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AFFECTIVE PREDICTORS OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

by

Allister Fraser Webster



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

Counselling Psychology

Department of Educational Psychology

Edmonton, Alberta

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
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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Affective Predictors of Ethical Behaviour* submitted by Allister Fraser Webster in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Counselling Psychology.




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Abstract

This study illustrates the necessity of considering affective processes as essential components in the prediction of ethical behaviour. Instruments designed to measure factors that possibly contribute to ethical behaviour - - moral reasoning, self-esteem, locus of control, and hope - - were administered to a group of older adolescents in a small Canadian city. Emphasis was placed on the examination of relationships amongst predictor variables in relation to ethical behaviour.

Findings indicate that aspects of locus of control, hope, and gender all play a part in the promotion of ethical behaviour. Graphic analysis suggests that hope influences the relationship between locus of control and ethical behaviour. Personal efficacy was the dominant factor in predicting ethical behaviour amongst females. Sociopolitical control was the dominant factor in predicting ethical behaviour amongst males.

Interventions to encourage ethical behaviour should reflect the development of sociopolitical control amongst males and personal efficacy amongst females. In all interventions, the development of hope should be a primary outcome goal.

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Introduction

Despite the urgent need for society to proactively participate in the moral development and functioning of its junior members (Czudner, 1999), information necessary to the creation of appropriate initiatives and interventions remains lacking. Misconceived and misdirected initiatives have abounded and have proven unsuccessful. This study will seek to broaden understanding of possible affective processes involved in moral functioning in an adolescent population. Specifically, this study will attempt to ascertain the relationships of hope, self-esteem, and locus of control (affective process) with the moral reasoning stage (cognitive process) and the ethical action stage (volitional process). The quest to discover the particular nature of possible relationships amongst moral reasoning, hope, self-esteem, locus of control, and ethical volition in an adolescent population is the focus of this study.

With new knowledge we may be better able to address the unique moral functioning processes of adolescent populations through specific interventions and initiatives designed and delivered in a directed and informed manner. Given the insular and protective qualities of hope (Gottschalk & Fronczek, 1993), and the contributions of self-esteem and locus of control to that construct, efforts to develop and enhance these qualities in early adolescence might serve as proactive initiatives in the encouragement of adolescents to take ethical actions when faced with moral dilemmas. It is clear that if individuals can be prepared and encouraged to engage in ethical

behaviour, then the probability of them engaging in high-risk behaviour decreases proportionately; that is, ethical behaviour is not compatible with high-risk behaviour (F. Cortoni, personal communication, September 26, 2002). Not only do individuals benefit from their own ethical behaviour; the broader community also profits.

Confucian philosophy offered the perspective that humans “innately possess a heart that is sensitive to the suffering of others. This sensitive heart is a composite of four hearts related to virtues - - hearts of compassion, of shame, of courtesy and modesty, and a sense of right and wrong” (Thomas, 1997b, p. 240). To be amongst others is central to the human existence; indeed, our survival as a species is connected to our ability to cooperate and live together as members of a society.

It is reasonable to assert that people exist in a psychosocial reality as it is only within a society that the individual holds an identity (Erikson, 1968). For societal groups to exist, individual members must conform to commonly accepted guidelines and rules (Czudner, 2000). These written and unwritten guides provide the framework for community functioning. For these community groupings to mature into a moral society, there must be evident patterns of conduct and cooperation that result in an autonomous good (Piaget, 1965). It might well be that the autonomous good to which Piaget refers is that of the development of a moral society. The very notion of being human has been tied to ethical behaviour within a social context (Piaget).

To further bring clarity to the concept of a moral society one needs only to consider the following perspectives. Social groupings such as the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi groups require their members to conform to guidelines and rules. However, since these groups are self-serving and do not exist to work towards an autonomous good, they would not be considered moral societies. On the other hand, the Canadian Cancer Society exists to promote the welfare and health of a broader society, thus this group could be considered to be moral. The study of the nature of morality and moral acts in society is referred to as ethics (Rich & DeVitis, 1985).

Within a moral community the well-being of individuals is achieved and guarded in harmony with, and consideration of, the protection and maintenance of the well-being of other members of the community; behaviours that reflect this notion are observable manifestations of moral functioning (Penn, 1990). Indeed, society's moral function is to act "as a safeguard of the individuals strengths and freedoms" (Erikson, 1968, p. 420). Vine (1996) supported these views of morality but cautioned that norms can not be imposed upon individuals; rather, it is the rational and reciprocal appeal of equity-based social norms that becomes binding on individuals within a community setting. This conceptualization appears to be congruent with Thomas' (1997a) suggestion that behaviour is deemed ethical when it is reflective of the delicate balance of personal freedom with social responsibilities. Although uncodified, these global determinants of ethical

practice allow the application of a broad measuring stick by which to evaluate behaviour while discouraging discrete parameters.

Fletcher (1966) similarly argued against “prescribed conduct and legalistic morality” (p. 45) via his conceptualization of situational ethics. He stated that all behaviour considered ethical must meet the standard of the Christian proffered “golden rule”. In essence, Fletcher posited that while situations requiring an ethical response might vary, the constant of “love thy neighbour” remains the key to an ethical outcome. While it is clear that many fundamental moral ideals have been associated with religion, it has not been demonstrated that religious affiliation significantly impacts on individual moral values or ethical behaviour (Thomas, 1997b). Indeed the behaviour of students in one large study demonstrated that individuals, regardless of enrollment at religious or secular schools, were “equally inclined to exhibit high levels of cheating and lying” (Bruggeman & Hart, 1996, p. 4).

Although useful tools in freeing the determination of ethical behaviour from rigid codes, all perspectives thus presented appear narrow in their literal view that ethical behaviour is limited to human interactions and relationships. From a broader and more ecological perspective, Thomas (1997a) argued that ethical behaviour should be examined and evaluated on the basis of all human interaction and relationships within the global environment. In other words, our behaviours towards our physical environment and other earthly creatures must also meet ethical standards. In effect this is a clarification of the notion of social responsibility.

Even when taking this broader conceptualization of social responsibility, the test of the ethical response against the ethical standard remains unchanged. Ethical behaviour can still be measured by its success in striking a balance between personal freedom and social responsibility. In western civilization, if we are to maintain democratic and pluralistic societies, it is necessary to facilitate the moral development of individuals to its highest level (Penn, 1990).

Societal efforts in modern, western society to foster moral development in their members have not been totally successful. Within adult professional populations concerns exist regarding the lack of abilities demonstrated by many medical and mental health practitioners in translating moral reasoning into ethical action (Hall & Lin, 1995; Weber, 1992). A large-scale study investigating ethical behaviour among psychologists, social workers, counsellors, and other mental health practitioners (both doctoral and non-doctoral level) revealed that expediency and opportunism play a larger role in determining behaviour than does knowledge of ethical responses (Smith, McGuire, Abbott, & Blau, 1991). Hall and Lin (1995) suggested that practitioner inability to translate moral knowledge into ethical action impacts on the larger society and may result in client abuse. It is logical to conclude that a conscious failure on the part of practitioners to act ethically leads to similar results.

Given the experiential and skill advantages that adults possess when compared to adolescents and young adults, it is not surprising that younger

populations also struggle to make the moral transitions necessary for ethical behaviour. In fact, research suggests that the highest prevalence rates of at-risk behaviours are found within adolescent and young adult populations (Arnett, 1992; Moffitt, 1993). Rich and DeVitis (1985) referred to this “population of individuals, aged between 17 – 21 years, as being engaged in the transition stage between late adolescence and early adulthood” (p. 100).

It is clear that the experimentation of youth is not always a healthy or ethical activity. At-risk behaviours are common within adolescent populations. At-risk behaviours include any self-directed activities that serve to place an individual at a disadvantage in terms of educational achievement and social interactions or place that individual in harm's way from a mental and physical health perspective (Pace, 1997; Steinberg, 1993). “The greatest incidence of robbery, theft, and vandalism occurs during the teen years and into the early twenties” (Thomas, 1997a, p.43). While Thomas wrote from an American perspective, similar concerns exist in regard to Canadian youth (Czudner, 1999). Increases in adolescent delinquency and reports of violence (Carlo & Koller, 1998; Kingery, 1998), staggering rates of high-risk sexual activities among adolescents and young adults leading to AIDS infection (Hubbs-Tait & Garmon, 1995), and significant numbers of drop-outs among high school students (Gilbert and Orok, 1993) are well documented. These trends reflect society's poor performance in promoting moral development and functioning amongst its younger members.

Individuals and the broader community bear the impacts of society's failure to assist junior members in the acquisition and utilization of ethical behaviours. At the adult level, Windsor and Cappel (1999) stated that companies and businesses pay a huge price as a result of unethical employee behaviours. The costs associated with inappropriate adolescent and junior adult behaviour are also severe. Czudner (1999) reported that the "cost of imprisonment per adolescent offender in Canada is \$100,000 per year" (p. 174). As well, individuals who leave the school system prior to the achievement of a secondary school completion certificate are significantly disadvantaged in the current Canadian labour market and face associated risks (Tanner, Krahn, & Hartnagel, 1995). From a purely health related perspective, Hubbs-Tait and Garmon (1995) suggested that the list of potential casualties from AIDS is incalculable.

Research has identified hopefulness as a major contributor to students' decisions to stay in school, and has suggested that self-esteem and locus of control have significant impacts on an individual's sense of hope (O'Keefe, 1993). By comparison, those students who leave school early (prior to achieving high school completion) tend to demonstrate a sense of hopelessness, low self-esteem and an external locus of control (Tanner et al., 1995). Snyder (2000) stated that high-hope adults linked past experiences with significant individuals such as parents and teachers with their positive sense of personal hope and achievement. Perhaps hope is inherently linked with school completion and vice versa.

Vanlizebdoorn and Zwart-Woudstra (1995) stated that self-esteem might be a pre-requisite for moral behaviour. A definitive explanation was not provided by these authors and it was left to future researchers to forge this link. Similarly, Phares (1976) suggested a link between the notion of internal locus of control and positive outcomes in social interactions. The nature of this connection was not illuminated by Phares but was left to the investigations of future researchers.

Given the relationships amongst these variables, it appears appropriate to explore the relationships of hope, self-esteem, and locus of control on adolescents' actions in other moral arenas. It is possible that these constructs play a role in the development of moral behaviour amongst individuals and the construction of a moral society.

This study allows for a comprehensive exploration of the complexities of ethical behaviour within the adolescent domain. As we are already aware that global initiatives and interventions are not effective for those youth considered to be at-risk (Pace, 1997), an alternative approach to the challenges that society faces in this regard is required. With a clearer understanding of the intricacies of this process, the development of initiatives and interventions facilitative of ethical development and functioning can be better informed. The final result of appropriately designed and delivered programming benefits both the individual and the social collective.

Review of the Literature

The following document reviews the literature surrounding the nature of moral functioning, the process of the adolescent stage of development, and recent perspectives on moral functioning. In addition, affective constructs central to this study will be operationalized. An understanding of the literature on hope, self-esteem, and locus of control is necessary to the framework of this study. In addition, an understanding of the nature of adolescence is necessary if we are to begin to address the needs of this segment of society.

Adolescence and Moral Society

The adolescent years are of particular significance in terms of facilitating a moral society. It has long been held that the passage from adolescence to adulthood results in at least individual responsibility for one's actions within the broader community, if not independent functioning. It is logical to look at the adolescent period as a pivotal stage in the evolution of a moral society.

Adolescent individuals must complete the steps necessary for moral functioning prior to entering adulthood (Keltikangas et al., 1999). This assertion suggests that it is the period prior to independent functioning that provides opportunity for individuals to develop and test their ethics within a socially supportive environment. Similarly, Erikson (1968) noted adolescence to be a critical period in moral development "as the ethical failures of youth, if treated properly, do not have the same fatal significance which they may have at other ages" (p. 131 – 132). Society sponsored opportunities for a second

chance appear most genuinely during adolescence. Erikson's statement offers society a measure of hope in that "a young person, given some leeway, may utilize a traditional way of life for dealing with a remnant of a negative identity" (p. 130). It might well be that during the period of adolescence the opportunity to overcome the consequences of questionable behaviour presents itself more readily than at any other developmental stage.

Role of the education system in moral development

Pragmatically, it is possible that this opportunity for prosocial development presents itself most clearly within the arena of the school. As gaining an education is "the business of youth" (Pace, 1997), school is the one common place where the majority of adolescents spend significant amounts of time. It is during this time that adolescents are exposed to social expectations and opportunities that extend their learnings beyond a familial context. Additionally, from a developmental standpoint, the school experience allows for the "interplay between the psychological and the social" (Erikson, 1968) so essential to integration of a moral identity.

Teachers, counsellors, and other staff members are in a unique position to model socially appropriate behaviours to a largely captive and impressionable audience during school hours. In educational institutions, students are meant to be provided with opportunities to clarify their values and test social boundaries in a supportive and low risk environment. In many ways the school environment can provide practice opportunity for developing

the skills necessary for the adult world of work and social interconnectedness.

It is not surprising then that the education system has been called on to provide leadership in promoting and facilitating the development of a moral society (Czudner, 1999; Scriven, 1975). The transmission of moral values has been referred to as the most important educational priority within a society (Keltikangas, Jarvinen, Terav, & Pakaslahti, 1999). There is little doubt that the focus on the education system for the support of moral development is well-advised (Howard-Hamilton & Franks, 1995). Given the uncertain trajectory of moral development across life span, it is clearly prudent to intervene prior to an individual's school exit. Additionally, gaining access to adolescent populations is difficult outside of school settings as no other venue is readily available for large-scale interfaces (Arnett, 2000).

Educational initiatives

Most educational initiatives and interventions that focus on moral development have followed cognitive-structural models (Santilli, 1992). Cognitive-structural theories suggest that as an individual's moral knowledge and experience increases, increased moral maturity will be reflected in the individual's subsequent actions. The thrust of cognitive-structural programs is to teach students moral codes and ethical decision-making models. The belief has been that when the individual gains a cognitive understanding of socially-inspired morality then they will generalize and apply these learnings in future social interactions. For those individuals who strayed from socially accepted

morals, an intervention was chosen in accordance with its presumed ability to increase the individual's knowledge and understanding of codes and decision-making models. In many ways, this style of approach embraces the remedial notion of, "if they knew better, then they would behave better".

Cognitive-structural models are based largely on the works of Piaget and Kohlberg. Piagetian theory suggests that as individuals move through developmental stages, their level of knowledge and ability to abstractly apply their knowledge to moral dilemmas increases accordingly. Similarly, research based on Kohlberg's theory suggests that an increase in knowledge of, and engagement in, the process of moral reasoning will result in the enhancement of moral development (DeHaan, Hanford, Kinlaw, Philler, & Snarey, 1997). Langford (1996) suggested that Piaget and Kohlberg's theories on moral reasoning attempt to explain the development and acceptance of moral rules by an individual. This process is referred to as legislative reasoning.

Not all researchers support the tenets of cognitive-structural models. According to Wygant (1997), a reliance on cognitive-structural models of moral reasoning is ill-advised. Hubbs-Tait and Garmon (1995) supported this assertion when they reported that cognitive-structural education programs directed at reducing incidents of AIDS infection in youth have been unsuccessful. Kelly and Stack (2000) forcefully stated that "as the prevention field is painfully aware, programs based on a 'something is missing' paradigm have achieved very limited results" (p. 7). Additional support is found in Czudner's (1999) statement that initiatives and interventions designed to

address serious behaviour problems demonstrated by adolescents have been reported to be ineffective. It appears that the remedial approach to programming is ill-advised.

Penn (1990) condemned educational systems and programs for their lack of success in engendering moral development in their charges. However, this lack of success may not be surprising as education is often based on tradition and available research, and moral development research has yet to yield comprehensive and useful data or direction in terms of preventative practices. As a result, initiatives and interventions currently utilized in the education and mental health fields are untested and may or may not have any significant impact on moral development (Kingery, 1998). Further, contemporary initiatives and interventions tend to involve universal programming ("Just Say No" and "DARE" are two examples of that type of programming) that does not provide for individual differences and experiences, and are therefore less than effective (Brooks, 1994). Czudner (1999), who insisted that there is no clear method for teaching pro-social behaviours at this time, supported this stance. Overall, interventions that are grounded in the cognitive-structural approach of increasing knowledge have not been viewed as effective by scholars (Santilli, 1992).

Moral research - refocused

Although previous research has demonstrated that moral behaviour is linked in some fashion to moral reasoning and knowledge of moral standards (Swanson & Hill, 1993; Windsor & Cappel, 1999), this link does not serve to

fully explain or predict moral behaviour (Czudner, 1999; Hall & Lin, 1995; Hubbs-Tait & Garman, 1995; Langford & Lovegrove, 1995). Wygant (1997) criticized the cognitive-structural model of moral reasoning for failing to consider contextual determinants of moral reasoning and action. Bruggeman and Hart (1996) stated that although it is generally accepted that morality seems to be an acquired characteristic, the experiences that influence its development are not well understood.

In consideration of the absence of comprehensive data regarding moral development and the lack of a clear method to engender pro-social, moral behaviour, additional research initiatives are required (Czudner, 1999). Schonert-Reichl (1999) stated that most research to date has focused on the relationship between moral development and anti-social behaviours. She went on to suggest that it would be appropriate to study the relationship between moral development and pro-social behaviours. In essence, future research examining positive moral functioning might provide valuable direction for intervention science.

To better understand moral functioning, Pozarnik (1995) suggested that the construct should be viewed as three separate processes: cognitive, affective, and volitional. Not only must we examine behaviour from the perspective of the individual's knowledge base, but we must also take into account the impact of affective processes on behavioural choices. This stance is supported in the literature by several authors (Czudner, 1999; Langford, 1996; Wygant, 1997).

Dollinger and LaMartina (1998) reported that human action must be studied in the context of personality variables, and suggested that it would be appropriate to study these characteristics in relation to moral development research as well. These variables are likely to include cognitive and affective constructs. Efforts to identify personality factors connected to moral development could yield valuable information (Redford & McPherson, 1995). In essence, the search to understand moral functioning must encompass and examine constructs from both the cognitive and affective domains. Once we are able to identify cognitive and affective constructs associated with ethical behaviour, our ability to analyze ethical behaviour should be increased.

Knowledge of moral rules is not sufficient to explain individual behaviours. Horn, Killen, and Stanger (1998) stated that the moral reasoning of adolescents is well-developed. For example, while students understand that staying in school is a sound decision, many ignore this awareness and do not achieve high school completion. It has been stated that those individuals who leave school early are more likely to require social assistance and employment assistance than those who complete their secondary schooling (Gilbert, 1993). Similar arguments can be offered in relation to other high-risk behaviours such as unprotected sex, impaired driving, and illicit drug abuse as there is no doubt that the dangers of such actions have been well-publicized and are now well-known within our society. It seems logical to assume that the actions of individuals who engage in these types of

behaviour have placed them at risk. Hence, their behaviours do not flow logically from their fund of moral knowledge.

Adolescence to Adulthood

Eriksonian theory

Erikson (1963, 1968) argued that the adolescent is engaged in the process of developing an identity. He went on to state that, in fact, "in the social jungle of human existence there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of identity" (p. 230). To fail to develop a solid sense of identity would result in a situation "where role confusion (lack of identity) joins hopelessness [and] delinquent and psychotic episodes are not uncommon" (p. 3). In order to assist adolescents in the formation of a solid, positive identity, society must present its youth with "ideals which can be shared by young people of many backgrounds, and which emphasize autonomy in the form of independence and initiative in the form of constructive work" (p. 133). For Erikson, the one, true criterion of identity was "an age-specific ethical capacity" (1968, p. 39) recognized and engendered in youth.

Erikson (1968) stated that a positive identity was achieved, in part, when the adolescent's behaviour towards others becomes "subject to that ethical sense which is the mark of an adult and which takes over from the ideological conviction of adolescence and the moralism of childhood" (p. 136). Further, the identity of which Erikson refers is that of a psychosocial identity - one that is forged and resonates within a dynamic society. It is thus that ethical behaviour forms the core of this identity and its achievement is

necessary as only an adult ethics can guarantee to the next generation an equal chance to experience the full cycle of humanity. And this alone allows the individual to transcend his identity – to become as truly individual as he will ever be, and as truly beyond all individuality. (p. 42)

While identity might be considered the uniqueness of the individual, the context of identity construction and its expression is not. Erikson (1968), wrote at length of the constructive necessity of social organization and the individual's participation in society to identity development; in essence, the individual's own identity is only a "successful variant of a group identity" (p. 49).

The process of identity formation was not believed to be finite and the individual could face task completion crises over a period of several years on the journey to adulthood. Erikson did not impose arbitrary restrictions of age on membership within his model of development. He stated that "rapid technological change makes it impossible for any traditional way of being older to become so institutionalized that the younger generation can step into it" (p. 38). The imposition of arbitrary boundaries on development would fail to honour the complexities of this process for each individual.

Adolescence was viewed as "the restless testing of the newest of possibilities and the oldest in values" (Erikson, 1968, p.87). Erikson suggested that the experience of adolescence as a time of great confusion and angst is legitimate; it truly is a time of searching for one's place in the world. However, he went on to pose the question, "would youth act so openly

confused and confusing if they did not know they were supposed to have an identity crisis?" (p. 19). The onus of guiding adolescents through the turbulence towards the development of a solid, positive identity was placed on the larger society.

To achieve an intact and portable sense of identity, the adolescent must engage in the completion of tasks specific to this developmental stage. These tasks include the development of increasingly more intimate and socially important relationships, a sense of autonomy, and a sense of moral identity (Erikson, 1959, 1968; Thomas, 1997a).

Developmental stage parameters

Eriksonian theory posits adolescence as the transition between childhood and adulthood, however there is no reference in this theory to an additional transition period between adolescence and adulthood (Corey, 2001). Many contemporary scholars agree with this perspective and have identified the ages of 18-19 years as the termination point of adolescence; early scholars also saw adolescence as the transition phase but insisted that individuals could be considered to be adolescents up to the age of 24 years (Arnett, 2000). Elliot and Feldman (1990) referred to those persons in their late teens and early twenties as adolescents. Regardless of demographic criterion, it seemed clear enough that when adolescence ended, adulthood began. However, while an intervening transition stage between adolescence and adulthood was not identified, a transition process was believed to occur within the sub-stage identified as late adolescence (Rich & DeVitis, 1985).

The notion of a transition process creates uncertainty in regard to the selection of research approaches appropriate for use with individuals engaged in the shift from adolescence to adulthood (Arnett, 2000); should they be treated as adolescents or adults? By definition, the word “transition” suggests they are neither one nor the other, but rather somewhere in between.

Arnett (2000) disagreed with the notion of a transition stage between adolescence and adulthood, and stated that, instead, a unique intervening stage with distinct characteristics exists. He referred to this stage as the “emerging adult” stage (p. 469). He stated that individuals within the “emerging adult” stage demonstrate both adolescent and adult characteristics, but also possess characteristics unique to this developmental period. The actions of members in this stage tend to vary between those considered consistent with adolescent behaviours and those considered consistent with adult behaviours.

Arnett’s (2000) argument appears to have merit; it seems plausible that a stage between adolescence and adulthood exists. The “emerging adult” population is suggested to be a heterogeneous grouping that can include persons up to the age of thirty years. However, Arnett’s suggestion is also open to criticism.

Following in the fashion of recent developmental models, Arnett (2000) has conformed to the practice of attaching artificial stage parameters (i.e., membership in the “emerging adult” stage is available up to the age of thirty

years). While it is possible that the arbitrary demographic classification of individuals as adolescents, “emerging adults”, and adults might serve a purpose, it can be argued that such parameters are more politically and economically, as opposed to developmentally, expedient. In addition, Arnett (2000) alluded to unique individual characteristics associated with his “emerging adult” stage but also spoke of the lack of normative data by which to identify the membership.

It might be parsimonious to consider the developmental classification of individuals on the basis of engagement in, and completion of, developmental tasks. Erikson (1968) and Gilligan (1982) supported this notion of task completion and argued that individuals forge a coherent sense of identity by engaging in activities necessary to bridging the gap between puberty and adulthood. Rich and DeVitis (1985) stated that “it is imperative for them to experiment with morality and begin to mature towards an ethical consolidation in adulthood” (p. 63). Thomas (1997a) argued that individuals do not completely develop a sense of moral identity until into their late twenties. Whether one should refer to these individuals as adolescents or “emerging adults” will require further academic debate and consideration. It is, however, clear that these individuals are faced with the completion of tasks necessary to move beyond the adolescent stage toward adult roles.

For the sampling purposes of this study, those engaged in the completion of adolescent tasks during the transition period from childhood to adulthood were referred to as adolescents.

Religion and Morality

Morality and religion have often been paired together; and many fundamental moral ideals have strong religious affiliations (Bruggeman & Hart, 1996). Indeed, Fletcher's (1966) notion of situational ethics is based on the Christian credo of "love thy neighbour". Thomas (1997b) stated that the two primary cornerstones of any religion are "its set of moral principles and its description of punishments to be suffered by people who violate the principles" (p. 197). However, the role that religion plays in the development of moral functioning is not well-understood; and although it is widely held that religious schooling is connected in some way to the development of stronger moral fiber and, in turn moral behaviour, this has yet to be evidenced (Bruggeman and Hart).

Bruggeman and Hart (1996) conducted a major study in which, not only did religious students not demonstrate a more sophisticated level of moral reasoning than their secular peers, they were equally likely to cheat when they felt the act to be advantageous in some way. Guttman (1984) in one study stated that, although cheating and lying are common occurrences among adolescents, religious school students were more likely to cheat than secular students. It appears that there is little evidence to suggest that religious affiliation is tightly associated with an individual's eventual behavioural choice (Bruggeman and Hart). The bombing of the *World Trade Center* in New York City and the actions of several abusive religious leaders

stand as concrete testaments to the separation between religious ideals and the actions of individual followers.

Moral Reasoning

Contemporary research on moral development can be traced back to the work of Durkheim, who philosophized that moral life is the objective of all societies, and that without such social groupings, there is no reason for moral life (Rich & DeVitis, 1985). Durkheim's paradigm posited that behaviour could not be judged moral unless the individual is aware of and understands the rules of moral conduct. It was against this backdrop that Piaget began to fashion his theory of moral development.

Piaget's theory of moral reasoning

Piaget was the first noted force in moral development research. Although Piaget (1965) generally criticized Durkheim's work for ignoring the moral development of children and specifically for ignoring "the facts relating to mutual respect" (p. 356), there is no doubt that Piagetian moral theory builds on that of Durkheim (Rich & DeVitis, 1985). Consistent with the tenets of Durkheim's paradigm, Piagetian theory suggested that it is within the context of society that individuals gain the opportunity to evaluate and possibly integrate the perspectives of others in determining moral decisions (Schonert-Reichl, 1999). This emphasis on cognitive processes signaled the beginnings of the cognitive-structural approach to moral development research.

Piaget (1965) posited that morality is of two types. The first type represents a morality of constraint, and it is under this umbrella that most children function. Rich and DeVitis (1985) identified this type of morality as heteronomous, that is, children's moral responses are in accordance with their understanding of the imposed expectations of adult authority. The underlying principles involved are those of fairness and justice.

Piaget (1965) referred to the second morality type as relations of cooperation "whose characteristic is to create within people's minds the consciousness of ideal norms at the back of all rules" (p. 356). This type has been referred to as autonomous morality. According to Piagetian theory, this morality begins to develop in early adolescence and reflects the principles of equity and cooperation (Rich & DeVitis, 1985).

Vine (1996) suggested that Piaget's theory identified the essence of morality as a sense of internalized obligation towards socially accepted norms of action. He argued that this principle restricts children to a subordinate position in relation to adults, and restricts adolescents and adults to idealized rules that continue to reflect morality as a product of power as opposed to reason. Piaget's method in exploring children's moral development and the unavailability of his original data for alternative interpretation has also been subject to wide-spread criticism (Rich & DeVitis, 1985). Despite these criticisms, Piaget's work represented an empirical departure from the philosophical musings of earlier theorists, and served as a theoretical basis for later researchers.

Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning.

The research perspective on cognitive-structural processes in moral reasoning begun by Piaget was continued in the works of Kohlberg (DeMey & Schulze, 1996). Rich and DeVitis (1985) suggested that whereas Piaget had emphasized obligation, equity, and cooperation as the principles of moral reasoning, Kohlberg focused on the principle of justice. As a result of his research, Kohlberg put forth a unique model of moral reasoning.

Pozarnik (1995) stated that the Kohlberg Model of moral reasoning consists of three progressive levels along with two subordinate stages at each level. The first level is referred to in the literature as preconventional moral reasoning (Dana & Lynch-Brown, 1991). The first stage in this level posits moral reasoning as a means to avoid punishment (Kohlberg, 1981); obedience determines moral action (Howard-Hamilton and Franks, 1995). Stage two moral reasoning is equivocated to satisfying one's needs (Kohlberg, 1981), and occasionally the needs of others (Poznarik, 1995).

The second level in Kohlberg's Model is referred to as conventional moral reasoning and represents a linear progression from the preconventional level (Howard-Hamilton & Franks, 1995). Stage three moral reasoning suggests that behaviour is adopted by the individual in an effort to please or to help others (Kohlberg, 1981). Dana and Lynch-Brown (1991) called this the "good boy, nice girl orientation" (p. 7). The fourth stage in this model focuses on the principles regarding authority and maintaining law and order (Pozarnik, 1995).

The highest level in Kohlberg's Model is referred to as postconventional moral reasoning. Stage five moral reasoning reflects the principle that action is appropriate if it maintains or furthers individual rights and societal standards (Dana & Lynch-Brown, 1991). This stage is based on the notions of democracy and non-maleficence (Pozarik, 1995). The sixth, and final, stage of moral reasoning is based on abstract conceptualizations of universal ethical principles. Dana and Lynch-Brown suggested that this stage could be adequately referred to as an application of the "Golden Rule" (p. 7).

A comparison of principles involved reveals that there is little to differentiate Piaget and Kohlberg's views on adolescent moral reasoning. Armon and Dawson (1997) contend that in adolescent populations, the majority of individuals operate at Stage three or lower; there are few instances of Stage four reasoning in adolescence reported. Both models suggest that outside control factors, and a sense of fair play, underpin the moral reasoning of adolescent populations.

As with Piaget, it was suggested by Kohlberg that social interactions play a key role in individual moral development. In adolescence, peer interactions serve as a critical theater for the development and enhancement of moral reasoning. The acquisition of higher, more sophisticated levels of moral reasoning can only be realized through engagement in complex social surroundings (Schonert-Reichl, 1999). In these surroundings, it is necessary for the individual to have continuous and direct experience with moral dissonance for growth to occur (Armon & Dawson, 1997).

Criticisms of the model constructed by Kohlberg quickly surfaced. Indeed, as reported by VanIjzendoorn and Zwart-Woudstra (1995), Kohlberg, himself, was the first critic when he voiced recognition of the gap that existed between moral reasoning and moral action. Adlerian theory, which stressed the complex relationship between reason and emotion in human interaction, represented a major challenge to the acceptance of Kohlberg's Model in the psychological community (Rich & DeVitis, 1985).

Langford and Lovegrove (1995) cited the absence of content validity in Kohlberg's research method as evidence in support of their judgment of the model as empirically unsound. Kohlberg's views on moral development have also been condemned as too rationalistic in that his model "isolated cognitive from emotional and volitional processes that form an indivisible whole" (Pozarnik, 1995, p. 52). Rich and DeVitis (1985) presented a similar argument in identifying Kohlberg's failure to consider the relationship between emotion and moral action. Wygant's (1997) concern that the cognitive-structural model ignores the contextual determinants of moral volition reflects the multi-dimensional nature of moral functioning.

Other criticisms of Kohlberg's Model include the absence of empirical evidence directly linking moral reasoning to moral volition. Czudner (1999) stated that "knowing right from wrong hardly ever serves as a deterrent to immoral acts" (p. 166). Research has supported this stance by suggesting that while mental health practitioners know what they ought to do when faced with moral dilemmas, they instead proceed towards action via consideration

of personal values and implications (Smith, McGuire, Abbott, & Blau, 1991). Indeed, it is possible that Kohlberg's Model lacks any connection to moral action (Wygant, 1997). DeMey and Schulz (1996) argued that Kohlberg's complexity hypothesis (an explanation of moral development through environmental interaction) also lacks an empirical basis.

The philosophical and scientific concerns in relation to Kohlberg's Model resulted in critical reconsideration of its educational implications and applications. Langford and Lovegrove (1995) stated that Kohlberg's Model is too vague to be useful in the development of educational programming. This stance was supported by Santilli (1992) who suggested that interventions based on the development of cognitive processes have not been viewed as successful.

Vine (1996) suggested that the Kohlberg Model tends to underestimate children's moral powers. In particular, adolescents have been reported to be highly capable of moral reasoning (Horn, Killen, & Stanger, 1998). Hall and Lin (1995) went so far as to suggest that adolescents have demonstrated general decision competence that cannot be differentiated from that of adults. Unfortunately this ability to reason has not correlated strongly with pro-social behaviour among this population (Czudner, 1999). It is reasonable to conclude that the moral reasoning powers of the emerging adult are therefore also well developed. It does appear that "ethical awareness alone cannot guarantee an ethical act" (Hall & Lin, 1995, p. 74).

Given these criticisms, it is evident that Kohlberg's work has suffered from an academic and scientific backlash. Vine (1996) provided perhaps the most damning criticism of Kohlberg's Model by referring to it as having become "in significant respects ... an obstacle to our further understanding of moral thinking" (p. 457). There are, however, some that oppose this wholesale abandonment of Kohlberg's theory.

Swanson and Hill (1993) were less pointed in their criticisms of the Kohlberg Model and suggested only that the connection between moral reasoning and moral action has yet to be confirmed. More importantly, the notion that moral volition is the result of several processes, including moral reasoning, which are interactional in nature is a widely held belief (Bruggeman & Hart, 1996; Swanson & Hill, 1993; Windsor & Cappel, 1999). Given the complex nature of moral development and functioning, it appears that the work undertaken by Kohlberg should not be dismissed lightly.

Gilligan's theory of moral reasoning.

Pozarnik (1995) suggested that Kohlberg's Model functions as a useful starting point for moral development research. Rich and DeVitis (1995) suggested that a linear progression of moral development research from Piaget to Kohlberg to Gilligan is evident. However, in addition, a shift to include interpersonal and affective processes in the study of moral development was noted in Gilligan's work. This shift also included the introduction of gender as a possible divergent mechanism in moral functioning (Stanley, 1997).

While Czudner (1999) noted these shifts and argued that the theory of morality developed by Gilligan clashed openly with that of Kohlberg, Rich and DeVitis (1985) suggested that it is more likely that the work undertaken by Gilligan served to extend and refine that of Kohlberg. This position was supported by Gilligan (1982) in her statement that the moralities described by Kohlberg and herself should be seen “as complementary rather than sequential or opposed” (p. 33).

Stanley (1997) stated that Gilligan proposed a shared moral structure between men and women. Within this structure both sexes were believed to possess a justice voice and a care voice, although Gilligan (1982) suggested that men relied predominantly upon their justice voice while women relied more heavily on their care voice in reaching moral decisions. According to Armon and Dawson (1997), the purpose of Gilligan’s work was to illuminate women’s experience and process of moral functioning beyond the narrow scope she felt Kohlberg’s Model provided.

Gilligan believed that men and women approach morality from differing paradigms (Rich & DeVitis, 1985). Her theory suggests that women and men make moral decisions to achieve unrelated objectives. Specifically, women reason from a basis of caring and a desire to maintain relationships while men reason from a justice perspective (Skoe et al., 1999). It is noteworthy to consider, and remember, that Gilligan suggested men and women were most healthy when they were able to flexibly access and apply both justice and care voices in a balanced fashion (Stanley, 1997).

Subjected to critical consideration, Gilligan's method of research was seen to be valid (Rich & DeVitis, 1985). However, like that of Piaget and Kohlberg, Gilligan's work has received its share of criticism. Several authors have provided considerable evidence to suggest that the gender debate is far from over, citing both contemporary and more recent studies that have reported no significant differences in moral reasoning between men and women (Armon & Dawson, 1997; Rich & DeVitis, 1985; Skoe et al., 1999).

DeMay and Schulze (1996) stated that the debate over the Kohlberg/Gilligan paradigms would not be resolved until future research provides empirical evidence. Rich and DeVitis (1985) suggested Gilligan's work might be expanded by incorporating the Adlerian concept of social interest; this would "extend Gilligan's thesis from private relationships to the larger social community" (p. 31), thus correcting a major theoretical flaw present in her current model.

The need for further research was heralded by Vine (1996) who described all currently dominant explanatory models as "woefully inadequate" (p. 464). He suggested that research must progress toward a "broader and less theoretically blinkered vision of moral dimensions" (p. 457). This is consistent with the position of Bruggeman and Hart (1996) who argued that although morality appears to be an acquired function, the underlying experiences that influence its development are not understood. To further our level of understanding, Armon and Dawson (1997) suggested that research

initiatives move away from philosophical debates and begin to focus on the human moral experience.

Mechanisms in Moral Functioning

As an appropriate starting point, Keltikangas-Jarvinen, Terav, and Pakaslahti (1999) posited that, as morality ultimately is experienced through action, studies of moral development must include action as a necessary criterion. It is possible that a three factor model, including reasoning, affect, and action, might offer rich research possibilities (Dehaan et al., 1997; Santilli, 1992). Swanson and Hill (1993) supported this approach when they argued that researchers must consider the possible mechanisms that connect moral reasoning with ethical action when considering individual moral functioning. In effect, these mechanisms act as a bridge between moral reasoning and ethical action.

Several authors have suggested that such a bridge might be formed by the presence and influence of affective factors (Betan & Stanton, 1999; Bruggeman & Hart, 1996; Czudner, 1999; Hall & Lin, 1995; Howard-Hamilton & Franks, 1995; Walker & Henning, 1999). This is consistent with the belief espoused by both Adler and Erikson that emotions, thoughts, and actions are inseparable (Rich & DeVitis, 1985; Dehaan et al., 1997). To study personality traits and characteristics as mechanisms in relation to moral functioning is therefore appropriate (Dollinger & LaMatina, 1998).

Empathy

One possible mechanism identified as a bridge between moral reasoning and ethical action during adolescence is empathy (Czudner, 1999). Unfortunately, academics and practitioners have been unable to reach a consensus as to the definition of empathy and therefore, much more work “is needed before a fully mature concept emerges that is useful in ... practice, research, and education” (Kunyk & Olson, 2001). To date, individual researchers and practitioners have held forth diverse and vague definitions of empathy that have served only to confuse and obscure the understanding of those who wish to examine the construct (Burke, 2001; Verducci, 2000). In addition, Reynolds, Scott, and Jesseman (1999) stated that our failure to define the construct has resulted in our inability to then measure empathy, and hence we have no way of assessing programs designed to develop the construct in individuals. This confusion, however, has not resulted in collective efforts to further clarify the construct nor has it been heeded as a warning by those who would use their limited understanding of empathy as a basis for program development.

Kunyk and Olson (2001) stated that there are five common conceptualizations of empathy currently held within academic and practitioner circles. Empathy might be a personality trait, a professional trait, a communication process, a way of caring, or a reflection of a special relationship. Kilgor (2001) offered the position that empathy is composed of cognitive and affective components and processes. From a personality

perspective, MacAskill and Maltby (2002) argued that some people are incapable of empathy. This stance suggests that empathy might be a hard-wired personality trait - - either an individual has the capacity for empathy or they do not. While our current lack of understanding in regard to empathy presents as a major obstacle to its effective use as an aid to program development, it has not precluded practitioners from attempting to capture and utilize its essence in their work.

Some suggest that the ability to empathize with the experience of others might be a critical cornerstone of moral functioning (Redford & McPherson, 1995). Indeed, Regeher and Graham (2001) reported that deficits in empathy are common amongst those who engage in sexual offending, thus suggesting that empathy might serve as a moral agent. This position is supported by the Correctional Service of Canada, and its influence is noted within programs designed and delivered for the purpose of empathy development as part of their rehabilitation strategy for federally sentenced women (D. McDonagh, personal communication, October 30, 2002). However, these views do not hold unanimous support within the research community.

Reynolds, Scott, and Jesseman (1999) reported that courses designed to promote and develop empathy have been ineffective, "as there is uncertainty about what is being taught and learned on existing empathy courses and there is confusion about which aspects of empathy education are effective" (p. 1178). Regeher and Graham (2001) argued that existing

empathy programs focus on developing the cognitive aspect of empathy but do not address the affective components of empathy, thus limiting their effectiveness. School-based programs aimed at reducing bullying are representative of typical, cognitive-based empathy training initiatives (Mulrine, 1999). The result of such training is the development of a set of skills that only simulate empathy and are therefore not generalizable to unfamiliar situations (Regeher & Graham). Hart (1999) stated that such skills development programs are not effective as, "it is important to note that deep empathy is not a particular technique, but an activity of more direct knowing that involves a shift in being or consciousness" (p. 117). Further, to think that one knows how another feels is not the same as empathy (S. Myers, personal communication, December 20, 2002). Verducci (2000) stated that teaching cognitive empathy does a disservice to global empathy as "practicing this sort of projective empathy can also lead students to believe that feeling another's pain is the limit of what is morally required of them" (p. 76). Myyry and Helkama (2001) similarly equated empathy with a global sense of caring and concern for humans and the natural environment, an action-based view of empathy.

DeHaan and Hanford (1997) reported that there is little statistical evidence in the literature to suggest a direct link between empathy and moral functioning. Further, most evaluations of existing empathy training programs are methodologically weak and have relied on testimonials and poorly constructed empathy scales (Reynolds, Scott, & Jesseman, 1999). More

recently, it has been demonstrated that while adolescent males convicted of sexually offending behaviour were found to have less empathy than non-offending male peers, the efficacy of empathy training with this group was evaluated and results clearly illustrated that the development of “victim empathy in adolescent offenders remains elusive” (Burke, 2001, p. 229). In other words, the training initiative was not found to be effective.

While it remains possible that empathy and ethical behaviour are connected, until we know what empathy is, we will fall far short of understanding the nature of that construct's relationship to behaviour. Further, the debate on empathic influences might serve no practical purpose in moral development research, as several authors (Czudner, 1999; DeHaan and Hanford; Myers, 2002; Verducci, 2000) noted the difficulty of promoting the development of empathy through educational initiatives.

Despite the controversial debate surrounding empathy and its possible influences, its lack of portability might represent its greatest limitation. In fact, it is unlikely that empathy can be taught or engendered where it does not already exist (S. Myers, personal communication, October 21, 2001). From a pragmatic perspective, if empathy cannot be defined, we cannot develop and evaluate programs to enhance it, and therefore the construct cannot be effectively utilized in a directed effort to enhance the moral development of individuals. Until empathy is operationalized and researched, its potential value in promoting ethical behaviour will remain unknown.

Hope

Conceptualizations of hope

It has long been suggested that the concept of hope first surfaced in Greek mythology, with the opening of Pandora's Box (Averill, Caitlin, and Chong, 1990). At that time hope was not perceived in a positive light. The contemporary roots of hope as a positive force have been traced to early Judaic and Christian traditions (Averill et al., 1990; Christopher, 1999).

To gain an understanding of hope, one must seek to avoid common mis-applications of the term . Hope is not synonymous with optimism (Averill et al., 1990) or with resiliency (Hinton-Nelson, Roberts, & Snyder, 1996). Indeed, one can be resilient and optimistic without demonstrating hopefulness (R. Jevne, personal communication, September 13, 2001). Although hope is often viewed as an elusive and abstract construct (Herth, 1991), it does appear to have unique qualities.

Definitions of hope

Curry, Snyder, Cook, Ruby, and Rehm (1997) defined hope as goal-directed behaviour resulting from two complementary processes, agency thinking and pathways thinking. Agency thinking refers to an individual's ability to initiate and sustain movement towards an identified goal. Pathways thinking refers to an individual's ability to identify personally achievable routes to the identified goals (Snyder, 2000). In addition, Snyder (2000) placed no

conditions on hope and stated that being hopeful does not restrict individuals to socially acceptable goals.

Other authors have offered definitions similar to that put forth by Snyder (2000) but with a corollary positing that a distinguishing characteristic of hope is that the identified goals should be socially constructive (Averill et al., 1990; Beavers and Kaslow, 1981). Snyder's position on hope does not include any condition of prosocial expression. However, as hope has been identified as a primary emotion and one of the three theological virtues, it is noteworthy to remember that a virtue is defined as "a disposition to do what is best, according to one's potential" (Averill et al., p. 3). It is therefore arguable that hope inculcates an essence of universal goodness; in the literature hope is often referred to as having a "goodness factor".

The definition of hope put forward for consideration by DuFault and Martocchio (1985) restricted the manifestation of the phenomenon to the parameters of a constructive society. These authors posited hope as "a multidimensional dynamic life force characterized by a confident yet uncertain expectation of achieving good, which, to the hoping person, is realistically possible and personally significant" (p. 380). This definition is generally consistent with that suggested by Hinds and Gattuso (1991) as appropriate for studying adolescent hopefulness, although these authors additionally noted the importance of including a time orientation in considering the nature of hope.

Hope is thought to be a “biological given” (Beavers & Kaslow, 1981, p. 119), and it appears that there are no gender differences in overall hope (Snyder, 2000). It has been argued that to access hope is “natural. It is universal. It is safe to say that everyone is at all times hoping” (Anderson, Major, & Mitchell, 1995, p. 92). Herth (1991) similarly stated that some trace element of hope is always operative in individuals.

The terms hopeful and hopeless are best understood as polar opposite ends of the hope continuum (Gottschalk, Fronczek, & Buchsbaum, 1993; Herth, 1991). Hinds and Gattuso (1991) suggested that this continuum serves to remind us that hope cannot be reduced to an absent or present phenomenon.

Christopher (1999) argued that regardless of how it is operationalized, hope is an essential element of life. This author also posited hope as an “existential freedom that refuses to let itself be hypnotized by a certain precise image” (p. 7). This seems to suggest that it is wise to spend time exploring the manifestations and influences of hope, as opposed to simply attempting to capture and confine its essence within linguistic boundaries. Perhaps it is exactly the elusive image of hope that allows each individual to uniquely experience the phenomenon and its impacts.

Correlates of hope

Hope has been linked to many personality constructs. Central to the parameters of this study, locus of control and self-esteem have been demonstrated to be positively correlated with hope. Snyder (2000) stated that

hope is linked to the construct of locus of control. In addition, studies have demonstrated that an internal locus of control and a positive sense of self-esteem contribute to higher levels of hope; efforts to enhance these constructs (locus of control and self-esteem) appear to be appropriate interventions to engender hopefulness (O'Keefe, 1993; Pace, 1997).

It has been suggested that hopefulness is directly related to higher levels of life satisfaction (Chong, 1998), and well-being (Chong, 1998; Jevne, 1991). Curry et al. (1997) and Snyder (2000) linked hope with high levels of academic and athletic achievement and school completion. Chong indicated that hopeful students demonstrate greater problem-solving skills than do their less hopeful peers. This ability may be directly linked to the notion that hopefulness and flexible thinking are directly related (Snyder, 2000). Conversely, those adolescents who are unable to effectively problem-solve and see violence as their only option are best seen as demonstrating hopelessness (Hinton-Nelson et al., 1996).

From a purely psychological perspective, hope appears to provide a protective function in maintaining mental health. Gottschalk and Fronczek (1993) reported that "the greater the mental health of individuals, the higher their hope scores" (p. 354). This is consistent with Snyder's (2000) assertion that higher hope individuals experience more positive and fewer negative self-thoughts, while lower hope individuals attend more closely to negative self evaluations and tend to remember the negatives about themselves. Similarly,

Gottschalk, Fronczek, and Buchsbaum (1993) reported that hope is “negatively correlated with anxiety, hostility, and social alienation” (p. 279).

Several authors have identified hope as a contributing factor to adaptive coping in individuals (Elbaz, 1992; Herth, 1991; Snyder, 2000). These same authors suggested that those individuals in possession of higher levels of hope might also be better able to adapt to the circumstances and demands of their environments than those with lesser levels of hope. Beavers and Kaslow (1981) identified the cultivation of hope as a prime directive of psychotherapy and commented on the unique position of therapists to engender hope in their clients.

Hope has also been identified as a phenomenon operating within the theater of medical science. Gottschalk (1985) referred to hope as a deterrent to physical illness. Byrne et al. (1994) stated that fostering hope in patients is a central task for caregivers. The achievement of this task results in positive spin-offs; persons possessing higher levels of hope have been found to be able to endure significantly longer periods of pain (Snyder, 2000). In addition, Christopher (1999) reported that while hope may change over the course of an individual’s experience of illness, ultimate survival is not a condition of remaining hopeful.

A link between athletic performance and hope has been suggested (Curry et al., 1997). This is consistent with the findings of Averill et al. (1985), who also suggested that hope and action are correlated.

The noted associations, between behaviour and hope, serve to lend support to a specific exploration of hope and human behaviour in regard to moral functioning. Additionally, there is evidence in the literature to suggest that it is possible to instill and enhance the presence of hope in others (Herth, 1998). Specifically, teachers and personally significant others have been identified as possible carriers and distributors of hope (Anderson et al., 1995; Beavers & Kaslow, 1981; Christopher, 1999). Accepting that a link between hope and moral functioning may exist, and that hope can be engendered, it might then be promising to consider that the enhancement of hope in individuals might contribute to ethical behaviour.

Brackney and Westman (1992) stated that further research efforts would be necessary if the phenomenon of hope is to become better illuminated and we are to discover mechanisms to engender its development. This position was supported by Snyder (2000) who stated that the "science of psychology is built on accumulating evidence" (p. 24), and that "the developmental antecedents of hope are worthy of further exploration" (p. 22).

The construct of hope has been identified as a mechanism influencing students' decisions to remain in school (O'Keefe, 1993). This appears logical as those individuals who have left school prior to completion tend to demonstrate increased levels of hopelessness (Tanner et al., 1995). The recognition of hope as a link between reasoning and action on this limited front provides justification to explore the construct's value in deepening our understanding of moral functioning.

The definition of hope put forward by DuFault and Martocchio (1985) serves as the standard for this study. Its use allows for an appreciation and measurement of the construct without reducing its influence to the narrow application offered by Snyder (2000). The conceptualization of hope, as offered by DuFault and Martocchio, as being guided by a prosocial manifestation is also consistent with the notion of ethical volition, the study's major theme.

Self-esteem

Self-esteem has been identified as a subordinate component or dimension of self-concept (Pace, 1997). This finding is consistent with Coopersmith's (1967) description of self-esteem as a personally relevant evaluation of self-worth; high self-esteem reflects an individual's perception of competence in a personally valued area. Although externally derived and communicated evaluations may influence a person's self-esteem, it is the internal self-evaluation that is the determinant factor (Hamachek, 1995).

Individuals with high self-esteem tend to believe that they can successfully navigate their way around obstacles and thereby meet the challenges that they face (Coopersmith, 1967). This appears to be consistent with Snyder's (2000) notion of agency thinking, wherein the individual initiates and maintains movement towards identified goals. Individuals with high self-esteem are not easily dissuaded from their path and they tend to seek alternative routes as necessary in achieving their goals. For these individuals the obstacle to goal attainment is therefore not perceived as a character flaw

or weakness but as an external challenge that can be successfully overcome. In addition, the belief that one has the ability to master challenges is considered to be adaptive (Mruk, 1995).

Brooks (1994) argued that a "fundamental aspect of self-esteem is the ability to care for and respect others" (p. 547), and that this is connected to morality and ethics. Beane (1991) stated that low self-esteem has been linked to the decisions of adolescents to engage in high-risk behaviours such as substance abuse, unsafe sexual practices, and other self-destructive behaviours. The implications of such self-destructive behaviours cause a ripple effect within the individual's community that demonstrate a lack of caring and respect not only for self but also for other community members. These acts could, therefore, be considered unethical.

Self-esteem has also been linked to the construct of hope. O'Keefe (1993), and Pace (1997) suggested that high self-esteem assists in the development of hopefulness and an internal sense of control within individuals. Hence, to bolster hopefulness and personal efficacy in individuals, one pathway might be through the enhancement of positive self-esteem.

Mruk (1995) and Brooks (1992) argued that self-esteem is a dynamic and reciprocal construct, and therefore it can be modified through life experiences (Rutter, 1987). In other words, self-esteem is an ongoing process of self evaluation that results in a generally stable although not static view of oneself. Life experiences impact on one's view of self in that the proving grounds of one's worth are found within the broader community and the

interactions that are undertaken in that environment. Brooks (1994) stated that self-esteem is learned, and can therefore be promoted through a variety of interventions.

Beane (1991) suggested that the educational system is the most appropriate social institution for facilitating the development of positive self-esteem in individuals and identified this as a moral imperative for such institutions. Brooks (1994) and Pace (1997) stressed the importance of initiatives and interventions that take the unique needs of the individual into consideration, as global interventions are less effective. These authors point specifically to initiatives that emphasize opportunities in areas of value to the individual. For example, helping an individual become a successful musician will only enhance self-esteem if the ability to play music is of personal value to that individual; if the individual does not care for achievement in terms of musical prowess, then the activity will not contribute in any meaningful way to the self-evaluation process. The pressure for schools to reach out with a broad array of curricular and extra-curricular offerings for students is a response to the recognition that all children have areas in which their self-esteem can be positively affected.

Steinberg (1993) described self-concept as “the way individuals think about and characterize themselves” (p. 256), and suggested that in adolescence, individuals begin to develop complex, multidimensional conceptualizations of themselves. VanIjzendoorn and Zwart-Woudstra (1995) suggested that a positive concept of self might be necessary as a prerequisite

mechanism for moral functioning. These authors postulated that only those individuals with a strong sense of self could adopt the ideals of a moral society and find the internal strength to act accordingly. Assuming that a failure to act ethically might pose a threat to one's sense of self, Vanlizandoorn and Zwart-Woodstra postulated that those with a lesser sense of self could not risk such a failure and therefore they would choose not engage in that arena. Should their argument be valid, then it could be argued that initiatives to improve self-esteem might translate into an increased probability that an individual would not necessarily avoid ethical interactions because the risk to one's sense of self would be reduced.

Noting that the literature had largely ignored the possible influences of affect on pro-social behaviour, Vine (1996) called for moral functioning studies to consider ego development as an integral component. However, Czudner (1999) dismissed the notion that self-esteem and self-concept had any significant impact on ethical behaviour. The debate over the possible relationship of self-concept and self-esteem to behaviour underscores the opportunity available to researchers to expand understanding in this area. As educational initiatives and institutions have demonstrated the ability to impact positively on individual's self-concept and self-esteem (Brooks, 1992), there is merit in further exploring the link between these constructs and moral development.

Locus of Control

The construct of locus of control refers to the level of control individuals feel they hold over the outcomes of events relevant to their lives (Phares, 1972). Although the construct is considered to exist on a continuum, it is generally utilized in terms that emphasize the construct's polarities. Specifically, the term has been examined in the sense of external versus internal control (the opposite extremes of the continuum) (Phares, 1978). Those with an internal sense of control consider themselves responsible for their circumstances, while those with an external sense of control project responsibility for their circumstances on influences beyond their control (Rotter, 1966). The construct of locus of control has also been referred to as personal control, mastery, personal efficacy, self-directedness, personal autonomy, and instrumentalism (Lewis, Ross, & Mirowsky, 1999; Ott, Greening, Palardy, Holderby, & William, 2000).

Those individuals with an internal sense of control are more likely to seek out assistance when they feel it necessary - - an instance of highly adaptive behaviour (Trusty & Colvin Harris, 1999). As well, it has been shown that those with this sense of internal control are more likely to comply with necessary health treatment (Ott et al., 1999). These individuals also demonstrate increased academic achievement and personal confidence (Findley & Cooper, 1983; Trusty & Colvin Harris). These findings suggest that those individuals with an internal sense of control actively seek to engage in and adapt to their environmental circumstances.

D'Arcy and Siddique (1984) reported that adolescent "internals" experienced less distress than their peers who demonstrated an external locus of control. In addition, those individuals who demonstrate a strong sense of internal control over events tend to assume directive and active stances in creating positive outcomes (Phares, 1978). These "internals" believe they have been successful because they chose to be successful (Barnard, 1994). It is likely that those with an external locus of control would therefore experience opposite feelings and engage in opposite behaviours.

An external locus of control or a negative sense of personal control develops from interactions amongst a host of variables. Specifically, denial of access to relevant power, social mobility, and material benefits, coupled with a perception of powerful and often unnamed external forces contribute to this reduced sense of control (Coopersmith, 1967; Phares, 1976). As well, dropping out of school has been demonstrated to damage and impede the emergence of positive personal control as necessary skill development, such as reading and writing, occurs largely within the educational system (Lewis, Ross, & Mirowsky, 1999).

Fortunately, there are methods by which individuals can be encouraged towards a more internal sense of control (Phares, 1976). Indeed, even "severely at-risk adolescents possess the inner resources necessary to transcend the most dysfunctional socialization processes and adverse environmental conditions (Thomas & Stack, 2000, p. 8). Bandura (1982) noted four methods for increasing self-efficacy. These included mastery of

relevant tasks, social persuasion, social modeling, and cognitive reinterpretation of physiological cues (Ott et al., 2000). Lewis, Ross, & Mirowsky (1999) supported this stance and added that as adolescents age and develop skills, they gain in their sense of personal control. Remaining in school further engenders an internal sense of personal control (Lewis, Ross, & Mirowsky), perhaps as a result of the opportunities that schools offer for skills development and mastery, social persuasion, modeling, and perspective testing regarding physiological cues as described by Ott et al..

Locus of control has been linked to other aspects of self. O'Keefe (1993) reported internal locus of control as a contributing factor in the development of hopefulness. Personal control over one's life via work expectation fulfillment was determined to act as a contributor to self-esteem (Elliot, 1996). In addition, Erikson (1968) tied this sense of personal control to the development of identity in adolescence. It would seem that mental well-being is positively associated with these constructs.

Keltikangas-Jarvinen et al. (1999) supported the notion that an internal locus of control is positively correlated with higher level moral reasoning. Specifically, as one gains strength in the belief that personal efforts can affect social change and that one must both contribute to and benefit from a moral society, the individual gains in recognition of the advantages associated with reasoning from a broader and more sophisticated moral base. However, these authors did not forge a link between this construct and ethical

behaviour. The task of investigating such a link was left open to future research initiatives.

Generally, researchers have only begun to focus on the emotional aspects of moral functioning, and this neglect has restricted our understanding (Walker & Henning, 1999). There is little doubt that the identification of personality factors associated with moral functioning is worthwhile (Redford & McPherson, 1995). The literature has identified moral functioning research opportunities that include the constructs of hope, self-esteem, and locus of control. In regard to adolescent populations, a better understanding of personality factors may translate into a deeper understanding of moral functioning. Such an understanding is of theoretical and practical importance (Keltikangas-Jarvinen et al., 1999), especially if we are to engender moral development and functioning in our junior populations.

Operationalized Terms

For the purposes of this study the key terms will be operationalized as follows:

- 1) Moral reasoning is the cognitive conceptualization of morality and ethical responses. Theorists such as Piaget, Kohlberg, and Gilligan argued that individuals approached morality and ethical behavior from a cognitive reasoning perspective. That is, the individual's arrival at a behavioural choice is representative of the "conceptual framework by which a subject analyzes a social-moral problem and judges the proper course of action" (Rest, 1988, p, 4.1) .

- 2) Locus of control is considered the individual's perception of personal power to affect change on three levels: personal level (efficacy), sociopolitical level, and interpersonal relationship level (Paulhus, 1990).
- 3) Self-esteem is considered to be the evaluative component of self-concept. In other words, self-esteem represents the level of value that the individual affords self (Battle, 1992).
- 4) Hope is operationalized in accordance with Dufault and Martocchio's (1985) definition of the construct as 'a multidimensional life force characterized by a confident yet uncertain expectation of achieving good, which the hoping person, is realistically possible and personally significant" (p. 380).
- 5) Ethical behaviour represents personal action that respectfully balances personal freedom and needs with social responsibility (Thomas, 1997a).

Purpose

It is clear that society must be engaged in the facilitation of ethical behaviour amongst its junior members. To successfully engage in this process, an informed approach to initiatives and interventions must be developed and implemented. This study will seek to broaden our understanding of the affective processes involved in moral functioning in an adolescent population. In particular, this study aims to examine the nature of the possible relationships amongst moral reasoning, hope, self-esteem, locus of control, and ethical volition in adolescent populations. Answers to the following questions will be sought: 1) What, if any, relationships do moral reasoning, hope, self-esteem, and locus of control have to ethical action? 2) What single aspects of moral reasoning, hope, self-esteem, and locus of control are most powerful in predicting ethical action? 3) What models are most powerful in the prediction of ethical action? 4) Are the influences of these variables differentiated by the age, sex, and ethnicity of the respondent?

This study will attempt to ascertain which, if any, affective constructs are the strongest predictors of moral volition in a group of individuals engaged in the last stage of adolescent development. In order to address the complexities of these constructs, relationships between significant predictor pairs will be examined. With this knowledge we may be better able to address the unique moral functioning processes of adolescent populations through

specific interventions and initiatives designed and delivered in a directed and informed manner.

Method

This section will serve to disclose the procedural steps taken to select both an appropriate sample and to ensure that collection of data adhered to ethical guidelines. In addition, the selection of specific instruments to measure the constructs as identified and operationalized within the literature review will be discussed.

The focus of this research was to explore the relationships that might exist amongst moral reasoning, hope, self-esteem, and locus of control and their possible influence on ethical volition. The background variables of sex, ethnicity, and locale were considered for their potential to impact on these relationships. To that end, a sample of students from a community college was invited to complete a series of five questionnaires. The questionnaires provided information on various aspects of the individual's moral reasoning, self-esteem, locus of control, hopefulness, and ethical behaviour. Demographic information was collected on each participant to determine if variation existed within the sample.

An ethical review of this study was undertaken at the University of Alberta. Approval was granted to engage in the study. Approval was also gained from the community college from whom the research participants were selected.

Sampling

The sample was comprised of individuals in the last stage of adolescent development in an atypical urban center in Eastern Canada. The

city is located within a province that relies heavily on its agricultural industry. A distinctly rural atmosphere is prevalent within the culture of the city. This combination of characteristics provides a relatively unique sampling location. The sample involved students, aged 18 – 22 years, enrolled in highschool upgrading and trades preparation programs at the local community college. Of the 77 student volunteers that submitted completed sets of questionnaires, 34 were males and 43 were females. The majority of participants were Caucasian (92%); the remaining participants were Native Canadians (3%) and Other (5%). In total, 62% of the participants were from rural settings and 38% were from urban settings.

All of the participants in the study were between the ages of 18 – 22 years. The average participant age was 19.88 years (standard deviation was 1.45 years) for the full sample. This age cohort was chosen because membership tends to imply that individuals might be potentially engaged in both adolescent developmental tasks and high-risk behaviours.

Data Collection

Permission was gained from the Program Coordinator of the college to invite students between the ages of 18 – 22 years to participate in the study. An explanatory letter was forwarded to the college for distribution to the students prior to the dates of the researcher's visit. The letter outlined the purpose and parameters of the study as well as the voluntary nature of the students' participation. College officials distributed the letter to prospective participants. Upon the researcher's arrival to the city, each of the classrooms

was visited so as to provide opportunities for clarification prior to student participation in the study. Questions were addressed by the researcher at that time.

At the time of data collection, the students were again informed (orally) of the voluntary nature of their participation. It was explained to students that their questionnaires would only be utilized in the study if they provided a signed consent form included in the questionnaire package; that an unsigned consent form resulted in the destruction of the individual's complete questionnaire packet was clearly explained to each group of students. This procedure provided opportunity for students to withdraw consent at any point in the data collection process.

Administration of the questionnaires was conducted by the researcher. The instructions for completing each of the questionnaires were read aloud to all the students before they began the task at hand. Students were encouraged to seek clarification at any time during their completion of the questionnaires. In addition, the researcher remained available following the collection of the packets to provide students with the opportunity to seek additional information. In some cases the participants completed the questionnaires within their classrooms; students not involved in the research had the option of continuing with other work or leaving the room to perform other tasks. On other occasions, the participants were relocated in a separate room to complete the questionnaires. Course instructors determined the course of action most appropriate to their particular needs in terms of student

placement for data collection. Completion of the questionnaires took approximately 60-90 minutes.

One hundred, two questionnaire packets were distributed and collected. Of this number, twenty-five were discarded as a result of incomplete questionnaires or the lack of a signed consent form. These twenty-five packets were then destroyed in keeping with the contract between the researcher and the participants.

Instruments

Except for the Visions of Morality Scale (Shelton, 1990), all other questionnaires were standardized instruments. Each instrument was designed as a self-report measure for use with individuals within the age group utilized in this study. All instruments are considered appropriate for group administration. Permission was obtained from each of the instrument authors or copyright holders to utilize the instruments in this study. Copies of each of the measures are included in Appendices A – E of this document.

The five measures administered included: the Defining Issues Test – Three Story Short Form (Rest, 1988), the Culture-Free Self-Esteem Inventory (Battle, 1992), the Herth Hope Scale (Herth, 1988), the Spheres of Control Scale (Paulhus, 1990), and the Visions of Morality Scale (Shelton, 1990).

The Defining Issues Test – Three Story Short Form (Rest, 1988) assesses the degree to which an individual's moral reasoning is ethically principled (Dehaan et al., 1997). This short version is based on the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1988) - a widely used research instrument (Redford &

McPherson, 1995). Indeed, Windsor and Cappel (1999) stated that the DIT is the most commonly accepted research instrument for the study of moral reasoning. Dollinger and LaMartina (1998) suggested that the DIT is both an efficient and objective measure of moral reasoning. Penn (1990) and DeHaan and Hanford (1997) stated that the DIT is an excellent instrument due to its high levels of reliability and construct validity. The instrument was standardized on a group of 2, 479 college-aged students from different geographic locations (Rest, 1988). The reliability coefficients of the DIT ranged from the high .70s to the .80s (Rest). The DIT Three Story Short Form produced a Cronbach's Alpha of .76 suggesting the instrument provides results consistent with those of the original instrument (Rest). The short form consists of three stories portraying moral dilemmas, and twelve issue statements associated with each dilemma. The instrument yields a "P" index score that indicates the individual's level of moral reasoning; the P-score of the short form correlates at a high level with the P-score for the full test (Windsor & Cappel, 1999). Higher P-scores indicate higher levels of moral reasoning (see Appendix A).

The Herth Hope Scale (Herth, 1988) provides an assessment of hope that is based upon the vision of hope described by DuFault and Martocchio (1985). It was chosen for use in this study as a result of its construction based on that definition of hope. The scale is a thirty item, four-point Likert scale that has proven useful in work with well and ill adult populations. The alpha reliability coefficients have been shown to range from acceptable to strong

(Herth, 1995). The instrument provides measures of overall and dimensional aspects of hope. In this study, the overall measure of hope provided by this instrument will be utilized in the analysis. The instrument was standardized on a group of 480 adults ranging in age from 18 – 94 years. The norming population included individuals diagnosed with cancer, healthy adult individuals, and elderly persons. The instrument has been “widely used in studies of hope in... clinical populations... in the United States and abroad...” (Herth, p. 63) The alpha reliability coefficients ranged from .74 to .94 with a three week test-retest reliability of .89 - .91 in the populations referred to above. Higher scores indicate higher levels of hope (see Appendix B).

The Visions of Morality Scale is a self-report instrument intended to examine ethical behaviour based on the everyday experiences of individuals in the late adolescent stage of development. The scale measures subject's responses to 45 everyday situations utilizing a seven-point Likert scale. The instrument has been judged to have acceptable construct validity and reliability for research purposes (Dehaan et al., 1997). The instrument yields three measures of ethical behaviour (social, interpersonal, and private dimensions) and a global measure of ethical volition. Higher scores on the scale indicate higher levels of ethical behaviour (see Appendix C).

The Culture-Free Self-Esteem Inventory – Adult Form provides a measure of self-esteem in the following areas: general, social, and personal self-esteem. As well, a global measure of self-esteem is provided. General self-esteem refers to that aspect of self-esteem which is based on the

individual's perception of their own worth. Social self-esteem refers to the individual's evaluation of personal success in developing and maintaining interpersonal relationships. Personal self-esteem is defined as an individual's "most intimate perception of self worth" (Battle, 1992, p. 3). The instrument was standardized on a group of 127 college students. Test-retest reliability for all subjects was measured at .81; for males and females, .79 and .82 respectively (Battle). For the purposes of this study, only the global measure of self-esteem was utilized. The author estimated that the instrument had been used in over 800 master's theses and doctoral dissertations (Battle, p. 1). The children's version of this scale has been used in both research and programming design and evaluation throughout Canada and the United States (see Appendix D).

The Spheres of Control (Paulhus, 1990) is a locus of control instrument based on the work of Rotter. The instrument provides a measure of an individual's sense of control in three specific realms: personal efficacy, interpersonal control, and sociopolitical control. Items are rated on a seven-point Likert scale. The measure was standardized on a university sample population of 177 students. Alpha reliabilities of the three scales were .75, .77, and .81 for the Personal, Interpersonal, and Sociopolitical scales respectively (Paulhus). Test-retest correlations at four week intervals are above .90 and at the six-month interval are above .70 for all three subscales (Paulhus). An overview of the extent of this instrument's use in research and

clinical practice was not available to this author at the time of writing (see Appendix E).

Results

The data analysis focused on the exploration of student responses to determine whether relative and absolute relationships were present amongst the predictor variables and on the outcome variable, ethical volition. Absolute effects refers to the influence of a variable on the outcome variable in the absence of other variables. Relative effects refers to the influence of a variable on the outcome variable in the presence of other variables. The nature of these relationships was also explored in the presence of mediating variables, including age, ethnicity, gender, and locale.

Multiple regression techniques were employed to examine relationships amongst variables. Schonert-Reichl (1999) suggested that the multiple regression approach to statistical analysis is an appropriate choice when attempting to discern the unique contributions of variables. As well, multiple regression approaches allow for examination of possible relationships among variables that might increase the regression model's ability to predict the outcome variable. Given the nature of this study, a stepwise regression approach was utilized as this method is most appropriate given that the focus of the research was on prediction (Diekhoff, 1992). The specific rationale for stepwise methods is that they provide for the inclusion of variables with significant effects while excluding those variables with insignificant effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1975). The sample size of 77 was sufficient for the type of analysis conducted (Diekhoff, 1992; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989).

A 10 X 10 correlation matrix was constructed to examine possible collinearity amongst predictor variables (see Appendix F). Those variables that contributed significantly to the prediction of ethical behaviour, while demonstrating unique and non-overlapping effects, were included in the models. Contributing variables included hope, aspects of locus of control, moral reasoning, self-esteem, gender, and age.

The first model estimated absolute effects of those variables determined to be unique via an examination of correlation coefficients. The second model examined relative effects of those variables deemed to have significant absolute effects. The third step of the analysis utilized graphic procedures to examine mediating relationships amongst the significant contributing variables.

The primary step in the analysis was to examine descriptive results to determine if significant differences existed between the means obtained by partitioned population segments. As the overwhelming majority of participants were Caucasian (92%), the variable based on ethnicity was highly skewed and was not utilized in the study as its ability to explain ethical behaviour was limited. In addition, the locale indicated by participants was not correlated with ethical behaviour and therefore it was not useful in predicting the outcome variable. Statistical results for the full sample, for males, and females are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Statistical Results (ANOVA) for Full Sample, for Males, and for Females

	Mean (SD)			
Variables	Full Sample ^a	Males ^b	Females ^c	Range
Hope	65.16 (12.13)	62.00 (12.07)	67.65 (11.70)*	30 - 84
LOCIC	48.65 (7.60)	46.24 (8.30)	50.54 (6.50)*	28 - 68
LOCPC	52.50 (7.24)	49.35 (6.30)	54.93 (7.05)**	3 - 69
LOCSP	37.32 (7.84)	35.18 (7.00)	39.02 (8.13)*	22 - 54
MR	27.53 (16.61)	25.03 (18.11)	29.51 (15.26)	00 - 77
Self-Esteem	28.26 (6.18)	28.32 (6.63)	28.21 (5.87)	17 - 39
Ethical Behavior	216.79 (35.13)	201.56 (32.23)	228.84 (32.90)***	132 - 293
Age	19.88 (1.45)	19.71 (1.44)	20.02 (1.45)	18 - 22

^aN = 77^bn = 34^cn = 43

*p < .05.

p < .01. *p < .001.

In this examination, no significant differences were noted between males and females on measures of moral reasoning and self-esteem. Females were found to be significantly more hopeful than their male counterparts. As well, females were seen to have a stronger sense of confidence in their ability to develop and maintain important interpersonal relationships (LOCIC) as compared to males in this sample. Similarly, females evidenced heightened senses of personal efficacy (LOCPC) and sociopolitical control (LOCSP). That is, females demonstrated self-confidence

in their abilities to successfully meet daily challenges and to assert sociopolitical influence over their environments. In terms of ethical volition, females were significantly more likely to report that they would engage in behaviour associated with positive outcomes.

Variables were then explored via multiple regression for their individual ability to predict ethical behaviour. The individual predictors, the percentage of variance accounted for by the predictor, both the standardized and unstandardized coefficients, and the standard error associated with each predictor, are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Absolute Effects of Individual Variables on Ethical Behaviour, Full Sample

Variables	R ²	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	SE
Gender	.139	-27.28	-.388***	7.50
Hope	.086	0.906	.313**	.318
LOCPC	.176	2.096	.432***	.505
LOCSP	.133	1.704	.380**	.478
LOCIC	.034	1.004	.217	.522
Self-Esteem	.009	0.448	.239	.212
Moral Reasoning	.032	0.488	.212	.239
Age	.003	2.41	.099	2.78

Note. N = 77 ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Only four of the original set of variables included in the study were significant in the prediction of ethical behaviour. Table 2 demonstrates that a sense of personal efficacy is the single strongest predictor of ethical behaviour followed by gender, sense of sociopolitical control, and hope. The degree to which one believes that he/she has the ability to successfully handle the challenges of life has a strong positive effect on ethical behaviour. As well, an individual's gender impacts significantly on ethical behaviour. It appears that an individual's perception of being able to exert control over their

social and political environments, and their level of hope also plays a significant positive role in ethical volition. Age, moral reasoning, interpersonal control, and self-esteem were all determined to be non-significant contributors to the prediction of ethical volition.

The four significant predictor variables were then entered into the regression model to determine their relative impacts on the prediction of ethical behaviour. This model was expected to provide a parsimonious explanation of the variance explained by this set of predictor variables. Specifically, those predictor variables that continued to be significant would be retained within the model while those that no longer significantly contributed to the variance explained in ethical behaviour would be eliminated. Table 3 presents the results of the second model. The amount of variance accounted for by the model, as well as the standard error, and the standardized and unstandardized coefficients associated with each of the predictor variables are displayed.

Table 3

Relative Effects of Predictor Variables on Ethical Behaviour

Variables	Unstandardized Coefficient	Standardized Coefficient	SE
LOCPC	1.850	.381***	.483
LOCSP	1.434	.320**	.446

Note. N = 77. $R^2 = .267$

p < .01. *p < .001

This procedure revealed that one combination of predictor variables accounted for the greatest amount of variance in ethical behaviour. This parsimonious model demonstrated that an individual's perceptions of personal efficacy and sociopolitical control remained significant, and are therefore the important variables when estimating ethical behaviour. This suggests that those individuals with perceived higher levels of both self-efficacy and the ability to affect sociopolitical change in their world obtained higher outcomes on the measure of ethical behaviour. Neither gender nor level of hope contributed in a meaningful way within this model.

The third step of analysis involved an examination of possible moderating effects on the variables identified at the second step of analysis. Specifically the effects of gender and hope were examined in relation to their ability to modify the relationships between personal efficacy, sociopolitical control, and ethical behaviour. Graphic analysis was used to demonstrate the

nature of these relationships. The results of this analysis are displayed in Figures 1 – 4. For illustrative purposes, high levels of hope represent values which fall one standard deviation above the mean or greater, moderate levels of hope represent values within one standard deviation of the mean, and low levels of hope represent values which fell more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Figure 1. Relationship between gender and personal efficacy for the full sample.

Examination of the main effect results indicated that an individual's sense of personal efficacy is strongly associated with ethical behaviour. Gender was determined to act as a moderating variable on the impact of personal efficacy in terms of ethical behaviour. As levels of self-efficacy increase, positive outcomes in terms of ethical behaviour for males and females also increase. As the graph illustrates, females at lower levels of perceived levels of personal efficacy produce slightly higher levels of ethical behaviour than do the males in this sample. However, this gap between male and female outcomes increases as perceived levels of personal efficacy increase. At the upper levels of personal efficacy, females were significantly more likely to engage in ethical behaviour than their male counterparts.




Figure 2. Relationship between gender and sociopolitical control for the full sample

Main effects demonstrated that an individual's perceived sense of ability to affect sociopolitical influence within their environment was strongly correlated with ethical behaviour. The analysis of the relationship of gender with sociopolitical influence indicates that while females far outperform males in terms of positive outcomes when faced with similar ethical dilemmas at lower perceived levels of sociopolitical influence, this gap closes significantly as the sexes approach similarly higher levels of perceived sociopolitical control. Females continued to produce more favorable outcomes than males but the difference in scores became much less pronounced when the individuals demonstrated more confidence in their ability to affect change within their environments.




Figure 3. Relationship between hope and personal efficacy for the full sample.

The highly significant relationship between perceived levels of personal efficacy and ethical behaviour is influenced by hope. More favorable outcomes are predicted for those individuals with higher levels of hope and, as the recorded levels of personal efficacy increased, this trend became more pronounced. In all situations where individuals had similar levels of perceived self-efficacy, higher levels of ethical behaviour were recorded for those with higher levels of hope. As the level of an individual's perceived self-efficacy increased, the moderating influence of hope became more significant in its effect on positive outcome. As can be seen in the graphic illustration, those with high levels of hope tended to demonstrate more favorable outcomes than those with moderate levels of hope even when these individuals' perceived sense of personal efficacy was lower. In fact, at increased levels of personal efficacy, the gap between those at high and moderate levels of hope grew wider.





Figure 4. Relationship between hope and sociopolitical control.

The main effect of an individual's perceived sense of sociopolitical control on ethical behaviour was significant. The influence of hope on an individual's sense of perceived control over their environment demonstrated dramatic outcome results. For those with low levels of hope, increases in the individuals' perceived level of sociopolitical control did not result in significant gains in terms of positive outcomes. It is suggested that, on its own, increased perception of sociopolitical control does not contribute to higher outcome results. However, those with moderate and high levels of hope significantly outperform those individuals with lower levels of hope on the outcome measure. Within these groups it is apparent that as both level of hope and sociopolitical control increase, performance on the outcome measure is also noted to increase. When an increase in sociopolitical control is evidenced, those with higher levels of hope increasingly outperform those with lesser levels of hope.



Discussion

This study explored the relationships between cognitive and affective variables in the prediction of ethical behaviour in a sample of adolescents aged 18 – 22 years of age. These relationships were to be examined in the context of background variables, age, ethnicity, and locale. The latter two variables were highly skewed and were therefore omitted from the study. Initial examination of descriptive statistics is followed by a discussion of the main and relative effects of predictors for the full sample. The influence of mediating effects is then offered for consideration.

Full Sample:

Main Effects. For the full sample, main effects were significant for only four of the predictor variables. Among the variables explored, age, moral reasoning, interpersonal control, and self-esteem were found to be non-significantly correlated with ethical behaviour. Conversely, personal efficacy, a sense of sociopolitical control, hope, and gender respectively were found to be significant in their individual abilities to predict ethical behaviour.

Age did not play a significant role in terms of the respondents' endorsement of ethical outcomes in this study. This might be suggestive of homogeneity of the sample in terms of developmental stage. In this sample, all of the participants were actively engaged in tasks associated with preparation for careers, tasks congruent with Erikson's (1968) notion of "inspired activity" (p. 32), a central element to identity formation. This preparation is also significant in that the individual's movement out into the

broader community has begun, and as such, so has the consolidation of the individual's sense of self. That is, this movement represents progress toward the integration of the various elements of an individual's identity into a coherent and solid sense of self as described by Erikson. The soundness of attaching artificial parameters (such as age) to developmental task completion is called into question by this finding. It appears that membership within a developmental stage is most appropriately measured by examining the tasks in which the individual is engaged.

The finding that moral reasoning was not significantly related to ethical behaviour is consistent with the recent literature. Knowing "right from wrong" and having the capacity to recognize the underlying reasoning of societal norms has not served to protect either individuals or the larger society from the ravages of deliberate antisocial behaviour (Czudner, 1999). This finding supports the literature in that interventions focused on increasing the knowledge base of the individual are unlikely to be fruitful.

The finding that self-esteem was not significantly correlated with ethical behaviour adds fuel to the ongoing debate on this subject within the literature. It is possible that the construct has little bearing on the behaviour of individuals as suggested by Czudner (1999). It is also conceivable that the true impact of self-esteem is to be observed through its influence on locus of control and hope as suggested by O'Keefe (1993) and Pace (1997), and then, indirectly, on ethical volition via these constructs. The widely accepted notion that self-esteem is the evaluative component of self (Coopersmith, 1967) also

holds that events and behaviours only impact on self-evaluation when they are perceived as being central to the process of evaluation. Indeed, the individual might not be disposed to a particular behaviour as a result of self-concept unless the individual's history in relation to this behaviour is reflective of an affirming consequence. It is therefore conceivable that evaluation of self does not bear on ethical volition; perhaps, it is the resultant response to an individual's behaviour in an ethically-charged situation that provides fodder for the self-evaluation process.

Although Mruk (1995) suggested that life events can modify one's self-esteem, it is more likely that it is the personal consequences and perceptions of events that actually play a mediating role in self-evaluation as opposed to the event itself. In facing an ethical dilemma, the circumstances surrounding the event are frequently unique and the potential consequences of one's actions uncertain. By its very nature, self-esteem is an internal process that filters past events. When faced with familiar situations that are likely to lead to anticipated consequences, one might be influenced by past practice and the self-esteem considerations particular outcomes have been known to engender. Behaviour in these cases might be repeated as it serves a reinforcing purpose. In unique ethical situations one lacks the benefit of certainty, and therefore one's behavioural response can not be clearly predicted from previous responses. Despite these musings, the construct of self-esteem and ethical behaviour remain unconnected by the evidence offered by the present study.

Personal efficacy was identified as the most powerful single predictor of ethical behaviour. This finding supports the notion that those individuals with higher levels of personal efficacy assume active stances in creating positive outcomes (Bernard, 1994; Phares, 1978). In this instance the positive outcome is ethical volition. In following an ethical course of action, highly efficacious individuals believe that their actions will be successful, that they can master the situation and bring about a positive outcome. Conversely, those individuals with a lesser sense of personal control do not tend to interact in ethical situations with the intention of creating a positive outcome. It might be that these individuals do not feel that they have the skills and ability necessary to invoke positive results in light of current environmental demands.

The influences of gender, sociopolitical control, and hope on ethical behaviour were also highly significant. However the amount of variance accounted for by each of these variables decreased in respect to the order in which they are presented.

A powerful prediction model was also obtained for one pairing of predictor variables. Results indicated that personal efficacy in combination with an individual's sense of control in bringing about positive change via social and political interaction remained significant in the presence of other variables.

Mediating Relationships. The complex nature of ethical behaviour as described in the literature was further underscored by the relationships

between predictor variables in this study. Examinations of relationships between pairings of the significant predictor variables revealed that the presence of gender and the degree of personal hope mediated the influences of the predictor variables and ethical behaviour. For example, although personal efficacy was demonstrated to be the most powerful predictor of ethical behaviour, the ability of this variable to predict ethical behaviour was strongly influenced by the level of hope held by the individual.

For those individuals with high levels of hope, the relationship between personal efficacy and ethical behaviour was most closely aligned. That is, the ability of personal efficacy to estimate ethical behaviour was greatest for those individuals with high levels of personal hope. Those individuals rated as possessing a moderate level of hope also displayed a strong positive correlation between personal efficacy and ethical behaviour. However, the predictive ability of personal efficacy on ethical behaviour was weaker within the moderate hope group than that of the high hope group. In turn, the group identified with a low level of hope, while also demonstrating a correlation between sense of personal efficacy and ethical behaviour, displayed the weakest predictive qualities in terms of ethical behaviours. In all groupings, as the level of hope increased, the gap between the groups increased in terms of ethical volition. Thus the predictive ability of personal efficacy benefited from increases in the individual's level of hope.

Snyder (2000) reported that locus of control and hope were linked. He stated that hope can be viewed as goal directed behaviour and that hope is

made up of two complementary processes, agency thinking and pathways thinking. In regard to the results of this study, it is conceivable that ethical behaviour as the outcome goal is achieved when one is able to initiate and sustain movement toward the goal (agency thinking component of hope) and one believes that they have the skills to achieve the outcome goal (personal efficacy).

The literature repeatedly refers to the prosocial factor necessary to the expression of hope by an individual (Averill et al., 1990; Beavers & Kaslow, 1981). The act of engaging in ethical behaviour might be regarded as virtuous and it might also be interpreted as a necessary step in enhancing and maintaining one's own sense of hope. It is possible that the "goodness factor" of hope brings about behaviours that serve to further the general well-being of individuals and society. The more hopeful one is, the stronger the "goodness factor", and the impetus to act ethically becomes more dominant in the individual. It is generally believed that as one gives hope, one's own sense of hope also increases. The outcome of ethical behaviour might represent a pathway along which hope is passed to others.

Erikson (1968) stated that adolescents might rather not attempt a behaviour if they did not feel that they possessed the skills necessary to be successful in a particular endeavor. The present study adds weight to Erikson's position in that those individuals with lower perceptions of personal efficacy and hope did not tend to demonstrate engagement in the

achievement of positive outcomes to the extent as those individuals who felt that they could be successful in their efforts.

Similar interpretations can be made based on the results found in relation to an individual's sense of sociopolitical control and their perceived level of hope. Higher levels of hope were demonstrated to be strongly associated with more positive outcomes when an individual's perception of sociopolitical control was considered. Of paramount importance was the finding that regardless of increases in the individual's level of sociopolitical control, those in the low hope grouping did not demonstrate significant gains in terms of a positive outcome. Thus the performance of sociopolitical control in the prediction of ethical behaviour is limited in significance to those with moderate to high levels of hope.

Those individuals with moderate and high levels of hope demonstrated dramatic increases in terms of positive outcomes. Those individuals with high levels of hope demonstrated an ever increasing tendency to engage in ethical acts in comparison with those in the moderate and low hope groupings at similar and higher levels of perceived sociopolitical control. It is possible that the "goodness factor" exerted its influence on the actions of these individuals. Consideration of this concept in terms of the present study offers an explanation that suggests those individuals with higher levels of hope are able to identify a goal which makes their efforts in following an ethical course appear worthy and valuable. It is possible that doing the "right" thing might

result in positive gains in terms of the enhancement of hope on a social and personal level.

The betterment of society necessarily benefits the individual if at no other level than to facilitate the solidification of the one's psychosocial identity. The contextual nature of sociopolitical control in regard to its influence on ethical behaviour clearly speaks to the importance of hope in creating positive outcomes. The findings of the present study represent an extension of O'Keefe's (1993) argument that one's degree of personal hope plays an integral role in adolescents' decisions to remain in school to the broader ethical field, one that holds both individual and social implications. The findings also offer an explanation for the actions of those individual's who, although aware of the negative implications of their actions, choose to engage in actions that do not serve to ethically benefit themselves or others. It is possible that to be without at least a moderate level of hope is to be at the mercy of aimless personal whim; a psychological state where one does not identify goals and where one's actions are therefore without direction. To be without hope is to be without purpose, and by extension to be, perhaps, without identity.

In terms of the mediating effect of gender on the ability of personal efficacy to predict ethical behaviour, females are clearly more likely to engage in ethical behaviours than their male counterparts. In addition, as females and males demonstrate increased senses of personal efficacy, the gap in positive outcomes between the sexes grows wider, suggesting that females become

even more likely to engage in prosocial behaviours as they gain confidence in their abilities. It could be that females not only approach reasoning from a caring and relationship-based perspective as described by Gilligan (1982), but that they also choose their course of action so as to achieve relationship objectives. This does not suggest that moral reasoning leads to ethical behaviour, current results do not support this position. However it could be argued that females have been gendered within our society to engage in behaviour that is in consideration of the importance of social relationships and a need to provide caring support to those in need. Their willingness to step in so as to assist another person might represent an effort to initiate, further develop, or maintain relational and social bonds. That males do not engage to the same extent as females might also find explanation in the process of gendering. From an early age males are exposed to media images and values that promote and encourage a sense of competitiveness in the pursuit of personal power, wealth, and stature. In many ways, ethical behaviour is incompatible with the images and values of this patriarchal social structure. It is possible that within this structure, growth in personal efficacy for males is valued and utilized only to the perceived benefit of self and the maintenance of this social structure. In the field of corrections, females are clearly more law-abiding than their male counterparts as evidenced by the ratio of males to females in federal custody (F. Cortoni, personal communication, September 26, 2002). This suggests that females are more likely to engage in behaviours

that do not impinge on the rights of others if one accepts that abiding by societal laws reflects an ethical behaviour.

The level of an individual's belief that she or he can successfully exert a measure of control over the shaping of the environment via political and social means was also mediated by gender. While females demonstrated modest increases in the likelihood of ethical volition as they felt their ability to affect political and social change increased, the effect for males was much more dramatic. Perhaps as males grow in their feelings of sociopolitical control they come to value opportunity to participate proactively when faced with an ethically charged situation. Further, to engage in positive social behaviour when one believes their efforts will be successful is supported in the literature as a means of further solidifying one's identity (Erikson, 1968). To engage in such behaviour is also supported within the literature as a means of lessening personal distress (Darcy & Siddique, 1984). For males, then, ethical opportunities might serve as an identity "testing ground", a place where individuals can further test their own connection with society. Conversely, those males, in this study, who tended not to engage in prosocial behaviour might have been hindered by feelings of social isolation, or by a sense of inability to affect change. Rather than face failure, their choice to not engage in prosocial behaviour might have represented a more palatable behavioural option. A fragile sense of identity might dispose a person to avoid behaviours that do not offer a certainty of positive consequence.

Implications for Practice

It is of paramount importance to be aware of the relationships that exist between gender and aspects of locus of control, and between hope and those same aspects of locus of control in order to conceptualize and deliver effective interventions that increase the likelihood of ethical volition within later adolescent populations. This study illustrates the dynamic roles that these variables play via mediating relationships, and thus, highlight the necessary reflection of these considerations within intervention initiatives. O'Keefe (1993) and Pace (1997) argued in favor of intervention strategies that focused on augmenting existing strengths within individuals. The findings of this study lend support to these arguments and serve to further challenge the notions of blanket interventions.

This information also challenges the notion of ethics-based curriculums that emphasize knowledge of codes of conduct and decision-making models as a comprehensive approach to engendering ethical volition. Given that the literature has previously demonstrated this approach to be ineffective with adult mental health and nursing professionals, it would seem that this lesson should have already been learned and that it should have served to inform adolescent programming. Still, global intervention programs exist within society's repertoire, and they are still being wielded in the battle to keep youth from engaging in unethical behaviour. This understanding begs the question, "Is anybody listening?" at the policy levels of education and government.

Given the results of this study, it appears that males and females might benefit from differing interventions to enhance ethical volition from a locus of control perspective. For females the opportunity for the greatest gains appears to be within the arena of personal efficacy. The results clearly illustrate the dramatic benefits to be derived from engendering a stronger sense of personal efficacy within female adolescents. Conversely, if we desire increases in ethical volition from male adolescents, interventions that are directed at enhancing their sense of sociopolitical control would be of greatest benefit. Lewis et al. (1999) suggested that interventions designed to enhance the individual's ability to acquire and apply knowledge "yields a power to comprehend, manage, and direct one's life" (p. 1595). While it is fundamental in our society that these cognitive interventions include strategies to promote the ability to read and write, it appears necessary to remember the caveat that Erikson provided in that adolescents need to engage in inspiring activities. Interventions that capitalize on the interests of individuals will likely lead to the greatest gains in terms of skill development. It is probable that this will, in turn, serve to engender an internal locus of control.

The findings of this study emphasize the importance of finding ways to strengthen a sense of hope within our adolescent populations. Engendering hope is neither expensive nor time consuming, and its benefits are beyond dispute in terms of fostering ethical development. Teachers and significant others are in an excellent position to contribute to the development and enhancement of hope in adolescents. Helping young people to interpret

events as representing challenges as opposed to threats, and reminding individuals of past successes represent examples of two easily initiated strategies for engendering the development of hope (Chang, 1998).

McDermott and Snyder (1999) suggested that attention to emotional, spiritual, intellectual, and physical needs can engender a higher sense of hope. It might be that a balanced lifestyle is resistant to despair and hopelessness.

A further implication of these findings is that interventions designed to develop and enhance locus of control, hope, and ethical volition should be constructive in nature. That is, strategies should not be viewed as a remedial approach to repairing a missing part in an individual but rather a focused effort to bolster that, which is already present and active to some degree within the person.

In terms of implications for training those individuals who desire the opportunity to work with youth, the findings of this study provide direction. While curriculum focused on skills development is essential, one must not lose sight of the importance of engendering hope-building skills and attitudes. Education and counsellor training programs would be well-advised to pay attention to this aspect of practitioner development. While many will not remember specific lessons or life skills taught by their teachers and counsellors, they do tend to remember the positive impacts that significant people have had on their lives. Perhaps it is a sense of hope that individuals take away from their relationships with these professionals. Intentionally working from a hope base might pay dividends.

Delimitations of the Study

The researcher determined the population and the particular age range to be sampled in this study. The sample is reflective of youth who are engaged in an activity reminiscent of the “inspired initiative” of which Erikson (1968) wrote, and this might identify this group as being in general at a lower risk level than youths currently not engaged in such a process. For this study, only those students enrolled in a community college program of studies were included.

The author determined the order of the instruments as presented to the participants. Cognitive measures, affective measures, and the volitional measure were presented in said order.

Limitations of the Study

This study is limited by the use of a single sample design. In addition, as the study utilizes self-report instruments, there are no measures to assess the degree to which respondents accurately endorse survey statements and questions. It is possible that the confidentiality and anonymity provided by the nature of the administration and collection of the data may have served to encourage accurate participant responses.

The fact that this study was conducted in a city that would be considered atypical of most cities in Canada in a number of ways also represents a limitation. Therefore the ability to generalize these findings to adolescents from other urban centers is reduced.

The use of an ethical behaviour scale does not guarantee that the endorsed behaviour is the one that would have been taken by the individual. However, this method represents a feasible alternative to a truly experimental design in which participants' actual behavioural responses would have needed to be monitored in order to collect data. An experimental design would have rendered this study far too unwieldy an undertaking for an initial, exploratory study.

Further Research

The limitations of this study highlight areas where further research might be beneficial. As indicated, this study was limited by the use of a single sample design. The identification and utilization of a larger, random sample of participants from a variety of geographical locations would serve to further clarify the nature of relationships amongst cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes central to ethical volition. In addition, such a sample design would provide for a greater sense of confidence in generalizing findings to a broader community of adolescents.

A qualitative research initiative might further illuminate the questions raised in this study. Inviting an adolescent focus group to explore the findings of this study could offer rich insights often lacking in quantitative studies.

Future research might seek to find if ethical volition results from differing combinations of factors at different psychosocial stages. Specifically, addressing the question of whether the ethical behaviours of children, adolescents, and adults result from similar or differing relationships amongst

cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes would be appropriate. This knowledge would serve to illuminate the design and delivery of interventions appropriate to an individual's membership in a specific psychosocial stage and according to the nature of the processes at play in their choice of behaviour.

Conclusion

The literature has long been calling for researchers to begin to address the lack of understanding that exists in regard to the affective factors that might underpin moral functioning (Walker & Henning, 1999). The value of this information will rest in its ability to inform the design and delivering interventions facilitative of ethical volition. This could prove invaluable in our society as the implications of unethical behaviour have been documented to be devastating on both individuals and the broader community. Appropriate interventions involve globally enhancing an individual's level of hope such that they can identify with universally valuable goals associated with ethical responsibility. In addition, engendering a sense of efficacy on personal and sociopolitical levels can result in huge dividends for both individuals and the larger society. Doing so involves an understanding of the strengths and needs of the individual.

The results of this study suggest that initiatives useful in promoting a sense of hopefulness might pay huge dividends on both an individual and societal level. In addition, strategies geared toward the engenderment and enhancement of personal efficacy within female populations, and

sociopolitical initiatives within male populations hold the greatest promise when considering interventions to enhance locus of control. This knowledge, that interventions designed to enhance locus of control in females are unlikely to yield positive results in males, and vice versa, allows for targeted initiatives. In addition, given that locus of control is a relatively easy construct to measure, this understanding provides a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of our interventions.

Taking what is known in regard to ethical behaviour and applying these lessons to intervention theory creates an opportunity to act in a proactive manner as opposed to the “something is missing” approach that has been so prevalent and so unsuccessful in our society (Kelly & Stack, 2000). Our approaches to the at-risk behaviours demonstrated by adolescents reveal our sense of frustration and the medically inspired philosophy that we cling to, that is, there must be something wrong at the individual level. However, despite this approach and the prevalent belief that if we could only find the pill that cures the illness, at-risk behaviour and its consequences are increasing. Perhaps, as we move towards the creation of an ethical society, the occurrence of unethical behaviours might well become reduced as they represent an incompatible phenomenon. As Erikson (1968) so eloquently stated,

Peoples of different tribal and national groups [must] join what must eventually become the identity of one mankind... The overriding issue is the creation of not a new ideology but of a universal ethics... This

can only be advanced by men and women who are neither ideological youths nor moralistic old men, but who know that from generation to generation the test of what you produce is the *care* that it inspires. If there is any chance at all, it is in a world ... at least ethically cared for.
(p. 260)

Therein lies our hope for reducing the dangers associated with finding one's place and identity in our world. That is, if the identity of the individual truly represents a successful variation of the group identity, not only must we focus our attention on enhancing those ethical qualities in our youth, we must engender and expect those same qualities in ourselves and our societies. To do less amounts to doing nothing.

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Appendix F

PEARSON CORRELATION

	AGE	ETHNICITY	GENDER	HOPE	LOCALE
AGE	1.000	-.035	.109	.163	.016
ETHNICITY	-.035	1.000	-.033	-.177	-.032
GENDER	.109	-.033	1.000	.233*	-.118
HOPE	.163	-.177	.233*	1.000	.028
LOCALE	.016	-.032	-.118	.028	1.000
LOCPC	.210	-.177	.385**	.420**	-.138
LOCIC	.044	.002	.281*	.415**	.160
LOCSP	-.068	-.062	.245*	.098	-.163
MORAL	.053	-.107	.135	.008	-.119
SELF-ESTEEM	.196	.067	.019	.522**	.091

	LOCPC	LOCIC	LOCSP	MORAL	SELF-ESTEEM
AGE	.210	.044	-.068	.053	.196
ETHNICITY	-.177	.002	-.062	-.107	.067
GENDER	.385**	.281*	.245*	.135	.019
HOPE	.420**	.415**	.098	.008	.522**
LOCALE	-.138	.160	-.163	-.119	.091
LOCPC	1.000	.453**	.158	.153	.363**
LOCIC	.453**	1.000	.186	.011	.474**
LOCSP	.158	.186	1.000	.330**	.046
MORAL	.153	.011	.330**	1.000	-.002
SELF-ESTEEM	.363**	.474**	.046	-.002	1.000