of an invisible Prospero on the top is hard to say, but the reader understands what Shakespeare has in mind, which is to put Prospero in the place of God quite physically".¹²

Perhaps in this, Shakespeare is illustrating the way in which religiosity and stories about the gods can be used to cultivate a unified openness to philosophy in the polity. Of course, the traditional opposition between reason and revelation may make it difficult to discern precisely how this will work. Nevertheless, if we reflect on the Renaissance, and imagine the effect on the Italy of *The Tempest* of a renewal of stories about gods, we can imagine how a renaissance of the old gods could rejuvenate a recognition of enduring entities that govern the cosmos and that provide standards for human activity in it, which might, in turn, help to sustain and fuel philosophy in the polity. And this seems to be what Shakespeare is suggesting in his illustration of Prospero's renewal of belief in these beings. The manner in which he has Prospero present the gods, both to Ferdinand and to Alonso, seems to be with an eye to renewing a unified focus on certain figures in the *Aeneid*, a text, as we have seen, that is being read in the state. At the same time, Prospero seems to remind especially the younger, more disbelieving Ferdinand that he beholds visions and hears stories that are the products of Prospero's imaginative and magical powers. In short, Shakespeare shows Prospero to be renewing a belief in the constant entities in the cosmos and a respect for his own understanding and alliance with them.

Whatever the case, Prospero's willingness to marry his daughter into the new regime suggests that he has come to accept empire as a viable if not desirable possibility for the time. Through this marriage he hopes to tighten the bonds of the regime with familial love, rather than expand the regime with force. Because of the inadequacy of these bonds for sustaining unity in a large polity, he instills religious awe which serves to effect greater unity in the general understanding of the cosmos, while at the same time

renewing the tradition of the liberal Arts with an eye to ensuring that the citizenry is friendly to philosophy.

Conclusion

The Question of Prospero's Magical Perpetuation of Political Philosophy

In the course of these considerations on *The Tempest*, we have looked at Prospero's development from the time of his exile from political life, to the time wherein he re-establishes himself in his reconstituted philosophy-friendly Italian Empire. It seems, then, that Shakespeare has presented us with a portrait of a politically naïve philosopher become kingly. At the same time, however, Shakespeare leaves us perplexed (fittingly, given the philosophic theme of the play) as to how, precisely, we are to understand Prospero as an exemplification of this idea; for Prospero effected his re-establishment by means of magic, but then he chooses to abandon his magic before his return (cf. V.i.50-57). Thus, we are left to speculate on how this magic is to be interpreted so as to grasp Shakespeare's actual teaching on this famous idea: the philosopher-king.

Recognizing that Shakespeare takes the theme of his play from the account of the philosopher-king in Plato's *Republic*, perhaps the first interpretative possibility that comes to mind is that in showing Prospero's use of magic to realize his project, Shakespeare is suggesting the extreme unlikelihood, if not outright paradoxical character (as Plato himself had intimated) of the attempt to establish the rule of a philosopher-king with anything less than magical powers. On this view, we would read the play as though it illustrates that the types of changes needed to the regime in order to establish the philosopher-king and the changes to the philosophic man himself, are radically paradoxical and so (practically speaking) impossible. Prospero's discarding his magic, then, would seem to be the implication of his recognition of the paradoxical nature of his efforts for actual political life.

This interpretation seems inadequate inasmuch as the changes Prospero makes by means of magic are not paradoxical—they are accelerated, to be sure, but the natures of the characters do not seem to change in ways that nature would otherwise disallow. Prospero cultivates people, including himself, in a manner that accords with the nature of each, and which seem attainable within the limited time frame of a human life. Presumably, he will return as an advisor to his new son-in-law and ally, Ferdinand, help him to establish the regime in the spirit of the tradition he has renewed on the island, and for most of his remaining time, continue philosophizing. His “Every third thought shall be my grave,” then, points elliptically to this intention, bearing in mind the age-old aphorism that to philosophize is to learn how to die (V.i.311). While his philosophizing may be compromised by his part-time ruling role as political supervisor, it seems that he has realized that this is the only way in which philosophy can be perpetuated: by means of an alliance with politics in the form of a regime ruled by gentlemen who are friendly to philosophy, and thus open to be advised by philosophers. On this view, the philosopher-king is a practical compromise whereby the philosopher ‘rules’ only indirectly, and with regard to only the weightiest matters. Assuming, then, that we are not to understand Prospero’s use of magic as indicative of the impossibility of the realization of the philosophic project he is shown to be undertaking in *The Tempest*, we are left to discern the practical analogue of his magical powers.

An alternative interpretation of how we are to understand this magical philosopher-king’s return to political life is that we are to understand Prospero as a philosopher-king in the manner that Shakespeare himself was a philosopher-king: a man who ruled with his ideas and philosophical divinations, which by means of his poetic

genius he projected into the perceptual realm in the form of dramas. The final speech seems to bring the poet and his hero together, as if united in the recognition of their proximity to death (*The Tempest* itself being, we believe, one of Shakespeare's final plays, and Prospero having expressed his recognition of his own mortality). This speech can be read as a call for the perpetuation of their projects—Prospero's, hence Shakespeare's—beyond their lives:

*Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
And what strength I have's mine own,
Which is most faint: now, 'tis true,
I must be here confin'd by you,
Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
Since I have my dukedom got,
And pardon'd the deceiver, dwell
In this bare island by your spell;
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands:
Gentle breath of yours my sails
Must fill, or else my project fails,
Which was to please. Now I want
Spirits to enforce, Art to enchant;
And my ending is despair,
Unless I be reliev'd by prayer,
Which pierces so, that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardon'd be,
Let your indulgence set me free.*

(Epilogue, 1-20)

On this reading, Prospero's supernatural powers could be read as an allegory for Shakespeare's, as though the manner in which Prospero is able to fulfill his project through magic, is the way in which Shakespeare is able to rule and charm people with his poetry: magically creating an illusory world that distills the reality of the natural world. The abandonment of Prospero's magic before his return, on this reading, could be understood as corresponding to Shakespeare's recognition that even his charm—that

which is presented in the other “great globe”: the globe theatre—too, will dissolve, and thus the two abjure from their arts in order to turn to a more introspective reflection on death. Prospero, of course, acknowledges that only one third of his thoughts will be turned to his grave, and so suggests that he will still be focused on advising the kingdom (V.i.310-311). The analogue in Shakespeare’s final days might have been his ensuring the publication of his works. In any case, the speech is easily amenable to an autobiographical reading at the close of Shakespeare’s life.

There nonetheless seems potentially to be a great difference between Prospero’s powers and Shakespeare’s, a difference that might come to mind when reading the stage directions for the Epilogue: “*Spoken by Prospero*”. That is, whereas Shakespeare’s ‘charms’ are written down, Prospero relies on his ‘personal’ involvement to perpetuate his project. The significance of this fact for the perpetuation of philosophy is made clearer when one considers that the founding father of political philosophy, Socrates, did not write. T

he perpetuation of his memory and thereby the tradition he founded depended upon the writing of those who came after him. Understood in this sense, the Epilogue suggests that, while Prospero doubtless has some kinship with his creator, he seems to be different from Shakespeare in the same way that Socrates differs from Plato—namely, in that the former did not record his philosophical teachings in a form that would outlast people’s memory of him. *The Tempest*, then, could be understood as Shakespeare’s ‘Apology for Prospero’. Put simply, it is to be understood an illustration of what the highest form of the philosophic nature brings to the polity, and why the memory of such a nature is invaluable for the highest realization of human nature as such. It would thereby suggest

the urgency of philosophic writing; that is, of writing that can take the place of a living philosopher-teacher, as Prospero's own use of books implied possible.

If we understand Prospero as different from Shakespeare in this respect, and the magical means by which he realizes his project as qualitatively different from those of Shakespeare, we are still left to discern precisely how these are to be interpreted. His final speech might be understood as a parting exhortation for those who may be able to somehow further his project politically. The abandonment of his books, on this reading, could be explained as his recognition that his magic, learned from esoteric books, cannot be beneficial on its own because the prudential knowledge required for the proper use of such an art must be acquired independently of it. Thus, he encourages men to develop the prudential understanding of what is required to continue his project without his "rough magic"; or alternatively, to learn such 'magic' and put it to the service of politics.

While Prospero's abandonment of his magic does suggest that Prospero does not deem magic essential to the perpetuation of his project, the manner in which he abandons it suggests also that he may not be entirely averse to its use in politics. Immediately before announcing that he will break his staff and drown his book (which, perhaps not incidentally, we do not actually see him do), he indicates that he still wishes to use it to generate some "heavenly music" that will serve his project (V.i.50-57). In so doing, he suggests that the magic of music can be a political instrument. How, then, are we to understand the powers he harnesses with his magic, if they are to be understood as effective tools for perpetuating his project?

A third interpretive possibility suggests itself when we look at a few of the details Shakespeare subtly weaves into the speeches of his play. In crafting Gonzalo's speech, as

we saw in Chapter IV, Shakespeare had drawn directly from lines of Montaigne's essay, "Of the Cannibals". His allusion is easily recognizable despite his changing a few quite significant words. In replacing but a few of the words Montaigne originally used Shakespeare makes a pointed reference to the rise of modern technology. In concluding his list of what is absent from the cannibals of whom he speaks, Montaigne tells us that they are without "dissimulation, avarice, belittling, envy, or pardon".¹ Shakespeare, alternatively, has Gonzalo substitute 'sword', 'pike', 'knife', 'gun', and 'engine' (II.i.156-157). This places the emphasis not simply on metal and weapons (especially being that Gonzalo had already indicated that there would be no use of metal; II.i.149), but on modern weapons and technology. As we have already seen, in having him adopt Alonso's larger state as a part of his project to sustain the possibility of philosophy in the polity, Shakespeare has Prospero tacitly endorse Alonso's imperialism. As we have also seen, one of the difficulties with governing empires is the matter of exercising control over wider expanses of space. Could it be that Shakespeare would have us understand Prospero's power as a precursor of modern technology, and as such a potential aid to overcoming the difficulty of establishing and governing larger regimes?

In likening Alonso's project to the Roman Empire, and in having Prospero endorse the antique Roman religion as an element of his project to establish a philosophy-friendly regime, Shakespeare seems, in part, to be endorsing a renewal of an empire like that of Rome. The Romans, of course, were able to overcome the difficulties of establishing an empire over a wide expanse of space without the help of modern technology. Nonetheless, stimulated by the portrayal of Prospero's powers, we might imagine how technology could be quite promising for the project of re-establishing such

empires in alliance with philosophy. Perhaps we are to use the example of Prospero's powers as a means to consider the proper use of this technology. We can understand his abandonment of magic as representing a recognition that it is not *essential* to the further perpetuation of his project, and—recalling that Prospero's magic came from “secret studies”—that the technological powers that come from unlocking the secrets of nature can carry grave political implications. At the same time, we can see him as representative of the potential promise of technology in the hands of a prudent and just ruler.

This interpretation may seem fanciful given only the few, very subtle, references to technology and given the understandable skepticism that the recognition of the potential of modern technology (then only in its incipient stages) was even possible at the time in which Shakespeare wrote. But two points in response to these difficulties may suffice to give the skeptical reader pause. First, as we can see from the implicit references to technology evidenced by the pointed change to Montaigne's words, that Shakespeare was at the very least aware of the significance of technology: that it represented a *qualitative* change in human powers: the gun is not simply a ‘refinement’ of the bow and arrow, and the printing press is not simply a means of ‘writing quickly’; these things operate on entirely different principles.² The context in which this oblique reference is placed—namely, in a speech that raises the question of the naturalness of the polity and of civilization—suggests, moreover, that he may have been acutely aware of the significance of modern science for modern political life and the place of philosophy therein. As to whether he might have intended for us to understand Prospero's magic powers as symbolic of the potential for commanding natural powers, we might consider one possible impetus for such a vision, namely, the writings Francis Bacon, arguably *the*

founding father of the modern scientific project, and Shakespeare's contemporary. For example, in his *New Atlantis*, Bacon portrays a city that both enjoys and controls the powers of technology. Not incidentally, an account of the legendary place after which Bacon's work is titled appears in Montaigne's essay, 'Of the Cannibals' which, as we have argued is the work from which Shakespeare makes his technological variations in Gonzalo's speech. Is it not at least possible that Shakespeare might have represented the technological possibility in the guise of a man possessing magical powers, a man who sought to establish a philosophy-friendly empire on the scale of the Roman Empire in which the use of such powers was under the control of philosophic rulers?

In any case, it is this teaching that we derive from *The Tempest*: that the perpetuation of philosophy, whether through scientific empire building or philosophic poetry, is the most important of projects and requires, as the example of Prospero suggests, a constantly renewed effort to cultivate political and philosophic prudence.

Endnotes

Introduction

¹ *Republic*, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 473d-e.

² *Republic*, 499b-c.

Chapter I: Mistakes in Milan

¹ As Francis Bacon may have put it, Prospero's errors are rooted in his own particular 'idol of the mind,' an idol which is particularly prominent in philosophic natures. The term 'idol' is from Francis Bacon's *New Organon* where he outlines several of the significant factors that affect human reasoning. Bacon uses the term to apply to the various distorting influences on reasoning, ranging from those that are embedded in the particular language one uses, to those that are due to tendencies characteristic of humans generally, to those that are rooted in the particular character of an individual. As we shall see, two of these are especially relevant to Prospero's character. The first is found in the Idols of the Tribe (illusions found in the race of human kind): "The human understanding is carried away to abstractions by its own nature, and pretends that things which are in flux are unchanging"; the second is found in the Idols of the Cave (illusions of particular men): "The biggest, and radical, difference between minds as far as philosophy and the sciences is concerned, is this: that some minds are more effective and more suited to noticing the differences between things, others to noticing similarities." (Francis Bacon, *New Organon*, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), aphorisms 38-69.)

² All references to *The Tempest* are from, William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Methuen & Co., 1954) and will be cited in the text following each reference.

³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), ch.17, p.66.

⁴ *The Prince*, ch. 9, p. 42.

⁵ Machiavelli's conclusion to the chapter elucidates the ways in which a prince who relies solely on the people runs into difficulties; these difficulties seem closely akin to those Prospero faced in Milan. While Machiavelli suggests here that a prince can rely to a great extent on the people to sustain his power, the previous lessons in the chapter reveal that it is essential that he take care to pay the proper regard to the great as well. Perhaps it is the latter that constitutes those "other preparations" he advises in the following:

...when a prince who founds on the people knows how to command and is a man full of heart, does not get frightened in adversity, does not fail to

make other preparations, and with his spirit and his orders keeps the generality of people inspired, he will never find himself deceived by them and he will see he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities customarily run into peril when they are about to ascend from a civil order to an absolute one. For these princes either command by themselves or by means of magistrates. In the later case their position is weaker and more dangerous because they remain altogether at the will of those citizens who have been put in the magistracies, who, especially in adverse times, can take away his state with great ease either by turning against him or by not obeying him. And the prince does not have time in the midst of danger to seize absolute authority because the citizens and subjects, who are accustomed to receive commands from the magistrates, are not ready, in these emergencies, to obey his; he will always have, in uncertain times, a shortage of those one can trust. (ch. 17, p. 66)

As we shall shortly see, Prospero's trust in his brother as a magistrate, and the latter's ability to harness the people contrary to Prospero's objectives, provide further illustration of what Machiavelli warns about here.

⁶ *The Prince*, ch. 9, 40.

⁷ *The Prince*, ch.17, p. 68.

⁸ *The Prince*, ch. 17, p. 66.

⁹ Perhaps in this Prospero exemplifies what Socrates tells the skeptical Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*: "no one willingly chooses to rule and get mixed up in straightening out other people's troubles", and later: "it is likely that if a city of good men came to be, there would be a fight over not ruling, just as there is now over ruling..." (346e-347a and 347d).

¹⁰ Virgil, *Aeneid*, trans. Allan Mandelbaum (California: University of California Press, 1982), I.484-514. References from this text will be cited by book number and English line numbers.

¹¹ cf. *Aeneid*, I.715-717 and I.761-763.

¹² *Aeneid*, IV.838-840.

¹³ *Aeneid*, IV.225-228.

¹⁴ *Aeneid*, IV.389-391.

¹⁵ Dido also appears as an example in the chapter illustrating Machiavelli's lessons on ruling with cruelty, mercy, love and fear—lessons upon which we had earlier drawn to illustrate Prospero's error. Given the appearance of Dido there, and that Prospero's example seems to provide an explicit illustration of the problem as Machiavelli presents it, one wonders whether Shakespeare had Machiavelli's comments on Dido in mind when he illustrated Prospero's problem. As Machiavelli tells it,

...of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to escape a name for cruelty because new states are full of dangers. And Virgil says in the mouth of Dido: 'The harshness of things and the newness of the kingdom compel me to contrive such things, and to keep a broad watch over the borders.'...

From this a dispute arises whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse. The response is that one would want to obey both the one and the other; but because it is difficult to put them together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one has to lack one of the two. (ch. 17, p. 66)

As we have seen, neither Prospero nor Dido rules effectively using love, and neither resorts to using fear to sustain their position. Prospero, moreover, did not see the problem in his reading of Virgil. Perhaps he did not heed the teaching contained in Machiavelli's warning not to trust the words of men. Machiavelli points to the fact that Virgil has Dido *say* that she is compelled to protect her kingdom, but her reasoning on this basis did not lead to the requisite actions. Prospero, perhaps, trusted the words Virgil gives to Dido without recognizing that she did not truly know whereof she spoke and so did not act with the virtue appropriate to one who would know what was appropriate for a new kingdom such as hers. In trusting Dido's words, Prospero failed to see that she did not actually know what was required—namely caution with a man like Aeneas—and in his thinking that she acted on the basis of what she knew, he supposed her downfall was due not to an error in judgment but rather to that which she could not have foreseen. On this basis Prospero seems to have made a similar mistake. He thought his rule was secure with the love of his people and was blind to the turn of events that lead to his exile as a result. What he subsequently realizes, however, is that his precautions, like Dido's, were not well reasoned, as opposed to believing that these downfalls were unforeseeable and without remedy.

Chapter II: The Master-Monster Relation

¹ While Shakespeare was not exposed to Darwin's theory of evolution, it seems that in pointing to these physical features in Caliban, he indicates that he has given careful consideration to the phenomenon of changes in the human and proto-human species, and that these may be background considerations to his teaching on Caliban.

² Aristotle, *Politics*, ed. and trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1253a9.

³ There is some debate about whether this speech—contrary to the way in which the Folio and the Arden editor (Frank Kermode) present it—is Prospero’s and not Miranda’s. I judge it to be Prospero’s, and that the Folio’s attribution to Miranda is a compositor’s error. My reasons are as follows. First, Miranda could not have taught Caliban language, as the speaker of this speech claims. Given that Sycorax was pregnant with Caliban when she was exiled we can presume he was born shortly after she arrived there (I.ii.269-284). Given that Sycorax confined Ariel into a pine where the spirit lived for a space of twelve years, “within which space she died” (I.ii.277-279), and that Caliban was young enough to be likened to a “whelp” when she died (I.ii.283) but old enough to have childhood memories of his mother’s curses (I.ii.341-342), we can also assume that Caliban was probably about fourteen or fifteen years old when Prospero and Miranda arrived on the island. Miranda was not yet three when they settled in Prospero’s cell (I.ii.39-41, 130-132). Not having acquired language for some time herself, she would hardly have been the one to help Caliban learn to speak. Second, the language of the speech itself does not sound at all like Miranda. It is both harsh and complex, and her speeches throughout the play do not resemble it in any way. I will thus treat the line, along with John Dryden, Theobald, and the Cambridge Edition as though it is Prospero’s (cf. I.ii.333-364 and note).

⁴ *Politics*, 1253a8-9.

⁵ Book I of Aristotle’s *Politics*, especially the comments on language and man’s political nature, and the account of slavery contained therein, have been essential to my understanding of what Shakespeare illustrates through Caliban. My interpretation of Caliban has been made largely in light of what Aristotle says there, because Shakespeare’s account seems to illustrate precisely what Aristotle discusses in Book I. My understanding of Aristotle’s teaching on slavery, in particular, has been helped tremendously by Wayne Ambler’s excellent essay on the subject, “Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery”, *Political Theory* Vol. 15, No. 3, 390-410.

⁶ Rousseau captures this very paradox in his *Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men*. In the context of an argument that subtly reveals the virtual incomprehensibility of understanding men as by nature solitary (contrary, for example, to what Hobbes suggests in the thirteenth chapter of his *Leviathan*, which contains his famous proclamation that life in the state of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”, (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p.76)), Rousseau asks “Which is the more necessary, an already united Society for the institution of Languages, or already invented languages?” As I have suggested, and as a careful examination of Rousseau’s essay also suggests, the only plausible way to resolve the paradox of this question is to posit man’s being brought up in families, and his thereby being—at the very least--social by nature.

⁷ *Politics*, 1253a14-15.

⁸ A comment on the effect of music on the soul that arises in a discussion of music in Plato's *Republic* is useful for beginning to grasp the relation between music and the rational part of the soul that Shakespeare may be suggesting in Prospero's apparent attempt at exposing Caliban to musical harmony:

[Socrates:]

'So, Glaucon,' I said, 'isn't this why the rearing in music is most sovereign? Because rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they make a man graceful if he is correctly reared, if not the opposite. Furthermore, it is sovereign because the man properly reared on rhythm and harmony would have the sharpest sense for what's been left out and what isn't a fine product of craft or what isn't a fine product of nature. And due to his having the right kind of dislikes, he would praise the fine things; and taking pleasure in them and receiving them into his soul, he would be reared on them and become a gentleman. He would blame and hate the ugly in the right way while he's still young, before he's able to grasp reasonable speech. And when reasonable speech comes, the man who's reared in this way would take most delight in it, recognizing it on account of its being akin?'

(*Republic*, 401e-402a).

⁹ It is difficult to discern whether Caliban is to be understood as amongst those who are to return to Italy. On the one hand, Shakespeare has Prospero speak of the island as 'bare' in the Epilogue which suggests that no one will be left there once Prospero departs. That said, we are given no explicit indication of this in Prospero's plan to bring him back. The ambiguity surrounding Caliban's return may be intentional on Shakespeare's part. For in creating such ambiguity, Shakespeare encourages us to consider seriously the implications of either his return or his remaining on the island. The subsequent comments might be considered in light of the question of whether his return or abandonment is just to the whole polity, as they will address some of the political implications of establishing the ruling relation that Prospero had subsequently deemed necessary for ruling Caliban in an actual polity.

¹⁰ Wayne Ambler, in his article on Aristotle and Slavery, makes a similar point that is pertinent to the argument I am making here. He writes,

In Book I's several memorable pronouncements about nature, Aristotle says that nature indeed wishes to make an appropriate bodily distinction between slaves and free men but that the results are often contrary to her wishes (1254b27-34). The consequence of this failure is not simply that certain slaves and free men have bodies ill-designed for their work; but because men make their judgments about who does and who does not deserve to be a slave in large part on the basis of bodily appearance (1253b34-1255a1), the confusion among bodies would lead to a departure

of the actual from the natural order even among men with the best of intentions. (Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery", *Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No.3, p. 399).

Chapter III: The Heirs of Prospero's Philosophical Legacy

¹Through Prospero's description of the education of Miranda Shakespeare makes use of a subtle equivocation that emphasizes the masculine and feminine distinctions that are at issue here. Prospero's lines there read as follows, "...and here/ Have I; thy schoolmaster, made thee more profit,/ Than other princess' can that have more time/ For vainer hours, and tutors not so careful" (I.ii.171-173). When one hears the line read aloud it is left ambiguous whether Prospero is speaking of "princes" a "princess" whereas when one reads the line one sees that he is speaking of a "princess". This subtle device seems intended to alert us to the question of the appropriate education for future kings and queens as Prospero understands it, a question that we see developed more explicitly in the rest of the scene.

²The lines that are attributed to Miranda in the First Folio and that I argued earlier are Prospero's (cf. Chapter II, note 3) may come to mind here, as it would seem to be a motherly sort of compassion on the part of his teacher that allows Caliban to acquire language. Despite the connection between compassion, Miranda, and the abilities of mothers that I have noted, I maintain that these lines are Prospero's for the reasons I have stated above. To the extent that these abilities arise out of the same disposition that gives rise to the philosophic nature, Prospero's possession of these qualities may be further evidence of his possessing this nature.

In fact, Shakespeare may be suggesting a more direct connection between the philosophic nature and characteristic maternal and feminine qualities. The first time we hear of compassion in the play it is spoken of as a virtue. This may seem strange given the problematic character of compassion as it appears throughout the play, most notably in Prospero and Miranda. Nevertheless, by the end of the play we see that while "virtue" remains used with reference to femininity, motherhood and compassion, for three of the four uses in the whole play, it is not reserved simply for female virtue. The second instance occurs when in response to Miranda's question about her parentage Prospero describes Miranda's mother as "a piece of virtue" (I.ii.56). Ferdinand makes the third use of the term in explaining to Miranda that for various "virtues" he had liked other women. ("For several virtues/ Have I lik'd several women; never any/ With so full soul, but some defect in her/ Did quarrel with the noblest grace she ow'd/ and put it to the foil: but you, O you, So perfect and so peerless, are created/ Of every creatures best"; III.i.42-48.) Ferdinand's lines point to the question of whether virtue is a name for one or many things, but in having him conclude with the view that the perfection of virtue is manifest in Miranda, he sides on the unity of virtue. By the end of the play, the more feminine quality of compassion, and virtue, are brought together, lending further support to the idea that there is a unity to virtue and that the four apparently distinct accounts of it presented in the play may have some connection to virtue simply. It appears when

Prospero, in response to Ariel's provocation of his sense of compassion for the Italians, resolves to restore the men of Italy to themselves:

Ariel: Say; my spirit,
Prospero: How fares the King and's followers?
Ariel: Confined together
In the same fashion as you gave in charge,
Just as you left them; all prisoners, sir,
In the line-grove which weather-fends your cell;
They cannot budge till your release. The King,
His brother, and yours, abide all three distracted,
And the remainder mourning over them,
Brimful of sorrow and dismay; but chiefly
Him you term'd, sir, "The good old lord,
Gonzalo";
His tears runs down his beard, like winter's drops
From eaves of reeds. Your charm so strongly
Works 'em,
That if you now beheld them, your affections
Would become tender.

Prospero: Dost thou think so, spirit?
Ariel: Mine would, sir, were I human.
Prospero: And mine shall.
Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling
Of their afflictions, and shall not myself,
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply
Passion as they, be kindlier mov'd than thou art?
Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th'
quick,
Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
Do I take part: the rarer action is
In *virtue* than in vengeance: they being penitent,
The sole drift of my purpose doth extend
Not a frown further. Go release them, Ariel:
My charms I'll break, their senses I'll restore,
And they shall be themselves.

(V.i.6-32, emphasis added)

Virtue itself appears here according to Prospero to be the appropriate rational use of compassion and so virtue is not to be understood simply in terms of female virtue; rather, by the time we reach this conclusion, it appears that the qualities earlier associated with female virtue may have a direct connection to virtue simply as it is manifest in Prospero, or philosophers, in general.

³ Ovid, *Metamorphosis*, trans. Allan Mandelbaum (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace, 1993), V.366-380. References from this text will be cited by book number and English line numbers.

⁴ Homer, *Odyssey*, trans. Richmond Lattimore, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), VIII.266-367. References from this text will be cited by book number and English line numbers.

⁵ *Republic*, 512c-514a.

⁶ cf. *Republic* 514b.

⁷ *Republic*, 516d.

⁸ That Prospero chooses to invoke the deities Juno and Iris may be further evidence of his attempt to bring Ferdinand into a philosophical alliance. As we saw in Chapter I, Prospero's identification with Dido is a function of his philosophic inclinations. Juno, with the assistance of Iris, happens to be the primary supporter of Dido and is instrumental in many of the trials of Aeneas. Perhaps in invoking these deities to awe Ferdinand, Prospero attempts to heighten Ferdinand's respect for them because of the kinship Prospero understands these goddesses to have with philosophy—by means of their relation to Dido). That the men of Italy are tacitly likened to the men of Aeneas—by virtue of their being attacked by Ariel as a Harpy—may lend further evidence to this point. For in using the Harpy to attack them Prospero suggests that they are guilty of what he views to be the crimes of Aeneas.

Chapter IV: Civilized Italy

¹ Michel de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1965), p.152.

² *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, p. 153.

³ *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, p. 155.

⁴ David Lowenthal makes this point in his chapter on, *The Tempest in Shakespeare and the Good Life* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) p.33.

⁵ II.i.84, editorial note.

⁶ Jean Bodin, *Six Books of a Commonweale*, ed. Kenneth Douglas McRae, trans. Richard Knolles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). Knolles' translation of Jean Bodin's book is an English translation contemporaneous with Shakespeare. I have modernized the spelling of Knolles' translation.

⁷ *Odyssey*, XI.260-265.

⁸ *Six Books of a Commonweale*, p.46.

⁹ *Six Books of a Commonweale*, p.51-52.

¹⁰ Shakespeare may also wish for us to recall the Carthage of Dido in this respect. As we saw in Chapter I, Dido's failure was in large part due to her failure to maintain her boundaries, or the distinction between friends and enemies when she fell in love with Aeneas (cf. Chapter I, note 14).

¹¹ The references to Thebes, in conjunction with Alonso's attempt to unify the political north and south, and the cultural west and east by marriage may also suggest that his imperialism is somewhat like Alexander's and we may wish to bear the example of Alexander in mind in considering the question of imperialism as Shakespeare presents it here. Shakespeare may even have Alexander's razing of Thebes in mind. In any case, a few excerpts from the *Oxford Companion to Classical Literature* (ed. Sir Paul Harvey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937)) may be pertinent to these considerations:

Alexander extended his policy of fusing the European and Asiatic portions of his empire, by colonization, by mixed marriages...and by unification of the military services. (The policy of equalizing the Greek and Eastern races, it may be noted, was censured by Aristotle)... We owe to Alexander, a man of genius at the head of a military monarchy, what no Greek city-state would have been able to achieve, the extension of Greek civilization over the East. As a result of his conquests the character of that civilization itself was changed. Greece sank into a secondary position; her city states lost their independence, and with it the special atmosphere in which their literary masterpieces had been produced. Hellenic civilization, as it extended to new regions became exposed to new influences, and the Hellenistic Age came into being (p.19-21).

Incidentally, when Alexander razed Thebes he ordered that the house of Pindar would be preserved—an event to which Milton refers in his sonnet “When the Assault was Intended to the City” (p. 424). This sonnet is presented on the opening pages of this project. I daresay that Milton may have had *The Tempest* and his author in mind when he wrote it.

¹² *Shakespeare and the Good Life*, p. 57.

Conclusion

¹ *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, 150.

² Cf. Francis Bacon, *The New Organon*, aphorism 129, (ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)).

Bibliography

- Adler, Eve. *Vergil's Empire: Political Thought in the Aeneid*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
- Ambler Wayne. "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery". *Political Theory* 15, no. 3 (1987): 390-410.
- Ambler Wayne. "Aristotle's Understanding of Nature and Politics." *Review of Politics* 47, no. 2 (1985): 163-185.
- Alvis, John E. and Thomas G., West eds. *Shakespeare as Political Thinker*. 2nd ed. Delaware: ISI Books, 2000.
- Aristotle. *The Politics*. Edited and Translated by Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Bacon, Francis. *The New Atlantis*. Edited by Jerry Weinberger. Illinois: Harlan Davidson Inc., 1989.
- Bacon, Francis. *The New Organon*. Edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Bodin, Jean. *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*. Edited by Kenneth Douglas McRae. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Cowden-Clarke, Mary. *The Complete Concordance to Shakespeare*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.
- Craig, Leon. *Of Philosophers and Kings: Political Philosophy in Shakespeare's Macbeth and King Lear*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
- Craig, Leon. *The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic*. Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1996.
- Coleridge, S. T. "An Analysis of Act I". In Shakespeare *The Tempest: A Casebook*. Edited by D.J. Palmer, 1968.
- Goddard, Harold C. 'The Tempest'. In *The Meaning of Shakespeare*. Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Graves, Robert. *The Greek Myths*. Vol. 1. London: Penguin, 1960.
- Graves, Robert. *The Greek Myths*. Vol. 2. London: Penguin, 1960.

- Harvey, Sir Paul, ed. *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.
- Homer, *The Odyssey of Homer*. Translated and Edited by Richmond Lattimore. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
- James, Henry. 'Introduction to *The Tempest*'. In *Shakespeare The Tempest: A Casebook*. Edited by D.J. Palmer, 1968.
- Knight, G. Wilson. 'The Shakespearian Superman'. In *The Crown of Life*. London Methuen: 1947.
- Lowenthal, David. "The Tempest". In *Shakespeare and the Good Life: Ethics and Politics in Dramatic Form*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. 2nd ed. Edited and Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Montaigne, Michel de. *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*. Edited by Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Moulton, Richard C. *Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist*. New York: Dover, 1966.
- Murry, J. Middleton 'Shakespeare's Dream'. In *Shakespeare*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1936.
- Noble, Richmond. *Shakespeare's Biblical Knowledge*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1935.
- Ovid, *The Metamorphosis of Ovid*. Edited and Translated by Allen Mandelbaum. New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1993.
- Plato. *The Republic of Plato*. Edited and Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1991.
- Shakespeare, William. *The Tempest*. Edited by Frank Kermode. London: Methuen & Co., 1987.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings*. Edited by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Virgil. *The Aeneid of Virgil*. Edited and Translated by Allen Mandelbaum. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.