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Full Name of Author — Nom complet de l'auteur

Jocelyn Martha Coates

Date of Birth — Date de naissance

March 16, 1962

Country of Birth — Pays de naissance

Canada

Permanent Address — Résidence fixe

12411 - 39 Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta
T6J 0N1

Title of Thesis — Titre de la these

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Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de these

Dr P. D. Clements

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TIME AND SPACE IN THE LATER WRITINGS OF JAMES JOYCE

by

JOCELYN MARTHA COATES

A THESIS

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(SIGNED)

Jocelyn Coates

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

12411 39 Avenue

Edmonton, Alberta

T6J 0N1

DATED September 21, 1984

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Time and Space in the Later Writings of James Joyce" submitted by Jocelyn Martha Coates in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

R. Coates

Supervisor

M. Coates

M. Coates

Date... *Sept 21, 2014*

To Dr S. C. Neuman

Abstract

Time and space, considered both as theme and as elements of technique, are closely interconnected in the later writings of James Joyce. While numerous critics contend that either space or time predominates in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, it is evident that the dimensions instead show a productive interaction. This relationship can be understood only if we explore the role of the reader, for the spatial and temporal qualities of all literature are inherent but also require a reader who completes or realizes them, and, moreover, Joyce's works involve the reader to an unusually great extent.

The first chapter of the thesis begins with a general discussion of the temporal and spatial qualities of literature, with particular attention given to the role of the reader. I then place *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* in this context and discuss the methods which I have chosen to approach each text. In the second chapter, I look closely at "Proteus" in order to show that time and space are fused on the level of form, which is perceived by the reader alone and not by Stephen, and that Joyce's technique requires the extensive participation of the reader, with the result that this involvement is essential to an understanding of time and space in the chapter. "Penelope" is comparable to "Proteus," except that it contains an incipient tension between the dimensions that looks forward to *Finnegans Wake*. In *Finnegans Wake*, time and space are in unresolved tension rather than fused, with the result that the reader continually pursues, in time, spatial stability. I conclude with the observation that Joyce's reader is not entrapped in isolated/textual worlds but instead experiences a productive involvement with Joyce's texts.

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A. Approaching Time and Space

Critics who have explored time and space in James Joyce's later writings can be divided into two groups: There are those who emphasize the temporal flow of Joyce's writing and argue that Joyce sees the flux of time as ultimately real. These critics, who draw upon the philosophy of Henri Bergson and are typified by writers such as Robert Klawitter and Shiv K. Kumar, do not deny the presence or importance in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* of patterns that seem to occupy space, but they argue that Joyce exposes these patterns as artificial or false. The second group of critics contends that spatial patterns predominate in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. The theoretical foundations of this approach were first and most clearly expressed by Joseph Frank, whose general discussions of "spatial form" I will examine at length. While this separation of critical perspectives into two groups is undeniably reductive because neither group ignores the dimension emphasized by the other, it serves to reveal a pervasive dichotomy in Joyce criticism, one which has had unfortunate consequences. For this fragmentation of perspectives has hindered the exploration of the crucial and complex interrelationship between time and space in Joyce's later writings. The primacy that critics are inclined to grant to time or to space usually upsets this intricate connection and leads to a simplification of their interaction. The purpose of the present study is to explore this interrelationship of time and space in the later writings of James Joyce.

In the second and third chapters, I will look closely at *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. But first, I will examine in more general terms the relationship between time and space in literature. While I will keep in mind the context of modernism and will, in time, apply this discussion to Joyce's later writings, I will first consider the broader, theoretical foundations of the approaches to modern literature which emphasize spatial form and temporal progression. The focus of this discussion will be the role of the reader: critical perspectives which emphasize spatial form or the temporal flow of writing always depend upon particular models of the reader, which are frequently implicit and unexamined, and an exploration of these crucial suppositions illuminates and often exposes the weaknesses of the theorists' arguments. Most

importantly, this emphasis upon the role of the reader permits us to examine the connection between time and space both as theme and as elements of technique and the act of reading. At a fundamental level, a text has neither a temporal nor a spatial dimension: it acquires the first as the reader proceeds through the work in time and the second as spatial patterns of form are completed or realized in our minds during this temporal reading. As we will see, the relationship between time and space in this act of reading and time and space as theme or content is particularly important in the writings of Joyce, for they are works which greatly involve the reader. We can say, even more emphatically, that our understanding of the interaction of time and space which emerges during the experience of reading provides the key to Joyce's ideas about time and space in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*.

The concept of space in literature is at best elusive, in large part because its meaning is figurative and often vague. The term is employed in a relatively strict sense by Joseph Frank, who limits its use to the spatial quality of form in literature. Frank introduced the term "spatial form" in a series of articles that were first published in 1945 in *The Sewanee Review* (and were subsequently collected and revised by Frank, who included them in *The Widening Gyre*), and in 1977 and 1978 he published two more articles in response to renewed interest in his ideas.¹ As the title of Frank's first article, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," indicates, his purpose was to examine the spatial qualities of the poetry and narrative of the early twentieth century. His criticism was a response to the difficulty of works of this time: Frank developed the concept of spatial form in order to account for puzzling features of modern literature, and he emphasizes that his comments on spatial form are descriptive rather than prescriptive.² While his theory has a particular use in the study of modern writers (including, as Frank recognized, James Joyce), it also has a general application. Consequently, Frank's ideas

¹Joseph Frank, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," in *The Widening Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in Modern Literature* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp. 3-62 (earlier version published in *The Sewanee Review*, Vol. 53, Nos. 2-4 [1945]); "Spatial Form: An Answer to Critics," *Critical Inquiry*, 4 (1977), 231-52; and "Spatial Form: Some Further Reflections," *Critical Inquiry*, 5 (1978), 275-90. Page references will be accompanied by the date of the article.

²Frank, 1977, p. 232.

can best be understood by considering modern writers' distinctive exploitation of the spatiality of all literature.

Frank argues that the moderns recognize and resist the temporal flow of poetry and narrative, a temporality which arises because words succeed one another in time and because they often refer to actions that unfold consecutively. While the moderns do not entirely ignore this quality of literature, they subordinate it to the spatial relations of parts of a text: sequence becomes secondary to patterns of interrelationship between the words, images, actions, or any other significant units of a work. A part of a text is not related causally or chronologically to the parts that precede or follow it; instead, the segment must be seen in the light of a more complex web of interconnections among the parts. Sequence is still important, for juxtaposition frequently serves to reveal or create meaning, but causal and chronological links are either of secondary importance or are significant but obscure. In the latter case in particular, there is a productive tension between time and space because an essential temporal flow has been deliberately distorted by giving primacy to spatial pattern. According to Frank, the "point at which such 'space-logic' becomes completely dominant: . . . is the point at which 'modernism' begins."³

The spatial pattern of a work emerges as we read but is not complete until the entire web of the work can be perceived, for Frank suggests that parts of a modernist text cannot be understood in isolation from their context: In "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," he makes a crucial remark with regard to poetry that he also applies to narrative: "modern poetry," he argues, "asks its readers to suspend the process of individual reference temporarily until the entire pattern of internal references can be apprehended as a unity."⁴ This, in other words, is "reflexive reference";⁵ like a subject that acts upon itself (and is, of course, described by a reflexive verb), the text is, at first, self-contained. The parts of the text do not directly refer to an external, seemingly real world but instead refer to one another and must first be seen in

³Frank, 1978, p. 281.

⁴Frank, 1963, p. 13.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 14.

their interrelationship. Once these connections are fully grasped, the "units of meaning are apprehended reflexively in an instant of time."⁶ Our apprehension of meaning occurs "in . . . time," but it is spatial in essence, for the web of connections is perceived as a whole that seems to occupy a field of space.

To some extent, these spatial qualities are present in all literature. As Frank recognizes, the moderns expose and exaggerate a characteristic of literature that is usually present but overlooked. In the third and most useful of his articles, "Spatial Form: Some Further Reflections," he turns his attention to the theoretical foundation of his ideas and considers their position in the history of criticism:

The radical nature of the experiments of literary modernism brought spatial form to the foreground of critical consciousness; but now that the novelty has worn off, it has become possible to locate the concept in relation to a much wider literary horizon. Spatial form, so far as I can judge, is at present in the process of being assimilated into a much more general theory of the literary text.⁷

This "more general theory" allows Frank to perceive spatial form as a quality of all literature.

Frank obtains a larger perspective by recognizing his affinities with the Russian Formalist critics, who were progenitors of structuralist theory and, like the structuralists who succeeded them, were concerned less with the form and meaning of particular texts than with the essence of textuality. In "Spatial Form: Some Further Reflections," Frank states that he was not familiar with the writings of such theorists as Roman Jakobson when he wrote his first article on spatial form,⁸ but he has come to recognize important similarities between his own work and that of the Russian Formalists and related theorists. This correspondence exists because the New Critics, who heavily influenced Frank's formalism, show some affinities with the Russian Formalists of the early part of this century. Most striking is the resemblance between Frank's understanding of internal reference in modern literature and Ferdinand de Saussure's insistence that linguistic signifiers constitute a system based on internal reference. Saussure was, of course, a linguist rather than a member of a school of Russian Formalism,

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷Frank, 1978, p. 279.

⁸*Ibid.*

but his analysis of language was the crucial starting point of much formalist and structuralist thought. He made a seemingly simple observation, but one with radical implications, when he argued that the "meaning" (Saussure would say the "value") of words is, as Frank puts it, "defined in terms of the differential relations within the system [of linguistic signs], not in terms of the relation of the sign to a reality external to language itself."⁹ In other words, a linguistic signifier is seen in relation to the signifiers from which it differs and has no natural connection to the signified that it represents; similarly, Frank argues that reference is internal or reflexive before external reference is possible. When we turn from the level of words to larger units of the narrative, another resemblance is evident, this time between Frank's conception of spatial form and the Russian Formalists' understanding of narrative order and voice. In 1917, Victor Shklovsky made the crucial and now famous distinction between story and plot in narrative when he argued that,

The idea of *plot* is too often confused with the description of events—with what I propose provisionally to call the *story*. The story is, in fact, only material for plot formulation.¹⁰

Or, as Boris Tomashevsky explained four years later,

Plot is distinct from story. Both include the same events, but in the plot the events *are arranged* and connected according to the orderly sequence in which they were presented in the work.¹¹

A story, then, consists of actions which are in causal and chronological order, while a plot is an arrangement of these actions which constitutes a particular narrative. When a story is shaped into a plot, the temporal flow of the action is disrupted, and the re-ordered units of the story acquire an important spatial arrangement. As Frank observes,

it would appear that the "literariness" of a narrative work, its specific *artistic* quality, may be defined as the disjunction between "story" and "plot," that is, the manner in which the writer manipulates and distorts causal-chronological sequence. . . . And. . . every narrative work of art necessarily includes elements that may be called spatial since the relations of significance between such elements must be

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 280.

¹⁰Victor Shklovsky, "Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*: Stylistic Commentary," in *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 57.

¹¹Boris Tomashevsky, "Thematics," in *Russian Formalist Criticism*, p. 67.

construed across gaps in the strict causal-chronological order of the text.¹²

The Russian Formalists did not speak of plot as a spatial arrangement, as Frank notes,¹³ but the term "spatial" accurately describes the qualities of narrative which they perceived.

I noted earlier that Frank characterizes modern writers by their exploitation of this spatiality. But he also makes larger claims. In "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," he argues that periods in which the temporality of literature predominates have alternated with the ascendancy of spatial form. Literary history can be understood in terms of this shifting emphasis: "it is possible," Frank contends, "to trace the evolution of art forms by their oscillations between these two poles [of time and space]."¹⁴ However, Frank does not suggest that literary history is propelled by the internal dynamics of these oscillating poles. Instead, he suggests that spatial form becomes predominant in response to particular cultural attitudes: "when the relationship between man and the cosmos is one of disharmony and disequilibrium, we find that nonorganic, linear-geometric styles are always produced."¹⁵ The moderns are illustrative (including, Frank contends, James Joyce). Their frequent juxtaposition in space of past and present removes historical sequence and results in the emergence of "eternal prototypes" and the "timeless world of myth,"¹⁶ and this discovery of archetypes within the particularity of history enables them to overcome (not to escape or to ignore) the "disharmony and disequilibrium" that they perceive. Frank stresses that the technique of the moderns, like that of all writers who exploit spatial form, is a response to cultural needs.

Spatial form, then, has significant appeal to the writer and, presumably, to the reader. But what is the precise nature of the reader's relationship to it? The reader may be, as Frank suggests, attracted to timeless myths that sometimes accompany spatial form. But it is even more likely that the reader will be confused by the disruption of sequence: it was, after all, Frank's puzzled response to modern literature that led him to postulate the concept of

¹²Frank, 1978, p. 283.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 284.

¹⁴Frank, 1963, p. 8.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 53-4.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

spatial form. Frank, however, does not devote much attention to the reader, for his concerns are elsewhere. William Holtz is in part correct when he says that "Joseph Frank's essay is grounded in an essentially formalist conception of the literary work as artifact,"¹⁷ for Frank is concerned with the literary object and not with the reader's relationship to it. With reference to the connections that draw a modern work together, Holtz proposes that,

What these poetic sinews are remains to be accounted for, but to the extent that they apparently depend heavily upon covert contributions by the reader to the continuity of what he reads (as distinct from overt, conventional contributions by the author), they would seem to call for an attention to audience at least as rigorous as our attention to artifact.¹⁸

While Holtz correctly points out this need, he does not give Frank his due. The role of the reader is often implicit in Frank's writing and can be specified by pursuing Frank's hints.

The reader required by Frank's theory is an active one, for the reader must discover or create connections among parts of a text that are seemingly disjointed. Using Joyce's *Ulysses* as an example, Frank notes that,

Joyce composed his novel of a vast number of references and cross references that relate to each other independently of the time sequence of the narrative. These references must be connected by the reader and viewed as a whole before the book fits together into any meaningful pattern.¹⁹

But the task of Joyce's reader is by no means easily completed: "The burdens placed on the reader by this method of composition may well seem insuperable."²⁰ These burdens may "seem" insuperable to an actual reader, but they may theoretically be carried. In this important point we can find the key to Frank's conception of the reader: the reader is neither an ideal nor a particular reader but is instead a balanced fusion of the two. Frank bases his understanding of the reader upon the practice of reading but then partially idealizes this observation. In "Spatial Form: An Answer to Critics," he emphasizes the ideal side of this duality. Speaking of his article "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," he contends that

¹⁷William Holtz, "Spatial Form in Modern Literature: A Reconsideration," *Critical Inquiry*, 4 (1977), 271-83, p. 275.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 279-80.

¹⁹Frank, 1963, p. 16.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 19.

All through the essay, as a matter of fact, I kept indicating that I was setting up what Max Weber called an "ideal type"—now called a "model"—rather than describing what was empirically and literally true in any particular case. In speaking, for example, of the "space-logic" of reflexive reference that governed modern poetry and of the necessity [of "its readers"] "to suspend the process of individual reference temporarily until the entire pattern of internal references can be apprehended as a unity," I specifically labeled this as the definition of a model. "This explanation, of course," I added in the next sentence, "is the extreme statement of an ideal condition rather than of an actually existing state of affairs."²¹

Frank's point is that actual readers cannot fully suspend external reference until reflexive reference is complete. He is here acknowledging his awareness that he partly idealizes the reader, and he reveals his concern that his "model" be not too remote from practice; in other words, Frank implies that the reader he envisages is both the reader who is required by the text and a real reader. While Frank is primarily concerned with the work "as artifact," as Holtz argues, he is also aware that the spatial form of a modern text is completed or realized in the mind of an active reader, one who precedes in time and cannot have a purely spatial apprehension of internal reference.

Holtz is not the only critic who fails to see Frank's subdued but important concern for the reader. Giovanni Giovannini cites Frank as one of several critics of the arts who too quickly assume that there are broad similarities among the sister arts because, Giovannini implies, Frank is not sufficiently attentive to the reader's role. Giovannini speaks of the temporal quality of the spatial art of painting and of the spatial quality of primarily temporal literature, and he suggests that these secondary temporal and spatial qualities (or "elements") are not inherent in works but are in the mind of the perceiver:

What is described as a common element in two art objects [in different media] is likely to be an element actually given (i.e., perceptible to sense) in one object and objectively analyzable in it, and not given in the other but merely suggested in the affective response and applicable to the object only by way of metaphor.²²

Referring specifically to "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," he argues that,

The discontinuous sequences are supposed to effect the apprehension of the whole in a moment of time, of "pure time," which is not time at all and therefore must be space. The logic is questionable. But what is more important, the method confuses the final

²¹Frank, 1977, pp. 232-3.

²²Giovanni Giovannini, "Method in the Study of Literature in its Relation to the Other Fine Arts," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 8 (1950), 185-95, p. 190.

operation of perception fusing disparate fragments into a whole with a technique which is spatial only in the sense that the fragments are found in different places. The method does not take into account the fact that the whole finally visualized is of a certain kind and has a certain kind of meaning because it has been built up and controlled by a temporal sequence, however much broken. Moreover, it is not an imitation of spatial art which explains the apparently instantaneous fusing of fragments in *The Waste Land* [one of Frank's examples in his study], but a technique of concentration and rapid shift without transitions, a technique which is probably a development of elements within a literary tradition.²³

Giovannini is making two points. First, he attributes to Frank the belief that spatial literature has the inherent spatial quality that we see in the visual arts and that this spatiality is derived from the visual arts rather than from literary tradition. Secondly, Giovannini suggests that the spatiality of literature is metaphorical only and not inherent because it belongs to the "final operation of perception." But Giovannini attributes ideas to Frank which were not suggested in "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," for Frank does not state or imply that the space of literature is like the space of visual arts. The disjointed parts of a text do not necessarily form a single, spatial image but instead have what can be figuratively called a spatial relationship. Simply put, Frank is concerned with "spatial *form*," not spatial content.²⁴ Moreover, it is not the case that Frank's logic is "questionable" and that he merely concludes that something which is not temporal "therefore must be space" (or, as Frank Kermodé argues, Frank "cannot rid himself of the notion that whatever is not temporal is spatial"²⁵). The web of connections does exist in space: it cannot be merely reduced to an abstract idea but must be visualized as a relationship that occupies space. This does not mean that the spatial quality of literature is entirely in the mind of the reader: Frank recognizes a close connection between the text and the reader, who realizes or completes the spatial form that is inherent in the work. Giovannini is, in general, correct to emphasize the role of the perceiver, but he does a disservice to Frank when he fails to recognize that this idea is implicit, in qualified form, in Frank's argument.

The reader's activity can be further specified. Sometimes, we must attempt to discover the causal-chronological order that has been deliberately disrupted, or, to use the terms of the

²³*Ibid.*, p. 191.

²⁴Frank implies this distinction in his response to Giovannini in "Spatial Form: An Answer to Critics" (1977), pp. 234-5.

²⁵Frank Kermodé, "A Reply to Joseph Frank," *Critical Inquiry*, 4 (1978), 579-88, p. 587.

Russian Formalists, our task is to reconstruct the causal-chronological story on the basis of a particular plot. This may involve only a re-ordering of events, but more often it requires greater activity on the part of the reader, for material that is essential to the story but only implicit in the plot must be inferred, sometimes with the assistance of extra-textual knowledge. The readers of texts with spatial form usually have a role that is even more complex: as was noted earlier, we must try to "suspend" external reference until internal reference has been completed; because we will likely expect external reference to be immediate, this process of suspension is often frustrating, with the result that we become aware of our hindered activity of interpretation. Spatial form also frustrates our expectations of continuity: the form is both in tension with the temporal continuity of reading and conflicts with our frequent assumption of narrative continuity. Once again, the tension between our expectations and the spatial form of a work serves to make us conscious of our considerable activity and of the author's technique.

Frank begins his first article on spatial form by insisting upon the relevance of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's *Laocoön* (1766) to an exploration of time and space in literature. While Frank does not accept Lessing's conclusions, he recognizes that *Laocoön* is an important (and often undervalued²⁷) study of the temporal and spatial dimensions of art. Unlike Frank, Lessing insists that literature is temporal: Lessing's primary purpose in *Laocoön* is to make a rigid and extreme distinction between the visual arts, which he contends are predominantly spatial, and poetry, which proceeds through time. Lessing emphasized this polarity in order to counteract the tendency of contemporary artists to disregard the limitations of their medium. Horace's simple declaration that "A poem is like a painting" (*ut pictura poesis*) because works in either medium give pleasure in a variety of ways²⁸ had led to a blurring of the distinction between the sister arts. Poets, Lessing argues, frequently describe objects that exist in space, even though these objects can be more effectively represented in the spatial media of painting

²⁶Frank, 1963, p. 13.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

²⁸Horace, *On the Art of Poetry*, in *Classical Literary Criticism*, trans. T. S. Dorsch (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 91.

and sculpture; similarly, visual artists often fail to leave actions that take place in time to the poets who have a temporal medium. It is worthwhile to examine Lessing's ideas about the sister arts more fully than does Frank, not only because *Laocoön* was innovative and seminal, but also because its short-comings illuminate the central questions of spatial interpretation, particularly that of the reader's role.

Lessing's argument is remarkable because it is based upon a careful analysis of the qualities of artistic media. At the beginning of Chapter XVI of *Laocoön*, Lessing declares that he "will turn to the foundations and try to argue the matter from first principles," meaning that he will consider the fundamental properties of the "signs" of poetry and painting and the relationship of these signs to content.²⁹ In the key passage of the work, he posits a correspondence between signs and content:

If it is true that painting employs in its imitations quite other means or signs than poetry employs, the former—that is to say, figures and colours in space—but the latter articulate sounds in time; as, unquestionably, the signs used must have a definite relation to the thing signified, it follows that signs arranged together side by side can express only subjects which, or the various parts of which, exist thus side by side, whilst signs which succeed each other can express only subjects which, or the various parts of which, succeed each other.³⁰

The logic is appealing, but also deceptive, in its simplicity.

The argument of *Laocoön* is explicitly based upon the properties of signs, but it also has an equally important (and considerably more complex and problematic) implicit foundation. Lessing's polarization of the sister arts largely rests upon his understanding of the reader and viewer: while there is no exhaustive discussion in *Laocoön* of the audience, Lessing's distinction between the sister arts owes much to his conception of the audience. In the above quotation, Lessing's use of the words "can" and "only" suggests that imitation is directly and necessarily limited by the properties of signs: a temporal form must imitate sequential "actions," and a static form must imitate "bodies" that exist in space.³¹ But it later becomes evident that the poet and painter are also restricted by the capacity of their audiences to

²⁹Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoön; Nathan the Wise; Minna von Barnhelm*, ed. William A. Steel (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1930), p. 55.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid.*

respond to these signs. Lessing's crucial declaration that "Physical beauty arises from the harmonious effect of manifold parts that can be taken in at one view"³² reveals the major constraint that the audience imposes upon the poet and painter: if the audience is to perceive beauty, and Lessing firmly believes that it should,³³ one must be able to see a work of art in its entirety. A painting can easily obtain this wholeness because it can exist within a single field of vision, but long works of poetry are not easily "taken in at one view." The unity of a poem depends entirely upon a single thread of "continuous actions,"³⁴ and poets must therefore be careful to maintain the coherence of events. The description of objects particularly detracts from the unity of a poem. Because a description of bodies is necessarily diffuse in a medium with successive signs, the reader cannot grasp the totality of the object; moreover, the coherence and forward movement of the action is disrupted. As a result, Lessing allows for description only when it is absolutely necessary to action and will not produce a fragmentation that lacks beauty. His insistence upon this unity is only in part a consequence of his understanding of signs: his tidy and rigid co-ordination of "signs" and "thing[s] signified"³⁵ has an important middle step, which is his belief that the audience ought to be able to perceive the entirety of a work of art.

We should not simply dismiss Lessing's theory by arguing that beauty need not be the goal of art. The issue is more complex, for it concerns the capacity of the audience to perceive as much as it involves prescriptions of beauty. While unity is partly a property of a text or painting, it also depends upon the person who completes or realizes this wholeness: because a work of art is only potentially unified, the capacity of the audience to see its parts in "one view" is of prime importance. Lessing demands a high degree of unity in a text or painting largely because he believes that this ability of the audience is limited. He suggests that the audience can grasp the whole through an active process of synthesis and abstraction; instead, he argues, the whole must be present in the passive mind of the reader or viewer,

³²*Ibid.*, p. 74.

³³On page 12 of *Laocoön*, Lessing speaks of "the first law of art, the law of Beauty."

³⁴Lessing, p. 56.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 55.

which greatly restricts the audience's capacity to see a work in "one view."

Lessing's reader or viewer does not actively create coherence in a work of art but is instead absorbed in an illusion. When a work of art comes alive and seems to be real (but is not necessarily realistic), it engages the imagination of the perceiver. This importance of illusion becomes increasingly clear in *Laocoön*. While in Chapter XVI Lessing states that consecutive signs "can. . . only" express actions, in Chapter XVII he revises his view by arguing that the poet could represent bodies, but only at the expense of the affective power of literature:

The poet is not concerned merely to be intelligible, his representations should not merely be clear and plain, though this may satisfy the prose writer. He desires rather to make the ideas awakened by him within us living things, so that for the moment we realize the true sensuous impressions of the objects he describes, and cease in this moment of illusion to be conscious of the means—namely, his words—which he employs for his purpose.³⁶

The goal of the poet is to bring us "nearer to the degree of illusion of which the material painting is specially capable,"³⁷ and it is an illusion which absorbs readers until they forget that the object is described in a work of art and, one may assume, until they forget their own activity of comprehension. Lessing is not merely advocating laziness when he declares "what trouble, what effort" it is to recall the parts of a poem that make up its whole and to remember "all of them in their due order, so vividly, to think of them together with even a moderate swiftness, and thus to arrive at an eventual conception of the whole,"³⁸ for the parts must be "constantly present"³⁹ in an unstrained mind if the reader is to experience a fictional illusion. When the reader's mind is excessively taxed, unity, beauty, and illusion are lost.

Because viewers of a painting are absorbed in an illusion, their imaginations can modify the temporal dimension of the painting's content. Lessing illustrates these ideas by discussing a painting of Medea. The viewer extends the static scene and thus, Lessing contends, "foresee[s] the end of the [Medea's] fight."⁴⁰ This extension "in Nature" (i.e., of content) is based upon

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

our external knowledge and is not an extrapolation from the given scene. It is significant, though, that this awareness of extra-textual knowledge is selective: while the viewer uses knowledge of the story to extend the fight of Medea, such knowledge is not said to permit recognition of a character who is captured in an unusual moment, and someone who is depicted out of character will not be "distinguishable."⁴¹ In this instance, Lessing assumes that the viewer is unaware of the narrative context, but Lessing still believes that this context matters. The difference between these two examples is revealing: in the first case, extra-textual knowledge creates a unified temporal dimension in which the painting is situated; in the second, extra-textual knowledge would make the scene incongruous, and one can assume that Lessing ignores the applicability of this knowledge so that beauty, harmony, and illusion will not be lost. The viewer is believed to extend content only when unity is enhanced. However, the inconsistencies in Lessing's argument show that the temporal dimension of the primarily spatial medium of painting is more significant and uncontrollable than Lessing suggests.

Lessing posits a temporal extension of form as well as of content. Extension on the level of form ("as Art presents it") is said to result in our perception of the "continued indecision of Medea,"⁴² not in a perception of slight movement: because the signs of painting are static, Lessing suggests, Medea's action seems to be continuous. But Lessing is naive to claim that the viewer mistakes this stasis of form for continuity of content and that a "single moment receives from Art an unchangeable continuance" that justifies limiting painting to the depiction of bodies rather than of "anything. . .transitory."⁴³ In short, Lessing suggests that the signs of painting are perceived as static and that a temporal dimension arises only through an extra-textual knowledge which creates an enveloping unity of action. He fails to see that this extension may involve extrapolation as well as knowledge of a broader story and consequently does not recognize that the primary temporal dimension of painting arises when the viewer gently sets the scene in motion.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 38-9.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴³*Ibid.*

Lessing also misunderstands the temporal quality of the signs of poetry. He contends that because poetic signs succeed one another, they should represent passing actions but not a description that must be contained as a whole in the reader's mind. However, consecution is not a property of the signs, as Lessing seems to suggest. At a fundamental level, the signs of poetry are not sequential at all but instead exist in space on a printed page. Sequence arises in two ways: the reader of the text may read from beginning to end, or the signs may refer to content which has an important temporal dimension. Lessing's concern is only with the latter, for he argues that the consecutive signs of poetry ought to represent actions that take place in time. He fails to realize that the sequential arrangement of signs in poetry is important even when the content is not an action sequence: the juxtaposition of signs has significance as the reader reads in time. When Lessing states that the "calamity of Laocoön and the Destruction of the City" are descriptions that "follow each other successively, and I do not see what disadvantage it could bring to the second, how greatly soever the preceding one had moved us,"⁴⁴ he suggests that scenes, unlike unified action sequences, are not influenced by succession. But while juxtaposed scenes do not form a unified whole, they nonetheless shape the reader's understanding of one another.

This juxtaposition is the essence of what Joseph Frank calls spatial form. But for the moment, the important point is not only that temporal literature has a major spatial dimension which Lessing overlooks and Frank elevates to its proper place. The reasons for Lessing's argument are crucial: while he explicitly contends that it is the relationship between signs and content that restricts each medium to certain subjects, there is an underlying concern for the role of the perceiver. As we have seen, Lessing's reader or viewer is passive: he or she must instantaneously and unconsciously acquire a "conception of the whole" in order to experience "the illusion on which poetry particularly depends."⁴⁵ But it is possible to see a more active role for the perceiver, who engages in a process of selection and interpretation, one which is partly conscious but which does not necessarily destroy the beauty of a work or the audience's

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 61 and 63.

illusion.

Lessing fails to recognize that a "conception of the whole," in which the parts are "constantly present,"⁴⁶ is not possible. Naturally, the mind cannot contain a wealth of detail at one moment, and when we look at the whole of a painting, we fail to see many details: only the major shapes and their relationships are perceived. Similarly, whenever a poem is grasped as a whole, material is left out or is subsumed under a more general concept. As a result, we are not overwhelmed by diffuse description in poetry but may, at the expense of detail, perceive its relationship to the rest of the work: while a reader or viewer is rarely able to take in all parts "at one view,"⁴⁷ he or she can use abstraction and synthesis in order to perceive the whole. This point may be self-evident and even banal, but it is crucial and easily overlooked; although Lessing's declared intention is "to argue the matter from first principles," he fails to adequately explore his fundamental assumptions concerning the reader's activities and capacities.

It is worthwhile to compare Northrop Frye's understanding of our perception of works of art, for Frye does not entirely avoid the problems that Lessing encounters. This comparison shows that Lessing's difficulties are not merely the inevitable short-comings of a pioneering work: Frye makes comparable errors because he, too, fails to adequately consider the reader's crucial influence upon the temporal and spatial qualities of literature. At first, Frye seems more perceptive than Lessing because he appears to recognize that we cannot grasp the entirety of a work without the loss of detail. In the *Anatomy of Criticism* (1957), Frye argues that patterns can be perceived when we "stand back" from a work:

In looking at a picture, we may stand close to it and analyse the details of brush work and palette knife. This corresponds roughly to the rhetorical analysis of the new critics in literature. At a little distance back, the design comes into clearer view, and we study rather the content represented: this is the best distance for realistic Dutch pictures, for example, where we are in a sense reading the picture. The further back we go, the more conscious we are of the organizing design. At a great distance from, say, a Madonna, we can see nothing but the archetype of the Madonna, a large centripetal blue mass with a contrasting point of interest at its center. In the criticism of literature, too, we often have to "stand back" from the poem to see its archetypal organization. If we "stand back" from Spenser's *Mutabilitie Cantoes*, we see a background of ordered circular light and a sinister black mass thrusting up into the

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 74.

lower foreground—much the same archetypal shape that we see in the opening of the Book of Job. If we "stand back" from the beginning of the fifth act of *Hamlet*, we see a grave opening on the stage, the hero, his enemy, and the heroine descending into it, followed by a fatal struggle in the upper world. If we "stand back" from a realistic novel such as Tolstoy's *Resurrection* or Zola's *Germinal*, we can see the mythopoeic designs indicated by those titles.⁴⁸

Detail is lost or, more precisely, is subsumed under a larger, archetypal pattern.

Problems begin to emerge when Frye elaborates upon this understanding of our perception of pattern. In "The Archetypes of Literature" (1951), he discusses the audience's apprehension of a work of art with specific reference to the spatial and temporal qualities of art:

Some arts move in time, like music; others are presented in space, like painting. In both cases the organizing principle is recurrence, which is called rhythm when it is temporal and pattern when it is spatial. Thus we speak of the rhythm of music and the pattern of painting; but later, to show off our sophistication, we may begin to speak of the rhythm of painting and the pattern of music. In other words, all arts may be conceived both temporally and spatially. The score of a musical composition may be studied all at once; a picture may be seen as the track of an intricate dance of the eye. Literature seems to be intermediate between music and painting: its words form rhythms which approach a musical sequence of sounds at one of its boundaries, and form patterns which approach the hieroglyphic or pictorial image at the other. The attempts to get as near to these boundaries as possible form the main body of what is called experimental writing. We may call the rhythm of literature the narrative, and the pattern, the simultaneous mental grasp of the verbal structure, the meaning or significance. We hear or listen to a narrative, but when we grasp a writer's total pattern we "see" what he means.⁴⁹

Frye makes comparable (but slightly less accessible) points in the *Anatomy* and concludes these remarks by observing that,

We *listen* to the poem as it moves from beginning to end, but as soon as the whole of it is in our minds at once we "see" what it means. More exactly, this response is not simply to *the whole of it*, but to *a whole in it*: we have a vision of meaning or *dianoia* whenever any simultaneous apprehension is possible.⁵⁰

It is this notion of "simultaneous apprehension" or "simultaneous mental grasp" which is problematic and must be explored.

⁴⁸Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 140.

⁴⁹Northrop Frye, "The Archetypes of Literature," in *Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic Mythology* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 14.

⁵⁰Frye, *Anatomy*, pp. 77-8; Frye's emphasis.

While Frye recognizes that detail is lost as we step back from a work of art, he does not perceive the audience's active role in selecting and abstracting this detail. The larger design of a work is not constructed by the audience but instead, Frye suggests, emerges automatically from our perception of the work's entirety. Just as Lessing believes that we can and ought to take in all the parts "at one view,"⁵¹ Frye believes that we can (and, as we will see, should) have a simultaneous apprehension of a work. But how can one contain, in a simultaneous mental grasp, the entirety of a work? Frye weakly proposes that the whole of a symphony may be perceived when one *sees* all of its notes: the "score of a musical composition may be studied all at once."⁵² This simultaneous grasp depends more upon the perceiver's mode of apprehension than upon any quality inherent in the symphony. Elsewhere, he contends that a symphony audience may miss "the subtleties detected by an analysis of the score," but "as the audience can hear everything that is being played, it gets them all as part of a linear experience; the awareness is less conscious, but not less real."⁵³ Simultaneous apprehension hinges upon this unconscious awareness, for we cannot contain the whole of any but the shortest works in our conscious minds. We could, of course, construct patterns, but Frye does not allow for this possibility, despite his discussion of "standing back" from a work. When Frye turns from music to literature, he is only slightly more convincing. His idea of simultaneous apprehension is successful, but only because he insists that the structure of a work of literature is also its theme: for example, Frye states that in the third phase of comedy, a "humor gives way to a young man's desires,"⁵⁴ which equally describes theme and plot. All of the phases of his mythoi are presented in terms that apply both to the shape that emerges from the whole of a work and to theme, with the result that a mind both can unconsciously contain an entire narrative and, on the basis of this simultaneous apprehension, can also perceive the meaning of the work. Frye does not posit a partly conscious process of selecting and constructing theme. In contrast with Lessing, Frye over-estimates the capacity of the reader or viewer to contain a

⁵¹Lessing, p. 74.

⁵²Frye, "The Archetypes of Literature," p. 14.

⁵³Frye, *Anatomy*, pp. 85-6.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 180.

whole in his mind; but like Lessing, he fails to see the active role of the audience in creating meaning and pattern.

Why does Frye insist upon this concept of simultaneous apprehension? The answer is embedded in his entire vision of the nature and purpose of literature. Frye's theories cannot be thoroughly discussed at this time, but we must at least recognize that his understanding of the reader's role is a consequence of his other beliefs and is not based upon a study of the act of reading. In the *Anatomy*, Frye's professed aim is to develop a comprehensive and objective analysis of literature which is not just another "document in the history of taste";⁵⁵ he seeks to systematically study the whole of English literature without assessing the failure or success of works according to any kind of prescribed value. But in his haste to avoid value judgements, Frye ignores morality in literature when he can and dismisses it when he cannot help but recognize its presence. Frye argues, for instance, that the moral natures of the tragic hero and of his nemesis are not important, and in order to account for the audience's conviction that morality is central, he turns to our reactions rather than to the plays themselves: he argues that "In high mimetic tragedy pity and fear become, respectively, favorable and adverse moral judgement, which are relevant to tragedy but not central to it."⁵⁶ Our emotional reactions certainly influence our moral judgements, but this fact does not preclude the presence of moral concerns within the tragedies. Where morality cannot be explained as a judgemental response, it is seen as incidental. Frye contends that "each mode of literature develops its own existential projection,"⁵⁷ which is the philosophy that each mode seems to contain. The words "develops" and "projection" are significant, for they suggest that the modes are not chosen because of their philosophies. This belief in the priority of form is made explicit when Frye argues that "the fact that *Le Malade Imaginaire* is a comedy is the only reason for making Argan's wife a hypocrite—she must be got rid of to make the play end happily."⁵⁸ That the play is a comedy is a reason for getting rid of her, but it cannot explain why Molière chose, out of many

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

possibilities, to make her a hypocrite. Frye too readily dismisses morality: it is either absent or incidental, never integral. Because he rejects moral themes, he can argue that meaning emerges only and directly through the mythopoeic shape of a work; value judgements are eliminated from the discovery of theme, but so is the active role of the reader. Frye's theory demands that the reader be seen as an essentially passive perceiver of the entire shape of a work.

Frye's reader sees a mythopoeic or archetypal pattern in art that is at once both spatial and temporal. The pattern is immanent in the work of art and emerges as we read in time; but the entire shape can be seen simultaneously, which means that it appears to occupy a limited, perceptible amount of space. When the shape of a work becomes its theme, the temporal dimension is transposed into space. But we cannot call this "spatial form" without diluting our critical vocabulary: as we have seen, spatial form is characterized by the temporal discontinuity but underlying spatial relationship of segments of a text. These segments must be rearranged and interpreted by an active reader, who does not merely experience a barely conscious perception of the whole. Lessing is like Frye to the extent that he also sees literature as spatial but does not perceive spatial form: the string of "continuous actions"⁵⁹ that gives unity to a poem (and consequently creates beauty and illusion) can, Lessing argues, be perceived as a whole; because we can see the entire action, we are not immersed in time but can see a shape that is spatial as well as temporal. Once again, though, the term "spatial form" cannot be used: neither the work's form nor the reader's role satisfies our definition of this term.

Frank's spatial form and its implications for the reader contrast with a perspective that emphasizes the temporal dimension of literature. This approach has its roots in the philosophy of Henri Bergson, whose attempts to reveal the continuous flow of the mind influenced writers of the early twentieth-century and their critics. Bergson argues that the mind and experience are essentially temporal in character, which is to say that sensations, feelings, and ideas all flow together without disruption. In *Time and Free Will* (1889), he terms this continuity of being "duration": because "states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one another,"⁶⁰

⁵⁹Lessing, p. 56.

⁶⁰Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans.

consciousness proceeds unbroken or seems to endure.

Duration is usually masked when the mind divides this flow into units and juxtaposes them in space. These units are not naturally occurring and inherent in states of consciousness but are instead imposed upon duration: a unit is not a fundamental substance but can always be broken into smaller segments, until finally it becomes evident that there are no stable, natural units. Consciousness is indivisible or, conversely, it is infinitely divisible, but we find it convenient to imagine that we have distinct moments of consciousness. Once we have created these units, we try to grasp their relationship. Because we find it difficult to conceive of two units occupying the same space,⁶¹ each unit is given a unique spatial position and is seen in terms of its proximity to other points. If we place these points in a line and imagine that they have a sequence, then we add the dimension of time to space. This shows that the concept of time can be subsumed under space; or, as Bergson phrases it, "time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space"⁶² (although it should be noted that Bergson sometimes uses the word "time" loosely, as an equivalent of "duration," and thus there are "two possible conceptions of time, the one free from all alloy, and the other surreptitiously bringing in the idea of space"⁶³). In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson clarifies the relationship between duration, spatial time, and space with an example:

. . . when the movement of my finger along a surface or a line provides me with a series of sensations of different qualities, one of two things happens: either I picture these sensations to myself as in duration only, and in that case they succeed one another in such a way that I cannot at a given moment perceive a number of them as simultaneous and yet distinct; or else I make out an order of succession, but in that case I display the faculty not only of perceiving a succession of elements, but also of setting them out in a line after having distinguished them: in a word, I already possess the idea of space. Hence the idea of a reversible series in duration, or even simply of a certain *order* of succession in time, itself implies the representation of space, and cannot be used to define it.⁶⁴

In other words, when duration is broken into units which are thought to succeed one another in time, a spatial field that contains the temporal order has necessarily been imagined. Time, like

⁶⁰(cont'd)F. L. Pogson (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1910), p. 98.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, pp. 88-9.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 91

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 102.

the space upon which it depends, is an artificial construct and must not be confused with duration; it obscures the essential continuity of consciousness.

Bergson suggests that the spatial arrangement of units is almost unavoidable. When the mind is relaxed (while it dreams, for instance⁶⁵), duration is not disrupted by the creation of separate units, but thought usually depends upon spatial imagination. This is the case because concepts are units that have been isolated from the flow of duration: whenever we conceive of something, it becomes a point in a field of space. This isolation is intensified when we name a concept and thereby solidify it. The experience of duration, Bergson argues, is "inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility";⁶⁶ even to speak of "several conscious states" that are inseparable is a falsehood, for "several" and "states" imply that there are separable units of consciousness.⁶⁷ Any attempt to think about or to discuss duration necessarily disrupts its continuity and requires the creation of a spatial field.

Bergson's goal is, in part, to expose the artificiality of this spatialization. While it seems to be an inevitable or natural activity of the mind, it also distorts and falsifies reality by concealing duration. Spatial thought is pervasive, automatic, and essential to verbal expression, but these are not grounds for its acceptance; while Bergson recognizes that spatial thought cannot be eliminated, he seeks to minimize it and to recover the experience of duration.

Some critics of Joyce's writings, most notably Shiv K. Kumar and Robert Klawitter, argue that Joyce, like Bergson, sees duration as the ultimate reality. In *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, Kumar is careful to point out that Joyce "was not consciously influenced by Bergson's theories,"⁶⁸ which is debatable; but Kumar also contends that "James Joyce's acquaintance with Bergson's thought was neither incomplete nor indirect" and that Joyce "seems to have made an intensive study of the new time-philosophy."⁶⁹ These seemingly contradictory points are resolved when Kumar goes on to state that Joyce's "acquaintance with

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁶⁸Shiv K. Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel* (London: Blackie and Son, 1962), p. 138.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 104.

Bergson was, in fact, in the nature of a self-realization":⁷⁰ Bergson merely formulated ideas that Joyce discovered for himself.⁷¹ Kumar makes bold and extreme claims for the importance of Bergsonian thought in the writings of Joyce. In "Space-Time Polarity in *Finnegans Wake*," he argues that Joyce's "primary intention as a literary artist is to render in a new fluid medium Bergson's durational flow."⁷² More specifically,

. . . in the work of James Joyce as in the entire thought of Bergson, space and time are presented as contraries, with durational flow as the only true reality. Whereas space is synonymous with matter, externality and convention, *la durée* [i.e., duration], on the other hand, represents spirit, inner reality and free will.⁷³

While Kumar is correct to see a duality of time and space, he too readily assumes the primacy of duration. The correspondence between Joyce and Bergson does not extend so far.

But Kumar must not be quickly dismissed, for he makes an important point that seems, at first, to strengthen his case. As was noted earlier, Bergson believes that the experience of duration is "inexpressible,"⁷⁴ for words inevitably and artificially fragment its continuity. Kumar argues that "Bergson, like Joyce," believed that "the conventional word. . . is like a spatial entity existing in a homogeneous medium and implies an inevitable solidification of our fluid impressions."⁷⁵ But Joyce, Kumar suggests, transforms language, making it contribute to duration rather than disrupt it:

James Joyce is essentially engaged in this effort to penetrate into the hard crust of the conventional word, seize it in its embryonic form and then remould it to embody nascent movements in his characters' streams of consciousness.

Unfortunately, Kumar concludes that,

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁷¹It is also possible that Joyce was influenced by St Augustine more than by Bergson. Herman Hausheer suggests that it is "interesting to note the analogies which Bergson's and St Augustine's psychology of duration have in common" ("St Augustine's Conception of Time," in *Aspects of Time*, ed. C. A. Patrides [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976], p. 34.). As Hausheer points out, Augustine believed that time is "a succession of indivisible instants" (p. 31) and that "there are three presents, a present of things present, a present of things past, and a present of things future," all of which exist "in our mind" (p. 32). Augustine's discussions of time are extensive (for example, *Confessions* XI 11-28, in which the above conclusions are reached) and would probably have been familiar to Joyce.

⁷²Shiv K. Kumar, "Space-Time Polarity in *Finnegans Wake*," *Modern Philology*, 54 (1957), 230-33, p. 233.

⁷³Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 133.

⁷⁴Bergson, p. 129.

⁷⁵Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 115.

It is not our intention here to present a detailed analysis of the various linguistic devices employed by him to achieve the effect of involuntary fluidity.⁷⁶

Such an analysis would show that Kumar's point needs major qualification. He is correct to suggest that Joyce's language has a "fluidity" that contributes to a presentation of duration. But some of the same qualities that create this flow also constitute spatial patterns. Assonance, for instance, produces a forward moving fluidity, but it is also a spatial pattern of internal reference. This is a minor example, but it illustrates Kumar's failure to account for spatial patterns in Joyce's writings.

Robert Klawitter more effectively deals with space, but he also overemphasizes the Bergsonian dimension of Joyce's thought. In an insightful article, "Henri Bergson and James Joyce's Fictional World," Klawitter recognizes that Joyce does not present pure duration. But he argues that Joyce exposes the division of reality into spatial units as false:

Most of us have long agreed that Joyce represents the world as Bergson says it is not, a repetitious, reversible, dialectical flux of the fragments of eternity; a formal, mechanical, determinate, uncreative world. And Joyce's books do not only represent a world that Bergson calls unreal, they also call attention to its unreality.⁷⁷

Because the reality of duration cannot be represented in language, Klawitter argues, Joyce affirms it by presenting and undermining its opposite:

Joyce's fictional world, then, is a parodic representation of unreality as Bergson describes it, a parody of the inevitable unreality of the human world. Several analysts have made the mistake of supposing that Bergson's philosophy can lead to a novel of *durée réelle*. But there can be no representation of reality as Bergson describes it because reality for Bergson is always falsified by representation.⁷⁸

According to Klawitter, Joyce's writings are indirectly Bergsonian because Joyce recognizes, on the basis of Bergsonian ideas, that duration cannot be immediately represented.

Two objections must be made to Klawitter's arguments. First, he does not recognize that duration can be, to some extent, directly represented. While "there can be no representation of reality as Bergson describes it because reality for Bergson is always falsified

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁷⁷Robert Klawitter, "Henri Bergson and James Joyce's Fictional World," *Comparative Literature Studies*, 3 (1966), 429-37, p. 433.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 435.

by representation," this same reality, for Joyce, can be partially represented. The difference lies in a distinction, which Klawitter overlooks, between a philosopher and a writer of literature. If we speak strictly and observe philosophic exactness, we can say that duration is inimitable in language. But a writer of literature may represent duration. This occurs when language becomes as transparent as possible or, conversely, when words become fluid things in themselves rather than mere units that convey meaning. As we will see, Joyce (in part) achieves the former in *Ulysses* and the latter in *Finnegans Wake*. The second point to be made is that Klawitter undervalues the patterned, spatial "world" of "unreality." It is true that Joyce calls attention to (and sometimes parodies) these "unreal" constructs and that they are undeniably artificial or human creations. But it does not necessarily follow that Joyce denies value to them and to their spatial dimension in favour of duration. It is significant that Joseph Frank, like Bergson, sees spatial constructs as artificial and grants a deeper reality to fluidity, but Frank does not dismiss them as somehow false for this reason. While this point is not explicit in Frank's articles, it is latent throughout. In "Spatial Form: An Answer to Critics," he approvingly observes that Frank Kermode has finally learned that,

...we say *tick-tock* because to repeat *tick-tick* endlessly is a burden that humans cannot bear; where there is a beginning we want an end, a human pattern, the music of the spheres, not simply the hum and buzz of repetition *ad infinitum*.⁷⁹

Both Frank and Bergson grant a lesser reality to the spatial order that the mind creates than to time or duration. But one praises this embellishment of time while the other seeks a release from space and spatial time in favour of duration.

Joyce is able both to present duration and to affirm spatial patterns. The two exist in an important tension and, while one continually undermines the other, one never gains absolute ascendancy. On the one hand, spatial patterns expose the limitations of duration; on the other hand, duration reveals the confusing plurality of spatial constructs. Before we proceed to explore this tension and specify the reader's relationship to it, we must consolidate and clarify the definitions of time and space that have been discussed. Frank's time of reading and of

⁷⁹Frank, 1977, p. 244.

narrated action is not, of course, identical to Bergson's duration or the fluid progression of a writer's representation of duration; nor is spatial form the same as the basic mental process of spatialization that Bergson describes. It is time to generalize these terms and, retaining what has been discovered about time, space, and the reader from these writers, we can now view the concepts more fully in the context of Joyce's later writings. I will broaden slightly Frank's definition of space: while he is concerned primarily with the interrelationship of substantial segments of narrative, the term "spatial form" can be applied to any size of unit, from morphemes to the macro-structure of a work. Anything that interrupts the flow of action and of reading and requires internal reference will be called "spatial." This includes paradigms or archetypes that emerge as we read, patterns of words, sounds, and phrases, and actions that occur in different places at the same time. This use of the word is intentionally broad; it is encompassing because it is defined in opposition to "temporal," and this will allow us to explore more fully the crucial tension between the two dimensions. "Temporal" will refer not only to pure duration, in which there is continual flow and an absence of units, but also to a forward movement that can be divided into units, provided that they do not form a prominent spatial pattern owing to internal reference.

The tension between temporality and the spatial dimension of Joyce's writings can best be approached through an understanding of the reader. This is the case because of the intricate relationship between time and space in the act of reading and time and space as ideas within the content of the works. The reader reads in time and may discover a comparable fluidity within the work; we also actively construct spatial patterns, and these patterns are both inherent in the text and realized in spatial form within our imagination. It is this four-fold distinction between time and space within the text and in the activity of interpretation that clarifies Joyce's understanding of the dimensions in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. But we need significantly different terms when we approach these two texts. While they are comparable to the extent that the reader's involvement clarifies time and space, the formal dissimilarity of the works creates important differences in the reader's role. When analysing both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans*

Wake, a distinction between form and content is the key to the reader's participation. But if the connection between time and space is to become clear, we require two different definitions of the relationship between form and content. The words are so ambiguous and so often misused that it is tempting to simply discard them. But we can specify distinct and very different meanings to them, yet still allow the consistency of terminology to reveal the point of similarity between these definitions, which is the reader's mediating role between form and content.

In *Ulysses*, the reader's understanding of time and space contrasts with and undermines the characters' views of this relationship. This is most obvious in "Proteus" and "Penelope," which will be analysed in the next chapter. For now, it is important to recognize that the knowledge we gain of time and space as we come to understand Joyce's technique is superior to the characters' comprehension of temporal flow and spatial pattern. It is useful here to invoke a definition of form and content which is based upon the comparative knowledge of the reader and the characters of a work. In "'What's Hecuba to Us?': The Audience's Experience of Literary Borrowing," Peter J. Rabinowitz asks,

How do we know how to interpret a given pattern? If it is perceived by the authorial but not the narrative audience, then it will be interpreted as "form," since the authorial audience sees what is before it as art, and any pattern it alone sees must be a quality of the work as art.¹⁰

While we do not find a narrative audience in "Proteus" or "Penelope," Rabinowitz's point still holds. We perceive a relationship of time and space that is not recognized by the characters and which occupies the level of form. It is from technique which we attribute to Joyce rather than to Stephen Dedalus or Molly Bloom that this superior knowledge arises.

Both "Proteus" and "Penelope" can be described as stream of consciousness narratives in which duration is represented. An exact specification is more difficult, for there are subtle differences between interior monologues, the representation of sensations and/or verbalized thought, and various other types of narrative that are grouped under the encompassing term

¹⁰Peter J. Rabinowitz, "'What's Hecuba to Us?': The Audience's Experience of Literary Borrowing," in *The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation*, ed. Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 252.

"stream of consciousness." But it is enough to recognize that these streams represent the flow of experience that Bergson calls duration. As we read in time, the thoughts, emotions, and sensations of the characters unfold without interruption. When pure duration is represented, there are relatively few demands placed upon the reader: while we may actively interpret a character's nature, we are not bothered by disruptions of form, and language is as transparent as possible rather than intrusive and subject to stylistic analysis (although such analysis may, of course, be profitably done). We are like Lessing's reader, who "cease[s] in this moment of illusion to be conscious of the means—namely, his [the poet's] words—which he employs for his purpose."¹¹ However, it is immediately apparent that Joyce does not present pure duration, for we find in "Proteus" and "Penelope" abundant and various patterns, including patterns of sound, images, phrases and concepts. These patterns form a complex web of internal reference that emerges as we read in time but is predominantly spatial in character. Sometimes Joyce's characters, especially Stephen, create or recognize patterns, but more often the reader perceives, through an awareness of technique, patterns that are limited to the level of form and cannot be understood as part of the content of the characters' minds. As we will see in the next chapter, the relationship of time and space that emerges on this level of form undermines the characters' temporal duration and their understanding of space.

It is necessary at this point to examine a spatial dimension of duration that is potentially problematic. In "Spatial Form: Some Further Reflection," Joseph Frank sees spatial qualities in literature which attempts to capture the mind's stream of consciousness. He argues that,

It was, however, not so much with regard to poetry as to the novel that the notion of "spatial form" made its greatest impact. For it focused attention on the opposition between the temporal nature of the narrative medium (language) and the experiments of such novelists as Joyce, Proust, and Djuna Barnes, who broke up narrative continuity in order to portray either the preflexive stream of consciousness or the interweaving time-shifts of memory, or who composed in terms of symbolic imagery.¹²

But what continuity has been broken in stream of consciousness narrative? The flow of

¹¹Lessing, p. 61.

¹²Frank, 1978, p. 281.

language, thought, and sensations has not been disrupted. What is disjointed is the time sequence of the mind's images and the contents of its thoughts, but this is entirely consistent with Bergson's understanding of duration. According to Bergson, duration is without spatial arrangement, but this does not mean that there can only be an immersion in the present moment:

Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer *endure*. Nor need it forget its former states: it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that, even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected?¹³

This does not mean that we have a simultaneous apprehension of past and present, for this would introduce space into temporal duration:

We here put our finger on the mistake of those who regard pure duration as something similar to space, but of a simpler nature. They are fond of setting psychic states side by side, of forming a chain or a line of them, and do not imagine that they are introducing into this operation the idea of space properly so called, the idea of space in its totality, because space is a medium of three dimensions.¹⁴

When a character such as Molly Bloom recalls her past, she is not disrupting the flow of duration. Neither do abrupt changes in topic result in a spatial arrangement; these shifts reveal the interpenetration of her states of consciousness, not the juxtaposition of spatial units of thought. Joyce represents duration when he shows us these movements of his characters' minds and is not employing spatial form. But there are, as we will see, abundant and prominent spatial patterns on the level of form that noticeably contrast with this duration.

Temporal flow and spatial patterns are in tension, with one continually undermining the other. Formal patterns expose the limitations of duration, but what this reveals about duration is not immediately clear. Does it show that duration is not real, that it cannot be represented, or that it is not desirable? This question will be explored in the next chapter, but

¹³Bergson, p. 100.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 103.

for now it is sufficient to recognize the tension between the flow of the mind and formal patterns. While space brings duration into question, the latter is not so impaired that it cannot, in turn, expose the artificiality of spatial patterns. But these patterns are not shown to be false, as Robert Klawitter believes. They are an integral part of the text that cannot be merely dismissed; moreover, readers contribute to these patterns as they realize them in their minds, with the result that the spatial patterns gain credibility and cannot be easily confined to Bergson's world of "unreality." These patterns call into question the Bergsonian duration as much as they are themselves undermined.

This tension between time and space is resolved on the level of character. Both Stephen Dedalus and Molly Bloom are unable to fuse time and space but instead understand or experience only the extremes of pure temporal flow and timeless patterns. The reader, by contrast, resolves duration and spatial form and is able to see the immanence of all types of spatial pattern in time (although, as we will see, this resolution is incomplete in "Penelope," which consequently looks forward to *Finnegans Wake*). Time and space on the level of form, which is understood by the reader alone and is clarified during the act of reading, illuminates time and space as content in these chapters.

Because separate consciousnesses cannot be demarcated in *Finnegans Wake*, this definition of form and content will not help us to understand the relationship of time and space in the work. Rather than distinguish between form that we perceive and content that the characters can also recognize, we must draw a distinction between linguistic signifiers and their referents or signifieds. The form of the work is its sound, the almost tangible signifiers that are significant objects in their own right, while its content is the elusive referents of these signifiers. By contrast, numerous commentators have argued that there is a merging of form and content in *Finnegans Wake*. The first to emphasize this quality was Samuel Beckett, who wrote in 1929 that "Here form *is* content, content *is* form";¹⁵ more recently, B. R. Gluck has

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¹⁵Samuel Beckett, "Dante. . . Bruno. Vico. . . Joyce," in Samuel Beckett, et al., *Our Exagmination Round his Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress* (London: Faber and Faber, 1929), p. 14.

argued that form and content in *Finnegans Wake* are "synonymous."¹⁶ However, by disrupting meaning, Joyce has not fused form and content but has instead forced them apart. Our task is to join them, and as we try to do so the relationship between form and content becomes clarified.¹⁷

Finnegans Wake is characterized by an unresolved and unresolvable tension between time and space. There is, on the one hand, an almost overwhelming fluidity in the book, for Joyce's distortion of language transforms words into sounds that continuously flow together. In *Laocoön*, Lessing speaks of the "signs" of poetry, his temporal medium, as "articulate sounds" rather than as words:¹⁸ because sounds are articulate or jointed, they seem to constitute a continuous stream that cannot be disrupted but is superficially divided when we typographically separate words. Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* shows this quality in the extreme, for the sound flows in an unstoppable surge. But we try to separate distinct words and find their referents, and we seek spatial patterns of internal reference in an attempt to discover what is of importance in the confusion of language. However, the patterns that emerge in time can never become complete or even achieve stability, and, consequently, we are engaged upon an unending temporal quest. The flow of words and our anticipation of finding internal reference draws us onward, but our desire for spatial form is largely frustrated: we cannot find a pattern that exists outside time, but instead only find connections that are continually modified as we proceed in time. Spatial order, then, is the goal that sustains our quest, but this goal is never

¹⁶Barbara Reich Gluck, *Beckett and Joyce: Friendship and Fiction* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979), p. 106.

¹⁷It is interesting to note that while Beckett insists that form and content are the same in *Finnegans Wake*, his reasons actually support the argument that the two are separated. He contends that,

Here form *is* content, content *is* form. You complain that this stuff is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read—or rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not *about* something; *it is that something itself* (p. 14).

Beckett suggests that the word is an important thing in itself, with aural and visual qualities, and, consequently, the word (i.e. form) has or is content. But this prominence of the word in fact serves to separate the signifier from its signified, or form from content, as we will see in the third chapter.

¹⁸Lessing, p. 55.

reached; signifiers are never conclusively joined to signifieds and stable patterns of meaning cannot emerge. A seeming connection between time and space is illusory and continually hindered: a temporal reading never yields stable patterns which escape the flow of time that continually changes whatever shapes we discover.

It might be argued that *Finnegans Wake* can be perceived as a whole. The book, of course, ends where it begins, with its final sentence flowing back to the opening words. This gives the book the spatial design of a circle: *Finnegans Wake* appears to be autonomous, a self-contained and limited pattern of internal reference that can be imagined spatially as a whole. But two objections must be made. One is that this simultaneous apprehension which produces the dominance of space over time can occur only in theory. In practice, we are bound by time, for our temporal quest does not lead us to a spatial apprehension of the whole. Like many commentators, Northrop Frye recognizes that the reader of *Finnegans Wake* is engaged upon a quest, but he fails to recognize the significance of the practical impossibility of successfully acquiring a simultaneous, spatial apprehension. In "Quest and Cycle in *Finnegans Wake*," Frye makes a general distinction between the cyclical order of nature, which is "the hero's world," and the quest, which is "dialectic" or upward-moving,⁸⁹ and he asks,

Who then is the hero who achieves the quest? It is not Shem, for here as in *Ulysses* the artist is part of the cycle, and Joyce's view of him is detached and ironic. It is not HCE, nor Shaun, nor even Finnegan, who never does wake up even if HCE does. Eventually it dawns on us that it is the *reader* who achieves the quest, the reader who, to the extent that he masters the book of Doublends Jined, is in a position to look down on its rotation, and see its total form as something more than rotation.⁹⁰

"To the extent that he masters the book": this is a crucial point, the implications of which Frye does not see, for it radically influences the role of the reader and the relationship between time and space in *Finnegans Wake*. Frye seems indifferent to his own qualification, for he still speaks of the reader as a "hero" who "achieves the quest." This betrays excessive confidence in the reader, who is more ideal than real in Frye's conception, and it suggests that Frye

⁸⁹Northrop Frye, "Quest and Cycle in *Finnegans Wake*," in *Fables of Identity: Studies in Poetic Mythology* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 261.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 263-4; Frye's emphasis.

believes the book is masterable: Frye both elevates the reader and diminishes the reader's task. But a spatial, simultaneous apprehension can, in practice, never be achieved. As a result, time and space necessarily remain at odds: no matter how long we proceed in time, a spatial conception of the book cannot be attained; space remains the ideal that is in tension with our temporal quest.

The second objection is related to the first. *Finnegans Wake* is not, strictly speaking, circular. More precisely, the text as object is circular; but as a text that involves its reader, it assumes a very different shape, which again shows that time and space in *Finnegans Wake* can be understood only if we consider the reader. When this is done, it is evident that *Finnegans Wake* should be envisaged not as a circle but as a coil that has no perceptible beginning or end. Each new reading is not a rereading of the same text, as a circular model suggests, but is instead a new and different reading. It goes beyond and modifies an earlier reading and is consequently unique; it does not lead us within reach of a simultaneous apprehension of a limited, circular text but instead emphatically reveals that a complete spatial apprehension of the text is an unattainable ideal. When we describe *Finnegans Wake* as a coil, this important temporal dimension of the rereading is illustrated. The spatial dimension is still present, though, and in two ways: first, a quest through time is necessarily a quest across space because of the unavoidable spatial dimension of time (which was noted earlier in the discussion of Bergson's distinction between time, which is spatial, and pure duration); secondly, and more importantly, the spatial dimension is present as an ideal that escapes time or contains time within it. But time predominates, as this image of the coil suggests, during the activity of reading. The coil traps us in time; a circle, the ideal, exists in space and is complete, outside time.

One might object that *Finnegans Wake* abounds with spatial patterns that seem stable. We find, for instance, the four-fold division of the text that corresponds to Vico's four stage cycle of history; there are numerous archetypes or paradigms that emerge as we read; and there is an intricate, spatial web of interconnected phrases, images, and concepts. But this

abundance of the spatial designs helps undermine them, for it means that none is reliable or authoritative. Their complexity alone is not problematic, for, as was noted earlier, a reader of literature can often abstract an order-giving pattern at the expense of detail. The crucial point is that none of the patterns is stable: they are constantly modified in time and none is given priority in a hierarchical order. Even the Viconian patterns are more problematic than problem-solving and are neither stable nor dominant. I do not intend to suggest, though, that the spatial patterns of *Finnegans Wake* are entirely undermined because of their plurality. Robert Klawitter argues, as we have seen, that Joyce parodies all spatial thought in order to indirectly assert the primacy of duration, but his case is too extreme. The spatial patterns are in tension with durational flow, not undermined by it; the ideal is only partially mocked because it is unattainable. Once again, we see that the problem is less the abundance of perspectives than their instability: there are only two fundamental kinds of perspectives, the spatial and the temporal, and their instability arises because they continually undermine one another. Rather than try to make sense of each spatial design, we must first understand this tension between temporal flow and spatial pattern in *Finnegans Wake*, for what these numerous patterns have in common is their relationship to temporality. This connection will be explored in detail in the third chapter: for now, my concern is to firmly establish the relevance of the reader's temporal reading and active construction of pattern to the temporal and spatial qualities of the text. It is in the reader's mind that this tension between time and space is realized, and this tension is the means by which the text is sustained and becomes comprehensible.

Wolfgang Iser describes *Ulysses* in terms that are, to some extent, comparable to those I have found appropriate to *Finnegans Wake*. In "Patterns of Communication in Joyce's *Ulysses*," he argues that the reading of *Ulysses*

is a quest which brings to the surface the possibility of any number of findings. Thus it is possible to discover many different 'pictures' of the everyday world, but they will never converge into a defined picture—and it is this very fact that compels the reader to continue his search. Even though he will never find the object of his search, on his way he will meet with a vast array of possible conceptions, through which the reality of everyday life will come alive in a corresponding number of ways. As these

conceptions are not joined together, every picture remains representative of no more than one aspect of reality. . . . [T]he aspects of reality that group together into a 'picture' are continually merging and diverging, so that the reader can experience that reality as he goes along, but being thus entangled in it he can never hope to encompass it all.⁹¹

Iser's argument is questionable. The meaning of *Ulysses* is not, as he suggests, indeterminate but is instead constrained to a substantial extent. I have argued that formal patterns of time and space have an ironic purpose that serves to restrict meaning, and the following chapter is devoted to an exploration of this process in two sections of *Ulysses*. At that time, I will elaborate upon Iser's view of "Proteus" and "Penelope" and hope to show that it is his conception of the reader which has led him astray.

But Iser's argument should not be put aside so readily, for the underlying spatial metaphor in the above quotation illuminates the spatial quality of Joyce's writings. When Iser speaks of the "many different 'pictures'" which "will never converge into a defined picture," his placement of "picture" in quotation marks suggests that he is aware of its figurative quality. But he does not consider the suitability and implications of this metaphor nor point out that it is spatial in character. The metaphor is crucial to his argument and weakens his conclusions. A picture is a spatial construction that has considerable cohesion; in particular, a single, "defined" picture, unlike "many different 'pictures,'" is inherently unified. Iser's metaphor reveals that he demands a greater degree of spatial coherence than does Joseph Frank. As was noted earlier, Frank does not suggest that the space of literature is like the space of the visual arts: while Giovannini accuses him of mistaking the two, it is clear that Frank does not envisage a single, spatial image or picture but instead uses the term "spatial" to describe a web of internal reference that must be imagined as occupying space. Almost no text, *Ulysses* included, constitutes a unified picture, but it can be grasped as a spatial pattern. Once we reject Iser's implicit understanding of the spatial quality of a text in favour of Frank's, we can find that reading *Ulysses* is not an unsuccessful quest but instead is a more structured

⁹¹Wolfgang Iser, "Patterns of Communication in Joyce's *Ulysses*," in *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 232-3.

activity.

Reading *Finnegans Wake*, by contrast, can be described as an unsuccessful quest. But this is the case not because pictures fail to "converge into a defined picture," for the reader does not expect to find such cohesion. If the reader does not seek this unity, what propels the act of reading? Iser suggests that it is our failure that prompts us: it is "this very fact" of failure that "compels the reader to continue his search." But why does the reader not give up or diminish the goal of unity, wander aimlessly or become content with one of the "many different 'pictures'"? It is the relationship between time and space which is the key to the reader's persistence. When I analyse *Finnegans Wake* in the third chapter, I will show that Joyce continually taunts us with the possibility that spatial patterns can be found, with the result that we pursue a goal through time rather than wander aimlessly. By exploring the implications of Iser's spatial metaphor and placing it in the larger context of time and space in Joyce's works, we can see that Iser overestimates the reader's freedom. Meaning is more constrained in *Ulysses* than Iser contends, and his understanding of the reader's role does not even suit the more plural *Finnegans Wake*.

My emphasis upon the reader's role is by no means intended to suggest that the reader may simply impose interpretations upon Joyce's works. The reader is active but not entirely free, for the text acts to constrain all but the most uncooperative of readers. Joyce's texts demand a particular kind of reader, one who attends to the temporal and spatial qualities of form, and the reader with which I am concerned is, in part, this ideal reader that is demanded by the text. When reading *Ulysses*, he or she accepts an ironic perspective upon the characters' understandings of time and space, and the reader realizes the tensions between time and space in *Finnegans Wake*. However, this reader is not only ideal but is also a model of an actual reader who has a limited capacity to perceive patterns and cannot, for instance, achieve simultaneous apprehension. Here we should recall the reader implicit in Joseph Frank's discussions of spatial form. Frank, we found, envisages an idealized version of actual readers and thus creates a balance between the reader required by the text and the practices of actual

readers. If we accept and expand this model that is implicit in Frank's criticism, we can establish a close connection between text and reader.

One of the dangers of spatial form is that the connection between juxtaposed parts of a text may be so unclear that the reader has a confusing freedom of interpretation. Joyce avoids these problems by constraining the activity of the reader, and how he does so is best illustrated by contrasting Joyce with T. E. Hulme, who does not avoid these difficulties in his poetic theory and practice. In Hulme's work, as in Joyce's, spatial form is in tension with the flow of time. Hulme accepts Bergson's conclusions that the flow of duration constitutes reality, although Hulme sees this flow as an aimless flux and as a property of the objective world rather than as a desirable quality of the human mind, and he argues that the task of the poet is to isolate spatial images from this flux that characterizes reality. These images are then juxtaposed in space: they are placed side by side, without causal or chronological connection, so that a deeper relationship will emerge. According to Hulme, "Two visual images form what one may call a visual cord. They unite to suggest an image which is different to both."⁹² By fusing these images, the poet creates a spatial order that contrasts with the flux of time.

Hulme supposes that the reader will be able to grasp the connection between the juxtaposed images. He calls the reader the "*unexpressed* author,"⁹³ which is the case because the fusion of images that takes place in the author's mind also occurs in the reader's. Both poet and reader respond, in the same way, to the images that have been isolated from the flux, with the result that the poet has "Sympathy with [the] reader as brother." The foundation of this concurrence is a latent similarity between poet and reader: "all the effects that can be produced by the literary man," Hulme argues, ". . . are to be found dormant, unused in the reader, and are thus awakened." What is dormant in the reader is a "half-forgotten impression,"⁹⁴ which the images of a poem bring to full consciousness. What matters, Hulme believes, is that a poet could "pick out one element which is really in all of us, but which before

⁹²T. E. Hulme, *Further Speculations*, ed. Sam Hynes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1955), p. 73.

⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 93; Hulme's emphasis.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 94.

he had disentangled it, we were unable to perceive."⁹⁵

But what constrains the response of the reader? The relationship between juxtaposed images is uncertain, with the result that readers have a puzzling freedom when they read a poem. The juxtaposed images do not have a causal or chronological relation that can be discovered through reason; instead, Hulme suggests that the connection between images is perceived intuitively and leads to an emotional response. It follows that the readers' understanding of the poem will depend more upon their own emotions and the nature of their "half-forgotten impressions" than upon qualities inherent in the poem. In practice, Hulme overcomes this problematic vagueness by giving a narrative context to many of his poems, which permits us to reconstruct a causal-chronological relationship between the juxtaposed images. This context also enables us to infer the presence of an author who perceives the images, with the result that the images do not directly provoke an emotional response in the reader but are mediated by the implied author. We sense that a creator has actively discovered images in the flux of time and has placed them side by side in his or her art. This relationship between spatial form and time is comparable to that which we find in *Ulysses*: in both cases, the relationship between time and space is understood by comparing the spatial and temporal qualities of form with the spatial and temporal qualities of content. If Hulme's juxtaposed images were perceived immediately by the reader, so that an intuitive, emotional response would result, form would not be visible or mediate, with the result that the crucial relationship between the flux of time and the spatial form of the poetry would pass unperceived. It is our consciousness of the implied author and his transformation of experience into art which constrains our activity of interpretation and prevents spatial form from becoming aimless.

Hulme's theory leads to another problem in practice, one which illuminates Joyce's technique in *Finnegans Wake*. As was noted earlier, Hulme believes that poetic images should make an immediate impression upon the reader's mind. If this is to be achieved, Hulme suggests, language must be fresh, precise, and pure. What this means is that the poet must

⁹⁵T. E. Hulme, *Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art*, ed. Herbert Read (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1924), p. 150.

avoid worn-out words and the "vain decorative and verbal images of the ordinary poets"⁹⁶ in favour of words which directly convey the essence of an object. Words should be transparent, creating an image of the object to which they refer, and should not be perceived as things in their own right with unique qualities of sound; according to Hulme, "This new verse resembles sculpture rather than music; it appeals to the eye rather than to the ear."⁹⁷ In short, Hulme seeks to fuse signifiers with their referents or signifieds. One consequence of his reluctance to see words as things is his failure to acknowledge their histories. He assumes that they can be purely immediate, stripped of all past meanings and connotations and directly convey their referents. As a result, he fails to control these secondary meanings and they contribute to the vagueness of the connections between images that are given spatial form. In *Finnegans Wake*, as we have seen, Joyce separates signifiers and signifieds (or form from content) rather than assumes that they can be fused. It is true that he does not control the meanings and connotations of words; but the activity of readers of *Finnegans Wake* is constrained because their goal is to reunite signifier and signified. The goal cannot be achieved, but it nonetheless provides a strong sense of direction. Hulme's reader, by contrast, wanders aimlessly in the spaces between his juxtaposed images.

I have argued that the reader of *Finnegans Wake* is engaged in a temporal pursuit of spatial patterns. To use more suggestive terms, the reader is seeking an origin, something stable that is beyond time. This origin is either a pattern of internal reference that is within but superior to time, an origin that existed before time, or a paradigm that transcends time. The reader seeks, but can never find, an origin that is not subject to constant, temporal revision. This unsuccessful pursuit of an origin has obvious affinities with the deconstructionist critics' necessarily unsuccessful search for a ground or origin. Time does not permit a detailed exploration of these affinities, but it is important to briefly note the resemblance between qualities inherent in *Finnegans Wake* and the activity of deconstruction. *Finnegans Wake* is an almost ideally plural text, for it has no stable pattern that has priority

⁹⁶Hulme, *Further Speculations*, p. 90.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*; p. 75.

and would constitute a center, and, as was noted earlier, it is problematic less because of the abundance of patterns than because of their lack of stability and dominance. Instead of a centered structure, we find an eruption of language, a world consisting of unstable linguistic signifiers. Jacques Derrida's insistence that there is nothing beyond language is clearly applicable to *Finnegans Wake*: as we have seen, Joyce separates signifiers from signifieds, with the result that we are overwhelmed by signifiers that have no stable, dominant referents. While it seems obvious that *Finnegans Wake* is inherently deconstructed, one must be careful to avoid hasty conclusions. Margot Norris, for instance, uses post-structuralist terms to describe *Finnegans Wake*, but she does not show that the book lacks a center: while she states that "In the course of several chapters, I have examined this lack of certainty in every aspect of the work," she does not prove that this uncertainty arises because *Finnegans Wake* is decentered rather than merely ambiguous.⁹⁸ The key to proving this point lies in an exploration of time and space in *Finnegans Wake*, for the lack of stability in the work depends upon the tension between spatial pattern and temporal flow, which undermines both and upsets all ways of centering the text. The relevance of this approach becomes even more clear if we consider the deconstructionist critics' underlying concern for time and space. Reference is, of course, said to be "deferred," meaning that it is continually postponed in time. The goal of this temporal quest for a signifier with priority is often described by a metaphor that is spatial: J. Hillis Miller, for instance, speaks of the desired "ground" (and of its absence as an "abyss").⁹⁹ Similarly, the reader of *Finnegans Wake* seeks, in time, a stable spatial pattern that contains or

⁹⁸Margot Norris, *The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake: A Structuralist Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 120. Norris, drawing mostly upon Jacques Derrida's early and crucial essay, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," applies Derrida's terms and key points to *Finnegans Wake*. While she notes the resemblance, she does not adequately justify this procedure. The problems in her analysis arise because in most of her book she does not apply deconstructionist theory but instead draws upon psychoanalytic/mythological concepts and upon structuralism; at the end of her study, she tries to move from structuralism to post-structuralism but cannot complete the transition. Norris's confusion of method is apparent in her title, for she speaks of *Finnegans Wake* as "*Decentered*," thereby implying that she will use deconstructionist techniques, but at the same time promises "*A Structuralist Analysis*."

⁹⁹For example, in J. Hillis Miller, "Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure," *The Georgia Review*, 30 (1976), 5-31 and 330-48, passim.

transcends time. Textual justification of this point will be given in the third chapter; for now, my purpose is largely to show that conclusions comparable to those of theorists of deconstruction can be reached using a model of the reader superior to the model most often employed by the deconstructionists.

Deconstructionist critics, most notably Jacques Derrida, decenter the reader as well as the text. In his influential article, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," Derrida cites, as an example of the "radical formulation" of decentering, the "Freudian critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession."¹⁰⁰ When he later states that "I don't believe that there is any perception,"¹⁰¹ he denies a subject/object distinction; this has implications for the reader, for it suggests that there can be no separation of the reading subject and perceived text. The reader, consequently, cannot act as a center.

The reader is thought to have two types of response to a text. First, he or she experiences the emotional response of joy. In *After the New Criticism*, Frank Lentricchia argues that "this shift to affective rhetoric succeeds in generating a subject-object model (with psychologistic nuances) for the relationship of reader and text markedly similar to the one that operates in traditionalist thought."¹⁰² However, the deconstructionists never foolishly argue that the reader can have no physiological-psychological qualities; they instead deny that the reader can act as a stable ground. Roland Barthes's understanding of response is comparable to Derrida's, for, as Jonathan Culler points out,

. . . [Barthes] needs a way of speaking that takes account of the empirical fact that an individual can read and enjoy a text and that however stereotyped or generalized his subjectivity, certain experiences are best treated as his. The notion of the *body* permits Barthes to avoid the problem of the subject: appealing to "the given that separates my body from other bodies and appropriates suffering or pleasure to it," he emphasizes that he is not talking about subjectivity.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man*, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 250.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, p. 272.

¹⁰²Frank Lentricchia, *After the New Criticism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 185.

¹⁰³Jonathan Culler, *Barthes* (Great Britain: Fontana Paperbacks, 1983), p. 94.

Like Barthes's *jouissance*, the joy that Derrida perceives does not require a centered subject.

The deconstructionist critics also recognize a cognitive response, but, like an emotional reaction, it is essentially passive. J. Hillis Miller argues that the critic "repeats" a deconstruction that "the text performs on itself":¹⁰⁴

The deconstruction . . . annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the text has already annihilated that ground, knowingly or unknowingly. Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the structure of a text but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself.¹⁰⁵

Miller's point is that deconstruction is inherent in language because the linguistic system is based on difference (as Saussure pointed out). Miller minimizes the role of the reader in order to stress this characteristic of the linguistic system; the reader envisaged by Miller does not destroy the text but is instead subservient to language. Moreover, because the reader does not actively deconstruct the text, a subject/object distinction is not required and there is consequently no danger that the reader will be seen as a center.

Like the deconstructionist critic, the reader of *Finnegans Wake* pursues an origin in vain. But Joyce's reader is more active than the essentially passive critic envisaged by the deconstructionists. To allow for a more active reader is not necessarily to establish the reader as a center, for as long as the reader is in no way given priority, the pleasure of the text will not be limited. Deconstructionists decenter rather than ignore the structures that permit interpretation (Derrida argues that he is not "doing away with all boundaries" but instead shows how a text is "making them more complex, dividing and multiplying strokes and lines,"¹⁰⁶ so that plenitude becomes absence, the absence of a center); as a result, the reader may belong to a decentered structure and is active without closing a text. The deconstructionists have unnecessarily minimized the role of the reader: their own theory allows for a more active reader, such as the one required by Joyce's text.

¹⁰⁴Miller, p. 333.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 341.

¹⁰⁶Jacques Derrida, "LIVING ON: Border Lines," in Harold Bloom, et al., *Deconstruction and Criticism* (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1979), p. 84.

I have touched on deconstruction in part to show that the reader cannot be ignored no matter how Joyce's writings are analysed. A reader-oriented approach to questions of theme and technique in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* is, of course, only one of several possible methods, but the reader can never be entirely forgotten. I have considered a wide variety of approaches in this chapter in an attempt to show that each can help us to comprehend time and space in Joyce's work, but only if we understand the assumptions about the role of the reader that underlie them. The New Criticism that influenced Joseph Frank, Lessing's poetic theory, the formalism and proto-structuralism of the Russian Formalists, Frye's mythopoeic criticism, Hulme's imagism, and deconstruction: all contain assumptions about the reader which may strengthen (but more often weaken) the explicit foundations of these methods. Moreover, the wide range of the critical approaches that I have discussed reveals a fundamental cohesion in critical theory and the need for a cautious eclecticism when approaching a given problem of interpretation. Time and space in the later writings of James Joyce cannot be fully understood if we severely narrow our approach. But one method can assume dominance in response to the nature of the particular problem to be examined. Time and space, because they are so intricately connected with the time of reading and the reader's spatial imagination, are best approached through a reader theory, but one which is not detached from other critical concerns.

In the following chapters, I will examine sections of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. While this general discussion should be kept in mind and I hope to reveal a close relationship between theory and practice, a slight separation between this background and the following practical analysis is essential. This is the case for two, related reasons. First, the relationship between time and space that I will discuss should emerge from the text and not be overly influenced by extra-textual knowledge. We have seen the danger of such a bias in the criticism of Kumar and Klawitter, who apparently assume that Bergsonian ideas are important in Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* because of the historical importance of Bergson's thought. Secondly, my purpose in this chapter has been to examine the role of actual (but

slightly idealized) readers. Consequently, I intend to show the conclusions that emerge from the activity of reading and do not seek to distort the texts by imposing an unrealistic model of the reader. This theoretical discussion should illuminate, but not overpower, the relationship between time and space that emerges as we read.

B. *Ulysses*: Time Resolved with Space

In the first chapter, I promised to explore the relationship between time and space in *Ulysses* by closely analysing two chapters, "Proteus" and "Penelope," in which these dimensions are especially prominent. Time and space are not, for the most part, atypical in these chapters, but they acquire unusual importance and clarity because of the characters' failure to understand their interaction. Our superior comprehension arises through our awareness of form and of our own activity of reading: we discover spatial patterns during our temporal readings and come to recognize that time and space are productively fused on the level of form. The dimensions are clarified not by explicit statement but rather through our own active comprehension of the formal qualities of the chapters. I will look at "Proteus" and "Penelope" successively rather than together, for the latter is unique and problematic because the resolution of time and space is incomplete.

"Proteus" is a variety of stream of consciousness narrative in which Joyce presents the verbalized thoughts of his character. We learn about Stephen's sensations, but only indirectly, through his mediating mind. Because Stephen speaks to himself, Joyce avoids the difficult problem of whether and how duration can be represented in language: Stephen's states of consciousness are predominantly linguistic in character, so that there is no tension between duration, which Bergson argues is independent of space and spatial time, and the "space-logic" of language. While Bergson contends that the experience of duration is "inexpressible",¹⁰⁷ the artist is able to give it representation. Or, more precisely, Joyce does not represent duration by transforming it into language: the flow is already in linguistic form and is therefore not falsified by words.

Duration is not in tension with language, but it is brought into question by another kind of space-logic. For contrasting with Stephen's fluidity of mind are the formal patterns of the chapter, which are various in nature. Most striking are the frequent disruptions of the flow of Stephen's mind by the comments of an elusive, unidentified narrator. This abrupt change

¹⁰⁷Bergson, p. 129.

of voice can be described by Joseph Frank's term "spatial form," for the narrator upsets the temporal flow of the chapter and cannot be explained away as part of the causal-chronological story that serves as the basis of plot. We must, consequently, find a more complex relationship between the two voices that is, figuratively speaking, spatial. Another spatial element of the chapter is its affinity with Homer's *Odyssey*, which is only implicit but nonetheless constitutes a crucial juxtaposition of past and present. As we will see, Joseph Frank's description of the spatial quality of myth is relevant to this aspect of "Proteus": "Past and present," Frank argues, "are apprehended spatially, locked in a timeless unity that, while it may accentuate surface differences, eliminates any feeling of sequence by the very act of juxtaposition."¹⁰⁸ These patterns in "Proteus" are undeniably subtle and, consequently, are sometimes overlooked. Wolfgang Iser makes this error when he argues in "Patterns of Communication in Joyce's *Ulysses*" that "Stephen's monologue has no consistent pattern."¹⁰⁹ Iser does recognize the Homeric parallel and, rightfully, questions its usefulness in our attempts to make sense of "Proteus," but he fails to perceive important shapes that are inherent in the chapter, particularly Stephen's shift from a space-dominated mind to one preoccupied by the flux of time. The tension between duration and the spatial qualities of form have a counterpart in this dichotomy in Stephen's mind.

At the beginning of "Proteus," Stephen desires to escape the temporal world by discovering paradigms that transcend time. He is inclined to see experience spatially, to group similar instances together in an attempt to find their informing pattern. By doing so, he hopes to overcome time: both the present moment, which confines Stephen to the physical world, and the constraining flow of history can be transcended, he believes, through the discovery of archetypes or Platonic ideals. When Stephen closes his eyes as he walks along the shore, he tries to reject the temporal, objective world and to establish the primacy of the patterning mind. In *Ulysses on the Liffey*, Richard Ellmann argues that Stephen "makes the experiment. . . of closing off the external world of space by shutting his eyes and living

¹⁰⁸Frank, 1963, p. 59.

¹⁰⁹Iser, p. 208.

altogether in the internal world of time,"¹¹⁰ but the opposite is more accurate. Stephen does not retreat into the internal world "of time" but rather into an internal world that can, through the power of the mind to discover spatial archetypes, escape time. The physical world is, of course, spatial, but its space is inextricably intertwined with the flow of time: as Stephen says, there is "A very short space of time through very short times of space."¹¹¹ It is important to notice that space does not predominate in the physical world, nor define it, as Ellmann suggests.¹¹² But space can dominate in the mind. David Lodge recognizes this quality of Stephen's mind, although he calls it "metaphoric" rather than spatial. In *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature*, Lodge makes a distinction between metaphor, which is a vertical relation based on similarity, and metonymy, which is horizontal or contiguous, and he applies it to the workings of Stephen's mind:

Stephen's consciousness is essentially metaphoric—he is constantly transforming what he perceives, the world of contiguities, of *nacheinander* (one thing after another) and *nebeneinander* (one thing next to another) into other images and concepts drawn from his reading, on the basis of

¹¹⁰Richard Ellmann, *Ulysses on the Liffey* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 23.

¹¹¹James Joyce, *Ulysses* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 37. Subsequent page references will be given in the text after each quotation.

I have chosen to cite the 1961 Random House edition because, as Hugh Kenner observes, it "has become, *faut de mieux*, the standard text for critical citations" (*Ulysses* [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980], p. 174), and it is, for instance, the edition cited in the *James Joyce Quarterly*. While I have not given page references to the 1937 Boney Head edition, I have compared this version with the 1961 edition and have found that all quotations from *Ulysses* which appear in this chapter are identical in the two editions.

¹¹²Like Richard Ellmann, Joseph Kestner sees the external world as predominantly spatial. In *The Spatiality of the Novel*, Kestner quotes the first two paragraphs of "Proteus" and concludes that,

Although the novel is a temporal art form, the opening sentence is about the timeless world of the visible and the unavoidable presence of its modality. In other words, before all there is space, a pure Einsteinian relativity. All first knowledge is spatial. . . . In contrast to the first paragraph, which concerns the spatial, in the second Joyce evokes the world of the temporal: "Stephen closed his eyes to hear." Since by closing his eyes Stephen both sees and hears, it is evident one must pass through the spatial for the temporal to operate, and the temporal is not attained except by the spatial. . . . Because of this space-time relativity, the temporal, the *nacheinander* or the successive, is less an object of fear than the inescapable spatial, the *nebeneinander* (*The Spatiality of the Novel* [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978], p. 140.)

It is not clear how this primacy of space constitutes "a pure Einsteinian relativity," nor is Kestner's division between the first two paragraphs convincing. Most importantly, Kestner fails to recognize the spatial qualities of Stephen's thoughts.

some perceived similarity or ironic contrast. The more insistently he does this—the more substitutions he makes—the weaker becomes the chain of combination and the more difficult it is for the reader to follow the discourse. Thus "Proteus," in which Stephen is actively pondering the metaphorical processes of the mind (and stepping up their power artificially by closing his eyes and shutting off one sensory channel to the world of contiguities) is the most "difficult" of the first three episodes.¹¹³

Lodge's point is strong, although it is preferable to replace the terms "similarity" and "contiguity" with "spatial" and "temporal." While we can describe both similarity and contiguity as spatial, similarity shows a stronger, more figurative spatial relation than contiguity, which can be seen as a temporal succession within a spatial field. By referring to Stephen's process of mind as spatial rather than as metaphoric, we can minimize a problem that Lodge encounters. It is not possible to entirely separate metaphor and metonymy, and often they are almost identical, for an attribute that stands for something (metonymy) also shows a relation of similarity to it (metaphor), and the reverse is true as well.¹¹⁴ Time and space are also intertwined, but their relation is clearer than that between metaphor and metonymy, and, in addition, they can be more readily understood as opposite poles, which Lodge hopes to achieve with his differentiation between metaphor and metonymy. Most importantly, by using the terms "time" and "space" we can more fully relate Stephen's process of mind to the other matters in the chapter, and we can go beyond the relatively narrow concept of metaphorical similarity to perceive a wider variety of spatial arrangements.

This spatial quality of mind is the means by which Stephen can assert his own importance in opposition to the external, temporal world. When Stephen places himself in a paradigm, he denies his individuality but at the same time strengthens his ego. His declaration that "Wombed in sin darkness I was too, made not begotten" (*U* 38) implies that he belongs to a paradigm which includes Christ; compensating for his denial of heritage (or historical time) and individuality (uniqueness at a point in time) is his role as a Christ figure. This paradigm is

¹¹³David Lodge, *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 140.

¹¹⁴Lodge's attempt to forestall this charge (pp. 76-7) by drawing upon the arguments of linguist Roman Jakobson is theoretically acceptable but is weak when it comes to the practice of literary criticism. In other words, Lodge too readily broadens the application of the terms "metaphor" and "metonymy."

spatial in the same way that myth is spatial: past and present are juxtaposed so that causal and chronological connections are absent or unimportant, and the paradigm is formed because of the mutual reference of two juxtaposed instances, Christ and Stephen.

Stephen seems to realize that he cannot transcend time, although he resists this knowledge and its implications. When he opens his eyes after trying to withdraw into the spatial mind, he recognizes that the external world was "There all the time without you: and ever shall be, world without end" (*U* 37). According to Richard Ellmann, Stephen's recognition that the world continued while he shut his eyes shows that Stephen accepts and prefers Aristotle's argument that form and matter, and time and space, are fused:

Stephen tests Aristotle's view of space and time by shutting his eyes. Will the world empty if the perceiver blots it out? If so, the subjectivists and the idealists are right. But he opens his eyes again and confirms Aristotle, though he humorously summons a doxological rather than a peripatetic phrase for the purpose: "See now. There all the time without you: and ever shall be, world without end."¹¹⁵

But Stephen's desire is for transcendence, and he is not easily defeated by the continuing presence of the material world. The "subjectivists and idealists," whom we can describe as spatialists (rejecting Ellmann's insistence that Stephen retreats into the temporal world of the mind) remain more congenial to Stephen. For Stephen seems to think that if the physical world that persists forever is the world of God, then Stephen can escape time by becoming a Christ figure. With characteristic arrogance, he transforms time into space by finding within the flow of experience archetypes that touch the temporal world but also transcend it. He sees himself as the manifestation of an archetype, which means that he is the expression of the timeless in time. But Stephen does not value this manifestation as a fusion of time and space; he instead emphasizes the possibility that this raises of overcoming time. For Stephen is seeking origins, ones which explain the puzzling flow of time and which are stable, standing outside or before time. These origins are of various kinds, including his own origin ("One of my sisters lugged me squealing into life. Creation from nothing" [*U* 37]) and the origin of humanity ("The world was made in the image of God" [*U* 38]). These different types are manifestations of the concept of

¹¹⁵Ellma.

origin, which again shows that Stephen's mind tends to abstract spatial paradigms. Only is Stephen's process of mind metaphorical, as David Lodge argues,¹¹⁶ but Stephen also uses this method in an attempt to find spatial origins. These patterns emerge from time, but Stephen desires to overcome time through them: he is aware of the interrelationship between time and space but nonetheless seeks the unattainable goal of transcending time through space.

Stephen must close his eyes when he tries to escape time because perception belongs to the physical, temporal world rather than to the spatial world of his mind. Perception occurs at a particular moment and place, for both the observing subject and observed object are defined in terms of these two coordinates of time and space. Subject and object, in other words, are relative, and this intertwining hinders Stephen's attempts to stand back and perceive a timeless pattern. Consequently, purely spatial patterns are discovered only when the mind separates itself from the external world, as is the case when Stephen closes his eyes and becomes self-absorbed. The link between subject and object, which exists in time, must be broken before spatial patterns can be apprehended.

Like Stephen, the reader of "Proteus" attempts to discover spatial patterns that transcend the confusing flow of time. As we read, we try to stand back from the text and find a spatial order that makes sense of the stream of Stephen's consciousness. Joyce hinders our ability to do so because we, like Stephen, are enmeshed in the complex relationship between subject and object. While Stephen closes his eyes, immersing himself in his mind at the expense of external objects in order to acquire a spatial apprehension, the reader has a more difficult task and sees as simplistic Stephen's attempt to shut out the temporal world in favour of his spatial mind. Joyce's narrative technique makes us question our own relationship as subjects to the text as object, with the result that our ability to give spatial order to the confusing temporal flow of the chapter is undermined and we become aware of the tension between time and space.

¹¹⁶Lodge discusses the metaphorical processes evident on pages 34-5 of *Ulysses* in *The Modes of Modern Writing*, pp. 140-1.

The third person narration that frequently interrupts Stephen's thoughts has unsettling consequences for the reader and hinders the perception of spatial pattern. The narrator's comments are not clearly distinguished from Stephen's thoughts, and this confusion of voice enmeshes readers in the text and upsets their own relation as subjects to the text as object. The narrator's voice is not fully distinct, for the content of his statements could easily have been presented by Stephen and, moreover, the observations of the narrator are often closely related to the thoughts of Stephen that precede and follow. This lack of differentiation of content is accompanied by an ambiguous use of pronouns that often makes it impossible to determine at what point the voices switch. When, for example, the statement that "You are walking through it howsomever" (*U* 37) follows an obvious intrusion by the narrator, it is not immediately clear whether the narrator is addressing the reader or Stephen or whether Stephen's voice has returned and he is speaking of himself as object. We may eventually choose one possibility, but not before we confuse the relationship between the narrator and Stephen, his object, and wonder about our own position with regard to the text. The distinction between voices is again unclear when we are told that,

The grainy sand had gone from under his feet. His boots trod again a damp crackling mast, razorshells, squeaking pebbles, that on the unnumbered pebbles beats, wood sieved by the shipworm, lost Armada. Unwholesome sandflats waited to suck his treading soles, breathing upward sewage breath. He coasted them, walking warily. A porter-bottle stood up, stogged to its waist, in the cakey sand dough. A sentinel: isle of dreadful thirst. Broken hoops on the shore; at the land a maze of dark cunning nets; farther away chalkscrawled backdoors and on the higher beach a dryingline with two crucified shirts. Ringsend: wigwams of brown steersmen and master mariners. Human shells.

He halted. I have passed the way to aunt Sara's. Am I not going there? Seems not. No-one about. He turned northeast and crossed the firmer sand towards the Pigeonhouse (*U* 40-1).

Even in the first sentence, which is obviously spoken in the third person, elements of the first person point of view are evident: the "grainy sand" moves, rather than Stephen, which establishes Stephen as the center of perception; the past tense of "had gone" suggests that our concern at the moment is primarily with Stephen, and the absence of any indication of where the sand has gone again shows that Stephen is the focus of attention. The next sentence is also

in the narrator's voice, but the allusion to Shakespeare ties the statement to Stephen's similarly allusive thought five lines earlier¹¹⁷ and thus blurs the distinction between the observing narrator and Stephen. By the end of the paragraph, Stephen's voice has replaced that of the narrator, but it is impossible to determine at what point this switch occurs because the landscape is described from Stephen's point of view. (For instance, Stephen imposes himself upon his surroundings when he gives the porter-bottle the human attribute of a "waist," and the "crucified shirts" recall his perception of himself as a Christ figure.) There are numerous other examples in the chapter of this confusion of voice, a surprising number of which concern Stephen's boots and feet. This is because Stephen is almost as detached from his feet as the reader and narrator are, so that the reader cannot be certain who is looking down. The reader's relationship to the text is even more directly brought into question when Stephen asks, "Who ever anywhere will read these written words?" (*U* 48). While Stephen seems to refer to the note that he has just written, the question is, of course, applicable to the reader and makes uncertain our position with regard to the text. The unstable relationship between the observing narrator and his object, Stephen, resembles and in fact causes our own unclear relationship to the text as object.

The intrusions of the narrator both prompt us to stand back from the text and hamper our ability to discover spatial patterns. The perception of pattern is facilitated by the change in voice, use of the past tense, and the objective, pictorial description, all of which serve to distance us from Stephen's thought. But voices are blurred, action is not completed in the past (that is to say, the past perfect is rarely used), and the pictorial is related to Stephen's imagery and ideas. Our distance helps us to understand the theme of subject and object, but Joyce's technique results in the extension of this theme to the reader's relation to the text as object; the recognition of theme does not lift the reader out of the confusion of the text, providing a spatial apprehension, but instead sinks us further into the moment of reading and constitutes a

¹¹⁷Weldon Thornton notes that "the unnumbered pebbles beats" alludes to *King Lear* IV vi 20 (*Allusions in Ulysses: An Annotated List* [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961], p. 50); this recalls Stephen's allusion to *Hamlet* III ii 367 when he says "Ay, very like a whale."

destabilizing reflexivity. This self-consciousness does not itself become an order-giving theme, for it hinders our attempt to grasp other themes rather than replaces these themes and becomes dominant. Form does not become content, meaning that form does not contain or determine the primary themes, although form does have a content that echoes or parallels Stephen's ideas: because of Joyce's technique, the reader encounters difficulties with the relationship of subject and object which are comparable to the problems that Stephen tries to overcome.

Joyce challenges us to separate the narrator's voice from Stephen's, and, by doing so, we come to understand the nature of consciousness. Stephen's voice is related to but ultimately distinct from the voice of the narrator, just as his mind is inseparable from the surroundings which make impressions upon it yet is a distinct entity in itself. On the one hand, Stephen's mind cannot be isolated from the physical and literary contexts into which it flows; on the other hand, however, this fluidity reinforces the idea of duration, of an independent mind that is dominated by its own internal flow. (It is interesting to note that this duration flows into its literary as well as its physical context, which once again shows that Stephen's linguistic duration is not in tension with literary representation. This is an important point, and I will return to it when I discuss "Penelope.") Our task as readers is to recognize that consciousness is an inseparable flow that also touches upon the external world without suffering dissolution. The perceiving subject is distinct yet in dependent relation to its surroundings, which is a dependence that Stephen wishes to overcome in favour of the spatial world of the mind.

Like Stephen, the reader seeks a spatial order, but we use space in an attempt to clarify rather than overcome the subject-object link. Our own muddled relation to the text as object becomes clear as we slowly discover spatial patterns within the flow of the text. This relation to the text is stabilized because our understanding of spatial form is not shared by the characters, with the result that we are able to separate our own consciousnesses from those of Stephen and the narrator. Form and consciousness are, then, inseparably intertwined: the confusion of voices blurs distinctions of consciousnesses, and this distinction becomes clarified as we recognize that we, as readers, can see formal properties that are not recognized by the

characters. It is important that we now recall the definition of form and content that was emphasized in the previous chapter. Drawing upon the comments of Peter Rabinowitz, I argued that form in *Ulysses* is that which the reader alone perceives, while content is also seen by the characters. As we come to understand the spatial form of "Proteus," we clarify our confused relation to the text and are able to distinguish consciousnesses (including our own) from the objective world and from one another.

The spatial pattern that most enables us to stand back from the confusing fluidity of the text is, specifically, Stephen's movement from a spatial to a temporal perspective. Of course, the blurring of voices in the text calls attention to itself because it is puzzling, and we consequently see the spatial form of voice, but this pattern is secondary. More important and helpful is Stephen's abrupt change, which concerns the relationship between time and space that is the essence of the matter under consideration. Stephen's change occurs when he walks to the edge of the sea, which is a symbol of transcendence for him (he wonders whether he is walking "into eternity" along the strand [U 37], and the "harping" air at the sea's edge [U 44] reminds the reader of angels). However, he turns back toward the world of time, for when he reaches the sea's edge he has no choice but to recognize that he belongs to the temporal world of the shore rather than to the spatial sea. This opposition between time and space is evident in the language used to describe the moment. The eternal is presented symbolically (the sea; "harping" air or angels), and the unity of impact and the fusion of the tangible and insubstantial in the symbol is suggestive of the wholeness of transcendence. But the pictorial symbol is in tension with the concrete and temporal: the air is said to be "harping in wild nerves, wind of wild air of seeds of brightness" (U 44), which is almost incomprehensible and suggests that syntax and the tangible have hampered the symbolic. The temporal qualities of language are also prominent when Stephen turns: the *s* sounds are drawn out in time and the near repetition ("Turn back"; "Turning") suggests both the forward movement of rhythm (and time) and Stephen's indecision or stasis. That the latter word, "Turning," is a present participle or continuous present also serves to emphasize Stephen's necessary recognition of

time. In short, the pictorial, unified symbol cannot withstand the pressure of time, just as Stephen gives in and turns. It is important to notice that this turn is preceded and followed by the voice of the third person narrator, whose intrusions both increase our awareness of the time of action and narration and give us the distance needed to perceive the spatial shape of the chapter. This shape that we find is Stephen's abrupt change as he emphasizes external time rather than internal space.

After Stephen turns, he shows greater concern for the objective world and more awareness of time. In the three or four pages that follow his turn, he is more observant of the scene that surrounds him and is, at times, almost a passive recorder of impressions. Rather than retreat into the subjective, spatial mind, he turns to the objective, temporal world. In *Time and the Novel*, Margaret Church argues that,

Stephen rejects Protean change that stands in direct opposition to Victorian cyclical recurrence. . . . Turning from the sea, leaving the soggy sandflats, Stephen symbolically overcomes Proteus and Protean flux as he reaches firmer sand.¹¹⁸

While she is correct to say that the flux is "represented by the sea,"¹¹⁹ she fails to recognize that earlier in "Proteus" the sea is a symbol of the transcendence of time: the sea is at first associated with "eternity" (*U* 37), but after Stephen's turn it is primarily temporal, and he speaks of the "flood" which is "following me. I can watch it flow past from here" (*U* 44). Once the symbolic meaning of the sea changes from transcendence to flux, Stephen can find no escape from the transformations of time and instead observes the flux and decay that characterizes the shore:

A bloated carcass of a dog lay lolled on bladderwrack. Before him the gunwale of a boat sunk in sand. *Un coche ensablé*, Louis Veuillot called Gautier's prose. These heavy sands are language tide and wind have silted here. And there, the stoneheaps of dead builders, a warren of weasel rats. . . . (*U* 44)

Not only does Stephen fail to find the "firmer sand" that Church speaks of, but he also does not even seek this ground: Stephen abandons an extreme view of transcendence and accepts an

¹¹⁸Margaret Church, *Time and Reality: Studies in Contemporary Fiction* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949), p. 48.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

extreme view of flux that can, like the former, accommodate his egotism. If "seachange" (*U* 50) is pervasive, then there can be only flux, not continuity; Stephen will decay and become "toothless," but so will all authority and everything that threatens him: he will be "Toothless Kinch, the superman" (*U* 50). As a result, Stephen accepts the flux and when, for instance, he loses his handkerchief, he does not bemoan its absence and change over time but instead concludes that he had "Better buy [another] one" (*U* 50). Stephen wants either pure transcendence, in which the mind's spatial world is reality, or a pure flux that leaves room for his ego.¹²⁰

While Stephen observes an orderly process of change over time in the latter part of "Proteus," he cannot find within it a spatial pattern that gives this transformation purpose. When he looks at the life in the sea, he thinks that,

God becomes man becomes fish becomes barnacle goose becomes
featherbed mountain. Dead breaths I living breathe, tread dead dust,
devour a urinous offal from all dead (*U* 50).

"Seachange" (*U* 50) is not transcendence, a transformation into "something rich and strange" (*The Tempest* I ii 401), but is instead pointless decay. When Stephen says that "All days make their end" (*U* 50), his emphasis is upon the "end"; rather than constitute a meaningful pattern, the repetition of days merely brings recurrent expiration. But while Stephen cannot discover the pattern that he seeks, the reader is aware of a shape within the flux of the chapter. For words and images that are found at the beginning of "Proteus" reappear at the end in changed form: the sea, which was a symbol of eternity at first, comes to represent flux, and words such as "snot" (*U* 37, 51) and "*nebeneinander*" (*U* 37, 49) re-emerge in a new context. These words

¹²⁰In "Time, Sexuality and Identity in Joyce's *Ulysses*," Sheldon Brivic argues that Stephen "rejects time" (*James Joyce Quarterly*, 7 [1969], 30-51, p. 31), but his reasons also show how Stephen can embrace time. Brivic contends that Stephen denies the body and the physical world in favour of the mind, and this necessarily involves a denial of time, for "Time is a function of matter" in *Ulysses* (p. 30). While Brivic's association of time and matter is insightful and well supported (although his discussion is marred because the concept of space, including the space of form, is noticeably absent), his understanding of Stephen is questionable because he does not specify the quality of time/matter which repels Stephen. It is not the physical decay of matter as such which bothers him but only the implications of this decay for the mind; consequently, Stephen can accept change and time (as well as the body and the physical world) when they seem to give his mind superiority and freedom.

may seem, initially, to be merely in flux, but they make us recall Stephen's earlier attempt to retreat into spatial thought. "Snot" is a particularly clear example of this: at the beginning of "Proteus," Stephen describes the sea as "Snotgreen" in an attempt to impose himself upon the objective world; at the end of the chapter, when he "laid the dry snot picked from his nostril on a ledge of rock," the "dry" snot becomes a symbol of his own flux and decay and of the subordination of his spatial imagination to the world of time. As a result of such transformations, we can more clearly perceive Stephen's change from a predominantly spatial mind to temporal thought, and the spatial shape of the chapter is emphasized as we conclude our temporal reading.

The final paragraph of "Proteus" summarizes the chapter because it presents Stephen's two extremes. Looking over his shoulder, he sees a ship: "Moving through the air high spars of a threemaster, her sails brailed up on the crosstrees, homing, upstream, silently moving, a silent ship" (*U* 51). On the one hand, the ship is a symbol of transcendence: the three masts or crosses represent the crucifixion and Stephen's perception of himself as a Christ figure. On the other hand, the ship is passing through time: it is "homing, upstream, silently moving." The first is spatial or pictorial, and the second is marked by trochaic feet and the repetition of *s* sounds, which emphasize the ship's movement because they are temporal. The final paragraph thus summarizes the tension in the chapter between time and space and largely resolves it. As Richard Ellmann argues, the ship "seals the marriage of form and matter, of body and soul, of space and time."¹²¹ Ellmann sees this fusion as part of a larger shape in *Ulysses*—"I shall propose that in every group of three chapters the first defers to space, the second has time in the ascendant, and the third blends (or expunges) the two"¹²²—although it is a pattern which is very reductive. He applies his generalization to the first triad to reach the conclusion that "If the corruptions of space dominate the first episode, and the corruptions of time the second, the third chapter is Stephen's attempt to sort out corrupt and incorrupt."¹²³ But while Ellmann is

¹²¹Ellmann, p. 26.

¹²²*Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p. 23.

correct to say that time and space are blended (although, as was noted earlier, he sees time as internal and space as external to Stephen rather than the reverse), he is incorrect to suggest that this resolution is perceived by Stephen. At the end of the chapter, Stephen "turned his face over a shoulder, *re regardant*" (*U* 51), and this "backward glance," Ellmann argues,

is a parting denial of the subjectivist universe which briefly attracted him at the beginning of the episode, as well as of the universe of moribund gloom which has filled his thoughts. Since Stephen is an artist, Joyce implies that art is not self-isolation, that it depends upon recognition of other existences as well as one's own.¹²⁴

Ellmann is too positive, as he is throughout *Ulysses on the Liffey*, when he suggests that the resolutions at the end of the chapter are perceived and even experienced by Stephen rather than commented upon him. Stephen's parting glance is too brief and comes too abruptly after his concern with flux to resolve the tension between time and space that pervades the chapter. Ellmann does not recognize that concerns of time and space inform "Proteus": while he sees the division of the chapter into two halves, arguing that "The first part deals with what is primal, the second with what is terminal,"¹²⁵ he does not see that the "primal" is a spatial origin, outside time, and that Stephen's concern for flux, which leads to decay or the "terminal," is opposed to this spatial goal. The tensions of time and space are not resolved when Stephen opens his eyes near the beginning of the chapter to find that matter has continually existed, but they instead persist throughout. Stephen does not achieve nor even desire a resolution of time and space, because such a merging would place the pressures of history and ancestry upon him. The history which Stephen fears, which in "Nestor" he calls "a nightmare from which I am trying to awake" (*U* 34), is not, strictly speaking, temporal but is ordered time, that is to say, time with an inherent spatial pattern. When time is purposeful, meaning that it has a spatial shape or design, the past is a burden for Stephen; when there is a continuous present, either the continuous present of the archetype or its opposite, the continuous present of the moment in flux, he is free to assert his own importance as Christ or as toothless Superman. It is a mistake to assume that the resolution of time and spatial pattern

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 23.

is as desirable to Stephen as it is to us.

To say that Stephen recognizes or experiences the reconciliation of time and space is also to mistake form for content. The resolution belongs to the realm of art or technique that is perceived by the reader alone and not by the characters; it does not occur on the level of content. But Stephen should perceive this resolution, and this is where problems of interpretation begin. For here the distinction between form and content becomes unclear: while the resolution between time and space occurs on the level of form, it can and ought to also be found on the level of content and be perceived by Stephen. This is, of course, what makes the resolution ironic; we see something that Stephen should recognize but fails, in his arrogance, to perceive. It is tempting, then, but unsound to suggest that the resolution on the level of form also occurs on the level of content and is recognized by Stephen. This potentially confusing relationship between form and content creates problems for Peter Rabinowitz's definition of the terms: Rabinowitz argues, we noted, that form is "perceived by the authorial . . . audience" alone;¹²⁶ but what do we do with a pattern that is perceived by the authorial audience and ought to be (but is not) recognized by the characters? In other words, his distinction cannot deal with knowledge that also belongs to the level of content but is unperceived there. While this hampers Rabinowitz's definition, it advances our purpose. For the close relationship between form and content shows that form is integral, that it arises out of content and is not imposed. The pattern that we see, in which Stephen's spatial point of view is followed by an abrupt turn, then a temporal perspective, and finally by a summarizing image, emerges from the content of the chapter. Form, which is necessarily a pattern and which is, consequently, spatial, arises from the temporal flow of content: form and content, like time and space, are merged. Form is distinct from content to the extent that it comments ironically upon content, but it is integral rather than imposed.

This immanence of form in content has counterparts in other aspects of the chapter which also demonstrate a fusion of spatial pattern and temporal movement. Sometimes, there

¹²⁶Rabinowitz, p. 252.

is a fusion that Stephen can see and even discuss, which intensifies the irony of the chapter because it shows that he should be able to perceive this fusion in matters which more closely touch upon his own life and sense of self. Near the beginning of the chapter, for instance, Stephen discusses the temporal and spatial qualities of poetry:

*Won't you come to Sandymount,
Madeline the mare?*

Rhythm begins, you see. I hear. A catalectic tetrameter of iambs
marching. No, agallop: *deline the mare* (U 37).

"Rhythm begins, you see": the sounds that follow one another in time reinforce the spatial or imagistic content of a line of poetry. Temporal sound does not create sense but instead echoes sense or parallels it: in Stephen's example, "*Madeline the mare*," the rhythm is "agallop" and thus reinforces the lexical content of the line. A similar relationship of verbal form and content is evident in the onomatopoeia of "crush crackling wrack" (U 37), in which sound is imitative rather than creates new content; sound is not an autonomous system that determines relations of content (as it is, by contrast, in *Finnegans Wake*), for the formal qualities of language are inextricably attached to the particular content of an expression. The temporal and spatial qualities of language are intertwined, but it is a fusion that Stephen will not apply to his own life.

Stephen sometimes attempts to reconcile the past with the present and thereby find spatial patterns that are immanent in the flow of time, but he is not successful when he is concerned with his own past. Rather than place himself in a paradigm, Stephen occasionally tries to find a continuity of self: he perceives neither archetypes nor flux but instead tries to fuse the spatial and the temporal. The technique that Stephen uses is self-mockery, in which he ridicules his past selves and can consequently begin to accept them, seeing an evolution of personality rather than stasis or flux. Stephen ridicules his past ideas (his "deeply deep" epiphanies, for example), but he does not entirely reject them; mockery leads to a reluctant and incomplete forgiveness and he concludes that "I was young" (U 40). Stephen goes on to declare that "When one reads these strange pages of one long gone one feels that one is at one with one who once. . ." (U 40): he is "at one" because he can first see himself as another and

ridicule himself, just as he seems to laugh at the twisted style of the sentence. But the convolutions of syntax also show that Stephen is uncomfortable with this view of himself that merges time and space to create an evolving identity. Moreover, the abundance of "one" in the sentence implies a self-importance and solipsism that is in tension with mockery: Stephen tries to use self-mockery as a way of increasing his egotism, and because of this contradiction he is necessarily unsuccessful. He cannot resolve past and present but instead prefers to disown his past selves and consequently live in the flux of the moment, or else he seeks to become a stable, exalted "one" who transcends time.

Because Stephen tries to build his ego through self-mockery, he shows a seeming but false humility, with the result that his character is easily misinterpreted. This difficulty is compounded because the narrator gives us no clues as to how we should respond to this egotism, for he seems to reinforce it or, conversely, seems unable to disrupt Stephen's emphasis upon himself. In addition, the confusion of subject and object prevents any sustained sympathy or alienation that would lead the reader in one direction or the other. These uncertainties can be clarified through an attention to time and space on the level of form and content, as we have seen in our discussion of the chapter's irony. We can also assess Stephen's failure to resolve past and present in his own life by contrasting his successful fusion of time and space when he brings the past into the present by modifying ancient models. While Stephen's self-ridicule does not create this merging, his mockery of the archetypal figure of Aristotle, for instance, successfully fuses time and space: when Stephen ridicules Aristotle ("Bald he was and a millionaire" [U 37]), Aristotle is incorporated into the temporal world because he is subject to revision in the present. Time and spatial pattern are here successfully resolved.

This fusion of time and space characterizes form in "Proteus" and is particularly evident in the archetypes of the chapter. Wolfgang Iser presents a contrasting view when he emphasizes the particular quality of an archetype at the expense of its paradigmatic nature. Seen from a perspective concerned with time and space, this means that Iser emphasizes the

temporal side of archetypes. Speaking in general of "the archetype," but in the context of a discussion of Homeric parallels, he argues that "The history of its [the archetype's] manifestations takes precedence over its mythical nature."¹²⁷ He later contends that,

one must bear in mind the fact that the "archetype" does not exist in itself, but must be brought into existence by a realization. It is, so to speak, an empty frame that requires the concrete powers of style and language to provide the picture. The archetype, then, can take on as many forms as there are forms of presentation, so that we cannot really say even that the homecoming in the *Odyssey* is *the* archetype. It is only one rendering among many possible renderings, and, in the light of all the variations apparent in the novel, it becomes retrospectively as restricted as they are. The archetype as such remains a structured blank that bears all potential realizations within itself and provides the basis for all its own subsequent variations.¹²⁸

But if, as Iser suggests, *Ulysses* shows us the limitations of archetypes (and, he argues, the limitations of any attempt to constrain the plurality of meaning through spatial pattern), from what do these archetypes derive their authority and their value as a "frame"? Why, in other words, are they not simply mocked or parodied as part of Bergson's world of unreality? The archetypes can be a framework because these spatial patterns call into question the flow of time as much as time undermines the spatial patterns. This tension between time and space is resolved on the level of form, in which spatial patterns are immanent in time, and, most importantly, it is a balanced resolution. But by emphasizing the particular or temporal, Iser can leave the text as open as possible and consequently illustrate his reader theory, which requires substantial freedom for the reader.¹²⁹

That Iser's reader theory distorts our understanding of time and space is most evident when we focus our attention on the Homeric parallels. Iser begins his discussion of this correspondence by rejecting two common views of it: he objects to the conclusion that the parallels reveal "the permanent nature of basic human conduct"¹³⁰ and, secondly, he argues against the view that the parallels reveal a decline from past to present and that events in

¹²⁷Iser, p. 201.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹²⁹It is also interesting to note, once again, Iser's crucial pictorial metaphors. He tries to diminish archetypes by seeing them as the "frame" rather than as part of the "picture," but he cannot entirely dismiss them.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 196.

Dublin are an inferior copy of an ideal. Iser calls them "the permanence and analogy theories,"¹³¹ but we can as easily say that the first is spatial, for past and present are juxtaposed without regard for chronology and causation, and the second is temporal, emphasizing historical decline. Rather than accept a median view, Iser rejects them both. He instead argues that the parallels serve to emphasize particularity, not continuity or decline, and that "the similarities serve in fact to point up the differences;" for instance, Iser believes that the parallel between Leopold Bloom and Ulysses illustrates Bloom's "uniqueness" and "the enormous variety of possibilities of human conduct," not his similarity to Ulysses or decline from an ideal: the individuality and humanity of Bloom are revealed in opposition to "the ideality of Ulysses."¹³² Iser goes on to argue that Ulysses and the *Odyssey* are not, in fact, ideals, but are the realization of an archetype and show the particularity that he values in Bloom, for he contends that "Ulysses's reactions" merely "assume a paradigmatic character, and the homecoming, for instance, is transformed into an 'ideal' homecoming."¹³³ Iser's argument becomes problematic, and perhaps contradictory, because he fails to recognize that Ulysses and Bloom are both types and are, at the same time, particular or unique. In other words, the timeless and the temporal are fused. But Iser insists upon the importance of human "variety" at the total expense of ideals, for particularity increases the text's indeterminacy and the reader's freedom.

The Homeric parallels constrain the text more than Iser will allow, although they do not severely close its meaning. For the correspondence between Joyce's writing and the *Odyssey* demonstrates the fusion of time and space and the immanence of form in content that is the key to "Proteus." The *Odyssey* is an informing pattern, one which both reveals timeless similarities because of the spatial juxtaposition of past and present and which exposes historical decline from an ideal. One or the other side of this balance is often emphasized in contemporary criticism, but this dichotomy merely shows that they are of equal importance and

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 229-30.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

are better seen in fusion. Moreover, these two sides of the balance should not be considered opposites, for comparable techniques contribute to the timelessness and the temporality of the correspondence. First, our sense of the spatial juxtaposition of past and present is increased because the *Odyssey* is revised and thereby brought into the present. Just as Aristotle is brought into the present when Stephen mocks him, the *Odyssey* seems to be alive because it has been modified. Past and present are thus juxtaposed in a timeless present, which is spatial because causality and chronology are irrelevant. But this revision of the *Odyssey* sometimes reaches the extreme of parody, and an awareness of time consequently intrudes and is not entirely separable from the spatial quality of the correspondence. Moreover, this revision and parody of the *Odyssey* mean that the pattern which it gives is intertwined with or immanent in the material that is shaped. This immediacy, though, reduces the capacity of the *Odyssey* to provide an authoritative design, and thus the pattern comes to be more in need of explanation than something which explains. While revision of the *Odyssey* increases our sense that it is a pure, original form, the immediacy that this change gives hampers its capacity to shape and clarify the action in Dublin. We are aware that it provides a spatial pattern, but because it is fused with time, this pattern is unable to adequately order the chapter. This duality creates uncertainty in the chapter, although it is not the indeterminacy arising from particularity that Iser discusses. While meaning is considerably open, our understanding of the Homeric parallels is nonetheless constrained because of the relationship between time and space, one which belongs to a much larger pattern of meaning in "Proteus."

It becomes clear by the end of "Proteus" that the chapter has a unique form. Despite its numerous allusions, the chapter is centripetal because of the strength of Stephen's consciousness and the patterns of the chapter as a whole. The pattern that finally emerges grows out of a temporal reading and is not imposed; it is founded upon our understanding of Stephen's failure to see a relationship between paradigmatic patterns and complete flux. When we acquire a sense of the shape of the chapter, we also begin to understand the relationship of "Proteus" to *Ulysses* as a whole. The last paragraph draws the chapter together and ends with

a repetition of "silent" that seems, in part, to refer to the silence or ending of the narrative, but these devices which close the chapter are balanced by foreshadowing of "Calypso." We have seen that after Stephen turns, he is more concerned with the external world, and on the last page of the chapter there is emphasis upon action and time. This prepares the reader for "Calypso," which begins with traditional third person narration and is more concerned than most of "Proteus" with action and the observable world. Similarly, "Proteus" builds upon "Nestor," in which we can see Stephen's frustration with the objective world and his dislike of the patterns of history. We can thus see "Proteus" both as an autonomous chapter with its own pattern and as part of the larger shape of *Ulysses*.

Wolfgang Iser argues that formal differences among chapters prompt us to reject as limited the form that characterizes each chapter. In "Patterns of Communication in Joyce's *Ulysses*," Iser speaks of "style," used broadly to mean the perspectives and formal patterns that shape the abounding material in *Ulysses*, and argues that,

In *Ulysses* Joyce shows up these limitations by thematizing the capacity of style itself. By constantly changing the perspective through the eighteen chapters, he draws attention to the normative pressure caused by the modes of observation inherent in any one style, thus revealing the extreme one-sidedness of each individual "act of interpretation." While the change of styles shows up these limitations, the process is underlined in the individual chapters by the surplus of non-integrated, unstructured material. This, too, makes one aware of the limitations of the style in question, so that it often seems more real than the view of reality being presented at the time.¹³⁴

But we should not dismiss these forms simply because we are aware of their presence and limitations. Iser suggests that we should value individual variation and particularity rather than these patterns, which is comparable to Klawitter's and Kumar's insistence that Joyce affirms duration at the expense of spatial modes of organization;¹³⁵ however, Stephen's failure to integrate flux and paradigms shows us that duration or temporal flow must be fused with spatial pattern. This integration is achieved throughout "Proteus," primarily in the merging of form and content, of sound patterns and word meaning, and of the Homeric paradigms and

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

¹³⁵ While Iser does not specifically argue that Joyce affirms duration, he does speak of "transformations" and "a fluidity" that cannot be reduced to a "common pattern" (p. 228).

their temporal manifestations. As a result, we do not dismiss form when we find different ways of ordering in other chapters. (And, as we have seen, "Proteus" follows and leads into its neighbouring chapters and is not undercut by them.) The spatial pattern of the chapter does not distort a temporal reality but is instead an essential and integral part of time, and it has as much reality as the flow of Stephen's states of consciousness. While we are initially confused by the tension between duration and pattern in the chapter and cannot resolve it because our own position as subject in relation to the text as object is uncertain, we can eventually discover, through an awareness of form, that time and space can and must be fused. Once this is recognized, we can answer the question raised in the first chapter, which is whether duration is undermined because it cannot be represented, because it is not real, or because it is undesirable. We have seen that duration can be represented (if it is a predominantly linguistic duration) and that it is real, as real as spatial patterns, but we can see in Stephen the dangers that result from an immersion in flux alone or, conversely, from a retreat into spatial paradigms. It is essential that the two be fused, for this merging makes time purposeful and patterned. This is a fusion that the reader not only perceives but also experiences when the inherent shape of the chapter emerges as we read in time.

It is possible, though not entirely convincing, to understand the relationship between reader and text in terms of spatial metaphors. This enables us to fuse more directly and extremely the topic under discussion, namely the spatial and temporal qualities of Joyce's writings, with the predominant method of approach, which is a concern for the reader's activity. The key question is whether readers do more than complete or realize in their minds the spatial patterns that are inherent in the text: can we describe, at any time during the process of reading, the text as an object, as something that exists in space like a piece of sculpture, so that the text and its reader seem to be juxtaposed in space? We can begin by extrapolating a notion that is latent in Iser's article and then turn to the more explicit argument of Joseph Kestner. I noted in the first chapter that Iser speaks of the reader's goal as the

discovery of "a defined picture,"¹³⁶ and in the above quotation he refers to the style of each chapter as a "perspective," which is to say that form obstructs or distorts the audience's view of their object (or "picture"). These are clearly spatial metaphors that are derived from the visual arts, although Iser does not note this nor speak of reading as in any way spatial. Most importantly, he does not suggest, it seems at first, that the metaphors imply a separation of subject and object that distances readers from the text and makes them mere observers. While there may, of course, be considerable interaction between a painting or sculpture and its viewer, there is also a physical distance between perceiver and object that becomes especially prominent when this relationship is understood metaphorically and applied to a text and its reader. According to Iser, there is no such detachment between subject and object: because the reader cannot deal with the overwhelming material that Joyce presents, he tries to reduce it to manageable shapes; "in so doing, he is forced to enter into the action of the novel,"¹³⁷ for *Ulysses*, Iser believes, is primarily concerned with the limitations of all ways of organizing the book's material.¹³⁸ But while this involves the reader, as Iser suggests, it is more a parallel relationship, a correspondence between subject and object, than an enmeshing in the text. Even Iser's understanding of the gaps in a text which must be filled by the reader betrays a notion of the text as object which seems to be a vestige of a rigid formalism, for the text remains an object to be confronted by the reader. Ironically, while Joseph Frank is accused, erroneously, of treating the text as an object, one which is analogous to a painting or sculpture, it is Iser, a reader theorist who grants much freedom to the reader, who suffers from this conception of the text. Iser's theory is in large part a reaction against the formalist notion of the text as object, but he overcomes this idea by first accepting it and then attempting to transcend it: Iser thinks of the text as an object which a dissociated reader acts upon, and this separation is never entirely overcome, so that the concept of text as object burdens Iser's theory. In short, Iser adopts the notion of the text as object and then overcompensates by positing a largely

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

unrestrained reader. The reader of *Ulysses*, he argues, "is virtually free to choose his own direction,"¹³⁹ which suggests that there is a disjunction between subject and object rather than a productive interaction. But there is a greater dependence and involvement between reader and text than Iser recognizes, for the reader of "Proteus," like Stephen, seeks to overcome confusions of subject and object. We are able, in time, to perceive an order-giving pattern, one that is revealing rather than reductive because it gives us an ironic superiority to Stephen. Because of the complexity of this relation of the reader to the text, it is undesirable to use spatial metaphors that imply a distance between text and reader in order to describe their interaction.

Joseph Kestner tries to use spatial metaphors while at the same time allowing for a complex relation between reader and text. In *The Spatiality of the Novel*, Kestner argues that novels are like buildings because both have "exterior and interior space": "The book is not only an object, but an architectural object; it is constructed, not written."¹⁴⁰ But it does not follow that the reader is a distant perceiver, for Kestner argues that the reader may enter the space of a novel. Kestner explains this process by drawing upon a distinction that Bergson makes¹⁴¹ between encountering a representation of a person's conscious states and directly experiencing that person's duration for oneself. The latter, called "dynamism," also describes the experience of the reader: "One of the properties of a novel," Kestner argues, ". . . is that it is a dynamic field through which the reader may atemporally be the characters, be the author of his own text, and be an interpreter."¹⁴² The novel, then, is a spatial field, one that can be entered when the distinction between fiction and reality is broken down through literary reflexivity. The reader, Kestner suggests, reads about readers and must constantly wonder whether all readers, himself included, are fictitious, and we are authors because we construct a text as we read and interpret.¹⁴³ Because there is a text as object and a particular reading, which is itself

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 231.

¹⁴⁰Kestner, *The Spatiality of the Novel*, pp. 134 and 135.

¹⁴¹Bergson, p. 186 (Kestner, p. 135).

¹⁴²Kestner, *The Spatiality of the Novel*, pp. 138-9.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, pp. 136-7.

"an act of creation" and constitutes "another novel,"¹⁴⁴ there are actually two texts that seem to be two fields which are juxtaposed in space. Kestner's spatial metaphor is ill-defined, but it does emphasize his belief that there are two distinct texts, the author's and the reader-author's.

Kestner applies his understanding of "dynamism" to the works of James Joyce, although he concentrates upon the early writings. While he touches upon *Ulysses*, he does not show that it illustrates his thesis, and there is, oddly, no discussion of *Finnegans Wake*. Kestner's practical analysis is problematic because he explores ideas significantly different from those he discusses in more general terms: while he begins his chapter by describing the relationship between the text and the text created by the reader, in practice he explores intertextuality, especially within the corpus of Joyce's writings, and minimizes the role of the reader. He examines the similarities among Joyce's writings and suggests that we must compare them by juxtaposing them in space: his argument is, in essence, that "Joyce's work is concerned with the relationship of texts outside time, a nexus that can be grasped only spatially."¹⁴⁵ This idea is applied more fully to Joyce's writings in "Virtual Text/Virtual Reader: The Structural Signature Within, Behind, Beyond, Above," but once again Kestner is more concerned with Joyce's texts than the reader's activity, even though he insists that the reader is a creator.¹⁴⁶ This problem arises because Kestner, like Wolfgang Iser forces apart subject and object and sees the text as a thing: we have seen that he calls the text "an object, . . . an architectural object,"¹⁴⁷ something which a dissociated subject must seek to penetrate. Kestner attempts to overcome this disjunction with his idea of juxtaposed fields that result in a blurring of fiction and reality, but this mixture cannot heal the separation because it does not allow for a sufficiently complex and variable relationship between text and reader. When Kestner turns from theory to practical analysis, he largely leaves behind his concern for the reader and concentrates upon the text as object. If we try to apply Kestner's ideas to *Ulysses*,

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 139.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁴⁶Kestner, "Virtual Text/Virtual Reader: The Structural Signature Within, Behind, Beyond, Above," *James Joyce Quarterly*, 16 (1978-9), 27-42, pp. 33-4 and 38-9.

¹⁴⁷Kestner, *The Spatiality of the Novel*, p. 135.

their limitations become apparent, for the confusion of fiction and reality that characterizes the reader's relationship to a dynamic field is not as pervasive as Kestner assumes: while we are initially confused by the third person narration, we are finally able to separate consciousnesses and to distance ourselves from the narrative. In addition, we do not confuse ourselves with the author when we "write" our interpretation but instead must posit an implied author who is responsible for the ironic form of the chapter. "Proteus," while an innovative and complex chapter, nonetheless depends upon traditional techniques of irony that require our allegiance to (not our reflexive identification with) an implied author. Joyce's reflexive form is only partially absorbing, for the reader's task is to overcome the confusion that reflexivity creates by discovering the spatial form which has been constructed by the implied author and which reveals the short-comings of Stephen. Consequently, the text cannot be described as an "architectural object" that is entered by the reader; instead, we are at first immersed in the text and must try to distance ourselves through the discovery of immanent spatial form. To describe the text and the activity of reading in spatial terms is to simplify this interaction and to use spatial metaphors inexactly.

Kestner argues that we create when we read Joyce's works because we write a new text as we proceed, and a comparable idea is advocated by Brook Thomas, who calls the reader of *Ulysses* an "accomplice of the author."¹⁴⁸ Both suggest that the reader is the author's equal. Thomas argues that "*Ulysses* cannot be read, . . . it can only be misread"¹⁴⁹ because he, like Iser, sees the text as open or "inexhaustible,"¹⁵⁰ and, consequently, this misreading attests to the creativity of Joyce's readers rather than to their inferiority. Because Thomas insists that the reader is an "accomplice" and that reflexivity, the "tale of the telling," is as important as the "naturalistic tale,"¹⁵¹ he must posit some sort of creator of the telling with whom we conspire: he rejects the deconstructionist approach that sees plays of language as a consequence

¹⁴⁸Brook Thomas, "Not a Reading of, but the Act of Reading *Ulysses*," *James Joyce Quarterly*, 16 (1978-9), 81-93, p. 82; cf. p. 86.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 84.

of qualities of the linguistic system rather than as the conscious creation of the author and, while he recognizes the problems that arise from the idea of authorial intention, he favours this latter view in order to make the reader the "accomplice" of a creator.¹⁵² Thomas could minimize the problem if he were simply to recognize that the reader constructs an implied author. This construction would, of course, close the text somewhat and reduce the reader's status, which Thomas wishes to avoid: "with *Ulysses*," he argues, "the reader's journey never ends,"¹⁵³ for the reader acts creatively upon an indeterminate text.¹⁵⁴ Thomas's understanding of the Homeric parallels is illustrative of the role he envisages for the reader, for he argues that because the parallel is only hinted at, "the reader activates these clues"¹⁵⁵ and consequently has a large and free role. But it is this very immanence of the parallels that constrains (rather than opens) our interpretation of them, for the parallels show the fusion of time and space that is the key idea in "Proteus." Thomas argues that our active discovery of the correspondence makes each of us a writer, an "accomplice," but in fact it makes us aware of an authoritative voice, an implied author. In short, the relationship between the reader, text, and implied author is not unusual in "Proteus." There are not two comparable planes or fields, of text and a reading, that are juxtaposed in a parallel, spatial relationship which allows chiasmal interconnections that blur the distinction between fiction and reality and between author and reader. Instead, we show an ironic superiority to Stephen and must acknowledge our inferiority to the implied author, whose technique illuminates Stephen's short-comings and explains our own initial enmeshing in the text. While we discover spatial patterns as we read, our relationship to the text cannot be usefully described as spatial; the reader is active in both

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 91-2.

¹⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁵⁴It should be noted that Thomas does recognize the dangers of subjectivity and indeterminacy (p. 89) and suggests that he avoids them because he is concerned with both subject and object (p. 90). The activity of reading, he proposes, is shaped by the text: he suggests that "We are not totally making the book over in our image because, as we read, we are being made over, in part, in the book's image" (p. 90), and, consequently, we find "metaphors" in the text which describe our activity and "the best reading models for *Ulysses* are the models provided by *Ulysses* itself. . ." (p. 91). But these are vague constraints and, while Thomas successfully avoids seeing the activity of reading as radically subjective, he continues to emphasize the freedom of the reader.

¹⁵⁵Thomas, p. 86.

conceptions, but in the latter case we find a presumptuous¹⁵⁶ reader theory that seeks to elevate the reader to the status of co-creator, without regard for the qualities of the text that shape and sometimes limit the role of the reader.

The questions that were raised and the answers I have proposed in this discussion of "Proteus" will do much to clarify "Penelope," yet the final chapter of *Ulysses* shows tensions which are not so easily resolved. As in "Proteus," we find in "Penelope" a contrast between the temporal flow of mind and the spatial patterns of the chapter, a contrast whose resolution illuminates Molly's understanding and experience of time and space. But there is also a residual conflict between duration and spatial order that remains after we have achieved this ironic perspective upon character. It might, at first, be argued that I have weighted my evidence by choosing a chapter too much like "Proteus"; moreover, if we argue with Karen Lawrence, that "Penelope" is a "technical reversion" in which "Joyce returned to one of the stylistic conceptions that dominates the early chapters of the book,"¹⁵⁶ then it will follow that Joyce's conception of time and space is itself static and that a temporal progression in *Ulysses* is incomplete or even absent. But "Penelope" is a more experimental and open-ended chapter than "Proteus" because of the unresolved tensions between time and space, tensions which make the chapter unique in *Ulysses* and look forward to *Finnegans Wake*.

"Penelope" is a stream of consciousness narrative, although it is different in kind from the predominantly linguistic "Proteus." The absence of punctuation in the chapter suggests that Molly is not thinking through language and that the words which represent the flow of her mind are unavoidable means of representation that should remain as unobtrusive as possible. The fluidity and immediacy of Molly's thoughts have led some critics to argue that "Penelope" is transparent, without an authorial voice or visible language: Hugh Kenner contends that "there is no 'style': for once, no style. . . . The illusion created by 'Penelope' is the

¹⁵⁶Karen Lawrence, *The Odyssey of Style in Ulysses* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 204.

Shakespearean one, that anything at all can be said. . . ."¹⁵⁷ and Margaret Church argues that in "Penelope" there is "a close approach to pure duration."¹⁵⁸

Molly's shifting thoughts do display spatial form, but this is a pattern entirely consistent with the concept of duration. Her mind moves from idea to idea and among past, present, and future by means of a process of free association that is based upon internal reference and juxtaposition. To use David Lodge's terms, Molly finds vertical or metaphorical associations, although Lodge would not accept this conclusion. In *The Modes of Modern Writing*, he argues that,

Molly Bloom's stream of consciousness is still more "metonymic" than her husband's, inasmuch as she seldom makes *any* metaphorical connections between items. Such metaphors and similes as occur in her discourse are rarely coined by her, but are colloquial or proverbial clichés. She is very literal-minded, pragmatic, down-to-earth. Bloom's speculative, whimsical thought is as far removed from hers as Stephen's complex, ironic and cultured intelligence is from Bloom's.¹⁵⁹

Lodge cites an example (Molly thinking of "Bloom having breakfast in bed the next morning and Bloom having breakfast in bed in the past") to show that Molly does perceive similarity, but argues that "this is not a metaphorical kind of similarity" because the two events "belong to the same order of reality."¹⁶⁰ This strained point is the result of the difficulty that is inevitably encountered when trying to differentiate between metaphor and metonymy, a problem which is largely avoided if we instead think in terms of time and space. Molly's thought is clearly spatial, within the temporality of its flow, because she disregards causal and chronological order. While this spatial juxtaposition constitutes the underlying system of Molly's thought and appears to the reader as spatial form, its predominant effect is to emphasize the temporal fluidity of Molly's mind. The spatial pattern remains a ~~sub~~structure and is not in tension with but rather explains the durational flow of her thoughts.

¹⁵⁷Kenner, p. 148.

¹⁵⁸Church, pp. 23-4.

¹⁵⁹Lodge, p. 142.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 143.

While the spatial quality of Molly's process of free association is not in tension with the fluidity of her thoughts, this duration does conflict with the language that represents it. I have said that Molly's stream of consciousness, unlike Stephen's, is not linguistic in character: whereas Stephen is conscious of and thinks through language, with the result that his duration need not be translated into linguistic form, Molly's thoughts are not verbal and must consequently be given representation in words. I argued earlier that Joyce makes this transformation as unobtrusive as possible by using no punctuation, which gives the words an uninterrupted flow and makes them seem less substantial. But this technique has another effect that is opposed to the first, for the unusual typography and syntax call attention to themselves and emphasize the contrast between the words and Molly's non-linguistic thought. Karen Lawrence begins to recognize this point but does not pursue its important implications when she says that,

"Penelope" is first-person narration that does shut out a third-person narrative voice. But some narrative presence transcribes the sound of the train whistle (pp. 754, 762, 763) and, if it performs this act of transcription, it is also scribe for Molly's monologue as well.¹⁶¹

But our awareness of the "scribe" is more than a logical consequence of the transcription of the whistle. An implied author who transcribes Molly's thoughts is omnipresent, for the language of the chapter calls attention to itself because of its oddity. Moreover, this effect is continually intensified because of Molly's materialism: the word sometimes becomes a thing in itself for Molly, as when she repeats the word "yes" at the end of the chapter until the sound gains substance and, because of Molly's predominating materialism, we come to recognize this tangibility in all the language of the chapter. Consequently, the implied author is more than a "scribe," for he obtrusively transforms Molly's thoughts into a medium that contrasts with her non-linguistic mind. This tension, which is absent from "Proteus," pervades "Penelope."

The tension between duration and language must not be overemphasized, for there is a strong cohesion between Molly's thoughts and the words which represent them. While Karen

¹⁶¹Lawrence, p. 204.

Lawrence recognizes that there is a "reforging" of "the link between character and style,"¹⁶² she fails to see that this is most obvious in the example of the train whistle, which Lawrence believes disrupts Molly's stream of consciousness. However, the sound of the train has not been directly transcribed by the implied author but is instead mediated by Molly, for the sound is echoed by her mind and is in concord with her thoughts. The first sound of the train coincides with the climax of Molly's sexual thoughts (*U* 754), the second "weeping tone," with her sentimental memories (*U* 762), and the third is sounded when she feels "some wind in me" (*U* 763). The external and internal worlds, like thought and language, are here fused, and this conjunction pervades the chapter. But Lawrence's anxiousness to find evidence of the scribe is understandable, for there is an incipient tension in "Penelope" between duration and the language that represents it. This tension emerges most strongly when Molly calls attention to language, which is not evidence of a linguistic mind comparable to Stephen's but instead demonstrates her casual attitude towards expression. Molly constantly forgets words (for example, "that word met something with hoses in it. . . ." [*U* 753-4] and "Saint Michaels cave with the icicles or whatever they call them" [*U* 760]), which has the opposite effect of making her diction prominent. She does not seek a precise awareness of expression but instead wants a language that is direct and not bothersome: thinking of the priest who heard her confession, she wonders "couldnt he say bottom right out" (*U* 741), and sometimes she seems to ridicule others' euphemisms ("did you wash possible" [*U* 743]; "so I went around to the whatyoucallit everything was whatyoucallit" [*U* 761]). But her recurrent concern for letter writing helps make language bothersome, including the language of the chapter: this is most evident when she thinks of a letter which has "no stops" (*U*, 758), like the chapter itself. We are also reminded that we are reading a chapter in a larger narrative, for Molly thinks of "Ulysses Grant" (*U* 757), "H M S Calypso" (*U* 761), and of "books with a Molly in them" (*U* 756). These various comments by Molly encourage our continual awareness of language, an awareness which Molly does not fully share. In addition, this prominence of language makes

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

us ask whether pure duration can exist and be represented, and there is a resulting and irresolvable tension between duration and language. While this tension is absent in "Proteus," it is incipient yet noticeable in "Penelope."

The language of the chapter is not spatial in Bergson's sense, for the reader is not encouraged to have a philosopher's heightened awareness of the spatial quality that underlies all verbal expression. But patterns of internal word reference emerge which contrast with the stream of Molly's consciousness and which, because they are not recognized by her, reveal an ironic contrast between spatial form, which we alone perceive, and Molly's duration. These word patterns are described by James Van Dyck Card, who finds numerous pairs of contraries in "Penelope," such as "yes" and "no" or "much" and "little," which are often juxtaposed to emphasize their relationship. In "The Ups and Downs, Ins and Outs of Molly Bloom: Patterns of Words in 'Penelope,'" he insists that "the words exist to be noticed and the web of the text is such that these little details cannot be accidental," and goes on to posit some explanations of these contrasts: he hints that they call attention to language, and he argues that they emphasize the contrarities of ordinary life.¹⁶³ Card's concern is primarily with identifying the patterns, but we can see that they have important implications for our understanding of time and space. The contraries suggest that there is a pattern which is complete within the flow of time, although the opposing terms sometimes seem to cancel one another and imply that Molly is static rather than entire and autonomous. These contrasting interpretations express Molly's characteristic duality, for she is at once both whole, an archetypal symbol of the earth, and static, full of contradiction and burdened by her materialism. In both cases, we have an ironic perspective upon Molly for she lacks the mythical imagination necessary to perceive herself as an archetype and she cannot recognize her own stasis. It is consequently apposite that our awareness of this wholeness and static materialism arises through patterns of words that the reader perceives but which Molly, because she is not observant of language, cannot see. As well, we can see the contrast between linguistic form and the content of Molly's thoughts in

¹⁶³James Van Dyck Card, "The Ups and Downs, Ins and Outs of Molly Bloom: Patterns of Words in 'Penelope,'" *James Joyce Quarterly*, 19 (1982), 127-39, p. 138.

more general terms, as evidence of the necessary tension between her type of duration and linguistic signs. The conflict is thus not entirely resolved on the level of character by means of our ironic perception of spatial form; the tension remains open, for the abstract, unresolved opposition transcends the particularity of the narrative situation.

The wholeness and stasis that are suggested by Molly's contradictions are also evident in the pattern of circularity in "Penelope." The entire chapter has a circular form, for it begins and ends with the word "yes": the final word does not flow into the first, but a more static circular shape is created because the two ends seem to meet. This shape of the chapter affects upon Molly in two ways, first by making her seem stable, whole, and eternal yet earthly, so that she represents life, especially sexual creation. Joyce said in a letter that "Penelope" "turns like the huge earthball slowly surely and evenly round and round spinning," and the points around which it spins are four parts of the body and four corresponding words.¹⁶⁴ In the same letter, Joyce observes that the chapter "begins and ends with the female word *Yes*," with "female" emphasizing the connection between circular form and sexuality, a correspondence that emerges in the text itself. When Molly remembers that "he caressed them outside they love doing that its the roundness" (*U* 760) and later thinks that "theyre all mad to get in there where they come out of" (*U* 760), she points out the circularity of procreation and sexuality. At the same time, the circularity of the chapter has the opposite effect of emphasizing Molly's stasis, isolation, sexual inactivity with Bloom, and her materialism. While we are encouraged to be sympathetic with Molly rather than harshly judgemental, we nonetheless recognize that these qualities are short-comings. The circle here represents a lack of progress; it is an empty circle that return us to the beginning, and a pattern that suggests the absence of a pattern. In both cases, when Molly is an earth-symbol and when she is earth-bound, the circularity of the chapter is perceived as a property of form rather than of content because it is recognized by the narrative audience only.

¹⁶⁴James Joyce, *Letters of James Joyce*, Vol. I, ed. Stuart Gilbert (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 170.

The circularity of the chapter can also be seen as part of a more complex pattern which draws upon Vico's four-stage cycle of history and which belongs to form rather than to content. This structure is discussed by Diane Tolomeo in "The Final Octagon of *Ulysses*," in which she argues that the eight "sentence" pattern of "Penelope" is a doubling of the Viconian pattern; more specifically, the "second half" of the octagon is "not a repetition but a reflection of what preceded it, each of the remaining sentences mirroring major images in the first four sentences."¹⁶⁵ For example, the first sentence "corresponds, in Viconian terms, to the chaotic phase of history," the *recorso*, for it contains images of destruction and of rebirth or generation (for instance, eggs),¹⁶⁶ and this first sentence is mirrored by the last one. But Tolomeo also suggests that the eighth sentence does not exactly reflect the first one and that the final "yes" differs from the first, so that there is not a perfectly circular pattern nor, at the same time, does the eighth sentence constitute a unique terminal of "a simple linear movement",¹⁶⁷ in other words, the last sentence is part of both a temporal progression and a spatial pattern. Even if we question Tolomeo's complex and sometimes strained textual justification of the symmetrical pattern of "Penelope" and demand clear proof that its sentences correspond to Vico's four ages, we can nonetheless see that there are important elements of Vico's cycles in the chapter and that time and space are fused in the Viconian pattern of change that leads to rebirth and repetition. More precisely, time is purposeful in this conception and is contained within a spatial pattern.

But this Viconian pattern, while undeniably present, is tenuous and unobtrusive, and it does not give a strong spatial order to the flow of Molly's thoughts. Time and space in the chapter are not entirely resolved by means of the Viconian pattern: while time is contained within space in the Viconian cycles, there remains a tension between this predominantly spatial pattern and the abounding flow of Molly's thoughts. Duration and pattern are not resolved, for the Viconian pattern lacks the immanence and strength of the spatial patterns that we

¹⁶⁵Diane Tolomeo, "The Final Octagon of *Ulysses*," *James Joyce Quarterly*, 10 (1973), 439-54, pp. 448-9.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 441-2.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 449.

found in "Proteus." Once again, an incipient and unresolved tension disrupts our more conclusive view of time and space that reflects ironically upon Molly.

A more successful fusion of time and space, one which we have already seen in our discussion of Stephen's stream of consciousness, occurs when archetypes are brought into the temporal world. Molly is at once both immersed in time, in the moment, and timeless: she plays two kinds of continuous present, the continually changing present of duration and the present that is constant because it never alters (and which can also be described as spatial). These two may be seen as opposite poles, but they also seem to fuse because Molly's immersion in the thought of the moment usually leaves her indifferent to clock time, just as the timeless transcends objective time. When she thinks that "I never know the time even that watch he gave me never seems to go properly" (*U* 747), we can see that she is both immersed in subjective time and is timeless. Molly is unique in time, as the abundance and particularity of detail suggest, and a timeless archetypal figure who symbolizes the earth, female sexuality, maternity, and womanhood in general. The symbol that Joyce has given to this chapter in his design for *Ulysses* is that of eternity, for Molly is earthly yet everlasting, representative of the cycles of generation yet transcending this temporal pattern by virtue of her symbolic, archetypal quality. As a result, the symbol of eternity in Joyce's schema stands for an eternity that contains rather than escapes time. But, once again, the spatial and the temporal do not seem to be perfectly resolved, for their conflict transcends the narrative situation. They are fused within Molly, but they also seem to spill over, to go beyond this level of character and to exist in a more general tension. While Stephen, too, is a timeless figure because he belongs to the paradigm typified by Telemachus, he does not become an archetypal figure comparable to the female, tellurian figure of Molly, and it is this more prominent archetypal quality that begins to strain the merging of the continuous present of duration and the timeless present of the archetype. But this is an incipient tension that must not be overemphasized, and it is not at all evident when we look at the Homeric parallels of the chapter. In "Penelope," as in "Proteus," the Homeric pattern demonstrates the immanence of form in content and the fusion

of time and space: the parallel is both a spatial juxtaposition that reveals timeless similarities and an exposure of temporal decline from an ideal. And, like the Viconian pattern, it is one that Molly cannot recognize.

Our ability to perceive the synthesis of time and space exposes the limitations of Molly's immersion in the present. Because she is absorbed by the thought of the moment, she cannot recognize the contradictions that abound in her stream of consciousness. One of many instances is her changing view of women's pacifism: she first contends that "you wouldn't see women going and killing one another and slaughtering when do you ever see women rolling around drunk like they do. . ." (U 778), but later she thinks of "some woman ready to stick her knife in 'you I hate that in women no wonder they treat us the way they do we are a dreadful lot of bitches" (U 778-9). The most pervasive dichotomy is her attitude toward adultery, which she fears Bloom practices but herself has committed. While Molly's immersion in the moment and usual indifference to language prevent her from seeing the contradictions and dualities that characterize her, the reader, by contrast, can perceive spatial patterns within the flow of time, thus requiring an ironic perspective. But this irony is not harsh, for we are encouraged to sympathize with Molly and to see her inconsistencies as evidence of her humanity rather than ridicule her. Severe judgement is discouraged because spatial patterns are brought into question by duration as much as Molly's temporal flow is undermined by spatial patterns, for Molly's life-affirming flow contrasts with the rigidities of spatial design. As a result, we must recognize that time and space should be fused, so that neither gains ascendancy. Readers may not become arrogant because their ironic perspective places upon them the responsibility of realizing this fusion.

We are even less likely to criticize Molly's inconsistencies because they are largely superficial. Our perception of her contradictions does not lead to criticism of her but instead encourages us to see the deeper unity that is within her, a fundamental cohesion whose essence is her humanity. For example, we may be initially tempted to see irony in Molly's thought of "a kiss long and hot down to your soul" (U 740), for the obvious tension between body and

soul seems to be unperceived by her. But the spirituality of the naturalistic Molly is not only ironic, for there is a deeper level at which body and spirit are fused in her. Near the end of the chapter, she observes that "I love flowers. I'd love to have the whole place swimming in roses. God of heaven there's nothing like nature. . . as for them saying there's no God I wouldn't give a snap of my two fingers for all their learning why don't they go and create something. . ." (*U* 781-2), and this pantheism resolves the surface contradiction between body and soul. Even the dual implications of the chapter's circularity, which suggests both that Molly is an earth-figure and that she is static, can be perceived as the dual consequence of her essential humanity and femininity. Her dualities remain, but they are diminished when we recognize that they come from the single essence of her self.

An important consequence of this cohesion is that the more abstract tensions of the chapter seem detached from Molly's character and the specific narrative situation. The tensions between language and duration and between all patterns, especially archetypal and Viconian shapes, and the temporal flow of Molly's thoughts seem to be beyond her and do not reflect ironically upon her: the conflict between time and space is not fully resolved on the level of character but constitutes a more abstract problem that prevents closure of the text. We cannot even attribute the tension to an implied author, for it seems beyond his control and to reside in the properties of language and in an unavoidable disharmony between spatial pattern and temporal flow. In "Proteus," Stephen's duration and spatial imagination are undermined because neither is alone desirable, but in "Penelope" the problem is larger: duration cannot be represented in language without being noticeably shaped by it, and duration does not even seem real, for it cannot be isolated from its dependent relation with the spatial patterns that undermine it. Time and space each require the concept that is its antithesis, but their tensions are not overcome to form an encompassing unity. The tensions are problematic because they are never resolved, but they are independent of Molly and, if they influence our understanding of her at all, they emphasize her fundamental coherence and stability.

While the dualities of Molly's character make her superficially ambiguous, the tension between language or spatial pattern and duration constitutes a mutual undermining that more severely destabilizes the chapter. The resulting openness of the text is not comparable to the indeterminacy that Wolfgang Iser perceives. In "Patterns of Communication in Joyce's *Ulysses*," Iser argues that "Penelope" reveals the triumph of abounding particularity over order-giving shapes, just as he emphasizes particularity in "Proteus" at the expense of ideals or archetypes. While Iser recognizes a cyclical shape in "Penelope" and that Molly is a symbolic "Mother Earth," he insists that these patterns cannot contain the profusion of life in the chapter: "it is only fitting," he argues, "that the interior monologue should end the novel in a form which sets a life free from all the restrictions of—precisely—its form."¹⁶ Iser suggests that Joyce affirms "life," that which is fluid and plural, in order to reveal the limitations of all patterns, but we have seen that there is a more balanced tension between spatial patterns and temporal flow. This tension is open or unresolved, which is not the same as saying that it creates ambiguity or indeterminacy: there is openness but not aimlessness, for the tensions, while unresolved, constrain our understanding of the chapter.

This unresolved opposition between time and space makes "Penelope" unique in *Ulysses*, which has important implications for our understanding of the spatial and temporal qualities of the entire book. In order to understand these qualities, we must consider whether and in what way "Penelope" concludes *Ulysses*, giving particular attention to whether the chapter is primarily a temporal goal or part of a spatial pattern. According to Karen Lawrence, "Penelope" does not conclude all aspects of the book:

Perhaps it makes sense to say that in "Penelope" Joyce provides a powerful ending for one "story" in *Ulysses* and not another: he completes the archetypal plot of the *Odyssey* by giving us Penelope, and he fleshes out the naturalistic plot as well by showing us the very human Molly Bloom, whom we have waited to see throughout the day. . . . But the other "story" in *Ulysses* that I have traced, the story of the writing of a novel, is somehow falsified by this kind of final chapter. "Penelope" does exist outside the sequence of styles, but it has the whole weight of that sequence behind it. The whole book has cautioned us not to trust any one version of things more than another, even one so apparently formless or "natural"

¹⁶Iser, p. 225.

as this one.¹⁶⁹

Lawrence's first two observations are correct, for even though the story is not fully resolved it seems to be completed by the homecoming, and we are not left wondering about the future; and, as Joyce observed, the nature or humanity of "Penelope" is "the indispensable countersign to Bloom's passport to eternity," and thus "Penelope," along with "Ithaca," constitutes a dual conclusion to the book.¹⁷⁰ In addition, Molly's time dominated mind is the antithesis of Stephen's spatial thought, and her maternal nature and concern for Stephen's "poor mother," who "wouldnt like that if she was alive ruining himself for life" (*U* 778), make her the opposite of the unfilial Stephen: both of these contrasts create balance and a sense of wholeness, and, as a result, "Penelope" is a temporal goal that completes the spatial patterns of *Ulysses*. Lawrence's observation that "Penelope" exists "outside the sequence of styles" is questionable, though, for the chapter also completes the marked temporal progression of technique in *Ulysses*. At the beginning of this discussion of "Penelope," I noted that Lawrence sees a "reversion" to earlier techniques, and we have just seen that Iser believes that "Penelope" is free from the ~~temporal~~ intrude upon our perception in the earlier seventeen chapters. However, the contrast between the world of time and spatial forms that pervades and is resolved in the earlier chapters is also found in "Penelope," where this tension reaches its most extreme dissociation. As a result, "Penelope" both looks back to "Proteus," with which it shares an ironic perspective upon the character's understanding of time and space, and it looks ahead to *Finnegans Wake*, in which there is no resolution of time and space. "Penelope" is a unique temporal goal of the book, but one which also recalls earlier chapters and consequently increases our spatial apprehension of *Ulysses* as a whole. Karen Lawrence argues that the "technical reversion" of "Penelope" "contributes to our sense of return and closure,"¹⁷¹ which suggests that it is a temporal goal that completes the spatial shape of a circle. Its unique tensions intensify the temporal progression of *Ulysses*, although this progression can also be

¹⁶⁹Lawrence, p. 207.

¹⁷⁰Joyce, *Letters of James Joyce*, Vol. I., pp. 160 and 168.

¹⁷¹Lawrence, p. 204.

seen as a spatial pattern. While space predominates in the former view, time is more important in the latter.

Just as time and space are fused or in balanced tension in all parts of *Ulysses*, the work as a whole is both end oriented and spatial. It first seems that we are primarily engaged in a quest through time, for the apparent self-containment of the epic form implies that the clues to this puzzling book will be forthcoming if we only persist. But this seeming autonomy also suggests that *Ulysses* is a self-contained, spatial whole. It does not matter that the wealth of detail prevents a simultaneous apprehension of the work, for we may nonetheless abstract and select from this detail in order to acquire a conception of the whole; this process is not a reductive imposition of an order-giving pattern (of the kind that Iser dislikes) but is instead a hazier spatial imagination of the entirety of the work. When we have finished *Ulysses*, we are left with a primarily spatial understanding of character, of Dublin, and of the pattern of the day, and even the temporal progression of technique can be seen from a distance, as a spatial pattern. Joseph Frank argues that Joyce wanted a "unified impact," a "sense of simultaneous activity,"¹⁷² and that he assumed "a unified spatial apprehension of his work would ultimately be possible."¹⁷³ The words "sense" and "ultimately" are crucial here: we cannot, of course, contain the entirety of *Ulysses* in our minds and eliminate time, but we can have a fairly clear sense of the space that the work occupies or seems to contain. This spatial apprehension is not the elusive goal of a temporal reading (that is to say, it is not an ideal), but instead grows out of time. Ida Fasel sees a less desirable fusion of time and space in *Ulysses* when she says, in passing,

how static: time emptied into itself without passion. the river become stagnant, become space. There is no struggle, as in Faulkner, to break through; no tension of space-time conflict, of attempted escape from the trap.¹⁷⁴

In other words, because characters are immersed in time, they seem lifeless or static and to

¹⁷²Frank, 1963, p. 17.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁷⁴Ida Fasel, "Spatial Form and Spatial Time," in *The Western Humanities Review*, 16 (1962), 223-34, p. 227.

acquire a spatial quality. However, not only do the characters often struggle to escape time, but the form of *Ulysses* is pervaded by "space-time conflict," a conflict whose resolution leaves us with a vibrant, not a static, spatial quality that grows out of time and finally contains time within it. Moreover, because the tensions in "Penelope" are not fully resolved, *Ulysses* is somewhat open-ended rather than a self-contained, static shape that seems to close in upon itself. Most importantly, the spatial quality of *Ulysses* does not make the book an object, as though it were an impenetrable and static piece of sculpture. This point is crucial and must be looked at more closely.

When I discussed "Proteus," I argued that the text does not seem to be a remote object because of the confusing interrelationship between subject and object. The blurred relationship is found both within the story, in which Stephen cannot dissociate himself from the objects that he perceives, and in the telling of the story, for Stephen's consciousness is not distinct from the narrator's voice and, consequently, the reader's own relation to the text as object is confused. The reader is enmeshed in the text and must seek to partially objectify it; we do not attempt to penetrate a text that already seems to be a distant, spatial object. The harmonious parallelism between the story and its telling that characterizes "Proteus" is not evident in "Penelope," in which there is a disjunction between Molly's stream of consciousness and the forms, namely language and spatial patterns, which call attention to the literary representation of these thoughts. There is, in a sense, a confusion of consciousness, but it is different in kind from that found in "Proteus": Molly's archetypal quality makes her part of the collective unconscious rather than a mere individual consciousness, which gives her as much affinity to the "characters" of *Finnegans Wake* as to Stephen, whose consciousness is ultimately distinct from all others. But it is not this archetypal quality that is primarily responsible for the lack of a strong subject-object distinction when we read "Penelope." Instead, it is the dissociation between the story and its literary telling that enmeshes the reader in the text and prevents the chapter from becoming a static, spatial object. Because the tension between Molly's duration and the language and spatial patterns of the chapter is never resolved,

the reader continually mediates between time and space and cannot solidify a spatial apprehension of the text. Time is not reconciled with nor contained in space, and consequently there is a tension from which the reader cannot stand back.

We also have a more conventional relation to the text because of our ironic perspective, which requires that we posit an implied author. Our superiority to Molly does not fully align us with this implied author, though, for we cannot overcome our sympathetic attachment to Molly. As a result, we do not seem to be the author's equal and confuse ourselves with him (as Joseph Kestner, by contrast, would suggest), nor do we thereby enter into the space of an objective text. Our less conventional role of sustaining the text's tensions does, in a sense, make us creators because of the magnitude of our involvement, but once again we are not the author's equal. Because the tensions in "Penelope" seem to be beyond the controlling power of the implied author and they humble the reader, who cannot resolve them, we lack a sense of superiority, or, if we are the implied author's equal, we are equal only in powerlessness. Near the end of "Penelope," we become more conscious of this role as creator when Molly insists that "I wouldnt give a snap of my two fingers for all their learning, why dont they go and create something" (U 782). We are, of course, reading such a creation and are ourselves creative, but disrupting this similarity is a contrast between Molly's creation in nature and literary creation. Once again, the tension between nature and art, like that between time and space, is most extreme in this last chapter, although we must be careful not to overemphasize difference at the expense of likeness. We have a balanced, dual perspective, for we both align ourselves with Molly as a fellow creator and see tensions that she fails to recognize and which distance us from her non-literary, temporal world of nature. This dichotomy is typical of our relation to the text, for our reading is continually disrupted by the irresolvable tensions of time and space in the chapter. We have a relatively conventional role that recalls our activity when reading "Proteus," but at the same time we must sustain tensions without the reassuring guidance of an implied author. In both cases, we are fully involved in the spatial and temporal qualities of the text, which shows once again that we can understand the relationship between time and space

only if we specify the reader's activity.

While the tensions which disrupt the surface of "Penelope" are only incipient, they predominate in *Finnegans Wake*, where time and space are in extreme disjunction and are never reconciled. This affinity between the two texts can be further specified in order to reveal the continuity between the largely dissimilar *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. Most obviously, the tension between the predominantly spatial Viconian patterns and Molly's temporal thought find a strong parallel in Joyce's use of Vico's cycles in *Finnegans Wake*, although in the latter the patterns contrast with the flow of words rather than the flow of a single consciousness. Even this emphasis in *Finnegans Wake* upon the fluid word is adumbrated in "Penelope," in which the word is at once both a transparent representative of Molly's duration and a thing in itself that belongs to a linguistic duration. Moreover, the disjunction in "Penelope" between art and nature or form and content that is in part created by our awareness of the word finds its most extreme expression in *Finnegans Wake*, in which the linguistic signifier is detached from its referent. Molly rejects the word and tries to live in a non-linguistic reality, but Joyce shows us in "Penelope" that words, like spatial patterns, are inescapable. They shape thought and undermine duration, which in turn exposes the artful quality of the spatial patterns. In *Finnegans Wake* the word dominates, and there is no longer any point in trying to separate consciousness from the language and patterns that inform it. Our task when reading *Finnegans Wake* is not to separate form that we alone see from content, as part of our attempt to distinguish and understand consciousnesses through an ironic perspective; instead, consciousness is archetypal, more markedly so than Molly's, and our task is to relate spatial archetypes and other patterns to the temporal flow of words. Our role is made more difficult because the implied author who begins to disappear in "Penelope" has vanished in *Finnegans Wake*, leaving us to cope with tensions of time and space more severe than those found at the end of *Ulysses*. While the tensions are less extreme in "Penelope," there can be no doubt that they are present: they are observable not only in retrospect but also emerge even when the reader does not think ahead to *Finnegans Wake*. Our understanding of the later work serves to

clarify temporal and spatial qualities of "Penelope" which are inherent and which are an extension of the interrelationship that we perceived in "Proteus."

C. *Finnegans Wake*: Time Chasing Space

The relationship between time and space in *Finnegans Wake* is the key to the work and its reader's activity. For we cannot begin to make sense of the abundant patterns of meaning in *Finnegans Wake* until we recognize that spatial interconnections and the temporal flow of words are in balanced and irresolvable tension, with each undermining the other. This mutual antagonism does not make the book stagnant, with a static spatial pattern in direct opposition to aimless temporality, but instead has the opposite effect of sustaining the text and compelling the reader onward. One might expect to find that *Finnegans Wake* is a perfect example of spatial form because of the extreme disruption of a causal, chronological story to form a plot sustained by spatial relationships; but while we pursue these spatial connections in time, the goal of a stable, spatial order is a distant ideal that cannot be reached by an actual reader. Even though we are unsuccessful, we do not give up the hope of achieving our quest and begin to wander aimlessly, for Joyce continually taunts us with the possibility that we will, in time, find spatial stability. In the following pages, I will examine this productive tension between spatial ideal and temporal quest and will show that it directs but does not rigidly constrain our activity. The first half of the chapter is a relatively broad and abstract discussion in which I begin by looking at the level of words and then move to larger dimensions of the book. It is essential that we then turn to Chapter vi of the first part of *Finnegans Wake*, particularly to the story told by Professor Jones ("so eminent a spatialist"¹⁷⁵) of the Mookse and the Gripes, for this is Joyce's most direct consideration of space and time.

The stream of words in *Finnegans Wake* constitutes a temporal flow that is similar to but more marked than the flow in "Penelope." Each word is an almost tangible sound, a thing in itself that is part of a stream rather than refers to something external that is fluid. This substantiality of the written word and its sound is heightened because Joyce breaks down the boundaries between words, causing us to hear a sequence of sound rather than a series of distinct sound groups. Words are only superficially divided by typology into units, for their

¹⁷⁵James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (1939; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 149, ll. 18-19. Subsequent page and line numbers will be given in the text.

sounds, like their meanings, are not easily separated; for instance, "passencore" (*FW* 3.4-5) is typographically distinguished as one word and may be understood to mean "passenger," but it may also be a fusion of the two words "*pas encore*." Joyce presents in the extreme a property of all language that was recognized by Ferdinand de Saussure, whose *Course in General Linguistics* will be used extensively to illuminate the nature of word reference in *Finnegans Wake*.¹⁷⁶ According to Saussure, speech is not segmented on the level of sound but is instead a continuous stream. In his discussion of the "Concrete Entities of a Language," he argues that,

. . . a primary characteristic of the spoken sequence is its linearity. . . . In itself, it is merely a line, a continuous ribbon of sound, along which the ear picks out no adequate or clearly marked divisions. In order to do so, recourse must be had to meanings.¹⁷⁷

When Joyce disrupts the meaning that permits segmentation, this fluidity of sound becomes more prominent. Our discovery of meaning does not entirely break this flow but instead partially segments it; like Lessing, who speaks of the signs of poetry as "articulate"¹⁷⁸ in order to emphasize the fundamental temporality that underlies word division, Saussure describes language as jointed:

In Latin, the word *articulus* means "member, part, subdivision in a sequence of things." As regards language, articulation may refer to the division of the chain of speech into syllables, or to the division of the chain of meanings into meaningful units.¹⁷⁹

The task of Joyce's reader is to articulate or find meaningful units within the temporal flow of sound rather than entirely sever its continuity.

The unusual degree of fluidity that characterizes Joyce's language emerges because Joyce exploits the potential in language for the separation of the almost tangible signifier from

¹⁷⁶Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. Roy Harris (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1983).

It is impossible to determine whether Joyce was directly influenced by Saussure's *Course*. Hugh Kenner believes that there was no link because the *Course* was "published only after both Joyce and its author were dead" ("Approaches to the Artist as a Young Language Teacher," in *iViva Vivas!: Essays in Honor of Eliseo Vivas*, ed. Henry Regnery [Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1976], p. 335). But while the first translation did not appear until 1959, the French text was first published in 1916. Nonetheless, Kenner is probably correct to suggest that Joyce independently reached many of Saussure's conclusions (p. 343).

¹⁷⁷Saussure, p. 102.

¹⁷⁸Lessing, p. 55.

¹⁷⁹Saussure, p. 10.

its referent or signified. This possible separation was not explored by Saussure, but it nonetheless arises from qualities of language which he perceived. The most radical and influential insight in his *Course in General Linguistics* is his argument that the relationship between the two halves of a linguistic sign, the signifier and the signified, is arbitrary and secured by convention rather than an inevitable or natural link; we associate a given signifier with its corresponding referent not because of any quality inherent in the sound of the signifier but because we can differentiate it from all other sound patterns in the language. Saussure proposes that there are two distinct realms, that of sound and that of concept, in both of which units are understood in terms of what they are not:

Just as the conceptual part of linguistic value is determined solely by relations and differences with other signs in the language, so the same is true of its material part. The sound of a word is not in itself important, but the phonetic contrasts which allow us to distinguish that word from any other. That is what carries the meaning.

This may seem surprising. But how could it possibly be otherwise? No particular configuration of sound is more aptly suited to express a given message than any other such configuration. So it is clearly the case—indeed, it must be the case—that no linguistic item can ever be based, ultimately, upon anything other than its non-coincidence with the rest. Here the terms *arbitrary* and *differential* designate two correlative properties.

Everything we have said so far comes down to this. *In the language itself; there are only differences.* Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, *and no positive terms.* Whether we take the signification or the signal, the language includes neither ideas nor sounds existing prior to the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonetic differences arising out of that system. In a sign, what matters more than any idea or sound associated with it is what other sounds surround it.¹⁸⁰

Joyce challenges his reader to determine which sounds are significant, to find the differential relations that allow arbitrary signifiers to carry value. For instance, the word "war" (FW 142.30) may be pronounced in different ways, so that it may mean "war" or "were," and our task is to think of all possible ways of sounding the letters in order to give them meaning. But the process is more complex, for we rapidly compare the sound sequence of "war" with all sounds from which it differs and which it is like in order to determine in what way it is

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 116 and 118; Saussure's emphasis.

significant. This process occurs whenever we use language, but Joyce exploits it in *Finnegans Wake*. His play with significant sounds calls attention to our activity of finding referents and exposes the arbitrary nature of the link between signifier and referent. Joyce increases the difficulty of our task and intensifies his exposure of signification because *Finnegans Wake* contains numerous languages, with the result that we do not know which differential systems of sound are relevant at any given instant. When Joyce almost overwhelms the reader with a confusing stream of sound, he thereby separates signifiers from their signifieds and calls attention to the signifiers that constitute an autonomous system based on difference.

Reference in *Finnegans Wake* is not merely ambiguous, in which case the link between signifiers and signifieds would be secure but the relationship among signifieds uncertain. Instead, Joyce makes us conscious of the process of identifying signifiers with signifieds because we discover meanings by differentiating a unit of sound that we can match with a concept. There is a continual interplay between postulated concepts and sound groups which calls attention to the two differential systems of sound and concepts and the arbitrary links between them. Sound is presented as a world of its own, an autonomous system that must be related to the conceptual world. As Saussure observes, "the language itself is a form, not a substance,"¹¹¹ and Joyce separates this form from the content to which it refers and which makes the articulation or disruption of its temporal flow possible.¹¹²

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120; italicized in original.

¹¹² In "Approaches to the Artist as a Young Language Teacher," a rare application of Saussurian linguistics to *Finnegans Wake*, Kenner discusses differential relations but does so without fully exploring the relationship between signifiers and signifieds. Kenner observes that because language is based on difference rather than a natural link between signifier and signified, a given signifier brings to mind and is understood in contrast to those from which it differs; this interplay is prominent in *Finnegans Wake* and serves to create content, to call forth words not printed on the page:

It is an odd property of *Finnegans Wake* that it brings vividly to mind so many words that it does not use. They are often more vivid than the words on the page, and they exist in the mind's ear to specify what the words on the page are not (p. 336).

Kenner extends this principle to other levels of the text and argues that the relationships among entities such as "characters" are differential (for instance, we can begin to understand what a Mookse *is* by realizing that it is *not* a Gripes [p. 335]). In effect, Kenner believes, we are creating the referent, the "Mookse": it does not exist in the "real," extratextual world but seems to acquire characteristics and reality because it is a product of its relation to another entity, the Gripes. Kenner sees the origin of this quality of *Finnegans Wake* in Joyce's use of

The differential relations among signifiers that permit us to segment a flow of sound are an instance of what Joseph Frank calls internal reference. This can best be understood if we contrast the predominant relationship between sound and meaning in "Proteus" with an especially clear (but not unrepresentative) instance of sound usage in *Finnegans Wake*. We saw in the last chapter that the sound of some words in "Proteus" is onomatopoeic and that rhythm may also echo the lexical content of words so that there is an immanence of form in content and of spatial pattern in time. In *Finnegans Wake*, however, sound is predominantly functional rather than onomatopoeic: the qualities of the sounds (such as vowel length and nasal quality) are unimportant because the sounds are relational, not imitative. Just as sounds are "contrastive" or "relative" within the differential system of signifiers,¹³³ sound in *Finnegans Wake* is based upon internal relations. For example, the *s* and *b* sounds in "from swerve of shore to bend of bay" (*FW* 3.1-2) are not in themselves significant, and their primary purpose is to relate the motion of the river to a particular point of reference ("shore" or "bay"): the similarity of sounds creates rather than merely echoes content. We eventually find a close connection between sound and meaning, but the functional use of sound first separates the word as an object with its own qualities from its meaning. The word is a

¹³²(cont'd) the "Berlitz method" as a language teacher. Because students do not "talk about" the language they are learning but rather *use* it,

Slowly, as they proceed, a universe of discourse, commencing from a very few words like glove and shoe and umbrella and rapidly accreting population, will sustain itself in the room between them, cohered by grammar and usage, and will *generate* such realities as are talked "about."

That is the principle by which Mookses are born, and the world into which they are born. . . is wholly that of language (p. 342; Kenner's emphasis).

But Kenner does not adequately show that it is the internal reference of language that creates the Mookse, or any other entity. On the level of words, we can see that a *signified* is not created by difference but that the arbitrary *link* between signifier and signified is created; similarly, the difference between the Mookse and the Gripes does not mean that the Mookse itself is created. It is not the case that "words can create Mookses" (p. 345), ones that we might expect to "see" in the extra-textual world (p. 334), and difference may, by contrast, in fact intensify the fictionality of the Mookse by drawing attention to the medium of representation. Because the link rather than the signified is created, what is crucial in *Finnegans Wake* is not difference or internal reference among signifiers or among signifieds but Joyce's exposure of the link between signifier and signified. Kenner does not discuss Joyce's extreme disruption of the relation of signifier and signified that calls attention to reference, but this is the key to the language of *Finnegans Wake*. Kenner's application of Saussurian linguistics to *Finnegans Wake* is interesting but limited and sometimes questionable.

¹³³Saussure, p. 117.

sequence of sounds that first displays internal, spatial reference to other sounds on a non-semantic level and then shows external reference to a signified.

Once we have posited signifieds, these concepts may also display influential patterns of internal reference. We are inclined to recognize as important ideas which recur in the confusing plurality of *Finnegans Wake* and which belong to a web of interconnections. Like spatial patterns of sound, though, these links do not escape time, for they continually change shape as they incorporate more elements from the teeming book. But once again, the most important factor is not the large quantity of material in *Finnegans Wake* but its essential instability, which can be understood only if we look more closely at the link between sound and referent in *Finnegans Wake*.

Signifiers and signifieds have a spatial relation that is different in character from internal reference among sounds alone or among referents. A sign can be understood as a spatial juxtaposition of two elements: while the words themselves are first an unbroken stream of sound, and concepts, by themselves, are fluid, once sound patterns are linked by convention to referents a spatial relation emerges. This is true not only of nouns but of all parts of speech, for the stasis resides not in the referent but in its link with its signifier. We are usually aware of this quality only in special circumstances: allusions, for instance, and highly ambiguous signs that seem to branch out in a number of directions are obviously spatial.

If there is a temporal dimension in this reference, it is transcended. The signified to which a signifier refers seems to exist prior to the signifier, to belong to a stable pool of potential meanings that is antecedent to a given usage of its signifier. But while we can say that the referent seems prior in time, it is more accurate to say that it is timeless: a given signifier refers to one or many signifieds that belong to a pool that is spatial, outside time or before time. Joyce heightens this spatial quality because he does not limit reference to current meanings but instead incorporates all past meanings into a large, atemporal pool of possibilities. Neither current meanings nor etymological roots are given priority because of their position in time. Etymology must be considered if sense is to be made of some words,

and archaic words should be recognized as such, but past meanings have no priority, so that we cannot appeal to the root of a word to find a stable meaning. In short, the pool of potential meanings seems to have prior existence, but within this pool there is no temporal order that would enable us to secure meaning.

The crucial conclusion at this stage of my argument is that reference is unstable not because there is a large number of possible referents but because there is no original or privileged referent that would end the temporal play of signification by creating a stable, spatial link between signifier and signified. We seek to find one meaning that is primary or else a handful of meanings that can be ordered hierarchically or reconciled to form a larger, stable complex of meaning. Eventually, we reach an impasse, a point at which we recognize that the atemporal origin or primary meaning cannot be found. Our goal is to solidify the link between signifier and signified, but Joyce does not allow meaning to close; as a result, we continually chase meaning in time, following the play of signification in the hope that we will find a spatial origin or ground. Because Joyce ruptures the link between the two differential systems of signifiers and signifieds, we both find a temporal flow of sound and follow, in time, the play of signification. While our quest for spatial stability in reference necessarily fails, we nonetheless persist because of the continual renewal of our illusory hope that an origin which escapes time can be secured. We are aware of etymology, but we discover that root meanings fail to stabilize words; we may finally discover a referent for an odd sequence of sounds, only to find that play within the system of signifiers and the differential relations of signifieds removes any stability that we believed we had found.

An example of this absence of a stable, spatial relation between signifier and signified is the play of meaning in the book's title. Perhaps the first meaning that occurs to us is that the "*Wake*" is an observance of death, specifically Finnegans' death. But it is immediately evident that there are numerous other possibilities which remove any priority that we may attach to the "first" meaning: "*Wake*" may mean "to awaken" (which is opposed to the sleep or death of Finnegans), and it may also refer to a ship's wake. The play of signification extends further,

and some examples can be found in the text itself (we are told, for instance, that "Timm Finn again's weak" [FW 93.35-6], of "*This Funnycoon's Week*" [FW 105.21], of "Fenegans Wick" [FW 358.23], and of "Wimmegame's fake" [FW 375.16-17]), while numerous others emerge if we think of the differential system of sound (wake, wade, waft, waif, quake, etc.).¹¹⁴ Reference is similarly open in the case of "*Finnegan*." The absence of an apostrophe suggests that it is not the possessive form of the name of one person but is a plural noun, although this latter sense does not become dominant. "*Finnegan*" is even less stable because, as David Lodge points out, "*Finnegan* contains the double echo of 'finish again' and 'begin again'";¹¹⁵ it also brings to mind "sin again," "grin again" (FW 580.20), "win a gain" (FW 358.19), "*Timeagen*" (FW 415.15), and the "funn" at "Flammagen's ball" (FW 321.17). This plurality of meaning is qualitatively different from ambiguity: the instability does not arise because there are numerous signifieds but because there is a separation of signifiers and signifieds that permits the play of sound within the differential system of signifiers. This leads us to attempt to secure a spatial relationship between signifier and signified by finding the privileged, atemporal referent, but we find only the continual, temporal play between a signifier and the sounds with which it differs, including both those in the given sound sequence and those which are significant in the language but happen to be absent. Each signifier and each signified calls up the signifiers and signifieds with which it differs and which negatively define it, so that we continually follow the web of interconnections in the differential systems. Because of this negative definition, a series of contrasts emerges: a wake for the dead, for instance, opposes the notion of awakening, although there is life as well as death at a wake, and this life or motion of wakefulness contrasts with the stillness of a ship's wake (which follows motion). The signifieds continually undermine one another and lead us on a continual pursuit through differential relations: if we begin by trying to secure reference in the title, we start an endless quest that carries us throughout *Finnegans Wake* and throughout the system of language.

¹¹⁴Compare Joyce's particularly clear play with reference in Part III, Chapter iv: ". . . curious dreamers, curious dramas, curious deman, plagiast dayman, playajest dearest, plaguiest dourest" (FW 577.31-3).

¹¹⁵Lodge, p. 133.

This is not to suggest that we fail to find meanings to work with along the way but rather to suggest that reference lacks stability, a spatial stability that would end a temporal pursuit. We can say, for example, that the absence of an apostrophe in "*Finnegans*" suggests that experience is recurrent or archetypal, not the unique possession of an individual, and we can see a pattern of opposition in the meanings of "*Wake*," in which movement is always in tension with stillness. But these notions do not close reference and show priority. Joyce upsets reference by forcing apart the temporal flow of sound from spatial reference, and while we find referents along the way and can posit interpretations using them, we find no stable ground. Because we can posit temporary meaning, our quest is not merely open or aimless but is directed. As we hop from referent to referent and among the significant sounds that constitute the differential linguistic systems, we follow a winding but not unconstrained path. If we begin with the sequence of sounds "regginbrow" (*FW* 3.14), which we cannot demarcate as a "word," numerous referents start to emerge: rainbow, begin, egg, regain, reginal, brow, row, etc. Gradually, plays of signification lead us further and further away from the original sound sequence of "regginbrow," and these connections can be followed endlessly. The immediate context of the sound sequence directs but does not close the play of signification, for the context is not stable but continually expands until the entire book becomes a web of interconnecting threads that we follow in time. While this quest never ends, it is nonetheless shaped and sustained rather than aimless; *Finnegans Wake* is unstable not because we can impose any meaning that suits us but because the paths of meaning are interminable.

While the relationship among sounds alone and among referents may at first seem to give primacy to spatial form, the unstable connection between these signifiers and signifieds allows time to predominate. If this link between signifiers and signifieds were merely ambiguous, reference would seem to spread out to fill a limited amount of space; but because the link is instead severed, we find a flow of signifiers and reference that continually changes in time. By building upon the linguistic theory of Saussure, who was unwittingly the forerunner of deconstruction, we have seen that reference in *Finnegans Wake* lacks the spatial ground that

is the unattainable goal sought by post-structuralist critics.¹¹⁶ It is important to notice that Joyce has exploited the qualities of language that create stability and that the reader does not impose this understanding upon the text. In other words, deconstructionist theory illuminates the text and the experience of reading, and it can be seen as a tool for practical analysis rather than as an end in itself. Most importantly, it is a use of deconstructionist theory that allows for considerable reader activity and can be made compatible with the reader's other findings. As we will see, the lack of spatial stability that characterizes word reference has counterparts in other dimensions of *Finnegans Wake*.

Beyond the level of words are tenuous spatial patterns, such as grammatical constructions, that cannot contain the flow of sound. Once we have broken the phonetic duration into unstable words, we can move to larger syntactic shapes which, while sequential or temporal, are also spatial because they are patterns of internal reference and because rules of syntax describe ideal shapes which are beyond particular manifestations in time. Joyce often seems to disrupt or ignore rules of syntax, but they have a subtle importance, as the construction of the first paragraph shows. The phrases that are marked by commas follow a pattern, for they grow steadily in size and build upon one another: the first word presents and describes an object, and the second phrase places it in relation to a point ("Eve and Adam's" [*FW* 3.1]); then the river is seen in relation to other points of reference, and we follow the river's movement just as we move from monosyllable to monosyllable; the fourth clause makes us stand back and see the entire pattern of "recirculation" (*FW* 3.2). The sentence, then, "brings us" (*FW* 3.2) through the cycle. The first paragraph grows as its clauses increase in size and the focus changes, and then the cycle begins again in the following paragraph, which also starts with an object ("Sir Tristram") and a phrase of one and a half feet. However, the syntax of the first paragraph is unable to contain the eruption of language by closing the play of meaning, for relations dictated by syntax are not constraining: for instance, syntax suggests

¹¹⁶And, by extending Saussure's argument, which has affinities to the theory of Joseph Frank, as we saw in the first chapter, we have found that *Finnegans Wake* is temporal rather than characterized by Frank's "spatial form."

between signifiers and signifieds, he shows us the unattained ideal of a novelistic spatial form.

Joyce also raises the possibility that there is an implied author, an omniscient designer within whose mind the entirety of the book could be apprehended as a spatial whole. Not only would this implied author define the boundaries of the text, but we could also attribute to him the rearrangement of a causal, chronological story into a plot with spatial form. Joyce sometimes hints that there is such a creator, especially by means of pronouns. The "riverrun," for instance, "brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs" (*FW* 3.1-3; emphasis added): the plural pronoun suggests that there is an implied author, although one whose single voice cannot be distinguished. The elusiveness of the implied author is more extreme in *Finnegans Wake* than in *Ulysses*. I noted in the previous chapter that the ambiguous pronouns of "Proteus" make the narrator's voice unclear and disrupt our own relation as subjects to the text as object, and in "Penelope" we are aware of an obscure implied author who transforms duration to give it linguistic representation; while there seems to be some kind of authorial presence in *Finnegans Wake*, we cannot define an authorial voice (just as the letter which the hen finds in the mud pile and which is a symbol or analogue of the whole of *Finnegans Wake* has a creator, but one whose signature cannot be read [*FW* 114-15]). The linguistic duration may seem, because of its oddity, to belong to an idiosyncratic voice, and we seem to conspire with or to play against a mischievous implied author who constructs puzzles for us, but the flow of language also appears to be inherent in language, to be the inevitable quality of a vital, self-propelling and autonomous system. The voice disappears, but not without first suggesting that an ideal of novelistic normalcy can be found within this experimental text. Once again, the reader is prompted to search for something that would give spatial stability to the work but which has only a fleeting presence, and our temporal quest is thereby sustained and directed, even though we fail to reach our goal.

Margot Norris is correct to remind us of the "novelistic fallacy,"¹⁸⁷ which is the assumption that *Finnegans Wake* is in essence a novel, one that has been enriched or is

¹⁸⁷Norris, p. 10.

decadent."¹⁸⁸ Norris concludes that Joyce's "departures" from traditional novel form "signify a critique of the novel itself"¹⁸⁹ and, while she does not specify the nature of this critique, she implies that Joyce presents the novel form as undesirable and, perhaps, that he parodies it. However, the novel form is primarily impotent in *Finnegans Wake* rather than undesirable: while Joyce's distortion serves partly to ridicule novelistic form, the distortion also strengthens it, converting it into a lost ideal, one that we hope, in vain, can give order to the confusion in *Finnegans Wake*. The importance of this form emerges when Norris shows that she is unable to entirely reject the novelistic "fallacy." Norris readily and categorically asserts that *Finnegans Wake* is a "dream-work"¹⁹⁰ and thereby suggests that there is a constraining story, the story of dreaming. While Norris seems to recognize, in practice, that this story is just one dimension of a multivalent book, she is nonetheless drawn by an order-giving novelistic "fallacy." We are tempted by Joyce to look for novelistic form because it is valid rather than entirely parodied, but it is also weak and remains an unattainable ideal.

Like the novelistic ideal, the Viconian patterns of *Finnegans Wake* constitute a primarily spatial order that fails to dominate time but that nonetheless serves as the goal of our temporal reading. In order to understand this complex relation, we must first consider alternate ways of interpreting Vico's cycles. One might argue that time and space are in balanced fusion in the patterns because time has spatial shape. Joyce seems to be presenting this view when he tells us that "in this drury world of ours, Father Times and Mother Spacies boil their kettle with their crutch" (*FW* 600.2-3), but closer examination suggests that time and space are reconciled only momentarily and in order to perpetuate time. Male and female, like time and space, come together to "boil their kettle" or apply the energy of fire to the waters of creation: the aging generation uses their "crutch" in order to create a new generation (the "lad and lass in the lane" who acquire the parents' knowledge of procreation [*FW* 600.3-4]), and time is thereby propelled. This temporary reconciliation of the sexes and of the dimensions

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

occurs at dawn and in the *recorso* stage of the Viconian cycles, when change through time predominates. At all levels of meaning, the union of "Father Times and Mother Spaces" is not a permanent fusion but rather contributes to the more prominent dissociation of time and space.

Viconian patterns can also be described as predominantly spatial, for time and space are resolved in the patterns through the containment of time within space. In *Time and Reality*, Margaret Church summarizes the role of Viconian ideas in *Finnegans Wake* and suggests that Joyce was attracted to their spatial quality:

The number *four*, representing Vico's four cycles, is basic to *Finnegans Wake*, written in four books. The first book, Book of the Parents, is divided into eight sections, the first four dealing with the father image, the last four with the mother image and its projections. Wherever there are groupings of four, one can find parallels with Vico's four cycles, the divine, the heroic, the human, the *recorso*. Joyce refers to this system as a "vicocicrometer" ("eggburst, eggblend, eggburial and hatch-as-hatch can") (p. 614), implying that Vico's pattern works with the regularity of an instrument. It is this regularity and predictability that drew Joyce to Vico and counteracted for him the insecurity found in uncontrolled flux.¹⁹¹

"Vico's philosophy," Church later contends, "appealed to Joyce as a synthesis between time and space, between that which changes and that which remains. Through it he transcended the fact of man's impermanence."¹⁹²

However, just as the Viconian pattern in "Penelope" is weak, unable to contain the temporal fluidity of Molly's duration (or the opposing duration of language in the chapter), the Viconian patterns of *Finnegans Wake* lack the obtrusiveness and capacity to give order that is necessary if the temporal flow of sound is to be contained within space. While time and space are resolved within the pattern, this predominantly spatial pattern remains in tension with the abounding temporality of the book.

The Viconian patterns are not exposed as false (that is to say, shown to be part of the spatial world of unreality that opposes Bergson's duration), nor are they a spatial pattern that successfully overcomes an undesirable temporal flow. Neither time nor space gains ascendancy

¹⁹¹Church, p. 55.

¹⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 65.

at the expense of the other, but they instead exist in a productive tension. Critics sometimes fail to see that both time and space are undermined, with the spatial goal brought into question as much as the desirability of duration. We have seen in the first chapter that both Shiv K. Kumar and Robert Klawitter grant ultimate reality to duration, although neither denies the presence of spatial patterns: Klawitter argues that patterns belong to Bergson's world of unreality, and Kumar, while recognizing that *Finnegans Wake* contains a "space-time polarity,"¹⁹³ nonetheless argues that Joyce treats duration "as the only determining factor in assessing human experience."¹⁹⁴ Spatial patterns, they suggest, are undermined in favour of duration. Like Kumar, Margaret Church recognizes the opposition between time and space in *Finnegans Wake* and contends that Joyce, unlike Bergson, "saw the necessity of both duration and space and of their interaction in *Finnegans Wake*,"¹⁹⁵ but, as we have just seen, she argues that Vico's patterns successfully resolve the two by giving primacy to space over temporal flux. While Church is correct to take the patterns seriously, more seriously than critics who grant primacy to time, she overemphasizes their capacity to reconcile time and space. The Viconian pattern is in tension with the flux of *Finnegans Wake* and is a predominantly spatial ideal that we seek in the hope of ending our temporal quest; it is artificial, created and imposed by the mind, but it is nonetheless a valid, though unsuccessful, way of giving spatial order to time.

In large part, the Viconian pattern fails to dominate time because its cycles have no beginning or end. Because the recurring cycles are continuous, and they seem to have no extremities that would give them a limited, spatial shape, they are subject to time rather than subjugate it. In the first chapter, I proposed that *Finnegans Wake* is not a circular object that we can perceive, simultaneously in space but is instead a never-ending coil that involves its reader, and this dominance of time over space can again be seen in the spiral Viconian cycles, in which the *recorso* always leads back to the age of divinity. Of course, each reader has a first reading, but rather than set in motion the book's cycles, we seem to join an already continuing

¹⁹³Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 134.

¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵Church, p. 64.

cycle, one that is largely propelled by vital and autonomous language. Margot Norris makes a questionable but illuminating comment when she wonders whether the end of *Finnegans Wake* leads to its beginning:

Although it is commonly supposed to be so, I recall no conclusive evidence that the last word of the book connects with the first to form a complete circle. But even if it does, the last "the" stands alone at the end of the work, completely devoid of semantic meaning, and followed only by the remaining blank paper of the page. For "the," although it means nothing in itself, means something in relation to other words. Its sole purpose is to anticipate the next word, to guarantee that something will follow, something definite and particular. The "the" at the end of *Finnegans Wake* anticipates nothing—a definite nothing, the void, the silence, the death of ALP.¹⁹⁶

While it is more reasonable to say that the final word of *Finnegans Wake* is followed by the first word rather than by "silence" and that *Finnegans Wake* is indeed "the book of Doublends Jined" (*FW* 20.15-16), Norris makes us question the smoothness of this return to the first stage of the four part cycle. We do not easily and automatically repeat the cycle but instead feel a jolt as we move from end to beginning, which suggests that we are starting a new and somewhat different cycle. There is an unending series of cycles which is extended in time rather than limited in space; there is no original cycle, nor is there ever silence after the flow of language has completed the *recorso* stage.

In short, the subjugation of the Viconian patterns to time arises in two ways: first, they cannot contain the overwhelming temporal fluidity of *Finnegans Wake* and, secondly, they lack an origin or terminal that would demarcate temporal limits and permit us to see a contained, spatial shape. But they nonetheless constitute an unattainable, spatial ideal and are not entirely undermined by the temporal flow of the book.

Like the Viconian pattern, the various archetypes in *Finnegans Wake* cannot escape time. Strictly speaking, there are no archetypes but only manifestations that are particular in time. This is reminiscent of Iser's questionable argument that *Ulysses* presents, in essence, the triumph of particularity over ideals and that "the 'archetype' does not exist in itself, but must

¹⁹⁶Norris, p. 139.

be brought into existence by a realization."¹⁹⁷ There is, though, an important difference between Iser's understanding of *Ulysses* and my interpretation of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. While Iser suggests that the plural manifestations of archetypes are more valuable than the constraining ideal that lies behind them (largely because particularity yields indeterminacy in the text and freedom for the reader), it is more accurate to say that spatial archetypes and their manifestations in time are fused in *Ulysses* and that archetypes or ideals become more elusive but no less valuable in *Finnegans Wake*. The goal of the reader of *Finnegans Wake* is to find the spatial archetypes that inform the numerous and protean manifestations in the book. However, it is not entirely accurate to speak of the archetypes as "protean": while the mythological figure Proteus has a usual shape and assumes various disguises in order to avoid prophesying, it is difficult to see the various manifestations in *Finnegans Wake* as departures from a norm. In short, we cannot distinguish archetypes from manifestations; we can, for instance, see a series of opposed pairs, including Shem and Shaun, Nolan and Bruno, Mercy and Justice, and Cain and Abel, but which is the primary archetype that transcends time? We see only manifestations, ones which have an elusive timeless quality that cannot be secured because the manifestations are constantly changing in time and dissolving into one another.

We might expect to find that recurrent manifestations of archetypes exhibit the internal reference that characterizes spatial form and that the archetype itself transcends time. In the first chapter, I noted Joseph Frank's general discussion of "eternal prototypes"¹⁹⁸ that escape time and, more particularly, Margaret Church argues that Joyce saw Jung's theories of recurrent archetypes "as means of defeating change";¹⁹⁹ Philip Rahv argues that "*Finnegans Wake* is the most complete example of 'spatial form' in modern literature," apparently because "the mythic bias is in the ascendant, [and] the historical element recedes."²⁰⁰ But rather than lift us out of time, archetypes are brought within the temporal world: we see them only in the

¹⁹⁷Iser, p. 230.

¹⁹⁸Frank, 1963, p. 60.

¹⁹⁹Church, p. 63.

²⁰⁰Philip Rahv, "The Myth and the Powerhouse," in *Literature and the Sixth Sense* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), p. 212.

form of their continually changing temporal manifestations, for they, like Joyce's readers, are trapped in time. This immersion in time is not entirely undesirable, for it creates a sense of renewal and vitality, but it necessarily restricts our understanding of spatial ideals. Most importantly, the divinity that gives spatial boundaries to the temporal world of fallen humanity cannot be known: in Part II, Chapter ii, which begins and ends with Joyce's most extensive considerations of the immanence of the divine in the worldly, Joyce shows that the divine can only be approached through the systems of symbols created by fallen humanity, systems which hinder as much as help our necessarily unsuccessful quest to escape these very constructions that pervade our temporal world. We are overwhelmed by time and cannot perceive transcending archetypes or spatial ideals.

Some examples are illuminating: the numerous rivers in the book are instances of an archetypal river and are manifestations of the unchanging concept "time," but their fluidity within time is overwhelming and makes the archetype a remote, unattainable ideal; Anna Livia Plurabelle, like the other "characters" in *Finnegans Wake*, is seen only in her changing manifestations, which are not easily reduced to a monolithic archetype. Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson argue that the various roles of Anna are

continually shifting and mingling into each other. Anna is the principle of vivid movement, ever setting in motion and keeping in motion the river-flow of time.²⁰¹

But while it is true that Anna continually changes in time, she should not and cannot be reduced to "the principle" of movement. Like all the characters in *Finnegans Wake*, Anna evolves and merges with her surroundings, so that her spatial, archetypal qualities are overwhelmed by time. The incipient tension that we saw in "Penelope" between Molly's temporality and her archetypal quality is evident in extreme form in *Finnegans Wake*, although for a different reason: because an archetype is difficult to ascertain and solidify, this spatial ideal contrasts with an essentially temporal reality. We pursue patterns of internal reference in the hope that we can secure the volatile archetype that we glimpse, but manifestations in time

²⁰¹Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson, *A Skeleton Key to Finnegans Wake* (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), p. 19.

predominate over spatial shape. The archetypal patterns fail to end our temporal quest through *Finnegans Wake*, although they serve as a distant goal that directs this quest.

The fall is a crucial example of an archetype that cannot escape time. Like the Viconian patterns that have no beginning, the fall does not exist before time nor set time in motion; like archetypes that fail to transcend time, the fall is perceived only in the form of its manifestations, which seem to be metamorphoses that occur and flow together in time. Before the fall there is unity, a spatial unity, but Joyce never shows us this original state that escapes time; instead, we see only the plurality that follows the fall. Nonetheless, Joyce suggests that the original, atemporal state may have existed and, once again, he taunts us with the illusory possibility that we can discover spatial stability. Just as the reader and "characters" of *Finnegans Wake* cannot ascertain how and when HCE fell but are usually certain that he did fall, we are unable to discover when humanity (which HCE symbolizes, often in conjunction with ALP) suffered its original fall.

Joyce's careful presentation of the fall can be seen most clearly if we look at the first few paragraphs of *Finnegans Wake*. The river that runs "past" Eve and Adam's (*FW* 3.1) does so in both a geographical and a temporal sense. If it is understood to be running past Eve and Adam's in space, then time does not begin with the fall and instead flows in a continuous cycle. Moreover, we have already seen that *Finnegans Wake* is a never-ending coil rather than a circular object and, as a result, the fall occurs repeatedly and does not start the flow of time. But "past" also has a temporal meaning which suggests that Paradise existed long ago and is a golden age that can be separated from the flow of time. While the spatial meaning of "past" immerses us in time, the temporal meaning gives us a perspective beyond that of the moment. This second meaning prompts us to seek a golden age that escapes time, but the first suggests that we cannot succeed; fallen humanity can only assume that an unfallen, spatial state once existed, and we are trapped in post-lapsarian time. In the following paragraph of *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce upsets the linearity of Christian time by again suggesting that the fall occurs continuously. That the "regginbrow" (*FW* 3.14) or rainbow immediately precedes "The fall"

(*FW* 3.15) suggests that sin and the flood are not a consequence of the fall: Christian time is denied in favour of recurrence. In the third paragraph, Joyce presents yet another instance of a fall, that of Humpty Dumpty, and thereby suggests that the fall is recurrent rather than an origin. But within this example, he seems to suggest that Paradise is an origin and to affirm a linear view of time, for if Humpty Dumpty is scattered by his fall, then he was once whole. However, fallen humanity cannot grasp this original state and must be content with plurality and the assumption that such a state existed and may be regained. We seek, in vain, to find the original or archetypal fall of which Humpty Dumpty is an instance.

The example of Humpty Dumpty is particularly important because it enables us to relate our search for a paradisiac origin that escapes time to our failed quest for spatial stability in word reference. Humpty's fall is described by a long, onomatopoeic word (*FW* 3.15-17), in which sound and content are fused, and we do not find the usual intertextual relations of sound that I described earlier. But the primal language that exists at the time of the fall and imitates its sound is replaced by a confusion of language (just as "the Lord dispersed them [the builders of the Tower of Babel] from there all over the earth" [Gen. 11.8] and gave them many languages). This is illustrated by the fact that the onomatopoeic quality of the word is an illusion, for the word is actually a composite of words from languages that were given to the builders of the Tower of Babel. Once this confusion has been created, the pre-fall state that is unified, original, and essentially non-linguistic cannot be seized; fallen humanity is not satisfied with pure sound and relentlessly pursues meaning, so that we cannot escape referential language. Onomatopoeic or directly referential language is an ideal, one that characterizes divinity: in *Finnegans Wake*, God is represented by pure sound that escapes the differential system of signifiers that humanity has created, as Joyce makes clear when he plays with the words "Lord" and "Loud" (*FW* 258-9); God is also represented by variants of an onomatopoeic, "hundredlettered name" which imitates the sound of thunder and which is the

"last word of perfect language" (*FW* 424.23-4).²⁰² If language is just onomatopoeic sound before the fall, then a complex reconciliation of signifiers and referents is impossible and fusion can be achieved only with a return to a simpler, lost state in which language is imitative. Nevertheless, a complex reconciliation is the reader's goal. *Finnegans Wake* is sustained as we seek to fuse sound and meaning, just as our desire to find the Original Sin amongst a multitude of instances propels the activity of reading. Our spatial goals cannot be reached, but they seem to be almost within our grasp and worth pursuing.²⁰³

²⁰²Compare the thunderbolt described by Vico, which caused men "in the bestial state of solitude" to imagine that "the sky was a vast, animate body which, with shouts, grunts and murmurs, was talking and wishing to say something to them" (Giambattista Vico, *Vico: Selected Writings*, ed. and trans. Leon Pompa [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], p. 141). This, Vico suggests, was the origin of more complex language.

²⁰³In *The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake: A Structuralist Analysis*, Margot Norris observes a comparable but extremely questionable relationship between language and the fall when she argues that,

the theme of the fallen father, the fallen God, has linguistic repercussions. . . . If the father signifies the semantic function of language, the act of giving names to things or assigning meanings to words, then the fall of the father in *Finnegans Wake* signifies that severing of words from their referents which creates a linguistic freeplay. . . (p. 124).

Not only does Norris fail to demonstrate (or even attempt to demonstrate) that freeplay occurs in *Finnegans Wake* and instead shows her incomprehension of deconstruction by speaking of "the uncertainty and ambiguity that must characterize a decentered language" (p. 128), but she also reveals how her emphasis upon Freudian and mythological criticism prevents her from fully utilizing the deconstructionist approach. She argues that the point of similarity between the "fall" of language and the fall of the father and the God is the absence of authority or regulation, for the

father's symbolic function as figure of the law is. . . analogous to the semantic function of language, which assigns to lexical items their meanings and their grammatical functions. The primordial law of the father, the incest taboo and the kinship regulations, function like those laws of phonological combination which permit certain sounds to be combined only in certain ways in the formation of words, and those laws of syntax that regulate the relationships of words in the formation of the sentence (p. 124).

Had Norris chosen a different example, such as the fall of Humpty Dumpty, it would be apparent that the problem is less the loss of authority, specifically authority as described by Freud and anthropology, but instead a more encompassing loss of stability; while neither authority nor a stable order is discovered in deconstructionist analysis, it is characterized and defined by the latter (with the former also its largest point of contact with myth, as we are about to see). In short, the strength of Norris's Freudian/structuralist position prevents her from fully reconciling it with deconstruction. This is again evident when she argues that,

Both babble, the first speech of the infant man, and thunder, the first word of God to the Semite man, represent sound without meaning or signification (p. 124).

Norris's Freudian bias prompts her to argue that sound represents the failure of signification

The idea of the continuous recurrence of sin, which lacks an origin outside time, is the key to a more general understanding of myth and Joyce's use of it. Just as the mythic events of *Finnegans Wake* (such as the fall) are continually repeated in various forms, and the book recurs continuously because it is spiral rather than circular, all performances of a ritual can be understood as a link in an unending cycle of repetition. When a rite is performed, an original, mythic event is not merely represented mimetically by an inferior copy but is recreated: the rite has immediacy because it *is* the mythical event rather than a mere acting out of it. Mircea Eliade approaches this view when he argues, in *Myth and Reality*, that,

What is involved is not a commemoration of mythical events but a reiteration of them. The protagonists of the myth are made present, one becomes their contemporary. This also implies that one is no longer living in chronological time, but in the primordial Time, the Time when the event first took place.²⁰³

While Eliade contends that a ritual is not a mere "commemoration," he does not entirely reject the notion that it is an imitation of an action rather than another occurrence of that action itself: ritual, he suggests, "re-enacts" mythic events and is a "reiteration"²⁰⁵ and is not itself the enactment. Eliade reaches this conclusion because he insists that "myth is always related to a 'creation,' it tells how something came into existence":²⁰⁶ the mythic event occurred only once, in the past, and is re-enacted but not carried out in the present; it follows that "A rite cannot be performed unless its 'origin' is known, that is, the myth that tells how it was performed for the first time."²⁰⁷ Joyce's myths show no such origin, and the same is true of all but one class of rituals, those which describe creation. Because Joyce presents no "first time," his recurrent myths do not escape the temporal flow, and even if we suspect that an origin has

²⁰³(cont'd)and the absence of power that the infant and the sinful person experiences; however, we have just seen that pure sound represents not the failure of signification and is not a "noise" (pp. 124-6) that is "an obstruction to the understanding of a message" (p. 126) but is rather the prelapsarian unification of sound and meaning, in which reference or signification is unnecessary. I do not intend to suggest that Norris should abandon her Freudian, mythological perspective but rather that her attempted eclecticism is unsuccessful because of the strength of her predominant concern.

²⁰⁴Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 19; Eliade's emphasis.

²⁰⁵*Ibid.*

²⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 17; italicized in original.

existed, we cannot specify its nature. Myth in *Finnegans Wake* is characterized by the lost origin that is also common in ritual, with the result that myth intensifies time rather than overcomes it by demarcating a beginning to time.

The absence of spatial stability in myth is the point of similarity between mythic and deconstructionist interpretations of *Finnegans Wake*. We have found that word reference is predominantly temporal because the spatial link between signifier and referent never becomes stable, nor can we find an original sense that has priority; we also follow a trail of manifestations of myth without escaping time or discovering the first, atemporal instance. I have repeatedly pointed out that Margot Norris fails to reconcile her deconstructionist approach with the mythical and psychoanalytic methods that she favours; it should now be apparent that the predominance of time that arises from the lack of spatial origins is the common discovery of each method when applied to *Finnegans Wake*. The psychoanalytic critic seeks in vain for the origins of a sense of sin, the mythological critic cannot discover the origin of various manifestations of archetypes, and the deconstructionist fails to find word origins and instead encounters continuous temporal deferral. There is a remarkable consistency among the various aspects of the text, for in all cases spatial stability is the goal of a temporal quest.

Finnegans Wake is not, as one might expect, characterized by predominantly spatial ambiguity, archetypes, and Viconian patterns but is instead temporal. Nonetheless, space is not entirely undermined and it, in turn, brings time into question. Space is not shown to be somehow false but is instead an ideal order, albeit a largely impotent one that cannot contain the flow of time; time shows a comparable duality, for while it is vital and purposeful, it is incomplete because its spatial destination is never reached. As a result, there is an extreme and balanced tension between time and space, in which neither is fully affirmed nor undermined. This tension can be seen most clearly in Part I, Chapter vi of *Finnegans Wake*, in which Professor Jones tells the story of the Mookse and the Gripes.

Chapter vi of Part I is a series of questions, one of which is addressed to Professor Jones, "so eminent a spatialist" (*FW* 149.18-19). Part of his reply is the fable of "The Mookse and The Gripes" (*FW* 152.15), which is intended to justify his insistence upon the primacy of space. Numerous critics believe that there is an opposition between time and space in the story: Shiv K. Kumar, for instance, lists "polarized couples symbolizing time and space respectively" and includes the Gripes (time) and the Mookse (space),²⁰⁸ and Margaret Church calls the story of the Mookse and the Gripes "a tale of time and space in conflict."²⁰⁹ Most critics also contend that this space-time polarity is somehow resolved. Kumar hints that there is a resolution of the conflict in the story and, after continually emphasizing Joyce's Bergsonian preference for duration, makes a general (and puzzling) conclusion:

Whereas Shaunian space only divides, measures and calculates, Shemian *durée* remains a process of eternal renewal. But in *Finnegans Wake* Joyce, whatever his bias, impersonally comes out for their ultimate union.²¹⁰

"Impersonally," "ultimate": Kumar does not develop these vague ideas but instead briefly seems to dismiss his argument concerning Joyce's time "bias." Margaret Church contends that Nuvoletta "attempts a reconciliation" between the Mookse and the Gripes and that the tale "actually show[s] the interdependence of space and time,"²¹¹ but she does not clearly describe the nature of this "reconciliation" or "interdependence" and suggests both that time and space are fused and that they merely coexist in peace. In order to clarify the opposition of time and space and to determine whether there is a reconciliation, it is necessary to look closely at this relatively explicit consideration of time and space and, most importantly, to look at the latent temporal and spatial qualities of the fable.

There is no question that Joyce ridicules the "spatialist," but we must be careful to separate Joyce's attitude toward the professor himself from his understanding of space.

²⁰⁸Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 134. Similarly, Hugh Kenner argues that "... we derive a strong sense (to say the least) that Mookses are space-creatures: Gripeses therefore by contrast time-bound" (Kenner, "Approaches to the Artist as a Young Language Teacher," p. 339).

²⁰⁹Church, p. 63.

²¹⁰Kumar, *Bergson and the Stream of Consciousness Novel*, p. 137.

²¹¹Church, pp. 63-4.

Professor Jones in large part represents Wyndham Lewis, with whom Joyce had a long controversy.²¹² Typical of Lewis's comments on Joyce is his statement in *Time and Western Man* that "Without all the uniform pervasive growth of the time-philosophy starting from the little seed planted by Bergson, discredited, and now spreading more vigorously than ever, there would be no *Ulysses*. . .":²¹³ Lewis repeatedly bemoans the predominance of time in the theories of Bergson and Einstein, as well as in the writings of Joyce. But the story that Jones/Lewis tells does not justify his attack upon the time-philosophers, nor does it ironically affirm Joyce's supposed preference for time. The relationship between time and space in the tale is more complex.

I propose that the two dimensions of time and space can never be clearly separated to form what Kumar calls a "polarity" and instead there is only a changing emphasis in the professor's tale. Rather than find a wholly spatial Mookse and temporal Gripes, we discover an intertwining of the dimensions; when one dimension does predominate, it is the Mookse who represents time and the Gripes space. The Mookse proceeds through time but also across space: "Eins within a space and a wearywide space it wast ere wohnded a Mookse" (*FW* 152.18-19). The word "Eins" alerts the reader to the presence of Einsteinian concepts, specifically the idea that time and space form a continuum rather than constitute distinct entities. In order to describe any event, Einstein and his followers argued, both its location in space and its position in time must be given (although to separate the two in this way is to create an artificial distinction). The Mookse is within this space-time continuum, and the temporal dimension is emphasized in his case because he is in motion rather than stationary. It is true that the Mookse has "specious heavings" (*FW* 153.17), but the Gripes similarly talks of his "spatial ineshellsis" (*FW* 154.35); while the Mookse calls the Gripes a "temporizer" (*FW* 154.26), it is

²¹²Geoffrey Wagner describes this conflict in "Wyndham Lewis and James Joyce: A Study in Controversy," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 56 (1957), 57-66. At the end of his article (p. 66), Wagner briefly hints that Joyce did not entirely reject space, but Wagner does not pursue this idea and instead focuses on the opposition between time and space as it reflects the conflict between the two men.

²¹³Wyndham Lewis, "An Analysis of the Mind of James Joyce," in *Time and Western Man* (1927; rpt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 89.

because the Gripes had asked to learn the clock time, which neither knows; it is the Mookse who declares "Let thor be orlog [French "horloge," clock]" (*FW* 154.23), who wears an "o'cloak" (*FW* 155.2), who declares that "it is out of my temporal to help you. . ." (*FW* 155.10-11), and who "would a walking go" because sitting is "broady oval" (bloody awful; *FW* 152.19-20). The Mookse is not the polar opposite of the Gripes (indeed, nothing has such distinct boundaries in *Finnegans Wake*), but he does represent a predominance of time. Like his antecedent, the fox in Aesop's fable of "The Fox and the Grapes," the Mookse happens upon something which he wishes to get the better of, namely the Gripes (grapes). The Gripes is also within the space-time continuum, but he is predominantly spatial because he is "bolt downright" (*FW* 153.10-11); while he is above a flowing stream that represents time, the Gripes himself is motionless and the stream comments ironically upon his stasis as it babbles past. In short, two things are apparent: time and space are not distinct poles but always belong to the space-time continuum, and the predominantly temporal Mookse is in pursuit of the predominantly spatial Gripes, so that time and space are again closely connected. We see, in miniature, the relationship of time and space that characterizes the whole of *Finnegans Wake*, for space is the goal of a temporal pursuit: the Mookse encounters the Gripes because "Allmookse must to Moodend much as Allrouths, austereways or wastersways, in roaming run through Room" (*FW* 153.21-3) (roughly, all roads run through Rome/Room/Raum [German "raum," space²¹⁴]), just as the reader pursues space through time. Rather than grant priority to either dimension, we must recognize that both are partially desirable and, at the same time, that both are partially undermined because of their tension. Jones/Lewis does not prove his spatial point with his fable, but he is not ironically undermined by a tale that favours time.

Before I show how these ideas are embedded in the telling of the story, I will briefly consider whether a reconciliation of time and space is achieved. There are three possible resolutions of the conflict, one within the story, one ironically absent, and a third elsewhere in *Finnegans Wake*. First, Margaret Church argues that Nuvoletta overcomes a space-time

²¹⁴Roland McHugh, *Annotations to Finnegans Wake* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 153.

"conflict":

When these two figures come to blows and the Mookse overcomes the Gripes, it is their sister Nuvoletta who attempts a reconciliation. . . . Thus Professor Jones's tales, intended to prove the superiority of the space-oriented man, actually show the interdependence of space and time.²¹⁵

But while Nuvoletta may stop the fight, she does not resolve the tension (which is not, we have seen, a full opposition) between time and space. Neither does she embody a resolution, for she is dominated by time: "the river tripped on her by and by, lapping as though her heart was brook: *Why, why, why! Weh, O weh! I'se sò silly to be flowing but I no canna stay!*" (*FW* 159.16-18). The presence of Nuvoletta, who is an Iseult figure and part of the female water cycle (her name means "little cloud"), merely transposes the space-time conflict between the Mookse and the Gripes and incorporates it into the male-female conflict. She creates no full or permanent resolution of time and space.

The second possible resolution is equally questionable. Allusion is made to Bruno of Nola and to Nicholas of Cusa, who believed that time and space are contraries that can be resolved.²¹⁶ Professor Jones rejects this idea when he insists that "you, Bruno Nowlan, take your tongue out of your inkpot!" (*FW* 152.11) and, after telling his fable and presumably proving his point, he declares that "Nolan Browne, you may now leave the classroom" (*FW* 159.22); Jones later says that "I am not hereby giving my final endorsement to the learned ignorants of the Cusanus philosophism" (*FW* 163.15-17). It might be argued that these allusions ironically reveal the limitations of Jones's belief that space dominates and suggest that the dimensions are resolved. But Nicholas and Bruno argued that time and space are resolved only in God: according to Nicholas, "God encompasses all things, even contradictories,"²¹⁷ and

²¹⁵Church, pp. 63-4.

²¹⁶This idea is most fully presented on pages 49-50 of *Finnegans Wake*, where someone declares,

Now let the centuple celves of my egourge as Micholas de Cusack
[Nicholas of Cusa] calls them,—of all of whose I in my hereinafter of
course by recourse demission me—by the coincidence of their contraries
reamalgamerge in thät indentity of indiscernibles where the Baxters and the
Fleshmans may they cease to bidivil uns. . . .

²¹⁷Nicolas Cusanus, *Of Learned Ignorance*, trans. Germain Heron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 49.

these contradictories are resolved because God transcends all dualities, including that of time and space. In *Finnegans Wake*, the resolution of time and space is also divine or an ideal, and it cannot be attained by fallen humanity; it is the ideal that readers of *Finnegans Wake* seek but do not reach as they pursue, in time, spatial stability.

Because the numerous dualities in *Finnegans Wake* constantly merge with one another and transform themselves throughout time, the opposition between time and space or the Mookse and the Gripes cannot be considered in isolation. The third possible resolution of time and space occurs outside the story, when Shem and Shaun, who are analogues of the predominantly temporal Mookse and spatial Gripes, seem to be reconciled. In the twelfth part of Chapter vi, the questioner asks "*Sacer esto?*" (*FW* 168.13), "let him be accursed?";²¹⁸ the reply is "*Semus sumus*," which suggests that "we are" ("*sumus*") the same ("*Semus*": same/Shem). This is not a unification, though, but rather a recognition of parallelism: Shem and Shaun are alike within their opposition, just as yellow and blue are alike because they have comparable positions on the spectrum of colour. Earlier in *Finnegans Wake*, we are told that,

The hilariohoot of Pegger's Windup cumjustled as neatly with the tristitone of the Wet Pinter's as were they *iste et ille* equals of opposites, evolved by a onesame power of nature or of spirit, *iste*, as the sole condition and means of its himundher manifestation and polarised for reunion by the symphysis of their antipathies (*FW* 92.6-11).

But Joyce emphasizes the difference between the thesis and antithesis rather than their synthesis when he goes on to say that "Distinctly different were their duasdestinies" (*FW* 92.11). The contrarities are "equals of opposites," not just "equals," and they come together only momentarily and incompletely. Neither are time and space resolved in the figure of HCE, who seems to contain the qualities of both Shem and Shaun within him.²¹⁹ HCE is predominantly spatial and contrasts with temporal ALP; HCE and ALP unite, thus joining time and space, only long enough to ensure the continuance of time. While it is, of course, difficult to prove a negative, it should be clear from these discussions that time and space are

²¹⁸McHugh, p. 168.

²¹⁹Margaret Church, for instance, argues that "Shem and Shaun are synthesized in HCE, who combines the principles of change and of resistance to change" (pp. 64-5).

not resolved in or outside the story of the Mookse and the Gripes.

The unresolved tension between time and space is manifest not only in the action of the story but also in the manner of its telling. We can see contrasting spatial and temporal qualities on three different levels: the level of words, of the story as a whole, and of the act of narration.

Following the word "Eins" (*FW* 152.18) at the beginning of the story, Joyce applies the Einsteinian idea that time and space are inseparable to language with more clarity than anywhere else in *Finnegans Wake*. Instances of this relativity abound: while we might expect action to take place "upon" a space because "Eins within a space" (*FW* 152.18) echoes "Once upon a time," action occurs "within" a space, which suggests that motion and time are inseparable from space; the contraction of "there" to "ere" (*FW* 152.18) also reveals this intertwining, for "ere" serves to indicate place but refers to time when out of its context in the sentence; later in the paragraph, Joyce uses adjectives as nouns ("his impermeable," for instance [*FW* 152.24]) and shifts other parts of speech and thereby suggests that an object cannot be separated from the qualities that it possesses at the moment; we are told of the "Mookse now's assumptinome" (*FW* 153.20), and "now" suggests that the Mookse changes over time and that his temporal location is therefore essential in a description of him. These examples suggest that an object cannot be considered without regard to its motion and that space cannot be separated from time. A consequence of this dependence is the relativity of perception: all perception is influenced by the position of the observer (in time and in space) and by the position of the perceived object; in other words, perception is defined with reference to other events. Joyce also explores the implications of this idea in his technique: it may be that "a wearywide space" (*FW* 152.18) is a space that is personified and therefore shows weariness, but it is more likely that the fatigue belongs to a traveller through space; the object, space, is connected with or made relative to its observer, and this dependence is emphasized because we become aware of the weary observer only by implication; the Mookse's position in relation to the "Shinshone Lanteran" (*FW* 152.36) is captured within the words themselves, for

"Shin" and "ran" describe the Mookse and "shone" and "Lanter'n" refer to the light that he approaches. Moreover, Joyce uses the internal reference of sound that I discussed earlier in order to enforce these relations: in "Eins within a space" we find an *s-w-s* pattern of sound that connects time ("Eins"/once) and "space," while the opposite *w-s-w* pattern is evident in "a wearywide space it wast" and serves to connect observer and observed; "ere wohnd a Mookse" contains both the *w* and *s* sound, which connect motion and object. These examples show that events are relative, and space cannot be isolated from time.

The intertwined spatial and temporal qualities of language are in marked tension. This can be seen most clearly when the meaning of a word in the context of a sentence clashes with its meaning when removed from that context. It was noted earlier, for instance, that "ere" (*FW* 152.18) must mean "there" because of its position in its sentence, but it refers to time rather than to spatial position when it is removed from its context. The latter meaning is comparable to an archetype or paradigm because it is static and general, while the former depends upon other words in the sentence and belongs to a particular moment in time. Because of Joyce's relatively explicit references to grammar in the tale, we are made even more aware of the rules of usage that transcend time and their specific applications. Of course, Joyce calls attention to language throughout *Finnegans Wake*, but it has unusual prominence in the fable because Joyce distorts the terminology of grammar (for example, Jones's audience includes "fullstoppers and semicolonials" [*FW* 152.16]). Similarly, the phrase "with preprocession and with proprecession" (*FW* 156.8-9) makes the reader aware of the paradigms of prefixes. Grammatical rules, like the standard, dictionary meanings of words, transcend their particular manifestations or are, in other words, ideals that are above time. When Joyce subjects these standard meanings and forms to time, a pervasive tension results. I observed earlier that Joyce changes the roles of some parts of speech, and this creates a tension between a word's prescribed meaning and its meaning in the context of the sentence. For example, "impugnable" (*FW* 152.24-5) must be a noun because it is preceded by "his," but it is an adjective when removed from its context. Neither the paradigmatic nor contextual meaning has priority;

instead, Joyce creates a productive tension between the two referents that upsets our attempts to find a dominant meaning, one that shows spatial stability. Once again, we are inclined to appeal to an original or ideal meaning, only to find that the meaning is upset; spatial stability is glimpsed, but it cannot escape time and is seen only in the form of a particular, relative manifestation. Spatial stability is not entirely undermined but is brought into question.

Like words and phrases, the entire fable of the Mookse and the Gripes shows conflicting spatial and temporal dimensions. The story is pervaded by time, for the narrative is a chain of actions that succeed one another: both events and their temporal location are important. We are continually reminded of the relative time of actions by such words as "after" and "As" (*FW* 152.21 and 31) and by changes in verb tense. However, within the story as a whole, there are numerous levels of meaning that are manifestations of an archetype which transcends time. The story is a folk or children's tale, a scientific story of creation, a mythic story of creation, a historical story, a Christian tale, and a story of sexual creation; the Mookse is the hero of a tale, a celestial object, a deity, a historic figure, and Christ. There is an archetype that joins most of these threads, and this is a paradigmatic story of creation. But once again, we see that there is no spatial stability in the archetype. In fact, each "particular" story can itself be seen as archetypal, so that archetypes and manifestations cannot be clearly distinguished. There is no archetype that fully transcends time, and we see only protean images of the ideal. Joyce tempts us to find stable archetypes within relativity, but we cannot succeed; time continues to overwhelm spatial stability.

It may also be tempting to see the form of the fable as a timeless norm which is subject to transformation and given temporal particularity. There seems to be a norm or paradigm of the story form because of the deformation of "Once upon a time" to "Eins within a space" (*FW* 152.18), but it should not be hastily concluded that the conventional phrase acts as a norm. While it has a strong presence, which makes it seem to be an origin or archetype, it is also so severely distorted that its authority as a norm is weakened: space cannot escape time, although transcendence appears to be almost attainable.

This tension between an elusive, atemporal norm and its temporal manifestations pervades the fable and can be understood in more general terms. Throughout the story, it is not clear whether Joyce has deformed a spatial norm or presents us with transformations that continue in time. Something can be deformed only if it has a standard or normal shape that can still be faintly recognized in the deformation; we must be able to infer an original, archetypal shape and contrast it with the distortion. In contrast to deformation is transformation, which depends upon our awareness of a precursor but not of a norm or archetype and which is dominated by the temporal dimension. These two very different processes exist in unresolved conflict, for Joyce does not prefer one form of change to the other but instead uses the tension between them to help sustain the text. The numerous distortions of conventional phrases are illustrative, for it is not clear whether a timeless standard exists or whether there is only change. Joyce prompts his reader to search for a stable form that escapes time, but the goal is elusive.

The tension between time and space is also manifest in the act of narration. In part, Professor Jones's narrative technique illustrates Einstein's theory of the intertwining of time and space, for the observer and his object are interdependent. This relativity of perception is heightened because Jones seems to be inseparable from the events that he describes and we cannot sharply delineate his nature. While we are aware that Jones is shaping the story, we cannot be certain whether some of the qualities of the narrative can be attributed to him or whether they belong to an elusive implied author or to the forms of language and narrative. The relativity of narration is most evident when rhythm and sound provide a distinctive (and usually comic) voice that colours the presentation of events. An example is the phrase "Eins within a space and a wearywide space it wast ere wohnd a Mookse" (*FW* 152.18-19), in which the anapestic feet of the middle phrase stand apart from the preceding trochaic feet and the iambs that follow. This change in metre creates a comic parenthesis that bounces with the rhythm of a poem for children; there is a change of tone and the creation of a voice. Another instance is "I see, she sighed. There are menner" (*FW* 158.5). The patterns ("I. . .she,"

"see. . .sighed"), the rocking rhythm, and the sequence of long vowels that is followed by the abrupt "menner" all contribute to a comic tone. Because this pattern includes the narrator's "she sighed," the tone does not belong to Nuvoletta but instead mocks her. In both of these instances, sound creates the distinctive voice of the narrator; however, it is important to notice that the narrator is not sharply defined and that we can describe this voice as the personification of language as easily as we can see it as the expression of Jones in language. In other words, the distinction between language and person is obscured, just as Jones seems to be telling a story but at the same time seems to be the animation of narrative conventions. Joyce challenges the reader to separate Jones from the system of language and the conventions of narrative, and our goal is to overcome time, to find a stability of voice that transcends the relative or temporal interdependence of object and observer. Rather than intensify spatial form by visibly shaping a causal, chronological story into a plot, the narrator increases the temporality of the fable. This relativity of narration is not overcome in the story of the Mookse and the Gripses, but a stable, spatial goal remains a valid, if largely impotent, ideal.

In short, Professor Jones's fable, like all of *Finnegans Wake*, is characterized by a tension between time and spatial ideals. This conflict emerges in the words of the fable, in the story as a whole, and in the act of narration, for at each level we are taunted with the possibility that time can be overcome, either through the discovery of paradigmatic meanings and grammatical constructions, standard story forms, or a stable narrative voice. We saw that in the action of the story, the Moose and the Gripses are not polar opposites but instead represent an unresolved tension between the closely interconnected dimensions of time and space. By looking at the telling of the story, we can specify the nature of this interrelationship: the text and the activity of reading are sustained because we continually search within and through time for an unattainable but tantalizingly close spatial stability.

In *Finnegans Wake*, neither time nor space is alone valuable: it is their productive interaction which allows their desirable qualities to predominate. By itself, time is aimless and confusing or it brings decay; space alone is merely static and lifeless. Were time and space a

polarized couple, these undesirable qualities would dominate and be in static opposition. But the two are in tension, a tension which is more productive because it cannot be resolved. Time is purposeful because valid spatial goals appear to be within reach: it remains partly confusing, but it gains vitality because it has direction. Similarly, space is not without an undesirable static quality, but it is predominantly desirable because it is an unattained and always ideal haven, a stable rather than a merely static goal that promises order. A spatial paradise may be lost, but it is this absence which makes time purposeful. Joyce does not affirm time but instead shows how the continuous interaction of time and space allows the desirable qualities of both to dominate their short-comings.

Had Joyce parodied spatial patterns, attributing them to a Bergsonian world of unreality, this productive tension could not exist. There is no doubt that Joyce presents spatial patterns as artificial, but we saw in our discussion of Joseph Frank in the first chapter that space is commonly thought to be less natural than time and is not necessarily dismissed for this reason. Joyce accepts spatial pattern because it is unavoidable: fallen humanity is surrounded by a confusing babel of languages and other human constructions, and we have no choice but to stay within the limits of these creations. They are too pervasive, too informing to be dismissed in favour of pure duration; indeed, there is no such thing as an underlying "nature" that is free from spatial constructions, as Joyce makes clear when we are told of "the pages of nature's book" (*FW* 57.30-1). The patterns that humanity has created are chaotic, but they are also amazing and praiseworthy because of their plurality and vitality. While Joyce sometimes parodies them he also embraces the creativity that lies behind them, a creativity that Joyce displays in the extreme in *Finnegans Wake*. Like everything else in *Finnegans Wake*, space can be assessed in more than one way; Joyce requires that we accept complexity, including the multiple and sometimes contradictory values of time and space. Spatial patterns are never entirely parodied and dismissed in favour of duration: instead, time and space continually undermine one another and largely overcome their limitations by virtue of this productive tension.

Robert Klawitter argues that *Finnegans Wake* "is a triumph or catastrophe of the parodic vision, a total parody of the unreality of man's world"²²⁰ and that by calling attention to this unreality, Joyce indirectly affirms Bergson's understanding of duration. But Joyce also affirms and celebrates this world of unreality, and, what perhaps most clearly reveals the limitations of Klawitter's argument, the duration that Joyce presents has its foundations in the very world of unreality that Klawitter believes is entirely parodied. Rather than find a duration of consciousness, we discover a duration of language and of other constructions of humanity. While it is not entirely accurate to describe these as durations, they do display fluidity and they constitute and are experienced by the reader as interpenetrating states. Klawitter argues that,

For the artist like Joyce, Bergson's critique posed a terrible dilemma, doomed him to unreality, because for him the verbal representational world was more important than un verbalized and nonverbal reality.²²¹

Joyce, Klawitter suggests, could not represent duration in language but could only affirm duration indirectly by exposing language. But we have seen that sound, the system of signifiers, constitutes the primary duration in *Finnegans Wake* because Joyce explores the nature of reference within an arbitrary linguistic system that is a human creation; moreover, Joyce shows the duration of humanity's systems, which flow inseparably into one another. Joyce *is* able to represent duration, for fluidity dominates the spatial qualities of humanity's designs and spatiality consequently becomes an ideal. Space and time are thus closely interconnected, and neither can be dismissed. Most importantly, they are in tension, a dialectical tension that is never resolved. Klawitter argues that,

Bergson's unreality is a world of dialectical polarities; Joyce shows a nature whose processes are the processes of the dialectical intellect, full of ". . . equals of opposites, evolved by a oneness power of nature or of spirit, *iste*, as the sole condition and means of its humundher [sic] manifestation and polarised for reunion by the symphysis of their antipathies" (p. 92). Polarised for reunion, not reunited. Bergson's unreality is a universe fallen into pieces, a multiplicity of fragments swarming in mechanical patterns—as Marcel Brion aptly describes a page of Joyce: "A strange vibration of cells, a swarming of the lowest Brownian movements under the lens of the microscope."²²²

²²⁰Klawitter, p. 432.

²²¹*Ibid.*, p. 436.

²²²*Ibid.*, p. 432.

Reunification, Klawitter suggests, would affirm the unreal dialectic by making contrarities whole and productive rather than chaotically splintered. However, while time and space are not fused, as we have seen, they nonetheless constitute a dialectic which is not parodied but which instead sustains the text and gives positive values to time and space, values which they would otherwise lack. A dialectic is not a merging of polar opposites, as Klawitter suggests, but is instead a process in which a thesis gives rise to an antithesis, one that gravitates towards the pole opposite to the thesis, and the synthesis that results is not their sum but rather their product, an entity of a different order. Time and space in *Finnegans Wake* are not opposites that unite but are dialectical, for our spatial goals emerge as we read in time and the two are not fused but instead create something else, namely directed time and a purposeful quest for the reader. Joyce affirms both time and space and, most importantly, he affirms their dialectical interaction.

Because spatial patterns are largely impotent rather than unreal or undesirable, our quest for spatial stability—in word reference, in our search for transcending archetypes, such as the Original Sin, or in our desire to find syntactic and novelistic patterns—is a valid pursuit and is consequently sustained even though we are unsuccessful. Spatial stability is continually near at hand and is desirable, but it is weak, unable to contain time. Our repeated failure to achieve our quest creates a dual response, for we are continually frustrated yet our hope is continually renewed. Joyce thereby avoids a problem frequently encountered by deconstructionist critics, who may at first be horrified by their failure to find a ground and later come to expect this outcome, which loses its impact. In contrast, Joyce's reader always feels that spatial stability is attainable, so that hope and disappointment are simultaneously sustained.

This duality of response reflects a larger dichotomy in *Finnegans Wake*. For the book is at once both comic and threatening, full of playful distortion and at the same time nearly chaotic (although like all dualities in *Finnegans Wake*, this is not a polarization, for our delight and anxiety both have their source in our failure to end our temporal quest and, consequently, our responses are not easily separated). We can say, even more generally, that *Finnegans*

Wake seems to be an autonomous book that includes everything, and therefore it necessarily contains such contrarities. This autonomy is intensified because the volume of material that Joyce presents is overwhelming and may even seem all-inclusive, with the result that the reader searches within the text for answers to problems of interpretation; because allusions are numerous and from many sources, the text seems to have no single, external key to its meaning and is centripetal, and the spiral shape of *Finnegans Wake* brings the text back upon itself and thus creates expectations of internal clues to its own construction. As a result, *Finnegans Wake* seems to constitute or contain its own, autonomous world of space and time.

To speak of *Finnegans Wake* as autonomous is not to suggest that the book is an object that can be perceived as a whole in space. The book lacks the defining spatial boundaries of a piece of sculpture and cannot be understood, in figurative terms, to be spatially distant from its readers. *Finnegans Wake* is not an autonomous object that seems to be a delimited whole within a larger context but instead seems to constitute the entirety of the cosmos; it contains rather than is contained. The issue becomes more complex, however, for the reader attempts to demarcate the limits of the work and is tempted to believe that such objectification is possible. But we cannot be certain whether *Finnegans Wake* is exploding, expanding to take in and become the world, or whether it is imploding, collapsing upon itself amidst internal confusion. The two have an important difference, for only an imploding object has comprehensible spatial boundaries. In practice, though, it is difficult to differentiate between them: like a massive star that collapses under its own weight until internal tensions reverse the process and it begins to burst, *Finnegans Wake* seems to be on the borderline between implosion and explosion. This is another instance in which spatial limits are tantalizingly within sight but cannot be seized, for the seemingly autonomous world of *Finnegans Wake* that is apparently characterized by internal combustion cannot be demarcated in space. Its words seem to be a subgroup of the instances of language, but Joyce's disruption of signification draws all linguistic systems into *Finnegans Wake* and abolishes the boundaries of the text; it is not within language but dissolves into language. Similarly, Joyce seems to have included

certain human constructions within his work, but the text also seems to expand to become all of human thought. The crucial problem is not that a simultaneous apprehension of the text is impossible but that we are unable to discover and secure spatial boundaries. In short, the text appears to be an autonomous, spatial whole, but we cannot objectify it; we are caught in the flow of time within the space of the text and cannot distance ourselves enough to see the atemporal whole.²²³

Because we are continually encouraged to seek spatial stability, only to find that we cannot escape time, text and reader are interdependent: readers are enmeshed in the text, unable to extricate themselves, while the relationship of time and space is completed or realized only through the readers' activity. The reader is not a subject who perceives the text as an object but instead experiences a relationship of relativity, comparable to that between Professor Jones and his fable, in which observer and object are inseparable. The language of the text is the readers' language, its systems of thought are ours, and its "characters" are ourselves. Just as all boundaries are blurred within *Finnegans Wake*, the dividing line between text and reader cannot be found. Even though *Finnegans Wake* can be a confusing, alienating text, we are absorbed by it: not only is the flow of time inescapable, but the cooperative reader will willingly pursue, in time, the tempting but continually receding goal of spatial stability.

This view of *Finnegans Wake* is qualitatively different from a formalist perspective in two main ways. First, we have discovered not a complex ambiguity but a fundamental instability in the text, one that is best explained by reference to deconstructionist models of

²²³Deconstructionist theory can help to illuminate these qualities of *Finnegans Wake*. In "LIVING ON: Border Lines" (in Bloom, et al., *Deconstruction and Criticism*), Jacques Derrida argues that,

If we are to approach a text, it must have an edge. . . . What has happened, if it has happened, is a sort of overrun [*débordement*] that spoils all these boundaries and divisions and forces us to extend the accredited concept, the dominant notion of a "text," of what I still call a "text," for strategic reasons, in part—a "text" that is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces (pp. 83-4).

Joyce's text is not simply without spatial boundaries but seems to actively break them down, to be contained and autonomous yet without limits, and the reader becomes involved in the inherent tension between space and temporal instability that results.

interpretation. Our entrapment in the text, I have argued, is not a consequence of the size and complexity of the work but is rather owing to the relationship of time and space that characterizes it. Secondly, the formalist view of the text as an object has been entirely rejected in favour of emphasis upon the reader's activity. This view of the reader is compatible with deconstruction yet goes beyond the restricted conceptions of the reader that are frequently found in deconstructionist criticism. The reader does more than repeat an instability inherent in the text or show essentially passive bodily and cognitive responses. This does not mean, however, that we become a center, for *Finnegans Wake* destabilizes our own sense of self when we are entrapped in the temporality of the book and see its "characters" as ourselves. The reader is neither insignificant nor aggressively destroys spatial stability: we are guided by the text, enchanted by its illusory promises of spatial stability, with the result that there is a close and complex interaction between text and reader.

Were we to assume that the text is an object independent of its readers, *Finnegans Wake* would seem to be an ideally spatial text, a work whose temporal order is so severely disrupted that spatial patterns of internal reference predominate. The opposite is actually the case, for Joyce's disruption of causal, chronological order in *Finnegans Wake* immerses the reader in time. But time is nonetheless in balanced tension with space, which constitutes a desirable ideal; although the spatiality that a formalist might perceive does not describe the text, it is the goal of the reader, who seeks to objectify the text, at least in part, in order to overcome absorption in time. This relationship differs markedly from the fusion of time and space that we saw in "Proteus" and completes a progression from "Proteus" to "Penelope" to *Finnegans Wake* in which time and space are in increasing tension and the reader finds it increasingly difficult to see the text as a spatial object that contains time. But the differences between "Proteus" and *Finnegans Wake* should not be overemphasized, for in both cases it is the interaction of time and space which gives positive value to the dimensions and which engages the reader.

Conclusion

I have used significantly different methods to approach *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* in order to suit theory to the unique qualities of the texts. Rather than impose a predetermined, inflexible method upon Joyce's later writings, I have tried to show that theory can illuminate qualities inherent in these works. Because of the central importance of character and the nature of consciousness in *Ulysses*, the subject of time and space is best approached through a method which differentiates between the reader's realm of form and the characters' realm of content; *Finnegans Wake*, by contrast, suits an analysis that draws upon, but is not overly constrained by, deconstructionist theory. The crucial point of similarity between the two texts and approaches is the large role of the reader. While it is always necessary to expose the assumptions concerning the reader that underlie an analysis or method, an understanding of the reader is particularly important in a study of time and space, for while temporal and spatial qualities are inherent in the text rather than imposed, they must nonetheless be completed or realized by an active reader.

This concern for the reader has radically influenced our understanding of time and space in Joyce's later writings, in large part because the reader's involvement in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* is unusually extensive. More specifically, because the reader whom I have posited is only slightly idealized (that is to say, the reader demanded by the texts but one whose capacities, such as the ability to perceive texts simultaneously, are limited), this reader is enmeshed in Joyce's works, unable to stand back fully from confusions of subject and object and from unresolved tensions of time and space. In short, the reader theory which I have employed is itself practicable and, moreover, it serves to make other theoretical concerns accessible and relevant to Joyce's texts and the experience of reading. This approach does not impose remote constraints upon our reading but instead reveals the ways in which Joyce's texts carefully guide the reader: I have found that critics of *Finnegans Wake* tend to close the text excessively and that other critics, especially reader theorists, are inclined to see *Ulysses* as extremely open, but we have seen that in both cases the reader is active but not entirely free,

and an important distinction must be made between open and aimless texts and works, such as Joyce's, which involve yet guide the reader.

Joyce's massive and complex later writings may at first seem to be impenetrable and alienating, but they rapidly become absorbing works. Their difficulty and obscurity do not suggest that they are unreadable but rather are a sign to the reader that they contain embedded truths, that the mysteries within them can only be discovered if we accept and immerse ourselves in their complexity; their purposes are not readily manifest but emerge during and because of our activity of reading, and Joyce's ideas gain forcefulness because they are experienced rather than merely perceived by the reader.

Because of this extensive involvement, the reader's world and the world of the text become fused. *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* are not isolated texts that draw readers away from their own realms and into an illusory fictional world which is detached and esoteric. Neither is the converse true: the literary self-consciousness that they encourage does not create a self-contained, reflexive world in which the reader's absorption in the text is a decadent self-absorption and the author's fascination with literary form is narcissistic. One might also argue that Joyce's texts are microcosms that parallel on the level of literary technique the "external" world of the reader. But *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* are not so isolated and self-contained. Joyce suggests that the world created by humanity is formal and can only be understood by experiencing its forms: just as reader and text are inseparable, the literary world is inseparable from the "external" world that consists of human constructions and is not a world of nature. When we read *Ulysses*, we see the folly of trying to ignore the patterns created by humanity, especially literary designs: Stephen will recognize such patterns, but he wants to confine them to the internal world of his mind, where he can control them, and Molly is oblivious to the designs that we perceive. In *Finnegans Wake*, these constructions become pervasive and even inescapable; they do not echo, imitate, or clarify the world but rather constitute it. As a result, distinctions between fiction and reality and between illusion and self-consciousness are impracticable when analysing *Ulysses* and meaningless with regard to

Finnegans Wake. While these works are undeniably esoteric, they are not detached and irrelevant, for Joyce continually overcomes the boundaries of fiction, and his works flow into the systems of human thought and into the realm of the reader.

The esoteric quality of *Finnegans Wake* is also largely overcome because a crucial point of the work is that we are unable to grasp or transcend humanity's multitudinous constructions. That an actual reader, unlike an ideal one, cannot understand all of *Finnegans Wake* is itself significant, and it intensifies our immersion in time and emphasizes the fallen nature of humanity. The difficulty of *Ulysses* is also purposeful, for it makes us conscious of form, the form that enables us to see the relationship between time and space more clearly than do the characters of *Ulysses*.

While the initial inaccessibility and esoteric quality of Joyce's texts is purposeful and largely overcome by means of our awareness of our own participation, the complexity of Joyce's texts is never eliminated. Joyce requires that we accept complexity, including a complex relationship between time and space. We have seen the dangers of simplifying the subject by concentrating upon only one of the dimensions, by failing to place the discussion in a larger context, including other ideas in the works and the continuity and progression within Joyce's later writings, and by failing to examine the theoretical assumptions that underlie any understanding of time and space. However, we have not only looked at time and space in a broader context but can say, more emphatically, that time and space are crucial to our understanding of these other matters. For the relationship between the dimensions is essential to our involvement and, consequently, to our understanding of the entirety of Joyce's later writings.

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