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A Phenomenological Investigation of Stereotyping Within an Interethnic Context

by

Serge Frederick Hein 

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Educational Psychology

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

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L. L. Stewin, Supervisor

R. H. Short

M. A. Bibby

D. T. Shannon-Brady

K. L. Ward

P. D. Ashworth

December 1, 1995

For Maureen

ABSTRACT

The present study involves a phenomenological investigation of stereotyping. The intergroup experiences and beliefs of four people who displayed stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group were explored using the phenomenological method. All participants were fourth year students in a Bachelor of Education program and members of the majority group in Canadian society. All participants had experienced interactions in the form of actual face-to-face encounters with members of the outgroup and the level of each participant's stereotyping was measured using a screening instrument.

Minimally structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with each participant and focused on beliefs about, and contact experiences with, outgroup members. The transcribed interviews were then analyzed using the phenomenological method to reveal the shared structure of the phenomenon for this group of participants.

The analysis of the data revealed twelve themes that were found to be common to all of the participants. These themes included (1) the perceived characteristics of the outgroup, (2) early experiences in the development of beliefs about the outgroup, (3) awareness of generalizing about the outgroup, (4) generalizing from one's contact experiences to the outgroup, (5) lack of consideration of more specific aspects of one's beliefs about the outgroup, (6) awareness of exceptions to one's beliefs about the outgroup, (7) awareness of the potential limitations of one's beliefs about the outgroup, (8) consideration of possible causes of outgroup behavior, (9) a desire to be unbiased/fair toward the outgroup, (10) openness to the outgroup and its culture, (11) perceiving one's beliefs about the outgroup as evolving versus established but open to change, and (12) the perceived value of the outgroup's culture and values.

The implications of the findings for further research are considered and the importance of adopting an idiographic approach to studying stereotyping is discussed. Implications of the findings for education are also considered.

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And finally, thank you Maureen for your love and ever-present support and encouragement. I am privileged to have such a wonderful partner.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study involves a phenomenological investigation of stereotyping. More specifically, it explores the nature of the intergroup experiences and beliefs of people who hold stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group. This study grew out of my desire to investigate and understand more about the nature of stereotyping and intergroup perception in general. Global interdependence has increased dramatically in the latter half of this century and ethnically, contemporary society has become increasingly integrated. As a result, people find themselves in greater contact with others whose cultural beliefs, attitudes, and goals may differ significantly from their own. The possibility of intergroup animosity and conflict in such circumstances is also increased. Thus, interethnic relations have become more diverse and complex, and therefore more problematic. Many commentators have identified stereotyping and social perception in general as being of critical importance in various aspects of interethnic relations. Stereotyping and other intergroup processes are also an important issue within North American educational systems, where interethnic conflict among students has become increasingly more prevalent (e.g., Curcio & First, 1993; Ordovensky, 1993).

In exploring stereotyping, my interest is in understanding the nature of people's intergroup experiences and beliefs rather than seeking to explain them. Thus, this study emphasizes individual experience and meaning. Achieving an understanding from the individual's perspective seems crucial given that there is no "objective" perspective on interethnic (or other social) relations (Berg, 1984). Specifically, our group membership influences our perception and interpretation of events, and is therefore a powerful force shaping our understanding of other groups and our relationships with them. Because the process of knowing about other groups is shaped by our group

identities, Berg maintains that "there is no platform from which to collect data about social processes that is free of the social process called intergroup dynamics" (p. 396).

Phenomenological methodology is therefore used because by identifying meaningful realities and contexts, it provides an opportunity to explore the nature of stereotyping for individual people. This study emphasizes contact situations and people's experiences during face-to-face encounters with outgroup members. Contact situations are focused on because my aim is to investigate the phenomenon where it occurs naturally: in people's day-to-day lived-experience. Thus, in order to achieve an understanding of how people perceive members of other groups, it is important to explore their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors during contact situations, as well as the context within which these occur. As von Eckartsberg (1989) indicates, "the place to study social living is where it naturally occurs and in the manner in which it is given to the experience of the participants" (p. 140).

Overview of the Thesis

Chapter 2 provides a broad review of literature on stereotyping and other, related concepts. The first portion of the review examines quantitative literature on stereotyping within the context of theories of intergroup relations and research that they have generated. These theories are organized according to their "level of analysis" (i.e., whether each represents a sociocultural, psychodynamic, or cognitive theory of intergroup relations). The literature is also critiqued and the limitations of different approaches to studying intergroup relations are discussed. In the second portion of the review, qualitative literature on aspects of intergroup relations is examined. The chapter concludes with a formulation of the research question.

Chapter 3 begins with an examination of the nature of phenomenological methodology and a discussion of the phenomenological reduction. My presuppositions about the phenomenon being investigated are then outlined, followed by a rationale for the

use of the screening instrument in this study. The specific procedure followed, including participant selection, data collection, and data analysis, is also discussed.

Chapter 4 presents the results of the data analysis, including a description of each of the participants and an overall synthesis of his or her experience. The 12 themes shared by all of the participants, an overall synthesis of these shared themes, and the higher order themes that emerged from clustering the shared themes are also included in this chapter. The overall synthesis of the shared themes provides a description of the essence of the phenomenon of stereotyping for the participants.

Chapter 5 involves a discussion of the results in terms of the literature examined in chapter 2 and other relevant literature. Various aspects of the 12 shared themes are discussed in detail and new findings identified. The higher order themes presented in chapter 4 are used as a framework for organizing the discussion of the findings.

Chapter 6 begins with a more extensive discussion of the more important research findings. The boundaries and limitations of the study are then discussed, followed by a consideration of the implications of the findings for future research. An idiographic approach to investigating stereotyping is described and possibilities for further research are identified. Suggestions for expanding on the findings of the present study are also included. The implications of the findings for educational programs are then discussed.

CHAPTER 2

THE LITERATURE

Theoretical explanations of intergroup processes such as stereotyping have typically occurred within the broader context of intergroup relations. In order to provide a broad treatment of issues that are relevant to this study, the literature review presented here will include an examination of various theories of intergroup relations. Prior to reviewing this literature, however, it is important to provide several definitions.

Definitions

Intergroup Relations

Intergroup relations is conceived of as a broader concept than *intergroup behavior.* Consistent with the view of DeRidder, Schruijer, and Tripathi (1992), intergroup relations is used in this study to refer to behavior *and* to the cognitive and affective processes (e.g., attitudes, attributions, stereotyping, and prejudice) involved between groups. In contrast, intergroup behavior is used to refer to the concrete and observable instances of verbal and nonverbal action (e.g., discrimination) that members of a specific group direct toward members of another group. Embedded within this definition, however, is the term *group.* A group, as defined by Sherif (1966), refers to

> a social unit that consists of a number of individuals (1) who, at a given time, have role and status relationships with one another, stabilized in some degree and (2) who possess a set of values or norms regulating the attitude and behavior of individual members, at least in the matters of consequence to them. Shared attitudes, shared sentiments, shared aspirations and goals that characterize the closely identified members are related to these properties, especially to the common values or norms of the group. (p. 12)

Moreover, both internal and external criteria can be used to define a group. External criteria include "external" designations that identify one as being a member of a

group (e.g., physicist, carpenter), whereas internal criteria involve group identification (Tajfel, 1982). More specifically, for group identification to occur, two components are required: a cognitive one (i.e., an awareness of one's membership in the group) and an evaluative one (i.e., value connotations associated with such awareness). A third component that is commonly associated with these components involves the emotional investment that one makes in the awareness and evaluations. For a group to exist, a combination of the internal criteria and *some* external criteria is required (Tajfel, 1982).

In this study, the terms *ingroup* and *outgroup* are also used. Ingroup is used to refer to a group of which a person is a member, whereas outgroup refers to a group of which a person is not a member (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986).

Stereotypes

An important aspect of intergroup relations involves the concept of *stereotype*. The term was introduced into the social sciences by Lippmann (1922) to refer to the "pictures in our heads" of various social groups. Although he did not provide an explicit definition of "stereotype", he argued that people do not respond directly to "the world outside" but to a "representation of the environment which is in lesser or greater degree made by man himself" (p. 10). He referred to this representation as a "pseudoenvironment" or "fiction". Moreover, Lippmann viewed "reality" as too complex to be represented completely in a person's pseudoenvironment and maintained that stereotypes serve the function of simplifying perception and cognition.

It can be seen, then, that his use of the term "stereotype" is consistent with contemporary cognitive psychologists' use of the term *schema*. Thus, Lippmann (1922) conceived of stereotypes as cognitive structures that influence the processing of information about the environment. It is important to emphasize, however, that for Lippmann, stereotypes are not neutral. Instead, they are an integral part of a person's personality and serve to explain or rationalize his or her "position" within society.

According to Stroebe and Insko (1989), the term "stereotype", as used by social scientists, has historically evolved through a number of distinct phases. In its earliest phase, a stereotype was conceived of as a rigid, oversimplified, and biased overgeneralization about an aspect of reality, especially of a group or class of people (Reber, 1988). Thus, stereotypes were viewed essentially as incorrect generalizations. Empirical studies, however, produced little support for the rigidity of people's beliefs about other groups (Brigham, 1971; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Moreover, characterizing a stereotype as incorrect or invalid necessarily implies that a validity criterion exists. Yet, there is little empirical evidence regarding the actual distribution of characteristics within ethnic groups (Brigham, 1971). As a result, it is difficult to determine the factual validity of most ethnic stereotypes.

Thus, during the second phase in the conception of stereotypes, the role of motivational factors was minimized and a distinctly cognitive approach was taken toward stereotypes. That is, stereotypes were conceived of as categories that lend coherence and order to social reality, and the biases and distortions reflected in stereotypes were seen as products of people's limited capacity to process information.

The third phase in the development of the stereotype concept arose due to the recognition of a fundamental difference between stereotypes and other categories: Stereotypes of outgroups are generally less positive than stereotypes of ingroups. This ethnocentrism (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup devaluation) and the functions that stereotypes serve for a given group could not be accounted for within a purely cognitive framework (Tajfel, 1981). It seems that stereotypes "help to preserve or create positively valued differentiations of a group from other social groups and contribute, therefore, to the creation and maintenance of group ideologies explaining or justifying a variety of social actions against the outgroup" (Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p. 5). Thus, motivational factors have once again emerged in the conception of stereotypes.

In their historical analysis of stereotype research and theory, however, Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) concluded that the stereotyping literature is marked by conceptual ambiguity regarding key issues associated with stereotypes. For Ashmore and Del Boca, the most crucial conceptual issue concerns definition (i.e., What is a stereotype?). They indicated that areas of disagreement among social scientists include (1) whether or not stereotypes are, by definition, "bad" (i.e., incorrectly learned, rigid, overgeneralized, or factually invalid); (2) whether stereotypes are beliefs that are held by an individual or are culturally shared; and (3) whether stereotypes include traits that are characteristic of a particular social group or traits that differentiate that group from other groups. It is important to emphasize that this conceptual ambiguity regarding stereotypes still exists at present (e.g., see Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994; Gardner, 1994). Nevertheless, social scientists agree that a stereotype is a cognitive structure that consists of the perceived or assumed characteristics of a particular social group.

Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) therefore offer a core definition of a stereotype as "a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people" (p. 16). They add that they "are not proposing a single *best* conceptual definition of the stereotype construct; rather we are attempting to state explicitly the essential defining features of the term *as it has been used by social scientists* " (p. 16). Given the concerns outlined by Ashmore and Del Boca, their conceptual definition of a stereotype will be used in this study.

Measures of Stereotyping

The first empirical test of ethnic stereotypes, conducted by Katz and Braly (1933), provided the research paradigm that, until relatively recently, was used in the majority of stereotype research. The method typically involves the use of an adjective checklist, from which subjects select traits that they consider to be "most typical" of a particular group. The group stereotype is then considered to be the set of traits most frequently ascribed to the target group. Several methodological problems, however, are associated with the Katz and Braly technique. First, by instructing subjects to select

those adjectives that they perceive as "most typical" of a particular ethnic group, the procedure may essentially be *forcing* subjects to think in terms of generalizations and categories (Brigham, 1971). That is, subjects are not given the opportunity to respond in a non-stereotyped manner. Also, this approach precludes any determination of the magnitude of the generalizations made by respondents (Brigham, 1971). Specifically, the assignment of traits on the basis of those that are perceived as most typical of an ethnic group provides no information about how the subject construes the term "most typical". Thus, it is not possible to know whether the subject, in using the term, is referring to a trait exhibited by 20%, 50%, or some other proportion of the target group. Last, this approach makes the implicit assumption that all traits are binary (e.g., materialistic or not materialistic) and it therefore overlooks the probabilistic nature of stereotypes (Linville et al., 1986). It should be noted that the Katz and Braly technique is also limited in that it is a measure of a cultural stereotype rather than a personal stereotype. Specifically, although stereotypes are associated with individuals, the method relies on group consensus to define a stereotype.

Several recent approaches have attempted to provide a more adequate measure of stereotyping. For example, after asking subjects to choose traits that they felt were most typical of an ethnic group, Brigham (1971) asked them to indicate the percentage of group members who possessed each of these traits. It is unclear, however, whether the Brigham and the Katz and Braly (1933) procedures yield comparable results. Although Brigham reported that both methods produced different results, several studies (Stapf, Stroebe, & Jonas, 1986, cited in Stroebe & Insko, 1989; Jonas & Hewstone, 1986) concluded that the results of both methods were very similar. Jonas and Hewstone, for example, reported correlations of 0.70 to 0.90 between both methods.

McCauley and his associates (McCauley & Stitt, 1978; McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980) used a Bayesian approach and defined a stereotype as a diagnostic ratio of the percentage of group members possessing a trait divided by the percentage of "all the

world's people" possessing the trait. Thus, the stereotype of any given group will consist of those traits for which within-group predictions differ from base-rate predictions. McCauley et al., then, conceive of stereotypes as generalizations about a group that distinguish them from other people. Differentiating traits, even if they tend to be ascribed to a group relatively infrequently, appear to be important elements of a stereotype. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) argue that such traits are important because they maximize a stereotype's predictive utility (i.e., they enhance our ability to anticipate the behavior of others in social situations).

Nevertheless, Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) outline several reasons for why stereotypes should not be limited to traits that are assumed to distinguish between groups. First, attributes that differentiate a target group from other groups likely represent a relatively small proportion of the traits that comprise the stereotype for that group. Moreover, the exclusive use of differentiating traits would mean that traits that are ascribed to a group relatively frequently but that fail to distinguish between groups, would be excluded from the stereotype. Second, defining stereotypes solely in terms of differentiating traits is problematic because a specific target group must be specified for each stereotype. This is a complex undertaking and McCauley et al. (1980) have dealt with this difficulty by assuming that people use "humans in general" as a baseline for considering the attributes of social groups. Although it is likely that people possess beliefs about humans in general and that such information may be used in evaluating groups, it is unlikely "that 'humans in general' is the sole, or even primary, 'contrast category' for beliefs about specific groups" (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 21).

A further difficulty with both of the approaches described above is that despite extending the Katz and Braly (1933) measure by explicitly incorporating probability estimates, they are limited because they still assume implicitly, like the original measure, that the attributes involved are binary. The stereotype measure developed by

Linville et al. (1986) improves upon these approaches by incorporating multiple levels of attributes (e.g., very unfriendly, moderately unfriendly, slightly unfriendly, slightly friendly, moderately friendly, very friendly). Thus, within this framework, stereotyping is conceived of as the degree of differentiation in a person's beliefs about the members of a social category. More specifically, this approach to stereotyping assumes "a distribution of features or attribute values across members of a given category, with different distributions of attribute values being associated with different categories" (Linville et al., 1986, p. 180), whereas the traditional approach assumes a list of "most typical" characteristics for a given category. Thus, the more differentiated a person's representation of the members of a group, the less stereotypical is his or her thinking about that group.

The Linville et al. (1986) method, then, requires subjects to indicate the relative likelihood of different values (i.e., levels) of a given attribute for members of a particular group. Subjects are typically given a series of response scales (each of which deals with a single attribute) for a given target group and are asked to make judgements about the percentage of group members falling into each level of the attribute. The degree of differentiation, which Linville et al. refer to as the probability of differentiation (P_d)[1], can then be measured[2]. A low P_d score, which represents a relatively undifferentiated representation of the members of a group, indicates stereotypical thinking.

Prejudice

Stereotypes are commonly, although not necessarily, accompanied by *prejudice.* The two concepts differ, however, in that stereotypes refer to *beliefs or opinions* about the psychological characteristics (i.e., traits) of a particular group or its members,

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[1] Linville et al. (1986) define P_d as "the probability that a perceiver will differentiate between two randomly chosen instances of the category in terms of the attribute in question; i.e., assign them to different levels of the attribute" (p. 184).

[2] The degree of differentiation for a particular attribute is measured by subtracting from one the sum of the squared percentages given for the various levels of the attribute.

whereas prejudice usually refers to a negative *attitude* toward a group or its members (Reber, 1988; Stephan, 1985). An attitude is "a tendency to evaluate an entity (attitude object) with some degree of favor or disfavor" (Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p. 8). It should be noted that while prejudice is often conceptualized as involving an unfavorable attitude toward a category or its members, it can also involve a favorable attitude. Thus, a prejudice is an attitude toward another group or its members that involves evaluative tendencies that are predominantly negative in nature. It should be noted that although in the past, prejudice has been conceptualized according to a three component view of attitude (i.e., as possessing a cognitive, an affective, and a behavioral component), the term is now typically used to refer to the affective component of intergroup relations (Brewer & Kramer, 1985).

Theories of Intergroup Relations

A wide variety of theories have been developed in order to understand the nature of relationships between groups. These theories differ dramatically in terms of both their levels of analysis and the psychological processes that are assumed to be involved. As a result, it is often unclear whether these approaches are complementary or contradictory. Moreover, due to the complexity and difficulty of this area of study, research "has been more a matter of 'approaches' or perspectives than of tight theoretical articulations" (Tajfel, 1982, p. 1).

Although various frameworks have been proposed for organizing the different approaches to understanding intergroup relations, in this review, theories will be classified according to their "level of analysis" (Allport, 1954; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Within this framework, theories of intergroup relations can be distinguished on the basis of their reliance on individual or sociocultural processes to explain intergroup relations. Sociocultural theories conceive of negative intergroup relations as arising from social conflict (conflict theories) or socialization processes (social learning theory), whereas individual approaches attempt to explain negative intergroup relations in terms of

intrapsychic needs and personality traits (pschodynamic theories), or in terms of the impact of cognitive structures and processes on information processing (cognitive theory). It should be added that, historically, stereotypes and prejudice have been conceived of as resulting from three types of processes: motivational, sociocultural, and cognitive (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1981; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). Within a "level of analysis" framework, motivational processes are present within conflict theories and psychodynamic theories, but are de-emphasized in social learning and cognitive theories.

Because the literature on intergroup relations is voluminous and one that "has always defied attempts at neat and tidy integration" (Tajfel, 1982, p. 30), this literature review is necessarily selective and attempts to provide only a broad, general overview of the field. Thus, only the more prominent theories of intergroup relations are included.

Sociocultural (Interpersonal) Processes in Intergroup Relations

Theories that focus on sociocultural influences in intergroup relations can be classified as being either motivational or non-motivational in nature. Conflict theories of intergroup relations, which include realistic conflict theory, social identity theory, and relative deprivation theory, can be viewed as motivational and assume that conflicts of interest are inherent in all societies (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Alternatively, social learning theories are non-motivational and make the assumption that socialization processes are responsible for the transmission of values and beliefs to the members of a society and across generations.

Realistic Conflict Theory

Realistic conflict theory is based largely on the work of Sherif (1967), which consisted mainly of data collected from a series of experiments involving boys and their interactions at summer camps. These studies, which involved boys between 10 and 12 years of age, typically included three or four stages. In the first stage, the boys were given time to develop interpersonal relationships. During the second stage, they were

divided into two separate groups and each group was allowed to develop. During this group formation phase, a positive interdependence was created between the members of each group and group norms, values, and a group identity emerged. The third stage involved introducing a negative interdependence (i.e., intergroup competition) between both groups (e.g., tug-of-war, baseball, a treasure hunt, etc.). A fourth stage that was present in some of the studies involved attempts to eliminate the intergroup conflict.

Within realistic conflict theory, intergroup conflict and prejudice are conceived of as arising from intergroup competition for a scarce resource (i.e., a situation involving an incompatibility of group goals). Thus, when the achievement of goals by one group precludes another group's goal attainment, a negative interdependency exists between the groups and negative intergroup behavior is likely to occur. Both groups view one another as "the enemy" and negative attitudes and stereotypes emerge (Sherif, 1967). Over time, hostility between the two groups escalates, and interaction and communication decrease. Moreover, biases favoring the ingroup occur in how outgroup behavior is perceived.

In addition to affecting intergroup processes, intergroup conflict also influences *intragroup* processes. Specifically, during conflict there is an increase in a group's organization, task-orientedness, and cohesiveness, and in members' awareness of their ingroup identity (Sherif, 1967). Group boundaries also become more distinct and impermeable, and the risk of defection from the group is minimized by punishing and rejecting defectors. Thus, intergroup conflict results in both the devaluation of the outgroup and an increase in ingroup solidarity — a phenomenon which, as mentioned earlier, is commonly referred to as ethnocentrism. Although some studies have provided support for Sherif's assertions, his experiments have been criticized on methodological grounds. Rabbie (1982, cited in DeRidder et al., 1992), for example, emphasizes that it is difficult to determine whether Sherif's results are due to (a) the classification of persons into distinct groups, (b) the anticipation of competing or cooperating with the

other group, (c) anticipated or actual interaction between both groups, (d) the experience of sharing a common fate with other members of the group, (e) the mutually frustrating nature of the interaction between both groups, (f) the anticipated or actual experience of winning or losing to the other group, or (g) a combination of these factors. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that differences in power were not taken into consideration in Sherif's research.

Social Identity Theory

The assertion that negative interdependence between groups is a necessary and sufficient cause of negative intergroup behavior was challenged by Tajfel and his colleagues (e.g., Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) on several grounds. First, they argued that conflict of interest does not lead inevitably to ethnocentrism. More specifically, if, for example, the allocation of resources is sanctioned by a mutually accepted status system, then negative intergroup behavior will not result. Second, Tajfel argued that ethnocentrism can emerge in the absence of *any* conflict of interest. The results of studies using the "minimal intergroup paradigm" (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) revealed that the mere categorization of individuals into two (arbitrary) groups is sufficient to elicit intergroup discrimination (for reviews, see Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982).

For example, in one of the earliest studies (Tajfel et al., 1971) using minimal social categorization (i.e., categorization that is artificially produced in the laboratory), intergroup categorization was based on subjects' over- or underestimation of the number of dots present in clusters and on differing aesthetic preferences (i.e., preferences between paintings by two modern painters). Other characteristics of this and other minimal group studies include: (a) the absence of social interaction either between or within groups, (b) the absence of self-interest (i.e., lack of any personal reward) as a factor in subjects' responses, and (c) the anonymity of group membership (Tajfel, 1982). The major dependent variable in the Tajfel et al. study was the allocation by each

subject of points worth money to two anonymous subjects. These subjects were either portrayed as being from different groups (i.e., one representing the ingroup and one representing the outgroup), as both being from the ingroup, or as both being from the outgroup. The results indicated a clear and consistent bias in favor of the ingroup (referred to as intergroup bias, ingroup favoritism, intergroup discrimination, or ethnocentrism). Thus, the mere act of categorization can create for the individual an apparent differentiation between groups — one that would not exist if those persons were viewed only as a collection of individuals.

Social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is therefore an attempt to overcome the limitations inherent in realistic conflict theory. The theory assumes that individuals strive to achieve a positive self-image and that their self-evaluations are partially a product of their group membership. Social identity, as conceived of by Tajfel and Turner, therefore refers to "that *part* of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). Thus, individuals strive to achieve a positive social identity by comparing the ingroup with a relevant outgroup on a dimension that is important to the ingroup — a process referred to as social comparison. If the comparison results in the ingroup distinguishing itself positively from the outgroup, then a positive social identity is assumed to result. Moreover, because individuals are motivated to perceive the ingroup in a positive way (i.e., as distinct from and better than other groups), there is pressure to differentiate the ingroup from outgroups and to make favorable comparisons through intergroup bias or discrimination. Thus, in social identity theory, categorization is a central process in making sense of the social world but it is motivated by a need to achieve and maintain positive self-esteem.

For social identity theory it is also essential that an individual's social identity be salient (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Only in situations where group membership is an

important component of the individual's self-image will an intergroup comparison be made. From a social identity perspective, the ingroup favoritism observed in the minimal group paradigm is explained as an attempt to achieve positive ingroup distinctiveness in a situation where the only available dimension of comparison is the distribution of money or points.

Social identity theory therefore makes two important modifications to the implications of realistic conflict theory (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). First, it limits the assumption that all conflict over scarce resources leads inevitably to intergroup hostility. Second, it maintains that intergroup conflict can be precipitated by competition for scarce "social" resources (e.g., status and prestige within society) as well as scarce physical resources. An additional advantage of social identity theory is that it provides an explanation for individual (and group or societal) differences in prejudice. That is, individual differences in level of prejudice can be due to differences in individuals' need for a positive self-image or to differences in the competitiveness of a specific situation. For example, blue collar workers may be competing for jobs with members of specific minority groups, a condition that may not exist for white collar workers. Last, social identity theory, like realistic conflict theory, is able to provide an adequate explanation of ethnocentrism. Stereotypes and prejudice can be understood as "part of an ideology of a group which, on one hand, buttresses group members' beliefs in their own superiority, and on the other hand, justifies aggression and violence toward members of the outgroup." (Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p. 15)

Social identity theory is not, however, without shortcomings. First, the theory's explanation for intergroup bias is difficult to test (Messick & Mackie, 1989). The theory may be correct in assuming that people strive to achieve a positive self-image and that they view positively those groups to which they belong, but it has not been established that these are in fact the *causes* of intergroup bias. It is doubtful whether a direct test of a causal relationship of this kind could exist.

Second, the empirical evidence for key aspects of the theory has been mixed (for a discussion, see Messick & Mackie, 1989). Thus, although social identity theory has had the effect of reviving intergroup research (Messick & Mackie, 1989), an explanation grounded in the concept of self-esteem has failed to provide a complete understanding of intergroup discrimination.

Third, the minimal group paradigm has been criticized on methodological grounds. For example, Aschenbrenner and Schaefer (1980) argue that it is unlikely that subjects believe that money is actually being distributed to other subjects. They maintain that the minimal intergroup research paradigm is highly susceptible to "causing the subject to think about what the experimenter is really looking for or to suspect that he or she will be evaluated in some kind according to his or her responses" (p. 394). Aschenbrenner and Schaefer also emphasize that data from minimal intergroup studies indicate that only *some* (and often only a minority) of the members of groups exhibit discriminatory behavior. Moreover, they argue that the paradigm is somewhat narrow and artificial, and that the findings of minimal intergroup studies are of questionable value unless they can be generalized to more realistic settings. (For a discussion of other, more technical, methodological problems associated with the minimal intergroup paradigm, see Aschenbrenner and Schaefer (1980).)

A final shortcoming of social identity theory is that although bias and favoritism are exhibited in minimal intergroup situations, in none of the minimal group experiments have subjects actually been found to *express* dislike or hostility toward outgroup members (Brown, 1986, cited in DeRidder et al., 1992; Duckitt, 1992). Moreover, the bias evident in minimal group studies appears to be a reflection of ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup dislike (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Condor & Brown, 1988; Messick & Mackie, 1989).

Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation theory is similar to social identity theory in that it focuses on social comparison processes. It differs, however, in using as its starting point feelings of resentment, anger, moral outrage, or other negative feelings that arise from unfavorable outcomes relative to those of other people or groups (Crosby, 1982). Moreover, persons experiencing relative deprivation perceive outcomes as unjust or illegitimate and perceive themselves as victims of distributive and/or procedural injustice.

Crosby (1982) suggests that relative deprivation is accompanied by a general belief that one is in a poorer situation than others or that the group is poorly off in comparison with an outgroup. The theory also postulates that a person must both desire a certain object or state, and feel that he or she deserves or is entitled to obtain it. Runciman (1966, cited in Crosby, 1982) distinguishes between egoistical and fraternal relative deprivation. Egoistical relative deprivation is assumed to occur when comparisons between oneself and other ingroup members are found to be unfavourable (i.e., personal gains are less than those of other members of the group). In contrast, fraternal relative deprivation is assumed to occur when comparisons between the ingroup and the outgroup are unfavourable for the ingroup. It is this latter form of relative deprivation that is predicted to lead to both constructive and destructive forms of individual and collective behavior (Crosby, 1982).

Although relative deprivation theory is plausible, empirical support for the relationship between fraternal relative deprivation and negative intergroup behavior is mixed (for a review, see DeRidder et al., 1992). It should be noted, however, that relative deprivation theory provides an important extension to social identity theory in its emphasis on the cognitive consequences of legitimacy (or illegitimacy).

Social Learning Theory

In contrast to conflict theories, social learning theory is non-motivational in that it does not assume that individuals have a motive to devalue outgroups. Social learning theories posit that stereotypes and intergroup bias are the result of either perceived differences between groups in a society or socialization processes such as parents, peer groups, schools, and the mass media.

The findings of a study by Eagly and Steffen (1984) suggest that the social roles that people occupy when intergroup contact occurs may determine the nature of many stereotypes. A role theoretical analysis underscores the importance of social roles in guiding behavior and that the observation of these role behaviors forms the basis of people's beliefs about groups. This approach, however, does not imply that people are exposed to the "real" attributes of members of specific groups. Rather, people are exposed to behaviors that are constrained by the demands of the specific social role enacted and the limitations of the social context. Thus, if a particular group is often seen in the same role and engaging in a particular activity, it is likely that the abilities and personal characteristics required to carry out the activity will be perceived as typical of that group of people. According to this view, ethnic and racial stereotypes may have their origins in social class differences (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). For example, historically, blacks have, on average, had a lower socioeconomic status than whites and interracial interactions therefore often involve differences in power and status — a fact that may account for the content of black stereotypes. Thus, the content of ethnic and racial stereotypes may in fact be a reflection of class differences rather than group (i.e., ethnic or racial) differences.

An alternative perspective, however, is provided in a study by Hoffman and Hurst (1990), which suggests that stereotypes arise to rationalize role or status differences between groups in society. Specifically, their findings suggest that ethnic and other stereotypes can emerge solely in response to role or status differences between groups

and that stereotypes function to rationalize, justify, or explain such differences by attributing different characteristics to groups.

In evaluating the social learning approach it is evident that the theory is capable of accounting for individual or group differences in the content or level of intergroup bias. It is also the only theoretical perspective that can provide a satisfactory account of the historic and cultural stability of stereotypes and prejudice (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). From this perspective, ethnic stereotypes can be conceived of as culturally shared categories that transcend the individual and are transmitted through socialization processes. Where the theory does seem inadequate, however, is in its inability to account for the predominance of negative outgroup stereotypes (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). If stereotypes simply reflected societal differences, an equal proportion of negative *and* positive outgroup beliefs would be expected. Nevertheless, social learning theory's emphasis on the role of socialization processes in the transmission of attitudes and beliefs about outgroups is an important addition to the view developed by conflict theories.

Intrapersonal Processes in Intergroup Relations

Both psychodynamic and cognitive approaches focus on the intrapersonal processes involved in intergroup relations. Both approaches are, however, based upon very different assumptions and thus provide vastly different explanations of the psychological causes of intergroup perceptions and behavior.

Historically, psychodynamic theories represented the dominant theoretical orientation to the study of intergroup relations. Psychodynamic theories are a strong example of an individual-level explanation of intergroup processes such as stereotyping and prejudice. From a psychodynamic perspective, prejudice results from intrapersonal conflict or maladjustment rather than intergroup conflict or social learning. Prejudice is therefore viewed as merely a symptom of a deeper conflict within the individual. Two of the more important theories to emerge from this perspective are scapegoat theory and authoritarian personality theory.

Scapegoat Theory

Scapegoat theory (e.g., Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964; Miller & Bugelski, 1948) postulates that aggression toward an outgroup is actually aggression toward a powerful frustrator that is displaced onto a visible and relatively powerless minority group. Scapegoat theory has its origins in the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), which states that aggressive behavior is always a reaction to frustration of some kind. Thus, the person who is prevented from reaching a goal will respond with aggression and this aggression will typically be directed toward the person who is obstructing attainment of the goal. If this person is too powerful or cannot be identified, then the aggression will be displaced to some less powerful person or group. Scapegoat theory expands upon this hypothesis by adding the assumption that minority groups will often be the targets of such displaced aggression. In order to rationalize the displaced aggression, the minority group will be attributed negative qualities or blamed for the frustration (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Moreover, the form that the aggression takes will be determined by the norms of the ingroup.

Although scapegoat theory appears plausible, it provides only a partial explanation for the development of prejudice. That is, it may provide an explanation for the origins of aggressive behavior toward specific outgroups but it cannot account for *why* a particular outgroup is chosen. One would expect that a minority group that was both highly visible and powerless would be very likely to be chosen as a scapegoat. The theory, however, lacks "any principle which would allow one to define the characteristics of the group chosen as a target of aggression except for the provision that it must be powerless" (Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p. 18).

The Authoritarian Personality

There is some evidence to support the theory that some people are predisposed toward being prejudiced because of their personality traits. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) refer to such people as "authoritarian

personalities". Authoritarian personalities tend to display the following characteristics: a rigid belief system, "conventional" values, an unusually high level of obedience to and respect for authority, a highly punitive nature, suspiciousness, and an intolerance for weakness in others *and* in themselves (Aronson, 1992).

Authoritarian personality theory makes three assumptions: first, prejudice is part of a more comprehensive ideological framework involving social, political, and economic beliefs; second, prejudice is a reflection of more basic personality characteristics; and third, the type of personality that is predisposed to prejudice is a product of the quality of parental control during childhood (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). A number of different scales have been used to test these assumptions, including the Ethnocentrism scale (E), the Implicit Antidemocratic Trends or Fascism scale (F), the anti-Semitism scale (A-S), and the Political and Economic Conservatism scale (PEC).

A major finding of Adorno et al. (1950) was that people who scored high on authoritarianism (as measured using the F scale) were not simply prejudiced against specific minority groups but rather, displayed a high level of prejudice toward *all* minority groups. Based on data from clinical interviews, Adorno et al. also concluded that the authoritarian personality has its origins in early childhood experiences involving harsh and threatening parental discipline. The childhood of the authoritarian personality is characterized by high insecurity and dependency upon parents, coupled with fear of and unconscious hostility toward parents. As an adult, the authoritarian personality possesses a high degree of anger (and resentment) that is displaced onto outgroups. It can be seen, then, that the explanation provided by authoritarian personality theory overlaps somewhat with scapegoat theory, although the scapegoating involved is long-term.

Although research on the authoritarian personality has broadened our understanding of the possible causes of prejudice, it is important to emphasize that the majority of the data are correlational (Aronson, 1992). It is therefore not possible to make statements about the causal mechanisms involved. Specifically, although the

development of an authoritarian personality may be associated with a harsh and disciplined upbringing, this is inadequate for concluding that this parenting style *caused* individuals to develop authoritarian personalities. It is equally possible that beliefs about minority groups are consciously learned from parents who are themselves prejudiced. This explanation, which is consistent with social learning theory, is simpler than one based on unconscious hostility and repressed resentment. A second weakness of authoritarian personality theory involves its assertion that parental behavior alone is sufficient to account for the belief system of the authoritarian personality. It seems unlikely that this belief system could exist without the influence of social and cultural factors. Third, authoritarian personality theory is limited in that it can only address the issue of individual differences in the intensity of stereotypes and prejudice, and therefore provides a very incomplete explanation of these phenomena. There is some evidence to suggest that group or societal differences in prejudice are more likely to be the result of differences in sociocultural norms than personality factors (for a review see Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Last, authoritarian personality theory has been criticized for focusing specifically on the authoritarianism of the right and ignoring authoritarianism associated with other political belief systems (Rokeach, 1960). Rokeach argues that authoritarianism and intolerance are present in all political and cultural contexts, and that an authoritarianism scale is needed that is free of ideological bias.

Symptom theories such as scapegoat theory or authoritarian personality theory, then, provide at best only a partial explanation of intergroup prejudice. They fail to account for cultural or regional differences in levels of prejudice. Additionally, they offer inadequate explanations for the specific content of stereotypes and for why specific groups are chosen as targets of prejudice.

Social Cognitive Theory

Recent reviews (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Stephan, 1985; Tajfel, 1982) indicate that a general cognitive information processing

model has emerged as the dominant paradigm in research on intergroup relations. The current popularity of a cognitive approach, however, should not be misinterpreted as suggesting that this perspective has provided a more comprehensive understanding of intergroup relations than other, older approaches (i.e., that a cognitive approach has explained all of the facts accounted for by older theories as well as those facts that these theories were unable to account for). Older approaches such as psychodynamic theory "were not refuted empirically; they simply went out of fashion" (Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p. 3).

The social cognitive approach to studying stereotypes emphasizes the role of mental representations (i.e., cognitive schemata) in guiding how information about persons or social events is processed. This approach involves the use of cognitive research methods such as measures of recognition, recall, and reaction time to investigate social behavior. Thus, motivational factors, which occupy a central role in some of the theories discussed earlier, are minimized and stereotypes are seen as the categories that lend coherence and order to the social world. The application of the cognitive approach to intergroup relations therefore involves the investigation of group stereotypes and their influence on the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information about groups and their members. The biases and distortions characteristic of stereotypes are taken to be reflective of limitations of the human capacity to process information.

Assumptions of Social Cognitive Theory

The emphasis of the social cognitive perspective is clearly on the role of cognitive structures and processes to explain intergroup processes. Implicit within this framework, however, are a number of strong assumptions (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Schneider, 1991). First, processing is assumed to be general and independent of any particular content. Thus, the processing of information about people and groups is considered to differ little from that of inanimate objects. In terms of its implications for stereotypes, as cognitive categories, all stereotypes are viewed as influencing

information processing in the same manner. Understanding the cognitive mechanisms involved is therefore the central concern, with the content of the specific stereotype being only a secondary concern. The methodological implication of this assumption is that research can safely incorporate artificial and informationally impoverished stimuli.

Second, knowledge structures (e.g., schemata, scripts, stereotypes) are assumed to play a crucial role in the encoding and storage of information. Thus, incoming data are reduced to abstract representations that presumably retain essential aspects of the data. Information processing is therefore implicitly "top-down" or schema-driven, with "little room [existing] in such models for the messy content of our mental lives" (Schneider, 1991, p. 532). All stereotypes, then, are seen as possessing the same basic structural properties.

Third, bias is considered to be inherent in information processing. Specifically, information processing is viewed as prone to errors, which results largely from our inability to attend to all important details in information and our bias toward interpreting and recalling information consistent with existing cognitive structures.

Last, information processing is assumed to occur in specific stages, with memory occupying a central role. Memory measures therefore constitute an important way of investigating basic structures and processes. Reaction time measures may also be used but ecological validity is not assumed for either measure.

The Process of Categorization

According to social cognitive theory, underlying people's ability to hold beliefs about social groups is the general process of categorization. That is, in order to hold specific beliefs about groups, people must be able to differentiate between groups. Each person that is encountered in the social world is unique. As a result, the social world provides us with an immense amount of information about others. If people attempted to consider each person from an individual perspective, they would be overwhelmed by the enormous amount of information that they would be required to contend with. One of the

ways that people therefore reduce and manage this information is by seeking commonalities among the people that they encounter and grouping people based on the properties or characteristics they share. Thus, people are categorized into groups in order to deal with the overwhelming amount and diversity of information in the social world, "thereby establishing categories of persons whose members are considered to be equivalent in functionally important respects" (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986).

An important aspect of the categorization process involves the person's ability to identify features of other people that will serve as an effective basis for categorization. A variety of these features exist in the social world, such as a person's race, gender, age, or dress. Through this process of identifying relevant features, people establish a variety of categories, each of which is useful in a particular context. For example, categories are present when a person refers to blacks and whites, men and women, old and young people, or white collar and blue collar workers.

The Cognitive Origins of Social Categories

As mentioned earlier, the differential perception of groups is essential for stereotyping and other intergroup processes to occur. Consequently, any psychological process that promotes the perception of some persons as different from others would serve as a potential source for the development of social categories. Research on the categorization process provides evidence of an important source in the creation of social categories. Specifically, as mentioned earlier, research using the minimal group paradigm has demonstrated that the trivial or random categorization of subjects into groups is, by itself, sufficient to elicit differential perceptions and behavior (i.e., intergroup bias) by members of both groups (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982).

Another important process in the differential perception of groups involves the distinctiveness of specific stimuli. The distinctiveness of a stimulus can be due to a number of different factors, including (a) inherent properties of the stimulus (e.g., its

novelty or unusualness), (b) the perceiver's value system (e.g., a minority group member's race may always be a salient stimulus for a racially prejudiced person), and (c) the social context (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). A distinctive stimulus receives greater attention and can therefore result in differential perceptions.

That stimulus distinctiveness results in greater attention has been demonstrated in a series of studies described by Taylor (1981). In one study, subjects were instructed to listen to a tape-recorded discussion involving six men. When each man spoke, a slide presumably showing that person was displayed. By varying the race of the persons on the slides but using the same taped conversation, the racial composition of the group could be manipulated while holding constant other elements of the discussion. Two conditions were used: In one condition three white and three black males were portrayed (the integrated condition) and in the other condition one black and five white males were portrayed (the solo condition). The same person was viewed as more active and talkative during the discussion, viewed as having had more influence on the discussion, and rated more extremely on personality characteristics when in the solo condition than when in the integrated condition. Moreover, subjects recalled more of what the black male had said when he was in the solo condition than when he was in the integrated condition. Thus, in a context in which group membership was made salient, the same person was perceived differently.

A stimulus can also be distinctive if it occurs infrequently. The conception of stereotypes as arising due to focusing attention on salient people or events is reflected in the research on illusory correlations (e.g., Hamilton, 1981a; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). An illusory correlation can arise when distinctive stimulus events co-occur. For example, white persons often have relatively infrequent exposure to and interaction with members of minority groups, thereby making the target person salient to the perceiver. Certain behaviors (e.g., undesirable behaviors) occur relatively infrequently and are therefore also salient. Thus, the co-occurrence of these two distinctive stimuli

would be salient to the perceiver and might result in the differential processing of this information. An illusory correlation would arise from biases in the recall of information, whereby the relative frequency of pairings of the distinctive stimuli would be overestimated, resulting in a perceived correlation between both stimuli that was higher than their actual correlation.

Evidence for such a process is provided in a study by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). Subjects read a series of sentences, each of which described a person who was a member of one of two groups and who performed either a desirable or an undesirable behavior. To prevent potential bias from affecting the judgements that subjects made, the groups were described simply as Group A and Group B. In terms of the sentences given, Group A had twice as many members as Group B and desirable behaviors were more frequent than undesirable ones. The ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors, however, was the same for both groups, meaning that group membership and behavior desirability were therefore unrelated. Nevertheless, subjects overestimated the frequency of the undesirable behaviors for Group B (the smaller group) and also evaluated Group B less favorably than Group A. An illusory correlation was therefore formed between group membership and behavior desirability that influenced subsequent judgements about the two groups.

It is important to note several extensions of the findings of the Hamilton and Gifford (1976) study. First, the effect is not limited to the situation in which undesirable behaviors are distinct: When desirable behaviors are less frequent (and therefore more salient), subjects evaluate the smaller group *more* favorably (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Second, the effect is due to biases in the encoding of stimulus information and not errors in the judgement process (Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985). Third, the differential evaluation of both groups reflects a lowered evaluation of the smaller group and not an overevaluation of the larger group (Hamilton et al., 1985).

Effects of Social Categorization on Intergroup Perception and Behavior

Social categorization can have important consequences for interpersonal perception and intergroup behavior. First, in terms of the perceptual concomitants of categorization, when people are viewed as members of groups rather than as individuals, within-group similarities and between-group differences can be exaggerated. Specifically, when others are categorized into groups, discriminability among people within categories is reduced and perceived distinctiveness between members of different categories is accentuated (e.g., Taylor & Falcone, 1982; Wilder, 1981; Wilder & Allen, 1978). That is, members of the same category are perceived as being more similar to each other and members of different categories are perceived as being more different than when these persons are perceived in the absence of group identification. These results are obtained even when people are assigned arbitrarily to groups and when categorization is uninformative (e.g., individuals are identified only as being members of Group A or Group B) (see Wilder, 1981).

The effects of categorization are influenced further when the perceiver is a member of one of the groups involved (i.e., when categorization is between an ingroup and an outgroup). Although, as mentioned above, ingroup members view one another as similar in some ways, ingroup-outgroup categorization results in outgroup members being perceived as even more homogeneous than ingroup members (for reviews, see Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992) — a phenomenon referred to as the outgroup homogeneity effect. Thus, a person's belief about outgroup members is that "they are all alike", while ingroup members are viewed as being more diverse. Evidence for the effect has been found using a variety of conceptualizations and measures of homogeneity (for a review, see Linville et al., 1986) and for both real and minimal groups (Judd & Park, 1988; Simon & Brown, 1987). Linville et al. attribute the effect to the greater contact that people have with ingroup than outgroup members, which results in ingroup

members being perceived as more differentiated and variable (i.e., greater contact with ingroup members increases the number of exemplars and the number of ways in which ingroup members are seen to differ). Research has not, however, been able to determine clearly whether the greater differentiation of ingroup members than outgroup members "stem[s] from the degree of differentiation available in subjects' knowledge structures or from differences in motivation to utilize the distinctions that might be available" (Brewer & Kramer, 1985, p. 224).

The processing and retention of information about persons has also been found to vary as a function of category membership. For example, Howard and Rothbart (1980), using a minimal group design, found that categorization resulted in favorable expectations about ingroup members and unfavorable expectations about outgroup members. These differential expectancies influenced subjects' recall in a subsequent recall task: They exhibited significantly better memory for negative outgroup behaviors than for negative ingroup behaviors. These findings suggest that once an ingroup-outgroup distinction has been made, "subsequent information processing can be biased in such a way that the intergroup differentiation will be maintained, and indeed, will come to seem justified" (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986, p. 132).

Related to this finding is a bias evident in the kinds of causal attributions that people make about the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members. In its most general form, this bias involves making more favorable attributions about ingroup members than outgroup members. Perhaps its strongest form is manifested in what Pettigrew (1979) refers to as "the ultimate attribution error". Specifically, desirable behaviors of ingroup members are much more likely to be attributed to internal, dispositional causes, whereas similar behaviors by outgroup members are more likely to be attributed to situational causes, exceptional effort, luck, or special advantage. The outgroup member may also be viewed as an "exceptional case" and subtyped (see also Weber & Crocker, 1983). Conversely, undesirable behaviors are much more likely to be attributed to

internal causes for outgroup than for ingroup members. Thus, the successes and failures of each group are attributed to very different causes.

A closely related bias, involving the role of language in contributing to intergroup bias and the persistence of stereotypes, has recently been investigated by Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin (1989). They termed this bias the linguistic intergroup bias and argued that in an intergroup context, socially desirable ingroup behaviors and undesirable outgroup behaviors are described in abstract terms, whereas socially undesirable ingroup behaviors and desirable outgroup behaviors are described in more concrete terms. More specifically, ingroup favoritism will occur in that people observing ingroup members exhibiting desirable behaviors will readily assume that these actions are reflective of the actors' dispositions, and will therefore describe the behavior in abstract linguistic terms. A similar process will occur for undesirable outgroup behaviors. Alternatively, undesirable ingroup and desirable outgroup behaviors will be described in concrete terms, without abstracting beyond the given information. Thus, these expectancy-violating episodes can be treated as behavioral "exceptions to the rule" that have resulted from situational or temporal constraints.

Since abstract statements imply greater stability over time, are perceived as revealing more about the target person than the situation, and are relatively resistant to disconfirmation, Maass et al. (1989) propose that this bias in the use of language may help to explain the persistence of stereotypes. They used a linguistic category model to examine the type of language used by subjects to describe ingroup and outgroup behavior. The model identifies four linguistic categories, representing four different levels of abstraction, that can be used to describe others. The results indicated that socially desirable ingroup behaviors were described at a higher level of abstraction than desirable outgroup behaviors. There was only partial support, however, for the predicted pattern involving socially undesirable behaviors. When descriptions of desirable and undesirable episodes within ingroup and outgroup were compared, a strong

polarization effect was found whereby undesirable outgroup behavior was described at a higher level of abstraction than desirable outgroup behavior. Interestingly, desirable and undesirable ingroup behavior were described in a largely unbiased manner. This linguistic intergroup bias may contribute to the persistence of stereotypes, as well as maintain or even exacerbate initial intergroup biases.

Although the cognitive-perceptual consequences of social categorization have received the most research attention, behavioral forms of intergroup bias have also been examined. As mentioned earlier, when categorization occurs, even when based on trivial or random assignment, a clear pattern of preferential treatment toward ingroup members emerges (for reviews, see Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982). Such preferential treatment has typically been measured in terms of subjects' decisions about resource allocation (e.g., money or points) to persons based on their category membership or subjects' evaluative judgements. Moreover, preferential treatment is observed even when direct self-interest is not a potential factor influencing subjects' decisions (Tajfel, 1982).

A methodological problem, however, is evident in many of the studies that have investigated intergroup bias. Specifically, a wide variety of dependent variables have been used to measure intergroup bias (for a review, see Messick & Mackie, 1989). The difficulties associated with this situation are clear, as Messick and Mackie (1989, p. 63) point out: "This broad spectrum of dependent measures would be reassuring about the pervasive nature of the intergroup bias if the evidence suggested that these measures all assessed the same thing. Unfortunately, this is not the case." Thus, experimental social psychology faces the task of formulating a unifying theory of its dependent variables and determining what these different indices measure and how they relate to one another and to other theoretical concepts (Messick & Mackie, 1989).

Individuals' Control Over Stereotypes and Prejudice

A study was conducted by Devine (1989) to investigate the automatic (i.e., largely involuntary) and controlled (i.e., largely voluntary) processes involved in prejudice — an area in which little research has been conducted. The proposed model focuses on the conditions under which stereotypes and personal beliefs influence responses toward stereotyped groups. Specifically, the model holds that high- and low-prejudice individuals are equally knowledgeable about specific stereotypes and that a stereotype is activated automatically when a member of the target group (or a symbolic equivalent) is encountered. Moreover, this unintentional activation of the stereotype is assumed to be as strong and involuntary for low-prejudice individuals as for high-prejudice individuals. These two groups differ, however, in that the personal beliefs of high-prejudice individuals are likely to overlap considerably with the cultural stereotype, whereas the personal beliefs of low-prejudice individuals are likely to conflict with the automatically activated stereotype. This conflict is due to low-prejudice individuals' decision to reject the stereotype as a basis for behavior or evaluation. Thus, controlled processes are involved in that a non-prejudiced response requires both intentional inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype and intentional activation of non-prejudiced personal beliefs.

The results of the study indicated that during a free response task, in which subjects were asked to list features of the cultural stereotype of blacks irrespective of their personal beliefs about blacks, both high- and low-prejudice subjects displayed equivalent knowledge of the stereotype. In addition, after automatic activation of the racial stereotype (through the use of a priming task), high- and low-prejudice subjects were asked to evaluate ambiguous stereotype-related (i.e., ambiguously hostile) behaviors performed by a target person of unspecified race. Both high- and low-prejudice subjects evaluated the ambiguous behaviors in an equally stereotype-congruent (or prejudice-like) manner (i.e., a high level of priming resulted in more extreme

ratings on a number of hostility-related scales for both high- and low-prejudice subjects). Thus, when controlled processes were absent, automatic stereotype activation resulted in equally strong, stereotype-congruent responses from both high- and low-prejudice subjects.

Last, when subjects were asked to list, under anonymous conditions, their personal beliefs about blacks, it was found that high- and low-prejudice subjects reported different thoughts about blacks. That is, low-prejudice subjects reported few negative thoughts (i.e., their thoughts tended to be incongruent with the cultural stereotype of blacks) and they avoided ascribing traits to the group as a whole, whereas high-prejudice subjects reported predominantly negative thoughts and readily ascribed traits (especially negative traits such as hostility and aggressiveness) to the group. These differences would appear to be due to low-prejudice subjects' use of intentional, controlled processes to inhibit automatic stereotype activation. Thus, the results of the study would seem to provide support for the proposed model and for the existence of automatic and controlled processes in stereotypes and prejudice. Within this framework, non-prejudiced responses are the product of intentional, controlled processes and require a conscious effort to behave in a non-prejudiced manner.

Limitations of the Cognitive Approach

Although the cognitive approach has clearly made a significant contribution to our knowledge of intergroup relations, several important limitations are evident. First, and perhaps most importantly, modern social cognition, in its steady pursuit of underlying psychological processes, has had little interest in conscious experience and phenomenology (Schneider, 1991), and has placed little emphasis on intergroup processes as a macrolevel substantive problem (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). With its emphasis on intrapsychic cognitive processes, the social context and the dynamic features of intergroup relations have been largely neglected. Thus, despite the significance of its contributions, social cognition "can seem sterile and bloodless as much of the richness of

the everyday social world gets processed and abstracted out" (Schneider, 1991, p. 530). Moreover, the ecological validity of much of the social cognitive research on intergroup relations is low (Stephan, 1985). Thus, it is unclear to what extent phenomena such as intergroup bias and illusory correlation, for example, operate in everyday social situations.

The current cognitive approach emphasizes the perceiver's use of higher-level cognitive structures like schemata, prototypes, and scripts for organizing information about groups, and it can therefore provide only a limited perspective on stereotypes, prejudice, and other intergroup processes. Consistent with this criticism, Jones (1983) argues that the cognitive approach has caused researchers to overlook many important issues in the study of race:

> The rising emphasis on methodology inadvertently discouraged a sophisticated analysis of race-related issues. The experimental method, combined with enthusiasm for quantification and causal hypotheses, made it desirable to assign subjects randomly to experimental treatment and control groups. Since it is impossible to assign subjects randomly to races, race was forced to join other culture- and social system-related variables on social psychology's back burner. Moreover, the mass movement into university social psychology laboratories encouraged an emphasis on *molecular* levels of analysis. . . . Analogies between the individual mind and computers dominated the field. (p. 122)

Clearly, such singular approach to an area of study as complex and multifaceted as intergroup relations will necessarily encounter its limits (Pettigrew, 1981). The ways in which cognitive processes interact with other processes therefore becomes an important issue for future research. It should also be added that compared to the large body of research that has been generated to test the implications of the various theoretical orientations that have been reviewed here, relatively little research has attempted to explore the intersection or integration of two or more approaches (Duckitt,

1992; Hamilton, 1981b; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Phenomenology, which examines the lived-experience of a phenomenon holistically, provides a valuable approach in this regard.

A second, closely related, limitation involves the social cognitive approach's neglect of affective factors (e.g., Duckitt, 1992). As Hamilton (1981b) states:

> if there is any domain of human interaction that history tells us is laden with strong, even passionate, feelings, it is in the area of intergroup relations. And this point makes clear the fact that the cognitive approach, despite the rich and varied advances that it has made in recent years, is by itself incomplete. (p. 347)

Moreover, from a purely cognitive perspective it is not possible to explain the ethnocentric behavior characteristic of intergroup relations. Similarly, the social cognitive approach is based on the premise that the identification of the relevant processes alone is sufficient to explain intergroup stereotyping. A cognitive approach cannot, however, explain why outgroup stereotypes are generally negative and ingroup stereotypes are generally positive.

Third, although the cognitive paradigm assumes that intergroup processes have their origins in observation or socialization processes (Stroebe & Insko, 1989), it has made little, if any, contribution to understanding individual differences in intergroup attitudes and behavior, or to explaining the socialization process as it relates to the acquisition of the intergroup attitudes and beliefs of one's group and culture (Condor & Brown, 1988).

Finally, from a phenomenological perspective, several other limitations are also evident. First, in reviewing the cognitive (and other natural science) literature on intergroup relations, it is clear that this body of literature is replete with studies that emphasize explanation and exclude an understanding of people's experiences. This research approaches intergroup relations from an external perspective, from outside of the experience, and therefore fails to examine the *meaning* of intergroup beliefs,

attitudes, and behavior for individuals. This consideration is crucial given that a person's "conduct proceeds immediately from his view of the situation confronting him. His response to the world conforms to his definition of the world" (Allport, 1954, p. 216).

Second, the literature on social categorization would seem to represent an instance of what Merleau-Ponty (1965) refers to as *intellectualism.* That is, the overwhelming amount of information that the social world furnishes must be altered and ordered by cognition. Thus, "intellectualism wishes to stage a consciousness which endows the world with meaning" (Ashworth, 1980, p. 45). From a phenomenological perspective, although social cognitive theory is correct in maintaining that a person's perception of the social world is not a direct reflection of social stimuli but rather, has personal meaning, it is incorrect to attribute this meaning to cognitive categories (e.g., stereotypes) that organize social information. As an example of intellectualism, social cognition attempts to vest *all* meaning in the social perceiver and therefore overlooks the "originality" of the perceptual world (Merleau-Ponty, 1965). That is, although it attempts to address the social perceiver's world, social cognition maintains the primacy of a "real", external world, thereby excluding entry into the life-world (Ashworth, 1980).

Finally, from a phenomenological perspective, natural science research is also deficient because of its emphasis on content and its de-emphasis of contextual and relational factors.

An Integrative Perspective on Intergroup Relations

Recognizing the limited perspective offered by the cognitive paradigm, researchers in this area (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stroebe & Insko, 1989) have recently begun to acknowledge that stereotypes, prejudice, and other aspects of intergroup relations are the result of cognitive, motivational, *and* sociocultural factors. Hamilton and Trolier (1986), for example, state:

> Any particular form of stereotyping or prejudice, such as racism, is in all likelihood multiply determined by cognitive, motivational, and social learning processes, whose effects combine in a given social context to produce specific judgmental and behavioral manifestations. Therefore, any attempt to understand such phenomena as a product of one process alone is probably misguided. (p. 153)

Despite this recognition that intergroup phenomena are multiply determined, however, very little is presently known about how motivational and sociocultural factors interact with cognitive processes (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). From a phenomenological perspective, "historical, cultural, social, personality, and immediate contextual forces converge to influence a person's experience, perceptions, and hypotheses, and thus together they shape attitudes and behavior" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p. 16). Phenomenology therefore seems well suited for investigating the ways in which sociocultural, cognitive, and motivational processes interact.

Qualitative Approaches to Intergroup Relations

Recent research on intergroup processes has been almost exclusively quantitative, involving either laboratory or field experiments (Brewer & Kramer, 1985). Descriptive studies involving interview data (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950; Bettleheim & Janowitz, 1964) are rare and also do not necessarily meet the criteria for genuine qualitative research. Specifically, these studies are characterized by the use of *a priori* theoretical frameworks (i.e., psychodynamic theory) for analyzing data, the use of quantitative measures, and the failure to adequately explore subjects' experiences. Equally rare are phenomenological studies of intergroup processes.

Phenomenological Research

Although there appear to be no phenomenological studies that deal specifically with stereotyping, the phenomenological method has been used to investigate related topics. In the area of attitudes, several theoretical and empirical studies are present.

According to Macleod (1947), the suspension of one's presuppositions or biases allows the essential nature of attitudes to be revealed. In its essential form, attitude appears as a state of the *field* (of awareness) rather than as a state of the *self*. Stated differently, an attitude does not refer directly to the attitude-holder but to the attitude's object (i.e., attitudes are always *of* something). Thus, from a phenomenological perspective, an attitude is a structuring of the field of experience and is always intentional in that it always has an object.

In terms of empirical research, Romanyshyn (1970, cited in Romanyshyn, 1971) studied the attitudes toward race of a white and a black person. Initial reflection on the structure of attitude revealed that it "was an *intentional and situational phenomenon which related an individual to some aspects of his own history, to other people and to a project unfolding in time*" (p. 174). The results of the reflection revealed that traditional theories of attitude had ignored the fundamentally relational nature of attitudes (i.e., the relation and meaning of the object of an attitude to a person's experience). Thus, Romanyshyn identified intentionality as a key aspect of the structure of attitude. The results of his investigation were consistent with this structure of attitudes.

A study was also conducted by Ashworth (1985) to describe the essential structure of social attitude. The technique used involved a meaning unit analysis of written accounts of attitude-revealing situations provided by six participants, followed by in-depth interviews with each participant. A number of essential features of attitude resulted from the analysis. First, cognition, affect, and conation emerged as fundamental components of attitude. Second, three levels of self-awareness were found to be possible in attitude situations. At the first level, the attitudinal nature of experience is prereflective and there is a lack of awareness of the self as holder of the attitude. At the second level, a reflective awareness of the attitudinal experience is present. At the third level, there exists an awareness of the self as holding the attitude. The third essential

feature of attitude to emerge was that reflection on one's attitudes distinguishes the self from others (i.e., social individuation) and that through comparison with others' attitudes (or one's own prior attitude), one's own attitudes acquire personal meaning.

From the analysis, the following essential description of the structure of social attitude resulted:

> Attitudinal awareness is an *intentional* phenomenon, which has an object or '*figural concern*', and *structures* the *field of consciousness* in a primarily *affective manner* (any one of a *gamut of emotions* being candidates for the affective element of the field). *Conation* is an essential component, though the implication for action may be *null*: there is an inner connection between consciousness and action — the model of independent and dependent 'variables' is inappropriate. (Ashworth, 1985, p. 91)

A phenomenological study of prejudice was conducted by Lazar (1991) and, like Ashworth's (1985) study, involved the analysis of both written accounts and interview data. The data analysis resulted in an essential description of being-prejudiced. Briefly, being-prejudiced involves a negative affective state that is associated with disliked aspects of outgroup members. These aspects of outgroup members are viewed as unique to and representative of the outgroup, and are salient. A negative affective state also occurs during contacts with outgroup members and during reflection on the outgroup name or label. Avoidance or minimization of contact with outgroup members is also present and when contact does occur, outgroup members are typically treated in a less friendly manner than ingroup members.

Attitudes toward the outgroup are shaped primarily by experiences with outgroup members. Differences between ingroup and outgroup become the focus of attention and foster stereotypical thinking and evaluation based on group membership. Although there is acknowledgement of the plight of outgroup members (i.e., as negatively perceived by outgroups) and some sympathy for them, these result in little change in actual behavior

toward outgroup members. Outgroup members are viewed as largely responsible for their own condition and for initiating change.

Being-prejudiced does not normally involve a belief that one is prejudiced and the prejudice is viewed as a natural reaction to outgroup members. Awareness that one's attitude toward outgroup members may be interpreted as prejudiced (and may be responded to negatively), however, results in a reluctance to express one's attitudes to others.

From the essential description, the following description of the structure of being-prejudiced was produced:

> Being-prejudiced means to rather inflexibly maintain an attitude about all outgroup members based on experience with some outgroup members. At the core of being-prejudiced is a predominantly negative emotional state that is accompanied by characteristic modes of perception, thought and action which are influenced somewhat by context factors. (Lazar, 1991, p. 69)

Formulating the Research Question

Although the studies by Ashworth (1985) and Lazar (1991) deal with people's experiences during contact situations, neither of them deals specifically with people's stereotypical beliefs about outgroups. Both studies focus primarily on people's attitudes toward other groups and although Lazar's analysis does address the issue of stereotypes, it does so only briefly. Lazar's study deals mainly with attitudes and behavior, and does not explore the nature and scope of the outgroup stereotype or its significance for the participants. It should also be emphasized that because Lazar's study focused on the phenomenon of prejudice, and a Fascism (F) scale was used as a screening instrument, it is not possible to determine (a) the *extent* to which the participants in that study exhibited stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup or (b) the degree of difference in the stereotypicality of the participants' beliefs about the outgroup and their beliefs about

their own group. Thus, the present study will build upon existing qualitative research by investigating stereotypes in greater depth.

As mentioned earlier, social cognitive research has largely ignored the contextual and dynamic aspects of intergroup processes. Moreover, very little quantitative research of any kind has investigated the intersection or integration of various theoretical approaches to understanding intergroup relations (Duckitt, 1992; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Similarly, despite widespread acknowledgement that intergroup phenomena are multiply determined, very little research has been conducted to explore the interaction of sociocultural, cognitive, and motivational processes (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). Although Lazar (1991) has elucidated some of these interactions as they relate to being-prejudiced, the proposed study will explore these interactions as they relate to the phenomenon of stereotyping.

The goal of this study, then, is to investigate the nature of the intergroup experiences and beliefs of people who hold stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group. The study will build on the large body of quantitative research by providing what is felt to be a much needed complementary perspective. It is important to emphasize such complementarity because quantitative and qualitative methods are each best suited for answering a particular kind of research question. The study will also extend existing qualitative research on intergroup processes by focusing specifically on stereotyping.

In chapter 3, the methodology and the procedure (i.e., participant selection, data collection, and data analysis) that were used in this study are discussed in detail. My presuppositions and preconceptions prior to and while conducting the research are also presented.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE

A researcher's choice of research method must be guided by a consideration of which method will be most appropriate for answering the research question. To answer the question, "What is the nature of the intergroup experiences and beliefs of people who hold stereotypical beliefs about an ethnic minority group?", the phenomenological method — with its emphasis on the elucidation of meaning and understanding from the individual's perspective — was considered most appropriate. The phenomenological method uses first person descriptions of how a phenomenon is experienced; that is, it focuses on people's experiences as they occur in the everyday world. As mentioned in chapter 2, quantitative research has excluded an understanding of people's experiences and has therefore failed to explore the meaning of intergroup beliefs for individual people. The phenomenological method therefore provides a complementary approach to this research in its use of experientially meaningful, descriptive data. Also, despite widespread acknowledgement that intergroup processes are multiply determined, very little quantitative research has investigated the interaction of sociocultural, cognitive, and motivational processes (Duckitt, 1992; Hamilton, 1981b; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Because the phenomenological method permits investigation of the contextual and dynamic aspects of intergroup beliefs and experiences, it seems well suited for investigating the ways in which the above processes interact.

The phenomenological method was also chosen because my intention was to investigate and understand stereotyping in its entirety rather than focus on one particular aspect of the phenomenon. Moreover, phenomenological research that focuses specifically on stereotyping has not been conducted. Although several phenomenological studies have investigated attitudes, stereotyping has not been investigated in depth. For these reasons, the phenomenological method was considered to be the most appropriate method for use in this study.

The Nature of Phenomenological Research

Perhaps the most significant philosophical difference between phenomenological research and natural scientific research in psychology involves the assumption in phenomenology that people are "in and of the world" (Colaizzi, 1978). Colaizzi maintains that although people ordinarily tend to locate experience within themselves (i.e., we view experiences as existing inside ourselves and not out in the real world), in actuality:

> experience is not inside us but instead our experience is always of how we behave towards the world and act toward others. . . . I myself am always already involved in the world because I am never locked up in myself. And because I find myself always already directed toward and involved in the world, my experience of my world activities likewise is *at the world*. Rather than experiencing internal states, I experience my existence as it thrusts itself in the world. (p. 52)

Within phenomenology, the person is therefore not viewed merely as an object in the world but rather, as forming a fundamental unity with it. That is, the person and his or her world are said to "co-constitute" one another (Valle & King, 1978). Within this framework, the meaning of the person's existence can emerge only within the context of the world and vice versa. Due to this interdependency of person and world, existential phenomenological thought views existence as "being-in-the-world" rather than simply "being" (Valle & King, 1978).

Phenomenology, then, studies the world as it appears to consciousness or is given in experience (Giorgi, 1986). Thus, phenomenological research concerns itself with that which appears in the uninterpreted world of direct and immediate experience — that which is phenomenal. This realm of pure phenomena is referred to as the *Lebenswelt* or life-world. It is "the everyday world as it is lived by all of us prior to explanations and theoretical interpretations of any kind" (Giorgi, 1975, p. 99). It is therefore prereflective in nature and gives rise to our reflective awareness. The life-world is

phenomenology's starting point (Valle & King, 1978), which is reflected in Husserl's famous maxim "unto the things themselves". The hypotheses and theories of natural science are not part of the life-world; they are not part of our direct and immediate experience but rather, are derivatives of the life-world. As such, they are not part of the subject matter of the phenomenological researcher (Valle & King, 1978).

Phenomenologists therefore choose as their subject matter the intersection of world and consciousness, which is subjectivity or experience. Phenomenologists maintain that consciousness is always consciousness *of* something — something that is either present out in the world (i.e., transcendent objects) or within the person (i.e., immanent objects), such as fantasy or memory (Valle & King, 1978). Thus, consciousness always has an object — an object that is not consciousness itself. This directional quality of consciousness is referred to as intentionality. Giorgi (1986) describes intentionality in the following way:

> To say that experience is intentional is to say that it is essentially directed toward the givens of experience. These givens may be internal or external to consciousness but they always transcend the acts in which they appear. In other words, creatures possessing this characteristic enjoy a direct openness to things or events that transcend them and consequently they themselves cannot be sheer material things in the same sense that the objects of physics and chemistry are material. . . . Because experience is essentially directed to things or events that transcend it, the object of psychological analysis becomes inherently relational. (p. 7)

Phenomenology searches out the "givens" (Polkinghorne, 1981) in experience (i.e., what exists for consciousness) by obtaining first person descriptions. Thus, phenomenological research relies primarily on natural language to gain access to people's life-world. According to Giorgi (1986), phenomenology "uses a descriptive approach in order to obtain the facts of a given experience in order to clarify their meaning" (p. 8).

Words and sentences are conscious (i.e., reflective) expressions of the way in which people experience their world prereflectively and the descriptions provided convey the meanings of situations as they are experienced prereflectively.

Phenomenological research is guided by "a genuine wish to look and see" (Seamon, 1982, p. 122), and its goal is to reveal essences or invariant structures that constitute the experience of a particular phenomenon. That is, essences are necessary (i.e., essential) and invariant aspects of a phenomenon that make the phenomenon what it is (Polkinghorne, 1981). As Seamon explains,

> Although phenomenology begins with descriptive accounts of concrete things, events and experiences, these specific idiosyncratic descriptions are in the end secondary. Rather, phenomenology is primarily eidetic, i.e. a major goal is to seek out within the uniqueness of concrete phenomena more general experiential structures, patterns and essences. (p. 121)

The analysis of descriptions may reveal such essences but to do so, an attitude of "disciplined naivete" (Wertz, 1984) is required. This critical openness, wherein the researcher deliberately suspends all assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon being investigated, allows unknown aspects of the phenomenon to be made available for research. Thus, phenomenology does not impose structures from outside of the experience but instead, examines the experience as it is lived by the person who experiences it. In other words, perceived reality is viewed as the primary reality and the aim of phenomenological analysis is to describe this perceived reality.

At this point, it is also important to discuss the issue of the status of the shared structure that emerges from phenomenological research and its generalizability. Contemporary existential-phenomenological research in psychology seeks patterns and structures in meanings that are inductively produced from representations, usually spoken or written, of human experience. The identification of essential structures of experience is usually based on thematic descriptions of the meaning of lived-experience.

This research is therefore grounded in existential experience, as expressed by Heidegger (1962), rather than in the idealism of earlier philosophical phenomenology (Polkinghorne, 1989; Sprigge, 1984). Thus, although philosophical phenomenology such as Husserl's (1913/1931) investigates eidetic structures (i.e., essential structures of experience that are universal, transcending individuals and contexts), existential-phenomenological psychology "investigates structures that are typical or general for groups of people" (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 43).

The concern with the products of existential-phenomenological research, however, is summarized by Osborne (1991):

> Husserlian theory insists that eidetic structures are intuited or directly apprehended rather than produced inductively. But it appears that much contemporary existential-phenomenological research is based on inductive thematic analyses whose generalizability may be domain-specific rather than universal. Such thematic analyses are contextualized by the persons and situations from which the data were collected. The validity of such meaning structures depends on their internal coherence and on the extent to which they are emphathically [*sic*] generalizable. Whether their validity is universal or domain-specific remains an empirical question. (pp. 212-213)

Given this concern with the status of shared structures in contemporary phenomenological research, it seems important to emphasize that the findings of the present study represent a *shared* structure of experience for the participants included in the study. The extent to which this structure or a portion of this structure is also *universal* must be established *a posteriori*. Specifically, the generalizability of the findings will be established to the extent that they resonate with the experiences of others who have experienced the phenomenon being investigated (Osborne, 1990).

The Phenomenological Reduction

As mentioned earlier, phenomenology is the return to "the things themselves". In order to make this fundamental return, the researcher begins by "knowing" the phenomenon thoroughly through personal and scholarly information sources. The next step in phenomenological research involves the reduction, during which the researcher brackets the "natural attitude" in order to understand the phenomenon as it is expressed by the participant. Thus, the aim of this process is to facilitate the researcher's openness to the participant's life-world. The natural attitude refers to our unquestioned assumptions about the world. It is the "taken-for-grantedness of daily events . . . — the unquestioned acceptance of the structure and tenor of day-to-day life" (Seamon, 1982, p. 124).

By bracketing, the researcher attempts to suspend his or her natural attitude. Thus, he or she tries to render inoperative all preconceptions and presuppositions about the phenomenon. This includes bracketing what has been learned about the phenomenon from personal and scholarly sources. The process of bracketing involves making assumptions explicit so that they appear as clearly as possible to oneself (Valle & King, 1978). Moreover, the process of explicating one's preconceptions and presuppositions often results in additional assumptions being revealed at the level of reflective awareness. These newly revealed assumptions are then bracketed, leading to the discovery of still other assumptions, and so on. It should be emphasized, however, that the process of bracketing is never complete. The researcher cannot be aware of all of his or her presuppositions and as a result, a presuppositionless perspective from which to analyze the data is unattainable. Nevertheless, every effort is made to approach the data analysis with a minimum of interpretive bias.

Through this process of bracketing and rebracketing, the researcher aims at moving from the natural attitude toward the "transcendental attitude". Thus, this effort to adopt the transcendental attitude is referred to as the reduction because the researcher

"quite literally reduces the world as it is considered in the 'natural attitude' to a world of pure phenomena or, more poetically, to a purely *phenomenal* realm" (Valle & King, 1978, p. 12).

Through the reduction, then, the researcher is better able to understand the participant's lived-experience of the phenomenon. The researcher becomes more open or receptive to the phenomenon as experienced and expressed by the participant, without knowing in advance what will be found. In essence, the researcher attempts to see the phenomenon "for the first time".

Outlining My Presuppositions

Prior to beginning the data collection and analysis, I reflected on how I came to be interested in stereotyping and other intergroup processes. My interest in these topics is relatively long-standing and was fostered through psychology courses that I took as an undergraduate student. Since then, I have often reflected on how people from different ethnic or other social groups can often perceive one another differently and frequently misunderstand one another's actions. The central element in this process appears to me to involve people's propensity to categorize on the basis of highly visible characteristics (e.g., race, gender, cultural practices, etc.) and to perceive groups as being different in other, important ways based on this initial differentiation. That is, I believe that people often unwittingly "create" intergroup differences where none exist. Moreover, when people view others in predominantly categorical terms, this has the deleterious effect of minimizing their uniqueness or individuality.

From this explanation, it is clear that I support a social cognitive view of stereotyping insofar as I believe that it provides valuable insights into how people come to perceive differences between themselves and members of other social groups. Thus, in this regard, I agree with Miller (1982b) when he concludes that:

> people clearly seem primed to engage in stereotyping of some kind. We are disposed to think in categorical terms, to differentiate among social groups, and to

> distinguish between others who appear similar to us or different from us. We are able to infer personality or character traits in others very readily, and to form expectations on the basis of limited, often extraneous information. (p. 493)

It is important for me to emphasize, however, that I also view affective or emotional processes as important in stereotyping. I believe that factors such as dislike, fear, and mistrust of an outgroup are fundamental in guiding intergroup perception and that they often arise simply due to a lack of familiarity with the outgroup. Additionally, affective processes are, in my view, dominant after stereotypical beliefs have emerged. That is, these processes become of central importance because of people's need to defend or justify what they believe to be true about an outgroup.

After reading literature on intergroup relations, I also became aware of holding another belief that required bracketing. Specifically, I believe that people's need to maintain positive self-esteem is an important factor contributing to stereotyping and other intergroup processes. This belief became clearer after being exposed to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981), which emphasizes people's need to achieve and maintain positive self-esteem. Prior to beginning the data collection I became aware of another assumption that required bracketing, namely, that the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup were false or unjustified. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to determine the factual validity of most ethnic stereotypes (Brigham, 1971) and consequently, the accuracy of the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup is unclear.

As described earlier, it is necessary for the researcher to be aware of presuppositions and biases because it is from his or her perspective that the data are viewed and interpreted. I therefore attempted to be continually aware of these presuppositions and biases, and made every effort to bracket them so as to allow the data to "show themselves".

The Screening Instrument

Participants for this study were selected partially on the basis of the scores that they obtained on a screening instrument. The screening instrument consisted of attribute scales that were similar to those developed by Linville et al. (1986). Eight attribute scales were included for the majority group and for each ethnic minority group (see Appendix A). This is consistent with studies conducted by Linville et al., in which subjects typically completed six to ten response scales for a given target group. The attributes included in the screening instrument were chosen from the Katz and Braly (1933) attribute list to represent a broad range of characteristics. Because the probability of differentiation scores for the majority group and for each ethnic minority group were compared, it was necessary to use the same attributes for all groups. It should also be noted that the screening instrument was piloted prior to being used to screen respondents. That is, it was given to a number of acquaintances who then provided me with feedback regarding its adequacy. No difficulties were found with the format of the screening instrument.

In terms of the scoring procedure used in the present study, a P_d score was first calculated for each trait item. The stereotyping score (i.e., trait index P_d score) assigned to each respondent for each target group was then determined by averaging the P_d scores for the eight attribute scales associated with that group. The respondent's stereotyping score for each ethnic minority group included in the screening instrument was then subtracted from his or her stereotyping score for the majority group. It should be noted that with the exception of two of the respondents, all stereotyping scores for the ethnic minority groups were lower than the stereotyping scores for the majority group. This indicates that the respondents' beliefs about these minority groups were more stereotypical than their beliefs about their own group. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, respondents who displayed the largest differences between their stereotyping score for the majority group and their stereotyping score for any of the

ethnic minority groups included in the screening instrument were considered for possible participation in the study. An example of the scoring procedure is provided in Appendix B.

Rationale For Use of the Screening Instrument

A screening instrument was used in this study because it would have been difficult to assess the extent of the volunteers' stereotyping by other means. Given the nature of the study, it was necessary to determine the stereotypicality of the volunteers' beliefs. If I had attempted to probe their beliefs during a preliminary interview, for example, it would have been difficult to question them in such a way as to establish the *degree* to which they held stereotypical beliefs. The use of questioning to assess the extent of the volunteers' stereotyping might also have had the unintended effect of "leading" them. That is, the form of my questioning might have biased the volunteers' descriptions.

Even if such questioning had been able to avoid the above difficulties, an additional problem would have been encountered. Specifically, it would have been necessary to establish adequate rapport in order to ensure that the descriptions obtained from the volunteers were valid. Given the number of volunteers, this process would have been extremely time-consuming. More importantly, however, establishing adequate rapport would have involved informing each of the volunteers about the true nature of the study and this would not have been feasible prior to determining their level of stereotyping.

The difficulties associated with interviewing the volunteers would have been further compounded by the need to also assess (a) the stereotypicality of their beliefs about the majority group and (b) the degree of difference in the stereotypicality of their beliefs about the majority group and their beliefs about the ethnic minority group in question. Given that all of the volunteers had experienced contact with more than one ethnic minority group, interviewing each of them would have been very time-consuming and perhaps confusing for them. Moreover, it would also have been difficult to compare ethnic groups in order to determine which group was perceived more stereotypically by

the volunteer. Clearly, attempting to evaluate the volunteers' beliefs by using preliminary interviews would have been complicated and fraught with difficulties.

It is also important to emphasize that the screening instrument was used only as a criterion for selecting participants. As such, it did not influence the conduct of the study once the participants were selected. That is, its use did not compromise the integrity of the various stages of the phenomenological procedure used (i.e., bracketing, data collection, and data analysis).

Participant Selection

In phenomenological research, the most important criterion for participant selection is the person's ability to provide rich descriptions of the phenomenon being investigated (Osborne, 1990). Participants must not only have experience with the phenomenon but they must be able and willing to share their lived-experiences with the researcher. A number of other criteria that were specific to this study were also used to select participants. First, participants were required to be students in a Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) program. Although quantitative research within psychology is often criticized for using students as subjects, there were several reasons for choosing students as participants in this study. First, my interest was in investigating stereotyping within an educational context. Although practicing teachers could also have been chosen as participants, my interest was in examining the beliefs and contact experiences of undergraduate students. Also, it was felt that teachers might be unwilling to openly discuss their stereotypical beliefs. Second, students are generally more familiar with the methods and goals of research than non-students and are therefore less likely to feel that they are being evaluated. As a result, they are likely to feel more comfortable and to provide more valid data during the interviews than non-students. Last, students tend to be cooperative, articulate, and reflective. Given their level of education, they are also more likely to understand the nature of the research and the questions being asked.

Second, participants also had to be in the fourth year of a B.Ed. program and therefore near completing their formal training as teachers. This criterion was included because it was unclear to what extent one's training as a teacher and, more generally, one's university education, might impact one's stereotypes of other social groups. Thus, it would have been difficult to determine the degree to which first, second, or third year students' stereotypical beliefs about other groups would have changed during the remainder of their university training. It was therefore considered important to include only students who were at the same stage in their education and more importantly, who were as near as possible to completing their degrees and entering the teaching profession.

Third, only people who were representative of the white majority group in Canada were included in the study. The participants represented a broad range of cultural backgrounds (e.g., Scandinavian, French Canadian, American, British) but all of them had lived in Canada for all (or most) of their lives. Moreover, all of the participants chosen felt themselves to be members of the majority group in this culture.

Fourth, participants had to hold stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group. As described earlier, level of individual stereotyping was measured using a screening instrument that included a series of attribute scales similar to those used by Linville et al. (1986). Last, participants had to have had at least several interactions, in the form of actual face-to-face encounters, with one or more members of the ethnic minority group for which they held stereotypical beliefs.

It should be added that gender was not included as a criterion for selecting participants. Both males and females were included because it was my intention to explore stereotyping for majority group members in general. In addition, intergroup processes such as stereotyping are not unique to either gender but rather, are universal processes.

In terms of the participant selection procedure used in this study, after obtaining permission from instructors, I visited five classes of two senior-level educational

psychology courses in the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. I explained the general nature of the research that I was conducting and solicited the students' participation. Students were then provided with an information sheet about the study that included an address and a phone number where I could be contacted (see Appendix C). Overall, approximately 180 information sheets were distributed.

I then met individually with the 12 people who volunteered to be included in the study. For volunteers who were members of the white majority group, the general nature of the study was discussed. They were then shown a list of ethnic minority groups in Canada (see Appendix D) and asked if they had experienced face-to-face contact with members of any of these groups. The extent of their contact was then discussed. All of these volunteers indicated that they had experienced contact with members of at least one ethnic minority group. Each volunteer was then asked to complete the screening instrument, which included eight attribute scales for the majority group and for each of the ethnic minority groups with which face-to-face contact had been experienced. Because volunteers were selected for inclusion in the study partially on the basis of their stereotyping scores, prior to completing the screening instrument, they were not told precisely what it was intended to measure. I simply told the volunteers that I was interested in their beliefs about the ethnic groups included in the screening instrument. It was felt that if the volunteers knew that their level of stereotyping was being measured they might have modified their responses (i.e., social desirability might have influenced their responses). For volunteers who were not members of the majority group, the nature of the study was explained to them and they were thanked for their interest in the study.

As mentioned earlier, scoring of the volunteers' responses involved arriving at a stereotyping score for each of the groups included in the screening instrument. Each volunteer's stereotyping score for each of the ethnic minority groups included in the screening instrument was then subtracted from his or her stereotyping score for the

majority group. Four of the volunteers displayed a large difference between their stereotyping score for the majority group and their stereotyping score for an ethnic minority group.

Each of these volunteers was then contacted and met with in person. The results and purpose of the screening instrument, as well as the nature of the study, were explained and any questions answered. Given people's general reluctance to discuss their stereotypes, the volunteers' willingness to discuss these openly also needed to be assessed. This requirement was crucial because although the screening instrument was able to identify people who held stereotypical beliefs about specific ethnic minority groups, it provided no guarantee that these people would provide valid and complete descriptions of their beliefs and contact experiences. People who readily acknowledge their stereotypical beliefs and other biases are more likely to provide full and accurate descriptions of their experiences. None of the volunteers contacted appeared defensive when told that they held stereotypical beliefs about a particular ethnic minority group and all of them were willing to discuss their beliefs and contact experiences.

During this time, it was also possible to assess more thoroughly each volunteer's expressive abilities and his or her level of experience with the ethnic minority group chosen for the interviews. All of the volunteers were considered to be suitable in both respects. Each of the volunteers was then asked to participate in the study and all of them agreed to do so. Those volunteers who did not display highly stereotypical beliefs about any of the ethnic minority groups included in the screening instrument were contacted, debriefed, and thanked for their participation.

The phenomenological method does not dictate the number of participants required for a study. The researcher includes as many participants as are needed to illuminate the phenomenon being investigated (Becker, 1986; Wertz, 1984). In this study, four participants was found to be sufficient to achieve this. In terms of the specific characteristics of this group of participants, an equal number of males and females were

included. They ranged in age from 21 to 42 years at the time of the interviews and the average age was 30.5 years. Two of the participants were married, whereas the other two participants were single. Three of the participants' area of study was secondary education, while the fourth participant's area of study was elementary education.

The volunteers' stereotyping scores for all ethnic minority groups ranged from 0.315 to 0.769, with an average score of 0.624. Their stereotyping scores for the majority group ranged from 0.568 to 0.787, with an average score of 0.694. In contrast, the participants' stereotyping scores for the ethnic minority groups chosen for the interviews ranged from 0.348 to 0.591, and the average score was 0.443. The participants' stereotyping scores for the majority group ranged from 0.568 to 0.776, with an average score of 0.692.

It is evident from these scores that although the participants' average stereotyping score for the ethnic minority group chosen for the interviews (0.443) was dramatically lower than the volunteers' average stereotyping score for all of the ethnic minority groups (0.624), both groups had nearly identical average stereotyping scores for the majority group (0.692 and 0.694, respectively). Thus, overall, the participants viewed the ethnic minority group chosen for the interviews much more stereotypically than the volunteers viewed all of the ethnic minority groups. Nevertheless, the participants did not view their own group differently than did the volunteers. Moreover, compared to the volunteers, the participants generally viewed the ethnic minority group chosen for the interviews much more stereotypically than their own group (0.624 and 0.694, respectively, for the volunteers and 0.443 and 0.692, respectively, for the participants).

Data Collection: The Interviews

The data used in this study were obtained through phenomenological interviews. There were several reasons why an interview format was chosen as opposed to having participants describe their lived-experiences in written form. First, by using

interviews, I was able to attend to meaning inherent in each participant's level of eye contact, rate of speech, body posture, and degree of expressed emotion. In this way, I was able to be exposed to more of each participant's communication. Second, the interviews also allowed me to detect concealments or omissions in the participant's communication (Wertz, 1984), thus providing me with the opportunity to explore such areas further. Third, the interview format allowed me to develop greater rapport and to interact more extensively with each participant. Last, the dynamic, interpersonal nature of the interview "provides a human context that motivates the subject to take up the task of articulating complex, lived experiences" (Becker, 1986, p. 102).

Regardless of the specific procedure that is used in a phenomenological study, however, the most important consideration is the establishment of good rapport between the researcher and the participant (Osborne, 1990). Without rapport and an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect, participants are unlikely to provide genuine descriptions of their lived-experiences (Osborne, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1981). Through the researcher's efforts to foster an atmosphere of trust in which a non-judgemental position is taken, the participant can feel freer to express his or her lived-experience of the phenomenon in its entirety. Qualities that have been identified as important for interviewers include empathy, sensitivity, transparency, genuineness, responsiveness, and curiosity (Becker, 1986). In terms of the interview process used in this study, three phases of interviewing were involved.

The Orienting Interview

The first phase of interviewing was used to build rapport with each of the participants. The nature of the interview process was discussed and any questions that the participant had were answered. I also shared some of my own personal background and my reasons for being interested in the topic of the study. Confidentiality, informed consent, and the participant's right to withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice were also explained. Each participant was then given a consent form to sign

(see Appendix E). Ethical release for this consent form was obtained from the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Alberta. Each participant also received a letter that outlined the nature of the study and provided general guidelines to assist in preparing for the data gathering interview (see Appendix F).

The Data Gathering Interview

The second phase of interviewing involved gathering data about each participant's lived-experience of the phenomenon. The interviews were conducted in a quiet setting that was free of any possible interruptions or distractions. The interviews were open-ended and minimally structured so as to avoid any questioning that might have supported my biases and directed the participant's thoughts. The flexibility and openness of this approach also allows the phenomenon to be explored in greater depth and breadth, and is therefore more likely to yield aspects of the phenomenon that might otherwise have been missed (Osborne, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1981).

Before beginning each of the data gathering interviews, the nature and purpose of the minimally structured format of the interviews was explained and any questions that the participant had were answered. This is an important preliminary step in the interview process because it helps participants to understand that it is *their* experience of the phenomenon that the interviewer wishes to explore (Becker, 1986). During each interview, I followed the conversational lead of the participant and asked for elaboration wherever necessary. Participants were prompted only when they had said all that they could about the phenomenon being investigated. The questions asked, which were taken from a prepared list of questions, dealt with aspects of the phenomenon that had not been addressed by the participant. The prepared list of questions is presented in Appendix G.

The data gathering interviews ranged in length from 70 to 120 minutes. Only one such interview was required with each participant in order to expose the various constituents of the phenomenon. Each interview was concluded when I sensed that the full extent of the participant's experience of the phenomenon had been uncovered (i.e., when I

detected repetition in the information provided by the participant and was able to anticipate the general trend of his or her communication). The data gathering interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the participants and later transcribed. A transcript of a portion of one of the interviews has been included as an example in Appendix H. Excerpts taken from the transcript have been underlined. Also, real names have been changed, as have any details that might identify the participant or other persons mentioned.

The Validation Interview

The final phase of interviewing involved having each participant assess the extent to which my interpretation of the data reflected his or her experience. The participants were asked to read the essential description of their experience and to indicate if it included all aspects of their experience. They were also asked if the description implied anything that was not part of their experience.

All of the participants felt that the essential description accurately and comprehensively reflected their experiences with, and beliefs about, the outgroup. Three of the participants remarked that they enjoyed the experience of participating in the study and that they found it to be valuable. Moreover, all of the participants felt that discussion of their beliefs and contact experiences had caused them to be more reflective and to critically re-evaluate and clarify their beliefs about other ethnic groups.

Data Analysis

After data collection is complete, the researcher begins the data analysis. During the analysis, the researcher reflects on the participant's experience of the phenomenon. The researcher's aim is to disclose the meaning of the constituents of the phenomenon and their relationship to the essential structure of the phenomenon. It is important to emphasize, however, that the researcher is not imposing meaning because:

> reflection is not speculation but genuine *finding*, requiring the most rigorous grasp of the essence of the phenomenon. The researcher thereby grasps the whole

> of the phenomenon *through the part* expressed by the subject, making explicit the implicit root of the matter. (Wertz, 1984, p. 32)

It is also essential for the researcher to be tolerant of ambiguity during the analysis and to allow the unexpected aspects of the phenomenon to emerge just as the more expected aspects are revealed. Moreover, the researcher must not rush to achieve closure because this may result in a premature description of the phenomenon. The researcher's overall aim, then, is to understand the phenomenon but to also remain faithful to the participant's lived-experience of that phenomenon. The steps that were followed in analyzing the participants' verbal descriptions are similar to those outlined by Colaizzi (1978) and are listed below.

1. Each interview was tape recorded and then transcribed. During the transcribing, attention was paid to such factors as the participant's rate of speech, expressed emotion, tone of voice, and emphasis of specific words or phrases.

2. Each transcript was read in its entirety several times in order to gain an overall sense of the participant's experience of the phenomenon. Close attention was paid to those aspects of the participant's communication described above, to repeated statements, and to the specific words that the participant chose to express him- or herself.

3. Phrases or sentences that revealed an aspect of the participant's experience of the phenomenon were extracted from the transcript. This process is referred to as "extracting significant statements" (Colaizzi, 1978). For example, the following excerpt was considered to be revealing of an aspect of Karen's experience: ". . . from my own background, . . . in the way in which I was socialized, it was to be accepting of minority groups. That diversity was the proper way to go, that we should recognize that kind of diversity and, you know, accept it." In addition, when more than one statement in the transcript conveyed a particular aspect of the phenomenon in the same manner, only one of the statements was extracted.

4. A theme (or themes) was formulated to capture the *meaning* of each excerpt. This first level of interpretive abstraction involves an attempt to understand the meaning of the excerpt for the participant. This step involves what Colaizzi (1978) refers to as "creative insight" and is precarious because "while moving beyond the protocol statements, the meanings he arrives at and formulates should never sever all connection with the original protocols" (p. 59). For example, the theme that was formulated for the above-mentioned statement by Karen was: "Early Socialization Emphasizes Acceptance of Other Ethnic Groups".

5. The themes that emerged from all of the excerpts were clustered into more abstract themes. For example, the above theme for Karen's statement was included in a cluster that was given the theme: "Early Influences on the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup". These thematic clusters were validated by referring them back to the transcript to determine if they omitted any aspect of the transcript or if they suggested anything not implied in the transcript (Colaizzi, 1978).

6. The thematic clusters and the themes that they contained were integrated into an exhaustive description of the participant's experience of the phenomenon. This description was written so as to state the fundamental structure of the phenomenon in as unequivocally a manner as possible. The analysis described thus far, involving each participant's experience of the phenomenon, is referred to as the "within persons analysis".

7. The essential description was validated by having the participant determine if it accurately reflected his or her experience of the phenomenon. These interviews were generally one hour in length. Any relevant new data or modifications to the description that were suggested by the participant were discussed and appropriate changes made to the analysis.

8. The final thematic clusters for each participant were compared in order to identify themes that were shared by all four participants. If a theme was present for two

or three of the participants, the remaining participant(s) were contacted in order to determine if that theme was also a part of their experience. This procedure was necessary because some aspects of the phenomenon may not have been revealed during the data gathering interview with each participant.

9. The shared themes, which are referred to as the shared structure, were integrated into an overall structural description of the phenomenon. This structural description reveals the structural components of the phenomenon; that is, it relates the essential structure of the phenomenon without referring to the specific content of the participants' experiences. As mentioned earlier, it is this shared structure of experience that is most important in phenomenological research.

10. The shared themes were clustered into more abstract themes, which were used to structure the discussion of the findings. This highest level of abstraction is referred to as the "between persons analysis".

In chapter 4, each of the participants is described, followed by the essential description of his or her experience. The analysis of the themes that were shared by all of the participants is also included.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter contains the individual descriptions of each of the participants. Each description includes personal information about the participant and an overall synthesis of his or her experience. The individual descriptions are presented in the order in which the interviews were conducted.

The data analysis of the themes shared by all of the participants is also contained in this chapter. This includes a delineation of the themes shared by all of the participants, an overall synthesis of the experience shared by all of the participants, and clustering of the shared themes into more abstract themes. The overall synthesis excludes themes that were not experienced, in some way, by all of the participants. It is at this level of the analysis, then, that the shared structure of the phenomenon is revealed. That is, the overall synthesis is no longer situated in concrete instances of the phenomenon but rather, provides a more generalized description of the phenomenon across time and situations.

Karen

Personal Information

Karen's stereotyping score (i.e., her trait index P_d score) for Native Indians was 0.47, indicating that she holds relatively undifferentiated (i.e., stereotypical) beliefs about the members of this group. Her stereotyping score for white Canadians was 0.725, meaning that she holds relatively differentiated (i.e., non-stereotypical) beliefs about the members of her own group. The difference between both stereotyping scores was 0.255, indicating a considerable difference in the degree of differentiation in her beliefs about both groups.

Karen is 42 years of age and was born in Atlanta, Georgia. She lived in Oregon for much of her childhood and adolescence. As an adult, Karen lived in Northern Saskatchewan for six years and in Northern Alberta for ten years. She has lived in

Edmonton for five years and is married, with several children. At the time of the interviews, she was completing her fourth year of the B.Ed. program in Secondary Education. At present, Karen is seeking employment in the area of adult education.

Karen holds stereotypical beliefs about Native Indians. Her first experiences with Native Indians occurred while living in Northern Alberta and she later worked as a tutor and instructor with Native Indian students in Northern Saskatchewan. In reflecting on her experiences as an instructor, she described how her lack of awareness of cultural differences at that time impacted her teaching:

> At the time, I really wasn't reflecting really on what it was that I was doing and this, of course, was just prior to my having any kind of real teaching experience or knowing how to teach people. So, unfortunately, I wasn't a very good listener. I had just assumed that these [subjects] are things that were very, very valuable and that what I was teaching would be of immense use [laughs]. Very presumptuous of me, I'm afraid, you know — that I had this wonderful knowledge which I would be able to impart to them. Again, I had then, I suppose, a flawed view of communication. I was just, you know, the conduit. I would just relay this information to them, they would take it back and they would, "Ah yes, we've been enlightened" [laughs]. And it would be a very wonderful experience in all. I was — well, needless to say, horrifically dismayed because it didn't quite go that way, as I expected. And I had this immense anticipation of tutoring and ambition of these wonderful things, and it didn't turn out.

The analysis of Karen's experience is presented in tabular form in Appendix I. The excerpts taken from the transcribed interview with Karen are presented in the first column of Table 1 and appear in the order that they occurred in the interview transcript. In the second column of Table 1, the themes that were formulated to reflect the essence of the excerpts are presented. In Table 2, these themes are clustered into more abstract

themes. The numbers that appear in brackets below each of the themes indicate the specific excerpts that contribute to that theme.

Overall Synthesis of Karen's Experience

Karen feels that Native Indians have a different world view than whites and that they are less analytical, less discerning of others' motives, and less time-conscious than whites. She also views them as being more generous, forthright, friendly, and accommodating than whites. They are also seen as more relaxed and forgiving about punctuality, and more informal about receiving guests in their homes. Karen also feels that from an educational perspective, Native Indians have greater difficulty with conceptual understanding than whites.

Karen is somewhat critical of Western culture and feels that it is too reliant on technology. She views the white majority group as being more analytical and more suspecting and discerning of others' motives than Native Indians. She also feels that whites are more formal and less relaxed than Native Indians about receiving visitors in their homes, and that they place a high value on their privacy. Whites are also seen as more time-conscious than Native Indians and as unaccepting and unforgiving of lack of punctuality in others.

Karen's upbringing emphasized acceptance of ethnic minority groups and of ethnic diversity, and she views her beliefs about Native Indians as not having changed significantly over time. She is aware of exceptions to her beliefs about Native Indians and has also considered possible cultural causes of some of the behavior that she has observed in members of this group. She also acknowledges the potential limitations of her experiences with, and beliefs about, Native Indians and is aware that these may not apply to Native Indians in general.

Karen often sympathizes with the circumstances of Native Indians and sees their world view as making a valuable contribution to Western culture. She is also receptive to Native Indians and to learning more about their culture. She strives to be unbiased in

her beliefs about Native Indians, which is reflected in her efforts to avoid generalizing about, and discriminating against, other groups. She is also aware of the damaging effects of viewing members of other groups in stereotypical terms and strives to avoid generalizing about them. Instead, she attempts to evaluate members of other groups as individuals. She also attempts to be open-minded and to appreciate the Native perspective but acknowledges that this may not be possible. That is, she is aware of the possibility of self-deception in believing that she has been able to understand how Native Indians might feel in a particular situation.

Although Karen attempts to be unbiased in her beliefs about Native Indians, she sometimes experiences a "nagging feeling" that she is generalizing about Native Indians. At such times, she is unsure whether the Native Indians that she encounters are being viewed as individuals or in categorical terms. Karen also acknowledges that her beliefs about Native Indians as a group are based on her personal contact experiences with Native Indians. Although she dislikes the thought that she is generalizing from her contact experiences, she is aware of the difficulty of escaping this process and acknowledges that it does occur. Karen also acknowledges that apart from associating specific characteristics with Native Indians, she has not considered her beliefs in any further detail.

Ron

Personal Information

Ron's stereotyping score for Chinese people was 0.364, indicating that he holds relatively undifferentiated (i.e., stereotypical) beliefs about the members of this group. His stereotyping score for white Canadians was 0.697, meaning that he holds relatively differentiated (i.e., non-stereotypical) beliefs about the members of his own group. The difference between both stereotyping scores was 0.333, indicating a considerable difference in the degree of differentiation in his beliefs about both groups.

Ron is 36 years of age and has lived in Alberta for much of his life. He also lived in Eastern Canada and the United States for part of his childhood. He presently works for a home construction company and prior to this, worked as an electrician. He has lived in Edmonton most recently for six years and is married. At the time of the interviews, he was in the fourth year of the B.Ed. program in Secondary Education. Since that time, Ron has graduated and is pursuing a full-time teaching position.

Ron's stereotypical beliefs involve Chinese people. He describes his first contact experiences with Chinese people as having been "very positive". These first experiences involved a Chinese family that he came to know as an adolescent in rural Alberta:

> I think the Lee family probably was my first real contact with Chinese and that would have been in Grade 10, 11, and 12. . . . But I think that the Lee's were a very positive model of a family of their culture. Their kids were very progressive, did very well in school, diverse interests, very loyal to the family, very hard-working. They always were going to school and had a job — sometimes two jobs, you know, part-time things. . . . Mr. Lee was friendly, always, "How are you doing? Did you have a good day?" Talk about the weather, all this stuff. . . . Mr. Lee was a neat man. His restaurant was right on the edge of town. We [i.e., his son and I] used to go hunting and we'd come back and sometimes we'd stop for dinner in his restaurant. We'd fill our guts and he'd put the rifles behind the counter, "It's alright boys. Come on in. Have yourself a meal." That was kind of neat.

In his present work, Ron has dealt with a large number of first generation Chinese. He added that his beliefs about Chinese people have also been influenced by the professionalism and other positive qualities that he has observed in a fellow employee who is Chinese.

The analysis of Ron's experience is presented in tabular form in Appendix J. The excerpts taken from the transcribed interview with Ron are presented in the first

column of Table 3. They appear in the order that they occurred in the interview transcript. The second column of Table 3 contains the themes that were formulated to capture the essence of the excerpts. In Table 4, these themes are clustered into more abstract themes. The numbers that appear in brackets below each of the themes indicate the specific excerpts that contribute to that theme.

Overall Synthesis of Ron's Experience

Ron views Chinese people as hard-working, very family-oriented, honest, friendly, and economical. He also feels that they are more willing to express gratitude and are more complimentary than other ethnic groups. Chinese people are also seen as more intelligent than other ethnic groups in that they score higher than other groups on intelligence tests. In terms of his business interactions with Chinese people, Ron views them as astute but appreciative, and complimentary when work has been done well.

Ron's upbringing emphasized openness and encouraged him to develop a positive orientation toward other ethnic groups. The need to view others as individuals was also emphasized in his upbringing. His first contact experiences with Chinese people were very positive and he feels that these experiences were important in establishing many of the positive characteristics that he now associates with this group. His contact experiences were also instrumental in establishing his positive general orientation toward Chinese people. Ron is aware of exceptions to his beliefs about Chinese people and acknowledges that he may be unable to recall some contact experiences involving such exceptions.

Ron also takes into consideration possible personal motivations and cultural factors in trying to understand the behavior of others in general, and has considered possible cultural, situational, or historical causes of some of the behavior that he has observed in Chinese people. He also acknowledges the potential inaccuracy of his experiences with, and beliefs about, Chinese people. That is, he is aware that his beliefs about Chinese people may be influenced by contextual factors such as the geographical

location of his interactions with members of this group (i.e., Canada, as opposed to a country with a large proportion of Chinese), his physical size (i.e., he is larger than most Chinese), the socioeconomic status and educational level of the Chinese whom he has interacted with, and the business-oriented nature of such interactions. Nevertheless, Ron feels that his beliefs about Chinese people are accurate. He has arrived at this conclusion after reflecting on his previous contact experiences with members of this group and failing to find evidence that contradicts his beliefs. This lack of belief-inconsistent information, combined with the present usefulness of his beliefs, serves to reinforce the accuracy of his beliefs. Nevertheless, he is open to the possibility that his beliefs may be inaccurate.

Ron enjoys interacting with others and learning about, and from, them. He is receptive to Chinese people and would like to learn more about their culture and to become more comfortable in his interactions with them. He also admires Chinese people's ability to plan and make sacrifices for the benefit of future family generations. He feels that this emphasis on family is important and that it would make a valuable contribution to North American culture. Ron also strives to be unbiased in his beliefs about Chinese people and other ethnic groups, which is reflected in his willingness to critically examine his beliefs about other groups — something that he has done for much of his adult life. He is also concerned with the impression that immigrants form of Canadians and strives to provide these people with positive experiences.

Although Ron attempts to be unbiased in his beliefs about Chinese people, he is aware of generalizing about this group. That is, he feels that his beliefs about Chinese people generally apply to them as a group. He also generalizes from his contact experiences with Chinese people. Specific beliefs about Chinese people are based on an initial feeling that he then evaluates by reflecting on his contact experiences with members of this group. The overall emotional response that results from these recalled contact experiences then forms the basis of a belief about this group. Ron also

acknowledges that apart from associating specific characteristics with Chinese people, he has not considered his beliefs in any further detail.

Nicole

Personal Information

Nicole's stereotyping score for Native Indians was 0.348, indicating that she holds relatively undifferentiated (i.e., stereotypical) beliefs about the members of this group. Her stereotyping score for white Canadians was 0.568, meaning that she holds relatively differentiated (i.e., non-stereotypical) beliefs about the members of her own group. The difference between both stereotyping scores was 0.220, indicating a considerable difference in the degree of differentiation in her beliefs about both groups.

Nicole is 21 years of age and has lived in Alberta all of her life. She began university after completing high school and has lived in Edmonton for three years. At the time of the interviews, she was completing her fourth year of the B.Ed. program and was majoring in Elementary Education. Her plans are to return to her community and teach in an elementary school.

Nicole holds stereotypical beliefs about Native Indians and has had extensive contact with members of this group. When she was 13 years of age, her parents moved to an area in which many Native people lived. In the following excerpt, she describes her first experience of contact with Native people:

> . . . my first contact with a Native family was I met this girl in Grade 9. I don't even know how I became friends with her. We just seemed to become friends. She had beautiful beaded moccasins and I really liked the beadwork on there. And I've always kind of liked sewing and knitting stuff. I told her I wanted to learn how to do that and she said, "Well, come home with me and talk to my mom. My mom will teach you." You know, just like that, "My mom will teach you." So I thought, "Okay", and I walked in the house and she introduced me to her mom. And her mom was like, "Hi, how are you?" . . . The first question she asked me was if I was

> hungry. And I blushed and said, "Yeah." She went and got me a bowl of soup and put the bannock on the table, and kicked her son out of the chair and let me sit at the table and eat [laughter]. Then I asked her and she said, "Okay, sure. Come back tomorrow." So I went back over there the next day with my friend and she had all the stuff set up for me and she said, "Choose your colours that you need." And every night for two weeks I would go over there for about an hour and she'd sit with me and teach me how to do it. I'd go home and do it, practice, and come back and learn a new way. She was such a great lady because she just was always so friendly and willing to help.

Such contact experiences had a positive impact on Nicole's beliefs about Native Indians and when she was fourteen years of age, her "stereotypes just flipped upside down." She feels that by age fifteen, her own beliefs about Native Indians became firmly established.

The analysis of Nicole's experience is presented in tabular form in Appendix K. The excerpts taken from the transcribed interview with Nicole are presented in the first column of Table 5. They appear in the order that they occurred in the interview transcript. The second column of Table 5 contains the themes that were formulated to capture the essence of the excerpts. In Table 6, these themes are clustered into more abstract themes. The numbers that appear in brackets below each of the themes indicate the specific excerpts that contribute to that theme.

Overall Synthesis of Nicole's Experience

Nicole views Native Indians as friendly, helpful, very generous, honest, and generally forthright about their thoughts and feelings. Moreover, they are seen as being superstitious and as not truly accepting whites into their culture. She also views many Native Indians as trapped within the welfare system because of their lack of both education and opportunities. Most Native Indians are also seen as having alcohol and other substance addictions. Nicole considers Native society to be "very unstructured" and believes that it permits a great deal of personal freedom. Although she views Native

Indians as unwilling to compete with one another, she feels that they are ambitious but that they establish their own, personal standards for success. Native Indians are also viewed as relaxed and informal about receiving guests into their homes. She also feels that they are open and honest about family matters. In terms of their family life, Nicole feels that Native Indians advocate large families, discourage child discipline, and have a high level of respect for their children. She also considers most Native Indians to have a great deal of respect for the elders within their community.

In contrast, Nicole views whites as non-superstitious and feels that they are competitive, self-centered, and unwilling to share with others. Most whites are also seen as dishonest or as being honest only when it benefits them. She also feels that most of them are unwilling to disclose information about family matters.

Nicole's earliest beliefs about Native Indians were largely negative ones and were shaped by her parents' beliefs. Her first contact with Native Indians, which was prompted by her desire to oppose her parents, was positive and resulted in a transformation of these early beliefs. Initially, her contact experiences with Native Indians were positive and resulted in positive beliefs about this group. Several later contact experiences, however, caused her to become aware of the existence of exceptions to these beliefs and of the need to consider Native Indians as individuals. At present, Nicole considers her beliefs about Native Indians to be experientially-based and fully her own. She feels that these beliefs were fully formed when she was fifteen years of age and that they will not change in the future. She also feels that her beliefs about Native Indians are accurate, based on her experiences with Native Indians, but that other people may show these beliefs to be inaccurate.

Nicole is aware of exceptions to her beliefs about Native Indians and has also considered possible cultural, historical, or situational causes of some of the behavior that she has observed in members of this group. She is also aware of the potential limitations of her beliefs about Native Indians and recognizes that these beliefs may be influenced by

contextual factors such as Native Indians' treatment of her as an outsider and her lengthy exposure to, and familiarity with, members of this group.

Nicole sympathizes with the circumstances of Native Indians and feels that many of them need support if they are to avoid conforming to the cultural stereotype of Native Indians. She also feels that various aspects of Native culture are valuable, such as its orientation toward child-rearing, for example. Nicole is receptive to Native Indians and expresses a desire to learn more about their culture. She also strives to be unbiased in her beliefs about Native Indians, which is reflected in her efforts to view them as individuals. Moreover, she attempts to alter others' negative beliefs about Native Indians or to encourage others who have had negative contact experiences with Native Indians not to generalize from such experiences.

Although Nicole strives to be unbiased in her beliefs about Native Indians, she is aware of generalizing about this group. She is also aware of assuming that Native Indians as a group exhibit the same characteristics as the Native Indians that she has encountered. Nicole also believes that the behavior of Native Indians who represent exceptions to some of her beliefs about this group is constrained by serious personal problems or other, situational factors. As a result, she does not feel that these people represent true exceptions to her beliefs. She also acknowledges that apart from associating specific characteristics with Native Indians, she has not considered her beliefs in more specific terms.

Keith

Personal Information

Keith's stereotyping score for Koreans was 0.591, indicating that he holds relatively undifferentiated (i.e., stereotypical) beliefs about the members of this group. His stereotyping score for white Canadians was 0.776, meaning that he holds relatively differentiated (i.e., non-stereotypical) beliefs about the members of his own group. The

difference between both stereotyping scores was 0.185, indicating a considerable difference in the degree of differentiation in his beliefs about both groups.

Keith is 23 years of age and has lived in Alberta all of his life. At the time of the interviews, Keith was completing his fourth year of the B.Ed. program in Secondary Education. He indicated that his goals after completing his degree were not clear at that time.

Keith holds stereotypical beliefs about Koreans and held only a "generic view" of this group until several years ago. His contact experiences have been limited to a friendship that he formed with a Korean student while at university and exposure to other Koreans through this friendship. This friendship played a central role in shaping his beliefs about Koreans and he described his friend in the following way:

> I think what struck me about him was that he was very nice, very self-motivated, didn't seem to have a lot of family problems. He seemed to have a good family base. No relationship problems, you know, like with girlfriends. Not messed up in ways that a lot of my Canadian friends are, I guess. He seemed to be a fairly smooth personality. He's a nice guy to be around. . . . Yeah, I think that it just struck me that he seemed to have a clear relationship with his parents, you know, like I think maybe a clear respect for his parents.

The analysis of Keith's experience is presented in tabular form in Appendix L. The excerpts taken from the transcribed interview with Keith are presented in the first column of Table 7. They appear in the order that they occurred in the interview transcript. The second column of Table 7 contains the themes that were formulated to capture the essence of the excerpts. In Table 8, these themes are clustered into more abstract themes. The numbers that appear in brackets below each of the themes indicate the specific excerpts that contribute to that theme.

Overall Synthesis of Keith's Experience

Keith views Koreans as industrious, well-spoken, kind, cleanly, very studious, business-oriented, and excelling in a wide range of areas, including areas where creativity is required. They are also seen as maintaining both a close community and a strongly traditional family structure.

Keith views discrimination against other groups as having been absent from his upbringing. His first exposure to Koreans occurred through the mass media and he describes himself as having had only a "generic view of Asians" at that time. His beliefs about Koreans later emerged as a result of an Asian history course and establishing a friendship with a Korean student. During the interview, discussion of the general issue of exceptions to beliefs resulted in Keith becoming more aware of the existence of exceptions to his beliefs about Koreans. Nevertheless, he feels that the proportion of exceptions to his beliefs about Koreans is smaller than the proportion of exceptions to his beliefs about white Canadians. He also views Korean society as more uniform or homogeneous than Canadian society, and as therefore exhibiting a narrower range of exceptions for any specific belief.

Keith has also considered possible situational causes of some of the behavior that he has observed in Koreans. He is aware of the potential limitations of his beliefs about Koreans and feels that because of his limited exposure to members of this group, his beliefs about them are flexible and open to change. He views these beliefs as making him more receptive to further contact with Koreans and to learning more about their culture. He also feels that his university education has changed the way in which he understands other groups and that his beliefs about Koreans are undergoing continual change.

Keith strives to be unbiased toward Koreans and other ethnic groups, which is reflected in his efforts to avoid speaking about Koreans in a way that might be interpreted by others as prejudiced. He also avoids referring to Koreans as a group when describing the behavior of Korean immigrants.

Although Keith attempts to be unbiased in his beliefs about Koreans, he is aware of generalizing about Koreans and believes that general characteristics can be used to describe groups. He acknowledges that he associates characteristics with Koreans as a group, based on his perception of the lack of exceptions to these characteristics. Keith is also aware of generalizing from his contact experiences with Koreans. He considers his friendship with a Korean student to have been the main factor shaping his beliefs about Koreans and qualities that were exhibited by his friend were attributed to Koreans as a group. At times, however, exposure to new, belief-inconsistent information about Koreans has caused him to question the accuracy of some of his beliefs, as well as the appropriateness of generalizing from his personal experiences with Koreans. Nevertheless, his belief in the importance of personal contact as a source of information about other groups reconfirms his belief in the appropriateness of this form of generalizing.

Keith also feels that his beliefs about Koreans have caused him to develop specific expectations about the characteristics that Koreans will display when he encounters them. As a result, he believes that he would be "a little bit shocked" if he encountered a Korean who did not conform to these expectations. Keith also acknowledges that apart from associating specific characteristics with Koreans in general, he has not considered his beliefs in more specific terms.

Shared Experience

From the data analysis, ten themes were found to be common to all of the participants. These themes included (1) Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup, (2) Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup, (3) Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup, (4) Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup, (5) Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup, (6) Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup, (7) Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup, (8) Considering Possible Causes of

Outgroup Behavior,(9) Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup, and (10) Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture. Through follow-up contacts, two other themes were also found to be common to all of the participants: (1) Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Evolving Versus Established but Open to Change and (2) Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values. It should be noted that the first of these two themes describes a polarity in that it includes two themes that occupy opposite ends of a continuum: (1) Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Evolving and (2) Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Established but Open to Change. Thus, each participant viewed his or her beliefs about the outgroup as being either (a) firmly established and accurate, but open to change; or (b) in a state of continual change, without emphasis on their accuracy. The themes that were shared by all of the participants are listed in Table 9 (see Appendix M).

Four of the themes that emerged from the within persons analyses, however, were not found to be common to all of the participants. The first theme, "Perceived Characteristics of the Ingroup", was shared by Karen, Ron, and Nicole. This theme refers to the specific beliefs that participants held about their own group. Karen and Nicole viewed a number of characteristics as applying to their own group. Similarly, during follow-up contact, Ron indicated that he held the belief that white Canadians as a group are "lazy". This theme was not found to be part of Keith's experience because he did not feel that he held any specific beliefs about his own group.

A second theme, "Sympathizing With the Outgroup", was part of only Karen and Nicole's experience. It refers to participants' sympathizing with the circumstances or treatment of outgroup members within society. Such sympathizing was prompted by perceived discrimination against outgroup members or the perceived difficulties experienced by outgroup members because of differences between their own culture and the larger culture. This theme also involves appreciating the difficulties faced by outgroup members because of their general status as a minority group within society.

This theme was not found to be part of Ron's or Keith's experience. Ron stated that he sympathized with *any* immigrant, regardless of ethnicity, when he or she is "singled out" by others who are racist but that he did not sympathize with a specific aspect of Chinese people's situation in particular. Similarly, Keith felt that there was no specific aspect of Koreans' situation with which he sympathized.

The third theme, "Awareness of Contextual Factors Influencing One's Beliefs About the Outgroup", was shared by Ron and Nicole. Ron was aware that his beliefs about Chinese people might be influenced by such factors as geographical location and the business-oriented nature of his interactions with members of this group. Similarly, Nicole felt that her beliefs about Native Indians might be influenced by contextual factors such as her familiarity with members of this group and their treatment of her as a member of the white majority group. Karen and Keith, however, were not aware of any such factors shaping their beliefs about the outgroup.

The final theme, "Perceiving a Lack of True Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup", was an aspect of only Nicole's experience. It reflects the view that outgroup members who display characteristics that are inconsistent with some of one's beliefs about the outgroup do not represent true exceptions to those beliefs. Specifically, Nicole felt that although the behavior of some Native Indians was inconsistent with some of her beliefs about this group, this behavior was in fact constrained by serious personal problems or situational factors. This theme, however, was not found to be part of Karen's, Ron's, or Keith's experience; they viewed the exceptions to their beliefs as being true exceptions. Specifically, the behavior of exceptional outgroup members was not considered to be the product of special circumstances that constrained their behavior.

Higher Order Themes

The themes that were common to all of the participants were then further clustered into more abstract themes, which are presented in Table 10 (see Appendix N). These higher order themes include: (1) Early Life Experiences Associated With One's

Beliefs About the Outgroup, (2) Generalizing: The Central Role of Personal Experience, (3) The Non-Specific Nature of Beliefs About the Outgroup, (4) Striving to Be Accurate and Flexible in One's Beliefs About the Outgroup, and (5) A Positive, Receptive Orientation Toward the Outgroup and Its Culture. The number that appears in parentheses after each shared theme indicates the number of the theme as it is presented in Table 9.

The themes that were common to all of the participants were also incorporated into an overall synthesis of the experience shared by all of the participants. This synthesis describes the shared aspects of the phenomenon for these participants — that which remains invariant in concrete, situated instances of the phenomenon. Moreover, the overall synthesis is a description of the phenomenon not as the participant lives it pre-reflectively but rather, as the researcher understands it. It is the product of the researcher's application of the phenomenological reduction to different instances of the phenomenon, as lived by individual participants. The following overall synthesis of the experience shared by all of the participants, then, provides a structural, generalized description of the phenomenon.

Overall Synthesis of the Shared Experience

All of the participants hold a set of specific beliefs about the outgroup and each of these beliefs is felt to be true of the outgroup in general. The characteristics that are associated with the outgroup are generally positive (i.e., desirable) but negative (i.e., undesirable) characteristics may also be present.

For Karen, Ron, and Keith, their upbringing emphasized a positive and accepting orientation toward the outgroup and other ethnic groups in general, while for Nicole, her upbringing fostered negative beliefs about the outgroup. Her beliefs were transformed, however, as a result of positive contact experiences with outgroup members. For all of the participants, their initial (and subsequent) contact experiences with outgroup members have generally been positive. The participants are also aware of exceptions to

their beliefs about the outgroup. For Ron and Nicole, this awareness results from contact experiences with exceptional outgroup members, while for Karen and Keith, it is based solely on a belief that such exceptions must exist. The participants have also reflected on possible causes — either situational, cultural, or historical — of some of the behavior that they have observed in outgroup members.

The participants are also aware of the potential limitations of their beliefs about the outgroup and acknowledge that their beliefs may not apply to the outgroup in general. Karen, Ron, and Nicole, however, feel that their present beliefs about the outgroup are accurate until such time as they are shown to be inaccurate. In contrast, Keith views his beliefs about the outgroup as changing continually because of new experiences with outgroup members and increased understanding of the outgroup's culture. Although the participants differ in their orientation toward the accuracy of their beliefs, all of them are nevertheless receptive to the possibility of changes in their beliefs.

All of the participants view some aspects of the outgroup's culture and values as valuable and feel that these elements can make a positive contribution to Western culture. Receptiveness to the outgroup and to learning more about the outgroup's culture is also present. Moreover, the participants strive to be unbiased in their beliefs about the outgroup. This is expressed in a variety of ways, such as: (a) attempting to avoid generalizing and instead, evaluating outgroup members as individuals; (b) continually examining the basis for one's beliefs about the outgroup; (c) attempting to be open-minded and culturally sensitive; or (d) avoiding statements about the outgroup that might be interpreted by others as prejudicial.

Although the participants attempt to be unbiased in their beliefs about the outgroup, they are aware of generalizing. That is, they view specific characteristics as applying to most members of the outgroup. Karen and Nicole view such generalizing as inappropriate; they try to evaluate outgroup members as individuals but acknowledge that they nevertheless generalize about the outgroup. Ron and Keith, however, do not

view their generalizing as unjustified. In fact, they believe that specific characteristics can be used to describe the outgroup (or groups in general). The participants also generalize from their contact experiences with outgroup members to the outgroup in general. Thus, the participants' beliefs about the outgroup are based, to a large extent, on their contact experiences with outgroup members. Karen dislikes the fact that she generalizes from her contact experiences with outgroup members but finds it difficult to avoid doing so. Alternatively, Ron and Keith do not view such generalizing as inappropriate and feel that personal contact constitutes an important source of information about other groups.

The participants also acknowledge that they have not reflected on more specific aspects of their beliefs about the outgroup. That is, they associate general characteristics with the outgroup but have not considered these beliefs in any further detail.

In chapter 5, the common themes that emerged from the data analysis are discussed and related to the literature presented in chapter 2 and other relevant literature. The higher order themes described in chapter 4 are used as a framework for organizing the discussion.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the twelve general themes or dimensions of the lived-world that have been revealed in this investigation of stereotyping will be discussed. These themes will also be related to the literature discussed in chapter 2 and to other, relevant literature. The higher order themes that were outlined in chapter 4 will serve as the framework for organizing the discussion. It should be emphasized that although these themes are discussed here in isolation, they are not experienced discretely.

Early Life Experiences Associated With One's Beliefs About the Outgroup

Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup

Exploring participants' early beliefs about the outgroup revealed that early parental influences were instrumental in shaping the participants' general orientation toward the outgroup, and in Nicole's case, shaping some of her beliefs about the outgroup. For Karen, Ron, and Keith, these parental influences were positive in nature. That is, they described upbringings in which their parents promoted values such as acceptance of, and sensitivity toward, other ethnic groups. These values engendered a positive, receptive orientation toward other groups and were important in establishing the form of initial interactions with outgroup members. For example, Ron described his parents as having "no preconceived ideas about what anybody was like and that we had to treat them all as individuals". He described his father, in particular, as having taught him to be open-minded and to focus on the positive aspects of other groups:

> I think some of my beliefs about Chinese people may have been adopted from my father. He was very, very smart — he always taught that every culture, every group of people, has something valuable to offer. If they didn't, they wouldn't have survived as long as they have. . . . And I think some of it may have come from my father, just generally being open-minded about anything. Looking for the good first and finding out what you can in a non-predatorial way.

In discussing her early family life, Karen emphasized the importance that was placed on accepting ethnic diversity:

> from my own background, . . . in the way in which I was socialized, it was to be accepting of minority groups. That diversity was the proper way to go, that we should recognize that kind of diversity and, you know, accept it.

Similarly, Keith described the lack of discrimination present in his upbringing:

> Well, I don't think I ever remember my parents saying anything negative about them [i.e., Koreans] or making any jokes about them or anything. . . . Maybe just, you know, having an upbringing that really didn't focus on discrimination. . . . My parents never really talked about Koreans or any group really.

In contrast, Nicole described her parents as having fostered negative beliefs about Native Indians. She described her parents as having been "very prejudiced" toward this group and felt that her parents had shaped her initial beliefs about Native Indians prior to her having had any contact with members of this group. She describes the impact that this had on her as a child:

> I guess it kind of made me avoid a lot of Native people in elementary and I wasn't really nice to Native children. I didn't play with them and tended to look at them as being [redacted] from me. . . . There was a group of us who weren't really nice to Native kids in our school and we tended to call them little savages and, "You're not Christian, you don't believe in God of any type and you worship the devil." — things like that. I think my parents, like, they don't say that but I think that just the fact that they were saying Native people are different from us because they drink all the time, they're lazy, they're on welfare. They really focused on the differences. There were no similarities. They kind of gave us almost, "We are good, they are bad." So everything that we considered bad became what Native people are.

It is evident from this description that Nicole's earliest beliefs about Native Indians included many of the characteristics found in the cultural stereotype of this group (e.g., laziness, alcohol abuse, and dependence on the welfare system).

The finding that parental influences played a key role in establishing the initial orientation — whether positive or negative — toward other ethnic groups is consistent with the sociocultural approach to stereotyping and intergroup relations (e.g., see Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). As mentioned earlier, this theoretical perspective emphasizes the role of social learning processes in the acquisition of stereotypical beliefs and the maintenance of these beliefs through social reinforcements obtained from parents, peers, and other important reference groups. Thus, from a sociocultural perspective, we acquire stereotypes through the socialization process, which involves exposure to the culture's current beliefs about particular groups within society. The sociocultural orientation also emphasizes the social channels through which stereotypes are transmitted (Miller, 1982a). The present finding is consistent with the sociocultural perspective in that exposure to parents' general orientation toward other groups and/or their beliefs about those groups emerged as an important aspect of the experiences of all of the participants. Only Nicole, however, appears to have been exposed to the type of socialization process mentioned earlier, in which parents, as socializing agents, directly transmitted aspects of the prevailing cultural stereotype of Native Indians (e.g., laziness, alcohol abuse, and abuse of the welfare system). Karen, Ron, and Keith appear to have been free of such socialization pressures from their parents.

Although Nicole was unlike the other participants in having had parents who fostered a negative orientation toward the outgroup, as an adolescent, her orientation toward Native Indians was altered radically. This change in her beliefs was precipitated by a desire to oppose her parents, as is evident in the following description:

> It was a rebellion thing, I think, at first, where my parents were very prejudiced and they didn't want me to have anything to do with these Native people. And I kind of decided, "Oh, I'll be friends with these people", you know, just to bug them. And I started realizing, you know, they [i.e., my parents] weren't always right and the more contact I had with Native people, the more I realized that a lot of people judged them a lot and felt fine labelling them. When I was fourteen, my stereotypes just flipped upside down.

Nicole's desire to oppose her parents therefore appears to have been a crucial factor in initiating change in her early beliefs about Native Indians. Her growing experiences with outgroup members then provided her with the basis for challenging the beliefs that she had adopted from her parents. Through this process, positive beliefs were able to replace her earlier, negative beliefs about Native Indians.

Nicole's description also reveals an important aspect of experience that was shared by all of the participants. Specifically, all of the participants described having had positive initial contact experiences with outgroup members. These positive initial experiences appear to have been important in establishing the tenor of subsequent interactions with outgroup members. As is evident in Nicole's description, the important role of positive early contact experiences with outgroup members is also reflected in the capacity of these experiences to transform initially negative beliefs about an outgroup. Her first true contact with Native people occurred during Grade 9 and was a positive and growthful experience:

> . . . my first contact with a Native family was I met this girl in Grade 9. . . . She had beautiful beaded moccasins. . . . I told her I wanted to learn how to do that and she said, "Well, come home with me and talk to my mom. My mom will teach you." . . . And every night for two weeks I would go over there for about an hour and she'd sit with me and teach me how to do it. I'd go home and do it, practice, and

> come back and learn a new way. She was such a great lady because she just was always so friendly and willing to help.

For the other participants, whose upbringing fostered an accepting/non-discriminatory orientation toward other ethnic groups, these early experiences also appear to have been a crucial factor in determining the eventual view taken of the outgroup. This was clear in Ron's description of his first experiences with Chinese people:

> I think the Lee family probably was my first real contact with Chinese and that would have been in Grade 10, 11, and 12. . . . But my experience with that family was very positive . . . and because of the first experience, I probably would use it as the measuring stick for all encounters thereafter. Not probably, I know I did. . . . I think if your first experiences were good, you're going to look and focus on the good. If your first experience was bad, then everything is tainted.

For Ron, his first contact experiences with Chinese people provided him with a standard for evaluating subsequent interactions with members of this group.

Early contact experiences, then, appear to have played an important role in shaping the participants' later beliefs about the outgroup. Thus, if a person's early contact experiences are negative, they can, as Ron described, "taint" subsequent interactions with outgroup members and result in negative later beliefs about the outgroup. Conversely, if a person's early contact experiences are positive, they may, as in Nicole's case, be capable of altering an initially negative orientation toward an outgroup and result in positive later beliefs about the outgroup.

The findings presented in this section of the discussion are consistent with Romanyshyn's (1971) description of attitude as relating a person to aspects of his or her own history. Much like attitudes, beliefs also relate people to their own history. The importance of early life experiences (e.g., parental influences), especially early contact experiences with outgroup members, in shaping beliefs about the outgroup reveals the

role of people's life-histories in stereotyping. The present findings are also consistent with Lazar's (1991) finding that participants' personal experiences with outgroup members, including their upbringing and religious or moral beliefs, was the most important element shaping their attitude toward the outgroup. Additionally, in terms of quantitative research, the important role played by early contact experiences in determining the nature of subsequent interactions with outgroup members and the form of later beliefs about the outgroup is consistent with studies indicating that past experiences influence the seeking and processing of new information (for reviews, see Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stephan, 1985).

Generalizing: The Central Role of Personal Experience

Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup

Each of the participants held a set of specific beliefs about the outgroup. The majority of these beliefs were positive in nature, such as the following beliefs that Ron held about Chinese people:

> I believe they are as a group — that's generally speaking — on standardized IQ tests they score higher. I believe that. That's been my experience. They're generally hard-working, very family-oriented, generally quite friendly . . . but I think there's a genuine friendliness when it's expressed.

It is important to emphasize that such beliefs are intentional phenomena that relate people to others in the social world. Intergroup beliefs have an object focus, namely, outgroup members. As mentioned earlier, phenomenological thought emphasizes intentionality in that all consciousness is viewed as consciousness *of* something. Thus, an essential aspect of beliefs involves their intentional relatedness to the world. Intentionality, as it relates to attitude, has been discussed by a number of researchers (e.g., Ashworth, 1980, 1985, 1986; Lazar, 1991; Romanyshyn, 1971). Ashworth (1986) describes this intentional relatedness in the following way:

> Thus objects of awareness — even of perceptual awareness — are not, cannot be, sense-data copies of objects in the 'outer world'. One does not see meaningless sense data to which a meaning is later attached. My percepts are 'relatednesses' intrinsically. They have a meaning which is bipolar. On the one hand the object, on the other hand the self. So that the percept is inextricably caught up in a net of meanings. It is part of my life-world. (p. 293)

Intergroup beliefs are therefore not knowledge structures "inside one's head" (i.e., a state of the self), as social cognition maintains, but rather, a state of the field (Ashworth, 1980; McLeod, 1947) or being-in-the-world. They are expressed in one's perception of the world (Ashworth, 1980).

It is also evident from the analysis of the participants' beliefs about the outgroup that differences between the ingroup and the outgroup were often focused upon. This is consistent with quantitative research on contrast effects in stereotyping (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978; Taylor & Falcone, 1982; Wilder, 1981; Wilder & Allen, 1978). Similarly, in his phenomenological investigation of prejudice, Lazar (1991) found that participants who displayed prejudice focused on differences between the ingroup and the outgroup, which fostered stereotypical thinking and group-based evaluation.

Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup

The participants also felt that their beliefs were true of the outgroup in general. This tendency to generalize is considered to be the defining characteristic of stereotyping and is often a direct consequence of the categorization process (Anderson, 1980; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Wilder, 1981). In the social world, generalization occurs when a person observes a specific characteristic or pattern of characteristics in two or more members of the same group and then, often implicitly, forms an association between that characteristic and the social group involved. In this way, people often come to believe that the members of a particular group have certain characteristics in common. These beliefs, in turn, form the basis of our stereotypes.

Although the participants were aware of generalizing about the outgroup, they differed in their feelings about the appropriateness of such generalizations. Karen and Nicole viewed generalizing as wrong or unjustified, and therefore strove to avoid it. Nevertheless, they were aware of the difficulty of escaping this process, as reflected in the following statement by Karen:

> But I guess that sometimes it's almost impossible to get away from it, uh, categorizing and/or making generalizations about a specific group of people. So that you just tend to naturally fall into certain kinds of patterns of thinking.

From this statement, Karen makes clear the ease with which we can engage in generalizing despite our conscious efforts to avoid doing so. Similarly, Nicole makes a concerted effort to avoid generalizing but acknowledges the extensiveness of her generalizing about others:

> So I try — I *really* [her emphasis] try — to look at people as individuals but . . . [heavy sigh] I do stereotype pretty widely. Maybe it's my upbringing but I do tend to categorize people.

An added difficulty that can confront a person involves the difficulty associated with knowing when he or she is in fact generalizing. Specifically, it may sometimes be difficult to determine if a particular belief about an outgroup represents an inaccurate or unjustified generalization. Karen describes how she found herself in this position:

> Well, sometimes you have a nagging feeling in the back of your mind that you are [generalizing] — "hmm, is this a caricature of some [group]" — and you're not really dealing with, you know, what you're really seeing? Is it just a caricature . . . or is it an authentic way of looking at it? And it's very difficult, I think, making these kinds of distinctions.

In contrast, Ron and Keith did not view their generalizing about the outgroup as incorrect or unjustified. A person may hold a general belief that traits or other

characteristics can be used to accurately or adequately describe social groups. This belief was evident in Keith's willingness to generalize about outgroups in general:

> I think there's general characteristics that describe groups. You know, sometimes they're good and sometimes they're bad. I don't really think that's prejudice because I'm not saying that it's the group's or a different group's fault. Maybe it's a condition or whatever.

Another factor that may contribute to a person's willingness to generalize about a group is the perceived absence of information that is inconsistent with the generalization. Thus, given a perceived lack of exceptions, a person may believe that a particular characteristic applies to a group in general. This was evident in Keith's belief that Koreans as a group are industrious:

> I guess there would be reasons why I attach it [i.e., the trait of industrious] to the group [i.e., Koreans]. I mean, it doesn't seem like they have a lot of poverty in the country. They seem to have fairly uniform and good social standards. . . . I've never really seen anything about poverty or crime in South Korea. Uhm, I can't think of any qualifiers . . . yeah, I guess I label them as a group.

Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup

When the participants' generalizing about the outgroup is examined more closely, it is evident that their personal contact experiences played a fundamental role in this process. Karen and Keith, however, indicated that their beliefs about the outgroup were shaped partially by other influences. Specifically, Keith felt that knowledge of the Korean economy and culture that he gained through an Asian history course helped him to formulate his beliefs about Koreans. Similarly, Karen stated that her beliefs about Native Indians were influenced to some extent by what she had read about them. Nevertheless, the participants' beliefs about the outgroup appeared to be based, to a large extent, on their contact experiences with outgroup members. These contact experiences

were relied upon almost exclusively when participants reflected on, evaluated, or justified their beliefs about the outgroup.

The central role of contact experiences in the participants' beliefs about the outgroup is well illustrated in Ron's description of the basis for his beliefs about Chinese people:

> [When I'm thinking about a trait that I apply to Chinese people], it's more like pictures — pictures flashing of situations or episodes. You know, Mr. So-and-So here, Mr. So-and-So, and the time I remember he did that. . . . And with each picture, you have another emotional response, "Oh yeah, that was good. That was good. That was horrible." So you count the emotional responses, I guess, and most of them are one way or another, and that's how you base your overall belief system. It's how you feel overall.

Thus, it appears that Ron relies exclusively on his previous contact experiences with outgroup members in arriving at his beliefs about the outgroup. For Ron, reflecting on these experiences results in an overall emotional response that then serves as the basis for a particular belief.

The key role played by contact experiences is also evident in Keith's description of the role that his friendship with a Korean student played in shaping his beliefs about Koreans:

> . . . I think from contact with my [Korean] friend, I sort of did generalize towards the population too because I really hadn't met anybody else Korean, right. . . . It's pretty good to take a history course and to learn a bit about the [Korean] culture — it was only a couple of lectures [about Korea] because the course was about the entire Southeast Asian area. So, I think the contact with my friend was the big thing. I mean, I may have thought of them as similar to the Chinese without having known him. Yeah, so it's probably contact that probably shapes beliefs the most, I think.

Insights into the role of personal contact experiences in the participants' beliefs about the outgroup can also be gained from participants' descriptions of the experience of completing the screening instrument. Nicole, for example, gave the following description:

> I think that my experiences [with Native Indians] did come into the survey [i.e., screening instrument] because I started out with one belief system and changed it — through my experiences it changed. . . . My experiences did have a *large* [her emphasis] part on it [i.e., completing the screening instrument], you know. I guess I did look at a lot of the situations when I was answering the questions because those are the Native people I know and have experienced. And I guess I kind of went with "the majority rules" kind of thing, where, "Okay, you know, most of them [in my experience] are this way, so most of all of them must be this way."

In this description, it is clear that in outlining her beliefs about Native Indians, Nicole relied to a large extent on her experiences with members of this group. Specifically, she generalized from her contact experiences to the outgroup in general, based on her belief that other Native Indians would be similar to those that she had encountered.

The extent to which the participants relied on contact experiences in formulating their beliefs about the outgroup is also reflected in some participants' descriptions of how they evaluated the accuracy of their beliefs. Ron, for example, described how he evaluated some of his beliefs about Chinese people:

> When you're constantly scanning [your experiences] — you can always challenge it [i.e., a belief]. Like, maybe I do have an overinflated sense of certain qualities of Chinese people on the whole, and I have to challenge that because, I mean, that's a stereotype too, that I've created for myself. So let's look at it. Are they really that different than another group of people? . . . When I try to do that, I still come to basically the same conclusions, based on my experience.

From this description, it is evident that Ron has evaluated the accuracy of his beliefs about Chinese people by reflecting on the very contact experiences upon which these beliefs are based. Not surprisingly, this process confirms the apparent accuracy of his beliefs.

The centrality of personal contact experiences is further displayed in some participants' general conviction about the importance of contact experiences in providing information about other groups. This is illustrated in the following description given by Keith:

> I kind of wondered how, you know, is this entire [Korean] population really that friendly [like my Korean friend]? You know, I kind of wondered that because some of the demonstrations [during the 1988 Olympics] seemed to be fairly [anti-West]. . . . Yeah, but I think I've thought that you can't generalize but yet still, what would you know about a people other than what you get from contact — the human factor?

Thus, Keith has encountered information that has prompted him to question the appropriateness of generalizing from his contact experiences with Koreans. Nevertheless, his belief in the importance of personal contact as a source of information about other groups reconfirms his belief in the appropriateness of generalizing in this way.

The participants' personal contact experiences with outgroup members therefore appear to have played a dominant role in how they came to know about the outgroup, while other sources of information about the outgroup (e.g., sociocultural influences, base-rate information) were less influential or were overlooked. In considering this finding, however, it is important to emphasize that one of the criteria for selecting participants for this study was that they had experienced face-to-face contact with the outgroup. This criterion played an important role during the interviews, which involved exploring in depth the participants' contact experiences with outgroup members. Thus, it may have

fostered a focus on the role of personal contact experiences in constituting the participants' beliefs about the outgroup. In considering the *extent* to which this occurred, however, it is important to emphasize that other influences (e.g., sociocultural) were also explored during the interviews[3].

The central role of contact experiences in the participants' beliefs about the outgroup is an important finding, given that in his review, Brigham (1971) indicated that the sources from which people obtain information about the characteristics to attribute to specific ethnic groups have not been elucidated. Moreover, with the emergence of a process-oriented, cognitive approach to stereotype research in the 1970's (Schneider, 1991), this issue is still unaddressed at present. It should be noted, however, that in his phenomenological investigation of prejudice, Lazar (1991) made a similar finding. Specifically, he found that participants' attitudes toward the outgroup resulted primarily from personal experiences with outgroup members. It should be added here that the central role of contact experiences may arise because they represent information about the outgroup that is experienced personally. Such information is not only likely to be more salient but also more personally *meaningful* than information about the outgroup that is obtained from other sources.

Another aspect of the present finding, namely, the participants' generalizing from their contact experiences to the outgroup as a whole, has been implied in the quantitative literature. Specifically, several studies (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Quattrone & Jones, 1980) have shown that people tend to make stronger generalizations from the behavior of a specific group member to the group as a whole (i.e., person-to-group generalizations) for an outgroup than for the ingroup. Quattrone

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[3] It should be added here that the vast majority of people in society have likely had *some* form of personal contact — even if such contact is brief and superficial in nature — with members of outgroups for which stereotypical beliefs are held. Moreover, as suggested by the research on illusory correlations (e.g., Hamilton, 1981a; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976), contact with outgroup members that occurs infrequently is salient and can be influential in shaping our stereotypical beliefs.

and Jones (1980), for example, conducted a study in which undergraduates from Princeton and Rutgers were asked to rate the variability of their own group and the outgroup. They were required to view a tape of either a Princeton or a Rutgers student making a choice during a psychology experiment (e.g., to wait alone or to wait with others). After viewing the choice of the student, subjects were asked to estimate the proportion of students from that university who would make the same decision. The results of the main study showed that subjects tended to generalize from the target person to that person's group. Additionally, these person-to-group inferences were stronger for the outgroup than for the ingroup but only when subjects had a weak prior expectation about what the target person's choice was likely to be.

Another important point to be made here involves the personal rather than consensual nature of the participants' stereotypical beliefs. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) distinguish between "stereotype" and "cultural stereotype" because both concepts have been referred to as "stereotypes". They have argued that distinguishing between them is important for conceptual clarity (i.e., enhancing communication) and for identifying new areas of research. Given that the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup appear to have been based largely on personal contact experiences with outgroup members, they were therefore "personal" beliefs (i.e., beliefs that the participants arrived at largely themselves) rather than beliefs that were consensual or culturally shared. Thus, these beliefs constituted a "personal stereotype" (Brigham, 1971) rather than a cultural stereotype. It should be emphasized that although the prevailing cultural stereotype of the outgroup likely played *some* role in shaping participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup, their personal experiences appear to have played a larger and more definitive role in this process. Even for Nicole and Keith, whose early beliefs were influenced significantly by culturally shared beliefs about the outgroup, their personal experiences with outgroup members ultimately formed the basis of their present beliefs about the outgroup.

The Non-Specific Nature of Beliefs About the Outgroup

Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup

An important finding to emerge from the data analysis is that apart from associating specific characteristics with the outgroup, the participants did not consider their beliefs in more specific terms. Thus, they did not consider more specific aspects of their beliefs, such as the proportion (or percentage) of outgroup members who would display a particular characteristic or the different levels that a characteristic might possess, for example. When Karen was asked about the proportion of Native Indians who would display a quality like "analytical", she replied, "I really haven't thought about it." Similarly, Keith viewed Koreans in general as being industrious and when asked if he thought about this and other attributes in quantitative terms such as percentages, he stated:

> Uhm . . . no, I don't know if I really attach percentages to the different things. . . . But I don't know what — it's sort of like I had trouble with the [screening] instrument, trying to figure out percentages because I don't know if I really think like that.

Although none of the participants considered their beliefs about the outgroup in more specific terms, their reasons for not doing so may have varied. As was evident from Karen's earlier statement, some participants may simply not have given any thought to more specific aspects of their beliefs. For example, Keith's difficulty in considering his beliefs in quantitative terms such as percentages is reflected in the following excerpt:

> Maybe in Canada we have more people who — we have a greater range. We have people who maybe are richer and you know, more millionaires. But we also have people who are poor and I don't know if that means that they're lazy or not but uh, given the situation and the economy or whatever. And uh yeah, I find it fairly hard to think in percentages of the group.

From this description, it is evident that thinking about his beliefs in terms of percentages is a foreign task for Keith.

For other participants, considering their beliefs in more specific terms such as percentages was simply not seen as relevant or meaningful. For example, Ron's beliefs about Chinese people were largely affective in nature and viewing them in terms of percentages was considered to be irrelevant:

> [I think about how a trait applies to Chinese people] on an emotional gut level. I mean, obviously you have to back it up with some statistical analysis [i.e., examination of his contact experiences] but it's the same: 95%, 90% — I don't think that really matters. I don't think those numbers are really relevant. It's a feeling and I look back and I go, "What experiences have you had with these people?" And you go look it over, "Well yeah, most of them." An awful lot and maybe it is 95% but maybe it's only 85%. Maybe the bad experiences, I've forgotten them all. . . . I mean, that is a possibility because of the facts; it's just [that] what I feel is [what is] important. Uhm . . . and no, I don't think I'd look at it quantitatively. At least I hope — I mean, I'm not that analytical.

Although Ron, like the other participants, did not consider any of his beliefs about the outgroup in specific terms, it is evident from this excerpt that less precise terms (i.e., "most of them") are used to describe the prevalence of a trait in the outgroup.

In the following excerpt, Nicole described how she would use similar terms if she were required to elaborate on her beliefs about Native Indians:

> I guess I wouldn't really think of it [i.e., a trait that she applies to Native Indians] in quantitative terms. Not really, unless I was talking to somebody who hadn't had any experience with Native people. Then I would say to them, "The majority of the Native people that I've met have been this way. Most of them have."

This tendency for the participants to think about their beliefs in general terms, however, should not be interpreted as arising because they held their beliefs to be true of

all outgroup members. As will be discussed later, the participants were aware of the existence of exceptions to their beliefs about the outgroup. The point that is being made here is that although the participants may have believed that a characteristic applied to most members of the outgroup, it was not considered in more specific terms.

This finding is an important one, given how stereotypes have been conceptualized and measured in previous research. From their historical review of past efforts to understand stereotypes, Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) drew the following conclusion:

> Past attempts to understand stereotypes have been shaped more by methodological factors than by conceptual analysis. The overwhelming majority of publications concerned with stereotypes have been descriptive, (i.e., "x group of perceivers holds the following beliefs about the characteristics of group y"). And, most of the descriptive studies have used the Katz and Braly (1933) adjective checklist procedure. . . . The accumulation of descriptive studies has occurred in the absence of consensus among researchers about a number of important conceptual questions regarding stereotypes. (p. 11)

For Ashmore and Del Boca, two conceptual questions are: What is a stereotype? How should stereotypes be studied?

Similarly, in his review of the literature on ethnic stereotypes, Brigham (1971) noted that nearly fifty years after the term "stereotype" was introduced, there was little consensus among stereotype researchers and theorists about important conceptual questions such as: What is a stereotype? What is the function and importance of stereotypes? Brigham (1971) maintained that because this conceptual ambiguity has been largely ignored, "the accumulated research products will necessarily remain fragmented and of limited value until these conceptual questions are resolved, or at least recognized" (p. 15). More recently, Gardner (1994) stated that the terms "stereotype" and "prejudice" contain much excess meaning and have therefore lost much of their scientific utility:

> Both terms have acquired such a great deal of excess meaning (often in the absence of any empirical justification) that when researchers gather to discuss them, they often talk at cross purposes. Theorists use the same terms to refer to very different phenomena, often referring to the same previous research, and then are surprised to find that they disagree on very basic conclusions. (p. 1)

He adds that the concept of stereotype contains even more excess meanings than the concept of prejudice and that researchers and theorists must consider carefully the way in which stereotypes have been assessed when discussing stereotyping.

As mentioned earlier, historically, the Katz and Braly (1933) adjective checklist procedure has dominated research on stereotypes, representing the prevailing technique for directly assessing stereotypes (Miller, 1982a). Because this procedure relies on group consensus to define a stereotype, consensus has, without adequate theoretical analysis, been incorporated into the conceptual definition of stereotypes.

Given the general nature of the participants' stereotypical beliefs, it would seem that the procedures available for measuring stereotypes are inappropriate. That is, the conceptualization of stereotypes underlying each of these procedures is inconsistent with the non-specific nature of the stereotypes held by the participants. Beginning with the Linville et al. (1986) procedure, which was used in the present study, it is assumed that there exists a distribution of attribute values across members of a particular group and participants are required to assign percentages for the different levels of an attribute for members of the outgroup. As discussed earlier, the participants did not consider their stereotypical beliefs in quantitative terms and several of them stated that they found it difficult to assign percentages in completing the screening instrument. Thus, the way in which Linville et al. conceive of stereotypes is clearly different from the way in which the participants considered their beliefs about the outgroup.

The approach taken by McCauley and his associates (McCauley & Stitt, 1978; McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980), whereby stereotypes are conceived of as

generalizations about a group that differentiate them from other people, also seems incompatible with the manner in which the participants considered their stereotypical beliefs. As mentioned earlier, this procedure requires subjects to estimate (1) the percentage of outgroup members who possess a particular trait and (2) the percentage of all of the world's people who possess that trait. Apart from the difficulties with this procedure that were discussed previously, it is clear that participants did not consider their beliefs about the outgroup in these terms. Similarly, in the Brigham (1971) procedure, subjects are asked to choose traits that they feel are most typical of a particular ethnic group and to then indicate the percentage of group members who possess each trait. Given that this procedure also involves having people provide percentages for ascribed traits, it is also incompatible with the nature of the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup.

Finally, the Katz and Braly (1933) procedure, which involves having subjects select from an adjective checklist those traits that they consider to be "most typical" of a particular group, appears to most closely approximate the nature of the participants' beliefs about the outgroup. But it does so *only* in the generality of its approach to measuring beliefs (i.e., its lack of focus on the more specific, quantitative aspects of beliefs). The conceptualization of stereotypes underlying this approach, however, is diametrically opposed to the way in which the participants considered their beliefs. The Katz and Braly procedure, as well as variations of this procedure that have been developed, assess a person's knowledge of the cultural stereotype of the group involved. They do not assess the stereotypes held by individual people (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971; Miller, 1982a). As discussed earlier, the participants' stereotypes were clearly "personal stereotypes" in that their beliefs were based, to a large extent, on personal contact experiences with outgroup members. Thus, it is clear from this discussion of measurement procedures that each of these procedures involves a definite operational definition of stereotypes (Gardner, 1994).

A major difficulty associated with all of the above approaches to measuring stereotypes, then, is that they assume *a priori* the nature of the phenomenon (i.e., stereotyping) that they undertake to investigate. That is, they fail to take into account the importance of subjective experience. This is consistent with a general tendency in psychological research to ignore subjects' own accounts of their experiences (Harris, 1984). As a result, subjects' beliefs about groups are made to conform to a conceptual definition of stereotypes that is pre-established by the researcher. This is similar to Gardner's (1994) criticism that in research on stereotypes and interethnic relations, "often researchers start off with underlying definitions of various concepts, and these definitions help to determine the results obtained" (p. 2).

Within a quantitative paradigm, what a stereotype *means for the individual* is not established. Thus, although subjects may be *capable* of completing the tasks associated with a particular procedure (e.g., assigning percentages), this does not establish that subjects *actually* think about their stereotypical beliefs in these terms. Like the participants, they may view such a task as artificial or irrelevant.

The aim of this section of the discussion, however, is not to make the claim that all people consider their stereotypical beliefs about other groups in relatively general terms. In phenomenological research, generalizability is based on empathic understanding and is therefore established *a posteriori* (Osborne, 1990). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, stereotyping involves perception, which is inherently situated and perspectival (Ashworth, 1980). It therefore cannot be assumed that other people's stereotypical beliefs are similar in nature to those of the participants. It seems reasonable to assume, for example, that some people who hold stereotypical beliefs but who have had little or no direct contact with members of an outgroup may be heavily influenced by consensual beliefs about that group (i.e., the cultural stereotype of the group). It is also likely that some people who hold stereotypical beliefs about other groups — whether such beliefs are personal or consensual in nature — do consider their

beliefs in more specific terms (e.g., the percentage of outgroup members who display a particular characteristic). Thus, it seems clear that we cannot make assumptions about how people conceive of their stereotypical beliefs.

Striving to Be Accurate and Flexible in One's Beliefs About The Outgroup

All of the participants strove to be unbiased in their beliefs about the outgroup and to be aware of limitations inherent in these beliefs. They attempted to be accurate and fair in arriving at an understanding of the personal qualities of members of the outgroup and to consider factors that might shape their beliefs about the outgroup. The participants were also flexible in the beliefs that they held: They were willing to modify them if new personal experiences or others' experiences indicated that these beliefs were inaccurate.

Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup

The participants' efforts to be unbiased in their beliefs about the outgroup were expressed in a number of ways. Some of the participants expressed a desire to avoid generalizing about the outgroup. Karen, for example, disliked generalizing and attempted instead to consider other people as individuals:

> I don't particularly care for kinds of characterizations which are going to be overgeneralizing with respect to the group. I prefer to look at individuals as individuals.

Nicole also strove to evaluate others as individuals but found it difficult to avoid generalizing:

> So I try — I *really* [her emphasis] try — to look at people as individuals but . . . [heavy sigh] I do stereotype pretty widely. Maybe it's my upbringing but I do tend to categorize people.

Some of the participants also described how they regularly engaged in a critical examination of their beliefs about other groups. In the following excerpt, Ron describes

how he began to assess his beliefs about other groups after becoming familiar with a group of Native Indians:

> That was interesting as well, again being a little bit of a minority amongst them [i.e., Native Indians] and being able to understand how they feel about how they're being perceived or how they believe they were being perceived. That was a very valuable lesson and . . . I think [it] probably started, "What do I believe about them? What do other people believe about them? What's the facts? What do I see before me most real and why is it happening?" And I've applied that to every group of people that I encounter, whether they're Chinese, Korean, Lebanese, Ed. Psyc. majors. You know, like, they're all the same. You have to look at them.

From this description, it is evident that Ron's exposure to Native Indians and their feelings about how other groups perceived them caused him to become aware of the perspectival nature of intergroup beliefs. As a result of gaining this insight, he began a process of examining his own beliefs about other groups and critically evaluating the basis for these beliefs.

A desire to avoid being prejudicial or discriminatory toward other groups was also evident during several of the interviews. The desire to avoid unintentionally discriminating against Native Indians is reflected in the following statement made by Karen:

> I was just reading a statistic which is, you know, teachers in the public school system are three times more likely to target Native American kids as learning disabled and gosh, I mean, I don't want to fall into those kinds of traps. I mean, I think that's horrific. That is something which I'm really going to strive to avoid.

Similarly, Keith wished to avoid being perceived as prejudicial in the choice of words that he used to describe Koreans:

> But I don't want to say that they [i.e., Koreans] stick together because that sounds prejudicial but I think that they are maybe a close community, the Korean community.

Another way in which the participants attempted to be unbiased in their beliefs about the outgroup was in their efforts to be open-minded and sensitive to the outgroup's perspective. For Karen, attempting to appreciate Native Indians' perspective was an important aspect of her orientation toward this group:

> So I think it's important that you have an open mind and try to — I think it's really important. I try to see things from their [i.e., Native Indians'] perspective or at least attempt to do that even if it may not be possible. Or I may be very deceived many times when I think I am, when in reality, I may not be.

Thus, although Karen attempts to be open-minded and understand the Native perspective, she is aware that she may fail in her attempts to do so.

Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup

The participants were also aware of the existence of exceptions to their beliefs about the outgroup. Thus, although they generalized in their beliefs about the outgroup, they were aware of exceptions to these beliefs. This awareness emerged as a result of either contact with exceptional outgroup members or feeling that such exceptions must exist. For example, Nicole was aware of Native Indians who represented exceptions to her beliefs and who conformed to her parents' negative stereotype of this group:

> I can see the stereotypes that my parents have, where it comes from, because I met Native people who are just out-and-out lazy drunks, who never want to get off the welfare system, who are always getting pulled into jail and stuff. So I guess I can understand it that way. . . . But there are exceptions to the rule just like in my society — generally, people are okay and everything, and then there's these people who are really down-and-out scuzzy. That's the way it is in Native culture too.

In contrast, prior to the interview, Keith was only somewhat aware of exceptions to his beliefs about Koreans in that he had not given much consideration to this aspect of his beliefs. During the interview, discussion of the general issue of exceptions to beliefs resulted in a growing recognition by him of the extent of such exceptions to his beliefs:

> . . . but now talking more to you about that [i.e., exceptions to one's beliefs], you know, the more I reflect on that, I can more realize that there are exceptions [to my beliefs about Koreans]. So, I don't know if it's maybe more hindsight or aftersight but it seems that there are exceptions. . . . I mean, I do think they [i.e., Koreans] are hard working but yet, there are more exceptions the more I think about it.

The finding that the participants were aware of exceptions to their beliefs is an important one, given that historically, much of the research aimed at measuring people's stereotypes has involved the use of the Katz and Braly (1933) procedure or a variation of this procedure, and has therefore overlooked the extent of people's generalizations. It is important to note, however, that more recent approaches to measuring stereotyping (e.g., Brigham, 1971; McCauley & Stitt, 1978; Linville et al., 1986) provide quantitative measures (i.e., percentages) of people's estimates of exceptions to their beliefs about a particular group. Also, some researchers have suggested that it is quite rare for people to make exceptionless generalizations (e.g., Brigham, 1969, cited in Brigham, 1971).

Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior

The participants also reflected on the potential causes of some of the characteristics that they associated with the outgroup. They considered a broad range of causal factors that were situational, cultural, or historical in nature. Ron, for example, places a great deal of importance on the role of cultural factors in attempting to understand others' behavior:

> You can look at individuals for what they are but you have to look at where they come from too. And that's why we have, I believe, different cultures and subcultures with different behavioral patterns and different belief systems themselves.

Similarly, Nicole considers how some Native Indians' chronic use of the welfare system may be due not to laziness, as some people believe, but to historical and situational factors that create dependency:

> I kind of believe that a lot of Native people are stuck in the welfare system and they just don't know how to get out of it. . . . I don't think it's laziness or anything. I just think that due to their lack of education and opportunities that welfare has become their career. And when you've been on welfare for twenty years, you can't get off it.

Nicole also considers historical and situational causes of behavior in discussing Native Indians' openness and honesty about family violence within their communities:

> It [i.e., family violence] is a taboo subject [in Western culture]. White people I don't think consider it to be something that's supposed to occur in a community or [I don't think] they've accepted [that it] happens in a community. Where Native people, it's something that's been going on ever since the missionaries came over and started residential schools. "It's a problem and we all have to know about it so that we can help this person" — and that's why they tell you. That's where the honesty and straight-forwardness comes in.

Thus, the participants sometimes considered causal factors (and made causal inferences) in their attempts to understand the actions of outgroup members. As von Eckartsberg (1989) explains, the process of attributing causes to others' actions is "based upon human meaning and the striving to perceive human meanings" (p. 142).

Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup

In their efforts to be fair-minded, the participants were also aware of the *potentially* limited nature of their experiences with, and beliefs about, the outgroup. Karen, Ron, and Nicole had experienced considerable contact with outgroup members and felt that their beliefs about the outgroup were accurate, given the nature of their contact experiences. Nevertheless, they were aware that their contact experiences involved exposure to a limited range of outgroup members and that these experiences might therefore not be representative of experiences with all outgroup members. As a result, these participants were open to the possibility that their beliefs might not be applicable to the outgroup in general. This finding is reflected in the following statement made by Karen:

> This has just been my experience with, uhm, Indians in a specific location that's in Northern Alberta. They were Cree-speaking Indians and again, I don't know if it's generalizable to the rest of the population or if you could say the same with regard to Natives which have been largely assimilated and living in urban centers. It may be something quite different.

Similarly, Ron identifies the context within which his contact experiences with Chinese people have occurred as being an important element shaping his beliefs about that group:

> So, I wouldn't be surprised if a lot of [my beliefs about Chinese people changed if I went to China] — I think I made it clear with [this being] my experience with Chinese in Canada, and I think there is a different motivation in a different culture. If we were to go over to China, we're the ones who are on their turf. I'm the one that's going to stand out and I'm the one who's going to be treated — I fully expect to be treated differently than my experience here.

From this excerpt, then, it is clear that Ron considers his beliefs about Chinese people to be potentially limited in their accuracy because they are based on experiences

that have occurred within a specific context. That is, Ron is aware that his beliefs about Chinese people may be context-dependent.

Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Evolving Versus Established but Open to Change

A final aspect of the participants' efforts to be fair and accurate in their beliefs about the outgroup involves their openness to changes in these beliefs. Although three of the participants viewed their present beliefs about the outgroup as being well established and accurate, based on their contact experiences with outgroup members, they were open to the possibility of change in these beliefs. Specifically, these participants regarded their beliefs about the outgroup as being true until such time as they were shown to be inaccurate. They felt that these challenges to their beliefs might arise as a result of new contact experiences with outgroup members or exposure to others' beliefs about the outgroup.

Ron, for example, considered his present beliefs about Chinese people to be accurate but was aware that additional contact experiences outside of a work-related context might provide him with new information that challenged the accuracy of these beliefs:

> My experience [with Chinese people], the limited experience I've had outside of a professional environment has nothing significant enough to say that I am wrong [in my beliefs]. But the incidences have been low enough that there's still a possibility that I am [wrong]. . . . But right now they serve me, so why — don't fix it if it's not broken. And I don't think I'm harming anyone with this. I mean, if I thought my beliefs were harmful, then maybe, you know, I'd have to look at them. . . . Yeah, that's — I'm quite certain that I'm right [in my beliefs]. There that's — yeah, yeah, I think they're accurate.

Nicole's perspective, however, is somewhat different. She feels that her beliefs about Native Indians are accurate, based on her experiences with members of this group,

but acknowledges that others who have had different experiences with Native Indians may provide information that challenges the accuracy of her beliefs:

> I believe my beliefs [about Native Indians] are true but other people, I guess they could prove me wrong if they're using their own experiences as their basis for their proof. Like, their argument, because they'd have different experiences than me, may be true. . . . So I guess I could be proven wrong but *I* [her emphasis] believe it's true from my experiences.

For Keith, his limited range of experience with the outgroup has also fostered an openness to changes in his beliefs but unlike the other participants, he views his present beliefs as evolving:

> I have views of them [i.e., Koreans] but I know that they're not -- they're definitely not set in stone or anything because I really haven't had a lot of contact with them. . . . From the exposure which I've had, I guess it has sort of formulated some of those beliefs but they're always changing, I think.

Clearly, the participants differed in the level of confidence that they placed in the accuracy of their beliefs about the outgroup but they were all nevertheless open to the possibility of modifying these beliefs.

This finding, as well as the previous one, are consistent with quantitative research indicating that stereotyping is context-dependent (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Specifically, there is considerable evidence (for a review, see Oakes et al., 1994) that, far from being rigid and unaccomodating, stereotypes are changeable given changes in the social context (i.e., from a social cognitive perspective, they are contextual representations of groups). In fact, stereotypes appear to be linked with intergroup relations. Brigham (1971), for example, has argued that stereotypes are rigid only insofar as they fail to change when changes occur within or between the groups involved. This type of rigidity, however, has not been found (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). Rather, relevant aspects of stereotypes

appear to change with changes in intergroup relations. For example, after reviewing research relevant to this issue, Oakes et al. (1994) concluded that stereotypes "vary with the level and content of social categorizations that become salient to represent and fit the comparative intergroup relations" (p. 193).

The present findings are also consistent with the findings of previous phenomenological research (e.g., Ashworth, 1980; Romanyshyn, 1971). Specifically, Romanyshyn found that attitudes are situational phenomena. Similarly, Ashworth indicated that the specific nature of the social situation is intrinsically related to the attitude expressed. From the preceding discussion it is clear that intergroup beliefs are also situational phenomena. That is, the importance of context in determining the nature of the participants' perceptions of the outgroup reveals the situational nature of beliefs.

The discussion thus far, however, has focused specifically on the "object" of perception. It is also important to consider the role of the "subject" in the formation of intergroup beliefs. Ashworth (1980) describes attitudinal perception as bodily and as therefore originating from a particular point of view. As a result, such perception is inherently situated and perspectival. He adds that in

> "holding a certain attitude" (though that phrase is problematical) my perceptual activity will focus on certain elements of a situation which may well differ from those to which others attend. (I know the possibility of other perspectives for the very reason that attitudinal perception *is* perception, and therefore perspectival.) The situation calls forth *particular beliefs* [italics added], feelings, desires — indeed it is already perceived as embodying a reference to such "components of attitude" insofar as the perception is (as all perception is) of meanings. (p. 59)

Although Ashworth is here referring primarily to attitudes, it is clear from this description that beliefs are also embodied and perspectival. That is, beliefs emerge from a particular point of view and are therefore meaning-bound.

A Positive, Receptive Orientation Toward the Outgroup and Its Culture

All of the participants displayed an openness toward the outgroup and its culture. This receptiveness to the outgroup was expressed as a genuine desire to learn more about the outgroup's cultural practices and world view. Another aspect of the participants' orientation toward the outgroup involved the value that they attached to the outgroup's culture. They viewed some of the outgroup's cultural values and practices as making a valuable contribution to the larger culture. Thus, the participants' orientation toward the outgroup's culture was largely positive, emphasizing its merits or strengths.

Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture

Ron's openness to learning about the Chinese culture, as well as his general admiration of Chinese people, is evident in the following description:

> I've always been interested in China too, which maybe takes [in] Chinese history, culture, art, the history of Chinese in Canada, what they did when they got here and how they organized themselves, how they brought their family over. I admire that, whereas the trends in the public, I think, is this, you know, "Stop reuniting families. Let's stop that. Let's screen our immigrants better."

The following excerpt reveals that a more general motivation to learn about (and from) others, is also part of Ron's orientation toward other people:

> . . . I always liked people. . . . But I like talking to people. I like communicating and sharing with others, and the more I could learn from somebody and about them, the happier I was. And if they wanted to learn from me at the same time, great.

Similarly, Keith describes how he would like to have greater contact with Koreans and people from other cultures in general:

> So, I think of it [i.e., my beliefs] as having a good impact. I think maybe I'd be more open to contact, I guess. That's happened with a number of different groups, like, you know, I'd like to have contact with people from a lot of other countries.

> But yeah, I think it would be more interesting to learn about the culture from someone who's actually from Korea.

Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values

As mentioned earlier, the participants also valued some of the outgroup's cultural practices and values, and viewed these elements as making a valuable contribution to the larger culture. Ron, for example, emphasizes the value of the future orientation that he observes in Chinese people:

> And the sacrifices that are made for family are very unselfish — looking at tomorrow, looking at the future, not living for today. . . . When people come to this country and work with not only their own successes in mind but their children's and their grandchildren's, that's something that's lost in North American society. I think that's a new value that has worth and I believe that the Chinese can teach us a lot from that. I think that's probably one of the biggest things that I admire about them is that sense of time.

Similarly, Nicole values the emphasis that Native culture places on non-competitiveness and sharing:

> . . . white people — I think we tend to really be selfish and think about ourselves a lot more. And I think it's due to our competition within our society. I don't find Native people to be ready and willing to compete with each other, you know, like, "I have more than you, so I'm not going to give you anything I have because that makes me a step above you on the ladder to success." Whereas white people are always thinking that way and very few of them are really willing to give you what they have just because you need it at that time. Natives may have very little but they're willing to share it.

From these descriptions it is clear that the participants were receptive to the outgroup and its cultural practices. They also valued aspects of the outgroup's culture and viewed it as contributing to the larger culture in a positive way. These findings are

similar to Lazar's (1991) finding that being-prejudiced influences a person's perceptions of, and behavior toward, outgroup members. The present findings are also consistent with Romanyshyn's (1971) description of attitude as relating a person "to a project unfolding in time" (p. 174). Specifically, it would seem that beliefs also relate people to a project that is unfolding over time. Unlike the historical aspect of beliefs discussed earlier, this aspect of beliefs leads a person toward the future. The participants' intergroup beliefs, which were largely positive in nature, were associated with a positive orientation toward the outgroup (i.e., receptivity to further contact with the outgroup and valuing the outgroup's culture) and efforts to be unbiased and fair in these beliefs. Thus, beliefs have implications for people's perceptions of, and behavior toward, the outgroup. In this way, then, beliefs function to orient people toward the future.

In chapter 6, a more general discussion of the more important findings and their implications for future research and for educational programs is presented. The boundaries and the limitations of the study are also considered.

CHAPTER 6

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter, a more general discussion of the more important findings of the present research is undertaken. The boundaries of the study, as well as the study's limitations, are then discussed, followed by a consideration of the implications of the study's findings for further research and for educational programs.

Important Research Findings

A researcher's aim in using the phenomenological method is to achieve a greater understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Prior to discussing the more important findings, however, it is important to point out that some of the findings of the present study are similar to findings from quantitative studies of stereotyping and intergroup relations. The overall structural description of the experience shared by all of the participants, however, is new. A description of this kind has not been formulated previously because prior to this study, the phenomenological method had not been applied specifically to the study of stereotyping.

Moreover, based on the previous discussion of the findings, stereotyping can be described as involving having a set of specific beliefs about the characteristics of an outgroup. These beliefs are intentional phenomena that are situational and perspectival, and that relate people to their own past and orient them toward the future. It should be emphasized here that although a number of phenomenological studies (Ashworth, 1980, 1985, 1986; Lazar, 1991; Romanyshyn, 1971) have described attitudes in these terms, the phenomenon of stereotyping has not previously been described in this manner.

An important finding that has not been addressed in the literature involves the central role played by personal experience in constituting the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup (theme 4). That is, the participants' present beliefs about the outgroup appeared to be based, to a large extent, on their contact experiences with outgroup members. As noted earlier, it is important to emphasize that the inclusion of

personal contact as a criterion for selecting participants may have fostered a focus, during the interviews, on the role of personal contact experiences in the participants' beliefs about the outgroup. Nevertheless, other influences were also explored and the present finding is an important one given that the sources of information that people rely on to determine which characteristics to attribute to specific ethnic groups have not been elucidated (Brigham, 1971). As mentioned earlier, some participants were aware of other influences on their beliefs. Keith, for example, felt that although his friendship with a Korean student was the main factor influencing his beliefs about Koreans, knowledge of the Korean economy and culture that he gained through an Asian history course also influenced these beliefs. Similarly, Karen indicated that her beliefs about Native Indians were based on her experiences with members of this group and knowledge that she acquired from reading about Native Indians. It is likely that factors other than personal contact experiences with outgroup members also played some role in shaping the other participants' beliefs about the outgroup but that they were simply not aware of these influences or of the extent of the impact of these influences on their beliefs. That such influences may have been present and may have figured more prominently in the participants' beliefs than they were aware is therefore an important consideration. Nevertheless, the analysis of the participants' lived-experiences suggests that personal experience played a central role in their beliefs about the outgroup. That is, they relied almost exclusively on their contact experiences in articulating, evaluating, or justifying their beliefs about the outgroup.

As discussed earlier, the prepotency of personal experience in shaping the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup suggests that what a person experiences him- or herself may be more salient and *meaningful* than information about the outgroup that is obtained from other sources. Thus, because contact with outgroup members is experienced personally, the accuracy of the information that it provides may appear "undeniable", thereby making it more influential than information obtained from

other sources. The present finding therefore provides insight into an important interaction between cognitive and sociocultural processes. For the participants in this study, personal contact experiences with outgroup members (a cognitive process) appear to have played a more central, dominant role in the establishment of beliefs about the outgroup than sociocultural processes (e.g., influences arising from family, peer groups, the mass media). It should be emphasized that this finding is unlikely to have emerged from any of the individual conceptual approaches to the study of intergroup processes — whether cognitive, sociocultural, or motivational — because each of these approaches to research focuses on the investigation of one particular process.

The non-specific nature of the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup (theme 5) represents a second important finding. That is, the participants viewed specific characteristics as applying to the outgroup but they did not consider these beliefs in any further detail. The general and personal (as opposed to culturally shared) nature of the participants' stereotypical beliefs represents a specific belief structure that has not been addressed explicitly in the literature and is not reflected in the procedures available for measuring stereotypes. Specifically, stereotypes have not been conceptually defined in a way that reflects the belief structure revealed in this study: a personal stereotype consisting of general beliefs. In fact, the procedures for measuring stereotypes that have been developed since the Katz and Braly (1933) procedure have involved increasingly more complex conceptualizations of stereotypes and, as mentioned earlier, have ignored how people actually think about their beliefs.

It should be emphasized, however, that it is not being assumed that all people conceive of their beliefs in non-specific terms. As discussed earlier, the beliefs that comprise people's stereotypes are not conceived of in the same manner by all people. This point, regarding the subjective nature of stereotypes and the resulting heterogeneity of belief structure across individuals, appears to have been overlooked in previous research on stereotypes. As discussed earlier, despite the existence of a voluminous

literature on stereotypes, there is still little consensus among stereotype researchers and theorists about key conceptual issues regarding stereotypes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971; Gardner, 1994). Because such conceptual ambiguity has been largely ignored, research on stereotypes is necessarily fragmented and very few advances have been made in our knowledge of stereotypes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971).

These problems would appear to arise for several reasons. First, researchers have traditionally been mistrustful of subjective experience and have therefore failed to recognize the value of phenomenological reports for increasing our knowledge of stereotypes. Thus, although the three orientations to the study of stereotypes (i.e., cognitive, sociocultural, and motivational) differ significantly in their analysis and interpretation of behavior, the research conducted within each approach is "strictly empirical" (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 30). Second, researchers have adhered to a quantitative paradigm and the assumptions about phenomena that this entails. That is, quantitative methodology represents a *nomothetic* as opposed to an *idiographic* approach to the study of stereotypes. Thus, it is concerned with discovering the universal or abstract rather than the individual or concrete. The perennial dispute as to what a stereotype *is* therefore appears to arise, in part, because of the failure to recognize that stereotypes are thought of differently by different people. In other words, stereotype researchers have failed to take into consideration the importance of subjective experience. They have approached the study of stereotypes from an external perspective, from outside of the experience or perspective of the stereotyper.

As will be discussed later, it therefore seems essential to adopt an idiographic approach such as the phenomenological method in order to understand the *actual* structure of people's stereotypical beliefs and, more generally, to further our understanding of stereotypes. The phenomenological method has demonstrated itself to be a valuable method for revealing the structure of the stereotypical beliefs held by the participants in

this study. An idiographic approach to the study of stereotypes would focus on the unique structure of a given person's stereotypical beliefs, as understood by that person, instead of assuming that any given person's stereotypical beliefs could meaningfully be measured using a particular procedure.

Boundaries of the Study

Prior to discussing the limitations of the present study, it is important to outline briefly what the study was not intended to accomplish. In doing so, the boundaries of the study are demarcated. First, the focus of this study was the investigation of stereotyping as revealed through the experiences and beliefs of people who held stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group. The study was not intended to deal specifically with the phenomena of prejudice or discrimination. Second, the study dealt with the experiences and beliefs of majority group members in society, and was not intended to explore the experiences and beliefs of members of specific ethnic minority groups in their interactions with majority group members. Although such an investigation would have been valuable, it was beyond the scope of the present study. Finally, the study was not intended to examine attitude change or the reduction or elimination of intergroup processes such as prejudice or intergroup conflict.

Limitations of the Study

A number of limitations are evident in the present study. First, data collection and data analysis are influenced by the researcher's presuppositions and biases. Although a degree of interpretation is inevitable in any type of research, I have attempted to minimize such influences through a continuous process of rigorous self-reflection (i.e., bracketing). That is, over the course of the study, I reflected on my presuppositions and biases about the phenomenon being investigated and attempted to "bracket" or suspend them. Also, I have articulated these presuppositions and biases so that readers can be aware of the perspective from which the research was conducted.

A second limitation of this study involves the generalizability of the findings. In much the same way as it may be inappropriate to generalize the findings of a particular experiment to other contexts, it is inappropriate to generalize the present study's findings to all majority group members who hold stereotypical beliefs about other groups. There are a number of considerations in this regard. First, the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup were largely positive, while stereotypical beliefs about social groups have generally been found to be negative (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Second, the participants represented people who were relatively reflective and who strove to be unbiased in their beliefs about the outgroup. Third, the participants had all attained a relatively high level of education. Fourth, only people who held stereotypical beliefs about an ethnic minority group and who had experienced actual face-to-face contact with members of that group were included in the study. Last, the participants were people who volunteered to participate in the study and who were willing to discuss their beliefs and contact experiences. They may therefore constitute an "extreme group". For the above reasons, it may not be appropriate to generalize this study's findings to other majority group members in Canadian society.

Similarly, it may be inappropriate to generalize these findings to ethnic minority groups other than those included in the study. Specifically, the study only included people who had contact experiences with, and stereotypical beliefs about, Native Indians, Chinese, or Koreans. As mentioned earlier, however, phenomenological research involves empathic as opposed to statistical generalizability; generalizability is therefore established *a posteriori* (Osborne, 1990). Consequently, the generalizability of this study's findings will be established to the extent that they resonate with the experiences of other people not included in the study.

A third limitation involves the adequacy of the phenomenological method for fully understanding stereotyping and intergroup perception. Jones (1985), for example, points out that although phenomenological reports may provide the researcher with

valuable data, people may not be aware of some of the expectancies and other framing cognitions that shape their perceptions. In other words, people are only capable of providing information about aspects of the phenomenon that are available through reflection. They are incapable of addressing aspects of the phenomenon that are outside of awareness and therefore beyond reflection. Similarly, from a phenomenological perspective, because beliefs are embodied and in the world, they cannot be entirely conscious or entirely mental (Ashworth, 1980). Thus, the researcher is unable to gain exposure to some aspects of people's stereotypical beliefs. Despite these limitations, however, the phenomenological method is considered the most appropriate method when the aim of research is, as in the present study, to explore questions concerning lived-experience and meaning. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that limitations are inherent in the use of any method.

A final, related limitation involves the phenomenological method's reliance on language as a vehicle for understanding. That is, it relies on language for both the expression of experience and meaning by the participant, and the description of the phenomenon as interpreted by the researcher. MacLeod (1947) views the phenomenological method as limited in this regard because words are capable of indicating, but never completely representing, phenomena. He adds that "our almost paradoxical task is, while of necessity using language in our analysis, to penetrate through language to real psychological structures, yet all the while recognizing that some linguistic artifacts are psychologically real" (p. 205). Thus, due to the limitations of language, phenomena cannot be apprehended fully in linguistic terms.

Implications For Further Research

The findings of the present study have a number of implications for further research on intergroup processes. First, the finding that the participants considered their stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup in non-specific terms (theme 5) and the recognition that stereotypical beliefs are not thought of in the same way by all people

have important implications for future research on stereotypes. Specifically, it was concluded earlier that because of these findings, an idiographic approach to the study of stereotypes is needed. An idiographic approach to studying stereotypes would involve focusing on the unique structure of a given person's stereotypical beliefs as these are understood by that person. The central feature of this approach would therefore be the identification of the structure of the person's stereotypical beliefs. A second feature of an idiographic approach would involve the researcher's willingness to look to the person for assistance in determining the structure of such beliefs. This might involve asking the person to reflect on his or her beliefs about a particular group and to then describe the nature of these beliefs, in either written or verbal form, for the researcher. The phenomenological method would seem well suited for this approach to stereotype research.

The use of an idiographic approach to study stereotypes is important for several reasons. First, by establishing how individual people think about their stereotypical beliefs, it may be possible to establish a typology of belief structures. Some people may think about their stereotypical beliefs in only the most general of terms so that a characteristic or trait is simply attributed to an outgroup in general. Alternatively, some people may consider their stereotypical beliefs in highly specific terms. For example, they may consider multiple levels of a characteristic that they attribute to the outgroup and assign a proportion of outgroup members to each of these levels. Thus, it is possible to imagine a continuum of belief structures, with a very general structure (e.g., a unidimensional attribute that is applied to all members of an outgroup) occupying one extreme of the continuum and a highly elaborated structure (e.g., an attribute consisting of multiple levels that represent various proportions of the outgroup) occupying the opposite extreme of the continuum. Through the use of an idiographic approach it would also be possible to determine the prevalence of each of these belief structures in the general population and in various social groups such as those based on age, occupation, or

socioeconomic status, for example. Similarly, by conducting longitudinal idiographic research, it would be possible to identify any developmental changes in the way people think about their stereotypical beliefs.

A second reason for using an idiographic approach is that it will result in greater conceptual clarity about stereotypes. As mentioned earlier, stereotypes have traditionally been defined as beliefs about the modal characteristics of the members of a particular social group (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971). More recently, however, some researchers have argued that a more complex conceptualization of stereotypes is required (e.g., Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Linville at al., 1986). Specifically, stereotypes are conceived of as consisting not only of beliefs about the central tendency of group members but of estimates of the variability or diversity of group members around these central tendencies. In the study by Judd et al. (1991), for example, it was assumed that social stereotypes contain such variability estimates. One of the tasks in the study required subjects to consider the target group as a whole and to indicate the relative numbers of group members who would be represented by each point along a trait or attitude dimension. Thus, this task was similar to the procedure used in the present study to measure the participants' level of stereotyping. Subjects' *ability* to complete this task and their tendency to underestimate the variability of outgroups relative to ingroups, however, should not be taken as evidence that subjects *actually* include such variability estimates in their thinking about other social groups. A difficulty for studies of this kind, then, involves the issue of generalization or ecological validity: If people do not actually think in terms of variability estimates, then to what extent are the results of such studies useful in helping us to understand stereotyping as it occurs naturally?

The findings of the present study indicate that people are capable of providing valuable information about the structure of their stereotypical beliefs and that such data can be valuable in clarifying important conceptual aspects of stereotypes. Given

cognitive social psychology's concern with a subjective frame of reference (i.e., that the causes of social behavior lie in how people perceive their world), when phenomenological research can provide data about stereotypes, such research should be pursued.

A second implication of the findings of the present study involves the value of the phenomenological method for providing us with new insights into interactions between cognitive, sociocultural, and motivational processes. As discussed earlier, researchers have recently begun to acknowledge that intergroup processes are multiply determined (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). At present, however, very little is known about how these processes interact (Duckitt, 1992; Hamilton, 1981b; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Theme 4 (Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup) reveals an interaction between cognitive and sociocultural processes, and is therefore encouraging about the usefulness of the phenomenological method for investigating such interactions. The phenomenological method, as well as other qualitative methods, may also be valuable in providing added insights into the role of personal contact experiences and other factors in shaping people's beliefs about other groups.

Third, future phenomenological research could be undertaken to verify or challenge the findings of the present study. Such research could include people who hold stereotypical beliefs about minority groups other than those included in the present study. Additionally, given that the participants in this study held stereotypical beliefs that were largely positive in nature, it would be useful to study people who hold negative stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group. The findings of such research would be valuable in establishing the extent to which the present study has been successful in revealing the essential structure of stereotyping.

Finally, future phenomenological studies could also focus on people who represent other age groups or who possess different levels of education than the participants in the present study. In addition, the beliefs and contact experiences of minority group

members who hold stereotypical beliefs about the majority group (or other outgroups) could be explored. Similarly, studies involving other social groups (e.g., occupational groups) could also be conducted. These studies would be valuable in providing us with a more comprehensive understanding of stereotyping and, more generally, intergroup perception.

Implications For Education

Before discussing the implications of the findings for education it is important to point out that the present study was not intended to deal directly with educational programs or the formulation of specific educational objectives. Nevertheless, the findings have resulted in a number of general recommendations for improving interethnic relations within educational settings. It should also be noted that the literature on improving intergroup relations is extensive and as a result, only relevant aspects of the literature will be discussed.

An aspect of theme 2 (Early Influences on the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup) that has implications for educational programs is the finding that participants' initial contact experiences with outgroup members played an important role in establishing the nature of subsequent interactions with outgroup members and the form of later beliefs about the outgroup. This suggests that during the early school years, when children are often gaining initial exposure to members of other ethnic groups, it is important to create an environment that fosters positive initial encounters between children from different ethnic groups.

This suggestion is consistent with the "contact hypothesis", which is considered the most prominent approach to modifying intergroup relations (Stephan, 1985). The contact hypothesis is based on the assumption that a "shift from the abstract and unfamiliar to the interpersonal and familiar will engender more positive intergroup attitudes and social acceptance" (Brewer & Kramer, 1985, p. 232). Despite its intuitive appeal, however, research on the contact hypothesis has produced mixed results

(for reviews, see Amir, 1976; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Stephan, 1985). A factor that has only recently been recognized as limiting the potential benefits of intergroup contact involves the existing social relationship (e.g., unequal status) between the groups involved (Brewer & Kramer, 1985). In his review of the intergroup contact literature, Tajfel (1982) concluded that "whenever the underlying structure of social divisions and power or status differentials is fairly resilient, it is not likely to be substantially affected by piecemeal attempts at reform in selected situations of 'contact' " (p. 29). Similarly, Norvell and Worchel (1981) emphasize that it is important to consider both immediate status differences present within the contact setting and historical status differences. They add, however, that it can be difficult to compensate for such preexisting status differences.

In terms of actual interventions involving intergroup interactions within the classroom, the most commonly studied have been cooperative learning programs. In these programs, students work together in multiethnic groups and goals are achieved through positive interdependence (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Stephan, 1985). A number of such classroom learning techniques have been developed, including Jigsaw (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978), Learning Together (Johnson & Johnson, 1975), Student-Teams-Achievement-Divisions (e.g., Slavin, 1977), and Teams-Games-Tournaments (e.g., DeVries, Edwards, & Slavin, 1978). Jigsaw, for example, involves multiethnic groups in which students work together on academic tasks. Each student is responsible for teaching a section of the learning material to other students in the group but students are graded independently. The teacher does not directly teach any of the material but instead, acts as a facilitator.

In his review of research on cooperative learning techniques, Stephan (1985) concluded that these techniques have a generally positive effect on intergroup relations. These positive results include improved attitudes toward team members and outgroups, decreases in interethnic conflict, increases in interethnic helping, and increases in

minority group members' participation and influence within groups. He added that these techniques possess commonalities such as "strong normative and institutional support for intergroup contact, positive contact experiences, interdependence of team members, an individualizing of out-group members, longer durations than laboratory studies, settings with high ecological validity, and . . . equal status within the groups" (Stephan, 1985, p. 642).

The findings that participants generalized about the outgroup (theme 3) and generalized from their personal contact experiences to the outgroup as a whole (theme 4) suggest that it is important to make students aware of such biases in their thinking and of the negative consequences associated with these biases. This suggestion is similar to Kehoe's (1994) recommendation that intergroup attitudes can be improved by teaching students critical thinking skills (e.g., recognizing fallacious arguments). A similar recommendation, made by Craft and Klein (1986, cited in Norcross, 1990), involves making children aware of the negative effects of their attitudes about other ethnic groups. It has been pointed out, however, that the first step in changing students' stereotypical views is for teachers to analyze their own beliefs about their own and other cultures (e.g., Boutte, LaPoint, & Davis, 1993; Lay-Dopyera & Dopyera, 1987).

Several other findings of this study have related implications for educational programs. Specifically, given most students' limited exposure to members of other ethnic groups, it would seem important to make students aware of the potential limitations of their beliefs about these groups (theme 7). The finding that participants generalized from their contact experiences to the outgroup (theme 4) suggests that it would also be important to emphasize the inadequacy of contact experiences as a basis for developing beliefs about other ethnic groups. Students should be made aware of the existence of variability within groups (Jones, 1982) and that as a result, there exist exceptions to their beliefs about other groups (theme 6). This is consistent with Aboud's (1988) emphasis on the enhancement of specific cognitive abilities in students, such as

awareness of the differences present within ethnic groups. It is important to emphasize that these recommendations are equally applicable to teachers within the educational system. Thus, culturally sensitive teachers are aware that there is no single entity such as the "White" or "Asian" child (Boutte & McCormick, 1992).

Theme 8 (Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior) suggests that students, as well as teachers, should be encouraged to consider possible causes of behavior that they observe in members of other ethnic groups. There is considerable evidence that people are prone to attribute personal causes or motives to others' behavior (for a review, see Fiske & Taylor, 1991) — a bias that is referred to as the fundamental attribution error. This issue is of particular importance in stereotyping because this form of bias in how people perceive others can greatly increase the extent and negative consequences of stereotyping (Miller, 1982b). It can result in others being viewed as responsible for their life circumstances when strong situational or contextual forces are in fact present. Thus, educational programs should emphasize the important role played by situational factors (e.g., social norms or roles) in shaping others' behavior and the need to avoid attributing such behavior to others' dispositional qualities.

Theme 12 (Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture) suggests that teachers should instill in students a curiosity and a desire to learn about other cultures. It has been recommended that students become acquainted with music, art, literature, dance, food, clothing, and religious beliefs from a variety of cultures (e.g., Kehoe, 1994; Lay-Dopyera & Dopyera, 1987). Subjective elements of culture such as social distance, degree of eye contact, and forms of greeting should also be included (Kehoe, 1994). Moreover, literature used should portray children from different cultures, races, and home environments, and present a variety of people from any given ethnic group (Lay-Dopyera & Dopyera, 1987; Klein, 1985, cited in Norcross, 1990). Boutte and McCormick (1992) also emphasize the importance of integrating multicultural activities in formal and informal class activities on an ongoing basis. This process of

learning about other cultures should also involve interactions between students from different ethnic groups. Chalmers, Andrews, and Nadaner (1984), for example, recommend that art exchanges be used as a means of developing students' social understanding. Similarly, it is also important for teachers to be open to learning about other cultures.

Finally, teachers should emphasize the value of other cultures (theme 11), both in making valuable contributions to the majority culture and in enhancing the richness of society in general. This is consistent with suggestions that children can be sensitized to the value of other cultures, as well as helped to critically evaluate their own culture (Craft & Klein, 1986, cited in Norcross, 1990); that children can be taught to see alternative ways of living as equally valid as their own (Aboud, 1988); and that the curriculum can include information about the contributions of specific cultures to humankind and to one's country (Kehoe, 1994). It is also important for teachers to appreciate different cultural perspectives and to develop an awareness of different cultural practices (Boutte & McCormick, 1992; Locke, 1988; Wilson, 1993). Wilson suggests that international and other cross-cultural experiences can contribute significantly to a person's knowledge and perceptions of other cultures. Moreover, he describes how a university cross-cultural conversation partner program, which involved pairing education students with English as a second language (ESL) international students, was successful in increasing the intercultural competence of the education students.

Locke (1988) has developed a Cross-Cultural Awareness Continuum to describe the series of awareness levels through which a teacher must pass to become culturally sensitive. He identifies seven levels of awareness, with the first level involving self-awareness. This process of self-understanding is considered necessary in order to adequately understand others. The second level of awareness involves awareness of one's own culture; that is, the teacher must explore the culturally determined nature of his or

her values, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. At the third level of awareness, the teacher examines his or her beliefs about racism, sexism, and poverty. At the fourth level, which involves awareness of individual differences, the teacher must become aware of students as both unique individuals and members of specific cultural groups. It is at the fifth level, involving awareness of other cultures, that the teacher is able to explore and gain knowledge of the various aspects of other cultures. Awareness of diversity, the sixth level, involves becoming aware of the diversity of cultural practices present within one's own society. The final level of awareness, which Locke refers to as teaching effectiveness, involves implementing into one's teaching what has been learned at the previous six levels. Locke adds that competence as a teacher is essential for effective cross-cultural teaching and that cross-cultural awareness therefore cannot substitute for good teaching skills.

It is evident that many of the implications for educational programs described above have been addressed in the literature. Nevertheless, the use of the phenomenological method to explore the participants' experiences has produced several implications that do not appear to have been addressed explicitly in the literature. These include (a) making students aware of potential biases in their thinking and of the negative consequences associated with these biases; (b) making students aware of the potential limitations of their beliefs about other ethnic groups; and (c) emphasizing the limitations inherent in using contact experiences as a basis for developing beliefs about other ethnic groups. Implementing these new suggestions may provide new ways of improving interethnic relations in educational settings.

Conclusion

The present study grew out of my desire to explore and come to a greater understanding of the nature of stereotyping. Specifically, my intention was to answer the question, "What is the nature of the intergroup experiences and beliefs of people who hold stereotypical beliefs about a specific ethnic minority group?" In pursuing this question,

my interest was in understanding stereotyping rather than attempting to explain it. Given this emphasis on experience and meaning, the phenomenological method seemed well suited for such an investigation.

Through the use of the phenomenological method, many aspects of stereotyping were revealed. Moreover, it was found that stereotyping involves having a set of specific beliefs about the characteristics of an outgroup. These beliefs are intentional phenomena that are situational and perspectival, and that relate people to their own past and orient them toward the future. Several other important findings also emerged from this research. First, it was found that personal contact experiences can play a central, dominant role in constituting a person's stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup. Second, the non-specific nature of the participants' stereotypical beliefs about the outgroup, combined with the personal as opposed to culturally shared nature of these beliefs, represents a belief structure that has not been addressed in the procedures available for measuring stereotypes. More importantly, however, this finding reveals the subjective nature of stereotypes. That is, all people do not consider their beliefs about other groups in the same manner.

This second finding suggests the importance of adopting an idiographic approach to investigating stereotypes. Such an approach focuses on the unique structure of a person's stereotypical beliefs — as he or she conceives of them — rather than assuming that any person's stereotypical beliefs can be meaningfully measured using a particular procedure. In this way, it is possible to explore the actual nature of the beliefs that comprise people's stereotypes. As a result, our knowledge of stereotypes may be increased. The findings of this study are also encouraging about the value of the phenomenological method for providing us with a greater understanding of the interactions between cognitive, sociocultural, and motivational processes in stereotyping and other intergroup processes. In addition, the study has also been useful in providing a number of suggestions for improving interethnic relations within educational settings.

The present investigation represents the beginning of an effort to understand stereotyping phenomenologically. By using the phenomenological method, it was possible to reveal the essential structure of the participants' experiences and hopefully, a greater understanding of stereotyping has been achieved. It is also hoped that the findings of this study will stimulate both qualitative and quantitative research that will further enhance our knowledge of stereotyping and other intergroup processes.

Undertaking this research has also caused me to reflect more on my own beliefs about other groups. In the process of exploring people's perceptions of other ethnic groups, I have gained a greater understanding of the nature of my own intergroup beliefs. I have also gained a greater appreciation of the necessity of reflecting on the adequacy of these beliefs. It is my hope that through the findings of this research, others will be affected in a similar way.

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Appendix A

Screening Instrument

Each of the following items includes different degrees (or levels) of a specific personal characteristic. Please estimate the percentage of **Native Indians** who fall into each level for each characteristic. For example, consider the characteristic "friendliness". What percentage of Native Indians are "very friendly"? What percentage are "moderately friendly"? What percentage are "slightly friendly"? And so forth. Assume that any given person falls into one — and only one — level of a characteristic. Please write your estimates above each level on the scale and ensure that the percentages that you assign to the different levels of a characteristic add up to 100.

Friendliness

very unfriendly	moderately unfriendly	slightly unfriendly	slightly friendly	moderately friendly	very friendly

Reliability

very reliable	moderately reliable	slightly reliable	slightly unreliable	moderately unreliable	very unreliable

Generosity

very miserly	moderately miserly	slightly miserly	slightly generous	moderately generous	very generous

Motivation



Courtesy



Honesty



Cleanliness



Intelligence



Now repeat the above procedure for **White Canadians**. Estimate the percentage of White Canadians who fall into each level for each characteristic.

Friendliness

very unfriendly	moderately unfriendly	slightly unfriendly	slightly friendly	moderately friendly	very friendly

Reliability

very reliable	moderately reliable	slightly reliable	slightly unreliable	moderately unreliable	very unreliable

Generosity

very miserly	moderately miserly	slightly miserly	slightly generous	moderately generous	very generous

Motivation

very ambitious	moderately ambitious	slightly ambitious	slightly unambitious	moderately unambitious	very unambitious

Courtesy



Honesty



Cleanliness



Intelligence



Appendix B

Scoring Procedure

Calculating P_d Scores For Individual Attribute Scales

Friendliness



P_d Score (Friendliness) $= 1 - (0.05^2 + 0.15^2 + 0.80^2)$
$= 1 - (0.0025 + 0.0225 + 0.64)$
$= 1 - 0.665$
$= 0.335$

Calculating Stereotyping Scores

Trait Item	P_d Score (Native Indians)	P_d Score (White Canadians)
Friendliness	0.335	0.705
Reliability	0.615	0.665
Generosity	0.335	0.768
Motivation	0.660	0.705
Courtesy	0.340	0.740
Honesty	0.345	0.735
Cleanliness	0.465	0.740
Intelligence	0.665	0.742
Average (Trait Index P_d Score)	0.470	0.725

Trait Index P_d Score (White Canadians) - Trait Index P_d Score (Native Indians) =
0.725 - 0.470 = 0.255

Appendix C

Information Sheet

Hi, my name is Serge Hein and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of Educational Psychology. My doctoral research involves intergroup processes and exploring people's contact experiences with members of other ethnic groups.

Participation in the study will require only a small investment of your time: no more than about 3 hours, spread out over about a 3-month period. Being in the study will involve several interviews with me and during these interviews we will focus on your contact experiences with members of a specific ethnic group. All information that you provide will be kept strictly confidential; your identity will be known only to me and will not be revealed at any time.

There are a number of benefits to you if you are selected to be in the study.

1) It is likely that your self-knowledge will increase as a result of being in a study of this kind.
2) School systems are becoming more ethnically diverse and having an awareness of interethnic/intergroup processes is therefore an important facet of your training as a teacher. Participating in the study will contribute significantly to this aspect of your training.
3) After I have completed my research, I will discuss my findings with you and provide you with a written report.

If you are interested in participating in the study or would like more information please:

a) complete the attached form, place it in the envelope provided, and leave it with the receptionist in the Department of Educational Psychology General Office (**6-102, Education North**) or slip it under my office door (**6-141C, Education North**)

OR

b) phone me at 432-0884 (please leave a message on the answering machine if no one is home)

If you are interested in being in the study, I would very much appreciate hearing from you by Oct. 3/94. Thank you very much for your time and I hope to hear from you soon!

Serge Hein

I am interested in participating in the study.

Name: _____

Phone Number: _____

When I Can Be Reached: _____

Appendix D

List of Ethnic Minority Groups

1) East Indians
2) Chinese
3) Blacks
4) Native Indians
5) Vietnamese
6) Koreans
7) Lebanese
8) Other?

Appendix E

Consent to Participate

I, _____, am aware that the purpose of this study is to understand people's beliefs about other ethnic groups and their contact experiences with members of those groups. Through the use of an interview format, I will be asked to describe my experiences in as much detail as possible. I understand that the present study is being conducted as a doctoral thesis by Serge Hein, under the supervision of Dr. Len Stewin of the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Alberta.

I agree to participate in the study and I am willing to share my experiences with the researcher. I am aware that one or two interviews of approximately one hour in length will be tape recorded in order that it can be transcribed for later analysis. I realize that my participation in the study is completely voluntary and that I can withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice. If I choose to withdraw from the study, any information about me or any data that I provide will be destroyed. I am also aware that if discussion of my experiences raises any concerns for me that I wish to discuss further with a counselor, Serge Hein will suggest individuals that I might contact.

I am aware that all information associated with this study is strictly confidential and that my identity, or that of any persons that I mention, will be known only to the researcher and will not be revealed at any time. When transcribing the interview recordings, the researcher will use pseudonyms (i.e., false names) for my name and for those of any persons that I mention. These pseudonyms will also be used in writing the final report. Any details in the interview recordings that might identify me or any persons that I mention will also be changed during the transcribing. Furthermore, the researcher will be the only person with access to the tape recordings and interview transcripts, and these will be stored in a secure place. Interview recordings will be erased when the transcript has been completed.

I am also aware that the information obtained from the interview(s) will be used by the researcher solely for purposes of this study and that the transcript of the interview(s) conducted with me may be included in the appendices of the researcher's thesis. Any portion of the transcript that is not included in the appendices will be destroyed following the completion of the study.

Signature _____

Date _____

Witness _____

Appendix F

Study Description

[Participant]:

By having the opportunity to interview you, I hope to gain insight into people's beliefs about specific ethnic minority groups and their experiences of face-to-face contact with members of those groups. My desire to explore this topic stems from my interest in how people perceive and interact with members of other groups. By undertaking this research I hope to increase my understanding of the processes involved.

Your participation in the study will be in the form of three or four interviews with myself. The first interview — what we are doing today — gives us an opportunity to become acquainted and to learn something about each other's backgrounds. During this interview I will also explain to you the nature of the study and why you've been selected, and answer any questions that you may have.

Before our second interview takes place, I would like you to take some time to think about your experiences as they relate to the topic that we are exploring. Specifically, think about face-to-face encounters that you have had with [ethnic minority group] in the last year or two. These encounters can be brief (e.g., passing someone on the street) or more long-term (e.g., working with someone). Some episodes of contact may stand out in your mind more than others. For each of these encounters, think about the thoughts, feelings, and bodily reactions/sensations that you experienced during the course of the interaction. Also, reflect on the surroundings/context within which each encounter occurred, as well as your behavior and the behavior of the other person (or persons). Last, I would also like you to reflect on your beliefs about [ethnic minority group]. As you think about your experiences from time to time, you may want to write down any important thoughts or details so that you can refer to them during the interview.

During our second interview, I will ask you to describe your experiences of face-to-face contact with members of the [ethnic minority group] community in as much detail as possible. It is an open-ended interview, meaning that it doesn't follow a standardized format but instead, unfolds based on what is discussed. It is important that you describe your <u>actual</u> experience on the topic we are exploring. Please tell me about your experiences just as they happened. Remember, there are no "right" or "wrong" responses. What I'm looking for from you is complete honesty. (Don't tell me what you

think I want to hear: I want to learn about your experiences, whatever they may be for you.) The interview will be about one hour long. Another short interview may be necessary if we haven't had enough time to adequately explore your experiences.

During our final interview, we will examine my understanding of your experience. That is, after analyzing the interview data, I will end up with a brief description of the essential aspects of your experience. We will discuss this final description in order to determine how accurately it describes your experience. After I have completed the study, I will share my findings with you.

I want to mention again that your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Also, all information will be kept strictly confidential and you can withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. If you decide that you no longer want to participate in the study, all information about you will be destroyed.

If you have any other questions or if you would like to discuss anything with me, please feel free to phone me.

Serge Hein

Appendix G

Interview Questions

1. Before we explore your contact experiences with _____ could you tell me about your beliefs about_____'s as a group.
2. How do you think about this trait?
3. When can you remember first having these beliefs?
4. Can you describe your upbringing for me?
5. Have your beliefs about _____'s changed over time? In what way?
6. Now I would like to focus on your contact experiences. Tell me about an experience of face-to-face contact with a_____ that stands out in your mind. Please describe, in as much detail as possible, the situation, your actions, and the thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations that you experienced during the course of the interaction.
7. What was your earliest experience of contact with _____?
8. Could you describe later experiences that you have had?
9. How, if at all, did your experiences with _____'s change over time?
10. What impact, if any, did your earlier experiences have on later experiences with _____'s?
11. What impact, if any, have these experiences had on your beliefs about _____'s?

Appendix H

Portion of Transcribed Interview With Ron

S: Okay, I just wanted to switch gears here a little bit . . . When can you remember first having these beliefs about Chinese people? Could you step back in time a little bit? Your beliefs, I mean, some may have emerged earlier than others but what are your earliest remembrances of some of the beliefs that you've had about Chinese people?

R: Well, I had some of the beliefs before I actually met any Chinese people. It was something I didn't think about. The first Chinese people that I met were the Lees. Stephen went to school and was in a lot of my classes. We went square dancing together. His dad owned a lot of the construction industry and a restaurant. His dad used to use the restaurant to bring family over from China, which I mentioned earlier when I think about it now. I don't know what the time interval was but there always seemed to be a new family working in the restaurant, "Okay, you've been here long enough and you apply for immigration", whatever the requirements were [laughs]. But I don't think the restaurant or the convenience store ever made a lot of money but it was a good way of getting family in. I thought it was kind of neat. But my father . . . I think some of my beliefs about Chinese people may have been adopted from my father. He was very, very smart — he always taught that every culture, every group of people, has something valuable to offer. If they didn't, they wouldn't have survived as long as they have. And he always had the saying, "Before you judge someone, walk a mile in their shoes", or moccasins, I think was the birch bark saying on the wall. And I think some of it may have come from my father; just generally being open-minded about anything. Looking for the good first and finding out what you can from it in a non-predatorial way.

I think the Lee family probably was my first real contact with Chinese and that would have been in Grade 10, 11, and 12. Lost track of them after high school. He went to university; I went to work. But I think that the Lees were a very positive model of a family of their culture. Their kids were very progressive, did very well in school, diversive interests, very loyal to the family, very hard working. They always were going to school and had a job — sometimes two jobs, you know — part-time things. Stephen, when he went to university, I guess he was working a restaurant job or something and other part-time jobs while going to university. And his sister I think did the same thing. Mr. Lee was friendly, always, "How are you doing? Did you have a good day?"; talk about the weather, all this stuff. He was very successful in business. That'd be my first experience. I was on a personal school level with his son. Mr. Lee was a neat man. His restaurant was right on the edge of town. We used to go hunting and we'd

come back and sometimes we'd stop for dinner in his restaurant. We'd fill our guts and he'd put the rifles behind the counter, "It's alright boys. Come on in. Have yourself a meal". That was kind of neat. He did try to arrange a marriage between his son and this German family who was also fairly well off in the construction business. And it almost worked but she had already been spoken for [laughs].

S: So which of your beliefs would you say then were formed or had their beginnings with your experiences in high school? Which specifically?

R: Hard working, friendly; most of the positive ones I think were established then, I would say, or were on their way. They were the only Chinese family in town, so, you know, what can you base it on? But my experience with the Lee family was very positive . . . and because of the first experience, I probably would use it as the measuring stick for all encounters thereafter. Not probably, I know I did. I think that probably — and I think if your first experiences were good, you're going to look and focus on the good. If your first experience was bad, then everything is tainted.

S: Did your upbringing — you'd mentioned earlier about your father's views — did any of your concrete beliefs arise at that point, from your upbringing or from your father?

R: I don't know whether the beliefs did or the need to examine them did. My father wasn't the type of person that you could take everything he said as gospel. He wasn't like that. He set in motion a bunch of questions. He didn't give me the answers. Whether he did consciously or not, I don't know. But that's what happened. I didn't believe everything he said but I was willing to go out and look and find out whether he was telling the truth or not. And he wasn't always telling the truth. So no, I don't really think much of the beliefs came from there. I think the willingness to look open-mindedly came from him but not what to believe and what not to believe. A lot of it would be with the first encounter.

S: Just continue with talking about your father.

R: Which part, that I didn't believe everything he said [laughs]? I felt like I couldn't afford to. Uhm . . . yeah, and my mother too. My mother came from a French family that was very chauvinistic and she rejected that, that very closed-mindedness. It was what she saw in the French community and she wanted to make darn sure us kids didn't experience the same thing.

So both my parents, probably the only thing they had in common is that they had no preconceived ideas about what anybody was like and that we had to treat them all as individuals.

S: Sounds great.

R: Yeah, they were kind of outcasts [laughs]. And that openness or the willingness to look at individuals for what they are prevents, I guess, stereotypes from being developed — or, well, maybe not. But they weren't telling the entire truth. You can look at individuals for what they are but you have to look at where they came from too. And that's why we have, I believe, different cultures and subcultures with different behavioral patterns and different belief systems themselves. The one thing I find about the Chinese, that I don't think I mentioned, is that some of the most racist people that I have ever met have been Chinese. A Chinese woman I remember in one development, we had a showhome in there a couple of years ago, and this Chinese lady came in. She said, "That lot, that lot still not sold is it?" It was the last one on that street. I said, "No, that lot's still available". She said, "What are the neighbours like on each side? You got any Pakis in there?"

S: Subtle.

R: Yeah, oh yeah. She wasn't beating around the bush at all. "Yeah, there aren't any Pakistanis in the neighbourhood" . . . and historically, the Chinese have been very isolationist anyway. It goes a long way back and it's probably because everybody that comes in the neighbourhood wants to conquer them because they had so much more to loot and pillage than anyone else [laughs]. You know, it's a survival instinct. That's why they had the great wall of China. It wasn't antisocial: it was to protect themselves. So it's — I can't think of any other group where I've seen racism as evident as with the Chinese, except for the British and North Americans. It's so outward. You know, like the different groups express some aspect of racism. Always. I mean, look at the Croats here in Canada. And Blacks have there own form of racism too.

S: Yeah, it's quite pervasive in any culture — a natural, human kind of predisposition.

R: I find that the Chinese — back to the Chinese — there is a certain racism there for some reason. And I don't know whether it's feeling of superiority or protectiveness or a little of both. What's it matter. But that one really blew me away, that lady, "Are there any Pakis in the neighbourhood?"

S: One more question in this area on beliefs that I wanted to ask you about. Have your beliefs about Chinese people changed over time? Have they been modified in any way?

R: Beliefs . . . probably. I think at the beginning they're not a belief. They're a question or a possibility or a theory. Some beliefs have been more reinforced. Like the intelligence thing. There's a book — you've probably read the one published in the States quite recently, about the IQ's?

S: Yeah.

R: And the [illegible] showed Jewish and Chinese people score high. Of course you've got to look at the motivation, why he's doing that. And look at the test and everything else. I thought that was kind of interesting. I mean, you've got scientific proof of the feeling that I had. Although, on the other side, I've got to account for my disrespect for IQ tests.

S: So have you had any beliefs, then, that have been changed significantly, in one way or another, at some point in your adult life?

R: With the Chinese people, no. With other groups, yes.

S: Okay. You mentioned earlier about your fascination with Chinese culture and Chinese history. Have you ever wondered or do you think at the present time, that that fascination has somehow at all, perhaps, affected your perceptions or shaped your beliefs in any way? Can you think of any concrete examples?

R: Maybe a little bit. And maybe because that long fascination, I examine or am more critical of what I see. Maybe.

S: It's not something you've really reflected on?

R: No, it's too bad.

S: Well, that's okay.

R: Actually, I'm trying to go to China right now. China could be quite neat. I'll see how I feel when I get back [laughs]. You know, dealing with Chinese in Canada — the Vietnamese-Chinese,

ethnic Chinese from Vietnam — and then going to a place like Beijing, which is large and very industrial, it would be interesting to see what would happen to perceptions. You know, like a Japanese — to use a parallel — my experience with Japanese in Canada has been generally very good. And I have some friends who have had similar experiences going over to Japan, coming back from Japan with a very, very different feeling, "If I never go back to Japan!", you know.

So that's a different environment, right. So, I wouldn't be surprised if a lot of — I think I made it clear that my experience with Chinese in Canada and I think there is a different motivation in a different culture. If we were to go over to China, we're the ones who are on their turf. I'm the one that's going to stand out and I'm the one who's going to be treated — I fully expect to be treated differently than my experience here. Which, I mean, already I've set up expectations. I'm a foreigner; I'm an outsider. What's the Japanese term — geijing, or something like that — you know, where they're very distrustful of outsiders. Like I said, I'm really looking forward to that. I think that will be quite neat and how to overcome and blend in.

S: Okay, I wanted to move on to the second half of our interview and look at your contact experiences, and look at those in some detail. You've already touched on some of those just in talking about your beliefs but I wanted to get more of an understanding of some of the things that have happened, some of the interactions that really stand out in your mind. So, if you could tell me about an experience with face-to-face contact with a Chinese person that stands out in your mind and please describe, in as much detail as possible, the situation, how you acted, and the thoughts, feelings, and if possible, the bodily sensations that you experienced during the course of the interaction.

R: You set me up for this question earlier . . . and it was kind of interesting, this Chinese fellow phoned me up and he said, "Ron, I have a problem. Can you do me a favour?" I said, "Sure, I'd love to". I promised I would do something for him and I didn't write it down, and I totally forgot. And two weeks later, a week later, something like that, I bumped into him someplace and he goes — he just gave me that look of incredible disappointment, like maybe he was angry at me almost. I was thinking back to our responses about reliability. If I had asked him to do it and he promised he would do it, it would have been done. I know it would have. I didn't. I let him down. He was very, very disappointed. I felt like garbage [chuckles]. And I said, "I forgot to take care of it. Can someone else do it?"

S: How did you feel about the whole thing?

R: Oh, I felt like shit. And I've seen him a couple of times since and he's still — the last time I saw him, which was actually just yesterday, you know, he had sort of almost forgiven me for it.

S: You can still sense that there's this feeling there?

R: Yeah. Yeah.

S: Can you describe that for me, when you're around him?

R: Oh, it's real simple. He doesn't smile and say hi the way he did before. It's very, very — we're not friends anymore.

S: So that's kind of a subtle thing you're picking up on?

R: Uhm, not real subtle.

S: No but it's in the tone or it's the way something is expressed. It's not really overt.

R: Yeah, that's right. Yes. He hasn't actually come out and said, "You pissed me off, Ron".

S: Did you ever feel like communicating that to him? Like saying, "Look, let's talk this one out".

R: Yeah. And I did, not the last time we met but the time before. That's way it wasn't quite as bad yesterday. But it's going to take a long time. And I have to do something to make up for it. The neat thing is . . . is that for a lot of people — I mean, it was an honest mistake — I goofed. And if you can't forgive me for that, well then up yours! With him it don't feel that same, "Up yours!" I feel like I really owe him. I promised him something and I didn't do it. You know, I may have had good reasons but I know that if he promised me, he would have done it regardless of what the reason. I mean, he wouldn't have forgot.

S: But what makes you certain of that?

R: Because in the past he's always come through for me when I needed something. You know, "Weng, I need a report on such and such. Can you find me that?" He's been there. So, this time I really blew it. Other incidences . . . I did a high rise building . . . I think there was 102 units and eleven of them were non-Chinese. It was an interesting building [chuckles]. Actually, it's quite interesting, the Native people and Chinese how well they get along. There's something there. Dealing there with the Chinese people in Victoria — we were dealing with them either as individuals or their agents because a lot of their English was just not there. So they were hiring agents who were usually Chinese and often related but not always. And again, their word was good and they believed — and they took me for my word. "Unit #24 will be ready by January 15. If I have to come in myself and finish the painting and fix that fireplace, it will be done". So I had to make sure it was done by that date and if there was a problem, get a hold of them way ahead of time and let them know why. Give them a new schedule and don't screw up because everybody talks to each other and if I don't honour my word, they're going to stop honouring theirs. And it's going to make these meetings and assessments a waste of time.

S: So, was that ever like a one-on-one interaction?

R: Most of the time it was one-on-one.

S: Could you describe that at all?

R: Yeah, most of the time it was one-on-one. Occasionally, it was two, usually with one person acting as the agent or the interpreter. I felt comfortable, intrigued or excited, maybe a little — "This is fun; this is kind of neat". On that particular project, I felt really, when dealing with these people, I wonder if maybe a little paternalistic in that, "You're new to this country. I'm going to show you how good we can be". I think that was there. I wanted to prove to them that at least some of us felt you are welcome. That probably — no, that did steer some of my behavior and therefore some of the feedback I would get from them and then, which would reinforce what I believed already.

S: Can you elaborate on that, how it guided you behavior or may have shaped it?

R: I think I put out a little more. I worked harder for those people than I would normally have. And I spent time with them and talked to them just to learn something from them. Just little things . . . I remember a lady, I was in to fix her door. Her door kept flying open — her patio door wasn't adjusted properly. And her son was working on a computer and he couldn't get it to

work. She doesn't know anything about computers and the son knows even less. I'm building her bloody house; I don't care about her computer. I take the time out. I read about the thing and save her computer so she doesn't have to take it to the store and get charged 150 bucks like she did last week. And I showed her how she did it and how not to do it again. I don't think I would as readily do things like that, except for these people because they were new to the country, because you hear so many stories about immigrants being shafted. I mean, I wanted to counter that. And whether they were Chinese or — new immigrants I always feel like I have to show them the good side of Canada. I do that when — mostly because like, I think, if it weren't for immigrants, where would we be today? The majority of Canadians are pretty well third generation, at best.

Appendix I

Table 1
Thematic Abstraction of Karen's Experience

Excerpts from Protocols	Theme(s)
1. I don't particularly care for kinds of characterizations which are going to be overgeneralizing with respect to the group. I prefer to look at individuals as individuals.	Desire to Avoid Generalizing About Outgroups
2. But I guess that sometimes it's almost impossible to get away from it, uh, categorizing and/or making generalizations about a specific group of people. So that you just tend to naturally fall into certain kinds of patterns of thinking.	Awareness of Difficulty of Escaping Generalizing About Outgroups
3. I think that sometimes that these patterns that we get into can be very destructive and uhm, I think in a way it can be damaging to the group that you're obviously applying to the stereotyping in any way.	Awareness of Negative Impact of Stereotyping
4. I think that first of all, the way in which youths have been raised in their culture [i.e., Native culture], and specifically within their culture, I suspect that, uhm, they may have a different way of perceiving the world, which is very much different from the lens through which we look at the world. I think that they are probably less analytic. They are not so apt to be breaking things down. And in many ways, I think their culture reflects an oral basis, not a particularly British or literary one.	Perception of Native Indians as Less Analytical and as Possessing a Different World View Than Whites
5. . . . I think that they may offer us ways, and that diversity may be helpful for us and may be a reflection of similar ways that we could improve the ways in which we perceive things that may be improved by looking at how they see things. And uhm, developing a greater sensitivity with respect to how they view the world.	Perceived Value of Native World View
6. Oh, I would certainly say that in my dealings with Native Indians they appeared to be, uhm, as far as I was concerned, far more generous, open, and in a way, more forthright and more forthcoming.	Perception of Native Indians as More Generous and Forthright Than Whites

7. I think that in our culture, sometimes what happens is that we become very cynical and we suspect motives and motivations. And, you know, we can sort of glean why a person may be behaving in a certain way and we can see it as being "Oh yes, he wants to manipulate and/or use the person." Whereas with Native people, they are less apt to see that or envision it. They can't perceive that person as being acting in a way that may be in a way manipulative to that person.	Perception of Native Indians as Less Suspecting and Discerning of Others' Motives Than Whites
8. They [i.e., Native Indians] are simply not as aware [of time]. And we take — we interpret it again in a very negative way: that they are being lazy or they're being unpunctual or that some other explanation for that. I suspect that it may be something which is just simply that they are not prone to be as conscious or as aware [of time].	Perception of Native Indians as Less Time-Conscious Than Whites (Critical of Own Culture)
9. . . . I don't like to generalize. This has just been my experience with, uhm, Indians in a specific location that's in Northern Alberta. They were Cree-speaking Indians and again, I don't know if it's generalizable to the rest of the population or if you could say the same with regard to Natives which have been largely assimilated and living in urban centers. It may be something quite different.	Recognition of Potential Limitations of Experiences and Beliefs About Native Indians; Desire to Avoid Generalizing
10. Yes, as it being general, I would have to say [that Native Indians are] less analytic. . . . . I would imagine that there are perhaps, you know, probably Native groups which have in fact become totally assimilated to uhm — would be indistinguishable, probably, in the values of the majority, that being whites and Natives.	Perception of Native Indians As Less Analytical Than Whites; Awareness of Existence of Exceptions to Belief
11. I really haven't thought about it [i.e., the proportion of Native Indians, as a group, who would be less analytical than whites].	Lack of Consideration of the Distribution of an Attribute Among Native Indians
12. Well, I mean it [i.e., my beliefs about Native Indians in general] from a very, uhm, from my own perspective, right. From what I've seen. Of course, I would probably be willing to, you know, hedge it with, you know, "But this is dependent on my experience."	Awareness of Potential Limitations of Beliefs About Native Indians; Awareness That Beliefs Are Based on Personal Experiences With Native Indians
13. I think there always will be [exceptions to beliefs]. I mean, definitely there always will be exceptions. There are bound to be because in any group you are going to find people that are not going to follow a pattern.	Awareness of Exceptions to Beliefs About Other Groups

14. One of my early experiences [with Native Indians] was actually in uhm, living in a mining town. . . . .Okay, in this community there was a great debate as to whether or not the mine should continue to operate or should disband. . . . There was a town meeting and this is where the two sides [i.e., Native Indians and whites] converged. . . . And then the next day in the newspaper — this was really quite shocking. I suppose it was sort of like yellow journalism or something; it was just absolutely infuriating — the people who were writing the newspaper had access, of course, to only put across their point of view, which was [that of] the white miners and other expansionists who wanted to develop the mine.	Sympathizing With the Native Position
15. . . . I totally sympathize in terms of their [i.e., the Native Indians'] position and the Native reality. So I wrote a letter to the editor and expressed an opposite point of view, which was in line with the Native's concern with regard to their livelihood [i.e., hunting and trapping]. . . . And then I had, you know, many Native people who phoned who said, "Thank you for having expressed that for us", you know, and, "It was a really nice gesture."	Sympathizing With The Native Position
16. . . . I think that our culture, when it becomes so, I think one-sided and so absolutely insistent [on], uhm, technology to such an extent. Uhm, there were just other things as well, uhm, the way in which the mine was operating. It was absolute and total disregard [for the environment]. It was, to me, it was just terrible and immoral.	Perception of Own Culture as Overly Technologically-Oriented (Critical of Own Culture)
17. . . . at the time [that I was tutoring Native students], I really wasn't reflecting really on what it was that I was doing and this, of course, was just prior to my having any kind of real teaching experience or knowing how to teach people. So, unfortunately I wasn't a very good listener. I had just assumed that these are things that were very, very valuable and that what I was teaching would be of immense use [laughs].	Lack of Awareness of Cultural Differences in Early Teaching Experiences With Native Indians
18. In a way, it was like a feeling of failing to make it [i.e., analytical logic], you know, understandable to them [i.e., Native students]. . . . At first I was angry, you know, that they did not understand this because it was so simple, you know; it was so easy. But uhm, I think in reflecting back to then, I don't know if it was appropriate but I didn't listen enough to hear them.	Awareness of Importance of Intercultural Sensitivity In Teaching Native Indian Students

19. So I started talking about, you know, "Could you share some of the experiences that you had in that residential school with regard to physical punishment?" And the Native lady looked at me and said, "Aah yes, aah yes." . . . And she said, "Physical — physical punishment, aah yes. I remember my son in physical education, in phys. ed. class. The teacher coaxed him to run so many laps around the gym and it was so hard, it was so physically demanding of him. I thought my son would have a heart attack." I went, "Ahh!" It was extremely kind of Cree and , you know, very literal but it was totally, in a way, it was her way of working in what it was that I was teaching. But yet, it was totally off track.	Perception of Native Indians as Having Difficulty With Conceptual Understanding
20. A Native student was in [a] history class. Oh dear, sometimes they cue into the wrong thing and they think that what is important and they latch onto these ideas. The thing is important but it really is just totally off topic and almost all the white people in the class know it's totally off topic. But it's really unfortunate.	Perception of Native Indians as Having Difficulty With Conceptual Understanding
21. There's another thing also . . . and that is other contact experiences which I had and that relates to what it is that we're teaching and how, you know, we may be — this is the values content that I find problematic.	Perception of Value-Laden Nature of School Curricula
22. . . . there was an English course which I was taking and there were a lot of Native students in the classroom. The professor decided that to make it more relevant, he would bring in Native folktales , alright, which I thought was a great idea.	Receptivity to Native Indian Culture
23. . . . I don't know, because of a collection of factors, that it may be relating to the way in which they [i.e., Native Indians] are socialized, the way in which they are growing up in our culture that uhm . . . or reality [i.e., life experience], as such, plays a far greater role than does, you know, maybe reading and writing and entering analytical sorts of things. And that's a part of their socialization, that they don't make sense of things.	Consideration of Possible Cultural Causes of Perceived Lower Analytical Ability in Native Indians (Socialization)
24. . . . what I have noticed anyway is they [i.e., Native Indians] are much more, you know, they're much more open and forthcoming. . . . you know, they tell you to come over and pop by. And you can do so. You don't have to phone ahead of time. Their house is your house. It's just a totally different kind of — it's much freer. I mean, in ordinary culture, you obviously just wouldn't go in and drop by to someone's house and say, "Hi, here I am!" You'd get the door slammed in your face.	Perception of Native Indians as More Forthright and Informal Than Whites (Critical of Own Culture)

25. But uhm, I've noticed that they [i.e., Native Indians] open the door; you can come in. They offer you anything you want. I don't know, they tend to be, you know, as far as my experience has been, friendly, accommodating.	Perception of Native Indians as Friendly and Accommodating
26. Uhm, some of them [i.e., Native Indians] are hostile and distrusting if you're a white person. Obviously, you could say that they would just judge you by your colour but with good reason.	Awareness of Exceptions to Belief That Native Indians Are Friendly; Perceiving Reverse Discrimination as Justified
27. . . . I guess there are numerous explanations, I suppose, but uhm, it just seems that it [i.e., Native Indians' behavior] was somehow less constrained by the clock and not as . . . I think in general this can also, in a way, be extended to other areas. Just not as consciously aware of what the time is and not as constrained by factors such as time.	Perception of Native Indians as Less Time-Conscious
28. And [Native Indians have] a more forgiving attitude, too, in that if you appeared late, then it was not outrage: "What is your excuse? What do you have to say for yourself?" It was just something which is, uhm, a more relaxed kind of attitude.	Perception of Native Indians as More Relaxed/Forgiving About Punctuality Than Whites (Critical of Own Culture)
29. . . . if you notice the behavior of white people when they come in late [to a class], they are very anxious and, "Oh, excuse me. Oh, I'm sorry." Well, this was not with [Native students] — they would be quiet. They would enter very quietly. Not to make a big commotion but it wouldn't be, at least seemingly, they would not appear as anxiety-prone or anxious or running up to give an excuse, "Sorry."	Perception of Native Students as Less Anxious or Apologetic About Tardiness Than White Students
30. I think that probably, if they [i.e., my beliefs about Native Indians] have evolved or if they have changed, I haven't really [noticed] — perhaps it's just been more of a gradual — and I haven't really taken note of any kinds of exceptional breaks or, you know, alterations, really.	Perceived Constancy of Beliefs About Native Indians
31. . . . from my own background, . . . in the way in which I was socialized, it was to be accepting of minority groups. That diversity was the proper way to go, that we should recognize that kind of diversity and, you know, accept it.	Early Socialization Emphasizes Acceptance of Other Ethnic Groups
32. So I think it's important that you have an open mind and try to — I think it's really important. I try to see things from their [i.e., Native Indians'] perspective or at least attempt to do that even if it may not be possible. Or I may be very deceived many times when I think I am, when in reality, I may not be.	Desire to be Open-Minded and Sensitive to Native Indians' Perspective (Awareness of Possible Self-Deception)

33. The way in which I attempt to operate is to listen first of all and then not try to, uhm, have precategorical conclusions already drawn; so that if a person says something, it may or may not confirm my belief and, you know, I sort of incorporate it into the working structure, as it were. So that actually, it's experience which is the kind of motor which is, you know, formulating what it is that I see or conclude.	Desire to View Outgroup Members as Individuals; Desire to Avoid Categorical Judgements
34. I think of it in a way in which we expect [people] to be analytical; it requires a certain degree of literacy. We have to be able to work and know, and be comfortable with figures, you know, language and playing these little manipulative games. You have to be coming from a literate basis to be that way. This is not something I have found really prevalent in many of the Native Indians which I have spoken with. They are coming from more of an oral basis.	Consideration of Possible Causes of Perceived Lower Analytical Ability in Native Indians
35. Actually, I think that after I had done that instrument, that I was working from a real world perspective and that this was my — as much as possible, based on what I had experienced, what I had seen, what I've read about.	Beliefs About Native Indians Based on Personal Experiences/Knowledge of Outgroup
36. . . . rather than having conflict in our lives, I would want to avoid a situation in which I am making presumptions and, you know, already formulating conclusions prior to . . . But I may be just deceiving myself in a way and thinking that I'm not doing this when in reality I may be.	Desire to Avoid Categorical Judgements About Members of Other Groups; Awareness That This Process May Occur
37. . . . I was just reading a statistic which is, you know, teachers in the public school system are three times more likely to target Native American kids as learning disabled and gosh, I mean, I don't want to fall into those kinds of traps. I mean, I think that's horrific. That is something which I'm really going to strive to avoid.	Desire to Avoid Discriminating Against Native Indians
38. Well, sometimes you have a nagging feeling in the back of your mind that you are [generalizing about a group] — hmm, is this a caricature of some — and you're not really dealing with, you know, what you're really seeing? Is it just a caricature . . . or is it an authentic way of looking at it? And it's very difficult, I think, making those kinds of distinctions.	Awareness of Difficulty of Knowing When One Is Generalizing About An Outgroup
39. In the community which we lived in, the northern community, you very frequently had the court report, alright. And every time you found the court report, you would always find Native-American people being overrepresented in the courts. I don't know, many of the cases which I recall were so, in a way, not really cases at all. I mean, they should never have been litigated.	Perceiving Native Indians as Being Discriminated Against (Critical of Own Culture)

40. Whereas sometimes it seemed that the police just didn't have anything better to do than simply to pick up the one Native. You know, the notorious alcoholic, and they would get him on some charge of, "Drunk in public", so they could throw him in jail and go through the court process and have the lawyers there. It just seemed so, ah, infinitely ridiculous.	Perceiving Police Actions as Discriminating Against Native Indians
41. I may not like the fact that that's happening [i.e., generalizing] but it may in fact be happening, you know. If I really, really honestly look at it, it may be in fact that I am generalizing . . . based on these perceptions which I have.	Awareness of Possibility of Generalizing Despite Its Undesirability

Table 2

Thematic Clusters of Karen's Experience

1. Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup
   (1, 3, 9, 12, 17, 18, 21, 26, 32, 33, 36, 37)
2. Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup
   (2, 36, 38)
3. Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup
   (4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29)
4. Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior
   (4, 23, 34)
5. Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values
   (5)
6. Perceived Characteristics of the Ingroup
   (4, 6, 7, 8, 16, 24, 27, 28, 29)
7. Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (9, 12)
8. Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (10, 13, 26)
9. Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (11)
10. Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup
    (12, 33, 35, 41)
11. Sympathizing With the Outgroup
    (14, 15, 37, 39, 40)
12. Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture
    (15, 22)
13. Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup
    (17, 18, 31)
14. Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Stable
    (30)

Appendix J

Table 3
Thematic Abstraction of Ron's Experience

Excerpts from Protocols	Theme(s)
1. I believe they [i.e., Chinese people] are as group — that's generally speaking — on standardized IQ tests they score higher. I believe that; that's been my experience. They're generally hard-working, very family-oriented, generally quite friendly . . . but I think there's a genuine friendliness when it's expressed.	Perception of Chinese as Scoring Higher on Intelligence Tests, Hard-Working, Family-Oriented, and Friendly
2. Honest in business; hard-nosed in business but honest. And I think that would extend to all their [i.e., Chinese people's] dealings — they're honest and generally, when they want something, they're willing to tell you and if they're not, then obviously it's not an issue.	Perception of Chinese as Honest/Astute
3. They [i.e., Chinese people] are able to, generally I find, able to express gratitude a lot better than other people. And willing to compliment.	Perception of Chinese as Complimentary and Willing to Express Gratitude
4. The family values, the strength of family, the acceptance, the understanding of family as being continual — not something that's [only] here today. Just the heritage has spilled over, I guess, into the ancestry; it's all very present and very real amongst a lot of Chinese people.	Perception of the Central Role of Family in Chinese Culture
5. . . . I think that [i.e., my perceiving Chinese people as miserly] is just from watching them in their homes. . . . Very, very — whether you want to call it thrifty or miserly. And I think that it's a question of value. . . . Some of the more personal, creature comforts of a consumer society — Western consumer society — maybe don't apply to, with my experience at least, to these Chinese people.	Perception of Chinese as Economical
6. Hard-working. And now whether that just applies to Chinese in Canada or whether it applies to Chinese [people] period, it's hard to say.	Awareness of Potential Limitations of Belief That Chinese Are Hard-Working
7. In my experience, yeah, [I feel that my beliefs generally apply to Chinese people].	Perceiving Beliefs As Applying To Chinese as a Group

8. There's been some very noticeable exceptions [to my belief that Chinese people are cleanly]. . . . I can think of a house I went into, and did some repair work, that was rented to a Chinese family. They should have been thrown in jail, just for the lack of cleanliness. I mean, the place was just horrible; very disrespectful of the landlord.	Awareness of Exceptions to Belief That Chinese Are Cleanly
9. I found some instances of rudeness [among Chinese people] that could possibly be attributed not so much to just blatant rudeness as [to] insecurity or fear.	Consideration of Possible Causes of Perceived Rudeness in Some Chinese
10. [I think about my beliefs about Chinese people] on an emotional, gut level. I mean, obviously you have to back it up with some statistical analysis [i.e., examination of my contact experiences] but it's the same: 95%, 90% — I don't think that really matters. I don't think those numbers are really relevant. It's a feeling and I look back and I go, "What experiences have you had with these people?" And you go look it over, "Well yeah, most of them [display this particular trait]." An awful lot, and maybe it is 95% but maybe it's only 85%. . . . It's just [that] what I feel is [what is] important. Uhm . . . and no, I don't think I'd look at it quantitatively. At least I hope — I mean, I'm not that analytical.	Beliefs Based On Emotional Response That Is Evaluated By Reviewing Previous Experiences With Chinese People; Beliefs Not Considered in Quantitative Terms
11. Maybe the bad experiences [with Chinese people], I've forgotten them all. I suppose that's possible but I hate to think that I would do that. I mean, that is a possibility, because of the facts.	Awareness That Exceptions To Beliefs May Not Be Recalled
12. [When I'm thinking about a trait that I apply to Chinese people], it's more like pictures — pictures flashing of situations or episodes. You know, Mr. So-and-So here, Mr. So-and-So, and the time I remember he did that. . . . And with each picture, you have another emotional response, "Oh yeah, that was good. That was good. That was horrible." So you count the emotional responses, I guess, and most of them are one way or another, and that's how you base your overall belief system. It's how you feel overall.	Beliefs About Chinese Based on Overall Emotional Response Elicited When Recalling Previous Contact Experiences
13. When you're constantly scanning [your contact experiences] — you can always challenge it [i.e., a belief]. Like, maybe I do have an overinflated sense of certain qualities of Chinese people on the whole and I have to challenge that because, I mean, that's a stereotype too, that I've created for myself. So let's look at it. Are they really that different than another group of people? . . . When I try to do that, I still come to basically the same conclusions, based on my experience.	Awareness of Potential Inaccuracy of Beliefs About Chinese; Desire To Be Accurate In Beliefs Held; Examination of Previous Contact Experiences Reaffirms Accuracy of Beliefs

14. [I've challenged my beliefs about other groups] probably most of my adult life. I'm what you call self-analytical. I think you should always cross-check what you believe. It's a value system-checking or whatever you want to call it.	Strives to Critically Evaluate Beliefs About Other Groups
15. That was interesting as well, again being a little bit of a minority amongst them [i.e., Native Indians] and being able to understand how they feel about how they're being perceived or how they believe they were being perceived. That was a very valuable lesson and . . . I think probably started, "What do I believe about them? What do other people believe about them? What's the facts? What do I see before me most real and why is it happening?" And I've applied that to every group of people that I encounter, whether they're Chinese, Korean, Lebanese, Ed. Psyc. majors. You know, like, they're all the same. You have to look at them.	Exposure to a Minority Group's Perspective Fosters Critical Examination of Beliefs About Other Groups
16. And there have been things that I have believed that I have had to turn around [i.e., change] because eventually you've got to face — you start to look at situations in a different light.	Openness to New, Belief-Inconsistent Information
17. Ten people could do the exact same thing and have ten different motivations. So when you start looking at the motivations behind the activity, the behavior, then your view of the behavior becomes, "Were these people being courteous just because that's the way they are or are they trying to set me up [laughs] ?"	Consideration of Possible Motivation For Others' Behavior
18. With Chinese people generally, it has been very — my interactions with them have been very positive throughout. When I compare it to the average Canadians, British immigrants, well-educated Jamaican immigrants, poorly educated Jamaican immigrants — when I look at other groups, I find . . . the Chinese experience much more positive or very, very good compared to a lot of other groups, including WASP's.	Positive Nature of Experiences With Chinese
19. I've always been interested in China too, which maybe takes [in] Chinese history, culture, art, the history of Chinese in Canada, what they did when they got here and how they organized themselves, how they brought their family over. I admire that, whereas the trends in the public, I think, is this, you know, "Stop reuniting families. Let's stop that. Let's screen our immigrants better."	Expressed Interest In, and Admiration of, Chinese Culture

20. And the sacrifices that are made for family are very unselfish — looking at tomorrow, looking at the future, not living for today. . . . When people come to this country and work with not only their own successes in mind but their children's and their grandchildren's, that's something that's lost in North American society. I think that's a new value that has worth and I believe that the Chinese can teach us a lot from that. I think that's probably one of the biggest things that I admire about them is that sense of time.	Admiration of Chinese People's Future Orientation; Perception of Its Positive Contribution to Canadian Society
21. If someone does something, I'd ask, "Why is he doing it?" I ask, "Why is he [his emphasis] doing it?", not why what was done. . . . Examine the motivation and the source — I think it's the source of the motivation. You know, again, are you running away from something or are you running to something? Is it the carrot or the stick that's making you do it, or a little of both? Or is it just habit?	Consideration of Possible Motivations In Analyzing Others' Behavior
22. Well, I had some of the beliefs before I actually met any Chinese people. It was something I didn't think about. . . . I think some of my beliefs about Chinese people may have been adopted from my father. He was very, very smart — he always taught that every culture, every group of people, has something valuable to offer. If they didn't, they wouldn't have survived as long as they have. . . . And I think some of it may have come from my father; just generally being open-minded about anything. Looking for the good first and finding out what you can in a non-predatorial way.	Upbringing Emphasizes Openness and A Positive Orientation Toward Other Groups
23. I think the Lee family probably was my first real contact with Chinese and that would have been in Grade 10, 11, and 12. . . . But I think that the Lees were a very positive model of a family of their culture. Their kids were very progressive, did very well in school, diverse interests, very loyal to the family, very hard-working. . . . Mr. Lee was friendly, always, "How are you doing? Did you have a good day?"; talk about the weather, all this stuff.	Positive Initial Experiences With Chinese
24. Hard-working, friendly; most of the positive ones [i.e., positive traits associated with Chinese people] I think were established then, I would say, or were on their way [to being established]. . . . But my experience with the Lee family was very positive . . . and because of the first experience, I probably would use it as the measuring stick for all encounters thereafter. Not probably, I know I did. . . . I think if your first experiences were good, you're going to look and focus on the good. If your first experience was bad, then everything is tainted.	Positive Initial Experiences With Chinese Form Basis of Many Positive Beliefs About Chinese and Establish A Positive Orientation Toward Chinese

25. So no, I don't really think much of the beliefs [about Chinese people] came from there [i.e., from my father]. I think the willingness to look open-mindedly came from him but not what to believe and what not to believe. A lot of it [i.e., beliefs] would be with the first encounter [with Chinese people].	Upbringing Fosters Open-Mindedness Toward Other Groups; Early Contact Experiences Form Basis of Many Beliefs About Chinese
26. So both my parents, probably the only thing they had in common is that they had no preconceived ideas about what anybody was like and that we had to treat them all as individuals.	Upbringing Emphasizes Need to View Others as Individuals
27. You can look at individuals for what they are [i.e., consider them as individuals] but you have to look at where they came from too. And that's why we have, I believe, different cultures and subcultures with different behavioral patterns and different belief systems themselves.	Perceived Importance of Cultural Factors in Understanding Others
28. The one thing I find about the Chinese, that I don't think I mentioned, is that some of the most racist people that I have ever met have been Chinese. . . . and historically, the Chinese have been very isolationist anyway. It goes a long way back and it's probably because everybody that comes in the neighbourhood wants to conquer them because they had so much more to loot and pillage than anyone else [laughs]. You know, it's a survival instinct. That's why they had the great wall of China. It wasn't antisocial; it was to protect themselves. . . . And I don't know whether it [i.e., their racism] is a feeling of superiority or protectiveness, or a little of both.	Consideration of Possible Historical Causes of Racism in Chinese
29. With the Chinese people, no, [my beliefs haven't changed significantly]. With other groups, yes.	Perceived Stability of Beliefs About Chinese
30. So, I wouldn't be surprised if a lot of [my beliefs about Chinese people changed if I went to China] — I think I made it clear with [this being] my experience with Chinese in Canada, and I think there is a different motivation in a different culture. If we were to go over to China, we're the ones who are on their turf. I'm the one that's going to stand out and I'm the one who's going to be treated — I fully expect to be treated differently than my experience here.	Awareness That Beliefs About Chinese May Change In Another Context
31. Yeah, most of the time it [i.e., my interactions with Chinese clients on that project] was one-on-one. Occasionally, it was two, usually with one person acting as the agent or the interpreter. I felt comfortable, intrigued or excited, maybe a little — "This is fun; this is kind of neat."	Openness/Excitement About Interacting With Chinese

32. On that particular project, I felt really, when dealing with these people, I wonder if maybe a little paternalistic in that, "You're new to this country. I'm going to show you how good we can be." I think that was there. I wanted to prove to them that at least some of us felt you are welcome.	Desire To Provide Chinese Immigrants With A Positive Perception of Canadians
33. And whether they were Chinese or — new immigrants, I always feel like I have to show them the good side of Canada. I do that when — mostly because like, I think, if it weren't for immigrants, where would we be today? The majority of Canadians are pretty well third generation, at best.	Concern With Providing Immigrants With A Positive Perception of Canada; Appreciation of Immigrants' Contributions
34. But the thing that I learned after — and the first time, of course, you just think it's a fluke — but the thing I found with Chinese clients is that they'll nickel-and-dime you, they'll negotiate you, they'll worm little things out of you, and everything else. But when it's done, they say, "Thank you." And they'll say, "You did a wonderful job on the house and we really like it." . . . They'll let other people know that they were impressed with you. I haven't found that combination of behavior in any other group.	Perception of Outgroup as Astute But Appreciative in Business Interactions
35. And I think there was a different reason for it [i.e., Chinese people offering me gifts after I completed work on their homes]. Uhm . . . actually, most of them were non — the Wongs were very much Canadian. But the rest of the gifts came from second or first generation people or actual immigrants. And I think that is maybe their perceptions of [how business should be conducted] . . . . abroad, there is this exchange of whatever on all levels of business and that [practice] doesn't exist in North America. I think that might be part of the reason.	Consideration Of Possible Cultural Causes of Outgroup Behavior (Gift Giving)
36. My size gives me an unfair advantage in a lot of situations. I mean, and sometimes I consciously use it, I think. And this may influence how Chinese people react to me — I'm taller than most of them. I outweigh them by quite a bit. And I think there's a little bit of physical intimidation whether I intend it or not. . . . I don't know how much my size influenced their behavior towards me, which influences my perception of them. If I was only 5 feet 5 inches and 110 pounds, maybe I'd have a different set of beliefs. I'd hate to think that but, I mean, I think that's realistic. I think that's definitely a factor.	Consideration of Physical Size As A Factor Influencing Beliefs About Chinese and Their Behavior
37. . . . what I started doing is setting up situations where we were sitting so my size isn't as intimidating [to Chinese clients]. Or if I could, where I could sit and leave them standing. Sometimes even that. Maybe if it was just sitting on someone's toolbox at the stairs. Stairs, I guess, would be the most common or planter or something that were around the property.	Consideration of Contextual Factors Influences Behavior During Interactions With Chinese

38. I'm probably trying to be more comfortable [with Chinese people]. In other words, the more you learn about people, or about their culture, the easier it is to be comfortable with them.	Desire to Increase Understanding of Chinese People/Culture and Comfort Level
39. I'm not afraid to ask — there was this one house, actually this was just within the last year and a half or so. We needed a garage to do some service work on their home — they had some problems with some windows. You wouldn't believe the jars in their garage — those big bulk pickle jars. And they were full of all sorts of things. One thing I could identify out of all those jars and it was a mushroom of some sort [laughs]. . . . So it was, "Hey, what is that?" You know, I had to ask and he went through it all. . . . I felt very comfortable asking and I also didn't feel like I'm an ignoramus for having to.	Curiosity About Chinese Practices
40. And it's true. I always liked people. . . . But I like talking to people. I like communicating and sharing with others. And the more I could learn from somebody and about them, the happier I was. And if they wanted to learn from me at the same time, great.	Openness/Curiosity About Others; Desire to Learn From And About Others
41. . . . and [when I] look at the people [in Chinatown], there are a lot of losers; some of them are Chinese. And I find that interesting, like, Why? What's happened? Where's the family structure? Why is this happening? I suppose if I had a lot more time and the inclination, I would try to resolve that. I know that a lot of my perceptions are based upon, as you said, people with a certain social economic standing and a certain education level . . . And because a lot of my contact [with Chinese people] has been through business, we're all motivated to get along. That poisons the trueness of it, I guess.	Awareness of Exceptions To Beliefs About Chinese; Recognition That Beliefs About Chinese May Be Limited By One's Contact Experiences
42. As I said earlier, I always want to be right and to be honest. I mean, I have these beliefs and that I can base them on these experiences and this training or education. I mean, it is possible that I'm wrong [in my beliefs].	Desire To Be Accurate/Fair in One's Beliefs About Chinese; Awareness of Potential Inaccuracy of Beliefs
43. Like, I mean, I'm probably not wrong [in my beliefs] but — you know [laughs], it could be that I am. My experience [with Chinese people], the limited experience I've had outside of a professional environment has nothing significant enough to say that I am wrong. But the incidences have been low enough that there's still a possibility that I am [wrong]. . . . But right now they serve me, so why — don't fix it if it's not broken. And I don't think I'm harming anyone with this. I mean, if I thought my beliefs were harmful, then maybe, you know, I'd have to look at them. . . . Yeah, that's — I'm quite certain that I'm right [in my beliefs]. There, that's — yeah, yeah, I think they're accurate.	Expressed Certainty Regarding Accuracy of Beliefs About Chinese: Awareness of Potential Inaccuracy of Beliefs; Lack of Contradictory Evidence Reinforces Beliefs

Table 4

Thematic Clusters of Ron's Experience

1. Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup
   (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 34)
2. Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (6, 13, 30, 36, 41, 42, 43)
3. Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup
   (7)
4. Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (8, 12, 41)
5. Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior
   (9, 17, 21, 27, 28, 35)
6. Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup
   (10, 12, 13, 24, 25)
7. Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (10)
8. Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup
   (13, 14, 15, 16, 32, 33, 37, 42)
9. Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Established but Open to Change
   (13, 29, 43)
10. Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup
    (18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26)
11. Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture
    (19, 31, 38, 39, 40)
12. Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values
    (19, 20)
13. Awareness of Contextual Factors Influencing One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
    (30, 36, 41)

Appendix K

Table 5
Thematic Abstraction of Nicole's Experience

Excerpts from Protocols	Theme(s)
1. Well generally, in my experiences I've found that most Native people are quite friendly, willing to help, very generous. Maybe that comes from the culture. It may come from something different but they'll give you anything, you know, anything that will help you out.	Perception of Native Indians as Friendly, Helpful, and Generous; Considering Culture As a Cause of Behavior
2. I kind of believe that a lot of Native people are stuck in the welfare system and they just don't know how to get out of it. . . . I don't think it's laziness or anything. I just think that due to their lack of education and opportunities, that welfare has become their career. And when you've been on welfare for twenty years, you can't get off it.	Perception of Native Indians As Dependent Upon Welfare System; Considering Situational Causes of Dependency
3. Most Native people have a problem with addictions — alcohol and other substances in their area.	Perception of Native Indians As Having Difficulties With Addictions
4. They [i.e., Native Indians] seem to believe in large families, not disciplining their children a lot They're very unstructured also. Not unstable but very unstructured. I find that everybody has a lot of choice in what they want to do and when they want to do it. And nobody ever seems to question that except, you know, "Maybe that was not right. Maybe you should do that." A lot of times it's their decision — you do it and the consequences are yours to deal with.	Perception of Native Indians As Advocating Large Families, Not Emphasizing Child Discipline, and Permitting Extensive Personal Freedom
5. Maybe this [i.e., permissiveness in child-raising] comes from the belief that children are on loan and you're there to guide them and provide them with the best possible life you can. It's a feel good theory. You know, if you want to make your child feel good, you can avoid anything that's going to cause them pain or upset them or anything else. But that's because the child is just on loan to you and if you're making the child terribly unhappy, God's going to take this child from you. . . . To an extent, it's a great philosophy. You really start respecting your child.	Perception of Value of Native Orientation Toward Child-Rearing
6. . . . I find that they [i.e., Native Indians] respect their children a lot. They don't necessarily expect that respect in return to them but to elders — they <u>definitely</u> [her emphasis] respect them. Most Native people I've found have a lot of respect for the elders in their community.	Perception of Native Indians As Respecting Their Children And Elders

7. Yeah, there's a lot of myths within the [Native] culture. European culture has kind of moved away from those myths. They don't follow them as truths anymore because they have been scientifically disproven. But Native people hold on to them dearly.	Perception of Native Indians As Superstitious; Perception of Whites As Non-Superstitious
8. They [i.e., Native Indians] invite white people to their functions — powwows and things — but I don't believe that they really accept them into it. You know, just because the culture is based on a lot of politeness, you'll assume that you are accepted but in reality, you're not accepted. That's just what I believe.	Perception of Lack of Native Acceptance of Whites
9. Well . . . I don't know. I think that it [i.e., the trait of generosity] describes most people within that ethnic group. They [i.e., Native Indians] are generous. They're willing to help you with whatever you need, whether it's materialistic or emotional.	Perception of Most Native Indians As Generous
10. With individual circumstances, though - like when somebody [i.e., a Native person] is really down and out — they're not going to be willing to help you. Or if they're in an alcohol-induced state and things aren't going well, and it's been brought on by depression and if they're drinking, chances are they're not going to be generous. If anything, they're going to be more abusive.	Awareness of Exceptions to Belief That Native Indians Are Helpful and Generous; Providing Explanations For Exceptional Behavior
11. . . . like, I don't live with these people [i.e., Native Indians] 24 hours a day, so maybe I'm a little bit of an outsider — I'm being treated as an outsider. Or within the family, maybe those traits [i.e., friendliness, generosity, cleanliness] wouldn't be as evident but they are to me.	Consideration of Status As An Outgroup Member In Influencing Beliefs About Native Indians
12. The people [i.e., Native Indians] that I've come across that don't have those traits, it's because they're going through a lot of pain in their life and they've got other circumstances they're dealing with — alcoholism, abuse. And they're not well themselves, so they can't give to these people [i.e., to other people].	Providing Explanations For Exceptions to Beliefs About Native Indians
13. . . . I guess I wouldn't really think of it [i.e., a trait that I apply to Native Indians] in quantitative terms. Not really, unless I was talking to somebody who hadn't had any experience with Native people. Then I would say to them, "The majority of the Native people that I've met have been this way. Most of them have."	Beliefs About Native Indians Not Considered in Quantitative Terms

14. [If I was talking to someone who had had a bad experience with a Native Indian] then I would say, "Well, you know, that might be but in my experience that's been only a very small percentage of those people. And the majority, from my experience, is" — to give them the other side of the picture so that they don't get the impression all Native people are like that.	Concern With Preventing Others' From Developing A Negative Perception of Native Indians
15. . . . white people — I think we tend to really be selfish and think about ourselves a lot more. And I think it's due to our competition within our society. I don't find Native people to be ready and willing to compete with each other, you know, like, "I have more than you, so I'm not going to give you anything I have because that makes me a step above you on the ladder to success." Whereas white people are always thinking that way and very few of them are really willing to give you what they have just because you need it at that time. Natives may have very little but they're willing to share it.	Perception of Native Indians As Non-Competitive and Unselfish; Perception of Whites as Competitive and Selfish
16. . . . I find from my experience a lot of white people aren't really honest. A lot of times they're honest if it benefits them but if honesty isn't going to benefit them, they're not always going to tell the truth. They're going to stretch it a bit.	Perception of Whites as Generally Dishonest
17. They [i.e., Native Indians] don't seem to have that competition aspect. They're ambitious — they want to do well but everyone has their own individual level they want to do well on. And they don't really promote that, "So and so down the block is doing this and you should be doing that too or more [her emphasis] than what they're doing." I found them to be really honest and straightforward with their feelings and what they're thinking — usually.	Perception of Native Indians as Ambitious, Honest, and Forthright About Their Thoughts and Feelings
18. I've known these [Native] people over six and ten years so, you know, if I'd just known them for fifteen, twenty minutes and I was [illegible] worker or something, perhaps then they wouldn't be [illegible] Because as an outsider, they might not look at n[illegible]ell me, "I don't agree with you," or whatever. Now, the Native people I know will tell me, "I don't agree with you. I think you're wrong." But when I first knew them, they would look at me and go, "Uhn huhn, yep, that's right." But in their mind, they may be thinking something else but out of politeness in their culture, they weren't going to tell me, "You're an idiot!"	Awareness That Familiarity With Native Indians May Influence Beliefs About Them (Honesty, Openness)

19. When I first realized I had beliefs about Native Indians, it was probably when I was about ten years old and a lot of them were started by my parents — they kind of indoctrinated me into it. And that was more that all Native people are lazy, they're all drunks, they all want to be on welfare, they all get breaks from the system that we don't get — and things like that.	Upbringing Fostered Negative Beliefs About Native Indians
20. It was a rebellion thing I think, at first, where my parents were very prejudiced and they didn't want me to have anything to do with these Native people. And I kind of decided, "Oh, I'll be friends with these people", you know, just to bug them. And I started realizing, you know, they [i.e., my parents] weren't always right and the more contact I had with Native people, the more I realized that a lot of people judge them a lot and felt fine labeling them. When I was fourteen, my stereotypes just flipped upside down.	Desire to Oppose Parents' Beliefs About Native Indians; Exposure To Native Indians Transforms Prior Negative Beliefs About Them
21. I really generalized during the time that I was fourteen to sixteen and I really became a Native activist — all Native people were the greatest thing on earth. These people were wonderful, right!	Exposure To Native Indians Results in A Generalized Positive Perception Of Them As A Group
22. And then after that, when I was about sixteen to eighteen, I had a few experiences and I realized that not all Native people are wonderful. And that I really had to look at the person as an individual.	Experiences Highlight Existence of Exceptions to Beliefs About Native Indians; Realization of Need to View Native Indians as Individuals
23. I started, I guess, kind of going back to my parents and trying to involve them in what I had experienced. To an extent, it worked	Desire to Influence Parents' Beliefs About Native Indians
24. And they [i.e., my parents] also think that there's a lot of sexual and physical abuse, and things like that [in the Native community]. I don't think it's necessarily like that; it's just learned behavior through generation to generation, which all goes back to the residential schools.	Consideration of Historical and Situational Factors Influencing Physical and Sexual Abuse Among Native Indians
25. [As an adult, my beliefs about Native Indians haven't changed.] Not really. Not that I'm conscious of yet. I think that by the time I was fifteen, I'd kind of figured it out and decided that's what I believe [about Native Indians], without really going through the process of learning who I was. It's not likely that things [i.e., my beliefs about Native Indians] are going to change later on.	Perceived Stability of Beliefs About Native Indians

26. . . . I guess it [i.e., my parents' beliefs] kind of made me avoid a lot of Native people in elementary and I wasn't really nice to Native children. I didn't play with them and tended to look at them as being different from me. . . . There was a group of us who weren't really nice to Native kids in our school and we tended to call them little savages and, "You're not Christian, you don't believe in God of any type, and you worship the devil" — things like that. I think my parents, like, they don't say that but I think that just the fact that they were saying Native people are different from us because they drink all the time, they're lazy, they're on welfare. They really focussed on the differences; there were no similarities. They kind of gave us almost, "We are good, they are bad." So everything that we considered bad became what Native people are.	Negative Beliefs And Behavior Toward Native Indians Arise From Parents' Negative Beliefs About Native Indians
27. . . . my first contact with a Native family was I met this girl in Grade nine. . . . She had beautiful beaded moccasins. . . . I told her I wanted to learn how to do that and she said, "Well, come home with me and talk to my mom. My mom will teach you.". . . And every night for two weeks I would go over there for about an hour and she'd sit with me and teach me how to do it. I'd go home and do it, practice, and come back and learn a new way. She was such a great lady because she just was always so friendly and willing to help.	Positive/Growthful Initial Experience With Native Indians
28. We'd be — me and Ann, her daughter — would be sitting in the room listening to music and she [i.e., Ann's mother] would bring us something to eat or ask us, "What do you want to eat?" We'd say, "Chicken," or something and if she didn't have it, she'd go out and buy it, bring it back, and cook it [laughs]. It's just really cool and that went along really good.	Positive Early Experiences With Native Indians
29. One other thing is I got to be the minority and I really now can sympathize with people who are a minority within any kind of situation because I know how it feels. I was the only white person who attended a prom dance on a reserve and I had all of these people talking Cree around me and I had no idea what was going on. I just kind of followed everybody else and asked people I knew, "What's going on now?" It really made me think and feel what these people must feel when they're in a situation like that.	Experience As a Minority Fosters Empathy For the Situation of Minority Groups; Curiosity About Native Culture
30. I worked in the hospital and these Native ladies were like seventy years old and they came in and they didn't speak any English. I really tried to — even though I didn't know the language — make it better for them. You know, like, just be extra nice or give them a little pat on the back, bringing them tea, trying to show respect and sympathy for the situation they were in. Like holding their hands when they need a lift, trying to show that they're going to get the needle, rubbing the spot and making the motion so that they kind of have the understanding that this is going to happen.	Sympathizing With The Situation Of Elderly Native Indians; Expressing Care And Sensitivity

31. I went out to the nurse's station and did some home visitations with the head nurse. That was a neat experience because you don't make appointments with these people [i.e., Native Indians]. You just walk in because that's the way you do it in their culture. You don't make appointments. You just knock on the door and if they're home, they let you in no matter what's happening. If they're having a meal, they offer you food and you join the family.	Perception of Native Indians As Relaxed/Informal
32. You'd ask them [i.e., Native Indians], "So, what's going on?" They'd be completely honest and candid with you, "So-and-so got drunk and tried to shoot their wife the other night." It wasn't gossip that was trying to hurt the other person, it was just, "This is what's been happening." You asked, [so] you're going to get it [laughing]. Really straightforward.	Perception of Native Indians As Candid/Honest About Family Matters
33. It [i.e., visiting Native homes] was a new experience because in my feelings, if you walk into a white household and say, "So, what's been going on?", chances are they're not going to tell you their oldest son tried to shoot his wife when he got drunk. . . . I haven't found very many white families that would tell you that.	Perception of Whites As Taciturn About Family Matters
34. It [i.e., family violence] is a taboo subject [in North American culture]. White people I don't think consider it to be something that's supposed to occur in a community or [I don't think] they've accepted [that it] happens in a community. Where Native people, it's something that's been going on ever since the missionaries came over and started residential schools. "It's a problem and we all have to know about it so that we can help this person" — and that's why they tell you. That's where the honesty and straightforwardness comes in.	Perception of Whites As Unacknowledging of Family Violence; Consideration of Historical and Situational Causes of Native Indians' Openness About Family Violence
35. And the generousness, like, you never go hungry and thirsty in a Native household. Sometimes you go to somebody's [home] and they're preoccupied with something and they don't think about your needs. And you're sitting there and they don't offer you tea. Or if they're eating, they don't offer you to join them. But when you go into a Native household, if they only have so much and they're not going to get their cheque for another two weeks, and this is the food they have, they'd still offer it to you.	Perception of Native Indians As Generous/Hospitable
36. . . . he [i.e., the medicine man] wouldn't let me come into the room with my fiancee when he — for lack of a better term — did magic. As a white person, I wasn't allowed to see this. It's a big Native secret [laughing]. . . . On the way back [home] I was like, "You should have answered him in English once in a while just so I could understand what was going on." That was kind of a neat experience.	Curiosity About Native Indian Spirituality

37. And a lot of people really seem to have the idea that Native people are really dirty and, you know, maybe they are, if they're real chronic alcoholics or drug abusers. Like in the city here. But the people I've known, it doesn't matter what kind of housing they got — whether it's a really nice house or a really old, old house and they don't have running water — it's still a clean, clean house. You don't have to worry about eating there and eating in dirty dishes or anything like that. You never even think about it because they're just so clean.	Perception of Native Indians As Cleanly
38. There's only been a couple of people [i.e., Native Indians] I've been to their houses and they've been really dirty. It [i.e., the uncleanliness] has always been [due to] other circumstances.	Providing Explanations For Exceptions To Belief That Native Indians Are Cleanly
39. Like, when I was first there [in the Native community], I was kind of an outsider, so I was treated with all the courtesy that's due to a guest within the community. And then, after I'd hung around for a few years . . . they became more candid and uhm, they treated me more like one of their own. When they don't agree with something I say, they let me know. And I know the people, so they can speak more openly about, you know, "So-and-so's doing this, so-and-so's did that, we don't like this."	Familiarity With Native Indians Brings About Change In Nature of Interactions With Them
40. Before, it was everybody [in the Native community] was [apparently] in harmony, right. And now, in the past few years, it's become apparent that there are clan conflicts and there are families that have been fighting for years and stuff. I guess maybe I'm starting to get the real picture. Maybe . . . you know, the general traits haven't changed really that much, it's just that everybody's more comfortable with me and I'm more comfortable with them. We can just sit down and talk about real things and get personal — going to a personal level.	Greater Contact With Native Indians Fosters Greater Comfort/Openness and Exposure to New Aspects of Native Community (Internal Conflict)
41. And teachers have always kind of been a problem in the [Native] community because there's been a lot of abuse by teachers on this one reserve. . . . and I think I'm kind of being stuck in a general category as white teacher right now. Until I get back and start teaching, and some of these people figure out that I haven't become the white teacher, I'm still Nicole, I think it will be like that. And that I'm not out to get them.	Concern With Altering Native Indians' Negative Perceptions Of Her As "White Teacher"
42. I can see the stereotypes that my parents have, where it comes from, because I met Native people who are just out-and-out lazy drunks, who never want to get off the welfare system, who are always getting pulled into jail and stuff. So I guess I can understand it that way and it's impacted me to think these people really need help or else they will end up like that, a lot of them.	Awareness of Native Indians Who Conform to Cultural Stereotype of Native Indians; Concern About Native Indians' Need For Assistance

43. Well, it [i.e., my experiences with Native Indians] changed my original stereotype because now it's far more positive. I started to look at people more as individuals rather than just ethnic groups because with my contact, I found that most of the people are really nice and everything.	Contact With Native Indians Results In Positive Experiences and Fosters Positive Beliefs About Native Indians
44. But there are exceptions to the rule just like in my society [i.e., culture] — generally, people are okay and everything, and then there's these people who are really down-and-out scuzzy. That's the way it is in Native culture too.	Awareness of Exceptions to Beliefs About Native Indians
45. So I try — I <u>really</u> [her emphasis] try — to look at people as individuals but . . . [heavy sigh] I do stereotype pretty widely. Maybe it's my upbringing but I do tend to categorize people.	Awareness of Evaluating Others In Categorical Terms Despite Striving to Treat Them As Individuals
46. I guess in the beginning it [i.e., my beliefs] did [shape my experiences with Native Indians], when I was rebelling against my parents. Because they had this certain idea of Native people, I was going to be friends with every Native person I met up with. I was rebelling so I was seeing all the positives in the experiences and none of the negatives — until they were really negatives that punched you in the stomach.	Opposing Parent's Beliefs About Native Indians: Initial Perception Of Native Indians Positively Biased
47. But I think in the beginning, I did come up with these beliefs [about Native Indians] just to go against my parents' beliefs — but through experience, I've come up with them. Like, they're part of me now. They're not just the rebellion beliefs. They're real beliefs that I believe in.	Initial Beliefs About Native Indians Motivated By Desire to Oppose Parents' Beliefs; Perception of Present Beliefs As One's Own and Experientially-Based
48. I think that my experiences [with Native Indians] did come into the survey [i.e., screening instrument] because I started out with one belief system [when I was younger] and changed it — through my experiences it changed. . . . My experiences did have a <u>large</u> [her emphasis] part on it [i.e., completing the screening instrument], you know. I guess I did look at a lot of the situations when I was answering the questions because those are the Native people I know and have experienced. And I guess I kind of went with "the majority rules" kind of thing, where, "Okay, you know, most of them [in my experience] are this way, so most of all of them must be this way."	Beliefs About Native Indians Based Largely On Personal Experiences With Native Indians

49. I believe my beliefs [about Native Indians] are true but other people, I guess they could prove me wrong if they're using their own experiences as their basis for their proof. Like, their argument, because they'd have different experiences than me, may be true. . . . So I guess I could be proven wrong but I [her emphasis] believe it's true from my experiences. I think people who usually try to prove me wrong haven't had direct experiences [with Native Indians]. They're just looking at their own world picture and analyzing it [i.e., Native culture], not really getting into it and experiencing it.	Perceiving Beliefs About Native Indians as Accurate; Awareness Of Potential Limitations Of Beliefs
50. Like, government statistics are always proving me wrong when I'm saying that Native people generally are ambitious. They're always saying, "No, they're not ambitious. They just get stuck on this welfare and they stay there." Because most Native people are on welfare, so that would say they're not ambitious. But I believe they're ambitious; it's just circumstances haven't allowed them to get as far as we have.	Consideration Of Situational Causes of Native Indians' Perceived Lack of Ambition

Table 6

Thematic Clusters of Nicole's Experience

1. Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup
   (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37)
2. Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior
   (1, 2, 5, 24, 34, 50)
3. Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values
   (5, 15)
4. Perceived Characteristics of the Ingroup
   (7, 15, 16, 33, 34)
5. Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup
   (45)
6. Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (10, 22, 42, 44)
7. Perceiving a Lack of True Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (10, 12, 38)
8. Awareness of Contextual Factors Influencing One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (11, 18, 39, 40)
9. Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (13)
10. Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup
    (13, 14, 22, 23, 30, 41, 43, 45)
11. Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup
    (19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 43, 46, 47)
12. Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Established but Open to Change
    (25, 49)
13. Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture
    (21, 27, 29, 36)
14. Sympathizing With the Outgroup
    (29, 30, 42)
15. Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup
    (47, 48)
16. Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
    (49)

Appendix L

Table 7
Thematic Abstraction of Keith's Experience

Excerpts from Protocols	Theme(s)
1. I think their [i.e., Koreans'] role in North America and how their economy's going now, they're very hard-working, industrious, well-spoken people. They seem fairly kind, what else . . . very business-oriented.	Perception of Koreans As Hard-Working, Industrious, Kind, And Business-Oriented
2. [Koreans are] very studious. I mean that because I've taken classes with them and they usually get marks that are up there. Good with computers, science. Good with pretty well anything, for that matter. Creative things, like in arts, they do quite well also.	Perception of Koreans As Studious, Highly Capable, and Creative
3. . . . from how their economy has really turned around in South Korea, I would say yeah, as a group, they do tend to be fairly motivated, maybe even collectively, towards their national goal because they're not communists. Yeah, collectively they do seem to be fairly industrious.	Perception of Koreans As Industrious
4. I guess there would be reasons why I attach it [i.e., the trait of industrious] to the group [i.e., Koreans]. I mean, it doesn't seem like they have a lot of poverty in the country. They seem to have fairly uniform and good social standards. . . . I've never really seen anything about poverty or crime in South Korea. Uhm, I can't think of any qualifiers . . . yeah, I guess I label them as a group.	Perception Of Koreans As Industrious, Based on A Perceived Lack of Exceptions
5. . . . as far as differentiating among Koreans, yeah, I think they generally are hard-working. I mean, I'm sure that there's still a fairly substantial rural population but I don't think that they have a great social welfare net in their country. And you know, I don't recall hearing about people starving or dying. . . . I do think about it [i.e., my belief that Koreans are hard-working] but it seems that it does apply to a large percent of the group. I haven't lived over there, or even travelled there, so you know, my experiences would be fairly limited.	Perception That Trait Applies To Koreans In General (Hard-Working); Acknowledgment of Limited Knowledge of This Aspect of Korean Society

6. Uhm . . . no, I don't know if I really attach percentages to the different things [i.e., my beliefs about Koreans]. I think that there's always room for individual differences. Like, I'm sure you're going to have Koreans who don't want to work. If I gave percentages in that respect maybe they're different from us — from Canadian culture — in that they are more hard-working than us. But I don't know what — it's sort of like I had trouble with the [screening] instrument, trying to figure out percentages, because I don't know if I really think like that.	Awareness of Not Considering Beliefs About Koreans In Quantitative Terms (Percentages)
7. [The way in which I think about the traits that I associate with Koreans is] I have characteristics and then apply them to the group. Maybe in Canada we have more people who — we have a greater range. We have people who maybe are richer and you know, more millionaires but we also have people who are poor. And I don't know if that means that they're lazy or not but ah, given the situation and the economy or whatever. And ah yeah, I find it fairly hard to think in percentages of the group.	Awareness of Applying Characteristics To Koreans In General; Difficulty Associated With Considering Beliefs As Percentages
8. Yeah, I think it would come in fairly often [when I'm thinking about a belief] — that there are exceptions — because I think more and more I found out that if I think of a group, or any person, in a certain way, you know, I find out later there's usually a reason for a person acting out a certain way. Maybe for a group, maybe they're not all like that and you can't really paint them like that. . . . But ah, yeah, I do think that there are exceptions to every rule.	Consideration of Exceptions To Beliefs About Other Groups
9. I think there's general characteristics that describe groups. You know, sometimes they're good and sometimes they're bad. I don't really think that's prejudice because I'm not saying that it's the group's or a different group's fault. Maybe it's a condition or whatever.	Perceived Appropriateness Of Generalizing; Concern With Being Viewed As Prejudiced
10. I don't mean there's less exceptions for Koreans but it always seemed . . . not like a uniform society, definitely not, with all the demonstrations at the Olympics. But ah, they don't seem to have such a broad range of exceptions within the Korean culture. But there definitely are exceptions, I'm sure.	Perception Of Lesser Variability of Exceptions For Beliefs About Koreans
11. . . . but now talking more to you about that [i.e., exceptions to one's beliefs], you know, the more I reflect on that, I can more realize that there are exceptions [to my beliefs about Koreans]. So, I don't know if it's maybe more hindsight or aftersight but it seems that there are exceptions. . . . I mean, I do think they [i.e., Koreans] are harder working but yet, there are more exceptions the more I think about it.	Reflection Results In A Greater Appreciation of The Existence of Exceptions To Beliefs About Koreans

12. [In the past,] . . . the more contact I had with the people [from another group], you know, the more I reflected on exceptions [to my beliefs about that group].	Increased Contact With An Outgroup Prompts Greater Consideration of Exceptions To Beliefs About That Outgroup
13. . . . like this summer I worked with some Lebanese people. The more I realized there were exceptions, the more I realized that the characteristic of a group doesn't really apply to everybody, you know.	Increased Exposure To Another Group Results In Increased Awareness Of Exceptions To Beliefs About That Group
14. I have views of them [i.e., Koreans] but I know that they're not — they're definitely not set in stone or anything because I really haven't had a lot of contact with them. So it's hard to have a general view of them without really having a lot of exposure to them. From the exposure which I've had, I guess it's sort of formulated some of those beliefs but they're always changing, I think.	Flexibility of Beliefs About Koreans; Perception Of Beliefs As Continually Changing
15. Before that [i.e., taking a university course in Asian history], I mean, my only real exposure to Koreans was probably watching M*A*S*H and other movies and media which is about Korea. I guess probably back then, I was probably fairly young. I only had a generic view of Asians.	General Nature of Early Beliefs About Koreans (Initial Exposure To Koreans Through Media)
16. I didn't really know what to think about them [i.e., Koreans], just that they were just sort of a generic country like Vietnam. Maybe we don't really hear that much about these countries and the war there. And then I was either 21 or 22 when I took the [Asian] history course and that sort of — I really didn't have much of an opinion [about Koreans] until that.	General Nature of Early Beliefs About Koreans; History Course As Initial Factor In Establishment of Specific Beliefs About Koreans
17. Well, I don't think I ever remember my parents saying anything negative about them [i.e., Koreans] or making any jokes about them or anything. So I don't know if that affects it [i.e., my beliefs about Koreans]. Maybe just, you know, having an upbringing that really didn't focus on discrimination. . . . My parents never really talked about Koreans or any group really.	Discrimination and Negative Beliefs About Other Groups Absent From Upbringing
18. I guess they [i.e., my beliefs about Koreans] are not that concrete because they're changing the more I learn about the country [i.e., Korea]. I'm just still trying to figure out what the political questions are there. Why people are demonstrating, and that sort of thing, and why they want to reunify with the North. I'm not quite sure why that is, so yeah, I think that just in the past few years they've changed.	Perceiving Beliefs About Koreans As Changing; Desire To Increase Understanding Of Korea

19. I went to school in kind of a rural school and there's not a lot of different groups there so you weren't having exposure. And then as I got in university, and in the Asian history course, I started thinking that they [i.e., Koreans] were more industrious and they seemed to really turn their economy around, and they're doing really well and really booming. And my Korean friend seemed fairly self-directed, you know, sort of well-motivated, self-motivated.	Beliefs About Koreans Shaped By Asian History Course And Friendship With Korean
20. Clean people; you don't see a lot of poverty or crime in Korea. But I don't really know that much about it so maybe it's unfair in a way but I don't think so.	Perception of Koreans as Cleanly and Law-Abiding
21. And then, ah, going through this exercise, I think now when I think about it, sure there are exceptions. I'm sure there's poor people, people starving in Korea, just as there is here but ah, maybe less percentage of them still.	Recognition of Exceptions To Beliefs About Koreans; Perception of Smaller Proportion Of Exceptions For Beliefs About Koreans
22. I think that another thing that struck me about Koreans is that, you know, Koreans seem to have Korean friends and they have, not really their own group but his girlfriend was Korean and I don't think his parents would have been very approving if he'd married a non-Korean girl. So that's one thing that sort of struck me about them. I mean, not that he was prejudiced or anything about other groups.	Perception Of Koreans As Maintaining A Cohesive Community
23. The more I think about it, the more I — even now actually, the more I think that he [i.e., my Korean friend] really was quite a nice guy. You know, right before a final we wrote in a huge — one of those huge Tory auditoriums — and I just sat down and he was sitting with a friend and he came, you know, and asked me how I was doing and wished me good luck on the exam. . . . I think that that sort of stood out in my mind that it was very nice of him.	Positive Early Experience With Korean
24. But I don't want to say that they [i.e., Korean immigrants] stick together because that sounds prejudicial but I think that they are maybe a close community, the Korean community. I'm not quite sure, I really don't know them that well. I don't know his [i.e., my Korean friend's] parents or anything so. From my limited contact with them, I think that they are a close community.	Perception of Koreans As Maintaining A Cohesive Community; Desire To Avoid Being Perceived As Prejudicial Or Biased
25. But I think that they [i.e., Koreans] have sort of a traditional family, I think, where it is maybe the husband who works and his wife stays home. I guess that's another thing that I think about them, that's maybe how that would fit in. That did seem to strike me, that it is sort of a traditional family. I think a strong traditional family.	Perception Of Koreans As Strongly Traditional

26. Uhm . . . no, I don't think that they [i.e., Korean immigrants] stick together that strongly. I don't like to say "they" because, you know, it's not like we're talking about a whole race or something.	Desire To Avoid Using Categorical Terms
27. I guess maybe having some common interest in their own culture, they [i.e., Koreans] sort of associate maybe with people who have that. Because, you know, I have an interest in my background and if somebody mentions that they've heard of Austria or something, then I'm really interested in that. . . . So, I think it's the same sort of way, and I think it's only bad if you maybe put yourself up above another group, and he [i.e., my Korean friend] didn't seem to strike me as doing that.	Consideration of Possible Situational Causes of Cohesiveness in Korean Community
28. I think [that initially,] I probably always equated them [i.e., Koreans] with the Japanese but it was a pretty generic opinion of Southeast Asia. And I can't really say if it was good or bad. It was just kind of a fuzzy feeling out because I didn't know anything about it [i.e., Korea].	Undifferentiated Nature of Early Beliefs About Koreans (Koreans Equated With Japanese)
29. I think basically he [i.e., my Korean friend] was informative because I really didn't have a lot of beliefs about that [i.e., about Koreans] — from watching M*A*S*H but that doesn't really count. So I do think that my former beliefs have changed and they changed, like, the more I got to know him.	Friendship With A Korean Instrumental In Development of Beliefs About Koreans
30. That's another thing that did strike me with my Korean friend — and we talked a bit about that — is that Japanese really don't like Koreans. Like, they're very racist against Koreans and they based their concentration camps in Korea during the Second World War. I don't think the Koreans felt the same way towards the Japanese but I don't really know because I didn't really ask him about that. I don't know, I think that maybe it strikes me that if the Japanese are racist which — that's a whole other thing because that's something else, I really don't know that much about them. To me the Koreans are a lot less so.	Perception Of Koreans As Less Racist Than Japanese
31. You know, like, I thought my Korean friend was hard-working and self motivated . . . . but I think from contact with him, I sort of did generalize towards the population too because I really hadn't met anybody else Korean, right.	Awareness of Generalizing From Experiences With A Korean
32. . . . but I think from taking the [Asian history] course, you learn that their [i.e., Korea's] economy is doing fairly well and with a good number of good businesses — they create cars and tires and stuff — so that I think that that sort of helped clarify that [i.e., my beliefs about Koreans].	Knowledge Of Korean Economy Important In Development Of Beliefs About Koreans

33. Yeah, I mean, it's pretty good to take a history course and to learn a bit about the [Korean] culture — it was only a couple of lectures [about Korea] because the course was about the entire Southeast Asian area. So, I think the contact with my Korean friend was the big thing. I mean, I may have thought of them as similar to the Chinese without having known him. Yeah, so it's probably contact that probably shapes beliefs the most, I think.	Friendship With Korean Viewed As Most Important Factor Shaping Beliefs About Koreans
34. I kind of wondered how, you know, is this entire [Korean] population really that friendly [like my Korean friend]? You know, I kind of wondered that because some of the demonstrations [during the 1988 Olympics] seemed to be fairly[anti-West]. . . . Yeah, but I think I've thought that you can't generalize but yet still, what would you know about a people other than what you get from contact — the human factor?	Belief-Inconsistent Information Prompts Doubts About Accuracy of Belief About Koreans; Perceived Importance of Personal Experience Reconfirms Appropriateness Of Generalizing
35. . . . I really didn't think about Koreans a lot [after developing specific beliefs about them]. I mean, I worked and got a degree, and then I had jobs and stuff. And I can really say that I didn't philosophize a lot on other groups. Like, the Koreans are fairly — on the backburner as far as international attention. So, yeah, I really didn't focus a lot on them.	Awareness of Lack of Reflection on Beliefs About Koreans and Other Groups
36. I never really thought about it [i.e., situational causes of behavior] either way a lot, maybe till now, I think. So now that you mention that, yeah, I think that that probably is a factor. You know, maybe sometimes immigrants are trying to make a better start and they do work harder. But yet, the country [i.e., Korea] as a whole does seem to work fairly hard.	Recognition of Potential Situational Cause of Behavior Of Korean Immigrants (Hard-Working); Perception Of Koreans As Hard-Working
37. I think that they really value education in Korea, you know, and the teacher is in front of the class and kids listen. They really respect the teacher compared to what we have out here.	Perception Of Koreans As Valuing Education (Traditional Orientation Toward Education)
38. Uhm, I think [my beliefs about Koreans have had] a good impact. I think now I would have some interest in the social situation [in Korea]. I'd like to find out a little more about the country. Find out what sort of career aspirations they have, if they want to own a business or something. So, I think of it as having a good impact. I think maybe I'd be more open to contact, I guess. That's happened with a number of different groups, like, you know, I'd like to have contact with people from a lot of other countries. But yeah, I think it would be more interesting to learn about the culture from someone who's actually from Korea.	Receptivity To Increased Learning About Korean Society/Culture And Increased Contact With Koreans

39. Because I think the more I've been in university, the more I've learned, the more I've seen those [selective] filters change, you know. And ah, I think I still do have a lot of beliefs about groups but I think that it's open to change.

Flexibility Of Beliefs About Other Groups (Receptivity To Change)

40. And maybe the beliefs I had then sort of shape now what I think about Koreans and what I think when I meet them. If I met a real mean, nasty Korean I'd probably be a little shocked, maybe, I think. Or a Korean who didn't want to work or . . . . Yeah, I would be a little bit shocked, I guess. To that extent the beliefs that I have formed now would kind of colour my experiences.

Beliefs About Koreans Associated With Expectations About Their Behavior

Table 8

Thematic Clusters of Keith's Experience

1. Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup
   (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 20, 22, 24, 25, 30, 36, 37)
2. Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup
   (4, 7, 9, 40)
3. Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (5, 14)
4. Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (6, 7, 35)
5. Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21)
6. Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup
   (9, 24, 26)
7. Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Evolving
   (14, 18, 39)
8. Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup
   (15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 28, 32)
9. Openness to the Outgroup And Its Culture
   (18, 38)
10. Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior
    (27, 36)
11. Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup
    (2, 29, 31, 33, 34)

Appendix M

Table 9

Themes Shared By All Participants

1. Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup
2. Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup
3. Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup
4. Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup
5. Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
6. Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup
7. Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
8. Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior
9. Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup
10. Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture
11. Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Evolving Versus Established but Open to Change
12. Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values

Appendix N

Table 10

Higher Abstraction of Clustered Shared Themes

1. Early Life Experiences Associated With One's Beliefs About the Outgroup

    Early Experiences in the Development of Beliefs About the Outgroup (1)

2. Generalizing: The Central Role of Personal Experience

    Perceived Characteristics of the Outgroup (2)
    Awareness of Generalizing About the Outgroup (3)
    Generalizing From One's Contact Experiences to the Outgroup (4)

3. The Non-Specific Nature of Beliefs About the Outgroup

    Lack of Consideration of More Specific Aspects of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup (5)

4. Striving to Be Accurate and Flexible in One's Beliefs About the Outgroup

    Desire to Be Unbiased/Fair Toward the Outgroup (6)
    Awareness of Exceptions to One's Beliefs About the Outgroup (7)
    Considering Possible Causes of Outgroup Behavior (8)
    Awareness of the Potential Limitations of One's Beliefs About the Outgroup (9)
    Perceiving One's Beliefs About the Outgroup As Evolving Versus Established but Open to Change (11)

5. A Positive, Receptive Orientation Toward the Outgroup and Its Culture

    Openness to the Outgroup and Its Culture (10)
    Perceived Value of the Outgroup's Culture and Values (12)