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Anarchy, Self-Interest and Rationality: Assessing the Impact of the International System on Modern English School Theory

by

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Abstract

Since its reorganization in the early 1990s, the English School of international relations has emerged as a popular theoretical lens through which to examine global events. Those that use the international society approach promote it as a middle-way of theorizing due to its supposed ability to incorporate features from both systemic and domestic perspectives. A noticeable trend in the School since the end of the Cold War has been its interest with domestic and critical theory concerns, often focusing on individual, discursive or emancipatory issues. As a result, the English School has been able to accommodate the growing trends in international theory more generally, with the decline of problem-solving theory and the rise of critical projects. While the School and its practitioners may, for the most part, see value in discussing how domestic or critical variables impact the society of states, such examinations tend to neglect or overlook the systemic level of analysis. This project takes exception to the decline of the English School's problem-solving foundations and argues that the School must place more emphasis on the systemic level of analysis if it hopes to be relevant in international theory debates. To this end, the criticisms of American scholars regarding the School's lack of methodological rigour and explanatory power are addressed by demonstrating the added value to the international society approach if the constraints of the international system are included in theoretical explanations. In order to demonstrate how the systemic level alters English School analyses, two areas of popular examination within the School are explored, namely the role of international institutions and the debate over humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, the contention of this work is that English School scholars can greatly benefit from including systems-level thinking because of what it

adds to the School's explanatory power and also its ability to provide methodological rigour. In doing so, it is more likely the English School can penetrate the mainstream of international theory in the future.

Acknowledgment

It would be irresponsible to submit this dissertation without acknowledging the many people, in both the professional and personal circles of my life, which allowed and encouraged me to complete such a task.

I should start by thanking both the University of Alberta and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the funding I received. Without such funds, this project would not have been a possibility.

The ideas included here began during my days in Brock University's political science department and made their way across the country to the University Alberta in the fall of 2007. Since that time, this project saw many different forms and became both the greatest companion, and greatest adversary, in my life. Working on international theory is a labour of love in many respects, primarily because there is never a moment of completion or satisfaction. Rather, theory is an ongoing set of debates and ideas that never cease to evolve and hopefully, progress. In essence, this dissertation is not intended to conclude anything; instead, it signifies the beginning of a new line of theoretical questioning that may, or perhaps may not, lead somewhere of interest in the future.

Many academic mentors and colleagues provided sound advice, guidance, counter-arguments and inspiration in the crafting of this work at Brock University, the University of Alberta, and beyond. My first words of thanks must go out to the members of my Examining Committee, who took the time and effort to make their way through the vast forest of thoughts included here. My appreciation goes out to Tom Keating, Andy Knight, Greg Anderson, Joanna Harrington and Kim Nossal for helping me through the defence and final stages of a long voyage.

I was initially introduced to English School theory by my MA Supervisor and dear friend Pierre Lizée. Somehow and someway, Pierre recognized that I was likely to take interest in the works of Wight, Bull and others before I had any clue who they were. Countless others in Brock's political science community are also to be thanked for their help along the way, including Leah Bradshaw, Marc James, Diane Leon and William Mathie.

Once my work began at the University of Alberta, two things became immediately clear – my realist tendencies were going to be a unique contribution to the department and I would experience ideological challenges from great minds that I could never have foreseen. Throughout my course work, comprehensive exams, dissertation proposal and the dissertation itself, I received encouragement and support from many people that had a hand in shaping the final dissertation. I am grateful to the entire department, but must centre out Rob Aitken, Cindy Anderson, Greg Anderson, Don Carmichael, Donna Coombs-Montrose, Judy Garber, Lois Harder, Catherine Kellogg, Heidi Studer and Linda Trimble for their profound impact on my career and life as friends.

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Table of Contents

Tables

Introduction: International vs. Global Theory

It was after the end of World War I that the field of study known as international relations (IR) was born. Early IR scholars like David Davies and E.H. Carr sought to explain and understand why the Great War broke out in the first place, and what could be done to prevent it from recurring (Booth 1996, 328-329). Various theories and formulations were advanced, but the outbreak of the Second World War led to a widespread belief that perhaps war, its causes and possibilities for conflict prevention, went far deeper than any one theory could possibly explain. If there was one commonality between these traditional theories, it was their effort to examine behaviour in the international system of states; a system characterized by a lack of overarching authority above the state level; a system defined by a great number of previous conflicts. Whether international theory examined the domestic-level or the influence of the anarchic nature of the system, the state was accepted as the universal unit of analysis for the field known as *international* relations.[1]

Those theories which initially dominated the field, namely realism and liberalism, were seriously questioned as the Cold War went on by scholars like Robert Cox and Susan Strange. The methodology, ontology, epistemology and fundamental core values of early international theories were all brought into doubt. As Timothy Sinclair notes about Cox in particular: "Strongly historical in perspective, Cox's method of understanding global change represents a challenge to conventional ontological assumptions about international relations...the central of which is that states are the major actors whose interaction is to be explained" (Sinclair 1996, 3). This sort of critical inquiry intensified with the collapse of the Soviet Union, for the end of the Cold War led to notions of uncertainty, especially because realist theory was unable to account for the factors that led to the end of the Cold War.

The Cold War has been over for over two decades, and critical theories have heavily infiltrated the study of IR, fundamentally altering the way in which the field is studied and taught. Critical theories of IR examine such issues as gender, postcolonial legacies, poststructural discourse, social theory, the individual and economic oppression, and try to understand the world in new ways that traditional IR either ignored or dismissed. Mark Rupert argues:

> A critical theory approach to global politics would then take a relational, process-oriented perspective, and seek to show how social forces (classes, social movements, etc.), states, and world orders are bound up together in particular constellations of historical structures. It would inquire as to the ways in which those historical structures – entailing political, cultural, and economic aspects – had been socially produced, the ways in which they differentially empower

[1] 'The state in this project adheres to the definition put forth by Hedley Bull: "The starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities each of which possess a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population" (Bull 2002, 8-10).

> various kinds of social agents, and the kinds of resistances which those relations engender (Rupert 2007, 159).

The critical project has made a concentrated effort to expand the field beyond its perceived narrow boundaries to examine old ideas and approaches through different lenses. As Rupert claims, critical philosophical contributions have tried to take the study away from the *international* and deliberately expanded the discourse to account for the broader *global* realm.

In his 2003 Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, Steve Smith summarized what he saw as the primary problem with the traditional study of international relations:

> The problem is that this narrow focus cannot deal with the problems of world politics in the new millennium. What it has done has been to help sing into existence the world that resulted in September 11. International Relations theory has concentrated almost exclusively on a particular world of international relations, and that has not been a world that most of the world's population could relate to. Their concerns, the violences that affected them, the inequalities they suffered, were all invisible to the gaze of the discipline, and in that very specific way the discipline, my discipline, my work, was culpable in serving specific social interests and explaining their agenda (Smith 2004, 514).

Broadening the agenda of international relations theory, for Smith, meant not just an acceptance of theoretical plurality but an embracing of it in order to take the field in a direction that would move beyond the boundaries created and enforced by realism. Smith's vision for the study is articulated quite clearly:

> Above all, I want to see a discipline that is open to a variety of issues, subjectivities, and identities rather than taking the agenda of the powerful as the natural and legitimate focus for the discipline. I want to see a discipline that enquires into the meanings and subjectivities of individuals in cultures different to those of the dominant world powers rather than assuming their rationality, interests, and thus identities. I want to see a discipline that admits of many routes to understanding, rather than treating one model of social science as if it was the sole bearer of legitimacy and thus beyond criticism. I want to see a discipline that realizes the limitations on correspondence theories of truth, and instead treats truth not as a property of the world waiting to be discovered, but as a matter for negotiation and interpretation. Finally, I want to see a discipline that does not hide behind the mask of value-neutrality and empiricism (Smith 2004, 514).

Smith's indictment of the way international relations had been written up to 9/11 only verified what he and other scholars were saying since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991- that it was time to progress from international politics as conceived by realists to a more global understanding which addresses the needs and concerns of humanity.

> the discipline has helped to sing into existence the world of September 11, 2001 by focusing on specific, and partial, notions of violence and inequality; by taking its referent object to be the state rather than the individual; and by subsuming difference and identity into sameness. Above all, this has been done in the name of legitimate social science, very narrowly defined (Smith 2004, 513-514).

This transition from the rigidly *international* to the more humanity-focused *global* has been taking place long enough for the field to take stock of just how far it has come. Smith's contention is that by opening the borders of the field, a far greater appreciation of the world's complexities and how they affect real people can be achieved. Has this actually happened?

Yes. It can be argued that the study of global politics has begun to illuminate areas that were previously misunderstood or totally ignored. Some critical approaches have offered enormous insight into the social and economic causes of particular outcomes at the global level and the human experiences of various events have been of particular interest.[2] The vision of plurality and globalism articulated by Smith can, in fact, be seen as emerging. Like many others who spent their lives examining politics above the state level, Smith saw a need for greater complexity and that is exactly what the field has seen.

Such evolution has also begun to influence the way security is studied in modern IR. Realist notions of security were mostly limited to examining the causes of conflict between states and the impact of the anarchic international system (Morgenthau 2006). Dynamics of interstate conflict and cooperation were of utmost interest and, in many ways, these variables were studied exhaustively. The realist preoccupation with interstate conflict has typically been coupled by studies which look beyond state-based security with an eye toward how to understand the human security issues of the world. These humanity-centred studies of global security have intensified with the growth in the critical theory agenda. Notions like environmental security, the insecurity of poverty and economic plight, humanitarian atrocity and other concerns dominate the literature of human insecurity and why such problems exist in the first place.[3] The interests of humanity are being considered and debated to a previously unforeseen level (MacLean, Black and Shaw 2006). This has been the vast contribution of the critical study of global politics.

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[2] It is noted here that not call critical approaches to IR are concerned with the global. Some prefer to examine sub-national forces entirely, but human experiences remain at the core of the critical agenda.

[3] On environmental security, see John Vogler and Mark Imber (eds.), *The Environment and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1996), Lorraine Elliot, *The Global Politics of the Environment* (London: Macmillan, 1998), and Robyn Eckersley, *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); on the insecurity of poverty, see Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* (London: Zed Books, 2001), Caroline Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security* (London: Pluto Press, 2000) and Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet (eds.), *Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); and on humanitarian atrocity, see Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003), Henry Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, *International Human Rights in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Jennifer Welsh(ed.), *Humanitarian Intervention in International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

In spite of such successes for the critical and global agenda, there is a cause for pause. One area that has come under heavy criticism from a variety of sources is the existence, character and theoretical assumptions of the realist international system.[4] One of the primary postulates of realist theory is the existence of an international system; a system where states are seen as the primary actors in international politics. With the rise and recent proliferation of human-centric approaches to international relations, one must question the continued relevance of the realist conception of the international system.

While there may be close to seven billion people on the planet earth, it is necessary to wonder just how responsible individuals are for the daily outcomes of politics above the domestic level. Some variants of realism, especially the structural version, have dismissed the notion that humans have a major impact on the dynamics of interstate behaviour in the international system (Waltz 1979, 93-97). Since the end of the Cold War, however, international relations discourse has made a concentrated effort at examining the role of people on the ground in various conflicts and has begun to influence policy-makers in an effort to secure those most vulnerable populations (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008, 3-37). It is in the context of deciphering the extent to which either states or humans represent a unit of international relations analysis that this project seeks to make a contribution.

Would reforming existing institutions and refining the roles or duties of states truly achieve the goals of human security or are there larger obstacles hindering the recognition and protection of human interests worldwide?

In order to approach concerns about human security, it is believed that one cannot view the global realm in any narrow or singular sense. Following the logic of Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, IR is meant to be a practical discourse: "Without idealism, realism is sterile, devoid of purpose; without realism, idealism is naive, devoid of understanding of the world in which one seeks to act" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008, 7). Embracing the plurality of international relations literature may aid in the quest of scholars, policy-makers and global citizens alike to find a novel way of thinking about international politics, which is able to incorporate both realist and critical values. As Robert Jackson claims:

> the world is a multifarious and changeable place which can only be captured adequately by a pluralistic approach. By pluralistic I mean a recognition that social and political life discloses divergent and even contradictory ideas and discourses which must be accommodated by our theories if they are to remain faithful to reality...In international political theory there can be no sovereign paradigm or discourse (Jackson 1992, 281).

[4] For more on systemic critique in realist thought, see Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 255-300 and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (1992), 391-425.

The model of international theory used for this work is derived from four primary sources – E.H. Carr, Martin Wight, Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jackson. Carr's work on balancing the competing claims of realism and utopianism between World War I and World War II is by far the best work of international theory to date. Carr, even before the outbreak of the Second World War, recognized the danger inherent in trying to espouse an understanding of international politics that used only one theoretical lens. Wight, building in some sense on Carr's warnings, articulated a version of international theory that sought to build a middle-ground between pessimism and utopianism. His version of international theory is defined in this way: "International theory is the corresponding tradition of enquiry about relations between states, the problems of obligations that arise in the absence as distinct from the presence of government, the nature of the community of which states are members, and the principles of foreign policy. In other words international theory is the political philosophy of international relations" (Wight 1991, 1). While Kenneth Waltz is perhaps best known for his promotion of strictly positivist methods of international theory, his work on empirical verification and theoretical evaluation are of particular interest in exploring how international theory is to be constructed. More recently, Robert Jackson's work on how humans affect a world of states serves to highlight the tensions between realism and humanity in the modern era.

Building on the foundations set out by Carr, Wight, Waltz and Jackson, this study is especially interested in the continued relevance of the international system and the nature of interstate cooperation since the end of the Cold War. In order to examine the conduct of states in their contemporary society and how variables from both the overarching international system and domestic-level concerns of humanity affect such behaviour, this study attempts to establish a novel theoretical framework that provides the reader with the necessary tools to comprehend the modern society of states, the stability it provides and potential threats to that constancy. After establishing a theoretical framework, two issues, namely the role of institutions and the debate over humanitarian intervention, are explored to test the validity of the postulates presented in earlier chapters.

What is first necessary is to describe how the international system has been traditionally understood in international theory and why its relevance has declined since the end of the Cold War. Chapter 1 takes the reader through international theory literature in order to comprehend the realist emphasis on the international system and the reactions to such a concern by other theoretical lenses. Chapter 2 describes how international relations can be studied at various levels by utilizing the English School of international theory, and the consequences associated with using such a theoretical approach. Chapter 3 relates systemic thinking to the historical evolution of international society and how this may provide a more accurate model of recognizing alterations in interstate behaviour. After a clearer framework for explaining how one society of states differs from another, chapter 4 presents an in-depth discussion of modern international society and its unique composition. Chapter 5 builds on chapter 4's discussion of the contemporary society of states and offers a way of maintaining the international system as an essential component of international theory, but moves away from the realist treatment of the state as a monolithic concept.

The theoretical agenda presented in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 is premised upon finding a theoretical middle-ground between realism and idealism, much like the one envisioned by Carr, Wight and Jackson. To assess the validity of this framework, chapters 6 and 7 focus their attention on two of the most important considerations in international society literature today, being the role of institutions and the debate over humanitarian intervention. Chapter 6 surveys the role of the United Nations in the contemporary society of states and why desires for its reform may not be the ideal avenue for maximizing the organization's utility while chapter 7 is dedicated to the human security agenda, specifically the need for a more pragmatic approach to doctrines like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Finally, chapter 8 summarizes why international theory must maintain at least some of its systemic and statist concerns and examines the costs of sacrificing such considerations.

Ultimately, it is hoped that reading this work provokes at least one essential question as international relations moves forward: can a single theoretical lens provide a full, or effective, account of this complex world and the issues facing both states and humanity?

Chapter 1: International Theory and the Decline of Structural Realism

The story of how the international system has evolved from the bipolar configuration of the Cold War period to the altered post-Cold War international political environment has been told a number of times, in a variety of ways, and by scholars of various theoretical allegiances. IR theorists have concentrated an enormous amount of attention on trying to determine the causes for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global shifts that took place soon thereafter. While theorists approach the global political situation from different ontological and epistemological viewpoints, one thing is clear – the world has changed since 1991 and this new age of international relations can be characterized by its complexity, as opposed to the supposedly simple and predictable character of bipolarity which existed during the Cold War.

In trying to determine how the geopolitical environment has changed and which theory, or set of theories, best explains current conditions, it must be noted that it is impossible to use one approach to IR to understand every aspect of global politics. The history of IR is not a commonly accepted set of facts and dates, as a number of scholars fundamentally disagree with the way IR history is often presented. Theorists from different backgrounds and loyalties describe the evolution of IR as a professional field of study very differently, and their views of this historical evolution have been important in comprehending why the field is so fractured at present (Holsti 1985). This being the case, the various accounts of international events and outcomes throughout the Cold War and the years leading to its end tells a story of realist domination, hard power concerns, self-interested states and the constant fear of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Keohane 1986b, 1-26).

While alternative theoretical formulations to realism have existed since the inception of IR as a legitimate field of scholarly study, their relevance and dominance were always questioned throughout the Cold War because of the seemingly prophetic nature of the realist bipolar system (Keohane 1986b, 9). Each time scholars from different theoretical backgrounds would make a case for peace, human rights or economic interdependence, a situation or conflict would occur that reminded scholars and policy-makers alike of the self-interested and security maximizing nature of both superpowers. Since 1991 and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), many new theoretical approaches have emerged, while the relevance of traditional theories have been brought into question.

Making the case that the conduct or nature of international politics has been altered since the fall of the Soviet Union requires an examination of how IR got to this point from a meta-theoretical perspective. By tracing the evolution of international theory, particularly the varying viewpoints on the importance of the international system, it will be shown that IR was once a field dictated and influenced heavily by realist ideas of international affairs and where the importance of systemic concerns were considered to be of greater significance than they are currently. The realist paradigm in IR set the tone for how the Cold War was primarily understood, and this paradigm has been responsible for provoking reactions from different areas of the political spectrum, many of which

seek to dismantle the realist research programme and its reluctance to focus on variables outside of, or below, the international system (Keohane 1986c, 158-203). To first understand the way modern IR is written, the *problem-solving* versus *critical* debate will be explored. This debate rests at the core of the field and influences how various theories aim to explain and understand the role of states in modern international politics and the character of the international system.[1]

By examining the divide between those theories classified as either problem-solving or critical, it becomes evident that debates over the existence, structure and importance of the international system in contemporary international theory is focused mainly on the account of systemic theory articulated by structural or neo realists. In order to demonstrate the declining relevance of structural realist theory since the end of the Cold War, this chapter will examine how the traditional rational choice assumptions inherent in structural realist theory may no longer be completely applicable to modern international politics, if they were ever truly pertinent at all. Instead, the rational assumptions of states may be better explained by a different rational choice model that accounts for elements of historical learning of actors and long-term rational calculations, namely theory of moves (Brams 1994). In assessing the rational decisions of states in the international system, and how these choices impact systemic transitions, the plausibility of theory of moves will be investigated to evaluate whether it is a more plausible representation of explaining the rational calculations of states in the international system.

1.1 The Meta-theoretical Evolution of Contemporary IR

International theory is by no means a new area of study. In fact, many scholars who examine the history of international thought can find discussions of foreign relations in texts ranging from Thucydides' reflections on the Peloponnesian War, through Aquinas' thoughts on just war, in Grotius' ideas on international law and Kant's writings on perpetual peace.[2] While international theories find their grounding in classical texts, the field of scholarly study known as IR, and the theoretical lenses created to explain this field, did not come about until the early twentieth century (Cox 2007).

Recently there has been plenty of debate about the history of international thought and the growth of IR. The various historical accounts of IR tend to differ on how the field has unfolded since its creation, but there is typically some common ground in terms of the early perspectives, being realist and idealist, and these first efforts to examine international politics often focused on interstate dynamics of cooperation and conflict (Dunne, Cox and Booth 1998b, xiv). Early realist articulations of these dynamics emphasized the centrality of states, state self-interest, lusts for power, the protection of Westphalian state sovereignty, the offensive military capabilities of states and the

[1] It is noted here that there is a debate regarding the role and character of the international system that is independent of the problem-solving/critical divide. See Jack Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1971).

[2] For more on the foundations of international thought, see David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein and Jay Schafritz(eds.), *Classic Readings of International Relations* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1994).

condition of anarchy internationally among other things.[3] It was not long after these early realist discussions that various reactions, rebuttals and other new theories came to the forefront of the study.[4] No matter which version of foundational IR history is told, though, it is difficult to deny the rapid growth of realist theory and interstate concerns after the end of World War II.[5]

A major point of contention as well within IR has been the level at which to focus one's theoretical analysis. Realist theories generally tend to present an idea of an international system that is defined by its anarchic structure. According to Robert Art and Robert Jervis, when using realist theories to explain international politics, one must focus on the behaviour of states in an anarchic environment, where no authority exists above the domestic level. "States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punished deviation. This – the absence of a supreme power – is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics" (Art and Jervis 2007, 2). The centrality of states and the lack of a governing power above states are at the core of realist theories.

What is meant by the term *international system*? As noted by Art and Jervis, the system of states is an environment where states interact without the existence of an overarching authority to compel them towards certain kinds of ethical or morally righteous behaviour. This is why the character of the system is described as anarchic. According to Kenneth Waltz, one of the most prominent realist scholars of the modern era, the anarchic nature of the international system is the defining characteristic which explains interstate behaviour at the international level. In describing what anarchy means for the international system, Waltz argues:

> In anarchy there is no automatic harmony...A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist (Waltz 1959, 160).

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[3] For foundational realist ideas in IR, see Charles Beard, "Neglected Aspects of Political Science," *The American Political Science Review* 42:2 (April, 1948), 211-222, Walter Lipmann, "US Foreign Policy," *Pacific Affairs* 17:2 (June, 1944), 251-252, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006) and Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," *World Politics* 4:1 (Oct., 1951), 39-63).

[4] Examples of these new approaches include liberal, Marxist, Frankfurt school, feminist, postcolonialist, poststructuralist, world systems, dependency theory, neo-Marxism, liberal internationalism, green theory and many others. For a detailed account of international theory and its proliferation, see Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[5] Note that scholars have recently begun to question the strength of both idealism and realism in early international theory. For instance, see Ken Booth, "75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past – Reinventing its Future," *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 328-339.

Within the realist school of thought, only one variant centres exclusively on the existence of, and state behaviour in, the international system, namely structural realism, which will be described in greater detail below.[6] The structural variant of realism differs from its classical counterpart because of its preference for systemic theorizing, as compared to the classical emphasis on how philosophical traditions of human nature and desire for power condition states. John Mearsheimer effectively summarizes the structural realist thesis by providing five bedrock assumptions:

> The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic...The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other...The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states' intentions...The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers...The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2001, 30-31).

From these basic assumptions, Mearsheimer claims that three broad patterns of interstate behaviour can be deduced: "fear, self-help, and power maximization" (Mearsheimer 2001, 32). Structural realism's exclusive discussion of the international system as the realm in which interstate behaviour is best explained has become of serious interest for international theorists of varying ideological allegiances.[7]

While realist theories are not alone in their recognition of an international system, other theories, most notably liberal theories and neo-Marxist theories, have a different understanding of how important the international system is and its effect on states. Rather than narrowing the analysis of international politics to the systemic level, these other theories focus on specific variables, actors or ideas within states or which affect state action.[8] Distinguishing between the different approaches and goals of international theories and the reasoning behind such differences can be explained by differentiating between *problem-solving* and *critical* theories.

To help understand the different goals and methods of various international theories, scholars have offered categories in which to classify theories. One scheme of theory classification is referred to as the inter-paradigm debate.[9] This approach divides the major theoretical divisions throughout the history of IR into debates. According to Ole Wæver, the inter-paradigm model, however, is far too confusing and inaccurate to be

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[6] For the seminal work in structural realist theory, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

[7] For the purposes of this project, it is the neorealist conception of the system of states, adhering to the assumptions articulated by Mearsheimer that will be used as the international system referred to henceforth.

[8] It is noted here that various realist theories differ in their levels of analysis.

[9] For more on this, see Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* (London: Pinter, 1985), 7-26, A.J.R. Groom, "Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher," *Review of International Studies* 14:2 (1988), 97-115, and Kalevi Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline – Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

useful in the current context of theoretical plurality in IR scholarship. Wæver notes: "The story about an inter-paradigm debate does not give a grip on the ongoing controversies in the discipline. The debate has moved on; self-referential story-telling in the discipline ought to move with it" (Wæver 1996, 149) Rather than engaging in the futile effort to comprehend almost a century of debates, there is a far more useful, simple and accurate classification model provided in the work of Robert Cox. Cox's approach, which divides theories into two broad classifications, namely problem-solving and critical is beneficial due to its ability to easily separate the goals of each project while not delegitimizing their ontological assumptions (Cox 1996c, 85-123).

Problem-solving theories tend to accept the world in its existing order and work to address situations within that fixed order. Cox argues: "It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble" (Cox 1996c, 88). Therefore, problem-solving theories typically do not seek to alter the world *as it is*.

Cox's second category is called critical theory. This side of the field seeks to understand the complex variety of features within global politics and also, to put a human, moral face on world events (Jackson 1996, 215). According to Cox:

> Critical theory is theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historical change. Problem-solving theory is nonhistorical or ahistorical, since it, in effect, posits a continuing present (the permanence of the institutions and power relations which constitute its parameters). The strength of one is the weakness of the other. Because it deals with a changing reality, critical theory must continually adjust its concepts to the changing object it seeks to understand and explain. These concepts and the accompanying methods of enquiry seem to lack the precision that can be achieved by problem-solving theory, which posits a fixed order as its point of reference. This relative strength of problem-solving theory, however, rests upon a false premise, since the social and political order is not fixed but is changing (Cox 1996c, 89).

Cox is concerned with the need to understand how prevailing understandings of world order are constructed and the ability to critique those assumptions; theory, for Cox, cannot be divorced from a particular standpoint in time and space. Based on their fundamental divergences over interpretations of objectivity, science, empiricism, history and agency, it becomes evident why Cox's problem-solving and critical distinctions become valuable tools in comprehending how the field is studied.[10]

[10] This does not delegitimize other efforts to classify theoretical trends in the field, like Holsti's comments on the various debates within IR. The simplicity and clarity provided by Cox allow for a quick reference point and aptly accounts for the distinctions between the goals, variables and units of analysis which tend to differ between problem-solving and critical theories. Furthermore, not all non-positivist theories are considered critical in nature.

Of course, there is debate as to whether or not problem-solving theory provides any value in political science anymore (Brown, Cote, Jones and Miller 2000). There are contemporary critical theory scholars who argue in favour of an approach to international relations which is not limited by the sometimes narrow commitments of problem-solving theory. Jim George and David Campbell describe the nature of their dissent with problem-solving theories:

> These broad patterns of dissent come together around the issue of praxis, the question of theoretical analysis and the global life in which poverty, militarization, and oppression are the norm. It is a dissatisfaction with the way that traditional approaches to International Relations (including Marxist orthodoxy) have confronted this issue that has provided the impetus for the dissent of the present. In the wake of (among other developments) the Vietnam War, the restructuring of the world economy, the rise of religious fundamentalism, the continuing struggle for survival of the great majority of the world's peoples, and the new dangers and opportunities of the superpower relationship, critically inclined scholars have looked with dismay at orthodox responses that invoke and replicate the caricatured debates and theoretical understanding of the past (George and Campbell 1990, 288).

The aims of critical theories are certainly noble and provide added value to the study of IR. To study what John Mearsheimer describes as the human condition by understanding how ideas shape practice, critical theory serves to better the lives of individuals throughout the world and aims for peace (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 37-38). One must still question, however, whether problem-solving approaches, including those that emphasize an anarchic international system of states like realism, are completely outdated and irrelevant in modern international theory.

Though problem-solving theories can be accused of being narrowly conceived in some sense, there is still value in their use of explaining international relations. Robert Cox makes note of why problem-solving approaches should not be entirely dismissed: "The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to a relatively close and precise examination" (Cox 1996c, 88). Critical theorists may disagree with the fact that problem-solving theories accept a given world order, but this does not entirely negate their explanatory power within that order. Georg Sorensen notes that problem-solving theories do contain a preference for a fixed world order, "but that does not mean that it is without merit in analysing particular aspects of international relations from a particular point of view" (Sorensen 1998, 88).

In order to appreciate more fully the way the international system is presented in the international theory literature, it may be of value to examine how some of the major schools of thought in IR present the issue. Due to constraints of space, this analysis will not be complete in terms of examining how every theory of international relations addresses the usefulness of thinking about the international system, but it is hoped that a

better understanding of why some theories resist upholding the realist conception of the system, especially the structural realist version presented in the works of scholars like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, can be achieved. To do so, the notion of an international system will be explored by looking at classical realist, classical liberal and neo-Marxist theories.

1.2 Tracing the System in IR Theory

1.21 Classical Realism

Realist explanations of international politics remain among the most predominant theories in IR to this day, but are constantly being refuted from all sides of the theoretical spectrum (Finnemore 1996, 1). In 1939, E.H. Carr described an environment of international politics that was anarchic and competitive, and he spent considerable effort in warning against the pitfalls of utopian thought in international policy-making. His major work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939), tells a story of international amorality in the vein of Machiavelli and Hobbes, a lack of common interests among states and the dismal probability for interstate cooperation. Carr argues: "In the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less...When self-sacrifice is attributed to a state, the chances are greater that this alleged self-sacrifice will turn out on inspection to be a forced submission to a stronger power" (Carr 2001, 151). This work set the stage for a series of early realists, like Arnold Wolfers and Walter Lipmann, to build a foundation for realism in IR theory.

Of course, many of Carr's predictions and warnings came to the forefront of international study when World War II broke out in September of 1939. Some of the problems that early realists saw in the Treaty of Versailles, such as the treatment of lesser powers and state self-interest during the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, only added to the growing popularity of realist theory. In the wake of the Second World War, Hans Morgenthau published his famous classical realist manifesto, *Politics Among Nations* (1948). This book, combined with those which came before, told a very specific version of international political history and articulated similar prospects for future relations as described by Carr – first, that states are the primary actors in an anarchic international system; second, that self-interest is the motivating principle for state action; third, that the trends of self-interest and quest for power are historically universal and have always been the motivations for human action; and finally, that states only cooperate with one another if it is within their interests to do so, as they have no social nature. This point is emphasized by Morgenthau when he asserts: "The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and in the international spheres" (Morgenthau 2006, 37).

Though classical realist theory differs from structural realism in its articulation of how the international system is to be understood, they both highlight the lack of authority in the international realm above the state level, the centrality of the state in international politics, and the self-interested nature of state behaviour (Wohlforth 2008, 135). For its

version of the international system, classical realism looks to two primary sources: one are philosophical texts that describe humans as naturally self-interested and also to those thinkers that theorize about man's actions or motives in the state of nature[11]; the second is human history, which classical realists believe tells a story of perpetual self-interest tracing back to Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.[12] Morgenthau argues that:

> the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them. This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts. This school, then, sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historical precedent rather than to abstract principles and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good (Morgenthau 2006, 3).

Classical realism, then, sees the international system as a realm in which states attempt to maximize their power, and where there are no universal moral principles to guide state action.

1.22 Classical Liberalism

Classical liberals prefer to look within the state to explain how and why states act, and some argue in favour of a Kantian notion of individual preferences seeking peaceful coexistence.[13] Some of these liberal authors, like James Rosenau, J. David Singer, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Robert Putnam, articulate a version of international politics which see states as becoming increasingly more interdependent or linked, and see state interests as being shaped from within.[14] Diana Panke and Thomas Risse argue: "All classical liberal theories of International Relations rest on the core assumption that domestic actors or structures strongly influence the foreign-policy identities and interests of states as well as their actual behaviour in international relations" (Panke and Risse 2007, 90). Like classical realism, classical liberal international theory looks to both philosophy and history as its foundation, but the interpretations of liberals differ greatly from their realist counterparts. Where classical realists look to philosophical sources like Machiavelli, Hobbes or Rousseau to demonstrate the self-interested nature of humanity, liberals use thinkers like Kant, Smith and Mill to demonstrate the inherent good within

[11] For instance, see the works of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
[12] For instance see the works of Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli.
[13] It is noted here that Kant was not the only thinker to present such ideas, but his work has become synonymous with international liberal theory.
[14] See for instance James Rosenau, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (* New York: Free Press, 1967), J. David Singer, *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), 427-460, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

humanity and the value of interdependence (Friedman 1999, 39-76). According to Andrew Moravcsik, liberal international theory has three core assumptions:

> Assumption 1: The Nature of Societal Actors: Globalization generates differential demands from societal individuals and groups with regard to international affairs. Liberal international relations theory rests on a bottom-up or pluralist view of politics
>
> Assumption 2: The Nature of the State: States represent the demands of a subset of domestic individuals and social groups, on the basis of whose interests they define state preferences and act instrumentally to manage globalization. For the purpose of analyzing international politics, an essential characteristic of the state is its set of underlying preferences: the rank ordering among potential substantive outcomes or states of the world that might result from international political interaction.
>
> Assumption 3: The Nature of the International System: The pattern of interdependence among state preferences shapes state behaviour. The critical theoretical link between state preferences, on the one hand, and state behaviour, on the other, is the concept of policy interdependence. Policy interdependence refers to the distribution and interaction of preferences (Moravcsik 2008, 236-240).

The interdependence of preferences, described by Moravcsik, indicates that in order to comprehend the events in the international system, one must look within the state, rather than to the anarchic condition alone. Liberals do recognize the importance of the state as a major actor in international politics, but rather than acting in a consistently self-interested manner as realists might argue, states in the liberal vision instead retain the option to cooperate.

Cooperation for states is seen as being in their best interests, according to classical liberal theory. By binding their fates and increasing their levels of interdependence, states can stem the tide of the anarchic international system and share both economic and ideological gains. The cooperation of states with similar domestic preferences is at the core of the Democratic Peace Theory.[15] According to Michael Doyle:

> Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another. No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states. Indeed, threats of war also have been regarded as illegitimate. A liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has

[15] For more on the Democratic Peace Theory see Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," pts. 1 and 2, *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12:3 (1983), 205-235 and 12:4 (1983), 323-354 and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

> been maintained and has expanded despite numerous particular conflicts of economic and strategic interest (Doyle 1983, 213).

Realist theories argue in favour of an international system which is conditioned by the anarchic character of the system, and because of this anarchy, states are seen as reluctant to cooperate, and distrustful. Classical liberals accept the condition of anarchy, but see the domestic preferences of individual states as the level at which to focus their theoretical analysis.

1.23 Neo-Marxism

While realist and liberal notions of IR are primarily concerned with questions of interstate security and cooperation, the critical reaction to both realist and liberal accounts shifts the debate away from an acceptance of a fixed international system. One of the primary concerns for critical theories of international relations, especially those in the neo-Marxist tradition, is the prospect for change.[16] Instead of a version of international politics grounded in universal understandings of human nature that humanity cannot escape, Robert Cox looks to the social forces of production as the primary area of analysis, which he bases on a historical materialist version of history drawn from Marxist dialectical theory (Cox 1996b, 19-38). By examining international affairs through a historical materialist lens, Cox argues that conflict internationally is not simply a consequence of competing states in a continuing structure. Cox claims: "Historical materialism sees in conflict the process of a continual remaking of human nature and the creation of new patterns of social relations which change the rules of the game and out of which – if historical materialism remains true to its own logic and method – new forms of conflict may be expected ultimately to arise" (Cox 1996c, 95).

Using a historical materialist understanding of history, Cox then sees enormous prospect for change internationally if counter-hegemonic forces are able to rival the capitalist powers that be. Cox claims that "a significant structural change in world order is, accordingly, likely to be traceable to some fundamental change in social relations and in the national political orders which correspond to national structures of social relations…We must shift the problem of changing world order back from international institutions to national societies" (Cox 1996d, 140). Though Cox makes arguments about an unfixed international system, and the prospects for change within world order, he does not completely dismiss the state as a legitimate unit of analysis in international politics. Building on Gramsci's theory of the state, Cox concludes that any comprehension of the state must incorporate a wide array of social, economic and political factors in order for it to have explanatory power. "However, the state, which remains the primary focus of social struggle and the basic entity of international relations, is the enlarged state which includes its own social basis. This view sets aside a narrow or superficial view of the state which reduces it, for instance, to the foreign-policy bureaucracy or the state's military capabilities" (Cox 1996d, 134). Neo-Marxist international theory shifts the

[16] For a detailed discussion of Cox's legacy regarding change in critical theory, see Stephen Gill and James Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

debate regarding the interstate system away from realist and liberal notions, and Cox's contentions about change in world order and different historical understandings became a common trait in many critical projects as well.[17]

1.24 Structural realism

In an effort to refine the original realist postulates articulated by scholars like Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz sought to promote a different understanding of the international system which was not contingent upon philosophical debates over human nature. In his 1979 *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz uses a combination of political, economic and mathematical theory to create a system of international politics that differs greatly from that conceived of by classical realists, liberals and critical scholars alike. Waltz argues in this work that states are the primary actors in the system, that the system is defined by economic and mathematical game theory rules based on anarchy, and that any effort to discuss domestic, economic or individual features of the world are reductionist in nature, meaning they provide no useful insight into how or why states act. He claims that "reductionist theories explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels. That internal forces produce external outcomes is the claim of such theories" (Waltz 1979, 60). Waltz's disagreement with reductionism and preference for systems-level theory in the economics tradition virtually discounts all theories which focus their analysis on anything but the systemic level.

Waltz's presentation of structural realism has led to a variety of responses from all sides of the international theoretical spectrum. One of the major sources of criticism against the structural realist conception of the international system has been its preferred method of examination, which borrows from scientific and rational-choice traditions. Wæver describes the reason for such fear toward Waltz's work, as he argues: "The really new thing about structural realism is its *concept of science*. General speculation and reflection is no longer sufficient, realism has to express itself in the form of *theory*, of a system of clearly specified sentences...In this sense the shift from realism to structural realism can be seen as a delayed and displaced victory for the scientific side of the second debate" (Wæver 1996, 162). It was this perceived victory for scientific approaches to IR that spurred such strong and intense reactions from across the theoretical spectrum.

1.25 Reactions to Waltz's Structural Realism

Since the end of the Cold War, a sense of idealism, combined with the inability of structural realist theories to predict the end of the Cold War, has led to the explosion of theoretical projects which seek to shift debates within IR away from the structural realist emphasis on the systemic-level of analysis. When examining this trend, some authors are

[17] For instance, Frankfurt scholars seek to emancipate humanity from a Capitalist dominated system, post and neocolonial scholars see new forms of empire as representing new threats to humanity's security and seek to alter such trends, gender and identity discourses are being addressed by certain feminist and poststructural thinkers who question fixed understandings of such concepts and green theorists see the environment as an essential calculation which must be included in international security discourse.

very much in favour of the diverse and pluralistic nature of the field that has since emerged. The critical agenda within IR has done much of what Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith see as being positive. They claim: "We think more is better, and that theoretical pluralism not only enables old issues to be addressed in new ways, but also opens up new agendas which speak more directly to changing threats and potentialities" (Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2007b, vi). The critical side of IR grew based on two primary factors: the first is the failure of structural realism to predict détente and end of the Cold War and the second is the rise of critical theories in other subfields of political science.

As theories which challenged systems theory's ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives began to pervade the other subfields within political science, IR was also affected.[18] Though structural realism was not solely responsible for the expansion of the critical theory agenda, reactions to its rational choice assumptions and exclusive focus on states at the systemic level certainly provided added motivation for scholars like Robert Cox and Richard Ashley to articulate other understandings of world order and history. As critical theories and many problem-solving theories, most notably classical realism, have enlarged their scope in the wake of the Cold War, the structural realist conception of the international system has been heavily criticized and delegitimized.[19] While structural realism was able to account successfully for a set of interstate variables throughout the Cold War, such as the balance of power, arms racing behaviour, rational decision-making and the desire for security maximization, these were admittedly narrow in scope.

At the heart of the debate over structural realism's value in the post-Cold War era is its acceptance of rational choice theory as a means of explaining the foreign policy decisions of states. Cox notes this essential component of structural realist theory: "For structural realism, this rationality is the one appropriate response to a postulated anarchic state system. Morality is effective only to the extent that it is enforced by physical power" (Cox 1996c, 92). Supporting traditional approaches to game theory has been heavily criticized in recent years and can be seen as the primary weakness of structural realism since the fall of the bipolar international system.[20] Is a theory that incorporates rational choice elements completely irrelevant in post-Cold War international theory or is there still value in such an approach?

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[18] For more on the growth and criticisms of systems theory in political science, see David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Luigi Graziano (eds.), *The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey* (London: Routledge, 1991).

[19] It is important to note that these trends speak far more to the developments in international theory in Canada and the UK since the end of the Cold War. While structural realism has declined in its prominence in the United States, its assumptions continue to play a major role in American international relations.

[20] For more on criticisms of game theory in IR, see Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), Michael Brown, Owen Cote Jr., Sean-Lynn Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), *Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International theory: positivism and beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

While structural realism's acceptance and use of traditional game theory may be brought into question due to its ahistoricism and lack of attention to long-term thinking on the part of actors, there may still be use in rational choice thinking. The character of the international system has changed since the end of the Cold War, but one is left to wonder whether describing states as rational actors is as outdated as international theory scholars tend to proclaim (Green and Shapiro 1995b). The following section describes the traditional conception of game theory and its application to structural realist theory. Ultimately, it is argued that applying game theory to international politics is problematic, but the assumption that states are rational utility maximizers in the anarchic international system can still be useful if it is refined.

1.3 The Traditional Game of Structural Realism

Structural realists proved unable to foresee and account for the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity, and thus other theories gained in legitimacy based on their effort to distance IR from purely systemic and rational-choice concerns. Also, with the end of a system-wide bipolar conflict, which many structural realists saw as vital to maintaining a semblance of international order and stability, other concerns, like human security, the environment, underdevelopment and identity politics have been able to grow in relevance (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 53). In this climate of change, complexity and theoretical plurality, there is still a question as to whether rational choice models that aim to explain outcomes at the systemic level are relevant or useful. By examining the structural realist idea of interstate rationality and its application to international politics, it is hoped a better comprehension of why traditional rational choice models have decreased in explanatory power since the end of the Cold War will be presented.

The security climate throughout the Cold War was seen by a variety of scholars, especially structural realists, as a *security dilemma*. Security dilemmas are not a new concept by any means, but the bipolar conflict between two superpowers in the international system allowed for rational choice models of theorizing to provide useful insight into interstate decision-making processes. In his 1950 article discussing anarchy and its effects on international politics, John Herz defines the security dilemma:

> Wherever such anarchic society has existed – and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level – there has arisen what may be called the security dilemma of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on (Herz 1950, 157).

The specific dilemma which existed throughout the Cold War was focused chiefly on the tense and unfriendly relationship between the US and the USSR.[21] Following the end of World War II, these two superpowers began a fifty year standoff, primarily motivated by ideological and strategic differences. Of course, these factors paled in comparison to the main aspect which created the real dilemma, being the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons between the two largest powers in the world. From the time President Harry Truman dropped the atomic bombs on Japan to end the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the US were striving to win an arms race and supersede the military capabilities of each other. In essence, the objective for both sides was not to simply obtain more weapons, but to maximize their national security by winning the arms race; to fall behind the opposing side in relative military gains was to lose the race, thus providing the other power with the opportunity to strike first. Ironically, while both powers were dedicated to winning the race, both had little or no intention of using their enormous arsenals based on the knowledge that each side could totally annihilate the other. This is how the idea of Mutual Assured Destruction and deterrence theory kept the Cold War cold, and created the balance of power which is so central to structural realist theory (Waltz 1979, 102-128). With the fall of the USSR, however, traditional rational choice models of IR theory could not account for the events to follow.

Systems theorists in IR, like Waltz and Morton Kaplan, have described the relations between the superpowers in a bipolar international system as a *game*, and defined it by referring to economic or mathematical game theory. Game theory has been a part of social sciences research since the 1950s based on its applicability in situations where actors are forced to make strategic decisions. Its history can be traced to the 1920s, but game theory did not hit mainstream research studies until mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern published their seminal work, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*, in 1944.[22] This type of theory is based on assumptions regarding rationality and logic, and seeks to explain the motivations and outcomes of two or more actors when they are confronted with decision-making situations involving a number of other actors who must also decide which strategy to play. Frank Zagare claims: "Underlying the structure of game theory is the key assumption that players in a game are *rational* (or *utility maximizers*). As game theorists use this term, rationality simply means that a player in an interactive situation will act to bring about the most preferred of the possible outcomes, given the constraint that other players are also acting in the same way" (Zagare 1984, 7). Political science as a general field of study has employed various types of game theoretic models in its different subfields to explore the rationale behind decisions made in political outcomes like election behaviour, vote-trading behaviour, coalition formation and, more importantly for the purposes of this study, international decision-making.[23]

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[21] It is noted here that the idea of a security dilemma has always existed, but this refers specifically to the dilemma game described by Waltz and other rational choice theorists during the Cold War.

[22] It is important to note that the application of game theory to international politics was not made until after World War II had ended.

[23] For an excellent range of rational choice uses in political science, see the special edition of *Critical Review* 9:1 & 2 (1995)

It is important to note here that within IR discussions, a number of game theoretic models have been presented and it is difficult to use one model to encompass every international consideration. These models include two-person zero-sum games, two person non-zero sum games, chicken and the game which has endured throughout the recent history of IR is the model of mixed-motives games commonly known as the prisoner's dilemma.

The reason for the enduring nature of the prisoner's dilemma, which is a two person non-zero sum game (2 x 2), is its application to theories of the state in the structural realist school of IR theory. According to Steven Brams: "political philosophers at least since Hobbes have used the anarchy of a stateless society to justify the need for an enforceable social contract and the creation of government, by coercion, if necessary" (Brams 1975, 33). The condition of anarchy described by virtually all realists tells a story of non-cooperation and constant distrust, building on Hobbes' state of nature. The prisoner's dilemma is used by international game theorists to explain the security dilemma faced by states in the structural realist conception of the international system because of the constant desire for states to pursue security, power and self-interest. Thus, cooperation is typically not seen by structural realists as the primary motivation for state interaction.

The prisoner's dilemma is typically represented in the following manner:

Table 1-1:

		Suspect 2	
		Do not confess	Confess
Suspect 1	Do not confess	$(-1, -1)$	$(-10, 0)$
	Confess	$(0, -10)$	$(-5, -5)$

The dilemma presented here is explained by Zagare:

> Two suspects are taken into custody. The district attorney is convinced that they are guilty of a certain crime but does not have enough evidence to convince a jury. Consequently, he separates the suspects and tells each one that he has two choices: to either confess or not confess to the crime. The suspects are told that if both confess, neither will receive special consideration and will therefore receive a jail sentence of five years. If neither confesses, both will probably be convicted of some minor charge and have to spend one year in jail. But if one confesses and the other does not, the suspect who confesses will be set free for cooperating with the state while the suspect that does not will have the book thrown at him and receive a ten-year sentence (Zagare 1984, 51).

The similarity to international politics, according to structural realists, is based on two major factors; first, questions are raised both in this game and internationally about whether actions are rationally calculated based on individual or collective interest, with structural realists preferring the individual, or state, self-interest argument; and second,

this example does not depict a one-time game in the international sphere, but rather, each time a situation arises between states, this game replays itself and the world is doomed to witness the self-interested and distrustful nature of states always choosing the irrational outcome of noncooperation, though cooperation is clearly the optimal strategy for both players because it would provide a far more favourable outcome.

Commenting on why the prisoner's dilemma became so important for realists during the Cold War, Robert Jervis emphasizes three of its strengths:

> First, it builds upon central characteristics of international politics – anarchy, the security dilemma, and the combination of common and conflicting interests. Second, the approach is parsimonious and lends itself to deductive theorizing. Third, it seeks to bring together the study of conflict and the study of cooperation, and tries to explain a wide range of phenomena encompassing both security and political economy (Jervis 1988, 319).

These seemingly attractive qualities of the prisoner's dilemma for realists, especially those preferring the structural variant, made for a number of analyses aimed at explaining the relations between nations throughout the tense climate of the Cold War and arms races.

The prisoner's dilemma model was used most often by structural realists to describe the distrustful, arms racing, though rational, behaviours of both the USSR and US throughout the Cold War. Case studies tend to centre on situations where the two superpowers were heavily focused on the continual arms build up, and the ongoing negotiations to limit those arms as the Cold War progressed. According to Scott Plous: "Typically, the United States and the Soviet Union are cast in a 2 x 2 game with one of four outcomes possible on each trial: mutual arms reductions, US armament and Soviet reductions, Soviet armament and US reductions, or a build up of nuclear weapons on both sides...According to a prisoner's dilemma, both sides ideally prefer to arm while the other disarms" (Plous 1993, 163). Plous' description of the typical prisoner's dilemma described by international security theorists throughout the Cold War is represented in the following matrix:

Table 1-2:

		USSR	
		Disarm	*Arm*
US	*Disarm*	(3, 3)	(1, 4) [24]
	Arm	(4, 1)	(2,2)

[24] This matrix is taken from Scott Plous, "The Nuclear Arms Race: Prisoner's Dilemma or Perceptual Dilemma?" *Journal of Peace Research* 30:2 (May 1993), 164.

While the prisoner's dilemma was such a sacred structural realist explanation for interstate behaviour throughout the Cold War, its continued relevance in the contemporary climate of international politics is questionable. The world is no longer bipolar. A variety of nations are beginning to make strides in power development, international institutions are playing vital roles in the daily outcomes of international politics and non-state actors are altering the security perceptions of states. As Stephen Walt notes:

> Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the last decade (such as the nature of the post-Cold War world; the character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribution of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conflict; the future role of nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods, and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others (Walt 2000, 43).

Walt does not completely discount the value of formal methods in international relations, but does argue that much of rational choice's explanatory power has been lost since the fall of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991.

As the Cold War was coming to an end, it is easy to see why structural realist theorists like John Mearsheimer argued so vehemently in favour of a bipolar international system. This fear is perhaps best described as he claims: "I argue that the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends" (Mearsheimer 1990, 6). Structural realist security arguments rest on the relative stability of the balance of power which is best arranged in a bipolar system, hence the preference for a 2 x 2 game like the prisoner's dilemma. The end of the Cold War would, according to structural realist theory, disrupt the balance of power, create conditions of multipolarity, and remove the deterrent effect of superpower nuclear arsenals. Ironically, none of these predictions came to fruition and structural realist theory lost much of its explanatory strength and respect.

The loss of explanatory power for structural realism has also led to broader, meta-theoretical concerns regarding the use of rational choice and game theory to examine interstate behaviour. An area of criticism has been the strong case made by rational choice theorists regarding the use of formal methods. Rational choice approaches are accused of both not producing novel empirical facts and seeking to explain existing facts through their preferred framework. According to Donald Green and Ian Shapiro:

> What explains the gap between rational choice theory's formidable analytic advances and its lackluster empirical applications? Our view is that empirical progress has been retarded by what may be termed method-driven, as opposed to problem-driven, research...The method-driven proclivities of rational choice scholars may, in turn, be accounted for by their universalistic aspirations: to construct a unified, deductively based theory from which propositions about

> politics—or, indeed, all human behavior—may be derived. One of our central objections to the way in which rational choice is applied in political science concerns its proponents' drive to show that *some* variant of rational choice theory can accommodate every fact, an impulse that is not accompanied by an equally strong drive to test the proposed account against new phenomena. The rational choice approach inspires great commitment among its adherents, and too often this leads to scientific practices seemingly designed to insulate rational choice theories from untoward encounters with evidence (Green and Shapiro 1995a, 238).

Green and Shapiro's concerns regarding the use of formal methods in IR and the limitations of rational choice theory more generally are relevant based on traditional game theory's lack of explanatory power in the wake of the Cold War.

Also included in questions regarding the usefulness of rational choice theory in modern international relations is the assumption that actors are rational. Cox argues:

> neorealist theory has extended itself into such areas as game theory, in which the notion of substance at the level of human nature is presented as a rationality assumed to be common to the competing actors who appraise the stakes at issue, the alternative strategies, and the respective payoffs in a similar manner. This idea of a common rationality reinforces the nonhistorical mode of thinking. Other modes of thought are to be castigated as inapt; and there is no attempt to understand them in their own terms (Cox 1996c, 92).

To reinforce this criticism, Cox points out that structural realism's use of rational choice postulates prevent it from commenting on modern issues, like Islamic integralism. Taking this argument a step further in security discourse, rational choice models would be virtually incapable of discussing Islamic terrorism as well.

Common rationality among actors is difficult to defend when irrational behaviour occurs on a regular basis in global affairs. States will defect and sometimes embark upon foreign policy initiatives with little or no rational foresight. The American intervention in Vietnam speaks to this (Waltz 1969). This being so, two essential facts must be considered before dismissing the assumptions of rationality given to actors. First, individuals play virtually no role in affecting outcomes in the international system as it is presented by structural realists (Waltz 1979, 93-97). Asking structural realism to describe Islamic integralism, for instance, is asking more than the parameters of structural realist theory are capable of giving. Second, rational choice does not speak to the cognitive process, but rather, focuses on the presentation of choices facing rational actors. Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal argue, "the axioms and conclusions of utility theory refer only to choices. Mental calculations are never mentioned: the theory makes no reference to them" (Achen and Snidal 1989, 164). Therefore, while actors may not always act rationally, rational choice theory does not contend the decisions of states, or their cognitive processes, are entirely rational. Zagare claims:

> there is almost unanimous agreement among its practitioners that rational choice theory seeks to explain and predict a specific form of human behavior: the choices of real-world decisionmakers. This is one important reason why it is called choice theory. Game theory and other theories based on the rationality assumption are not generally viewed as theories of the cognitive process (Zagare 2000, 97).

Rational choice theory, while narrow and limiting, is able to outline the choices facing rational actors in a given framework. The structural realist conception of the international system is very much consistent with the restricted nature of traditional game theory – structural realism is ahistorical and assumes actors make decisions without considering the long-term consequences. Therefore, the same myopic tendencies which affect the usefulness of game theory are also applied to structural realism.

Due to the perceived shortcomings of traditional structural realist and game theoretical accounts in explaining the end of the Cold War, it becomes necessary to consider whether rational choice models should simply be dismissed or if there might still be significance in maintaining a semblance of the international system as conceived of by structural realists. In its failure to explain the transition from bipolarity to the contemporary unipolar international system, structural realism's reliance on game theoretical modelling was falsified. Falsification, however, does not necessarily mean a theory is entirely dead. As Imre Lakatos contends:

> Although one must point out that any verification of the n+1-th version of the programme is a refutation of the n-th version, we cannot deny that *some* defeats of the subsequent versions are always foreseen: it is the verifications which keep the programme going, recalcitrant instances notwithstanding. We may appraise research programmes, even after their elimination, for their *heuristic power*: how many new facts did they produce, how great was their capacity to explain their refutations in the course of their growth (Lakatos 1970, 137).

In the case of structural realism, while many of its postulates can be refuted, it was able to effectively describe behaviour in the Cold War international system and does still have explanatory power in the contemporary era, though its applications are admittedly limited. As a result, it can be asserted that a different approach to the structural realist system, which accounts for new contributions to its hard core assumptions, can be made rather than completely discounting its contemporary applications.

1.4 From Dilemma to Stability

In a very short period of time, rational choice and game theorists in international relations went from speaking about how the USSR and US (United States) were in a perpetual prisoner's dilemma, to being unable to account for the actions of both superpowers as the Cold War came to an end. The type of arms racing and threatening of war which dominated the years of the Cold War took on a different character once the Soviet Union collapsed. It seemed as if suddenly states' strategies were not about which superpower to

align with in the balance of power, nor were they about one side winning the superpower game. Instead, what has emerged over the last two decades is an international system where states not only need to cooperate, but appear to desire such stable interaction. Such a shift has enormous consequences for the international system originally defined by Waltz since it alters how states would assess their security, which, according to Waltz, is their primary motivation. Does the inability of structural realism to explain alterations to interstate interaction mark the limits of rational choice theory in international politics?

It is logical, based on empirical evidence and recent history, to assume that the traditional rules of the Cold War dilemma have either changed or disappeared. For instance, the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council are far more likely to dialogue amongst one another rather than allow tension between them to lead to an arms race or threat of nuclear war. Even in situations where these five powers disagree on vital political issues, such as the opposition by P5 members to the US and British invasion of Iraq or the debate over sending troops to Darfur, no nuclear or hard power threat was made by the dissenting members to urge a particular outcome. Competitive behaviour between states has not completely disappeared, of course, but the fear of nuclear or hard power actually being used has decreased since the end of the Cold War. If one is to make a claim that self-interest and security remain the primary motives for states in the international system, how is self-help in the contemporary context to be understood?

Explaining these alterations in a game theoretic sense is not simple, but if structural realism's model of international theory is to be either refined or replaced, one must address its primary contentions. Assume for a moment that, rather than choosing strategies simultaneously, as described in traditional prisoner's dilemma representations, states are able to choose their strategies sequentially. In other words, states do not have to make their decisions at the same time as others because of fear, but rather, can see what another state will do before making its own strategic decision.[25] What happens to the prisoner's dilemma if sequentially made decisions replace simultaneously-made ones?

Table 1-3:

		Suspect 2			
		(C) Regardless	(D) Regardless	C/D Tit-for-Tat	D/C Tit-for-Tat
Suspect 1	(C)	$(-1,-1)$	$(-10,0)$	$(-1,-1)$	$(-10,0)$
	(D)	$(0,-10)$	$(-5,-5)$	$(-5,-5)$	$(0,-10)$

[25] Also noted here is the concept of delayed reciprocity – this principle does not apply in neorealist versions of game theory because of their assumptions about risk and rational-choice; in games that are static, like prisoner's dilemma, states will not expect reciprocity from other states in terms of cooperation. Of course, alliances were formed throughout the Cold War, but these alliances and organizations did not solve the prisoner's dilemma because of assumptions about the inherently self-interested character of states. In terms of sequentially played games, delayed reciprocity has a greater chance at success as a solution which leads to cooperation, but due to the anarchic nature of the system, there is still no incentive keeping states from defecting.

Zagare provides this outcome matrix for sequentially played prisoner's dilemma games. In this model, Suspect 1, who is normally assumed to choose his strategy first, no longer has a *dominant* strategy. Bear in mind, in the original form of the dilemma where strategies are chosen simultaneously, the dominant strategy for each player is to defect, not cooperate, and confess. In the payoff matrix represented here, because Suspect 1 chooses first, his optimal strategy actually depends on the choice of Suspect 2. However, just because 1 and 2 choose sequentially does not automatically indicate they will choose the best strategy for them both, which is C. In fact, the rational assumption is that they will both end up defecting in the same way as in simultaneously chosen strategy because the same fears of self-interest and distrust continue to exist, thus making the solution of DD the rational choice. This situation can be referred to as a Nash's equilibrium – where the players choose a solution, in a non-cooperative game, and any unilateral departure from this solution would lead to a worse outcome. Nash's equilibrium is considered to be the traditional solution to the prisoner's dilemma, but it is questionable whether Nash's solution applies to the realm of international politics. If there has been an increase in state willingness to cooperate, the game itself may have changed. In fact, even though self-interest and distrust continue to pervade the international system due to the condition of anarchy, there is a need to revise traditional uses of game theory due to the growth in interstate cooperation and stability. The observations being made about the current operation of the system would indicate that states are cooperating and somehow adhering to rules, whether formal or *de facto* in nature. Due to these possible state actions, Nash's Equilibrium could not be the effective explanation for the contemporary international system. Brams argues that the problem with Nash's solution is that it cannot account for players who communicate, who might agree to coordinate their strategies in a certain manner, and that there could be some binding to the agreements the players make (Brams 1994, 13).

The flaws with Nash's equilibrium and traditional game theory in any IR-based game are first, the strictly myopic calculations associated with both, and second, the notion that the game just suddenly appears without any previous historical account. According to Brams, standard game theory should be questioned in its application to IR because players rarely "choose strategies simultaneously or independently of each other, as assumed in the normal or strategic form of a game that can be represented by a payoff matrix" (Brams 2000, 222). Instead, it can be better argued that, if contemporary interstate behaviour in the system is to be explained according to a rational choice model, then it may have to be refined to account for how states are interacting. The necessary refinements to game theory towards an explanation more capable of describing current systemic behaviour might be found in theory of moves.

This theory, articulated primarily by Brams, is an effort to change the rules of play for games. These new rules, according to the theory of moves, are as follows:

1. Play starts at an outcome, called the *initial state*, which is at the intersection of the row and column of a 2 x 2 matrix.

> 2. Either player can unilaterally switch its strategy, and thereby change the initial state into a new state, in the same row or column as the initial state. The player who switches is called player 1 (P1).
> 3. Player 2 (P2) can respond by unilaterally switching its strategy, thereby moving the game to a new state.
> 4. The alternating responses continue until the player (P1 or P2) whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy. When this happens, the game terminates in a *final state*, which is the *outcome* of the game (Brams 1994, 24).

Previously, prisoner's dilemma and game theory were able to explain, to some extent, the events and outcomes which occurred during the Cold War at the systemic level, but since that time, no adequate theory has been able to engage structural realism's version of the international system while being able to explain the changes to interstate interaction. It is in this context that theory of moves might apply in providing a useful, rational choice framework for evaluating certain, though not all, strategic decisions of states without becoming too reductionist in the modern context of complexity and plurality.

It must be noted that models within the theory of moves do not provide an all-encompassing method of explaining every decision by every state all of the time. The sole reason for the limited success of the prisoner's dilemma model throughout the Cold War was the bipolar nature of the international system, and therefore calculations could be reduced to 2 x 2 matrices. What Brams makes explicitly clear is that theory of moves is designed in much the same as the prisoner's dilemma, or a 2 x 2 matrix. As a result, if there is any interesting application of formal rational choice models, like theory of moves, in the international system, it would be applied to specific situations between two actors and would not try to provide a grand theory capable of explaining every interaction at the systemic level.

The theory of moves model is far more applicable to international relations than traditional game theory precisely because it is able to correct some of the inherent shortcomings of game theoretical models. Theory of moves, when applied to the international system, assumes that states all begin from an initial state; state choices are not made in a vacuum, but instead, their choices must take history and the progression of strategy into account when discussing strategic outcomes, thus correcting a major flaw in traditional game theory and its application to political science. It is essential to note that theory of moves is not being presented here as a rational choice model that is able to correct every shortcoming of game theory or of structural realism, but instead, it is argued that the assumptions in theory of moves can be of some use in describing aspects of the international system, most notably in the transitions of polarity and emergence of new great powers. Promoting one, all-encompassing theory would be a fruitless exercise. As Martin Shubik notes: "The search for a single unifying solution theory to apply to all games is akin to the search for the philosopher's stone" (Shubik 1982, 333).

The systemic model described here does adhere to the fundamental arguments made by structural realists, despite the structural realist failure to foresee or describe the end of the Cold War. A primary reason for this shortcoming is the lack of structural realist attention

to the end of conflict and the rational calculations facing actors in the wake of war. Game theory models can explain the choices facing states in a given situation, but the consequences of those choices are typically omitted. Within theory of moves, there is a specific form of game, though not the only form, that can be used to examine actors' strategic choices and decisions at the end, and during the aftermath, of any conflict where there is a clear victor and defeated party. This game is called a magnanimity game.[26] It is this game that represents an opportunity to create a new explanatory framework through which to see transitions in the international system and how these shifts affect state behaviour both within the system, and in other levels of analysis.

Conclusion

The changes to the conduct of states since the end of the Cold War have been described in a variety of ways by a number of theorists, but one thing is very clear – the status and explanatory power of structural realism have been brought into serious doubt, and rightfully so. The more current explanations provided by Waltz himself admit that bipolarity and traditional balancing behaviour may not describe accurately the character of the current system, though he does emphasize the fact that these conditions will return due to states' preference for them. In the meantime, there may still be some sort of explanation that does not totally dismiss structural realist assumptions about the influence of anarchy over the international system and the idea that states are inherently rational utility maximizers. What has become clear over the last two decades since the Cold War ended is that no theoretical lens will be capable to providing an all-encompassing explanation of international politics. With this in mind, the international system itself has not disappeared and states continually act within their self-interest. Normative progress has been made in terms of recognizing and articulating the vitality of human security worldwide, but there is still reluctance on the part of states to act on such norms. If one is to comprehend states' lack of desire for revolutionary normative promotion, structural realism and the rational nature of interaction in the system may still be relevant. Even so, there must first be attention given to why structural realism was unable to explain the end of the Cold War and how a systems-level theory can account for changes within the system itself.

This chapter introduced first, how one can conceive of the international system, and second, why the structural realist conception of that system may be limited in the wake of the Cold War. Game theory, especially the prisoner's dilemma, was useful throughout the Cold War in describing the preferences of the US and USSR and why they were able to build arms, while not going to war with one another. The bipolar arrangement of the international system was a perfect model for game theory to describe based on its 2 player nature. This explanation, however, falls considerably short in trying to determine the motivations behind modern state behaviour. With alterations to the polarity of the system, the emergence of new major powers and the growth in interstate normative discourse, structural realism cannot hope to account for a vast array of changes without

[26] Of course, theory of moves and the magnanimity game model are not without criticism. See for instance Randall Stone, "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in International Relations: The Theory of Moves," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:2 (April 2001), 216-244.

altering its underlying assumptions. Instead, it may be valuable to retain structural realism as an explanatory theory with regards to a narrowly defined international system, but in order to address the larger and more complex scope of international relations, greater attention to theoretical plurality should be provided. The structural realism conception of the international system may still have a place in contemporary international theory if its tenets are applied to the English School of international relations. Such unification may help to understand both why norms are becoming increasingly important in international politics, but also why states are unwilling to act on them in many cases. To make the case for a structural realist and English School synthesis, one must address the changes to international relations since the end of the Cold War. By examining the choices of the US and USSR at end of this conflict through a magnanimity game model, it may be possible to describe how rational choice theory remains relevant, but that systemic explanations alone are not nearly adequate in describing modern international politics.

Chapter 2: The System, the World and the End of the Cold War

The prisoner's dilemma which dominated rational choice understandings of the decisions facing the USSR and US throughout the Cold War provided a formal, and arguably accurate, method of describing state behaviour in an era dominated by anarchy, non-cooperation and distrust according to structural realist theory. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, this sort of game theoretic model fails to explain the preferences facing major powers in the contemporary international system. States continue to build arms in the name of national security and military technologies still play vital roles in how states exercise their self-interest, but the type of major power competition which characterized the tension of the Cold War has not returned. In fact, the entire bipolar nature of the international system so heavily emphasized by structural realism is simply gone. While some theorists may dismiss structural realism completely and claim its explanatory power to be dead, there may be value in retaining particular structural realist principles in comprehending the current nature of international politics at the systemic level.

One of the largest problems facing the structural realist research programme and its ability to explain contemporary international politics is its monolithic view of the state. As John Mearsheimer notes: "Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others" (Mearsheimer 2007, 72). Is the state still the primary unit of analysis in international politics? Regardless of which level of analysis a theorist may focus on, it can be said that the state must still be involved in any sort of international theorizing due to its influence over outcomes in the global arena, even if its power in contemporary international politics is perceived to be in decline (Held 2003, 478). Due to the continued centrality of states in a variety of international theories, it is clear that the idea of the state may still retain its place as the primary unit of analysis in international relations. In this light, the role of the state remains paramount, but the way structural realism conceives of the state is where change must take place in order for its theoretical postulates to have contemporary relevance.

By moving away from the Cold War descriptions of international relations and arms racing provided by game theory, a new method of theorizing may be valuable in explaining the rational choices facing states in the modern international system. The Cold War's end is an essential moment in the history of international politics, and the preferences facing both the US and USSR between 1989 and 1991 may have helped to shape the current international political environment. By shifting away from traditional uses of game theory to a model specifically used to describe political decisions called theory of moves, a description of the decisions facing the US and USSR at the end of the Cold War can be given, which may provide a novel way of explaining, through rational choice theoretical assumptions, how and why the international system altered from its uncooperative bipolar character to the cooperative behaviour of states seen today.

A magnanimity game, which is a game within the framework of theory of moves, may be useful in describing how the Cold War ended without major war breaking out between the two superpowers and witnessing the conflict sometimes predicted by game theoretic

models. The solution to a magnanimity game and the assessments made by the two players, namely the US and USSR, can provide the initial steps in broadening the scope of international theory from strictly hard power concerns to a variety of complex variables which dominate IR today. This chapter will seek to create the magnanimity game capable of describing the stable end to the Cold War and the theoretical framework for analyzing international politics in the contemporary era. The driving concern here is to introduce a theoretical model that is able to account for more than simply the systemic level, while not abandoning the continued relevance of self-interested and security maximizing states, which remain at the core of modern international relations.

2.1 The Magnanimity Game and the end of the Cold War

Moving away from traditional uses of game theory has its advantages and disadvantages. Game theory has been used in the social sciences to describe a large number of decisions and variables, with some success (Zagare 1990, 197-201). The fundamental assumptions in game theory, about the self-interested nature of players and their goals of preferred outcomes, fits best with the realist version of international theory, particularly that of structural realism. Robert Keohane claims:

> If structural Realism formed a sufficient basis for the understanding of international crises, we could fill in the entries in the matrices solely on the basis of states' positions in the international system, given our knowledge of the fact that they perform similar functions, including the need to survive as autonomous entities. Interests would indeed be defined in terms of power. This would make game theory a powerful analytic tool, which could even help us predict certain outcomes. Where the game had no unique solution (because of strategic indeterminacy), complete predictability of outcomes could not be achieved, but our expectations about the range of likely action would have been narrowed (Keohane 1986c, 175-176).

Structural realism is heavily dependent upon states making rational choices in their foreign policy strategies, thus making game theory a useful explanatory tool (Axelrod 1984). Since Waltz's initial articulations of structural realism, a variety of criticisms have been focused on many postulates of structural realist theory, especially the ahistorical nature of the theory and its assumptions regarding interstate rationality.

The ahistorical issue of structural realist theory poses a particular problem in political science research (Little 2009, 79). In his efforts to prevent against what he termed as *reductionism* in international theory, Waltz precludes some of the traditional assumptions of politics in general (Waltz 1979, 79-101). By moving away from the classical realist emphasis on human nature, philosophy and individual characteristics being projected onto the international stage, Waltz attempts to remove normativity from his theory all together. Waltz contends: "In defining international-political structures we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have. We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except

their capabilities" (Waltz 1979, 99). Waltz's micro-economic approach aims to abstract the relations of like-units away from social or normative discourse. Alexander Wendt points out that: "The kinds of ideational attributes or relationships that might constitute a *social* structure, like patterns of friendship or enmity, or institutions, are specifically excluded from [Waltz's] definition" (Wendt 1999, 16).

At its core, politics is about power, but power cannot be effectively explained without some reference to history, philosophical tradition, humanity and the progression of state behaviour (Roberson 2002, 1-3). While states may have always existed in a condition of anarchy and have been self-interested, rational, security maximizing actors, as structural realism contends, their strategies in maintaining their survival have altered from time to time. These alterations come as a result of changes in the distributional structure of the system, depending on whether or not the system is in a bipolar, multipolar or unipolar arrangement.

The lack of explanatory power experienced by structural realists as the Cold War was coming to an end proves the need to move beyond ahistorical understandings of international theory when looking at the evolution of the international system. Players in any political game must be able to take historical memory into account when making far-sighted calculations. This variable provides states with an educated method of defining and maintaining their national interests, depending on how the system is ordered at the time (Brams 1994, 3-4). It is unlikely that either superpower throughout the Cold War, or major power in the current system, would embark upon a series of decisions in a prisoner's dilemma-type game without taking long-term goals into consideration. As a result of the myopic nature of traditional game theory and its lack of attention to the concern of political power, theory of moves may be a better tool of explaining major power strategic decisions at the systemic level. As Brams argues, theory of moves: "overcomes some problems of classical game theory by providing realistic rules for dynamic play, restricting nonmyopic equilibria to those that can be reached from where play commences, and using backward induction that enables players to make far-sighted calculations" (Brams 2000, 231). In assessing the decisions made by the US and USSR at the end of the Cold War, a traditional game which adheres to the static or sequential rules of explanation would be incomplete due to the lack of explanatory power about the long-term vision of both players and the historical situation leading to the end of the conflict. In order to maintain a sense of relevance for rational, systemic thinking, a form of game is needed to not only outline the choices facing the two superpowers at the end of the Cold War, but also the long-term outcome each side desired.

In any post-dispute situation, both the victorious and defeated parties are faced with choices. These choices have serious consequences in determining the nature of the post-conflict environment and how stable or chaotic the aftermath of conflict will be. To explain these situations in terms of rational choice theory, Brams presents a form of game designed to specifically address the possible choices facing actors following a conflict. magnanimity games can be applied to virtually any post-conflict example where there are two identifiable players, such as the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871),

the end of World War II (1945), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) (Brams 1994, 79-83).

A magnanimity game is designed according to the following matrix:

Table 2-1:

		Defeated (*D*)	
		Cooperate (*C*)	Don't Cooperate (*C**)
Victor (*V*)	Don't be magnanimous (*M* *)	*I Status Quo*	*IV Rejected Status Quo*
	Be magnanimous (*M*)	*II Magnanimity*	*III Rejected Magnanimity*

In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, both players are at the *Status Quo* position; this is called their *initial state*. This starting point for games adhering to theory of moves is an essential calculation of how actors will proceed next. One of the perceived shortcomings of traditional game theory is its ahistorical and static nature; the *initial state* variables in theory of moves games are an effort to correct this problem. Theory of moves contends that players do not simply choose strategies that determine an outcome, thus responding to charges made against game theory and its self-fulfilling nature. According to Brams:

> Rationality is a concept appropriately applied to the efficiency or efficacy of the means, or instruments used, to attain desired ends. What are the costs and benefits of different means, and are people making efficacious choices to achieve their ends? Rationality does *not* concern the ends themselves, which are neither rational nor irrational. To be sure, it is an important developmental question how people come to harbor the goals that they do, but that question is not pertinent to any instrumental notion of rationality that game theory postulates (Brams 2000, 222-223).

Instead, theory of moves logic dictates that players are assumed to already be playing strategies from previous games or situations, and can receive payoffs from this state of play. Theory of moves, then, gives credence to an ongoing nature of games and how players may or may not depart from an *initial state* of a new game. Brams claims: "almost all outcomes of games that we observe have a history; the players do not start from a *tabula rasa*. My interest is in explaining strategically the progression of (temporary) states that lead to a (more permanent) outcome" (Brams 1994, 25). The starting point of the post-Cold War magnanimity game is useful in understanding how the nature of the games described by structural realism between the US and USSR can evolve from a prisoner's dilemma model to a new form of rational calculation due to the historical circumstances leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Theory of moves defines the *initial state* of a magnanimity game in the following way: "In this state, *V* is in its best position and *D* is in an inferior position – that is, there is at

least one other state that *D* would prefer" (Brams 1994, 75). According to the payoff matrix above, four key rankings about a post-conflict magnanimity game can be made:

I. Status Quo – This is the best for *V*, but inferior to Magnanimity for *D*
II. Magnanimity – Second-best for *V*, and superior to Status Quo for *D*
III. Rejected Magnanimity – Inferior for *V* and superior to Rejected Status Quo for *D*
IV. Rejected Status Quo – Inferior for *V*, and inferior to Rejected Magnanimity for *D*

When creating a magnanimity game for the end of the Cold War, these rankings and strategic choices have relevance in terms of explaining how the conflict came to a stable end without the outbreak of major war. *V* in this game would be the United States. While there is historical debate as to whether the US actually won the Cold War, or whether the USSR lost due to its internal economic and political problems, the fact remains that the US emerged victorious in terms of sacrificing nothing and remaining a stable political entity both in terms of its power capabilities and internal political order; the same cannot be said for the USSR. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Russia's economy, political system and international influence all suffered major setbacks (Millar and Wegren 2003, xvii). Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* only proved to the world that the Soviet Union's supposed superpower status was entirely dependent upon its nuclear arsenal and virtually nothing else (Freedman 2001, 199). The US, on the other hand, emerged from the Cold War as a perceived winner. Americans take great pride in the American victory and how, after fifty years of tension, the US escaped almost unscathed (Kissinger 2001, 19-20). Therefore, America, in the game proposed here, becomes *V* while the USSR becomes *D*. The *initial state* of the game is the unipolar moment of American hegemony where the new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin assumes power and chooses its system of government based on promises of Western cooperation (Ellison 2003, 79). Each side at this stage had to make rational calculations, according to systemic logic, as to how the immediate aftermath of the post-Cold War world would look. In applying this historical example, the payoff matrix would describe the strategic rankings in this way:

I. *Status Quo* – America remains hegemonic and provides no assistance or help to the former USSR. The USSR is willing to cooperate, but the US chooses supreme power over Magnanimity. While many American security analysts would have preferred this option, it would have only served to alienate a number of emergent, post-Soviet, states. Security dynamics and the balance of power would have changed, but American security would not have been guaranteed in the short or long-term.

II. *Magnanimity* – the US sacrifices its best payoff, but gains Russian cooperation and eliminates the security threat from its former rival. The US makes the rational choice to leave its optimal outcome, which is Status Quo, but gains Russian cooperation in the process, thus improving its own national security prospects. This outcome is heavily dependent upon an element of trust between the two sides but also sets an interesting precedent in terms of interstate behaviour and how nations pursue their security.

III. *Rejected Magnanimity* – the US is willing to sacrifice as to foster an element of goodwill, but Russia refuses to cooperate and conflict continues in some fashion; the traditional security dilemma still remains the primary motivation for state decision-making. While the US would likely not depart from its Status Quo position without some form of guarantee from the Russians to cooperate, this outcome would have been a major fear among US policy-makers in dedicating resources to aid in the rebuilding of the Russian state.

IV. *Rejected Status Quo* – the worst possible outcome of any magnanimity game. In this scenario, the US wants to maintain its immediate post-conflict hegemony but the USSR is unwilling to admit defeat. The possibility for nuclear war and traditional security concerns would remain highly relevant. More importantly, this outcome would have proved that the traditional use of the prisoner's dilemma model was going to continue in the post-Cold War era and that Russian officials would have been dedicated to continuing the bipolar order which dominated the world since World War II.

According to the magnanimity game matrix proposed here, the US chose to be *Magnanimous* (*M*) while the former-Soviet Union chose *Cooperation* (*C*). As a result, the post-Cold War political environment can potentially be described in terms of ranking *II* in the payoff matrix.

The outcome of this theoretical game may be an important component in explaining how the international political atmosphere was transformed from the bipolar, tense and distrustful system described by structural realism, to a more stable and cooperative one in the modern era (Rengger 1993). According to the proposed magnanimity game, by choosing *M*, the US sacrificed its opportunity to punish and dismantle Russia by assisting in democratic state-building, which culminated with the seemingly legitimate election of Boris Yeltsin (Remington 2004, 53). The former-Soviet Union cooperates in this transition by not launching nuclear war against the US when its defeat became clear and by a peaceful internal relinquishing of power by Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. As a result of American *Magnanimity* and Russian *Cooperation*, the magnanimity game is solved with a *nonmyopic equilibrium.*

Created in 1982 by Brams and Donald Wittman, the concept of nonmyopic equilibrium is designed to correct the shortcomings of applying Nash's Equilibrium to situations of IR (Brams and Wittman 1981). Nonmyopic equilibrium places no restriction on the number of moves and countermoves a player can make and assumes that the players have the rational foresight to determine the consequences of strategy choices. According to Frank Zagare: "Put another way, this new equilibrium concept is a look-ahead idea that assumes that a player will evaluate the consequences of departing from an initial outcome or status quo point, taking into account both the probable response of the other player, his own counter-response, subsequent counter-responses, and so on" (Zagare 1981, 140). In assessing the potential strategies at the end of the Cold War, it was clear that Russia could no longer continue to hold its position as a superpower.

> Because of the changes in the international power structure, the relative power-political position of the Soviet Union declined during the 1980s. The state was economically weak and could not afford a new arms race against the West. This led to the new thinking which was a way to reform the economic basis of the communist economies and seek accommodation with the West. By accepting Western values, the Soviet leaders tried to seek new alliances among the rich Western powers in order to break the alliance and mend the rapidly deteriorating economy. All this aimed at preserving the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower. We now know that the Soviet Union did not succeed in this, but by showing its weakness it paved the way for the revolutions in Eastern Europe (Forsberg 1999, 608).

History clearly shows that a variety of internal and external factors led to the Soviet Union collapsing, leaving structural realism and other power-based theories scrambling to provide an explanation for what was occurring (Lebow 1994). The model of the prisoner's dilemma could not describe why Soviet leaders would embark upon a campaign of reform or why they would open dialogue with the West, nor could they foresee the complete dismantling of the USSR shortly thereafter. Once the Soviet empire was dead, it became abundantly clear that structural realist theory was unable to account for what was to come next.

The magnanimity game described above provides a possible way of identifying the rational calculations at the systemic level facing both sides at the end of the conflict. Major war did not break out between these two superpowers; nuclear weapons were not deployed or threatened; and the divide between East and West began to ease. All of these factors serve to demonstrate that option *II* in the magnanimity game payoff matrix can possibly account for the rational choices made by both sides at the end of the Cold War. With the magnanimity game ending in a nonmyopic equilibrium which sees the US being magnanimous and Russia cooperating, one is left to wonder what comes next for rational choice explanations of the international system in the wake of the Cold War.

The structural realist conception of an international system dominated by self-interested states has not entirely disappeared, but the predictions of structural realism did not come to fruition. Even so, it is difficult to reject Waltzian logic completely. As Waltz argues:

> Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system... Both changes of weaponry and changes of polarity were big ones with ramifications that spread through the system, yet they did not transform it. If the system were transformed, international politics would no longer be international politics, and the past would no longer serve as a guide to the future (Waltz 2000, 5-6).

According to Waltz, the end of the Cold War did see changes within the system, but there were no fundamental alterations to the system itself. With this in mind, assumptions regarding the rationality of actors may still hold explanatory power.

If one accepts the logic of the magnanimity game, the outcome of nonmyopic equilibrium may have set a precedent for interstate behaviour. In a time of extreme uncertainty, two superpowers made rational choices to act in a cooperative manner which would allow for conflict to be averted and stability to prevail. Each side could have taken some advantage of the situation and attacked the other; this was not, however, the case. More broadly, other major powers did not seek to make any territorial or military gains in this time either, and allowed for a secure transition from communist to democratic Russia (Remington 2004, 53). In essence, states saw the death of the bipolar-dominated balance of power and chose to pursue a new symmetry among each other, dependent upon dialogue, cooperation and a set of undefined but *de facto* rules. The end of the Cold War was not just the end of the USSR, but was also the end of structural realist explanatory power.

Understanding states, especially major powers, since the end of the Cold War is not nearly as simple as structural realism once proposed. To say that states are self-interested and rational actors continues to be the primary method of describing state motives for action in the international system, but how states are pursuing their goals has changed. Waltz accepts that changes in the system may translate into shifts in how states pursue their interests. "Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system" (Waltz 2000, 5). Though Waltz would disagree, it is evident that the hard-power military capabilities of states are less important than they were during the Cold War and states are no longer entering into arms races or alliances to make relative gains over their perceived enemies (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 22-23). In the contemporary era, a more complex and comprehensive method of studying interstate behaviour is required, which is able to account for the self-help actions of states in an anarchic system, but that can also describe how major powers have been pursuing their self-interest since the end of the Cold War. It is in this context that the pluralist account of the English School of international relations may have significance.

2.2 The Levels of Interstate Behaviour in the Modern Era

Thus far, there has been an effort to demonstrate that the structural realist conception of the Cold War international system is only partially relevant in explaining modern international outcomes. Empirical evidence of state action, especially their willingness to cooperate and participate in international institutions, brings the structural realist thesis of states assessing foreign policy decisions according to the traditional game theoretic model of prisoner's dilemma into doubt. In order to examine modern interstate decision-making at the systemic level, a magnanimity game within the overarching theory of moves has shown that the prisoner's dilemma assumptions which dominated US and Soviet actions throughout the Cold War are no longer useful in explaining state action. Instead, it can be argued that both sides saw it in their direct interest to work with one

another in order to prevent the outbreak of nuclear or major war. With such a stable outcome and transition away from bipolarity, the major powers in the contemporary international realm could use the examples set by the US and Russia in the wake of the Cold War as a precedent in their own actions by seeing the rational benefits of a more cooperative foreign policy strategy. The prisoner's dilemma game which structural realists used to explain Cold War tension and arms construction has since been made irrelevant. Of course, the fundamental character of states and the anarchic nature of the system remain in place but the structural realist account of these elements no longer provides an accurate description of how states assess their decisions. The nonmyopic equilibrium solution to the magnanimity game examining the end of the Cold War would have a profound and lasting effect on the conduct of interstate politics. What is essential in this context is providing a framework in which the rational choice models of state behaviour in the international system are maintained, but which can also account for the changes to state action since 1991.

Most theories which examine the global arena focus on either one, or a small number of, issues or units of analysis to make their case about the nature or character of the global realm. As discussed previously, this work maintains the state as the primary actors in international politics today. While some theorists may desire alterations or a decline in the power of the state, states have not declined so far as to be removed from their place as the central actors in international relations. Even those efforts which aim at changing politics above the state level to focus more on humanity, rather than purely state concerns, often rely on states to implement new doctrines (Linklater 2007, 148). The changes to interstate relations and the new issues facing the world at present require new ways of approaching international relations, while not abandoning rational preferences completely. One often overlooked theoretical lens which could allow for the type of theorizing required to encompass a more accurate evaluation of contemporary international relations is referred to as the English School.[1]

Succinctly, the English School, or society of states approach of IR, is a three-fold method to understanding how the world operates. In its original articulations, the English School was designed to incorporate the two major theories which were trying to explain international outcomes, namely realism and liberalism (Roberson 2002, 3). In order to come to a better, more complete, understanding of IR, English School theorists sought to answer an essential question: "How is one to incorporate the co-operative aspect of international relations into the realist conception of the conflictual nature of the international system" (Roberson 2002, 2). According to English School logic, there are three distinct spheres at play in international politics, and these three elements are always operating simultaneously. They are first, the international system; second, international society; and third, world society. Barry Buzan provides an explanation into each sphere:

> 1. International System (Hobbes/Machiavelli) is about power politics amongst states, and Realism puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the

[1] For a comprehensive introduction to, and historical account of, the English School, see Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 1998).

> centre of IR theory. This position is broadly parallel to mainstream realism and structural realism and is thus well developed and clearly understood.
>
> 2. International Society (Grotius) is about the institutionalization of shared interest and identity amongst states, and Rationalism puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory. This position has some parallels to regime theory, but is much deeper, having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications. International society has been the main focus of English School thinking, and the concept is quite well developed and relatively clear.
>
> 3. World society (Kant) takes individuals, non-state organizations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and Revolutionism puts transcendence of the state system at the centre of IR theory. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism. It could include communism, but as Wæver notes, these days it is usually taken to mean liberalism. This position has some parallels to transnationalism, but carries a much more foundational link to normative political theory. It is the least well developed of the English School concepts, and has not yet been clearly or systematically articulated (Buzan 2001, 474).

The English School incorporates realist postulates, such as an emphasis on the primacy of states interacting in an anarchic system, but combines that realist understanding with the notion of a human element emerging from the domestic sphere. Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell claim that "international relations cannot be understood simply in terms of anarchy or a Hobbesian state of war" (Alderson and Hurrell 2000a, 4). The most important element of the English School, international society, therefore operates as it does based on the influence of both the international system (realism) and world society (revolutionism) (Little 2002, 59-60).

Within the English School itself, there are two distinct divisions, which interpret the conduct and goals of international society very differently. The first is the *pluralist* account, which adheres to a more traditional conception of IR by placing its emphasis on a more Hobbesian or realist understanding of the field. Pluralists, according to Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, stress the conduct of states within anarchy, but are still sure to note that states cooperate, despite the existence of self-interest. "A pluralist framework places constraints on violence, but it does not outlaw the use of force and is, in any case, powerless to eradicate it…War is not only an instrument of realist foreign policy but is also a crucial mechanism for resisting challenges to the balance of power and violent assaults on international society" (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 131). The pluralist version of international society is founded upon minimalist rules, the protection of national sovereignty, and the quest to create and maintain international order (Dunne 2007, 137). The constraints imposed on international society by the system of states and the condition of anarchy are thought to be the most important factors in explaining and understanding the conduct of a pluralist society of states, and such a close relationship to

realist theory is what keeps the pluralist conception of the English School within a traditional IR framework.

The second interpretation of international society is referred to as the *solidarist* account. Solidarist conceptions of international society are interpreted in various ways, and can incorporate a variety of IR theories. Solidarists typically place their emphasis upon the relationship between the world society, or third level, and international society (Hurrell 2002, 26). In its earliest articulations, solidarism focused predominantly on Kantian or liberal understandings of IR, since the primary focus was on how the individual within the state affected the conduct of the society of states (Wæver 1992, 98). This allowed for notions such as human rights, individual security, and peace to permeate the normative foundations of the international society.

Over time and since the end of the Cold War, the solidarist account of international society has also been used and interpreted by critical theorists, who want to maintain the state in their theory, but find a way to include critical, global or human concerns. Barry Buzan argues:

> This view stresses global patterns of interaction and communication, and, in sympathy with much of the literature on globalization, uses the term society mainly to distance itself from state-centric models of IR…[world society] is aimed at capturing the total interplay amongst states, non-state actors and individuals, while carrying the sense that all the actors in the system are conscious of their interconnectedness and share some important values (Buzan 2004, 64).

The focus on individuals, norms, values and even discourse have come to provide a forum for liberal and critical projects in IR to use the English School as a method of both explaining and understanding the world from a perspective which does stray from realism, but does not reject the primacy or necessity of the state in global affairs.

What makes the world society element of the English School so attractive to some critical scholars? According to Roger Epp, there are three main components of the English School which have allowed for critical scholars to take notice of the solidarist version of international society. He claims:

> The first is a strong interest in the Third World, in decolonization and its consequences…The second is an understanding of international relations that is less about structure or what Wight called mechanics than it is about the diffuse, imprecise domain of culture…The third and most elemental characteristic is an interpretive orientation that bears strong resemblances to the practical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics (Epp 1998, 49).

These three elements allow for various critical scholars, concerned with both critical and state-driven elements of IR, to provide explanations of international politics which are consistent with a research programme founded upon the centrality of the state.

Like any theory, the English School approach is not without its own problems and shortcomings, of course. In her assessment of the English School, Martha Finnemore sees the problem with the approach as being too open to pluralism and normative concerns. In other words, Finnemore sees the English School as not being *American* enough due to its lack of clear, methodological boundaries. She claims: "Americans are fond of asking what the value added is of a theoretical approach: providing a strong demonstration of this for the English School would be powerful for that audience" (Finnemore 2001, 513). Finnemore recognizes the value of the international society approach to IR, but argues that it does not adhere to the rules and rigidity of the social sciences, and is too pluralistic, normative and historical in nature. It is these concerns, she argues, that make constructivism a more popular middle-approach to IR, and that prevent the English School from entering the mainstream of American international theory.

Such criticism, stemming from the ontological and epistemological differences between American and British IR, is also touched on by American IR scholar Dale Copeland.[2] He argues the English School of IR has two major problems. These are:

> its lack of clarity as a putative theory of international politics. For American social scientists, it is difficult to figure out what exactly the School is trying to explain, what its causal logic is, or how one would go about measuring its core independent (causal) variable, international society [and]…the idea that international societies of shared rules and norms play a significant role in pushing states towards greater cooperation than one would expect from examining realist theories alone (Copeland 2003, 427).

Copeland's second criticism comes as no surprise, as realists would deny the English School's emphasis that norms might play a major role in shaping state action. The first charge that Copeland makes, however, is of primary interest. He asserts that the English School does not display the traits of an American theory of IR; it is not methodologically firm in its approach, and thus is interpreted as being unclear as a theory. While Copeland and Finnemore would prefer more methodological rigor and Americanized method, the fact that the English School does not traditionally adhere to the structural elements of US social science is what encourages various theorists from all backgrounds to use the approach. As Richard Little contends, "methodological pluralism is inherent in the [English School's] theoretical approach and follows from the commitment to a multidimensional theoretical framework as well as a multifaceted theory of history. As a result, ES theory generates, arguably, the most ambitious and far-reaching research agenda that can be identified at this time in IR" (Little 2009, 79). While the criticisms of American scholars like Finnemore and Copeland are noted, one must wonder what a closed English School framework might look like.[3]

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[2] For more on the differences between British and American social sciences, see Benjamin Cohen, "The transatlantic divide: Why are American and British IPE so different? *Review of International Political Economy* 14:2 (2007), 197-219.

[3] For an in-depth discussion of English School methods, see Cornelia Navari (ed.), *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009).

There is a benefit to the English School approach to international relations, and recently, scholars from various areas of the world and which represent diverse theoretical allegiances have begun to revive the work started by Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and others.[4] A large advantage to a middle-approach like the English School is that on one level, it does incorporate the realist elements of IR with an emphasis on the state. On another level, however, the world society element of English School theory is able to allow for a wide array of theorists to discuss various critical elements and their effects on the society of states. Whether these come in the form of emancipation theory, globalization theory, neo or postcolonial theory and even some postmodern thinking, the critical thinkers who choose to adopt an English School method are forced to ground their work in some understanding of the state (Bleiker 2005, 188). Making sure that any contemporary efforts to examine the international arena maintain traditional elements is an essential component of modern IR. Robert Jackson highlights this point as he states:

> Contemporary international relations theory tends to be a mixed bag of unrelated approaches which usually are not in dialogue. I would borrow less from unrelated disciplines and make better use of the abundant traditional resources which are available for theorizing contemporary problems of international relations seeking thereby to add to our accumulated historical stock of knowledge (Jackson 1996, 216).

As a result of such a pluralistic model, the English School can be said to represent a coherent and advantageous method in achieving a broad and complex understanding of modern international political issues. It achieves this goal by first, remaining consistent with the argument that the society and system are dominated by states; second, it allows for theories of rules, cooperation and order to be discussed without having to delegitimize state self-interest which are vital calculations in the international environment; third, the world society level of the method gives credence, but not sole importance, to the more liberal or critical variants of world politics.

2.21 The International System

As noted in the previous chapter, realist theory is dedicated to describing the importance of the systemic level of international politics. Domestic-level variables, norms and other factors tend not to play central roles in describing how the world in general operates according to structural realists, but in terms of describing interstate conflict or cooperation, all one must do is focus their attention on the international system. As Waltz emphasizes:

> States are the units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems. They will long remain so. The death rate among states is remarkably low. Few states die; many firms do. Who is likely to be around 100 years from

[4] For a comprehensive bibliography of English School sources, see "The English School of International Relations Theory," http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/research/international-relations-security/english-school/ (accessed Jan. 22, 2010).

> now – the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Thailand, and Uganda? Or Ford, IBM, Shell, Unilever, and Massey-Ferguson? I would bet on the states, perhaps even on Uganda (Waltz 1979, 95).

Ironically enough, the Soviet Union did die, and Waltz was unable to foresee this fall, but his greater point remains relevant in today's world when discussing the dynamics of international politics. States still have a monopoly over the use of force and hard, military power (Mearsheimer 2001, 360-402). While other theoretical variables that Waltz identifies as reductionist may be increasing in importance, it is questionable that they have an ability to influence outcomes the way hard power does in the international system. Conflicts in the contemporary era are not solely focused on military concerns as they once tended to be, but those sorts of hard power disputes appear to be the only ones able to affect the character and nature of the international system.

The international system itself, in terms of the primary units of analysis and structure, has not changed since the end of the Cold War. There is still no overarching governing force and states are mostly able to do what they want, when they want. The typical comparison of the structure of the international system is to the state of nature described by social contract theorists, like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. For instance, Hobbes argues:

> Hereby it in manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as if of every man, against every man. For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known...So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is Peace (Hobbes 1985, 185-186).

When describing the international system as a state of nature, the comparison is made primarily to indicate a structure in which there is no governing body which compels units, whether they be people or states, to cooperate with one another. As in the Hobbesian account of humans in the state of nature, states are considered to be inherently self-interested; they rationally calculate the costs and benefits of every decision before making it, and no course of action is taken unless the state is certain it will somehow benefit in the short, and sometimes long, term (Waltz 1959, 159-186). Barry Buzan describes the systemic-level of analysis within the English School, as he states: "Anarchy falls within the structural component of the system. It tells us how the parts, or units are ordered, how they stand in relation to each other. All it tells us about the units themselves is that there are at least two of them, and that they recognize no overarching government" (Buzan 1991, 150). The systemic component of the English School is simply an examination of the units, being states in this case, and the nature of their interaction in a condition of anarchy, which is understood simply as an absence of authority. As a result of the structure of the international system as anarchic, interstate conflict has mostly been a consequence of unrestrained actors trying to attain their best interests (Art and Jervis 1973).

An important point to note is how the English School has typically defined the international system. Early writers in the school's history, like Wight and Bull, preferred a classical realist conception of the international system, as opposed to the rational choice model proposed by Waltz and structural realists. Tim Dunne rightly notes the vital distinction between the international system and international society as a pillar of the English School. It is also worth noting that the confusion surrounding the distinction between system and society was complicated by Wight's usage of the term *international system* when he was actually referring to what is now known as *international society* (Buzan 1993, 331). This separation, whose clarification Dunne attributes to Bull, is meant to demonstrate the intent of international society distinguished it from the system. Dunne claims that Bull's

> notion of an international system constituted by purposeless interaction among states contrasts with Bull's interpretation of international society as a union or association for regulating the relations of states in the absence of a common superior. The distinguishing feature of a society of states was the element of consciousness on the part of agents to maintain order. In this sense, a society presupposed a system of interaction parts (Dunne 1998, 126).

In terms of the structural realist conception of the international system, Bull had objections to a formal systems approach. Among his objections was the notion that the system presupposed the society of states and that the units in the system had a specific purpose. According to Dunne, Bull "berated systems thinking in general for presupposing that the survival of the system is the goal of the units, and for blurring descriptions of the system and justifications of the system" (Dunne 1998, 127). Even so, both Bull and another early English School scholar, Adam Watson, could not completely dismiss the relevance of systems thinking, but argued such theory needed to be approached far more critically (Dunne 1998, 127).

Despite Bull's clear problem with systems theory like that of Waltz, Barry Buzan recognizes the value in relating the structural realist model of the system to English School thought. Buzan notes the confusion in English School theory over when an international society comes into being. In order to address this problem, he argues: "The easiest way to construct an abstract developmental model of international society is to imagine an anarchic international system before any societal development takes place: pure system, no society. For such a system to exist, by definition there is significant interaction among the units: they have become sufficiently numerous and powerful that their activities regularly cross paths" (Buzan 1993, 341).

The presupposition of an anarchic system out of which societies of states emerge is a radical shift away from the earlier works of English School scholars. Buzan's effort to demonstrate how international societies are created is one step in filling the gaps outlined by American scholars like Finnemore and Copeland. According to Buzan, the link between the English School and structural realism "rescues the English School from the stagnation of its historical cul-de-sac by giving the concept of international society a much firmer claim to theoretical status. For structural realism it opens useful connective

channels to both history and liberal theory that are compatible with existing structural realist analysis" (Buzan 1993, 352). While Buzan is successful in relating structural realist thought to the English School, he does omit one vital element in his analysis – the assumption that the units in a structural realist system are rational actors. Such an omission does not preclude the link between structural realism and English School thought, but instead, there needs to be a method in which rational choice models can relate to English School theory. Such an effort may be achieved in demonstrating how magnanimity game models can explain the shifts from one international society to another based on the changes of strategy on the part of major powers in the international system at the end of a major conflict.

While the anarchic character of the system remains constant to this day, the actions of states as described by structural realism in this condition may not be entirely correct. Since the end of the Cold War, states are no longer trying to overcome one another in an effort to exercise hard power over other states. After witnessing the successful and stable end of the Cold War and transition out of bipolarity, major and minor powers alike have altered their foreign policy strategies to be less eager to threaten or actually use hard power over fellow states (Mueller 2006, 64-79). The nonmyopic equilibrium solution to the Cold War magnanimity game explains that, if states rationally calculate their self-interest over the long-term, they would see that their self-interest is best served by avoiding military conflict and using other means to achieve their goals. States now exist in a condition of relative equilibrium, where the preservation of a stable, orderly system is the most important motivating factor in calculating state strategy.

> Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image of international relations is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us (Waltz 1959, 238).

What is important to note in Waltz's contentions about the anarchic system is that states do pursue their own interests, but they do so in ways they see as rationally beneficial. Up to this point in history, realists have argued that war and hard power conflict have been the most effective way of achieving goals for states. This may no longer be the case, if it ever was the case at all. Force remains a last resort option for states and its use has not completely disappeared from the daily conduct of foreign policy. Its application, though, is not nearly as prevalent as it once was in the international system.[5]

The order of the system has altered since the fall of the Soviet Union, which has affected how states evaluate their foreign policy strategies. Rather than embarking upon bipolar balancing, bandwagoning or strategies of one-upmanship, states currently exist in a system defined by relative equilibrium. What is essential to note in any discussions of international equilibrium is that the version being discussed here differs from that of

[5] For a contemporary analysis of the decline in major war and threats of hard power, see Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates* (London: Routledge, 2006).

theorists who have previously tried to apply such a concept to IR on a systemic scale. For instance, perhaps the most famous name associated with conceptions of international equilibrium and security study is George Liska. Liska's writings throughout the Cold War sought to provide a reformed analysis of balance of power theory by arguing: "My central concept is that of *institutional equilibrium*, applied primarily to international organization with respect to its structure, the commitment of its members, and its functional and geographic scope" (Liska 1957, 13). The equilibrium theory presented in Liska's work does build on the foundations of game theory, but its approach is intended more as a means to discuss foreign policy and institutional decisions, and attempts to reform realist theory towards a more holistic approach, rather than discussing the possibility of equilibrium as an outcome of a specifically designed international game. Equilibrium theory is also very popular in discussions of international trade. Writers like Jacob Mosak, Takashi Negishi, Giovanni Caravale and others have attempted to use equilibrium theory in their discussions about how rational-choice models apply to trade dynamics or economic negotiation.[6]

Throughout the Cold War, the system was described as bipolar. This systemic ordering is said, by structural realism, to have a greater ability to correct itself and prevent wide-scale conflict because the two prevailing actors are more prone to make rationally-calculated decisions which uphold their positions in the system. "In a world in which two states united in their mutual antagonism far overshadow any other, the incentives to a calculated response stand out most clearly, and the sanctions against irresponsible behaviour achieve their greatest force" (Waltz 1979, 172-173). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the order of the system has changed twice, with the US first emerging as a systemic hegemon based on the defeat of the USSR. In this moment, which lasted throughout the 1990s, the US was able to dominate most of the global agenda in terms of encouraging expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in its own image, securing support from the United Nations (UN) for the First Gulf War to expel Iraq from Kuwait and extending its sphere of influence across the globe with virtually no resistance (Layne 2006). In the wake of 9/11, the intervention into Afghanistan and the illegitimate invasion of Iraq in 2003, combined with the economic crisis which started in late 2008, the moment of American hegemony is coming to an end (Clark 2009, 23). The drastic decline in US hard power capabilities has allowed for a system which is more multipolar in character to emerge. As Stephen Walt argues: "From the perspective of classical balance-of-power theory, this situation seems anomalous. Power in the international system is about as unbalanced as it has ever been, yet balancing tendencies have been comparatively mild" (Walt 2005, 123).

If there is a decline in balancing behaviour in a multipolar international system, then clearly structural realist theory has, again, fallen short. Some realist theorists, like Walt, attempt to argue that states are now balancing more against threat than power or that balancing behaviour centres more on soft power than traditional hard power concerns

[6] See for instance Jacob Mosak, *General-Equilibrium Theory in International Trade* (Bloomington: The Principia Press, 1944), Takashi Negishi, *General Equilibrium Theory and International Trade* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1972) and Giovanni Caravale, *Equilibrium and Economic Theory* (London: Routledge, 1997).

(Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann 2004). In this era of uncertainty in terms of systemic ordering, one may refer to the condition of states as existing in equilibrium. Rather than trying to win the game as previously described by the prisoner's dilemma and rational choice theorists throughout the Cold War, states appear far more willing to sacrifice their optimal strategy in order to maintain a cooperative system. Situations of extreme international tension, like the constant threat to Israel by neighbouring states, Russian relations with NATO as it expands, non-intervention by major powers in a wide array of intrastate conflicts and the increase in socialist regimes in Latin America without US interference only serve to prove that nations are not as willing to exercise their hard power as they once were (van Creveld 2006, 97-112). In order to explain why this has become the case, one may look to what happens within the state. According to English School theory, the domestic-level variables of global politics are included in what is called *world society*. Seeing factors within the state and their impact over global politics is an important element in any study, but it is also essential to question whether such issues have any large scale effect over state actions in the international system.

2.22 World Society

The structural realist emphasis on the systemic level of analysis has been met with opposition from theories which prefer to examine different variables in global politics. These theories can focus on domestic preferences or ideologies within states, the ideational or normative elements of individuals, the economic system, either internationally or nationally, discursive presentations of various political issues globally, the need for emancipating a dominated humanity or the effects of globalization on world citizens. In most of these approaches to examining international or world politics, the systemic level is a component typically omitted, criticized or refined (Hay 2007, 269). For the purposes of the English School, the world society level of the threefold methodological dichotomy represents the arguments about IR that do not adhere to realist models of examination and discuss what occurs within states.

Primary articulations of world society began with liberal theories of IR. This level does not rely upon the state for its ontological grounding, nor does it necessarily have to focus entirely on humanity. Hedley Bull defines world society in the following manner: "By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built" (Bull 2002, 269). As noted above, the world society aspect of Wight's three-fold approach began with Kantian ideas of world politics and has since become a major focal point of the English School's re-emergence in the 1990s based on its attractiveness to critical and solidarist scholars. Buzan claims: "Using English School theory to address globalization does not offer the predictive oversimplifications of structural realism and neoliberalism. But by opening the way to a wider historical interpretation, it does offer an escape from the Westphalian straitjacket" (Buzan 2004, 4).

In the present context of international politics, those focusing exclusively on world society variables are able to understand more factors within states or transnational forces

in an era of globalization, but these ideas are not entirely helpful when discussing outcomes in the international system. One of the tendencies in the current uses of the English School is the new-found preference for world society examinations by liberal and critical scholars. This point is highlighted by Buzan as he states: "Much hangs on which reading of English School theory one wants to pursue" (Buzan 2004, 23). The solidarist accounts of world society have begun to dominate modern English School theory. In doing so, accounts of international society tend to favour approaches which seek to study the relationship between the domestic-level and the society of states. The place of the international system has been brought into question by the lack of work being done on the link between the international system and international society.

Issues studied in the world society-level tend to focus more on concerns surrounding the individual or humanity. Issues like human rights, human security, global citizenship and non-state forces all play prominent roles in this level. In terms of how the cosmopolitan emphasis of world society impacts state decision-making, Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne argue "the vision of good international citizenship brings together domestic politics and foreign policy, since the latter springs from the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance" (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 856). The solidarist camp within the English School focuses on how domestic variables impact international society and how states should be compelled to place more of an emphasis on an international order dedicated to the rights of individuals, rather than realist self-interest (Wheeler 1992, 463-487). There is, of course, no denying that interstate relations affect individuals across the world, but the impact of those individuals over state calculations of self-interest are not made entirely clear by solidarist scholars.

A major theoretical shortcoming in making use of the English School in contemporary international theory has been the association made between how world society affects the international system. While Buzan would contend that each of the three levels of the English School affect each other constantly, the relationship between individuals and the system has not been made entirely evident by solidarist or world society scholars. World society may have an effect on international society, being the second level and which will be covered at greater length in the next chapter, but just how it affects the international system is not wholly clear. A major reason for this has to do with the ambiguity of what world society is. As Barry Buzan points out "present usage of world society covers so many meanings as to sow more confusion than clarity, and this weakens the structural potential of English school theory" (Buzan 2004, 269-270). Due to the vagueness of world society, this level will play a minor role in establishing the theoretical framework presented in this thesis. Instead, it will be the relationship between the international system and international society that founds the basis for this project.

Conclusion

With the Cold War ending in such a stable manner, it is difficult to argue that the conduct of states in the international arena has not changed. Up to this point in IR theory, however, rational choice explanations have fallen short in their efforts to provide a method of comprehending the actions of both the US and USSR at the end of the fifty-

year long conflict. While theory of moves is not entirely popular among traditional game theorists and rational choice scholars, it does provide a novel way of examining the choices facing both sides at the end of the Cold War and how the solution to that magnanimity game could have lasting effects over the international system to this day. Trying to argue that structural realism's reliance on purely prisoner's dilemma thinking still has applicability in the modern era may not be totally false, but this is no longer a framework whose explanatory power is able to apply to constant, wide-scale interstate interaction.

This chapter has made an effort to introduce a new explanation to an ongoing debate surrounding the end of the Cold War, and the role of rational choice theory in that argument. The assumptions about the motives and rational calculations of states remain much the same as realists have always asserted, but the contribution made here surrounds the willingness of both major powers to sacrifice their own optimal outcome to foster a spirit of post-Cold War cooperation. While the magnanimity game designed here, and its outcome of nonmyopic equilibrium, may be of interest, the influence of this game and its solution should be of even larger concern for international theorists. The challenge, perhaps, in describing interstate behaviour since 1991 has been the unwillingness of scholars to look beyond one theoretical lens in their efforts to depict the international political environment in the contemporary era.

What has been made clear thus far in this study is the constant emphasis by international theorists regarding the complexity of modern international relations and the wide array of theories trying to explain and understand variables on a global scale. In this light, the English School of IR appears to be an overlooked, yet extremely valuable tool in acknowledging this plurality and complexity. The English School idea of an international system relies entirely on realist explanations of IR, and this study makes use of the version of the international system presented by structural realist scholars like Waltz. Doing so means that self-interest, security maximization and anarchy remain the chief elements which comprise the systemic level of examination.

The international system and world society levels of English School method are vital to understanding how politics above and within states function, but do not represent the most important area of assessment in the current geopolitical setting. Tim Dunne reinforces this point: "The systemic lens shows not only the ordering of the units; it also directs our attention to the levels of technology, the distribution of material power, and the interaction capacity of the units...[world society] refers to the shared interests and values linking all parts of the human community" (Dunne 2007, 140). Both the international system and world society are made important in English School thought because of their relationship with the middle-level of consideration, being international society, which has always been at the heart of English School theory. It is in the society of states that the true effects of the proposed magnanimity game can be found and how the best understanding of international relations in the modern era can take place. The next chapter will be dedicated to the formation, conduct and impact of modern international society and how the nonmyopic equilibrium of the magnanimity game has affected international politics more generally.

Chapter 3: The Development of International Society

The idea that an international society exists is the pillar of English School theory in international relations. Early English School proponents sought to explain how and why states cooperated, despite the constraints of anarchy and self-help tendencies displayed by nations in the international system. Writers like Wight, Butterfield and Bull initially tried to create a way to understand IR by giving credence to history, realist theory and liberal notions of international politics through a rationalist lens (Dunne 1998, 8). While constructivism seems to dominate the supposed middle-ground of international theory today, the English School was the first to make such an effort. While the realist emphasis on the international system and the liberal or critical preference for world society are important considerations in any effort to explain the conduct of states, the international society level, being the second or middle level of analysis, remains the crucial aspect of English School thought.

International relations cannot be explained or understood by relying upon accounts of the international system or world society alone; as argued previously, the preference for one theoretical outlook in IR is too myopic and narrow to be of much use in an era of complexity and theoretical plurality. International politics cannot be understood as strictly focused on military capabilities, as structural realism might argue, nor can it be reduced to concerns like human rights, human security and domestically-focused issues as liberal and critical theories contend. The international society element of the English School is designed to incorporate realist, liberal and critical elements into one level of analysis which can be viewed as either greatly beneficial, or too generalized to be of any use. Accounts of what international society is, and how it operates, have varied across ideological and historical perspectives. As David Mapel and Terry Nardin claim: "international society is still an abstraction that lies at some distance from the gritty particulars of international history and current worries about the prospects for peace, justice, and the rule of law in a world divided not only into states but also by economic and cultural differences" (Mapel and Nardin 1998, 3). Versions of international society presented by early English School scholars differ greatly, in some cases, to those who might use the approach today. This project does not pretend to create a notion of international society which can fill every theoretical gap or appeal to every theorist across the ideological spectrum. In fact, it is likely that the more methodologically rigorous and closed version of the English School proposed here will earn the wrath of scholars from a variety of theoretical allegiances.[1] This being the case, the English School has been heavily criticized for its lack of rigour and its willingness to accommodate anyone and everyone, regardless of their intention, ontological or epistemological assumptions and their method of theorizing. Martha Finnemore's poignant discussion of the English School's lack of direction and clear method only serves to highlight the problems that have existed with this approach since its inception (Finnemore 2001).

English School scholars tend to avoid methodological debates because these are seen as internal and distracting to the greater mission of international theory, according to the

[1] This derives primarily from the vast accounts of the English School that praise its methodological openness.

School's logic. According to English School proponents, the purpose of international theory is to understand and find patterns in history by discussing the values and institutions in a variety of historical generations. Tim Dunne discusses this point:

> By seeking to clarify the concepts which reveal patterns in world history, the English school is working with a very different notion of theory to that which is found in the dominant American approaches. Rather than operationalizing concepts and formulating testable hypotheses, the emphasis upon contending concepts is driven by a search for defining properties which mark the boundaries of different historical and normative orders (Dunne 2007, 134).

The intention of this thesis is not to deny the traditional efforts of English School theory, but instead to examine the relationship between the structural realist conception of the international system and international society, a relationship that has been somewhat ignored or devalued by recent English School scholarship (Little 2005, 47). Of course, in doing so, it is noted that structural realism makes use of formal methods of theoretical evaluation, which are typically avoided by English School scholars. The English School has contemporary relevance in explaining international politics, but the approach may benefit from American social science methods of theory construction and evaluation if it hopes to perforate the mainstream of international theory.

This chapter will seek to provide insight into the most important element of English School theory, namely international society. The society of states has always been a component of comprehending interstate cooperation, but its ability to provide states with a forum for discussion and diplomacy may be useful in explaining the contemporary equilibrium which exists among states today. In order to understand the role played by international society in the modern world, this chapter will provide an elucidation as to how international societies are formed and the various types of societies which can exist. Only by viewing the relationship between the international system, international society and world society can a better appreciation of the wide array of political variables in the contemporary era take place, which in turn might contribute a novel, progressive approach to international theory.

3.1 The Formation of International Society

Perhaps the two most important questions facing proponents of the English School are – what is an international society and where did it come from? The former is far easier to answer than the latter, and responses to each question tend to vary depending on which theorist is doing the answering. Defining what an international society is can be straightforward in some sense. While the international system is grounded in Hobbesian theory and world society is reliant upon Kantian understandings, the international society element of international politics finds its philosophical underpinnings in the work of Hugo Grotius.[2] The Grotian tradition, according to Bull, places states as the primary unit

[2] For a comprehensive analysis on the Grotian approach to IR, see Hedley Bull, Benedict King and Adam Roberts (eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

of analysis in international affairs, but also claims that those states consciously and willingly limit conflict by adhering to self-imposed rules and institutions.

> The Grotian prescription for international conduct is that all states, in their dealings with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions they form. As against the view of the Hobbesians, states in the Grotian view are bound not only by rules of prudence or expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law. But, as against the view of the universalists, what these imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community of mankind, but rather acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and co-operation in a society of states (Bull 2002, 25-26).

The Grotian approach to international politics, then, embodies the effort on the part of English School theorists to forge a middle-ground between realist and liberal or critical perspectives when describing the conduct of states in an anarchic, state-based, but human influenced, international arena. Robert Jackson effectively summarizes the Grotian approach embodied in the English School by stating: "Humans, whether as individuals or organized into states, obviously cannot survive without power, but they cannot live by power alone. They also require law and morality" (Jackson 1992, 276). An essential consideration in describing just what an international society is must be the consensual nature of its formation. As Bull and Adam Watson point out, any society of states is not merely a system which recognizes the existence of other units "but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements" (Bull and Watson 1984, 1). An important point here is that, while the realist tenets of state-centrism, anarchy and self-help do dominate much of the systemic discussion, the international society level of examination is based upon ideas of cooperation, dialogue, strong international institutions and enforceable rules.

Throughout the history of the modern state system, it is argued by English School thinkers that various types of international societies have existed. Bull claims "the Grotian idea of international society has always been present in thought about the states system" (Bull 2002, 26). When the Peace at Westphalia was negotiated in 1648, and the modern system of states came into existence, supporters of the Grotian approach claim that examples of international societies could be immediately identified. Since that time, the idea of international society has changed in terms of internal arrangement, but its grounding in Grotian ideas of cooperation and rules has not. The historical evolution of international society can be divided, according to Bull, into three distinct eras: Christian international society (15^{th}, 16^{th}, 17^{th} centuries), European international society (18^{th} and 19^{th} centuries) and World international society (early 20^{th} century) (Bull 2002, 26-38).

Christian international society is the foundational element in Bull's thinking about how international society developed over time. The Grotian approach so heavily emphasized by Bull and other English School writers is, of course, grounded in the work of Grotius whose ideas on natural law came to influence how states would conduct themselves in the modern states system. In the time leading up to the articulations of what became the

Westphalian system in 1648, as the Western Christian Empire was in the process of collapsing, Bull argues there were three distinct schools of thought emerging which described the rising system of international politics: there was first, the potential for state conflict in an anarchic international environment advocated by thinkers like Machiavelli, Bacon and Hobbes; second, the Papal and Imperialist tradition, which fought for the supremacy of universal authority for the Church and Empire; and third, the budding natural law tradition advocated by Grotius and others, such as Suarez and Pufendorf (Bull 2002, 26-27). This third group, which conceived of an international society bound by common rules and norms, relied on the following assumptions in their assertions about international politics: the values underlying international society were Christian; there was no obvious decision made about who the members of international society were, primarily due to these early theories predating the modern states system; primacy was granted to natural law over any conceptions of positive law; the rules of coexistence in the society were based on universalist assumptions; and finally, the foundations for international law and diplomacy were laid by connecting institutions to natural and divine law, not by connection to state practice (Bull 2002, 29-30). This original conception of a Christian international society, then, provides an historical account as to how Grotian theories of natural law and what became known as international law were connected to the emerging system of states in the international realm, and how these ideas supposedly infiltrated the behaviour of states.

Bull moves on to describe European international society as the era which arose once Western Christendom was removed from international political thought and the contemporary conception of the state had been commonly accepted. This period is termed as exclusively European due to the dominant values and culture permeating the practice of states.[3] In this version of international society, the members comprising the society, namely states, were defined. Bull notes that "all members of international society are of a particular kind of political entity called states, and that entities that do not satisfy the criterion cannot be members" (Bull 2002, 33). Beyond the recognition of states as the exclusive members of European international society, Bull outlines other basic criterion of membership: that all members of international society share the same basic rights; all obligations are reciprocal; that all rules and institutions in the society are consensual among members; and that other political entities, like Islamic emirates or African chieftaincies are excluded from membership (Bull 2002, 33). Cooperation among European and other legitimate states was fostered by a growing set of institutions whose rules were more heavily influenced by positive, rather than natural, law. A major point of relevance during this period was the distinction made between domestic and international politics; no longer were laws seen to be common to all, but instead, were to govern the relations between states only (Bull 2002, 34). Bull looks to Jeremy Bentham's 1789 work, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, as the pillar of altering the perception from the natural law idea of *law of nations* to transforming into the positive law-based *law between nations*, which moved away from the universalist traditions articulated by Grotius and others.

[3] For more on the expansion of European international society see Adam Watson, "European International Society and its Expansion," *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 13-32.

By the 20th century, Bull argued in favour of an international society which reflected the natural law tradition found in his Christian account, rather than the values seen in the time of European dominance. Bull's conception of World international society is without clearly defined members, resembling the Grotian version, and appears to reject Vattel's ideas about the law of nations.[4] Perhaps the most interesting assertion made by Bull about the conduct of 20th century international politics is that regarding the return to natural and moral law. Rules of cooperation were again governed by universalist assumptions. These rules, laws and institutions were also founded on arguments about how states ought to act, rather than focusing solely on how they actually did act. To prove this, Bull makes reference specifically to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Charter of the United Nations (Bull 2002, 38).

While Bull describes, in detail, the conduct of what he terms as international society during these three distinct historical epochs, he does not outline how one is to detect the conditions leading to the formation of international society, or what triggers a change in its values, rules and preferences. This lack of clear borders around notions of international society speaks to the broader problem regarding the absence of research methods in English School theory (Jones 1981, 1-13). As mentioned previously, the approach is open to theoretical plurality, but there is very little said about what does count as falling within the English School and what does not. In terms of recognizing an international society, the lack of method again plays a role in weakening Bull's contentions.[5] Are these eras really distinctly different international societies, or are they just periods of cooperation marked by changing philosophical or cultural values? Martha Finnemore makes reference to the question of identifying an international society, as she asks, "how do you know an international society (or international system or world society) when you see one? English School authors sometimes give definitions for analytic categories, but they almost never provide systematic discussions about rules of evidence" (Finnemore 2001, 509). Finnemore's question about identifying an international system or world society are somewhat unproblematic to answer, as scholars like Waltz and Mearsheimer have responded to the problem of identifying a system, while the English School accounts for world society as the collection of individuals across the world. International society, however, is a different problem. The characteristics of what an international society is have been detailed and outlined by many English School writers, but how is one formed?[6]

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[4] For more on Vattel, see Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).

[5] For criticisms of the use of methodology in the English School, see Robert Jackson, "International Relations as a Craft Discipline," *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 21-38 and Peter Wilson, "The English School's Approach to International Law," *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 167-188.

[6] English School scholars have described the historical evolution of international societies but are not clear on when or how these societies are formed. For historical evolutionary discussions of international society see Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), Bull and Watson (eds.), 1984, Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992).

English School theory argues that any international society is formed when states come together to ensure their survival through mutual cooperation by consenting to rules governing their conduct. These rules are made in an anarchic environment so, while there is no formal governing force to uphold these rules, states see it as being within their self-interest to do so in order to guarantee their survival. Bull's historical divisions of the three distinct international societies may be useful in indentifying three different societies, yet the gap in causal logic as to why and how they come to exist is vast.[7] In the last chapter, a magnanimity game was designed to account for the altered nature of state interests in the post-Cold War period. The solution to this game as a non-myopic equilibrium of the US choosing *Magnanimity* and the USSR opting to *Cooperate* might account for the alterations to the behaviour of states in the international political environment, based on the fall of bipolar tension and the decline in arms racing and one-upmanship which defined the politics of the Cold War. Following from the logic of the Cold War magnanimity game's outcome, it might be possible to argue that a new international society emerged in the wake of the Cold War based on the choices made by the two superpowers in resolving the conflict. If one applies the reason of this type of game to the historical divisions described by Bull, perhaps greater insight into how these distinct societies came into existence can be achieved.

In each of the three epochs provided by Bull to delineate international societies, an infinite number of historical events occurred, and it is difficult to find any connection between the three. In an effort to show that international societies do not simply appear out of thin air, the use of a magnanimity game to demonstrate their formation might be useful. All of Bull's societies do have one thing in common – they were all created shortly after the end of a major, international, conflict. In the Christian international society, the Peace at Augsburg represented many of the trends and shifts in norms and culture described by Grotius and Bull; in European international society, the behaviour of states and the entrenchment of their primacy began shortly after the War of Spanish Succession ending with the Treaty of Utrecht; and in World international society, the developments depicted by Bull occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War I. Therefore, it might be possible to argue that an international society comes into existence after the resolution of a major international conflict, and the choices made by the actors at the conclusion of that conflict dictate the type of international society that will emerge.

An important factor to note, however, is that not all post-conflict environments at the international level compel the creation of a new international society. Magnanimity games can be used to describe each of these situations, but the connection being made here is not between every single conflict and the production of international society. Bull's historical analysis describes three distinct versions of international society that encompass large spans of time. During each of these periods, any sound historical analysis would list large numbers of conflicts across the world, many of which had little or no impact on the rules, values and normative aspects of the international society in existence at that time according to Bull's historical division. The contention being made

[7] There were efforts made by the British Committee to address some of these gaps, but none were specific enough to actually address causality. For an interesting attempt to address this issue, see Herbert Butterfield, "The Historic 'States-System'", (British Committee paper: January, 1965).

in this work is that, while international society is the most important explanatory level in English School thought, the international system is still a major concern for explaining international relations. International societies may, therefore, be created or transformed after a major international conflict in which the international system is also affected. A change in the polarity of the system or dominant powers in the wake of war could result in a new international society. Scholars may disagree with Bull's choice of historical time periods[8], but the fact that, early in each of these periods, a major international conflict which affected the ordering of the system took place, might serve to prove that any international society is subservient to the outcomes in the system. The shift in an international society may occur when states need to alter their approach to survival and the pursuit of self-interest based on shifts in systemic arrangement or polarity. Pursuing self-interest in a unipolar systemic arrangement would be different from the strategies practised in either a multipolar or bipolar arrangement. Changes to the structure of the system, according to Waltz, depend on the distribution of capabilities. "A systems theory requires one to define structures partly by the distribution of capabilities across units. States, because they are in a self-help system, have to use their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests" (Waltz 1979, 131). The value of the magnanimity game in assessing the end of conflict is that, at the conclusion of each of these games, the rational and non-myopic choices facing players can be identified and explained. These decisions, along with the outcome of the conflict, might somehow alter the hierarchy or polarity of the system, thus changing the foreign policy strategies of states in their quest for survival.

In the case of Christian international society, the time period provided by Bull is quite long, but it is difficult to argue in favour of an international society before the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.[9] Prior to this peace treaty, the foundations of Grotian theory were beginning to emerge, but could not be applied to a modern discussion of IR until the early articulations of state sovereignty came into existence. The Peace at Augsburg resolved the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant sects within the Holy Roman Empire and created an early version of what became Westphalian Sovereignty in 1648. Coming out of the negotiations at Augsburg was the famous phrase, *Cuius regio, eius religio*, meaning "Whose realm, his religion". Under this provision, free cities and territorial princes were able to determine the religion of their realm, and Lutheranism was given equal rights in the Holy Roman Empire. The Peace at Augsburg in 1555, however, was the ultimate result of a long and bloody conflict between Catholic and Protestant territories throughout the Reformation period.[10] To see how Bull's Christian international society came to be, one must look to the Peace of Passau, which was signed three years before the Peace at Augsburg.

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[8] See Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977) and Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[9] For more on the negotiations leading to the Peace of Augsburg, see J.H. Elliot, *Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[10] For more on the political impact of the Reformation period, see Thomas Lindsay, *A History of the Reformation* (New York: Scribner, 1916) and Madeleine Grey, *The Protestant Reformation: Beliefs and Practices* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2003).

The Peace of Passau was a negotiation between the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the Protestant defensive alliance known as the Schmalkaldic League in 1552.[11] After the Empire had won a decisive victory against the League following the Schmalkaldic War in 1547, Charles attempted to implement the Augsburg Interim, a document which called for religious unity under the Holy Roman Empire, thus eliminating the Protestant threat. Of course, the Interim did not end the conflict between the League and the Empire, so in 1552 the Peace at Passau was adopted, which eliminated the Augsburg Interim, ended the conflict between the two sides, granted Lutheran religious freedom thus ending thirty years of religious war and also compelled Charles to finally abandon his quest for religious unity under Catholicism (Bobbitt 2002, 75-94). The Peace at Passau set the stage for the Peace at Augsburg and eventually, after further conflict involving a larger number of parties, the Peace of Westphalia. The two sides signing the Peace at Passau, namely the Empire and the League, were faced with a number of choices as to how to proceed. Charles could have continued the fight and the League could have forged on with their cause; in the end, however, the conflict between the two sides was resolved, and this led to the first articulations of modern state sovereignty in 1555, thus also leading to the formation of Bull's Christian international society. In establishing this society, a magnanimity game would be described in the following manner:

The *initial state* of the game would have the Holy Roman Empire as *Victor* while the Schmalkaldic League would represent the *Defeated* party:

Table 3-1:

		Schmalkaldic League (*D*)	
		Cooperate (*C*)	Don't Cooperate (*C**)
Holy Roman Empire (*V*)	Don't be magnanimous ($M*$)	*I Status Quo*	*IV Rejected Status Quo*
	Be magnanimous (M)	*II Magnanimity*	*III Rejected Magnanimity*

As in all magnanimity games, both players are faced with rational calculations in the wake of a conflict. In this particular case, the solution is a nonmyopic equilibrium based on the choice of the Holy Roman Empire to be *Magnanimous* and grant Lutheran freedoms, while the League's choice to end their fight once and for all and *Cooperate* allows for the game to end. The solution to this game represented a shift in the preferences of the major actors, which in turn ushered in an international society based on territorial respect for religious difference, which becomes an essential component in the way sovereign statehood is defined in the Peace of Westphalia by 1648. Bull may not have been in favour of defining a clear group or set of groups whose membership in Christian international society were guaranteed, but this only serves to add credence to criticisms about the ambiguity of English School method. In this case, membership

[11] For more on the negotiations leading to the Peace of Passau, see Christopher Close, *The Negotiated Reformation: Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525-1550* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

would be reserved for those who, eventually, become formal states, though it is admitted that other groups in this era would have also played important roles (Bull 2002, 28). What Bull does not seem to account for is, without clear members in an international society, the relationship between the system, international and world society are impossible to see in an empirical sense. Therefore, a unit of analysis, in this case political entities which became states, would be the most logical and obvious choices for guaranteed membership.[12] Furthermore, the nonmyopic equilibrium established at the end of this game at the Peace of Passau, which is only strengthened by the Peace at Augsburg three years later, served to establish the rules and values of Christian international society – an emphasis on natural law, a lack of formalized institutions, the growth in modern forms of diplomacy and universalist assumptions.[13]

This same type of design can be provided for Bull's European international society as well. Again, Bull's historical period of choice is vast and vague, but there is a negotiated peace settlement at the end of a major conflict which corresponds to a shift in norms of international society.[14] Bull himself actually points to the magnitude of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht in its establishment of the balance of power system and the law between nations (Bull 2002, 35-36).[15] It is the choices facing the major players at the end of the War of Spanish Succession that can be said to represent the alteration from the Christian international society to the European version. While the Treaty of Utrecht is actually a serious of treaties signed between a variety of actors, its outcome seriously altered the course of European, and world, history for all of the 18th and 19th centuries. The War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) was an effort to unite the monarchies of Spain and France under one umbrella, which posed a clear threat to the British and Dutch empires.[16] War between these players was fought both in Europe and North America and resulted in approximately 400,000 deaths. The resolution to the war occurred after the signing of multiple treaties, one of which being the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 which ended the fighting between the British and Netherlands on one side, and the French and Spanish on the other (Bobbitt 2002, 95-143). Creating a magnanimity game for this post-conflict environment is not nearly as easy or clear as others might be, but in the final analysis, the game would focus on the most important treaty signed, which would place Britain as *Victor* while France would be represented as the *Defeated*. The negotiations between the British and French saw a clear desire for Britain to maintain the *Status Quo* position, as they forced the French to recognize English succession in the house of Hanover, to renounce claims to the French throne by the Spanish thus ending their attempts at

[12] According to Bull, these could be referred to as *civitates, principles, regni, gentes or republicae*. See Bull 2002, 28.

[13] It is noted here that the Peace of Westphalia is likely to be a more popular case to prove the rise of international society, but the Peace of Passau represents an earlier, though less known, example of similar actions. Also, it is questionable that the Peace of Westphalia could have occurred without the successful test case of Passau, furthered by the Peace at Augsburg.

[14] For more on the shifts in international society at this time, see Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[15] For more on the Treaty of Utrecht, see John Hosak, *On the Rise and Growth of the Law of Nations, as Established by General Usage and by Treaties, from the Earliest Time to the Treaty of Utrecht* (Littleton: F. B. Rothman, 1982).

[16] For more on the War of Spanish Succession, see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey (eds.), *The Treaties of the War of Spanish Succession* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995).

unification, to cede various North American territories and to establish the British as the world leader in commercial trade (Miquelon 2001, 653-677). The French, on the other hand, elected to Cooperate (*C*), even if the British had decided not to be Magnanimous (*M**) in their approach. The solution to this magnanimity game is thus found at position *I* of the matrix.

Table 3-2:

		France (*D*)	
		Cooperate (*C*)	Don't Cooperate (*C**)
Britain (*V*)	Don't be magnanimous (*M **)	*I Status Quo*	*IV Rejected Status Quo*
	Be magnanimous (*M*)	*II Magnanimity*	*III Rejected Magnanimity*

In terms of international political history, this treaty between the British and French helped to create a balance of power system in Europe. In this period, the system remained multipolar as it did during the Christian international society era, but the approach to state survival did change (Bull 2002, 36). Natural law and universalist assumptions about the laws of man or nature were removed almost entirely from the international arena. Instead, the focus was placed on trying to prevent the outbreak of war between sovereign and independent states which, by this time, were seen as the only actors in the international system and society, and also that had the monopoly on the legitimate use of power.[17] Throughout the Christian international society, power was not exclusively defined in the systemic-level of examination. As Bull notes, those in the time of Christian international society "did, indeed, think in terms of a hierarchy of rulers, but this was a hierarchy determined by the status and precedent of the receding universal society, and not by considerations of relative power" (Bull 2002, 31). The shift after the Treaty of Utrecht and the end of the War of Spanish Succession became about placing greater emphasis on the international system and the relationship between the first, or systemic, level and international society, rather than the Christian international society, which was premised more on the interactions between world society and international society. As a result, state interests were not morally-based; instead, positive law dedicated to stable interstate interaction became of primary concern and the balance of power system in international affairs was clearly established. In his commentary on the progression of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hans Morgenthau contends:

> In that period foreign policy was indeed a sport of kings, not to be taken more seriously than games and gambles, played for strictly limited stakes, and utterly devoid of transcendent principles of any kind. Since such was the nature of international politics, what looks in retrospect like treachery and immorality was then little more than an elegant manoeuver, a daring piece of strategy, or a finely

[17] For more on legitimacy in the society of states during this period, see Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

> contrived tactical movement, all executed according to the rules of the game, which all players recognized as binding. The balance of power of that period was amoral rather than immoral (Morgenthau 2006, 201).

The international society which emerged during the period described by Bull as European international society was thus premised upon very different rules and values than those found in the Christian international society. European international society witnessed the emergence of great power politics, the strengthening of state sovereignty and the growth in balancing behaviour among states in a multipolar arrangement (Mearsheimer 2001, 347-354). This system would last into the 20th century until the conclusion of another major international conflict and a shift in self-help tactics.

If one is willing to accept Bull's description of the first two major periods of international societal history, his third is perhaps the most contentious. According to Bull, events in the 20th century marked a return to the natural law and morally-based version of international society as seen during the Christian period of Grotius himself. This World international society is defined by an evolution away from the statist politics of European international society to a greater world focus. Bull argues:

> The twentieth-century emphasis upon ideas of a reformed or improved international society, as distinct from the elements of society in actual practice, has led to a treatment of the League of Nations, the United Nations and other general international organisations as the chief institutions of international society, to the neglect of those institutions whose role in the maintenance of international order is the central one. Thus there has developed the Wilsonian rejection of the balance of power, the denigration of diplomacy and the tendency to seek to replace it by international administration, and a return to the tendency that prevailed in the Grotian era to confuse international law with international morality or international improvement (Bull 2002, 38).

The trends seen by Bull, while originally published in 1977, are clearly not indicative of the entire 20th century. Cold War international politics were not morally-based, did not reject conceptions of international stability, at times ignored Wilsonian politics and relied heavily upon diplomacy, though limited in scope, to remain stable (Brown 1999, 115-116). Bull's depiction is relevant, but not to the entire century. Instead, it might be useful to assume that the 20th century saw two distinctly different versions of international society – both premised on self-interest and survival, which remain vital components to any society of states, but which were fundamentally different in terms of polarity and foreign policy strategy.

Bull's World international society arguably did exist in the 20th century, but was very short-lived. His description of 20th century international politics can be found in the aftermath of a major conflict which affected state pursuits of self-interest, thus making it a legitimate international society according to the model presented here. This version can be found in the time between the First and Second World Wars (1918-1939). Creating a magnanimity game for this period would be straightforward:

Table 3-3:

		Germany (*D*)	
		Cooperate (*C*)	Don't Cooperate (*C**)
Allies (*V*)	Don't be magnanimous ($M*$)	*I Status Quo*	*IV Rejected Status Quo*
	Be magnanimous (M)	*II Magnanimity*	*III Rejected Magnanimity*

The aftermath of the First World War was filled with idealism and notions of how to eliminate war all together in the international system. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points seem to have embodied this thinking and the establishment of the League of Nations sought to move international society away from the positive law, sovereignty-based rules of European international society and back to the moral and utopian conceptions of Christian international society.[18] E.H. Carr, whose work on the twenty years between the two major wars is foundational to the study of IR and the English School, looks to this period as one of attempted change and normative-focus, like the one described by Bull in his conception of World international society. Carr argues:

> When the theories of liberal democracy were transplanted, by a purely intellectual process, to a period and to countries whose stage of development and whose practical needs were utterly different from those of Western Europe in the nineteenth century, sterility and disillusionment were the inevitable sequel. Rationalism can create a utopia, but cannot make it real. The liberal democracies scattered throughout the world by the peace settlement of 1919 were the product of abstract theory, stuck no roots in the soil, and quickly shrivelled away (Carr 2001, 29).

Though Carr was not entirely supportive of the Wilsonian influence on international politics, it is impossible to deny its effects, even if Carr saw many of the utopian effects as negative. Carr famously notes:

> The advocate of a scheme for an international police force or for collective security, or of some other project for international order, generally replied to the critic not by an argument designed to show how and why he thought his plan will work, but either by a statement that it must be made to work because the consequences of its failure to work would be so disastrous, or by a demand for some alternative nostrum. This must be the spirit in which the alchemist or utopian socialist would have answered the sceptic who questioned whether lead could be turned into gold or men made to live in model communities. Thought has been at a discount (Carr 2001, 8).

[18] For more on Wilson's political idealism, see Arthur Walworth, *Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986).

While Carr may have criticized the Wilsonian tendency toward pure utopianism, Wilson's ideas did lead to some alterations at the international level. The League of Nations was only one step in trying to outlaw war, create a system of international law that went beyond simple interstate relations and to achieve a condition of peace across the world (Carr 2001, 30-31). During these twenty years, international society functioned according to Bull's description of World international society, but did not last past the outbreak of the Second World War. The emergence of what Bull saw as World international society was premised upon the efforts made at establishing a strong set of institutions aimed at allowing states to dialogue and prevent another major international war from breaking out. Two of the most important elements in World international society which make it distinct from European international society are first, the retreat from states having exclusive membership in international society and second, the return to a preference for natural law over positive law in the articulation of the rules of coexistence (Bull 2002, 37-38).

What must be noted at this juncture, however, is that the outcome of this post-war magnanimity game does not lend itself to a Grotian version of international society, like the one seen during Bull's Christian era. At the conclusion of the First World War, the allied powers chose to punish defeated Germany as much as possible, as evidenced by the many provisions in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Such a preference for the *Status Quo* option was coupled with a concern for a new world order that aimed to implement natural law-based strategies of war prevention and the promotion of law. In terms of the upholding of *Status Quo*, there was divergence among allied members about just how far the punishment for Germany was to extend:

> Punishment, payment, prevention – on these broad objectives there was agreement. It was everything else that was the problem...A smaller Germany, and a poorer Germany, would be less of a threat to its neighbours. But if Germany was losing a lot of land, was it also fair to expect it to pay out huge sums? Striking a balance between the different sets of terms was not easy, especially since Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George did not agree among themselves, or, frequently, with their own colleagues (MacMillan 2001, 161-162).

Though all three allied parties agreed that Germany was responsible for the start of the First World War, there was serious disagreement about what the post-war world order would look like. The political left was calling for an approach that favoured self-determination over power politics as a way to move forward, and this idea appealed strongly to Wilson (MacMillan 2001, 162-164). The French, on the other hand, were far more interested in making territorial gains and preventing the re-arming or immediate rebuilding of Germany so it would not make war against France.

The preference for the *Status Quo*, though a fractured version, demonstrates one thing quite clearly – that if a victorious party wants to create an international society that is based on moral and natural law, it cannot be simply imposed. Germany had little choice but to cooperate in the wake of the First World War because it had no functioning government capable of choosing a strategy of non-cooperation, nor did it have the

military or economic resources to resist the articles of the Treaty of Versailles.[19] Rather than seeing the opportunity of a defeated Germany as a moment in which to choose Magnanimity and create a new world order premised upon Grotian values, the allies presented the world with a strange mixture of power politics and natural law, which were eventually rejected once Germany was able to oppose such provisions less than twenty years later.

In the time between 1919 and 1939, however, major normative advances were made and international society witnessed the attempt on the part of many liberal thinkers, like Wilson, to create and foster international institutions which would be more world focused than simply international. Due to the creation of the League of Nations and the efforts to outlaw war, there is some, though limited, validity in Bull's thesis regarding a twentieth century World international society. Bull's contentions, however, are highly questionable with the outbreak of the Second World War, but perhaps even more with the start of the Cold War.

During the fifty years of the Cold War, international society did not operate according to Bull's claims about World international society. Wilsonian idealism and the belief that war could be eliminated or controlled based on moral guideless were both dead after the Second World War. The start of the Cold War provided an opportunity for states to return to a society of states resembling the European international society, but instead of being multipolar in nature, this version was bipolar in its systemic arrangement.

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the stage for the Cold War had been set and came as little surprise to any observer. Lawrence Freedman states: "At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, Truman, Stalin and Attlee came together for the first time to agree on the shape of post-war Europe. Tensions were evident. In many cases the spheres of influence were clear" (Freedman 2001, 23). Using a magnanimity game to analyze the end of the Second World War has been done with success by Brams in detail and thus will not be built on here (Brams 1994, 81). What is important to note, however, is that while the Allies maintained a condition of *Status Quo* in the aftermath of the war, as they did in 1919, the sense of idealism or Carr's utopianism did not impact the international realm nearly as much or as quickly as it had in 1918. Brams, who argues in favour of the Allies following a strategy of *Magnanimity* (*M*) after the Second World War, claims "the surrenders of Nazi Germany and Japan at the end of World War II were unconditional, with Germany this time divided into four zones. Once again, the allies made no concessions after the war, although the Marshall Plan, beginning in 1947, helped tremendously in the later reconstruction of Europe, including West Germany" (Brams 1994, 80). The magnanimity game for the post-Second World War environment would see both the US and USSR on the same side, but quickly altering their strategies to oppose one another as the Cold War began.

In terms of how the outcome to this game could affect the formation of a new Cold War international society, one should certainly pay close attention to the outcome of the

[19] For more on Germany during the interwar period, see Robert Gerwarth, *The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Second World War. Though the US and USSR were allies in 1945, Brams does not attribute the outcome of *Magnanimity* (*M*) until the introduction of the Marshall Plan. He qualifies this by saying: "The Magnanimity outcome after World War II became a reality only some years after the war, which raises the question of what time span the model supposes" (Brams 1994, 81). The problem with allowing a long-term idea of a post-dispute situation in this case is that the Allies were no longer allied by 1947. The immediate aftermath of the Second World War saw the preference by the Allies, including both the US and USSR for *Status Quo* (*I*), a point conceded by Brams. As a result, the self-interest of the victorious powers took precedence over any magnanimous or idealistic notions and created the conditions for the Cold War international society to form. Magnanimity by the US and other Western powers came after the start of the Cold War; therefore, it can be argued that the Marshall Plan was not at all magnanimous, but instead, an expression of self-interest on the part of the West to combat the USSR on the periphery.[20]

The purpose of this section is to provide methodological insight into how international societies are formed and how they are influenced by the modern states system. Bull's effort to show the historical evolution of international society had three main divisions, which may not be entirely false. What he fails to do, however, is account for the conditions leading to international societies and how to explain changes in their character or conduct. By arguing in favour of international societies emerging from major international conflict, it is hoped greater insight can be gained as to why these societies exist and the conditions which lead states to pursue their self-interest in various ways. At their core, states remain inherently self-interested searching for ways to survive in an anarchic international system, which is why they agree to enter into an international society at all (Buzan 1991, 174). At these various historical junctures, the larger players in the international arena determined what the rules and norms of these societies would be based on their decisions in the immediate, not long-term, aftermath of wide scale conflict. With the model of how international society is formed, it is vital to consider the different types of societies at the international level.

3.2 Types of International Society

In the historical development of international societies, two distinct forms seem to be evident, as outlined by Bull. The first is a heavily normative, moral and world society-focused version and the second is a normatively-limited, amoral and international system-focused version. These two opposing conceptions of how international society should run have been seen in the history of the modern state system and both have appeared since the start of the 20th century. This section is dedicated to providing a greater description of the two kinds of international society which can be found, termed here as either *solidarist* or *pluralist*, and tries to identify the benefits and problems inherent in each.

[20] For more on American foreign policy at the outset of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

3.21 Solidarist International Societies

As noted previously, the solidarist accounts of international society are contingent upon trying to prove the connection between the third, or world society, level of examination and its effects on the development and conduct of international society. A major consideration to bear in mind with this kind of international society is the argument made by solidarists against the primacy of the international system and traditional realist accounts of international politics (Williams 2005, 21). In the historical analysis of identifying when an international society is created, Bull argues that the first example of an international society, being the Christian version of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, was founded on the natural law traditions of moral rights and universalism. Such normative components lend themselves very well to the solidarist thesis in English School thought.

A solidarist international society is one which emphasizes the centrality of world society and the human element in international politics. According to R.J. Vincent, world society can be seen as "the individual and certain actors and institutions in world politics whose concerns have been regarded conventionally as falling outside the domain of diplomacy and international relations" (Vincent 1978, 20). Grotianism is interpreted as being a theory which tries to unite humanity and governs the laws of states by compelling them to protect their populations. According to Buzan, there are two kinds of solidarism evident in world society debates: liberal and illiberal. For liberal interstate societies:

> The liberal model of solidarism offers a very particular, and quite compelling, answer to how the interhuman, transnational and interstate will relate to each other as solidarism develops. Liberal arguments contain a strong logic that although the three units of individuals, TNAs and states are ontologically distinct, the interhuman, transnational, and interstate societies they form will be closely interrelated in a quite particular way (Buzan 2004, 197).

The liberal project in IR has always focused its attention on domestic-level variables and how internal preferences or ideological factors influence the actions of states above the national level (Moravcsik 1997, 513-553). Liberalism, at its core, is premised upon the values identified by Bull in his portrayal of Christian international society, such as a preference for natural, moral law and ontological universalism. Michael Doyle, one of the most prominent liberal theorists in IR, describes one of the founding aspects of liberalism as being: "To ensure that morally autonomous individuals remain free in those areas of social action where public authority is needed, public legislation has to express the will of the citizens making laws for their own community" (Doyle 1983, 207). Most often, liberal theories in IR are associated with the work of Kant and his theory on individual rights, peace and republican democratic values. These norms and values are very much at the centre of world society.

In the examples of solidarist international societies presented here, namely the Christian international society and the post-First World War society, a driving concern in each case was how to achieve peace among states and spreading certain liberal values. The

centrality of individuals in world society makes the spreading of values and the consent of those within states of great interest. It is thought, then, that the conduct of states within international society will depend largely on the opinions and actions of those within the state. This idea of stressing cosmopolitan consent builds on Kantian theory:

> If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future. But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it (Kant 1974, 790-792).

A primary issue with solidarist international societies, which tend to look more to world society values than they would to the constraints of the international system would be that, not all states are liberal. Buzan accounts for this issue by arguing that:

> The liberal model, in sum, can raise a highly political agenda in which developments in one domain force quite extreme patterns on the other two, and the nature of these questions may well vary depending on the stage of development that liberalism is in...In sum, the liberal model is not the only template on which one can and should think about the relationship among the three domains (Buzan 2004, 200).

While the degree of the liberal or non-liberal nature of solidarist international societies may be up for debate, the insistence upon human values and influence is not. The initial type of international society developed by Grotius and others once the modern state system came into being was premised primarily upon the laws of nations being directed toward a conception of good through cooperation and coexistence at the international level (Bull 2002, 25-26). Comprehending the entire solidarist project in the English School is difficult to do or even to generalize, based on the liberal, non-liberal and critical contributions to its development, but Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami provide a compelling set of guidelines by which a solidarist international society can be identified:

> 1. individuals and the various communities and associations to which they belong are the fundamental members of international society;

> 2. unnecessary suffering and cruelty to individuals and their immediate associations should be avoided in the conduct of war;
> 3. pluralist commitments to sovereignty and sovereign immunity should be replaced by the notion of personal responsibility for infringements of the laws of war;
> 4. superior orders do not justify violations of humanitarian international law;
> 5. breaches of the laws of war should be punishable in domestic and international courts;
> 6. the sovereignty of the state is conditional on compliance with the international law of human rights;
> 7. sovereignty does not entitle states to be free from the legitimate appraisal of their peers with respect to human rights;
> 8. states have responsibilities as custodians of human rights everywhere;
> 9. individuals have the legal right of appeal to international courts of law when violations of human rights occur; and
> 10. regard for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires the society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from unnecessary suffering (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 243-244).

Linklater and Suganami are sure to ground their theory of solidarism in the works of Grotius, Bull and of course, one of the primary architects of the solidarist commitment to human rights discourse, R.J. Vincent. The prevalence of human rights is a cornerstone feature of solidarism in the English School, and gained even more strength once Vincent began to articulate a set of ethical and normative underpinnings that influenced all three levels of analysis. "Unlike Bull's few, unsupported assertions that world society is the appropriate direction for world politics, Vincent wrote with moral conviction that starvation is wrong and that addressing it should no longer be seen as an act of charity, but a doctrine of human rights imposing a correlative obligation" (Cochran 2008, 291). Human rights, and the individual, came to define what solidarism would examine in the international realm.

While individuals may be at the centre of the solidarist international society model, there is still a question as to how these types of societies function. Formalized laws and institutions clearly exist in these societies, but they are not nearly as important as those in pluralist international societies, which base their existence on a minimalist contractual arrangement.[21] Instead, solidarist international societies find their roots in the natural law tradition. Robert George describes the principles of a society based on natural law: "the concern of the natural law theorist is fundamentally with justification, that is to say, moral evaluation or prescription. Insofar as laws, legal institutions, and legal systems are concerned, he is interested in their moral goodness or badness, their justice or injustice" (George 1998, 54). The preoccupation with justice, morality and normative growth in these societies requires a model upon which to base the value system of international society because, as history has proven time and again, there is no universal system of

[21] For more on contractarian thought and its application to international society, see John Charvet, "International Society from a Contractarian Perspective," *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 114-131.

international morality (Carr 2001, 135-155). Therefore, it can be argued that solidarist international societies arise when conflicts, described here through magnanimity games, are concluded with the *Victor* choosing Magnanimity (*M*) and the *Defeated* showing willingness to Cooperate (*C*) over the long term. Again, one of the advantages of using theory of moves logic in this study is allowing states to make both short and long-term assessments of their foreign policy strategies. In the case described above outlining the formation of Christian international society, the Holy Roman Empire chose to be *Magnanimous* while the League was compelled to *Cooperate*, based on the concessions made by the Empire regarding freedom of religious practice within sovereign territories. As a result of this nonmyopic equilibrium and peaceful conclusion to the conflict between the two sides, a solidarist society was instituted which focused far more on theological, moral and human variables than it did on a defined set of laws and institutions aimed at creating a body of law which disregarded morality or religion. Following the Peace of Passau, the international society which arose recognized the connection of men everywhere and the rights and duties they were bound by (Bull 2002, 27-28). Bull emphasizes, however, the prominent role granted to Christianity above all, hence the title chosen for this particular incarnation of international society:

> Even for Grotius, within the wider circle of all mankind, bound by the principles of natural law, there was the narrower circle of Christendom, bound by volitional divine law, by the inherited customs and rules of *ius gentium*, by canon and Roman law. For the Spanish scholastics, Victoria and Suarez, natural law was not separable from divine law. The signing of treaties, in this period, was accompanied by religious oaths (Bull 2002, 27).

In post-conflict situations where the *Victor* chooses to be magnanimous, and the *Defeated* opts to pursue a course of cooperation without any major resistance, a solidarist international society can be created which is premised on the values and moral codes of the *Victor* in the short term, and these normative commitments can grow over the long term, assuming the initial *Defeated* party or alliance does not reject the imposition in the first place. The strategy of *M* for the *Victor* at the international level typically means there is some sense of threat that can still be posed by the *Defeated* party; otherwise, there is little or no incentive to defect from the optimal strategy of *Status Quo*. As Brams notes: "Sacrifice may be rational not because it does not hurt the sacrifice but because it heads off action by the other player that hurts both players even more" (Brams 1994, 84). The threat, however, is likely to be hard power or militaristic in nature and would become a concern for interactions in the international system. When the international society is being created in the aftermath of the conflict, and both sides are willing to choose the nonmyopic equilibrium outcome, like that seen in the Peace of Passau, the *Victor* has the opportunity to institute rules and laws, based on their own moral code while possibly recognizing that of the *Defeated*, and creating a solidarist international society.

In the historical analysis above, the contention is made that the time between the First and Second World Wars can be described as solidarist in nature, though the outcome of a post-World War I magnanimity game would not have the same solution as would normally be required for a solidarist society. The reason this international society only

lasted for twenty years was because the *Victor* in this game, namely the allies, chose the *Status Quo* strategy rather than *Magnanimity*. The *Defeated* party, Germany, elected to choose *Cooperation* as their strategy because they were left with little choice during the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, but this outcome was not long-lasting. As a result, the effort to impose a solidarist society failed precisely because of the *Status Quo* choice of the allies; imposing a solidarist conception of international society is not likely to be met with favour from the *Defeated*, just as it was not between 1919 and 1939. By 1939, the *Defeated* party in the First World War changed its strategy from *Cooperation* to *Rejected Status Quo*, being the least favourable outcome in a magnanimity game, leading to the outbreak of the Second World War.

In order for a solidarist international society to arise and have lasting power, a magnanimity game must be solved with the *Victor* choosing *Magnanimity* and the *Defeated* choosing *Cooperation*. The spirit of trust and desire for post-conflict cooperation fostered by these rational choices on the parts of both parties serves to allow a solidarist society to be created without animosity and imposition. The *Defeated* party may not always like the idea of having to accept the solidarist values being cultivated but, because of the communicative and trusting outcome of the conflict, as well as rational calculations about their own prospects for survival in other solutions to the game, can appeal to the *Victor* and possibly have a say in what the international society will look like. The influence of world society on the outcome of a post-conflict magnanimity game cannot be ignored either, as the more peaceful the end of the conflict is, the more willing world society will be to support either *Magnanimity* or *Cooperation*. Solidarist international societies, however, may be too quick to dismiss the constraints of the international system.

The primary aims of solidarist versions of international societies are to protect individual rights, especially the idea of human rights, to place the state as a custodian for individual interests, to highlight the role of humanity and its impact over state behaviour and to open discussion of international politics to concerns like individuals, economics, and transnational forces or actors (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 315-317). The examples of this type of international society can be found in Bull's Christian international society and the version of international society which emerged in the wake of World War I, despite its rejection and abrupt collapse. In contradiction to solidarist international societies are those categorized here as pluralist in nature.

3.22 Pluralist International Society

In its earliest articulations, the English School was primarily interested in disproving the inherently pessimistic and Hobbesian discussions of international politics put forth by realist theory, but the historical-rationalist approach of English School scholars did not completely discount the vitality of the international system by any means (Dunne 1998, 124-129). In fact, Wight and Bull sought to ground their work in theory that gave large credence to the system and its effect on the behaviour of states, though their conceptions of the system diverged greatly (Dunne 1998, 126-127). The pluralist version of international society is one more often associated with problem-solving international

theory and which seeks to explain cooperation among states by examining the relationship between the international system and international society. Pluralist international societies do not totally ignore the influence of world society and tend to operate based on a variety of norms, but one in particular is given greatest influence – how to create a forum in which self-interested states can survive in an anarchic international system.

The interpretations of Grotian theory within solidarist accounts of international society are replaced in pluralist societies by competing claims about what Grotius was attempting to see internationally. Natural law, morality and norms are not eliminated from pluralist international society, but instead are secondary in importance to positive law and minimalist rules (Jackson 2000, 23). Rather than imposing a version of global morality across the world and grounding normative rules in ideas of religion or faith alone, strong, state-based institutions and a functioning body of international law are what compel states to participate in an international society. Robert Jackson argues:

> Grotius derives positive international law from the freedom, will and agency of statesmen. States and only states in virtue of controlling large populated territories and being organized realities in the vicinity of other states are in a position to participate in the making of international law by signing treaties, sending and receiving ambassadors, attending international conferences and giving their consent in various other conventional ways (Jackson 1993, 52).

Emphasizing positive and conventional law is the means by which states are to come together to mitigate anarchy and achieve survival. Otherwise, the international political environment would be much as realists try to describe it, as a state of war. The level of cooperation and shared interests in pluralist societies is far less than that seen in solidarist societies. International institutions are used, but not as a means to promote human rights or human security, or to decrease the power of the state (Buzan 2004, 143). Instead, secondary institutions are considered to be forums in which states can come together, bind themselves by minimalist rules, typically involving strong sovereignty and non-intervention, and can avert war. Buzan defines pluralist international societies as "*second-order societies* of states with a relatively low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions amongst the states, where the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition, or possibly also the management of collective problems of common fate" (Buzan 2004, xvii).

It is easy to recognize the realist and Hobbesian warnings included in pluralist societies based on their belief that states are self-interested and determine foreign policy strategy based on their quest to survive. Therefore, rational choice can play a role in pluralism and the way states achieve their goals.[22] The mere calculation as to whether or not the arrangement of international society would be beneficial could be rationally deduced, thus providing the impetus for English School theory all together. Would states enter

[22] Navari notes that Bull's work has borrowed from rational choice postulates. See Cornelia Navari, "What the Classical English School was Trying to Explain, and Why its Members Were not Interested in Causal Explanation," *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 48.

into such a cooperative arrangement with other self-interested states if the costs outweighed the benefits? States might have to sacrifice elements of their autonomy, but not nearly as much so in pluralist societies than they would in solidarist societies. Pluralism, then, sounds very much like the realist version of IR discussed in previous chapters, due to its recognition of state self-interest and a limited desire for cooperation. Linklater and Suganami explain the guidelines of a pluralist international society:

> 1. states are the basic members of international society;
> 2. all societies have a right to a separate existence subject to the need to maintain the balance of power;
> 3. intervention in the internal affairs of member states to promote some vision of human decency or human justice is prohibited;
> 4. states should relinquish the goal of acquiring preponderant power in the international system;
> 5. the duty to cooperate to maintain an equilibrium of power is incumbent on all states;
> 6. diplomatic efforts to reconcile competing interests should proceed from the assumption that each state is the best judge of its own interests;
> 7. an inclusive as opposed to exclusive conception of the national interest should be pursued so that other states, and the society to which they belong, are not harmed for the sake of trivial national advantages;
> 8. because of their unique military capabilities the great powers should assume special responsibilities which are determined by mutual consent for preserving international order;
> 9. an essential purpose of an inclusive foreign policy is to make changes to international society which will satisfy the legitimate interests of rising powers and new member states;
> 10. force is justified in self-defence and in response to states that seek preponderant power;
> 11. proportionality in war should be respected along with the principle that defeated powers should be readmitted as equals into international society (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 238-240).

States in pluralist societies are concerned primarily with how to survive in an anarchic system, and do so by defining a set of rules built on the underlying norm of minimalist cooperation. Foreign policy strategies are not centred on the promotion of individual rights or cosmopolitanism alone because these concerns are not seen as equal to the prevention of war (Bull 2002, 191). Armed conflict is not completely discounted and, in fact, the ability of powers in pluralist international society to use war as a means to provide order is typically guaranteed. As mentioned previously, solidarist ideas of peace and order aim to eliminate war and to uphold the sanctity of human life based on a set of common law beliefs about morality. Use of positive law in pluralist societies attempts to create and uphold order, but one which is premised predominantly on an effort to allow states to interact without the constant threat of war.

> Positivists who hold that international law arises only by consent think of international society as a kind of pact defined by mutual recognition and agreement. International society is *created* by treaties and other agreements voluntarily entered into for the sake of realizing common interests and shared goals. And international law is the limited and temporary *product* of these various transactions, not their continuous and permanent premise. Custom is law only to the extent that it expresses tacit consent (Nardin 1998, 21).

By placing conventional law as the foundational element in creating and maintaining international society, pluralists reject the solidarist effort at trying to aim a society of states at implementing global morality in favour of generating a system of laws and institutions which can stabilize the interactions of states (Bellamy 2005a, 10). It is the desire for stability and survival that compels the *Victor* to stay in the *Status Quo* outcome after a conflict and which motivates a *Defeated* party to cooperate. Solidarist societies, it is argued here, are created when a magnanimity game is solved by *V* choosing *Magnanimity* and *D* deciding to *Cooperate*. The goal of defection from the optimal outcome for *V* is the effort to implement a set of norms and values on international society and by seeing this defection on the part of *V*, *D* concedes to its implementation and allows solidarist values to be created and potentially enforced. If *V* stays in the *Status Quo* position, efforts to implement solidarist societies fail, as they did after the First World War, because *V* has shown no good faith to the *D* party and thus the choice of *Cooperation* for *D* is typically replaced by *Rejected Status Quo*, potentially leading in time to another major war.

The initial state of *Status Quo* for *V* provides a unique opportunity to guarantee its place in the international system by taking advantage of its victory through the creation of power and self-interest-based institutions and rules in international society.[23] Rather than force its values and norms on *D* and other states, *V* is aware that its *Status Quo* position is not likely to win many allies other than those trying to bandwagon and reap the benefits of its victory.[24] Those that were allied with *D* in the conflict are likely to *Cooperate*, as *D* does, but still engage in balancing behaviour in an effort not to let *V* become too powerful in the aftermath of the conflict. In the wake of the Second World War for instance, the Allies maintained the position of *Status Quo* and established a post-war order consistent with maintaining the position of power after the conflict, but which also recognized the benefit of the defeated Axis powers *Cooperating* (Brams 1994, 80). This *Cooperation* on the part of *D* was eventually recognized on the part of *V*, but in the short term, Germany was politically and militarily dismantled, the Nuremburg Trials punished those responsible for waging war and the country was divided in two parts according to the

[23] In the case of major war, single victors or a group can be equated to hegemonic forces. In this case, the imposition of values and norms on international society is comparable to the conduct of hegemons in realist theory. For more on this, see Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28:3 (April 1976), 317-347, Timothy McKeown, "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe," *International Organization* 37:1 (Winter 1983), 73-91 and Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39:4 (Autumn 1985), 579-614

[24] For more on bandwagoning behaviour, see Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19:1 (Summer 1994), 72-107.

desires of the victorious US and USSR. Japan was also dismantled militarily and politically, was subjected to a war tribunal of its own and its constitution became a product of US influence (Goff, Moss, Terry and Upshur 2002, 291-296). None of the war time atrocities or wrongs committed by the Allies were ever punished nor were they willing to set aside their military arsenals or even remove them from Europe or Japan in the immediate aftermath. While these examples prove that *V* took full advantage of their victory, they also created a set of laws and institutions embodied in the structure of the United Nations which established a new global order aimed at preventing the outbreak of another major war while maintaining the anarchic nature of the system.

The same argument for the *Status Quo* outcomes of magnanimity games can be made in the case of Bull's European international society. After the Treaty of Utrecht, the British came to an amicable agreement with France and assured their cooperation, but also forced the French to sacrifice their power position internationally through economic and territorial forfeitures (Clark 2007, 71). Britain's choice to not be magnanimous (*M**) in this game created an international society which sought to maintain a balance of power among states and was premised on conventional laws between nations to ensure stability. As Nardin argues:

> One consequence of the widespread acceptance of this consent theory in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century international legal thought was the view that international law is binding only among states recognized as belonging to the society of states and participating in its practices. The result was a nearly exclusive preoccupation with European state practice and the consequent identification of international law as the public law of Europe (Nardin 1998, 21).

States were motivated to enter into European international society out of their desire to survive, protect their sovereignty and prevent any more major wars unless the balance of power system was threatened. If an arrangement could ensure such provisions, states would be willing to consent to the rules and laws of a pluralist international society, as they were after the Treaty of Utrecht and in the wake of World War II. After each of these conflicts, the international system was also changed in terms of either polarity or the hierarchy of powers after the conflict. These shifts and the uncertainty which naturally accompany them are also compelling factors in explaining states' willingness to sacrifice certain independent rights and enter into a conventional arrangement like a pluralist international society.

Institutions and laws in pluralist international society aim primarily at preventing war by proving space for dialogue and diplomacy (Buzan 2004, 143). The nature of the international system is not changed and its anarchic character is the main consideration in the formation of international society. Hard power is the only concern that can alter or affect the international system, and to prevent war while not succumbing to the utopian nature of solidarist cosmopolitanism, pluralist societies allow states to exercise power and project their self-interest without reverting to war as the sole means of achieving security. The European international society and the society of states seen throughout the Cold War are good examples of how states can maintain a semblance of equilibrium among

each other without trying to base their cooperation on the value system of *V* after a conflict.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter is to provide a potential model for understanding how international societies are formed and the conduct of both types. It is doubtful that the ideas presented here are able to fully encompass all international societies or will be unquestioned by political scientists and historians alike, but to date, the English School has been too causally and methodologically weak in its explanations of international politics. To say that international societies exist and have profound effects over the way states behave is large in itself, but without offering theoretical insight as to where these come from or how one version is chosen over the other is inadequate.

Critics of the English School, like Finnemore, take exception to the lack of metatheoretical development within the approach. In defending against this, writers like Tim Dunne claim that such concerns have never been of interest to rationalist scholars within the English School. "The English School...are more likely to offer narratives on the evolution and contestation of norms and institutions *without* explicit metatheoretical reflection...As rationalism has never been anything other than a minority interest in the UK, there was no need of, or desire for, metatheoretical exceptionalism on the part of the English School" (Dunne 2008, 280). Taking this idea a step further to defend against the questions posed by Finnemore, writers like Linklater and Suganami argue that international society "is not something you see, but an idea in light of which we can make sense of an aspect of contemporary international relations" (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 103). Dunne is correct in his assertions about the lack of desire on the part of many English School scholars to apply rigorous methods in the past, but he is also sure to admit that part of the reason English School theory was rediscovered by Buzan and others was to reinvent it, and to combat previous criticisms from all sides of the IR theory spectrum. Linklater and Suganami may see international societies as mythical ideas that might explain one international outcome, but not another; such ambiguity only serves to hinder the approach from having any relevance at all. International societies, if they do exist, must be detectable from their formation until their collapse; the types of society, the rules in each and why they differ at all should be explainable if the English School is to have contemporary explanatory power. The framework presented in this chapter is one attempt at filling these gaps previously left wide open.

In his work on international order, Hedley Bull provides descriptions of the major historical eras of international society and the way each of those particular societies differ. To divide the history of international society into three parts, namely the Christian, European and World international societies, begs the question of whether a society of states can possibly last as long as two or three centuries at a time. It is right to assume that each of these periods witnessed substantial changes in rules, norms, values and institutional arrangements, so perhaps Bull is correct in assuming the prolonged period of each. Where Bull falls short is in his failure to explain how one international society changes to another.

Each of the three eras described by Bull coincides with the end of a major international conflict which typically results in some alteration to either the systemic polarity or the major powers that emerge victorious. As a result, this chapter makes use of the magnanimity game model as a possible method of understanding the rational decisions of the two major actors at the end of conflicts and how their choices affected the formation and type of international society which followed. It can be contended then, that Christian international society was formalized at the Peace of Passau, and was made even stronger by the Peace of Augsburg; European international society got its start after the Treaty of Utrecht; and World international society, though a failed experiment, began in the wake of the First World War. These examples may not be the only international societies which can be found if this model of theorizing has relevance, but they do remain consistent with Bull's original thought on the subject.

What remains to be explained is the unique nature of modern international society. Structural realist theory may be able to explain the international system, the constraints on state behaviour due to the nature of the system and the type of international society in existence, but this is by no means a complete picture into the way states behave in the contemporary context. The pluralist society seen throughout the Cold War, which will be described in greater detail in the next chapter, is by no means the same as the society of states today. Changes in polarity, values, norms and the challenge to self-interest, state survival and even the relevance of the state itself make modern conditions quite different from previous historical examples. By revisiting the magnanimity game created to explain the end of the Cold War and its outcome, an argument will be made regarding the distinctive nature of the contemporary international society.

Chapter 4: Classifying Modern International Society

Since the end of World War II, the conception of what type of international society has existed and its foundational norms have been subjects of intense debate within the English School (Clark 2001, 238-239). Solidarists and pluralists disagree on their perceptions about the character of the Cold War international society and the way interstate relations have been reshaped since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The bipolar and distrustful nature of the Cold War system was initially replaced by a unipolar, now an emerging multipolar, system in which states appear to be more willing to use the institutions and rules of international society to their advantage in securing themselves and pursuing their self-interest (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 158-163). While interpretations of both the Cold War society of states and modern incarnation may differ along ideological lines, it is difficult to argue against elementary alterations to the way states behave in international society today versus their conduct during the Cold War.

The framework for comprehending the formation and transitions of international societies may be better understood by making use of the magnanimity game model, which can offer an explanation as to how the conditions at the end of major international conflicts affect the willingness of states to cooperate and the actors which will define the norms and values of that arrangement. Following this logic, it can be said that the Cold War international society arose as a result of the magnanimity game which explains the decisions facing the major actors at the end of World War II. A contention being made here is that, while certain solidarist norms did come to the forefront of international political debate during the Cold War, most notably human rights, the society of states throughout that period would fall more into the category of pluralist than it would solidarist. Bipolarity, distrust, arms racing and the constant threat of major war all meant that states were primarily interested in their national security and maintaining the delicate balance of power. As Waltz notes in his discussion of the Cold War: "In a world in which two states united in their mutual antagonism far overshadow any other, the incentives to a calculated response stand out most clearly, and the sanctions against irresponsible behavior achieve their greatest force" (Waltz 1979, 172-173). Cosmopolitan values, global citizenship and natural law seemed to play a minor role in foreign policy calculations perhaps because the basic motivation of survival meant more to states than did their desire for normative development.

Using the rational choice framework of the magnanimity game, it can be argued that the end of World War II saw the Allied powers choose a position of *Status Quo* in the immediate aftermath of the conflict which allowed for the *Defeated* Axis parties to be completely eliminated as large threats and also provided the conditions for the Cold War to begin. According to John Lewis Gaddis:

> The convergence of…external and internal trends in late February and early March, 1946, produced a fundamental reorientation of United States policy toward the Soviet Union. Up to this time the Truman Administration, despite occasional outbursts of angry rhetoric, was still trying to resolve differences with Moscow through negotiation and compromise. In March, 1946, however,

> Administration officials began bringing their diplomacy into line with their rhetoric. From this time on American policy-makers regarded the Soviet Union not as an estranged ally but as a potential enemy, whose vital interests could not be recognized without endangering those of the United States (Gaddis 2000, 284).

Both the United States and the Soviet Union were sure to punish the Axis nations so they could begin to worry about one driving concern in the post-war era: each other. In order to prevent the outbreak of war with one other and to ensure that the Cold War remained *cold*, pluralist institutions and rules became the obvious choice as to how an international society would develop throughout the years of conflict between the two superpowers. Bodies like the United Nations provided a forum for dialogue and diplomacy, minimalist cooperation, stability and also a sense of predictability among states. Both the US and USSR, and their allies, saw it in their rational interest to cooperate and mitigate anarchy in order to ensure their survival. The motives for states taking part in institutions are explained by Robert Keohane: "Institutions that facilitate cooperation do not mandate what governments must do; rather, they help governments pursue their own interests through cooperation" (Keohane 2005, 246). To sacrifice this strategy in the name of normative development, enforceable human rights laws or nonexistent conceptions of global morality could have been highly detrimental for whichever actor chose to be irrational.

A popular explanatory model for the issues which dominated international politics during the Cold War era can be found in structural realist literature. According to structural realist logic as it would be applied to the English School, systemic stability in support of international order was the primary concern for states and the institutions which comprised international society during this time (Waltz 1964, 907). While Waltz and his contemporaries would not be willing to admit that self-interested actors willingly bound themselves to rules and institutions in the spirit of cooperation, structural realists would highlight the notion that states would do whatever they could to ensure their survival. Waltz noted in 1959: "Common to the desires of all states is the wish for survival. Even the state that wants to conquer the world wants also, as a minimum, to continue its present existence" (Waltz 1959, 203). As a result, the description of interstate behaviour at the systemic level during the Cold War provided by structural realism may help to understand why pluralism would have been preferred to solidarism during that time. A major variable in any explanatory model examining post-World War II foreign relations, to which structural realists pay close attention to, is the development of nuclear arms and their proliferation. Historically, states in post-conflict situations were faced with seemingly obvious, though nonmyopic, strategic options. Since the end of World War II, however, any conflict and therefore a possible shift in the values of international society, must account for nuclear weapons and their effects on interstate behaviour. Structural realist theory may be able to explain elements of the Cold War relations between the US and USSR at the systemic level, and the English School can provide insight into how each side and their allies used international society to ensure stability in an era when nuclear arms were new (Bull 2002, 63-64). Even with possible explanatory power being found in applying structural realist logic to the English School framework, it is important

to note that contemporary changes in systemic polarity and the political climate since 1991 are difficult to understand due to their extraordinary complexity.

The transition from the Cold War international society to the contemporary incarnation of international society and its unique composition has been a source of contention among English School scholars. This chapter will seek to explore how modern international society came into existence, the competing claims being made by both pluralists and solidarists as to what type of society currently exists and the primary reasons for this unclear nature. Two key explanatory variables must be taken into account when theorizing about current international relations – the continued relevance of nuclear arms and the non-violent end to the Cold War.

4.1 Cold War International Society and its Collapse

The end of the Second World War witnessed the emergence of a bipolar conflict which was of primary concern for every state in the international system. Not only was the systemic arrangement dominated by two ideologically and politically divergent enemies, but both sides in the conflict had nuclear capabilities by 1949 (Gaddis 1982, 79). The added variable of nuclear arms at the end of World War II made for a new political environment to take hold in 1945, and that atmosphere became even more complex once the Soviet Union revealed it had successfully tested a bomb of its own. In the final years of the Second World War, the Allied leaders were concerned with what the post-war order would look like in terms of governing rules and norms for the international society which was about to emerge (LaFeber 1985, 24-25). It was clear to virtually all involved in the decision-making process that the Wilsonian utopianism which perforated international society in the wake of the First World War would have to be avoided in favour of a stable and orderly society of states which sought to balance the nuclear capabilities of the superpowers and the periphery conflicts among their allies.

As defined previously, the conclusion of the Second World War can be described by a magnanimity game which is solved by the *Victor*, namely the Allied Powers, choosing to maintain their *Status Quo* position while the *Defeated* Axis parties elected to *Cooperate*. This solution to the post-World War II magnanimity game allowed for the creation of a pluralist international society to take shape and govern the fifty years of the Cold War based on the rational calculations of the players described in the magnanimity game model. The concern for international stability and nuclear deterrence compelled states to cooperate at a minimalist level and to participate in international organizations designed to sustain interstate independence, equality and Westphalian sovereignty. When looking to explain the pillars of a particular international society more deeply, one can look to the requirements of such an arrangement as outlined by Bull. According to Bull, order in international society is created and maintained by three distinct features: common interests, rules and institutions (Bull 2002, 62-71). These aspects of achieving international order should also take into consideration the structural realist descriptions of state self-interest and the constant quest for survival in an anarchic international system.

Theorizing about the nature and conduct of the international system is of great concern for structural realists, and scholars like Waltz provide a valuable model of comprehending interstate behaviour at the systemic level. For the most part, the English School says little about the international system itself beyond referring to it as realist or Hobbesian in character.[1] What is essential to note, however, is that even during the Cold War, Waltz and other structural realists fell short in their efforts to explain the intricacies of interstate action based on their lack of appreciation for the cooperation witnessed within international society. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little note "the logic of anarchy does not preclude cooperation and that anarchy, therefore, is not incompatible with the formation of rules" (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993, 152). Discussions of the security dilemma, traditional game theory, the prisoner's dilemma and nuclear arms racing do paint a partial portrait of how states conducted themselves in the international system and created foreign policy strategy based on their desire for survival. Equally as vital to pursuing self-interest through one-upmanship and arms racing during the Cold War, though, was the state reliance upon a functioning and stable international society which would not allow the hard power competition in the systemic level to lead to nuclear holocaust.

Building on Bull's description of how to achieve order in international society, it may be possible to provide an explanation of the pluralist society which governed state action during the Cold War.

4.11 Common Interests

According to realist logic, the most basic common interest that has dominated interstate relations since the inception of the modern state system has been survival. States are assumed to be rational, self-interested actors who pursue their goals in ways that maximize their benefits while limiting costs as much as possible (Waltz 1979, 91-92). Assuming structural realist theory provides useful insight into action at the systemic level, there is still a need to apply these assumptions to English School postulates. In doing so, one can claim that, though the structure of the system remains constant, there is change in each international society regarding the way states go about pursuing their self-interest and survival. Throughout the Cold War, a variety of interests and norms can be explained or detected, but at the core of Cold War international society is one common interest that every state paid particular attention to – mitigating the anarchic international system in the emerging nuclear age (Bull 2002, 202).

Never before in human history had political units been forced to conceive of security with such a major technological threat looming over them. War has always been a part of human history and will certainly continue to be, but since the introduction of nuclear technology, the willingness of actors to wage war on each other and the calculations made leading to war have actually been made easier. Waltz argues:

[1] This is typically attributed to the English School's concern with international society and history, not systems-theory. See Richard Little, "The English School and World History," *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 45-64.

> So complex is the fighting of wars with conventional weapons that their outcomes have been extremely difficult to predict. Wars start more easily because the uncertainties of their outcomes make it easier for the leaders of states to entertain illusions of victory at supportable cost. In contrast, contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is possible focuses one's attention not on the probability of victory but on the possibility of annihilation. Because catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders of states will shrink in horror from initiating them (Waltz 1990, 734).

Self-interest and survival throughout the Cold War did not disappear, but how states pursued it was affected by the bipolar arrangement of the system and also the constant fear of nuclear weapons being used. Paul Hirst discusses the consequences of nuclear weapons on how states sought to maximize their security:

> Clausewitzian war began to be impossible for the core states of these blocs with the development of an approximate balance of nuclear weapons between the USA and USSR in the 1960s. Supposing minimal rationality, the use of nuclear weapons could only negate any possible policy pursued by both sides. Despite attempts at complex strategic and nuclear warfighting doctrines in the US, deterrence depended on a crude existential balance of terror that paralysed certain actions by state officials. Thus nuclear weapons had only one purpose in policy terms, as Bernard Brodie perceptively understood at the beginning of the new era, that is to negate their own use until a political solution to their existence could be found (Hirst 1998, 139).

As is the case in any systemic calculations of states, hard power is the first concern. During the Cold War, the threat of war between the US and USSR meant that interstate cooperation in the society of states would have to persistently take into account the notion that war between the superpowers could break out at any time. Common interests during this period were limited as a result. As Lawrence Freedman points out:

> The central problem of [Cold War] policy was awesome in its implications but also relatively simple in its formulation. Deterrence was the issue: in what circumstances would nuclear threats work and what would be the consequences if they failed to deter war or were counterproductive in their effects? How could political benefit be extracted from a nuclear arsenal without triggering a cataclysmic riposte? How could credibility be injected into preposterous posturing (Freedman 2002, 330-331).

It became somewhat obvious that states could no longer rely on the threat of war alone as the means to pursue their self-interest because each state was always acutely aware of the risks associated with war in the nuclear age. A major difference, however, was that during this time, states were far more reluctant to use war as a tool of self-interest than in previous international societies based on the possible disruption of the delicate balance of power which was responsible for keeping the Cold War stable in terms of major war prevention (Bull 2002, 119). Controlling nuclear arms, promoting dialogue between the

two superpowers and their respective allies, and avoiding another international war in an anarchic system all forced states to place great faith into the concept of an international society and its institutions, thus fostering a degree of common interest.

Introducing nuclear weapons into the theatre of war at the conclusion of the Second World War effectively concluded that war, but this also served to precipitate a totally new form of conflict which was waged primarily in the international society level rather than in the international system. At the systemic level, the common interest of all states was to avoid war because of the nuclear arms variable and the desire for limitation. According to John Baylis:

> The Hot-line Agreement, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the SALT I and SALT II Treaties all contributed to the recognition that the superpowers had a mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war. According to this view, the constant technological changes and widespread suspicions inherent in a system of global anarchy help to encourage arms competition which, in turn, endangers international security. By addressing the instabilities of the military balance of power, supporters argue that arms control significantly contributed to the absence of great power conflict during the Cold War. Even those negotiations that did not succeed, such as the MBFR Talks, are believed to have contributed to greater understanding between the adversaries (Baylis 2002, 197-198).

Anarchy and its effects still conditioned the system, but rather than resort to interstate war as a primary means of achieving security, states looked to other means to extend their spheres of influence and exercise their self-interest, such as international organizations. According to Bull, the United Nations throughout the Cold War "succeeded in surviving as a single, universal international organisation, and thus as a symbol of a sense of common interests and values that underlies the discord of the [Cold War] international system" (Bull 2002, 250). Any society of states created and promoted during the Cold War had to take these issues into consideration and limit any heavily normative or solidarist preferences. Norms could be discussed and debated, but implementation was a different story altogether. Without a functioning, respected and pluralist international society, war would likely have broken out early in the years of the Cold War. Instead, the success of the rules and institutions during this time, conditioned by the common interests of nuclear arms control and the mitigation of anarchy, translated into a bipolar, superpower conflict that never led to the outbreak of major war.

4.12 Rules

Once the common interests of the members of international society, namely states, are established, there is a need to create a set of rules which can aid in achieving those interests. "These rules may have the status of international law, of moral rules, of custom or established practice, or they may be merely operational rules or rules of the game, worked out without formal agreement or even without verbal communication" (Bull 2002, 64). In the realm of international politics, rules are typically limited due to the anarchy of the international system, but this does not prevent states from consenting to

mutually binding regulations that reflect the type of international society being created (Oye 1985). Through the previous discussion of the types of international society, it is argued that pluralist societies prefer minimalist rules that are consistent with understandings of positive law. The chief motivation for these sorts of rules might be the potential for disorder and the outbreak of war within those societies following a conflict which ends with the *Victor* imposing an order and maintaining the *Status Quo* position in the magnanimity game. The importance or rule-adherence and independence in pluralist societies is highlighted by Dunne: "In a pluralist international society, the institutional framework is geared towards the liberty of states and the maintenance of order among them. The rules are complied with because, like the rules of the road, fidelity to them is relatively cost free but the collective benefits are enormous" (Dunne 2007, 137). By keeping rules at a minimal level, a plurality of interests can be included in the governing of international society, but those rules are far less moral and natural law-inclined than those seen in solidarist societies, like Bull's World society.

The common interests in the Cold War international society have been defined here as survival, the mitigation of anarchy and more importantly, the maintenance of the balance of power in a bipolar system in an effort to control the use and proliferation of nuclear arms. To attain this goal over a long period of time, states may have seen it as being in their best interest to create a set of rules which would guarantee their independence, maintain their sovereignty and rely on diplomacy in the institutions of the society of states as to not disrupt the balance of power. These basic guidelines to interstate behaviour could allow states to pursue their own interests, maximize their security but also avoid the outbreak of major war or affecting the balance of power in place. Designing a pluralist international society during the Cold War in this way would serve to "provide a structure of coexistence, built on the mutual recognition of states as independent and legally equal members of society, on the unavoidable reliance on self-preservation and self-help, and on freedom to promote their own ends subject to minimal constraints" (Alderson and Hurrel 2000a, 7). This type of international society is consistent with pluralist accounts of a society of states, but what differs, perhaps, is the perceived need by the members of this particular society to adhere to the rules and realize the defined common interests because of the unique nuclear threat involved.

In the wake of the Second World War, the Allied powers were compelled to create a new version of international society that would not suffer the same fate as the overly utopian society ushered in after World War I, but one that would also guarantee stability among self-interested members. This is perhaps best evidenced by the foundational norms of the United Nations system, which remained pluralist in nature. According to A. LeRoy Bennett and James Oliver, the negotiators of the United Nations Charter "were unwilling, and perhaps unable, to think in terms other than those of nationalism, national sovereignty, nations interests and established patterns of international relationships" (Bennett and Oliver 2002, 46). The costs of instability, like the possibility of nuclear war breaking out, were far too high for any nation, major or minor in power, to risk. The outcome of the post-World War II magnanimity game also means that the Allies were able to learn from previous pluralist international societies when creating their model for governance. Rather than look to a solidarist model, which surely would have failed based

on the inherent ideological conflict of the two superpowers, it can be argued that the pluralist example of Bull's European international society became more appealing. If one of the rules of the Cold War international society was to be equality of states, the European society of states is a good example for achieving such a goal. Buzan contends:

> The main reason for thinking that international society is in good shape by historical standards is the near universal acceptance of the sovereign territorial state as the fundamental unit of political legitimacy. This can be seen as the great, though unintended, political legacy of the European imperium. So successful was the European state in unleashing human potential that it overshadowed all other forms of political organization in the system (Buzan 1991, 168-169).

Maintaining the sovereign independence and centrality of the state in Cold War international society would have been essential to stem the tide of nuclear arms in order to safeguard the balance of power (Waltz 1979, 118). One method in making sure the power and sovereign rights of states were not infringed upon was the norm of non-intervention. While human rights rhetoric had begun to emerge throughout the years of the Cold War and peacekeeping missions took place after a successful model was used in the Suez Crisis of 1956, the principle of non-intervention remained mostly intact and vital to sustaining the Cold War order. Jackson notes: "There is evidently a great reluctance on the part of major military powers to infringe upon the jurisdiction of even the least substantial sovereign state. Nonintervention is the foundation of international society and there would have to be very compelling reasons of state to disregard this general prohibition" (Jackson 1993, 192). In the final analysis of the Cold War international society, the basic organizing rules which constituted the foundational guidelines for coexistence among states were aimed at the most basic common interest of all states: survival in the nuclear age. Rules of sovereign equality of states, independence and non-intervention all successfully served to uphold the balance of power between two superpower, nuclear, rivals for close to fifty years (Hoffman 1991, 71-94). Of course, no rules have any relevance whatsoever if there is no form of enforcement mechanism. Enforcing the rules of international society is left to the institutions involved.

4.13 Institutions

It is first important to note what is meant by the term *institutions* within the English School framework. Rather than simply referring to specific international organizations, like the UN or NATO, Bull and other English School scholars saw institutions as the pillars of an international society that seek to maintain order (Bull 2002, 68-71). To do so, they would be founded upon common interests shared by states coming to form a society and be based upon the rules consented to by the members of the given society. As Tim Dunne notes:

> Fully to comprehend the pluralist order, one needs only to be reminded that great powers, limited war, and the balance of power were thought by the English School to be institutions. By this term, Bull and his colleagues were pointing to the practices that helped to sustain order, practices that evolved over many

> centuries. For example, if the balance of power was essential to preserve the liberty of states, then status quo powers must be prepared to intervene forcefully to check the growing power of a state that threatens the general balance (Dunne 2008, 274).

Institutions, then, are considered to be the tools which are used by states to maintain or establish order in the society of states. International organizations, like the UN, certainly play into this notion because, without these bodies, the physical space for dialogue among states would not exist. Buzan summarizes Bull's conception of institutions in greater detail than Dunne. He argues that in order to comprehend the idea of institutions in English School thought, one would have to divide them into two classifications: primary and secondary (Buzan 2004, 167). In this distinction, Buzan is able to provide insight as to how Bull's conception of institutions, which is far more consistent with those used during the Cold War period, were used in practice.[2] Primary institutions describe the normative character of the international society, while the secondary institutions are those created by states to achieve their goals. Buzan explains this rationale as follows:

Primary – *Diplomacy*; Secondary – *most Intergovernmental Organizations*
Primary – *War*; Secondary – *UN Security Council*
Primary – *Balance of Power and Great Power Management*; Secondary – *Alliances*
Primary – *International Law*; Secondary – *UN, ICJ, ICC*
Primary – *the State*; Secondary – *UN* (Buzan 2004, 167-190)

The primary institutions in the English School are the desired characteristics that states want to use in order to enforce their rules and attain their common interest, while secondary institutions are those designed by states to physically implement the rules and institutional arrangements (Buzan 2004, 161-176).[3] During the Cold War, it would be obvious to any observer that creating functional and respected interstate institutions to govern the tense climate of the superpower conflict would have been difficult. What is missing from Bull's discussions of institutions, and from most English School scholarship on the topic as well, is how nuclear arms would have affected the impact of institutions on Cold War international society, and any society of states that will be created in the future.[4]

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[2] This is not to delegitimize the institutional explanations offered by Wight, Mayall, Holsti, James or Jackson, but instead, to highlight more that Bull's conception of institutions is far more consistent with Cold War International Society than the others. Even so, this project admits to the shortcomings of Bull's definitions as outlined by Buzan.

[3] For more on the institutions of international society, see Kalevi Holsti, "The Institutions of International Politics: Continuity, Change, and Transformation," paper presented at the ISA Convention (New Orleans, 2002) and James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and its Limits* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

[4] Bull did discuss the Cold War at length, but the impacts of nuclear arms on the types of institutions, and how these institutions have altered since the advent of nuclear weapons, are not clear in his work. For Bull's work on the Cold War, see Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961).

It is reasonable to conceive of the Cold War international society as being of the pluralist variant because of its primary goal of ensuring state survival through minimalist cooperation. With this being the case, envisioning primary institutions that the superpowers could agree on and actually adhere to would have been a delicate process. In his work on the topic, Bull describes a small number of primary institutions as being relevant, and this appears consistent with a pluralist society of states wishing to guarantee survival and independence (Bull 2000a, 77-94). Institutions like diplomacy and the state are both designed to give states, as the primary actors in global politics, the opportunity to dialogue and act without enormous constraints on their behaviour. Bull claims: "Diplomacy is an activity appropriate to the situation in which the states or other political entities concerned are pursuing different interests, but also have some common interests" (Bull 2002, 170). When restrictions are necessary, however, war, the balance of power and international law are used to make sure no one state, or group of states, disrupt the fragile international order of the time.

War was by no means eliminated from the international political landscape during the Cold War. Averting nuclear war may have been a common interest in the formation of the Cold War international society, but the use of legitimate violence by states was seen as a viable option for preventing such an outcome. As Martin Wight once argued "war is the institution for the final settlement of differences" (Wight 1979, 112). This may have been the case in the first half of the twentieth century, but by the time of the Cold War, Wight's statement would have been altered to indicate that nuclear war was the final settlement, while traditional war was a desperate means used to avoid getting to the final settlement. Within most of Buzan's descriptions of secondary institutions, the United Nations system played a major role in implementing each of the primary institutions, especially when determining the legitimate use of force and creating a space where the superpowers could put off any hints at war, whether in the nuclear or traditional form.

According to the design of the UN system, international law and the management of great powers were preventative measures to be taken before any suggestion of violence would take place. The UN Charter states that the organization was established

> to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom (Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations).

Arguably, however, the UN and its bodies were designed to create and maintain a balance of power in the nuclear age which would prevent the outbreak of a third major war in the twentieth century, and that would ultimately benefit the victors of the Second World War

by allowing them to determine the global political, economic and social agenda.[5] Solidarists use the rhetoric in the UN Charter and the various conventions and doctrines adopted throughout the Cold War to argue that while the UN does reflect power politics at its core, it was still heavily concerned with normative promotion (Roberts 2003). Denying such a claim becomes difficult based on the sheer number of human rights, economic and social treaties adopted between 1945 and 1991, but the question solidarists scholars find difficult to answer with any precision is – just how many of those heavily moral or normative ideas were ever acted upon, and can scholars find empirical proof of states, especially among the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council, acting on morally-based notions that were not directly in their self-interest? The gap in logic between the solidarist thesis of human rights and solidarity, and the empirical support for states acting according to their self-interest, may serve to demonstrate that pluralist concerns, and not entirely solidarist, were behind the formation of the UN and Cold War international society.

Conceiving of war as a primary institution of international society would be essential in comprehending the Cold War society of states and how the UN was established. As mentioned previously, war was considered to be a last resort option for the member states of the UN, especially the great powers, if the balance of power or nuclear deterrence were being threatened. "Specifically, in the perspective of international society, war is a means of enforcing international law, of preserving the balance of power, and, arguably, of promoting changes in the law generally regarded as just" (Bull 2002, 181). War to the UN was consistent with the English School's understanding of war as a primary institution – in many cases, war needs to be averted in order to avoid the realist warnings of self-interest and the use of power, especially in terms of nuclear arms; on the other hand, war is a useful tool in maintaining the order that is established at the formation of an international society. Cold War international society allowed the five of the victors of the Second World War, the US, Great Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union, to determine the legitimate uses of violence in the international system and privileged their abilities to guarantee diplomatic solutions to disputes among states, including themselves, by making them the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the UN Security Council (Hampson and Penny 2007, 546-547). Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter states:

> Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (Charter of the United Nations).

As a last resort option, the P5 can use war as a method of upholding the common interests and rules of international society and only they can establish the conditions when legitimate force can be used in an international dispute. Of course, what is also crucial to

[5] This builds on the logic of international institutions provided by Mearsheimer. For more, see John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/1995), 5-49. Of particular note is Mearsheimer's discussion of NATO (pp. 13-14).

note in any discussion of the P5 of the UN Security Council during the Cold War is that both the US and USSR were sure to veto any effort at using force if it was interpreted to affect their foreign policy strategies during the conflict (Smith 2005, 42).

For the duration of the Cold War, international society can be explained according to the pluralist model in English School literature. States appeared to define their common interests at a basic level, being that of survival, and were willing to adhere to rules through various institutions, like the UN, in order to achieve their primary interest, which was continued existence in the nuclear age (Grieco 1993, 116-143). Norms, global morality and ideas of cosmopolitanism could be detected during this time, but rarely did these solidarist notions replace the indispensable quest for state survival and security maximization. It was only when states could fulfill their interest directly that they would act on any solidarist ideas. To more clearly understand how the Cold War political climate was seen through an English School lens, the following hierarchy may be of use:

Table 4-1:

Cold War Hierarchy of International Politics

International System

Nature: *Anarchic, yet stable due to balance of power*
Units of analysis: *Self-interested, security maximizing states*
Forms of power able to affect level: *Hard Power only*
Power Structure: *Bipolar – US vs. USSR*
Theoretical Explanations: *Hobbes, Machiavelli, Waltz, Game Theory (Prisoner's Dilemma)*

Power is exercised through military capabilities



International Society

Nature: *Use of positive law-based institutions to foster reluctant cooperation*
Units of analysis: *Self-interested, security maximizing states; balance of power = necessary evil*
Forms of power able to affect level: *Hard Power only*
Power Structure: *Bipolar, brinksmanship-based*
Theoretical Explanations: *Wight, Bull, Jackson*
*affected primarily by System

Power is exercised through diplomacy and coercion; if unsuccessful, possibility for war becomes Systemic concern



World Society

Nature: *Nationalist (though it is noted transnationalism began to emerge by the 1970s)*
Units of analysis: *domestic variables*
Forms of power able to affect level: *all*
Power Structure: *Constrained by systemic concerns of Cold War - fear of nuclear war*
Theoretical Explanations: *Habermas, Keohane and Nye*
*able to affect international society, but typically ignored; system reigned supreme

Power is exercised through dominant norms and ideational concerns

Leading up to the end of the Cold War, theorists of virtually all backgrounds were unsure as to what the post-Cold War era would bring in terms of cooperation, systemic polarity and normative emphasis. Due to the stable end of the Cold War and the risk of nuclear war, the post-Cold War international society would be far more difficult to describe in terms of typology and suddenly, state self-interest was moving beyond hard power concerns alone.

4.2 The Move to Modern International Society

At the conclusion of the Cold War, both the United States and the USSR were forced to contemplate the nature of the post-Cold War international order, and what part each side would play (Schweller and Wohlforth 2000, 60-107). It was evident to most onlookers that the US was about to embark upon a moment of unipolar hegemony, while the status and power capabilities of the former USSR were uncertain. Designing a magnanimity game using the theory of moves model presented by Steven Brams would conclude with the US choosing a strategy of *Magnanimity* and the USSR choosing to *Cooperate*. These choices by both sides were calculated carefully and sought primarily to prevent the outbreak of either nuclear or major war as the Cold War came to an end. In essence, such an unstable era came to a very stable and quiet conclusion, much to the confusion of structural realist scholars. With the Cold War coming to an end and a major shift in the polarity of the international system, the world has since seen the formation of a new international society. What has become most difficult in the contemporary era, however,

is clearly defining and understanding this society of states because of its vast complexity when compared to previous international societies.

Interestingly enough, since 1945, the world has seen only two international societies – the pluralist Cold War variant and the modern example. In the wake of the Second World War and with the introduction of nuclear arms to the strategic equations facing states in their foreign policy decisions, a pluralist framework best suited the years of the Cold War and was successful in preventing any major wars from occurring.[6] Modern international society is not nearly as simple to describe, however. In the past, solidarist international societies had very clear aims, which included the imposition of ideational and normative concerns by the *Victor* in the wake of a conflict, but in the contemporary era, the introduction of nuclear arms and the threat of their use make solidarist ideas far more complex to introduce to the society of states.

Nuclear arms, while only successfully tested by a limited number of states internationally, have seriously altered the landscape of international societies. According to systemic logic, states are motivated primarily by their desire to survive and thus seek to maximize their security at every turn by making rational calculations regarding their own actions and evaluating the conduct of other states. While a *Victor* of a major conflict may see a solidarist society as being in its best interest in terms of guaranteeing its normative security, it is the actions of the *Defeated* which now pose a greater problem, especially if that *Defeated* party or any of its allies have nuclear capabilities. In the wake of the Cold War, the Russian Federation remains a major nuclear power and a regional hegemon (Alexseev 2003, 38-57). Because the Cold War ended without physical devastation or military defeat, the conclusion of the conflict is different than those seen in previous historical periods. It is difficult to conceive of an international society being created after a non-violent conflict because there would be no immediate rational incentive for states to alter their strategic calculations.[7] Proxy wars broke out a number of times during the conflict, but the two superpowers were deterred from direct conflict because of the rational acceptance of Mutual Assured Destruction (Waltz 1993, 47). Since 1991, interactions between the US and Russia are mostly stable, but must still take the threat of nuclear war into account when tensions between the two sides begin to rise.[8] Moreover, while modern international society has a number of solidarist elements to it, like the growth of human rights discourse and greater attention being given to individuals at the global level, the framework and institutions of the contemporary society of states remain primarily pluralist in nature. This dichotomy between the two types of international society represents a problem for states when they evaluate their foreign policy strategies in the modern era. Both solidarists and pluralists have claimed to better comprehend modern international society, and have spent considerable effort dismissing each other's arguments. Understanding these competing claims of ownership over the

[6] Though major war was averted, peripheral wars were fought. See Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18:2 (Autumn 1993), 47.

[7] It is noted here that the magnanimity game model provided by Brams is applied to interstate wars where there is a clear victor and a vanquished opponent. A lack of violence may have an impact over the rational choices facing the actors at the conclusion of a conflict. See Brams (1994), 73-75.

[8] Typical sources of tension between the US and Russia focus on NATO expansion and Russia's continued relations with 'rogue states'. See Ellison (2003), 78-99.

classification of modern international society demonstrates the unique character of the contemporary international political climate.

4.21 Contemporary Solidarism

Adhering to Bull's framework for understanding how to identify the type of international society in a particular historical period, the best way to demonstrate how either solidarists or pluralists understand the classification of modern international society is done by examining three elements: common interests, rules and institutions.

For solidarists, the common interests of modern international society differ somewhat from those seen throughout the Cold War. The self-interested nature of states is not necessarily brought into question, but how states come to define their self-interest has changed. Security maximization remains the primary motivator for states, but security is no longer understood in the narrow definition of national security, which is taken from realist conceptions of self-help. Instead, many solidarist scholars, like Nicholas Wheeler, Tim Dunne, Andrew Linklater and others, are pointing to the need to focus on how security affects the world society level of analysis in English School thought. According to Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald: "In this society, the boundaries of community extend beyond the state and the overall purpose of the society is the protection of individual security" (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 313). By looking to the domestic sphere, solidarist accounts of security attempt to discuss the responsibility of states in securing individuals, not simply statist interests and attempt to extend the understanding of security beyond the systemic concerns for hard power alone.

Individual or human security is contingent upon a notion that states are moral agents and are obligated to protect the natural rights of humanity, which is understood to be inherently connected. Solidarist scholars differ somewhat on their interpretations of the extent of human interdependence, but there is some common ground among them in terms of humanity being the ultimate referent for the policies of states (Linklater and Suganami 2006, 242-246). In terms of supporting a view of the interconnected nature of humanity in world society, Andrew Linklater makes a strong case. Rather than attempting to prove the notion of a like-minded or normatively universal humanity, Linklater claims that individuals in world society are linked by basic physical vulnerability:

> The main point to make is that the bonds and attachments between strangers may rest entirely on the almost universal experience of being similar to, but not necessarily equal with (or identical to) others, and in being exposed as part of one's biological heritage to similar vulnerabilities to mental and physical suffering. It is striking that some of the earliest formulations of the defence of cosmopolitanism in Western moral and political theory grounded the perspective in such universal vulnerabilities of the body. This is hardly extraordinary given that mutual recognition of shared mental and physical vulnerability provides the most readily available means of projecting forms of solidarity across the boundaries of established communities – and across the boundaries that are

> deemed to exist between human and non-human forms of life (Linklater 2007, 138).

An essential point here, however, is that while solidarists like Linklater may see humanity as the driving concern for theory, they maintain the primacy of the state as the vehicle through which security of the individual is to be attained. This argument is supported by Linklater as he argues:

> In this perspective, international societies are the key level of analysis because they have been the main steering mechanisms which independent communities have devised for organising increasing levels of global interconnectedness. As organisers of humanity, they have been the vehicles through which certain universal ethical potentialities could be released and embedded in collective efforts to ensure that the relations between social groups do not cause unnecessary suffering to peoples everywhere (Linklater 2007, 148).

The common interest for states in modern international society, according to solidarist scholars, is to protect the natural rights intrinsic to all individuals in world society. This account of the society of states tends not pay close attention to the anarchic constraints of the international system, but instead examines more closely the relationship between international society and world society.[9] To achieve this concern for individual security, the rules of modern international society are also divergent from those seen throughout the Cold War.

When discussing Cold War international society, the rule of non-intervention and strong state sovereignty was perceived as vital to maintaining the stability of the balance of power. Solidarists argue that this time has since passed and that human security is only guaranteed by an alteration to the rule of non-intervention. Bellamy and McDonald focus on this argument as a means for suggesting an English School discourse on security as they contend:

> the focus on justice rather than order, and human rights rather than a conception of sovereignty as non-intervention, allows us to think of ways of redressing human rights abuses and to question the centrality of the state as the primary referent of security. Solidarism suggests, for example, that sovereignty and human rights may be two sides of the same coin: a state's sovereignty may indeed be legitimised and supported (and the sovereignty of the international society more broadly with it) if the state does indeed provide human security for its citizens (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 326).

It is difficult to envision modern international society as rejecting the typical rule of non-intervention, but solidarists use strong empirical evidence to support their claims. Examples of changes within the UN and reform efforts hint at clear changes to the rules

[9] For an extensive discussion of world society and the solidarist relationship, see Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

of international society itself. Nicholas Wheeler points to the emerging practice of humanitarian intervention throughout the 1990s as a sign that the rules of modern international society are contingent upon interventionism becoming an accepted method for states to uphold or achieve the common interest of individual security (Wheeler 2000, 285-310). One of the most controversial examples of this alteration to the rule of non-intervention is found in the 2001 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) document.

Produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), R2P suggests that states in modern international society can no longer hide behind the excuse of sovereignty when it comes to averting humanitarian disaster (Bellamy 2009, 73-74). Sovereignty, according to this view, is not absolutely guaranteed under positive international law, but instead becomes a conditional right. To attain this right, states must ensure the protection of their populations. Section 2.15 of the ICISS report states:

> Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human security (ICISS 2001, 13).

Though opponents of doctrines like R2P point to the fact that such alterations to state sovereignty and the *need* for interventionism have not taken place in practice, the normative development and popularity of R2P in forums like the UN may prove a shift in the way states are pursuing their interests. Of course this change also comes as a result of the increase in the number of intrastate conflicts and civil wars since the end of World War II.[10] Cold War international society was occupied primarily with stemming the tide of nuclear war among the superpowers, but with the end of the Cold War, the solidarist agenda has been dedicated to seeing international society as the forum in which to discuss, debate and actually protect human rights.

In terms of institutions within the solidarist conception of modern international society, there are many of the same primary and secondary institutions that were in existence in Cold War international society, but there have also been some changes and additions. In his discussion of contemporary institutions, Buzan highlights those which are essential in maintaining the state-centrism of the English School, like territoriality, diplomacy and great power management, but he is also sure to make some additional contributions to the various institutions which govern a solidarist idea of modern international society (Buzan

[10] For more on the changed to warfare since the end of World War II, see Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

2004, 187). Added to the list of primary institutions are the equality of people, the market, nationalism and environmental stewardship. Buzan explains that the growth in many world society factors since the end of the Cold War has altered the institutional agenda in modern international society, allowing for factors like humanitarian intervention, the liberal economic markets and the environment to become vital considerations for all states. To protect these primary institutions and adhering to the common interest of individual security and well-being, Buzan describes the importance of bodies like the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Buzan 2004, 187).

In essence, solidarists argue in favour of a view that makes modern international society into a more idealist and human-focused realm. The primary responsibility of states, according to the solidarist agenda, is not to focus on mitigating anarchy and making advances in hard power technology alone, but is coupled, if not surpassed, by a desire to secure the rights and lives of humanity. Solidarists believe the rules of international society have changed from those which governed the Cold War, especially the understandings of sovereignty as absolute to a shift that defines sovereignty as a conditional right (Bellamy 2009, 19-27). Institutions continue to play a critical role in the governance of modern international society, but the types and range of institutions, both in the primary and secondary sense, are larger in number and are heavily influenced by the normative concerns of world society. It is easy to see that many states and international organizations have begun to discuss these norms and values underscored by solidarists, but the empirical evidence supporting their enforcement and implementation remains questionable. Dorothy Jones notes: "Sincerity of intent has often been overbalanced by sincerity of national interest and even more often by sincerity of grievance. Basically, for whatever reason, the states have never succeeded in creating an environment in which they felt safe enough to live together without arms and the resort to arms" (Jones 1991, 135). As a result, pluralists are able to make a case of their own for modern international society remaining firmly in their classification, despite the solution to the Cold War magnanimity game.

4.22 Contemporary Pluralism

It is difficult to deny that the foreign policy strategies of states have changed substantially since the end of the Cold War. Modern international society has become a forum in which states can more openly discuss and try to implement normative policies aimed at improving the conditions within world society and international institutions have made very public claims about their desires to reform in order to meet the needs of the global populous.[11] What must also be taken into account, however, is the continued relevance of the international system in describing the way states interact and behave. On one hand, solidarist values are playing a larger role in the ways states are attempting to achieve their self-interest, but apprehension about implementing these norms due to the

[11] See for instance Kofi Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000).

distrust of other states, the existence of nuclear weapons and the security maximizing tendencies of nations translates into a society of states very similar to pluralist models seen in the past. For pluralists, the public face of state behaviour may have changed, but their day-to-day behaviour has not.

The common interest intrinsic to all states in the modern era that was also seen throughout the Cold War is survival. In the pluralist view, states seek to cooperate at a minimalist level in international society so they do not disrupt the stability of the international system and end up potentially having to go to war with one another. In order to protect this common interest, the rules of modern international society are arguably much the same as they were throughout the Cold War – premised on non-intervention and minimalist cooperation. To claim, as solidarists do, that sovereignty has become more of a conditional right than an absolute one is difficult to prove. Robert Jackson discusses this point as he claims:

> Human rights in current international law are subject to the consent of sovereigns, however. The cosmopolitan society of humankind is legally – not to mention politically – inferior to the international society of sovereign states. Independent governments are free to decide whether or not to be signatories to human rights instruments. They may feel under a moral obligation to sign. They may come under political pressure to sign. They may believe it is in their interests to sign. They are under no legal obligation to do so, however. Although there is a growing moral imperative in international society to protect human rights which derives from domestic standards and international influence of Western democracies, sovereign rights still have priority over human rights in international law (Jackson 1993, 46).

Jackson's observations soon after the end of the Cold War continue to have relevance. States have not entirely moved away from seeking to attain national security in favour of human security. Discussions of such ideas have sometimes resulted in complete inaction on the parts of states. There can be no better examples than the genocides in Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan. These two major human rights atrocities occurred after the Cold War ended, and in an era when solidarists have been describing international affairs by looking to variables like world society, natural rights, global citizenship and cosmopolitan ideals. Even with the perceived victory of the UN adopting the R2P doctrine in 2005, albeit in a weaker form than that seen in the original ICISS document, there has not, to this day, been an intervention approved by the UN in the name of R2P. While noble in theory and rhetoric, there is little hope of seeing this document used in practice in either its 2001 or 2005 version. Kim Nossal explains why this is the case:

> despite the nominal endorsement of the [R2P] agenda at the United Nations, in real terms this endorsement is entirely symbolic, since there are at least two members of the security council, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, that do not really believe in R2P, and thus can be counted on to use their veto to block any security council approval of R2P initiatives that even marginally touch their interests (Nossal 2005, 1029).

The debate over the use and relevance of R2P in modern international society will be a topic of greater discussion later in this work, but its difficulties to this point may serve to demonstrate the pluralist contention about the need to focus more on interstate conflict and the behaviour of states in the system, rather than reducing international relations to individual concerns. Pluralists in the modern era, like Jackson, do not discount the possibility of changing the way that politics in the modern society of states is conducted, but the primary institutions, like sovereignty and great power management are as relevant as human-centric variables at this time in the history of international politics. Consequently, any shifts to a purely solidarist notion of foreign relations strategy might prove destabilizing at the systemic level because of the disruption to balance of power logic posed by individual-focused proposals for state action. Bellamy and McDonald discuss this point by showing how the pluralist political agenda is guided by the warnings of both Bull and E.H. Carr out of the belief that "the forceful articulation of political values would destabilise international order and make it harder for states to provide security for their citizens" (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 314). Moreover, Jackson finds a serious problem in trying to enforce the human security agenda emphasized by solidarists. This notion presents a possible threat to international order due to the fact that there is no consensus on what human rights are, and thus "the consistent enforcement of human security around the world is impossible" (Jackson 2000, 214).

Jackson concedes that primary institutions have changed and become more world society-focused, but does not agree with Buzan's logic which places these institutions on the same level as those which affect national security. Without national security, Jackson argues, there can be no hope of realizing progress in issues like economics or the environment, but these are not interpreted as security issues. He argues that "an economic depression might threaten my personal welfare as well as the national welfare, but it is no threat to my safety or my country's security" (Jackson 2000, 195). Therefore, the pluralist agenda, often associated with the traditional realist idea of international relations, is more concerned with maintaining stability among self-interested states in an anarchic system than it is with trying to impose values.[12] In the modern context, states are not consistently acting on the rhetorical values which solidarists define as being representative of the typology of modern international society.[13] It is this dichotomy between solidarist rhetoric and pluralist actions that makes the contemporary society of states so intriguing. The following hierarchy might be useful as a means of theorizing the hybrid nature of modern international society:

[12] This builds on Bull's earlier warnings about the Grotian idea of international society, which is now more closely related to solidarism. See Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," *Hedley Bull on International Society* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), 95-118.

[13] This does not preclude the possibility that solidarist norms will become a source of state action in the future. This follows the logic presented by Jackson in his discussion of contemporary international society. See Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Table 4-2:

Modern Hierarchy of International Politics

International System

Nature: *Anarchic, yet stable due to desired equilibrium*
Units of analysis: *Self-interested States*
Forms of power able to affect level: *Hard Power only*
Current power structure: *Unipolar though shifting to multipolar*
Theoretical Explanations: *Hobbes, Machiavelli, Mearsheimer, Layne*
*open to influence from international society

Power is still exercised through military capabilities

International Society

Nature: *Openly cooperative*
Units of analysis: *Self-interested states, though security is pursued in hard and non-hard power methods*
Forms of power able to affect level: *State-based – Hard and Soft*
Current power structure: Multipolar – *P5 Security Council members dominate agenda, plus regional hegemons - Forms of State as expansion of self-interest and projection of power*
Theoretical Explanations: *Grotius, Jackson*
*affected primarily by system, but at times from world society – Systemic concerns take precedence

Power is exercised through diplomacy; if unsuccessful, possibility for war increases

World Society

Nature: *Globalized, Moral, Empathetic*
Units of analysis: *individuals, non-state actors*
Forms of power able to affect level: *all*

Current power structure: *Cultures, norms, ideologies of dominant states dictate globalized agenda*
Theoretical Explanations: *Kant, Marx, Habermas*
*able to affect international society in theory, but remains subservient to systemic concerns; not able to affect system

Power is exercised through dominant norms and ideational concerns

Conclusion

Both solidarists and pluralists have legitimate claims as to which way one should classify modern international society. Each side has a strong case to make in terms of how states are currently behaving, but the reality of the situation is that neither side is totally correct, nor is either side completely wrong. Rhetorically, modern international society is very much solidarist in nature. Scholars like Wheeler, Dunne, Linklater, Bellamy and McDonald all point to solidarist-based issues and doctrines which would speak to the current willingness of states to discuss and strengthen ideas like human rights, human security and the primacy of individuals worldwide. The idealism in international theory as a whole since the end of the Cold War and the fact that the magnanimity game explaining the end of the conflict was solved with the US choosing a strategy of *Magnanimity* both mean that a significant change in the political agendas of states has occurred. When UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali introduced the *Agenda for Peace* in 1992, the solidarist case for an altered international society was empirically supported as it seemed as if states were entering into a new era of cooperation and action in human rights promotion. Like many critical and liberal writers, English School solidarists felt that the creation of modern international society equated the shift from international to global politics (Sorensen 1998, 99-100).

In terms of potential alterations to the international political environment, solidarists point to the vast array of doctrines and treaties that nations have signed on to since 1991 which focus entirely on the security of individuals. Cosmopolitan concerns have compelled debates over global citizenship and how contemporary forms of globalization have brought the world closer together. A marked decline in the willingness of states to even threaten war has allowed solidarist thinkers to argue in favour of a decline in the influence of the anarchic international system and that the prisoner's dilemma-type of international interaction may have disappeared. Of course, the problem with this kind of thinking is that, while states are discussing solidarist norms and values in public, they are sometimes acting quite differently in terms of foreign policy practice.

If a magnanimity game ended with a nonmyopic equilibrium solution and solidarists are able to find a variety of natural law, morally-based state doctrines consistent with their conceptions of international society, then how is it that pluralists are also still relevant in the contemporary context of international relations? It is admitted that states are behaving differently in terms of foreign policy creation and eagerness to debate issues that focus wholly on world society, but in practice, states are often acting in a manner

which would not reflect a solidarist society of states. Instead, the pillars of pluralism are highly prevalent in modern international affairs.

States may use the rhetoric of solidarism on a regular basis, but their actions sometimes tell a different tale. Self-interest calculations may have altered in such a way that, though states are pursuing their interests in ways that do not disturb the stability of interstate interaction, they are still, at least in part, motivated by security maximization and the fear of major war, especially with the constant threat of nuclear war. Within international society, states are willing to appear as moral, normative actors that are moving away from Cold War pluralism, but such normative progress often disappears once an issue threatens the hard power capabilities or national security concerns of a state (Mearsheimer 2001, 50-53). World society-based issues tend to become the basis for state action when hard power is not brought into the rational equation. Individuals, cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism are aspects of state policy only insofar as military or hard power action is not required. It is as if states will resort to pluralist behaviour when they are faced with the decision to sacrifice their self-interest or to potentially surrender power capabilities in the international system.

In essence, modern international society is best described as a *hybrid* model – rhetorically solidarist, but institutionally pluralist. Espousing norms and values is simple, but acting on those doctrines and enforcing the interests of humanity is a completely different equation. When concerns of self-interest reach the point where they may affect the international system or disrupt the delicate balance among states in the contemporary context, the stability of the system must remain a driving concern in determining state action. Such an explanation does not equate to victory for the prototypical realist argument, that states are always going to act in a self-interested manner regardless of the historical circumstances, but instead, means that English School scholars are often overlooking the continued importance of the international system in global affairs.

At present, it can be said that the institutions of international society reflect a pluralist typology for a reason: because states are fearful of making a transition away from the constancy and predictability of rational state action experienced throughout the Cold War. Efforts to make a successful transition from pluralist state practice towards a functioning solidarist society require further thought and development, and these theories must include reference to the international system. This issue will be covered at greater length in future chapters, but of immediate concern is defining how states are pursuing their self-interest in a hybrid international society. Rather than relying on the alliance system or great power influence of previous eras because of the desire to avoid armed conflict, it is possible that states have begun to use international society as a means of achieving their goals of security maximization without resorting to hard power. In an effort to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation and the possible use of nuclear arms, some states have embarked upon self-interested policies that tend to utilize other means of state power to achieve their goals, while safeguarding the equilibrium of the international system. Rejecting strictly hard power concerns from the international political agenda and engaging in other forms of diplomatic behaviour allows scholars to identify various

forms of states and to recognize the continued value of English School thought to the existing international relations discourse.

It should be noted that the theory of moves model has been used to this point in order to present a potential explanation as to where international societies come from and how history has witnessed transitions from one to another. At the heart of the magnanimity games designed in this work is the driving assumption, which is also inherent in structural realist theory, that states are utility maximizers and are, their core, rational actors. Though the formal games of theory of moves will not play a prominent role in the remainder of this work, the characterization of states as being rationally self-interested most certainly will. The next chapter will seek to broaden how the state is conceived of at its first principles in the society of states, but even with varying forms of state, rationality continues to dictate how states determine their foreign policy goals in both the international system and international society.

Chapter 5: Understanding the *State* in Modern International Society[1]

The metatheoretical concern with state centrism in contemporary international relations has become a preoccupation for many theorists due to the consequences associated with a potential decline or increase in the power of states (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995). Cold War international theory was compelled to think in terms of states because of the constant focus on the two superpowers in conflict, perhaps best evidenced in realist theories. Within the English School, the idea of *the state* has always played a central role in theorizing. From the School's original articulations in the works of Wight, Bull and others, understanding international politics could not be divorced from state theory, though state-centrism was coupled with world society concerns as well.

Along with the growth in critical theory since the end of the Cold War has been the expansion of the solidarist project in the English School.[2] Included in this agenda has been plenty of discussion about the continued pre-eminence of the state and more importantly, its relationship to the world society variables that tend to dominate solidarist scholarship. Individuals and normative forces are of primary interest to solidarist writers and as a result, the state can sometimes be seen to have a casual relationship with global politics. To some theorists, like Andrew Linklater, the state is almost interpreted as a necessary evil – its dominance is decreasing, but the solidarist agenda of emancipation and individual security cannot be achieved in the current incarnation of global politics without state assistance (Linklater 2007). Solidarism appears to view the state as one of many actors which aim to address human interests and normative enforcement; not as the primary actor in a system of states (Bellamy 2005b, 290-293). In contrast to this view is the pluralist understanding of the state. Pluralists recognize the changing nature of international politics to some extent but clearly still view the state as the unit of analysis when describing the *international*. In this light, the English School itself is divided over how states behave, ought to behave and their centrality in the modern era of international, or global, politics.

A major problem facing the English School on both sides of the theoretical divide is a clear and useful theory of the state. Many English School scholars tend to accept the original and basic definition of the state put forth by Hedley Bull: "The starting point of international relations is the existence of states, or independent political communities each of which possess a government and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of earth's surface and a particular segment of the human population" (Bull 2002, 8-10). How to interpret sovereignty and its nature have become of particular interest to both pluralist and solidarist scholars recently, but the fact remains that the state is understood as an actor which asserts a monopoly of control over a certain territory and

[1] A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication to *International Theory*.
[2] For more on seeing the end of the Cold War as a point of transition in English School thought, see Martin Shaw, "Global society and global responsibility: the theoretical, historical and political limits of 'international society'," *Millennium* 21:3 (1992), 421-434.

population.[3] Comprehending the functioning and character of any international society, however, requires far more insight than such a rudimentary theory of the state.

Modern international society is dominated by states, which remain the most important actors in the world today. No utopian or realist theoretical agenda above the national level can be fulfilled without the approval and action of states. Though states remain at the core of international relations, their behaviour in the modern society of states cannot be reduced to either the realist understanding of states in the international system, nor the liberal or critical concern with states as tools of individuals. To more adequately explain international relations in the contemporary era, one must look to how states behave in international society.

Rather than relying upon a monolithic comprehension of the state, this chapter seeks to broaden how theorists conceive of the state and the consequences of doing so. To this end, a theory regarding the different *forms of state* will be introduced. An immediate qualification here is that such an effort differs greatly from the forms of the state described by Robert Cox. In his work, Cox seeks to redefine the state as having various forms as well, but these variations are focused on how societies interact with the global economy. Cox claims:

> Some states use their powers to resist adaptation by attempting to force other states to adjust to their interests. Some states seize the new economic environment as an opportunity to control their own adjustment and advance their own economies. Many have adjustment thrust unwillingly upon them. All, however, reason about state policy and the premise of the world economy. In these changes in the role and capacities of states, it is increasingly meaningless to speak of the state as do neorealists, or even of the capitalist state. It becomes more useful to think in terms of *forms* of state – different forms which condition the ways in which different societies link into the global political economy (Cox 1996e, 154).

Cox makes a compelling case for approaching the conception of the state differently, but falters by conceiving of international politics as deriving initially from economic forces. It may be the case that various forms of states exist in the society of states and these forms help to determine the political strategies of states and their foreign policy calculations like just how willing a state will be to go to war, develop military technology, enter into alliances or international organizations and how willing they might be to disrupt the equilibrium in the international system. International politics, therefore, should take the state into account, but it is difficult to reply upon either the structural realist, liberal or critical conceptions currently in use based on their shortcomings in effectively explaining contemporary interstate behaviour.

[3] This is evidenced by the continued acceptance of the state as an actor in both pluralist and solidarist accounts. Also see Cornelia Navari, "Introduction: Methods and Methodology in the English School," *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 8-9.

In their daily affairs, states are faced with rational choices, like whether or not to enter into international society. Once in the society of states, these states must choose how they will behave and cooperate on a regular basis. In examining a variety of factors, like material capabilities, domestic resources, historical role in international affairs, geographical location and normative commitments, states may also decide what form of state they will embody in international society. This chapter will discuss the current understandings of the state and their limitations, and seek to present a theory regarding the modern forms of state which can be useful in the English School approach.

5.1 The Statist Research Programme

Traditionally, the centrality of the state has been at the core of realist theories, especially the structural variant. Throughout the works of scholars like Waltz, Mearsheimer and others, the interactions of self-interested and rational actors in the international system have been the dominant paradigm in structural realist theory (Wendt 1999, 15-16). In an effort to provide methodological rigour to realist theory, Waltz employs the work of Imre Lakatos.[4] Lakatos, a Hungarian philosopher of mathematics, logic and the natural sciences, provides a framework which attempts to evaluate the progressive nature of a theory, and whether contributions to it are progressive or degenerative. A major concern for Waltz is the way realism was initially constructed and how to evaluate the various theories being presented in IR. Waltz argues scholars should pay attention to Lakatos for one primary reason: "Lakatos' assaults crush the crassly positivist ideas about how to evaluate theories that are accepted by most political scientists. He demolishes the notion that one can test theories by pitting them against facts...One should think hard about why this is true" (Waltz 2003, xii). At the centre of this desire for methodological rigour, and to move realism into the scientific realm, Waltz proclaims that states are the primary actors in the international system, though his version of the system differs greatly from classical realists like Morgenthau before him (Elman and Elman 2003a, 19). Therefore, any alteration or contribution to the structural realist research agenda would have to give credence to the centrality of the state and its behaviour in the international system.

Within the international system, the driving assumptions of structural realism, including the centrality of the state, remain constant. While changes in state behaviour have occurred in the society of states, there has been little change in the underlying logic of describing international affairs at the systemic level since the end of the Cold War. As a result, it can be argued that elements of the structural realist research agenda continue to play a role in describing how states interact with each other at the systemic level of international politics (Mearsheimer 2007, 86). The concern here, however, lies with how the state is conceived of in the middle level of theorizing, being international society. To discuss the possibility of state classification, Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes can provide a useful framework to help clarify some of the ambiguities inherent in both structural realist and English School thought when it comes to describing *the state*. As previously noted, English School theory is constantly criticized for its lack

[4] For more on why Waltz sees Lakatos as being relevant to IR, see Kenneth Waltz, "Foreward: Thoughts about Assaying Theories," *Progress in International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), vii-xii.

of methodological boundaries and its uncertain descriptions of foundational elements, like the state. Lakatosian logic may assist in correcting the metatheoretical vagueness within English School theory.

The influence of Lakatos might aid in creating boundaries as to how the state is presented when explaining interstate behaviour in international society.[5] The existence and clear articulation of boundaries is an essential step in creating any theory because it helps to provide a guideline for evaluating the novelty of contributions to a theoretical programme, and presents a methodologically rigorous framework for determining if understandings of a theory are progressive in nature (Simowitz 2003, 405-417). Lakatosian method has been used by various IR theorists, but has constantly been accused of being too narrow in scope and excluding a vast array of theoretical understandings due to the constricted view of the hard core.[6] This being the case, international theory has spent considerable effort in recent years discussing the role and power of the state, and these debates are included in English School discussions as well. It is true that the hard core of any research programme will be constricted in nature, but this is a necessary element of any theory (Waltz 1979, 1-17). The English School takes the state as a primary actor in international politics and this forms the basis for explaining both the international system and international society, while world society is dedicated to domestic-level concerns. Even so, world society theory cannot deny the relevance of the state in the day-to-day operation of global politics and its role in affecting individuals.

The Lakatosian framework ironically finds its roots in similar circumstances as the English School. Like Wight and Bull, Lakatos' approach to method arose out of a desire to find a middle-ground between two dominant, yet absolutist paradigms, being those of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn (Elman and Elman 2003b, 21-25). The driving concern for Lakatos was to determine when one scientific theory should replace another. Lakatos saw Popper's views as too dependent upon falsification and a view of science as too open to dissent. "[Popper] still construes falsification as the result of a duel between theory and observation, without another, better theory necessarily being involved. The real Popper has never explained in detail the appeal procedure by which some accepted basic statements may be eliminated" (Lakatos 1978, 94). Kuhn's theory, on the other hand, was far too subjective for Lakatos, as Kuhn believed that science was what the powers at large thought it was.

> Kuhn certainly showed that the psychology of science can reveal important and, indeed, sad truths. But the psychology of science is not autonomous; for *the-rationally reconstructed-growth of science takes place essentially in the world of*

[5] It is noted here that Lakatosian method and its applicability to IR has been heavily criticized. For a summary of these criticisms, see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Lessons from Lakatos," *Progress in International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 21-70, Stephen Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," *American Political Science Review* 91:4 (December 1997), 931-935 and John Dryzek, "The Progress of Political Science," *Journal of Politics* 48:2 (May 1986), 301-320.

[6] For a contemporary criticism of Lakatosian methods in IR, see William Brenner, "In Search of Monsters: Realism and Progress in International Relations Theory after September 11," *Security Studies* 15:3 (2006), 496-528.

> *ideas, in Plato's and Popper's third world,* in the world of articulated knowledge which is independent of knowing subjects (Lakatos 1978, 92).

As a result, Lakatos sought to "develop a theory of scientific method which was sufficiently subtle to cope with the detail of the actual history of science and yet sufficiently rationalistic to resist the political dangers presented by Kuhn" (Larvor 1998, 45). This endeavour on the part of Lakatos led to the development of his scientific research programme method. This method consists of four primary components, namely a hard core, a negative heuristic, a positive heuristic and a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses (Elman and Elman 2003b, 25).

According to Lakatosian theory, the hard core of the Scientific Research Programme is its fundamental premise:

> All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their *hard core*. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the *modus tollens* at this hard core. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent auxiliary hypotheses, which form a *protective belt* around this core, and we must redirect the *modus tollens* to *these*. It is this protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core. A research programme is successful if all this leads to a progressive problemshift; unsuccessful if it leads to a degenerating problemshift (Lakatos 1978, 48).

In both structural realism and the English School, the hard core can be defined as states being the primary actors in international politics. Based on the history and current dynamics of IR, it will be questioned as to whether a theory of international political content must adhere to the most basic assumption that the state is the primary unit of analysis. As Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman point out, using Lakatosian method "requires that scholars first make several predicate choices among the various interpretations of [the theory's] components" (Elman and Elman 2003b, 25). It is admitted here that taking the state as the primary core of the field is a predicate choice but this is consistent with English School history, but more importantly, the operation of politics above the domestic level.

In order to evaluate the progressive nature of a theory within a research programme, one must look to Lakatos' theory on problemshifts. To be deemed as progressive in nature, a problemshift must do the following: first, it must present novel facts; those predicted novel facts must then be empirically tested and corroborated; if the theoretical amendment accords with the research programme's positive heuristic by maintaining the hard core, the theory can be deemed as progressive and an intra-program problemshift which remains within the research programme; if, on the other hand, the theoretical amendment disobeys the research programme's negative heuristic and amends the hard core, the problemshift is still progressive, but it produces an inter-program problemshift and begins a new research programme. If these conditions are not met, according to

Lakatosian theory, the problemshift is ad hoc and not progressive whatsoever (Lakatos 1978, 47-52).

Problemshifts are used to evaluate contributions when competing research programmes arise. There are two specific forms of problemshifts, being *intra-programme* change or *inter-programme* change. An intra-programme shift is "one that modifies the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses of a scientific research program" (Elman and Elman 2003b, 28), while an inter-programme shift is "one that, contrary to the negative heuristic, changes elements of the hard core, thus moving from one program to another" (Elman and Elman 2003b, 28). Lakatosian theory of problemshifts is of particular interest to the English School when evaluating the contributions made by both pluralist and solidarist scholars, and in determining if there is space for describing the English School as a research programme of its own. Both pluralists and solidarists are making a variety of claims regarding the categorization of contemporary international society, and at a broad metatheoretical level, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes may be able to determine whether these offerings are progressive to the English School, or whether they are extending beyond the hard core of the School's research programme, which is centred on the role of the state in the affairs of international society.

Of course, the English School has always conceived of the state but has not clearly articulated the difference between state action in the international system and international society. If states acted exactly the same way in both levels of analysis, there may not be a society of states, according to structural realist logic. It is also noted that using Lakatosian method is likely to offend scholars in the English School. Michael Nicholson explains why by claiming: "I am sure that many realists, particularly of the English School, would be outraged to think of themselves as participants in a scientific research programme as they are eager to dissociate themselves from such an American fad" (Nicholson 1998, 70). Even so, English School theory has been far too willing to allow theoretical contributions of all kinds to be made and it should be questioned whether these contributions are affecting the original intent of the School. Rejecting, denying or decreasing the importance of the state may be relevant in some aspects of world society, but to do so at the international society or systemic level has major theoretical and practical consequences. As John Mearsheimer argues: "States are the principal actors in world politics, and no higher authority sits above them."[7] Such an admission is simply an acknowledgment of the empirical operation of world affairs on a daily basis, not an abstract theoretical assumption. Centrality of the state, however, requires a deeper explanation when describing how states are using international society to pursue their self-interest. Describing the state in monolithic terms, as realists tend to do, severely limits the ability to comprehend how states are acting in a uniquely hybrid international society and how they are responding to emergent political issues, like terrorism or piracy.[8] The realist model of state conjecture is unable to account for such

[7] John Mearsheimer, "Realism, the Real World, and the Academy," *Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 25.

[8] For more on emerging security issues in the society of states, see Stuart Gottlieb (ed.), *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts and Responses*

concerns. According to William Brenner: "It has been this concern with higher authorities and their significance that has effectively blocked examination or appreciation of lower manifestations and configurations of violence. This legacy from previous debates inhibits appreciation of potentially diverse responses to systemic constraints in a framework that maintains the primacy and durability of anarchy" (Brenner 2006, 504). Presenting a theory which evolves the state from a singular, monolithic entity to a variety of state forms may be able to contribute a novel contribution to the English School research programme described here.

5.2 The Forms of State in Modern International Society

Understanding the state and its character at the systemic level may be best described by structural realist theory based on its clear articulation of interstate dynamics in an anarchic system. States are understood to be like-minded units, concerned with security maximization and are likely to enter into conflict with one another if their self-interest is threatened (Waltz 1979, 126). Stability exists when states engage in some form of balancing behaviour, premised upon the rational calculation of when war is likely to succeed, or as is mostly the case, when war is too costly (Mearsheimer 2001, 334-359). At the level of the international system, there would be no different forms of states. Units are adequately described as rational and distrustful actors according to structural realist theory. In terms of power at the systemic level, the type of power with the most weight is hard, or military, power. Differentiating states at the systemic level is dependent upon their capabilities (Waltz 1999, 698). States all act alike in the system, but some are more powerful than others. Of course, defining the great powers in any given period of history depends on more than just hard power, but the stability and change of any system depends on the military capabilities of the powers involved. In his description of the hierarchy of states in the international system, Waltz argues:

> Anarchic systems are transformed only by changes in organizing principle and by consequential changes in the number of their principal parties. To say that an international-political system is stable means two things: first, that it remains anarchic; second, that no consequential variation takes place in the number of principal parties that constitute the system...The stability of the system, so long as it remains anarchic, is then closely linked with the fate of its principal members (Waltz 1979, 161-162).

Anarchy remains the organizing principle of the international system and states are primarily concerned with the hard power capabilities of other states in making rational calculations when determining a strategy which guarantees survival at a minimal cost (Layne 1994, 11). Within an English School framework, however, states accept the constraints of the system but seek to mitigate its effects by entering into an international society where the other capabilities of states can be exercised. In some cases, the non-hard power capabilities of states can be used to equal the playing field in an effort to allow smaller powers in the systemic hierarchy to influence the development and conduct

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(Washington: CQ Press, 2010) and Martin Murphy, *Small boats, weak states, dirty money: the challenge of piracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

of international society, or in other cases, by larger powers to coerce without having to reduce a situation to hard power threats. According to Joseph Nye: "In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important" (Nye 2004, 55). Politics at any level is dependent on hierarchical classification, with units differentiated by their power capabilities. The forms of state in international society are best understood as choices made by states as to how to maximize on the power they do have without disrupting the balance of the international system by reverting to hard power competition.

Due to the hybrid nature of modern international society, the relevance of hard power remains very high, but states are less willing to even threaten its use than in previous historical eras because of the current nature of the system (Nye 2004, 38). The exercise of power and coercion are, of course, still used by states to achieve their goal of self-help, but such strategies are best achieved through international society than in the systemic level alone. This helps to explain why states are willing to form a society in the first place and to take part in international organizations – because these forums allow them to remain independent, and to pursue their self-interest without having to use war as the sole means of achieving their ends. Without such an incentive, self-interested units are not likely to bind their fates and the motivations for entering into international society would be highly questionable.

Success in the international society level would therefore be contingent upon states obeying the rules and coexisting in a stable manner without the outbreak of major war. To achieve this goal, states must engage in highly interactive behaviour. While conceiving of international society as over 190 sovereign states is not entirely complex, that figure becomes far more salient when it is considered in an interactive sense. Daniel Madar aptly describes this point: "Among those states, according to the formula that specifies the points of connection in a network, there are fully 18,336 two-way relationships [between 192 states]" (Madar 2007, 280). Complexity in international society is an essential consideration when states determine their foreign policy strategies. Security and survival are at the core of state tactics in international society and their approach to achieving their self-interest alters based on their capabilities.

Modern international society essentially contains five forms of state, which can be hierarchically classified in the following manner: the Hard Power State, the Soft Power State, the Agitator State, the Inapposite State and the Failed State. At this juncture, it should be noted that these classifications are presented as preliminary ideas, not fixed identities. Some states may fall into more than one category in a given historical moment, or change categories over time.

5.21 The Hard Power State

While hard power is rarely exercised in international society, the military capabilities of great powers certainly continue to play a role in their conduct. The primary and secondary institutions of modern international society are premised upon an

understanding that larger military powers are able to enforce certain rules and norms. As Jackson notes: "The primary responsibility for providing international security obviously rests with the great powers: they are among the only states in a position to threaten that political value, and they are the only states in a position to deter such threats or take effective military actions against them" (Jackson 2000, 201). For instance, maintaining stability of the balance of power may require the use of war at some point on a small or periphery scale, and thus nations with hard power capabilities are relied upon to achieve such a goal. If order is the objective of any international society, then hard power becomes the last resort option in ensuring order is maintained. It is also Hard Power States that can make a transition from being powerful in the society of states to affecting stability and outcomes in the international system, which explains why their existence and behaviour rank at the top of a hierarchy of state forms.[9]

States exemplifying this form would be those defined as great powers, most of which are also the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the UN Security Council.[10] The United States, Great Britain, Russia and China are militarily powerful, though certainly not all equal in that capacity, and are relied upon by international society to safeguard the order of international affairs. For instance, when states like North Korea threaten the use of nuclear weapons against neighbouring or enemy nations, great powers are expected to intervene, first using financial or diplomatic means, but the expectation exists that if these methods prove unsuccessful, great powers would be compelled to wage war against the state (Jackson 2000, 203). Empirically, the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States provides an interesting example of this argument. Though this agreement was ultimately violated by the North Koreans in October 2002, the original negotiation took place between the Clinton administration and the North Korean government.[11] In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the institutions of modern international society faced one of their first tests when North Korea made its desire for nuclear weapons public (Pritchard 2007, 1-3). In response, the UN and other international organizations pressured the US for action to prevent such an outcome, which eventually led to the Agreed Framework. According to Curtis Martin:

> Despite a reflexive preference for taking a hard line, in the autumn of 1994 the USA offered a state perceived as hostile, aggressive, and volatile - perhaps the most dangerous of what were called rogue states - a menu of diplomatic and economic incentives to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program. This was not an offer of broad diplomatic and economic engagement aimed at transforming relation... In fact, the carrots in the Agreed Framework are better understood as part of a limited engagement policy that still relied principally upon the sticks of containment and isolation (Martin 2002, 53).

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[9] This claim is derived from Mearsheimer's logic regarding the use of latent power. See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 55-82.

[10] France is omitted from this list based on its transition to a Soft Power State. For more on the decline of military power in economically strong European nations, see James Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).

[11] For more on North Korean withdrawal, see Victor Cha and David Kang, "The Korea Crisis," *Foreign Policy* 136 (May-Jun., 2003), 20-28.

While North Korea may have never intended to go to war, its threat of nuclear arms creation compelled other states, both large and limited in power, to look to the United States to put an end to any suggestions of disrupting the international order (Kyoung-Soo 2004). The situation was resolved diplomatically, but it can be argued that it was the hard power capabilities of the US which compelled North Korea to take part in the negotiations and sign any agreement.

5.22 The Soft Power State

Not all states in international society have dedicated themselves to the development of military capabilities. Nye argues:

> If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other states to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may not need as many costly exercises of coercive or hard power in bargaining situations. In short, the universalism of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power (Nye 2004, 57).

Other than the great powers, most states pursue their self-interest through means outside of the hard power realm and are able to negotiate, or coerce, through soft power means. According to Nye, the growth in soft power in contemporary global politics can be detected based on the following trends:

> Massive flows of cheap information have expanded the number of contacts across national borders. In a deregulated world, global markets and nongovernmental actors play a larger role. States are more easily penetrated today and less like the classic realist model of solid billiard balls bouncing off each other. As a result, political leaders are finding it more difficult to maintain a coherent set of priorities in foreign policy, and more difficult to articulate a single national interest (Nye 1999, 25).

Without wanting to rely exclusively upon the use of military threats and power, many states have elected instead to develop economically, diplomatically and have embraced the trends of modern globalization which bring people closer together and further the awareness of complex interdependence (Nye 2004). Included in this soft power development is also normative promotion, where Soft Power States are more willing to discuss ideas like global morality, human security and international justice. In essence, Soft Power States speak in solidarist terms, though their actions typically remain pluralist in terms of self-interest pursuits and a lack of action in implementing a heavily moral agenda.

Japan, India, Germany, France, Canada and Australia could all be considered as Soft Power States. In many ways, the Soft Power State is comparable to theory on middle-powers, except for the differentiating factor that nations with significant economic power are also considered to be Soft Power States.[12] Using Canadian foreign policy in modern international society as an example, the desire for soft power growth and normative promotion without the development of military capabilities is quite apparent (Keating 2007, 21-26). Though Canada has one of the smallest economies in the G8, its economic development in international society has been a major priority since the end of the Cold War (Kirton 2007, 298-317). For instance, some of the country's most important economic agreements have come since the creation of modern international society. Canada joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, signed a number of free trade agreements including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, and is still negotiating a variety of economic agreements through the institutions of international society.[13] With its decline in hard power relevance in the wake of the Cold War, Canadian involvement in international society has actually intensified based on its desire to pursue its interests without expanding militarily. While not all efforts at forging economic relationships have been successful, this has not deterred Canada's involvement in intergovernmental institutions and a preference for multilateral cooperation. Stephan Clarkson contends: "Multilateralism - building coalitions with other sovereign states and exploiting with them the machinery established by the available international institutions - has now become a vitally important thrust of the Canadian government's trade strategy" (Clarkson 2001, 513).

On the diplomatic and normative side of soft power development, Canada was at the forefront of the human security agenda. Though Prime Minister Stephen Harper, elected in 2006, has distanced his Conservative government from human security initiatives, Canadian involvement in the funding, publishing and international promotion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine cannot be ignored.[14] Though Canada has never implemented R2P in its own foreign policy, the fact remains that the original document published by the ICISS in 2001 was completely supported by the Canadian government. An example of the solidarist rhetoric embraced by some Canadian leaders in modern international society can be found in former Prime Minister Paul Martin's 2005 speech to the UN General Assembly in which he discusses Canada's changing conception of power and security:

> Clearly, we need expanded guidelines for Security Council action to make clear our responsibility to act decisively to prevent humanity's attack on humanity. The "Responsibility to Protect" is one such guideline. It seeks rules to protect the innocent against appalling assaults on their life and dignity. It does not bless unilateral action. To the contrary, it stands for clear, multilaterally-agreed criteria

[12] For more on middle-power theory, see Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Penguin Books, 1986) and Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993).
[13] For more, see Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Negotiations and Agreements," found at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx (Aug. 24, 2009)
[14] This is best evidenced by the fact that the International Development Research Council, based in Ottawa, Canada, funded the ICISS report.

> on what the international community should do when civilians are at risk (Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN 2005).

Not all Soft Power States have followed exactly the same course in modern international society as Canada, but all have placed great emphasis and faith in the development of economic and diplomatic means as appropriate methods of pursuing their self-interest. These states are not militarily powerful compared to the great powers, make constant use of the secondary institutions of international society and rely heavily upon alliances with great powers for their national security. Soft Power States are typically those described by solidarist scholars in the English School because of their supposedly non-realist behaviour, but even though hard power concerns may not dominate their foreign policy agendas, these states still tend not to implement or enforce solidarist-like policies.

5.23 The Agitator State

No international society ever functions in a totally stable manner. Bull is sure to note that "the order provided within modern international society is precarious and imperfect" (Bull 2002, 50). While it can be said that states are often rational and mostly predictable actors, there are always instances that no theory can possibly account for because of the irrational actions of actors that sometimes occur.[15] One fact that remains constant among the hierarchy of states in international society is that states without the power and influence to achieve their goals are willing to take what they deem to be necessary steps to fulfill their self-interest. According to Mearsheimer: "Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves" (Mearsheimer 2001, 33). In most cases, smaller states that want to improve their position internationally will enter into alliances with larger powers.[16] This helps to explain why international organizations are as popular as they are in the world today; without the benefit of gaining influence and power on a global scale, states would typically be unwilling to suffer the costs of sacrificing elements of their national sovereignty and independence.

The majority of smaller powers are likely to pursue their interests in a peaceful and quiet manner that will not upset the balance of international society. Such a strategy would typically involve calculating how to gain soft power influence rather than resorting to hard power gains because of the tension and unease such a move would create among neighbouring states and great powers. In some exceptional cases, however, states that want to be taken far more seriously at the international level, knowing they are never likely to be great powers, will embark upon policies aimed at getting the attention of larger powers by building hard power capabilities, especially the nuclear variety. To

[15] Even so, this does not detract from the strength of rational choice theorizing. As Zagare notes, actors are faced with choices – the theory cannot always forecast a guaranteed outcome. See Frank Zagare, "All Mortis, No Rigor," *Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 96-103.

[16] For more on realist alliance formation theory, see Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

explain why states would pursue nuclear arms without the fear of major international or nuclear war, Mearsheimer argues:

> MAD also bolsters peace by clarifying the relative power of states and coalitions. States can miscalculate each other's will, but miscalculations of relative capability are less likely, since nuclear capabilities are not elastic to the specific size and characteristics of forces; once an assured destruction capability is achieved, further increments of nuclear power have little strategic importance. Hence errors in assessing these specific characteristics have little effect (Mearsheimer 1990, 20).

In an effort to gain greater legitimacy, attention and financial resources, these states may threaten the creation or use of nuclear arms, try to exercise regional power through means of intimidation and coercion, and use powerful rhetoric to insight intense domestic nationalism. It is not rational to think that their goal is to actually go to war, but instead, it is likely their aim is to force great powers to pay closer attention to them, thus agitating the hierarchy.

Perhaps the best two examples of these Agitator States in modern international politics are Iran and North Korea. In recent years, both have taken steps to develop nuclear arms programs and both have leaders willing to incite extreme domestic nationalism to influence their populations as to believe their agenda is necessary.[17] In the case of Iran, it is difficult to ignore its strategic importance in the world and the leadership of the country is well aware of this fact. Puneet Talwar discusses Iran's regional significance: "The country abuts the fragile states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, some of which are endowed with large untapped energy reserves. Iran's neighborhood also features oil-rich U.S. allies, a recalcitrant Iraq, a terrorist and narcotics haven known as Afghanistan, and a politically troubled, nuclear-armed Pakistan" (Talwar 2001, 59. Iran's position as a regional hegemon in one of the most tumultuous areas in the world makes it a player on the world stage, but it was rarely taken seriously prior to the end of the Cold War because of internal political issues, limited economic development and perceived military shortcomings, despite the sales of US weaponry during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. In order to gain recognition, oppose the seeming threat from Israel and prevent any American thoughts of intervention for oil resources, Iran increased its military capabilities and has committed itself to a nuclear technology program which has compelled great powers to take them far more seriously (Ward 2009, 299-326). Steven Ward argues:

> Spurred by ongoing tensions with the West over its nuclear ambitions and the presence of US forces in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's un-elected leaders and principal military officials have publicly declared their view that US hostility toward the Islamic Republic has been increasing and would be resisted. As a result, Iranian officials have emphasized ongoing efforts to revise their

[17] For more on recent political developments in both Iran and North Korea, see Patrick Cronin (ed.), *Double Trouble: Iran and North Korea as challenges to international security* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008).

> country's military doctrine by applying observations of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom to the development of new strategies and tactics to defeat American forces and to deny the United States critical military and political objectives. In fact, Tehran has been following this path since the early 1990s as it sought to bring its national military doctrine more in line with its Armed Forces' actual capabilities and provide the concepts and guidance for confronting the superior power of the United States. The clear emphasis of these doctrines is on using ballistic missile-based deterrence, unconventional operations, Iran's strategic depth, and popular mobilization for partisan warfare (Ward 2005, 559).

Even with the increase in hard power capabilities, it is highly unlikely Iran will ever launch a pre-emptive offensive strike against Israel, the US or anyone else for that matter.[18] The same logic applies to North Korea. Despite the rhetoric from the North Korean regime, it would be completely irrational for Kim Jong Il to attack South Korea, Japan or any other nation because of the response which would surely take place. Developing these weapons for both Iran and North Korea is likely more about gaining influence, rather than a sincere desire to go to war. Is there a better way for states, perceived to be politically illegitimate and ostracized in most circles, to increase their power position in a world of states that value stability than to threaten the very order they work so hard to maintain? Rationality and the lessons of the Cold War would allow Agitator States of all kinds to understand the concepts of deterrence theory and Mutual Assured Destruction, and to know that military action of any kind would be met with a harsh response from other nations and organizations.[19] These states look not to violence as an end, but use the threat of violence as a means to achieve an end.

5.24 The Inapposite State

In an international system with over 190 nation-states, it is impossible for every state to become influential either in hard or soft power terms. The majority of individual states in the world fall into this fourth category of being Inapposite States. On their own, these nations have limited influence over the norms, rules and direction of international society, but their importance arises from their alignment with various blocs of influence and great powers. Membership in regional and international organizations allows these states to exercise influence in determining just how successful great powers will be at leading international society. Every leader needs a set of followers to implement its agenda, and leadership in the society of states is no different. At the end of major conflict and at the initiation of a new international society, it may be the case that the less powerful states have chosen a side to align with based on emerging patterns of power and influence. These Inapposite States are concerned with their own interests but are acutely aware of their limitations and need for alliances with great powers. Without these states choosing

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[18] This point borrows logic found in Frank Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence," *World Politics* 42:2 (January 1990), 259.

[19] For a comprehensive discussion of deterrence theory, see Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, *Perfect Deterrence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and D. Marc Kilgour and Frank Zagare, "Credibility, Uncertainty and Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science* 35:2 (May 1991), 305-334.

to cooperate with great powers, the rules and norms of any international society would be difficult to implement or enforce. Inapposite States are also interested in maintaining a semblance of balance as to ensure their own security.

There are too many examples of these states to identify individually, but a good example of how powerful these states can become based on their alliances with each other would be the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Formed in the 1960s and still in existence today, this geopolitical alliance is a forum for Inapposite States, typically considered to be part of the Global South, to come together in an effort to defend the rights and issues unique to the developing world (Grant 1995, 567-587). The NAM often comes into conflict with great and western powers in the society of states over a variety of issues, more recently involving sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention. David Malone describes this tension in modern international society:

> The increased activism of the Security Council in the 1990s – its willingness to intrude on the internal affairs of member states and the broader range of issues that it deemed to international peace and security – created a degree of nervousness within the NAM. For instance, the Security Council endorsed *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* of 2000, which recommended more robust peacekeeping mandates and a strategic analysis unit, was viewed with suspicion by some countries of the South, fearful of UN espionage. In another example, Western countries clearly felt justified in the NATO campaign over Kosovo in 1999, a position implicitly endorsed by Annan, but emphatically rejected by the president of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who reiterated the view that sovereignty remained the most prized possession of often defenceless developing countries (Malone 2007, 131).

Not all issues are met with a common approach within the NAM, but the ability of Inapposite States to come together over particular matters of concern for the Global South allows these states to pressure larger powers. On their own, Inapposite States are not vital considerations in the daily calculations of larger powers in terms of either hard or soft power, but taken as a possible ally, trading partner or ideologically similar supporter, their importance in the affairs of international society cannot be emphasized enough. A society of states may be formed by the victor of a major international conflict, but the pluralist or solidarist normative agenda in the wake of that conflict would be hard to put into effect without the help and willingness of Inapposite States to cooperate.

5.25 The Failed State

Failed States are those nations which lack the effective structures of governance. These states rank at the bottom of any hierarchy of power and pose virtually no threat to the stability of the international system or the great powers on their own. Failed States do, however, mean a great deal to the rules and norms of modern international society. Since the end of the Cold War, debates surrounding humanitarian intervention and the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding have focused intensely on the situation within Failed States (Bellamy 2009a, 39). In order for large-scale humanitarian disaster

to occur, there must be serious problems with the ability of a domestic government to function properly. When intrastate conflicts are mentioned, the world focuses on areas like Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. It is the right of these Failed States to remain sovereign in the contemporary international system that becomes an area of debate when determining the legal definition of sovereignty and the conditions under which intervention may take place. According to W. Andy Knight, violence in the post-Cold War era is often found in Failed States and centres on human atrocity:

> Many of these human tragedies and gross human rights violations occurred in so-called failed states where the absence of effective governance meant that civilians were particularly vulnerable to wanton violence...The problem of failed states reached the highest levels of national security planning after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. US officials identified failed states as a major source of terrorist activity and identified these states as the principal targets of concern in their National Security statement in September 2002 (Knight 2004, 360).

Traditional realist theory about security in the international system would tend to pay little attention at all to Failed States. They have almost no military capabilities, are unable to wage an effective war against a neighbouring state and have no effectual government in place which is able to calculate a foreign policy strategy (Jackson 2000, 296). In modern international society, however, Failed States pose a great risk to the order of the society of states, not because of any threat of major war, but due to the new types of domestic and non-state security calculations which are emerging in the post-Cold War era. As Knight argues, instances of terrorism and genocide are often linked back to Failed States, or perhaps those in the process of failing. From these states, like Somalia, other nations are coping with examples of piracy, organized crime, refugee displacement, disease and environmental degradation.[20] These various threats to the stability of international society are precisely why solidarists argue in favour of a principle of humanitarian intervention that alters state sovereignty from absolute right to condition and a collective responsibility on the part of the international community to protect human populations from such security threats.

5.3 An English School Research Programme for the Modern Era

To some, the effort to apply Lakatosian method to the English School might be seen as a betrayal of the original efforts of writers like Wight and Bull. A major difference between the development of IR as a field of study in the United Kingdom and the US has been the divide over questions of methodology. Madar notes: "As a discipline, [British IR] closely observes and draws from North American IR but regards itself as somewhat independent, particularly of heavily formal and mathematical methods, which it treats as parochially North American" (Madar 2000, 10). Since its inception, the English School has been able to appeal to a wide array of international theory scholars due to its efforts at forging a theoretical middle-ground (Brown 1995, 186). Realism, liberalism and even

[20] For more on emerging security threats and their connection to Failed States, see Solomon Hussein (ed.), *Challenges to Global Security: geopolitics and power in an age of transition* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).

critical theories can explain certain outcomes, but single theories have difficulty in addressing the complexity of modern international affairs. In the contemporary era, international relations have become intricate and international theory struggles to find a framework in which the traditional aspects of the field, like the centrality of the state, can be fused with the changing nature of global politics, as reflected in critical theory. The English School may be able to help fill this gap, but its own boundaries must, first, be clearly identified so scholars can understand whether theoretical contributions are providing novelty to English School method or are hindering its progress.

Some English School writers have attempted to cast the School as valuable because of its methodological openness and critical possibilities. For instance, Roger Epp argues: "In other words, the English school recollects a tradition – the historicality of open-ended, intersecting, competing narratives – *within* which critical resources are already present. Its erudite, generous horizons contain what amount to enabling prejudices: the biases of openness to an indeterminate future" (Epp 1998, 61). Within the solidarist agenda particularly there is great hope for the expansion of critical theory in the English School.[21] What lacks in this enterprise is the ability to determine whether a theorist is actually making use of the English School as a legitimate theoretical lens, or whether the international society approach is being used casually to achieve other normative ends. Applying Lakatosian method to the framework of English School theory is not entirely out of the realm of possibility because, as Richard Little notes, the approach is both ontologically and methodologically pluralist in nature: "A comprehensive assessment of the English School makes it clear that they rely on interpretivist, positivist and critical assumptions" (Little 2000, 398). With this in mind, it becomes possible and, perhaps necessary, to impose methodological rigour to the English School in an effort to apply its assumptions to the contemporary international political environment and to clearly demarcate what the English School research programme actually is.

A problem with creating a Scientific Research Programme in the Lakatosian sense for the English School is the inability to encompass all three levels of analysis, the international system, international society and world society, into one model. Each level has its own concerns and understandings, though there are commonalities between each. As a result, it might be useful to divide the analysis into three distinct areas to better comprehend what an English School SRP would look like:

The International System

* Hard Core – states are the primary actors in international politics.

The state in this level of analysis is closely related to the structural realist understanding, where states are understood as monolithic actors seeking to maximize their security and pursue their self-interest based on rational calculations of other actors' preferences. Hard power capabilities are what differentiate states, not any conception of form.

[21] See for instance Der Derian's use of English School theory in James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

* Protective Belt of Auxiliary Hypotheses – security maximization is the underlying goal for states. As Waltz claims: "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power" (Waltz 1979, 126).

Assessing problemshifts in the systemic level would remain intra-programme shifts if they contributed novel facts about the centrality of the security-maximizing state and did not betray the negative heuristic. Richard Ashley, for instance, levels criticism at the systemic research programme proposed here by attacking the hard core: "Excluded, for instance, is the historically testable hypothesis that the state-as-actor construct might be not a first-order given of international political life but part of a historical justificatory framework by which dominant coalitions legitimize and secure consent for their precarious conditions of rule" (Ashley 1986, 270). Such a claim would become degenerative to the research programme because of its attack on the programme's core assumptions. Instead, scholarship on balancing behaviour, forecasting ability, rationality of states and hard power considerations would likely adhere to the hard core assumptions of the research programme. Inter-programme shifts would be disloyal to the negative heuristic and would attempt to alter hard core assumptions (Lakatos 1978, 47-51). For instance, if states were removed as primary actors in international politics, if the existence and anarchic nature of the international system were brought into question, no novel facts would be contributed to this SRP.

Modern International Society

* Hard Core – states are the primary actors in international politics.

States here, however, are not monolithic actors that are only concerned with hard power capabilities. Instead, five distinct forms of state can be identified which are all self-interested, but pursue their goals in very different ways.

* Protective Belt of Auxiliary Hypotheses – security maximization remains the primary goal of states, but security is maintained by dialogue, cooperation and institutional binding. The first concern for states is to survive in the international system, which means the establishment of some kind of hard power balance. Once this is achieved, states are able to use international society as a means to safeguard that hard power equilibrium and to capitalize on the other capabilities they may have.

Problemshifts in the theory of international society would be numerous and also difficult to assess. As long as the state remains at the centre of a theory, whether it is identified as pluralist or solidarist, it is likely to remain an intra-programme shift. This being said, any theory involving an international society should reject any overly world society-based arguments which seek to remove humanity from a system and society where states are the primary units of analysis.[22] The openness that the English School is so proud of is not

[22] For more on the essential position of the state in international society, see Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," *Hedley Bull on International Society* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), 139-156.

totally closed by using Lakatosian logic; it just becomes easier for scholars to evaluate whether a contribution is providing novel facts or is actually degenerative. Tim Dunne asserts: "It is clear...that the term international society has been used by a variety of theoretical orientations as a general signifier of the institutional context within which interstate interactions take place" (Dunne 1005, 66). Dunne is correct to point out that English School foundations have been incorporated into the works of various theorists, but it is also important for those loyal to the English School to be able to identify when a theory is betraying its foundational elements.

By opening the concept of the state, this research programme is able to appreciate states' involvement in the international political economy, sometimes irrational behaviour, institutional reliance, and the conditions under which institutions must discuss the possibility of humanitarian intervention. In this sense, international politics remains a uniquely statist concern and states are perceived to act only when it is in their self-interest, but security is no longer strictly seen as hard power in nature. Each theory in this research programme should adhere to the basic identifying aspects of English School theory – the existence and importance of institutions, both primary and secondary. By doing so, one can more aptly identify a novel contribution to English School thought or dismiss it as degenerative.

World Society

* Hard Core – humans are the primary actors in global politics, but cannot achieve their ends without the existence of a strong and functioning international society.

States remain central to understanding the international arena, but world society is more concerned with the relationship between humans and the society of states. Securing individual rights and life become the primary tasks of states in all of their forms.

* Protective Belt of Auxiliary Hypotheses – human security is the end at which global politics aims, but states must be involved in finding ways to achieve this end. Without states and their involvement in institutions at the international society level, the impact of individuals is likely to be negligible.

The most contentious aspect of evaluating English School thought arises when world society becomes heavily involved.[23] In terms of security, contemporary discourse has become increasingly interested in the relationship of human security to the society of states. Progression in theoretical terms may bring the institutions of international society into question, but should not dismiss the predominance of the state or its role in protecting, or harming, the interdependent conception of humanity. In their description of Nicholas Wheeler's work, Bellamy and McDonald typify how solidarist studies provide novel facts to the English School SRP:

[23] This is primarily due to the inconsistency with which the term world society is used. See Richard Little, "International System, International Society and World Society: A Re-evaluation of the English School," *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory* (London: Continuum, 2002), 59-79.

> However, although he argues that it is possible to conceive of situations where the security of individuals or communities should—and indeed does—take precedence over the security of states, he is reticent about how far these developments can go. He is therefore committed to retaining the state as the principle *agent* of security though he argues that individuals, particularly individuals subjected to systematic abuse, should be the primary *referent* (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 316).

The intention of this proposed English School Scientific Research Programme is to help scholars recognize when a theoretical contribution is either novel or degenerative. Theoretical plurality may be a positive aspect of using the English School approach in the first place, but in some cases, it has become far too open and prevents the approach from entering the mainstream of international theory in the United States. Writers like Paul Williams and Jacqui True have attempted to combine English School thought with critical approaches that have traditionally had little or no relevance to the canon of English School theory.[24] This may not be entirely negative, but if such studies do not maintain the core assumptions of English School theory, it may be degenerative to wed them to the approach. When a theory becomes too open, it loses its coherence, its purpose and ultimately, its ability to speak to real world issues and problems.[25]

Conclusion

In their assessment of why the English School can contribute something valuable to contemporary international relations, Bellamy and McDonald note:

> It may be argued, then, that English School discourses of security contribute much to our understanding of security in world politics—particularly highlighting the normative aspects of security and pointing to the key tension between the security of international society and that of world society. This tension most frequently exists at the nexus between international order and justice, sovereignty and human rights (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 327).

Modern international society is extraordinarily complex and has, up to now, found few theories capable of discussing the issues affecting the systemic level all the way down to the domestic, individual variables.[26] While the English School has been in existence for quite some time, its methodological openness and reflexivity have not been able to

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[24] See for instance Paul Williams, "Critical Security Studies," *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 135-150 and Jacqui True, "Feminism," *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 151-162.

[25] For more on the limits of the English School's methodological pluralism, see Cornelia Navari, "Introduction: Methods and Methodology in the English School," *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 1-20.

[26] This likely derives from the fact that most international theories do not present themselves as trying to explain so many variables. Even so, English School thought is, in theory, supposedly able to provide insight into such extensive problems. See Martin Wight, "An Anatomy of International Thought," *Review of International Studies* 13 (1987), 221-227.

provide much scholarship on how various issues in the international realm can be adequately addressed by a theoretical approach which lacks clear methodological boundaries. Instead, English School theory prefers to approach subjects like history, human rights, international law and interstate cooperation with virtually no clear guideline as to when a scholar is falling within the School, or when they may simply be using the language of international society while betraying the School's hard core assumptions. With the revival of English School thought by thinkers like Barry Buzan, Tim Dunne, Andrew Linklater and many others, new opportunities have come to the forefront of the society of states approach, but for some reason, there has been a preoccupation with the relationship between international society and world society, and the influence of the international system is being largely ignored or fundamentally misunderstood (Little 2002, 59-79).

Even in their work about an English School security agenda, Bellamy and McDonald are chiefly interested in finding a niche for the solidarist research programme and what it is able to say about human security (Bellamy and McDonald 2004). Of course, the value of solidarism in the current context of international politics is that its preoccupation with human issues, like human rights, the environment, inequality, underdevelopment, etc., has proved that the English School can recognize the changing political climate and may even be able, if guided properly, to provide empirically-testable solutions. Such a hope may be a long way off, however, due to the overuse of English School characteristics by those with little interest in maintaining the integrity of the approach's theoretical premises.[27]

On the other hand, the English School discourse proposed by solidarists ignores fundamentally vital issues on the international stage that cannot be overlooked. Deemed to be too traditional or outdated, perhaps, these problems, like nuclear proliferation, interstate conflict and rational foreign policy calculations are receiving little, if any, attention from English School scholars outside of the pluralist camp. Modern international society contains solidarist elements and it is difficult to deny the increased role world society values are playing in global politics since the fall of the Soviet Union. Ignoring the relationship between the international system and modern international society, however, would only serve to make the English School appear as unaware of many vital political issues at the systemic level.

An important question remains, however, about what the English School framework is able to say about issues and situations which plague states and individuals worldwide. It can be argued that threats like piracy, terrorism and a variety of others are likely to fall beyond the limits of English School thought.[28] While statist theories may have difficulty in describing the root causes of such threats, it is logical to argue, according to English School postulates, that states are ultimately responsible for addressing such issues. In determining the limits of a theory, it is critical to note the necessity of abstraction.

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[27] See for instance James Der Derian, *International Theory: Critical Investigations* (London: Macmillan, 1995).

[28] For more on the limits of English School thought, see Richard Devetak, "Violence, Order, and Terror," *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 229-246.

Abstraction is a necessary element of any grand theorizing, and it is admitted here that the English School scientific research programme and formalized methods presented will be forced to abstract a number of elements in order to provide insight into areas of international relations. Waltz argues:

> A theory must then be constructed through simplifying. That is made obvious by thinking of any theory, whether Isaac Newton's or Adam Smith's, or by thinking of the alternative – to seek not explanation through simplification but accurate reproduction through exhaustive description. Simplifications may lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate the necessary relations of cause an interdependency – or suggest where we look for them (Waltz 1979, 10).

Such a move towards abstraction and simplification is not seen as detrimental, however, due to the need for a more clear and defined method of demarcating the boundaries of what does, and what does not, fall within the English School theoretical camp.

Regarding the major problems on the international political agenda, the English School appears to be principally interested in two driving issues – the role of secondary institutions in creating, maintaining and enforcing order, and the human security agenda, epitomized with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The solidarist interest in reforming the institutions of international society to reflect a more human-based political agenda is often focused on the vital role of the United Nations. Solidarist scholars, like Wheeler and Bellamy for instance, have also been preoccupied with the human security agenda and its potential for progressing international society toward a more human-centred view. These two areas are central considerations for states as they asses their foreign policy calculations and rationally determine which course to follow. The hybrid nature of the contemporary society of states makes these estimations even more complex for states because of the dual nature of interests at play – states are expected to have high regard for solidarist ideas, but are still constrained by a pluralist framework left over from the Cold War era. Even if states wanted to act according to solidarist values, they may be unable to overcome the self-interested, security maximizing tendencies of Cold War pluralism.

The chapters below will be essentially concerned with the role of secondary institutions, specifically the United Nations, and the debate over human security in an effort to apply the theoretical framework created in the previous chapters to important empirical issues in English School thought. In both cases, an explanation of the problem as it pertains to the stability of modern international society will be presented and a possible solution to the issues will also be provided. In doing so, attention to both solidarist and pluralist concerns will be given and it is hoped that a framework for understanding these issues can be found by using the English School approach.

Chapter 6: The UN as a Secondary Institution of Modern International Society

The end of the Cold War was a pivotal watershed in the history of international relations. Not only did existing theories decline in their ability to explain international outcomes, but there were also changes to the conduct of states. Change, it can be said, was inevitable; the end of bipolarity and the demise of the Soviet Union had a profound effect on the structure of the international system. The world quickly went from fearing the outbreak of war between two rival superpowers to a moment of US unipolarity. Such alterations to the systemic level also affected the behaviour of states in international society, which also filtered down to influencing the actions and attitudes of individuals in world society.[1] When the Cold War ended, so too did the type of international society that provided a niche for interstate cooperation throughout the conflict.

The uniqueness of the contemporary society of states can be attributed to the non-violent end of the Cold War. The *Defeated* party was economically destroyed, but physically and militarily, the Russian threat still existed. Russian nuclear weapons did not vanish, nor did the military technology it possessed before the transition from Soviet communism to post-Soviet democracy. Such a realization on the part of other states may have created a situation in which the *Victor* of the Cold War, namely the US, could attempt to impose a solidarist agenda in the post-Cold War era. Even with Russian *Cooperation*, however, the distrust between the two powers and the ever-obvious threat posed by a state that retained its nuclear and military capabilities, it is unlikely that many states were willing in 1991 to shift completely away from the stable institutional structure of Cold War international society (Layne 1990/1991, 62-63). Modern international society, then, may be best explained as a balancing act between solidarist ideals on one hand, and pluralist institutions on the other.

One of the essential components of international society, according to most English School scholars, is the existence of strong and functioning secondary institutions. These bodies are thought to be created in order to implement and protect the primary, normative institutions of the society of states. Perhaps the most vital secondary institution in the world today is the United Nations. Formed in 1945, this body, which replaced the failed League of Nations and sought to promote peace for all in the wake of World War II, became a forum inhibited by the politics of the Cold War which prevented it from reaching its full potential.[2] In response to these shortcomings, an ambitious effort aimed at transforming the UN emerged at the end of the Cold War which sought to expand the purview of the UN from simply being a pawn of the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council to being an active organization focused on meeting the needs of the global population (Bourantonis 2005). As Kofi Annan highlighted in his 1997 introductory letter to the President of the General Assembly: "My concept of reform has

[1] For more on the role of individuals in post-Cold War politics, see James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[2] For more on the constraints on the UN during the Cold War, see Peter Fromuth (ed.), *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow* (New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1988).

been clear and consistent throughout: the Organization needs to be significantly reconfigured in order to do better what the international community requires it to do" (Annan 2009). While certainly honourable in scope due to the moral implications of improving the lives of people across the world, the UN transformation agenda has gained significant popularity since the end of the Cold War and currently represents one of the highest priorities of the Secretariat, according to current Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (Jang 2006/2007, 161-168).

At the core of this transformational movement, which is admittedly not singular or united in scope, is the assumption that the UN is not working as well as it should, could or was originally intended to (Thakur 2007, 291-319). Support for this original intent, namely a view of the UN as an institution responsible for safeguarding the safety and rights of individuals, is typically found in the Preamble of the UN Charter. Within English School theory, solidarists are certainly involved in pushing for UN transformation in a variety of ways due to their normative commitments on issues like human rights, and more recently, human security. Living up to the claims made in the Preamble of the Charter would mean significantly redesigning the organization to meet moral and natural law-based standards. In essence, UN transformation would represent an attempt to make the institution more relevant to the needs of world society, and would use international society as the vehicle through which to achieve the values of the global populous. What may be lacking in this transformation movement within the English School is the lack of attention given to the international system.

Transforming the UN in a way that would accommodate solidarist and world society ideals would require significantly downplaying the constraints of the international system. Pluralist frameworks for international society are thought to work effectively because they are aimed at maintaining stability among self-interested states that have not found extensive moral norms to pursue commonly (Jackson 2000, 178-182). The hybrid nature of modern international society does not appear to have overcome the limitations imposed on interstate behaviour by the anarchic character of the system, thus making pluralist institutions far more attractive to states due to the guarantee of interstate political stability.

In light of this understanding, the attempt to mould the UN into a human-centred body may be worth reconsidering. English School thought cannot ignore the interplay of all three levels of analysis, which includes the role played by the international system. The growth in critical and liberal international theories since the end of the Cold War has shifted arguments about global politics away from the systemic level and tries to emphasize the effects of state and organizational policy on individuals. The vitality of such an endeavour should not be dismissed but one cannot overlook the environment in which states are forced to act on a daily basis and the limited number of strategies available to them as they pursue their self-interest.

It is noted here that the density of UN transformation efforts cannot be entirely encompassed in a single chapter, but the goal here is to describe how such endeavours may affect the way English School theory explains institutional behaviour in modern

international society. Therefore, it must be made immediately clear that this chapter is not intended to provide extensive insight into the debates regarding UN reform, adaptation, alteration or transformation. Instead, the UN is taken as one example of secondary institutions in the society of states due to its prominent role in upholding the peace and security of international society. The term *transformation* is used here to denote proposals for revolutionary and sweeping changes to the role of the UN by those wishing to see the body aim at promoting and protecting human-centred policies in the twenty-first century, which is consistent with the solidarist agenda within the English School.[3] This notion differs greatly from the idea of UN *reform*, which is best understood as an incremental approach to manageable change within a status quo framework (Knight 2005, 28-30). An area of interest in this debate will be examining the role played by great powers, especially the P5 members of the Security Council, in the potential consequences associated with transforming the UN. By transforming the UN according to ideals consistent with the solidarist thesis, the effects on international society's institutional structure should be considered. It is equally worth exploring what maintaining a status quo configuration of the UN may mean for the society of states.

6.1 The United Nations in the Society of States

A cornerstone of English School theory is the recognition of the existence and acceptance of institutions. These institutions serve as normative guidelines for any society of states and steer state foreign policy calculations, or as Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell describe them, as "historically constructed normative structures" (Alderson and Hurrell 2000b, 27). These pillars of international society are best understood as fundamental practices that guide the formation and conduct of secondary, or intergovernmental organizations (Buzan 2005, 120). The existence of primary institutions allows states that form an international society to create secondary institutions, with legal frameworks in place that reflect shared norms and practices. States form international societies, in part, to mitigate the effects of anarchy and to ensure their survival by engaging in diplomacy, which is a useful tool in preventing the outbreak of major interstate war. Prior to the proper functioning of such primary and secondary institutions, war was seen as a legitimate course of action for states if they felt other self-interested actors were preparing to wage war against them. Evidenced by the failed nature of Bull's World international society in the wake of the First World War, the distrust among states in an anarchic system was not overcome by the institutional arrangements put into place. Instead, a weak and lawless era ensued which eventually saw the outbreak of the Second World War. Interstate relations in any society of states not governed by mutually accepted primary institutions and properly functioning secondary institutions, like the failed World international society, are likely calculated based solely on assumptions of distrust and utility maximization, which arise as a result of the anarchic structure of the

[3] For insight into this perspective, see for instance Nora McKeon, *The United Nations and Civil Society: legitimating global governance – whose voice?* (New York, Palgrave, 2009), Kofi Annan, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (New York: United Nations, 2005), Bruce Cronin, "The Two Faces of the United Nations: the Tension between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism," *Global Governance* 8:1 (2002), 53-71, Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman (eds.), *New Millennium, New Perspectives: the United Nations, Security and Governance* (Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press, 2000).

international system. Behaviour that is not controlled by the institutions of international society and subjected to survival in anarchy alone is bound to fall into the realm of realist politics. Waltz describes this condition:

> A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the cost of weakness. The requirements of state action are, in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist (Waltz 1959, 160).

In an attempt to escape the prototypical description of politics among nations described by realists, English School scholars contend that institutions actually influence state action both in the normative sense, and also in the legal sense as well.[4]

Buzan's in-depth discussion of primary and secondary institutions has brought a newfound awareness to the debate within the English School, but what is also clear by Buzan's argument is that solidarists and pluralists have very different conceptions about the institutions governing modern international society. Contemporary trends in global politics indicate a world premised on solidarist aspirations in a pluralist structure. Emerging primary institutions, like the market, human equality and environmental stewardship are becoming increasingly important for states, but it appears that states will not act on them if they have to rationally spend more than they gain in accepting or enforcing such norms. At the forefront of the international political agenda are those primary institutions which form the underlying basis for explaining why states enter into a society at all – survival and constancy (Bull 2002, 62-73). These institutions, like diplomacy, alliances, the balance of power and war affect all states equally in terms of their desire to endure; environmental protection, human rights and neoliberal markets are growing in significance, but are yet to be universally accepted by states (Buzan 2004, 187). Solidarists may wish to see their normative values globally, but such norms tend not to dominate the political agendas of all, or even most, states. As Martin Wight notes: "The members of international society are, on the whole, immortals. States do die or disappear, from time to time, but for the most part they far outlive the span of human life...Their policies are based on the expectation of survival, and they see it as their duty to protect their vital interests" (Wight 1986, 107). Though perhaps morally ill-advised or narrow-sighted, survival for states is interpreted as the physical avoidance of harm or violence, while moral promotion of dignity for all or protection of the environment tend to be secondary interests.

At the time Cold War international society was founded, the primary institutions held in highest esteem among great powers led to the creation of the UN. In general, the UN is a secondary institution based on pluralist norms that was formed in an era when the emphasis on stability was essential for the continuance of the international system after

[4] For more on the legal nature of international society, see David Mapel and Terry Nardin (eds.), *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

the introduction of the nuclear arms variable to interstate foreign policy calculations. Throughout the years of the Cold War, it can be argued that the UN did the job it was intended to do – prevent another world war and allow the great powers to manage the international political agenda. According to Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws: "The success or failure of the...UN, of course, depends upon governments' perceptions of their vital interests and the accompanying political will, or lack thereof, to move ahead within a multilateral framework" (Weiss and Daws 2007, 16). If survival, independence and minimalist cooperation were the vital interests of states in Cold War international society, the UN's role in helping to influence the following outcomes speak to its usefulness - World War III did not break out, nuclear arms were not used, the two superpowers relied on diplomacy to solve their disputes and, though tension throughout the era was extraordinarily intense, the UN system was used as a means of protecting state interests. Even during the height of the conflict, both the US and USSR made use of the UN during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[5] The solution to the problem of nuclear missiles in Cuba was eventually solved beyond the confines of the UN, but the US still used the institution as a means of making its case to the members of international society. Of course, it must be noted that the UN was far from perfect throughout the Cold War, but it still managed to survive.

The place of the UN in modern international society is highly contested, questioned and often criticized. Edward Luck notes:

> At no point, either in its inception or in its operation, has the UN been above controversy and criticism. It has lurched from crisis to crisis not only in the agendas of world problems it seeks to ameliorate, but also in terms of recurrent questioning of its orientation and priorities, of the fairness and efficacy of its decision-making structures, of its funding and fiscal management, of its operational techniques and readiness, and of the quality and integrity of its Secretariat and leadership (Luck 2007, 653).

Even with its controversial standing in the eyes of pluralists and solidarists alike, the UN system is the most significant secondary institution in modern international society. If the UN meant little to the cause of international politics, it likely would have been completely dismissed in the wake of the Cold War, along with other institutions of the time, like the Warsaw Pact. Instead, the UN has endured and found a niche that allows it to promote solidarist normative values in a pluralist framework, almost exemplifying the hybrid nature of modern international society itself. The UN's role in upholding the five indispensable primary institutions of the contemporary society of states forms the basis for its durable nature.

[5] For a first-hand account of how the superpowers made use of diplomacy and the UN during the crisis, see Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1971).

6.11 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is not simply a set of cooperative strategies between two or more states, but instead involves a variety of actors, elements and secondary institutions through which to conduct the enterprise.[6] Defining diplomacy is no small feat, especially due to the ambiguous nature of the term and its use throughout the history of the state system in describing relations between actors in stemming the tide of conflict. Bull describes how the English School views diplomacy:

> Diplomacy is an activity appropriate to the situation in which the states or other political entities concerned are pursuing different interests, but also have some common interests. It is undermined not only by the growth of situations in which states can perceive no common interest, but also by situations in which states regard their interests as being identical. In these situations, states seek to advance their interests not by negotiating or bargaining with each other but by cooperating to maximise their common interest. Their common problem is not the political or diplomatic one of reconciling different interests or demands but the technical one of finding the most efficient means of achieving a given end (Bull 2002, 170).

Since its creation in 1945, the UN has been the best forum through which states have pursued the primary institution of diplomacy. In this capacity, the UN has served as the most efficient means of providing a space for dialogue among actors who at times agree, and at others disagree, but are mostly willing to work within the same framework to achieve their ends.[7] Bull's description of diplomacy does omit a fundamental point, however. At a rudimentary level, state interests can be universally defined – to maximize benefits without it costing too much in terms of power and capabilities. Diplomacy is the non-violent means for states to interact with one another in an effort to pursue their interests while maintaining the integrity of international society.

Within the UN structure, diplomacy is imperative for its successful functioning. Attaining the goal of international stability among rational actors would be contingent upon a strong diplomatic system; without it, states may embark upon prisoner's dilemma-types of actions. In recognizing the centrality of the primary institution of diplomacy, Chapter I, Article 2 of the UN Charter explicitly states:

> 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
> 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (Charter of the United Nations)

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[6] For a discussion of English School views on state diplomacy, see Cornelia Navari, *Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[7] For more on the UN's role in interstate diplomacy, see James P. Muldoon, Joann Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano and Earl Sullivan (eds.), *Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today* (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2005).

In order to compel states to use the UN as a forum for diplomacy, the right Westphalian sovereignty and a commitment to non-intervention are critical. Without a guarantee of these rights by the UN, states would likely have little incentive to take part in the institution and the diplomatic framework of international society. By designing the UN as an institution that recognizes the independence and sovereignty of states, and guarantees these rights by law, states can enter into diplomatic relations with each other and have at least some element of trust that their most sacred interests will not be breached.

6.12 Balance of Power and Great Power Management

Establishing the balance of power and creating the structure to maintain it is an essential component of the society of states.[8] The idea of balance of power means different things to different schools of thought, including those within the English School. Wight presents what the balance means to the Machiavellian, the Kantian and, most importantly for English School purposes, the Grotian. According to Wight, Machiavellians view the balance of power as the existing power structure at any given time and that distribution tends to favour the status quo powers (Wight 1991, 169). This version of the balance has relevance in the systemic level as found in structural realist theory. Kantians, in Wight's view, dismiss the entire notion of a balance of power. The revolutionary state that Kantians aim for must overcome balance of power thinking, and as a result, the unreliable and unmanageable nature of the balance is rejected. For the Grotian, which relates to the conduct of international society, balancing behaviour aims to distribute power as evenly as possible among states. Wight argues: "Grotians see the balance of power almost as a political or social law; they detect an inherent tendency in international politics to produce an even distribution of power, and see the balance as a general statement of how groupings of powers fall into ever-changing equilibria" (Wight 1991, 168).

It is clearly recognized by Wight that achieving an equal distribution of power in international affairs is virtually impossible. Instead, the UN and other secondary institutions are designed in a way that combines both realist and pluralist norms. Wight notes: "A good joint Grotian-Machiavellian definition [of the balance of power] would be: a multiplicity of sovereign states tends to fall into unstable equilibrium, striving always for even distribution, but constantly losing it again" (Wight 1991, 168). Constantly trying to level the playing field among rational actors is a difficult task, but the UN has found marginal success in doing so. Chapter IV, Article 18 of the UN Charter makes the effort at equality among members quite clear as each member of the General Assembly, regardless of geographical size or power capability, is granted one vote. Certainly there is doubt as to just how far this equality is meant to extend, as the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council are firmly in charge of the decision-making process at the UN, but as Wight claims, the Grotian strives for an equal distribution, knowing it is unlikely to ever truly happen (Wight 1991, 168). Upholding

[8] For a detailed discussion of balancing behavior in the society of states, see Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

the balance of power has been a primary task for the UN in modern international society and, in an era of uncertain capabilities and emerging major powers like China and India, the UN has been an effective body in safeguarding a delicate balance.

6.13 International Law

International law is considered by English School theory to be the most important primary institution in any international society. Wight presents, perhaps, the most succinct and accurate view of international law according to the English School. For the sake of brevity, these points are summarized as follows:

> 1. The subjects of international law are states, not individuals.
> 2. The purpose of international law is to define the rights and duties of one state, acting on behalf of its nationals, towards other states...it is not to regulate all international intercourse between private individuals, but to delimit the respective spheres within which each state is entitled to exercise its own authority.
> 3. International law is a system of customary law.
> 4. The bulk of international law consists of treaties. But these are contracts between those who sign them.
> 5. International law has no agents for its enforcement, except states themselves...This means to say, that cooperative self-help is as far as it can get in making itself effective.
> 6. International law has no judiciary with compulsory jurisdiction (Wight 1986, 108-109).

These points outlining the institution of international law tell a story of how limited and elusive the body of law between nations actually is. With this in mind, modern international society operates, as most international societies do, based on custom and learned behaviour; not according to a strong body of governing law (Wilson 2009, 168).

The development and enforcement of international law through the UN system is a contentious issue, and has been since the institution's creation.[9] Realist observers claim that states only adhere to international law when it is within their interests to do so. But it is more within the interests of states to follow international law than it is within their interests to break it. The potential costs of disobeying the underlying rules of international society far outweigh the long-term benefits. As a result: "It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time" (Henkin 1979, 47). The UN system recognizes the controversial nature of international law, which explains why it has not expanded its legal agenda to an extent that might compel states to leave the institution or disregard it completely based on states' unwillingness to bind themselves to a strong legal framework (Sarooshi 2005). There are a number of areas where the UN has succeeded in enforcing the laws between nations. To this end, there are well over ten

[9] For more on the role of international law, see Shabtai Rosenne, *The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006) and Antonio Cassese, *International Law in a Divided World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

thousand legal agreements registered at the UN (Henkin 1979, 47f). Areas where international law has found its greatest success include the law of the sea and oceans, intellectual property rights, international labour law and international trade issues (Crawford and Grant 2007, 202). Of course, where the UN tends to fall short is in its protection of solidarist values, such as human rights law, evidenced by the lack of enforcement of various conventions and doctrines aimed at protecting the lives of global citizens.

6.14 Sovereignty

In a world populated by states, the right to sovereignty and independence is bound to be a norm with considerable force. Much of English School theory is dedicated to debates about the extent of sovereignty rights for states, but virtually all scholars who use a society of states in their work would accept the idea that sovereignty is an essential consideration and driving value for nations to enter international society (Bellamy 2005a, 1-26). Jackson highlights the centrality of sovereignty as a founding point of international society:

> The *societas* of states is a pluralist arrangement of world politics in two important and distinctive respects. First, it is an association of multiple political authorities based on the values of equal sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention of member states...Second, it is an arrangement in which the domestic affairs of states are their own affair, which means that statespeople and citizens are free to compose their own domestic values and orchestrate them in their own way. State sovereignty should be expected to accommodate a diversity of such values (Jackson 2000, 178-179).

Solidarists are unlikely to agree with Jackson's firm statements about the nature of sovereignty, but the fact remains that the sovereign condition of states is a primary institution of any international society (Buzan 2004, 168-182). Proving this becomes simple when noting that the key institutions of European international society became universally accepted by the rest of the world, even in the wake of colonialism and global political transformation.

Without an apparent stress on the right of sovereignty among independent states, it is uncertain that the UN would have been formed at all. Sovereign statehood is a core principle for the UN, and the protection of states' rights as sovereign entities has played a large role in the institution's political history (Parsons 1988, 104-124). In legal terms, the UN Charter makes reference to establishing stability and striving for peace, but the goals set out in the Preamble of the Charter are difficult to conceive of without also protecting interstate sovereignty. Chapter I, Article 2 clearly describes the sovereign rights of UN member states:

> 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the

> present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (Charter of the United Nations).

Recent debates about the nature of national sovereignty have forced the UN and its most powerful members to reconsider just how far sovereign rights extend, and this questioning on the part of solidarist scholars is typified by the 2001 Responsibility to Protect report. Attempts to alter the meaning of sovereignty have begun to infiltrate the secondary institutions of modern international society, but no substantive changes have been made in law to this point. This consideration will be a driving concern in the following chapter, but in this instance, it is sufficient to point out the high legal standing given to Westphalian sovereignty by the UN and international law.

6.15 War

While outlining the protection of national sovereignty, the UN also places itself as the legitimate authority in deciding when the use of violence is warranted and lawful. War is a necessary tool in the society of states based on the need to maintain and enforce other primary institutions, like international law, sovereignty and balancing behaviour. The use of violence as a legitimate policy mechanism is considered to be a last resort in international society, but to think it can or should be completely eliminated is bordering on utopianism. Within the English School, war is a procedural tool used to maintain international order. For war to occur, it must be *just*. According to Wight, just war provisions can be found in the work of Aquinas and its application in international society must be judged according to the following criteria: "it must be declared by the proper authority; it must have a just case, for example defence, or to remedy justice; and it must be fought in the right frame of mind" (Wight 1991, 217). That war must be justified according to particular legal standards only proves that it is not a simple extension of state power in the society of states, but instead should be a carefully used policy instrument when the situation calls for it (Bull 2002, 191). Even in the nuclear age, Wight notes, the use of general war still plays a role in the political calculations of states, though they are more careful because of the nuclear threat (Wight 1991, 230). War can still be used by those in legitimate authority to protect the order so greatly valued by the members of international society.

Modern international society has placed the UN as the governing body that determines if and when war may be used to defend the rules and values of the society of states. This move was made in 1945, but the nature of the Cold War made any decision by the UN to wage war or use violence subservient to the desires and interests of the two superpowers. With the fall of the Soviet Union came an opportunity for the UN to live up to its original mandate. Chapter VII of the UN Charter describes how the Security Council is responsible for determining when war is a viable action, which is typically found in a situation where members of international society may be trying to disrupt international order. Justin Morris summarizes the purpose of Chapter VII requirements by arguing that "the Charter provided a potential mechanism through which recalcitrant members of international society could be coerced into abiding by its rules" (Morris 2005, 272).

If the proper functioning of modern international society is contingent upon the UN as the predominant and legitimate secondary institution of the society, then why has there been such a major push to transform the UN in recent years? Solidarists tend to argue that the current incarnation of international society is not working properly and must be altered in order to meet the growing needs of the global population. Recognizing the requirements, rights and problems facing individuals across the world is a central point of transformation efforts based on a belief that the UN and its agencies *ought* to be acting for a global humanity; not a society of states.[10] Such a belief, while noble in spirit, may also have unforeseen consequences for both international society and the international system.

6.2 Security Council Transformation

At the heart of any debate about how the UN upholds peace and security is the UN Security Council (UNSC). This body is at the epicentre of international decision making on peace and security issues and is primarily responsible for rejecting or implementing security initiatives that are above the state level. Recent examples of NATO or African Union deployment may bring the military operationality and collective security capabilities of the UN into question, but in the case of the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the African Union mission in Darfur, these regional bodies are acting with the express consent of the UNSC (Pugh 2007, 380-381). Solidarist efforts at progressing or changing the norms and values of international society are contingent upon an internal desire by UN member states to alter the UNSC and modify the power structure inherent in the UN Charter (Wheeler 2000, 296-297). In doing so, it is hoped that the UNSC can be more representative of regional power dynamics and move beyond the 1945-based pluralist model, towards a Security Council which takes the concerns of humanity into consideration.

Chapter V of the UN Charter notes that the UN the Security Council is the primary body responsible for the maintenance of international order, making it the single most important secondary institution according to English School theory.[11] If order, stability and diplomacy are among the most vital primary institutions, then the forum in which the vital decisions to such ends are made is in the UNSC. According to Chapter V, Article 24 of the UN Charter:

> 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf (Charter of the United Nations).

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[10] This is consistent with the revolutionist view that world society should be the primary aim of international relations. See Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).

[11] Jackson points to the UN Charter as the foundation of procedural norms for international society. See Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17-19.

At the end of World War II it was not surprising that the victors of the conflict would place themselves at the heart of any post-war international power structure (Weiss, Forsythe and Coate 1994, 24-26). Cold War international society sought to achieve the goal of security and survival for states, and aimed to do so by establishing an order contingent upon the most powerful states controlling the geopolitical agenda. It was probable that any major interstate conflict in the post-World War II era would likely require one of the P5 to intervene diplomatically, economically or militarily. As a result, the pluralist model of the Cold War society of states defined order as stability among states guaranteed by the great powers of the time; not moral solidarity among individuals.

What does the structure of the UNSC mean to modern international society? Solidarist scholars argue that the contemporary society of states should no longer adhere to the positive law trends of Cold War international society, but rather, see an opportunity for the achievement of a moral and emancipatory natural law agenda. Encouraging the cosmopolitan connections of humanity is at the forefront of this project. Nicholas Wheeler argues: "Thus, the political project of common humanity depends upon bringing citizens in constitutional states to a level of moral consciousness where their feelings of sympathy for the suffering of others lead them to make a sustained moral and practical commitment to the deepening of human solidarity" (Wheeler 1997, 22). Moral consciousness among a global citizenry is a righteous ambition, but what solidarists tend to overlook or dismiss is the underlying pluralist structure of modern international society, which is clearly seen in the configuration of the UN system.

The United Nations is a pluralist institution, guided by great power management. Various forms of states may have emerged in international society, but those ranked highest in the hierarchy of states are still those with elevated levels of hard power and soft power capabilities. In order for the needs of individuals to be met, the UNSC would have to be totally overhauled and transformed. Thomas Weiss notes that "the Security Council reflects the world of 1945 and not the twenty-first century's distribution of power" (Weiss 2008, 55). This being the case, those who favour change to the UN system have paid particular attention to the role and outdated nature of the UNSC.[12] A variety of plans for Security Council transformation have been put forth, few of which, however, will cure the problems outlined by critics of the Security Council, including solidarists.

In describing the transformation of the UNSC, the topic discussed most often is the enlargement of the permanent membership and accountability of the council (Luck 2005, 143-152). More broadly, reform efforts typically hint at strengthening the United Nations in the wake of the Cold War and the Security Council is an essential component of this proposed strength. According to the UN Millennium Declaration:

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[12] For instance, see Peter Fromuth (ed.), *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow* (New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1988), Thomas Weiss, *Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse* (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2005), Luck (2006) and Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (eds.), *Irrelevant or Indispensable? The United Nations in the 21st Century* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2005).

> 29. We will spare no effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for pursuing all of these priorities: the fight for development for all the peoples of the world, the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease; the fight against injustice; the fight against violence, terror and crime; and the fight against the degradation and destruction of our common home.

What becomes clear by this statement of the General Assembly is the rhetorical desire by member states to make the UN more effective in addressing the various threats facing individuals. Strength of the UN in the new millennium, according to the Declaration, is equated with meeting the needs of the global population, not simply preventing the outbreak of major war between states.[13] In terms of the Security Council, the Declaration resolves "to intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects" (United Nations Millennium Declaration). Adopted in September of 2000, the Millennium Declaration was an effort by the Secretary General and General Assembly to demonstrate awareness of the shortcomings in UN action in terms of human rights protection, particularly after humanitarian atrocities broke out in areas like Rwanda. A major problem, however, with this solidarist-type of rhetoric may be that radical proposals for transformation, particularly those aimed at the UNSC, tend to provide no clear plan for action. To transform the UNSC in all of its aspects, as outlined by the Millennium Declaration, might prove virtually impossible in practice.

With such an obstacle in mind, the issue of Security Council restructuring was again a chief component of the 2005 report released by the Secretary General's office called, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. According to Chapter V, paragraph 168:

> a change in the [Security] Council's composition is needed to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world. Its working methods also need to be made more efficient and transparent. The Council must be not only more representative but also more able and willing to take action when action is needed. Reconciling these two imperatives is the hard test that any reform proposal must pass (Report of the Secretary General).

Taking the idea of UNSC transformation a step further, the 2005 report offers a concrete solution to the questions of legitimacy and effectiveness plaguing the council since the end of the Cold War. Broadening the membership and therefore making the UNSC more accountable to global concerns would certainly bring an end to the style of great power management experienced since the UN's creation in 1945 and may even allow for concerns beyond the state-level to reach the purview of the council. Those states that are most often included in expansion discussions are Japan, Germany, Brazil, India, and South Africa, among others. Even an expanded Security Council that reflected the regional and soft power dynamics of the contemporary international political scene may

[13] For an in-depth analysis of UN reform proposals, see Ernesto Zedillo (ed.), *Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security* (New Haven: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2005).

not cure the problems of inaction and self-interest that pose the greatest obstacles for a solidarist vision of the UNSC. Edward Luck gets at the core of this problem:

> But simply adding seats to a flawed enterprise does nothing to improve the way it relates to other organs or reaches out to the larger UN membership...Neither the High-level Panel nor the Secretary General display much concern about how the enlarged Council would go about its work or about how the new members would act once they attain permanent status. Their preoccupation, instead, is with the size of the body. Without the former, i.e., without first tackling working methods, no real reform is being proposed at all; certainly nothing that would faintly qualify as radical, bold, or imaginative (Luck 2005, 148).

Luck makes a compelling point in his conclusions about the Secretary General's comments regarding Security Council transformation. How larger numbers of self-interested states being granted more power in an international forum would suddenly convert the most important body in international society from normatively pluralist to solidarist in nature is not at all clear (Mearsheimer 2001, 364). In fact, the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNSC could be reduced further based on the wider array of competing interests and lack of consensus among regional and international competitors.

Efforts to transform the UN are necessary, if for no other reason than to reflect the vitality of the institution in a previously unseen hybrid society of states. Since its creation, the UN has been a central body for diplomacy, dialogue and legitimacy in international society. Throughout its existence the UN has been successful in a number of areas, including the facilitation of decolonization, the early articulations of human rights, and the introduction of peacekeeping operations. The organization has also been at the forefront of addressing essential human problems such as development, poverty, the environment, satisfying basic needs, inequality and the effort to achieve peace.[14] With this in mind, it is essential to consider the impact that UNSC transformation, if done improperly, could have.

There is no doubt that the issue of international peace and security between states is the driving consideration for the purpose and scope of the Security Council. Throughout the Cold War, the UNSC was marginally successful in providing a space for dialogue between the US and Soviet Union, though many of the major disagreements between the two blocs took place beyond the UN sphere. Since the end of the Cold War, the UNSC has failed monumentally in its ability to meet the needs of humanity. Genocides in Rwanda, Sudan and the former Yugoslavia are only a few of the stark examples which prove the ineffectiveness of the UNSC according to solidarist values. Rather than adhering to the UNSC's original goal of maintaining peace and security for member states, Wheeler and Dunne assert that great powers must strive for a different goal: "Sacrificing the pursuit of narrow economic and political advantages in the cause of promoting international standards of human rights is the most important principle of good international citizenship" (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 868).

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[14] For more on the UN's successes, see Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and Thomas Weiss, *Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 205-214.

The P5 states of the UNSC have been hesitant to discuss revolutionary transformations to the UN in general, but more specifically to the Security Council itself. Even so, members of the P5 have shown some level of awareness that transformation is necessary and that they cannot make use of the veto provision each time a proposal which contradicts their national interests is brought forth. "In recent years the threat of a veto has become more important than its use; the SC usually agrees not to allow a matter to come to a vote if a veto is certain" (Franda 2006, 125). Expansion of the UNSC has also been met with opposition by some P5 members, especially China.

> Against a backdrop of anti-Japan street demonstrations, fuelled in part by Tokyo's campaign to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council, China dealt a peremptory blow to the notion of expansion. Beijing told the General Assembly in April 2005 that it was unwilling to rush a decision. The next day, Washington echoed the sentiment with specific references to artificial deadlines (Weiss 2008, 57).

Expanding the UNSC's permanent membership would mean that the P5 are expected to sacrifice their own interests for the good of the UN itself. Such a sentiment is consistent with what Wheeler and Dunne define as good international citizenship on the part of great powers, but tends not to be grounded in the realities of state practice. This is by no means a brand new, either. At the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the UN in 1995, the declaration document proclaimed the following in section 14:

> The Security Council should, inter alia, be expanded and its working methods continue to be reviewed in a way that will further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its working efficiency and transparency; as important differences on key issues continue to exist, further in-depth consideration of these issues is required (Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations).

The harsh reality of any revolutionary transformation discussions regarding the UNSC is that they have not progressed in any real sense since the formation of modern international society. Solidarists saw an opportunity to urge the UN towards policies that reflect what *ought to be* rather than the Cold War preference for acting on *what is*. Between 1995 and 2005, Security Council transformation has been suggested but the P5, while willing to discuss the idea, have made no true move in the direction of approving the expansion of numbers or permanent members. In essence, the ongoing debate between pluralists and solidarists is exemplified by the battles waged over what the role of the UN in international politics is, or ought to, be.

Most every UN organ has been a topic for debate since the fall of the Soviet Union, but none bears the importance of the Security Council in terms of protecting international order. Moving the Council away from its original structure and intent would serve effectively to prove the solidarist thesis regarding the progression of international politics in general, based on the centrality of the UNSC in the existence and maintenance of

international society. Even though incremental steps have been taken toward making solidarist norms a reality, the pluralist structure of international society seems to be more powerful in explaining the day-to-day actions of states and the UN alike. As history has shown, international societies have a way of changing or progressing over time and the same could be true in the current context of international politics.[15] In the existing structure of international society, however, pluralist action appears to reign supreme while solidarism serves as a moral compliment in the afterthoughts of states. What, then, might it take for a solidarist agenda to infiltrate the secondary institutions of international society and how can the UN be made useful according to this agenda?

6.3 The UN as a Pluralist Social Contract

In an era of complexity, plurality and emerging threats to international society, the notion of sacrificing stability in favour of a new, human-based agenda must be approached delicately. It is clear that the UN, and especially the Security Council, does not function according to the solidarist normative agenda. Power politics, self-interest, state-based decision-making and minimalist rules continue to dominate the institutional arrangement of international society. Progress, in solidarist terms, has been made in a variety of areas, however. The mere fact that secondary institutions have become open to normative evolution and a broadening of their political agendas is encouraging from a moral standpoint. The issue remains, though, that interstate organizations, like the UN, are reluctant to implement a solidarist-like agenda successfully based on the pluralist nature of the institutional structure. Explaining the UN's inability to move beyond the international political concerns of 1945 in the wake of the Second World War becomes possible by exploring what motivated states to join the organization in the first place, and why those original motivations still play an important role in the political concerns of states in the contemporary era.

English School thought is premised upon the assumption that international politics can be divided into three distinct spheres – the anarchic system, the cooperative international society and the cosmopolitan world society. Each of these three levels of analysis is important in its own right and serves to explain outcomes both in the international and domestic spheres. Solidarist scholars have begun to shift debates in recent years to highlight the relationship between international society and world society, attempting to encourage a discourse that places the individual at the centre of geopolitics. Rhetorically, this effort is expanding every day. State-building, humanitarian intervention, global citizenship and other concerns which are consistent with solidarism have perforated the political program of the UN. In this regard, the contemporary society of states has a strong solidarist overtone to it and has the potential to evolve into something more in line with what solidarists would prefer.

When examining the relationship between the international system and international society, the picture is not quite as bright as portrayed by solidarists. Even today, states

[15] This may be especially true for modern international society due to the uncertainty created by the non-violent end of the Cold War. Shifts in the victor's preferences may ultimately alter the normative framework of international society.

are forced to calculate their foreign relations strategies based on rational assumptions about other states in the system. Anarchy has not disappeared, nor has the possibility that states can wage war to achieve their goals. Even more importantly is the sustained existence of nuclear arms, which are even less controlled now than they were during the Cold War.[16] The bipolar balance between the US and USSR made it irrational for a state to use nuclear weapons, but the decay of Russia's armed forces, and the growth in global terrorism serve to make nuclear arms that much more dangerous than they were in Cold War international society. Despite calls for revolutionary changes to the UN system in the wake of the Cold War, the UN looks as if it prefers the status quo. This may translate into the UN losing its relevance and legitimacy. As Tom Keating observes:

> few signs suggest that member countries are willing to invest resources in the organization and to present it with a greater capacity to address effectively the problems it confronts...Without a demonstrated willingness on the part of the great powers to support the organization politically and financially and to share decision-making responsibilities more widely, the capacity of the UN will whither (Keating 1993, 227).

Keating may be correct in his assertions regarding the impossibility of expanding the UN agenda without the interest and commitment of great powers, but this argument is premised upon an assumption that the UN *ought to* be expanding its capacity. In his discussion, Keating notes that the UN is expected to address a wider array of concerns: "Moreover, the organization continues to address a range of additional issues, from the role of women in development to pressing environmental and health problems" (Keating 1993, 226). According to Keating's line of inquiry, the UN would be in the process of dying in the contemporary context of international relations because the behaviour of the great powers and the issues plaguing the UN have not changed much in practice since the inception of modern international society. More to the point, what the global community must realize is that the UN may be incapable of becoming the human security-focused institution they desire.[17]

Forming any international society is not a formal or legal agreement between states; instead, it is a set of mutually agreed upon de facto rules that nations agree to adhere to in order to ensure their survival.[18] As Jackson notes:

> International society is an institutional response to the fact that the earth's population is divided among separate territory-based political communities which are deemed to express the will of local populations to an independent political existence and to conduct their domestic affairs according to their own norms and values. Because those political communities exist side by side and even cheek by

[16] For more on current nuclear issues, see Michael Quinlan, *Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
[17] For more on the limitations of the UN, see Saadia Touval, "Why the UN Fails," *Foreign Affairs* 73:5 (September-October 1994), 44-57.
[18] For more on the legal limitations of international society, see Alan James, "Law and Order in International Society," *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 60-84.

> jowl, their leaders are obliged to arrange a normative framework of some kind for conducting their relations (Jackson 2000, 36).

This basic definition implies that a conscious effort is made to establish an institutional arrangement that seeks to stem the tide of systemic anarchy without sacrificing the independence of the states forming the society. English School thought has, for the most part, been very weak in its description of the secondary institutions that actually provide the space for self-interested, sovereign actors to dialogue and cooperate with one another. It is possible that new international societies are formed in the wake of major international war and conflict, as evidenced by the substantial shifts in the systemic arrangement and norms in various historical instances, but to comprehend how international society operates on a daily basis is more complex. Since the creation of the Cold War international society, the UN has been the secondary institution dedicated to acting as the legitimate authority on matters of interstate stability and relations (Bull 2002, 176). It can be argued, then, that the organization was never intended to act as a human-centred body of social change and relations.

In 1945, the UN was formed as a kind of social contract among states. Though this social contract has not provided a strong Sovereign or Hobbesian Leviathan, it has brought self-interested actors together in an effort to overcome international anarchy. In his description of why people should form a commonwealth and escape the brutish character of the state of nature[19], Thomas Hobbes states:

> The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment (Hobbes 1985, 227).

Lacking from the Hobbesian version of a social contract in the formation of the UN is a strong force able to exercise its power to compel members of the Commonwealth to live up to their contracts with others. This being admitted, Hobbes' social contract does have relevance in comprehending the UN structure, but also why the UN has been unable to transform itself to become the institution so many wish it to be today.

International society is not a formalized social contract due to states' continued preference for an anarchic international system. In order for the society of states to be known as a social contract in liberal theoretical terms, a clearer understanding of the tenets and characteristics of a society of states must be articulated, and the anarchic

[19] This account of people in the state of nature is contrasted with those of Locke and Rousseau.

nature of international politics would have to be overcome.[20] Instead, states chose to create a *quasi*-social contract in the UN; a contract which, in reality, is difficult to enforce and thus would be weak according to Hobbes. The quasi-social contract that is the UN sought, in many ways, to achieve what Hobbes describes in his theory about why people come to form a Commonwealth at all. In the state of nature, men are brutish, selfish and lusting for power; in the international system, without any kind of constraints, states are security maximizers that will use war as a tool to pursue their self-interest if necessary. People want to ensure their survival among other people and use a hierarchical body or individual to guarantee their safety in Hobbes' Commonwealth; states are constantly concerned about their security and survival and thus are willing to partake in the UN as a means of ensuring a level of independence and sovereignty. Knowing aspects of their autonomy will be sacrificed for their safety, Hobbes claims that people will enter into the Commonwealth and place their trust in the Sovereign or Assembly who will also determine what is, or is not, in the best interests of citizens; states do retain their independence and sovereignty in the UN but also sacrifice elements of it by coming together, agreeing upon rules and laws, and placing an element, though not a strong one, of trust in the UN version of Hobbes' Assembly: the Security Council.

The UNSC is composed of 15 members, but the P5 represent, in this version of a quasi-social contract, the Assembly described by Hobbes. This body has the final word on virtually all matters of consequence as they pertain to the peace and security of the institution's members.[21] For Hobbes, the entire purpose of forming a Commonwealth is to guarantee the survival of citizens:

> And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security (Hobbes 1985, 232-233).

Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter place the UNSC in the role as guarantor of peace and security, which is comparable to Hobbes' framework for legitimate authority in the Commonwealth. To best comprehend the actions and structure of the UN, it is difficult to view it as a vehicle capable of promoting solidarist, cosmopolitan values. Rather, it is, perhaps, more accurate to claim that the UN is a secondary institution designed to guarantee the survival of states by allowing them to mitigate the anarchy of the international system by exercising primary institutions, like international law,

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[20] For more on those who may view international society as a social contract, see John Charvet, "International Society from a Contractarian Perspective," *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 114-131and Chris Brown, "Contractarian Thought and the Constitution of International Society," *International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 132-143.

[21] For comprehensive accounts of the UNSC, see Edward Luck, *The UN Security Council: Practice and Promise* (New York: Routledge, 2006), Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) and David Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

diplomacy and war. This is not to say that the UN has acted perfectly since its inception, or does so in the current context of international relations. What is being contended here is that the UN may not capable of undertaking the reforms that would be necessary to make it into the organization considered necessary according to solidarist logic.

By examining the relationship between the international system and international society, it becomes evident that the UN remains an essential body for the functioning of the society of states due to its ability to provide states with a forum in which to exercise the primary institutions of international society. Without it, states will be left in their own state of nature without any recourse for cooperation and dialogue. If, after accepting the limitations of transforming the UN, one still desires a body capable of addressing the plurality of political and security issues facing humanity, there might only be two options: dismantle the UN and start again, or convince states to allow the creation of a new organization that can act in parallel with their own interests.

To determine whether or not to maintain the existing institutions of global governance, like the UN, requires one to ponder whether transformation efforts can save such organizations. These institutions are not being effective in their quest to meet the needs of people on the ground throughout the world. Perhaps these institutions are not necessary at all; it is possible that revolutionary-types of institutional alteration will have little or no impact in the end. Following Oran Young's logic, one should question whether or not institutions, altered incrementally or in a revolutionary sense, are necessary or beneficial in addressing people's needs: "to say that institutions are important is hardly to assert that they invariably or even usually operate as critical determinants of individual or collective behaviour at the international level" (Young 1992, 193). A mainstay of the English School is the existence of primary institutions, but there is ambiguity on the role, type and importance of secondary institutions in international society literature. It is, however, difficult to think that states can achieve the stability that motivates them into joining the society of states without some kind of secondary institutions capable of encouraging cooperative behaviour.

Walden Bello questions the ability to transform the overarching global governance and secondary institutional architecture, of which the UN is a part, due to its inherent flaws. In his discussions of the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Bello concludes that each of these institutions is based upon undemocratic, unaccountable and process-driven politics, controlled by a calculating elite. He claims:

> Even more alarming is much of the press's acceptance of the non-transparency that marks the WTO process from beginning to end. Is there an assumption here that economic institutions should not be measured by the same gauge of transparency and democracy as political institutions? Is there a feeling that economics is best left to the economic experts? Is it a case of being intimidated by a labyrinthine process? Or is it a case of not wanting to risk the ire of the monopolistic managements that now dominate the global media (Bello 2002, 125).

According to Bello's logic, the fact that the architecture of secondary institutions was established to centralize Western power and be undemocratic in nature would bring into doubt any discussion of a revolutionary transformation plan which seeks to base itself on existing, and defective, institutions. Solidarist values, then, might be impossible to implement globally based on the existing structure of power-based institutions.

While there is discourse about the benefits of transforming the UN, there is very little about the costs that such a movement could incur. To make the necessary changes, include a variety of groups, and implement a new architecture, would be very costly both in terms of money and time. Even changes to the existing system cannot take place too rapidly and the possible costs of getting it wrong may far exceed the costs of the status quo. Financially, the UN would need to be restructured using a bottom-up approach, emphasizing the needs of those on the ground affected by globalization and poverty. Democracy and transparency are also necessary goals, but these changes could seriously slow the decision-making process, create competing interests among groups, and legitimize a structure of civil society and Non-governmental Organization's which themselves are uncontrollable, while it is unclear as to how such alterations would meet the needs of states themselves in terms of security and stability.[22]

There may be danger in radically transforming institutions that may not be able to address the current problems facing humanity in the contemporary era. Louis Pauly argues:

> If common standards of industrial and financial governance are now required, it would be wise to seek them directly, truly transparently, and in a context where exceptions can be made for states and societies embarking late on the quest for prosperity. The risk of asserting such standards prematurely and non-symmetrically through ill-adapted organizations is likely to be high, especially if it becomes obvious that that assertion reflects most closely the immediate foreign policy priorities of one state (Pauly 1999, 419).

Pauly is concerned primarily with the possible efficiency costs of transforming existing institutions, and the high-level of risk associated with such changes if they are done in institutions that are incapable of supporting such alterations. The argument here is that the costs of transformation may outweigh the benefits based on the notion that existing institutions may not be salvageable; hindsight may prove that creating new institutions would have been the less-costly route or plan to pursue. Also, while this process of recreating a governance design would be taking place, globalization would not slow, and the nature of it, as well as its challenges, may also change.[23] As a result, a transformed architecture might very well be outdated by the time of its implementation.

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[22] For more on democracy and global governance, see Esref Aksu and Joseph Camilleri, *Democratizing Global Governance* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002) and W. Andy Knight, "Democracy and Good Governance," *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 620-633.

[23] For more on the trends of globalization, see Colin Hay, "International Relations Theory and Globalization," *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 266-287, Ian Clark, *Globalisation and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford

Solidarists are correct to identify the interests and insecurities of humanity, but the UN may not be the institution that should be used to meet these needs. Whether it is deemed to be morally positive or not, the UN is meeting the needs of its members, which are states.[24] If it was not, there would likely be far stronger calls for transformation from within or states would simply leave the institution entirely. In instances when states do act beyond the sphere of the UN, as in the case of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the UN did its job and achieved its goal – it deemed a proposal to be illegal based on insufficient evidence and also recognized that such a mission would destabilize an entire region for no rational reason at all.[25] The weak nature of the UN quasi-social contract was evident when the so-called *Coalition of the Willing* invaded anyway, but this speaks to UN success, not failure. At a critical juncture, in the face of enormous pressure, the system worked by making a decision that was deemed as best for the majority of its members. David Malone argues the invasion of Iraq "demonstrated to the surprise of many that [the UN] would not let itself be bullied or bribed by any power, permanent of even hyper" (Malone 2004, 644). Every state and person in the world is now aware of the costs such an illegal and illegitimate invasion has incurred, and it must be pondered just how different that mission may have turned out if the UN had been involved.

Conclusion

The United Nations represents an essential component of modern international society. Few English School theorists would take exception to this point and deny its significance in the society of states throughout the Cold War and into today. Recognizing the importance of the UN may not be the driving issue, but the role and meaning of the UN in international society is unclear. For pluralists, the UN is a vital secondary institution that implements the primary institutions aimed at mitigating the anarchic nature of the system and providing a basis for the functioning of international society. Though its role was limited by the bipolar structure of the Cold War, the UN has actually begun to perform its proper function since the collapse of the Soviet Union and is living up to its minimalist promise. On the other hand, solidarist accounts of politics in the contemporary environment are likely to provide a different account of the UN. This version is among those calling for changes to the UN system in general, but most specifically with the power structure of the Security Council and the need for a substantial shift away from state-centred ideas of security.

Modern international society operates based on a delicate hybrid model that incorporates both pluralist and solidarist values. The UN system is one of the few institutions in existence that is able to prove empirically the nature of the contemporary society of states and its internal normative conflict – on one hand, the UN is based on a pluralist power

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University Press, 1999) and David Held, "Cosmopolitanism: globalization tamed?" *Review of International Studies* 29 (2003), 465-480.

[24] For a discussion of the UN since the end of the Cold War, see David Hannay, *New World Disorder: The UN after the Cold War – An Insider's View* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2008).

[25] For a realist analysis regarding the legitimacy of the US invasion, see John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "Can Saddam be Contained? History Says Yes," (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 12, 2002).

structure, while on the other hand, it has recently begun to promote values in its rhetoric and vision that are consistent with those in English School solidarism. What has become apparent is the acceptance of the UN system being in a state of crisis. Is the UN to be transformed to reflect a changing normative structure of international politics; is it too premature to discuss revolutionary transformation; or is it time to dismantle the institution entirely and start over?

Presently there is little reason to believe that sweeping transformation to the UN Security Council is going to take place, or that the underlying structure of the organization is on the verge of being altered. Member states, including the P5, are open to debating the issue and see the shortcomings of the UN, but states are hesitant to make serious commitments to implementing the alterations being presented. Tentativeness toward UN transformation and an expanded individual-centred agenda may come as a result of states preferring a power structure aimed at providing stability and minimal rules that protect their independence. Proposed alterations to the UN would limit, change or completely erase the pluralist rules the organization was initially founded upon. Such a progression might be possible in international society if the norms and values had totally changed from one society of states to the next. In this case, the driving concerns of Cold War international society continue to have relevance in modern international society due to the non-violent end to the Cold War, which helps to explain why solidarism has not become the exclusive model for the society of states.

Currently, the interests of the international community, but not necessarily the global community, are the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council. This body was chosen intentionally by states to manage matters of peace and security for the society of states because of the place given to great powers in the wake of World War II. Each state and their leaders appreciated the problems this was going to pose in terms of a monopoly on decision-making powers, but such awareness did not prevent states from seeking membership in the UN (Weiss, Forsythe and Coate 1994, 24-26). In this light, the understandings about Security Council power and great power control were not enough to deter states from entering into a quasi-social contract that came to form the UN in 1945. If states truly had major problems with this system, it is likely the UN would have suffered the same fate at the League of Nations by this point in time.

Coupled with the interest in the role of institutions in English School theory has been the increase in literature from solidarist scholars on the debate regarding humanitarian intervention. This issue represents another source of tension and separation between pluralists and solidarists, based on similar issues involved in the discussion about institutions and the UN – when, if ever, should states act in the interests of humanity? Though the English School has been interested in human rights discourse for many years, recent scholarship has begun to pay particular attention to the emerging doctrine of human security, exemplified in the Responsibility to Protect. This topic and its consequences to understanding modern international society will form the basis for the next chapter.

Chapter 7: Human Security in International Society

Efforts at reforming the structure of the UN and broadening the agenda of international politics beyond the scope of state-based interest have found marginal success since the end of the Cold War. The UN itself has recognized many of its own shortcomings in meeting the needs of a global populous and has taken some, though admittedly few, steps to correct these problems.[1] Included in this new globalized political agenda is an expansion of the Economic and Social Council's agencies and mission, the creation of new bodies of international law aimed at prosecuting war criminals and endeavours to cope with a wide array of health and poverty issues in the poorest areas in the world. Even with the increase in normative and moral awareness worldwide, however, there are still serious obstacles in trying to implement a solidarist agenda in the society of states.

An increase of spending in the Economic and Social Council and holding various conferences or summits that probe humanitarian security issues has not yet compelled a fundamental alteration to the interventionist policies of states (Chesterman 2002). Rather, what these normative developments may prove is something realist scholars have always known – that states are willing to do and say anything, as long as their national interests are not threatened in the final calculations of foreign policy strategy (Mearsheimer 2001, 47-48). There may be monetary costs or diplomatic costs in trying to address health, environmental or development issues, but states are still reluctant to sacrifice their hard power capabilities, or substantial soft power capabilities, in order to protect every individual across the world. The rhetoric about global human security often does not match the conduct of states worldwide.

Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald make the case that the best way for the English School to be relevant in humanitarian discourse is to focus on the human security agenda. They argue:

> Human security may be viewed as a manifestation of an English School discourse of security, with its conception of the role of human rights, sovereignty and the individual in an international society grounded in a weak solidarist English School conception of international politics. Its universalist tendencies are also indicative of a basis in notions of shared societal values, norms and identities that characterises a solidarist approach to international society more generally (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, 321).

Bellamy and McDonald are not the only solidarist scholars who believe the most valuable contributions the English School can make to international relations more broadly exists exclusively in world society-based examinations. Nicholas Wheeler, Tim Dunne and Andrew Linklater have also dedicated themselves to demonstrating how valuable English School methods are in examining the normative and historical dimensions of

[1] See for instance Sumihiro Kuyama and Michael Ross Fowler (eds.), *Envisioning Reform: Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009) and Joachim Müller (ed.), *Reforming the United Nations: the Struggle for Legitimacy and Effectiveness* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).

international relations, particularly with a focus on human rights, and why it has become necessary to progress beyond traditional problem-solving concerns in IR theory.[2]

Human security, which attempts to redefine the scope of global security debates in a way that replaces statist interests with those of humanity, has become of great interest to both scholars and politicians since the end of the Cold War.[3] Ramesh Thakur summarizes what human security means at its most basic level, which is "the security of *people* against threats to personal safety and life" (Thakur 2007, 72). Its foundations in the contemporary period can be found in two primary documents, namely the 1995 Report of the Commission on Global Governance and the 2001 Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These reports call for a review and substantial revision to the normative and practical rules of international society so that the basic human rights of all humanity are protected. To do so, vital primary institutions used in the maintenance of international order, like sovereignty and international law, are altered or dismissed entirely (Welsh, Thielking and MacFarlane 2002, 489-512). The English School has been at the forefront of calls for a strong human security agenda, as issues like human rights and humanitarian intervention have been debates within English School literature since its creation.[4] Solidarists quickly began supporting a transformed global security agenda in the wake of the Cold War, especially due to the failures of international society to prevent the genocides in Rwanda, Sudan and the former Yugoslavia.

Modern international society has, indeed, taken steps to enlarge the normative discourse surrounding human rights in a solidarist sense, but state practice begs the question as to whether there may still be a preference for the continuation of status quo, or Westphalian, state sovereignty. Rather than urging a sweeping reform plan for the society of states that would see changes in the way states understand sovereignty, independence and the obligations placed on secondary institutions like the UN, perhaps there is value in scholars and policy-makers alike taking a step back and identifying what the underlying problems facing the implementation of the human security program are.[5] Realists and English School pluralists typically do not deny the value human security could provide, but rather do not see its execution as either possible or advisable. Approaching the human security problem with a healthy dose of pragmatism may prove that the theory

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[2] For more on the solidarist concern for humanity, see for instance Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State," *European Journal of International Relations* 2:1 (1996), 77-103.

[3] For more on human security, see Fen Hampson and Jean Daudelin, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), Robert G. MacRae and Don Hubert (eds.), *Human Security and The New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) and S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong (eds.), *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

[4] See for instance R.J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations: Issues and Responses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *International Journal of Human Rights* 6:1 (Spring, 2002), 81-102, Richard Norman and Alexander Moseley (eds.), *Human Rights and Military Intervention* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

[5] For more on the challenges facing interventionism, see J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

urging changes to human rights protection through the R2P is not yet developed enough to become operational, and that international society might be best served by its current pluralist structure.

7.1 The Emergence of the Human Security Agenda

The issue of human security has become one of the most discussed and important issues on the global agenda in recent years. With the end of the Cold War came new ideas about the changing nature of conceptualizing the protection and enforcement of human rights on a world stage. These evolving notions began to discuss the security of humanity in a context that was not exclusively centered on the state, and included a variety of actors in the international arena (Hutchings 1999, 154-155). In the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* report, the changing context of peacekeeping was highlighted as the debate shifted from traditional peacekeeping to what is now commonly referred to as peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy (Doyle and Sambanis 2007, 324). According to Section 15 of the *Agenda for Peace* document, world organization must undertake the following steps to adapt to the changing nature of security:

> - To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
> - Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
> - Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
> - To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
> - And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organization (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

While the idealism and perceived need for change was met by many UN members in a positive manner, the *Agenda for Peace* ultimately failed with the outbreak of conflict in areas like Somalia and Rwanda (Wheeler 2000, 219-230).

Building on the 1992 document, the UN and other agencies began to articulate a need to move beyond interstate concerns about security and rights promotion toward an individual-focused program that could meet the needs of the global population. The *Agenda for Peace* saw its demise with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 135-155). In its wake came what can be described as a radical proposal for humanitarian security, found in the 1995 report of the Commission on Global Governance. Consisting of 28 prominent individuals and funded largely by the UN, this

commission made a number of far-reaching suggestions to the UN General Assembly that would alter the landscape of international institutions and their role in upholding international peace and security. For instance, the final report of the commission calls for global taxation, a standing UN military force, the end of the veto power for the P5 Security Council members, a criminal court of justice and a larger role for the UN Secretary General (Our Global Neighbourhood 1995). Other than the suggestion for a criminal court, which was achieved in 2002 with the creation of the International Criminal Court and the signing of the Rome Statute, the other provisions of the report were largely ignored.[6]

One area that the report focused heavily on was the perceived change to the nature of international security. Many, if not all, of the proposed changes to the UN system included in the document were aimed at giving the UN enough power to protect populations from human rights abuses on a regular and consistent basis. According to the report:

> To confine the concept of security exclusively to the protection of states is to ignore the interests of people who form the citizens of a state and in whose name sovereignty is exercised. It can produce situations in which regimes in power feel they have the unfettered freedom to abuse the right to security of their people…All people, no less than all states, have a right to a secure existence, and all states have an obligation to protect those rights (Our Global Neighbourhood 1995, 81-84).

Clearly the 1995 report made little difference to those in the hierarchy of international society based on the continuation of humanitarian disaster and atrocity.[7] As the 1990s drew to a close, there arose yet another discussion as to the necessity for a global initiative that focused on the individual and the emerging normative discourse surrounding the security of humanity. As Bellamy notes, by the end of the 1990s: "The question was now not whether sovereigns had responsibilities but what those responsibilities were, how they were best realised and what role international society should play" (Bellamy 2009a, 32). It is in this light that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published its findings in the 2001 R2P document. Heavily sponsored by the Government of Canada, the report highlights the need for human security as a central driving force behind international policy formulation.

Among its findings, the ICISS called for major changes to the UN system as well as the basic motivations of state action. Security, according to the report, was no longer limited

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[6] For more on the challenges facing the ICC, see Mark Ellis and Richard Goldstone (eds.), *The International Criminal Court: Challenges to Achieving Justice and Accountability in the 21st Century* (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2008).

[7] For more on humanitarian inaction since the Cold War, see Amanda Grzyb (ed.), *The World and Darfur: International Responses to Crimes Against Humanity in Western Sudan* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009).

to states and a perceived outdated Cold War mentality. Rather, international security was to centre on the rights and interests of the global populous.

> Many new international institutions have been created to meet these changed circumstances. In key respects, however, the mandates and capacity of international institutions have not kept pace with international needs or modern expectations. Above all, the issue of international intervention for human protection purposes is a clear and compelling example of concerted action urgently being needed to bring international norms and institutions in line with international needs and expectations (ICISS 2001, 3).

Under the findings of the ICISS, the realm of global security would look far different from that of traditional international security. States, under the legal direction of the UN, had an obligation to enforce three major provisions for the safety of humanity: the responsibility to prevent the outbreak of humanitarian disaster, the responsibility to intervene and protect populations if rights were being abused, and the responsibility to rebuild in the wake of humanitarian crisis (ICISS 2001, xi). While the international community took widespread notice of the initial 2001 report, the proposed changes to issues including state sovereignty, the role of the UN in natural disaster relief, and post-conflict rebuilding, were all questioned by nations, especially the great powers who would likely incur the bulk of the costs in R2P sanctioned missions.

By 2005, the R2P had reached the UN agenda and was open for debate. Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin was among those pushing very hard for the UN to adopt R2P and offer hope to those in areas experiencing human rights problems, specifically in Darfur.[8] What became evident in 2005 to the entire membership of international society was that the society of states was not entirely prepared to sacrifice its independence and sovereignty for a western ideal of natural rights. As a result, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which ratifies parts of the R2P in principle only, outlines 4 key areas when interventionism may be a legitimate option: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UN General Assembly 2005). The 2005 version of R2P adopted by the UN does not call for legal changes to the meaning of sovereignty nor does it affirm the responsibility of international society to intervene in every case where human rights are being abused. Bellamy laments that "the responsibility to protect statement in the outcome document has done little to increase the likelihood of preventing future Rwandas and Kosovos...in order to secure consensus, the concept's advocates have abandoned many of its central tenets, significantly reducing the likelihood of progress in the near future" (Bellamy 2006, 145-146).

Since the issuing of the 2005 version of R2P, nations have yet to operationalize and implement the provisions of the doctrine. One must wonder why this is the case, particularly when in the summer of 2009, the members of the UN General Assembly

[8] For Martin's personal account on the events leading up to the World Summit, see Paul Martin, *Hell or High Water: My Life In and Out of Politics* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008).

reaffirmed their support for R2P.[9] Clearly the changes made between 2001 and 2005, and the lack of enforcement of human security since that time, reflect unwillingness on the part of states, especially the great powers, to introduce radical changes to interventionist strategy. This thesis pays particular attention to the 2001 version of R2P because it is the most robust and clear articulation of how the human security agenda would be implemented, if it were possible. There may be a variety of moral and normative arguments for why R2P *should* be implemented but, at this juncture of international history, it may be that the perceived costs of human security enforcement far outweigh any practical benefits to a group of self-interested states in international society.

7.2 Obstacles to R2P Operationalization

In exploring the reasons as to why there has been such reluctance on the part of international society to adopt and fully implement the R2P, either in its original 2001 version or weaker 2005 adaptation, there must be continued consideration given to the constraints on states by the anarchic international system. Of course, this description of the global realm assumes that states continue to be the primary units of analysis and major actors in the world, and are responsible for enforcing human security. In his discussion of the global human rights regime, Jack Donnelly writes: "The centrality of the state as the bearer of duties correlative to internationally recognised human rights reflects not only its dominant place as an agent for delivering goods, services and opportunities but also its continuing role as the focal point of visions of political loyalty and community" (Donnelly 1999, 92). With the acceptance of the state as the primary actor for implementing and enforcing human rights and security, it becomes necessary to examine the political concerns of states in international society so to better comprehend why the R2P remains purely rhetorical in nature.[10] To do so, this discussion will focus primarily on the 2001 ICISS version of the R2P, as it is the stronger and more ideal version of the doctrine. Even if the R2P was to be implemented in its most powerful and all-encompassing 2001 version, there are still a variety of interstate political issues which affect the use and support for the doctrine within international society. The next section will outline those concerns and obstacles which represent the largest hindrance to the realization of the R2P.

7.21 The Pluralist Structure of International Society

Secondary institutions in modern international society have not changed so much as to accommodate the human security agenda. Progress, in normative terms, has been made in a multiplicity of areas, perhaps best evidenced by the creation of R2P itself, but international society will have difficulty evolving from a pluralist structure without the desire and leadership of the great powers. Great power management is an essential

[9] For more on the General Assembly debate in the summer of 2009, see Ramesh Thakur, "The Responsibility to Protect," *The Mark*. Found at: http://www.themarknews.com/articles/739-responsibility-to-protect (Dec. 7, 2009) and Robert W. Murray and W. Andy Knight, "Operationalizing Our Ideals," *The Mark* (Dec. 30, 2009). Found at: http://www.themarknews.com/articles/774-operationalizing-our-ideals.

[10] For more on the rhetorical v. legal debate over R2P, see Carsten Stahn, "Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?" *The American Journal of International Law* 101:1 (January 2007), 99-120.

characteristic of international society, and it becomes clear that these major powers are hesitant to disrupt international order in favour of the human security agenda at the present time. Explaining why becomes evident by examining Bull's discussion of great power contributions as he argues "the great powers may be said to make, simply by virtue of their superior strength, to the simplification of international relations, they may play a role in the promotion of international order by pursuing policies that work for it rather than against it" (Bull 2002, 200). Like the proposals for transforming the United Nations, implementing the R2P requires fundamental alterations to the institutions and norms of the society of states and this must be reflected both in the desires of the great powers and in the laws that govern states internationally. In essence, it is questionable that the structure of international society would be able to sustain the implementation of the human security agenda.

If the end of the Cold War had been different and the United States had defeated the Soviet Union in a clear, physical, and quantifiable way, the normative configuration of modern international society could have been focused entirely on solidarism.[11] Such a preference on the part of the victorious party in the aftermath of a major conflict could have established the primary and secondary institutions necessary for a shift in preferences away from the pluralist norms that dominated the Cold War era. This, however, does not appear to have been the preference of the US in 1991 or beyond. As Stephen Walt notes quite clearly: "The bottom line is clear: The United States remains committed to maintaining – and, if possible, enhancing – its position of primacy, at virtually all levels of strategic competition" (Walt 2005, 45). In a time of rhetorical and theoretical optimism, why would the US not attempt to initiate a solidarist normative agenda that would guarantee both its strategic and moral primacy?

There may be two elements which account for why R2P is so difficult to operationalize. The first deals with the relationship between the international system and international society. The US, and every other state, recognizes the relevance of anarchy in the contemporary international system. It can also be argued that nations and their leaders actually prefer an anarchic system. This explains why states actually take steps to ensure the continued survival of the international system and have not made major overtures toward forming a Kantian world state. Waltz notes "attempts at world government would founder on the inability of an emerging central authority to mobilize the resources needed to create and maintain the unity of the system by regulating and managing its parts. The prospect of world government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war" Waltz 1979, 111-112). Instead, states have used international society as the method of communicating and cooperating with each other, while ensuring their survival in the international system. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little describe how the structure of the system is intentionally maintained by states through their participation in international society. By making agreements with each other, "states explicitly confirm each other's sovereignty and therefore actively help to reproduce the deep structure of the system. Treaties and acts of cooperation all intentionally serve to reconfirm and reproduce the anarchic system of independent states" (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993,

[11] This builds on the logic set out in earlier chapters regarding the decisions of the victorious and defeated parties at the end of a major international conflict.

152). Implementing R2P would disprove the theory that states recognize and find a sense of comfort in a society of states that prefers pluralist institutions to solidarist ideals. The mere fact that human security has reached the level of the UN and interstate debate speaks volumes about the rhetorical success of solidarist-like norms since the end of the Cold War. At present, these values are not defined or articulated clearly enough to convince states that focusing on world society issues, rather than those at the systemic level, are a rational choice.

A second variable in describing why the solidarist emphasis on human security may be untenable comes from the experience of the US in trying to implement the Bush Doctrine.[12] In essence, the Bush Administration experimented with the style of foreign policy strategy that would be used under a post-Cold War solidarist model. R2P contains three essential elements in its use: the responsibility to prevent human atrocity, the responsibility to intervene and protect if atrocities break out and the responsibility to rebuild in the wake of intervention. Initially, proponents of human security felt the election of George W. Bush might signal the end of the idea of humanitarianism in the post-Cold War era, but after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it appeared that Bush was suddenly open to the doctrine of interventionism.[13] In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration tested a new foreign policy strategy that essentially dismissed the pluralist structure of modern international society and that attempted to implement a US-focused solidarist agenda on the rest of the world. As Walt remarks:

> September 11 also allowed Bush's advisers to articulate a fundamental revision in US national security strategy, one that reflected their underlying belief that contemporary international norms did not operate to America's advantage. This new approach downplayed the traditional US reliance on deterrence and emphasized the need to preempt potential threats before they emerged (Walt 2005, 58-59).

Under the Bush Doctrine, proponents of human security and humanitarian intervention saw their worst fears realized. In the first time interventionism on a moral basis was used by the most powerful actor on the world stage, the mission was a dismal failure. The outcomes of Bush's foreign policy initiatives may have served to push states further into their preference for pluralist policies and institutions. According to Aidan Hehir:

> Up to this point supporters of humanitarian intervention found the Bush administration, to their surprise, to be amenable to their agenda; the invasion of Iraq, however, destroyed the tentative coalition between Bush, Blair and the humanitarians. The invasion broke the Kosovo liberal intervention consensus and

[12] For an analysis on the theory behind the Bush Doctrine, see Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 118:3 (Fall 2003), 365-388.

[13] For more on early perceptions of Bush's foreign policy, see Sowmya Anand and Jon Krosnick, "The Impact of Attitudes toward Foreign Policy Goals on Public Preferences among Presidential Candidates: A Study of Issue Publics and the Attentive Public in the 2000 US Presidential Election," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 33:1 (March 2003), 31-71.

> suggested a regression to self-interested interventionism, and worse, the appropriation of humanitarian rhetoric for this very cause (Hehir 2008, 147).

In a practical sense, the Bush Doctrine and its utter failure may have provided the final blow to the interventionist hope in modern international society. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the decline of US power both in hard and soft power terms has served as a lesson to other great powers and smaller powers alike as to what the consequences of moral promotion may actually be.[14] Bush's version of interventionism is not completely consistent with that promoted by solidarists and pro-human security advocates of course, but many of the same problems could plague R2P-sponsored missions in the future. Furthermore, any effort to promote human security must now also contend with the possibility that states may have become even more attached to pluralist institutions that will guarantee their independence and uphold the right of non-intervention. Bush's failed experiment has accomplished one thing for certain, and that is to strengthen the traditional idea of Westphalian sovereignty (Hehir 2008, 147).

7.22 State Preference for Westphalian Sovereignty

The R2P report makes a number of assertions and suggestions which involve the concerns of humanity in the global realm. Among them are a need to protect human life at all costs, as the report assumes all humans have the right to be free of governmental interference in their right to life (Thakur 2007, 21). In order to practically implement this right for all humans, the report suggests an alteration to a cornerstone of international politics and the society of states - the notion of Westphalian state sovereignty.

Traditionally in the field of international relations, states are assumed to have almost absolute sovereignty. This notion stems from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which established the modern state-system and that granted states the right to operate in whichever fashion they chose within their own borders; put differently, Westphalian sovereignty can be described as the *Sinatra doctrine*: "everybody could do it their way" (Jackson 2000, 168). Jackson discusses the classical conception of sovereignty:

> The constitutive rules of the sovereignty game are a response to the unavoidable and undeniable reality of a world of states: plurality. They are entailed by constitutional independence: legal equality of states, mutual recognition, jurisdiction, non-intervention, making and honouring of treaties, diplomacy conducted in accordance with accepted practices, and in the broadest sense, a framework of international law including the law of war which attempts to confine even violent conflict between states within a rule-bounded playing field that protects noncombatants and other spectators (Jackson 1993, 35).

[14] For more on how the 2003 Iraq War impacted R2P, see Alex Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 68-70. For a discussion of the impact of American foreign policy and the relative decline in power, see Joseph Nye, "The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry," *Foreign Affairs* 83:3 (May-June, 2004), 645-665.

Since the time of Westphalia, the idea of sovereignty has been virtually unconditional; all international laws were forced to account for the sovereign rights of states, few international institutions are formed without entrenching sovereign rights and states typically exercise this right when the rest of international society may disagree with their domestic actions (Roberson 2002, 13). It is this very right which is brought into question by the R2P, and creates anxiety among states.

According to R2P, sovereignty is to be changed at its first principles, going from being absolute to conditional in nature. A state only has sovereignty, according to the R2P, if the global community sees that the human population within a state is being secured and protected. The ICISS report makes this clear in section 2.15:

> Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human security (ICISS 2001, 13).

The alteration from a state having the ability to exercise jurisdiction over its territorial borders in an almost unconditional fashion to viewing sovereignty as a sort of contract may create tension among states and raises a number of doubts over the probability that states will implement such a radical change. The problems regarding the loss of autonomy and the creation of a condition of dependence upon western, liberal rights are a large part of the R2P's current failures especially due to the lack of support from developing nations across the world, whose human rights practices are less than perfect. As Ramesh Thakur notes:

> At one level, the developing countries' attachment to sovereignty is deeply emotional. The most important clue to understanding their concerns is the history of Europe's encounter with Arabs, Africans and Asians. The relentless march of colonialism and imperialism is never based on anything so vulgar as commercial and geopolitical calculations: land and wealth grabs. No, it is always driven by a lofty purpose (Thakur 2007, 266).

When forming an international society in hopes of mitigating anarchy, states create a set of rules that create the basis for their cooperation. One of the foundational rules of societies of states since 1648 has been sovereignty. In order to compel states to cooperate in the first place, there must be agreements in place which maintain and protect state independence, and included in this calculation is the need and perceived right to Westphalian sovereignty. Yale Ferguson explains why states entering into international

society prefer the continuation of Westphalian sovereignty: "Most state members of international society favour maintaining the status quo in boundaries, because they are keenly aware of how illogical boundaries (perhaps their own) are; once the rearranging starts, where does it stop" (Ferguson 2002, 198). While the R2P may promote a change to the norm of sovereignty from absolute to conditional, states have appeared somewhat unwilling to make and enforce such a change in practice.

In this light, one may be able to connect the contentions about the idea of sovereignty with the issues facing the R2P more generally; there has been a shift in policy to conditional sovereignty, but the necessary normative adoption of this change has not taken place among states. Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy describe this problem in the context of Darfur, as they claim there is an "apparent contradiction between governments' use of sovereignty as responsibility language to enhance their own humanitarian credentials and their unwillingness to take responsibility-based action" (Williams and Bellamy 2005, 29). In essence, the policy is trying to create a norm, and the success of such an effort is not clear at this juncture. Rather, it may be the case that states continue to value their independence in the international system, and often act in their own interests without fear of international repercussion. Empirical examples like the US invasion of Iraq, the lack of governmental action in Burma after Cyclone Nargis, and the continued defiance of the Sudanese government in dealing with Darfur all compel observers to wonder whether sovereignty is, in fact, changing.[15] If the version of sovereignty discussed within R2P circles is as tangible as human security proponents would claim, then these regimes would likely not act as they do; instead, they would make calculated decisions which would not defy international law and rights doctrine in fear of having their sovereignty brought into question. As the world stands at present, it appears as if the debate regarding the nature of sovereignty remains unresolved.

7.23 Normative Illusions

In order for the R2P to work, the normative foundations of international society would have to reflect the policy.[16] One question that must be posed to all proponents of the R2P is - why is there such strong reluctance to foster the normative component of human security? It is difficult to conceive of a regime or state as agreeing with genocide, mass-murder, or humanitarian inaction, and those that do are perceived as politically and morally illegitimate. Even so, the normative element of the R2P discussion requires further elaboration.[17]

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[15] For more on interventionism as it relates to Darfur and Burma, see Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur," *Security Dialogue* 36:1 (2005), 27-47 and Roberta Cohen, "The Burma Cyclone and the Responsibility to Protect," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 1:2 (March 2009), 253-257.

[16] For more on the life cycle of norms and their widespread acceptance, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52:4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917.

[17] For more on R2P as a norm, see Nicholas Wheeler, "The humanitarian responsibilities of sovereignty: Explaining the development of a new norm of military intervention for humanitarian purposes in international society," *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29-51 and W. Andy Knight, "The Responsibility to Protect as an Evolving International

A contributing factor to the hesitancy of developing world nations in fostering the R2P norm is undoubtedly the influence of western world values. The rights theory that drives the human security principle is derived from western conceptions of human rights.[18] Reactions to R2P and the right of intervention from developing nations are seen quite clearly in the 2000 *Declaration of the South Summit* issued by the G77:

> We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United Nations. We reject the so-called "right" of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general principles of international law… we stress that humanitarian assistance should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of host countries, and should be initiated in response to a request or with the approval of these States (Group of 77 2000).

According to the ICISS document, human security is defined as "the security of *people* against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity" (ICISS 2001, 15). What is worth noting here is that the entire goal of the R2P is to not only advocate in favour of a conception for international society to protect each individual, but further to this, is to redefine how international politics is conceived at its core. This would involve altering perceptions about the foundational institutions of any international society, like sovereignty, human rights, interventionism but perhaps most fundamentally, the idea of security.

In making a move from placing emphasis on national security to a notion of human security, power is removed from states and placed on global individuals (Evans and Sahnoun 2002, 102). Section 2.22 of the ICISS document argues:

> One of the virtues of expressing the key issue in this debate as the responsibility to protect is that it focuses attention where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance. The emphasis in the security debate shifts, with this focus, from territorial security, and security through armaments, to security through human development with access to food and employment, and to environmental security (ICISS 2001, 15).

While this shift in the nature of security may be morally justified, the implementation of such an alteration has yet to occur in any widespread sense.

Throughout the history of human rights, and especially since the end of the Seonc World War, there has been little to no universal consensus on what does or does not constitute a human right. There has been, since the inception of the UN, a clash between western and

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Norm," Notes for Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee Meeting, Ottawa, Canada, September 22, 2003.

[18] For critiques of this position, see David Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 and Ken Booth, "Three tyrannies," *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 31-70.

eastern ideals of rights, and debate about just how far universal rights extend, or whether they exist at all (Donnelly 1999, 72-76). The R2P assumes that, not only do universal rights exist, but that these rights now form the basis for political action internationally; as if to argue states no longer act according to ideas of narrow, realist self-interest, but have come to conceive of their interests as contingent upon individual security. Former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister and prominent R2P supporter Lloyd Axworthy comments on this view:

> The issue of our time is how to keep on building a system of rights that encompasses the complexity of the contemporary global order. The rampages of powerful but irresponsible political leaders, the lawlessness of non-state actors and the transgression of rights are global problems and cannot be met by states acting in isolation, or by separating consideration of human rights from questions of peace, security, trade and development (Axworthy 2003, 74).

While members of the global community may wish to see universal ideas of justice and rights, and have these ideas translated into practical institutional policy, this may ultimately be a western utopia. To claim that human development has become the primary focus of the international political agenda would require far more empirical evidence and action on the part of states than is currently observable (Wheeler and Egerton 2009). What, if anything, has suddenly changed within the society of states to make developing nations and great powers alike move away from pluralist and state-based concerns to those surrounding a universal conception of humanity when little evidence exists to prove this contention? Claiming that China, Zimbabwe, North Korea and others have recognized and accepted such a preference for humanitarian concerns, and have adopted the R2P in its normative and policy sense, may prove difficult to demonstrate. The westernized focus on rights and common humanity may only serve to create the conditions which continue to hinder the progress toward R2P implementation in the society of states.

7.24 Self-Interest

In order to re-define security from a state-based idea of survival to an individual-centric one, there must also be severe alterations to how states conceive of their self-interest. For the R2P to work successfully, states must see humanity as their primary concern; not their own survival as states (Evans and Sahnoun 2002, 102). Traditional discussions of territory, sovereignty, military capabilities, relative gains and conflict would all need to be coupled with cosmopolitanism in order to feasibly make the R2P work. The concern here is whether such a strategic change in the foreign policy calculations of states is actually occurring.

The theory that states are inherently motivated by their self-interest and survival is one that has played a prominent role in English School theory since its inception. One of the pioneers of English School thought, E.H. Carr, examined just how it is that states define what is in their interest. Carr's discussions of self-interest and state action place

Machiavellian thoughts on preservation and interest at the forefront of international action. Carr argues:

> The accepted standard of international morality in regard to the altruistic virtues appears to be that a state should indulge in them in so far as this is not seriously incompatible with its more important interests. The result is that secure and wealthy groups can better afford to behave altruistically than groups which are continually preoccupied with the problem of their own security and solvency; and this circumstance provides such basis as there is for the assumption of commonly made by Englishmen and Americans that the policies of their countries are morally more enlightened than those of other countries (Carr 2001, 144).

Realist theories and English School pluralism are premised upon states acting out of self-interest and viewing national security as being among their highest priorities. This attitude is what allows states to determine the extent of their cooperation with other states, whether it is rationally beneficial to enter an international society and determines how national interests are evaluated. Such an emphasis on self-interest is not abandoned by the R2P, however; it is simply cleverly re-defined.

Human security is presented in both the 2001 and 2005 incarnations of R2P as being in the best interests of states. The proponents of the R2P doctrine realize that states act primarily out of self-interest and attempt to reconceptualise this interest by shifting the focus away from state or national security, to individual or human security. Thakur argues: "In the real world today, the brutal truth is that our choice is not between intervention and non-intervention. Rather, our choice is between ad hoc or rules-based, unilateral or multilateral, and consensual or deeply divisive intervention" (Thakur 2005, 128). This shift in security and interventionist estimation is at the core of the report, as without such a change, states are unlikely to ever implement such a guiding principle. The dilemma currently being seen by those in favour of R2P implementation is that states have yet to change or alter their ideas on interest to the extent where R2P has been used at the UN level.

The ICISS discusses security and self-interest in a far broader context than realist theories do. Section 1.28 of the report defines and explains human security and the changing attitudes towards it within international society. The report claims, "the concept of security is now increasingly recognized to extend to people as well as to states. It is certainly becoming increasingly clear that the human impact of international actions cannot be regarded as collateral to other actions, but must be a central preoccupation for all concerned" (ICISS 2001, 6). While members of international society have made human security a priority in a rhetorical sense (see Canada during the Axworthy-era and Martin era), such a concern remains doubtful in practice.

Realist conceptions of state self-interest remain very much at the core of state action. While the R2P may compel states to write and even adopt altruistic policies like R2P, it is evident that self-interest in the Hobbesian sense still plays a pivotal role in the rational calculations made by states in their daily affairs. Proof for such a claim may be found in

the alterations made to the R2P between 2001 and 2005; states consciously removed a number of vital and foundational elements of the original report in order to make it suit the normative and political realities of international society. As a result, self-interest and its historical entrenchment due to the overarching condition of systemic anarchy remains a large obstacle to R2P operationality.

Another variable in describing why R2P has not yet been enforced by the UN is the idea of great power management. Neither the US, nor any other great powers in the wake of the Cold War, has appeared willing to consistently enforce solidarist norms. In a pluralist structure, the independence of states is vital and the strong norm of non-intervention is included in this arrangement (Jackson 1993, 192). The great powers have been quite clever in their strategies toward human security in terms of rhetorical support but physical distance. Great powers did pass the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, but have yet to actually implement it or allow any R2P-resembling mission to be approved in the UN Security Council. Areas like Burma, Zimbabwe and Sudan certainly meet the criteria laid out in both the 2001 and 2005 versions of the doctrine, but missions to these areas have not been UN-led.[19]

7.25 Costs

Another consideration in any discussion surrounding human security, intervention and reconstruction in terms of states is that of cost.[20] It is assumed here that states are rational actors, and operate based on making assessments which involve cost-benefit analyses before embarking upon any action. Costs can come in a variety of forms, but for the purposes of this examination, perhaps the three most important types would be financial or economic, political and military costs. By briefly examining each of these areas, it is hoped that greater insight can be provided as to how the R2P struggles to prove itself as more beneficial, as opposed to costly, in the rational calculations of states, especially for the great powers.

<Financial>

In October of 2008, the Canadian government released the entire cost of its mission in Afghanistan related to the events of 9/11. According to the Harper government, the mission since its deployment in 2001 had cost Canada over CDN $18 billion, with no clear end in sight (Campion-Smith 2008). While the mission was not initiated under the auspices of R2P, it certainly resembles, in many ways, what deployment under the R2P would look like. Even with this mission being a NATO-sponsored initiative, the Canadian government was alone paying tens of billions of dollars, and the nation could never have conceived that such high costs would be incurred at the time the deployment

[19] It is noted that the UN supported the AU deployment in Sudan but did not physically implement this mission under its own structure.

[20] Costs here do not refer simply to quantifiable calculations of expense, but rather, to the rational calculations made by actors in determining foreign policy strategy. See Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 110-132.

was approved. Of course, this dollar amount includes such considerations as equipment, soldiers, base accommodation, support staff, travel expenses and much more, but had the Canadian public been told in 2001 or early in 2002 that the mission was bound to cost so much, would they have been as willing to pledge their support?

The ICISS argues that preventative measures are far less costly than letting a situation get so out of hand that intervention becomes necessary.[21] "The best *financial* argument is that earlier action is always cheaper than later action. If prevention is possible, it is likely to be cheaper by many orders of magnitude than responding after the event through military action, humanitarian relief assistance, postconflict reconstruction, or all three" (ICISS 2001, 71). There must be consideration for the costs of the preventative measures outlined in the document, but beyond this, the fact that international relations has witnessed states acting out of self-interest (and not that version described in section 8.15 of the ICISS report), nations may continue to exercise their Westphalian sovereign right to act as they wish internally.

Perhaps the highest costs would be incurred throughout a post-conflict transition.[22] In the current climate of global economic instability, the fact that there is no cap on a financial amount in terms of reconstruction and the time such state-building will take, it is logical to assume states would be hesitant to desire rebuilding any nation, especially if that nation provides no practical benefits, like oil, to the reconstruction force (Hehir 2008, 79). R2P calls for a three-fold approach to resolving issues of human insecurity. The prevention aspect would likely incur little financial costs in a relative sense, other than intelligence gathering and diplomatic missions; the other two parts of the R2P doctrine, namely the protection and reconstruction stages are impossible to achieve at a low financial cost. Other than large, western powers, it is difficult to foresee that any other national government could possibly fund a long-term mission and be able to sustain its domestic economic situation in any stable manner. Even the US, during its deployment in Iraq, has weakened economically at home. If the world's largest power is negatively affected in an economic sense by state-building, how willing might others be to embark on such missions in the future? Beyond this, the UN budget is a constant topic of debate, with states not sharing the burden appropriately, and in some cases, not paying their dues at all.[23] All of this must be addressed and overcome if international society hopes to approve and deploy any R2P-like mission.

[21] For more on the prevention aspect of R2P, see Alex Bellamy, "Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect," *Global Governance* 14 (2008), 135-156.

[22] This logic is derived from the high financial costs associated with the Canadian mission in Afghanistan over time. A report issued by the Parliamentary Budget Officer shows that costs have increased as nation-building replaced strictly military operations early in the mission. See Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, "Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan," www.parl.gc.ca/pbo-dpb (accessed February 5, 2010).

[23] For a brief discussion of UN finances, see Jeffery Laurenti, "Financing," *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 675-700.

<Political>

Politically, state-building is a costly and unsuccessful idea.[24] Even in cases like the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the success of state-building efforts remain to be seen, as this is a long-term consideration (Keating 2005, 188-200). There are two primary problems with the politics of R2P – the issue of how to evaluate success, and the issue of political will. Each of these calculations is an important function needed in a successful political project of any kind. Many of the situations where the need for R2P is seen cannot provide onlookers with a clear definition of what a successful use of the doctrine would be, nor how to go about creating the necessary international political will to support such a mission. According to Jackson: "State-building is primarily a domestic process occurring over a long period of time that can only be brought about by the combined wills, efforts, and responsibilities of governments and populations. The community of states at most may only assist or hinder it" (Jackson 1993, 21). In terms of state-building, if the domestic population does not request, desire or approve of such means of protection what happens to the political legitimacy involved and how might such a reaction affect the outcome of a mission?

The necessity of political success should be recognized in using the R2P. While there are a number of variables that could never be taken into account in implementing such a doctrine, the costs of being *wrong* or failing may outweigh the moral significance of initiating a mission in the first place. Once a nation fails in this regard, their willingness to support or become involved in future endeavours may be severely limited. Proof of this is found by looking at the US involvement in Somalia in the 1990s. After the perceived failure of the deployment in Mogadishu throughout 1992 and 1993, the US was extremely reluctant to involve itself in the Rwandan Genocide two years later (Hehir 2008, 79). At this time, the *Agenda for Peace*, as promoted by then-UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, was being promoted as the method by which to move from traditional peacekeeping to a more expanded idea of peacebuilding. Even so, the US, the UN, and any other major state or international institution did virtually nothing to react to the situation in Rwanda. The ICISS claims that a moral shift has taken place within international society and that leaders underestimate the moral interdependence of the global citizenry: "As to *moral* appeal, preventing, averting and halting human suffering – all the catastrophic loss and misery that go with slaughter and ethnic cleansing and mass starvation – are inspiring and legitimizing motives in almost any political environment" (ICISS 2001, 71). Human suffering is not at all a new phenomenon, so it becomes curious as to where human security proponents look to explain their arguments about a contemporary realization of cosmopolitan values. Due to past experience and empirical evidence, most nations and institutions appear fearful of the political costs of failing at a peacebuilding mission and the domestic repercussions associated with such an outcome. Doubt remains about whether international society has since progressed to the point of favouring the moral over the political.

[24] For more on peacebuilding and its challenges, see Beatrix Schmelzle, Martina Fischer and Hans Giessmann (eds.), *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2010), http://berghof-handbook.net/ (Accessed February 5, 2010).

<Military>

The final major cost in terms of invoking the R2P would come in military terms. It is likely there would have to be serious military involvement in all stages of R2P implementation. In the prevention stage, military intelligence technology would need to be employed, and even more importantly, in order to dissuade a government or group from committing a human atrocity, the use of military power to threaten and deter is also a logical assumption. In the reaction stage, it is evident that military power would be used to intervene in any nation, if physical intervention became necessary. Throughout the reconstruction phase of the process, military personnel and resources would be essential in protecting the civilians and political assets on the ground, in policing and maintaining law and order, and to prevent foreign aggressors from taking advantage of a weakened state.[25] In sum, militarization is a central theme of the R2P.

Military deployment, particularly on an international scale, is extremely costly, both in terms of dollars and lives. The R2P doctrine calls for the UN to oversee all arrangements and execution of R2P projects, and thus any intervening force would be international in scope. As there are with any UN military operations, questions exist surrounding issues like the chain of command, length of the mission, which nations are to contribute troops and how many, whose military is responsible for transportation, and just how much political will is involved once troops begin to lose their lives.[26] The R2P itself admits the potential problems inherent in discussing international military deployment: "Even states willing in principle to look at new foreign military commitments are being compelled to make choices about how to use limited and strained military capabilities" (ICISS 2001, 71). No operation is without risk, and military personnel are acutely aware of such a hazard, but the R2P provides far too little attention about the logistical use of military force and resources.[27]

Further to this comes the matter of troop protection. If an R2P mission, either in its reactionary or reconstruction phase, is interpreted as a failure, how quickly are troops to be withdrawn? Is there to be a set timeline before troops are removed or are missions able to extend for decades? On this note also comes a chief reflection being, how is success evaluated? According to the R2P document:

> Nothing has done more harm to our shared ideal that we are all equal in worth and dignity, and that the earth is our common home, than the inability of the community of states to prevent genocide, massacre and ethnic cleansing. If we believe that all human beings are equally entitled to be protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all, then we must match rhetoric with reality, principle with practice. We cannot be content with reports and declarations. We must be

[25] For more on the logistics of peacebuilding, see Julia Raue and Patrick Sutter (eds.), *Facets and Practices of State-Building* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009).
[26] For more on UN peace operations, see Donald Daniel, Patricia Taft and Sharon Wiharta (eds.), *Peace Operations: trends, progress and prospects* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008).
[27] It is admitted here that Bellamy has been instrumental in addressing this shortcoming recently. See Alex Bellamy, "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect," *International Studies Perspectives* 10 (2009), 111-128.

> prepared to act. We won't be able to live with ourselves if we do not (ICISS 2001, 75).

Throughout this report, there is an emphasis on the practicality of the R2P and its tenets. Nowhere, however, is there a clear outline from a military or strategic standpoint as to how to go about using the report.[28] It is assumed, then, that the realistic aspects of the doctrine will be left to the UN Security Council, which has rarely proven itself capable or willing of handling such issues. This lack of design in terms of physical and operational guidelines could serve to increase financial and human costs, rather than protect those who the report claims need it most.

7.26 International Stability

While the above obstacles represent serious considerations about the prospects for realizing the R2P and the protection of human security, perhaps the largest problem that proponents and states would need to overcome is the current structure of international order, and the foundational rules of a pluralist international society.

What is international order? Bull's understanding of the term seems to work best for this study, as his conception of order recognizes the hybrid operation of modern international society as being both pluralist and solidarist in nature. Bull argues "that by international order is meant a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary or universal" (Bull 2002, 16). The goals of international society, as advocated by Bull, are summarized as being the preservation of the state system and society of states; the goal of maintaining state independence and sovereignty (in its traditional or Westphalian form); an absence of war among states; and the limitation of violence as to prevent death or bodily harm (Bull 2002, 16-19). If the current climate of international order is conceived in this way, it may be reasonable to assume there will be problems with altering the said order as to promote and enforce the R2P.

One of the crucial elements in the ICISS's document for English School purposes is a necessary normative shift toward world society values. This change is essential for the success of the doctrine, and the members of the Commission admit in section 8.32 that their work is premised upon a notion of a changed international environment:

> Our work reflects the remarkable, even historic, change that has occurred in the practice of states and the Security Council in the past generation. Thanks to this change, no one is prepared to defend the claim that states can do what they wish to their own people, and hide behind the principle of sovereignty in so doing. In the international community, just as there can be no impunity for unwarranted unilateral uses of force, nor can there be impunity for massacre and ethnic

[28] Attempts have been made recently to fill this gap. See for instance Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).

> cleansing. No one who has perpetrated such horrors should ever be allowed to sleep easily (ICISS 2001, 75).

While it is admitted that certain alterations in the global realm have occurred since the end of the Cold War, it should be questioned just how much these changes have affected international order.

International society and the cooperative structure of states is premised upon rules; these rules found the basis for how states will interact with each other, and just how much cooperation observers can expect to see among a society of independent units in a system of states. Bull claims that the most important rule of coexistence is that of sovereignty. "At the heart of this complex of rules is the principle that each states accepts the duty to respect the sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state over its own citizens and domain, in return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states" (Bull 2002, 67). The respect described by Bull for sovereignty is based upon one very important expectation and assumption on the part of states – that non-intervention will be included in this respect for sovereignty. "A corollary or near-corollary of this central rule is the rule that states will not intervene forcibly or dictatorially in one another's internal affairs" (Bull 2002, 67). If international order is premised upon ideas of non-intervention, when and where did the shift away from such a belief occur? The R2P assumes that this change has taken place in recent history and has become a guiding principle in the system of states, yet the empirical or historical proof for this claim is not entirely clear.

The counter-argument to the principle of non-intervention by R2P proponents is that the doctrine uses physical intervention as a last resort; that every possible step is taken to prevent infringements on human security so that intervention may not necessarily have to take place. History, though, has proven that any attempts to prevent such atrocities, whether in the form of genocide or natural disaster, cannot be prevented successfully in every case. Therefore, it may be assumed that if military intervention plays such a large role in the writing of this report, its use by the Security Council is thought to be a viable, and at times necessary, option. This option, however, is at the heart of the problem for the R2P.

Bull's description of international order is premised upon the two rules that have dominated international relations debates since the field's inception: the right of sovereignty and non-intervention. Robert Jackson shares Bull's concern for these two rules and he states: "There is evidently a great reluctance on the part of major military powers to infringe upon the jurisdiction of even the least substantial sovereign state. Nonintervention is the foundation of international society and there would have to be very compelling reasons of state to disregard this general prohibition" (Jackson 1993, 192). Jackson can certainly be accused of not seeing the shift in the global realm towards greater solidarity and common conceptions of justice based on his preference for a pluralist international order. Even so, the argument here is that while idealists and solidarists may *want* to see these alterations to the international order, their actual existence remains in doubt.

There is a danger in trying to see variables in the international realm, rather than there actually being such variables. Carr warned against overly idealistic thinking in 1939, and those same warnings still hold relevance today. A few key assumptions regarding the continued significance of the international system should still be taken into consideration when debating the human security agenda and its prospects for success. Briefly, these are: a continued preference for the balance of power among states, which know all too well after the US invasion of Iraq what can potentially happen to a states' power position in the system if intervention occurs; the condition of anarchy which still pervades and controls the system, even though states do cooperate and come together to form the rules of this coexistence, they are still not bound by any overarching, compelling international governance structure; a lack of common norms beyond that of state self-preservation and minimalist cooperation; and lastly, a fundamentally realist or pluralist UN system. The R2P argues that each of these concerns is either less relevant or even non-existent. Full faith of the R2P doctrine is placed in the hands of the UN, which at its core, is a power-based institution which tends to perpetuate the domination of great powers over lesser states (Jackson 2000, 17-19). These serious gaps in the R2P's logic present what can only be seen as grave problems in its quest for change.

7.3 A Case for Pragmatism in a Hybrid International Society

Within the pluralist context, it should be considered whether the changes to the international political agenda proposed by pro-human security scholars and policy-makers would be both possible and preferable to the current structure of interstate relations. Presently, a level of predictability and rationality exists in the international system which has maintained its balance in the wake of the Cold War, despite major changes in the systemic polarity.[29] Furthermore, at the level of international society, states have proven themselves capable of coexisting without resulting to war with any regularity and have even begun to adapt to the conditions of modern international society by pursuing self-interest by non-hard power means, which explains why various forms of state can be detected in the society of states. It can be said, then, that progression, in solidarist terms, is occurring but not at any revolutionary pace.

Gareth Evans, one of the primary architects of R2P, has already asked the vital question in the human security debate – has the time for R2P already come and gone? Evans concludes that the norm of R2P and human security more broadly are still going strong in the international arena, though he admits the conceptual and practical challenges associated with the doctrine:

> If the unanimous adoption of the R2P principles by the 2005 World Summit and the UN Security Council is not to be the high-water mark from which the tides recede – if the responsibility to protect is not to become an idea whose time has gone as fast as it came – then a serious ongoing diplomatic and other advocacy

[29] For more on the changes in polarity since the end of the Cold War, see Christopher Layne, "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?" *World Policy Journal* 15:2 (Summer 1998), 8-28.

> efforts have to be made to explain and defend the norm, with serious efforts being sustained over a number of years not only to enshrine R2P principles in the language of relevant international, regional and national institutions and forums beyond the UN, but also in their institutional practice (Evans 2008).

Evans and other human security advocates are correct to assume that the debate is not entirely dead. While it may be perceived as a moral imperative for international society to identify and address humanitarian atrocities before they occur, it is difficult to conceive of a realistic plan that would witness any other portion of the doctrine other than the prevention aspects being put into motion due to the vast obstacles facing them. This apparent slowing in the human security agenda is by no means a totally negative sign, and should actually be seen as a moment of opportunity for scholars and political leaders to reflect upon what is hindering the operationality of R2P and to take a more pragmatic approach to understanding the obstacles standing in the way of R2P implementation.[30]

In some ways, maintaining the status quo of modern international society does not effectively kill the R2P. Instead, it gives human security advocates the time and forum to correct the problematic tenets of the theory and ground efforts at humanitarian protection in political practice. The hybrid nature of modern international society provides space for very idealistic rhetoric to be explored and compels states not to overlook world society-focused issues. Before moving the practice of the society of states away from the constraints of the international system and attempting in a more serious way to effect positive change at the human-level, a number of lessons about the contemporary functioning of international society should be taken into account.

Both pluralists and solidarists ought to take notice of the lessons provided by the Bush Doctrine. Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States has embarked upon a costly set of foreign policy decisions that seriously affected the nation's power capabilities. R2P supporters do not propose to use unilateral interventionism as a legitimate policy practice, but they do intend to invade, wage physical war and subsequently reconstruct a nation if it is found that terrible humanitarian atrocities are occurring. According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which is considered by many to be a softer version of R2P[31], interventionism remains possible:

> In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect

[30] This is not the first project to urge caution or pragmatism. See for instance Jane Stromseth, "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change," *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 232-272.

[31] For more on this view, see Edward Luck, "Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 1 (2009), 10-21.

> populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law (UN General Assembly 2005).

If there is one positive that can be found in President Bush's inherently flawed foreign policy strategy, it is the recognition that dangers and costs are bound to be associated with interventionism and state-building. The costs of lives, economic resources and political legitimacy may have been reduced if the US had operated through the United Nations system, but it is doubtful the outcomes of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq would have found more success. American experiences in both missions serve to demonstrate to the rest of the world what happens when a western power imposes its ideological and normative will on parts of the world that are not willing to cooperate. In many cases, it may be that an R2P-sponsored mission would be perceived in much the same way.

It may also be time for the world to stop asking the UN for things it is simply incapable of giving. The previous chapter argues that the UN system is not entirely meant, and possibly unable, to accommodate the demands of global civil society, and the human security cause is not exempt from this line of thought. Though the UN General Assembly places itself at the forefront of the human security debate in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, it is difficult to conceive of the Security Council acting on certain sections of the report based on their own political and normative divisions, particularly over the issue of human rights. For instance, in the report's discussion of human rights, the document claims:

> We reaffirm that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing and that all human rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms (UN General Assembly 2005).

Is it reasonable to assume that the Security Council is likely to protect these rights and enforce such norms when, for the last half-century, it has not done so on any consistent basis? It is possibly the case that the UN is not a progressive institution aimed at the needs and concerns of all human beings, but instead, is a forum for states to dialogue with each other and practice the primary institutions of international society as to maintain the stability of the international order (Jackson 2000, 16-19). States, not individuals, have traditionally been seen as the primary actors in international politics and perhaps should remain so for the time being until a solution toward making a functioning human-based institution that decreases state influence and guarantees human security can be found. If this sounds dangerously like a world state solution, it should, because this may be the only hope a global body has of solving the problem of humanitarian insecurity and would need to demonstrate that all members of world society seek the perpetual peace described

by Kant. Bull aptly discusses this point: "The advocate for a universal state can show his scheme to be feasible as well as desirable only by admitting that international relations do not resemble a Hobbesian state of nature; that in it covenants without the sword are more than words and the materials may be found with which to bring about collaboration between sovereign governments" (Bull 2000a, 92).

Assuming, as Bull does, that anarchy has not disappeared, another factor to bear in mind becomes the continued importance of the international system. Since the introduction of the Bush Doctrine and the subsequent decline in US unipolarity, the international system is witnessing a variety of emerging powers that are not adhering to the traditional models of competition of previous eras (Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann 2004). Hard power is being coupled, and at times replaced, by soft power strength and development, and the surfacing of various forms of state in the society of states only further complicates matters in terms of foreign policy decision-making. Maintaining a balance of power is an essential component of any international society, and the relationship between the international system and international society should not be overlooked in favour of a desire for world society primacy. Martha Finnemore claims: "A balance-of-power system requires and permits different kinds of actions to maintain an orderly balance than is required either by a spheres-of-influence system (such as that which prevailed during the cold war) or the current system" (Finnemore 2003, 86). Finnemore's description of how state strategies about maintaining stability change over time is astute. States have not altered their strategies so much in the modern era as to prefer intervention for overtly humanitarian means, but rather, see its use in the same light as the primary institution of war – as a policy mechanism to restore balance to the order (Jackson 2000, 252). The common acceptance of universal or global morality is still not entirely static and if such a normative quest is to become a reality in the society of states, pragmatic steps, not revolutionary ones, may be less costly and more appealing to states in achieving such a goal.

Modern international society, while unique in its hybrid structure, has yet to allow international relations to overcome the obstacles facing R2P implementation. The many barriers to R2P and also the lessons learned since the end of the Cold War all indicate that the world may not be entirely ready for human security to dominate the foreign policy strategies of states or the UN agenda. Those in favour of R2P usage should not, and likely will not, give up, for there is hope based on the rhetorical progress made since 1991. In the meantime, states should be addressing the needs of humanity, not because of any sense of western morality, but because it serves their interest in certain cases to ensure the stability of the society of states. To meet the needs of individuals on the ground, while keeping the constraints of the international system in mind, is no simple task. Simplicity, however, has never been a hallmark of international politics and thus the multitude of obstacles facing R2P should not stand in the way of humanity's protection from negligent or criminal regimes.

Conclusion

Transforming English School theory away from state-centrism and toward the human security ideal may still be premature, but is not out of the realm of possibility at some point. Normative progression since the R2P was initially introduced in 2001 has shown that some states and institutions are open to this sort of thinking, though the obstacles and dangers currently outweigh the benefits in a pluralist structured society of states. Those wishing to implement R2P and human security policy at this moment in history may need to accept the limitations of the current conduct of interstate relations and the constraints of the international system. Building the R2P norm should be the first priority at this juncture, not arguing in favour of radical alterations to UN policy and international law which are unlikely to occur.

Operationalizing R2P in the current context of interstate security could actually lead to the failure of the doctrine before it ever got a fair chance to succeed. Much like the conditions that led to the demise of the *Agenda for Peace*, trying to impose a norm on international society before the norm is universally accepted has the potential to be disastrous, as was evidenced by the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda shortly after the first move was made toward making sovereignty conditional in the early 1990s. International society is not yet equipped to handle the human security agenda in its current and underdeveloped form, and it would require an alteration to its underlying pluralist structure to make R2P work. Jackson comments on the consequences of introducing the human security dynamic to the pluralist structured modern international society:

> If such an amendment were made to the [UN] charter it would be nothing less than a normative revolution in world politics: away from national and international security and toward human security. It would be revolutionary because it would place human rights and the positive international responsibility to promote human security above state sovereignty and the negative international responsibility to respect the rule of non-intervention. It would destroy the pluralism of international society. Kant in his most revolutionary persona would take over and Grotius and Hobbes would have to retire. International society, in that important connection, would become a *universitas*. The UN would be converted into a latter-day secular equivalent of the medieval *respublica Christiana* (Jackson 2000, 212).

In the broad context of international relations, it would be nothing short of Kantian revolutionism to overhaul the foreign policy strategies of both states and international institutions to focus on a global humanity. Jackson argues "that humanitarian doctrine is gaining ground in world politics at the present time even though it is still very far from being generally accepted" (Jackson 2000, 201). More than this, it would also border on being western imperialism in its worst form to impose non-accepted norms and practices on other states, despite the guarantees of independence and sovereignty under international law. Realistically, rushing the implementation of R2P and human security

could represent serious threats to the stability of the international system and the order of international society.[32]

Solidarists in favour of the human security agenda are not completely utopian in their thinking. Alex Bellamy, for instance, has recognized the need for a pragmatic approach to R2P, despite his clear preference for its use. He argues: It is important that those interested in advancing R2P recognize that further progress toward realizing their ambition is unlikely without a more concerted effort to distinguish R2P from these concerns about humanitarian intervention. The key to doing this rests in developing those aspects of the R2P continuum that involve measures other than nonconsensual force" (Bellamy 2009b, 125). These aspects include the development of the prevention aspect of R2P, focusing on practical questions about protecting civilians and modest institutional reforms which may accommodate human security, even in a lighter form than that proposed by the ICISS. Bellamy notes the constraints of the international system and state self-interest in his discussion of R2P application, though he is still proposing shifts to the international political environment.

This chapter has attempted to describe the challenges facing R2P and human security implementation based on international society's pluralist structure. Idealism and hope should never die, but nor should they be the basis of policy in a time of political change and complexity.[33] Using the English School as a lens through which to describe contemporary international relations may help to demonstrate two things: first, that the pluralist structure of Cold War international society has not completely disappeared and second, that solidarism is making great strides in its efforts to foster world society-focused norms and values. Having a hybrid international society is unique, but its actual configuration cannot be ignored when formulating foreign policy; the consequences of doing so could be devastating to international order and stability. Recognizing the relationship of the international system and international society levels in English School theory can only help explain why there is such a tension between pluralist and solidarist norms in the contemporary era. With this tension in mind, it may of use to provide a broad assessment of what states and institutions can do to ensure their own survival, while also taking notice of emerging norms and values that influence interstate relations. These elucidations will form the basis of the next chapter.

[32] According to structural realist logic, states are only willing to intervene on humanitarian grounds if there is to be little or no effect on their power capabilities. See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 46-47.

[33] A lesson aptly described in E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

Chapter 8: Contemporary International Relations through an English School Lens

If there is one fact that holds quite true in the current context of international relations, it is that one theoretical outlook is nowhere near capable of explaining the complexities of the global realm.[1] Theoretical plurality has provided the field with an extraordinary ability to debate and discuss a wide array of issues, ranging from the systemic level down to the most human-centric concerns. All of these combined account for the value in having international relations as a distinct field of scholarly study. Without it, it is difficult to conceive of how global politics would be interpreted. Throughout the Cold War, international politics was typically dominated by realism which saw the conflict in a fairly narrow sense – how states were going to overcome the nuclear threat and the ideological divide between capitalism and communism. Other, more humanistic, issues did certainly exist but were constantly delegitimized in comparison to discussions surrounding the strategies developed by states to handle the bipolar balance of power that was in existence for fifty years. Since 1991, the international relations agenda has not necessarily expanded, but its intricacies are getting far more attention from both scholars and policy-makers.

In an era of plurality and complexity, it is argued here that value can be found by using the English School of international relations as a lens through which to explain and understand both international and global outcomes, but only after recognizing two major points – first, that the English School is not a perfect theoretical lens and is one that gets constantly attacked from all sides of the theoretical spectrum; and second, that even within the English School there is little or no uniformity of theoretical assumptions.[2] Even so, traditional theoretical approaches like realism and liberalism have continually fallen short in their attempt to address the problems facing international politics and critical approaches tend not to share the same concerns of interstate relations in favour of an individual-focused schema. Taken as a whole, these theories can describe the multifarious nature of trying to understand trends in international and global politics, but few are capable of combining both traditional and critical approaches to international theory.

Since its inception, the English School has tried to forge a middle-way within international theory debates (Brown 1995). Its first articulations attempted to bridge the divide between realism and liberalism, and its most recent supporters have fixated on incorporating critical theory concerns into the picture as well. This, in turn, has allowed the English School to evolve to a point where the middle-ground it seeks to provide balances between the problem-solving and critical sides of international theory. Its unique ability to use both traditional and critical approaches makes the English School valuable for the study of international relations, but it has begun in recent years to fall victim to the same trends as international theory more generally – the problem-solving

[1] For more on the complexities and debates within IR, see Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002) and Stephanie Lawson (ed.), *The New Agenda for International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).

[2] For more on the shortcomings of the English School, see Alex Bellamy (ed.), *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

aspect is being replaced and outweighed by critical ideas, thus taking the English School into a realm that may threaten its original intent.[3]

Progression, in theoretical terms, is a positive thing for any field of study, as long as that progress is being properly evaluated. Rather than addressing the often-cited problems within the English School, like its lack of methodological rigour and inability to describe a way to identify the creation and operation of an international society, modern English School theory prefers to forge ahead with critically minded notions that only open the approach up to the same sorts of criticisms it has been experiencing for years. Furthermore, these trends have the potential to lead the theoretical model away from any practical value.[4]

If there is one area of interest that most international theories address, it is the role of the state in international or global politics. The questions surrounding method and theoretical boundaries of the English School must be improved or refined in order to make the approach more relevant to a wider audience if it hopes to survive and evolve over time, as critical theory expands its horizons. In order to take stock of where the English School is at present, creating an English School Research Programme may provide a different outlook when compared to the approach to method given by other English School theorists. Establishing this theoretical programme and applying its tenets to the international political environment offers a more clear, though somewhat disturbing, conclusion – that the post-Cold War world might not look quite as different or idealistic as scholars first believed.

This chapter will attempt to summarize the ideas presented throughout this work and assess the consequences of coming to such conclusions. Admittedly, this study is by no means faultless and is likely to be met with hostility by some, and maybe even welcomed by others. In any case, the theoretical portrait of international relations painted here cannot be accused of being too utopian. E.H. Carr once wrote: "Our task is to explore the ruins of our international order and discover on what fresh foundations we may hope to rebuild it; and like other political problems, this problem must be considered from the standpoint both of power and morality" (Carr 2001, 209). In the wake of the Cold War and the destruction of its bipolar order, the theories and ideas explaining, understanding and providing guidance for the next era of global history cannot suffer the same fate as those espoused in the wake of World War I. By proposing an outline of how to think about contemporary international politics and the two most vital issues facing the society of states, being the role of secondary institutions and debates over human security, it is thought the English School can contribute profoundly to how scholars, policy-makers and casual observers study the world around them.

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[3] Some see this as essential in filling the School's gaps. See Paul Williams, "Critical Security Studies," *International Society and its Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 135-150.

[4] For more on the influence of empirical evidence on theory construction, see Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

8.1 The English School Research Programme

A major obstacle facing the English School is its methodological incoherence. It is clear that the earliest scholars of the school, like Wight and Bull, shared common traits in their work which allowed for the emergence of the society of states approach to grow, but far too much was left to the imagination for any possibility of theoretical evaluation. Dale Copeland effectively summarizes a definite gap in English School thought: "Without knowing clearly what it is that is being explained, there is simply no way of gathering evidence to support or disconfirm a particular [English School] author's position" (Copeland 2003, 431). This is not to say that English School scholarship should adhere to the strict positivist standards imposed by American social science at all, but there is validity in saying there are too few commonalities between English School writers to define it as a coherent theoretical lens.[5] Richard Little, building on an argument first presented by Buzan, claims that there are at least three distinct ways to view the English School: "ES theory may be considered first as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of statesmen; second, as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of political theorists; and third, as a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of the international system" (Little 2009, 78).

In response to critiques from US scholars like Copeland, an effort is made here to provide certain boundaries on what would, and what may not, count as falling within an English School framework. Imre Lakatos' work on Scientific Research Programmes tries to do exactly what Bull, Wight and others sought to accomplish – to find a middle-ground between two competing theories that both had relevance, but fell short in any kind of *truth* (Elman and Elman 2003b, 21-25). For Lakatos, the challenge was providing a way to balance the claims made by Karl Popper on one hand and Thomas Kuhn on the other. The synthesis provided in Lakatosian terms is his method of evaluating the novelty of theory and whether various contributions actually add value, or ultimately degenerate, the hard core assumptions of a hypothesis. According to Lakatos, a theory is not simply dismissed based on factual falsifications. Instead, it is evaluated as a series of contributions and those additions to any hypothesis can have some kind of value, either in one research programme or in the creation of a new one.

Evaluating theory in the Lakatosian sense requires the substantiation of empirical facts, however. Lakatos claims, "the time-honoured empirical criterion for a satisfactory theory was agreement with the observed facts. Our empirical criterion for a series of theories is that it should produce new facts. *The idea of growth and the concept of empirical character are soldiered into one*" (Lakatos 1978, 35). Within English School circles, method is typically of little concern and the need to empirically verify theoretical contributions tends to be overlooked.[6] Instead, society of states approaches prefer to

[5] The main commonality between English School theorists is their use of the idea of international society. See Brunello Vigezzi, *The British Committee and the Theory of International Politics 1954-1985* (Milan: Edizione Unicopli Srl, 2005).

[6] Mayall argues that the English School follows in the empiricist tradition of Locke and Hume, but notes this differs from the positivist method of empirically testing theory. See James Mayall, "The Limits of Progress: Normative Reasoning in the English School," *Theorising International Society: English School Methods* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2009), 211-212.

favour rationalist methods that highlight the evolution of international societies throughout human history. Unfortunately, even this claim to historical explanation by English School writers is interpreted as weak. "For a school that prides itself on offering a historical approach to international relations, there are surprisingly few diplomatic-historical analyses that extensively utilise archival sources or documentary collections" (Copeland 2003, 432). Beyond the lack of empirical content of English School theory, even the use of historical explanation is questioned in terms of what the school is trying to do through its work.[7] William Bain begs the question: "But if it is clear that English School theorists take history seriously, their purpose for doing so is a great deal less so. Once we have gotten inside history and have allowed our imagination to roam freely, we are still left to ask: What is historical knowledge for" (Bain 2009, 148).

English School theory is not likely to adhere to the preoccupation with methodology found in American international theory, but the purpose of the society of states approach in the contemporary era should be questioned. Buzan, Dunne, Wheeler, Jackson, Bellamy and others all use the English School in their work and have dedicated themselves to bringing it back to life in the wake of the Cold War, but why? Without any sort of method to evaluate its contributions to the field, what purpose does it serve? Colin and Miriam Elman argue that the best lesson to take from Lakatos is simple. His work and method helps scholars to explore "how to assess theories, and how to decide whether, over time, theories about international relations are getting any better" (Elman and Elman 2003b, 21). Even within the English School itself, the solidarist v. pluralist division makes it difficult to answer why the School exists at all; it seems as if both sides of the debate assume that it is still relevant and adds something to the way international politics is explained, though how this is done is ambiguous and vague at best.

A contention in this work is that the English School does have relevance and can help to explain and understand the behaviours of states in international politics, but plenty of work remains if the approach is going to ever enter the mainstream of international theory.[8] History might demonstrate that various international societies have existed, but where did they come from, how are they created and who determines whether a particular society of states can be identified either as solidarist or pluralist in nature? Furthermore, when do international societies change or collapse? In terms of making the School relevant in contemporary international relations debates, what is the character of modern international society and what does this society say about the continued relevance of state-centric approaches to international theory?

Each of these vastly important questions must receive some level of attention from English School scholarship in the near future. Otherwise, the theory itself becomes even more insulated than it already is. At present, those that practise the society of states approach are small in number and as time goes on, this number may increase, but its

[7] For an interesting analysis of history in the English School, see William Bain, "Are There Any Lessons of History?" *Review of International Politics* 44 (2007), 513-530.

[8] For more on the relationship between the English School and American international theory, see Ole Wæver, "Four Meanings of International Society: A Trans-Atlantic Dialogue," *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory* (London: Continuum, 2002), 80-144.

ability to penetrate the North American international relations literature may be limited. In response to the questions posed above, this work has proposed possible answers, though they are admittedly brief and are bound to be heavily criticized. It can be immediately said that this is an effort to *Americanize the English School*. More accurately, this is an effort to propose a theory of international politics that bridges the divide between the positivist tendencies of the US literature with the normative and boundary-less tradition of British thought. In doing so, it is argued that the English School, with some formalization, can have significance in contemporary international theory.

By using the magnanimity game model created by Steven Brams in his theory of moves, there is potential to identify some of the variables included in the formation of an international society. According to this logic, at the end of a major international conflict, when the polarity or the international system is affected or new great powers emerge, a new society of states is created which alters the norms and values which will form the basis for interstate cooperation. Though few historical examples are provided in this work, this hypothesis can be applied in greater detail in the future. International societies cannot appear out of thin air; there must be some causal link that explains when and why they are created.[9] This study proposes a theory which argues international societies are initiated by states in the wake of major conflict in an effort to either avert another conflict, or at times they are an attempt by the victorious power, or set of powers, to impose their own normative agenda on a society of weaker states. By exploring the strategic decisions of a victor at the end of a conflict through the theory of moves rationale, and determine which choices are made by both the winner and loser of the conflict in its wake, these actions may indicate whether an international society will be pluralist or solidarist in nature. Societies would therefore collapse when there is a major international conflict with systemic consequences.

In terms of current importance, this approach to studying international relations can offer interesting insight into how and why states currently behave the way they do. Modern international society, it is contended here, is a uniquely hybrid model due to the non-violent end to the Cold War. The Soviet Union may have disintegrated and lost its soft power relevance in the bipolar struggle that dominated the Cold War, but it retained most of its hard, military power and was not physically defeated.[10] Therefore, Russian hard power never disappeared and the US strategy in the post-Cold War era had to account for a persistent Russian military threat in a nuclear world. The institutional structure of modern international society may have retained its Cold War pluralist character, but solidarist values have begun to infiltrate the thought processes of states as well (Wheeler

[9] Peter Wilson argues that early English School scholars gave little or no attention to causal variables and method because they were amateurs. See Peter Wilson, *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 17.

[10] For realist analyses of the end of the Cold War, see Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas," *International Security* 25:3 (Winter 2000-2001), 5-53, William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994-1995), 91-129 and Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth, "Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War," *Security Studies* 9:3 (Spring 2000), 60-107.

2005, 95-107). Empirically, there are few examples of solidarist-based alterations in the actions of states, but the mere fact that the great powers are discussing ideas like institutional transformation and human security means that some level of awareness exists.[11] It may be the case that states remain committed to their self-interest and survival, yet they are including more groups and variables in their decision-making calculations. This should be seen as a small but important victory for the solidarist agenda.

8.2 Interstate Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, a plethora of new or reformed theories have emerged that attempt to examine the political dynamics of both the international and global realms, and offer insights into how conflict and interests are conceived of.[12] Traditional or problem-solving international theories have always kept ideas about conflict at their core, while the critical agenda has begun to engage this vital topic as well in recent years. This has resulted in a plurality of lenses through which to view conflict that all offer something of interest.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, realists have remained steadfast in their preference for examining interstate dynamics of conflict and cooperation. The failure of structural realism to predict or explain the end of the Cold War has led to a reappearance of classical realist postulates, such as those originally articulated by prominent scholars like Hans Morgenthau. One of the best examples of this has been the emergence of the neoclassical realist position articulated by scholars like Randall Schweller. This theoretical modification to realism contends that domestic level variables may produce certain foreign policy behaviours. According to Schweller, neoclassical realism holds:

> that states assess and adapt to changes in their external environment partly as a result of their peculiar domestic structures and political situations. More specifically, complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts that channel, mediate, and (re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily changes in relative power). Hence, states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones (Schweller 2004, 164).

While some realists try to overcome the theoretical shortcomings of the structural realist thesis at the end of the Cold War, others, like Waltz, remain committed to their explanations of international relations.

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[11] The extent of how far the ethical claims of states reach is of concern to both pluralists and solidarists. See Nicholas Wheeler, "Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: A Review of the Ethical Claims of International Society," *Political Studies* 44 (1996), 91-108.

[12] For more on emerging critical approaches to international security, see for instance R. Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997) and Ken Booth (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

Waltz himself recognized the failures of his theory in explaining the end of the Cold War, but did not see this event, no matter how monumental it was, as representing the end of the international system as he conceived it. Structural realism, according to Waltz, was not falsified. What the world witnessed was not a change to the international system, but instead, was a change within the system. Therefore, his original theory remains relevant, it just could not explain the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, which itself may also be ending. Waltz claims: "Every time peace breaks out, people pop up to proclaim that realism is dead. That is another way of saying that international politics has been transformed. The world, however, has not been transformed; the structure of international politics has simply been remade by the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and for a time we will live with unipolarity" (Waltz 2000, 39). Realism, either in its classical, structural or neoclassical form, was found to have gaping holes in its postulates as the Cold War came to an end, and such imperfection is still relevant in today's climate of interstate cooperation.

On the other hand, certain critical approaches to the global realm have claimed that conflict and insecurity in the world comes primarily as a result of states in a given world order that is both socially constructed and inherently oppressive (Booth 2007). R.B.J. Walker highlights this point as he argues "states have become increasingly important sources of contemporary insecurity and increasingly unable to provide security from environmental collapse and economic maldevelopment" (Walker 1993, 182). Walker's efforts at reconstituting debates over conflict are also found in works by various writers in the poststructural, postcolonial, green theory, constructivist, feminist, neo-Marxist and Frankfurt School camps as well. A particular theoretical contribution to the broadening of how conflict and security are considered comes from the Copenhagen School that offers insight into what is termed as securitization.[13] How the understanding of conflict and security in the contemporary world is broadened by Copenhagen School logic is described by Michael Williams. "Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the referent objects of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state" (Williams 2003, 513). Such an alteration to the conception of conflict is made by viewing international politics through a distinctly critical lens, which sees the usage of the term *security* as a distinct speech act. Ole Wæver emphasizes this idea:

> What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard security as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering security a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Wæver 1995, 55).

[13] For more on securitization, see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1998).

Expanding the idea of conflict, compelling observers to consider the consequences of policy, and seeing the power relations inherent in any securitized situation, are all of value and have found a niche in the realm of international theory since the Cold War ended. What is essential to consider, however, is the direction of international theory and its relationship to foreign policy strategy outside of the academic realm.

One of the largest dangers inherent in any theoretical enterprise is creating, refining or arguing for a theory that has no or little relation to the real world. A theory of politics can promote an idealistic or even a utopian point of view, but it should still remain grounded in the realm of practical politics and political life.[14] Nowhere is this more important than in the study of international relations. To claim that post-Cold War international politics is either exactly the same as it was during the Cold War, or that global political concerns have overtaken those at the interstate level, are both fundamentally flawed.

Structural realism has been somewhat successful in explaining the nature and structure of the international system and this has an ahistorical element to it. Since 1648, the system has been anarchic, made up of self-interested units competing for relative gains. Realists of all subcategories fall short in describing where these states came from, who controls them and how their strategies of security maximization and pursuits of self-interest change over time. On the critical side, examining the human experience of insecurity and a variety of other factors, including literary discourse, can help to understand what has already happened but offers little in terms of practical policy advice.[15] Therefore, the field may comprehend what happened to the citizens of Rwanda or Sudan, but what is being offered to help prevent such human atrocity in the future? Is the point of studying international or global politics to reflect on outcomes or to offer solutions?

Interstate relations have changed since the fall of the USSR but not so much as to allow the world to ignore the hard, military power concerns that dominated the years of the Cold War. It is possible that a new international society was created which has, to this point, chosen to retain the pluralist institutions of the Cold War, but that has also accepted progressive rhetorical ideas into its normative framework. For international theory, this means that structural realism is still significant in explaining the events and nature of the international system, while liberal and critical approaches can describe events inside the state, at the world society level. In this context, the English School framework becomes valuable in examining three distinct spheres of international, and global, politics.

At the human level, solidarists have done a commendable job at bringing to light the experiences of people on the ground. It is difficult to imagine another point in human

[14] For a broader political science perspective on this, see Leo Strauss, "On Classical Political Philosophy," *Social Research* 12:1/4 (1945), 98-117.
[15] For a discussion of making IR relevant to policy, see William Wallace, "Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and practice in international relations," *Review of International Studies* 22:3 (1996), 301-321.

history where the needs, incidents and challenges facing individuals were appreciated on such a large scale. It appears, however, that domestic political problems are dependent on the whims and interests of states. Systemically, anarchy has not vanished and thus rational calculations continue to influence state foreign policy strategy. Military capabilities remain highly relevant in describing how states define power, though this hard power is no longer exercised nearly as often as it once was. In essence, both world society and international system variables present opposing viewpoints on how international politics should be conducted and place an onus on the state to think both in pluralist and solidarist terms on a regular basis.

The other variable to consider in the context of contemporary international relations is nuclear arms. Though these weapons tend to have a pacifying effect on interstate relations, their existence, proliferation and potential use still pose serious concerns for states in the modern era.[16] In reference to the role of nuclear arms in modern international relations, Waltz argues:

> Within-system changes take place all the time, some important, some not. Big changes in the means of transportation, communication, and war fighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapons decisively change how some states provide for their own and possibly for others' security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system (Waltz 2000, 5).

Waltz's observations are astute – nuclear arms have altered the way states conceive of their security but they have not gone so far as to completely pacify interstate relations. States are less willing to engage in armed conflict with each other since the advent and spread of nuclear arms but war is never out of the realm of possibility in international politics. As a result, states have begun to create new strategies to extend their spheres of influence and engage in new balancing behaviour that are not exclusively military-based.

Politics in modern international society are more multifaceted than ever. Rhetorically there are calls from a large number of interest groups to alter the landscape of state action to safeguard the rights and lives of global citizens, but these calls are rarely being put into practice. International theory in the post-Cold War world may be evolving and moving toward a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between world society and international society, but the practice of national security often remains firmly committed to systemic considerations and constraints.

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[16] For more in the continuing nuclear threat, see Sam Nunn, "The Race Between Cooperation and Catastrophe: Reducing the Global Nuclear Threat," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 607 (September 2006), 43-50.

8.3 Politics in Modern International Society

A principal goal of international society is to control or limit the use of violence between states. Modern international society is no different and the structures and institutions of the contemporary society all aim at attempting to encourage cooperation among self-interested actors. Violence, however, is not eliminated from international society, nor should it be. Instead it is limited and its legitimate use is strictly controlled by great powers, secondary institutions or international law. The use of force and its consequences remain a vital consideration in any debate over international politics. Martha Finnemore notes:

> Violence or the potential for violence is a fact of human existence. Societies, to cohere and function, must come to some understanding of the role force can or should play in the society members' collective life. That role may be large or small, but it is not random. Force is channelled and disciplined by the notions that members of a society share about when force is legitimate and what kinds of goals it can achieve. Like any society, international society has shared notions that shape the use of force (Finnemore 2003, 1).

Determining the likelihood of conflict between, or inside of, states is essential in questioning when, if ever, force is to be exercised and who has the right under the rules of international society to do so. This definition may appeal to the problem-solving side of international theory, but in the end, reflecting on *a posteriori* arguments about how international politics is presented may be limited in explaining how states and individuals are to be kept secure.

It is noted that many English School scholars will not agree with such a statement. In fact, debates about force often hinge, in the solidarist sense, on it being a last resort only to be used in protecting human populations. More critical interpretations of the English School agenda will claim that focusing only on the use of force in the society of states only perpetuates a realist-centred conception of interaction that the School must break away from if it is to have continued relevance in global political discussions.[17] In his chapter examining how the modern literature on critical security studies (CSS) may be of value to English School literature, Paul Williams argues: "But where the English School focuses on a top-down version of international history, proponents of CSS suggest that much more work needs to be done cataloguing a bottom-up history of world politics...that includes listening to the stories and explanations of those currently rendered insecure by the prevailing global order" (Williams 2005, 148). Interestingly enough, modern international society is witnessing a marriage of sorts between pluralist and solidarist accounts of politics. Voices on the ground are being heard louder than ever, but those voices from within world society have yet to become so powerful as to alter the conduct of states on a consistent basis.

[17] For more on this, see Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Implications for a Sociology of States Systems," *International Affairs* 78:2 (2002), 319-338.

To comprehend the contemporary political environment within modern international society, there must be attention granted to both the international system and world society.

8.31 Systemic Constraint

Within the international system, states appear to remain reluctant at removing or eliminating the possibility for armed conflict in their foreign policy strategies. Admittedly, the instances of interstate war have decreased substantially since 1945 (Stepanova 2008). Instances of armed conflict between states may be decreasing, but intrastate conflicts continue to dominate the international political agenda and the constraints of the international system may help to explain why intrastate conflicts continue to plague the society of states.

According to Lotta Harbon and Peter Wallensteen of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), there were 16 major armed conflicts in 2008 that were active in 15 locations. Even so, structural realists would argue that the contemporary balancing behaviour of states did not change drastically nor were these conflicts so major as to warrant an alteration to interstate behaviour at the systemic level. To explain this, Harbon and Wallensteen claim:

> All of these conflicts are intrastate: for the fifth year running, no major interstate conflict was active in 2008. However, troops from another state aided one of the parties in four conflicts: USA, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Over the past decade, the total number of conflicts has declined overall from 21 in 1999. However, the decline has been uneven, with increases in 2005 and 2008 (Harbon and Wallensteen 2009).

Two major issues are worth noting when assessing the strategies of states in the contemporary international system: the first is that states still recognize and fear the condition of anarchy. The introduction of nuclear arms to the political equation has led to a steep decline in state willingness to use war as a policy mechanism and this is due to the anarchic nature of the system. Under the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction, a state will not rationally use nuclear force because they understand this would lead to their own certain destruction. In an anarchic system, no strong governing body is capable of actually preventing the use of nuclear arms, or military power for that matter, but states are still unwilling to make use of the arsenals they possess.[18] In his analysis of anarchy, Waltz argues that the structure of the system precludes states from wanting to cooperate for two reasons, being the propensity of states to cheat and also because the benefits of cooperation are normally asymmetrical (Grieco 1988). English School logic, however, may be far better able to account for the trends in armed conflict described by SIPRI.

Anarchy, hard power and balancing behaviour might all still exist and remain the most important elements in any foreign policy strategy. Waltz's discussion of the unlikelihood

[18] For a brief discussion of contemporary nuclear deterrence, see Frank Harvey, "The Future of Strategic Stability and Nuclear Deterrence," *International Journal* 58:2 (Spring 2003), 321-346.

of cooperation between states was never entirely correct, but it was certainly more relevant during the Cold War based on the constraints of the bipolar system. In today's international system, however, the end of bipolarity has compelled states to redefine their strategies aimed at security maximization and this may have led to a greater willingness to cooperate, which in turn has caused a marked decline in the instances of interstate conflict.[19] Buzan, Jones and Little describe why this is the case:

> But despite the force of [Waltz's] arguments, the fact remains that states do cooperate and develop rules among themselves. Analysts working within the rational choice model have suggested that cooperation can take place in the anarchic arena when the potential for mutual benefits exists...Under these circumstances, cooperation can enhance the chances of a state surviving in the anarchic arena. It is denied, in other words, that cooperation and rules exist in opposition to the deep structure of the international system (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993, 151).

States have always cooperated and formed international societies, but the structure of the international system has not changed. The condition of anarchy is ahistorical and will continue to be so as long as there is no global social contract to overcome the condition. As a result, states will potentially remain distrustful of each other and develop hard power capabilities to protect themselves.

The second issue describing interstate foreign policy strategy today is the changing nature of threats. Behaviour at the systemic level may be closely related to structural realist theory, but states are not the only threat to national interests in the contemporary period. Human security, economic security, environmental security, piracy, global terrorism and many other non-state issues have begun to affect the way states conceive of their national security (Buzan and Hanson 2009). What is becoming apparent is that states are having difficulty coping with such issues because of the anarchic nature of the international system.

In order for states to address each of the issues described above, they would have to increase their willingness to pool resources, use non-traditional means of securing themselves and address non-state issues. Thakur describes the shortcomings of realist foreign policy in the contemporary era: "The realists should get real...To insist on national security at the expense of human security would be to trivialise the concept of security in many real-world circumstances to the point of sterility, bereft of any operational meaning" (Thakur 2007, 84). Stability and balancing behaviour remain of vital importance, not because realists say so, but because of the consequences of an unstable international system.[20] States may want to broaden their political agendas, and

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[19] For more on the decline of interstate war, see Kalevi Holsti, "The Decline of Interstate War: Pondering Systemic Explanations," *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 135-159.

[20] For more on the prospects for war in an unstable international system, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

recent policy pursuits prove this fact, but if they do they may actually worsen the global human insecurity plight.

It can be argued that realists are just as *real* now as they ever were. It is not as if structural realism, or pluralism for that matter, disregards the various political variables at work in the world, but they rather argue in favour of a worldview that attempts to prevent large scale international conflict and provide a sense of stability in an anarchic system. Without a balance of power or minimalist cooperation, the world might have plummeted into a third world war years ago; the acceptance of the anarchic nature of the system and the pacifying effect of nuclear arms have both served to reduce interstate armed conflict and allow for scholars, including solidarists, to bring light to the vast array of other problems facing the global community. To survive in the international system, states appear to prefer realist policy and to act through pluralist institutions. It has been in times of systemic ignorance that major international armed conflict has broken out in human history.

8.32 Recognizing World Society

As SIPRI has noted, the instances of intrastate conflict have actually increased between 2007 and 2008 (Harbon and Wallensteen 2009). The evolving political agenda within states has been brought to light in part due to the end of the realist-centred Cold War and the emergence of new theoretical perspectives. Within the English School, the solidarist camp is firmly dedicated to highlighting the experiences of people on the ground and trying to provoke responses from the powers in the society of states to find solutions. It is for this reason that modern international society can be seen as hybrid in nature.

To this point, solidarists have been mostly unsuccessful in altering the self-interested perceptions of states on a wide scale. Non-state issues have begun to matter, but their importance seems only to extend as far as state self-interest in concerned. If a state rationally calculates a particular issue from within world society to be outside of its interest, it is unlikely to act on it. Attempts to make strides in all non-traditional areas of international politics have been met with hostility from states, not because they have no interest in addressing emerging threats, but assessing national security policy is typically done hierarchically.[21] States are forced to choose the most immediate threats to their security and proceed from that point. Domestically, most states can be seen as normative and moral actors, though of course there are drastic examples which make such a statement impossible to universalize. Internationally, however, no such harmony of interests exists.

In explaining why states are so quick to identify armed conflict as the primary motivation for security maximization, Finnemore argues that it is easier for states to identify threats in the hard power realm than in any other. "Security, understood in this sweeping way, as any threat to influence and independence, could operate in so many arenas that

[21] Of course, it is noted that threat assessment is typically evaluated according to what may affect a state's prospects at survival. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 91-92.

developing tidy objective indicators to test for its presence is probably impossible. The narrower arguments about security threats understood in a military context are somewhat easier to test for" (Finnemore 41-42). It can therefore be argued that states do not have the domestic expertise to handle issues that extend beyond the national sphere. Responding to a military threat is simple; if one nation increases its military spending or produces quantifiable amounts of military technology, then another state increases their own production.[22] How are states supposed to combat global warming, piracy and global terrorism when they have never been compelled to do so? This is where the secondary institutions of international society may become highly valuable, though they are still firmly entrenched in Cold War pluralism and have not proven capable of moving beyond minimalist rules and cooperation.

Human security is another issue altogether. This term is all encompassing but the most atrocious of humanitarian issues, like genocide and crimes against humanity are equally as foreign to states as global warming it would seem. Of the 16 major armed conflicts in the SIPRI database, none takes place in the developed world (Harbon and Wallensteen 2009). The greatest areas of human insecurity are areas like Burma, Somalia, Burundi and Sudan. Each time a great power examines the intelligence reports coming out of these nations, if there is any credible intelligence at all, they are compelled to ask themselves – what is rationally gained by committing resources to such areas? Based on the terrible human disasters of the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries, the answer to this question becomes somewhat clear: nothing. Trying to defend against such an argument, Simon Caney contends "that while intervention brings with it risks, non-intervention also brings with it risks. The decision not to intervene in 1995 when Serbs killed nearly 8000 Muslims at Srebrenica is, certainly, open to the charge of indifference" (Caney 2005, 238). On a moral scale, states' reluctance to act in the face of humanitarian disaster is reprehensible, but permissible based on the fact that domestic interests tend not to compel state action. Though Caney may be correct in accusing states of moral indifference, he must also see that such a charge has been made against states for centuries and they have yet to change on any widespread basis.

Secondary institutions, especially the UN, have begun to expand their agendas to account for world society-based issues. Much of this comes about due to the expansion of the UN reform and transformation agenda but also because of the progressive rhetoric being espoused by certain Soft Power states, like Canada. For example, without Canadian influence, the R2P doctrine would likely never have received global attention or been adopted in 2005. Even with the rhetorical support of national leaders, the human security agenda has not been implemented at the UN level. The concerns of humanity are being heard but are infrequently being acted on. Solidarists claim that the reluctance on the part of states to operationalize the human security agenda rests on the fear that interventionism, if made a norm, could be abused, as seen by the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Bellamy 2009b, 125). This may be true in part, but even before getting to

[22] For an analysis on relative v. absolute gains in international politics, see Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," *The American Political Science Review* 85:4 (December 1991), 1303-1320.

the point of debating the legitimacy of one intervention over another is the need to overcome Westphalian sovereignty.

The largest obstacle to addressing the needs of people in world society is sovereignty. Its legal standing, emphasis by states and implications for foreign policy make the Westphalian version of the concept far more attractive to a world of independent states than an alteration to conditional sovereignty. According to Hehir "the significant aspect of juridical sovereignty is the fact that it derives from a recognition by the international community of a state's right to exist and thus the prohibition on *unsolicited* external interference" (Hehir 2008, 25). Until there is a substantive change made to the meaning of sovereignty in law and an acceptance by states of the new norm, world society's interests will mostly remain at the bottom of the international threat hierarchy.

8.33 National Interests in the Society of States

This project has examined the two competing methods of analysis in modern English School theory. The first and most popular in current English School scholarship is the scheme that examines the relationship between international society and world society. Preferred by solidarists, this method of theorizing highlights the need for international society to act on behalf of those individuals in world society, and to take the interests of the global citizenry more seriously.[23] In many ways, this agenda aims at describing what *ought to be* in global politics. It is typically the solidarist claim that "the rights of states must be connected in some way to the rights of the persons who compose them and whose good would seem to be the moral point of having states at all" (Nardin 2005, 248). Interests in world society are typically defined in human terms, building upon Cox's original description of what critical international theory sought to achieve:

> Critical theory thus contains an element of utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but its utopianism is constrained by its comprehension of historical processes. It must reject improbable alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of an existing order. In this way critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order (Cox 1996c, 90).

The solidarist platform operates very much in line with what Cox describes as the goals of critical theory. Its emphasis on human rights and security, which encompasses issues like globalization, underdevelopment, poverty, the environment and humanitarian atrocity, is utopian at its core. Securing each individual on the planet and addressing each of the issues that threaten human security is virtually impossible in the current structure of international society. Solidarists, though, recognize the constraints of the current historical era and attempt to work within its framework to achieve their goals. A perfect example of this is Linklater's call for emancipation. Linklater argues in favour of a worldview that sees humans as oppressed and needing to be emancipated and in order to do so, he refers directly to the institutions of international society (Linklater 2007).

[23] For a brief overview of solidarist goals, see Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will," *International Affairs* 72 (1996), 91-108.

Not nearly as popular within English School literature is the second way of framing theoretical analysis, which explores the relationship between the international system and international society. Pursuing this line of inquiry provides a totally different conception of what national interests in the modern era mean and how states go about achieving them. Prototypical realist terms like self-interest, anarchy and security maximization are placed on equal footing with the rules and norms of international society. At the end of the Cold War, the United States did not choose to create a post-conflict solidarist society of states. Due to the non-violent end to the conflict and the nuclear variable, the US may have instead sought to maintain a degree of rational predictability that pluralist institutions provide. As a result, both the primary and secondary institutions of international society remain firmly pluralist. Explaining why such a preference for pluralism exists, John Williams claims:

> The unpredictability of a global politics that is predicated on diversity is one of the attractions of a pluralist world society. It has the potential to offer individuals and groups not just the comfort, safety and familiarity of their own communities, but the chance to step out into the world, to engage and act in a public way and on their own terms. This insertion of people and groups into world society is unlikely to be amenable to specific rules, forms and institutions of action. Instead, it carries with it an unpredictability of outcome that is exciting and, of course, occasionally dangerous (Williams 2005, 34).

Interests in the solidarist sense offer solutions to humanitarian issues and are predicated on a sense of global interdependence, morality and a view that states are ethical agents. What is omitted here is the often accurate notion that states are only noble as long as their self-interest is not being interfered with. In order to achieve the version of interests so heavily desired by solidarists, the constraints of the international system would have to be ignored or overcome and humanity would become the primary unit of analysis in the English School research programme. To date, this has not happened. States remain at the heart of any English School study and should remain so if any sort of normative progress is desired.

In a more practical sense, the debates over the role of the United Nations in the society of states and the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect speak to the idealistic goals of solidarists. The UN was arguably never intended to act as anything other than a diplomatic body in which states could dialogue with each other and avert major international armed conflict. Violence was limited under international law and the balance of power was upheld based on a common acceptance of minimalist rules of cooperation, such as independence and non-intervention. Maintaining international order is the primary responsibility of the great powers; whether this can be coupled with protecting the world's populations during intrastate conflict remains to be seen.

Introducing the human security agenda to the global community is morally encouraging, but the potential consequences associated with hasty implementation may outweigh its benefits under the current pluralist order. Compelling states to overlook their

independent sovereignty and to sacrifice it in the name of western morality is an unlikely outcome. To summarize why human security and the moralistic changes to the UN may be difficult in the current pluralist order, Jackson argues:

> But one elementary thing is clear: the consistent enforcement of human security around the world is impossible. The world may be shrinking in some respects, but it is still far too big to make enforcement a realistic possibility. The most qualified enforcers – including the USA – lack the military ability and the political will to be the world's policemen. More significant for our purposes, the world is normatively more complicated and more contradictory than revolutionist Kantians seem to recognize. American and other leading states-people are responsible for defending their own national interests and that responsibility to save people in foreign countries who are suffering at the hands of the government or other political-military segments of the population (Jackson 2000, 214).

Jackson's description of why pluralism prevents substantive progress in the human security agenda does not signal the death of hope for the solidarist cause in modern international society, however. As Cox notes about critical theory, solidarism must take greater notice of the current historical reality and inject a sense of pragmatism and realism into their ideas about the future of the global political agenda.

Conclusion - The Future of Modern International Society

So what is international society to do in the face of such important and complicated political concerns? Is it time for great powers to accept the normative evolution of the society of states and embrace world society interests in practice; or should the stable, yet morally reprehensible, status quo of pluralism be maintained? This question has been at the heart of international relations debates since the end of the Cold War and within the English School for an even longer period. According to the framework and conclusions of this project, the international system, with all of its seemingly outdated and normatively limited parameters, might remain higher on the hierarchy of national interests compared to world society factors. If this is the case, rationality dictates that the status quo may be upheld for some time.

Embracing the pluralist world as it is currently known does not translate into a failure of solidarist idealism. Enormous progress has been made in terms of placing a larger focus on humanity in debates over global politics and there has been a marked reduction in the prevalence and usage of hard, military power since the end of the Cold War era. Various forms of state can be detected that pursue their self-interest through non-hard power means and that have expanded the importance and relevance of soft power in the contemporary world. Statist politics might remain at the heart of international relations, but how the state is understood and its role in addressing the needs of people within states are changing rapidly. By identifying the different forms of state and understanding its role in both international and global political concerns, solidarist principles are that much closer to being met. Soft Power, Agitator and Inapposite forms of state all make use of the structures of international society and must also look to world society for their ability

to define themselves in a particular way. Humanity is at the core of why different forms of state have begun to emerge in modern international society on some level, for without the influence of domestic-level variables and norms, states would probably have continued to embark upon myopic Cold War calculations about military capabilities.

Transforming the United Nations may not be the answer to the world's problems. In fact, this pursuit could disrupt international order if the potential consequences are not taken into consideration. An issue that should be contemplated is whether the UN has ever been allowed to work in the way it was intended to. Soon after its creation in 1945, the bipolar tension of the Cold War bogged the institution down in the east v. west conflict. As soon as the Cold War came to an end, and even before in some cases, members of the international community called for sweeping changes to the UN system based on its perceived failures in meeting the needs of the global populous throughout the Cold War era.

To ask the UN to be a body capable of addressing the vast array of humanitarian concerns throughout the world is likely asking too much. Rather than transforming almost every aspect of the UN and making it into a utopian vehicle destined to fail, why not let the UN be the UN? At this juncture in international history, there is nothing to lose. Those favouring transformation claim the body is not doing enough and realists argue there is nothing it can do. Realistically, there is no way of knowing what the UN is capable of because it has either been a tool of two superpowers as it was during the Cold War, or it has been deemed useless by those working within its framework, like former Secretary General Kofi Annan who pushed very hard for change (Annan 2005). By allowing the great powers to act within the parameters of the UN Charter and enforce the law that is already in place, would the threats to world society become any worse? Many of the proposed alterations threaten the interests of the P5; perhaps nations like China and Russia will be more willing to act in the interests of international society if they are not being pushed to accept changes they know are aimed directly at them.

By allowing the UN to act as it was originally intended, as a vital secondary institution of international society, it would also seem prudent to hold off on implementing the Responsibility to Protect doctrine or anything like it. Human security should be a driving consideration at all times in the society of states, but to revolutionize the laws, norms and rules of a society based on western ideals may affect the balance of power and create more problems than it solves. State-building has yet to prove itself as an effective strategy.[24] For evidence, one need look only at the experiments currently taking place in Afghanistan under NATO, or in Iraq under the control of US. Together these missions demonstrate the inability of traditional military forces to transform themselves into peacebuilding experts, but even more than this, they show quite apparently what happens to nations when they commit large amounts of financial, military and human resources to long-term missions with no clear end or goal in sight.

[24] For an in-depth analysis of the challenges and strategies of peacebuilding, see Tom Keating and W. Andy Knight (eds.), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2004).

Another vital argument about R2P and interventionism is the normative one. Norms cannot be imposed on members of world society; they must find their roots in the domestic populations of states before they can be projected into the rules and norms of international society. Human security and R2P-like missions are not yet universally accepted. Ideas like democracy, human rights, environmental protection and constitutionalism within a state must be sought by its own citizens. For the UN, NATO, the US or any other body to physically enter a state, dismantle its governance structure, and make a functioning democracy appear without domestic support is bound to be difficult, if not impossible. George W. Bush showed the world the consequences of natural law-based foreign policy and exactly what happens when one nation's moral will is forced on another's.[25] If the R2P is abandoned, does this equate to the members of international society sanctioning humanitarian atrocity? Or might the enforcement of existing international law be capable of achieving the same ends?

Using the English School of international relations as a lens to study international politics in the modern era can be highly effective on one hand, but difficult on another. Its effectiveness is found in the way the English School is able to accommodate so many different theoretical outlooks and historical factors while still staying true to a research programme with the state at its hard core. Its ineffectiveness exists in the constant battles between pluralists and solidarists that convolute the very tenets of the theory. Once these two sides focus on what unites them rather than trying to wage the problem-solving v. critical debate within an English School framework, their theory-building will be far more clear and relevant to the exploration of contemporary international relations.

[25] For a discussion of Bush's foreign policy legacy, see Ilan Peleg, *The Legacy of George W. Bush's Foreign Policy: Moving Beyond Neoconservatism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009).

Conclusion: The Road Ahead for English School Theory

Since its re-emergence in the realm of international theory, the English School has attempted to find a place for itself as an approach capable of discussing both problem-solving and critical approaches to IR. Barry Buzan's focus on the role of globalization, Tim Dunne's efforts at tracing the history and shortfalls of the approach to this point, Nicholas Wheeler's emphasis on humanitarian intervention debates, Alex Bellamy's desire for an English School security discourse, Robert Jackson's efforts at highlighting pluralism and Cornelia Navari's concern for method all serve to make the modern English School substantially different from its original articulations.

Finding its beginnings between realism and liberalism, the early English School works of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were more concerned with the trying to find a role for history and rationalism among two seemingly separate problem-solving theories. As time went on, Bull's work became increasingly dedicated to the idea of ethics and justice and he was joined by pioneers like R.J. Vincent in trying to find a space for humanity in state-based theories of international politics.[1] In doing so, however, the state and its role as the primary actor in the realm of international relations was never forgotten. Early English School scholars saw the need for, and primacy of, the state in virtually every work they produced. To think the state could be eliminated from theory was not within the School's framework.

Modern international theory attempts to question the role of the state and its role in global affairs. Critical sources of international theory appear to be more concerned with non-state elements than they are with anything resembling the problem-solving concerns of systemic international politics. The field as a whole has begun to move away from its historical concerns to an interpretation that politics have moved away from being solely international to instead being global in scope.[2] This emerging concern for global politics sees the state as only one of a variety of actors on the global stage, and tends to focus on world society variables rather than those in the international system.

One is then left to ponder - what is the role of the state in modern global politics? According to solidarist logic, states are to be vehicles for human prosperity and cooperation; not bodies acting according to the constraints an anarchic international system. Individuals and global citizens have become of utmost concern for the solidarist agenda within English School thought. The issues facing world society as an area of scholarship are those plaguing humanity. Security discussions now centre on how many people are affected and what should be done about it. Natural law, morality and human rights are all paramount in this solidarist comprehension.

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[1] See for instance Hedley Bull, "Justice in International Relations," *Hedley Bull on International Society* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), 206-245 and R.J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations: Issues and Responses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[2] See for instance Andrew Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Political Communities in International Relations," *International Relations* 16:1 (2004), 135-150 and David Held, "At the Global Crossroads: The End of the Washington Consensus and the Rise of Global Social Democracy?" *Globalizations* 2:1 (2005), 95-113.

It is likely true that most observers of events around the globe would be willing to say without much hesitation that states fall short in their efforts to secure people and world society. Environmental, economic, humanitarian and political security are all understood based on their impact on global populations. It is a sad fact that human insecurity far outweighs situations of human security. People of the global community are affected by a vast array of issues and problems, few of which are being addressed with any expediency or efficiency. It is in this regard that the English School may be of value for scholars and policy-makers in attempting to create solutions to emerging problems without having to abandon problem-solving methods completely.

Modern English School literature continues to see a need for the state, but most contemporary scholarship looks to provide solutions to human insecurity in a variety of different ways. Those debates engaged by English School thinkers, like humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect for instance, attempt to use the society of states approach to identify the overarching challenges facing the individuals in world society, and then offer solutions of some sort, typically involving the state. International society, above all, is understood as the single most important body in being able to address the concerns of humanity while also providing a forum for self-interested states to maintain a semblance of stability in an otherwise anarchic political environment. Coupling interstate cooperation with individual-focused concerns provides the basis for the English School's uniqueness in international theory.

The primary contention of this work is that modern English School work may benefit from reflecting upon its recent theoretical emphasis on solely world society-based analyses. Placing world society at the top of the theoretical hierarchy within the School may ultimately serve to weaken the usefulness of the international society approach altogether. Arguments regarding the primacy of a cosmopolitan and interdependent conception of humanity may have significance, but efforts at protecting the interests of individuals within states must still adhere to the constraints of the international system. The English School has always been concerned with the interests of humanity, which explains why there was an effort from the outset to identify world society variables. Justice, ethics, morality and natural law are all important parts of domestic politics to consider, but their impact on the conduct of states in modern international society remains in question.

In determining a future course for English School theory, it is argued here that the solidarist agenda may be growing, but its idealism should be coupled with a concern for realist postulates regarding the international system. Systemic logic dictates that there is certainly a place to include rational choice calculations when explaining the foreign policy strategies of states in the society of states. One of the problems facing solidarists in their discussions of contemporary international affairs is being able to understand why states are so unwilling to move forward with a seemingly moral agenda. Furthermore, ignoring the utility maximizing tendencies of states in the history of international relations fails to explore how states have always evaluated their decisions. The theory of moves, if applied to the English School framework, may be capable of articulating the underlying motives of states in the international system and how their decisions

ultimately impact the formation of an international society, and how a society of states will be run.

If human insecurity is to be effectively addressed, solidarists may profit from trying to find solutions to the threats facing world society if they consider the limitations placed on international society, secondary institutions and states more generally by the anarchic structure of the international system. Solidarists need also pay attention to other issues which affect the order of international society, such as interstate rationality, the nuclear arms variable, military capabilities, self-interest and security maximizing tendencies of states. Finding a methodologically coherent way of approaching both traditional and emerging problems at the international level can only help the English School in its efforts to provide novel contributions to international theory. Balancing realism and idealism is, and always has been, the purpose of English School theory; when the scale is tipped too far to one side, the entire project and its explanatory power is bound to fall apart.

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